The Project Gutenberg eBook of Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook. Title: Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2 Author: George Grote Release date: August 7, 2012 [eBook #40436] Language: English Credits: Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES, 3RD ED. VOLUME 2 *** Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. BY GEORGE GROTE, AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'. _A NEW EDITION._ IN FOUR VOLUMES. VOL. II. LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 1888. _The right of Translation is reserved._ CONTENTS. CHAPTER XII. ALKIBIADES I. AND II. Situation supposed in the dialogue. Persons--Sokrates and Alkibiades 1 Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of Alkibiades 2 Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What does he intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does he know? _ib._ Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better refer? To just and unjust 3 How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he always knew it, even as a boy 4 Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach just and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it. Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself 5 Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to every one--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing but question 6 Comment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the respondent makes the discoveries for himself _ib._ Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both does well, and procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates 7 Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make himself as good as possible 8 But good--for what end, and under what circumstances? Abundant illustrative examples 9 Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to make such discovery in youth 10 Platonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its anticipated effect--applicable to the season of youth 11 Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent importance--What is myself? My mind is myself _ib._ I cannot know myself, except by looking into another mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom 11 Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares that he will never quit Sokrates 12 Second Alkibiades--situation supposed _ib._ Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic word: madmen, a particular variety under it _ib._ Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar 13 Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance 14 Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must discriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always _ib._ Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used 15 Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial 16 It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel of Sokrates _ib._ Different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues 17 Grounds for disallowing them--less strong against the Second than against the First 18 The supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only marks of inferiority _ib._ The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's earlier compositions 20 Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men 21 Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for idealising this feature in Sokrates _ib._ Plato's manner of replying to the accusers of Sokrates. Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of Sokrates 22 The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology is followed out in Alkibiades I. Warfare against the false persuasion of knowledge 24 Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance 25 Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue--but these are acknowledged Incognita 26 Prolixity of Alkibiadês I.--Extreme multiplication of illustrative examples--How explained _ib._ Alkibiadês II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined 27 Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the Gods for favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular, semi-irregular agency of the Gods--he prays to them for premonitory warnings 28 Comparison of Alkibiadês II. with the Xenophontic Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus. Sokrates not always consistent with himself 29 Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiadês II.--that knowledge is not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is indispensable: without that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than beneficial _ib._ Knowledge of Good--appears postulated and divined, in many of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles 31 The Good--the Profitable--what is it?--How are we to know it? Plato leaves this undetermined _ib._ CHAPTER XIII. HIPPIAS MAJOR--HIPPIAS MINOR. Hippias Major--situation supposed--character of the dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias 33 Real debate between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate 34 Opening of the Hippias Major**--Hippias describes the successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his lectures 35 Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans did not admit his instructions--their law forbids _ib._ Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at the Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they fail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is also unlawful 36 Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates 37 The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he does not always adhere 38 Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or astronomy, &c., but upon the question--What pursuits are beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth? 39 Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it--What is the Beautiful? _ib._ Hippias thinks the question easy to answer 40 Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is Beauty, or the Beautiful? _ib._ Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object _ib._ Cross-questioning by Sokrates--Other things also are beautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes not beautiful 41 Second answer of Hippias--_ Gold_, is that by the presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied to the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies _ib._ Third answer of Hippias--questions upon it--proof given that it fails of universal application 42 Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself--1. The Suitable or Becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected 43 2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will not hold 44 3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable--that which is received through the eye and the ear 45 Objections to this last--What property is there common to both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful? _ib._ Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in common, the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this ground they are called beautiful 46 This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of Good, and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has been already declared inadmissible _ib._ Remarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations ascribed to Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept 47 Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia 49 Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates 51 Rhetoric against Dialectic 52 Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the speculative and analytical philosophers _ib._ Concrete Aggregates--abstract or logical Aggregates. Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician 53 Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought into debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty 54 Hippias Minor--characters and situation supposed 55 Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols Achilles as better than Odysseus--the veracious and straightforward hero better than the mendacious and crafty 56 This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can answer truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses, _i. e._ the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make sure of doing either the one or the other 57 Analogy of special arts--it is only the arithmetician who can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses _ib._ View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent purpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose 58 Issue here taken--Sokrates contends that those who hurt, or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like unwillingly--he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his questions _ib._ Questions of Sokrates--multiplied analogies of the special arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly, whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses 59 It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when he intends to hit 60 Dissent and repugnance of Hippias _ib._ Conclusion--That none but the good man can do evil wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion--Sokrates confesses his perplexity 61 Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted, the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the sophistry and corruption of the Sophists 62 Polemical purpose of the dialogue--Hippias humiliated by Sokrates 63 Philosophical purpose of the dialogue--theory of the Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by Plato _ib._ The Hippias is an exemplification of this theory--Sokrates sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it up. Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias--Error in the Greater 64 The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia 66 Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it 67 Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct _ib._ They rely too much on the analogy of the special arts--they take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of praise and blame 68 Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be suggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of the question under review 69 Antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic 70 CHAPTER XIV. HIPPARCHUS--MINOS. Hipparchus--Question--What is the definition of Lover of Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in this sense, no man is a lover of gain 71 Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all men are lovers of gain 72 Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of trying to deceive him--accusation is retorted upon Sokrates 73 Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the Peisistratid--never deceive a friend. Eulogy of Hipparchus by Sokrates _ib._ Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers. The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain is evil 74 Questions by Sokrates--bad gain is _gain_, as much as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a smaller outlay, is gain. Objections--the acquisition may be evil--embarrassment confessed _ib._ It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay. The valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good. Conclusion comes back. That Gain is Good 75 Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good, and that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no man ought to be reproached for being so the companion is compelled to admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded _ib._ Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion. What is Law, or The Law? All law is the same, _quatenus_ law: what is the common constituent attribute? 76 Answer--Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding customs. 2. The decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion _ib._ Cross-examination by Sokrates--just and lawfully-behaving men are so through law; unjust and lawless men are so through the absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful: lawlessness is ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city--or bad social opinion--cannot be law 77 Suggestion by Sokrates--Law is the _good_ opinion of the city--but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding out of reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so 77 Objection taken by the Companion--That there is great discordance of laws in different places--he specifies several cases of such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity, and requests him to confine himself to question or answer 78 Farther questions by Sokrates--Things heavy and light, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so, and are accounted so everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful _ib._ There are laws of health and of cure, composed by the few physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who know how to rule 79 That which is right is the regal law, the only true and real law--that which is not right, is not law, but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant 80 Minos, King of Krete--his laws were divine and excellent, and have remained unchanged from time immemorial _ib._ Question about the character of Minos--Homer and Hesiod declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians defame him as a tyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens 81 That Minos was really admirable--and that he has found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the city--we may be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered _ib._ The question is made more determinate--What is it that the good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the mind, as the physician measures out food and exercise for the body? Sokrates cannot tell. Close 81 The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each other, and both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished 82 Hipparchus--double meaning of [Greek: philokerdê\s] and [Greek: ke/rdos] _ib._ State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found 83 Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word _gain_**? None is found _ib._ Purpose of Plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clearing it up 84 Historical narrative and comments given in the dialogue respecting Hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to be spurious _ib._ Minos. Question--What is the characteristic property connoted by the word [Greek: No/mos] or law? 86 This question was discussed by the historical Sokrates, Memorabilia of Xenophon _ib._ Definitions of law--suggested and refuted. Law includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c. Bad decrees are not laws 86 Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it is the declared judgment and command of the Wise man upon the subject to which it refers--it is truth and reality, found out and certified by him 87 Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato--he acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought to _be_ Law 88 Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind--the work of systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man 89 Different applications of this general Platonic view, in the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. _Natural_ Rectitude of Law, Government, Names, &c _ib._ Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on this divine type or natural rectitude 90 The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a Trilogy along with the Leges 91 Explanations of the word Law--confusion in its meaning _ib._ CHAPTER XV. THEAGES. Theagês--has been declared spurious by some modern critics--grounds for such opinion not sufficient 98 Persons of the dialogue--Sokrates, with Demodokus and Theagês, father and son. Theagês (the son), eager to acquire knowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist 99 Sokrates questions Theagês, inviting him to specify what he wants _ib._ Theagês desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can govern freemen with their own consent 100 Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else. Theagês requests that Sokrates will himself teach him _ib._ Sokrates declares that he is not competent to teach--that he knows nothing except about matters of love. Theagês maintains that many of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation of Sokrates 101 Sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened--he recites his experience of the divine sign or Dæmon _ib._ The Dæmon is favourable to some persons, adverse to others. Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by the society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt anything from Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him 102 Theagês expresses his anxiety to be received as the companion of Sokrates 103 Remarks on the Theagês--analogy with the Lachês 104 Chief peculiarity of the Theagês--stress laid upon the divine sign or Dæmon _ib._ Plato employs this divine sign here to render some explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of his unequal influence upon different companions _ib._ Sokrates, while continually finding fault with other teachers, refused to teach himself--difficulty of finding an excuse for his refusal. The Theagês furnishes an excuse 106 Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues, allude to the divine sign in the same way. Its character and working essentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person _ib._ CHAPTER XVI. ERASTÆ OR ANTERASTÆ--RIVALES. Erastæ--subject and persons of the dialogue--dramatic introduction--interesting youths in the palæstra 111 Two rival Erastæ--one of them literary, devoted to philosophy--the other gymnastic, hating philosophy _ib._ Question put by Sokrates--What is philosophy? It is the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sum total 112 In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the mind also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured quantity which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure? _ib._ No answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher--as much as will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise 113 The philosopher is one who is second-best in several different arts--a Pentathlus--who talks well upon each _ib._ On what occasions can such second-best men be useful? There are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner 114 Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned acquirements _ib._ Sokrates changes his course of examination--questions put to show that there is one special art, regal and political, of administering and discriminating the bad from the good 115 In this art the philosopher must not only be second-best, competent to talk--but he must be a fully qualified practitioner, competent to act _ib._ Close of the dialogue--humiliation of the literary Erastes 116 Remarks--animated manner of the dialogue _ib._ Definition of philosophy--here sought for the first time--Platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered 117 View taken of the second-best critical talking man, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner 118 Plato's view--that the philosopher has a province special to himself, distinct from other specialties--dimly indicated--regal or political art 119 Philosopher--the supreme artist controlling other artists 120 CHAPTER XVII. ION. Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion among modern critics as to its genuineness 124 Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at the festivals. Ion has been triumphant 124 Functions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation--exposition of the poets--arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent 125 The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from their recitation--powerful effect which they produced _ib._ Ion both reciter and expositor--Homer was considered more as an instructor than as a poet 126 Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional working _ib._ Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of Sokrates to him--How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon other poets? The poetic art is one 127 Explanation given by Sokrates--both the Rhapsode and the Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration--fine poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from some God _ib._ Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction successive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then act through him and through Ion upon the auditors 128 This comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the Apology 129 Platonic Antithesis: systematic procedure distinguished from unsystematic: which latter was either blind routine, or madness inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good and bad 129 Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in Grecian life--privileged communications from the Gods to Sokrates--his firm belief in them 130 Condition of the inspired person--his reason is for the time withdrawn 131 Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind 132 Homer talks upon all subjects--Is Ion competent to explain what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its province? _ib._ The Rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers, having learnt it from Homer 133 Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of what he says, but by divine inspiration 134 The generals in Greece usually possessed no professional experience--Homer and the poets were talked of as the great teachers--Plato's view of the poet, as pretending to know everything, but really knowing nothing _ib._ Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge 136 Illustration of Plato's opinion respecting the uselessness of written geometrical treatises _ib._ CHAPTER XVIII. LACHES. Lachês. Subject and persons of the dialogue--whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of arms. Nikias and Lachês differ in opinion 138 Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion--he replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent professional judge 139 Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their competence to judge--Sokrates avows his own incompetence 140 Nikias and Lachês submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates 141 Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their feelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the question shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education 141 Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man--this man is never seen or identified 142 We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on education--virtue, as a whole, is too large a question--we will enquire about one branch of virtue--courage _ib._ Question--what is courage? Laches answers by citing one particularly manifest case of courage--mistake of not giving a general explanation 143 Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the mind--Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect--endurance is not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not always courage _ib._ Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort of Intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not terrible. Objections of Lachês 144 Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events, not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of future events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present 145 Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and we declared that courage was only a part thereof--it will not hold therefore as a definition of courage 146 Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about courage without knowing what it is _ib._ No solution given by Plato--apparent tendency of his mind, in looking for a solution. Intelligence--cannot be understood without reference to some object or end 147 Object--is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence--of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is not possessed by professional artists 148 Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man--correlates with the undiscovered Science of Ends _ib._ Perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one sufficient condition of virtue 149 Dramatic contrast between Lachês and Sokrates, as cross-examiners 150 CHAPTER XIX. CHARMIDES. Scene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded palæstra. Emotions of Sokrates 153 Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness 154 But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and slowness is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary. Temperance cannot be slowness _ib._ Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of shame. Refuted by Sokrates _ib._ Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one's own business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, and refutes it. Distinction between making and doing 155 Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in self-knowledge. _ib._ Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does self-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this case? Answer: There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the knowledge itself 156 Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge, without a given _cognitum_ as its object. Analogies to prove that knowledge of knowledge is impossible 156 All knowledge must be relative to some object 157 All properties are relative--every thing in nature has its characteristic property with reference to something else _ib._ Even if cognition of cognition were possible, cognition of non-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what he knows, but he cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the fact _that_ he knows: but he does not know how much he knows, and how much he does not know 158 Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be of little or no value 159 But even granting the possibility of that which has just been denied, still Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that all separate work were well performed, by special practitioners, we should not attain our end--Happiness _ib._ Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to well-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and evil 160 Without the science of good and evil, the other special science will be of little or of no service. Temperance is not the science of good and evil, and is of little service 161 Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research. He cannot find out what temperance is: although several concessions have been made which cannot be justified _ib._ Temperance is and must be a good thing: but Charmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not; since what temperance is remains unknown 162 Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornament throughout _ib._ The Charmides is an excellent specimen of Dialogues of Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all ultimately disallowed 163 Trial and Error, the natural process of the human mind. Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of the mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of conscious ignorance 164 Familiar words--constantly used, with much earnest feeling, but never understood nor defined--ordinary phenomenon in human society 165 Different ethical points of view in different Platonic dialogues 167 Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible _ib._ In other dialogues, Sokrates declares self-knowledge to be essential and inestimable. Necessity for the student to have presented to him dissentient points of view _ib._ Courage and Temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning, except as founded on the general cognizance of good and evil 168 Distinction made between the special sciences and the science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences are of no use _ib._ Knowledge, always relative to some object known. Postulate or divination of a Science of Teleology 169 Courage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and by Aristotle. Comparison between the two 170 CHAPTER XX. LYSIS. Analogy between Lysis and Charmides. Richness of dramatic incident in both. Youthful beauty 172 Scenery and personages of the Lysis _ib._ Origin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to give an example of the proper way of talking to a youth, for his benefit 173 Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis _ib._ Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothalês 177 Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain to Menexenus _ib._ Value of the first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis, as an illustration of the Platonico-Sokratic manner 177 Sokrates begins to examine Menexenus respecting friendship. Who is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue 178 Questions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims of the poets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected _ib._ Other poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion; unlikeness, of friendship. Reasons _pro_ and _con_. Rejected 179 Confusion of Sokrates. He suggests, That the Indifferent (neither good nor evil) is friend to the Good 180 Suggestion canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend to the Good, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil, from which it is anxious to escape 180 Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate condition--not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance 181 Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new suggestion. The Primum Amabile, or object originally dear to us, _per se_: by relation or resemblance to which other objects become dear _ib._ The cause of love is desire. We desire that which is akin to us or our own 182 Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is alien to every one. Inconsistency with what has been previously laid down 183 Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue 184 Remarks. No positive result. Sokratic purpose in analysing the familiar words--to expose the false persuasion of knowledge _ib._ Subject of Lysis. Suited for a Dialogue of Search. Manner of Sokrates, multiplying defective explanations, and showing reasons why each is defective 185 The process of trial and error is better illustrated by a search without result than with result. Usefulness of the dialogue for self-working minds 186 Subject of friendship, handled both by the Xenophontic Sokrates, and by Aristotle _ib._ Debate in the Lysis partly verbal, partly real. Assumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, questionable, such as the real Sokrates would have found reason for challenging 188 Peculiar theory about friendship broached by Sokrates. Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a superficial tinge of evil, and desiring good to escape from it 189 This general theory illustrated by the case of the philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of ignorance the attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and Plato upon this attribute 190 Another theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or original and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved through association with this. The object is Good 191 Statement by Plato of the general law of mental association _ib._ Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates, with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic communion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler analogical communion 192 Primum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima Amicitia of Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical aggregate, not member of a generic family 194 The Good and Beautiful, considered as objects of attachment _ib._ CHAPTER XXI. EUTHYDEMUS. Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthydêmus. Judgments of various critics 195 Scenery and personages _ib._ The two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus: manner in which they are here presented 196 Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by Sokrates, next by the two Sophists _ib._ Contrast between the two different modes of interrogation 197 Wherein this contrast does not consist 198 Wherein it does consist 199 Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists--their bidding for the applause of the by-standers _ibid._ Comparison of the Euthydêmus with the Parmenidês 200 Necessity of settling accounts with the negative, before we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both: in the one the process is solitary and serious; in the other, it is vulgarised and ludicrous 201 Opinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the Euthydêmus, that Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus represent the way in which Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors 202 That opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more Eristic than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by continuous speech or lecture _ib._ Sokrates in the Euthydêmus is drawn suitably to the purpose of that dialogue 203 The two Sophists in the Euthydêmus are not to be taken as real persons, or representatives of real persons 204 Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias--possession of good things is useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use them _ib._ But intelligence--of what? It must be such intelligence, or such an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and the right use of it when made 205 Where is such an art to be found? The regal or political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No answer can be found. Ends in puzzle 206 Review of the cross-examination just pursued by Sokrates. It is very suggestive--puts the mind upon what to look for 207 Comparison with other dialogues--Republic, Philêbus, Protagoras. The only distinct answer is found in the Protagoras 208 The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically admired while it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real admiration, but the contrary _ib._ Mistaken representations about the Sophists--Aristotle's definition--no distinguishable line can be drawn between the Sophist and the Dialectician 210 Philosophical purpose of the Euthydêmus--exposure of fallacies, in Plato's dramatic manner, by multiplication of particular examples 211 Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a classification of fallacies: Plato enumerates them without classification 212 Fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two Sophists in the Euthydêmus _ib._ Fallacies--_à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter_--in the Euthydêmus 213 Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their replies--determination not to contradict themselves 214 Farther verbal equivocations _ib._ Fallacies involving deeper logical principles--contradiction is impossible.--To speak falsely is impossible 215 Plato's Euthydêmus is the earliest known attempt to set out and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies is to exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the conclusion proved is known _aliunde_ to be false and absurd 216 Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and propagated by Athenian Sophists--they are inherent inadvertencies and liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal debate affords the best means of correcting them 217 Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief, misguided by one or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates, Plato, Bacon, &c.,--complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by Mill 218 Value of formal debate as a means for testing and confuting fallacies 221 Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could not have composed his Euthydêmus, nor Aristotle the treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis _ib._ Probable popularity of the Euthydêmus at Athens--welcomed by all the enemies of Dialectic 222 Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to obviate this inference by opponents--Conversation between Sokrates and Kriton 223 Altered tone in speaking of Euthydêmus--Disparagement of persons half-philosophers, half-politicians 224 Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his sons--Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher--tells him to search for himself 225 Euthydêmus is here cited as representative of Dialectic and philosophy 226 Who is the person here intended by Plato, half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates? 227 Variable feeling at different times, between Plato and Isokrates 228 CHAPTER XXII. MENON. Persons of the Dialogue 232 Question put by Menon--Is virtue teachable? Sokrates confesses that he does not know what virtue is. Surprise of Menon _ib._ Sokrates stands alone in this confession. Unpopularity entailed by it 233 Answer of Menon--plurality of virtues, one belonging to each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the property common to all of them _ib._ Analogous cases cited--definitions of figure and colour 235 Importance at that time of bringing into conscious view, logical subordination and distinctions--Neither logic nor grammar had then been cast into system _ib._ Definition of virtue given by Menon: Sokrates pulls it to pieces 236 Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds him like an electric shock--Sokrates replies that he is himself in the same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of search by both 237 But how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man searches for what he already knows: and for what he does not know, it is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he has found it _ib._ Theory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates--anterior immortality of the soul--what is called teaching is the revival and recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten _ib._ Illustration of this theory--knowledge may be revived by skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught. Sokrates questions the slave of Menon 238 Enquiry taken up--Whether virtue is teachable? without determining what virtue is 239 Virtue is knowledge--no possessions, no attributes, either of mind or body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance of knowledge _ib._ Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No teachers of it can be found 239 Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can teach virtue 240 Confused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring virtue is shown _ib._ Sokrates modifies his premisses--knowledge is not the only thing which guides to good results--right opinion will do the same _ib._ Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind, and can never give rational explanations, nor teach others--good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the Gods 241 All the real virtue that there is, is communicated by special inspiration from the Gods 242 But what virtue itself is, remains unknown _ib._ Remarks on the dialogue. Proper order for examining the different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates _ib._ Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions when the fundamental notions and word are unsettled _ib._ Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon--desire of good alleged to be universally felt--in what sense this is true 243 Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what? 244 Subject of Menon; same as that of the Protagoras--diversity of handling--Plato is not anxious to settle a question and get rid of it 245 Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of research 246 Great question discussed among the Grecian philosophers--criterion of truth--Wherein consists the process of verification? _ib._ None of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer here made by Plato--that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal experience 247 Plato's view of the immortality of the soul--difference between the Menon, Phædrus, and Phædon 249 Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind--how far correct? _ib._ Plato's doctrine about _à priori_ reasonings--different from the modern doctrine 251 Plato's theory about pre-natal experience. He took no pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience 252 Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic Ideas or Forms 253 What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning--his distinction between knowledge and right opinion _ib._ This distinction compared with modern philosophical views 254 Manifestation of Anytus--intense antipathy to the Sophists and to philosophy generally 255 The enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the sophists--practical statesmen 256 The Menon brings forward the point of analogy between Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the practical statesmen 257 CHAPTER XXIII. PROTAGORAS. Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue 259 Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates to become acquainted with Protagoras 260 Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose and expectations from Protagoras _ib._ Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a Sophist without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach 262 Remarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of knowledge brought to light 263 Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias. Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras 264 Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter, declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own openness in avowing himself a sophist _ib._ Protagoras prefers to converse in presence of the assembled company 266 Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young men as virtuous citizens _ib._ Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not. _ib._ Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe 267 Mythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods. Prometheus and Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter. It is partly amended by Prometheus 267 Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of individual wants, but could not give them the social art--Mankind are on the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions essential for society 268 Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse. Justice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but are possessed by all citizens and taught by all to all 269 Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of punishment 270 Why eminent men cannot make their sons eminent 271 Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws, dikastery, &c. _ib._ All learn virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his own individual aptitude 272 Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special teacher thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others 273 The sons of great artists do not themselves become great artists 274 Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain the manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates and perpetuates itself 274 Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is to be assimilated to a special art 275 Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of Protagoras--he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of the fundamental assumptions 276 One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer 277 Questions by Sokrates--Whether virtue is one and indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous? _ib._ Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? How far justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, "If you please" 278 Intelligence and moderation are identical, because they have the same contrary 279 Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term _ib._ Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated 280 Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry prolixity _ib._ Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates rises to depart 281 Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue 282 Claim of a special _locus standi_ and professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric _ib._ Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites Protagoras to question him _ib._ Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides. Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song 283 Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech 283 Character of this speech--its connection with the dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in continuous speech 284 Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering 285 Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose 287 The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue 288 Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates changes his attack _ib._ Identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate 289 Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant 290 Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures 291 Pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil. No man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and pain 292 Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it 293 To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance 294 Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable 295 Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible _ib._ Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras. Amicable reply of Protagoras 297 Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least allusion to Hippokrates 298 Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates 299 Order of ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates _ib._ Difference of method between him and Protagoras flows from this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without enquiry 300 Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in harmony 301 Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem which Protagoras had left out _ib._ Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner 303 Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though he is described as brought to a contradiction _ib._ Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by Plato himself elsewhere _ib._ The harsh epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the common consciousness 304 Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the song of Simonides 305 Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at length clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of pleasures and pains of the agent _ib._ Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory 306 Reasoning of Sokrates 307 Application of that reasoning to the case of courage _ib._ The theory which Plato here lays down is more distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues 308 Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is too narrow, and exclusively prudential 309 Comparison with the Republic 310 The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates 311 The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of other persons besides the agent himself 312 Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or satisfactory, especially about courage 313 Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct. That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists 314 Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency 315 Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close of the dialogue 316 CHAPTER XXIV. GORGIAS. Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the historical Gorgias 317 Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and Kalliklês 318 Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good definition _ib._ Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the artisan of persuasion 319 The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what matters is he competent to advise? 319 The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among the ignorant 320 Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes up the debate with Sokrates 321 Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to cookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery _ib._ Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure 322 Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish 323 All men wish for what is good for them. Despots and Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, and therefore have no real power 324 Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia--Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it 325 Sokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished 326 Sokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and Turpe--Proof of the first point 327 Proof of the second point _ib._ The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure for him. To be punished is best for him 328 Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our friend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought to keep him unpunished 329 Argument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed by Kalliklês whether he means it seriously 330 Principle laid down by Sokrates--That every one acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery _ib._ Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness 331 Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the Platonic meaning _ib._ Examination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency between the general answer of Polus and his previous declarations--Law and Nature 332 The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates, will not hold 334 Worse or better--for whom? The argument of Sokrates does not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference, the definition would be inadmissible _ib._ Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it 335 If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in which punishment is considered would be reversed 336 Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper and bodily distemper--Material difference between the two--Distemper must be felt by the distempered persons 337 Kalliklês begins to argue against Sokrates--he takes a distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature--Reply of Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly understood 338 What Kalliklês says is not to be taken as a sample of the teachings of Athenian sophists. Kalliklês--rhetor and politician 339 Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kalliklês is made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it 340 Sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kalliklês defends the negative 343 Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical? 344 Kalliklês maintains that pleasurable and good are identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad. A scientific adviser is required to discriminate them 345 Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and Sokrates in the Protagoras _ib._ Views of critics about this contradiction 346 Comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of Sokrates in both dialogues _ib._ Distinct statement in the Protagoras. What are good and evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed in discriminating them. No such distinct statement in the Gorgias 347 Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense--not recognised by Plato in either of the dialogues 348 In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is self-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the pleasures and pains of other persons, so far as affected by the agent 349 Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in substance the same, but differing in classification _ib._ Kalliklês, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, maintains a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in the Protagoras 350 The refutation of Kalliklês by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is unsuccessful--it is only so far successful as he adopts unintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras 351 Permanent elements--and transient elements--of human agency--how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues 353 In the Protagoras _ib._ In the Gorgias 354 Character of the Gorgias generally--discrediting all the actualities of life 355 Argument of Sokrates resumed--multifarious arts of flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure 357 The Rhetors aim at only flattering the public--even the best past Rhetors have done nothing else--citation of the four great Rhetors by Kallikles 357 Necessity for temperance, regulation, order. This is the condition of virtue and happiness 358 Impossible to succeed in public life, unless a man be thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force 359 Danger of one who dissents from the public, either for better or for worse _ib._ Sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself--to study permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction 360 Sokrates announces himself as almost the only man at Athens, who follows out the true political art. Danger of doing this 361 Mythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of deceased persons therein, according to their merits during life--the philosopher who stood aloof from public affairs, will then be rewarded _ib._ Peculiar ethical views of Sokrates--Rhetorical or dogmatical character of the Gorgias 362 He merges politics in Ethics--he conceives the rulers as spiritual teachers and trainers of the community _id._ _Idéal_ of Plato--a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer, on scientific principles, fashioning all characters pursuant to certain types of his own 363 Platonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily health--incomplete analogy--circumstances of difference _ib._ Sokrates in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a community of fixed opinions and habits. Impossible that a dissenter, on important points, should acquire any public influence 364 Sokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen. He is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic 365 Antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric _ib._ Position of one who dissents, upon material points, from the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen 366 Probable feelings of Plato on this subject--Claim put forward in the Gorgias of an independent _locus standi_ for philosophy, but without the indiscriminate cross-examination pursued by Sokrates 367 Importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion. Tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance 368 Issue between philosophy and rhetoric--not satisfactorily handled by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble manner in which it is presented by Polus and Kalliklês 369 Perikles would have accepted the defence of rhetoric, as Plato has put it into the mouth of Gorgias 370 The Athenian people recognise a distinction between the pleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which Plato conceived 371 Rhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to all the various established sentiments and opinions. Erroneous inferences raised by the Kalliklês of Plato 373 The Platonic Idéal exacts, as good, some order, system, discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good. Divergent ideas about virtue 374 How to discriminate the right order from the wrong. Plato does not advise us 375 The Gorgias upholds the independence and dignity of the dissenting philosopher _ib._ CHAPTER XXV. PHÆDON. The Phædon is affirmative and expository 377 Situation and circumstances assumed in the Phædon. Pathetic interest which they inspire _ib._ Simmias and Kebês, the two collocutors with Sokrates. Their feelings and those of Sokrates 378 Emphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate, active exercise of reason, and independent judgment for each reasoner 379 Anxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on their guard against being influenced by his authority--that they shall follow only the convictions of their own reason 380 Remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned truth and the liberty of individual dissent 381 Phædon and Symposion--points of analogy and contrast 382 Phædon--compared with Republic and Timæus. No recognition of the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul and body 383 Different doctrines of Plato about the soul. Whether all the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul alone 385 The life and character of a philosopher is a constant struggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone enables him to do this completely 386 Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after death into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher alone is relieved from all communion with body 387 Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the Phædon apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers 388 Simmias and Kebês do not admit readily the immortality of the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by asking for proof. Unabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate 390 Simmias and Kebês believe fully in the pre-existence of the soul, but not in its post-existence. Doctrine--That the soul is a sort of harmony--refuted by Sokrates _ib._ Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings through which his mind had passed 391 First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons why he rejected it _ib._ Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of Anaxagoras 393 Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow out the optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes efficient and causes co-efficient 394 Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle for himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it, and embraced a third doctrine about cause 395 He now assumes the separate existence of ideas. These ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain attributes 396 Procedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned. He insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the hypothesis and the discussion of its consequences 397 Exposition of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers. Remarks upon it 398 The philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned upon different views as to a true cause _ib._. Problems and difficulties of which Sokrates first sought solution 399 Expectations entertained by Sokrates from the treatise of Anaxagoras. His disappointment. His distinction between causes and co-efficients 400 Sokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of substituting physical agencies in place of mental. This is the same which Aristophanes and others imputed to Sokrates 401 The supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be carried out, either by Sokrates himself or any one else. Sokrates turns to general words, and adopts the theory of ideas 403 Vague and dissentient meanings attached to the word Cause. That is a cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to his inquisitive feelings 404 Dissension and perplexity on the question.--What is a cause? revealed by the picture of Sokrates--no intuition to guide him 407 Different notions of Plato and Aristotle about causation, causes regular and irregular. Inductive theory of causation, elaborated in modern times _ib._ Last transition of the mind of Sokrates from things to words--to the adoption of the theory of ideas. Great multitude of ideas assumed, each fitting a certain number of particulars 410 Ultimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme generality 411 Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul rests upon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to prove this 412 The soul always brings life, and is essentially living. It cannot receive death: in other words, it is immortal 413 The proof of immortality includes pre-existence as well as post-existence--animals as well as man--also the metempsychosis or translation of the soul from one body to another 414 After finishing his proof that the soul is immortal, Sokrates enters into a description, what will become of it after the death of the body. He describes a [Greek: Nekui/a] 415 Sokrates expects that his soul is going to the islands of the blest. Reply to Kriton about burying his body 416 Preparations for administering the hemlock. Sympathy of the gaoler. Equanimity of Sokrates _ib._ Sokrates swallows the poison. Conversation with the gaoler 417 Ungovernable sorrow of the friends present. Self-command of Sokrates. Last words to Kriton, and death _ib._ Extreme pathos, and probable trustworthiness of these personal details 419 Contrast between the Platonic Apology and the Phædon _ib._. Abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the Phædon compared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the Apology 421 Total renunciation and discredit of the body in the Phædon. Different feeling about the body in other Platonic dialogues 422 Plato's argument does not prove the immortality of the soul. Even if it did prove that, yet the mode of pre-existence and the mode of post-existence, of the soul, would be quite undetermined 423 The philosopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul unattached to any body 425 Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul did not appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers. The question remained debated and problematical 426 PLATO. CHAPTER XII ALKIBIADES I. AND II. ALKIBIADES I.--ON THE NATURE OF MAN. [Side-note: Situation supposed in the dialogue. Persons--Sokrates and Alkibiades.] This dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Alkibiades. It introduces Alkibiades as about twenty years of age, having just passed through the period of youth, and about to enter on the privileges and duties of a citizen. The real dispositions and circumstances of the historical Alkibiades (magnificent personal beauty, stature, and strength, high family and connections, great wealth already possessed, since his father had died when he was a child,--a full measure of education and accomplishments--together with exorbitant ambition and insolence, derived from such accumulated advantages) are brought to view in the opening address of Sokrates. Alkibiades, during the years of youth which he had just passed, had been surrounded by admirers who tried to render themselves acceptable to him, but whom he repelled with indifference, and even with scorn. Sokrates had been among them, constantly present and near to Alkibiades, but without ever addressing a word to him. The youthful beauty being now exchanged for manhood, all these admirers had retired, and Sokrates alone remains. His attachment is to Alkibiades himself: to promise of mind rather than to attractions of person. Sokrates has been always hitherto restrained, by his divine sign or Dæmon, from speaking to Alkibiades. But this prohibition has now been removed; and he accosts him for the first time, in the full belief that he shall be able to give improving counsel, essential to the success of that political career upon which the youth is about to enter.[1] [Footnote 1: Plato, Alkib. i. 103, 104, 105. Perikles is supposed to be still alive and political leader of Athens--104 B. I have briefly sketched the imaginary situation to which this dialogue is made to apply. The circumstances of it belong to Athenian manners of the Platonic age. Some of the critics, considering that the relation supposed between Sokrates and Alkibiades is absurd and unnatural, allege this among their reasons for denying the authenticity of the dialogue. But if any one reads the concluding part of the Symposion--the authenticity of which has never yet been denied by any critic--he will find something a great deal more abnormal in what is there recounted about Sokrates and Alkibiades. In a dialogue composed by Æschines Socraticus (cited by the rhetor Aristeides--[Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s], Or. xlv. p. 23-24), expressions of intense love for Alkibiades are put into the mouth of Sokrates. Æschines was [Greek: gnê/sios e(tai=ros Sôkra/tous], not less than Plato. The different companions of Sokrates thus agreed in their picture of the relation between him and Alkibiades.] [Side-note: Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of Alkibiades.] You are about to enter on public life (says Sokrates to Alkibiades) with the most inordinate aspirations for glory and aggrandisement. You not only thirst for the acquisition of ascendancy such as Perikles possesses at Athens, but your ambition will not be satisfied unless you fill Asia with your renown, and put yourself upon a level with Cyrus and Xerxes. Now such aspirations cannot be gratified except through my assistance. I do not deal in long discourses such as you have been accustomed to hear from others: I shall put to you only some short interrogatories, requiring nothing more than answers to my questions.[2] [Footnote 2: Plato, Alkib. i. 106 B. [Greek: A)=ra e)rôtta=|s ei)/ tina e)/chô ei)pei=n lo/gon makro/n, oi(/ous dê\ a)kou/ein ei)/thisai? ou) ga/r e)sti toiou=ton to\ e)mo/n.] I give here, as elsewhere, not an exact translation, but an abstract.] [Side-note: Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What does he intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does he know?] _Sokr._--You are about to step forward as adviser of the public assembly. Upon what points do you intend to advise them? Upon points which you know better than they? _Alk._--Of course. _Sokr._--All that you know, has been either learnt from others or found out by yourself. _Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--But you would neither have learnt any thing, nor found out any thing, without the desire to learn or find out: and you would have felt no such desire, in respect to that which you believed yourself to know already. That which you now know, therefore, there was a time when you believed yourself not to know? _Alk._--Necessarily so. _Sokr._--Now all that you have learnt, as I am well aware, consists of three things--letters, the harp, gymnastics. Do you intend to advise the Athenians when they are debating about letters, or about harp-playing, or about gymnastics? _Alk._--Neither of the three. _Sokr._--Upon what occasions, then, do you propose to give advice? Surely, not when the Athenians are debating about architecture, or prophetic warnings, or the public health: for to deliver opinions on each of these matters, belongs not to you but to professional men--architects, prophets, physicians; whether they be poor or rich, high-born or low-born? If not _then_, upon what other occasions will you tender your counsel? _Alk._--When they are debating about affairs of their own. [Side-note: Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better refer? To just and unjust.] _Sokr._--But about what affairs of their own? Not about affairs of shipbuilding: for of that you know nothing. _Alk._--When they are discussing war and peace, or any other business concerning the city. _Sokr._--You mean when they are discussing the question with whom they shall make war or peace, and in what manner? But it is certain that we must fight those whom it is best to fight--also _when_ it is best--and _as long as_ it is best. _Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--Now, if the Athenians wished to know whom it was best to wrestle with, and when or how long it was best which of the two would be most competent to advise them, you or the professional trainer? _Alk._--The trainer, undoubtedly. _Sokr._--So, too, about playing the harp or singing. But when you talk about _better_, in wrestling or singing, what standard do you refer to? Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art? _Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--Answer me in like manner about war or peace, the subjects on which you are going to advise your countrymen, whom, and at what periods, it is _better_ to fight, and _better_ not to fight? What in this last case do you mean by _better_? To what standard, or to what end, do you refer?[3] _Alk._--I cannot say. _Sokr._--But is it not a disgrace, since you profess to advise your countrymen when and against whom it is better for them to war,--not to be able to say to what end your _better_ refers? Do not you know what are the usual grounds and complaints urged when war is undertaken? _Alk._--Yes: complaints of having been cheated, or robbed, or injured. _Sokr._--Under what circumstances? _Alk._--You mean, whether justly or unjustly? That makes all the difference. _Sokr._--Do you mean to advise the Athenians to fight those who behave justly, or those who behave unjustly? _Alk._--The question is monstrous. Certainly not those who behave justly. It would be neither lawful nor honourable. _Sokr._--Then when you spoke about _better_, in reference to war or peace, what you meant was _juster_--you had in view justice and injustice? _Alk._--It seems so. [Footnote 3: Plato, Alkib. i. 108 E--109 A. [Greek: i)/thi dê/, kai\ to\ en tô=| polemei=n be/ltion kai\ to\ en tô=| ei)rê/nên a)/gein, tou=to to\ be/ltion ti/ o)noma/zeis? ô(/sper e)kei= e)ph' e)ka/stô| e)/leges to\ a)/meinon, o(/ti mousikô/teron, kai\ e)pi\ tô=| e(terô|, o(/ti gumnastikô/teron; peirô= dê\ kai\ e)ntau=tha le/gein to\ be/ltion . . . . . pro\s ti/ teinei to\ e)n tô=| ei)rê/nên te a)/gein a)/meinon kai\ to\ e)n tô=| polemei=n oi(=s dei=?] _Alkib._ [Greek: A)lla\ skopô=n ou) du/namai e)nnoê=sai.]] [Side-note: How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he always knew it, even as a boy.] _Sokr._--How is this? How do you know, or where have you learnt, to distinguish just from unjust? Have you frequented some master, without my knowledge, to teach you this? If you have, pray introduce me to him, that I also may learn it from him. _Alk._--You are jesting. _Sokr._--Not at all: I love you too well to jest. _Alk._--But what if I had no master? Cannot I know about justice and injustice, without a master? _Sokr._--Certainly: you might find out for yourself, if you made search and investigated. But this you would not do, unless you were under the persuasion that you did not already know. _Alk._--Was there not a time when I really believed myself not to know it? _Sokr._--Perhaps there may have been: tell me _when_ that time was. Was it last year? _Alk._--No: last year I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--Well, then two years, three years, &c., ago? _Alk._--No: the case was the same then, also, I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--But before that, you were a mere boy; and during your boyhood you certainly believed yourself to know what was just and unjust; for I well recollect hearing you then complain confidently of other boys, for acting unjustly towards you. _Alk._--Certainly: I was not then ignorant on the point: I knew distinctly that they were acting unjustly towards me. _Sokr._--You knew, then, even in your boyhood, what was just and what was unjust? _Alk._--Certainly: I knew even then. _Sokr._--At what moment did you first find it out? Not when you already believed yourself to know: and what time was there when you did not believe yourself to know? _Alk._--Upon my word, I cannot say. [Side-note: Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach just and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it. Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself.] _Sokr._--Since, accordingly, you neither found it out for yourself, nor learnt it from others, how come you to know justice or injustice at all, or from what quarter? _Alk._--I was mistaken in saying that I had not learnt it. I learnt it, as others do, from the multitude.[4] _Sokr._--Your teachers are none of the best: no one can learn from them even such small matters as playing at draughts: much less, what is just and unjust. _Alk._--I learnt it from them as I learnt to speak Greek, in which, too, I never had any special teacher. _Sokr._--Of that the multitude are competent teachers, for they are all of one mind. Ask which is a tree or a stone,--a horse or a man,--you get the same answer from every one. But when you ask not simply which are _horses_, but also which horses are fit to run well in a race--when you ask not merely about which are _men_, but which men are healthy or unhealthy--are the multitude all of one mind, or all competent to answer? _Alk._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--When you see the multitude differing among themselves, that is a clear proof that they are not competent to teach others. _Alk._--It is so. _Sokr._--Now, about the question, What is just and unjust--are the multitude all of one mind, or do they differ among themselves? _Alk._--They differ prodigiously: they not only dispute, but quarrel and destroy each other, respecting justice and injustice, far more than about health and sickness.[5] _Sokr._ How, then, can we say that the multitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely dispute about it among themselves? _Alk._--I now perceive that we cannot say so. _Sokr._--How can we say, therefore, that they are fit to teach others: and how can you pretend to know, who have learnt from no other teachers? _Alk._--From what you say, it is impossible. [Footnote 4: Plato, Alkib. i. 110 D-E. [Greek: e)/mathon, oi)=mai, kai\ e)gô\ ô(/sper kai\ oi( a)/lloi . . . . para\ tô=n pollô=n.]] [Footnote 5: Plato, Alkib. i. 112 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de\ dê\? nu=n peri\ tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn a)nthrô/pôn kai\ pragma/tôn, oi( polloi\ dokou=si/ soi o(mologei=n au)toi\ e(autoi=s ê)\ a)llê/lois?] _Alkib._ [Greek: Ê(/kista, nê\ Di/', ô)= Sô/krates.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de/? ma/lista peri\ au)tô=n diaphe/resthai?] _Alkib._ [Greek: polu/ ge.]] _Sokr._--No: not from what _I_ say, but from what _you_ say yourself. I merely ask questions: it is you who give all the answers.[6] And what you have said amounts to this--that Alkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust, but believes himself to know, and is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself? [Footnote 6: Plato, Alkib. i. 112-113.] [Side-note: Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to every one--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing but question.] _Alk._--But, Sokrates, the Athenians do not often debate about what is just and unjust. They think that question self-evident; they debate generally about what is expedient or not expedient. Justice and expediency do not do not always coincide. Many persons commit great crimes, and are great gainers by doing so: others again behave justly, and suffer from it.[7] _Sokr_--Do you then profess to know what is expedient or inexpedient? From whom have you learnt--or when did you find out for yourself? I might ask you the same round of questions, and you would be compelled to answer in the same manner. But we will pass to a different point. You say that justice and expediency are not coincident. Persuade _me_ of this, by interrogating me as I interrogated you. _Alk._--That is beyond my power. _Sokr._--But when you rise to address the assembly, you will have to persuade _them_. If you can persuade them, you can persuade me. Assume _me_ to be the assembly, and practise upon me.[8] _Alk._--You are too hard upon me, Sokrates. It is for you to speak and prove the point. _Sokr_--No: I can only question: you must answer. You will be most surely persuaded when the point is determined by your own answers.[9] [Footnote 7: Plato, Alkib. i. 113 D. [Greek: Oi)=mai me\n o)liga/kis A)thênai/ous bouleu/esthai po/tera dikaio/tera ê)\ a)dikôtera; ta\ me\n ga\r toiau=ta ê(gou=ntai dê=la ei)=nai], &c.] [Footnote 8: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 B-C. This same argument is addressed by Sokrates to Glaukon, in Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6, 14-15.] [Footnote 9: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei) le/geis o(/ti tau=th' ou(/tôs e)/chei, ma/list' a)\n ei)/ês pepeisme/nos?]] [Side-note: Comment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the respondent makes the discoveries for himself.] Such is the commencing portion (abbreviated or abstracted) of Plato's First Alkibiadês. It exhibits a very characteristic specimen of the Sokratico-Platonic method: both in its negative and positive aspect. By the negative, false persuasion of knowledge is exposed. Alkibiades believes himself competent to advise about just and unjust, which he has neither learnt from any teacher nor investigated for himself--which he has picked up from the multitude, and supposes to be clear to every one, but about which nevertheless there is so much difference of appreciation among the multitude, that fierce and perpetual quarrels are going on. On the positive side, Sokrates restricts himself to the function of questioning: he neither affirms nor denies any thing. It is Alkibiades who affirms or denies every thing, and who makes all the discoveries for himself out of his own mind, instigated indeed, but not taught, by the questions of his companion. [Side-note: Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both does well, and procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates.] By a farther series of questions, Sokrates next brings Alkibiades to the admission that what is just, is also honourable, good, expedient--what is unjust, is dishonourable, evil, inexpedient: and that whoever acts justly, and honourably, thereby acquires happiness. Admitting, first, that an act which is good, honourable, just, expedient, &c., considered in one aspect or in reference to some of its conditions--may be at the same time bad, dishonourable, unjust, considered in another aspect or in reference to other conditions; Sokrates nevertheless brings his respondent to admit, that every act, _in so far as it is just and honourable_, is also good and expedient.[10] And he contends farther, that whoever acts honourably, does well: now every man who does well, becomes happy, or secures good things thereby: therefore the just, the honourable, and the good or expedient, coincide.[11] The argument, whereby this conclusion is here established, is pointed out by Heindorf, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, as not merely inconclusive, but as mere verbal equivocation and sophistry--the like of which, however, we find elsewhere in Plato.[12] [Footnote 10: Plato, Alkib. i. 115 B--116 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n tê\n toiau/tên boêthei/an kalê\n me\n le/geis kata\ tê\n e)pichei/rêsin tou= sô=sai ou(=s e)/dei; tou=to d' e)sti\n a)ndri/a; . . . . kakê\n de/ ge kata\ tou\s thana/tous te kai\ ta\ e(/lkê. . . . Ou)kou=n ô(=de di/kaion prosagoreu/ein e(ka/stên tô=n pra/xeôn; ei)/per ê)=| kako\n a)perga/zetai kakê\n kalei=s, kai\ ê)=| a)gatho\n a)gathê\n klête/on. A)r' ou)=n kai\ ê)=| a)gatho\n kalo/n,--ê)=| de\ kako\n ai)schro/n? Nai/.] Compare Plato, Republic, v. p. 479, where he maintains that in every particular case, what is just, honourable, virtuous, &c., is also unjust, dishonourable, vicious, &c. Nothing remains unchanged, nor excludes the contrary, except the pure, self-existent, Idea or general Concept.--[Greek: au)to\-dikaiosu/nê], &c.] [Footnote 11: Plato, Alkib. i. 116 E.] [Footnote 12: The words [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein--eu)pragi/a] have a double sense, like our "doing well". Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 175; Steinhart, Einl. p. 149. We have, p. 116 B, the equivocation between [Greek: kalô=s pra/ttein] and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein], also with [Greek: kakô=s pra/ttein], p. 134 A, 135 A; compare Heindorf ad Platon. Charmid. p. 172 A, p. 174 B; also Platon. Gorgias, p. 507 C, where similar equivocal meanings occur.] [Side-note: Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make himself as good as possible.] Alkibiades is thus reduced to a state of humiliating embarrassment, and stands convicted, by his own contradictions and confession, of ignorance in its worst form: that is, of being ignorant, and yet believing himself to know.[13] But other Athenian statesmen are no wiser. Even Perikles is proved to be equally deficient--by the fact that he has never been able to teach or improve any one else, not even his own sons and those whom he loved best.[14] "At any rate" (contends Alkibiades) "I am as good as my competitors, and can hold my ground against them." But Sokrates reminds him that the real competitors with whom he ought to compare himself, are foreigners, liable to become the enemies of Athens, and against whom he, if he pretends to lead Athens, must be able to contend. In an harangue of unusual length, Sokrates shows that the kings of Sparta and Persia are of nobler breed, as well as more highly and carefully trained, than the Athenian statesmen.[15] Alkibiades must be rescued from his present ignorance, and exalted, so as to be capable of competing with these kings: which object cannot be attained except through the auxiliary interposition of Sokrates. Not that Sokrates professes to be himself already on this elevation, and to stand in need of no farther improvement. But he can, nevertheless, help others to attain it for themselves, through the discipline and stimulus of his interrogatories.[16] [Footnote 13: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118.] [Footnote 14: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-119.] [Footnote 15: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 120-124.] [Footnote 16: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124.] [Side-note: But good--for what end, and under what circumstances? Abundant illustrative examples.] The dialogue then continues. _Sokr._--We wish to become as good as possible. But in what sort of virtue? _Alk._--In that virtue which belongs to good men. _Sokr._--Yes, but _good_, in what matters? _Alk._--Evidently, to men who are good in transacting business. _Sokr._--Ay, but what kind of business? business relating to horses, or to navigation? If that be meant, we must go and consult horse-trainers or mariners? _Alk._--No, I mean such business as is transacted by the most esteemed leaders in Athens. _Sokr._--You mean the intelligent men. Every man is good, in reference to that which he understands: every man is bad, in reference to that which he does not understand. _Alk._--Of course. _Sokr._--The cobbler understands shoemaking, and is therefore good at _that_: he does not understand weaving, and is therefore bad at that. The same man thus, in your view, will be both good and bad?[17] _Alk._--No: that cannot be. _Sokr._--Whom then do you mean, when you talk of _the good_? _Alk._--I mean those who are competent to command in the city. _Sokr._--But to command whom or what--horses or men? _Alk._--To command men. _Sokr._--But what men, and under what circumstances? sick men, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in harvesting, or in what occupations? _Alk._--I mean, men living in social and commercial relation with each other, as we live here; men who live in common possession of the same laws and government. _Sokr._--When men are in communion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we name the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend? _Alk._--It is the art of the pilot; and the purpose towards which it tends, is, bringing them safely through the dangers of the sea. _Sokr._--When men are in social and political communion, to what purpose does the art of commanding them tend? _Alk._--Towards the better preservation and administration of the city.[18] _Sokr._--But what do you mean by _better_? What is that, the presence or absence of which makes _better_ or _worse_? If in regard to the management of the body, you put to me the same question, I should reply, that it is the presence of health, and the absence of disease. What reply will you make, in the case of the city? _Alk._--I should say, when friendship and unanimity among the citizens are present, and when discord and antipathy are absent. _Sokr._--This unanimity, of what nature is it? Respecting what subject? What is the art or science for realising it? If I ask you what brings about unanimity respecting numbers and measures, you will say the arithmetical and the metrêtic art. _Alk._--I mean that friendship and unanimity which prevails between near relatives, father and son, husband and wife. _Sokr._--But how can there be unanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of them knows, and the other does not know? For example, about spinning and weaving, which the husband does not know, or about military duties, which the wife does not know, how can there be unanimity between the two? _Alk._--No: there cannot be. _Sokr._--Nor friendship, if unanimity and friendship go together? _Alk._--Apparently there cannot. _Sokr._--Then when men and women each perform their own special duties, there can be no friendship between them. Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen performs his own special duties? or (which is the same thing) when each citizen acts justly? _Alk._--Not so: I think there may be friendship, when each person performs his or her own business. _Sokr._--Just now you said the reverse. What is this friendship or unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become good men? [Footnote 17: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 125 B. [Greek: O( au)to\s a)/ra tou/tô| ge tô=| lo/gô| kako/s te kai\ a)gatho/s.] Plato slides unconsciously here, as in other parts of his reasonings, _à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter_.] [Footnote 18: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 126 A. [Greek: ti/ de/? ê)\n su\ kalei=s eu)bouli/an, ei)s ti/ e)stin?] _Alk._ [Greek: Ei)s to\ a)/meinon tê\n po/lin dioikei=n kai\ sô/zesthai.] _Sokr._ [Greek: A)meinon de\ dioikei=tai kai\ sô/zetai ti/nos paragignome/nou ê)\ a)pogignomenou?]] [Side-note: Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to make such discovery in youth.] _Alk._--In truth, I am puzzled myself to say. I find myself in a state of disgraceful ignorance, of which I had no previous suspicion. _Sokr._--Do not be discouraged. If you had made this discovery when you were fifty years old, it would have been too late for taking care of yourself and applying a remedy: but at your age, it is the right time for making the discovery. _Alk._--What am I to do, now that I have made it? _Sokr._--You must answer my questions. If my auguries are just, we shall soon be both of us better for the process.[19] [Footnote 19: Plato, Alkib. i. 127 D-E. _Alk._ [Greek: A)lla\ ma\ tou\s theou/s, ou)d' au)to\s oi)=da o(/ ti le/gô, kinduneu/ô de\ kai\ pa/lai lelêthe/nai e)mauto\n ai)/schist' e)/chôn.] _Sokr._ [Greek: A)lla\ chrê\ thar)r(ei=n; ei) me\n ga\r au)to\ ê)=|sthou peponthô\s pentêkontae/tês, chalepo\n a)\n ê)=n soi e)pimelêthê=nai sautou=; nu=n de\ ê)\n e)/cheis ê(liki/an, au)/tê e)sti/n, e)n ê(=| dei= au)to\ ai)sthe/sthai.] _Alk._ [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n to\n ai(stho/menon chrê\ poiei=n?] _Sokr._ [Greek: _A)pokri/nesthai ta\ e)rôtô/mena_, kai\ e)a\n tou=to poiê=|s, a)\n theo\s e)the/lê|, ei)/ ti dei= kai\ tê=| e)mê=| mantei/a| pisteu/ein, su/ te ka)gô\ beltio/nôs schê/somen.]] [Side-note: Platonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its anticipated effect--applicable to the season of youth.] Here we have again, brought into prominent relief, the dialectic method of Plato, under two distinct aspects: 1. Its actual effects, in exposing the false supposition of knowledge, in forcing upon the respondent the humiliating conviction, that he does not know familiar topics which he supposed to be clear both to himself and to others. 2. Its anticipated effects, if continued, in remedying such defect: and in generating out of the mind of the respondent, real and living knowledge. Lastly, it is plainly intimated that this shock of humiliation and mistrust, painful but inevitable, must be undergone in youth. [Side-note: Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent importance--What is myself? My mind is myself.] The dialogue continues, in short questions and answers, of which the following is an abstract. _Sokr._--What is meant by a man _taking care of himself_? Before I can take care of myself, I must know what myself is: I must _know myself_, according to the Delphian motto. I cannot make myself better, without knowing what _myself_ is.[20] That which belongs to me is not _myself_: my body is not myself, but an instrument governed by myself.[21] My mind or soul only, is myself. To take care of myself is, to take care of my mind. At any rate, if this be not strictly true,[22] my mind is the most important and dominant element within me. The physician who knows his own body, does not for that reason know himself: much less do the husbandman or the tradesman, who know their own properties or crafts, know themselves, or perform what is truly their own business. [Footnote 20: Plato, Alkib. i. 129 B. [Greek: ti/n' a)\n tro/pon eu(rethei/ê _au)to\ to\ au)to/_?]] [Footnote 21: Plato, Alkib. i. 128-130. All this is greatly expanded in the dialogue--p. 128 D: [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra o)/tan tô=n sautou= e)pimelê=|, sautou= e)pime/lei?] This same antithesis is employed by Isokrates, De Permutatione, sect. 309, p. 492, Bekker. He recommends [Greek: au)tou= pro/teron ê)\ tô=n au)tou= poiei=sthai tê\n e)pime/leian].] [Footnote 22: Plato considers this point to be not clearly made out. Alkib. i. 130.] [Side-note: I cannot know myself, except by looking into another mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom.] Since temperance consists in self-knowledge, neither of these professional men, as such, is temperate: their professions are of a vulgar cast, and do not belong to the virtuous life.[23] How are we to know our own minds? We know it by looking into another mind, and into the most rational and divine portion thereof: just as the eye can only know itself by looking into another eye, and seeing itself therein reflected.[24] It is only in this way that we can come to know ourselves, or become temperate: and if we do not know ourselves, we cannot even know what belongs to ourselves, or what belongs to others: all these are branches of one and the same cognition. We can have no knowledge of affairs, either public or private: we shall go wrong, and shall be unable to secure happiness either for ourselves or for others. It is not wealth or power which are the conditions of happiness, but justice and temperance. Both for ourselves individually, and for the public collectively, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth and power. The evil and unjust man ought to have no power, but to be the slave of those who are better than himself.[25] He is fit for nothing but to be a slave: none deserve freedom except the virtuous. [Footnote 23: Plato, Alkib. i. 131 B.] [Footnote 24: Plato, Alkib. i. 133.] [Footnote 25: Plato, Alkib. i. 134-135 B-C. [Greek: Pri\n de/ ge a)retê\n e)/chein, to\ a)/rchesthai a)/meinon u(po\ tou= belti/onos ê)\ to\ a)/rchein a)ndri\, ou) mo/non paidi/ . . . . Pre/pei a)/ra tô=| kakô=| douleu/ein; a)/meinon ga/r.]] [Side-note: Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares that he will never quit Sokrates.] _Sokr._--How do you feel your own condition now, Alkibiades. Are you worthy of freedom? _Alk._--I feel but too keenly that I am not. I cannot emerge from this degradation except by your society and help. From this time forward I shall never leave you.[26] [Footnote 26: Plato, Alkib. i. 135.] ALKIBIADES II. [Side-note: Second Alkibiades--situation supposed.] The other Platonic dialogue, termed the Second Alkibiades, introduces Alkibiades as about to offer prayer and sacrifice to the Gods. [Side-note: Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic word: madmen, a particular variety under it.] _Sokr._--You seem absorbed in thought, Alkibiades, and not unreasonably. In supplicating the Gods, caution is required not to pray for gifts which are really mischievous. The Gods sometimes grant men's prayers, even when ruinously destructive; as they granted the prayers of Oedipus, to the destruction of his own sons. _Alk._--Oedipus was mad: what man in his senses would put up such a prayer? _Sokr._--You think that madness is the opposite of good sense or wisdom. You recognise men wise and unwise: and you farther admit that every man must be one or other of the two,--just as every man must be either healthy or sick: there is no third alternative possible? _Alk._--I think so. _Sokr._--But each thing can have but one opposite:[27] to be unwise, and to be mad, are therefore identical? _Alk._--They are. _Sokr._--Wise men are only few, the majority of our citizens are unwise: but do you really think them mad? How could any of us live safely in the society of so many mad-men? _Alk._--No: it cannot be so: I was mistaken. _Sokr._--Here is the illustration of your mistake. All men who have gout, or fever, or ophthalmia are sick; but all sick men have not gout, or fever, or ophthalmia. So, too, all carpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors, are craftsmen; but all craftsmen are not carpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors. In like manner, all mad men are unwise; but all unwise men are not mad. _Unwise_ comprises many varieties and gradations of which the extreme is, being mad: but these varieties are different among themselves, as one disease differs from another, though all agree in being disease and one art differs from another, though all agree in being art.[28] [Footnote 27: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139 B. [Greek: Kai\ mê\n du/o ge u(penanti/a e(ni\ pra/gmati pô=s a)\n ei)/ê?] That each thing has one opposite, and no more, is asserted in the Protagoras also, p. 192-193.] [Footnote 28: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139-140 A-B. [Greek: Kai\ ga\r oi( pure/ttontes pa/ntes nosou=sin, ou) me/nntoioi( nosou=ntes pa/ntes pure/ttousin ou)de\ podagrô=sin ou)de/ ge o)phthalmiô=sin; a)lla\ no/sos me\n pa=n to\ toiou=to/n e)sti, diaphe/rein de/ phasin ou(\s dê\ kalou=men i)atros tê\n a)pergasi/an au)tô=n; ou) ga\r pa=sai ou)/te o(/moiai ou)/te o(moi/ôs diapra/ttontai, a)lla\ kata\ tê\n au)tê=s du/namin e(ka/stê.]] [Side-note: Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar.] (We may remark that Plato here, as in the Euthyphron, brings under especial notice one of the most important distinctions in formal logic--that between a generic between a term and the various specific terms comprehended under it. Possessing as yet no technical language for characterising this distinction, he makes it understood by an induction of several separate but analogous cases. Because the distinction is familiar now to instructed men, we must not suppose that it was familiar then.) [Side-note: Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance.] _Sokr._--Whom do you call wise and unwise? Is not the wise man, he who knows what it is proper to say and do--and the unwise man, he who does not know? _Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--The unwise man will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or done? Though not mad like Oedipus, he will nevertheless pray to the Gods for gifts, which will be hurtful to him if obtained. You, for example, would be overjoyed if the Gods were to promise that you should become despot not only over Athens, but also over Greece. _Alk._--Doubtless I should: and every one else would feel as I do. _Sokr._--But what if you were to purchase it with your life, or to damage yourself by the employment of it? _Alk._--Not on those conditions.[29] _Sokr._--But you are aware that many ambitious aspirants, both at Athens and elsewhere (among them, the man who just now killed the Macedonian King Archelaus, and usurped his throne), have acquired power and aggrandisement, so as to be envied by every one: yet have presently found themselves brought to ruin and death by the acquisition. So, also, many persons pray that they may become fathers; but discover presently that their children are the source of so much grief to them, that they wish themselves again childless. Nevertheless, though such reverses are perpetually happening, every one is still not only eager to obtain these supposed benefits, but importunate with the Gods in asking for them. You see that it is not safe even to accept without reflection boons offered to you, much less to pray for boons to be conferred.[30] _Alk._--I see now how much mischief ignorance produces. Every one thinks himself competent to pray for what is beneficial to himself; but ignorance makes him unconsciously imprecate mischief on his own head. [Footnote 29: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141.] [Footnote 30: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141-142.] [Side-note: Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must discriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always.] _Sokr._--You ought not to denounce ignorance in this unqualified manner. You must distinguish and specify. Ignorance of what? and under what modifications of persons and circumstances? _Alk._--How? Are there _any_ matters or circumstances in which it is better for a man to be ignorant, than to know? _Sokr._--You will see that there are such. Ignorance of good, or ignorance of what is best, is always mischievous: moreover, assuming that a man knows what is best, then all other knowledge will be profitable to him. In his special case, ignorance on any subject cannot be otherwise than hurtful. But if a man be ignorant things of good, or of what is best, in his case knowledge on other subjects will be more often hurtful than profitable. To a man like Orestes, so misguided on the question, "What is good?" as to resolve to kill his mother, it would be a real benefit, if for the time he did not know his mother. Ignorance on that point, in his state of mind, would be better for him than knowledge.[31] _Alk._--It appears so. [Footnote 31: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 144.] [Side-note: Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used.] _Sokr._--Follow the argument farther. When we come forward to say or do any thing, we either know what we are about to say and do, or at least believe ourselves to know it. Every statesman who gives counsel to the public, does so in the faith of such knowledge. Most citizens are unwise, and ignorant of good as well as of other things. The wise are but few, and by their advice the city is conducted. Now upon what ground do we call these few, wise and useful public counsellors? If a statesman knows war, but does not know whether it is best to go to war, or at what juncture it is best--should we call him wise? If he knows how to kill men, or dispossess them, or drive them into exile,--but does not know upon whom, or on what occasions, it is good to inflict this treatment--is he a useful counsellor? If he can ride, or shoot, or wrestle, well,--we give him an epithet derived from this special accomplishment: we do not call him wise. What would be the condition of a community composed of bowmen, horsemen, wrestlers, rhetors, &c., accomplished and excellent each in his own particular craft, yet none of them knowing what is good, nor when, nor on what occasions, it is good to employ their craft? When each man pushes forward his own art and speciality, without any knowledge whether it is good on the whole either for himself or for the city, will not affairs thus conducted be reckless and disastrous?[32] _Alk._--They will be very bad indeed. [Footnote 32: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145.] [Side-note: Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial.] _Sokr._--If, then, a man has no knowledge of good or of the better--if upon this cardinal point he obeys fancy without reason--the possession of knowledge upon special subjects will be oftener hurtful than profitable to him; because it will make him more forward in action, without any good result. Possessing many arts and accomplishments, and prosecuting one after another, but without the knowledge of good,--he will only fall into greater trouble, like a ship sailing without a pilot. Knowledge of good is, in other words, knowledge of what is useful and profitable. In conjunction with this, all other knowledge is valuable, and goes to increase a man's competence as a counsellor: apart from this, all other knowledge will not render a man competent as a counsellor, but will be more frequently hurtful than beneficial.[33] Towards right living, what we need is, the knowledge of good: just as the sick stand in need of a physician, and the ship's crew of a pilot. _Alk._--I admit your reasoning. My opinion is changed. I no longer believe myself competent to determine what I ought to accept from the Gods, or what I ought to pray for. I incur serious danger of erring, and of asking for mischiefs, under the belief that they are benefits. [Footnote 33: Plato, Alkib. ii. 145 C: [Greek: O(/stis a)/ra ti tô=n toiou/tôn oi)=den, e)a\n me\n pare/pêtai au)tô=| ê( _tou= belti/stou e)pistê/mê--au(/tê d' ê)=n ê( au)tê\ dê/pou ê(/per kai\ ê( tou= ô)pheli/mou_--phro/nimo/n ge au)to\n phê/somen kai\ a)pochrô=nta xu/mboulou kai\ tê=| po/lei kai\ au)to\n au(tô=|; to\n de\ mê\ toiou=ton, ta)nanti/a tou/tôn.] ([Greek: Touou=ton] is Schneider's emendation for [Greek: poiou=nta].) Ibid. 146 C: [Greek: Ou)kou=n phame\n pa/lin tou\s pollou\s diêmartêke/nai tou= belti/stou, ô(s ta\ polla/ ge, oi)=mai, a)/neu nou= do/xê| pepisteuko/tas?] Ibid. 146 E: [Greek: O(ra=|s ou)=n, o(/te g' e)/phên kinduneu/ein to/ ge tô=n a)/llôn e)pistêmô=n ktê=ma, e)a/n tis a)/neu tê=s tou= belti/stou e)pistê/mês kektême/nos ê)=|, o)liga/kis me\n ô)phelei=n bla/ptein de\ ta\ plei/ô ton e)/chont' au)to/.] Ibid. 147 A: [Greek: O( de\ dê\ tê\n kaloume/nên poluma/theia/n te kai\ polutechni/an kektême/nos, o)rphano\s de\ ô)\n tau/tês tê=s e)pistê/mês, a)go/menos de\ u(po\ mia=s e(ka/stês tô=n a)/llôn, a)=r' ou)chi\ tô=| o)/nti dikai/ôs pollô=| cheimô=ni chrê/setai, a(/t', oi)=mai, a)/neu kubernê/tou diatelô=n e)n pela/gei], &c.] [Side-note: It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel of Sokrates.] _Sokr._--The Lacedæmonians, when they offer sacrifice, pray simply that they may obtain what is honourable and good, without farther specification. This language is acceptable to the Gods, more acceptable than the costly festivals of Athens. It has procured for the Spartans more continued prosperity than the Athenians have enjoyed.[34] The Gods honour wise and just men, that is, men who know what they ought to say and do both towards Gods and towards men--more than numerous and splendid offerings.[35] You see, therefore, that it is not safe for you to proceed with your sacrifice, until you have learnt what is the proper language to be used, and what are the really good gifts to be prayed for. Otherwise your sacrifice will not prove acceptable, and you may even bring upon yourself positive mischief.[36] _Alk._--When shall I be able to learn this, and who is there to teach me? I shall be delighted to meet him. _Sokr._--There is a person at hand most anxious for your improvement. What he must do is, first to disperse the darkness from your mind, next, to impart that which will teach you to discriminate evil from good, which at present you are unable to do. _Alk._--I shall shrink from no labour to accomplish this object. Until then, I postpone my intended sacrifice: and I tender my sacrificial wreath to you, in gratitude for your counsel.[37] _Sokr._--I accept the wreath as a welcome augury of future friendship and conversation between us, to help us out of the present embarrassment. [Footnote 34: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 148.] [Footnote 35: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.] [Footnote 36: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.] [Footnote 37: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 151.] * * * * * [Side-note: Different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues.] The two dialogues, called First and Second Alkibiadês, of which I have just given some account, resemble each other more than most of the Platonic dialogues, not merely in the personages introduced, but in general spirit, in subject, and even in illustrations. The First Alkibiadês was recognised as authentic by all critics without exception, until the days of Schleiermacher. Nay, it was not only recognised, but extolled as one of the most valuable and important of all the Platonic compositions; proper to be studied first, as a key to all the rest. Such was the view of Jamblichus and Proklus, transmitted to modern times; until it received a harsh contradiction from Schleiermacher, who declared the dialogue to be both worthless and spurious. The Second Alkibiadês was also admitted both by Thrasyllus, and by the general body of critics in ancient times: but there were some persons (as we learn from Athenæus)[38] who considered it to be a work of Xenophon; perceiving probably (what is the fact) that it bears much analogy to several conversations which Xenophon has set down. But those who held this opinion are not to be considered as of one mind with critics who reject the dialogue as a forgery or imitation of Plato. Compositions emanating from Xenophon are just as much Sokratic, probably even more Sokratic, than the most unquestioned Platonic dialogues, besides that they must of necessity be contemporary also. Schleiermacher has gone much farther: declaring the Second as well as the First to be an unworthy imitation of Plato.[39] [Footnote 38: Athenæus, xi. p. 506.] [Footnote 39: See the Einleitung of Schleiermacher to Alkib. i. part ii. vol. iii. p. 293 seq. Einleitung to Alkib. ii. part i. vol. ii. p. 365 seq. His notes on the two dialogues contain various additional reasons, besides what is urged in his Introduction.] [Side-note: Grounds for disallowing them--less strong against the Second than against the First.] Here Ast agrees with Schleiermacher fully, including both the First and Second Alkibiades in his large list of the spurious. Most of the subsequent critics go with Schleiermacher only half-way: Socher, Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, recognise the First Alkibiadês, but disallow the Second.[40] In my judgment, Schleiermacher and Ast are more consistently right, or more consistently wrong, in rejecting both, than the other critics who find or make so capital a distinction between the two. The similarity of tone and topics between the two is obvious, and is indeed admitted by all. Moreover, if I were compelled to make a choice, I should say that the grounds for suspicion are rather less strong against the Second than against the First; and that Schleiermacher, reasoning upon the objections admitted by his opponents as conclusive against the Second, would have no difficulty in showing that his own objections against the First were still more forcible. The long speech assigned in the First Alkibiadês to Sokrates, about the privileges of the Spartan and Persian kings,[41] including the mention of Zoroaster, son of Oromazes, and the Magian religion, appears to me more unusual with Plato than anything which I find in the Second Alkibiadês. It is more Xenophontic[42] than Platonic. [Footnote 40: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 112. Stallbaum, Prolegg. to Alkib. i. and ii. vol. v. pp. 171-304. K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos. p. 420-439. Steinhart, Einleitungen to Alkib. i. and ii. in Hieronymus Müller's Uebersetzung des Platon's Werke, vol. i. pp. 135-509.] [Footnote 41: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 121-124. Whoever reads the objections in Steinhart's Einleitung (p. 148-150) against the First Alkibiadês, will see that they are quite as forcible as what he urges against the Second; only, that in the case of the First, he gives these objections their legitimate bearing, allowing them to tell against the merit of the dialogue, but not against its authenticity.] [Footnote 42: See Xenoph. Oekonom. c. 4; Cyropæd. vii. 5, 58-64, viii. 1, 5-8-45; Laced. Repub. c. 15.] [Side-note: The supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only marks of inferiority.] But I must here repeat, that because I find, in this or any other dialogue, some peculiarities not usual with Plato, I do not feel warranted thereby in declaring the dialogue spurious. In my judgment, we must look for a large measure of diversity in the various dialogues; and I think it an injudicious novelty, introduced by Schleiermacher, to set up a canonical type of Platonism, all deviations from which are to be rejected as forgeries. Both the First and the Second Alkibiadês appear to me genuine, even upon the showing of those very critics who disallow them. Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, all admit that there is in both the dialogues a considerable proportion of Sokratic and Platonic ideas: but they maintain that there are also other ideas which are not Sokratic or Platonic, and that the texture, style, and prolixity of the Second Alkibiadês (Schleiermacher maintains this about the First also) are unworthy of Plato. But if we grant these premisses, the reasonable inference would be, not to disallow it altogether, but to admit it as a work by Plato, of inferior merit; perhaps of earlier days, before his powers of composition had attained their maturity. To presume that because Plato composed many excellent dialogues, therefore all that he composed must have been excellent, is a pretension formally disclaimed by many critics, and asserted by none.[42] Steinhart himself allows that the Second Alkibiadês, though not composed by Plato, is the work of some other author contemporary, an untrained Sokratic disciple attempting to imitate Plato.[44] But we do not know that there were any contemporaries who tried to imitate Plato: though Theopompus accused him of imitating others, and called most of his dialogues useless as well as false: while Plato himself, in his inferior works, will naturally appear like an imitator of his better self. [Footnote 43: Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 186) makes this general statement very justly, but he as well as other critics are apt to forget it in particular cases.] [Footnote 44: Steinhart, Einleitung, p. 516-519. Stallbaum and Boeckh indeed assign the dialogue to a later period. Heindorf (ad Lysin, p. 211) thinks it the work "antiqui auctoris, sed non Platonis". Steinhart and others who disallow the authenticity of the Second Alkibiadês insist much (p. 518) upon the enormity of the chronological blunder, whereby Sokrates and Alkibiadês are introduced as talking about the death of Archelaus king of Macedonia, who was killed in 399 B.C., in the same year as Sokrates, and four years after Alkibiades. Such an anachronism (Steinhart urges) Plato could never allow himself to commit. But when we read the Symposion, we find Aristophanes in a company of which Sokrates, Alkibiades, and Agathon form a part, alluding to the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of Mantineia, which took place in 386 B.C. No one has ever made this glaring anachronism a ground for disallowing the Symposion. Steinhart says that the style of the Second Alkibiadês copies Plato too closely (die ängstlich platonisirende Sprache des Dialogs, p. 515), yet he agrees with Stallbaum that in several places it departs too widely from Plato.] [Side-note: The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's earlier compositions.] I agree with Schleiermacher and the other recent critics in considering the First and Second Alkibiadês to be inferior in merit to Plato's best dialogues; and I contend that their own premisses justify no more. They may probably be among his earlier productions, though I do not believe that the First Alkibiadês was composed during the lifetime of Sokrates, as Socher, Steinhart, and Stallbaum endeavour to show.[45] I have already given my reasons, in a previous chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of Sokrates; still less in that of Alkibiadês, who died four years earlier. There is certainly nothing in either Alkibiadês I. or II. to shake this belief. [Footnote 45: Stallbaum refers the composition of Alkib. i. to a time not long before the accusation of Sokrates, when the enemies of Sokrates were calumniating him in consequence of his past intimacy with Alkibiades (who had before that time been killed in 404 B.C.) and when Plato was anxious to defend his master (Prolegg. p. 186). Socher and Steinhart (p. 210) remark that such writings would do little good to Sokrates under his accusation. They place the composition of the dialogue earlier, in 406 B.C. (Steinhart, p. 151-152), and they consider it the first exercise of Plato in the strict dialectic method. Both Steinhart and Hermann (Gesch. Plat. Phil. p. 440) think that the dialogue has not only a speculative but a political purpose; to warn and amend Alkibiades, and to prevent him from surrendering himself blindly to the democracy. I cannot admit the hypothesis that the dialogue was written in 406 B.C. (when Plato was twenty-one years of age, at most twenty-two), nor that it had any intended bearing upon the real historical Alkibiades, who left Athens in 415 B.C. at the head of the armament against Syracuse, was banished three months afterwards, and never came back to Athens until May 407 B.C. (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 13; i. 5, 17). He then enjoyed four months of great ascendancy at Athens, left it at the head of the fleet to Asia in Oct. 407 B.C., remained in command of the fleet for about three months or so, then fell into disgrace and retired to Chersonese, never revisiting Athens. In 406 B.C. Alkibiades was again in banishment, out of the reach of all such warnings as Hermann and Steinhart suppose that Plato intended to address to him in Alkib. i. Steinhart says (p. 152), "In dieser Zeit also, _wenige Jahre nach seiner triumphirenden Rückkehr_, wo Alkibiades," &c. Now Alkibiades left the Athenian service, irrevocably, within less _than one year_ after his triumphant return. Steinhart has not realised in his mind the historical and chronological conditions of the period.] [Side-note: Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men.] If we compare various colloquies of Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, we shall find Alkibiadês I. and II. very analogous to them both in purpose and spirit. In Alkibiadês I. the situation conceived is the same as that of Sokrates and Glaukon, in the third book of the Memorabilia. Xenophon recounts how the presumptuous Glaukon, hardly twenty years of age, fancied himself already fit to play a conspicuous part in public affairs, and tried to force himself, in spite of rebuffs and humiliations, upon the notice of the assembly.[46] No remonstrances of friends could deter him, nor could anything, except the ingenious dialectic of Sokrates, convince him of his own impertinent forwardness and exaggerated self-estimation. Probably Plato (Glaukon's elder brother) had heard of this conversation, but whether the fact be so or not, we see the same situation idealised by him in Alkibiadês I., and worked out in a way of his own. Again, we find in the Xenophontic Memorabilia another colloquy, wherein Sokrates cross-questions, perplexes, and humiliates, the studious youth Euthydemus,[47] whom he regards as over-confident in his persuasions and too well satisfied with himself. It was among the specialties of Sokrates to humiliate confident young men, with a view to their future improvement. He made his conversation "an instrument of chastisement," in the language of Xenophon: or (to use a phrase of Plato himself in the Lysis) he conceived. "that the proper way of talking to youth whom you love, was, not to exalt and puff them up, but to subdue and humiliate them".[48] [Footnote 46: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6.] [Footnote 47: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2.] [Footnote 48: Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, 1. [Greek: skepsa/menoi mê\ mo/non a(\ e)kei=nos] (Sokrates) [Greek: _kolastêri/ou e(/neka _tou/s pa/nt' oi)ome/nous ei)de/nai e)rôtô=n ê)/legchen, a)lla\ kai\ a(\ le/gôn sunême/reue toi=s sundiatri/bousin], &c. So in the Platonic Lysis, the youthful Lysis says to Sokrates "Talk to Menexenus, [Greek: i(/n' au)to\n kola/sê|s]" (Plat. Lysis, 211 B). And Sokrates himself says, a few lines before (210 E), [Greek: Ou(/tô chrê\ toi=s paidikoi=s diale/gesthai, tapeinou=nta kai\ suste/llonta, kai\ mê\ ô(/sper su\ chaunou=nta kai\ diathru/ptonta.]] [Side-note: Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for idealising this feature in Sokrates.] If Plato wished to idealise this feature in the character of Sokrates, no name could be more suitable to his purpose than that of Alkibiades: who, having possessed as a youth the greatest personal beauty (to which Sokrates was exquisitely sensible) had become in his mature life distinguished not less for unprincipled ambition and insolence, than for energy and ability. We know the real Alkibiadês both from Thucydides and Xenophon, and we also know that Alkibiades had in his youth so far frequented the society of Sokrates as to catch some of that dialectic ingenuity, which the latter was expected and believed to impart.[49] The contrast, as well as the companionship, between Sokrates and Alkibiades was eminently suggestive to the writers of Sokratic dialogues, and nearly all of them made use of it, composing dialogues in which Alkibiades was the principal name and figure.[50] It would be surprising indeed if Plato had never done the same: which is what we must suppose, if we adopt Schleiermacher's view, that both Alkibiadês I. and II. are spurious. In the Protagoras as well as in the Symposion, Alkibiades figures; but in neither of them is he the principal person, or titular hero, of the piece. In Alkibiadês I. and II., he is introduced as the solitary respondent to the questions of Sokrates--[Greek: kolastêri/ou e(/neka]: to receive from Sokrates a lesson of humiliation such as the Xenophontic Sokrates administers to Glaukon and Euthydemus, taking care to address the latter when alone.[51] [Footnote 49: The sensibility of Sokrates to youthful beauty is as strongly declared in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (i. 3, 8-14), as in the Platonic Lysis, Charmidês, or Symposion. The conversation reported by Xenophon between Alkibiades, when not yet twenty years of age, and his guardian Perikles, the first man in Athens--wherein Alkibiades puzzles Perikles by a Sokratic cross-examination--is likely enough to be real, and was probably the fruit of his sustained society with Sokrates (Xen. Memor. i. 2, 40).] [Footnote 50: Stallbaum observes (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 215, 2nd ed.), "Ceterum etiam Æschines, Euclides, Phædon, et Antisthenes, dialogos _Alcibiadis_ nomine inscriptos composuisse narrantur". Respecting the dialogues composed by Æschines, see the first note to this chapter.] [Footnote 51: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 8.] [Side-note: Plato's manner of replying to the accusers of Sokrates. Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of Sokrates.] I conceive Alkibiadês I. and II. as composed by Plato among his earlier writings (perhaps between 399-390 B.C.)[52] giving an imaginary picture of the way in which "Sokrates handled every respondent just as he chose" (to use the literal phrase of Xenophon[53]): taming even that most overbearing youth, whom Aristophanes characterises as the lion's whelp.[54] In selecting Alkibiades as the sufferer under such a chastising process, Plato rebuts in his own ideal style that charge which Xenophon answers with prosaic directness--the charge made against Sokrates by his enemies, that he taught political craft without teaching ethical sobriety; and that he had encouraged by his training the lawless propensities of Alkibiades.[55] When Schleiermacher, and others who disallow the dialogue, argue that the inordinate insolence ascribed to Alkibiades, and the submissive deference towards Sokrates also ascribed to him, are incongruous and incompatible attributes,--I reply that such a conjunction is very improbable in any real character. But this does not hinder Plato from combining them in one and the same ideal character, as we shall farther see when we come to the manifestation of Alkibiades in the Symposion: in which dialogue we find a combination of the same elements, still more extravagant and high-coloured. Both here and there we are made to see that Sokrates, far from encouraging Alkibiades, is the only person who ever succeeded in humbling him. Plato attributes to the personality and conversation of Sokrates an influence magical and almost superhuman: which Cicero and Plutarch, proceeding probably upon the evidence of the Platonic dialogues, describe as if it were historical fact. They represent Alkibiades as shedding tears of sorrow and shame, and entreating Sokrates to rescue him from a sense of degradation insupportably painful.[56] Now Xenophon mentions Euthydemus and other young men as having really experienced these profound and distressing emotions.[56] But he does not at all certify the same about Alkibiades, whose historical career is altogether adverse to the hypothesis. The Platonic picture is an _idéal_, drawn from what may have been actually true about other interlocutors of Sokrates, and calculated to reply to Melêtus and his allies. [Footnote 52: The date which I here suppose for the composition of Alkib. i. (_i.e._ after the death of Sokrates, but early in the literary career of Plato), is farther sustained (against those critics who place it in 406 B.C. or 402 B.C. before the death of Sokrates) by the long discourse (p. 121-124) of Sokrates about the Persian and Spartan kings. In reference to the Persian monarchy Sokrates says (p. 123 B), [Greek: e)pei/ pot' e)gô\ ê(/kousa a)ndro\s a)xiopi/stou tô=n a)nabebêko/tôn para\ basile/a, o(\s e)/phê parelthei=n chô/ran pa/nu pollê\n kai\ a)gathê/n--ê(\n kalei=n tou\s e)pichôri/ous zô/nên tê=s basile/ôs gunaiko/s], &c. Olympiodorus and the Scholiast both suppose that Plato here refers to Xenophon and the Anabasis, in which a statement very like this is found (i. 4, 9). It is plain, therefore, that _they_ did not consider the dialogue to have been composed before the death of Sokrates. I think it very probable that Plato had in his mind Xenophon (either his Anabasis, or personal communications with him); but at any rate visits of Greeks to the Persian court became very numerous between 399-390 B.C., whereas Plato can hardly have seen any such visitors at Athens in 406 B.C. (before the close of the war), nor probably in 402 B.C., when Athens, though relieved from the oligarchy, was still in a state of great public prostration. Between 399 B.C. and the peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.), visitors from Greece to the interior of Persia became more and more frequent, the Persian kings interfering very actively in Grecian politics. Plato may easily have seen during these years intelligent Greeks who had been up to the Persian court on military or political business. Both the Persian kings and the Spartan kings were then in the maximum of power and ascendancy--it is no wonder therefore that Sokrates should here be made to dwell upon their prodigious dignity in his discourse with Alkibiades. Steinhart (Einl. p. 150) feels the difficulty of reconciling this part of the dialogue with his hypothesis that it was composed in 406 B.C.: yet he and Stallbaum both insist that it must have been composed before the death of Sokrates, for which they really produce no grounds at all.] [Footnote 53: Xen. Mem. i. 2, 14. [Greek: toi=s de\ dialegome/nois au)tô=| pa=si chrô/menon e)n toi=s lo/gois o(/pôs bou/loito.]] [Footnote 54: Aristoph. Ran. 1431. [Greek: ou) chrê\ le/ontos sku/mnon e)n po/lei tre/phein.] Thucyd. vi. 15. [Greek: phobêthe/ntes ga\r au)tou=] (Alkib.) [Greek: oi( polloi\ to\ me/gethos tê=s te kata\ to\ e(autou= sô=ma paranomi/as e)s tê\n di/aitan, kai\ tê=s dianoi/as ô(=n kath' e(\n e(/kaston, e)n o(/tô| gi/gnoito, e)/prassen, ô(s turanni/dos e)pithumou=nti pole/mioi kathe/stasan], &c.] [Footnote 55: Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 17.] [Footnote 56: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iii. 32, 77; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 4-6. Compare Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 D, 135 C; Symposion, p. 215-216.] [Footnote 57: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 39-40.] [Side-note: The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology is followed out in Alkib. I. Warfare against the false persuasion of knowledge.] Looking at Alkibiadês I. and II. in this point of view, we shall find them perfectly Sokratic both in topics proclaimed and in manner--whatever may be said about unnecessary prolixity and common-place here and there. The leading ideas of Alkibiadês I. may be found, nearly all, in the Platonic Apology. That warfare, which Sokrates proclaims in the Apology as having been the mission of his life, against the false persuasion of knowledge, or against beliefs ethical and æsthetical, firmly entertained without having been preceded by conscious study or subjected to serious examination--is exemplified in Alkibiadês I. and II. as emphatically as in any Platonic composition. In both these dialogues, indeed (especially in the first), we find an excessive repetition of specialising illustrations, often needless and sometimes tiresome: a defect easily intelligible if we assume them to have been written when Plato was still a novice in the art of dialogic composition. But both dialogues are fully impregnated with the spirit of the Sokratic process, exposing, though with exuberant prolixity, the firm and universal belief, held and affirmed by every one even at the age of boyhood, without any assignable grounds or modes of acquisition, and amidst angry discordance between the affirmation of one man and another. The emphasis too with which Sokrates insists upon his own single function of merely questioning, and upon the fact that Alkibiades gives all the answers and pronounces all the self-condemnation with his own mouth[58]--is remarkable in this dialogue: as well as the confidence with which he proclaims the dialogue as affording the only, but effective, cure.[59] The ignorance of which Alkibiades stands unexpectedly convicted, is expressly declared to be common to him with the other Athenian politicians: an exception being half allowed to pass in favour of the semi-philosophical Perikles, whom Plato judges here with less severity than elsewhere[60]--and a decided superiority being claimed for the Spartan and Persian kings, who are extolled as systematically trained from childhood. [Footnote 58: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 112-113.] [Footnote 59: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 E.] [Footnote 60: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-120.] [Side-note: Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance.] The main purpose of Sokrates is to drive Alkibiades into self-contradictions, and to force upon him a painful consciousness of ignorance and mental defect, upon grave and important subjects, while he is yet young enough to amend it. Towards this purpose he is made to lay claim to a divine mission similar to that which the real Sokrates announces in the Apology[61] A number of perplexing questions and difficulties are accumulated: it is not meant that these difficulties are insoluble, but that they cannot be solved by one who has never seriously reflected on them--by one who (as the Xenophontic Sokrates says to Euthydemus),[62] is so confident of knowing the subject that he has never meditated upon it at all. The disheartened Alkibiades feels the necessity of improving himself and supplicates the assistance of Sokrates:[63] who reminds him that he must first determine what "Himself" is. Here again we find ourselves upon the track of Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, and under the influence of the memorable inscription at Delphi--_Nosce teipsum_. Your mind is yourself; your body is a mere instrument of your mind: your wealth and power are simple appurtenances or adjuncts. To know yourself, which is genuine Sophrosynê or temperance, is to know your mind: but this can only be done by looking into another mind, and into its most intelligent compartment: just as the eye can only see itself by looking into the centre of vision of another eye.[64] [Footnote 61: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124 C-127 E.] [Footnote 62: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 36. [Greek: A)lla\ tau=ta me/n, e)/phê o( Sôkra/tês, i)/sôs, dia\ to\ spho/dra posteu/ein ei)de/nai, ou)d' e)/skepsai.]] [Footnote 63: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 128-132 A.] [Footnote 64: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 133. A Platonic metaphor, illustrating the necessity for two separate minds co-operating in dialectic colloquy.] [Side-note: Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue--but these are acknowledged Incognita.] At the same time, when, after having convicted Alkibiades of deplorable ignorance, Sokrates is called upon to prescribe remedies--all distinctness of indication disappears. It is exacted only when the purpose is to bring difficulties and contradictions to view: it is dispensed with, when the purpose is to solve them. The conclusion is, that assuming happiness as the acknowledged ultimate end,[65] Alkibiades cannot secure this either for himself or for his city, by striving for wealth and power, private or public: he can only secure it by acquiring for himself, and implanting in his country-men, justice, temperance, and virtue. This is perfectly Sokratic, and conformable to what is said by the real Sokrates in the Platonic Apology. But coming at the close of Alkibiadês I., it presents no meaning and imparts no instruction: because Sokrates had shown in the earlier part of the dialogue, that neither he himself, nor Alkibiades, nor the general public, knew what justice and virtue were. The positive solution which Sokrates professes to give, is therefore illusory. He throws us back upon those old, familiar, emotional, associations, unconscious products and unexamined transmissions from mind to mind--which he had already shown to represent the fancy of knowledge without the reality--deep-seated belief without any assignable intellectual basis, or outward standard of rectitude. [Footnote 65: Plat. Alkibiad. i. p. 134.] [Side-note: Prolixity of Alkibiadês I.--Extreme multiplication of illustrative examples--How explained.] Throughout the various Platonic dialogues, we find alternately two distinct and opposite methods of handling--the generalising of the special, and the specialising of the general. In Alkibiadês I, the specialising of the general preponderates--as it does in most of the conversations of the Xenophontic Memorabilia: the number of exemplifying particulars is unusually great. Sokrates does not accept as an answer a general term, without illustrating it by several of the specific terms comprehended under it: and this several times on occasions when an instructed reader thinks it superfluous and tiresome: hence, partly, the inclination of some modern critics to disallow the dialogue. But we must recollect that though a modern reader practised in the use of general terms may seize the meaning at once, an Athenian youth of the Platonic age would not be sure of doing the same. No conscious analysis had yet been applied to general terms: no grammar or logic then entered into education. Confident affirmation, without fully knowing the meaning of what is affirmed, is the besetting sin against which Plato here makes war: and his precautions for exposing it are pushed to extreme minuteness. So, too, in the Sophistês and Politikus, when he wishes to illustrate the process of logical division and subdivision, he applies it to cases so trifling and so multiplied, that Socher is revolted and rejects the dialogues altogether. But Plato himself foresees and replies to the objection; declaring expressly that his main purpose is, not to expound the particular subject chosen, but to make manifest and familiar the steps and conditions of the general classifying process--and that prolixity cannot be avoided.[66] We must reckon upon a similar purpose in Alkibiadês I. The dialogue is a specimen of that which Aristotle calls Inductive Dialectic, as distinguished from Syllogistic: the Inductive he considers to be plainer and easier, suitable when you have an ordinary collocutor--the Syllogistic is the more cogent, when you are dealing with a practised disputant.[67] [Footnote 66: Plato, Politikus, 285-286.] [Footnote 67: Aristotel. Topic. i. 104, a. 16. [Greek: Po/sa tô=n lo/gôn ei)/dê tô=n dialektikô=n--e)/sti de\ to\ me\n e)pagôgê/, to\ de\ sullogismo/s . . . . e)/sti d' ê( me\n e)pagôgê\ pithanô/teron kai\ saphe/steron kai\ kata\ tê\n ai)/sthêsin gnôrimô/teron kai\ toi=s polloi=s koino/n; o( de\ sullogismo\s biastikô/teron kai\ pro\s tou\s a)ntilogikou\s e)nerge/steron.]] [Side-note: Alkibiadês II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined.] It has been seen that Alkibiadês I, though professing to give something like a solution, gives what is really no solution at all. Alkibiadês II., similar in many respects, is here different, inasmuch as it does not even profess to solve the difficulty which had been raised. The general mental defect--false persuasion of knowledge without the reality--is presented in its application to a particular case. Alkibiades is obliged to admit that he does not know what he ought to pray to the Gods for: neither what is _good_, to be granted, nor what is _evil_, to be averted. He relies upon Sokrates for dispelling this mist from his mind: which Sokrates promises to do, but adjourns for another occasion. [Side-note: Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the Gods for favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular, semi-irregular agency of the Gods--he prays to them for premonitory warnings.] Sokrates here ascribes to the Spartans, and to various philosophers, the practice of putting up prayers in undefined language, for good and honourable things generally. He commends that practice. Xenophon tells us that the historical Sokrates observed it:[68] but he tells us also that the historical Sokrates, though not praying for any special presents from the Gods, yet prayed for and believed himself to receive special irregular revelations and advice as to what was good to be done or avoided in particular cases. He held that these special revelations were essential to any tolerable life: that the dispensations of the Gods, though administered upon regular principles on certain subjects and up to a certain point, were kept by them designedly inscrutable beyond that point: but that the Gods would, if properly solicited, afford premonitory warnings to any favoured person, such as would enable him to keep out of the way of evil, and put himself in the way of good. He declared that to consult and obey oracles and prophets was not less a maxim of prudence than a duty of piety: for himself, he was farther privileged through his divine sign or monitor, which he implicitly followed.[69] Such premonitory warnings were the only special favour which he thought it suitable to pray for--besides good things generally. For special presents he did not pray, because he professed not to know whether any of the ordinary objects of desire were good or bad. He proves in his conversation with Euthydêmus, that all those acquisitions which are usually accounted means of happiness--beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, nay, even good health and wisdom--are sometimes good or causes of happiness, sometimes evil or causes of misery; and therefore cannot be considered either as absolutely the one or absolutely the other.[70] [Footnote 68: Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 2; Plat. Alk. ii. p. 143-148.] [Footnote 69: These opinions of Sokrates are announced in various passages of the Xenophontic Memorabilia, i. 1, 1-10--[Greek: e)/phê de\ dei=n, a(\ me\n matho/ntas poiei=n e)/dôkan oi( theoi/, mantha/nein; a(\ de\ mê\ dê=la toi=s a)nthrô/pois e)sti/, peira=sthai dia\ mantikê=s para\ tô=n theô=n puntha/nesthai; tou\s theou\s ga/r, oi(=s a)\n ô)=sin i(/leô|, sêmai/nein]--i. 3, 4; i. 4, 2-15; iv. 3, 12; iv. 7, 10; iv. 8, 5-11.] [Footnote 70: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 31-32-36.[Greek: Tau=ta ou)=n pote\ me\n ô)phelou=nta pote\ de\ bla/ptonta, ti/ ma=llon a)gatha\ ê)\ kaka/ e)stin?]] [Side-note: Comparison of Alkibiadês II. with the Xenophontic Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus. Sokrates not always consistent with himself.] This impossibility of determining what is good and what is evil, in consequence of the uncertainty in the dispensations of the Gods and in human affairs--is a doctrine forcibly insisted on by the Xenophontic Sokrates in his discourse with Euthydêmus, and much akin to the Platonic Alkibiadês II., being applied to the special case of prayer. But we must not suppose that Sokrates adheres to this doctrine throughout all the colloquies of the Xenophontic Memorabilia: on the contrary, we find him, in other places, reasoning upon such matters, as health, strength, and wisdom, as if they were decidedly good.[71] The fact is, that the arguments of Sokrates, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, vary materially according to the occasion and the person with whom he is discoursing: and the case is similar with the Platonic dialogues: illustrating farther the questionable evidence on which Schleiermacher and other critics proceed, when they declare one dialogue to be spurious, because it contains reasoning inconsistent with another. [Footnote 71: For example, Xen. Mem. iv. 5, 6--[Greek: sophi/an to\ me/giston a)gatho/n], &c.] We find in Alkibiadês II. another doctrine which is also proclaimed by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia: that the Gods are not moved by costly sacrifice more than by humble sacrifice, according to the circumstances of the offerer:[72] they attend only to the mind of the offerer, whether he be just and wise: that is, "whether he knows what ought to be done both towards Gods and towards men".[73] [Footnote 72: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149-150; Xen. Mem. i. 3. Compare Plato, Legg. x. p. 885; Isokrat. ad Nikok.] [Footnote 73: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149 E, 150 B.] [Side-note: Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiadês II.--that knowledge is not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is indispensable: without that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than beneficial.] But we find also in Alkibiadês II. another doctrine, more remarkable. Sokrates will not proclaim absolutely that knowledge is good, and that ignorance is evil. In some cases, he contends, ignorance is good; and he discriminates which the cases are. That which we are principally interested in knowing, is _Good_, or The _Best_--The _Profitable_:[74] phrases used as equivalent. The knowledge of this is good, and the ignorance of it mischievous, under all supposable circumstances. And if a man knows good, the more he knows of everything else, the better; since he will sure to make a good use of his knowledge. But if he does not know good, the knowledge of other things will be hurtful rather than beneficial to him. To be skilful in particular arts and accomplishments, under the capital mental deficiency supposed, will render him an instrument of evil and not of good. The more he knows--and the more he believes himself to know--the more forward will he be in acting, and therefore the greater amount of harm will he do. It is better that he should act as little as possible. Such a man is not fit to direct his own conduct, like a freeman: he must be directed and controlled by others, like a slave. The greater number of mankind are fools of this description--ignorant of good: the wise men who know good, and are fit to direct, are very few. The wise man alone, knowing good, follows reason: the rest trust to opinion, without reason.[75] He alone is competent to direct both his own conduct and that of the society. [Footnote 74: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145 C. [Greek: O(/stis a)/ra ti tô=n toiou/tôn oi)=den, e)a\n me\n pare/pêtai au)tô=| ê( tou= belti/stou e)pistê/mê--au)tê\ d' ê)=n ê( au)tê\ dê/pou ê(per kai\ ê( tou= ô)pheli/mou]--also 146 B.] [Footnote 75: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 146 A-D. [Greek: a)/neu nou= do/xê| pepisteuko/tas.]] The stress which is laid here upon the knowledge of good, as distinguished from all other varieties of knowledge--the identification of the good with the profitable, and of the knowledge of good with reason ([Greek: nou=s]), while other varieties of knowledge are ranked with opinion ([Greek: do/xa])--these are points which, under one phraseology or another, pervade many of the Platonic dialogues. The old phrase of Herakleitus--[Greek: Polumathi/ê no/on ou) dida/skei]--"much learning does not teach reason"--seems to have been present to the mind of Plato in composing this dialogue. The man of much learning and art, without the knowledge of good, and surrendering himself to the guidance of one or other among his accomplishments, is like a vessel tossed about at sea without a pilot.[76] [Footnote 76: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 147 A. [Greek: o( de\ dê\ tê\n kaloume/nên poluma/theia/n te kai\ polutechni/an kektême/nos, o)rphano\s de\ ô)\n tau/tês tê=s e)pistê/mês, a)go/menos de\ u(po\ mia=s e(ka/stês tô=n a)/llôn], &c.] [Side-note: Knowledge of Good--appears postulated and divined, in many of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles.] What Plato here calls the knowledge of Good, or Reason--the just discrimination and comparative appreciation of Ends and Means--appears in the Politikus and Euthydêmus, under the title of the Regal or Political Art, of employing or directing[77] the results of all other arts, which are considered as subordinate: in the Protagoras, under the title of art of calculation or mensuration: in the Philêbus, as measure and proportion: in the Phædrus (in regard to rhetoric) as the art of turning to account, for the main purpose of persuasion, all the special processes, stratagems, decorations, &c., imparted by professional masters. In the Republic, it is personified in the few venerable Elders who constitute the Reason of the society, and whose directions all the rest (Guardians and Producers) are bound implicitly to follow: the virtue of the subordinates consisting in this implicit obedience. In the Leges, it is defined as the complete subjection in the mind, of pleasures and pains to right Reason,[78] without which, no special aptitudes are worth having. In the Xenophontic Memorabilia, it stands as a Sokratic authority under the title of Sophrosynê or Temperance:[79] and the Profitable is declared identical with the Good, as the directing and limiting principle for all human pursuits and proceedings.[80] [Footnote 77: Plato, Politikus, 292 B, 304 B, 305 A; Euthydêmus, 291 B, 292 B. Compare Xenophon, Oekonomicus, i. 8, 13.] [Footnote 78: Leges, iii. 689 A-D, 691 A.] [Footnote 79: Xenoph. Memor. i. 2. 17; iv. 3. 1.] [Footnote 80: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 6, 8; iv. 7, 7.] [Side-note: The Good--the Profitable--what is it?--How are we to know it? Plato leaves this undetermined.] But what are we to understand by the _Good_, about which there are so many disputes, according to the acknowledgment of Plato as well as of Sokrates? And what are we to understand by the Profitable? In what relation does it stand to the Pleasurable and the Painful? These are points which Plato here leaves undetermined. We shall find him again touching them, and trying different ways of determining them, in the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Republic, and elsewhere. We have here the title and the postulate, but nothing more, of a comprehensive Teleology, or right comparative estimate of ends and means one against another, so as to decide when, how far, under what circumstances, &c., each ought to be pursued. We shall see what Plato does in other dialogues to connect this title and postulate with a more definite meaning. CHAPTER XIII. HIPPIAS MAJOR--HIPPIAS MINOR. [Side-note: Hippias Major--situation supposed--character of the dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias.] Both these two dialogues are carried on between Sokrates and the Eleian Sophist Hippias. The general conception of Hippias--described as accomplished, eloquent, and successful, yet made to say vain and silly things--is the same in both dialogues: in both also the polemics of Sokrates against him are conducted in a like spirit, of affected deference mingled with insulting sarcasm. Indeed the figure assigned to Hippias is so contemptible, that even an admiring critic like Stallbaum cannot avoid noticing the "petulans pene et proterva in Hippiam oratio," and intimating that Plato has handled Hippias more coarsely than any one else. Such petulance Stallbaum attempts to excuse by saying that the dialogue is a youthful composition of Plato:[1] while Schleiermacher numbers it among the reasons for suspecting the dialogue, and Ast, among the reasons for declaring positively that Plato is not the author.[2] This last conclusion I do not at all accept: nor even the hypothesis of Stallbaum, if it be tendered as an excuse for improprieties of tone: for I believe that the earliest of Plato's dialogues was composed after he was twenty-eight years of age--that is, after the death of Sokrates. It is however noway improbable, that both the Greater and Lesser Hippias may have been among Plato's earlier compositions. We see by the Memorabilia of Xenophon that there was repeated and acrimonious controversy between Sokrates and Hippias: so that we may probably suppose feelings of special dislike, determining Plato to compose two distinct dialogues, in which an imaginary Hippias is mocked and scourged by an imaginary Sokrates. [Footnote 1: Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Hipp. Maj. p. 149-150; also Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 42-43), who says, after an outpouring of his usual invective against the Sophist: "Nevertheless the coarse jesting of the dialogue seems almost to exceed the admissible limit of comic effect," &c. Again, p. 50, Steinhart talks of the banter which Sokrates carries on with Hippias, in a way not less cruel (grausam) than purposeless, tormenting him with a string of successive new propositions about the definition of the Beautiful, which propositions, as fast as Hippias catches at them, he again withdraws of his own accord, and thus at last dismisses him (as he had dismissed Ion) uninstructed and unimproved, without even leaving behind in him the sting of anger, &c. It requires a powerful hatred against the persons called Sophists, to make a critic take pleasure in a comedy wherein silly and ridiculous speeches are fastened upon the name of one of them, in his own day not merely honoured but acknowledged as deserving honour by remarkable and varied accomplishments--and to make the critic describe the historical Hippias (whom we only know from Plato and Xenophon--see Steinhart, note 7, p. 89; Socher, p. 221) as if he had really delivered these speeches, or something equally absurd. How this comedy may be appreciated is doubtless a matter of individual taste. For my part, I agree with Ast in thinking it misplaced and unbecoming: and I am not surprised that he wishes to remove the dialogue from the Platonic canon, though I do not concur either in this inference, or in the general principle on which it proceeds, viz., that all objections against the composition of a dialogue are to be held as being also objections against its genuineness as a work of Plato. The Nubes of Aristophanes, greatly superior as a comedy to the Hippias of Plato, is turned to an abusive purpose when critics put it into court as evidence about the character of the real Sokrates. K. F. Hermann, in my judgment, takes a more rational view of the Hippias Major (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 487-647). Instead of expatiating on the glory of Plato in deriding an accomplished contemporary, he dwells upon the logical mistakes and confusion which the dialogue brings to view; and he reminds us justly of the intellectual condition of the age, when even elementary distinctions in logic and grammar had been scarcely attended to. Both K. F. Hermann and Socher consider the Hippias to be not a juvenile production of Plato, but to belong to his middle age.] [Footnote 2: Schleierm. Einleitung. p. 401; Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 457-459.] [Side-note: Real debate between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate.] One considerable point in the Hippias Major appears to have a bearing on the debate between Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia: in which debate, Hippias taunts Sokrates with always combating and deriding the opinions of others, while evading to give opinions of his own. It appears that some antecedent debates between the two had turned upon the definition of the Just, and that on these occasions Hippias had been the respondent, Sokrates the objector. Hippias professes to have reflected upon these debates, and to be now prepared with a definition which neither Sokrates nor any one else can successfully assail, but he will not say what the definition is, until Sokrates has laid down one of his own. In reply to this challenge, Sokrates declares the Just to be equivalent to the Lawful or Customary: he defends this against various objections of Hippias, who concludes by admitting it.[3] Probably this debate, as reported by Xenophon, or something very like it, really took place. If so, we remark with surprise the feebleness of the objections of Hippias, in a case where Sokrates, if he had been the objector, would have found such strong ones--and the feeble replies given by Sokrates, whose talent lay in starting and enforcing difficulties, not in solving them.[4] Among the remarks which Sokrates makes in illustration to Hippias, one is--that Lykurgus had ensured superiority to Sparta by creating in the Spartans a habit of implicit obedience to the laws.[5] Such is the character of the Xenophontic debate. [Footnote 3: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, 12-25.] [Footnote 4: Compare the puzzling questions which Alkibiades when a youth is reported to have addressed to Perikles, and which he must unquestionably have heard from Sokrates himself, respecting the meaning of the word [Greek: No/mos] (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 42). All the difficulties in determining the definition of [Greek: No/mos], occur also in determining that of [Greek: No/mimon], which includes both Jus Scriptum and Jus Moribus Receptum.] [Footnote 5: Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 15.] [Side-note: Opening of the Hippias Major--Hippias describes the successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his lectures.] Here, in the beginning of the Hippias Major, the Platonic Sokrates remarks that Hippias has been long absent from Athens: which absence, the latter explains, by saying that he has visited many cities in Greece, giving lectures with great success, and receiving high pay: and that especially he has often visited Sparta, partly to give lectures, but partly also to transact diplomatic business for his countrymen the Eleians, who trusted him more than any one else for such duties. His lectures (he says) were eminently instructive and valuable for the training of youth: moreover they were so generally approved, that even from a small Sicilian town called Inykus, he obtained a considerable sum in fees. [Side-note: Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans did not admit his instructions--their law forbids.] Upon this Sokrates asks--In which of the cities were your gains the largest: probably at Sparta? _Hip._--No; I received nothing at all at Sparta. _Sokr._--How? You amaze me! Were not your lectures calculated to improve the Spartan youth? or did not the Spartans desire to have their youth improved? or had they no money? _Hip._--Neither one nor the other. The Spartans, like others, desire the improvement of their youth: they also have plenty of money: moreover my lectures were very beneficial to them as well as to the rest.[6] _Sokr._--How could it happen then, that at Sparta, a city great and eminent for its good laws, your valuable instructions were left unrewarded; while you received so much at the inconsiderable town of Inykus? _Hip._--It is not the custom of the country, Sokrates, for the Spartans to change their laws, or to educate their sons in a way different from their ordinary routine. _Sokr._--How say you? It is not the custom of the country for the Spartans to do right, but to do wrong? _Hip._--I shall not say that, Sokrates. _Sokr._--But surely they would do right, in educating their children better and not worse? _Hip._--Yes, they would do right: but it is not lawful for them to admit a foreign mode of education. If any one could have obtained payment there for education, I should have obtained a great deal; for they listen to me with delight and applaud me: but, as I told you, their law forbids. [Footnote 6: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 283-284.] [Side-note: Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at the Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they fail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is also unlawful.] _Sokr._--Do you call law a hurt or benefit to the city? _Hip._--Law is enacted with a view to benefit: but it sometimes hurts if it be badly enacted.[7] _Sokr._--But what? Do not the enactors enact it as the maximum of good, without which the citizens cannot live a regulated life? _Hip._--Certainly: they do so. _Sokr._--Therefore, when those who try to enact laws miss the attainment of good, they also miss the lawful and law itself. How say you? _Hip._--They do so, if you speak with strict propriety: but such is not the language which men commonly use. _Sokr._--What men? the knowing? or the ignorant? _Hip._--The Many. _Sokr._--The Many; is it _they_ who know what truth is? _Hip._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--But surely those who do know, account the profitable to be in truth more lawful than the unprofitable, to all men. Don't you admit this? _Hip._--Yes, I admit they account it so in truth. _Sokr._--Well, and it is so, too: the truth is as the knowing men account it. _Hip._--Most certainly. _Sokr._--Now you affirm, that it is more profitable to the Spartans to be educated according to your scheme, foreign as it is, than according to their own native scheme. _Hip._--I affirm it, and with truth too. _Sokr._--You affirm besides, that things more profitable are at the same time more lawful? _Hip._--I said so. _Sokr._--According to your reasoning, then, it is more lawful for the Spartan children to be educated by Hippias, and more unlawful for them to be educated by their fathers-- if in reality they will be more benefited by you? _Hip._--But they will be more benefited by me. _Sokr._--The Spartans therefore act unlawfully, when they refuse to give you money and to confide to you their sons? _Hip._--I admit that they do: indeed your reasoning seems to make in my favour, so that I am noway called upon to resist it. _Sokr._--We find then, after all, that the Spartans are enemies of law, and that too in the most important matters--though they are esteemed the most exemplary followers of law.[8] [Footnote 7: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 284 C-B.] [Footnote 8: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 285.] * * * * * [Side-note: Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates.] Perhaps Plato intended the above argument as a derisory taunt against the Sophist Hippias, for being vain enough to think his own tuition better than that of the Spartan community. If such was his intention, the argument might have been retorted against Plato himself, for his propositions in the Republic and Leges: and we know that the enemies of Plato did taunt him with his inability to get these schemes adopted in any actual community. But the argument becomes interesting when we compare it with the debate before referred to in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, where Sokrates maintains against Hippias that the Just is equivalent to the Lawful. In that Xenophontic dialogue, all the difficulties which embarrass this explanation are kept out of sight, and Sokrates is represented as gaining an easy victory over Hippias. In this Platonic dialogue, the equivocal use of the word [Greek: no/mimon] is expressly adverted to, and Sokrates reduces Hippias to a supposed absurdity, by making him pronounce the Spartans to be enemies of law: [Greek: paranomou/s] bearing a double sense, and the proposition being true in one sense, false in the other. In the argument of the Platonic Sokrates, a law which does not attain its intended purpose of benefiting the community, is no law at all,--not lawful:[9] so that we are driven back again upon the objections of Alkibiades against Perikles (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) in regard to what constitutes a law. In the argument of the Xenophontic Sokrates, law means a law actually established, by official authority or custom--and the Spartans are produced as eminent examples of a lawfully minded community. As far as we can assign positive opinion to the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Major, he declares that the profitable or useful (being that which men always aim at in making law) is The Lawful, whether actually established or not: and that the unprofitable or hurtful (being that which men always intend to escape) is The Unlawful, whether prescribed by any living authority or not. This (he says) is the opinion of the wise men who know: though the ignorant vulgar hold the contrary opinion. The explanation of [Greek: to\ di/kaion] given by the Xenophontic Sokrates ([Greek: to\ di/kaion = to\ no/mimon]), would be equivalent, if we construe [Greek: to\ no/mimon] in the sense of the Platonic Sokrates (in Hippias Major) as an affirmation that The Just was the generally useful--[Greek: To\ di/kaion = to\ koinê=| su/mphoron]. [Footnote 9: Compare a similar argument of Sokrates against Thrasymachus--Republic, i. 339.] [Side-note: The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he does not always adhere.] There exists however in all this, a prevalent confusion between Law (or the Lawful) as actually established, and Law (or the Lawful) as it ought to be established, in the judgment of the critic, or of those whom he follows: that is (to use the phrase of Mr. Austin in his 'Province of Jurisprudence') Law as it would be, if it conformed to its assumed measure or test. In the first of these senses, [Greek: to\ no/mimon] is not one and the same, but variable according to place and time--one thing at Sparta, another thing elsewhere: accordingly it would not satisfy the demand of Plato's mind, when he asks for an explanation of [Greek: to\ di/kaion]. It is an explanation in the second of the two senses which Plato seeks--a common measure or test applicable universally, at all times and places. In so far as he ever finds one, it is that which I have mentioned above as delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in this dialogue: viz., the Just or Good, that which ought to be the measure or test of Law and Positive Morality, is, the beneficial or profitable. This (I repeat) is the only approach to a solution which we ever find in Plato. But this is seldom clearly enunciated, never systematically followed out, and sometimes, in appearance, even denied. * * * * * [Side-note: Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or astronomy, &c., but upon the question--What pursuits are beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth.] I resume the thread of the Hippias Major. Sokrates asks Hippias what sort of lectures they were that he delivered with so much success at Sparta? The Spartans (Hippias replies) knew nothing and cared nothing about letters, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy: but they took delight in hearing tales about heroes, early ancestors, foundation-legends of cities, &c., which his mnemonic artifice enabled him to deliver.[10] The Spartans delight in you (observes Sokrates) as children delight in old women's tales. Yes (replies Hippias), but that is not all: I discoursed to them also, recently, about fine and honourable pursuits, much to their admiration: I supposed a conversation between Nestor and Neoptolemus, after the capture of Troy, in which the veteran, answering a question put by his youthful companion, enlarged upon those pursuits which it was fine, honourable, beautiful for a young man to engage in. My discourse is excellent, and obtained from the Spartans great applause. I am going to deliver it again here at Athens, in the school-room of Pheidostratus, and I invite you, Sokrates, to come and hear it, with as many friends as you can bring.[11] [Footnote 10: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 285 E.] [Footnote 11: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 A-B.] [Side-note: Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it--What is the Beautiful?] I shall come willingly (replied Sokrates). But first answer me one small question, which will rescue me from a present embarrassment. Just now, I was shamefully puzzled in conversation with a friend, to whom I had been praising some things as honourable and beautiful,--blaming other things as mean and ugly. He surprised me by the interrogation--How do you know, Sokrates, what things are beautiful, and what are ugly? Come now, can you tell me, What is the Beautiful? I, in my stupidity, was altogether puzzled, and could not answer the question. But after I had parted from him, I became mortified and angry with myself; and I vowed that the next time I met any wise man, like you, I would put the question to him, and learn how to answer it; so that I might be able to renew the conversation with my friend. Your coming here is most opportune. I entreat you to answer and explain to me clearly what the Beautiful is; in order that I may not again incur the like mortification. You can easily answer: it is a small matter for you, with your numerous attainments. [Side-note: Hippias thinks the question easy to answer.] Oh--yes--a small matter (replies Hippias); the question is easy to answer. I could teach you to answer many questions harder than that: so that no man shall be able to convict you in dialogue.[12] [Footnote 12: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 C-D.] Sokrates then proceeds to interrogate Hippias, in the name of the absentee, starting one difficulty after another as if suggested by this unknown prompter, and pretending to be himself under awe of so impracticable a disputant. [Side-note: Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is Beauty, or the Beautiful?] All persons are just, through Justice--wise, through Wisdom--good, through Goodness or the Good--beautiful, through Beauty or the Beautiful. Now Justice, Wisdom, Goodness, Beauty or the Beautiful, must each be _something_. Tell me what the Beautiful is? [Side-note: Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object.] Hippias does not conceive the question. Does the man want to know what is a beautiful thing? _Sokr._--No; he wants to know what is _The Beautiful_. _Hip._--I do not see the difference. I answer that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing. No one can deny that.[13] [Footnote 13: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 287 A.] _Sokr._--My disputatious friend will not accept your answer. He wants you to tell him, What is the Self-Beautiful?--that Something through which all beautiful things become beautiful. Am I to tell him, it is because a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing? He will say--Is not a beautiful mare a beautiful thing also? and a beautiful lyre as well? _Hip._--Yes;--both of them are so. _Sokr._--Ay, and a beautiful pot, my friend will add, well moulded and rounded by a skilful potter, is a beautiful thing too. _Hip._--How, Sokrates? Who can your disputatious friend be? Some ill-taught man, surely; since he introduces such trivial names into a dignified debate. _Sokr._--Yes; that is his character: not polite, but vulgar, anxious for nothing else but the truth. _Hip._--A pot, if it be beautifully made, must certainly be called beautiful; yet still, all such objects are unworthy to be counted as beautiful, if compared with a maiden, a mare, or a lyre. [Side-note: Cross-questioning by Sokrates--Other things also are beautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes not beautiful.] _Sokr._--I understand. You follow the analogy suggested by Herakleitus in his dictum--That the most beautiful ape is ugly, if compared with the human race. So you say, the most beautiful pot is ugly, when compared with the race of maidens. _Hip_--Yes. That is my meaning. _Sokr._--Then my friend will ask you in return, whether the race of maidens is not as much inferior to the race of Gods, as the pot to the maiden? whether the most beautiful maiden will not appear ugly, when compared to a Goddess? whether the wisest of men will not appear an ape, when compared to the Gods, either in beauty or in wisdom.[14] _Hip._--No one can dispute it. _Sokr._--My friend will smile and say--You forget what was the question put. I asked you, What is the Beautiful?--the Self-Beautiful: and your answer gives me, as the Self-Beautiful, something which you yourself acknowledge to be no more beautiful than ugly? If I had asked you, from the first, what it was that was both beautiful and ugly, your answer would have been pertinent to the question. Can you still think that the Self-Beautiful,--that Something, by the presence of which all other things become beautiful,--is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre? [Footnote 14: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 289.] [Side-note: Second answer of Hippias--_Gold_, is that by the presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied to the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies.] _Hip._--I have another answer to which your friend can take no exception. That, by the presence of which all things become beautiful, is Gold. What was before ugly, will (we all know), when ornamented with gold, appear beautiful. _Sokr._--You little know what sort of man my friend is. He will laugh at your answer, and ask you--Do you think, then, that Pheidias did not know his profession as a sculptor? How came he not to make the statue of Athênê all gold, instead of making (as he has done) the face, hands, and feet of ivory, and the pupils of the eyes of a particular stone? Is not ivory also beautiful, and particular kinds of stone? _Hip._--Yes, each is beautiful, where it is becoming. _Sokr._--And ugly, where it is not becoming.[15] _Hip._--Doubtless. I admit that what is becoming or suitable, makes that to which it is applied appear beautiful: that which is not becoming or suitable, makes it appear ugly. _Sokr._--My friend will next ask you, when you are boiling the beautiful pot of which we spoke just now, full of beautiful soup, what sort of ladle will be suitable and becoming--one made of gold, or of fig-tree wood? Will not the golden ladle spoil the soup, and the wooden ladle turn it out good? Is not the wooden ladle, therefore, better than the golden? _Hip._--By Hêraklês, Sokrates! what a coarse and stupid fellow your friend is! I cannot continue to converse with a man who talks of such matters. _Sokr._--I am not surprised that you, with your fine attire and lofty reputation, are offended with these low allusions. But I have nothing to spoil by intercourse with this man; and I entreat you to persevere, as a favour to me. He will ask you whether a wooden soup-ladle is not more beautiful than a ladle of gold,--since it is more suitable and becoming? So that though you said--The Self-Beautiful is Gold--you are now obliged to acknowledge that gold is not more beautiful than fig-tree wood? [Footnote 15: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 290.] [Side-note: Third answer of Hippias--questions upon it--proof given that it fails of universal application.] _Hip._--I acknowledge that it is so. But I have another answer ready which will silence your friend. I presume you wish me to indicate as The Beautiful, something which will never appear ugly to any one, at any time, or at any place.[16] _Sokr._--That is exactly what I desire. _Hip._--Well, I affirm, then, that to every man, always, and everywhere, the following is most beautiful. A man being healthy, rich, honoured by the Greeks, having come to old age and buried his own parents well, to be himself buried by his own sons well and magnificently. _Sokr._--Your answer sounds imposing; but my friend will laugh it to scorn, and will remind me again, that his question pointed to the Beautiful _itself_[17]--something which, being present as attribute in any subject, will make that subject (whether stone, wood, man, God, action, study, &c.) beautiful. Now that which you have asserted to be beautiful to every one everywhere, was not beautiful to Achilles, who accepted by preference the lot of dying before his father--nor is it so to the heroes, or to the sons of Gods, who do not survive or bury their fathers. To some, therefore, what you specify is beautiful--to others it is not beautiful but ugly: that is, it is both beautiful and ugly, like the maiden, the lyre, the pot, on which we have already remarked. _Hip._--I did not speak about the Gods or Heroes. Your friend is intolerable, for touching on such profanities.[18] _Sokr._--However, you cannot deny that what you have indicated is beautiful only for the sons of men, and not for the sons of Gods. My friend will thus make good his reproach against your answer. He will tell me, that all the answers, which we have as yet given, are too absurd. And he may perhaps at the same time himself suggest another, as he sometimes does in pity for my embarrassment. [Footnote 16: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 C-D.] [Footnote 17: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 292 D.] [Footnote 18: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 B.] [Side-note: Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself--1. The Suitable or Becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected.] Sokrates then mentions, as coming from hints of the absent friend, three or four different explanations of the Self-Beautiful: each of which, when first introduced, he approves, and Hippias approves also: but each of which he proceeds successively to test and condemn. It is to be remarked that all of them are general explanations: not consisting in conspicuous particular instances, like those which had come from Hippias. His explanations are the following:-- 1. The suitable or becoming (which had before been glanced at). It is the suitable or becoming which constitutes the Beautiful.[19] [Footnote 19: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 E.] To this Sokrates objects: The suitable, or becoming, is what causes objects to _appear_ beautiful--not what causes them to _be really_ beautiful. Now the latter is that which we are seeking. The two conditions do not always go together. Those objects, institutions, and pursuits which _are really_ beautiful (fine, honourable) very often do not appear so, either to individuals or to cities collectively; so that there is perpetual dispute and fighting on the subject. The suitable or becoming, therefore, as it is certainly what makes objects appear beautiful, so it cannot be what makes them really beautiful.[20] [Footnote 20: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 B-E.] [Side-note: 2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will not hold.] 2. The useful or profitable.--We call objects beautiful, looking to the purpose which they are calculated or intended to serve: the human body, with a view to running, wrestling, and other exercises--a horse, an ox, a cock, looking to the service required from them--implements, vehicles on land and ships at sea, instruments for music and other arts all upon the same principle, looking to the end which they accomplish or help to accomplish. Laws and pursuits are characterised in the same way. In each of these, we give the name Beautiful to the useful, in so far as it is useful, when it is useful, and for the purpose to which it is useful. To that which is useless or hurtful, in the same manner, we give the name Ugly.[21] [Footnote 21: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 C-D.] Now that which is capable of accomplishing each end, is useful for such end: that which is incapable, is useless. It is therefore capacity, or power, which is beautiful: incapacity, or impotence, is ugly.[22] [Footnote 22: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n to\ dunato\n e(/kaston a)perga/zesthai, ei)s o(/per dunato/n, ei)s tou=to kai\ chrê/simon; to\ de\ a)du/naton a)/chrêston? . . . . Du/namis me\n a)/ra kalo/n--a)dunami/a de\ ai)schro/n?]] Most certainly (replies Hippias): this is especially true in our cities and communities, wherein political power is the finest thing possible, political impotence, the meanest. Yet, on closer inspection (continues Sokrates), such a theory will not hold. Power is employed by all men, though unwillingly, for bad purposes: and each man, through such employment of his power, does much more harm than good, beginning with his childhood. Now power, which is useful for the doing of evil, can never be called beautiful.[23] [Footnote 23: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 296 C-D.] You cannot therefore say that Power, taken absolutely, is beautiful. You must add the qualification--Power used for the production of some good, is beautiful. This, then, would be the profitable--the cause or generator of good.[24] But the cause is different from its effect: the generator or father is different from the generated or son. The beautiful would, upon this view, be the cause of the good. But then the beautiful would be different from the good, and the good different from the beautiful? Who can admit this? It is obviously wrong: it is the most ridiculous theory which we have yet hit upon.[25] [Footnote 24: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 B.] [Footnote 25: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 D-E. [Greek: ei) oi(=o/n t' e)sti/n, e(kei/nôn ei)=nai (kinduneu/ei) geloio/teros tô=n prô/tôn.]] [Side-note: 3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable--that which is received through the eye and the ear.] 3. The Beautiful is a particular variety of the agreeable or pleasurable: that which characterises those things which cause pleasure to us through sight and hearing. Thus the men, the ornaments, the works of painting or sculpture, upon which we look with admiration,[26] are called beautiful: also songs, music, poetry, fable, discourse, in like manner; nay even laws, customs, pursuits, which we consider beautiful, might be brought under the same head.[27] [Footnote 26: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 A-B.] [Footnote 27: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 D. Professor Bain observes:--"The eye and the ear are the great avenues to the mind for the æsthetic class of influences; the other senses are more or less in the monopolist interest. The blue sky, the green woods, and all the beauties of the landscape, can fill the vision of a countless throng of admirers. So with the pleasing sounds, &c." 'The Emotions and the Will.' ch. xiv. (The Æsthetic Emotions), sect. 2, p. 226, 3rd ed.] [Side-note: Objections to this last--What property is there common to both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful?] The objector, however, must now be dealt with. He will ask us--Upon what ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures of sight and hearing, and other pleasures? Do you deny that these others (those of taste, smell, eating, drinking, sex) are really pleasures? No, surely (we shall reply); we admit them to be pleasures,--but no one will tolerate us in calling them beautiful: especially the pleasures of sex, which as pleasures are the greatest of all, but which are ugly and disgraceful to behold. He will answer--I understand you: you are ashamed to call these pleasures beautiful, because they do not seem so to the multitude: but I did not ask you, what _seems_ beautiful to the multitude--I asked you, what _is_ beautiful.[28] You mean to affirm, that all pleasures which do not belong to sight and hearing, are not beautiful: Do you mean, all which do not belong to both? or all which do not belong to one or the other? We shall reply--To either one of the two--or to both the two. Well! but, why (he will ask) do you single out these pleasures of sight and hearing, as beautiful exclusively? What is there peculiar in them, which gives them a title to such distinction? All pleasures are alike, so far forth as pleasures, differing only in the more or less. Next, the pleasures of sight cannot be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through sight--for that reason would not apply to the pleasures of hearing: nor again can the pleasures of hearing be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through hearing.[29] We must find something possessed as well by sight as by hearing, common to both, and peculiar to them,--which confers beauty upon the pleasures of both and of each. Any attribute of one, which does not also belong to the other, will not be sufficient for our purpose.[30] Beauty must depend upon some essential characteristic which both have in common.[31] We must therefore look out for some such characteristic, which belongs to both as well as to each separately. [Footnote 28: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 298 E, 299 A. [Greek: Mantha/nô, a)\n i)/sôs phai/ê, kai\ e)gô/, o(/ti pa/lai ai)schu/nesthe tau/tas ta\s ê(dona\s pha/nai kala\s ei)=nai, o(/ti ou) dokei= toi=s a)nthrô/pois; a)ll' e)gô\ ou) tou=to ê)rô/tôn, _o(\ dokei= toi=s polloi=s kalo\n ei)=nai_, a)ll' o(\, _ti e)/stin_.]] [Footnote 29: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 299 D-E.] [Footnote 30: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 300 B. A separate argument between Sokrates and Hippias is here as it were interpolated; Hippias affirms that he does not see how any predicate can be true of both which is not true of either separately. Sokrates points out that two men are Both, even in number, while each is One, an odd number. You cannot say of the two that they are one, nor can you say of either that he is Both. There are two classes of predicates; some which are true of either but not true of the two together, or _vice versâ_; some again which are true of the two and true also of each one--such as just, wise, handsome, &c. p. 301-303 B.] [Footnote 31: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 302 C. [Greek: tê=| ou)si/a| tê=| e)p' a)mpho/tera e(pome/nê| ô)=|mên, ei)/per a)mpho/tera/ e)sti kala/, tau/tê| dei=n au)ta\ kala\ ei)=nai, tê=| de\ kata\ ta\ e(/tera a)poleipome/nê| mê/. kai\ e(/ti nu=n oi)=omai.]] [Side-note: Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in common, the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this ground they are called beautiful.] Now there is one characteristic which may perhaps serve. The pleasures of sight and hearing, both and each, are distinguished from other pleasures by being the most innocuous and the best.[32] It is for this reason that we call them beautiful. The Beautiful, then, is profitable pleasure--or pleasure producing good--for the profitable is, that which produces good.[33] [Footnote 32: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: o(/ti a)sine/statai au(=tai tô=n ê(donô=n ei)si kai\ be/ltistai, kai\ a)mpho/terai kai\ e(kate/ra.]] [Footnote 33: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: le/gete dê\ to\ kalo\n ei)=nai, _ê(donê\n ô)phe/limon_.]] [Side-note: This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of Good, and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has been already declared inadmissible.] Nevertheless the objector will not be satisfied even with this. He will tell us--You declare the Beautiful to be Pleasure producing good. But we before agreed, that the producing agent or cause is different from what is produced or the effect. Accordingly, the Beautiful is different from the good: or, in other words, the Beautiful is not good, nor is the Good beautiful--if each of them is a different thing.[34] Now these propositions we have already pronounced to be inadmissible, so that your present explanation will not stand better than the preceding. [Footnote 34: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E--304 A. [Greek: Ou)/koun ô)phe/limon, phê/sei, to\ poiou=n ta)gatho/n, to\ de\ poiou=n kai\ to\ poiou/menon, e(/teron nu=n dê\ e)pha/nê, kai\ ei)s to\n pro/teron lo/gon ê(/kei u(mi=n o( lo/gos? _ou)/te ga\r to\ a)gatho\n a)\n ei)/ê kalo\n ou)/te to\ kalo\n a)gatho/n, ei)/per a)/llo au)tô=n e(ka/tero/n e)stin_.] These last words deserve attention, because they coincide with the doctrine ascribed to Antisthenes, which has caused so many hard words to be applied to him (as well as to Stilpon) by critics, from Kolôtes downwards. The general principle here laid down by Plato is--A is something different from B, therefore A is not B and B is not A. In other words, A cannot be predicated of B nor B of A. Antisthenes said in like manner--[Greek: A)/nthrôpos] and [Greek: A)gatho\s] are different from each other, therefore you cannot say [Greek: A)/nthrôpos e)stin a)gatho/s]. You can only say [Greek: A)/nthrôpos e)stin A)/nthrôpos]--A)gatho/s e)stin a)gatho/s]. I have touched farther upon this point in my chapter upon Antisthenes and the other Viri Sokratici.] * * * * * [Side-note: Remarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations ascribed to Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept.] Thus finish the three distinct explanations of [Greek: To\ kalo\n], which Plato in this dialogue causes to be first suggested by Sokrates, successively accepted by Hippias, and successively refuted by Sokrates. In comparing them with the three explanations which he puts into the mouth of Hippias, we note this distinction: That the explanations proposed by Hippias are conspicuous particular exemplifications of the Beautiful, substituted in place of the general concept: as we remarked, in the Dialogue Euthyphron, that the explanations of the Holy given by Euthyphron in reply to Sokrates, were of the same exemplifying character. On the contrary, those suggested by Sokrates keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to discover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is only a derivative or a modification, so as to render a definition of it practicable. To illustrate this difference by the language of Dr. Whewell respecting many of the classifications in Natural History, we may say--That according to the views here represented by Hippias, the group of objects called beautiful is given by Type, not by Definition:[35] while Sokrates proceeds like one convinced that some common characteristic attribute may be found, on which to rest a Definition. To search for Definitions of general words, was (as Aristotle remarks) a novelty, and a valuable novelty, introduced by Sokrates. His contemporaries, the Sophists among them, were not accustomed to it: and here the Sophist Hippias (according to Plato's frequent manner) is derided as talking nonsense,[36] because, when asked for an explanation of The Self-Beautiful, he answers by citing special instances of beautiful objects. But we must remember, first, that Sokrates, who is introduced as trying several general explanations of the Self-Beautiful, does not find one which will stand: next, that even if one such could be found, particular instances can never be dispensed with, in the way of illustration; lastly, that there are many general terms (the Beautiful being one of them) of which no definitions can be provided, and which can only be imperfectly explained, by enumerating a variety of objects to which the term in question is applied.[37] Plato thought himself entitled to objectivise every general term, or to assume a substantive Ens, called a Form or Idea, corresponding to it. This was a logical mistake quite as serious as any which we know to have been committed by Hippias or any other Sophist. The assumption that wherever there is a general term, there must also be a generic attribute corresponding to it--is one which Aristotle takes much pains to negative: he recognises terms of transitional analogy, as well as terms equivocal: while he also especially numbers the Beautiful among equivocal terms.[38] [Footnote 35: See Dr. Whewell's 'History of the Inductive Sciences,' ii. 120 seq.; and Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' iv. 8, 3. I shall illustrate this subject farther when I come to the dialogue called Lysis.] [Footnote 36: Stallbaum, in his notes, bursts into exclamations of wonder at the incredible stupidity of Hippias--"En hominis stuporem prorsus admirabilem," p. 289 E.] [Footnote 37: Mr. John Stuart Mill observes in his System of Logic, i. 1, 5: "One of the chief sources of lax habits of thought is the custom of using connotative terms without a distinctly ascertained connotation, and with no more precise notion of their meaning than can be loosely collected from observing what objects they are used to denote. It is in this manner that we all acquire, and inevitably so, our first knowledge of our vernacular language. A child learns the meaning of Man, White, &c., by hearing them applied to a number of individual objects, and finding out, by a process of generalisation of which he is but imperfectly conscious, what those different objects have in common. In many cases objects bear a general resemblance to each other, which leads to their being familiarly classed together under a common name, while it is not immediately apparent what are the particular attributes upon the possession of which in common by them all their general resemblance depends. In this manner names creep on from subject to subject until all traces of a common meaning sometimes disappear, and the word comes to denote a number of things not only independently of any common attribute, but which have actually no attribute in common, or none but what is shared by other things to which the name is capriciously refused. It would be well if this degeneracy of language took place only in the hands of the untaught vulgar; but some of the most remarkable instances are to be found in terms of art, and among technically educated persons, such as English lawyers. _Felony_, _e.g._, is a law-term with the sound of which all are familiar: _but there is no lawyer who would undertake to tell what a felony is, otherwise than by enumerating the various offences so called._ Originally the word _felony_ had a meaning; it denoted all offences, the penalty of which included forfeiture of lands or goods, but subsequent Acts of Parliament have declared various offences to be felonies without enjoining that penalty, and have taken away that penalty from others which continue nevertheless to be called felonies, insomuch that the acts so called have now no property whatever in common save that of being unlawful and punishable."] [Footnote 38: Aristot. Topic, i. 106, a. 21. [Greek: Ta\ pollachô=s lego/mena--ta\ pleonachô=s lego/mena]--are perpetually noted and distinguished by Aristotle.] [Side-note: Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia.] We read in the Xenophontic Memorabilia a dialogue between Sokrates and Aristippus, on this same subject--What is the Beautiful, which affords a sort of contrast between the Dialogues of Search and those of Exposition. In the Hippias Major, we have the problem approached on several different sides, various suggestions being proposed, and each successively disallowed, on reasons shown, as failures: while in the Xenophontic dialogue, Sokrates declares an affirmative doctrine, and stands to it--but no pains are taken to bring out the objections against it and rebut them. The doctrine is, that the Beautiful is coincident with the Good, and that both of them are resolvable into the Useful: thus all beautiful objects, unlike as they may be to the eye or touch, bear that name because they have in common the attribute of conducing to one and the same purpose--the security, advantage, or gratification, of man, in some form or other. This is one of the three explanations broached by the Platonic Sokrates, and afterwards refuted by him, in the Hippias: while his declaration (which Hippias puts aside as unseemly)--that a pot and a wooden soup-ladle conveniently made are beautiful is perfectly in harmony with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates, that a basket for carrying dung is beautiful, if it performs its work well.[39] We must moreover remark, that the objections whereby the Platonic Sokrates, after proposing the doctrine and saying much in its favour, finds himself compelled at last to disallow it--these objections are not produced and refuted, but passed over without notice, in the Xenophontic dialogue, wherein Sokrates affirms it decidedly.[40] The affirming Sokrates, and the objecting Sokrates, are not on the stage at once. [Footnote 39: Xen. Mem. iii. 6, 2, 7; iv. 6, 8. Plato, Hipp. Maj. 288 D, 290 D. I am obliged to translate the words [Greek: to\ Kalo/n] by the Beautiful or beauty, to avoid a tiresome periphrasis. But in reality the Greek words include more besides: they mean also the _fine_, the _honourable or that which is worthy of honour_, the _exalted_, &c. If we have difficulty in finding any common property connoted by the English word, the difficulty in the case of the Greek word is still greater.] [Footnote 40: In regard to the question, Wherein consists [Greek: To\ Kalo/n]? and objections against the theory of the Xenophontic Sokrates, it is worth while to compare the views of modern philosophers. Dugald Stewart says (on the Beautiful, 'Philosophical Essays,' p. 214 seq.), "It has long been a favourite problem with philosophers to ascertain the common quality or qualities which entitle a thing to the denomination of Beautiful. But the success of their speculations has been so inconsiderable, that little can be inferred from them except the impossibility of the problem to which they have been directed. The speculations which have given occasion to these remarks have evidently originated in a prejudice which has descended to modern times from the scholastic ages. That when a word admits of a variety of significations, these different significations must all be species of the same genus, and must consequently include some essential idea common to every individual to which the generic term can be applied. Of this principle, which has been an abundant source of obscurity and mystery in the different sciences, it would be easy to expose the unsoundness and futility. Socrates, whose plain good sense appears, on this as on other occasions, to have fortified his understanding to a wonderful degree against the metaphysical subtleties which misled his successors, was evidently apprised fully of the justice of the foregoing remarks, if any reliance can be placed on the account given by Xenophon of his conversation with Aristippus about the Good and the Beautiful," &c. Stewart then proceeds to translate a portion of the Xenophontic dialogue (Memorab. iii. 8). But unfortunately he does not translate the whole of it. If he had he would have seen that he has misconceived the opinion of Sokrates, who maintains the very doctrine here disallowed by Stewart, viz., That there is an essential idea common to all beautiful objects, the fact of being conducive to human security, comfort, or enjoyment. This is unquestionably an important common property, though the multifarious objects which possess it may be unlike in all other respects. As to the general theory I think that Stewart is right: it is his compliment to Sokrates, on this occasion, which I consider misplaced. He certainly would not have agreed with Sokrates (nor should I agree with him) in calling by the epithet _beautiful_ a basket for carrying dung when well made for its own purpose, or a convenient boiling-pot, or a soup-ladle made of fig-tree wood, as the Platonic Sokrates affirms in the Hippias (288 D, 290 D). The Beautiful and the Useful sometimes coincide; more often or at least very often, they do not. Hippias is made to protest, in this dialogue, against the mention of such vulgar objects as the pot and the ladle; and this is apparently intended by Plato as a defective point in his character, denoting silly affectation and conceit, like his fine apparel. But Dugald Stewart would have agreed in the sentiment ascribed to Hippias--that vulgar and mean objects have no place in an inquiry into the Beautiful; and that they belong, when well-formed for their respective purposes, to the category of the Useful. The Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia is mistaken in confounding the Beautiful with the Good and the Useful. But his remarks are valuable in another point of view, as they insist most forcibly on the essential relativity both of the Beautiful and the Good. The doctrine of Dugald Stewart is supported by Mr. John Stuart Mill ('System of Logic,' iv. 4, 5, p. 220 seq.);** and Professor Bain has expounded the whole subject still more fully in a chapter (xiv. p. 225 seq., on the Æsthetic Emotions) of his work on the Emotions and the Will.] The concluding observations of this dialogue, interchanged between Hippias and Sokrates, are interesting as bringing out the antithesis between rhetoric and dialectic--between the concrete and exemplifying, as contrasted with the abstract and analytical. Immediately after Sokrates has brought his own third suggestion to an inextricable embarrassment, Hippias remarks-- [Side-note: Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates.] "Well, Sokrates, what do you think now of all these reasonings of yours? They are what I declared them to be just now,--scrapings and parings of discourse, divided into minute fragments. But the really beautiful and precious acquirement is, to be able to set out well and finely a regular discourse before the Dikastery or the public assembly, to persuade your auditors, and to depart carrying with you not the least but the greatest of all prizes--safety for yourself, your property, and your friends. These are the real objects to strive for. Leave off your petty cavils, that you may not look like an extreme simpleton, handling silly trifles as you do at present."[41] "My dear Hippias," (replies Sokrates) "you are a happy man, since you know what pursuits a man ought to follow, and have yourself followed them, as you say, with good success. But I, as it seems, am under the grasp of an unaccountable fortune: for I am always fluctuating and puzzling myself, and when I lay my puzzle before you wise men, I am requited by you with hard words. I am told just what you have now been telling me, that I busy myself about matters silly, petty, and worthless. When on the contrary, overborne by your authority, I declare as you do, that it is the finest thing possible to be able to set out well and beautifully a regular discourse before the public assembly, and bring it to successful conclusion--then there are other men at hand who heap upon me bitter reproaches: especially that one man, my nearest kinsman and inmate, who never omits to convict me. When on my return home he hears me repeat what you have told me, he asks, if I am not ashamed of my impudence in talking about beautiful (honourable) pursuits, when I am so manifestly convicted upon this subject, of not even knowing what the Beautiful (Honourable) is. How can you (he says), being ignorant what the Beautiful is, know _who_ has set out a discourse beautifully and _who_ has not--_who_ has performed a beautiful exploit and _who_ has not? Since you are in a condition so disgraceful, can you think life better for you than death? Such then is my fate--to hear disparagement and reproaches from you on the one side, and from him on the other. Necessity however perhaps requires that I should endure all these discomforts: for it will be nothing strange if I profit by them. Indeed I think that I have already profited both by your society, Hippias, and by his: for I now think that I know what the proverb means--Beautiful (Honourable) things are difficult."[42] [Footnote 41: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 A.] [Footnote 42: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 D-E.] [Side-note: Rhetoric against Dialectic.] Here is a suitable termination for one of the Dialogues of Search: "My mind has been embarrassed by contradictions as yet unreconciled, but this is a stage indispensable to future improvement". We have moreover an interesting passage of arms between Rhetoric and Dialectic: two contemporaneous and contending agencies, among the stirring minds of Athens, in the time of Plato and Isokrates. The Rhetor accuses the Dialectician of departing from the conditions of reality--of breaking up the integrity of those concretes, which occur in nature each as continuous and indivisible wholes. Each of the analogous particular cases forms a continuum or concrete by itself, which may be compared with the others, but cannot be taken to pieces, and studied in separate fragments.[43] The Dialectician on his side treats the Abstract ([Greek: to\ kalo\n]) as the real Integer, and the highest abstraction as the first of all integers, containing in itself and capable of evolving all the subordinate integers: the various accompaniments, which go along with each Abstract to make up a concrete, he disregards as shadowy and transient disguises. [Footnote 43: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 301 B. [Greek: A)lla\ ga\r dê\ su/, ô)= Sô/krates, ta\ me\n o(/la tô=n pragma/tôn ou) skopei=s, ou)d' e)kei=noi, oi(=s su\ ei)/ôthas diale/gesthai, krou/ete de\ a)polamba/nontes to\ kalo\n kai\ e(/kaston tô=n o)/ntôn e)n toi=s lo/gois katate/mnontes; dia\ tau=ta ou(/tô mega/la u(ma=s lantha/nei kai\ _dianekê= sô/mata tê=s ou)si/as pephuko/ta_.] Compare 301 E. The words [Greek: dianekê= sô/mata tê=s ou)si/as pephuko/ta] correspond as nearly as can be to the logical term _Concrete_, opposed to _Abstract_. Nature furnishes only Concreta, not Abstracta.] [Side-note: Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the speculative and analytical philosophers.] Hippias accuses Sokrates of never taking into his view Wholes, and of confining his attention to separate parts and fragments, obtained by logical analysis and subdivision. Aristophanes, when he attacks the Dialectic of Sokrates, takes the same ground, employing numerous comic metaphors to illustrate the small and impalpable fragments handled, and the subtle transpositions which they underwent in the reasoning. Isokrates again deprecates the over-subtlety of dialectic debate, contrasting it with discussions (in his opinion) more useful; wherein entire situations, each with its full clothing and assemblage of circumstances, were reviewed and estimated.[44] All these are protests, by persons accustomed to deal with real life, and to talk to auditors both numerous and commonplace, against that conscious analysis and close attention to general and abstract terms, which Sokrates first insisted on and transmitted to his disciples. On the other side, we have the emphatic declaration made by the Platonic Sokrates (and made still earlier by the Xenophontic[45] or historical Sokrates)--That a man was not fit to talk about beautiful things in the concrete--that he had no right to affirm or deny that attribute, with respect to any given subject--that he was not** even fit to live unless he could explain what was meant by The Beautiful, or Beauty in the abstract. Here are two distinct and conflicting intellectual habits, the antithesis between which, indicated in this dialogue, is described at large and forcibly in the Theætêtus.[46] [Footnote 44: Aristophan. Nubes, 130. [Greek: lo/gôn a)kribô=n schindala/mous--paipa/lê.] Nub. 261, Aves, 430. [Greek: leptota/tôn lê/rôn i(ereu=], Nub. 359. [Greek: gnô/mais leptais], Nub. 1404. [Greek: skariphismoi=si lê/rôn], Ran. 1497. [Greek: smileu/mata]--id. 819. Isokrates, [Greek: Pro\s Nikokle/a], s. 69, antithesis of the [Greek: lo/goi politikoi\] and [Greek: lo/goi e)ristikoi/--ma/lista me\n kai\ a)po\ tôn kairô=n theôrei=n sumbouleu/ontas, ei) de\ mê\, _kath' o(/lôn tô=n pragma/tôn_ le/gontas]--which is almost exactly the phrase ascribed to Hippias by Plato in this Hippias Major. Also Isokrates, Contra Sophistas, s. 24-25, where he contrasts the useless [Greek: logi/dia], debated by the contentious dialecticians (Sokrates and Plato being probably included in this designation), with his own [Greek: lo/goi politikoi/]. Compare also Isokrates, Or. xv. De Permutatione, s. 211-213-285-287.] [Footnote 45: Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16.] [Footnote 46: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 173-174-175.] [Side-note: Concrete Aggregates--abstract or logical Aggregates. Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician.] When Hippias accuses Sokrates of neglecting to notice Wholes or Aggregates, this is true in the sense of Concrete Wholes--the phenomenal sequences and co-existences, perceived by sense or imagined. But the Universal (as Aristotle says)[47] is one kind of Whole: a Logical Whole, having logical parts. In the minds of Sokrates and Plato, the Logical Whole separable into its logical parts and into them only, were preponderant. [Footnote 47: Aristot. Physic. i. 1. [Greek: to\ ga\r o(/lon kata\ tê\n ai)/sthêsin gnôrimô/teron, _to\ de\ katho/lou o(/lon ti e)sti; polla\ ga\r perilamba/nei ô(s me/rê to\ katho/lou_.] Compare Simplikius, Schol. Brandis ad loc. p. 324, a. 10-26.] [Side-note: Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought into debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty.] One other point deserves peculiar notice, in the dialogue under our review. The problem started is, What is the Beautiful--the Self-Beautiful, or Beauty _per se_: and it is assumed that this must be Something,[48] that from the accession of which, each particular beautiful thing becomes beautiful. But Sokrates presently comes to make a distinction between that which is really beautiful and that which appears to be beautiful. Some things (he says) appear beautiful, but are not so in reality: some are beautiful, but do not appear so. The problem, as he states it, is, to find, not what that is which makes objects appear beautiful, but what it is that makes them really beautiful. This distinction, as we find it in the language of Hippias, is one of degree only:[49] that _is_ beautiful which appears so to every one and at all times. But in the language of Sokrates, the distinction is radical: to _be_ beautiful is one thing, to _appear_ beautiful is another; whatever makes a thing appear beautiful without being so in reality, is a mere engine of deceit, and not what Sokrates is enquiring for.[50] The Self-Beautiful or real Beauty is so, whether any one perceives it to be beautiful or not: it is an Absolute, which exists _per se_, having no relation to any sentient or percipient subject.[51] At any rate, such is the manner in which Plato conceives it, when he starts here as a problem to enquire, What it is. [Footnote 48: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 286 K. [Greek: au)to\ to\ kalo\n o(/, ti e)/stin.] Also 287 D, 289 D.] [Footnote 49: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 D, 292 E.] [Footnote 50: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 A-B, 299 A.] [Footnote 51: Dr. Hutcheson, in his inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, observes (sect. i. and ii. p. 14-16):-- "Beauty is either original or comparative, or, if any like the terms better, absolute or relative; only let it be observed, that by _absolute_ or _original_, is not understood any quality supposed to be in the object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any mind which perceives it. For Beauty, like other names of sensible ideas, properly denotes the perception of some mind. . . . . Our inquiry is only about the qualities which are beautiful to men, or about the foundation of their sense of beauty, for (as above hinted) Beauty has always relation to the sense of some mind; and when we afterwards show how generally the objects that occur to us are beautiful, we mean that such objects are agreeable to the sense of men, &c." The same is repeated, sect. iv. p. 40; sect. vi. p. 72.] Herein we note one of the material points of disagreement between Plato and his master: for Sokrates (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) affirms distinctly that Beauty is altogether relative to human wants and appreciations. The Real and Absolute, on the one hand, wherein alone resides truth and beauty--as against the phenomenal and relative, on the other hand, the world of illusion and meanness--this is an antithesis which we shall find often reproduced in Plato. I shall take it up more at large, when I come to discuss his argument against Protagoras in the Theætêtus. * * * * * [Side-note: Hippias Minor--characters and situation supposed.] I now come to the Lesser Hippias: in which (as we have already seen in the Greater) that Sophist is described by epithets, affirming varied and extensive accomplishments, as master of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, poetry (especially that of Homer), legendary lore, music, metrical and rhythmical diversities, &c. His memory was prodigious, and he had even invented for himself a technical scheme for assisting memory. He had composed poems, epic, lyric, and tragic, as well as many works in prose: he was, besides, a splendid lecturer on ethical and political subjects, and professed to answer any question which might be asked. Furthermore, he was skilful in many kinds of manual dexterity: having woven his own garments, plaited his own girdle, made his own shoes, engraved his own seal-ring, and fabricated for himself a curry-comb and oil-flask.[52] Lastly, he is described as wearing fine and showy apparel. What he is made to say is rather in harmony with this last point of character, than with the preceding. He talks with silliness and presumption, so as to invite and excuse the derisory sting of Sokrates, There is a third interlocutor, Eudikus: but he says very little, and other auditors are alluded to generally, who say nothing.[53] [Footnote 52: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 368.] [Footnote 53: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 369 D, 373 B. Ast rejects both the dialogues called by the name of Hippias, as not composed by Plato. Schleiermacher doubts about both, and rejects the Hippias Minor (which he considers as perhaps worked up by a Platonic scholar from a genuine sketch by Plato himself) but will not pass the same sentence upon the Hippias Major (Schleierm. Einleit. vol. ii. pp. 293-296; vol. v. 399-403. Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 457-464). Stallbaum defends both the dialogues as genuine works of Plato, and in my judgment with good reason (Prolegg. ad Hipp. Maj. vol. iv. pp. 145-150; ad Hipp. Minor, pp. 227-235). Steinhart (Einleit. p. 99) and Socher (Ueber Platon, p. 144 seq., 215 seq.) maintain the same opinion on these dialogues as Stallbaum. It is to be remarked that Schleiermacher states the reasons both for and against the genuineness of the dialogues; and I think that even in his own statement the reasons _for_ preponderate. The reasons which both Schleiermacher and Ast produce as proving the spuriousness, are in my view quite insufficient to sustain their conclusion. There is bad taste, sophistry, an overdose of banter and derision (they say very truly), in the part assigned to Sokrates: there are also differences of view, as compared with Sokrates in other dialogues; various other affirmations (they tell us) are _not_ Platonic. I admit much of this, but I still do not accept their conclusion. These critics cannot bear to admit any Platonic work as genuine unless it affords to them ground for superlative admiration and glorification of the author. This postulate I altogether contest; and I think that differences of view, as between Sokrates in one dialogue and Sokrates in another, are both naturally to be expected and actually manifested (witness the Protagoras and Gorgias). Moreover Ast designates (p. 404) a doctrine as "durchaus unsokratisch" which Stallbaum justly remarks (p. 233) to have been actually affirmed by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia. Stallbaum thinks that both the two dialogues (Socher, that the Hippias Minor only) were composed by Plato among his earlier works, and this may probably be true. The citation and refutation of the Hippias Minor by Aristotle (Metaphys. [Greek: D]. 1025, a. 6) counts with me as a strong corroborative proof that the dialogue is Plato's work. Schleiermacher and Ast set this evidence aside because Aristotle does not name Plato as the author. But if the dialogue had been composed by any one less celebrated than Plato, Aristotle would have named the author. Mention by Aristotle, though without Plato's name, is of greater value to support the genuineness than the purely internal grounds stated by Ast and Schleiermacher against it.] [Side-note: Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols Achilles as better than Odysseus--the veracious and straightforward hero better than the mendacious and crafty.] In the Hippias Minor, that Sophist appears as having just concluded a lecture upon Homer, in which he had extolled Achilles as better than Odysseus: Achilles being depicted as veracious and straightforward, Odysseus as mendacious and full of tricks. Sokrates, who had been among the auditors, cross-examines Hippias upon the subject of this affirmation. Homer (says Hippias) considers veracious men, and mendacious men, to be not merely different, but opposite: and I agree with him. Permit me (Sokrates remarks) to ask some questions about the meaning of this from you, since I cannot ask any from Homer himself. You will answer both for yourself and him.[54] [Footnote 54: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 365 C-D. The remark here made by Sokrates--"The poet is not here to answer for himself, so that you cannot put any questions to him" is a point of view familiar to Plato: insisted upon forcibly in the Protagoras (347 E), and farther generalised in the Phædrus, so as to apply to all written matter compared with personal converse (Phædrus, p. 275 D). This ought to count, so far as it goes, as a fragment of proof that the Hippias Minor is a genuine work of Plato, instead of which Schleiermacher treats it (p. 295) as evincing a poor copy, made by some imitator of Plato, from the Protagoras.] Mendacious men (answers Hippias, to a string of questions, somewhat prolix) are capable, intelligent, wise: they are not incapable or ignorant. If a man be incapable of speaking falsely, or ignorant, he is not mendacious. Now the capable man is one who can make sure of doing what he wishes to do, at the time and occasion when he does wish it, without let or hindrance.[55] [Footnote 55: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 366 B-C.] [Side-note: This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can answer truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses, _i.e._ the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make sure of doing either the one or the other.] You, Hippias (says Sokrates), are expert on matters of arithmetic: you can make sure of answering truly any question put to you on the subject. You are _better_ on the subject than the ignorant man, who cannot make sure of doing the same. But as you can make sure of answering truly, so likewise you can make sure of answering falsely, whenever you choose to do so. Now the ignorant man cannot make sure of answering falsely. He may, by reason of his ignorance, when he wishes to answer falsely, answer truly without intending it. You, therefore, the intelligent man and the good in arithmetic, are better than the ignorant and the bad for both purposes--for speaking falsely, and for speaking truly.[56] [Footnote 56: Plato, Hippias Minor, 366 E. [Greek: Po/teron su\ a)\n ma/lista pseu/doio kai\ a)ei\ kata\ tau)ta\ pseudê= le/gois peri\ tou/tôn, boulo/menos pseu/desthai kai\ mêde/pote a)lêthê= a)pokri/nesthai? ê)/ o( a)mathê\s ei)s logismou\s du/nait' a)\n sou= ma=llon pseu/desthai boulome/nou? ê)\ o( me\n a)mathê\s polla/kis a)\n boulo/menos pseudê= le/gein ta)lêthê= a)\n ei)/poi a)/kôn, ei) tu/choi, dia\ to\ mê\ ei)de/nai--su\ de\ o( sopho/s, ei)/per bou/loio pseu/desthai, a)ei\ a)\n kata\ ta\ au)ta\ pseu/doio?]] [Side-note: Analogy of special arts--it is only the arithmetician who can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses.] What is true about arithmetic, is true in other departments also. The only man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses is the man who can speak truly whenever he chooses. Now, the mendacious man, as we agreed, is the man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses. Accordingly, the mendacious man, and the veracious man, are the same. They are not different, still less opposite: nay, the two epithets belong only to one and the same person. The veracious man is not better than the mendacious--seeing that he is one and the same.[57] [Footnote 57: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 367 C, 368 E, 369 A-B.] You see, therefore, Hippias, that the distinction, which you drew and which you said that Homer drew, between Achilles and Odysseus, will not hold. You called Achilles veracious, and Odysseus, mendacious: but if one of the two epithets belongs to either of them, the other must belong to him also.[58] [Footnote 58: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 360 B.] [Side-note: View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent purpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose.] Sokrates then tries to make out that Achilles speaks falsehood in the Iliad, and speaks it very cleverly, because he does so in a way to escape detection from Odysseus himself. To this Hippias replies, that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, he does it innocently, without any purpose of cheating or injuring any one; whereas the falsehoods of Odysseus are delivered with fraudulent and wicked intent.[59] It is impossible (he contends) that men who deceive and do wrong wilfully and intentionally, should be better than those who do so unwillingly and without design. The laws deal much more severely with the former than with the latter.[60] [Footnote 59: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 370 E.] [Footnote 60: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 372 A.] [Side-note: Issue here taken--Sokrates contends that those who hurt, or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like unwillingly--he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his questions.] Upon this point, Hippias (says Sokrates), I dissent from you entirely. I am, unhappily, a stupid person, who cannot find out the reality of things: and this appears plainly enough when I come to talk with wise men like you, for I always find myself differing from you. My only salvation consists in my earnest anxiety to put questions and learn from you, and in my gratitude for your answers and teaching. I think that those who hurt mankind, or cheat, or lie, or do wrong, _wilfully_--are better than those who do the same _unwillingly_. Sometimes, indeed, from my stupidity, the opposite view presents itself to me, and I become confused: but now, after talking with you, the fit of confidence has come round upon me again, to pronounce and characterise the persons who do wrong _unwillingly_, as worse than those who do wrong _wilfully_. I entreat you to heal this disorder of my mind. You will do me much more good than if you cured my body of a distemper. But it will be useless for you to give me one of your long discourses: for I warn you that I cannot follow it. The only way to confer upon me real service, will be to answer my questions again, as you have hitherto done. Assist me, Eudikus, in persuading Hippias to do so. Assistance from me (says Eudikus) will hardly be needed, for Hippias professed himself ready to answer any man's questions. Yes--I did so (replies Hippias)--but Sokrates always brings trouble into the debate, and proceeds like one disposed to do mischief. Eudikus repeats his request, and Hippias, in deference to him, consents to resume the task of answering.[61] [Footnote 61: Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 B.] [Side-note: Questions of Sokrates--multiplied analogies of the special arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly, whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses.] Sokrates then produces a string of questions, with a view to show that those who do wrong wilfully, are better than those who do wrong unwillingly. He appeals to various analogies. In running, the good runner is he who runs quickly, the bad runner is he who runs slowly. What is evil and base in running is, to run slowly. It is the good runner who does this evil wilfully: it is the bad runner who does it unwillingly.[62] The like is true about wrestling and other bodily exercises. He that is good in the body, can work either strongly or feebly,--can do either what is honourable or what is base; so that when he does what is base, he does it wilfully. But he that is bad in the body does what is base unwillingly, not being able to help it.[63] [Footnote 62: Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 D-E.] [Footnote 63: Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 B.] What is true about the bodily movements depending upon strength, is not less true about those depending on grace and elegance. To be wilfully ungraceful, belongs only to the well-constituted body: none but the badly-constituted body is ungraceful without wishing it. The same, also, about the feet, voice, eyes, ears, nose: of these organs, those which act badly through will and intention, are preferable to those which act badly without will or intention. Lameness of feet is a misfortune and disgrace: feet which go lame only by intention are much to be preferred.[64] [Footnote 64: Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 C-D.] Again, in the instruments which we use, a rudder or a bow,--or the animals about us, horses or dogs,--those are better with which we work badly when we choose; those are worse, with which we work badly without design, and contrary to our own wishes. [Side-note: It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when he intends to hit.] It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark by design, than that of one who misses when he tries to hit. The like about all other arts--the physician, the harper, the flute-player. In each of these artists, _that_ mind is better, which goes wrong only wilfully--_that_ mind is worse, which goes wrong unwillingly, while wishing to go right. In regard to the minds of our slaves, we should all prefer those which go wrong only when they choose, to those which go wrong without their own choice.[65] [Footnote 65: Plat. Hipp. Min. 376 B-D.] Having carried his examination through this string of analogous particulars, and having obtained from Hippias successive answers--"Yes--true in that particular case," Sokrates proceeds to sum up the result:-- _Sokr._--Well! should we not wish to have our own minds as good as possible? _Hip._--Yes. _Sokr._--We have seen that they will be better if they do mischief and go wrong wilfully, than if they do so unwillingly? _Hip._--But it will be dreadful, Sokrates, if the willing wrong-doers are to pass for better men than the unwilling. [Side-note: Dissent and repugnance of Hippias.] _Sokr._--Nevertheless--it seems so: from what we have said. _Hip._--It does not seem so to me. _Sokr._--I thought that it would have seemed so to you, as it does to me. However, answer me once more--Is not justice either a certain mental capacity? or else knowledge? or both together?[66] _Hip._--Yes! it is. _Sokr._--If justice be a capacity of the mind, the more capable mind will also be the juster: and we have already seen that the more capable soul is the better. _Hip._--We have. _Sokr._--If it be knowledge, the more knowing or wiser mind will of course be the juster: if it be a combination of both capacity and knowledge, that mind which is more capable as well as more knowing,--will be the juster that which is less capable and less knowing, will be the more unjust. _Hip._--So it appears. _Sokr._--Now we have shown that the more capable and knowing mind is at once the better mind, and more competent to exert itself both ways--to do what is honourable as well as what is base--in every employment. _Hip._--Yes. _Sokr._--When, therefore, such a mind does what is base, it does so wilfully, through its capacity or intelligence, which we have seen to be of the nature of justice? _Hip._--It seems so. _Sokr._--Doing base things, is acting unjustly: doing honourable things, is acting justly. Accordingly, when this more capable and better mind acts unjustly, it will do so wilfully; while the less capable and worse mind will do so without willing it? _Hip._--Apparently. [Footnote 66: Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 D. [Greek: ê( dikaiosu/nê ou)chi ê)\ du/nami/s ti/s e)stin, ê)\ e)pistê/mê, ê)\ a)mpho/tera?]] [Side-note: Conclusion--That none but the good man can do evil wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion--Sokrates confesses his perplexity.] _Sokr._--Now the good man is he that has the good mind: the bad man is he that has the bad mind. It belongs therefore to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man, to do wrong without wishing it--that is, if the good man be he that has the good mind? _Hip._--But that is unquestionable--that he has it. _Sokr._--Accordingly, he that goes wrong and does base and unjust things wilfully, if there be any such character--can be no other than the good man. _Hip._--I do not know how to concede _that_ to you, Sokrates.[67] _Sokr._--Nor I, how to concede it to myself, Hippias: yet so it must appear to us, now at least, from the past debate. As I told you long ago, I waver hither and thither upon this matter; my conclusions never remain the same. No wonder indeed that I and other vulgar men waver; but if you wise men waver also, that becomes a fearful mischief even to us, since we cannot even by coming to you escape from our embarrassment.[68] [Footnote 67: Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 E, 376 B.] [Footnote 68: Plato, Hipp. Min. 376 C.] * * * * * I will here again remind the reader, that in this, as in the other dialogues, the real speaker is Plato throughout: and that it is he alone who prefixes the different names to words determined by himself. [Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted, the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the sophistry and corruption of the Sophists.] Now, if the dialogue just concluded had come down to us with the parts inverted, and with the reasoning of Sokrates assigned to Hippias, most critics would probably have produced it as a tissue of sophistry justifying the harsh epithets which they bestow upon the Athenian Sophists--as persons who considered truth and falsehood to be on a par--subverters of morality--and corruptors of the youth of Athens.[69] But as we read it, all that, which in the mouth of Hippias would have passed for sophistry, is here put forward by Sokrates; while Hippias not only resists his conclusions, and adheres to the received ethical sentiment tenaciously, even when he is unable to defend it, but hates the propositions forced upon him, protests against the perverse captiousness of Sokrates, and requires much pressing to induce him to continue the debate. Upon the views adopted by the critics, Hippias ought to receive credit for this conduct, as a friend of virtue and morality. To me, such reluctance to debate appears a defect rather than a merit; but I cite the dialogue as illustrating what I have already said in another place--that Sokrates and Plato threw out more startling novelties in ethical doctrine, than either Hippias or Protagoras, or any of the other persons denounced as Sophists. [Footnote 69: Accordingly one of the Platonic critics, Schwalbe (Oeuvres de Platon, p. 116), explains Plato's purpose in the Hippias Minor by saying, that Sokrates here serves out to the Sophists a specimen of their own procedure, and gives them an example of sophistical dialectic, by defending a sophistical thesis in a sophistical manner: That he chooses and demonstrates at length the thesis--the liar is not different from the truth-teller--as an exposure of the sophistical art of proving the contrary of any given proposition, and for the purpose of deriding and unmasking the false morality of Hippias, who in this dialogue talks reasonably enough. Schwalbe, while he affirms that this is the purpose of Plato, admits that the part here assigned to Sokrates is unworthy of him; and Steinhart maintains that Plato never could have had any such purpose, "however frequently" (Steinhart says), "sophistical artifices may occur in this conversation of Sokrates, which artifices Sokrates no more disdained to employ than any other philosopher or rhetorician of that day" ("so häufig auch in seinen Erörterungen sophistische Kunstgriffe vorkommen mögen, die Sokrates eben so wenig verschmaht hat, als irgend ein Philosoph oder Redekünstler dieser Zeit"). Steinhart, Einleitung zum Hipp. Minor, p. 109. I do not admit the purpose here ascribed to Plato by Schwalbe, but I refer to the passage as illustrating what Platonic critics think of the reasoning assigned to Sokrates in the Hippias Minor, and the hypotheses which they introduce to colour it. The passage cited from Steinhart also--that Sokrates no more disdained to employ sophistical artifices than any other philosopher or rhetorician of the age--is worthy of note, as coming from one who is so very bitter in his invectives against the sophistry of the persons called Sophists, of which we have no specimens left.] [Side-note: Polemical purpose of the dialogue--Hippias humiliated by Sokrates.] That Plato intended to represent this accomplished Sophist as humiliated by Sokrates, is evident enough: and the words put into his mouth are suited to this purpose. The eloquent lecturer, so soon as his admiring crowd of auditors has retired, proves unable to parry the questions of a single expert dialectician who remains behind, upon a matter which appears to him almost self-evident, and upon which every one (from Homer downward) agrees with him. Besides this, however, Plato is not satisfied without making him say very simple and absurd things. All this is the personal, polemical, comic scope of the dialogue. It lends (whether well-placed or not) a certain animation and variety, which the author naturally looked out for, in an aggregate of dialogues all handling analogous matters about man and society. But though the polemical purpose of the dialogue is thus plain, its philosophical purpose perplexes the critics considerably. They do not like to see Sokrates employing sophistry against the Sophists: that is, as they think, casting out devils by the help of Beelzebub. And certainly, upon the theory which they adopt, respecting the relation between Plato and Sokrates on one side, and the Sophists on the other, I think this dialogue is very difficult to explain. But I do not think it is difficult, upon a true theory of the Platonic writings. [Side-note: Philosophical purpose of the dialogue--theory of the Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by Plato.] In a former chapter, I tried to elucidate the general character and purpose of those Dialogues of Search, which occupy more than half the Thrasyllean Canon, and of which we have already reviewed two or three specimens--Euthyphron, Alkibiadês, &c. We have seen that they are distinguished by the absence of any affirmative conclusion: that they prove nothing, but only, at the most, disprove one or more supposable solutions: that they are not processes in which one man who knows communicates his knowledge to ignorant hearers, but in which all are alike ignorant, and all are employed, either in groping, or guessing, or testing the guesses of the rest. We have farther seen that the value of these Dialogues depends upon the Platonic theory about knowledge; that Plato did not consider any one to know, who could not explain to others all that he knew, reply to the cross-examination of a Sokratic Elenchus, and cross-examine others to test their knowledge: that knowledge in this sense could not be attained by hearing, or reading, or committing to memory a theorem, together with the steps of reasoning which directly conducted to it:--but that there was required, besides, an acquaintance with many counter-theorems, each having more or less appearance of truth; as well as with various embarrassing aspects and plausible delusions on the subject, which an expert cross-examiner would not fail to urge. Unless you are practised in meeting all the difficulties which he can devise, you cannot be said _to know_. Moreover, it is in this last portion of the conditions of knowledge, that most aspirants are found wanting. [Side-note: The Hippias is an exemplification of this theory--Sokrates sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it up. Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias--Error in the Greater.] Now the Greater and Lesser Hippias are peculiar specimens of these Dialogues of Search, and each serves the purpose above indicated. The Greater Hippias enumerates a string of tentatives, each one of which ends in acknowledged failure: the Lesser Hippias enunciates a thesis, which Sokrates proceeds to demonstrate, by plausible arguments such as Hippias is forced to admit. But though Hippias admits each successive step, he still mistrusts the conclusion, and suspects that he has been misled--a feeling which Plato[70] describes elsewhere as being frequent among the respondents of Sokrates. Nay, Sokrates himself shares in the mistrust--presents himself as an unwilling propounder of arguments which force themselves upon him,[71] and complains of his own mental embarrassment. Now you may call this sophistry, if you please; and you may silence its propounders by calling them hard names. But such ethical prudery--hiding all the uncomfortable logical puzzles which start up when you begin to analyse an established sentiment, and treating them as non-existent because you refuse to look at them--is not the way, to attain what Plato calls knowledge. If there be any argument, the process of which seems indisputable, while yet its conclusion contradicts, or seems to contradict, what is known, upon other evidence--the full and patient analysis of that argument is indispensable, before you can become master of the truth and able to defend it. Until you have gone through such analysis, your mind must remain in that state of confusion which is indicated by Sokrates at the end of the Lesser Hippias. As it is a part of the process of Search, to travel in the path of the Greater Hippias--that is, to go through a string of erroneous solutions, each of which can be proved, by reasons shown, to _be_ erroneous: so it is an equally important part of the same process, to travel in the path of the Lesser Hippias--that is, to acquaint ourselves with all those arguments, bearing on the case, in which two contrary conclusions appear to be both of them plausibly demonstrated, and in which therefore we cannot as yet determine which of them is erroneous--or whether both are not erroneous. The Greater Hippias exhibits errors,--the Lesser Hippias puts before us confusion. With both these enemies the Searcher for truth must contend: and Bacon tells us, that confusion is the worst enemy of the two--"Citius emergit veritas ex errore, quam ex confusione". Plato, in the Lesser Hippias, having in hand a genuine Sokratic thesis, does not disdain to invest Sokrates with the task (sophistical, as some call it, yet not the less useful and instructive) of setting forth at large this case of confusion, and avowing his inability to clear it up. It is enough for Sokrates that he brings home the painful sense of confusion to the feelings of his hearer as well as to his own. In that painful sentiment lies the stimulus provocative of farther intellectual effort.[72] The dialogue ends but the process of search, far from ending along with it, is emphatically declared to be unfinished, and, to be in a condition not merely unsatisfactory but intolerable, not to be relieved except by farther investigation, which thus becomes a necessary sequel. [Footnote 70: Plato, Republ. vi. 487 B. [Greek: Kai\ o( A)dei/mantos, Ô)= Sô/krates, e)/phê, pro\s me\n tau=ta/ soi ou)dei\s a)\n oi(=os t' ei)/ê a)nteipei=n; a)lla\ ga\r toio/nde ti pa/schousin oi( a)kou/ontes e)ka/stote a)\ nu=n le/geis; ê(gou=ntai di' a)peiri/an tou= e)rôta=|n kai\ a)pokri/nesthai u(po\ tou= lo/gou par' e(/kaston to\ e)rô/têma smikro\n parago/menoi, a)throisthe/ntôn tô=n smikrô=n e)pi\ teleutê=s tô=n lo/gôn, me/ga to\ spha/lma kai\ e)nanti/on toi=s prô/tois a)naphai/nesthai . . . e)pei to/ ge a)lêthe\s ou)de/n ti ma=llon tau/tê| e)/chein.] This passage, attesting the effect of the Sokratic examination upon the minds of auditors, ought to be laid to heart by those Platonic critics who denounce the Sophists for generating scepticism and uncertainty.] [Footnote 71: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 373 B; also the last sentence of the dialogue.] [Footnote 72: See the passage in Republic, vii. 523-524, where the [Greek: to\ paraklêtiko\n kai\ e)gertiko\n tê=s noê/seôs] is declared to arise from the pain of a felt contradiction.] There are two circumstances which lend particular interest to this dialogue--Hippias Minor. 1. That the thesis out of which the confusion arises, is one which we know to have been laid down by the historical Sokrates himself. 2. That Aristotle expressly notices this thesis, as well as the dialogue in which it is contained, and combats it. [Side-note: The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia.] Sokrates in his conversation with the youthful Euthydemus (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) maintains, that of two persons, each of whom deceives his friends in a manner to produce mischief, the one who does so wilfully is not so unjust as the one who does so unwillingly.[73] Euthydemus (like Hippias in this dialogue) maintains the opposite, but is refuted by Sokrates; who argues that justice is a matter to be learnt and known like letters; that the lettered man, who has learnt and knows letters, can write wrongly when he chooses, but never writes wrongly unless he chooses--while it is only the unlettered man who writes wrongly unwillingly and without intending it: that in like manner the just man, he that has learnt and knows justice, never commits injustice unless when he intends it--while the unjust man, who has not learnt and does not know justice, commits injustice whether he will or not. It is the just man therefore, and none but the just man (Sokrates maintains), who commits injustice knowingly and wilfully: it is the unjust man who commits injustice without wishing or intending it.[74] [Footnote 73: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19. [Greek: tô=n de\ dê\ tou\s phi/lous e)xapatô/ntôn e)pi\ blabê=| (i(/na mêde\ tou=to paralei/pômen a)/skepton) po/teros a)dikô/tero/s e)stin, o( e(kô\n ê)\ o( a)/kôn?] The natural meaning of [Greek: e)pi\ blabê=|] would be, "for the purpose of mischief"; and Schneider, in his Index, gives "nocendi causâ". But in that meaning the question would involve an impossibility, for the words [Greek: o( a)/kôn] exclude any such purpose.] [Footnote 74: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19-22.] This is the same view which is worked out by the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Minor: beginning with the antithesis between the veracious and mendacious man (as Sokrates begins in Xenophon); and concluding with the general result--that it belongs to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man to do wrong unwillingly. [Side-note: Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it.] Aristotle,[75] in commenting upon this doctrine of the Hippias Minor, remarks justly, that Plato understands the epithets _veracious_ and _mendacious_ in a sense different from that which they usually bear. Plato understands the words as designating one who _can_ tell the truth if he chooses--one who _can_ speak falsely if he chooses: and in this sense he argues plausibly that the two epithets go together, and that no man can be mendacious unless he be also veracious. Aristotle points out that the epithets in their received meaning are applied, not to the power itself, but to the habitual and intentional use of that power. The power itself is doubtless presupposed or implied as one condition to the applicability of the epithets, and is one common condition to the applicability of both epithets: but the distinction, which they are intended to draw, regards the intentions and dispositions with which the power is employed. So also Aristotle observes that Plato's conclusion--"He that does wrong wilfully is a better man than he that does wrong unwillingly," is falsely collected from induction or analogy. The analogy of the special arts and accomplishments, upon which the argument is built, is not applicable. _Better_ has reference, not to the amount of intelligence but to the dispositions and habitual intentions; though it presupposes a certain state and amount of intelligence as indispensable. [Footnote 75: Aristotel. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 8; compare Ethic. Nikomach. iv. p. 1127, b. 16.] [Side-note: Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct.] Both Sokrates and Plato (in many of his dialogues) commit the error of which the above is one particular manifestation--that of dwelling exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct,[76] and omitting to give proper attention to the emotional and volitional, as essentially co-operating or preponderating in the complex meaning of ethical attributes. The reasoning ascribed to the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Minor exemplifies this one-sided view. What he says is true, but it is only a part of the truth. When he speaks of a person "who does wrong unwillingly," he seems to have in view one who does wrong without knowing that he does so: one whose intelligence is so defective that he does not know when he speaks truth and when he speaks falsehood. Now a person thus unhappily circumstanced must be regarded as half-witted or imbecile, coming under the head which the Xenophontic Sokrates called _madness_:[77] unfit to perform any part in society, and requiring to be placed under tutelage. Compared with such a person, the opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be defended--that the mendacious person, who _can_ tell truth when he chooses, is the better of the two in the sense of less mischievous or dangerous. But he is the object of a very different sentiment; moreover, this is not the comparison present to our minds when we call one man veracious, another man mendacious. We always assume, in every one, a measure of intelligence equal or superior to the admissible minimum; under such assumption, we compare two persons, one of whom speaks to the best of his knowledge and belief, the other, contrary to his knowledge and belief. We approve the former and disapprove the latter, according to the different intention and purpose of each (as Aristotle observes); that is, looking at them under the point of view of emotion and volition--which is logically distinguishable from the intelligence, though always acting in conjunction with it. [Footnote 76: Aristotle has very just observations on these views of Sokrates, and on the incompleteness of his views when he resolved all virtue into knowledge, all vice into ignorance. See, among other passages, Aristot. Ethica Magna, i. 1182, a. 16; 1183, b. 9; 1190, b. 28; Ethic. Eudem. i. 1216, b, 4. The remarks of Aristotle upon Sokrates and Plato evince a real progress in ethical theory.] [Footnote 77: Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 7. [Greek: tou\s diêmartêko/tas, ô(=n oi( polloi\ gignô/skousi, mainome/nous kalei=n], &c.] [Side-note: They rely too much on the analogy of the special arts--They take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of praise and blame.] Again, the analogy of the special arts, upon which the Platonic Sokrates dwells in the Hippias Minor, fails in sustaining his inference. By a good runner, wrestler, harper, singer, speaker, &c., we undoubtedly mean one who can, if he pleases, perform some one of these operations well; although he can also, if he pleases, perform them badly. But the epithets _good_ or _bad_, in this case, consider exclusively that element which was left out, and leave out that element which was exclusively considered, in the former case. The good singer is declared to stand distinguished from the bad singer, or from the [Greek: i)diô/tês], who, if he sings at all, will certainly sing badly, by an attribute belonging to his intelligence and vocal organs. To sing well is a special accomplishment, which is possessed only by a few, and which no man is blamed for not possessing. The distinction between such special accomplishments, and justice or rectitude of behaviour, is well brought out in the speech which Plato puts into the mouth of the Sophist Protagoras.[78] "The special artists (he says) are few in number: one of them is sufficient for many private citizens. But every citizen, without exception, must possess justice and a sense of shame: if he does not, he must be put away as a nuisance--otherwise, society could not be maintained." The special artist is a citizen also; and as such, must be subject to the obligations binding on all citizens universally. In predicating of him that he is _good_ or _bad_ as a citizen, we merely assume him to possess the average intelligence, of the community; and the epithet declares whether his emotional and volitional attributes exceed, or fall short of, the minimum required in the application of that intelligence to his social obligations. It is thus that the words _good_ or _bad_ when applied to him as a citizen, have a totally different bearing from that which the same words have when applied to him in his character of special artist. [Footnote 78: Plato, Protagoras, 322.] [Side-note: Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be suggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of the question under review.] The value of these debates in the Platonic dialogues consists in their raising questions like the preceding, for the reflection of the reader--whether the Platonic Sokrates may or may not be represented as taking what we think the right view of the question. For a Dialogue of Search, the great merit is, that it should be suggestive; that it should bring before our attention the conditions requisite for a right and proper use of these common ethical epithets, and the state of circumstances which is tacitly implied whenever any one uses them. No man ever learns to reflect upon the meaning of such familiar epithets, which he has been using all his life--unless the process be forced upon his attention by some special conversation which brings home to him an uncomfortable sentiment of perplexity and contradiction. If a man intends to acquire any grasp of ethical or political theory, he must render himself master, not only of the sound arguments and the guiding analogies but also of the unsound arguments and the misleading analogies, which bear upon each portion of it. [Side-note: Antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic.] There is one other point of similitude deserving notice, between the Greater and Lesser Hippias. In both of them, Hippias makes special complaint of Sokrates, for breaking the question in pieces and picking out the minute puzzling fragments--instead of keeping it together as a whole, and applying to it the predicates which it merits when so considered.[79] Here is the standing antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic: between those unconsciously acquired mental combinations which are poured out in eloquent, impressive, unconditional, and undistinguishing generalities--and the logical analysis which resolves the generality into its specialities, bringing to view inconsistencies, contradictions, limits, qualifications, &c. I have already touched upon this at the close of the Greater Hippias. [Footnote 79: Plato, Hipp. Min. 369 B-C. [Greek: Ô)= Sô/krates, a)ei\ su/ tinas toiou/tous ple/keis lo/gous, kai\ a)polamba/nôn o(/ a)\n ê)=| duschere/staton tou= lo/gou, tou/tou e)/chei kata\ smikro\n e)phapto/menos, kai\ ou)ch o(/lô a)gôni/zei tô=| pra/gmati, peri\ o(/tou a)\n o( lo/gos ê)=|], &c. A remark of Aristotle (Topica, viii. 164, b. 2) illustrates this dissecting function of the Dialectician. [Greek: e)/sti ga/r, ô(s a(plô=s ei)pei=n, dialektiko\s o( protatiko\s kai\ e)nstatiko/s; e)/sti de\ to\ me\n protei/nesthai, e(\n poiei=n ta\ plei/ô (dei= ga\r e(\n o(/lô| lêphthê=nai pro\s o(\ o( lo/gos), to\ d' e)ni/stasthai, to\ e(n polla/; ê)\ ga\r diairei=, ê)\ a)nairei=, to\ me\n didou/s, to\ de\ ou)/, tô=n proteinome/nôn.]] CHAPTER XIV. HIPPARCHUS--MINOS. In these two dialogues, Plato sets before us two farther specimens of that error and confusion which beset the enquirer during his search after "reasoned truth". Sokrates forces upon the attention of a companion two of the most familiar words of the market-place, to see whether a clear explanation of their meaning can be obtained. [Side-note: Hipparchus--Question--What is the definition of Lover of Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in this sense, no man is a lover of gain.] In the dialogue called Hipparchus, the debate turns on the definition of [Greek: to\ philokerde\s] or [Greek: o( philokerdê/s]--the love of gain or the lover of gain. Sokrates asks his Companion to define the word. The Companion replies--He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing.[1] Does he do this (asks Sokrates) knowing that the things are worth nothing? or not knowing? If the latter, he is simply ignorant. He knows it perfectly well (is the reply). He is cunning and wicked; and it is because he cannot resist the temptation of gain, that he has the impudence to make profit by such things, though well aware that they are worth nothing. _Sokr._--Suppose a husbandman, knowing that the plant which he is tending is worthless--and yet thinking that he ought to gain by it: does not that correspond to your description of the lover of gain? _Comp._--The lover of gain, Sokrates, thinks that he ought to gain from every thing. _Sokr._--Do not answer in that reckless manner,[2] as if you had been wronged by any one; but answer with attention. You agree that the lover of gain knows the value of that from which he intends to derive profit; and that the husbandman is the person cognizant of the value of plants. _Comp._--Yes: I agree. _Sokr._--Do not therefore attempt, you are so young, to deceive an old man like me, by giving answers not in conformity with your own admissions; but tell me plainly, Do you believe that the experienced husbandman, when he knows that he is planting a tree worth nothing, thinks that he shall gain by it? _Comp._--No, certainly: I do not believe it. [Footnote 1: Plato, Hipparch. 225 A. [Greek: oi(\ a)\n kerdai/nein a)xiô=sin a)po\ tô=n mêdeno\s a)xi/ôn.]] [Footnote 2: Plato, Hipparch. 225 C.] Sokrates then proceeds to multiply illustrations to the same general point. The good horseman does not expect to gain by worthless food given to his horse: the good pilot, by worthless tackle put into his ship: the good commander, by worthless arms delivered to his soldiers: the good fifer, harper, bowman, by employing worthless instruments of their respective arts, if they know them to be worthless. [Side-note: Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all men are lovers of gain.] None of these persons (concludes Sokrates) correspond to your description of the lover of gain. Where then can you find a lover of gain? On your explanation, no man is so.[3] _Comp._--I mean, Sokrates, that the lovers of gain are those, who, through greediness, long eagerly for things altogether petty and worthless; and thus display a love of gain.[4] _Sokr._--Not surely knowing them to be worthless--for this we have shown to be impossible--but ignorant that they are worthless, and believing them to be valuable. _Comp._--It appears so. _Sokr._--Now gain is the opposite of loss: and loss is evil and hurt to every one: therefore gain (as the opposite of loss) is good. _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--It appears then that the lovers of good are those whom you call lovers of gain? _Comp._--Yes: it appears so. _Sokr._--Do not you yourself love good--all good things? _Comp._--Certainly. _Sokr._--And I too, and every one else. All men love good things, and hate evil. Now we agreed that gain was a good: so that by this reasoning, it appears that all men are lovers of gain while by the former reasoning, we made out that none were so.[5] Which of the two shall we adopt, to avoid error. _Comp._--We shall commit no error, Sokrates, if we rightly conceive the lover of gain. He is one who busies himself upon, and seeks to gain from, things from which good men do not venture to gain. [Footnote 3: Plat. Hipparch. 226 D.] [Footnote 4: Plat. Hipparch. 226 D. [Greek: A)ll' e)gô\, ô)= Sô/krates, bou/lomai le/gein tou/tous philokerdei=s ei)=nai, oi(\ e(ka/stote u(po\ a)plêsti/as kai\ panu\ smikra\ kai\ o)li/gou a)/xia kai\ ou)deno\s gli/chontai u(perphuô=s kai\ philokerdou=sin.]] [Footnote 5: Plat. Hipparch. 227 C.] [Side-note: Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of trying to deceive him. Accusation is retorted upon Sokrates.] _Sokr._--But, my friend, we agreed just now, that gain was a good, and that all men always love good. It follows therefore, that good men as well as others love all gains, if gains are good things. _Comp._--Not, certainly, those gains by which they will afterwards be hurt. _Sokr._--Be hurt: you mean, by which they will become losers. _Comp._--I mean that and nothing else. _Sokr._--Do they become losers by gain, or by loss? _Comp._--By both: by loss, and by evil gain. _Sokr._--Does it appear to you that any useful and good thing is evil? _Comp._--No. _Sokr._--Well! we agreed just now that gain was the opposite of loss, which was evil; and that, being the opposite of evil, gain was good. _Comp._--That was what we agreed. _Sokr._--You see how it is: you are trying to deceive me: you purposely contradict what we just now agreed upon. _Comp._--Not at all, by Zeus: on the contrary, it is you, Sokrates, who deceive me, wriggling up and down in your talk, I cannot tell how.[6] _Sokr._--Be careful what you say: I should be very culpable, if I disobeyed a good and wise monitor. _Comp._--Whom do you mean: and what do you mean? _Sokr._--Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus. [Footnote 6: Plat. Hipparch. 228 A. _Sokr._--[Greek: O(ra=|s ou)=n? e)picheirei=s me e)xapata=|n, e)pi/têdes e)nanti/a le/gôn oi(=s a)/rti ô(mologê/samen.] _Comp._ [Greek: Ou) ma\ Di/', ô)= Sô/krates; a)lla\ tou)nanti/on su\ e)me\ e)xapata=|s, kai\ ou)k oi)=da o(pê=| e)n toi=s lo/gois a)/nô kai\ ka/tô stre/pheis.]] [Side-note: Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the Peisistratid--"Never deceive a friend". Eulogy of Hipparchus by Sokrates.] Sokrates then describes at some length the excellent character of Hipparchus: his beneficent rule, his wisdom, his anxiety for the moral improvement of the Athenians: the causes, different from what was commonly believed, which led to his death; and the wholesome precepts which he during his life had caused to be inscribed on various busts of Hermes throughout Attica. One of these busts or Hermæ bore the words--Do not deceive a friend.[7] [Footnote 7: Plat. Hipparch. 228 B-229 D. The picture here given of Hipparchus deserves notice. We are informed that he was older than his brother Hippias, which was the general belief at Athens, as Thucydides (i. 20, vi. 58) affirms, though himself contradicting it, and affirming that Hippias was the elder brother. Plato however agrees with Thucydides in this point, that the three years after the assassination of Hipparchus, during which Hippias ruled alone, were years of oppression and tyranny; and that the hateful recollection of the Peisistratidæ, which always survived in the minds of the Athenians, was derived from these three last years. The picture which Plato here gives of Hipparchus is such as we might expect from a philosopher. He dwells upon the pains which Hipparchus took to have the recitation of the Homeric poems made frequent and complete: also upon his intimacy with the poets Anakreon and Simonides. The colouring which Plato gives to the intimacy between Aristogeiton and Harmodius is also peculiar. The [Greek: e)rastê\s] is represented by Plato as eager for the education and improvement of the [Greek: e)rô/menos]; and the jealousy felt towards Hipparchus is described as arising from the distinguished knowledge and abilities of Hipparchus, which rendered him so much superior and more effective as an educator.] The Companion resumes: Apparently, Sokrates, either you do not account me your friend, or you do not obey Hipparchus: for you are certainly deceiving me in some unaccountable way in your talk. You cannot persuade me to the contrary. [Side-note: Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers. The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain is evil.] _Sokr._--Well then! in order that you may not think yourself deceived, you may take back any move that you choose, as if we were playing at draughts. Which of your admissions do you wish to retract--That all men desire good things? That loss (to be a loser) is evil? That gain is the opposite of loss: that to gain is the opposite of to lose? That to gain, as being the opposite of evil is a good thing? _Comp._--No. I do not retract any one of these. _Sokr._--You think then, it appears, that some gain is good, other gain evil? _Comp._--Yes, that is what I do think.[8] _Sokr._--Well, I give you back that move: let it stand as you say. Some gain is good: other gain is bad. But surely the good gain is no more _gain_, than the bad gain: both are _gain_, alike and equally. _Comp._--How do you mean? [Footnote 8: Plat. Hipparch. 229 E, 230 A.] [Side-note: Questions by Sokrates--bad gain is _gain_, as much as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a smaller outlay, is gain. Objections--the acquisition may be evil--embarrassment confessed.] Sokrates then illustrates his question by two or three analogies. Bad food is just as much _food_, as good food: bad drink, as much _drink_ as good drink: a good man is no more _man_ than a bad man.[9] [Footnote 9: Plat. Hipparch. 230 C.] _Sokr._--In like manner, bad gain, and good gain, are (both of them) _gain_ alike--neither of them more or less than the other. Such being the case, what is that common quality possessed by both, which induces you to call them by the same name _Gain_?[10] Would you call _Gain_ any acquisition which one makes either with a smaller outlay or with no outlay at all?[11] _Comp._--Yes. I should call that gain. _Sokr._--For example, if after being at a banquet, not only without any outlay, but receiving an excellent dinner, you acquire an illness? _Comp._--Not at all: that is no gain. _Sokr._--But if from the banquet you acquire health, would that be gain or loss? _Comp._--It would be gain. _Sokr._--Not every acquisition therefore is gain, but only such acquisitions as are good and not evil: if the acquisition be evil, it is loss. _Comp._--Exactly so. _Sokr._--Well, now, you see, you are come round again to the very same point: Gain is good. Loss is evil. _Comp._--I am puzzled what to say.[12] _Sokr._--You have good reason to be puzzled. [Footnote 10: Plat. Hipparch. 230 E. [Greek: dia\ ti/ pote a)mpho/tera au)ta\ ke/rdos kalei=s? ti/ tau)to\n e)n a)mphote/rois o(rô=n?]] [Footnote 11: Plat. Hipparch. 231 A.] [Footnote 12: Plat. Hipparch. 231 C. _Sokr._ [Greek: O(ra=|s ou)=n, ô(s pa/lin au)= peritre/cheis ei)s to\ au)to\--to\ me\n ke/rdos a)gatho\n phai/netai, ê( de\ zêmi/a kako/n?] _Comp._ [Greek: A)porô= e)/gôge o(\, ti ei)/pô.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)k a)di/kôs ge su\ a)porô=n.]] [Side-note: It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay. The valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good. Conclusion comes back. That Gain is Good.] But tell me: you say that if a man lays out little and acquires much, that is gain? _Comp._--Yes: but not if it be evil: it is gain, if it be good, like gold or silver. _Sokr._--I will ask you about gold and silver. Suppose a man by laying out one pound of gold acquires two pounds of silver, is it gain or loss? _Comp._--It is loss, decidedly, Sokrates: gold is twelve times the value of silver. _Sokr._--Nevertheless he has acquired more: double is more than half. _Comp._--Not in value: double silver is not more than half gold. _Sokr._--It appears then that we must include value as essential to gain, not merely quantity. The valuable is gain: the valueless is no gain. The valuable is that which is valuable to possess: is that the profitable, or the unprofitable? _Comp._--It is the profitable. _Sokr._--But the profitable is good? _Comp._--Yes: it is. _Sokr._--Why then, here, the same conclusion comes back to us as agreed, for the third or fourth time. The gainful is good. _Comp._--It appears so.[13] [Footnote 13: Plato, Hipparch. 231 D-E, 232 A.] [Side-note: Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good, and that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no man ought to be reproached for being so. The companion is compelled to admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded.] _Sokr._--Let me remind you of what has passed. You contended that good men did not wish to acquire all sorts of gain, but only such as were good, and not such as were evil. But now, the debate has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains are good, whether small or great. _Comp._--As for me, Sokrates, the debate has compelled me rather than persuaded me.[14] _Sokr._--Presently, perhaps, it may even persuade you. But now, whether you have been persuaded or not, you at least concur with me in affirming that all gains, whether small or great, are good. That all good men wish for all good things. _Comp._--I do concur. _Sokr._--But you yourself stated that evil men love all gains, small and great? _Comp._--I said so. _Sokr._--According to your doctrine then, all men are lovers of gain, the good men as well as the evil? _Comp._--Apparently so. _Sokr._--It is therefore wrong to reproach any man as a lover of gain: for the person who reproaches is himself a lover of gain, just as much. [Footnote 14: Plat. Hipparch. 232 A-B. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n nu=n pa/nta ta\ ke/rdê o( lo/gos ê(ma=s ê)na/gkake kai\ smikra\ kai\ mega/la o(mologei=n a)gatha\ ei)=nai?] _Comp._ [Greek: Ê)na/gkake ga/r, ô)= Sô/krates, ma=llon e)me/ ge ê)\ pe/peiken.] _Sokr._ [Greek: A)ll' i)/sôs meta\ tou=to kai\ pei/seien a)\n.]] [Side-note: Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion. What is Law, or The Law? All law is the same, _quatenus_ law: what is the common constituent attribute?] The Minos, like the Hipparchus, is a dialogue carried on between Sokrates and a companion not named. It relates to Law, or The Law-- _Sokr._--What is Law (asks Sokrates)? _Comp._--Respecting what sort of Law do you enquire (replies the Companion)? _Sokr._--What! is there any difference between one law and another law, as to that identical circumstance, of being Law? Gold does not differ from gold, so far as the being gold is concerned--nor stone from stone, so far as being stone is concerned. In like manner, one law does not differ from another, all are the same, in so far as each is Law alike:--not, one of them more, and another less. It is about this as a whole that I ask you--What is Law? [Side-note: Answer--Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding customs. 2. The decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion.] _Comp._--What should Law be, Sokrates, other than the various assemblage of consecrated and binding customs and beliefs?[15] _Sokr._--Do you think, then, that discourse is, the things spoken: that sight is, the things seen? that hearing is, the things heard? Or are they not distinct, in each of the three cases--and is not Law also one thing, the various customs and beliefs another? _Comp._--Yes! I now think that they are distinct.[16] _Sokr._--Law is that whereby these binding customs become binding. What is it? _Comp._--Law can be nothing else than the public resolutions and decrees promulgated among us. Law is the decree of the city.[17] _Sokr._--You mean, that Law is social opinion. _Comp._--Yes I do. [Footnote 15: Plato, Minos, 313 B. [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n a)/llo no/mos ei)/ê a)\n a)ll' ê)\ ta\ nomizo/mena?]] [Footnote 16: Plato, Minos, 313 B-C. I pass over here an analogy started by Sokrates in his next question; as [Greek: o)/psis] to [Greek: ta\ o(rô/mena], so [Greek: no/mos] to [Greek: ta\ nomizo/mena], &c.] [Footnote 17: Plato, Minos, 814 A. [Greek: e)peidê\ no/mô| ta\ nomizo/mena nomi/zetai, ti/ni o)/nti tô=| no/mô| nomi/zetai?]] [Side-note: Cross-examination by Sokrates--just and lawfully-behaving men are so through law; unjust and lawless men are so through the absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful: lawlessness is ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city--or bad social opinion--cannot be law.] _Sokr._--Perhaps you are right: but let us examine. You call some persons wise:--they are wise through wisdom. You call some just:--they are just through justice. In like manner, the lawfully-behaving men are so through law: the lawless men are so through lawlessness. Now the lawfully-behaving men are just: the lawless men are unjust. _Comp._--It is so. _Sokr._--Justice and Law, are highly honourable: injustice and lawlessness, highly dishonourable: the former preserves cities, the latter ruins them. _Comp._--Yes--it does. _Sokr._--Well, then! we must consider law as something honourable; and seek after it, under the assumption that it is a good thing. You defined law to be the decree of the city: Are not some decrees good, others evil? _Comp._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--But we have already said that law is not evil. _Comp._--I admit it. _Sokr._--It is incorrect therefore to answer, as you did broadly, that law is the decree of the city. An evil decree cannot be law. _Comp._--I see that it is incorrect.[18] [Footnote 18: Plato, Minos, 314 B-C-D.] [Side-note: Suggestion by Sokrates--Law is the _good_ opinion of the city--but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding out of reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so.] _Sokr._--Still--I think, myself, that law is opinion of some sort; and since it is not evil opinion, it must be good opinion. Now good opinion is true opinion: and true opinion is, the finding out of reality. _Comp._--I admit it. _Sokr._--Law therefore wishes or tends to be, the finding out of reality.[19] _Comp._--But, Sokrates, if law is the finding out of reality--if we have therein already found out realities--how comes it that all communities of men do not use the same laws respecting the same matters? _Sokr._--The law does not the less wish or tend to find out realities; but it is unable to do so. That is, if the fact be true as you state--that we change our laws, and do not all of us use the same. _Comp._--Surely, the fact as a fact is obvious enough.[20] [Footnote 19: Plato, Minos, 315 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ê( a)lêthê\s do/xa tou= o)/ntos e)stin e)xeu/resis? . . . o( no/mos a)/ra bou/letai tou= o)/ntos ei)=nai e)xeu/resis?]] [Footnote 20: Plato, Minos, 315 A-B.] [Side-note: Objection taken by the Companion--That there is great discordance of laws in different places--he specifies several cases of such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity, and requests him to confine himself to question or answer.] (The Companion here enumerates some remarkable local rites, venerable in one place, abhorrent in another, such as the human sacrifices at Carthage, &c., thus lengthening his answer much beyond what it had been before. Sokrates then continues): _Sokr._--Perhaps you are right, and these matters have escaped me. But if you and I go on making long speeches each for ourselves, we shall never come to an agreement. If we are to carry on our research together, we must do so by question and answer. Question me, if you prefer:--if not, answer me. _Comp._--I am quite ready, Sokrates, to answer whatever you ask. [Side-note: Farther questions by Sokrates--Things heavy and light, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so, and are accounted so everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful.] _Sokr._--Well, then! do you think that just things are just and unjust things are unjust? _Comp._--I think they are. _Sokr._--Do not all men in all communities, among the Persians as well as here, now as well as formerly, think so too? _Comp._--Unquestionably they do. _Sokr._--Are not things which weigh more, accounted heavier; and things which weigh less, accounted lighter, here, at Carthage, and everywhere else?[21] _Comp._--Certainly. _Sokr._--It seems, then, that honourable things are accounted honourable everywhere, and dishonourable things dishonourable? not the reverse. _Comp._--Yes, it is so. _Sokr._--Then, speaking universally, existent things or realities (not non-existents) are accounted existent and real, among us as well as among all other men? _Comp._--I think they are. _Sokr._--Whoever therefore fails in attaining the real fails in attaining the lawful.[22] _Comp._--As you now put it, Sokrates, it would seem that the same things are accounted lawful both by us at all times, and by all the rest of mankind besides. But when I reflect that we are perpetually changing our laws, I cannot persuade myself of what you affirm. [Footnote 21: Plato, Minos, 316 A. [Greek: Po/teron de\ ta\ plei=on e)/lkonta baru/tera nomi/zetai e)ntha/de, ta\ de\ e)/latton, koupho/tera, ê)\ tou)nanti/on?] The verb [Greek: nomi/zetai] deserves attention here, being the same word as has been employed in regard to law, and derived from [Greek: no/mos].] [Footnote 22: Plato, Minos, 316 B. [Greek: ou)kou=n, ô(s kata\ pa/ntôn ei)pei=n, ta\ o)/nta nomi/zetai ei)=nai, ou) ta\ mê\ o)/nta, kai\ par' ê(mi=n kai\ para\ toi=s a)/llois a(/pasin.] _Comp._ [Greek: E)/moige dokei=.] _Sokr._ [Greek: O(\s a)\n a)/ra tou= o)/ntos a(marta/nê|, tou= nomi/mou a(marta/nei.]] [Side-note: There are laws of health and of cure, composed by the few physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who know how to rule.] _Sokr._--Perhaps you do not reflect that pieces on the draught-board, when their position is changed, still remain the same. You know medical treatises: you know that physicians are the really knowing about matters of health: and that they agree with each other in writing about them. _Comp._--Yes--I know that. _Sokr._--The case is the same whether they be Greeks or not Greeks: Those who know, must of necessity hold the same opinion with each other, on matters which they know: always and everywhere. _Comp._--Yes--always and everywhere. _Sokr._--Physicians write respecting matters of health what they account to be true, and these writings of theirs are the medical laws? _Comp._--Certainly they are. _Sokr._--The like is true respecting the laws of farming--the laws of gardening--the laws of cookery. All these are the writings of persons, knowing in each of the respective pursuits? _Comp._--Yes.[23] _Sokr._--In like manner, what are the laws respecting the government of a city? Are they not the writings of those who know how to govern--kings, statesmen, and men of superior excellence? _Comp._--Truly so. _Sokr._--Knowing men like these will not write differently from each other about the same things, nor change what they have once written. If, then, we see some doing this, are we to declare them knowing or ignorant? _Comp._--Ignorant--undoubtedly. [Footnote 23: Plato, Minos, 316 D-E.] [Side-note: That which is right is the regal law, the only true and real law--that which is not right, is not law, but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant.] _Sokr._--Whatever is right, therefore, we may pronounce to be lawful; in medicine, gardening, or cookery: whatever is not right, not to be lawful but lawless. And the like in treatises respecting just and unjust, prescribing how the city is to be administered: That which is right, is the regal law--that which is not right, is not so, but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant--being in truth lawless. _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--We were correct therefore in declaring Law to be the finding out of reality. _Comp._--It appears so.[24] _Sokr._--It is the skilful husbandman who gives right laws on the sowing of land: the skilful musician on the touching of instruments: the skilful trainer, respecting exercise of the body: the skilful king or governor, respecting the minds of the citizens. _Comp._--Yes--it is.[25] [Footnote 24: Plato, Minos, 317 C. [Greek: to\ me\n o)rtho\n no/mos e)sti\ basiliko/s; to\ de\ mê\ o)rtho/n ou)/, o(\ dokei= no/mos ei)=nai toi=s ei)do/sin; e)/sti ga\r a)/nomon.]] [Footnote 25: Plato, Minos, 318 A.] [Side-note: Minos, King of Krete--his laws were divine and excellent, and have remained unchanged from time immemorial.] _Sokr._--Can you tell me which of the ancient kings has the glory of having been a good lawgiver, so that his laws still remain in force as divine institutions? _Comp._--I cannot tell. _Sokr._--But can you not say which among the Greeks have the most ancient laws? _Comp._--Perhaps you mean the Lacedæmonians and Lykurgus? _Sokr._--Why, the Lacedæmonian laws are hardly more than three hundred years old: besides, whence is it that the best of them come? _Comp._--From Krete, they say. _Sokr._--Then it is the Kretans who have the most ancient laws in Greece? _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--Do you know those good kings of Krete, from whom these laws are derived--Minos and Rhadamanthus, sons of Zeus and Europa? _Comp._--Rhadamanthus certainly is said to have been a just man, Sokrates; but Minos quite the reverse--savage, ill-tempered, unjust. _Sokr._--What you affirm, my friend, is a fiction of the Attic tragedians. It is not stated either by Homer or Hesiod, who are far more worthy of credit than all the tragedians put together. _Comp._--What is it that Homer and Hesiod say about Minos?[26] [Footnote 26: Plato, Minos, 318 E.] [Side-note: Question about the character of Minos--Homer and Hesiod declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians defame him as a tyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens.] Sokrates replies by citing, and commenting upon, the statements of Homer and Hesiod respecting Minos, as the cherished son, companion, and pupil, of Zeus; who bestowed upon him an admirable training, teaching him wisdom and justice, and thus rendering him consummate as a lawgiver and ruler of men. It was through these laws, divine as emanating from the teaching of Zeus, that Krete (and Sparta as the imitator of Krete) had been for so long a period happy and virtuous. As ruler of Krete, Minos had made war upon Athens, and compelled the Athenians to pay tribute. Hence he had become odious to the Athenians, and especially odious to the tragic poets who were the great teachers and charmers of the crowd. These poets, whom every one ought to be cautious of offending, had calumniated Minos as the old enemy of Athens.[27] [Footnote 27: Plato, Minos, 319-320.] [Side-note: That Minos was really admirable--and that he has found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the city--we may be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered.] But that these tales are mere calumny (continues Sokrates), and that Minos was truly a good lawgiver, and a good shepherd ([Greek: nomeu\s a)gatho/s]) of his people--we have proof through the fact, that his laws still remain unchanged: which shows that he has really found out truth and reality respecting the administration of a city.[28] _Comp._--Your view seems plausible, Sokrates. _Sokr._--If I am right, then, you think that the Kretans have more ancient laws than any other Greeks? and that Minos and Rhadamanthus are the best of all ancient lawgivers, rulers, and shepherds of mankind? _Comp._--I think they are. [Footnote 28: Plato, Minos, 321 B. [Greek: tou=to me/giston sêmei=on, o(/ti a)ki/nêtoi au)tou= oi( no/moi ei)si/n, a)/te tou= o)/ntos peri\ po/leôs oi)kê/seôs e)xeuro/ntos eu)= tê\n a)lê/theian.]] [Side-note: The question is made more determinate--What is it that the good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the mind, as the physician measures out food and exercise for the body? Sokrates cannot tell. Close.] _Sokr._--Now take the case of the good lawgiver and good shepherd for the body--If we were asked, what it is that he prescribes for the body, so as to render it better? we should answer, at once, briefly, and well, by saying--food and labour: the former to sustain the body, the latter to exercise and consolidate it. _Comp._--Quite correct. _Sokr._--And if after that we were asked, What are those things which the good lawgiver prescribes for the mind to make it better, what should we say, so as to avoid discrediting ourselves? _Comp._--I really cannot tell. _Sokr._--But surely it is discreditable enough both for your mind and mine--to confess, that we do not know upon what it is that good and evil for our minds depends, while we can define upon what it is that the good or evil of our bodies depends?[29] [Footnote 29: Plato, Minos, 321 C-B.] * * * * * [Side-note: The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each other, and both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished.] I have put together the two dialogues Hipparchus and Minos, partly because of the analogy which really exists between them, partly because that analogy is much insisted on by Boeckh, Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and other recent critics; who not only strike them both out of the list of Platonic works, but speak of them with contempt as compositions. On the first point, I dissent from them altogether: on the second, I agree with them thus far--that I consider the two dialogues inferior works of Plato:--much inferior to his greatest and best compositions,--certainly displaying both less genius and less careful elaboration--probably among his early performances--perhaps even unfinished projects, destined for a farther elaboration, which they never received, and not published until after his decease. Yet in Hipparchus as well as in Minos, the subjects debated are important as regards ethical theory. Several questions are raised and partially canvassed: no conclusion is finally attained. These characteristics they have in common with several of the best Platonic dialogues. [Side-note: Hipparchus--Double meaning of [Greek: philokerdê\s] and [Greek: ke/rdos].] In Hipparchus, the question put by Sokrates is, about the definition of [Greek: o( philokerdê\s] (the lover of gain), and of [Greek: ke/rdos] itself--gain. The first of these two words (like many in Greek as well as in English) is used in two senses. In its plain, etymological sense, it means an attribute belonging to all men: all men love gain, hate loss. But since this is predicable of all, there is seldom any necessity for predicating it of any one man or knot of men in particular. Accordingly, when you employ the epithet as a predicate of A or B, what you generally mean is, to assert something more than its strict etymological meaning: to declare that he has the attribute in unusual measure; or that he has shown himself, on various occasions, wanting in other attributes, which on those occasions ought, in your judgment, to have countervailed it. The epithet thus comes to connote a sentiment of blame or reproach, in the mind of the speaker.[30] [Footnote 30: Aristotle adverts to this class of ethical epithets, connoting both an attribute in the person designated and an unfavourable sentiment in the speaker (Ethic. Nikom. ii. 6, p. 1107, a. 9). [Greek: Ou) pa=sa d' e)pide/chetai pra=xis, ou)de\ pa=n pa/thos, tê\n meso/têta; e)/nia ga\r eu)thu\s ô)no/mastai suneilêmme/na meta\ tê=s phaulo/têtos, oi)=on], &c.] [Side-note: State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found.] The Companion or Collocutor, being called upon by Sokrates to explain [Greek: to\ philokerde\s], defines it in this last sense, as conveying or connoting a reproach. He gives three different explanations of it (always in this sense), each of which Sokrates shows to be untenable. A variety of parallel cases are compared, and the question is put (so constantly recurring in Plato's writings), what is the state of the agent's mind as to knowledge? The cross-examination makes out, that if the agent be supposed to know,--then there is no man corresponding to the definition of a [Greek: philokerdê/s]: if the agent be supposed not to know--then, on the contrary, every man will come under the definition. The Companion is persuaded that there is such a thing as "love of gain" in the blamable sense. Yet he cannot find any tenable definition, to discriminate it from "love of gain" in the ordinary or innocent sense. [Side-note: Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word _gain_? None is found.] The same question comes back in another form, after Sokrates has given the liberty of retractation. The Collocutor maintains that there is bad _gain_, as well as good _gain_. But what is that common, generic, quality, designated well as good by the word _gain_, apart from these two distinctive epithets? He cannot find it out or describe it. He gives two definitions, each of which is torn up by Sokrates. To deserve the name of _gain_, that which a man acquires must be good; and it must surpass, in value as well as in quantity, the loss or outlay which he incurs in order to acquire it. But when thus understood, all gains are good. There is no meaning in the distinction between good and bad gains: all men are lovers of gain. [Side-note: Purpose of Plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clearing it up.] With this confusion, the dialogue closes. The Sokratic notion of _good_, as what every one loves--_evil_ as what every one hates--also of evil-doing, as performed by every evil-doer only through ignorance or mistake is brought out and applied to test the ethical phraseology of a common-place respondent. But it only serves to lay bare a state of confusion and perplexity, without clearing up any thing. Herein, so far as I can see, lies Plato's purpose in the dialogue. The respondent is made aware of the confusion, which he did not know before; and this, in Plato's view, is a progress. The respondent cannot avoid giving contradictory answers, under an acute cross-examination: but he does not adopt any new belief. He says to Sokrates at the close--"The debate has constrained rather than persuaded me".[31] This is a simple but instructive declaration of the force put by Sokrates upon his collocutors; and of the reactionary effort likely to be provoked in their minds, with a view to extricate themselves from a painful sense of contradiction. If such effort be provoked, Plato's purpose is attained. [Footnote 31: Plato, Hipparch. 232 B. [Greek: ê)na/gkake ga\r (o( lo/gos) ma=llon e)me/ ge ê)\ pe/peiken.]] One peculiarity there is, analogous to what we have already seen in the Hippias Major. It is not merely the Collocutor who charges Sokrates, but also Sokrates who accuses the Collocutor--each charging the other with attempts to deceive a friend.[32] This seems intended by Plato to create an occasion for introducing what he had to say about Hipparchus--_apropos_ of the motto on the Hipparchean Hermes--[Greek: mê\ phi/lon e)xapa/ta]. [Footnote 32: Plato, Hipparch. 225 E, 228 A.] [Side-note: Historical narrative and comments given in the dialogue respecting Hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to be spurious.] The modern critics, who proclaim the Hipparchus not to be the work of Plato, allege as one of the proofs of spuriousness, the occurrence of this long narrative and comment upon the historical Hipparchus and his behaviour; which narrative (the critics maintain) Plato would never have introduced, seeing that it contributes nothing to the settlement of the question debated. But to this we may reply, first, That there are other dialogues[33] (not to mention the Minos) in which Plato introduces recitals of considerable length, historical or quasi-historical recitals; bearing remotely, or hardly bearing at all, upon the precise question under discussion; next,--That even if no such analogies could be cited, and if the case stood single, no modern critic could fairly pretend to be so thoroughly acquainted with Plato's views and the surrounding circumstances, as to put a limit on the means which Plato might choose to take, for rendering his dialogues acceptable and interesting. Plato's political views made him disinclined to popular government generally, and to the democracy of Athens in particular. Conformably with such sentiment, he is disposed to surround the rule of the Peisistratidæ with an ethical and philosophical colouring: to depict Hipparchus as a wise man busied in instructing and elevating the citizens; and to discredit the renown of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, by affirming them to have been envious of Hipparchus, as a philosopher who surpassed themselves by his own mental worth. All this lay perfectly in the vein of Plato's sentiment; and we may say the same about the narrative in the Minos, respecting the divine parentage and teaching of Minos, giving rise to his superhuman efficacy as a lawgiver and ruler. It is surely very conceivable, that Plato, as a composer of ethical dialogues or dramas, might think that such recitals lent a charm or interest to some of them. Moreover, something like variety, or distinctive features as between one dialogue and another, was a point of no inconsiderable moment. I am of opinion that Plato did so conceive these narratives. But at any rate, what I here contend is, that no modern critics have a right to assume as certain that he did not. [Footnote 33: See Alkibiad. ii. pp. 142-149-150; Alkibiad. i. pp. 121-122: Protagoras, 342-344; Politikus, 268 D., [Greek: schedo\n paidia\n e)gkerasame/nous] and the two or three pages which follow. F. A. Wolf, and various critics after him, contend that the genuineness of the Hipparchus was doubted in antiquity, on the authority of Ælian, V. H. viii. 2. But I maintain that this is not the meaning of the passage, unless upon the supposition that the word [Greek: mathêtê\s] is struck out of the text conjecturally. The passage may be perfectly well construed, leaving [Greek: mathêtê\s] in the text: we must undoubtedly suppose the author to have made an assertion historically erroneous: but this is nowise impossible in the case of Ælian. If you construe the passage as it stands, without such conjectural alteration, it does not justify Wolf's inference.] [Side-note: Minos. Question--What is the characteristic property connoted by the word [Greek: No/mos] or law?] I now come to the Minos. The subject of this dialogue is, the explanation or definition of Law. Sokrates says to his Companion or Collocutor,--Tell me what is the generic constituent of Law: All Laws are alike _quatenus_ Law. Take no note of the difference between one law and another, but explain to me what characteristic property it is, which is common to all Law, and is implied in or connoted by the name Law. This question is logically the same as that which Sokrates asks in the Hipparchus with reference to [Greek: ke/rdos] or gain. [Side-note: This question was discussed by the historical Sokrates, Memorabilia of Xenophon.] That the definition of [Greek: No/mos] or Law was discussed by Sokrates, we know, not only from the general description of his debates given in Xenophon, but also from the interesting description (in that author) of the conversation between the youthful Alkibiades and Perikles.[34] The interrogations employed by Alkibiades on that occasion are Sokratic, and must have been derived, directly or indirectly, from Sokrates. They are partially analogous to the questions of Sokrates in the dialogue Minos, and they end by driving Perikles into a confusion, left unexplained, between Law and Lawlessness. [Footnote 34: Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16; i. 2, 42-46.] [Side-note: Definitions of law--suggested and refuted. Law includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c. Bad decrees are not laws.] Definitions of [Greek: No/mos] are here given by the Companion, who undergoes a cross-examination upon them. First, he says, that [Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena]. But this is rejected by Sokrates, who intimates that Law is not the aggregate of laws enacted or of customs held binding: but that which lies behind these laws and customs, imparting to them their binding force.[35] We are to enquire what this is. The Companion declares that it is the public decree of the city: political or social opinion. But this again Sokrates contests: putting questions to show that Law includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, beauty, and preservation of the city with its possessions; while lawlessness includes injustice, evil, ugliness, and destruction. There can be no such thing as bad or wicked law.[36] But among decrees of the city, some are bad, some are good. Therefore to define Law as a decree of the city, thus generally, is incorrect. It is only the good decree, not the bad decree, which is Law. Now the good decree or opinion, is the true opinion: that is, it is the finding out of reality. Law therefore wishes or aims to be the finding out of reality: and if there are differences between different nations, this is because the power to find out does not always accompany the wish to find out. [Footnote 35: Plato, Minos, 314 A. [Greek: e)peidê\ no/mô| ta\ nomizo/mena nomi/zetai, ti/ni o)/nti tô=| no/mô| nomi/zetai?]] [Footnote 36: Plato, Minos, 314 E. [Greek: kai\ mê\n no/mos ge ou)k ê)=n ponêro/s.]] [Side-note: Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it is the declared judgment and command of the Wise man upon the subject to which it refers--it is truth and reality, found out and certified by him.] As to the assertion--that Law is one thing here, another thing there, one thing at one time, another thing at another--Sokrates contests it. Just things are just (he says) everywhere and at all times; unjust things are unjust also. Heavy things are heavy, light things light, at one time, as well as at another. So also honourable things are everywhere honourable, base things everywhere base. In general phrase, existent things are everywhere existent,[37] non-existent things are not existent. Whoever therefore fails to attain the existent and real, fails to attain the lawful and just. It is only the man of art and knowledge, in this or that department, who attains the existent, the real, the right, true, lawful, just. Thus the authoritative rescripts or laws in matters of medicine, are those laid down by practitioners who know that subject, all of whom agree in what they lay down: the laws of cookery, the laws of agriculture and of gardening--are rescripts delivered by artists who know respectively each of those subjects. So also about Just and Unjust, about the political and social arrangements of the city--the authoritative rescripts or laws are, those laid down by the artists or men of knowledge in that department, all of whom agree in laying down the same: that is, all the men of art called kings or lawgivers. It is only the right, the true, the real--that which these artists attain--which is properly a law and is entitled to be so called. That which is not right is not a law,--ought not to be so called--and is only supposed to be a law by the error of ignorant men.[38] [Footnote 37: M. Boeckh remarks justly in his note on this passage--"neque enim illud demonstratum est, eadem omnibus legitima esse--sed tantum, _notionem_" (rather the sentiment or emotion) "_legitimi_ omnibus eandem esse. Sed omnia scriptor hic confundit."] [Footnote 38: Plato, Minos, 317 C.] [Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato--he acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought to _be_ Law.] That the reasoning of Sokrates in this dialogue is confused and unsound (as M. Boeckh and other critics have remarked), I perfectly agree. But it is not the less completely Platonic; resting upon views and doctrines much cherished and often reproduced by Plato. The dialogue Minos presents, in a rude and awkward manner, without explanation or amplification, that worship of the Abstract and the Ideal, which Plato, in other and longer dialogues, seeks to diversify as well as to elaborate. The definitions of Law here combated and given by Sokrates, illustrate this. The good, the true, the right, the beautiful, the real--all coalesce in the mind of Plato. There is nothing (in his view) real, except _The_ Good, _The_ Just, &c. ([Greek: to\ au)to-a)gatho\n]; [Greek: au)to-di/kaion]--Absolute Goodness and Justice): particular good and just things have no reality, they are no more good and just than bad and unjust--they are one or the other, according to circumstances--they are ever variable, floating midway between the real and unreal.[39] The real alone is knowable, correlating with knowledge or with the knowing Intelligence [Greek: Nou=s]. As Sokrates distinguishes elsewhere [Greek: to\ di/kaion] or [Greek: au)to-di/kaion] from [Greek: ta\ di/kaia]--so here he distinguishes ([Greek: no/mos] from [Greek: ta\ nomizo/mena]) _Law_, from the assemblage of actual commands or customs received as _laws_ among mankind. These latter are variable according to time and place; but Law is always one and the same. Plato will acknowledge nothing to _be_ Law, except that which (he thinks) _ought to be_ Law: that which emanates from a lawgiver of consummate knowledge, who aims at the accomplishment of the good and the real, and knows how to discover and realise that end. So far as "the decree of the city" coincides with what would have been enacted by this lawgiver (_i. e._ so far as it is good and right), Sokrates admits it as a valid explanation of Law; but no farther. He considers the phrase _bad law_ to express a logical impossibility, involving a contradiction _in adjecto_.[40] What others call a bad law, he regards as being no real law, but only a fallacious image, mistaken for such by the ignorant. He does not consider such ignorant persons as qualified to judge: he recognises only the judgment of the knowing one or few, among whom he affirms that there can be no difference of opinion. Every one admits just things to be just,--unjust things to be unjust,--heavy things to be heavy,--the existent and the real, to be the existent and the real. If then the lawgiver in any of his laws fails to attain this reality, he fails in the very purpose essential to the conception of law:[41] _i. e._ his pretended law is no law at all. [Footnote 39: See the remarkable passage in the fifth book of the Republic, pp. 479-480; compare vii. 538 E.] [Footnote 40: Plato, Minos, 314 D. The same argument is brought to bear by the Platonic Sokrates against Hippias in the Hippias Major, 284-285. If the laws are not really profitable, which is the only real purpose for which they were established, they are no laws at all. The Spartans are [Greek: para/nomoi]. Some of the answers assigned to Hippias (284 D) are pertinent enough; but he is overborne.] [Footnote 41: Plato, Minos, 316 B. [Greek: O(\s a)\n a)/ra tou= o)/ntos a(marta/nê, tou= nomi/mou a(marta/nei.]] [Side-note: Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind--the work of systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man.] By _Law_ then, Plato means--not the assemblage of actual positive rules, nor any general property common to and characteristic of them, nor the free determination of an assembled Demos as distinguished from the mandates of a despot--but the Type of Law as it ought to be, and as it would be, if prescribed by a perfectly wise ruler, aiming at good and knowing how to realise it. This, which is the ideal of his own mind, Plato worships and reasons upon as if it were the only reality; as Law by nature, or natural Law, distinguished from actual positive laws: which last have either been set by some ill-qualified historical ruler, or have grown up insensibly. Knowledge, art, philosophy, systematic and constructive, applied by some one or few exalted individuals, is (in his view) the only cause capable of producing that typical result which is true, good, real, permanent, and worthy of the generic name. [Side-note: Different applications of this general Platonic view, in the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. _Natural_ Rectitude of Law, Government, Names, &c.] In the Minos, this general Platonic view is applied to Law: in the Politikus, to government and social administration: in the Kratylus, to naming or language. In the Politikus, we find the received classification of governments (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) discarded as improper; and the assertion advanced, That there is only one government right, true, genuine, really existing--government by the uncontrolled authority and superintendence of the man of exalted intelligence: he who is master in the art of governing, whether such man do in fact hold power anywhere or not. All other governments are degenerate substitutes for this type, some receding from it less, some more.[42] Again, in the Kratylus, where names and name-giving are discussed, Sokrates[43] maintains that things can only be named according to their true and real nature--that there is, belonging to each thing, one special and appropriate Name-Form, discernible only by the sagacity of the intelligent Lawgiver: who alone is competent to bestow upon each thing its right, true, genuine, real name, possessing rectitude by nature ([Greek: o)rtho/tês phu/sei]).[44] This Name-Form (according to Sokrates) is the same in all languages in so far as they are constructed by different intelligent Lawgivers, although the letters and syllables in which they may clothe the Form are very different.[45] If names be not thus apportioned by the systematic purpose of an intelligent Lawgiver, but raised up by insensible and unsystematic growth--they will be unworthy substitutes for the genuine type, though they are the best which actual societies possess; according to the opinion announced by Kratylus in that same dialogue, they will not be names at all.[46] [Footnote 42: Plato, Politikus, 293 C-E. [Greek: tau/tên o)rthê\n diaphero/ntôs ei)=nai kai\ mo/nên politei/an, e)n ê(=| tis a)\n eu(/riskoi tou\s a)/rchontas a)lêthô=s e)pistê/monas kai\ ou) dokou=ntas mo/non . . . to/te kai\ kata\ tou\s toiou/tous o(/rous ê(mi=n mo/nên o)rthê\n politei/an ei)=nai r(ête/on. o(/sas de\ a)/llas le/gomen, _ou) gnêsi/as ou)d' o)/ntôs ou)/sas lekte/on_, a)lla\ memimême/nas tau/tên, a(/s me\n eu)no/mous le/gomen, e)pi\ ta\ kalli/ô, ta\s de\ a)/llas e)pi\ ta\ ai)schi/ona memimê=sthai.] The historical (Xenophontic) Sokrates asserts this same position in Xenophon's Memorabilia (iii. 9, 10). "Sokrates said that Kings and Rulers were those who knew how to command, not those who held the sceptre or were chosen by election or lot, or had acquired power by force or fraud," &c. The Kings of Sparta and Macedonia, the [Greek: Boulê\] and [Greek: Dê=mos] of Athens, the Despot of Syracuse or Pheræ are here declared to be not real rulers at all.] [Footnote 43: Plato, Kratylus, 387 D.] [Footnote 44: Plato, Kratyl. 388 A-E.] [Footnote 45: Plato, Kratyl. 389 E, 390 A, 432 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ou)/tôs a)xiô/seis kai\ to\n nomothe/tên to/n te e)ntha/de kai\ to\n e)n toi=s barba/rois, e(/ôs a)\n to\ tou= o)no/matos ei)=dos a)podidô=| to\ prosê=kon e(ka/stô| e)n o(poiaisou=n sullabai=s, ou)de\n chei/rô nomothe/tên ei)=nai to\n e)ntha/de ê)\ to\n o(pouou=n a)/llothi?] Compare this with the Minos, 315 E, 316 D, where Sokrates evades, by an hypothesis very similar, the objection made by the collocutor, that the laws in one country are very different from those in another--[Greek: i)/sôs ga\r ou)k e)nnoei=s tau=ta metapetteuo/mena o(/ti tau)ta/ e)stin.]] [Footnote 46: Plato, Kratyl. 430 A, 432 A, 433 D, 435 C. Kratylus says that a name badly given is no name at all; just as Sokrates says in the Minos that a bad law is no law at all.] [Side-note: Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on this divine type or natural rectitude.] The Kretan Minos (we here find it affirmed), son, companion, and pupil of Zeus, has learnt to establish laws of this divine type or natural rectitude: the proof of which is, that the ancient Kretan laws have for immemorial ages remained, and still do remain,[47] unchanged. But when Sokrates tries to determine, Wherein consists this Law-Type? What is it that the wise Lawgiver prescribes for the minds of the citizens--as the wise gymnastic trainer prescribes proper measure of nourishment and exercise for their bodies?--the question is left unanswered. Sokrates confesses with shame that he cannot answer it: and the dialogue ends in a blank. The reader--according to Plato's manner--is to be piqued and shamed into the effort of meditating the question for himself. [Footnote 47: Plato, Minos, 319 B, 321 A.] [Side-note: The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a Trilogy along with the Leges.] An attempt to answer this question will be found in Plato's Treatise De Legibus--in the projected Kretan colony, of which he there sketches the fundamental laws. Aristophanes of Byzantium very naturally placed this treatise as sequel to the Minos; second in the Trilogy of which the Minos was first.[48] [Footnote 48: I reserve for an Appendix some further remarks upon the genuineness of Hipparchus and Minos.] [Side-note: Explanations of the word Law--confusion in its meaning.] Whoever has followed the abstract of the Minos, which I have just given, will remark the different explanations of the word Law--both those which are disallowed, and that which is preferred, though left incomplete, by Sokrates. On this same subject, there are in many writers, modern as well an ancient, two distinct modes of confusion traceable--pointed out by eminent recent jurists, such as Mr. Bentham, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Maine. 1. Between Law as it is, and Law as it ought to be. 2. Between Laws Imperative, set by intelligent rulers, and enforced by penal sanction--and Laws signifying uniformities of fact expressed in general terms, such as the Law of Gravitation, Crystallisation, &c.--We can hardly say that in the dialogue Minos, Plato falls into the first of these two modes of confusion: for he expressly says that he only recognises the Ideal of Law, or Law as it ought to be (actual Laws everywhere being disallowed, except in so far as they conform thereunto). But he does fall into the second, when he identifies the Lawful with the Real or Existent. His Ideal stands in place of generalisations of fact. There is also much confusion, if we compare the Minos with other dialogues; wherein Plato frequently talks of Laws as the laws and customs actually existing or imperative in any given state--Athens, Sparta, or elsewhere ([Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena], according to the first words in the Minos). For example, in the harangue which he supposes to be addressed to Sokrates in the Kriton, and which he invests with so impressive a character--the Laws of Athens are introduced as speakers: but according to the principles laid down in the Minos, three-fourths of the Laws of Athens could not be regarded as laws at all. If therefore we take Plato's writings throughout, we shall not find that he is constant to one uniform sense of the word Law, or that he escapes the frequent confusion between Law as it actually exists and Law as it ought to be.[49] [Footnote 49: The first explanation of [Greek: No/mos] advanced by the Companion in reply to Sokrates (viz. [Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena], coincides substantially with the meaning of [Greek: No/mos basileu\s] in Pindar and Herodotus (see above, chap. viii.), who is an imaginary ruler, occupying a given region, and enforcing [Greek: ta\ nomizo/mena]. It coincides also with the precept [Greek: No/mô| po/leôs], as prescribed by the Pythian priestess to applicants who asked advice about the proper forms of religious worship (Xen. Mem. i. 3, 1); though this precept, when Cicero comes to report it (Legg. ii. 16, 40), appears divested of its simplicity, and over-clouded with the very confusion touched upon in my text. Aristotle does not keep clear of the confusion (compare Ethic. Nikom. i. 1, 1094, b. 16, and v. 5, 1130, b. 24). I shall revert again to the distinction between [Greek: no/mos] and [Greek: phu/sis], in touching on other Platonic dialogues. Cicero expressly declares (Legg. ii. 5, 11), conformably to what is said by the Platonic Sokrates in the Minos, that a bad law, however passed in regular form, is no law at all; and this might be well if he adhered consistently to the same phraseology, but he perpetually uses, in other places, the words _Lex_ and _Leges_ to signify laws actually in force at Rome, good or bad. Mr. Bentham gives an explanation of Law or The Law, which coincides with [Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena]. He says (Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. ii. ch. 17, p. 257, ed. 1823), "Now Law, or The Law, taken indefinitely, is an abstract and collective term, which, when it means anything, can mean neither more nor less than the sum total of a number of individual laws taken together". Mr. Austin in his Lectures, 'The Province of Jurisprudence Determined', has explained more clearly and copiously than any antecedent author, the confused meanings of the word Law adverted to in my text. See especially his first lecture and his fifth, pp. 88 seq. and 171 seq., 4th ed.] * * * * * APPENDIX. In continuing to recognise Hipparchus and Minos as Platonic works, contrary to the opinion of many modern critics, I have to remind the reader, not only that both are included in the Canon of Thrasyllus, but that the Minos was expressly acknowledged by Aristophanes of Byzantium, and included by him among the Trilogies: showing that it existed then (220 B.C.) in the Alexandrine Museum as a Platonic work. The similarity between the Hipparchus and Minos is recognised by all the Platonic critics, most of whom declare that both of them are spurious. Schleiermacher affirms and vindicates this opinion in his Einleitung and notes: but it will be convenient to take the arguments advanced to prove the spuriousness, as they are set forth by M. Boeckh, in his "Comment. in Platonis qui vulgo fertur Minoem": in which treatise, though among his early works, the case is argued with all that copious learning and critical ability, which usually adorn his many admirable contributions to the improvement of philology. M. Boeckh not only rejects the pretensions of Hipparchus and Minos to be considered as works of Plato, but advances an affirmative hypothesis to show what they are. He considers these two dialogues, together with those De Justo, and De Virtute (two short dialogues in the pseudo-Platonic list, not recognised by Thrasyllus) as among the dialogues published by Simon; an Athenian citizen and a shoemaker by trade, in whose shop Sokrates is said to have held many of his conversations. Simon is reported to have made many notes of these conversations, and to have composed and published, from them, a volume of thirty-three dialogues (Diog. L. ii. 122), among the titles of which there are two--[Greek: Peri\ Philkerdou=s] and [Greek: Peri\ No/mou]. Simon was, of course, contemporary with Plato; but somewhat older in years. With this part of M. Boeckh's treatise, respecting the supposed authorship of Simon, I have nothing to do. I only notice the arguments by which he proposes to show that Hipparchus and Minos are not works of Plato. In the first place, I notice that M. Boeckh explicitly recognises them as works of an author contemporary with Plato, not later than 380 B.C. (p. 46). Hereby many of the tests, whereby we usually detect spurious works, become inapplicable. In the second place, he admits that the dialogues are composed in good Attic Greek, suitable to the Platonic age both in character and manners--"At veteris esse et Attici scriptoris, probus sermo, antiqui mores, totus denique character, spondeat," p. 32. The reasons urged by M. Boeckh to prove the spuriousness of the Minos, are first, that it is unlike Plato--next, that it is too much like Plato. "Dupliciter dialogus a Platonis ingenio discrepat: partim quod parum, partim quod nimium, similis ceteris ejusdem scriptis sit. Parum similis est in rebus permultis. Nam cum Plato adhuc vivos ac videntes aut nuper defunctos notosque homines, ut scenicus poeta actores, moribus ingeniisque accurate descriptis, nominatim producat in medium--in isto opusculo cum Socrate colloquens persona plané incerta est ac nomine carens: quippe cum imperitus scriptor esset artis illius colloquiis suis _dulcissimas veneres_ illas inferendi, quæ ex peculiaribus personarum moribus pingendis redundant, atque à Platone ut flores per amplos dialogorum hortos sunt disseminatæ" (pp. 7-8): again, p. 9, it is complained that there is an "infinitus secundarius collocutor" in the Hipparchus. Now the sentence, just transcribed from M. Boeckh, shows that he had in his mind as standard of comparison, a certain number of the Platonic works, but that he did not take account of all of them. The Platonic Protagoras begins with a dialogue between Sokrates and an unknown, nameless person; to whom Sokrates, after a page of conversation with him, recounts what has just passed between himself, Protagoras, and others. Next, if we turn to the Sophistês and Politikus, we find that in both of them, not simply the secundarius collocutor, but even the principal speaker, is an unknown and nameless person, described only as a Stranger from Elea, and never before seen by Sokrates. Again, in the Leges, the principal speaker is only an [Greek: A)thênai=os xe/nos], without a name. In the face of such analogies, it is unsafe to lay down a peremptory rule, that no dialogue can be the work of Plato, which acknowledges as _collocutor_ an unnamed person. Then again--when M. Boeckh complains that the Hipparchus and Minos are destitute of those "_flores et dulcissimæ Veneres_" which Plato is accustomed to spread through his dialogues--I ask, Where are the "dulcissimæ Veneres" in the Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Leges, Timæus, Kritias? I find none. The presence of "dulcissimæ Veneres" is not a condition _sine quâ non_, in every composition which pretends to Plato as its author: nor can the absence of them be admitted as a reason for disallowing Hipparchus and Minos. The analogy of the Sophistês and Politikus (besides Symposium, Republic, and Leges) farther shows, that there is nothing wonderful in finding the titles of Hipparchus and Minos derived from the subjects ([Greek: Peri\ Philkerdou=s] and [Greek: Peri\ No/mou]), not from the name of one of the collocutors:--whether we suppose the titles to have been bestowed by Plato himself, or by some subsequent editor (Boeckh, p. 10). To illustrate his first ground of objection--Dissimilarity between the Minos and the true Platonic writings--M. Boeckh enumerates (pp. 12-23) several passages of the dialogue which he considers unplatonic. Moreover, he includes among them (p. 12) examples of confused and illogical reasoning. I confess that to me this evidence is noway sufficient to prove that Plato is not the author. That certain passages may be picked out which are obscure, confused, inelegant--is certainly no sufficient evidence. If I thought so, I should go along with Ast in rejecting the Euthydêmus, Menon, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, &c., against all which Ast argues as spurious, upon evidence of the same kind. It is not too much to say, that against almost every one of the dialogues, taken severally, a case of the same kind, more or less plausible, might be made out. You might in each of them find passages peculiar, careless, awkwardly expressed. The expression [Greek: tê\n a)nthrôpei/an a)ge/lên tou= sô/matos], which M. Boeckh insists upon so much as improper, would probably have been considered as a mere case of faulty text, if it had occurred in any other dialogue: and so it may fairly be considered in the Minos. Moreover as to faults of logic and consistency in the reasoning, most certainly these cannot be held as proving the Minos not to be Plato's work. I would engage to produce, from most of his dialogues, defects of reasoning quite as grave as any which the Minos exhibits. On the principle assumed by M. Boeckh, every one who agreed with Panætius in considering the elaborate proof given in the Phædon, of the immortality of the soul, as illogical and delusive--would also agree with Panætius in declaring that the Phædon was not the work of Plato. It is one question, whether the reasoning in any dialogue be good or bad: it is another question, whether the dialogue be written by Plato or not. Unfortunately, the Platonic critics often treat the first question as if it determined the second. M. Boeckh himself considers that the evidence arising from dissimilarity (upon which I have just dwelt) is not the strongest part of his case. He relies more upon the evidence arising from _too much similarity_, as proving still more clearly the spuriousness of the Minos. "Jam pergamus ad alteram partem nostræ argumentationis, _eamque etiam firmiorem_, de _nimia similitudine_ Platonicorum aliquot locorum, quæ imitationem doceat subesse. Nam de hoc quidem conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos, Platonem se ipsum haud posse imitari: nisi si quis dubitet de sanâ ejus mente" (p. 23). Again, p. 26, "Jam vero in nostro colloquio Symposium, Politicum, Euthyphronem, Protagoram, Gorgiam, Cratylum, Philêbum, dialogos expressos ac tantum non compilatos reperies". And M. Boeckh goes on to specify various passages of the Minos, which he considers to have been imitated, and badly imitated, from one or other of these dialogues. I cannot agree with M. Boeckh in regarding this _nimia similitudo_ as the strongest part of his case. On the contrary, I consider it as the weakest: because his own premisses (in my judgment) not only do not prove his conclusion, but go far to prove the opposite. When we find him insisting, in such strong language, upon the great analogy which subsists between the Minos and seven of the incontestable Platonic dialogues, this is surely a fair proof that its author is the same as their author. To me it appears as conclusive as internal evidence ever can be; unless there be some disproof _aliunde_ to overthrow it. But M. Boeckh produces no such disproof. He converts these analogies into testimony in his own favour, simply by bestowing upon them the name _imitatio,--stulta imitatio_ (p. 27). This word involves an hypothesis, whereby the point to be proved is assumed--viz.: difference of authorship. "Plato cannot have imitated himself" (M. Boeckh observes). I cannot admit such impossibility, even if you describe the fact in that phrase: but if you say "Plato in one dialogue thought and wrote like Plato in another"--you describe the same fact in a different phrase, and it then appears not merely possible but natural and probable. Those very real analogies, to which M. Boeckh points in the word _imitatio_, are in my judgment cases of the Platonic thought in one dialogue being like the Platonic thought in another. The _similitudo_, between Minos and these other dialogues, can hardly be called _nimia_, for M. Boeckh himself points out that it is accompanied with much difference. It is a similitude, such as we should expect between one Platonic dialogue and another: with this difference, that whereas, in the Minos, Plato gives the same general views in a manner more brief, crude, abrupt--in the other dialogues he works them out with greater fulness of explanation and illustration, and some degree of change not unimportant. That there should be this amount of difference between one dialogue of Plato and another appears to me perfectly natural. On the other hand--that there should have been a contemporary _falsarius_ (scriptor miser, insulsus, vilissimus, to use phrases of M. Boeckh), who studied and pillaged the best dialogues of Plato, for the purpose of putting together a short and perverted abbreviation of them--and who contrived to get his miserable abbreviation recognised by the Byzantine Aristophanes among the genuine dialogues notwithstanding the existence of the Platonic school--this, I think highly improbable. I cannot therefore agree with M. Boeckh in thinking, that "ubique se prodens Platonis imitatio" (p. 31) is an irresistible proof of spuriousness: nor can I think that his hypothesis shows itself to advantage, when he says, p. 10--"Ipse autem dialogus (Minos) quum post Politicum compositus sit, quod quædam in eo dicta rebus ibi expositis manifesté nitantur, ut paullo post ostendemus--quis est qui artificiosissimum philosophum, postquam ibi (in Politico) accuratius de naturâ legis egisset, de eâ iterum putet negligenter egisse?"--I do not think it so impossible as it appears to M. Boeckh, that a philosopher, after having _written_ upon a given subject _accuratius_, should subsequently write upon it _negligenter_. But if I granted this ever so fully, I should still contend that there remains another alternative. The negligent workmanship may have preceded the accurate: an alternative which I think is probably the truth, and which has nothing to exclude it except M. Boeckh's pure hypothesis, that the Minos must have been copied from the Politikus. While I admit then that the Hipparchus and Minos are among the inferior and earlier compositions of Plato, I still contend that there is no ground for excluding them from the list of his works. Though the Platonic critics of this century are for the most part of an adverse opinion, I have with me the general authority of the critics anterior to this century--from Aristophanes of Byzantium down to Bentley and Ruhnken--see Boeckh, pp. 7-32. Yxem defends the genuineness of the Hipparchus--(Ueber Platon's Kleitophon, p. 8. Berlin, 1846). CHAPTER XV. THEAGES. [Side-note: Theagês--has been declared spurious by some modern critics--grounds for such opinion not sufficient.] This is among the dialogues declared by Schleiermacher, Ast, Stallbaum, and various other modern critics, to be spurious and unworthy of Plato: the production of one who was not merely an imitator, but a bad and silly imitator.[1] Socher on the other hand defends the dialogue against them, reckoning it as a juvenile production of Plato.[2] The arguments which are adduced to prove its spuriousness appear to me altogether insufficient. It has some features of dissimilarity with that which we read in other dialogues--these the above-mentioned critics call un-Platonic: it has other features of similarity--these they call bad imitation by a _falsarius_: lastly, it is inferior, as a performance, to the best of the Platonic dialogues. But I am prepared to expect (and have even the authority of Schleiermacher for expecting) that some dialogues will be inferior to others. I also reckon with certainty, that between two dialogues, both genuine, there will be points of similarity as well as points of dissimilarity. Lastly, the critics find marks of a bad, recent, un-Platonic style: but Dionysius of Halikarnassus--a judge at least equally competent upon such a matter--found no such marks. He expressly cites the dialogue as the work of Plato,[3] and explains the peculiar phraseology assigned to Demodokus by remarking, that the latter is presented as a person of rural habits and occupations. [Footnote 1: Stallbaum, Proleg. pp. 220-225, "ineptus tenebrio," &c. Schleiermacher, Einleitung, part ii. v. iii. pp. 247-252. Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 495-497. Ast speaks with respect (differing in this respect from the other two) of the Theagês as a composition, though he does not believe it to be the work of Plato. Schleiermacher also admits (see the end of his Einleitung) that the style in general has a good Platonic colouring, though he considers some particular phrases as un-Platonic.] [Footnote 2: Socher, Ueber Platon, pp. 92-102. M. Cobet also speaks of it as a work of Plato (Novæ Lectiones, &c., p. 624. Lugd. Bat. 1858).] [Footnote 3: Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetor. p. 405, Reiske. Compare Theagês, 121 D. [Greek: ei)s to\ a)/stu katabai/nontes]. In general, in discussions on the genuineness of any of the Platonic dialogues, I can do nothing but reply to the arguments of those critics who consider them spurious. But in the case of the Theagês there is one argument which tends to mark Plato positively as the author. In the Theagês, p. 125, the senarius [Greek: sophoi\ tu/rannoi tô=n sophô=n sunousi/a|] is cited as a verse of _Euripides_. Now it appears that this is an error of memory, and that the verse really belongs to _Sophokles_, [Greek: e)n Ai)/anti Lokrô=|]. If the error had only appeared in this dialogue, Stallbaum would probably have cited it as one more instance of stupidity on the part of the _ineptus tenebrio_ whom he supposes to have written the dialogue. But unfortunately the error does not belong to the Theagês alone. It is found also in the Republic (viii. 568 B), the most unquestionable of all the Platonic compositions. Accordingly, Schleiermacher tells us in his note that the _falsarius_ of the Theagês has copied this error out of the above-named passage of the Republic of Plato (notes, p. 500). This last supposition of Schleiermacher appears to me highly improbable. Since we know that the mistake is one made by Plato himself, surely we ought rather to believe that he made it in two distinct compositions. In other words, the occurrence of the same exact mistake in the Republic and the Theagês affords strong presumption that both are by the same author--Plato.] [Side-note: Persons of the dialogue--Sokrates, with Demodokus and Theagês, father and son. Theagês (the son), eager to acquire knowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist.] Demodokus, an elderly man (of rank and landed property), and his youthful son Theagês, have come from their Deme to Athens, and enter into conversation with Sokrates: to whom the father explains, that Theagês has contracted, from the conversation of youthful companions, an extraordinary ardour for the acquisition of wisdom. The son has importuned his father to put him under the tuition of one of the Sophists, who profess to teach wisdom. The father, though not unwilling to comply with the request, is deterred by the difficulty of finding a good teacher and avoiding a bad one. He entreats the advice of Sokrates, who invites the young man to explain what it is that he wants, over and above the usual education of an Athenian youth of good family (letters, the harp, wrestling, &c.), which he has already gone through.[4] [Footnote 4: Plato, Theagês, 122.] [Side-note: Sokrates questions Theagês, inviting him to specify what he wants.] _Sokr._--You desire wisdom: but what kind of wisdom? That by which men manage chariots? or govern horses? or pilot ships? _Theag._--No: that by which men are governed. _Sokr._--But what men? those in a state of sickness--or those who are singing in a chorus--or those who are under gymnastic training? Each of these classes has its own governor, who bears a special title, and belongs to a special art by itself--the medical, musical, gymnastic, &c. _Theag._--No: I mean that wisdom by which we govern, not these classes alone, but all the other residents in the city along with them--professional as well as private--men as well as women.[5] [Footnote 5: Plato, Theagês, 124 A-B. Schleiermacher (Einleit. p. 250) censures the prolixity of the inductive process in this dialogue, and the multitude of examples here accumulated to prove a general proposition obvious enough without proof. Let us grant this to be true; we cannot infer from it that the dialogue is not the work of Plato. By very similar arguments Socher endeavours to show that the Sophistês and the Politikus are not works of Plato, because in both these dialogues logical division and differentiation is accumulated with tiresome prolixity, and applied to most trivial subjects. But Plato himself (in Politikus, pp. 285-286) explains why he does so, and tells us that he wishes to familiarise his readers with logical subdivision and classification as a process. In like manner I maintain that prolixity in the [Greek: lo/goi e)paktikoi/] is not to be held as proof of spurious authorship, any more than prolixity in the process of logical subdivision and classification. I noticed the same objection in the case of the First Alkibiadês.] [Side-note: Theagês desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can govern freemen with their own consent.] Sokrates now proves to Theagês, that this function and power which he is desirous of obtaining, is, the function and power of a despot: and that no one can aid him in so culpable a project. I might yearn (says Theagês) for such despotic power over all: so probably would you and every other man. But it is not _that_ to which I now aspire. I aspire to govern freemen, with their own consent; as was done by Themistokles, Perikles, Kimon, and other illustrious statesmen,[6] who have been accomplished in the political art. [Footnote 6: Plato, Theagês, 126 A.] _Sokr._--Well, if you wished to become accomplished in the art of horsemanship, you would put yourself under able horsemen: if in the art of darting the javelin, under able darters. By parity of reasoning, since you seek to learn the art of statesmanship, you must frequent able statesmen.[7] [Footnote 7: Plato, Theagês, 126 C.] [Side-note: Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else. Theagês requests that Sokrates will himself teach him.] _Theag._--No, Sokrates. I have heard of the language which you are in the habit of using to others. You pointed out to them that these eminent statesmen cannot train their own sons to be at all better than curriers: of course therefore they cannot do _me_ any good.[8] _Sokr._--But what can your father do for you better than this, Theagês? What ground have you for complaining of him? He is prepared to place you under any one of the best and most excellent men of Athens, whichever of them you prefer. _Theag._--Why will not you take me yourself, Sokrates? I look upon you as one of these men, and I desire nothing better.[9] [Footnote 8: Plato, Theagês, 126 D. Here again Stallbaum (p. 222) urges, among his reasons for believing the dialogue to be spurious--How absurd to represent the youthful Theagês as knowing what arguments Sokrates had addressed to others! But the youthful Theætêtus is also represented as having heard from others the cross-examinations made by Sokrates (Theætêt. 148 E). So likewise the youthful sons of Lysimachus--(Lachês, 181 A); compare also Lysis, 211 A.] [Footnote 9: Plato, Theagês, 127 A.] Demodokus joins his entreaties with those of Theagês to prevail upon Sokrates to undertake this function. But Sokrates in reply says that he is less fit for it than Demodokus himself, who has exercised high political duties, with the esteem of every one; and that if practical statesmen are considered unfit, there are the professional Sophists, Prodikus, Gorgias, Polus, who teach many pupils, and earn not merely good pay, but also the admiration and gratitude of every one--of the pupils as well as their senior relatives.[10] [Footnote 10: Plato, Theagês, 127 D-E, 128 A.] [Side-note: Sokrates declares that he is not competent to teach--that he knows nothing except about matters of love. Theagês maintains that many of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation of Sokrates.] _Sokr._--I know nothing of the fine things which these Sophists teach: I wish I did know. I declare everywhere, that I know nothing whatever except one small matter--what belongs to love. In that, I surpass every one else, past as well as present.[11] _Theag._--Sokrates is only mocking us. I know youths (of my own age and somewhat older), who were altogether worthless and inferior to every one, before they went to him; but who, after they had frequented his society, became in a short time superior to all their former rivals. The like will happen with me, if he will only consent to receive me.[12] [Footnote 11: Plato, Theagês, 128 B. [Greek: a)lla\ kai\ le/gô dê/pou a)ei/, o(/ti e)gô\ tugcha/nô, ô(s e)/pos ei)pei=n, ou)de\n e)pista/menos plê/n ge smikrou= tino\s mathê/matos, tô=n e)rôtikô=n, tou=to me/ntoi to\ ma/thêma par' o(ntinou=n poiou=mai deino\s ei)=nai, kai\ tô=n progegono/tôn a)nthrô/pôn kai\ tô=n nu=n.]] [Footnote 12: Plato, Theagês, 128 C.] [Side-note: Sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened--he recites his experience of the divine sign or Dæmon.] _Sokr._--You do not know how this happens; I will explain it to you. From my childhood, I have had a peculiar superhuman something attached to me by divine appointment: a voice, which, whenever it occurs, warns me to abstain from that which I am about to do, but never impels me.[13] Moreover, when any one of my friends mentions to me what he is about to do, if the voice shall then occur to me it is a warning for him to abstain. The examples of Charmides and Timarchus (here detailed by Sokrates) prove what I say: and many persons will tell you how truly I forewarned them of the ruin of the Athenian armament at Syracuse.[14] My young friend Sannion is now absent, serving on the expedition under Thrasyllus to Ionia: on his departure, the divine sign manifested itself to me, and I am persuaded that some grave calamity will befall him. [Footnote 13: Plato, Theagês, 128 D. [Greek: e)sti ga/r ti thei/a| moi/ra| parepo/menon e)moi\ e)k paido\s a)rxa/menon daimo/nion; e)/sti de\ tou=to phônê/, ê)\ o(/tan ge/nêtai, a)ei/ moi sêmai/nei, o(\ a)\n me/llô pra/ttein, tou/tou a)potropê/n, protre/pei de\ ou)de/pote.]] [Footnote 14: Plato, Theag. 129.] [Side-note: The Dæmon is favourable to some persons, adverse to others. Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by the society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt anything from Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him.] These facts I mention to you (Sokrates continues) because it is that same divine power which exercises paramount influence over my intercourse with companions.[15] Towards many, it is positively adverse; so that I cannot even enter into companionship with them. Towards others, it does not forbid, yet neither does it co-operate: so that they derive no benefit from me. There are others again in whose case it co-operates; these are the persons to whom you allude, who make rapid progress.[16] With some, such improvement is lasting: others, though they improve wonderfully while in my society, yet relapse into commonplace men when they leave me. Aristeides, for example (grandson of Aristeides the Just), was one of those who made rapid progress while he was with me. But he was forced to absent himself on military service; and on returning, he found as my companion Thucydides (son of Melesias), who however had quarrelled with me for some debate of the day before. I understand (said Aristeides to me) that Thucydides has taken offence and gives himself airs; he forgets what a poor creature he was, before he came to you.[17] I myself, too, have fallen into a despicable condition. When I left you, I was competent to discuss with any one and make a good figure, so that I courted debate with the most accomplished men. Now, on the contrary, I avoid them altogether--so thoroughly am I ashamed of my own incapacity. Did the capacity (I, _Sokrates_, asked Aristeides) forsake you all at once, or little by little? Little by little, he replied. And when you possessed it (I asked), did you get it by learning from me? or in what other way? I will tell you, Sokrates (he answered), what seems incredible, yet is nevertheless true.[18] I never learnt from you any thing at all. You yourself well know this. But I always made progress, whenever I was along with you, even if I were only in the same house without being in the same room; but I made greater progress, if I was in the same room--greater still, if I looked in your face, instead of turning my eyes elsewhere--and the greatest of all, by far, if I sat close and touching you. But now (continued Aristeides) all that I then acquired has dribbled out of me.[19] [Footnote 15: Plato, Theagês, 129 E. [Greek: tau=ta dê\ pa/nta ei)/rêka/ soi, o(/ti ê( du/namis au(/tê tou= daimoni/ou tou/tou kai\ ei)s ta\s sunousi/as tô=n met' e)mou= sundiatribo/ntôn to\ a(/pan du/natai. polloi=s me\n ga\r e)nantiou=tai, kai\ ou)k e)/sti tou/tois ô)phelêthênai met' e)mou= diatri/bousin.]] [Footnote 16: Plato, Theag. 129 E. [Greek: oi(=s d' a)\n sulla/bêtai tê=s sunousi/as ê( tou= daimo/niou du/namis, ou(=toi ei)sin ô(=n kai\ su\ ê)/|sthêsai; tachu\ ga\r parachrê=ma e)pidido/asin.]] [Footnote 17: Plato, Theag. 130 A-B. [Greek: Ti/ dai/? ou)k oi)=den, e)/phê, pri\n soi\ suggene/sthai, oi(=on ê)=n to\ a)ndra/podon?]] [Footnote 18: Plato, Theag. 130 D. [Greek: Ê(ni/ka de/ soi parege/neto (ê( du/namis), po/teron matho/nti par' e)mou= ti parege/neto, ê)/ tini a)/llô| tro/pô|? E)gô/ soi, e)/phê, e)rô=, ô)= Sô/krates, a)/piston me\n nê\ tou\s theou/s, a)lêthe\s de/. e)gô\ ga\r e)/mathon me\n para\ sou= ou)de\n pô/pote, ô(s au)to\s oi)=stha; e)pedi/doun de\ o(pote soi sunei/ên, ka)\n ei) e)n tê=| au)tê=| mo/non oi)ki/a| ei)/ên, mê\ e)n tô=| au)tô=| de\ oi)kê/mati], &c.] [Footnote 19: Plato, Theag. 130 E. [Greek: polu\ de\ ma/lista kai\ plei=ston e)pedi/doun, o(po/te par' au)to/n se kathoi/mên e)cho/meno/s sou kai\ a(pto/menos. nu=n de/, ê)= d' o(/s, pa=sa e)kei/nê ê(\ e(/xis e)xer)r(u/êken.]] [Side-note: Theagês expresses his anxiety to be received as the companion of Sokrates.] _Sokr._--I have now explained to you, Theagês, what it is to become my companion. If it be the pleasure of the God, you will make great and rapid progress: if not, not. Consider, therefore, whether it is not safer for you to seek instruction from some of those who are themselves masters of the benefits which they impart, rather than to take your chance of the result with me.[20] _Theag._--I shall be glad, Sokrates, to become your companion, and to make trial of this divine coadjutor. If he shows himself propitious, that will be the best of all: if not, we can then take counsel, whether I shall try to propitiate him by prayer, sacrifice, or any other means which the prophets may recommend or whether I shall go to some other teacher.[21] [Footnote 20: Plato, Theag. 130 E. [Greek: o(/ra ou)=n mê/ soi a)sphale/steron ê)=| par' e)kei/nôn tini\ paideu/esthai, oi(\ e)gkratei=s au)toi/ ei)si tê=s ô)phelei/as, ê)\n ô)phelou=si tou\s a)nthrô/pous, ma=llon ê)\ par' e)mou= o(/, ti a)\n tu/chê|, tou=to pra=xai.]] [Footnote 21: Plato, Theag. 131 A.] * * * * * [Side-note: Remarks on the Theagês--analogy with the Lachês.] The Theagês figured in the list of Thrasyllus as first in the fifth Tetralogy: the other three members of the same Tetralogy being Charmidês, Lachês, Lysis. Some persons considered it suitable to read as first dialogue of all.[22] There are several points of analogy between the Theagês and the Lachês, though with a different turn given to them. Aristeides and Thucydides are mentioned in both of them: Sokrates also is solicited to undertake the duty of teacher. The ardour of the young Theagês to acquire wisdom reminds us of Hippokrates at the beginning of the Protagoras. The string of questions put by Sokrates to Theagês, requiring that what is called wisdom shall be clearly defined and specialised, has its parallel in many of the Platonic dialogues. Moreover the declaration of Sokrates, that he knows nothing except about matters of love, but that in them he is a consummate master--is the same as what he explicitly declares both in the Symposion and other dialogues.[23] [Footnote 22: Diog. L. iii. 59-61.] [Footnote 23: Symposion, 177 E. [Greek: ou)/te ga\r a)/n pou e)gô\ a)pophê/saimi, o(\s ou)de/n phêmi a)/llo e)pi/stasthai ê)\ ta\ e)rôtika/.] Compare the same dialogue, p. 212 B, 216 C. Phædrus, 227 E, 257 A; Lysis, 204 B. Compare also Xenoph. Memor. ii. 6, 28; Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 27. It is not reasonable to treat this declaration of Sokrates, in the Theagês, as an evidence that the dialogue is the work of a _falsarius_, when a declaration quite similar is ascribed to Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues.] [Side-note: Chief peculiarity of the Theagês--stress laid upon the divine sign or Dæmon.] But the chief peculiarity of the Theagês consists in the stress which is laid upon the Dæmon, the divine voice, the inspiration of Sokrates. This divine auxiliary is here described, not only as giving a timely check or warning to Sokrates, when either he or his friends contemplated any inauspicious project--but also as intervening, in the case of those youthful companions with whom he conversed, to promote the improvement of one, to obstruct that of others; so that whether Sokrates will produce any effect or not in improving any one, depends neither upon his own efforts nor upon those of the recipient, but upon the unpredictable concurrence of a divine agency.[24] [Footnote 24: See some remarks on this point in Appendix.] [Side-note: Plato employs this divine sign here to render some explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of his unequal influence upon different companions.] Plato employs the Sokratic Dæmon, in the Theagês, for a philosophical purpose, which, I think, admits of reasonable explanation. During the eight (perhaps ten) years of his personal communion with Sokrates, he had had large experience of the variable and unaccountable effect produced by the Sokratic conversation upon different hearers: a fact which is also attested by the Xenophontic Memorabilia. This difference of effect was in no way commensurate to the unequal intelligence of the hearers. Chærephon, Apollodôrus, Kriton, seem to have been ordinary men:--[25] while Kritias and Alkibiades, who brought so much discredit both upon Sokrates and his teaching, profited little by him, though they were among the ablest pupils that he ever addressed: moreover Antisthenes, and Aristippus, probably did not appear to Plato (since he greatly dissented from their philosophical views) to have profited much by the common companionship with Sokrates. Other companions there must have been also personally known to Plato, though not to us: for we must remember that Sokrates passed his whole day in talking with all listeners. Now when Plato in after life came to cast the ministry of Sokrates into dramatic scenes, and to make each scene subservient to the illustration of some philosophical point of view, at least a negative--he was naturally led to advert to the Dæmon or divine inspiration, which formed so marked a feature in the character of his master. The concurrence or prohibition of this divine auxiliary served to explain why it was that the seed, sown broadcast by Sokrates, sometimes fructified, and sometimes did not fructify, or speedily perished afterwards--when no sufficient explanatory peculiarity could be pointed out in the ground on which it fell. It gave an apparent reason for the perfect singularity of the course pursued by Sokrates: for his preternatural acuteness in one direction, and his avowed incapacity in another: for his mastery of the Elenchus, convicting men of ignorance, and his inability to supply them with knowledge: for his refusal to undertake the duties of a teacher. All these are mysterious features of the Sokratic character. The intervention of the Dæmon appears to afford an explanation, by converting them into religious mysteries: which, though it be no explanation at all, yet is equally efficacious by stopping the mouth of the questioner, and by making him believe that it is guilt and impiety to ask for explanation--as Sokrates himself declared in regard to astronomical phenomena, and as Herodotus feels, when his narrative is crossed by strange religious legends.[26] [Footnote 25: Xenophon, Apol. Sokr. 28. [Greek: A)pollo/dôros--e)pithumê/tês me\n i)schurô=s au)tou=, a)/llôs d' eu)ê/thês.]--Plat. Phædon, 117 D.] [Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. iv. 7, 5-6; Herodot. ii. 3, 45-46.] [Side-note: Sokrates, while continually finding fault with other teachers, refused to teach himself--difficulty of finding an excuse for his refusal. The Theagês furnishes an excuse.] In this manner, the Theagês is made by Plato to exhibit one way of parrying the difficulty frequently addressed to Sokrates by various hearers: "You tell us that the leading citizens cannot even teach their own sons, and that the Sophists teach nothing worth having: you perpetually call upon us to seek for better teachers, without telling us where such are to be found. We entreat you to teach us yourself, conformably to your own views." If a leader of political opposition, after years employed in denouncing successive administrators as ignorant and iniquitous, refuses, when invited, to take upon himself the business of administration--an intelligent admirer must find some decent pretence to colour the refusal. Such a pretence is found for Sokrates in the Theagês: "I am not my own master on this point. I am the instrument of a divine ally, without whose active working I can accomplish nothing: who forbids altogether my teaching of one man--tolerates, without assisting, my unavailing lessons to another--assists efficaciously in my teaching of a third, in which case alone the pupil receives any real benefit. The assistance of this divine ally is given or withheld according to motives of his own, which I cannot even foretell, much less influence. I should deceive you therefore if I undertook to teach, when I cannot tell whether I shall do good or harm." The reply of Theagês meets this scruple. He asks permission to make the experiment, and promises to propitiate the divine auxiliary by prayer and sacrifice; under which reserve Sokrates gives consent. [Side-note: Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues, allude to the divine sign in the same way. Its character and working essentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person.] It is in this way that the Dæmon or divine auxiliary serves the purpose of reconciling what would otherwise be an inconsistency in the proceedings of Sokrates. I mean, that such is the purpose served in _this_ dialogue: I know perfectly that Plato deals with the case differently elsewhere: but I am not bound (as I have said more than once) to force upon all the dialogues one and the same point of view. That the agency of the Gods was often and in the most important cases, essentially undiscoverable and unpredictable, and that in such cases they might sometimes be prevailed on to give special warnings to favoured persons--were doctrines which the historical Sokrates in Xenophon asserts with emphasis.[27] The Dæmon of Sokrates was believed, both by himself and his friends, to be a special privilege and an extreme case of divine favour and communication to him.[28] It was perfectly applicable to the scope of the Theagês, though Plato might not choose always to make the same employment of it. It is used in the same general way in the Theætêtus;[29] doubtless with less expansion, and blended with another analogy (that of the mid-wife) which introduces a considerable difference.[30] [Footnote 27: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 8-9-19. Euripid. Hecub. 944. [Greek: phu/rousi d' au)ta\ theoi\ pa/lin te kai\ pro/sô, taragmo\n e)ntithe/ntes, ô(s a)gnôsi/a| se/bômen au)tou/s.]] [Footnote 28: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 3, 12.] [Footnote 29: Plato, Theætêt. 150 D-E.] [Footnote 30: Plato, Apolog. Sokr. 33 C. [Greek: e)moi\ de\ tou=to, ô(s e)gô/ phêmi, proste/taktai u(po\ toou= theou= pra/ttein kai\ e)k manteiô=n kai\ e)x e)nupni/ôn kai\ panti\ tro/pô|, ô(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\ a)/llê thei/a moio/ra a)nthrô/pô| kai\ o(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein.] 40 A. [Greek: ê( ga\r ei)ôthui=a/ moi mantikê\ ê( tou= daimoni/ou e)n me\n tô=| pro/sthen _chro/nô| panti\ pa/nu puknê\ a)ei\ ê)=n kai\ pa/nu e)pi\ smikroi=s e)nantioume/nê_, ei)/ ti me/lloimi mê\ o)rthô=s pra/xein.] Compare Xenophon, Memor. iv. 8, 5; Apol. Sokr. c. 13.] APPENDIX. [Greek: To\ daimo/nion sêmei=on.] Here is one of the points most insisted on by Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, as proving that the Theagês is not the work of Plato. These critics affirm (to use the language of Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 220) "Quam Plato alias de Socratis dæmonio prodidit sententiam, ea longissimè recedit ab illâ ratione, quæ in hoc sermone exposita est". He says that the representation of the Dæmon of Sokrates, given in the Theagês, has been copied from a passage in the Theætêtus, by an imitator who has not understood the passage, p. 150, D, E. But Socher (p. 97) appears to me to have shown satisfactorily, that there is no such material difference as these critics affirm between this passage of the Theætêtus and the Theagês. In the Theætêtus, Sokrates declares, that none of his companions learnt any thing from him, but that all of them [Greek: oi(=sper a)\n o( theo\s parei/kê|] (the very same term is used at the close of the Theagês--131 A, [Greek: e)a\n me\n parei/kê| ê(mi=n--to\ daimo/nion]) made astonishing progress and improvement in his company. Stallbaum says, "Itaque [Greek: o( theo\s], qui ibi memoratur, non est Socratis dæmonium, sed potius deus _i.e._ sors divina. Quod non perspiciens _noster tenebrio_ protenus illud dæmonium, quod Socrates sibi semper adesse dictitabat, ad eum dignitatis et potentiæ gradum evexit, ut, &c." I agree with Socher in thinking that the phrase [Greek: o( theo\s] in the Theætêtus has substantially the same meaning as [Greek: to\ daimo/nion] in the Theagês. Both Schleiermacher (Notes on the Apology, p. 432) and Ast (p. 482), have notes on the phrase [Greek: to\ daimo/nion]--and I think the note of Ast is the more instructive of the two. In Plato and Xenophon, the words [Greek: to\ daimo/nion], [Greek: to\ thei=on], are in many cases undistinguishable in meaning from [Greek: o( dai/môn], [Greek: o( theo/s]. Compare the Phædrus, 242 E, about [Greek: theo\s] and [Greek: thei=o/n ti]. Sokrates, in his argument against Meletus in the Apology (p. 27) emphatically argues that no man could believe in any thing [Greek: daimo/nion], without also believing in [Greek: daimo/nes]. The special [Greek: thei=o/n ti kai\ daimo/nion (Apol. p. 31 C), which presented itself in regard to him and his proceedings, was only one of the many modes in which (as he believed) [Greek: o( theo/s] commanded and stimulated him to work upon the minds of the Athenians:--[Greek: e)moi\ de\ tou=to, ô(s e)gô/ phêmi, proste/taktai u(po\ tou= theou= pra/ttein kai\ e)k manteiô=n kai\ e)x e)nupni/ôn kai\ panti\ tro/pô|, ô(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\ a)/llê thei/a moi=ra a)nthrô/pô| kai\ o(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein] (Apol. p. 33 C). So again in Apol. p. 40 A, B, [Greek: ê( ei)ôthui=a/ moi mantikê\ ê( tou= daimoni/ou]--and four lines afterwards we read the very same fact intimated in the words, [Greek: to\ tou= theou= sêmei=on], where Sokratis dæmonium--and Deus--are identified: thus refuting the argument above cited from Stallbaum. There is therefore no such discrepancy, in reference to [Greek: to\ daimo/nion], as Stallbaum and Schleiermacher contend for. We perceive indeed this difference between them--that in the Theætêtus, the simile of the obstetric art is largely employed, while it is not noticed in the Theagês. But we should impose an unwarrantable restriction upon Plato's fancy, if we hindered him from working out his variety and exuberance of metaphors, and from accommodating each dialogue to the metaphor predominant with him at the time. Moreover, in respect to what is called the Dæmon of Sokrates, we ought hardly to expect that either Plato or Xenophon would always be consistent even with themselves. It is unsafe for a modern critic to determine beforehand, by reason or feelings of his own, in what manner either of them would speak upon this mysterious subject. The belief and feeling of a divine intervention was very real on the part of both, but their manner of conceiving it might naturally fluctuate: and there was, throughout all the proceedings of Sokrates, a mixture of the serious and the playful, of the sublime and the eccentric, of ratiocinative acuteness with impulsive superstition--which it is difficult to bring into harmonious interpretation. Such heterogeneous mixture is forcibly described in the Platonic Symposium, pp. 215-222. When we consider how undefined, and undefinable, the idea of this [Greek: daimo/nion] was, we cannot wonder if Plato ascribes to it different workings and manifestations at different times. Stallbaum affirms that it is made ridiculous in the Theagês: and Kühner declares that Plutarch makes it ridiculous, in his treatise De Genio Sokratia (Comm. ad. Xenoph. Memor. p. 23). But this is because its agency is described more in detail. You can easily present it in a ridiculous aspect, by introducing it as intervening on petty and insignificant matters. Now it is remarkable, that in the Apology, we are expressly told that it actually did intervene on the most trifling occasions--[Greek: pa/nu e)pi\ smikroi=s e)nantioume/nê]. The business of an historian of philosophy is, to describe it as it was really felt and believed by Sokrates and Plato--whether a modern critic may consider the description ridiculous or not. When Schleiermacher says (Einleitung, p. 248), respecting the _falsarius_ whom he supposes to have written the Theagês--"Damit ist ihm begegnet, auf eine höchst verkehrte Art wunderbar zusammenzurühren diese göttliche Schickung, und jenes persönliche Vorgefühl welches dem Sokrates zur göttlichen Stimme ward".--I contend that the mistake is chargeable to Schleiermacher himself, for bisecting into two phenomena that which appears in the Apology as the same phenomenon under two different names--[Greek: to\ daimo/nion]--[Greek: to\ tou= theou= sêmei=on]. Besides, to treat the Dæmon as a mere "personal presentiment" of Sokrates, may be a true view:--but it is the view of one who does not inhale the same religious atmosphere as Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon. It cannot therefore be properly applied in explaining their sayings or doings. Kühner, who treats the Theagês as not composed by Plato, grounds this belief partly on the assertion, that the [Greek: daimo/nion] of Sokrates is described therein as something peculiar to Sokrates; which, according to Kühner, was the fiction of a subsequent time. By Sokrates and his contemporaries (Kühner says) it was considered "non sibi soli tanquam proprium quoddam beneficium a Diis tributum, sed commune sibi esse cum cæteris hominibus" (pp. 20-21). I dissent entirely from this view, which is contradicted by most of the passages noticed even by Kühner himself. It is at variance with the Platonic Apology, as well as with the Theætêtus (150 D), and Republic (vi. 496 C). Xenophon does indeed try, in the first Chapter of the Memorabilia, as the defender of Sokrates, to soften the _invidia_ against Sokrates, by intimating that other persons had communications from the Gods as well as he. But we see plainly, even from other passages of the Memorabilia, that this was not the persuasion of Sokrates himself, nor of his friends, nor of his enemies. They all considered it (as it is depicted in the Theagês also) to be a special privilege and revelation. CHAPTER XVI. ERASTÆ OR ANTERASTÆ--RIVALES. The main subject of this short dialogue is--What is philosophy? [Greek: ê( philosophi/a--to\ philosophei=n]. How are we to explain or define it? What is its province and purport? [Side-note: Erastæ--subject and persons of the dialogue--dramatic introduction--interesting youths in the palæstra.] Instead of the simple, naked, self-introducing, conversation, which we read in the Menon, Hipparchus, Minos, &c. Sokrates recounts a scene and colloquy, which occurred when he went into the house of Dionysius the grammatist or school-master,[1] frequented by many elegant and high-born youths as pupils. Two of these youths were engaged in animated debate upon some geometrical or astronomical problem, in the presence of various spectators; and especially of two young men, rivals for the affection of one of them. Of these rivals, the one is a person devoted to music, letters, discourse, philosophy:--the other hates and despises these pursuits, devoting himself to gymnastic exercise, and bent on acquiring the maximum of athletic force.[2] It is much the same contrast as that between the brothers Amphion and Zethus in the Antiopê of Euripides--which is beautifully employed as an illustration by Plato in the Gorgias.[3] [Footnote 1: Plato, Erastæ, 132. [Greek: ei)s Dionusi/ou tou= grammatistou= ei)sê=lthon, kai\ ei)=don au)to/thi tô=n te ne/ôn tou\s e)pieikesta/tous dokou=ntas ei)=nai tê\n i)de/an kai\ pate/rôn eu)doki/môn kai\ tou/tôn e)rasta/s.]] [Footnote 2: Plato, Erast. 132 E.] [Footnote 3: Plato, Gorgias, 485-486. Compare Cicero De Oratore, ii. 37, 156.] [Side-note: Two rival Erastæ--one of them literary, devoted to philosophy--the other gymnastic, hating philosophy.] As soon as Sokrates begins his interrogatories, the two youths relinquish[4] their geometrical talk, and turn to him as attentive listeners. Their approach affects his emotions hardly less than those of the Erastes. He first enquires from the athletic Erastes, What is it that these two youths are so intently engaged upon? It must surely be something very fine, to judge by the eagerness which they display? How do you mean _fine_ (replies the athlete)? They are only prosing about astronomical matters--talking nonsense--philosophising! The literary rival, on the contrary, treats this athlete as unworthy of attention, speaks with enthusiastic admiration of philosophy, and declares that all those to whom it is repugnant are degraded specimens of humanity. [Footnote 4: The powerful sentiment of admiration ascribed to Sokrates in the presence of these beautiful youths deserves notice as a point in his character. Compare the beginning of the Charmidês and the Lysis.] [Side-note: Question put by Sokrates--What is philosophy? It is the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sum total.] _Sokr._--You think philosophy a fine thing? But you cannot tell whether it is fine or not, unless you know what it is.[5] Pray explain to me what philosophy is. _Erast._--I will do so readily. Philosophy consists in the perpetual growth of a man's knowledge--in his going on perpetually acquiring something new, both in youth and in old age, so that he may learn as much as possible during life. Philosophy is polymathy.[6] _Sokr._--You think philosophy not only a fine thing, but good? _Erast._--Yes--very good. _Sokr._--But is the case similar in regard to gymnastic? Is a man's bodily condition benefited by taking as much exercise, or as much nourishment, as possible? Is such very great quantity good for the body?[7] [Footnote 5: Plat. Erast. 133 A-B.] [Footnote 6: Plato, Erast. 133 D. [Greek: tê\n philosophi/an--poluma/theian.]] [Footnote 7: Plato, Erast. 133 E.] [Side-note: In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the mind also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured quantity which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure?] It appears after some debate (in which the other or athletic Erastes sides with Sokrates[8]) that in regard to exercise and food it is not the great quantity or the small quantity, which is good for the body--but the moderate or measured quantity.[9] For the mind, the case is admitted to be similar. Not the _much_, nor the _little_, of learning is good for it but the right or measured amount. _Sokr._--And who is the competent judge, how much of either is right measure for the body? _Erast._--The physician and the gymnastic trainer. _Sokr._--Who is the competent judge, how much seed is right measure for sowing a field? _Erast._--The farmer. _Sokr._--Who is the competent judge, in reference to the sowing and planting of knowledge in the mind, which varieties are good, and how much of each is right measure? [Footnote 8: Plat. Erast. 134 B-C. The literary Erastes says to Sokrates, "To _you_, I have no objection to concede this point, and to admit that my previous answer must be modified. But if I were to debate the point only with _him_ (the athletic rival), I could perfectly well have defended my answer, and even worse answer still, for _he_ is quite worthless ([Greek: ou)de\n ga/r e)sti])." This is a curious passage, illustrating the dialectic habits of the day, and the pride felt in maintaining an answer once given.] [Footnote 9: Plato, Erastæ, 134 B-D. [Greek: ta\ me/tria ma/lista ô)phelei=n, a)lla\ mê\ ta\ polla\ mêde\ ta\ o)li/ga.]] [Side-note: No answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher--as much as will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise.] The question is one which none of the persons present can answer.[10] None of them can tell who is the special referee, about training of mind; corresponding to the physician or the farmer in the analogous cases. Sokrates then puts a question somewhat different: _Sokr._--Since we have agreed, that the man who prosecutes philosophy ought not to learn many things, still less all things--what is the best conjecture that we can make, respecting the matters which he ought to learn? _Erast._--The finest and most suitable acquirements for him to aim at, are those which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher. He ought to appear accomplished in every variety of science, or at least in all the more important; and with that view, to learn as much of each as becomes a freeman to know:--that is, what belongs to the intelligent critic, as distinguished from the manual operative: to the planning and superintending architect, as distinguished from the working carpenter.[11] _Sokr._--But you cannot learn even two different arts to this extent--much less several considerable arts. _Erast._--I do not of course mean that the philosopher can be supposed to know each of them accurately, like the artist himself--but only as much as may be expected from the free and cultivated citizen. That is, he shall be able to appreciate, better than other hearers, the observations made by the artist: and farther to deliver a reasonable opinion of his own, so as to be accounted, by all the hearers, more accomplished in the affairs of the art than themselves.[12] [Footnote 10: Plato, Erast. 134 E, 135 A.] [Footnote 11: Plat. Erast. 135 B. [Greek: o(/sa xune/seôs e)/chetai, mê\ o(/sa cheirourgi/as.]] [Footnote 12: Plat. Erast. 135 D.] [Side-note: The philosopher is one who is second-best in several different arts--a Pentathlus--who talks well upon each.] _Sokr._--You mean that the philosopher is to be second-best in several distinct pursuits: like the Pentathlus, who is not expected to equal either the runner or the wrestler in their own separate departments, but only to surpass competitors in the five matches taken together.[13] _Erast._--Yes--I mean what you say. He is one who does not enslave himself to any one matter, nor works out any one with such strictness as to neglect all others: he attends to all of them in reasonable measure.[14] [Footnote 13: Plat. Erast. 135 E, 136 A. [Greek: kai\ ou(/tôs gi/gnesthai peri\ pa/nta u(/pakro/n tina a)/ndra to\n pephilosophêko/ta.] The five matches were leaping, running, throwing the quoit and the javelin, wrestling.] [Footnote 14: Plat. Erast. 136 B. [Greek: a)lla\ pa/ntôn metri/ôs e)phê=phthai.]] [Side-note: On what occasions can such second-best men be useful? There are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner.] Upon this answer Sokrates proceeds to cross-examine: _Sokr._--Do you think that good men are useful, bad men useless? _Erast._--Yes I do. _Sokr._--You think that philosophers, as you describe them, are useful? _Erast._--Certainly: extremely useful. _Sokr._--But tell me on what occasions such second-best men are useful: for obviously they are inferior to each separate artist. If you fall sick will you send for one of _them_, or for a professional physician? _Erast._--I should send for both. _Sokr._--That is no answer: I wish to know, which of the two you will send for first and by preference? _Erast._--No doubt I shall send for the professional physician. _Sokr._--The like also, if you are in danger on shipboard, you will entrust your life to the pilot rather than to the philosopher: and so as to all other matters, as long as a professional man is to be found, the philosopher is of no use? _Erast._--So it appears. _Sokr._--Our philosopher then is one of the useless persons: for we assuredly have professional men at hand. Now we agreed before, that good men were useful, bad men useless.[15] _Erast._--Yes; that was agreed. [Footnote 15: Plat. Erast. 136 C-D.] [Side-note: Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned acquirements.] _Sokr._--If then you have correctly defined a philosopher to be one who has a second-rate knowledge on many subjects, he is useless so long as there exist professional artists on each subject. Your definition cannot therefore be correct. Philosophy must be something quite apart from this multifarious and busy meddling with different professional subjects, or this multiplication of learned acquirements. Indeed I fancied, that to be absorbed in professional subjects and in variety of studies, was vulgar and discreditable rather than otherwise.[16] [Footnote 16: Plato, Erast. 137 B.] Let us now, however (continues Sokrates), take up the matter in another way. In regard to horses and dogs, those who punish rightly are also those who know how to make them better, and to discriminate with most exactness the good from the bad? _Erast._--Yes: such is the fact. [Side-note: Sokrates changes his course of examination--questions put to show that there is one special art, regal and political, of administering and discriminating the bad from the good.] _Sokr._--Is not the case similar with men? Is it not the same art, which punishes men rightly, makes them better, and best distinguishes the good from the bad? whether applied to one, few, or many? _Erast._--It is so.[17] _Sokr._--The art or science, whereby men punish evil-doers rightly, is the judicial or justice: and it is by the same that they know the good apart from the bad, either one or many. If any man be a stranger to this art, so as not to know good men apart from bad, is he not also ignorant of himself, whether he be a good or a bad man? _Erast._--Yes: he is. _Sokr._--To be ignorant of yourself, is to be wanting in sobriety or temperance; to know yourself is to be sober or temperate. But this is the same art as that by which we punish rightly--or justice. Therefore justice and temperance are the same: and the Delphian rescript, _Know thyself_, does in fact enjoin the practice both of justice and of sobriety.[18] _Erast._--So it appears. _Sokr._--Now it is by this same art, when practised by a king, rightly punishing evil-doers, that cities are well governed; it is by the same art practised by a private citizen or house-master, that the house is well-governed: so that this art, justice or sobriety, is at the same time political, regal, economical; and the just and sober man is at once the true king, statesman, house-master.[19] _Erast._--I admit it. [Footnote 17: Plato, Erast. 137 C-D.] [Footnote 18: Plato, Erast. 138 A.] [Footnote 19: Plato, Erast. 138 C.] [Side-note: In this art the philosopher must not only be second-best, competent to talk--but he must be a fully qualified practitioner, competent to act.] _Sokr._--Now let me ask you. You said that it was discreditable for the philosopher, when in company with a physician or any other craftsman talking about matters of his own craft, not to be able to follow what he said and comment upon it. Would it not also be discreditable to the philosopher, when listening to any king, judge, or house-master, about professional affairs, not to be able to understand and comment? _Erast._--Assuredly it would be most discreditable upon matters of such grave moment. _Sokr._--Shall we say then, that upon these matters also, as well as all others, the philosopher ought to be a Pentathlus or second-rate performer, useless so long as the special craftsman is at hand? or shall we not rather affirm, that he must not confide his own house to any one else, nor be the second-best within it, but must himself judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well administered? _Erast._--That too I admit.[20] _Sokr._--Farther, if his friends shall entrust to him the arbitration of their disputes,--if the city shall command him to act as Dikast or to settle any difficulty,--in those cases also it will be disgraceful for him to stand second or third, and not to be first-rate? _Erast._--I think it will be. _Sokr._--You see then, my friend, philosophy is something very different from much learning and acquaintance with multifarious arts or sciences.[21] [Footnote 20: Plato, Erast. 138 E. [Greek: Po/teron ou)=n kai\ peri\ tau=ta le/gômen, pe/ntathlon au)to\n dei=n ei)=nai kai\ u(/pakron, ta\ deuterei=a e)/chonta pa/ntôn, to\n philo/sophon, kai\ a)chrei=on ei)=nai, e(/ôs a)\n tou/tôn tis ê)=|? ê)\ prô=ton me\n tê\n au(tou= oi)ki/an ou)k a)llô| e)pitrepte/on ou)de ta\ deuterei=a e)n tou/tô| e(kte/on, a)ll' au)to\n kolaste/on dika/zonta o)rthô=s, ei) me/llei eu)= oi)kei=sthai au)tou= ê( oi)ki/a?]] [Footnote 21: Plato, Erast. 139 A. [Greek: Pollou= a)/ra dei= ê(mi=n, ô)= be/ltiste, to\ philosophei=n poluma/theia/ te ei)=nai kai\ ê( peri\ ta\s te/chnas pragmatei/a.]] [Side-note: Close of the dialogue--humiliation of the literary Erastes.] Upon my saying this (so Sokrates concludes his recital of the conversation) the literary one of the two rivals was ashamed and held his peace; while the gymnastic rival declared that I was in the right, and the other hearers also commended what I had said. * * * * * [Side-note: Remarks--animated manner of the dialogue.] The antithesis between the philo-gymnast, hater of philosophy,--and the enthusiastic admirer of philosophy, who nevertheless cannot explain what it is--gives much point and vivacity to this short dialogue. This last person is exhibited as somewhat presumptuous and confident; thus affording a sort of excuse for the humiliating cross-examination put upon him by Sokrates to the satisfaction of his stupid rival. Moreover, the dramatic introduction is full of animation, like that of the Charmidês and Lysis. Besides the animated style of the dialogue, the points raised for discussion in it are of much interest. The word philosophy has at all times been vague and ambiguous. Certainly no one before Sokrates--probably no one before Plato--ever sought a definition of it. In no other Platonic dialogue than this, is the definition of it made a special topic of research. [Side-note: Definition of philosophy--here sought for the first time--Platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered.] It is here handled in Plato's negative, elenchtic, tentative, manner. By some of his contemporaries, philosophy was really considered as equivalent to polymathy, or to much and varied knowledge: so at least Plato represents it as being considered by Hippias the Sophist, contrary to the opinion of Protagoras.[22] The exception taken by Sokrates to a definition founded on simple quantity, without any standard point of sufficiency by which much or little is to be measured, introduces that governing idea of [Greek: to\ me/trion] (the moderate, that which conforms to a standard measure) upon which Plato insists so much in other more elaborate dialogues. The conception of a measure, of a standard of measurement--and of conformity thereunto, as the main constituent of what is good and desirable--stands prominent in his mind,[23] though it is not always handled in the same way. We have seen it, in the Second Alkibiadês, indicated under another name as knowledge of Good or of the Best: without which, knowledge on special matters was declared to be hurtful rather than useful.[24] Plato considers that this Measure is neither discernible nor applicable except by a specially trained intelligence. In the Erastæ as elsewhere, such an intelligence is called for in general terms: but when it is asked, Where is the person possessing such intelligence, available in the case of mental training--neither Sokrates nor any one else can point him out. To suggest a question, and direct attention to it, yet still to leave it unanswered--is a practice familiar with Plato. In this respect the Erastæ is like other dialogues. The answer, if any, intended to be understood or divined, is, that such an intelligence is the philosopher himself. [Footnote 22: Plato, Protag. 318 E. Compare too, the Platonic dialogues, Hippias Major and Minor.] [Footnote 23: See about [Greek: ê( tou= metri/ou phu/sis] as [Greek: ou)si/a]--as [Greek: o)/ntôs gigno/menon].--Plato, Politikus, 283-284. Compare also the Philêbus, p. 64 D, and the Protagoras, pp. 356-357, where [Greek: ê( metrêtikê\ te/chnê] is declared to be the principal saviour of life and happiness.] [Footnote 24: Plato, Alkib. ii. 145-146; supra, ch. xii. p. 16.] [Side-note: View taken of the second-best critical talking man, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner.] The second explanation of philosophy here given--that the philosopher is one who is second-best in many departments, and a good talker upon all, but inferior to the special master in each--was supposed by Thrasyllus in ancient times to be pointed at Demokritus. By many Platonic critics, it is referred to those persons whom they single out to be called Sophists. I conceive it to be applicable (whether intended or not) to the literary men generally of that age, the persons called Sophists included. That which Perikles expressed by the word, when he claimed the love of wisdom and the love of beauty as characteristic features of the Athenian citizen--referred chiefly to the free and abundant discussion, the necessity felt by every one for talking over every thing before it was done, yet accompanied with full energy in action as soon as the resolution was taken to act.[25] Speech, ready and pertinent, free conflict of opinion on many different topics--was the manifestation and the measure of knowledge acquired. Sokrates passed his life in talking, with every one indiscriminately, and upon each man's particular subject; often perplexing the artist himself. Xenophon recounts conversations with various professional men--a painter, a sculptor, an armourer--and informs us that it was instructive to all of them, though Sokrates was no practitioner in any craft.[26] It was not merely Demokritus, but Plato and Aristotle also, who talked or wrote upon almost every subject included in contemporary observation. The voluminous works of Aristotle,--the Timæus, Republic, and Leges, of Plato,--embrace a large variety of subjects, on each of which, severally taken, these two great men were second-best or inferior to some special proficient. Yet both of them had judgments to give, which it was important to hear, upon all subjects:[27] and both of them could probably talk better upon each than the special proficient himself. Aristotle, for example, would write better upon rhetoric than Demosthenes--upon tragedy, than Sophokles. Undoubtedly, if an oration or a tragedy were to be composed--if resolution or action were required on any real state of particular circumstances--the special proficient would be called upon to act: but it would be a mistake to infer from hence, as the Platonic Sokrates intimates in the Erastæ, that the second-best, or theorizing reasoner, was a useless man. The theoretical and critical point of view, with the command of language apt for explaining and defending it, has a value of its own; distinct from, yet ultimately modifying and improving, the practical. And such comprehensive survey and comparison of numerous objects, without having the attention exclusively fastened or enslaved to any one of them, deserves to rank high as a variety of intelligence whether it be adopted as the definition of a philosopher, or not. [Footnote 25: Thucyd. ii. 39 fin.--40. [Greek: kai\ e)/n te tou/tois tê\n po/lin a)xi/an ei)=nai thauma/zesthai, kai\ e)/ti e)n a)/llois. philokalou=men ga\r met' eu)telei/as kai\ philosophou=men a)/neu malaki/as], &c., and the remarkable sequel of the same chapter about the intimate conjunction of abundant speech with energetic action in the Athenian character.] [Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. iii. 10; iii. 11; iii. 12.] [Footnote 27: The [Greek: pe/ntathlos] or [Greek: u(/pakros] whom Plato criticises in this dialogue, coincides with what Aristotle calls "the man of universal education or culture".--Ethic. Nikom. I. i. 1095, a. 1. [Greek: e(/kastos de\ kri/nei kalô=s a(\ gignô/skei, kai\ tou/tôn e)sti\n a)gatho\s kritê/s; kath' e(/kaston a)/ra, o( pepaideume/nos; a(plô=s de/, o( peri\ pa=n pepaideume/nos.]] [Side-note: Plato's view--that the philosopher has a province special to himself, distinct from other specialties--dimly indicated--regal or political art.] Plato undoubtedly did not conceive the definition of the philosopher in the same way as Sokrates. The close of the Erastæ is employed in opening a distant and dim view of the Platonic conception. We are given to understand, that the philosopher has a province of his own, wherein he is not second-best, but a first-rate actor and adviser. To indicate, in many different ways, that there is or must be such a peculiar, appertaining to philosophy--distinct from, though analogous to, the peculiar of each several art--is one leading purpose in many Platonic dialogues. But what is the peculiar of the philosopher? Here, as elsewhere, it is marked out in a sort of misty outline, not as by one who already knows and is familiar with it, but as one who is trying to find it without being sure that he has succeeded. Here, we have it described as the art of discriminating good from evil, governing, and applying penal sanctions rightly. This is the supreme art or science, of which the philosopher is the professor; and in which, far from requiring advice from others, he is the only person competent both to advise and to act: the art which exercises control over all other special arts, directing how far, and on what occasions, each of them comes into appliance. It is philosophy, looked at in one of its two aspects: not as a body of speculative truth, to be debated, proved, and discriminated from what cannot be proved or can be disproved--but as a critical judgment bearing on actual life, prescribing rules or giving directions in particular cases, with a view to the attainment of foreknown ends, recognised as _expetenda_.[28] This is what Plato understands by the measuring or calculating art, the regal or political art, according as we use the language of the Protagoras, Politikus, Euthydêmus, Republic. Both justice and sobriety are branches of this art; and the distinction between the two loses its importance when the art is considered as a whole--as we find both in the Erastæ and in the Republic.[29] [Footnote 28: The difference between the second explanation of philosophy and the third explanation, suggested in the Erastæ, will be found to coincide pretty nearly with the distinction which Aristotle takes much pains to draw between [Greek: sophi/a] and [Greek: phro/nêsis].--Ethic. Nikomach. vi. 5, pp. 1140-1141; also Ethic. Magn. i. pp. 1197-1198.] [Footnote 29: See Republic, iv. 433 A; Gorgias, 526 C; Charmidês 164 B; and Heindorf's note on the passage in the Charmidês.] [Side-note: Philosopher--the supreme artist controlling other artists.] Here, in the Erastæ, this conception of the philosopher as the supreme artist controlling all other artists, is darkly indicated and crudely sketched. We shall find the same conception more elaborately illustrated in other dialogues; yet never passing out of that state. * * * * * APPENDIX. This is one of the dialogues declared to be spurious by Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, and Stallbaum, all of them critics of the present century. In my judgment, their grounds for such declaration are altogether inconclusive. They think the dialogue an inferior composition, unworthy of Plato; and they accordingly find reasons, more or less ingenious, for relieving Plato from the discredit of it. I do not think so meanly of the dialogue as they do; but even if I did, I should not pronounce it to be spurious, without some evidence bearing upon that special question. No such evidence, of any value, is produced. It is indeed contended, on the authority of a passage in Diogenes (ix. 37), that Thrasyllus himself doubted of the authenticity of the Erastæ. The passage is as follows, in his life of Demokritus--[Greek: ei)/per oi( A)nterastai\ Pla/tôno/s ei)si, phêsi\ Thra/sullos, ou(=tos a)\n ei)/ê o( parageno/menos a)nô/numos, tô=n peri\ Oi)nopi/dên kai\ A)naxago/ran e(/teros, e)n tê=| pro\s Sôkra/tên o(mili/a| dialego/menos peri\ philosophi/as; ô(=|, phêsi/n, ô(s penta/thlô| e)/oiken o( philo/sophos; kai\ ê)=n ô(s a)lêthô=s e)n philosophi/a| pe/ntathlos] (Demokritus). Now in the first place, Schleiermacher and Stallbaum both declare that Thrasyllus can never have said that which Diogenes here makes him say (Schleierm. p. 510; Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad. Erast. p. 266, and not. p. 273). Next, it is certain that Thrasyllus did consider it the undoubted work of Plato, for he enrolled it in his classification, as the third dialogue in the fourth tetralogy (Diog. L. iii. 59). Yxem, who defends the genuineness of the Erastæ (Ueber Platon's Kleitophon, pp. 6-7, Berlin, 1846), insists very properly on this point; not merely as an important fact in itself, but as determining the sense of the words [Greek: ei)/per oi( A)nterastai\ Pla/tôno/s ei)si], and as showing that the words rather affirm, than deny, the authenticity of the dialogue. "If the Anterastæ are the work of Plato, _as they are universally admitted to be_." You must supply the parenthesis in this way, in order to make Thrasyllus consistent with himself. Yxem cites a passage from Galen, in which [Greek: ei)/per] is used, and in which the parenthesis must be supplied in the way indicated: no doubt at all being meant to be hinted. And I will produce another passage out of Diogenes himself, where [Greek: ei)/per] is used in the same way; not as intended to convey the smallest doubt, but merely introducing the premiss for a conclusion immediately following. Diogenes says, respecting the Platonic Ideas, [Greek: ei)/per e)sti\ mnê/mê, ta\s i)de/as e)n toi=s ou)=sin u(pa/rchein] (iii. 15). He does not intend to suggest any doubt whether there be such a fact as memory. [Greek: Ei)/per] is sometimes the equivalent of [Greek: e)peidê/per]: as we learn from Hermann ad Viger. VIII. 6, p. 512. There is therefore no fair ground for supposing that Thrasyllus doubted the genuineness of the Erastæ. And when I read what modern critics say in support of their verdict of condemnation, I feel the more authorised in dissenting from it. I will cite a passage or two from Stallbaum. Stallbaum begins his Prolegomena as follows, pp. 205-206: "Quanquam hic libellus genus dicendi habet purum, castum, elegans, nihil ut inveniri queat quod à Platonis aut Xenophontis elegantiâ, abhorreat--tamen quin à Boeckhio, Schleiermachero, Astio, Sochero, Knebelio, aliis jure meritoque pro suppositicio habitus sit, haudquaquam dubitamus. Est enim materia operis adeo non ad Platonis mentem rationemque elaborata, ut potius cuivis alii Socraticorum quam huic rectè adscribi posse videatur." After stating that the Erastæ may be divided into two principal sections, Stallbaum proceeds:--"Neutra harum partium ita tractata est, ut nihil desideretur, quod ad justam argumenti explicationem merito requiras--nihil inculcatum reperiatur, quod vel alio modo illustratum vel omnino omissum esse cupias". I call attention to this sentence as a fair specimen of the grounds upon which the Platonic critics proceed when they strike dialogues out of the Platonic Canon. If there be anything wanting in it which is required for what they consider a proper setting forth of the argument--if there be anything which they would desire to see omitted or otherwise illustrated--this is with them a reason for deciding that it is not Plato's work. That is, if there be any defects in it of any kind, it cannot be admitted as Plato's work;--_his genuine works have no defects_. I protest altogether against this _ratio decidendi_. If I acknowledged it and applied it consistently I should strike out every dialogue in the Canon. Certainly, the presumption in favour of the Catalogue of Thrasyllus must be counted as _nil_, if it will not outweigh such feeble counter-arguments as these. One reason given by Stallbaum for considering the Erastæ as spurious is, that the Sophists are not derided in it. "Quis est igitur, qui Platonem sibi persuadeat illos non fuisse castigaturum, et omnino non significaturum, quinam illi essent, adversus quos hanc disputationem instituisset?" It is strange to be called on by learned men to strike out all dialogues from the Canon in which there is no derision of the Sophists. Such derision exists already in excess: we hear until we are tired how mean it is to receive money for lecturing. Again, Stallbaum says that the persons whose opinions are here attacked are not specified by name. But who are the [Greek: ei)dô=n phi/loi], attacked in the Sophistês? They are not specified by name, and critics differ as to the persons intended. CHAPTER XVII. ION. [Side-note: Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion among modern critics as to its genuineness.] The dialogue called Ion is carried on between Sokrates and the Ephesian rhapsode Ion. It is among those disallowed by Ast, first faintly defended, afterwards disallowed, by Schleiermacher,[1] and treated contemptuously by both. Subsequent critics, Hermann,[2] Stallbaum, Steinhart, consider it as genuine, yet as an inferior production, of little worth, and belonging to Plato's earliest years. [Footnote 1: Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Ion, p. 261-266; Ast, Leben und Schriften des Platon, p. 406.] [Footnote 2: K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. pp. 437-438; Steinhart, Einleitung, p. 15.] [Side-note: Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at the festivals. Ion has been triumphant.] I hold it to be genuine, and it may be comparatively early; but I see no ground for the disparaging criticism which has often been applied to it. The personage whom it introduces to us as subjected to the cross-examination of Sokrates is a rhapsode of celebrity; one among a class of artists at that time both useful and esteemed. They recited or sang,[3] with appropriate accent and gesture, the compositions of Homer and of other epic poets: thus serving to the Grecian epic, the same purpose as the actors served to the dramatic, and the harp-singers ([Greek: kitharô|doi\]) to the lyric. There were various solemn festivals such as that of Æsculapius at Epidaurus, and (most especially) the Panathenæa at Athens, where prizes were awarded for the competition of the rhapsodes. Ion is described as having competed triumphantly in the festival at Epidaurus, and carried off the first prize. He appeared there in a splendid costume, crowned with a golden wreath, amidst a crowd which is described as containing more than 20,000 persons.[4] [Footnote 3: The word [Greek: a)/|dein] is in this very dialogue (532 D, 535 A) applied to the rhapsoding of Ion.] [Footnote 4: Plato, Ion, 535 D.] [Side-note: Functions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation--Exposition of the poets. Arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent.] Much of the acquaintance of cultivated Greeks with Homer and the other epic poets was both acquired and maintained through such rhapsodes; the best of whom contended at the festivals, while others, less highly gifted as to vocal power and gesticulation, gave separate declamations and lectures of their own, and even private lessons to individuals.[5] Euthydêmus, in one of the Xenophontic conversations with Sokrates, and Antisthenes in the Xenophontic Symposion, are made to declare that the rhapsodes as a class were extremely silly. This, if true at all, can apply only to the expositions and comments with which they accompanied their recital of Homer and other poets. Moreover we cannot reasonably set it down (though some modern critics do so) as so much incontestable truth: we must consider it as an opinion delivered by one of the speakers in the conversation, but not necessarily well founded.[6] Unquestionably, the comments made upon Homer (both in that age and afterwards) were often fanciful and misleading. Metrodorus, Anaxagoras, and others, resolved the Homeric narrative into various allegories, physical, ethical, and theological: and most men who had an opinion to defend, rejoiced to be able to support or enforce it by some passages of Homer, well or ill-explained--just as texts of the Bible are quoted in modern times. In this manner, Homer was pressed into the service of every disputant; and the Homeric poems were presented as containing, or at least as implying, doctrines quite foreign to the age in which they were composed.[7] [Footnote 5: Xen. Sympos. iii. 6. Nikêratus says that he heard the rhapsodes nearly every day. He professes to be able to repeat both the Iliad and the Odyssey from memory.] [Footnote 6: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 10; Sympos. iii. 6; Plato, Ion, 530 E. Steinhart cites this judgment about the rhapsodes as if it had been pronounced by the Xenophontic Sokrates himself, which is not the fact (Steinhart, Einleitung p. 3).] [Footnote 7: Diogenes Laert. ii. 11; Nitzsch, Die Heldensage des Griechen, pp. 74-78; Lobeck, Agloaphamus, p. 157. Seneca, Epistol. 88: "modo Stoicum Homerum faciunt--modo Epicureum . . . modo Peripateticum, tria genera bonorum inducentem: modo Academicum, incerta omnia dicentem. Apparet nihil horum esse in illo, cui omnia insunt: ista enim inter se dissident."] [Side-note: The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from their recitation. Powerful effect which they produced.] The Rhapsodes, in so far as they interpreted Homer, were probably not less disposed than others to discover in him their own fancies. But the character in which they acquired most popularity, was, not as expositors, but as reciters, of the poems. The powerful emotion which, in the process of reciting, they both felt themselves and communicated to their auditors, is declared in this dialogue: "When that which I recite is pathetic (says Ion), my eyes are filled with tears: when it is awful or terrible, my hair stands on end, and my heart leaps. Moreover I see the spectators also weeping, sympathising with my emotions, and looking aghast at what they hear."[8] This assertion of the vehement emotional effect produced by the words of the poet as declaimed or sung by the rhapsode, deserves all the more credit--because Plato himself, far from looking upon it favourably, either derides or disapproves it. Accepting it as a matter of fact, we see that the influence of rhapsodes, among auditors generally, must have been derived more from their efficacy as actors than from their ability as expositors. [Footnote 8: Plato, Ion, 535 C-E. The description here given is the more interesting because it is the only intimation remaining of the strong effect produced by these rhapsodic representations.] [Side-note: Ion both reciter and expositor--Homer was considered more as an instructor than as a poet.] Ion however is described in this dialogue as combining the two functions of reciter and expositor: a partnership like that of Garrick and Johnson, in regard to Shakspeare. It is in the last of the two functions, that Sokrates here examines him: considering Homer, not as a poet appealing to the emotions of hearers, but as a teacher administering lessons and imparting instruction. Such was the view of Homer entertained by a large proportion of the Hellenic world. In that capacity, his poems served as a theme for rhapsodes, as well as for various philosophers and Sophists who were not rhapsodes, nor accomplished reciters. [Side-note: Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional working.] The reader must keep in mind, in following the questions put by Sokrates, that this pædagogic and edifying view of Homer is the only one present to the men of the Sokratic school--and especially to Plato. Of the genuine functions of the gifted poet, who touches the chords of strong and diversified emotion--"qui pectus inaniter angit, Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet" (Horat. Epist. II. 1, 212)--Plato takes no account: or rather, he declares open war against them, either as childish delusions[9], or as mischievous stimulants, tending to exalt the unruly elements of the mind, and to overthrow the sovereign authority of reason. We shall find farther manifestations on this point in the Republic and Leges. [Footnote 9: The question of Sokrates (Ion, 535 D), about the emotion produced in the hearers by the recital of Homer's poetry, bears out what is here asserted.] [Side-note: Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of Sokrates to him--How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon other poets? The poetic art is one.] Ion professes to have devoted himself to the study of Homer exclusively, neglecting other poets: so that he can interpret the thoughts, and furnish reflections upon them, better than any other expositor.[10] How does it happen (asked Sokrates) that you have so much to say about Homer, and nothing at all about other poets? Homer may be the best of all poets: but he is still only one of those who exercise the poetic art, and he must necessarily talk about the same subjects as other poets. Now the art of poetry is _One_ altogether--like that of painting, sculpture, playing on the flute, playing on the harp, rhapsodizing, &c.[11] Whoever is competent to judge and explain one artist,--what he has done well and what he has done ill,--is competent also to judge any other artist in the same profession. [Footnote 10: Plato, Ion, 536 E.] [Footnote 11: Plato, Ion, 531 A, 532 C-D. [Greek: poiêtikê\ pou/ e)sti to\ o(/lon. . . Ou)kou=n e)peida\n la/bê| tis kai\ a)/llên te/chnên ê(ntinou=n o(/lên, o( au)to\s tro/pos tê=s ske/pseô/s e)sti peri\ a(pasô=n tô=n technô=n?] 533 A.] I cannot explain to you how it happens (replies Ion): I only know the fact incontestably--that when I talk about Homer, my thoughts flow abundantly, and every one tells me that my discourse is excellent. Quite the reverse, when I talk of any other poet.[12] [Footnote 12: Plato, Ion, 533 C.] [Side-note: Explanation given by Sokrates. Both the Rhapsode and the Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration. Fine poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from some God.] _I_ can explain it (says Sokrates). Your talent in expounding Homer is not an art, acquired by system and method--otherwise it would have been applicable to other poets besides. It is a special gift, imparted to you by divine power and inspiration. The like is true of the poet whom you expound. His genius does not spring from art, system, or method: it is a special gift emanating from the inspiration of the Muses.[13] A poet is a light, airy, holy, person, who cannot compose verses at all so long as his reason remains within him.[14] The Muses take away his reason, substituting in place of it their own divine inspiration and special impulse, either towards epic, dithyramb, encomiastic hymns, hyporchemata, &c., one or other of these. Each poet receives one of these special gifts, but is incompetent for any of the others: whereas, if their ability had been methodical or artistic, it would have displayed itself in all of them alike. Like prophets, and deliverers of oracles, these poets have their reason taken away, and become servants of the Gods.[15] It is not _they_ who, bereft of their reason, speak in such sublime strains: it is the God who speaks to us, and speaks through them. You may see this by Tynnichus of Chalkis; who composed his Pæan, the finest of all Pæans, which is in every one's mouth, telling us himself, that it was the invention of the Muses--but who never composed anything else worth hearing. It is through this worthless poet that the God has sung the most sublime hymn:[16] for the express purpose of showing us that these fine compositions are not human performances at all, but divine: and that the poet is only an interpreter of the Gods, possessed by one or other of them, as the case may be. [Footnote 13: Plato, Ion, 533 E--534 A. [Greek: pa/ntes ga\r oi(/ te tô=n e)pô=n poiêtai\ oi( a)gathoi\ ou)k e)k te/chnês a)ll' e)/ntheoi o)/ntes kai\ katecho/menoi pa/nta tau=ta ta\ kala\ le/gousi poiê/mata, kai\ oi( melopoioi\ oi( a)gathoi\ ô(sau/tôs; ô(/sper oi( korubantintiô=tes ou)k e)/mphrones o)/ntes o)rchou=ntai, ou(/tô kai\ oi(] melopoioi\ ou)k e)/mphrones o)/ntes ta\ kala\ me/lê tau=ta poiou=sin], &c.]] [Footnote 14: Plato, Ion, 534 B. [Greek: kou=phon ga\r chrê=ma poiêtê/s e)sti kai\ ptêno\n kai\ i(ero/n, kai\ ou) pro/teron oi(=o/s te poiei=n pri\n a)\n e)/ntheo/s te ge/nêtai kai\ e)/kphrôn kai\ o( nou=s mêke/ti e)n au)tô=| e)nê=|; e(/ôs d' a)\n touti\ e)/chê| to\ ktê=ma, a)du/natos pa=s poiei=n e)stin a)/nthrôpos kai\ chrêsmô|dei=n.]] [Footnote 15: Plato. Ion, 534 C-D. [Greek: dia\ tau=ta de\ o( theo\s e)xairou/menos tou/tôn to\n nou=n tou/tois chrê=tai u(pêre/tais kai\ toi=s chrêsmô|doi=s kai\ toi=s ma/ntesi toi=s thei/ois, i(/na ê(mei=s oi( a)kou/ontes ei)dô=men, o(/ti ou)ch ou(=toi/ ei)sin oi( tau=ta le/gontes ou(/tô pollou= a)/xia, a)ll' o( theo\s au)to/s e)stin o( le/gôn, dia\ tou/tôn de\ phthe/ggetai pro\s ê(ma=s.]] [Footnote 16: Plato, Ion. 534 E. [Greek: tau=ta e)ndeiknu/menos o( theo\s e)xepi/têdes dia\ tou= phaulota/tou poiêtou= to\ ka/lliston me/los ê)=|sen.]] [Side-note: Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction successive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then act through him and through Ion upon the auditors.] Homer is thus (continues Sokrates) not a man of art or reason, but the interpreter of the Gods; deprived of his reason, but possessed, inspired, by them. You, Ion, are the interpreter of Homer: and the divine inspiration, carrying away your reason, is exercised over you through him. It is in this way that the influence of the Magnet is shown, attracting and holding up successive stages of iron rings.[17] The first ring is in contact with the Magnet itself: the second is suspended to the first, the third to the second, and so on. The attractive influence of the Magnet is thus transmitted through a succession of different rings, so as to keep suspended several which are a good way removed from itself. So the influence of the Gods is exerted directly and immediately upon Homer: through him, it passes by a second stage to you: through him and you, it passes by a third stage to those auditors whom you so powerfully affect and delight, becoming however comparatively enfeebled at each stage of transition. [Footnote 17: Plato, Ion, 533 D-E.] [Side-note: This comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the Apology.] The passage and comparison here given by Sokrates--remarkable as an early description of the working of the Magnet--forms the central point or kernel of the dialogue called Ion. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates himself in his Apology to the Dikasts, and it is repeated in more than one place by Plato.[18] Sokrates declares in his Apology that he had applied his testing cross-examination to several excellent poets; and that finding them unable to give any rational account of their own compositions, he concluded that they composed without any wisdom of their own, under the same inspiration as prophets and declarers of oracles. In the dialogue before us, this thought is strikingly illustrated and amplified. [Footnote 18: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 22 D; Plato, Menon, p. 99 D.] [Side-note: Platonic Antithesis: systematic procedure distinguished from unsystematic: which latter was either blind routine, or madness inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good and bad.] The contrast between systematic, professional, procedure, deliberately taught and consciously acquired, capable of being defended at every step by appeal to intelligible rules founded upon scientific theory, and enabling the person so qualified to impart his qualification to others--and a different procedure purely impulsive and unthinking, whereby the agent, having in his mind a conception of the end aimed at, proceeds from one intermediate step to another, without knowing why he does so or how he has come to do so, and without being able to explain his practice if questioned or to impart it to others--this contrast is a favourite one with Plato. The last-mentioned procedure--the unphilosophical or irrational--he conceives under different aspects: sometimes as a blind routine or insensibly acquired habit,[19] sometimes as a stimulus applied from without by some God, superseding the reason of the individual. Such a condition Plato calls _madness_, and he considers those under it as persons out of their senses. But he recognises different varieties of madness, according to the God from whom it came: the bad madness was a disastrous visitation and distemper--the good madness was a privilege and blessing, an inspiration superior to human reason. Among these privileged madmen he reckoned prophets and poets; another variety under the same genus, is, that mental love, between a well-trained adult, and a beautiful, intelligent, youth, which he regards as the most exalted of all human emotions.[20] In the Ion, this idea of a privileged madness--inspiration from the Gods superseding reason--is applied not only to the poet, but also to the rhapsode who recites the poem, and even to the auditors whom he addresses. The poet receives the inspiration directly from the Gods: he inoculates the rhapsode with it, who again inoculates the auditors--the fervour is, at each successive communication, diminished. The auditor represents the last of the rings; held in suspension, through the intermediate agency of other rings, by the inherent force of the magnet.[21] [Footnote 19: Plato, Phædon, 82 A; Gorgias, 463 A, 486 A.] [Footnote 20: This doctrine is set forth at length by Sokrates in the Platonic Phædrus, in the second discourse of Sokrates about Eros, pp. 244-245-249 D.] [Footnote 21: Plato, Ion, 535 E. [Greek: ou(=to/s e)stin o( theatê\s tô=n daktuli/ôn o( e)/schatos . . . . o( de\ me/sos su\ o( r(apsô|do\s kai\ u(pokritê\s, o( de\ prô=tos, au)to\s o( poiêtê/s.]] [Side-note: Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in Grecian life. Privileged communications from the Gods to Sokrates--his firm belief in them.] We must remember, that privileged communications from the Gods to men, and special persons recipient thereof, were acknowledged and witnessed everywhere as a constant phenomenon of Grecian life. There were not only numerous oracular temples, which every one could visit to ask questions in matters of doubt--but also favoured persons who had received from the Gods the gift of predicting the future, of interpreting omens, of determining the good or bad indications furnished by animals sacrificed.[22] In every town or village--or wherever any body of men were assembled--there were always persons who prophesied or delivered oracles, and to whom special revelations were believed to be vouchsafed, during periods of anxiety. No one was more familiar with this fact than the Sokratic disciples: for Sokrates himself had perhaps a greater number of special communications from the Gods than any man of his age: his divine sign having begun when he was a child, and continuing to move him frequently, even upon small matters, until his death: though the revelations were for the most part negative, not affirmative--telling him often what was not to be done--seldom what was to be done--resembling in this respect his own dialogues with other persons. Moreover Sokrates inculcated upon his friends emphatically, that they ought to have constant recourse to prophecy: that none but impious men neglected to do so: that the benevolence of the Gods was nowhere more conspicuous than in their furnishing such special revelations and warnings, to persons whom they favoured: that the Gods administered the affairs of the world partly upon principles of regular sequence, so that men by diligent study might learn what they were to expect,--but partly also, and by design, in a manner irregular and undecypherable, such that it could not be fathomed by any human study, and could not be understood except through direct and special revelation from themselves.[23] [Footnote 22: Not only the [Greek: chrêsmolo/goi, ma/nteis] oracular temples, &c., are often mentioned in Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, &c., but Aristotle also recognises [Greek: oi( numpho/lêptoi kai\ theo/lêptoi tô=n a)nthrô/pôn, e)pipnoi/a| daimoni/ou tino\s ô(/sper e)nthousia/zontes], as a real and known class of persons. See Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1214, a. 23; Ethic. Magna, ii. p. 1207, b. 8. The [Greek: ma/ntis] is a recognised profession, the gift of Apollo, not merely according to Homer, but according to Solon (Frag. xi. 52, Schn.): [Greek: A)/llon ma/ntin e)/thêken a)/nax e(ka/ergos A)po/llôn, e)/gnô d' a)ndri\ kako\n têlo/then e)rcho/menon], &c.] [Footnote 23: These views of Sokrates are declared in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, i. 1, 6-10; i. 4, 2-18; iv. 3, 12. It is plain from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1, 3) that many persons were offended with Sokrates because they believed,--or at least because he affirmed--that he received more numerous and special revelations from the Gods than any one else.] [Side-note: Condition of the inspired person--his reason is for the time withdrawn.] Here, as well as elsewhere, Plato places inspiration, both of the prophet and the poet, in marked contrast with reason and intelligence. Reason is supposed to be for the time withdrawn or abolished, and inspiration is introduced by the Gods into its place. "When Monarch Reason sleeps, this mimic wakes." The person inspired (prophet or poet) becomes for the time the organ of an extraneous agency, speaking what he neither originates nor understands. The genuine gift of prophecy[24] (Plato says) attaches only to a disabled, enfeebled, distempered, condition of the intelligence; the gift of poetry is conferred by the Gods upon the most inferior men, as we see by the case of Tynnichus--whose sublime pæan shows us, that it is the Gods alone who utter fine poetry through the organs of a person himself thoroughly incompetent. [Footnote 24: Plato, Timæus, 71 E. [Greek: i(kano\n de\ sêmei=on ô(s mantikê\n a)phrosu/nê| theo\s a)nthrôpi/nê| de/dôken; ou)dei\s ga\r e)/nnous e)pha/ptetai mantikê=s e)nthe/ou kai\ a)lêthou=s, a)ll' ê)\ kath' u(/pnon tê\n tê=s phronê/seôs pedêthei\s du/namin, ê)\ dia\ no/son ê)/ tina e)nthousiasmo\n paralla/xas.] Compare Plato, Menon, pp. 99-100. [Greek: oi( chrêsmô|doi/ te kai\ oi( theoma/nteis . . . . le/gousi me\n a)lêthê= kai\ polla\ i)/sasi de\ ou)de\n ô(=n le/gousi.] Compare Plato, Legg. iv. 719.] [Side-note: Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind.] It is thus that Plato, setting before himself a process of systematised reason,--originating in a superior intellect, laying down universal principles and deducing consequences from them--capable of being consistently applied, designedly taught, and defended against objections--enumerates the various mental conditions opposed to it, and ranks inspiration as one of them. In this dialogue, Sokrates seeks to prove that the success of Ion as a rhapsode depends upon his being out of his mind or inspired. But Ion does not accept the compliment: _Ion._--You speak well, Sokrates; but I should be surprised if you spoke well enough to create in me the new conviction, that I am possessed and mad when I eulogize Homer. I do not think that you would even yourself say so, if you heard me discourse on the subject.[25] [Footnote 25: Plato, Ion, 536 E.] [Side-note: Homer talks upon all subjects--Is Ion competent to explain what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its province?] _Sokr._--But Homer talks upon all subjects. Upon which of them can you discourse? _Ion._--Upon all. _Sokr._--Not surely on such as belong to special arts, professions. Each portion of the matter of knowledge is included under some special art, and is known through that art by those who possess it. Thus, you and I, both of us, know the number of our fingers; we know it through the same art, which both of us possess--the arithmetical. But Homer talks of matters belonging to many different arts or occupations, that of the physician, the charioteer, the fisherman, &c. You cannot know these; since you do not belong to any of these professions, but are a rhapsode. Describe to me what are the matters included in the rhapsodic art. The rhapsodic art is one art by itself, distinct from the medical and others: it cannot know every thing; tell me what matters come under its special province.[26] _Ion._--The rhapsodic art does not know what belongs to any one of the other special arts: but that of which it takes cognizance, and that which I know, is, what is becoming and suitable to each variety of character described by Homer: to a man or woman--to a freeman or slave--to the commander who gives orders or to the subordinate who obeys them, &c. This is what belongs to the peculiar province of the rhapsode to appreciate and understand.[27] _Sokr._--Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for the commander of a ship to say to his seamen, during a dangerous storm, better than the pilot? Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for one who gives directions about the treatment of a sick man, better than the physician? Will the rhapsode know what is suitable to be said by the herdsman when the cattle are savage and distracted, or to the female slaves when busy in spinning? _Ion._--No: the rhapsode will not know these things so well as the pilot, the physician, the grazier, the mistress, &c.[28] _Sokr._--Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for the military commander to say, when he is exhorting his soldiers? _Ion._--Yes: the rhapsode will know this well: at least I know it well. [Footnote 26: Plato, Ion, 538-539.] [Footnote 27: Plato, Ion, 540 A. [Greek: a)\ tô=| r(apsô|dô=| prosê/kei kai\ skopei=sthai kai\ diakri/nein para\ tou\s a)/llous a)nthrô/pous], 539 E.] [Footnote 28: Plato, Ion, 540 B-C.] [Side-note: The Rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers, having learnt it from Homer.] _Sokr._--Perhaps, Ion, you are not merely a rhapsode, but possess also the competence for being a general. If you know matters belonging to military command, do you know them in your capacity of general, or in your capacity of rhapsode? _Ion._--I think there is no difference. _Sokr._--How say you? Do you affirm that the rhapsodic art, and the strategic art, are one? _Ion._--I think they are one. _Sokr._--Then whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general? _Ion._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--And of course, whoever is a good general, is also a good rhapsode? _Ion._--No: I do not think that. _Sokr._--But you do maintain, that whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general? _Ion._--Decidedly. _Sokr._--You are yourself the best rhapsode in Greece? _Ion._--By far. _Sokr._--Are you then also the best general in Greece? _Ion._--Certainly I am, Sokrates: and that too, by having learnt it from Homer.[29] [Footnote 29: Plato, Ion, 540 D--541 B.] After putting a question or two, not very forcible, to ask how it happens that Ion, being an excellent general, does not obtain a military appointment from Athens, Sparta, or some other city, Sokrates winds up the dialogue as follows:-- [Side-note: Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of what he says, but by divine inspiration.] Well, Ion, if it be really true that you possess a rational and intelligent competence to illustrate the beauties of Homer, you wrong and deceive me, because after promising to deliver to me a fine discourse about Homer, you will not even comply with my preliminary entreaty--that you will first tell me what those matters are, on which your superiority bears. You twist every way like Proteus, until at last you slip through my fingers and appear as a general. If your powers of expounding Homer depend on art and intelligence, you are a wrong-doer and deceiver, for not fulfilling** your promise to me. But you are not chargeable with wrong, if the fact be as I say; that is, if you know nothing about Homer, but are only able to discourse upon him finely and abundantly, through a divine inspiration with which you are possessed by him. Choose whether you wish me to regard you as a promise-breaker, or as a divine man. _Ion._--I choose the last: it is much better to be regarded as a divine man.[30] [Footnote 30: Plato, Ion, 541 E--542 A. [Greek: ei) me\n a)lêthê/ le/geis, ô(s te/chnê| kai\ e)pistê/mê| oi(=o/s te ei)= O(/mêrou e)painei=n, a)dikei=s . . . ei) de\ mê\ techniko\s ei)=, a)lla\ thei/a| moi/ra| katecho/menos e)x O(mê/rou mêde\n ei)dô\s polla\ kai\ kala\ le/geis peri\ tou= poiêtou=, ô(/sper e)gô\ ei)=pon peri\ sou=, ou)de\n a)dikei=s; e(lou= ou)=n, po/tera bou/lei nomi/zesthai u(ph' ê(mô=n a)/dikos a)nê\r ei)=nai ê)\ thei=os.]] * * * * * [Side-note: The generals in Greece usually possessed no professional experience--Homer and the poets were talked of as the great teachers--Plato's view of the poet, as pretending to know everything, but really knowing nothing.] It seems strange to read such language put into Ion's mouth (we are not warranted in regarding it as what any rhapsode ever did say), as the affirmation--that every good rhapsode was also a good general, and that he had become the best of generals simply through complete acquaintance with Homer. But this is only a caricature of a sentiment largely prevalent at Athens, according to which the works of the poets, especially the Homeric poems, were supposed to be a mine of varied instruction, and were taught as such to youth.[31] In Greece, the general was not often required (except at Sparta, and not always even there) to possess professional experience.[32] Sokrates, in one of the Xenophontic conversations, tries to persuade Nikomachides, a practised soldier (who had failed in getting himself elected general, because a successful Chorêgus had been preferred to him), how much the qualities of an effective Chorêgus coincided with those of an effective general.[33] The poet Sophokles was named by the Athenians one of the generals of the very important armament for reconquering Samos: though Perikles, one of his colleagues, as well as his contemporary declared that he was an excellent poet, but knew nothing of generalship.[34] Plato frequently seeks to make it evident how little the qualities required for governing numbers, either civil or military, were made matter of professional study or special teaching. The picture of Homer conveyed in the tenth book of the Platonic Republic is, that of a man who pretends to know everything, but really knows nothing: an imitative artist, removed by two stages from truth and reality,--who gives the shadows of shadows, resembling only enough to satisfy an ignorant crowd. This is the picture there presented of poets generally, and of Homer as the best among them. The rhapsode Ion is here brought under the same category as the poet Homer, whom he has by heart and recites. The whole field of knowledge is assumed to be distributed among various specialties, not one of which either of the two can claim. Accordingly, both of them under the mask of universal knowledge, conceal the reality of universal ignorance. [Footnote 31: Aristophan. Ranæ, 1032. [Greek: O)rpheu\s me\n ga\r teleta/s th' ê(mi=n kate/deixe pho/nôn t' a)pe/chesthai Mousai=os d' e)xake/seis te no/sôn kai\ chrêsmou/s, Ê(si/odos de\ Gê=s e)rgasi/as, karpô=n ô(/ras, a)ro/tous; o( de\ thei=os O(/mêros A)po\ tou= timê\n kai\ kle/os e)/schein, plê\n tou=d', o(/ti chrê/st' e)di/daxe. Ta/xeis, a)reta/s, o(pli/seis a)ndrô=n? . . . . A)ll' a)/llous toi pollou\s a)gathou\s (e)di/daxen), ô(=n ê)=n kai\ La/machos ê(/rôs.] See these views combated by Plato, Republ. x. 599-600-606 E. The exaggerated pretension here ascribed to Ion makes him look contemptible--like the sentiment ascribed to him, 535 E, "If I make the auditors weep, I myself shall laugh and pocket money," &c.] [Footnote 32: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 5, 21, in the conversation between the younger Perikles and Sokrates--[Greek: tô=n de\ stratêgô=n oi( plei=stoi au)toschedia/zousin.] Also iii. 5, 24. Compare, respecting the generals, the striking lines of Euripides, Androm. 698, and the encomium of Cicero (Academ. Prior. 2, 1) respecting the quickness and facility with which Lucullus made himself an excellent general.] [Footnote 33: Xen. Mem. iii. 4, especially iii. 4, 6, where Nikomachides asks with surprise, [Greek: le/geis su/, ô)= Sô/krates, ô(s tou= au)tou= a)ndro/s e)sti chorêgei=n te kalô=s kai\ stratêgei=n?]] [Footnote 34: See the very curious extract from the contemporary Ion of Chios, in Athenæus, xiii. 604. Aristophanes of Byzantium says that the appointment of Sophokles to this military function arose from the extra-ordinary popularity of his tragedy Antigonê, exhibited a little time before. See Boeckh's valuable 'Dissertation on the Antigonê,' appended to his edition thereof, pp. 121-124.] [Side-note: Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge.] Ion is willing enough (as he promises) to exhibit before Sokrates one of his eloquent discourses upon Homer. But Sokrates never permits him to arrive at it: arresting him always by preliminary questions, and requiring him to furnish an intelligible description of the matter which his discourse is intended to embrace, and thus to distinguish it from other matters left untouched. A man who cannot comply with this requisition,--who cannot (to repeat what I said in a previous chapter) stand a Sokratic cross-examination on the subject--possesses no rational intelligence of his own proceedings: no art, science, knowledge, system, or method. If as a practitioner he executes well what he promises (which is often the case), and attains success--he does so either by blind imitation of some master, or else under the stimulus and guidance of some agency foreign to himself--of the Gods or Fortune. This is the Platonic point of view; developed in several different ways and different dialogues, but hardly anywhere more conspicuously than in the Ion. [Side-note: Illustration of Plato's opinion respecting the uselessness of written geometrical treatises.] I have observed that in this dialogue, Ion is anxious to embark on his eloquent expository discourse, but Sokrates will not allow him to begin: requiring as a preliminary stage that certain preliminary difficulties shall first be cleared up. Here we have an illustration of Plato's doctrine, to which I adverted in a former chapter,[35]--that no written geometrical treatise could impart a knowledge of geometry to one ignorant thereof. The geometrical writer begins by laying down a string of definitions and axioms; and then strikes out boldly in demonstrating his theorems. But Plato would refuse him the liberty of striking out, until he should have cleared up the preliminary difficulties about the definitions and axioms themselves. This the geometrical treatise does not even attempt.[36] [Footnote 35: Chap. viii. p. 353.] [Footnote 36: Compare Plato, Republic, vi. 510 C; vii. 538 C-D.] CHAPTER XVIII. LACHES. The main substance of this dialogue consists of a discussion, carried on by Sokrates with Nikias and Lachês, respecting Courage. Each of the two latter proposes an explanation of Courage: Sokratês criticises both of them, and reduces each to a confessed contradiction. [Side-note: Lachês. Subject and persons of the dialogue, Whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of arms. Nikias and Lachês differ in opinion.] The discussion is invited, or at least dramatically introduced, by two elderly men--Lysimachus, son of Aristeides the Just,--and Melêsias, son of Thucydides the rival of Perikles. Lysimachus and Melêsias, confessing with shame that they are inferior to their fathers, because their education has been neglected, wish to guard against the same misfortune in the case of their own sons: respecting the education of whom, they ask the advice of Nikias and Lachês. The question turns especially upon the propriety of causing their sons to receive lessons from a master of arms just then in vogue. Nikias and Lachês, both of them not merely distinguished citizens but also commanders of Athenian armies, are assumed to be well qualified to give advice. Accordingly they deliver their opinions: Nikias approving such lessons as beneficial, in exalting the courage of a young man, and rendering him effective on the field of battle: while Lachês takes an opposite view, disparages the masters of arms as being no soldiers, and adds that they are despised by the Lacedæmonians, to whose authority on military matters general deference was paid in Greece.[1] Sokratês,--commended greatly by Nikias for his acuteness and sagacity, by Lachês for his courage in the battle of Delium,--is invited to take part in the consultation. Being younger than both, he waits till they have delivered their opinions, and is then called upon to declare with which of the two his own judgment will concur.[2] [Footnote 1: Plato, Lachês, 182-183.] [Footnote 2: Plato, Lachês, 184 D. Nikias is made to say that Sokrates has recently recommended to him Damon, as a teacher of [Greek: mousikê\] to his sons, and that Damon had proved an admirable teacher as well as companion (180 D). Damon is mentioned by Plato generally with much eulogy.] [Side-note: Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion. He replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent professional judge.] _Sokr._--The question must not be determined by a plurality of votes, but by superiority of knowledge.[3] If we were debating about the proper gymnastic discipline for these young men, we should consult a known artist or professional trainer, or at least some one who had gone through a course of teaching and practice under the trainer. The first thing to be enquired therefore is, whether, in reference to the point now under discussion, there be any one of us professionally or technically competent, who has studied under good masters, and has proved his own competence as a master by producing well-trained pupils. The next thing is, to understand clearly what it is, with reference to which such competence is required.[4] _Nikias._--Surely the point before us is, whether it be wise to put these young men under the lessons of the master of arms? That is what we want to know. _Sokr._--Doubtless it is: but that is only one particular branch of a wider and more comprehensive enquiry. When you are considering whether a particular ointment is good for your eyes, it is your eyes, and their general benefit, which form the subject of investigation--not the ointment simply. The person to assist you will be, he who understands professionally the general treatment of the eyes. So in this case, you are enquiring whether lessons in arms will be improving for the minds and character of your sons. Look out therefore for some one who is professionally competent, from having studied under good masters, in regard to the general treatment of the mind.[5] _Lachês._--But there are various persons who, without ever having studied under masters, possess greater technical competence than others who have so studied. _Sokr._--There are such persons: but you will never believe it upon their own assurance, unless they can show you some good special work actually performed by themselves. [Footnote 3: Plato, Lachês, 184 E. [Greek: e)pistê/mê| dei= kri/nesthai a)ll' ou) plê/thei to\ me/llon kalô=s krithê/sesthai.]] [Footnote 4: Plato, Lachês, 185 C.] [Footnote 5: Plato, Lachês, 185 E. [Greek: ei)/ tis ê(mô=n techniko\s peri\ psuchê=s therapei/an, kai\ oi(=o/s te kalô=s tou=to therapeu=sai, kai\ o(/tô| dida/skaloi a)gathoi\ gego/nasi, tou=to skepte/on.]] [Side-note: Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their competence to judge--Sokrates avows his own incompetence.] _Sokr._--Now then, Lysimachus, since you have invited Lachês and Nikias, as well as me, to advise you on the means of most effectively improving the mind of your son, it is for us to show you that we possess competent professional skill respecting the treatment of the youthful mind. We must declare to you who are the masters from whom we have learnt, and we must prove their qualifications. Or if we have had no masters, we must demonstrate to you our own competence by citing cases of individuals, whom we have successfully trained, and who have become incontestably good under our care. If we can fulfil neither of these two conditions, we ought to confess our incompetence and decline advising you. We must not begin to try our hands upon so precious a subject as the son of a friend, at the hazard of doing him more harm than good.[6] [Footnote 6: Plato, Lachês, 186 B.] As to myself, I frankly confess that I have neither had any master to impart to me such competence, nor have I been able to acquire it by my own efforts. I am not rich enough to pay the Sophists, who profess to teach it. But as to Nikias and Lachês, they are both older and richer than I am: so that they may well have learnt it from others, or acquired it for themselves. They must be thoroughly satisfied of their own knowledge on the work of education; otherwise they would hardly have given such confident opinions, pronouncing what pursuits are good or bad for youth. For my part, I trust them implicitly: the only thing which surprises me, is, that they dissent from each other.[7] It is for you therefore, Lysimachus, to ask Nikias and Lachês,--Who have been their masters? Who have been their fellow-pupils? If they have been their own masters, what proof can they produce of previous success in teaching, and what examples can they cite of pupils whom they have converted from bad to good?[8] [Footnote 7: Plato, Lachês, 186 C-D. [Greek: dokou=si dê/ moi dunatoi\ ei)=nai paideu=sai a)/nthrôpon; ou) ga\r a)\n pote a)deô=s a)pephai/nonto peri\ e)pitêdeuma/tôn ne/ô| chrêstô=n te kai\ ponêrô=n, ei) mê\ au)toi=s e)pi/steuon i(kanô=s ei)de/nai. ta\ me\n ou)=n a)/lla, e)/gôge tou/tois pisteu/ô, o(/ti de\ diaphe/resthon a)llê/loin, e)thau/masa.]] [Footnote 8: Plato, Lachês, 186-187.] [Side-note: Nikias and Lachês submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates.] _Nikias._--I knew from the beginning that we should both of us fall under the cross-examination of Sokrates, and be compelled to give account of our past lives. For my part, I have already gone through this scrutiny before, and am not averse to undergo it again. _Lachês._--And I, though I have never experienced it before, shall willingly submit to learn from Sokrates, whom I know to be a man thoroughly courageous and honest in his actions. I hate men whose lives are inconsistent with their talk.[9]--Thus speak both of them. [Footnote 9: Plato, Lachês, 188. "Ego odi homines ignavâ operâ et philosophiâ sententiâ," is a line cited by Cicero out of one of the Latin comic writers.] * * * * * [Side-note: Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their feelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the question shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education.] This portion of the dialogue, which forms a sort of preamble to the main discussion, brings out forcibly some of the Platonic points of view. We have seen it laid down in the Kriton--That in questions about right and wrong, good and evil, &c., we ought not to trust the decision of the Many, but only that of the One Wise Man. Here we learn something about the criteria by which this One man may be known. He must be one who has gone through a regular training under some master approved in ethical or educational teaching: or, if he cannot produce such a certificate, he must at least cite sufficient examples of men whom he has taught well himself. This is the Sokratic comparison, assimilating the general art of living well to the requirements of a special profession, which a man must learn through express teaching, from a master who has proved his ability, and through conscious application of his own. Nikias and Lachês give their opinions offhand and confidently, upon the question whether lessons from the master of arms be profitable to youth or not. Plato, on the contrary, speaking through Sokrates, points out that this is only one branch of the more comprehensive question as to education generally--"What are the qualities and habits proper to be imparted to youth by training? What is the proper treatment of the mind? No one is competent to decide the special question, except he who has professionally studied the treatment of the mind." To deal with the special question, without such preliminary general preparation, involves rash and unverified assumptions, which render any opinion so given dangerous to act upon. Such is the judgment of the Platonic Sokrates, insisting on the necessity of taking up ethical questions in their most comprehensive aspect. [Side-note: Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man--this man is never seen or identified.] Consequent upon this preamble, we should expect that Lachês and Nikias would be made to cite the names of those who had been their masters; or to produce some examples of persons effectively taught by themselves. This would bring us a step nearer to that One Wise Man--often darkly indicated, but nowhere named or brought into daylight--from whom alone we can receive a trustworthy judgment. But here, as in the Kriton and so many other Platonic dialogues, we get only a Pisgah view of our promised adviser--nothing more. The discussion takes a different turn. * * * * * [Side-note: We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on education. Virtue, as a whole, is too large a question. We will enquire about one branch of virtue--courage.] _Sokr._--"We will pursue a line of enquiry which conducts to the same result; and which starts even more decidedly from the beginning.[10] We are called upon to advise by what means virtue can be imparted to these youths, so as to make them better men. Of course, this implies that we know what virtue is: otherwise how can we give advice as to the means of acquiring it? _Lachês._--We could give no advice at all. _Sokr._--We affirm ourselves therefore to know what virtue is? _Lachês._--We do. _Sokr._--Since therefore we know, we can farther declare what it is.[11] _Lachês._--Of course we can. _Sokr._--Still, we will not at once enquire as to the whole of virtue, which might be an arduous task, but as to a part of it--Courage: that part to which the lessons of the master of arms are supposed to tend. We will first enquire what courage is: after that has been determined, we will then consider how it can best be imparted to these youths." [Footnote 10: Plato, Lachês, 189 E. [Greek: kai\ ê( toia/de ske/psis ei)s tau)to\n phe/rei, schedo\n de/ ti kai\ ma=llon e)x a)rchê=s ei)/ê a)\n.]] [Footnote 11: Plato, Lachês, 190 C. [Greek: phame\n a)/ra, ô)= La/chês, ei)de/nai au)to\ (tê\n a)retê\n) o(/, ti e)/sti. Phame\n me/ntoi. Ou)kou=n o(/ ge i)/smen, ka)\n ei)/poimen dê/pou, ti/ e)/sti. Pô=s ga\r ou)/?]] "Try then if you can tell me, Lachês, what courage is. _Lachês._--There is no difficulty in telling you that. Whoever keeps his place in the rank, repels the enemy, and does not run away, is a courageous man."[12] [Footnote 12: Plato, Lachês, 190 D-E.] [Side-note: Question--what is courage? Lachês answers by citing one particularly manifest case of courage. Mistake of not giving a general explanation.] Here is the same error in replying, as was committed by Euthyphron when asked, What is the Holy? and by Hippias, about the Beautiful. One particular case of courageous behaviour, among many, is indicated, as if it were an explanation of the whole: but the general feature common to all acts of courage is not declared. Sokrates points out that men are courageous, not merely among hoplites who keep their rank and fight, but also among the Scythian horsemen who fight while running away; others also are courageous against disease, poverty, political adversity, pain and fear of every sort; others moreover, against desires and pleasures. What is the common attribute which in all these cases constitutes Courage? If you asked me what is _quickness_--common to all those cases when a man runs, speaks, plays, learns, &c., quickly--I should tell you that it was that which accomplished much in a little time. Tell me in like manner, what is the common fact or attribute pervading all cases of courage? Lachês at first does not understand the question:[13] and Sokrates elucidates it by giving the parallel explanation of quickness. Here, as elsewhere, Plato takes great pains to impress the conception in its full generality, and he seems to have found difficulty in making others follow him. [Footnote 13: Plato, Lachês, 191-192. [Greek: pa/lin ou)=n peirô= ei)pei=n a)ndrei/an prô=ton, ti/ o)\n e)n pa=si tou/tois tau)to/n e)stin. ê)\ ou)/pô katamantha/neis o(\ le/gô?] _Lachês._ [Greek: Ou) pa/nu ti. . . .] _Sokr._ [Greek: peirô= dê\ tê\n a)ndrei/an ou(/tôs ei)pein, ti/s ou)=sa du/namis ê( au)tê\ e)n ê(donê=| kai\ e)n lu/pê| kai\ e)n a(/pasin oi(=s nu=n dê\ e)le/gomen au)tê\n ei)=nai, e)/peit' a)ndrei/a ke/klêtai.]] [Side-note: Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the mind. Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect. Endurance is not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not always courage.] Lachês then gives a general definition of courage. It is a sort of endurance of the mind.[14] [Footnote 14: Plato, Lachês, 192 B. [Greek: karteri/a tis tê=s psuchê=s.]] Surely not _all_ endurance (rejoins Sokrates)? You admit that courage is a fine and honourable thing. But endurance without intelligence is hurtful and dishonourable: it cannot therefore be courage. Only intelligent endurance, therefore, can be courage. And then what is meant by _intelligent_? Intelligent--of what--or to what end? A man, who endures the loss of money, understanding well that he will thereby gain a larger sum, is he courageous? No. He who endures fighting, knowing that he has superior skill, numbers, and all other advantages on his side, manifests more of intelligent endurance, than his adversary who knows that he has all these advantages against him, yet who nevertheless endures fighting. Nevertheless this latter is the most courageous of the two.[15] Unintelligent endurance is in this case courage: but unintelligent endurance was acknowledged to be bad and hurtful, and courage to be a fine thing. We have entangled ourselves in a contradiction. We must at least show our own courage, by enduring until we can get right. For my part (replies Lachês) I am quite prepared for such endurance. I am piqued and angry that I cannot express what I conceive. I seem to have in my mind clearly what courage is: but it escapes me somehow or other, when I try to put it in words.[16] [Footnote 15: Plato, Lachês, 192 D-E. [Greek: ê( phro/nimos karteri/a . . . i)/dômen dê/, _ê( ei)s ti/_ phro/nimos; ê)\ ê( ei)s a(/panta kai\ ta\ mega/la kai\ ta\ smikra/?]] [Footnote 16: Plato, Lachês, 193 C, 194 B.] Sokrates now asks aid from Nikias. _Nikias._--My explanation of courage is, that it is a sort of knowledge or intelligence. _Sokr._--But what sort of intelligence? Not certainly intelligence of piping or playing the harp. Intelligence of what? [Side-note: Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort of intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not terrible. Objections of Lachês.] _Nikias._--Courage is intelligence of things terrible, and things not terrible, both in war and in all other conjunctures. _Lachês._--What nonsense! Courage is a thing totally apart from knowledge or intelligence.[17] The intelligent physician knows best what is terrible, and what is not terrible, in reference to disease: the husbandman, in reference to agriculture. But they are not for that reason courageous. _Nikias._--They are not; but neither do they know what is terrible, or what is not terrible. Physicians can predict the result of a patient's case: they can tell what may cure him, or what will kill him. But whether it be better for him to die or to recover--_that_ they do not know, and cannot tell him. To some persons, death is a less evil than life:--defeat, than victory:--loss of wealth, than gain. None except the person who can discriminate these cases, knows what is really terrible and what is not so. He alone is really courageous.[18] _Lachês._--Where is there any such man? It can be only some God. Nikias feels himself in a puzzle, and instead of confessing it frankly as I have done, he is trying to help himself out by evasions more fit for a pleader before the Dikastery.[19] [Footnote 17: Plato, Lachês, 195 A. [Greek: tê\n tô=n deinôn kai\ thar)r(ale/ôn e)pistê/mên kai\ e)n pole/mô| kai\ e)n toi=s a)/llois a(/pasin.] _Lachês._--[Greek: Ô(s a)/topa le/gei!--chôri\s dê/ pou sophi/a e)sti\n a)ndrei/as.] It appears from two other passages (195 E, and 198 B) that [Greek: thar)r(a/leos] here is simply the negation of [Greek: deino\s] and cannot be translated by any affirmative word.] [Footnote 18: Plato, Lachês, 195-196.] [Footnote 19: Plato, Lachês, 196 B.] [Side-note: Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events, not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of future events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present.] _Sokr._--You do not admit, then, Nikias, that lions, tigers, boars, &c., and such animals, are courageous? _Nikias._--No: they are without fear--simply from not knowing the danger--like children: but they are not courageous, though most people call them so. I may call them bold, but I reserve the epithet courageous for the intelligent. _Lachês._--See how Nikias strips those, whom every one admits to be courageous, of this honourable appellation! _Nikias._--Not altogether, Lachês: I admit you, and Lamachus, and many other Athenians, to be courageous, and of course therefore intelligent. _Lachês._--I feel the compliment: but such subtle distinctions befit a Sophist rather than a general in high command.[20] _Sokr._--The highest measure of intelligence befits one in the highest command. What you have said, Nikias, deserves careful examination. You remember that in taking up the investigation of courage, we reckoned it only as a portion of virtue: you are aware that there are other portions of virtue, such as justice, temperance, and the like. Now you define courage to be, intelligence of what is terrible or not terrible: of that which causes fear, or does not cause fear. But nothing causes fear, except future or apprehended evils: present or past evils cause no fear. Hence courage, as you define it, is intelligence respecting future evils, and future events not evil. But how can there be intelligence respecting the future, except in conjunction with intelligence respecting the present and the past? In every special department, such as medicine, military proceedings, agriculture, &c., does not the same man, who knows the phenomena of the future, know also the phenomena of present and past? Are they not all inseparable acquirements of one and the same intelligent mind?[21] [Footnote 20: Plato, Lachês, 197. [Greek: Kai\ ga\r pre/pei, ô)= Sô/krates, sophistê=| ta\ toiau=ta ma=llon kompseu/esthai ê)\ a)ndri\ o(\n ê( po/lis a)xioi= au(tê=s proi+sta/nai.] Assuredly the distinctions which here Plato puts into the mouth of Nikias are nowise more subtle than those which he is perpetually putting into the mouth of Sokrates. He cannot here mean to distinguish the Sophists from Sokrates, but to distinguish the dialectic talkers, including both one and the other, from the active political leaders.] [Footnote 21: Plato, Lachês, 198 D. [Greek: peri\ o(/sôn e)sti\n e)pistê/mê, ou)k a)/llê me\n ei)=nai peri\ gegono/tos, ei)de/nai o(/pê| ge/gonen, a)/llê de\ peri\ gignome/nôn, o(/pê| gi/gnetai, a)/llê de\ o(/pê| a)\n ka/llista ge/noito kai\ genê/setai to\ mê/pô gegono/s--a)ll' ê( au)tê/. oi(=on peri\ to\ u(gieino\n ei)s a(/pantas tou\s chro/nous ou)k a)/llê tis ê)\ ê( i)atrikê/, mi/a ou)=sa, e)phora=| kai\ gigno/mena kai\ gegono/ta kai\ genêso/mena, o(/pê| genê/setai.] 199 B. [Greek: ê( de/ g' au)tê\ e)pistê/mê tô=n au)tô=n kai\ mello/ntôn kai\ pa/ntôs e)cho/ntôn ei)=nai [ô(molo/gêtai].] [Side-note: Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and we declared that courage was only a part thereof. It will not hold therefore as a definition of courage.] Since therefore courage, according to your definition, is the knowledge of futurities evil and not evil, or future evil and good--and since such knowledge cannot exist without the knowledge of good and evil generally--it follows that courage is the knowledge of good and evil generally.[22] But a man who knows thus much, cannot be destitute of any part of virtue. He must possess temperance and justice as well as courage. Courage, therefore, according to your definition, is not only a part of virtue, it is the whole. Now we began the enquiry by stating that it was only a part of virtue, and that there were other parts of virtue which it did not comprise. It is plain therefore that your definition of courage is not precise, and cannot be sustained. We have not yet discovered what courage is.[23] [Footnote 22: Plato, Lachês, 199 C. [Greek: kata\ to\n so\n lo/gon ou) mo/non deinô=n te kai\ thar)r(ale/ôn ê( e)pistê/mê a)ndrei/a e)sti/n, a)lla\ schedo/n ti ê( peri\ pa/ntôn a)gathô=n te kai\ kakô=n kai\ pa/ntôs e)cho/ntôn], &c.] [Footnote 23: Plato, Lachês, 199 E. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra eu)rê/kamen, a)ndrei/a o(/, ti e)/stin.]] * * * * * [Side-note: Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about courage without knowing what it is.] Here ends the dialogue called Lachês, without any positive result. Nothing is proved except the ignorance of two brave and eminent generals respecting the moral attribute known by the name _Courage_: which nevertheless they are known to possess, and have the full sentiment and persuasion of knowing perfectly; so that they give confident advice as to the means of imparting it. "I am unaccustomed to debates like these" (says Lachês): "but I am piqued and mortified--because I feel that I know well what Courage is, yet somehow or other I cannot state my own thoughts in words." Here is a description[24] of the intellectual deficiency which Sokrates seeks to render conspicuous to the consciousness, instead of suffering it to remain latent and unknown, as it is in the ordinary mind. Here, as elsewhere, he impugns the false persuasion of knowledge, and the unconscious presumption of estimable men in delivering opinions upon ethical and social subjects, which have become familiar and interwoven with deeply rooted associations, but have never been studied under a master, nor carefully analysed and discussed, nor looked at in their full generality. This is a mental defect which he pronounces to be universal: belonging not less to men of action like Nikias and Lachês, than to Sophists and Rhetors like Protagoras and Gorgias. [Footnote 24: Plato, Lachês, 194. [Greek: Kai/toi a)ê/thês g' ei)mi\] (Lachês) [Greek: tô=n toiou/tôn lo/gôn; a)lla/ ti/s me kai\ philoneiki/a ei)/lêphe pro\s ta\ ei)rême/na, kai\ ô(s a)lêthô=s a)ganaktô=, ei) ou(tôsi\ a)\ noô= mê\ oi(=o/s t' ei)mi\ ei)pei=n; noei=n me\n ga\r e)/moige dokô= peri\ a)ndrei/as o(/, ti e)/stin, ou)k oi)=da d' o(/pê| me a)/rti die/phugen, ô(/ste mê\ xullabei=n tô=| lo/gô| au)tê\n kai\ ei)pei=n o(/, ti e)/stin.] Compare the Charmidês p. 159 A, 160 D, where Sokrates professes to tell Charmides, If temperance is really in you, you can of course inform us what it is.] [Side-note: No solution given by Plato. Apparent tendency of his mind, in looking for a solution. Intelligence--cannot be understood without reference to some object or end.] Here, as elsewhere, Plato (or the Platonic Sokrates) exposes the faulty solutions of others, but proposes no better solution of his own, and even disclaims all ability to do so. We may nevertheless trace, in the refutation which he gives of the two unsatisfactory explanations, hints guiding the mind into that direction in which Plato looks to supply the deficiency. Thus when Lachês, after having given as his first answer (to the question, What is Courage?) a definition not even formally sufficient, is put by Sokrates upon giving his second answer,--That Courage is intelligent endurance: Sokrates asks him[25]--"Yes, _intelligent_: but intelligent to _what end_? Do you mean, to all things alike, great as well as little?" We are here reminded that _intelligence_, simply taken, is altogether undefined; that intelligence must relate to _something_--and when human conduct is in question, must relate to some end; and that the Something, and the End, to which it relates, must be set forth, before the proposition can be clearly understood. [Footnote 25: Plato, Lachês, 192 D. [Greek: ê( phro/nimos karteri/a . . . i)/dômen dê/, ê( ei)s ti phro/nimos; ê)\ ê( ei)s a(/panta kai\ ta\ mega/la kai\ ta\ smikra/?]] [Side-note: Object--is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence--of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is not possessed by professional artists.] Coming to the answer given by Nikias, we perceive that this deficiency is in a certain manner supplied. Courage is said to consist in knowledge: in knowledge of things terrible, and things not terrible. When Lachês applies his cross-examination to the answer, the manner in which Nikias defends it puts us upon a distinction often brought to view, though not always adhered to, in the Platonic writings. There can be no doubt that death, distemper, loss of wealth, defeat, &c. are terrible things (_i.e._ the prospect of them inspires fear) in the estimation of mankind generally. Correct foresight of such contingencies, and of the antecedents tending to produce or avert them, is possessed by the physician and other professional persons: who would therefore, it should seem, possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible. But Nikias denies this. He does not admit that the contingencies here enumerated are, always or necessarily, proper objects of fear. In some cases, he contends, they are the least of two evils. Before you can be said to possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible, you must be able to take correct measure not only of the intervening antecedents or means, but also of the end itself as compared with other alternative ends: whether, in each particular case, it be the end most to be feared, or the real evil under the given circumstances. The professional man can do the former, but he cannot do the latter. He advises as to means, and executes: but he assumes his own one end as an indisputable datum. The physician seeks to cure his patient, without ever enquiring whether it may not be a less evil for such patient to die than to survive. [Side-note: Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man--correlates with the undiscovered Science of Ends.] The ulterior, yet not less important, estimate of the comparative worth of different ends, is reserved for that unknown master whom Nikias himself does not farther specify, and whom Lachês sets aside as nowhere to be found, under the peculiar phrase of "some God". Subjectively considered, this is an appeal to the judgment of that One Wise Man, often alluded to by Plato as an absent Expert who might be called into court--yet never to be found at the exact moment, nor produced in visible presence: Objectively considered, it is a postulate or divination of some yet undiscovered Teleology or Science of Ends: that Science of the Good, which (as we have already noticed in Alkibiadês II.) Plato pronounces to be the crowning and capital science of all--and without which he there declared, that knowledge on all other topics was useless and even worse than useless.[26] The One Wise Man--the _Science of Good_--are the Subject and Object corresponding to each other, and postulated by Plato. None but the One Wise Man can measure things terrible and not terrible: none else can estimate the good or evil, or the comparative value of two alternative evils, in each individual case. The items here directed to be taken into the calculation, correspond with what is laid down by Sokrates in the Protagoras, not with that laid down in the Gorgias: we find here none of that marked antithesis between pleasure and good--between pain and evil--upon which Sokrates expatiates in the Gorgias. [Footnote 26: Plato, Alkib. ii. 146-147. See above, ch. xii. p. 16.] [Side-note: Perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one sufficient condition of virtue.] This appears still farther when the cross-examination is taken up by Sokrates instead of by Lachês. We are then made to perceive, that the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible is a part, but an inseparable part, of the knowledge of good and evil generally: the lesser cannot be had without the greater--and the greater carries with it not merely courage, but all the other virtues besides. None can know good or evil generally except the perfectly Wise Man. The perfect condition of the Intelligence, is the sole and all-sufficient condition of virtue. None can possess one mode of virtue separately. This is the doctrine to which the conclusion of the Lachês points, though the question debated is confessedly left without solution. It is a doctrine which seems to have been really maintained by the historical Sokrates, and is often implied in the reasonings of the Platonic Sokrates, but not always nor consistently. [Side-note: Dramatic contrast between Lachês and Sokrates, as cross-examiners.] In reference to this dialogue, the dramatic contrast is very forcible, between the cross-examination carried on by Lachês, and that carried on by Sokrates. The former is pettish and impatient, bringing out no result, and accusing the respondent of cavil and disingenuousness: the latter takes up the same answer patiently, expands it into the full generality wrapped up in it, and renders palpable its inconsistency with previous admissions. APPENDIX. Ast is the only critic who declares the Lachês not to be Plato's work (Platon's Leben und Schr. pp. 451-456). He indeed even finds it difficult to imagine how Schleiermacher can accept it as genuine (p. 454). He justifies this opinion by numerous reasons--pointing out what he thinks glaring defects, absurdity, and bad taste, both in the ratiocination and in the dramatic handling, also _dicta_ alleged to be _un-Platonic_. Compare Schleiermacher's Einleitung zum Lachês, p. 324 seq. I do not concur with Ast in the estimation of those passages which serve as premisses to his conclusion. But even if I admitted his premisses, I still should not admit his conclusion. I should conclude that the dialogue was an inferior work of Plato, but I should conclude nothing beyond. Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Lachet. p. 29-30, 2nd ed.) and Socher discover "adolescentiæ vestigia" in it, which are not apparent to me. Socher, Stallbaum, and K. F. Hermann pass lightly over the objections of Ast; and Steinhart (Einleit. p. 355) declares them to be unworthy of a serious answer. For my part, I draw from these dissensions among the Platonic critics a conviction of the uncertain evidence upon which all of them proceed. Each has his own belief as to what Plato _must_ say, _ought to_ say, and _could not_ have said; and each adjudicates thereupon with a degree of confidence which surprises me. The grounds upon which Ast rejects Lachês, Charmidês, and Lysis, though inconclusive, appear to me not more inconclusive than those on which he and other critics reject the Erastæ, Theagês. Hippias Major, Alkibiadês II., &c. The dates which Stallbaum, Schleiermacher, Socher, and Steinhart assign to the Lachês (about 406-404 B.C.) are in my judgment erroneous. I have already shown my reasons for believing that not one of the Platonic dialogues was composed until after the death of Sokrates. The hypotheses also of Steinhart (p. 357) as to the special purposes of Plato in composing the dialogue are unsupported by any evidence; and are all imagined so as to fit his supposition as to the date. So also Schleiermacher tells us that a portion of the Lachês is intended by Plato as a defence of himself against accusations which had been brought against him, a young man, for impertinence in having attacked Lysias in the Phædrus, and Protagoras in the Protagoras, both of them much older than Plato. But Steinhart justly remarks that this explanation can only be valid if we admit Schleiermacher's theory that the Phædrus and the Protagoras are earlier compositions than the Lachês, which theory Steinhart and most of the others deny. Steinhart himself adapts his hypotheses to his own idea of the date of the Lachês: and he is open to the same remark as he himself makes upon Schleiermacher. CHAPTER XIX. CHARMIDES. As in Lachês, we have pursued an enquiry into the nature of Courage--so in Charmidês, we find an examination of Temperance, Sobriety, Moderation.[1] Both dialogues conclude without providing any tenable explanation. In both there is an abundant introduction--in Charmidês, there is even the bustle of a crowded palæstra, with much dramatic incident--preluding to the substantive discussion. I omit the notice of this dramatic incident, though it is highly interesting to read. [Footnote 1: I translate [Greek: sôphrosu/nê] Temperance, though it is very inadequate, but I know no single English word better suited.] [Side-note: Scene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded palæstra. Emotions of Sokrates.] The two persons with whom Sokrates here carries on the discussion, are Charmides and Kritias; both of whom, as historical persons, were active movers in the oligarchical government of the Thirty, with its numerous enormities. In this dialogue, Charmides appears as a youth just rising into manhood, strikingly beautiful both in face and stature: Kritias his cousin is an accomplished literary man of mature age. The powerful emotion which Sokrates describes himself as experiencing,[2] from the sight and close neighbourhood of the beautiful Charmides, is remarkable, as a manifestation of Hellenic sentiment. The same exaltation of the feelings and imagination, which is now produced only by beautiful women, was then excited chiefly by fine youths. Charmides is described by Kritias as exhibiting dispositions at once philosophical and poetical:[3] illustrating the affinity of these two intellectual veins, as Plato conceived them. He is also described as eminently temperate and modest:[4] from whence the questions of Sokrates take their departure. [Footnote 2: Plato, Charm. 154 C. Ficinus, in his Argumentum to this dialogue (p. 767), considers it as mainly allegorical, especially the warm expressions of erotic sentiment contained therein, which he compares to the Song of Solomon. "Etsi omnia in hoc dialogo mirificam habeant allegoriam, amatoria maxime, non aliter quam Cantica Salomonis--mutavi tamen nonnihil--nonnihil etiam prætermisi. Quæ enim consonabant castigatissimis auribus Atticorum, rudioribus fortè auribus minimé consonarent."] [Footnote 3: Plato, Charm. 155 A.] [Footnote 4: Plato, Charm. 157 D. About the diffidence of Charmides in his younger years, see Xen. Mem. iii. 7, 1.] [Side-note: Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness.] You are said to be temperate, Charmides (says Sokrates). If so, your temperance will surely manifest itself within you in some way, so as to enable you to form and deliver an opinion, What Temperance is. Tell us in plain language what you conceive it to be. Temperance, replies Charmides (after some hesitation),[5] consists in doing every thing in an orderly and sedate manner, when we walk in the highway, or talk, or perform other matters in the presence of others. It is, in short, a kind of sedateness or slowness. [Footnote 5: Plato, Charm. 159 B. [Greek: to\ kosmi/ôs pa/nta pra/ttein kai\ ê(suchê=|, e)/n te tai=s o)doi=s badi/zein kai\ diale/gesthai . . . sullê/bdên ê(suchio/tês tis.]] [Side-note: But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and slowness is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary. Temperance cannot be slowness.] Sokrates begins his cross-examination upon this answer, in the same manner as he had begun it with Laches in respect to courage. _Sokr._--Is not temperance a fine and honourable thing? Does it not partake of the essence and come under the definition, of what is fine or and honourable?[6] _Char._--Undoubtedly it does. _Sokr._--But if we specify in detail our various operations, either of body or mind--such as writing, reading, playing on the harp, boxing, running, jumping, learning, teaching, recollecting, comprehending, deliberating, determining, &c.--we shall find that to do them quickly is more fine and honourable than to do them slowly. Slowness does not, except by accident, belong to the fine and honourable: therefore temperance, which does so belong to it, cannot be a kind of slowness.[7] [Footnote 6: Plato, Charm. 159 C--160 D. [Greek: ou) tô=n kalô=n me/ntoi ê( sôphrosu/nê e)sti/n? . . . e)peidê\ _e)n tô=| lo/gô|_ tô=n kalô=n ti ê(mi=n ê( sôphrosu/nê u(pete/thê.]] [Footnote 7: Plato, Charm. 160 C.] [Side-note: Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of shame. Refuted by Sokrates.] Charmides next declares Temperance to be a variety of the feeling of shame or modesty. But this (observes Sokrates) will not hold more than the former explanation: since Homer has pronounced shame not to be good, for certain persons and under certain circumstances.[8] [Footnote 8: Plato, Charm. 161 A.] [Side-note: Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one's own business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, and refutes it. Distinction between making and doing.] "Temperance consists in doing one's own business." Here we have a third explanation, proposed by Charmides and presently espoused by Kritias. Sokrates professes not to understand it, and pronounces it to be like a riddle.[9] Every tradesman or artisan does the business of others as well as his own. Are we to say for that reason that he is not temperate? I distinguish (says Kritias) between _making_ and _doing_: the artisan _makes_ for others, but he does not _do_ for others, and often cannot be said to _do_ at all. _To do_, implies honourable, profitable, good, occupation: this alone is a man's own business, and this I call temperance. When a man acts so as to harm himself, he does not do his own business.[10] The doing of good things, is temperance.[11] [Footnote 9: Plato, Charm. 161 C--162 B. [Greek: sôphrosu/nê--to\ ta\ au(tou= pra/ttein . . . ai)ni/gmati/ tini e)/oiken.] There is here a good deal of playful vivacity in the dialogue: Charmidês gives this last answer, which he has heard from Kritias, who is at first not forward to defend it, until Charmides forces him to come forward, by hints and side-insinuations. This is the dramatic art and variety of Plato, charming to read, but not bearing upon him as a philosopher.] [Footnote 10: Plato, Charm. 163 C-D. [Greek: ta\ kalô=s kai\ ô)pheli/môs poiou/mena . . . oi)kei=a mo/na ta\ toiau=ta ê(gei=sthai, ta\ de\ blabera\ pa/nta a)llo/tria . . . o(/ti ta\ oi)kei=a te kai\ ta\ au(tou= a)gatha\ kaloi/ês, kai\ ta\s tô=n a)gathô=n poiê/seis pra/xeis.]] [Footnote 11: Plato, Charm. 163 E. [Greek: tê\n tô=n a)gathô=n pra=xin sôphrosu/nên ei)=nai saphô=s soi diori/zomai.]] [Side-note: Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in self-knowledge.] _Sokr._--Perhaps it is. But does the well-doer always and certainly know that he is doing well? Does the temperate man know his own temperance? _Krit._--He certainly must. Indeed I think that the essence of temperance is, _Self-knowledge_. _Know thyself_ is the precept of the Delphian God, who means thereby the same as if he had said--Be temperate. I now put aside all that I have said before, and take up this new position, That temperance consists in a man's knowing himself. If you do not admit it, I challenge your cross-examination.[12] [Footnote 12: Plato, Charm. 164-165.] [Side-note: Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does self-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this case? Answer: There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the knowledge itself.] _Sokr._--I cannot tell you whether I admit it or not, until I have investigated. You address me as if I professed to know the subject: but it is because I do not know, that I examine, in conjunction with you, each successive answer.[13] If temperance consists in knowing, it must be a knowledge of something. _Krit._--It is so: it is knowledge of a man's self. _Sokr._--What good does this knowledge procure for us? as medical knowledge procures for us health--architectural knowledge, buildings, &c.? _Krit._--It has no object positive result of analogous character: but neither have arithmetic nor geometry. _Sokr._--True, but in arithmetic and geometry, we can at least indicate a something known, distinct from the knowledge. Number and proportion are distinct from arithmetic, the science which takes cognizance of them. Now what is that, of which temperance is the knowledge,--distinct from temperance itself? _Krit._--It is on this very point that temperance differs from all the other cognitions. Each of the others is knowledge of something different from itself, but not knowledge of itself: while temperance is knowledge of all the other sciences and of itself also.[14] _Sokr._--If this be so, it will of course be a knowledge of ignorance, as well as a knowledge of knowledge? _Krit._--Certainly. [Footnote 13: Plato, Charm. 165 C.] [Footnote 14: Plato, Charm. 166 C. [Greek: ai( me\n a)/llai pa=sai a)/llou ei)si\n e)pistê=mai, e(autô=n d' ou)/; ê( de\ mo/nê tô=n te a)/llôn e)pistêmô=n e)pistê/mê e)sti\ kai\ au)tê\ e(autê=s.] So also 166 E.] [Side-note: Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge, without a given _cognitum_ as its object. Analogies to prove that knowledge of knowledge is impossible.] _Sokr._--According to your explanation, then, it is only the temperate man who knows himself. He alone is able to examine himself, and thus to find out what he really knows and does not know: he alone is able to examine others, and thus to find out what each man knows, or what each man only believes himself to know without really knowing. Temperance, or self-knowledge, is the knowledge what a man knows, and what he does not know.[15] Now two questions arise upon this: First, is it possible for a man to know, that he knows what he does know, and that he does not know what he does not know? Next, granting it to be possible, in what way do we gain by it? The first of these two questions involves much difficulty. How can there be any cognition, which is not cognition of a given _cognitum_, but cognition merely of other cognitions and non-cognitions? There is no vision except of some colour, no audition except of some sound: there can be no vision of visions, or audition of auditions. So likewise, all desire is desire of some pleasure; there is no desire of desires. All volition is volition of some good; there is no volition of volitions: all love applies to something beautiful--there is no love of other loves. The like is true of fear, opinion, &c. It would be singular therefore, if contrary to all these analogies, there were any cognition not of some _cognitum_, but of itself and other cognitions.[16] [Footnote 15: Plato, Charm. 167 A.] [Footnote 16: Plato, Charm. 167-168.] [Side-note: All knowledge must be relative to some object.] It is of the essence of cognition to be cognition of something, and to have its characteristic property with reference to some correlate.[17] What is greater, has its property of being greater in relation to something else, which is less--not in relation to itself. It cannot be greater than itself, for then it would also be less than itself. It cannot include in itself the characteristic property of the _correlatum_ as well as that of the _relatum_. So too about what is older, younger, heavier, lighter: there is always a something distinct, to which reference is made. Vision does not include in itself both the property of seeing, and that of being seen: the _videns_ is distinct from the _visum_. A movement implies something else to be moved: a heater something else to be heated. [Footnote 17: Plato, Charm. 168 B. [Greek: e)/sti me\n au(tê\ ê( e)pistê/mê tino\s e)pistê/mê, kai\ e)/chei tina toiau/tên du/namin ô(/ste tino\s ei)=nai.]] [Side-note: All properties are relative--every thing in nature has its characteristic property with reference to something else.] In all these cases (concludes Sokrates) the characteristic property is essentially relative, implying something distinguishable from, yet correlating with, itself. May we generalise the proposition, and affirm, That all properties are relative, and that every thing in nature has its characteristic property with reference, not to itself, but to something else? Or is this true only of some things and not of all--so that cognition may be something in the latter category? This is an embarrassing question, which I do not feel qualified to decide: neither the general question, whether there be any cases of characteristic properties having no reference to any thing beyond themselves, and therefore not relative, but absolute--nor the particular question, whether cognition be one of those cases, implying no separate _cognitum_, but being itself both _relatum_ and _correlatum_--cognition of cognition.[18] [Footnote 18: Plato, Charm. 168-169. 169 A: [Greek: mega/lou dê/ tinos a)ndro\s dei=, o(/stis tou=to kata\ pa/ntôn i(kanô=s diairê/setai, po/teron ou)de\n tô=n o)/ntôn tê\n au(tou= du/namin au)to\ pro\s e(auto\ pe/phuken e)/chein, a)lla\ pro\s a)llo\--ê)\ ta\ me\n, ta\ d' ou)/; kai\ ei) e)/stin au(= a(/tina au)ta\ pro\s e(auta\ e)/chei, a)=r' e)n tou/tois e)sti\n e)pistê/mê, ê(\n dê\ ê(mei=s sôphrosu/nên phame\n ei)=nai. e)gô\ me\n ou) pisteu/ô e)mautô=| i(kano\s ei)=nai tau=ta diele/sthtai.]] But even if cognition of cognition be possible, I shall not admit it as an explanation of what temperance is, until I have satisfied myself that it is beneficial. For I have a presentiment that temperance must be something beneficial and good.[19] [Footnote 19: Plato, Charm. 169 B. [Greek: ô)phelimo/n ti ka)gatho\n manteu/omai ei)=nai.]] [Side-note: Even if cognition of cognition were possible, cognition of non-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what he knows, but he cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the fact _that_ he knows: but he does not know how much he knows, and how much he does not know.] Let us concede for the present discussion (continues Sokrates) that cognition of cognition is possible. Still how does this prove that there can be cognition of non-cognition? that a man can know both what he knows and what he does not know? For this is what we declared self-knowledge and temperance to be.[20] To have cognition of cognition is one thing: to have cognition of non-cognition is a different thing, not necessarily connected with it. If you have cognition of cognition, you will be enabled to distinguish that which is cognition from that which is not--but no more. Now the knowledge or ignorance of the matter of health is known by medical science: that of justice known by political science. The knowledge of knowledge simply--cognition of cognition--is different from both. The person who possesses this last only, without knowing either medicine or politics, will become aware that he knows something and possesses some sort of knowledge, and will be able to verify so much with regard to others. But _what_ it is that he himself knows, or that others know, he will not thereby be enabled to find out: he will not distinguish whether that which is known belong to physiology or to politics; to do this, special acquirements are needed. You, a temperate man therefore, as such, do not know _what_ you know and _what_ you do not know; you know the bare fact, _that_ you know and _that_ you do not know. You will not be competent to cross-examine any one who professes to know medicine or any other particular subject, so as to ascertain whether the man really possesses what he pretends to possess. There will be no point in common between you and him. You, as a temperate man, possess cognition of cognition, but you do not know any special _cognitum_: the special man knows his own special _cognitum_ but is a stranger to cognition generally. You cannot question him, nor criticise what he says or performs, in his own specialty--for of that you are ignorant:--no one can do it except some fellow _expert_. You can ascertain that he possesses some knowledge: but whether he possesses that particular knowledge to which he lays claim, or whether he falsely pretends to it, you cannot ascertain:--since, as a temperate man, you know only cognition and non-cognition generally. To ascertain this point, you must be not only a temperate man, but a man of special cognition besides.[21] You can question and test no one, except another temperate man like yourself. [Footnote 20: Plato, Charm. 169 D. [Greek: nu=n me\n tou=to xugchôrê/sômen, dunato\n ei)=nai gene/sthai e)pistê/mên e)pistê/mês--i)/thi dê\ ou)=n, ei) o(/, ti ma/lista dunato\n tou=to, ti/ ma=llon oi(=o/n te/ e)stin ei)de/nai a(/ te/ tis oi)=de kai\ a(\ mê/? tou=to ga\r dê/pou e)/phamen ei)=nai to\ gignô/skein au(to\n kai\ sôphronei=n.]] [Footnote 21: Plato, Charm. 170-171. 171 C: [Greek: Panto\s a)/ra ma=llon, ei) ê( sôphrosu/nê e)pistê/mês e)pisê/mê mo/non e)sti\ kai\ a)nepistêmosu/nês, ou)/te i)atro\n diakri=nai oi(/a te e)/stai e)pista/menon ta\ tê=s te/chnês, ê)\ mê\ e)pista/menon prospoiou/menon de\ ê)\ oi)o/menon, ou)/te a)//lon ou)de/na tô=n e)pistame/nôn kai\ o(tiou=n, plê/n ge to\n au(tou= o(mo/technon, ô(/sper oi( a)/lloi dêmiourgoi/.]] [Side-note: Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be of little or no value.] But if this be all that temperance can do, of what use is it to us (continues Sokrates)? It is indeed a great benefit to know how much we know, and how much we do not know: it is also a great benefit to know respecting others, how much _they_ know, and how much they do not know. If thus instructed, we should make fewer mistakes: we should do by ourselves only what we knew how to do,--we should commit to others that which they knew how to do, and which we did not know. But temperance (meaning thereby cognition of cognition and of non-cognition generally) does not confer such instruction, nor have we found any science which does.[22] How temperance benefits us, does not yet appear. [Footnote 22: Plato, Charm. 172 A. [Greek: o(ra=|s, o(/ti ou)damou= e)pistê/mê ou)demi/a toiau/tê ou)=sa pe/phantai.]] [Side-note: But even granting the possibility of that which has just been denied, still Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that all separate work were well performed, by special practitioners, we should not attain our end--Happiness.] But let us even concede--what has been just shown to be impossible--that through temperance we become aware of what we do know and what we do not know. Even upon this hypothesis, it will be of little service to us. We have been too hasty in conceding that it would be a great benefit if each of us did only what he knew, committing to others to do only what they knew. I have an awkward suspicion (continues Sokrates) that after all, this would be no great benefit.[23] It is true that upon this hypothesis, all operations in society would be conducted scientifically and skilfully. We should have none but competent pilots, physicians, generals, &c., acting for us, each of them doing the work for which he was fit. The supervision exercised by temperance (in the sense above defined) would guard us against all pretenders. Let us even admit that as to prediction of the future, we should have none but competent and genuine prophets to advise us; charlatans being kept aloof by this same supervision. We should thus have every thing done scientifically and in a workmanlike manner. But should we for that reason do well and be happy? Can that be made out, Kritias?[24] [Footnote 23: Plato, Charm. 172-173.] [Footnote 24: Plato, Charm. 173 C-D. [Greek: kateskeuasme/non dê\ ou(/tô to\ a)nthrô/pinon ge/nos o(/ti me\n e)pistêmo/nôs a)\n pra/ttoi kai\ zô=|ê, e(/pomai--o(/ti d' e)pistêmo/nôs a)\n pra/ttontes eu)= a)\n pra/ttoimen kai\ eu)daimonoi=men, tou=to de\ ou(/pô duna/metha mathei=n, ô)= phi/le Kriti/a.]] [Side-note: Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to well-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and evil.] _Krit._--You will hardly find the end of well-doing anywhere else, if you deny that it follows on doing scientifically or according to knowledge.[25] _Sokr._--But according to knowledge, of _what_? Of leather-cutting, brazen work, wool, wood, &c.? _ Krit._--No, none of these. _Sokr._--Well then, you see, we do not follow out consistently your doctrine--That the happy man is he who lives scientifically, or according to knowledge. For all these men live according to knowledge, and still you do not admit them to be happy. Your definition of happiness applies only to some portion of those who live according to knowledge, but not to all. How are we to distinguish which of them? Suppose a man to know every thing past, present, and future; which among the fractions of such omniscience would contribute most to make him happy? Would they all contribute equally? _Krit._--By no means. _Sokr._--Which of them then would contribute most? Would it be that by which he knew the art of gaming? _Krit._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--Or that by which he knew the art of computing? _Krit._--No. _Sokr._--Or that by which he knew the conditions of health? _Krit._--That will suit better. _Sokr._--But which of them most of all? _Krit._--That by which he knew good and evil.[26] [Footnote 25: Plato, Charm. 173 D. [Greek: A)lla\ me/ntoi, ê)= d' o(/s, ou) r(a|di/ôs eu(rê/seis a)/llo ti te/los tou= eu)= pra/ttein e)a\n to\ e)pistêmo/nôs a)tima/sês.]] [Footnote 26: Plato, Charm. 174.] [Side-note: Without the science of good and evil, the other special science will be of little or of no service. Temperance is not the science of good and evil, and is of little service.] _Sokr._--Here then, you have been long dragging me round in a circle, keeping back the fact, that well-doing and happiness does not arise from living according to science generally, not of all other matters taken together--but from living according to the science of this one single matter, good and evil. If you exclude this last, and leave only the other sciences, each of these others will work as before: the medical man will heal, the weaver will prepare clothes, the pilot will navigate his vessel, the general will conduct his army--each of them scientifically. Nevertheless, that each of these things shall conduce to our well-being and profit, will be an impossibility, if the science of good and evil be wanting.[27] Now this science of good and evil, the special purpose of which is to benefit us,[28] is altogether different from temperance; which you have defined as the science of cognition and non-cognition, and which appears not to benefit us at all. _Krit._--Surely it does benefit us: for it presides over and regulates all the other sciences, and of course regulates this very science, of good and evil, among the rest. _Sokr._--In what way can it benefit us? It does not procure for us any special service, such as good health: _that_ is the province of medicine: in like manner, each separate result arises from its own producing art. To confer benefit is, as we have just laid down, the special province of the science of good and evil.[29] Temperance, as the science of cognition and non-cognition, cannot work any benefit at all. [Footnote 27: Plato, Charm. 174 C-D. [Greek: e)pei\ ei) the/leis e)xelei=n tau/tên tê\n e)pistê/mên] (of good and evil) [Greek: e)k tô=n a)/llôn e)pistêmô=n, ê(=tto/n ti ê( me\n i)atrikê\ u(giai/nein poiê/sei, ê( de\ skutikê\ u(podede/sthai, ê( de\ u(phantikê\ ê(mphie/sthai, ê( de\ kubbernêtikê\ kôlu/sei e)n tê=| thala/ttê| a)pothnê/skein kai\ ê( stratêgikê\ e)n pole/mô|? Ou)de\n ê(=tton, e)/phê. A)lla\ to\ eu)= te tou/tôn e(/kasta gi/gnesthai kai\ ô)pheli/môs a)poleloipo\s ê(ma=s e)/stai tau/tês a)pou/sês.]] [Footnote 28: Plato, Charm. 174 D. [Greek: ê(=s e)/rgon e)sti\ to\ ô)phelei=n ê(ma=s], &c.] [Footnote 29: Plato, Charm. 175 A. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra u(giei/as e)/stai dêmiourgo/s (ê( sôphrosu/nê). Ou) dê=ta. A)/llês ga\r ê)=n te/chnês u(giei/a, ê)\ ou)/? A)/llês. Ou)d' a)/ra ô)phelei/as, ô)= e(/taire; a)/llê| ga\r au)= a)pe/domen tou=to to\ e)/rgon te/chnê| nu=n dê/; ê)= ga/r? Pa/nu ge. Pô=s ou)=n ô)phe/limos e)/stai ê( sôphrosu/nê, ou)demia=s ô)phelei/as ou)=sa dêmiourgo/s? Ou)damô=s, ô)= Sô/krates, e)/oike/ ge.]] [Side-note: Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research. He cannot find out what temperance is: although several concessions have been made which cannot be justified.] Thus then, concludes Sokrates, we are baffled in every way: we cannot find out what temperance is, nor what that name has been intended to designate. All our tentatives have failed; although, in our anxiety to secure some result, we have accepted more than one inadmissible hypothesis. Thus we have admitted that there might exist cognition of cognition, though our discussion tended to negative such a possibility. We have farther granted, that this cognition of cognition, or science of science, might know all the operations of each separate and special science: so that the temperate man (_i.e._ he who possesses cognition of cognition) might know both what he knows and what he does not know: might know, namely, that he knows the former and that he does not know the latter. We have granted this, though it is really an absurdity to say, that what a man does not know at all, he nevertheless does know after a certain fashion.[30] Yet after these multiplied concessions against strict truth, we have still been unable to establish our definition of temperance: for temperance as we defined it has, after all, turned out to be thoroughly unprofitable. [Footnote 30: Plato, Charm. 175 B. [Greek: kai\ ga\r e)pistê/mên e)pistê/mês ei)=nai xunechôrê/samen, ou)k e)ô=ntos tou= lo/gou ou)de\ pha/skontos ei)=nai; kai\ tau/tê| au)= tê=| e)pistê/mê| kai\ ta\ tô=n a)/llôn e)pistêmô=n e)/rga gignô/skein xunechôrê/samen, ou)de\ tou=t' e)ô=ntos tou= lo/gou, i(/na dê\ ê(mi=n ge/noito o( sô/phrôn e)pistê/môn ô(=n te oi)=den, o(/ti oi)=de, kai\ ô(=n mê\ oi)=den, o(/ti ou)k oi)=de. tou=to me\n dê\ kai\ panta/pasi megaloprepô=s xunechôrê/samen, ou)d' e)piskepsa/menoi to\ a)du/naton ei)=nai a(/ tis mê\ oi)=de mêdamô=s, tau=ta ei)de/nai a(mô=s ge/ pôs; o(/ti ga\r ou)k oi)=de, phêsi\n au)ta\ ei)de/nai ê( ê(mete/ra o(mologi/a. kai/toi, ô(s e)gô=mai, ou)deno\s o(/tou ou)chi\ a)logô/teron tou=t' a)\n phanei/ê.] This would not appear an absurdity to Aristotle. See Analyt. Priora, ii. p. 67, a. 21; Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 28.] [Side-note: Temperance is and must be a good thing: but Charmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not; since what temperance is remains unknown.] It is plain that we have taken the wrong road, and that I (Sokrates) do not know how to conduct the enquiry. For temperance, whatever it may consist in, must assuredly be a great benefit: and you, Charmides, are happy if you possess it. How can I tell (rejoins Charmides) whether I possess it or not: since even men like you and Kritias cannot discover what it is?[31] [Footnote 31: Plato, Charm. 176 A.] * * * * * [Side-note: Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornament throughout.] Here ends the dialogue called Charmidês[32] after the interchange of a few concluding compliments, forming part of the great dramatic richness which characterises this dialogue from the beginning. I make no attempt to reproduce this latter attribute; though it is one of the peculiar merits of Plato in reference to ethical enquiry, imparting to the subject a charm which does not naturally belong to it. I confine myself to the philosophical bearing of the dialogue. According to the express declaration of Sokrates, it ends in nothing but disappointment. No positive result is attained. The problem--What is Temperance?--remains unsolved, after four or five different solutions have been successively tested and repudiated. [Footnote 32: See Appendix at end of chapter.] [Side-note: The Charmides is an excellent specimen of Dialogues of Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all ultimately disallowed.] The Charmidês (like the Lachês) is a good illustrative specimen of those Dialogues of Search, the general character and purpose of which I have explained in my eighth** chapter. It proves nothing: it disproves several hypotheses: but it exhibits (and therein consists its value) the anticipating, guessing, tentative, and eliminating process, without which no defensible conclusions can be obtained--without which, even if such be found, no advocate can be formed capable of defending them against an acute cross-examiner. In most cases, this tentative process is forgotten or ignored: even when recognised as a reality, it is set aside with indifference, often with ridicule. A writer who believes himself to have solved any problem, publishes his solution together with the proofs; and acquires deserved credit for it, if those proofs give satisfaction. But he does not care to preserve, nor do the public care to know, the steps by which such solution has been reached. Nevertheless in most cases, and in all cases involving much difficulty, there has been a process, more or less tedious, of tentative and groping--of guesses at first hailed as promising, then followed out to a certain extent, lastly discovered to be untenable. The history of science,[33] astronomical, physical, chemical, physiological, &c., wherever it has been at all recorded, attests this constant antecedence of a period of ignorance, confusion, and dispute, even in cases where ultimately a solution has been found commanding the nearly unanimous adhesion of the scientific world. But on subjects connected with man and society, this period of dispute and confusion continues to the present moment. No unanimity has ever been approached, among nations at once active in intellect and enjoying tolerable liberty of dissent. Moreover--apart from the condition of different sciences among mature men--we must remember that the transitive process, above described, represents the successive stages by which every adult mind has been gradually built up from infancy. Trial and error--alternate guess and rejection, generation and destruction of sentiments and beliefs--is among the most widespread facts of human intelligence.[34] Even those ordinary minds, which in mature life harden with the most exemplary fidelity into the locally prevalent type of orthodoxy,--have all in their earlier years gone through that semi-fluid and indeterminate period, in which the type to come is yet a matter of doubt--in which the head might have been permanently lengthened or permanently flattened, according to the direction in which pressure was applied. [Footnote 33: It is not often that historians of science take much pains to preserve and bring together the mistaken guesses and tentatives which have preceded great physical discoveries. One instance in which this has been ably and carefully done is in the 'Biography of Cavendish,' the chemist and natural philosopher, by Dr. Geo. Wilson. The great chemical discovery of the composition of water, accomplished during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, has been claimed as the privilege of three eminent scientific men--Cavendish, Watt, and Lavoisier. The controversy on the subject, voluminous and bitter, has been the means of recording each successive scientific phase and point of view. It will be found admirably expounded in this biography. Wilson sets forth the misconceptions, confusion of ideas, approximations to truth seen but not followed out, &c., which prevailed upon the scientific men of that day, especially under the misleading influence of the "phlogiston theory," then universally received. To Plato such a period of mental confusion would have been in itself an interesting object for contemplation and description. He might have dramatised it under the names of various disputants, with the cross-examining Elenchus, personified in Sokrates, introduced to stir up the debate, either by first advocating, then refuting, a string of successive guesses and dreams (Charmidês, 173 A) of his own, or by exposing similar suggestions emanating from others; especially in regard to the definition of _phlogiston_, an entity which then overspread and darkened all chemical speculation, but which every theorist thought himself obliged to define. The dialogues would have ended (as the Protagoras, Lysis, Charmidês, &c., now end) by Sokrates deriding the ill success which had attended them in the search for an explanation, and by his pointing out that while all the theorists talked familiarly about _phlogiston_ as a powerful agent, none of them could agree what it was. See Dr. Wilson's 'Biography of Cavendish,' pp. 36-198-320-325, and elsewhere.] [Footnote 34: It is strikingly described by Plato in one of the most remarkable passages of the speech of Diotima in the Symposion, pp. 207-208.] [Side-note: Trial and Error, the natural process of the human mind. Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of the mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of conscious ignorance.] We shall follow Plato towards the close of his career (Treatise De Legibus), into an imperative and stationary orthodoxy of his own: but in the dialogues which I have already reviewed, as well as in several others which I shall presently notice, no mention is made of any given affirmative doctrine as indispensable to arrive at ultimately. Plato here concentrates his attention upon the indeterminate period of the mind: looking upon the mind not as an empty vessel, requiring to be filled by ready-made matter from without--nor as a blank sheet, awaiting a foreign hand to write characters upon it--but as an assemblage of latent capacities, which must be called into action by stimulus and example, but which can only attain improvement through multiplied trials and multiplied failures. Whereas in most cases these failures are forgotten, the peculiarity of Plato consists in his bringing them to view with full detail, explaining the reasons of each. He illustrates abundantly, and dramatises with the greatest vivacity, the intellectual process whereby opinions are broached, at first adopted, then mistrusted, unmade, and re-made--or perhaps not re-made at all, but exchanged for a state of conscious ignorance. The great hero and operator in this process is the Platonic Sokrates, who accepts for himself this condition of conscious ignorance, and even makes it a matter of comparative pride, that he stands nearly alone in such confession.[35] His colloquial influence, working powerfully and almost preternaturally,[36] not only serves both to spur and to direct the activity of hearers still youthful and undecided, but also exposes those who have already made up their minds and confidently believe themselves to know. Sokrates brings back these latter from the false persuasion of knowledge to the state of conscious ignorance, and to the prior indeterminate condition of mind, in which their opinions have again to be put together by the tentative and guessing process. This tentative process, prosecuted under the drill of Sokrates, is in itself full of charm and interest for Plato, whether it ends by finding a good solution or only by discarding a bad one. [Footnote 35: Plato, Apolog. Sokr. pp. 21-22-23.] [Footnote 36: Plato, Symposion, 213 E, 215-216; Menon, 80 A-B.] [Side-note: Familiar words--constantly used, with much earnest feeling, but never understood nor defined--ordinary phenomenon in human society.] The Charmidês is one of the many Platonic dialogues wherein such intellectual experimentation appears depicted without any positive result: except as it adds fresh matter to illustrate that wide-spread mental fact,--(which has already come before the reader, in Euthyphron, Alkibiadês, Hippias, Erastæ, Lachês, &c., as to holiness, beauty, philosophy, courage, &c., and is now brought to view in the case of _temperance_ also; all of them words in every one's mouth, and tacitly assumed by every one as known quantities) the perpetual and confident judgments which mankind are in the habit of delivering--their apportionment of praise and blame, as well as of reward and punishment consequent on praise and blame--without any better basis than that of strong emotion imbibed they know not how, and without being able to render any rational explanation even of the familiar words round which such emotions are grouped. No philosopher has done so much as Plato to depict in detail this important fact--the habitual condition of human society, modern as well as ancient, and for that very reason generally unnoticed.[37] The emotional or subjective value of temperance is all that Sokrates determines, and which indeed he makes his point of departure. Temperance is essentially among the fine, beautiful, honourable, things:[38] but its rational or objective value (_i.e._, what is the common object characterising all temperate acts or persons), he cannot determine. Here indeed Plato is not always consistent with himself: for we shall come to other dialogues wherein he professes himself incompetent to say whether a thing be beautiful or not, until it be determined what the thing is:[39] and we have already found Sokrates declaring (in the Hippias Major), that we cannot determine whether any particular object is beautiful or not, until we have first determined, What is Beauty in the Absolute, or the Self-Beautiful? a problem nowhere solved by Plato. [Footnote 37: "Whoever has reflected on the generation of ideas in his own mind, or has investigated the causes of misunderstandings among mankind, will be obliged to proclaim as a fact deeply seated in human nature--That most of the misunderstandings and contradictions among men, most of the controversies and errors both in science and in society, arise usually from our assuming (consciously or unconsciously) fundamental maxims and fundamental facts as if they were self-evident, and as if they must be assumed by every one else besides. Accordingly we never think of closely examining them, until at length experience has taught us that these _self-evident_ matters are exactly what stand most in need of proof, and what form the special root of divergent opinions."--(L. O. Bröcker--Untersuchungen über die Glaubwürdigkeit der alt-Römischen Geschichte, p. 490.)] [Footnote 38: Plato, Charm. 159 B, 160 D. [Greek: ê( sôphrosu/nê--tô=n kalô=n ti--e)n tô=| lo/gô=| tô=n kalô=n ti]. So also Sokrates in the Lachês (192 C), assumes that courage is [Greek: tô=n pa/nu kalô=n pragma/tôn], though he professes not to know nor to be able to discover what courage is.] [Footnote 39: See Gorgias, 462 B, 448 E; Menon, 70 B.] [Side-note: Different ethical points of view in different Platonic dialogues.] Among the various unsuccessful definitions of temperance propounded, there is more than one which affords farther example to show how differently Plato deals with the same subject in different dialogues. Here we have the phrase--"to do one's own business"--treated as an unmeaning puzzle, and exhibited as if it were analogous to various other phrases, with which the analogy is more verbal than real. But in the Republic, Plato admits this phrase as well understood, and sets it forth as the constituent element of justice; in the Gorgias, as the leading mark of philosophical life.[40] [Footnote 40: Plato, Republ. iv. 433, vi. 496 C, viii. 550 A; Gorgias, 526 C. Compare also Timæus, 72 A, Xen, Mem. ii. 9, 1.] [Side-note: Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible.] Again, another definition given by Kritias is, That temperance consists in knowing yourself, or in self-knowledge. In commenting upon this definition, Sokrates makes out--first, that self-knowledge is impossible: next, that if possible, it would be useless. You cannot know yourself, he argues: you cannot know what you know, and what you do not know: to say that you know what you know, is either tautological or untrue--to say that you know what you do not know, is a contradiction. All cognition must be cognition of something distinct from yourself: it is a relative term which must have some correlate, and cannot be its own correlate: you cannot have cognition of cognition, still less cognition of non-cognition. [Side-note: In other dialogues, Sokrates declares self-knowledge to be essential and inestimable. Necessity for the student to have presented to him dissentient points of view.] This is an important point of view, which I shall discuss more at length when I come to the Platonic Theætetus. I bring it to view here only as contrasting with different language held by the Platonic Sokrates in other dialogues; where he insists on the great value and indispensable necessity of self-knowledge, as a preliminary to all other knowledge--upon the duty of eradicating from men's minds that false persuasion of their own knowledge which they universally cherished--and upon the importance of forcing them to know their own ignorance as well as their own knowledge. In the face of this last purpose, so frequently avowed by the Platonic Sokrates (indirectly even in this very dialogue),[41] we remark a material discrepancy, when he here proclaims self-knowledge to be impossible. We must judge every dialogue by itself, illustrating it when practicable by comparison with others, but not assuming consistence between them as a postulate _à priori_. It is a part of Plato's dramatic and tentative mode of philosophising to work out different ethical points of view, and to have present to his mind one or other of them, with peculiar force in each different dialogue. The subject is thus brought before us on all its sides, and the reader is familiarised with what a dialectician might say, whether capable of being refuted or not. Inconsistency between one dialogue and another is not a fault in the Platonic dialogues of Search; but is, on the contrary, a part of the training process, for any student who is destined to acquire that full mastery of question and answer which Plato regards as the characteristic test of knowledge. It is a puzzle and provocative to the internal meditation of the student. [Footnote 41: Plato, Charm. 166 D.] [Side-note: Courage and Temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning, except as founded on the general cognizance of good and evil.] In analyzing the Lachês, we observed that the definition of courage given by Nikias was shown by Sokrates to have no meaning, except in so far as it coincided with the general knowledge or cognition of good and evil. Here, too, in the Charmidês, we are brought in the last result to the same terminus--the general cognition of good and evil. But Temperance, as previously good and defined, is not comprehended under that cognition, and is therefore pronounced to be unprofitable. [Side-note: Distinction made between the special sciences and the science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences are of no use.] This cognition of good and evil--the science of the profitable--is here (in the Charmidês) proclaimed by Sokrates to have a place of its own among the other sciences; and even to be first among them, essentially necessary to supervise and direct them, as it had been declared in Alkibiadês II. Now the same supervising place and directorship had been claimed by Kritias for Temperance as he defines it--that is, self-knowledge, or the cognition of our cognitions and non-cognitions. But Sokrates doubts even the reality of such self-knowledge: and granting for argument's sake that it exists, he still does not see how it can be profitable. For the utmost which its supervision can ensure would be, that each description of work shall be scientifically done, by the skilful man, and not by the unskilful. But it is not true, absolutely speaking (he argues), that acting scientifically or with knowledge is sufficient for well doing or for happiness: for the question must next be asked--Knowledge--of what? Not knowledge of leather-cutting, carpenter's or brazier's work, arithmetic, or even medicine: these, and many others, a man may possess, and may act according to them; but still he will not attain the end of being happy. All cognitions contribute in greater or less proportion towards that end: but what contributes most, and most essentially, is the cognition of good and evil, without which all the rest are insufficient. Of this last-mentioned cognition or science, it is the special object to ensure profit or benefit:[42] to take care that everything done by the other sciences shall be done well or in a manner conducing towards the end Happiness. After this, there is no province left for temperance--_i.e._, self-knowledge, or the knowledge of cognitions and non-cognitions: no assignable way in which it can yield any benefit.[43] [Footnote 42: Plato, Charm. 174 D. [Greek: Ou)ch au(/tê| de/ ge, ô(s e)/oiken, e)sti\n ê( sôphrosu/nê, a)ll' ê(=s e)/rgon e)sti\ to\ ô)phelei=n ê(ma=s. Ou) ga\r e)pistêmô=n ge kai\ a)nepistêmosunô=n ê( e)pistê/mê e)sti/n, a)lla\ a)gathou= te kai\ kakou=.]] [Footnote 43: Plato, Charm. 174 E. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra u(giei/as e)/stai dêmiourgo/s? Ou) dê=ta. A)/llês ga\r ê)=n te/chnês u(gi/eia? ê)\ ou)/? A)/llês; Ou)d' a)/ra ô)phelei/as, ô)= e(tai=re; a)/llê| ga\r au)= a)pe/domen tou=to to\ e)/rgon te/chnê| nu=n dê/; ê)= ga\r? Pa/nu ge. Pô=s ou)=n ô)phe/limos e)/stai ê(sôphrosu/nê, ou)demia=s ô)phelei/as ou)=sa dêmiourgo/s? Ou)damô=s, ô)= Sô/krates, e)/oike/ ge.]] [Side-note: Knowledge, always relative to some object known. Postulate or divination of a Science of Teleology.] Two points are here to be noted, as contained and debated in the handling of this dialogue. 1. Knowledge absolutely, is a word without meaning: all knowledge is relative, and has a definite object or _cognitum_: there can be no _scientia scientiarum_. 2. Among the various objects of knowledge (_cognita_ or _cognoscenda_), one is, _good and evil_. There is a science of good and evil, the function of which is, to watch over and compare the results of the other sciences, in order to promote results of happiness, and to prevent results of misery: without the supervision of this latter science, the other sciences might be all exactly followed out, but no rational comparison could be had between them.[44] In other words, there is a science of Ends, estimating the comparative worth of each End in relation to other Ends (Teleology): distinct from those other more special sciences, which study the means each towards a separate End of its own. Here we fall into the same track as we have already indicated in Lachês and Alkibiadês II. [Footnote 44: Compare what has been said upon the same subject in my remarks on Alkib. i. and ii. p. 31.**] [Side-note: Courage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and by Aristotle. Comparison between the two.] These matters I shall revert to in other dialogues, where we shall find them turned over and canvassed in many different ways. One farther observation remains to be made on the Lachês and Charmidês, discussing as they do Courage (which is also again discussed in the Protagoras) and Temperance. An interesting comparison may be made between them and the third book of the Nikomachean Ethics of Aristotle,[45] where the same two subjects are handled in the Aristotelian manner. The direct, didactic, systematising, brevity of Aristotle contrasts remarkably with the indirect and circuitous prolixity, the multiplied suggestive comparisons, the shifting points of view, which we find in Plato. Each has its advantages: and both together will be found not more than sufficient, for any one who is seriously bent on acquiring what Plato calls knowledge, with the cross-examining power included in it. Aristotle is greatly superior to Plato in one important attribute of a philosopher: in the care which he takes to discriminate the different significations of the same word: the univocal and the equivocal, the generically identical from the remotely analogical, the proper from the improper, the literal from the metaphorical. Of such precautions we discover little or no trace in Plato, who sometimes seems not merely to neglect, but even to deride them. Yet Aristotle, assisted as he was by all Plato's speculations before us, is not to be understood as having superseded the necessity for that negative Elenchus which animates the Platonic dialogues of Search: nor would his affirmative doctrines have held their grounds before a cross-examining Sokrates. [Footnote 45: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. iii. p. 1115, 1119; also Ethic. Eudem. iii. 1229-1231. The comments of Aristotle upon the doctrine of Sokrates respecting Courage seem to relate rather to the Protagoras than to the Lachês of Plato. See Eth. Nik. 1116, 6, 4; Eth. Eud. 1229, a. 15.] APPENDIX. The dialogue Charmidês is declared to be spurious, not only by Ast, but also by Socher (Ast, Platon's Leb. pp. 419-428; Socher, Ueber Platon, pp. 130-137). Steinhart maintains the genuineness of the dialogue against them; declaring (as in regard to the Lachês) that he can hardly conceive how critics can mistake the truly Platonic character of it, though here too, as in the Lachês, he detects "adolescentiæ vestigia" (Steinhart, Einleit. zum Charmidês, pp. 290-293). Schleiermacher considers Charmidês as well as Lachês to be appendixes to the Protagoras, which opinion both Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Charm, p. 121; Proleg. ad Lachet. p. 30, 2nd ed.) and Steinhart controvert. The views of Stallbaum respecting the Charmidês are declared by Steinhart (p. 290) to be "recht äusserlich und oberflächlich". To me they appear much nearer the truth than the profound and recondite meanings, the far-sighted indirect hints, which Steinhart himself perceives or supposes in the words of Plato. These critics consider the dialogue as composed during the government of the Thirty at Athens, in which opinion I do not concur. CHAPTER XX. LYSIS. [Side-note: Analogy between Lysis and Charmidês. Richness of dramatic incident in both. Youthful beauty.] The Lysis, as well as the Charmidês, is a dialogue recounted by Sokrates himself, describing both incidents and a conversation in a crowded Palæstra; wherein not merely bodily exercises were habitually practised, but debate was carried on and intellectual instruction given by a Sophist named Mikkus, companion and admirer of Sokrates. There is a lively dramatic commencement, introducing Sokrates into the Palæstra, and detailing the preparation and scenic arrangements, before the real discussion opens. It is the day of the Hermæa, or festival of Hermes, celebrated by sacrifice and its accompanying banquets among the frequenters of gymnasia. [Side-note: Scenery and personages of the Lysis.] Lysis, like Charmidês, is an Athenian youth, of conspicuous beauty, modesty, and promise. His father Demokrates represents an ancient family of the Æxonian Deme in Attica, and is said to be descended from Zeus and the daughter of the Archêgetês or Heroic Founder of that Deme. The family moreover are so wealthy, that they have gained many victories at the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean games, both with horses and with chariots and four. Menexenus, companion of Lysis, is somewhat older, and is his affectionate friend. The persons who invite Sokrates into the palæstra, and give occasion to the debate, are Ktesippus and Hippothalês: both of them adults, yet in the vigour of age. Hippothalês is the Erastes of Lysis, passionately attached to him. He is ridiculed by Ktesippus for perpetually talking about Lysis, as well as for addressing to him compositions both in prose and verse, full of praise and flattery; extolling not only his personal beauty, but also his splendid ancestry and position.[1] [Footnote 1: Plato, Lysis, 203-205.] [Side-note: Origin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to give an example of the proper way of talking to a youth, for his benefit.] In reference to these addresses, Sokrates remonstrates with Hippothalês on the imprudence and mischief of addressing to a youth flatteries calculated to turn his head. He is himself then invited by Hippothalês to exhibit a specimen of the proper mode of talking to youth; such as shall be at once acceptable to the person addressed, and unobjectionable. Sokrates agrees to do so, if an opportunity be afforded him of conversing with Lysis.[2] Accordingly after some well-imagined incidents, interesting as marks of Greek manners--Sokrates and Ktesippus with others seat themselves in the palæstra, amidst a crowd of listeners.[3] Lysis, too modest at first to approach, is emboldened to sit down by seeing Menexenus seated by the side of Sokrates: while Hippothalês, not daring to put himself where Lysis can see him, listens, but conceals himself behind some of the crowd. Sokrates begins the conversation with Menexenus and Lysis jointly: but presently Menexenus is called away for a moment, and he talks with Lysis singly. [Footnote 2: Plato, Lysis, 206.] [Footnote 3: Plato, Lysis, 206-207.] [Side-note: Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis.] _Sokr._--Well--Lysis--your father and mother love you extremely. _Lysis._--Assuredly they do. _Sokr._--They would wish you therefore to be as happy as possible. _Lysis._--Undoubtedly. _Sokr._--Do you think any man happy, who is a slave, and who is not allowed to do any thing that he desires? _Lysis._--I do not think him happy at all. _Sokr._--Since therefore your father and mother are so anxious that you should be happy, they of course allow you to do the things which you desire, and never reprove nor forbid you. _Lysis._--Not at all, by Zeus, Sokrates: there are a great many things that they forbid me. _Sokr._--How say you! they wish you to be happy--and they hinder you from doing what you wish! Tell me, for example, when one of your father's chariots is going to run a race, if you wished to mount and take the reins, would not they allow you to do so? _Lysis._--No--certainly: they would not allow me. _Sokr._--But whom do they allow, then? _Lysis._--My father employs a paid charioteer. _Sokr._--What! do they permit a hireling, in preference to _you_, to do what he wishes with the horses? and do they give him pay besides for doing so? _Lysis._--Why--to be sure. _Sokr._--But doubtless, I imagine, they trust the team of mules to your direction; and if you chose to take the whip and flog, they would allow you? _Lysis._--Allow me? not at all. _Sokr._--What! is no one allowed to flog them? _Lysis._--Yes--certainly--the mule-groom. _Sokr._--Is he a slave or free? _Lysis._--A slave. _Sokr._--Then, it seems, they esteem a slave higher than you their son; trusting their property to him rather than to you, letting _him_ do what he pleases, while they forbid you. But tell me farther: do they allow you to direct yourself--or do not they even trust you so far as that? _Lysis._--How can you imagine that they trust me? _Sokr._--But does any one else direct you? _Lysis._--Yes--this tutor here. _Sokr._--Is he a slave? _Lysis._--To be sure: belonging to our family. _Sokr._--That is shocking: one of free birth to be under the direction of a slave! But what is it that he does, as your director? _Lysis._--He conducts me to my teacher's house. _Sokr._--What! do _they_ govern you also, these teachers? _Lysis._--Undoubtedly they do. _Sokr._--Then your father certainly is bent on putting over you plenty of directors and governors. But surely, when you come home to your mother, she at least, anxious that you should be happy as far as she is concerned, lets you do what you please about the wool or the web, when she is weaving: she does not forbid you to meddle with the bodkin or any of the other instruments of her work? _Lysis._--Ridiculous! not only does she forbid me, but I should be beaten if I did meddle. _Sokr._--How is this, by Heraklês? Have you done any wrong to your father and mother? _Lysis._--Never at all, by Zeus. _Sokr._--From what provocation is it, then, that they prevent you in this terrible way, from being happy and doing what you wish? keeping you the whole day in servitude to some one, and never your own master? so that you derive no benefit either from the great wealth of the family, which is managed by every one else rather than by you--or from your own body, noble as it is. Even _that_ is consigned to the watch and direction of another: while you, Lysis, are master of nothing, nor can do any one thing of what you desire. _Lysis._--The reason is, Sokrates, that I am not yet old enough. _Sokr._--That can hardly be the reason; for to a certain extent your father and mother do trust you, without waiting for you to grow older. If they want any thing to be written or read for them, they employ you for that purpose in preference to any one in the house: and you are then allowed to write or read first, whichever of the letters you think proper. Again, when you take up the lyre, neither father nor mother hinder you from tightening or relaxing the strings, or striking them either with your finger or with the plectrum. _Lysis._--They do not. _Sokr._--Why is it, then, that they do not hinder you in this last case, as they did in the cases before mentioned? _Lysis._--I suppose it is because I know this last, but did not know the others. _Sokr._--Well, my good friend, you see that it is not your increase of years that your father waits for; but on the very day that he becomes convinced that you know better than he, he will entrust both himself and his property to your management. _Lysis._--I suppose that he will. _Sokr._--Ay--and your neighbour too will judge in the same way as your father. As soon as he is satisfied that you understand house-management better than he does, which do you think he will rather do--confide his house to you, or continue to manage it himself? _Lysis._--I think he will confide it to me. _Sokr._--The Athenians too: do not you think that they also will put their affairs into your management, as soon as they perceive that you have intelligence adequate to the task? _Lysis._--Yes: I do. _Sokr._--What do you say about the Great King also, by Zeus! When his meat is being boiled, would he permit his eldest son who is to succeed to the rule of Asia, to throw in any thing that he pleases into the sauce, rather than us, if we come and prove to him that we know better than his son the way of preparing sauce? _Lysis._--Clearly, he will rather permit us. _Sokr._--The Great King will not let his son throw in even a pinch of salt: while we, if we chose to take up an entire handful, should be allowed to throw it in. _Lysis._--No doubt. _Sokr._--What if his son has a complaint in his eyes; would the Great King, knowing him to be ignorant of medicine, allow him even to touch his own eyes or would he forbid him? _Lysis._--He would forbid him. _Sokr._--As to us, on the contrary, if he accounted us good physicians, and if we desired even to open the eyes and drop a powder into them, he would not hinder us, in the conviction that we understood what we were doing. _Lysis._--You speak truly. _Sokr._--All other matters, in short, on which he believed us to be wiser than himself or his son, he would entrust to us rather than to himself or his son? _Lysis._--Necessarily so, Sokrates. _Sokr._--This is the state of the case, then, my dear Lysis: On those matters on which we shall have become intelligent, all persons will put trust in us--Greeks as well as barbarians, men as well as women. We shall do whatever we please respecting them: no one will be at all inclined to interfere with us on such matters; not only we shall be ourselves free, but we shall have command over others besides. These matters will be really ours, because we shall derive real good from them.[4] As to those subjects, on the contrary, on which we shall not have acquired intelligence, no one will trust us to do what we think right: every one,--not merely strangers, but father and mother and nearer relatives if there were any,--will obstruct us as much as they can: we shall be in servitude so far as these subjects are concerned; and they will be really alien to us, for we shall derive no real good from them. Do you admit that this is the case?[5] _Lysis._--I do admit it. _Sokr._--Shall we then be friends to any one, or will any one love us, on those matters on which we are unprofitable _Lysis._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--You see that neither does your father love you, nor does any man love another, in so far as he is useless? _Lysis._--Apparently not. _Sokr._--If then you become intelligent, my boy, all persons will be your friends and all persons will be your kinsmen: for you will be useful and good: if you do not, no one will be your friend,--not even your father nor your mother nor your other relatives. [Footnote 4: Plato, Lysis, 210 B. [Greek: kai\ ou)dei\s ê(ma=s e(kô\n ei)=nai e)mpodiei=, a)ll' au)toi/ te e)leu/theroi e)so/metha e)n au)toi=s kai\ a)/llôn a)/rchontes, ê(me/tera/ te tau=ta e)/stai; o)nêso/metha ga\r a)p' au)tô=n.]] [Footnote 5: Plato, Lysis, 210 C. [Greek: au)toi/ te e)n au)toi=s e)so/metha a)/llôn u(pêkooi, kai\ ê(mi=n e)/stai a)llo/tria; ou)de\n ga\r a)p' au)tô=n o)nêso/metha. Sugchôrei=s ou(/tôs e)/chein? Sugchôrô=.]] Is it possible then, Lysis, for a man to think highly of himself on those matters on which he does not yet think aright? _Lysis._--How can it be possible? _Sokr._--If you stand in need of a teacher, you do not yet think aright? _Lysis._--True. _Sokr._--Accordingly, you are not presumptuous on the score of intelligence, since you are still without intelligence. _Lysis._--By Zeus, Sokrates, I think not.[6] [Footnote 6: Plato, Lysis, 210 D. [Greek: Oi(=o/n te ou)=n e)pi\ tou/tois, ô)= Lu/si, me/ga phronei=n, e)n oi(=s tis mê/pô phronei=? Kai\ pô=s a)\n? e)/phê. Ei) d' a)/ra su\ didaska/lou de/ei, ou)/pô phronei=s. A)lêthê=. Ou)d' a)/ra megalo/phrôn ei)=, ei)/per a)/phrôn e)/ti. Ma\ Di/', e)/phê, ô)= Sô/krates, ou)/ moi dokei=.] There is here a double sense of [Greek: me/ga phronei=n, megalo/phrôn], which cannot easily be made to pass into any other language.] [Side-note: Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothalês.] When I heard Lysis speak thus (continues Sokrates, who is here the narrator), I looked towards Hippothalês and I was on the point of committing a blunder: for it occurred to me to say, That is the way, Hippothalês, to address a youth whom you love: you ought to check and humble him, not puff him up and spoil him, as you have hitherto done. But when I saw him agitated and distressed by what had been said, I called to mind that, though standing close by, he wished not to be seen by Lysis. Accordingly, I restrained myself and said nothing of the kind.[7] [Footnote 7: Plato, Lysis, 210 E.] [Side-note: Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain to Menexenus.] Lysis accepts this as a friendly lesson, inculcating humility: and seeing Menexenus just then coming back, he says aside to Sokrates, Talk to Menexenus, as you have been talking to me. You can tell him yourself (replies Sokrates) what you have heard from me: you listened very attentively. Most certainly I shall tell him (says Lysis): but meanwhile pray address to him yourself some other questions, for me to hear. You must engage to help me if I require it (answers Sokrates): for Menexenus is a formidable disputant, scholar of our friend Ktesippus, who is here ready to assist him. I know he is (rejoined Lysis), and it is for that very reason that I want you to talk to him--that you may chasten and punish him.[8] [Footnote 8: Plato, Lysis, 211 B-C. [Greek: a)ll' o(/ra o(/pôs e)pikourê/seis moi, e)a/n me e)le/gchein e)picheirê=| o( Mene/xenos. ê)\ ou)k oi)=stha o(/ti e)ristiko/s e)sti? Nai\ ma\ Di/a, e)/phê, spho/dra ge. dia\ tau=ta/ toi kai\ bou/lomai/ se au)tô=| diale/gesthai--i(/n' au)to\n kola/sê|s.] Compare Xenophon, Memor. i. 4, 1, where he speaks of the chastising purpose often contemplated by Sokrates in his conversation--[Greek: a)\ e)kei=nos kolastêri/ou e(/neka tou\s pa/nt' oi)ome/nous ei)de/nai e)rôtô=n ê)/legchen.]] [Side-note: Value of the first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis, as an illustration of the Platonico-Sokratic manner.] I have given at length, and almost literally (with some few abbreviations), this first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis, because it is a very characteristic passage, exhibiting conspicuously several peculiar features of the Platonico-Sokratic interrogation. Facts common and familiar are placed in a novel point of view, ingeniously contrasted, and introduced as stepping-stones to a very wide generality. Wisdom or knowledge is exalted into the ruling force with liberty of action not admissible except under its guidance: the questions are put in an inverted half-ironical tone (not uncommon with the historical Sokrates[9]), as if an affirmative answer were expected as a matter of course, while in truth the answer is sure to be negative: lastly, the purpose of checking undue self-esteem is proclaimed. The rest of the dialogue, which contains the main substantive question investigated, I can report only in brief abridgment, with a few remarks following. [Footnote 9: See the conversation of Sokrates with Glaukon in Xenophon, Memor. iii. 6; also the conversation with Perikles, iii. 5, 23-24.] [Side-note: Sokrates begins to examine Menexenus respecting friendship. Who is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue.] Sokrates begins, as Lysis requests, to interrogate Menexenus--first premising--Different men have different tastes: some love horses and dogs, others wealth or honours. For my part, I care little about all such acquisitions: but I ardently desire to possess friends, and I would rather have a good friend than all the treasures of Persia. You two, Menexenus and Lysis, are much to be envied, because at your early age, each of you has made an attached friend of the other. But I am so far from any such good fortune, that I do not even know how any man becomes the friend of another. This is what I want to ask from you, Menexenus, as one who must know,[10] having acquired such a friend already. [Footnote 10: Plato, Lysis, 211-212.] When one man loves another, which becomes the friend of which? Does he who loves, become the friend of him whom he loves, whether the latter returns the affection or not? Or is the person loved, whatever be his own dispositions, the friend of the person who loves him? Or is reciprocity of affection necessary, in order that either shall be the friend of the other? The speakers cannot satisfy themselves that the title of _friend_ fits either of the three cases;[11] so that this line of interrogating comes to a dead lock. Menexenus avows his embarrassment, while Lysis expresses himself more hopefully. [Footnote 11: Plato, Lysis, 212-213. 213 C:--[Greek: ei) mê/te oi( philou=ntes (1) phi/loi e)/sontai, mê/th' oi( philou/menoi (2), mê/th' oi( philou=nte/s te kai\ philou/menoi] (3), &c. Sokrates here professes to have shown grounds for rejecting all these three suppositions. But if we follow the preceding argument, we shall see that he has shown grounds only against the first two, not against the third.] [Side-note: Questions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims of the poets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected.] Sokrates now takes up a different aspect of the question, and turns to Lysis, inviting him to consider what has been laid down by the poets, "our fathers and guides in respect of wisdom".[12] Homer says that the Gods originate friendship, by bringing the like man to his like: Empedokles and other physical philosophers have also asserted, that like must always and of necessity be the friend of like. These wise teachers cannot mean (continues Sokrates) that bad men are friends of each other. The bad man can be no one's friend. He is not even like himself, but ever wayward and insane:--much less can he be like to any one else, even to another bad man. They mean that the good alone are like to each other, and friends to each other.[13] But is this true? What good, or what harm, can like do to like, which it does not also do to itself? How can there be reciprocal love between parties who render to each other no reciprocal aid? Is not the good man, so far forth as good, sufficient to himself,--standing in need of no one--and therefore loving no one? How can good men care much for each other, seeing that they thus neither regret each other when absent, nor have need of each other when present?[14] [Footnote 12: Plato, Lysis, 213 E: [Greek: skopou=nta kata\ tou\s poiêta/s; ou(=toi ga\r ê(mi=n ô(/sper pate/res tê=s sophi/as ei)si\ kai\ ê(gemo/nes.]] [Footnote 13: Plato, Lysis, 214.] [Footnote 14: Plato, Lysis 215 B: [Greek: O( de\ mê/ tou deo/menos, ou)de/ ti a)gapô/| a)\n. . . . O(\ de\ mê\ a)gapô/|ê, ou)d' a)\n philoi=. . . . Pô=s ou)=n oi( a)gathoi\ toi=s a)gathoi=s ê(mi=n phi/loi e)/sontai tê\n a)rchê/n, oi(\ mê/te a(po/ntes potheinoi\ a)llê/lois--i(kanoi\ ga\r e(autoi=s kai\ chôri\s o)/ntes--mê/te paro/ntes chrei/an au)tô=n e)/chousi? tou\s dê\ toiou/tous ti/s mêchanê\ peri\ pollou= poiei=sthai a)llêlous?]] [Side-note: Other poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion; unlikeness, of friendship. Reasons _pro_ and _con_. Rejected.] It appears, therefore, Lysis (continues Sokrates), that we are travelling in the wrong road, and must try another direction. I now remember to have recently heard some one affirming--contrary to what we have just said--that likeness is a cause of aversion, and** unlikeness a cause of friendship. He too produced evidence from the poets: for Hesiod tells us, that "potter is jealous of potter, and bard of bard". Things most alike are most full of envy, jealousy and hatred to each other: things most unlike, are most full of friendship. Thus the poor man is of necessity a friend to the rich, the weak man to the strong, for the sake of protection: the sick man, for similar reason, to the physician. In general, every ignorant man loves, and is a friend to, the man of knowledge. Nay, there are also physical philosophers, who assert that this principle pervades all nature; that dry is the friend of moist, cold of hot, and so forth: that all contraries serve as nourishment to their contraries. These are ingenious teachers: but if we follow them, we shall have the cleverest disputants attacking us immediately, and asking--What! is the opposite essentially a friend to its opposite? Do you mean that unjust is essentially the friend of just--temperate of intemperate--good of evil? Impossible: the doctrine cannot be maintained.[15] [Footnote 15: Plato, Lysis, 215-216.] [Side-note: Confusion of Sokrates. He suggests, That the Indifferent (neither good nor evil) is friend to the Good.] My head turns (continues Sokrates) with this confusion and puzzle--since neither like is the friend of like, nor contrary of contrary. But I will now hazard a different guess of my own.[16] There are three genera in all: the good--the evil--and that which is neither good nor evil, the indifferent. Now we have found that good is not a friend to good--nor evil to evil--nor good to evil--nor evil to good. If therefore there exist any friendship at all, it must be the indifferent that is friend, either to its like, or to the good: for nothing whatever can be a friend to evil. But if the indifferent be a friend at all, it cannot be a friend to its own like; since we have already shown that like generally is not friend to like. It remains therefore, that the indifferent, in itself neither good nor evil, is friend to the good.[17] [Footnote 16: Plato, Lysis, 216 C-D: [Greek: tô=| o)/nti au)to\s i)liggiô= u(po\ tê=s tou= lo/gou a)pori/as--Le/gô toi/nun a)pomanteuo/menos], &c.] [Footnote 17: Plato, Lysis, 216 D.] [Side-note: Suggestion canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend to the Good, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil, from which it is anxious to escape.] Yet hold! Are we on the right scent? What reason is there to determine, on the part of the indifferent, attachment to the good? It will only have such attachment under certain given circumstances: when, though neither good nor evil in itself, it has nevertheless evil associated with it, of which it desires to be rid. Thus the body in itself is neither good nor evil: but when diseased, it has evil clinging to it, and becomes in consequence of this evil, friendly to the medical art as a remedy. But this is true only so long as the evil is only apparent, and not real: so long as it is a mere superficial appendage, and has not become incorporated with the essential nature of the body. When evil has become engrained, the body ceases to be indifferent (_i.e._, neither good nor evil), and loses all its attachment to good. Thus that which determines the indifferent to become friend of the good, is, the contact and pressure of accessory evil not in harmony with its own nature, accompanied by a desire for the cure of such evil.[18] [Footnote 18: Plato, Lysis, 217 E: [Greek: To\ mê/te kako\n a)/ra mê/t' a)gatho\n e)ni/ote kakou= paro/ntos ou)/pô kako/n e)stin, e)/sti d' o(/te ê)/dê to\ toiou=ton ge/gonen. Pa/nu ge. Ou)kou=n o(/tan mê/pô lalo\n ê(=| kakou= paro/ntos, au)tê\ me\n ê( parousi/a a)gathou= au)to\ poiei= e)pithumei=n, ê( de\ kako\n poiou=sa a)posterei= au)to\ tê=s t' e)pithumi/as a)/ma kai\ tê=s phili/as ta)gathou=. Ou) ga\r e)/ti e)sti\n ou)/te kako\n ou)/t' a)gatho/n, a)lla\ kako/n; phi/lon de\ a)gathô=| kako\n ou)k ê)=n.]] [Side-note: Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate condition--not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance.] Under this head comes the explanation of the philosopher--the friend or lover of wisdom. The man already wise is not a lover of wisdom: nor the man thoroughly bad and stupid, with whose nature ignorance is engrained. Like does not love like, nor does contrary love contrary. The philosopher is intermediate between the two: he is not wise, but neither has he yet become radically stupid and unteachable. He has ignorance cleaving to him as an evil, but he knows his own ignorance, and yearns for wisdom as a cure for it.[19] [Footnote 19: Plato, Lysis, 218 A. [Greek: dia\ tau=ta dê\ phai=men a)\n kai\ tou\s ê)/dê sophou\s mêke/ti philosophei=n, ei)/te theoi\ ei)/te a)/nthrôpoi/ ei)sin ou(=toi; ou)d' au)= e)kei/nous philosophei=n tou\s ou(/tôs a)/gnoian e)/chontas ô(/ste kakou\s ei)=nai; kako\n ga\r kai\ a)mathê= ou)de/na philosophei=n. lei/pontai dê\ oi( e)/chontes me\n to\ kako\n tou=to, tê\n a)/gnoian, mê/pô de\ u(p' au)tou= o)/ntes a)gnô/mones mêd' a)mathei=s, a)ll' e)/ti ê(gou/menoi mê\ ei)de/nai a(\ mê\ i)/sasin. dio\ dê\ philosophou=sin oi( ou)/te a)gathoi\ ou)/te kakoi/ pô o)/ntes. o(/soi de\ kakoi\, ou) philosophou=sin, ou)de\ oi( a)gathoi/.] Compare Plato, Symposion, 204.] [Side-note: Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new suggestion. The Primum Amabile, or object originally dear to us, _per se_: by relation or resemblance to which other objects become dear.] The two young collocutors with Sokrates welcome this explanation heartily, and Sokrates himself appears for the moment satisfied with it. But he presently bethinks himself, and exclaims, Ah! Lysis and Menexenus, our wealth is all a dream! we have been yielding again to delusions! Let us once more examine. You will admit that all friendship is on account of something and for the sake of something: it is relative both to some producing cause, and to some prospective end. Thus the body, which is in itself neither good nor evil, becomes when sick a friend to the medical art: on account of sickness, which is an evil--and for the sake of health, which is a good. The medical art is dear to us, because health is dear: but is there any thing behind, for the sake of which health also is dear? It is plain that we cannot push the series of references onward for ever, and that we must come ultimately to something which is dear _per se_, not from reference to any ulterior _aliud_. We must come to some _primum amabile_, dear by its own nature, to which all other dear things refer, and from which they are derivatives.[20] It is this _primum amabile_ which is the primitive, essential, and constant, object of our affections: we love other things only from their being associated with it. Thus suppose a father tenderly attached to his son, and that the son has drunk hemlock, for which wine is an antidote; the father will come by association to prize highly, not merely the wine which saves his son's life, but even the cup in which the wine is contained. Yet it would be wrong to say that he prizes the wine or the cup as much as his son: for the truth is, that all his solicitude is really on behalf of his son, and extends only in a derivative and secondary way to the wine and the cup. So about gold and silver: we talk of prizing highly gold and silver--but this is incorrect, for what we really prize is not gold, but the ulterior something, whatever it be, for the attainment of which gold and other instrumental means are accumulated. In general terms--when we say that B is dear on account of A, we are really speaking of A under the name of B. What is really dear, is that primitive object of love, _primum amabile_, towards which all the affections which we bear to other things, refer and tend.[21] [Footnote 20: Plato, Lysis, 219 C-D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n ou)k a)na/gkê a)peipei=n ê(ma=s ou(/tôs i)o/ntas, kai\ a)phike/sthai e)pi/ tina a)rchê\n, ê)\ ou)ke/t' e)panoi/sei e)p' a)/llo phi/lon, a)ll' ê(/xei e)p' e)kei=no o(/ e)sti _prô=ton phi/lon_, ou(= e(/neka kai\ ta)/lla phame\n pa/nta phi/la ei)=nai?]] [Footnote 21: Plato, Lysis, c. 37, p. 220 B. [Greek: O(/sa ga/r phamen phi/la ei)=nai ê(mi=n e(/neka phi/lou tino/s, e(te/rô| r(ê/mati phaino/metha le/gontes _au)to/_; phi/lon de\ _tô=| o)/nti_ kinduneu/ei _e)kei=no au)to\_, ei)s o(\ pa=sai au(=tai ai( lego/menai phili/ai teleutô=sin.]] [Side-note: The cause of love is desire. We desire that which is akin to us or our own.] Is it then true (continues Sokrates) that good is our _primum amabile_, and dear to us in itself? If so, is it dear to us on account of evil? that is, only as a remedy for evil; so that if evil were totally banished, good would cease to be prized? Is it true that evil is the cause why any thing is dear to us?[22] This cannot be: because even if all evil were banished, the appetites and desires, such of them as were neither good nor evil, would still remain: and the things which gratify those appetites will be dear to us. It is not therefore true that evil is the cause of things being dear to us. We have just found out another cause for loving and being loved--desire. He who desires, loves what he desires and as long as he desires: he desires moreover that of which he is in want, and he is in want of that which has been taken away from him--of his own.[23] It is therefore this _own_ which is the appropriate object of desire, friendship, and love. If you two, Lysis and Menexenus, love each other, it is because you are somehow of kindred nature with each other. The lover would not become a lover, unless there were, between him and his beloved, a certain kinship or affinity in mind, disposition, tastes, or form. We love, by necessary law, that which has a natural affinity to us; so that the real and genuine lover may be certain of a return of affection from his beloved.[24] [Footnote 22: Plato, Lysis, 220 D. We may see that in this chapter Plato runs into a confusion between [Greek: to\ dia/ ti] and [Greek: to\ e(/neka/ tou], which two he began by carefully distinguishing. Thus in 218 D he says, [Greek: o( phi/los e)sti\ tô| phi/los--e(/neka/ tou kai\ dia/ ti.] Again 219 A, he says--[Greek: to\ sô=ma tê=s i)atrikê=s phi/lon e)sti/n, _dia\ tê\n no/son, e(/neka tê=s u(giei/as_.] This is a very clear and important distinction. It is continued in 220 D--[Greek: o(/ti _dia\ to\ kako\n_ ta)gatho\n ê)gapô=men kai\ e)philou=men, ô(s pha/rmakon o)\n tou= kakou= to\ a)gatho/n, to\ de\ kako/n no/sma.] But in 220 E--[Greek: to\ de\ tô=| o)/nti phi/lon pa=n tou)nanti/on tou/tou phai/netai pephuko/s; _phi/lon ga\r ê(mi=n a)nepha/nê o(\n e(chthrou= e(/neka_.] To make the reasoning consistent with what had gone before, these two last words ought to be exchanged for [Greek: dia\ to\ e)chthro/n]. Plato had laid down the doctrine that good is loved--[Greek: dia\ to\ kako/n], not [Greek: e(/neka tou= kakou=]. Good is loved on _account of evil_, but for _the sake of obtaining_ a remedy to or cessation of the evil. Steinhart (in his note on Hieron. Müller's translation of Plato, p. 268) calls this a "sophistisches Räthselspiel"; and he notes other portions of the dialogue which "remind us of the deceptive tricks of the Sophists" (die Trugspiele der Sophisten, see p. 222-224-227-230). He praises Plato here for his "fine pleasantry on the deceptive arts of the Sophists". Admitting that Plato puts forward sophistical quibbles with the word [Greek: phi/los], he tells us that this is suitable for the purpose of puzzling the contentious young man Menexenus. The confusion between [Greek: e(/neka/ tou] and [Greek: dia/ ti] (noticed above) appears to be numbered by Steinhart among the fine jests against Protagoras, Prodikus, or some of the Sophists. I can see nothing in it except an unconscious inaccuracy in Plato's reasoning.] [Footnote 23: Plato, Lysis, 221 E. [Greek: To\ e)pithumou=n ou(= a)\n e)ndee\s ê)=|, tou/tou e)pithumei=--e)ndee\s de\ gi/gnetai ou(= a)/n tis a)phairê=tai--tou= oi)kei/ou dê/, ô(s e)/oiken, o(/ te e)/rôs kai\ ê( phili/a kai\ ê( e)pithumi/a tugcha/nei ou)=sa.] This is the same doctrine as that which we read, expanded and cast into a myth with comic turn, in the speech of Aristophanes in the Symposion, pp. 191-192-193. [Greek: e(/kastos ou)=n ê(mô=n e)/stin a)nthrô/pou su/mbolon, a)/te tetmême/nos ô(/sper ai( psê=ttai e)x e(no\s du/o. zêtei= dê\ a)ei\ to\ au)tou= e(/kastos xu/mbolon] (191 D)--[Greek: dikai/ôs a)\n u(mnoi=men E)/rôta, o(\s e)/n te tô=| paro/nti plei=sta ê(ma=s o)ni/nêsin ei)s to\ oi)kei=on a)/gôn], &c. (193 D).] [Footnote 24: Plato, Lysis, 221-222.] [Side-note: Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is alien to every one. Inconsistency with what has been previously laid down.] But is there any real difference between what is akin and what is like? We must assume that there is: for we showed before, that like was useless to like, and therefore not dear to like. Shall we say that good is of a nature akin to every one, and evil of a nature foreign to every one? If so, then there can be no friendship except between one good man and another good man. But this too has been proved to be impossible. All our tentatives have been alike unsuccessful. [Side-note: Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue.] In this dilemma (continues Sokrates, the narrator) I was about to ask assistance from some of the older men around. But the tutors of Menexenus and Lysis came up to us and insisted on conveying their pupils home--the hour being late. As the youths were departing I said to them--Well, we must close our dialogue with the confession, that we have all three made a ridiculous figure in it: I, an old man, as well as you two youths. Our hearers will go away declaring, that we fancy ourselves to be friends each to the other two; but that we have not yet been able to find out what a friend is.[25] [Footnote 25: Plato, Lysis, 223 B. [Greek: Nu=n me\n katage/lastoi gego/namen e)gô/ te, gerô\n a)nê/r, kai\ u(mei=s], &c.] * * * * * [Side-note: Remarks. No positive result. Sokratic purpose in analysing the familiar words--to expose the false persuasion of knowledge.] Thus ends the main discussion of the Lysis: not only without any positive result, but with speakers and hearers more puzzled than they were at the beginning: having been made to feel a great many difficulties which they never felt before. Nor can I perceive any general purpose running through the dialogue, except that truly Sokratic and Platonic purpose--To show, by cross-examination on the commonest words that what every one appears to know, and talks about most confidently, no one really knows or can distinctly explain.[26] This is the meaning of the final declaration put into the mouth of Sokrates. "We believe ourselves to be each other's friends, yet we none of us know what a friend is." The question is one, which no one had ever troubled himself to investigate, or thought it requisite to ask from others. Every one supposed himself to know, and every one had in his memory an aggregate of conceptions and beliefs which he accounted tantamount to knowledge: an aggregate generated by the unconscious addition of a thousand facts and associations, each separately unimportant and often inconsistent with the remainder: while no rational analysis had ever been applied to verify the consistency of this spontaneous product, or to define the familiar words in which it is expressed. The reader is here involved in a cloud of confusion respecting Friendship. No way out of it is shown, and how is he to find one? He must take the matter into his own active and studious meditation: which he has never yet done, though the word is always in his mouth, and though the topic is among the most common and familiar, upon which "the swain treads daily with his clouted shoon". [Footnote 26: Among the many points of analogy between the Lysis and the Charmidês, one is, That both of them are declared to be spurious and unworthy of Plato, by Socher as well as by Ast (Ast, Platon's Leben, pp. 429-434; Socher, Ueber Platon, pp. 137-144). Schleiermacher ranks the Lysis as second in his Platonic series of dialogues, an appendix to the Phædrus (Einl. p. 174 seq.); K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, and nearly all the other critics dissent from this view: they place the Lysis as an early dialogue, along with Charmidês and Lachês, anterior to the Protagoras (K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. Plat. Phil. pp. 447-448; Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Lys. p. 90 (110 2nd ed.); Steinhart, Einl. p. 221) near to or during the government of the Thirty. All of them profess to discover in the Lysis "adolescentiæ vestigia". Ast and Socher characterise the dialogue as a tissue of subtle sophistry and eristic contradiction, such as (in their opinion) Plato cannot have composed. Stallbaum concedes the sophistry, but contends that it is put by Plato intentionally, for the purpose of deriding, exposing, disgracing, the Sophists and their dialectical tricks: "ludibrii causâ" (p. 88); "ut illustri aliquo exemplo demonstretur dialecticam istam, quam adolescentes magno quodam studio sectabantur, nihil esse aliud, nisi inanem quandam argutiarum captatricem," &c. (p. 87). Nevertheless he contends that along with this derisory matter there is intermingled serious reasoning which may be easily distinguished (p. 87), but which certainly he does not clearly point out. (Compare pp. 108-9-14-15, 2nd ed.) Schleiermacher and Steinhart also (pp. 222-224-227) admit the sophistry in which Sokrates is here made to indulge. But Steinhart maintains that there is an assignable philosophical purpose in the dialogue, which Plato purposely wrapped up in enigmatical language, but of which he (Steinhart) professes to give the solution (p. 228).] [Side-note: Subject of Lysis. Suited for a Dialogue of Search. Manner of Sokrates, multiplying defective explanations, and showing reasons why each is defective.] This was a proper subject for a dialogue of Search. In the dialogue Lysis, Plato describes Sokrates as engaged in one of these searches, handling, testing, and dropping, one point of view after another, respecting the idea and foundation of friendship. He speaks, professedly, as a diviner or guesser; following out obscure promptings which he does not yet understand himself.[27] In this character, he suggests several different explanations, not only distinct but inconsistent with each other; each of them true to a certain extent, under certain conditions and circumstances: but each of them untrue, when we travel beyond those limits: other contradictory considerations then interfering. To multiply defective explanations, and to indicate why each is defective, is the whole business of the dialogue. [Footnote 27: Plato, Lysis, 216 D. [Greek: le/gô toi/nun a)pomanteuo/menos], &c.] [Side-note: The process of trial and error is better illustrated by a search without result than with result. Usefulness of the dialogue for self-working minds.] Schleiermacher discovers in this dialogue indications of a positive result not plainly enunciated: but he admits that Aristotle did not discover them--nor can I believe them to have been intended by the author.[28] But most critics speak slightingly of it, as alike sceptical and sophistical: and some even deny its authenticity on these grounds. Plato might have replied by saying that he intended it as a specimen illustrating the process of search for an unknown _quæsitum_; and as an exposition of what can be said for, as well as against, many different points of view. The process of trial and error, the most general fact of human intelligence, is even better illustrated when the search is unsuccessful: because when a result is once obtained, most persons care for nothing else and forget the antecedent blunders. To those indeed, who ask only to hear the result as soon as it is found, and who wait for others to look for it--such a dialogue as the Lysis will appear of little value. But to any one who intends to search for it himself, or to study the same problem for himself, the report thus presented of a previous unsuccessful search, is useful both as guidance and warning. Every one of the tentative solutions indicated in the Lysis has something in its favour, yet is nevertheless inadmissible. To learn the grounds which ultimately compel us to reject what at first appears admissible, is instruction not to be despised; at the very least, it helps to preserve us from mistake, and to state the problem in the manner most suitable for obtaining a solution. [Footnote 28: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Lysis, i. p. 177.] [Side-note: Subject of friendship, handled both by the Xenophontic Sokrates, and by Aristotle.] In truth, no one general solution is attainable, such as Plato here professes to search for.[29] In one of the three Xenophontic dialogues wherein the subject of friendship is discussed we find the real Sokrates presenting it with a juster view of its real complications.[30] The same remark may be made upon Aristotle's manner of handling friendship in the Ethics. He seems plainly to allude to the Lysis (though not mentioning it by name); and to profit by it at least in what he puts out of consideration, if not in what he brings forward.[31] He discards the physical and cosmical analogies, which Plato borrows from Empedokles and Herakleitus, as too remote and inapplicable: he considers that the question must be determined by facts and principles relating to human dispositions and conduct. In other ways, he circumscribes the problem, by setting aside (what Plato includes) all objects of attachment which are not capable of reciprocating attachment.[32] The problem, as set forth here by Plato, is conceived in great generality. In what manner does one man become the friend of another?[33] How does a man become the object of friendship or love from another? What is that object towards which our love or friendship is determined? These terms are so large, that they include everything belonging to the Tender Emotion generally.[34] [Footnote 29: Turgot has some excellent remarks on the hopelessness of such problems as that which Plato propounds, here well as in other dialogues, to find definitions of common and vague terms. We read in his article Etymologie, in the Encyclopédie (vol. iii. pp. 70-72 of his Oeuvres Complets): "Qu'on se répresente la foule des acceptions du mot _esprit_, depuis son sens primitif _spiritus, haleine_, jusqu'à ceux qu'on lui donne dans la chimie, dans la littérature, dans la jurisprudence, _esprit acide_, esprit de Montaigne, _esprit des loix_, &c.--qu'on essaie d'extraire de toutes ces acceptions une idée qui soit commune à toutes--on verra s'évanouir tous les caractères qui distinguent _l'esprit_ de toute autre chose, dans quelque sens qu'on le prenne. . . . La multitude et l'incompatibilité des acceptions du mot _esprit_, sont telles, que personne n'a été tenté de les comprendre toutes dans une seule _définition_, et de définir l'esprit en général. Mais le vice de cette méthode n'est pas moins réel lorsqu'il n'est pas assez sensible pour empêcher qu'on ne la suive. "A mesure que le nombre et la diversité des acceptions diminue, l'absurdité s'affoiblit: et quand elle disparoit, il reste encore l'erreur. J'ose dire, que presque toutes les _définitions_ où l'on annonce qu'on va définir les choses _dans le sens le plus général_, ont ce défaut, et ne définissent véritablement rien: parceque leurs auteurs, en voulant renfermer toutes les acceptions d'un mot, ont entrepris une chose impossible: je veux dire, de rassembler sous une seule idée générale des idées très différentes entre elles, et qu'un même nom n'a jamais pu désigner que successivement, en cessant en quelque sorte d'être le même mot." See also the remarks of Mr. John Stuart Mill on the same subject. System of Logic, Book IV. chap. 4, s. 5.] [Footnote 30: See Xenophon, Memor. ii. 4-5-6. In the last of these three conversations (s. 21-22), Sokrates says to Kritobulus [Greek: A)ll' e)/chei me\n poiki/lôs pôs tau=ta, ô)= Krito/boule; phu/sei ga\r e)/chousin oi( a)/nthrôpoi ta\ me\n philika/; de/ontai te ga\r a)llê/lôn, kai\ e)leou=si, kai\ sunergou=ntes ô)phelou=si, kai\ tou=to sunie/ntes cha/rin e)/chousin a)llê/lois, ta\ de\ polemika/; ta/ te ga\r au)ta\ kala\ kai\ ê(de/a nomi/zontes u(pe\r tou/tôn ma/chontai, kai\ dichognômonou=ntes e)nantiou=ntai; polemiko\n de\ kai\ e)/ris kai\ o)rgê/; kai\ dusmene\s me\n o( tou= pleonektei=n e)/rôs, misêto\n de\ o( phtho/nos.] This observation of Sokrates is very true and valuable--that the causes of friendship and the causes of enmity are both of them equally natural, _i.e._ equally interwoven with the constant conditions of individual and social life. This is very different from the vague, partial, and encomiastic predicates with which [Greek: to\ phu/sei] is often decorated elsewhere by Sokrates himself, as well as by Plato and Aristotle.] [Footnote 31: Aristot. Eth. Nikom. viii. 1, p. 1155 b. Compare Plato, Lysis, 214 A--215 E.] [Footnote 32: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. viii. 2, p. 1155, b. 28; Plato, Lysis, 212 D.] [Footnote 33: Plato, Lysis, 212 A: [Greek: o(/ntina tro/pon gi/gnetai phi/los e(/teros e(te/rou.] 223 ad fin.: [Greek: o(/, ti e)sti\n o( phi/los.]] [Footnote 34: See the chapter on Tender Emotion in Mr. Bain's elaborate classification and description of the Emotions. 'The Emotions and the Will,' ch. vii. p. 94 seq. (3rd ed., p. 124). In the Lysis, 216 C-D, we read, among the suppositions thrown out by Sokrates, about [Greek: to\ phi/lon--kinduneu/ei kata\ tê\n a)rchai/an paroimi/an to\ kalo\n phi/lon ei)=nai. e)/oike gou=n malakô=| tini kai\lei/ô| kai\ liparô=|; dio\ kai\ i)/sôs r(a|di/ôs diolisthai/nei kai\ diadu/etai ê(ma=s, a(/te toiou=ton o)/n; le/gô ga\r ta)gatho\n kalo\n ei)=nai.] This allusion to the soft and the smooth is not very clear; a passage in Mr. Bain's chapter serves to illustrate it. "Among the sensations of the senses we find some that have the power of awakening tender emotion. The sensations that incline to tenderness are, in the first place, the effects of very gentle or soft stimulants, such as soft touches, gentle sounds, slow movements, temperate warmth, mild sunshine. These sensations must be felt in order to produce the effect, which is mental and not simply organic. We have seen that an acute sensation raises a vigorous muscular expression, as in wonder; a contrast to this is exhibited by gentle pressure or mild radiance. Hence tenderness is passive emotion by pre-eminence: we see it flourishing best in the quiescence of the moving members. Remotely there may be a large amount of action stimulated by it, but the proper outgoing accompaniment of it is organic not muscular." That the sensations of the soft and the smooth dispose to the Tender Emotion is here pointed out as a fact in human nature, agreeably to the comparison of Plato. Mr. Bain's treatise has the rare merit of describing fully the physical as well as the mental characteristics of each separate emotion.] [Side-note: Debate in the Lysis partly verbal, partly real. Assumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, questionable, such as the real Sokrates would have found reason for challenging.] The debate in the Lysis is partly verbal: _i.e._, respecting the word [Greek: phi/los], whether it means the person loving, or the person loved, or whether it shall be confined to those cases in which the love is reciprocal, and then applied to both. Herein the question is about the meaning of words--a word and nothing more. The following portions of the dialogue enter upon questions not verbal but real--"Whether we are disposed to love what is like to ourselves, or what is unlike or opposite to ourselves?" Though both these are occasionally true, it is shown that as general explanations neither of them will hold. But this is shown by means of the following assumptions, which not only those whom Plato here calls the "very clever Disputants,"[35] but Sokrates himself at other times, would have called in question, viz.: "That bad men cannot be friends to each other--that men like to each other (therefore good men as well as bad) can be of no use to each other, and therefore there can be no basis of friendship between them--that the good man is self-sufficing, stands in need of no one, and therefore will not love any one."[36] All these assumptions Sokrates would have found sufficient reason for challenging, if they had been advanced by Protagoras or any other opponents. They stand here as affirmed by him; but here, as elsewhere in Plato, the reader must apply his own critical intellect, and test what he reads for himself. [Footnote 35: Plato, Lysis, 216 A.: [Greek: oi( pa/nsophoi a)/ndres oi( a)ntilogikoi/], &c. Yet Plato, in the Phædrus and Symposion, indicates colloquial debate as the great generating cause of the most intense and durable friendship. Aristeides the Rhetor says, Orat. xlvii. ([Greek: Pro\s Kapi/tôna]), p. 418, Dindorf, [Greek: e)pei\ kai\ Pla/tôn to\ a)lêthe\s a(pantachou= tima=|, kai\ ta\s e)n toi=s lo/gois sunousi/as a)phormê\n phili/as a)lêthinê=s u(polamba/nei.]] [Footnote 36: Plato, Lysis, 214-215. The discourse of Cicero, De Amicitiâ, is composed in a style of pleasing rhetoric; suitable to Lælius, an ancient Roman senator and active politician, who expressly renounces the accurate subtlety of Grecian philosophers (v. 18). There is little in it which we can compare with the Platonic Lysis; but I observe that he too, giving expression to his own feelings, maintains that there can be no friendship except between the good and virtuous: a position which is refuted by the "nefaria vox," cited by himself as spoken by C. Blossius, xi. 37.] [Side-note: Peculiar theory about friendship broached by Sokrates. Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a superficial tinge of evil, and desiring good to escape from it.] It is thus shown, or supposed to be shown, that the persons who love are neither the Good, nor the Bad: and that the objects loved, are neither things or persons similar, nor opposite, to the persons loving. Sokrates now adverts to the existence of a third category--Persons who are neither good, nor bad, but intermediate between the two--Objects which are intermediate between likeness and opposition. He announces as his own conjecture,[37] that the Subject of friendly or loving feeling, is, that which is neither good nor evil: the Object of the feeling, Good: and the cause of the feeling, the superficial presence of evil, which the subject desires to see removed.[38] The evil must be present in a superficial and removable manner--like whiteness in the hair caused by white paint, not by the grey colour of old age. Sokrates applies this to the state of mind of the philosopher, or lover of knowledge: who is not yet either thoroughly good or thoroughly bad,--either thoroughly wise or thoroughly unwise--but in a state intermediate between the two: ignorant, yet conscious of his own ignorance, and feeling it as a misfortune which he was anxious to shake off.[39] [Footnote 37: Plato, Lysis, 216 D. [Greek: le/gô toi/nun a)pomanteuo/menos], &c.] [Footnote 38: Plato, Lysis, 216-217.] [Footnote 39: Plato, Lysis, 218 C. [Greek: lei/pontai dê\ oi( e)/chontes me\n to\ kako\ tou=to, tê\n a)/gnoian, mê/pô de\ u(p' au)tou= o)/ntes a)gnô/mones mêd' a)mathei=s, a)ll' e)/ti ê(gou/menoi mê\ ei)de/nai a)\ mê\ i)/sasi; dio\ dê\ philosophou=sin oi( ou)/te a)gathoi\ ou)/te kakoi/ pô o)/ntes; o(/soi de\ kakoi/, ou) philosophou=sin, ou)de\ oi( a)gathoi/.] Compare the phrase of Seneca, Epist. 59, p. 211, Gronov.: "Elui difficile est: non enim inquinati sumus, sed infecti".] [Side-note: This general theory illustrated by the case of the philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of ignorance the attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and Plato upon this attribute.] This meaning of philosophy, though it is not always and consistently maintained throughout the Platonic writings, is important as expanding and bringing into system the position laid down by Sokrates in the Apology. He there disclaimed all pretensions to wisdom, but he announced himself as a philosopher, in the above literal sense: that is, as ignorant, yet as painfully conscious of his own ignorance, and anxiously searching for wisdom as a corrective to it: while most men were equally ignorant, but were unconscious of their own ignorance, believed themselves to be already wise, and delivered confident opinions without ever having analysed the matters on which they spoke. The conversation of Sokrates (as I have before remarked) was intended, not to teach wisdom, but to raise men out of this false persuasion of wisdom, which he believed to be the natural state of the human mind, into that mental condition which he called philosophy. His Elenchus made them conscious of their ignorance, anxious to escape from it, and prepared for mental efforts in search of knowledge: in which search Sokrates assisted them, but without declaring, and even professing inability to declare, where that truth lay in which the search was to end. He considered that this change was in itself a great and serious improvement, converting what was evil, radical, and engrained--into evil superficial and removable; which was a preliminary condition to any positive acquirement. The first thing to be done was to create searchers after truth, men who would look at the subject for themselves with earnest attention, and make up their own individual convictions. Even if nothing ulterior were achieved, that alone would be a great deal. Such was the scope of the Sokratic conversation; and such the conception of philosophy (the capital peculiarity which Plato borrowed from Sokrates), which is briefly noted in this passage of the Lysis, and developed in other Platonic dialogues, especially in the Symposion,[40] which we shall reach presently. [Footnote 40: Plato, Sympos. 202-203-204. Phædrus, 278 D.] [Side-note: Another theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or original and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved through association with this. The object is, Good.] Still, however, Sokrates is not fully satisfied with this hypothesis, but passes on to another. If we love anything, we must love it (he says) for the sake of something. This implies that there must exist, in the background, a something which is the primitive and real object of affection. The various things which we actually love, are not loved for their own sake, but for the sake of this _primum amabile_, and as shadows projected by it: just as a man who loves his son, comes to love by association what is salutary or comforting to his son--or as he loves money for the sake of what money will purchase. The _primum amabile_, in the view of Sokrates, is _Good_; particular things loved, are loved as shadows of good. [Side-note: Statement by Plato of the general law of mental association.] This is a doctrine which we shall find reproduced in other dialogues. We note with interest here, that it appears illustrated, by a statement of the general law of mental association--the calling up of one idea by other ideas or by sensations, and the transference of affections from one object to others which have been apprehended in conjunction with it, either as antecedents or consequents. Plato states this law clearly in the Phædon and elsewhere:[41] but he here conceives it imperfectly: for he seems to believe that, if an affection be transferred by association from a primitive object A, to other objects, B, C, D, &c., A always continues to be the only real object of affection, while B, C, D, &c., operate upon the mind merely by carrying it back to A. The affection towards B, C, D, &c., therefore is, in the view of Plato, only the affection for A under other denominations and disguises.[42] Now this is doubtless often the case; but often also, perhaps even more generally, it is not the case. After a certain length of repetition and habit, all conscious reference to the primitive object of affection will commonly be left out, and the affection towards the secondary object will become a feeling both substantive and immediate. What was originally loved as means, for the sake of an ulterior end, will in time come to be loved as an end for itself; and to constitute a new centre of force, from whence derivatives may branch out. It may even come to be loved more vehemently than any primitive object of affection, if it chance to accumulate in itself derivative influences from many of those objects.[43] This remark naturally presents itself, when we meet here for the first time, distinctly stated by Plato, the important psychological doctrine of the transference of affections by association from one object to others. [Footnote 41: Plato, Phædon, 73-74. It is declared differently, and more clearly, by Aristotle in the treatise [Greek: Peri\ Mnê/mês kai\ A)namnê/seôs], pp. 451-452.] [Footnote 42: Plato, Lysis, 220 B. [Greek: o(/sa ga/r phamen phi/la ei)=nai ê(mi=n e(/neka phi/lou tino/s, e(te/rô| r(ê/mati phaino/metha le/gontes au)to/; phi/lon de\ tô=| o)/nti kinduneu/ei e)kei=no au)to\ ei)=nai, ei)s o(\ pa=sai au(=tai ai( lego/menai phili/ai teleutô=sin.]] [Footnote 43: There is no stronger illustration of this than the love of money, which is the very example that Plato himself here cites. The important point to which I here call attention, in respect to the law of Mental Association, is forcibly illustrated by Mr. James Mill in his 'Analysis of the Human Mind,' chapters xxi. and xxii., and by Professor Bain in his works on the Senses and the Intellect,--Intellect, chap. i. sect. 47-48, p. 404 seq. ed. 3; and on the Emotions and the Will, chap. iv. sect. 4-5, p. 428 seq. (3rd ed. p. 363 seq.).] [Side-note: Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates, with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic communion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler analogical communion.] The _primum amabile_, here introduced by Sokrates, is described in restricted terms, as valuable merely to correct evil, and as having no value _per se_, if evil were assumed not to exist. In consequence chiefly of this restriction, Sokrates discards it as unsatisfactory. Such restriction, however, is noway essential to the doctrine: which approaches to, but is not coincident with, the Ideal Good or Idea of Good, described in other dialogues as what every one yearns after and aspires to, though without ever attaining it and without even knowing what it is.[44] The Platonic Idea was conceived as a substantive, intelligible, Ens, distinct in its nature from all the particulars bearing the same name, and separated from them all by a gulf which admitted no gradations of nearer and farther--yet communicating itself to, or partaken by, all of them, in some inexplicable way. Aristotle combated this doctrine, denying the separate reality of the Idea, and admitting only a common generic essence, dwelling in and pervading the particulars, but pervading them all equally. The general word connoting this generic unity was said by Aristotle (retaining the Platonic phraseology) to be [Greek: lego/menon kata\ mi/an i)de/an] or [Greek: kath' e(/n]. [Footnote 44: Plato, Republ. vi. pp. 505-506.] But apart from and beyond such generic unity, which implied a common essence belonging to all, Aristotle recognised a looser, more imperfect, yet more extensive, communion, founded upon common relationship towards some [Greek: A)rchê\]--First Principle or First Object. Such relationship was not always the same in kind: it might be either resemblance, concomitance, antecedence or consequence, &c.: it might also be different in degree, closer or more remote, direct or indirect. Here, then, there was room for graduation, or ordination of objects as former and latter, first, second, third, &c., according as, when compared with each other, they were more or less related to the common root. This imperfect communion was designated by Aristotle under the title [Greek: kat' a)nalogi/an], as contrasted with [Greek: kata\ ge/nos]: the predicate which affirmed it was said to be applied, not [Greek: kata\ mi/an i)de/an] or [Greek: kath' e(/n], but [Greek: pro\s mi/an phu/sin] or [Greek: pro\s e(/n]:[45] it was affirmed neither entirely [Greek: sunônu/môs] (which would imply generic communion), nor entirely [Greek: o(mônu/môs] (which would be casual and imply no communion at all), but midway between the two, so as to admit of a graduated communion, and an arrangement as former and later, first cousin, or second, third cousin. Members of the same Genus were considered to be brothers, all on a par: but wherever there was this graduated cousinship or communion (signified by the words Former and Later, more or less in degree of relationship), Aristotle did not admit a common Genus, nor did Plato admit a Substantive Idea.[46] [Footnote 45: Arist. Metaphys. A. 1072, a. 26-29; Bonitz, Comm. p. 497 id. [Greek: Prô=ton o)rekto/n--Prô=ton voêto/n (prô=ton o)rekto\n]--"quod _per se_ appetibile est et concupiscitur"). "Quod autem primum est in aliquâ serie, id præcipue etiam habet qualitatem, quæ in reliquâ cernitur serie, c. a. 993, b. 24: ergo prima illa substantia est [Greek: to\ a)/riston]"--also [Greek: G] 1004, a. 25-26, 1005, a. 7, about the [Greek: prô=ton e(/n--prô=ton o)/n]. These were [Greek: ta\ pollachô=s lego/mena--ta\ pleonachô=s lego/mena]--which were something less than [Greek: sunô/numa] and more than [Greek: o(mô/numa]; intermediate between the two, having no common [Greek: lo/gos] or generical unity, and yet not entirely equivocal, but designating a [Greek: koino\n kat' a)nalogi/an]: not [Greek: kata\ mi/an i)de/an lego/mena], but [Greek: pro\s e(\n] or [Greek: pro\s mi/an phu/sin]; having a certain relation to one common [Greek: phu/sis] called [Greek: to\ prô=ton]. See the Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 1003, a. 33--[Greek: to/ de\ o)/n le/getai me\n pollachô=s, a)lla\ pro\s e(/n kai\ mi/an tina\ phu/sin, kai\ ou)ch o(mônu/môs, a)ll' ô(/sper to\ u(gieino\n a(/pan pro\s u(giei/an, to\ me\n tô=| phula/ttein, to\ de\ tô=| poiei=n, to\ de\ tê| sêmei=on ei)=nai tê=s u(giei/as, to\ d' o(/ti dektiko\n au)tê=s--kai\ to\ i)atriko\n pro\s i)atrikê/n], &c. The Scholion of Alexander upon this passage is instructive (p. 638, a. Brandis); and a very copious explanation of the whole doctrine is given by M. Brentano, in his valuable treatise, 'Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung _des Seienden_ nach Aristoteles,' Freiburg, 1862, pp. 85-108-147. Compare Aristotel. Politic. III. i. 9, p. 1275, a. 35. The distinction drawn by Aristotle between [Greek: to\ koino\n kat' i)de/an] and [Greek: to\ koino\n kat' a)nalogi/an]--between [Greek: ta\ kata\ mi/an i)de/an lego/mena], and [Greek: ta\ pro\s e(\n] or [Greek: pro\s mi/an phu/sin lego/mena]--this distinction corresponds in part to that which is drawn by Dr. Whewell between classes which are given by Definition, and natural groups which are given by Type. "Such a natural group" (says Dr. Whewell) "is steadily fixed, though not precisely limited; it is given, though not circumscribed; it is determined, not by a boundary but by a central point within, &c." The coincidence between this doctrine and the Aristotelian is real, though only partial: [Greek: to\ prô=ton phi/lon, to\ prô=ton o(rekto/n], may be considered as types of _objects loveable, objects desirable_, &c., but [Greek: ê( u(giei/a] cannot be considered as a type of [Greek: ta\ u(gieina\] nor [Greek: ê( i)atrikê\] as a type of [Greek: ta\ i)atrika/], though it is "the central point" to which all things so called are referred. See Dr. Whewell's doctrine stated in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, i. 476-477; and the comments of Mr. John Stuart Mill on the doctrine--'System of Logic,' Book iv. ch. 7. I have adverted to this same doctrine in remarking on the Hippias Major, supra, p. 47; also on the Philêbus, infra, chap. 32, vol. III.] [Footnote 46: This is attested by Aristotle, Eth. Nik. i. 64, p. 1096, a. 16. [Greek: Oi( de\ komi/santes tê\n do/xan tau/tên, ou)k e)poi/oun i)de/as e)n oi(=s to\ pro/teron kai\ to\ u(/steron e)/legon; dio/per ou)de\ tô=n a)rithmô=n i)de/an kateskeu/azon]: compare Ethic. Eudem. i. 8, 1218, a. 2. He goes on to object that Plato, having laid this down as a general principle, departed from it in recognizing an [Greek: i)de/an a)gathou=], because [Greek: ta)gatho\n] was predicated in all the categories, in that of [Greek: ou)si/a] as well as in that of [Greek: pro/s ti--to\ de\ kath' au(to\ kai\ ê( ou)si/a pro/teron tê=| phu/sei tou= pro/s ti--ô(/ste ou)k a)\n ei)/ê koinê/ tis e)pi\ tou/tôn i)de/a.]] [Side-note: Primum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima Amicitia of Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical aggregate, not member of a generic family.] Now the [Greek: Prô=ton phi/lon] or Primum Amabile which we find in the Lysis, is described as the principium or initial root of one of these imperfectly united aggregates; ramifying into many branches more or less distant, in obedience to one or other of the different laws of association. Aristotle expresses the same idea in another form of words: instead of a Primum Amabile, he gives us a Prima Amicitia--affirming that the diversities of friendship are not species comprehended under the same genus, but gradations or degeneracies departing in one direction or other from the First or pure Friendship. The Primum Amabile, in Plato's view, appears to be the Good, though he does not explicitly declare it: the Prima Amicitia, with Aristotle, is friendship subsisting between two good persons, who have had sufficient experience to know, esteem, and trust, each other.[47] [Footnote 47: Aristotel. Eth. Nikom. viii. 2, 1155, b. 12, viii. 5, 1157, a. 30, viii. 4; Eth. Eudem. vii. 2, 1236, a. 15. The statement is more full in the Eudemian Ethics than in the Nikomachean; he begins the seventh book by saying that [Greek: phili/a] is not said [Greek: monachô=s] but [Greek: pleonachô=s]; and in p. 1236 he says [Greek: A)na/gkê a)/ra tri/a phili/as ei)/dê ei)=nai, kai\ _mête kath' e(\n a(pa/sas_ mêth' ô(s _ei)/dê e(no\s ge/nous_, mê/te pa/mpan le/gesthai o(mônu/môs; pro\s _mi/an ga/r tina le/gontai kai\ prô/tên, ô(/sper to\ i)atriko/n_], &c. The whole passage is instructive, but is too long to cite. Bonitz gives some good explanations of these passages. Observationes Criticæ in Aristotelis quæ feruntur _Magna Moralia_ et _Eudemia_, pp. 55-57.] [Side-note: The Good and Beautiful, considered as objects of attachment.] In regard to the Platonic Lysis, I have already observed that no positive result can be found in it, and that all the hypotheses broached are successively negatived. What is kept before the reader's mind, however, more than anything else, though not embodied in any distinct formula, is--The Good and the Beautiful considered as objects of love or attachment. CHAPTER XXI. EUTHYDEMUS. [Side-note: Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthydêmus. Judgments of various critics.] Dramatic vivacity, and comic force, holding up various persons to ridicule or contempt, are attributes which Plato manifests often and abundantly. But the dialogue in which these qualities reach their maximum, is, the Euthydêmus. Some portions of it approach to the Nubes of Aristophanes: so that Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and other admiring critics have some difficulty in explaining, to their own satisfaction,[1] how Plato, the sublime moralist and lawgiver, can here have admitted so much trifling and buffoonery. Ast even rejects the dialogue as spurious; declaring it to be unworthy of Plato and insisting on various peculiarities, defects, and even absurdities, which offend his critical taste. His conclusion in this case has found no favour: yet I think it is based on reasons quite as forcible as those upon which other dialogues have been condemned:[2] upon reasons, which, even if admitted, might prove that the dialogue was an inferior performance, but would not prove that Plato was not the author. [Footnote 1: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Euthydemos, vol. iii. pp. 400-403-407; Stallbaum. Proleg. in Euthydem. p. 14.] [Footnote 2: Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 408-418.] [Side-note: Scenery and personages.] Sokrates recounts (to Kriton) a conversation in which he has just been engaged with two Sophists, Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus, in the undressing-room belonging to the gymnasium of the Lykeium. There were present, besides, Kleinias, a youth of remarkable beauty and intelligence, cousin of the great Alkibiades--Ktesippus, an adult man, yet still young, friend of Sokrates and devotedly attached to Kleinias--and a crowd of unnamed persons, partly friends of Kleinias, partly admirers and supporters of the two Sophists. [Side-note: The two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus: manner in which they are here presented.] This couple are described and treated throughout by Sokrates, with the utmost admiration and respect: that is, in terms designating such feelings, but intended as the extreme of irony or caricature. They are masters of the art of Contention, in its three varieties[3]--1. Arms, and the command of soldiers. 2. Judicial and political rhetoric, fighting an opponent before the assembled Dikasts or people. 3. Contentious Dialectic--they can reduce every respondent to a contradiction, if he will only continue to answer their questions--whether what he says be true or false.[4] All or each of these accomplishments they are prepared to teach to any pupil who will pay the required fee: the standing sarcasm of Plato against the paid teacher, occurring here as in so many other places. Lastly, they are brothers, old and almost toothless--natives of Chios, colonists from thence to Thurii, and exiles from Thurii and resident at Athens, yet visiting other cities for the purpose of giving lessons.[5] Their dialectic skill is described as a recent acquisition,--made during their old age, only in the preceding year,--and completing their excellence as professors of the tripartite Eristic. But they now devote themselves to it more than to the other two parts. Moreover they advertise themselves as teachers of virtue. [Footnote 3: Plato, Euthyd. pp. 271-272.] [Footnote 4: Plat. Euthyd. p. 272 B. [Greek: e)xele/gchein to\ a)ei\ lego/menon, o(moi/ôs e)a/n te pseu=dos e)a/n t' a)lêthe\s ê)=|]: p. 275 C. [Greek: ou)de\n diaphe/rei, e)a\n mo/non e)the/lê| a)pokri/nesthai o( neani/skos.]] [Footnote 5: Plat. Euthyd. p. 273 B-C. "quamvis essent ætate grandiores et _edentuli_" says Stallbaum in his Proleg. p. 10. He seems to infer this from page 294 C; the inference, though not very certain, is plausible. Steinhart, in his Einleitung zum Euthydemos (vol. ii. p. 2 of Hieronym. Müller's translation of Plato) repeats these antecedents of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, as recited in the dialogue before us, as if they were matter of real history, exemplifications of the character of the class called Sophists. He might just as well produce what is said by the comic poets Eupolis and Aristophanes--the proceedings as recounted by the Sokratic disciple in the [Greek: phrontistê/rion] (Nubes)--as evidence about the character of Sokrates.] [Side-note: Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by Sokrates, next by the two Sophists.] The two Sophists, having announced themselves as competent to teach virtue and stimulate pupils to a virtuous life, are entreated by Sokrates to exercise their beneficent influence upon the youth Kleinias, in whose improvement he as well as Ktesippus feels the warmest interest. Sokrates gives a specimen of what he wishes by putting a series of questions himself. Euthydêmus follows, and begins questioning Kleinias; who, after answering three or four successive questions, is forced to contradict himself. Dionysodorus then takes up the last answer of Kleinias, puts him through another series of interrogations, and makes him contradict himself again. In this manner the two Sophists toss the youthful respondent backwards and forwards to each other, each contriving to entangle him in some puzzle and contradiction. They even apply the same process to Sokrates, who cannot avoid being entangled in the net; and to Ktesippus, who becomes exasperated, and retorts upon them with contemptuous asperity. The alternate interference of the two Sophists is described with great smartness and animation; which is promoted by the use of the dual number, peculiar to the Greek language, employed by Plato in speaking of them. [Side-note: Contrast between the two different modes of interrogation.] This mode of dialectic, conducted by the two Sophists, is interrupted on two several occasions by a counter-exhibition of dialectic on the part of Sokrates: who, under colour of again showing to the couple a specimen of that which he wishes them to do, puts two successive batches of questions to Kleinias in his own manner.[6] The contrast between Sokrates and the two Sophists, in the same work, carried on respectively by him and by them, of interrogating Kleinias, is evidently meant as one of the special matters to arrest attention in the dialogue. The questions put by the couple are made to turn chiefly on verbal quibbles and ambiguities: they are purposely designed to make the respondent contradict himself, and are proclaimed to be certain of bringing about this result, provided the respondent will conform to the laws of dialectic--by confining his answer to the special point of the question, without adding any qualification of his own, or asking for farther explanation from the questioner, or reverting to any antecedent answer lying apart from the actual question of the moment.[7] Sokrates, on the contrary, addresses interrogations, each of which has a clear and substantive meaning, and most of which Kleinias is able to answer without embarrassment: he professes no other design except that of encouraging Kleinias to virtue, and assisting him to determine in what virtue consists: he resorts to no known quibbles or words of equivocal import. The effect of the interrogations is represented as being, not to confound and silence the youth, but to quicken and stimulate his mind and to call forth an unexpected amount of latent knowledge: insomuch that he makes one or two answers very much beyond his years, exciting the greatest astonishment and admiration, in Sokrates as well as in Kriton.[8] In this respect, the youth Kleinias serves the same illustrative purpose as the youthful slave in the Menon:[9] each is supposed to be quickened by the interrogatory of Sokrates, into a manifestation of knowledge noway expected, nor traceable to any teaching. But in the Menon, this magical evocation of knowledge from an untaught youth is explained by the theory of reminiscence, pre-existence, and omniscience, of the soul: while in the Euthydêmus, no allusion is made to any such theory, nor to any other cause except the stimulus of the Sokratic cross-questioning. [Footnote 6: Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 279-288.] [Footnote 7: Plat. Euthyd. pp. 275 E--276 E. [Greek: Pa/nta toiau=ta ê(mei=s e)rôtô=men a)/phukta], pp. 287 B--295 B--296 A, &c.] [Footnote 8: Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 290-291. The unexpected wisdom, exhibited by the youth Kleinias in his concluding answer, can be understood only as illustrating the obstetric efficacy of Sokratic interrogations. See Winckelmann, Proleg. ad Euthyd. pp. xxxiii. xxxiv. The words [Greek: tô=n kreitto/nôn] must have the usual signification, as recognised by Routh and Heindorf, though Schleiermacher treats it as absurd, p. 552, notes.] [Footnote 9: Plato, Menon, pp. 82-85.] [Side-note: Wherein this contrast does not consist.] In the dialogue _Euthydêmus_, then, one main purpose of Plato is to exhibit in contrast two distinct modes of questioning: one practised by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; the other, by Sokrates. Of these two, it is the first which is shown up in the most copious and elaborate manner: the second is made subordinate, serving mainly as a standard of comparison with the first. We must take care however to understand in what the contrast between the two consists, and in what it does not consist. The contrast does not consist in this--that Sokrates so contrives his string of questions as to bring out some established and positive conclusion, while Euthydemus and his brother leave everything in perplexity. Such is not the fact. Sokrates ends without any result, and with a confession of his inability to find any. Professing earnest anxiety to stimulate Kleinias in the path of virtue, he is at the same time unable to define what the capital condition of virtue is.[10] On this point, then, there is no contrast between Sokrates and his competitors: if they land their pupil in embarrassment, so does he. Nor, again, does Sokrates stand distinguished from them by affirming (or rather implying in his questions) nothing but what is true and indisputable.[11] [Footnote 10: Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 291 A--293 A; Plat. Kleitophon, pp. 409-410.] [Footnote 11: See Plat. Euthydêm. p. 281 C-D, where undoubtedly the positions laid down by Sokrates would not have passed without contradiction by an opponent.] [Side-note: Wherein it does consist.] The real contrast between the competitors, consists, first in the pretensions--next in the method. The two Sophists are described as persons of exorbitant arrogance, professing to teach virtue,[12] and claiming a fee as if they did teach it: Sokrates disdains the fee, doubts whether such teaching is possible, and professes only to encourage or help forward on the road a willing pupil. The pupil in this case is a given subject, Kleinias, a modest and intelligent youth: and the whole scene passes in public before an indiscriminate audience. To such a pupil, what is needed is, encouragement and guidance. Both of these are really administered by the questions of Sokrates, which are all suggestive and pertinent to the matter in hand, though failing to reach a satisfactory result: moreover, Sokrates attends only to Kleinias, and is indifferent to the effect on the audience around. The two Sophists, on the contrary, do not say a word pertinent to the object desired. Far from seeking (as they promised) to encourage Kleinias,[13] they confuse and humiliate him from the beginning: all their implements for teaching consist only of logical puzzles; lastly, their main purpose is to elicit applause from the by-standers, by reducing both the modest Kleinias and every other respondent to contradiction and stand-still. [Footnote 12: Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 273 D, 275 A, 304 B.] [Footnote 13: Plat. Euthyd. p. 278 C. [Greek: e)pha/tên ga\r e)pidei/xasthai tê\n protreptikê\n sophi/an.]] [Side-note: Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists--their bidding for the applause of the by-standers.] Such is the real contrast between Sokrates and the two Sophists, and such is the real scene which we read in the dialogue. The presence, as well as the loud manifestations of an indiscriminate crowd in the Lykeium, are essential features of the drama.[14] The point of view which Plato is working out, is, the abusive employment, the excess, and the misplacement, of logical puzzles: which he brings before us as administered for the humiliation of a youth who requires opposite treatment, in the prosecution of an object which they do not really promote and before undiscerning auditors, for whose applause the two Sophists are bidding.[15] The whole debate upon these fallacies is rendered ridiculous; and when conducted with Ktesippus, degenerates into wrangling and ribaldry. [Footnote 14: The [Greek: o)/chlos] (surrounding multitude) is especially insisted on in the first sentence of the dialogue, and is perpetually adverted to throughout all the recital of Sokrates to Kriton, pp. 276 B-D, 303 B.] [Footnote 15: Plat. Euthydêm. p. 303 B.] [Side-note: Comparison of the Euthydêmus with the Parmenidês.] The bearing of the Euthydêmus, as I here state it, will be better understood if we contrast it with the Parmenidês. In this last-mentioned dialogue, the amount of negative dialectic and contradiction is greater and more serious than that which we read in the Euthydêmus. One single case of it is elaborately built up in the long Antinomies at the close of the Parmenidês (which occupy as much space, and contain nearly as much sophistry, as the speeches assigned to the two Sophists in Euthydêmus), while we are given to understand that many more remain behind.[16] These perplexing Antinomies (addressed by the veteran Parmenides to Sokrates as his junior), after a variety of other objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas, which theory Sokrates has been introduced as affirming,--are drawn up for the avowed purpose of checking premature affirmation, and of illustrating the difficult exercises and problems which must be solved, before affirmation can become justifiable. This task, though long and laborious, cannot be evaded (we are here told) by aspirants in philosophy. But it is a task which ought only to be undertaken in conjunction with a few select companions. "Before any large audience, it would be unseemly and inadmissible: for the public are not aware that without such roundabout and devious journey in all directions, no man can hit upon truth or acquire intelligence."[17] [Footnote 16: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B. I shall revert to this point when I notice the Parmenidês.] [Footnote 17: Plat. Parmen. pp. 135-136. [Greek: e(/lkuson de\ sauto\n kai\ gu/mnasai ma=llon dia\ tê=s dokou/sês a)chrê/stou ei)=nai kai\ kaloume/nês u(po\ tô=n pollô=n a)doleschi/as, e(/ôs e(/ti ne/os ei)=--ei) me\n ou)=n plei/ous ê(=men, ou)k a)\n a)/xion ê)=n dei=sthai], (to request Parmenides to give a specimen of dialectic) [Greek: a)prepê= ga\r ta\ toiau=ta pollô=n e)nanti/on le/gein, a)/llôs te kai\ têlikou/tô|; a)gnoou=si ga\r oi( polloi\ o(/ti a)/neu tau/tês tê=s dia\ pa/ntôn diexo/dou te kai\ pla/nês, a)du/naton e)ntucho/nta tô=| a)lêthei= nou=n schei=n.]] [Side-note: Necessity of settling accounts with the negative, before we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both: in the one the process is solitary and serious; in the other, it is vulgarised and ludicrous.] This important proposition--That before a man can be entitled to lay down with confidence any affirmative theory, in the domain of philosophy or "reasoned truth," he must have had before him the various knots tied by negative dialectic, and must find out the way of untying them--is a postulate which lies at the bottom of Plato's Dialogues of Search, as I have remarked in the eighth chapter of this work. But there is much difference in the time, manner, and circumstances, under which such knots are brought before the student for solution. In the Parmenidês the process is presented as one both serious and indispensable, yet requiring some precautions: the public must be excluded, for they do not understand the purpose: and the student under examination must be one who is competent or more than competent to bear the heavy burthen put upon him, as Sokrates is represented to be in the Parmenidês.[18] In the Euthydêmus, on the contrary, the process is intended to be made ridiculous; accordingly these precautions are disregarded. The crowd of indiscriminate auditors are not only present, but are the persons whose feelings the two Sophists address--and who either admire what is said as dexterous legerdemain, or laugh at the interchange of thrusts, as the duel becomes warmer: in fact, the debate ends with general mirth, in which the couple themselves are among the loudest.[19] Lastly, Kleinias, the youth under interrogation, is a modest novice; not represented, like Lysis in the dialogue just reviewed, as in danger of corruption from the exorbitant flatteries of an Erastes, nor as requiring a lowering medicine to be administered by a judicious friend. When the Xenophontic (historical) Sokrates cross-examines and humiliates Euthydêmus (a youth, but nevertheless more advanced than Kleinias in the Platonic Euthydêmus is represented to be), we shall see that he not only lays a train for the process by antecedent suggestions, but takes especial care to attack Euthydêmus when alone.[20] The cross-examination pursued by Sokrates inflicts upon this accomplished young man the severest distress and humiliation, and would have been utterly intolerable, if there had been by-standers clapping their hands (as we read in the Platonic Euthydêmus) whenever the respondent was driven into a corner. We see that it was hardly tolerable even when the respondent was alone with Sokrates; for though Euthydêmus bore up against the temporary suffering, cultivated the society of Sokrates, and was handled by him more gently afterwards; yet there were many other youths whom Sokrates cross-examined in the same way, and who suffered so much humiliation from the first solitary colloquy, that they never again came near him (so Xenophon expressly tells us)[21] for a second. This is quite enough to show us how important is the injunction delivered in the Platonic Parmenidês--to carry on these testing colloquies apart from indiscriminate auditors, in the presence, at most, of a few select companions. [Footnote 18: See the compliments to Sokrates, on his strenuous ardour and vocation for philosophy, addressed by Parmenides, p. 135 D.] [Footnote 19: Plat. Euthyd. p. 303 B. [Greek: E)ntau=tha me/ntoi, ô)= phi/le Kri/tôn, ou)deis o(/stis ou) tô=n paro/ntôn u(perepê/nese to\n lo/gon, kai\ tô\ a)/ndre] (Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus) [Greek: gelô=nte kai\ krotou=nte kai\ chai/ronte o)li/gou pareta/thêsan.]] [Footnote 20: Xenophon. Memor. iv. 2, 5-8. [Greek: ô(s d' ê)/|stheto] (Sokrates) [Greek: au)to\n e)toimo/teron u(pome/nonta, o(/te diale/goito, kai\ prothumo/teron a)kou/onta, _mo/nos ê)=lthen_ ei)s to\ ê(niopoiei=on; parakathezome/non d' au)tô=| tou= Eu)thudê/mou, Ei)=pe/ moi, e)/phê], &c.] [Footnote 21: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 39-40. Compare the remarks of Sokrates in Plato, Theætêtus, p. 151 C.] [Side-note: Opinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the Euthydêmus, that Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus represent the way in which Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors.] Stallbaum, Steinhart, and other commentators denounce in severe terms the Eristics or controversial Sophists of Athens, as disciples of Protagoras and Gorgias, infected with the mania of questioning and disputing every thing, and thereby corrupting the minds of youth. They tell us that Sokrates was the constant enemy of this school, but that nevertheless he was unjustly confounded with them by the comic poets, and others; from which confusion alone his unpopularity with the Athenian people arose.[22] In the Platonic dialogue of Euthydêmus the two Sophists (according to these commentators) represent the way in which Protagoras and Gorgias with their disciples reasoned: and the purpose of the dialogue is to contrast this with the way in which Sokrates reasoned. [Footnote 22: Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Plat. Euthydêm. pp. 9-11-13; Winckelmann, Proleg. ad eundem, pp. xxxiii.-xxxiv.] [Side-note: That opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more Eristic than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by continuous speech or lecture.] Now, in this opinion, I think that there is much of unfounded assumption, as well as a misconception of the real contrast intended in the Platonic Euthydêmus. Comparing Protagoras with Sokrates, I maintain that Sokrates was decidedly the more Eristic of the two, and left behind him a greater number of active disciples. In so far as we can trust the picture given by Plato in the dialogue called Protagoras, we learn that the Sophist of that name chiefly manifested himself in long continuous speeches or rhetoric; and though he also professed, if required, to enter into dialectic colloquy, in this art he was no match for Sokrates.[23] Moreover, we know by the evidence of Sokrates himself, that _he_ was an Eristic not only by taste, but on principle, and by a sense of duty. He tells us, in the Platonic Apology, that he felt himself under a divine mission to go about convicting men of ignorance, and that he had prosecuted this vocation throughout many years of a long life. Every one of these convictions must have been brought about by one or more disputes of his own seeking: every such dispute, with occasional exceptions, made him unpopular, in the outset at least, with the person convicted: the rather, as his ability in the process is known, upon the testimony of Xenophon[24] as well as of Plato, to have been consummate. It is therefore a mistake to decry Protagoras and the Protagoreans (if there were any) as the special Eristics, and to represent Sokrates as a tutelary genius, the opponent of such habits. If the commentators are right (which I do not think they are) in declaring the Athenian mind to have been perverted by Eristic, Sokrates is much more chargeable with the mischief than Protagoras. And the comic poets, when they treated Sokrates as a specimen and teacher of Eristic, proceeded very naturally upon what they actually saw or heard of him.[25] [Footnote 23: See Plat. Protag., especially pp. 329 and 336. About the eristic disposition of Sokrates, see the striking passage in Plato, Theætêt. 169 B-C; also Lachês, 187, 188.] [Footnote 24: Xen. Mem. i. 2.] [Footnote 25: Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon. Euthydêm. pp. 50-51. "Sed hoc utcunque se habet, illud quidem ex Aristophane pariter atque ex ipso Platone evidenter apparet, Socratem non tantum ab orationum scriptoribus, sed etiam ab aliis, in vanissimorum sophistaram loco habitum fuisse."] [Side-note: Sokrates in the Euthydêmus is drawn suitably to the purpose of that dialogue.] The fact is, that the Platonic Sokrates when he talks with the two Sophists in the dialogue Euthydêmus, is a character drawn by Plato for the purpose of that dialogue, and is very different from the real historical Sokrates, whom the public of Athens saw and heard in the market-place or gymnasia. He is depicted as a gentle, soothing, encouraging talker, with his claws drawn in, and affecting inability even to hold his own against the two Sophists: such indeed as he sometimes may have been in conversing with particular persons (so Xenophon[26] takes pains to remind his readers in the Memorabilia), but with entire elimination of that characteristic aggressive Elenchus for which he himself (in the Platonic Apology) takes credit, and which the auditors usually heard him exhibit. [Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. i. 4, 1; iv. 2, 40.] [Side-note: The two Sophists in the Euthydêmus are not to be taken as real persons, or representatives of real persons.] This picture, accurate or not, suited the dramatic scheme of the Euthydêmus. Such, in my judgment, is the value and meaning of the Euthydêmus, as far as regards personal contrasts. One style of reasoning is represented by Sokrates, the other by the two Sophists: both are the creatures of Plato, having the same dramatic reality as Sokrates and Strepsiades, or the [Greek: Di/kaios Lo/gos] and [Greek: A)/dikos Lo/gos], of Aristophanes, but no more. That they correspond to any actual persons at Athens, is neither proved nor probable. The comic poets introduce Sokrates as talking what was either nonsensical, or offensive to the feelings of the Athenians: and Sokrates (in the Platonic Apology) complains that the Dikasts judged him, not according to what he had really said or done, but according to the impression made on them by this dramatic picture. The Athenian Sophists would have equal right to complain of those critics, who not only speak of Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus with a degree of acrimony applicable only to historical persons, but also describe them as representative types of Protagoras, Gorgias, and their disciples.[27] [Footnote 27: The language of Schleiermacher is more moderate than that of Stallbaum, Steinhart, and others. He thinks moreover, that the polemical purpose of this dialogue is directed not against Protagoras or Gorgias, but against the Megarics and against Antisthenes, who (so Schleiermacher supposes) had brought the attack upon themselves by attacking Plato first (Einleitung zum Euthyd. p. 404 seq.). Schleiermacher cannot make out who the two Sophists were personally, but he conceives them as obscure persons, deserving no notice. This is a conjecture which admits of no proof; but if any real victim is here intended by Plato, we may just as reasonably suppose Antisthenes as Protagoras.] [Side-note: Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias--possession of good things is useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use them.] The conversation of Sokrates with the youth Kleinias is remarkable for its plainness and simplicity. His purpose is to implant or inflame in the youth the aspiration and effort towards wisdom or knowledge ([Greek: philosophi/a], in its etymological sense). "You, like every one else, wish to do well or to be happy. The way to be happy is, to have many good things. Every one knows this: every one knows too, that among these good things, wealth is an indisputable item:[28] likewise health, beauty, bodily activity, good birth, power over others, honour in our city, temperance, justice, courage, wisdom, &c. Good fortune does not count as a distinct item, because it resolves itself into wisdom.[29]--But it is not enough to have all these good things: we must not only have them but use them: moreover, we must use them not wrongly, but rightly. If we use them wrongly, they will not produce their appropriate consequences. They will even make us more miserable than if we had them not, because the possession of them will prompt us to be active and meddlesome: whereas, if we have them not, we shall keep in the back-ground and do little.[30] But to use these good things rightly, depends upon wisdom, knowledge, intelligence. It thus appears that the enumerated items are not really good, except on the assumption that they are under the guidance of intelligence: if they are under the guidance of ignorance, they are not good; nay, they even produce more harm than good, since they are active instruments in the service of a foolish master.[31] [Footnote 28: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 279 A. [Greek: a)gatha\ de\ poi=a a)/ra tô=n o)/ntôn tugcha/nei ê(mi=n o)/nta? ê)\ ou) chalepo\n ou)de\ semnou= a)ndro\s pa/nu ti ou)de\ tou=to e)/oiken ei)=nai eu(rei=n? pa=s ga\r a)\n ê(mi=n ei)/poi o(/ti to\ ploutei=n a)gatho/n?]] [Footnote 29: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 279-280.] [Footnote 30: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 281 C. [Greek: ê(=tton de\ kakô=s pra/ttôn, a)/thlios ê(=tton a)\n ei)/ê.]] [Footnote 31: Plato, Euthyd. p. 282 E. If we compare this with p. 279 C-D we shall see that the argument of Sokrates is open to the exception which he himself takes in the case of [Greek: eu)tuchi/a--di\s tau)ta\ le/gein]. Wisdom is counted twice over.] [Side-note: But intelligence--of what? It must be such intelligence, or such an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and the right use of it when made.] "But what intelligence do we want for the purpose? Is it _all_ intelligence? Or is there any one single variety of intelligence, by the possession of which we shall become good and happy?[32] Obviously, it must be must be such as will be profitable to us.[33] We have seen that there is no good in possessing wealth--that we should gain nothing by knowing how to acquire wealth or even to turn stones into gold, unless we at the same time knew how to use it rightly. Nor should we gain any thing by knowing how to make ourselves healthy, or even immortal, unless we knew how to employ rightly our health or immortality. We want knowledge or intelligence, of such a nature, as to include both acting, making, or construction and rightly using what we have done, made, or constructed.[34] The makers of lyres and flutes may be men of skill, but they cannot play upon the instruments which they have made: the logographers compose fine discourses, but hand them over for others to deliver. Even masters in the most distinguished arts--such as military commanders, geometers, arithmeticians, astronomers, &c., do not come up to our requirement. They are all of them varieties under the general class _hunters_: they find and seize, but hand over what they have seized for others to use. The hunter, when he has caught or killed game, hands it over to the cook; the general, when he has taken a town, delivers it to the political leader or minister: the geometer makes over his theorems to be employed by the dialectician or comprehensive philosopher.[35] [Footnote 32: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 282 E. Sokrates here breaks off the string of questions to Kleinias, but resumes them, p. 288 D.] [Footnote 33: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 288 D. [Greek: ti/na pot' ou)=n a)\n ktêsa/menoi e)pistê/mên o)rthô=s ktêsai/metha? a)=r' ou) tou=to me\n a(plou=n, o(/ti tau/tên ê(/tis ê(ma=s o)nê/sei?]] [Footnote 34: Plato, Euthyd. p. 289 B. [Greek: toiau/tês tino\s a)/r' ê(mi=n e)pistê/mês dei=, e)n ê(=| sumpe/ptôken a(/ma to/ te poiei=n kai\ to\ e)pi/stasthai chrê=sthai ô(=| a)\n poiê=|.]] [Footnote 35: Plato, Euthyd. p.290 C-D.] [Side-note: Where is such an art to be found? The regal or political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No answer can be found. Ends in puzzle.] "Where then can we find such an art--such a variety of knowledge or intelligence--as we are seeking? The regal or political art looks like it: that art which regulates and enforces all the arrangements of the city. But what is the work which this art performs? What product does it yield, as the medical art supplies good health, and the farmer's art, provision? What good does it effect? You may say that it makes the citizens wealthy, free, harmonious in their intercourse. But we have already seen that these acquisitions are not good, unless they be under the guidance of intelligence: that nothing is really good, except some variety of intelligence.[36] Does the regal art then confer knowledge? If so, does it confer every variety of knowledge--that of the carpenter, currier, &c., as well as others? Not certainly any of these, for we have already settled that they are in themselves neither good nor bad. The regal art can thus impart no knowledge except itself; and what is _itself_? how are we to use it? If we say, that we shall render other men _good_--the question again recurs, _Good_--in what respect? _useful_--for what purpose?[37] [Footnote 36: Plato, Euthyd. p. 292 B. [Greek: A)gatho\n de/ ge/ pou ô(mologê/samen a)llê/lois--ou)de\n ei)=nai a)/llo ê)\ e)pistê/mên tina/.]] [Footnote 37: Plat. Euthydêm. p. 292 D. [Greek: A)lla\ ti/na dê\ e)pistê/mên? ê(=| ti/ chrêso/metha? tô=n me\n ga\r e)/rgôn ou)deno\s dei= au)tê\n dêmiourgo\n ei)=nai tô=n mê/te kakô=n mê/te a)gathô=n, e)pistê/mên de\ paradido/nai mêdemi/an a)/llên ê)\ au)tê\n e(autê/n; le/gômen dê\ ou)=n, ti/s pote e)/stin au(tê\ ê(=| ti/ chrêso/metha?]] "Here then" (concludes Sokrates), "we come to a dead lock: we can find no issue.[38] We cannot discover what the regal art does for us or gives us: yet this is the art which is to make us happy." In this difficulty, Sokrates turns to the two Sophists, and implores their help. The contrast between him and them is thus brought out. [Footnote 38: Plat. Euthyd. p. 292 E.] [Side-note: Review of the cross-examination just pursued by Sokrates. It is very suggestive--puts the mind upon what to look for.] The argument of Sokrates, which I have thus abridged from the Euthydêmus, arrives at no solution: but it is nevertheless eminently suggestive, and puts the question in a way to receive solution. What is the regal or political art which directs or regulates all others? A man has many different impulses, dispositions, qualities, aptitudes, advantages, possessions, &c., which we describe by saying that he is an artist, a general, a tradesman, clever, just, temperate, brave, strong, rich, powerful, &c. But in the course of life, each particular situation has its different exigencies, while the prospective future has its exigencies also. The whole man is one, with all these distinct and sometimes conflicting attributes: in following one impulse, he must resist others--in turning his aptitudes to one object, he must turn them away from others--he must, as Plato says, distinguish the right use of his force from the wrong, by virtue of knowledge, intelligence, reason. Such discriminating intelligence, which in this dialogue is called the Regal or political art,--what is the object of it? It is intelligence or knowledge,--But _of what_? Not certainly of the way how each particular act is to be performed--how each particular end is to be attained. Each of these separately is the object of some special knowledge. But the whole of a man's life is passed in a series of such particular acts, each of which is the object of some special knowledge: what then remains as the object of Regal or political intelligence, upon which our happiness is said to depend? Or how can it have any object at all? [Side-note: Comparison with other dialogues--Republic, Philêbus, Protagoras. The only distinct answer is found in the Protagoras.] The question here raised is present to Plato's mind in other dialogues, and occurs under other words, as for example, What is good? Good is the object of the Regal or political intelligence; but what is Good? In the Republic he raises this question, but declines to answer it, confessing that he could not make it intelligible to his hearers:[39] in the Gorgias, he takes pains to tell us what it _is not_: in the Philêbus, he does indeed tell us what it is, but in terms which need explanation quite as much as the term which they are brought to explain. There is only one dialogue in which the question is answered affirmatively, in clear and unmistakable language, and with considerable development--and that is, the Protagoras: where Sokrates asserts and proves at length, that Good is at the bottom identical with pleasure, and Evil with pain: that the measuring or calculating intelligence is the truly regal art of life, upon which the attainment of Good depends: and that the object of that intelligence--the items which we are to measure, calculate, and compare--is pleasures and pains, so as to secure to ourselves as much as possible of the former, and escape as much as possible of the latter. [Footnote 39: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 505-506.] In my remarks on the Protagoras, I shall state the view which I take of the doctrine laid down in that dialogue by Sokrates. Persons may think the answer insufficient: most of the Platonic critics declare it to be absolutely wrong. But at any rate it is the only distinct answer which Plato ever gives, to the question raised by Sokrates in the Euthydêmus and elsewhere. [Side-note: The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically admired while it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real admiration, but the contrary.] From the abstract just given of the argument of Sokrates in the Euthydêmus, it will be seen to be serious and pertinent, though ending with a confession of failure. The observations placed in contrast with it and ascribed to the two Sophists, are distinguished by being neither serious nor pertinent; but parodies of debate for the most part, put together for the express purpose of appearing obviously silly to the reader. Plato keeps up the dramatic or ironical appearance, that they are admired and welcomed not only by the hearers, but even by Sokrates himself. Nevertheless, it is made clear at the end that all this is nothing but irony, and that the talk which Plato ascribes to Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus produced, according to his own showing, no sentiment of esteem for their abilities among the by-standers, but quite the reverse. Whether there were individual Sophists at Athens who talked in that style, we can neither affirm nor deny: but that there were an established class of persons who did so, and made both money and reputation by it, we can securely deny. It is the more surprising that the Platonic commentators should desire us to regard Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus as representative samples of a special class named Sophists, since one of the most eminent of those commentators (Stallbaum),[40] both admits that Sokrates himself was generally numbered in the class and called by the name and affirms also (incorrectly, in my opinion) that the interrogations of Sokrates, which in this dialogue stand contrasted with those of the two Sophists, do not enunciate the opinions either of Sokrates or of Plato himself, but the opinions of these very Sophists, which Plato adopts and utters for the occasion.[41] [Footnote 40: Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon. Euthydem. p. 50. "Illud quidem ex Aristophane pariter atque ipso Platone evidenter apparet, Socratem non tantum ab orationum scriptoribus, sed etiam ab aliis in vanissimorum sophistarum numero habitum fuisse." Ib. p. 49 (cited in a previous note). "Videtur pervulgata fuisse hominum opinio, quâ Socratem inter vanos sophistas numerandum esse existimabant." Again p. 44, where Stallbaum tells us that Sokrates was considered by many to belong "misellorum Sophistarum gregi".] [Footnote 41: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Euthydem. p. 30. "Cavendum est magnopere, ne quæ hic à Socrate disputantur, pro ipsius decretis habeamus: _sunt enim omnia ad mentem Sophistarum disputata_, quos ille, reprehensis eorum opinionibus, sperat eo adductum iri, ut gravem prudentemque earum defensionem suscipiant." Compare p. 66. Stallbaum says that Plato often reasons, adopting for the occasion the doctrine of the Sophists. See his Prolegg. to the Lachês and Charmidês, and still more his Proleg. to the Protagoras, where he tells us that Plato introduces his spokesman Sokrates not only as arguing _ex mente Sophistarum_, but also as employing captious and delusive artifice, such as in this dialogue is ascribed to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.--pp. 23-24. "Itaque Socrates, missâ hujus rei disputatione, repentè ad alia progreditur, scilicet _similibus loqueis_ hominem denuo irretiturus. Nemini facilé obscurum erit, hoc quoque loco Protagoram _argutis conclusiunculis deludi_" (_i.e._ by Sokrates) "atque _callidé eo permoveri,_" &c. "Quanquam nemo erit, quin videat, _callidé deludi Protagoram_, ubi ex eo, quod qui injusté faciat, is neutiquam agat [Greek: sôphro/nôs], protinus colligitur justitiam et [Greek: sôphrosu/nê] unum idemque esse."--p. 25. "Disputat enim Socrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius Protagoræ."--p. 30. "Platonem ipsum hæc non probâsse, sed e vulgi opinione et mente explicasse, vel illud non obscuré significat," &c.--p. 33.] [Side-note: Mistaken representations about the Sophists--Aristotle's definition--no distinguishable line can be drawn between the Sophist and the Dialectician.] The received supposition that there were at Athens a class of men called Sophists who made money and reputation by obvious fallacies employed to bring about contradictions in dialogue--appears to me to pervert the representations given of ancient philosophy. Aristotle defines a Sophist to be "one who seeks to make money by apparent wisdom which is not real wisdom":--the Sophist (he says) is an Eristic who, besides money-making, seeks for nothing but victory in debate and humiliation of his opponent:--Distinguishing the Dialectician from the Sophist (he says), the Dialectician impugns or defends, by probable arguments, probable tenets--that is, tenets which are believed by a numerous public or by a few wise and eminent individuals:--while the Sophist deals with tenets which are probable only in appearance and not in reality--that is to say, tenets which almost every one by the slightest attention recognises as false.[42] This definition is founded, partly on the personal character and purpose ascribed to the Sophist: partly upon the distinction between apparent and real wisdom, assumed to be known and permanent. Now such pseudo-wisdom was declared by Sokrates to be the natural state of all mankind, even the most eminent, which it was his mission to expose: moreover, the determination, what is to be comprised in this description, must depend upon the judges to whom it is submitted, since much of the works of Aristotle and Plato would come under the category, in the judgment of modern readers both vulgar and instructed. But apart from this relative and variable character of the definition, when applied to philosophy generally--we may confidently assert, that there never was any real class of intellectual men, in a given time or place, to whom it could possibly apply. Of individuals, the varieties are innumerable: but no professional body of men ever acquired gain or celebrity by maintaining theses, and employing arguments, which every one could easily detect as false. Every man employs sophisms more or less; every man does so inadvertently, some do it by design also; moreover, almost every reasoner does it largely, in the estimation of his opponents. No distinct line can be drawn between the Sophist and the Dialectician: the definition given by Aristotle applies to an ideal in his own mind, but to no reality without: Protagoras and Prodikus no more correspond to it than Sokrates and Plato. Aristotle observes, with great truth, that all men are dialecticians and testers of reasoning, up to a certain point: he might have added that they are all Sophists also, up to a certain point.[43] Moreover, when he attempts to found a scientific classification of intellectual processes upon a difference in the purposes of different practitioners--whether they employ the same process for money or display, or beneficence, or mental satisfaction to themselves--this is altogether unphilosophical. The medical art is the same, whether employed to advise gratis, or in exchange for a fee.[44] [Footnote 42: Aristotel. Topic, i. 1, p. 100, b. 21. [Greek: e)/ndoxa de\ ta\ dokou=nta pa=sin ê)\ toi=s plei/stois ê)\ toi=s sophoi=s, kai\ tou/tois ê)\ pa=sin ê)\ toi=s plei/stois ê)\ toi=s ma/lista gnôri/mois kai\ e)ndo/xois. E)ristiko\s de\ e)/sti sullogismo\s o( e)k phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn, mê\ o)/ntôn de\--kai\ o( e)x e)ndo/xôn ê)\ phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn phaino/menos. Ou)the\n ga\r tô=n legome/nôn e)ndo/xôn e)pipolai/on e)/chei pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an, katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken e)/chein. Parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ toi=s kai\ mikra\ sunora=|n duname/nois, kata/dêlos e)n au)toi=s ê( tou= pseu/dous e)/sti phu/sis.] De Sophisticis Elenchis, i. p. 165, a. 21. [Greek: e)/sti ga\r ê( sophistikê\ phainome/nê sophi/a, ou)=sa d' ou)/; kai\ o( sophistê\s chrêmatistê\s a)po\ phainome/nês sophi/as, a)ll' ou)k ou)/sês], p. 165, b. 10, p. 171, b. 8-27. [Greek: Oi( phile/rides, e)ristikoi\, a)gônistikoi\], are persons who break the rules of dialectic ([Greek: a)dikomachi/a]) for the purpose of gaining victory; [Greek: oi( sophistai\] are those who do the same thing for the purpose of getting money. See also Metaphys. iii. 1004, b. 17.] [Footnote 43: Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. 172, a. 30.] [Footnote 44: Aristot. Rhetor, i. 1, 1355, b. 18. He here admits that the only difference between the Dialectician and the Sophist lies in their purposes--that the mental activity employed by both is the same. [Greek: o( ga\r sophistiko\s ou)k e)n tê=| duna/mei a)ll' e)n tê=| proaire/sei; plê\n e)ntau=tha me\n] (in Rhetoric) [Greek: e)/stai o( me\n kata\ tê\n e)pistê/mên o( de\ kata\ tê\n proai/resin, r(ê/tôr, e)kei= de\] (in Dialectic) [Greek: sophistê\s me\n kata\ tê\n proai/resin, dialektiko\s de\ ou) kata\ tê\n proai/resin, a)lla\ kata\ tê\n du/namin.]] [Side-note: Philosophical purpose of the Euthydêmus--exposure of fallacies, in Plato's dramatic manner, by multiplication of particular examples.] Though I maintain that no class of professional Sophists (in the meaning given to that term by the Platonic critics after Plato and Aristotle) ever existed--and though the distinction between the paid and the gratuitous discourser is altogether unworthy to enter into the history of philosophy--yet I am not the less persuaded that the Platonic dialogue Euthydêmus, and the treatise of Aristotle De Sophisticis Elenchis, are very striking and useful compositions. This last-mentioned treatise was composed by Aristotle very much under the stimulus of the Platonic dialogue Euthydêmus, to which it refers several times--and for the purpose of distributing the variety of possible fallacies under a limited number of general heads, each described by its appropriate characteristic, and represented by its illustrative type. Such attempt at arrangement--one of the many valuable contributions of Aristotle to the theory of reasoning--is expressly claimed by him as his own. He takes a just pride in having been the first to introduce system where none had introduced it before.[45] No such system was known to Plato, who (in the Euthydêmus) enumerates a string of fallacies one after another without any project of classifying them, and who presents them as it were in concrete, as applied by certain disputants in an imaginary dialogue. The purpose is, to make these fallacies appear conspicuously in their character of fallacies: a purpose which is assisted by presenting the propounders of them as ridiculous and contemptible. The lively fancy of Plato attaches suitable accessories to Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus. They are old men, who have been all their lives engaged in teaching rhetoric and tactics, but have recently taken to dialectic, and acquired perfect mastery thereof without any trouble--who make extravagant promises--and who as talkers play into each other's hands, making a shuttlecock of the respondent, a modest novice every way unsuitable for such treatment. [Footnote 45: See the last chapter of the treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis.] [Side-note: Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a classification of fallacies: Plato enumerates them without classification.] Thus different is the Platonic manner, from the Aristotelian manner, of exposing fallacies. But those exhibited in the former appear as members of one or more among the classes framed by the latter. The fallacies which we read in the Euthydêmus are chiefly verbal: but some are verbal, and something beyond. [Side-note: Fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two Sophists in the Euthydêmus.] Thus, for example, if we take the first sophism introduced by the two exhibitors, upon which they bring the youth Kleinias, by suitable questions, to declare successively both sides of the alternative--"Which of the two is it that learns, the wise or the ignorant?"--Sokrates himself elucidates it by pointing out that the terms used are equivocal:[46] You might answer it by using the language ascribed to Dionysodorus in another part of this dialogue--"Neither and Both".[47] The like may be said about the fallacy in page 284 D--"Are there persons who speak of things as they are? Good men speak of things as they are: they speak of good men well, of bad men badly: therefore, of course, they speak of stout men stoutly, and of hot men hotly. Ay! rejoins the respondent Ktesippus, angrily--they speak of cold men coldly, and say that they talk coldly."[48] These are fallacies of double meaning of words--or double construction of phrases: as we read also in page 287 D, where the same Greek verb ([Greek: noei=n]) may be construed either to _think_ or to _mean_: so that when Sokrates talks about what a predication _means_--the Sophists ask him--"Does anything _think_, except things having a soul? Did you ever know any predication that had a soul?" [Footnote 46: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 275 D--278 D. Aristotle also adverts to this fallacy, but without naming the Euthydêmus. See Soph. El. 4, 165, b. 30.] [Footnote 47: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 300 D. [Greek: Ou)de/tera kai\ a)mpho/tera]] [Footnote 48: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 284 E. [Greek: tou\s gou=n psuchrou\s psuchrô=s le/gousi/ te kai\ phasi\ diale/gesthai.] The metaphorical sense of [Greek: psuchro\s] is _pointless_, _stupid_, _out of taste_, _out of place_, _&c._] [Side-note: Fallacies--_à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter_--in the Euthydêmus.] Again, the two Sophists undertake to prove that Sokrates, as well as the youth Kleinias and indeed every one else, knows everything. "Can any existing thing _be_ that which it is, and at the same time _not be_ that which it is?--No.--You know some things?--Yes.--Then if you know, _you are knowing_?--Certainly. I am knowing of those particular things.--That makes no difference: if you are knowing, you necessarily know everything.--Oh! no: for there are many things which I do not know.--Then if there be anything which you do not know, _you are not knowing_?--Yes, doubtless--of that particular thing.--Still you are _not knowing_: and just now you said that you were _knowing_: and thus, at one and the same time, you are what you are, and you are not what you are.[49] [Footnote 49: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 293 C. Aristotle considers _know_ to be an equivocal word; he admits that in certain senses you may both _know_ and _not know_ the same thing. Anal. Prior. ii. 67, b. 8. Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 25.] "But _you_ also" (retorts Sokrates upon the couple), "do not you also know some things, not know others?--By no means.--What! do you know nothing?--Far from it.--Then you know all things?--Certainly we do,--and you too: if you know one thing, you know all things.--What! do you know the art of the carpenter, the currier, the cobbler--the number of stars in the heaven, and of grains of sand in the desert, &c.?--Yes: we know all these things." [Side-note: Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their replies--determination not to contradict themselves.] The two Sophists maintain their consistency by making reply in the affirmative to each of these successive questions: though Ktesippus pushes them hard by enquiries as to a string of mean and diverse specialties.[50] This is one of the purposes of the dialogue: to represent the two Sophists as willing to answer any thing, however obviously wrong and false, for the purpose of avoiding defeat in the dispute--as using their best efforts to preserve themselves in the position of questioners, and to evade the position of respondents--and as exacting a categorical answer--Yes or No--to every question which they put without any qualifying words, and without any assurance that the meaning of the question was understood.[51] [Footnote 50: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 293-294.] [Footnote 51: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 295-296.] The base of these fallacious inferences is, That respecting the same subject, you cannot both affirm and deny the same predicate: you cannot say, A is knowing--A is not knowing ([Greek: e)pistê/môn]). This is a fallacy more than verbal: it is recognised by Aristotle (and by all subsequent logicians) under the name--_à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter_. It is very certain that this fallacy is often inadvertently committed by very competent reasoners, including both Plato and Aristotle. [Side-note: Farther verbal equivocations.] Again--Sophroniskus was my father--Chæredemus was the father of Patrokles.--Then Sophroniskus was different from a father: therefore he was not a father. You are different from a stone, therefore you are not a stone: you are different from gold, therefore you are not gold. By parity of reasoning, Sophroniskus is different from a father--therefore he is not a father. Accordingly, you, Sokrates, have no father.[52] [Footnote 52: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 297-298.] But (retorts Ktesippus upon the couple) your father is different from my father.--Not at all.--How can that be?--What! is your father, then, the father of all men and of all animals?--Certainly he is. A man cannot be at the same time a father, and not a father. He cannot be at the same time a man, and not a man--gold, and not gold.[53] [Footnote 53: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 298. Some of the fallacies in the dialogue ([Greek: Po/teron o(rô=sin oi( a)/nthrôpoi ta\ dunata\ o(ra=|n ê)\ ta\ a)du/nata? . . . Ê)= ou)ch oi(=o/n te sigô=nta le/gein?] p. 300 A) are hardly translatable into English, since they depend upon equivocal constructions peculiar to the Greek language. Aristotle refers them to the general head [Greek: par' a)mphiboli/an]. The same about [Greek: prosê/kei to\n ma/geiron katako/ptein], p. 301 D.] You have got a dog (Euthydêmus says to Ktesippus).--Yes.--The dog is the father of puppies?--Yes.--The dog, being a father, is yours?--Certainly.--Then your father is a dog, and you are brother of the puppies. You beat your dog sometimes? Then you beat your father.[54] [Footnote 54: Plat. Euthyd. p. 298.] Those animals, and those alone are _yours_ (sheep, oxen, &c.), which you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. But Zeus, Apollo, and Athênê are _your_ Gods. The Gods have a soul and are animals. Therefore your Gods are your animals. Now you told us that those alone were your animals, which you could give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. Therefore you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure, Zeus, Apollo, and Athênê.[55] [Footnote 55: Plat. Euthydêm. p. 302. This same fallacy, in substance, is given by Aristotle, De Sophist. El. 17, 176 a. 3, 179, a. 5, but with different exemplifying names and persons.] This fallacy depends upon the double and equivocal meaning of _yours_--one of its different explanations being treated as if it were the only one. [Side-note: Fallacies involving deeper logical principles--contradiction is impossible.--To speak falsely is impossible.] Other puzzles cited in this dialogue go deeper:--Contradiction is impossible--To speak falsely is impossible.[56] These paradoxes were maintained by Antisthenes and others, and appear to have been matters of dialectic debate throughout the fourth and third centuries. I shall say more of them when I speak about the Megarics and Antisthenes. Here I only note, that in this dialogue, Ktesippus is represented as put to silence by them, and Sokrates as making an answer which is no answer at all.[57] We see how much trouble these paradoxes gave to Plato, when we read the Sophistês, in which he handles the last of the two in a manner elaborate, but (to my judgment) unsatisfactory. [Footnote 56: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 285-286.] [Footnote 57: Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 286 B--287 A.] [Side-note: Plato's Euthydêmus is the earliest known attempt to set out and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies is to exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the conclusion proved is known _aliunde_ to be false and absurd.] The Euthydêmus of Plato is memorable in the history of philosophy as the earliest known attempt to set out, and exhibit to attention, a string of fallacious modes of reasoning. Plato makes them all absurd and ridiculous. He gives a caricature of a dialectic debate, not unworthy of his namesake Plato Comicus--or of Aristophanes, Swift, or Voltaire. The sophisms appear for the most part so silly, as he puts them, that the reader asks himself how any one could have been ever imposed upon by such a palpable delusion? Yet such confidence is by no means justified. A sophism, perfectly analogous in character to those which Plato here exposes to ridicule, may, in another case, easily escape detection from the hearer, and even from the reasoner himself. People are constantly misled by fallacies arising from the same word bearing two senses, from double construction of the same phrase, from unconscious application of a _dictum secundum quid_, as if it were a _dictum simpliciter_; from Petitio Principii, &c., Ignoratio Elenchi, &c. Neither Plato himself, nor Aristotle, can boast of escaping them.[58] If these fallacies appear, in the examples chosen by Plato for the Euthydêmus, so obviously inconclusive that they can deceive no one--the reason lies not in the premisses themselves, but in the particular conclusions to which they lead: which conclusions are known on other grounds to be false, and never to be seriously maintainable by any person. Such conclusions as--"Sokrates had no father: Sophroniskus, if father of Sokrates, was father of all men and all animals: In beating your dog, you beat your father: If you know one thing, you know everything," &c., being known _aliunde_ to be false, prove that there has been some fallacy in the premisses whereby they have been established. Such cases serve as a _reductio ad absurdum_ of the antecedent process. They make us aware of one mode of liability to error, and put us on our guard against it in analogous cases. This is a valuable service, and all the more valuable, because the liability to error is real and widespread, even from fallacies perfectly analogous to those which seem so silly under the particular exemplifications which Plato selects and exposes. Many of the illustrations of the Platonic Euthydêmus are reproduced by Aristotle in the Treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis, together with other fallacies, discriminated with a certain method and system.[59] [Footnote 58: See a passage in Plato's Charmidês, where Heindorf remarks with propriety upon his equivocal use of the words [Greek: eu)= zê=|n] and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein]--also the Gorgias, p. 507 D, with the notes of Routh and Heindorf. I have noticed both passages in discussing these two dialogues.] [Footnote 59: Aristotle, De Sophist. Elench.; also Arist. Rhet. ii. p. 1401, a-b.] [Side-note: Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and propagated by Athenian Sophists--they are inherent inadvertencies and liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal debate affords the best means of correcting them.] The true character of these fallacies is very generally overlooked by the Platonic critics, in their appreciation of the Euthydêmus; when they point our attention to the supposed tricks and frauds of the persons whom they called Sophists, as well as to mischievous corruptions alleged to arise from Eristic or formal contentious debate. These critics speak as if they thought that such fallacies were the special inventions of Athenian Sophists for the purposes of Athenian Eristic: as if such causes of error were inoperative on persons of ordinary honesty or intelligence, who never consulted or heard the Sophists. It has been the practice of writers on logic, from Aristotle down to Whately, to represent logical fallacies as frauds devised and maintained by dishonest practitioners, whose art Whately assimilates to that of jugglers. This view of the case appears to me incomplete and misleading. It substitutes the rare and accidental in place of the constant and essential. The various sophisms, of which Plato in the Euthydêmus gives the _reductio ad absurdum_, are not the inventions of Sophists. They are erroneous tendencies of the reasoning process, frequently incident to human thought and speech: specimens of those ever-renewed "inadvertencies of ordinary thinking" (to recur to a phrase cited in my preface), which it is the peculiar mission of philosophy or "reasoned truth" to rectify. Moreover the practice of formal debate, which is usually denounced with so much asperity--if it affords on some occasions opportunity to produce such fallacies, presents not merely equal opportunity, but the only effective means, for exposing and confuting them. Whately in his Logic,[60] like Plato in the Euthydêmus, when bringing these fallacies into open daylight in order that every one may detect them, may enliven the theme by presenting them as the deliberate tricks of a Sophist. Doubtless they are so by accident: yet their essential character is that of infirmities incident to the _intellectus sibi permissus_: operative at Athens before Athenian Sophists existed, and in other regions also, where these persons never penetrated.] [Footnote 60: Whately's Logic, ch. v. sect. 5. Though Whately, like other logicians, keeps the Sophists in the foreground, as the fraudulent enemy who sow tares among that which would otherwise come up as a clean crop of wheat--yet he intimates also incidentally how widespread and frequent such fallacies are, quite apart from dishonest design. He says--"It seems by most persons to be taken for granted, that a Fallacy is to be dreaded merely as a weapon fashioned and wielded by a skilful Sophist: or, if they allow that a man may with honest intentions slide into one, unconsciously, in the heat of _argument_--still they seem to suppose, that where there is no _dispute_, there is no cause to dread Fallacy. Whereas there is much danger, even in what may be called _solitary reasoning_, of sliding unawares into some Fallacy, by which one may be so far deceived as even to act upon the conclusion so obtained. By _solitary reasoning_, is meant the case in which we are not seeking for arguments to prove a given question, but labouring to elicit from our previous stock of knowledge some useful inference." "To speak of all the Fallacies that have ever been enumerated, as too glaring and obvious to need even being mentioned--because the simple instances given in books, and there stated in the plainest and consequently most easily detected form, are such as (in that form) would deceive no one--this, surely, shows either extreme weakness or extreme unfairness."--Aristotle himself makes the same remark as Whately--That the man who is easily taken in by a Fallacy advanced by another, will be easily misled by the like Fallacy in his own solitary reasoning. Sophist. Elench. 16, 175, a. 10.] [Side-note: Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief, misguided by one or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates, Plato, Bacon, &c.,--complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by Mill.] The wide diffusion and constant prevalence of such infirmities is attested not less by Sokrates in his last speech, wherein he declares real want of knowledge and false persuasion of knowledge, to be universal, the mission of his life being to expose them, though he could not correct them--than by Bacon in his reformatory projects, where he enumerates the various Idola worshipped by the human intellect, and the false tendencies acquired "_in primâ digestione mentis_". The psychological analysis of the sentiment of belief with its different sources, given in Mr. Alexander Bain's work on the Emotions and the Will, shows how this takes place; and exhibits true or sound belief, in so far as it ever is acquired, as an acquisition only attained after expulsion of earlier antecedent error.[61] Of such error, and of the different ways in which apparent evidence is mistaken for real evidence, a comprehensive philosophical exposition is farther given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the fifth book of his System of Logic, devoted to the subject of Fallacies. Every variety of erroneous procedure is referable to some one or more of the general heads of Fallacy there enumerated. It is the Fallacies of Ratiocination, of which the two Sophists, in the Platonic Euthydêmus, are made to exhibit specimens: and when we regard such Fallacies, as one branch among several in a complete logical scheme, we shall see at once that they are not inventions of the Athenian Sophists--still less inventions for the purpose of Eristic or formal debate. For every one of these Fallacies is of a nature to ensnare men, and even to ensnare them more easily, in the common, informal, conversation of life--or in their separate thoughts. Besides mistakes on matters of fact, the two main causes which promote the success and encourage the multiplication of Fallacies generally, are first, the emotional bias towards particular conclusions, which disposes persons to accept any apparent evidence, favourable to such conclusion, as if it, were real evidence: next, the careless and elliptical character of common speech, in which some parts of the evidence are merely insinuated, and other parts altogether left out. It is this last circumstance which gives occasion to the very extensive class of Fallacies called by Mr. Mill Fallacies of Confusion: a class so large, that the greater number of Fallacies might plausibly be brought under it.[62] [Footnote 61: See the instructive and original chapter on the generation, sources, and growth of Belief, in Mr. Bain's work, 'Emotions and Will,' p. 568 seq. After laying down the fundamental characteristic of Belief, as referable altogether to intended action, either certain to come, or contingent under supposed circumstances, and after enumerating the different Sources of Belief.--1. Intuitive or Instinctive. 2. Experience. 3. The Influence of the Emotions (sect. x. p. 579)--Mr. Bain says: "Having in our constitution primordial fountains of activity in the spontaneous and voluntary impulses, we follow the first clue that experience gives us, and accept the indication with the whole force of these natural promptings. Being under the strongest impulses to act somehow, an animal accepts any lead that is presented, and if successful, abides by that lead with unshaken confidence. This is that instinct of credulity so commonly attributed to the infant mind. It is not the single instance, or the repetition of two or three, that makes up the strong tone of confidence; it is the mind's own active determination, finding some definite vent in the gratification of its ends, and abiding by the discovery with the whole energy of the character, until the occurrence of some check, failure, or contradiction. The force of belief, therefore, is not one rising from zero to a full development by slow degrees, according to the length of the experience. We must treat it rather as a strong primitive manifestation, derived from the natural activity of the system, and taking its direction and rectification from experience (p. 583). The anticipation of nature, so strenuously repudiated by Bacon, is the offspring of this characteristic of the mental system. With the active tendency at its maximum, and the exercise of intelligence and acquired knowledge at the minimum, there can issue nothing but a quantity of rash enterprises. The respectable name _generalisation_, implying the best products of enlightened scientific research, has also a different meaning, expressing one of the most erroneous impulses and crudest determinations of untutored human nature. To extend some familiar and narrow experience, so as to comprehend cases the most distant, is a piece of mere reckless instinct, demanding severe discipline for its correction. I have mentioned the case of our supposing all other minds constituted like our own. The veriest infant has got this length in the career of fallacy. Sound belief, instead of being a pacific and gentle growth, is in reality the battering of a series of strongholds, the conquering of a country in hostile occupation. This is a fact common both to the individual and to the race. Observation is unanimous on the point. It will probably be long ere the last of the delusions attributable to this method of believing first and proving afterwards can be eradicated from humanity." [3rd ed., p. 505 seq.]] [Footnote 62: Mill, 'System of Logic,' Book V., to which is prefixed the following citation from Hobbes's 'Logica'. "Errare non modo affirmando et negando, sed etiam in sentiendo, et in tacitâ hominum cogitatione, contingit." Mr. Mill points out forcibly both the operation of moral or emotional bias in perverting the intellect, and causing sophisms or fallacies to produce conviction; and the increased chance afforded for the success of a sophism by the suppression of part of the premisses, which is unavoidable in informal discussions. "Bias is not a direct source of wrong conclusions (v. 1-3). We cannot believe a proposition only by wishing, or only by dreading, to believe it. Bias acts indirectly by placing the intellectual grounds of belief in an incomplete or distorted shape before a man's eyes. It makes him shrink from the irksome labour of a rigorous induction. It operates too by making him look out eagerly for reasons, or apparent reasons, to support opinions which are conformable, or resist those which are repugnant, to his interests or feelings; and when the interests or feelings are common to great numbers of persons, reasons are accepted or pass current which would not for a moment be listened to in that character, if the conclusion had nothing more powerful than its reasons to speak in its behalf. The natural or acquired prejudices of mankind are perpetually throwing up philosophical theories, the sole recommendation of which consists in the premisses which they afford for proving cherished doctrines, or justifying favourite feelings; and when any one of these theories has become so thoroughly discredited as no longer to serve the purpose, another is always ready to take its place."--"Though the opinions of the generality of mankind, when not dependent upon mere habit and inculcation, have their root much more in the inclinations than in the intellect, it is a necessary condition to the triumph of the moral bias that it should first pervert the understanding." Again in v. 2, 3. "It is not in the nature of bad reasoning to express itself unambiguously. When a sophist, whether he is imposing upon himself or attempting to impose upon others, can be constrained to throw his argument into so distinct a form, it needs, in a large number of cases, no farther exposure. In all arguments, everywhere but in the schools, some of the links are suppressed: _à fortiori_, when the arguer either intends to deceive, or is a lame and inexpert thinker, little accustomed to bring his reasoning processes to any test; and it is in those steps of the reasoning which are made in this tacit and half-conscious, or even wholly unconscious, manner, that the error oftenest lurks. In order to detect the fallacy the proposition thus silently assumed must be supplied, but the reasoner, most likely, has never really asked himself what he was assuming; his confuter, unless permitted to extort it from him by the Socratic mode of interrogation, must himself judge what the suppressed premiss ought to be, in order to support the conclusion." Mr. Mill proceeds to illustrate this confusion by an excellent passage cited from Whately's 'Logic'. I may add, that Aristotle himself makes a remark substantially the same--That the same fallacy may be referred to one general head or to another, according to circumstances. Sophist. Elench. 33, 182, b. 10.] [Side-note: Value of formal debate as a means for testing and confuting fallacies.] We thus see not only that the fallacious agencies are self-operative, generating their own weeds in the common soil of human thought and speech, without being planted by Athenian Sophists or watered by Eristic--but that this very Eristic affords the best means of restraining their diffusion. It is only in formal debate that the disputant can be forced to make clear to himself and declare explicitly to others, without reserve or omission, all the premisses upon which his conclusion rests--that every part of these premisses becomes liable to immediate challenge by an opponent--that the question comes distinctly under consideration, what is or is not sufficient evidence--that the premisses of one argument can be compared with the premisses of another, so that if in the former you are tempted to acquiesce in them as sufficient because you have a bias favourable to the conclusion, in the latter you may be made to feel that they are _insufficient_, because the conclusion which they prove is one which you know to be untrue (_reductio ad absurdum_). The habit of formal debate (called by those who do not like it, Eristic[63]) is thus an indispensable condition both for the exposure and confutation of fallacies, which exist quite independent of that habit--owing their rise and prevalence to deep-seated psychological causes. [Footnote 63: The Platonic critics talk about the Eristics (as they do about the Sophists) as if that name designated a known and definite class of persons. This is altogether misleading. The term is vituperative, and was applied by different persons according to their own tastes. Ueberweg remarks with great justice, that Isokrates called all speculators on philosophy by the name of Eristics. "Als ob jener Rhetor nicht (wie ja doch Spengel selbst gut nachgewiesen hat) alle und jede Spekulation mit dem Nahmen der Eristik bezeichnete." (Untersuchungen über die Zeitfolge der Plat. Schriften, p. 257.) In reference to the distinction which Aristotle attempts to draw between Dialectic and Eristic--the former legitimate, the latter illegitimate--we must remark that even in the legitimate Dialectic the purpose prominent in his mind is that of victory over an opponent. He enjoins that you are not only to guard against your opponent, lest he should out-manoeuvre you, but you are to conceal and disguise the sequence of your questions so as to out-manoeuvre him. [Greek: Chrê\ d' o(/per phula/ttesthai paragge/llomen a)pokrinome/nous, au)tou\s e)picheirou=ntas peira=sthai lantha/nein.] Anal. Prior. ii. 66, a. 32. Compare Topic. 108, a. 25, 156, a. 23, 164, b. 35.] [Side-note: Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could not have composed his Euthydêmus, nor Aristotle the treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis.] Without the experience acquired by this habit of dialectic debate at Athens, Plato could not have composed his Euthydêmus, exhibiting a _reductio ad absurdum_ of several verbal fallacies--nor could we have had the logical theories of Aristotle, embodied in the Analytica and Topica with its annexed treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis, in which various fallacies are discriminated and classified. These theories, and the corollaries connected with them, do infinite honour to the comprehensive intellect of Aristotle: but he could not have conceived them without previous study of the ratiocinative process. He, as the first theorizer, must have had before him abundant arguments explicitly laid out, and contested, or open to be contested, at every step by an opponent.[64] Towards such habit of formal argumentation, a strong repugnance was felt by many of the Athenian public, as there is among modern readers generally: but those who felt thus, had probably little interest in the speculations either of Plato or of Aristotle. That the Platonic critics should themselves feel this same repugnance, seems to me not consistent with their admiration for the great dialectician and logician of antiquity: nor can I at all subscribe to their view, when they present to us the inherent infirmities of the human intellect as factitious distempers generated by the habit of formal debate, and by the rapacity of Protagoras, Prodikus, and others. [Footnote 64: Mill, 'System of Logic.' Book VI. 1, 1. "Principles of Evidence and Theories of Method, are not to be constructed _à priori_. The laws of our rational faculty, like those of every other natural agency, are only got by seeing the agent at work."] [Side-note: Probable popularity of the Euthydêmus at Athens--welcomed by all the enemies of Dialectic.] I think it probable that the dialogue of Euthydêmus, as far as the point to which I have brought it (_i.e._, where Sokrates finishes his recital to Kriton of the conversation which he had had with the two Sophists), was among the most popular of all the Platonic dialogues: not merely because of its dramatic vivacity and charm of expression, but because it would be heartily welcomed by the numerous enemies of Dialectic at Athens. We must remember that in the estimation of most persons at Athens, Dialectic included Sokrates and all the _viri Sokratici_ (Plato among them), just as much as the persons called Sophists. The discreditable picture here given of Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus, would be considered as telling against Dialectic and the Sokratic Elenchus generally: while the rhetors, and others who dealt in long continuous discourse, would treat it as a blow inflicted upon the rival art of dialogue, by the professor of the dialogue himself. In Plato's view, the dialogue was the special and appropriate manifestation of philosophy. [Side-note: Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to obviate this inference by opponents--Conversation between Sokrates and Kriton.] That the natural effect of the picture here drawn by Plato, was, to justify the antipathy of those who hated philosophy--we may see by the epilogue which Plato has thought fit to annex: an epilogue so little in harmony with what has preceded, that we might almost imagine it to be an afterthought--yet obviously intended to protect philosophy against imputations. Sokrates having concluded the recital, in his ironical way, by saying that he intended to become a pupil under the two Sophists, and by inviting Kriton to be a pupil along with him--Kriton replies by saying that he is anxious to obtain instruction from any one who can give it, but that he has no sympathy with Euthydêmus, and would rather be refuted by him, than learn from him to refute in such a manner. Kriton proceeds to report to Sokrates the remarks of a by-stander (an able writer of discourses for the Dikastery) who had heard all that passed; and who expressed his surprise that Sokrates could have remained so long listening to such nonsense, and manifesting so much deference for a couple of foolish men. Nevertheless (continued the by-stander) this couple are among the most powerful talkers of the day upon philosophy. This shows you how worthless a thing philosophy is: prodigious fuss, with contemptible result--men careless what they say, and carping at every word that they hear.[65] [Footnote 65: Plat. Euthyd. pp. 304-305.] Now, Sokrates (concludes Kriton), this man is wrong for depreciating philosophy, and all others who depreciate it are wrong also. But he was right in blaming you, for disputing with such a couple before a large crowd. _Sokr._--What kind of person is this censor of philosophy? Is he a powerful speaker himself in the Dikastery? Or is he only a composer of discourses to be spoken by others? _Krit._--The latter. I do not think that he has ever spoken in court: but every one says that he knows judicial practice well, and that he composes admirable speeches.[66] [Footnote 66: Plat. Euthyd. p. 305.] [Side-note: Altered tone in speaking of Euthydêmus--Disparagement of persons half-philosophers, half-politicians.] _Sokr._--I understand the man. He belongs to that class whom Prodikus describes as the border-men between philosophy and politics. Persons of this class account themselves the wisest of mankind, and think farther that besides being such in reality, they are also admired as such by many: insomuch that the admiration for them would be universal, if it were not for the professors of philosophy. Accordingly they fancy, that if they could once discredit these philosophers, the prize of glory would be awarded to themselves, without controversy, by every one: they being in truth the wisest men in society, though liable, if ever they are caught in dialectic debate, to be overpowered and humbled by men like Euthydêmus.[67] They have very plausible grounds for believing in their own wisdom, since they pursue both philosophy and politics to a moderate extent, as far as propriety enjoins; and thus pluck the fruit of wisdom without encountering either dangers or contests. _Krit._--What do you say to their reasoning, Sokrates? It seems to me specious. _Sokr._--Yes, it is specious, but not well founded. You cannot easily persuade them, though nevertheless it is true, that men who take a line mid-way between two pursuits, are _better_ than either, if both pursuits be bad--_worse_ than either, if both pursuits be good, but tending to different ends--_better_ than one and _worse_ than the other, if one of the pursuits be bad and the other good--_better_ than both, if both be bad, but tending to different ends. Such being the case, if the pursuit of philosophy and that of active politics be both of them good, but tending to different objects, these men are inferior to the pursuers of one as well as of the other: if one be good, the other bad, they are worse than the pursuers of the former, better than the pursuers of the latter: if both be bad, they are better than either. Now I am sure that these men themselves account both philosophy and politics to be good. Accordingly, they are inferior both to philosophers and politicians:[68] they occupy only the third rank, though they pretend to be in the first. While we pardon such a pretension, and refrain from judging these men severely, we must nevertheless recognise them for such as they really are. We must be content with every one, who announces any scheme of life, whatever it be, coming within the limits of intelligence, and who pursues his work with persevering resolution.[69] [Footnote 67: Plat. Euthyd. p. 305 D. [Greek: ei)=nai me\n ga\r tê=| a)lêthei/a| spha=s sophôta/tous, e)n de\ toi=s i)di/ois lo/gois o(/tan a)polêphthô=sin, u(po\ tô=n a)mphi\ Eu)thu/dêmon kolou/esthai.] [Greek: Oi( a)mphi\ Eu)thu/dêmon] may mean Euthydêmus himself and alone; yet I incline to think that it here means Euthydêmus and his like.] [Footnote 68: Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 B.] [Footnote 69: Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 C. [Greek: suggignô/skein me\n ou)=n au)toi=s chrê\ tê=s e)pithumi/as kai\ mê\ chalepai/nein, ê(gei=sthai me/ntoi toiou/tous ei)=nai oi(=oi/ ei)si; pa/nta ga\r a)/ndra chrê\ a)gapa=|n, o(/stis kai\ o(tiou=n le/gei e)cho/menon phronê/seôs pra=gma, kai\ a)ndrei/ôs diaponei=tai.]] [Side-note: Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his sons--Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher--tells him to search for himself.] _Krit._ I am always telling you, Sokrates, that I too am embarrassed where to seek instructors for my sons. Conversation with you has satisfied me, that it is madness to bestow so much care upon the fortune and position of sons, and so little upon their instruction. Yet when I turn my eyes to the men who make profession of instructing, I am really astonished. To tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me extravagantly absurd,[70] so that I know not how to help forward my son towards philosophy. _Sokr._--Don't you know, Kriton, that in every different pursuit, most of the professors are foolish and worthless, and that a few only are excellent and above price? Is not this the case with gymnastic, commercial business, rhetoric, military command? Are not most of those who undertake these pursuits ridiculously silly?[71] _Krit._--Unquestionably: nothing can be more true. _Sokr._--Do you think _that_ a sufficient reason for avoiding all these pursuits yourself, and keeping your son out of them also? _Krit._ No: it would be wrong to do so. _Sokr._--Well then, don't do so. Take no heed about the professors of philosophy, whether they are good or bad; but test philosophy itself, well and carefully. If it shall appear to you worthless, dissuade not merely your sons, but every one else also, from following it.[72] But if it shall appear to you as valuable as I consider it to be, then take courage to pursue and practise it, you and your children both, according to the proverb.-- [Footnote 70: Plato, Euthyd. p. 306 E. [Greek: kai/ moi dokei= ei)=s e(/kastos au)tô=n skopou=nti pa/nu a)llo/kotos ei)=nai], &c.] [Footnote 71: Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 B. [Greek: e)n e(ka/stê| tou/tôn tou\s pollou\s pro\s e(/kaston to\ e)/rgon ou) katagela/stous o(ra=|s?]] [Footnote 72: Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 B. [Greek: e)a/sas chai/rein tou\s e)pitêdeu/ontas philosophi/an, ei)/te chrêstoi/ ei)sin ei)/te ponêroi/, au)to\ to\ pra=gma basani/sas kalô=s te kai\ eu)=, e)a\n me/n soi phai/nêtai phaulo\n o)/n], &c.] [Side-note: Euthydêmus is here cited as representative of Dialectic and philosophy.] The first part of this epilogue, which I have here given in abridgment, has a bearing very different from the rest of the dialogue, and different also from most of the other Platonic dialogues. In the epilogue, Euthydêmus is cited as the representative of true dialectic and philosophy: the opponents of philosophy are represented as afraid of being put down by Euthydêmus: whereas, previously, he had been depicted as contemptible,--as a man whose manner of refuting opponents was more discreditable to himself than to the opponent refuted; and who had no chance of success except among hearers like himself. We are not here told that Euthydêmus was a bad specimen of philosophers, and that there were others better, by the standard of whom philosophy ought to be judged. On the contrary, we find him here announced by Sokrates as among those dreaded by men adverse to philosophy,--and as not undeserving of that epithet which the semi-philosopher cited by Kriton applies to "one of the most powerful champions of the day". Plato, therefore, after having applied his great dramatic talent to make dialectic debate ridiculous, and thus said much to gratify its enemies--changes his battery, and says something against these enemies, without reflecting whether it is consistent or no with what had preceded. Before the close, however, he comes again into consistency with the tone of the earlier part, in the observation which he assigns to Kriton, that most of the professors of philosophy are worthless; to which Sokrates rejoins that this is not less true of all other professions. The concluding inference is, that philosophy is to be judged, not by its professors but by itself; and that Kriton must examine it for himself, and either pursue it or leave it alone, according as his own convictions dictated. This is a valuable admonition, and worthy of Sokrates, laying full stress as it does upon the conscientious conviction which the person examining may form for himself. But it is no answer to the question of Kriton; who says that he had already heard from Sokrates, and was himself convinced, that philosophy was of first-rate importance--and that he only desired to learn where he could find teachers to forward the progress of his son in it. As in so many other dialogues, Plato leaves the problem started, but unsolved. The impulse towards philosophy being assured, those who feel it ask Plato in what direction they are to move towards it. He gives no answer. He can neither perform the service himself, nor recommend any one else, as competent. We shall find such silence made matter of pointed animadversion, in the fragment called Kleitophon. [Side-note: Who is the person here intended by Plato, half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates?] The person, whom Kriton here brings forward as the censor of Sokrates and the enemy of philosophy, is peculiarly marked. In general, the persons whom Plato ranks as enemies of philosophy are the rhetors and politicians: but the example here chosen is not comprised in either of these classes: it is a semi-philosopher, yet a writer of discourses for others. Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Spengel, suppose that Isokrates is the person intended: Winckelmann thinks it is Thrasymachus: others refer it to Lysias, or Theodorus of Byzantium:[73] Socher and Stallbaum doubt whether any special person is intended, or any thing beyond some supposed representative of a class described by attributes. I rather agree with those who refer the passage to Isokrates. He might naturally be described as one steering a middle course between philosophy and rhetoric: which in fact he himself proclaims in the Oration De Permutatione, and which agrees with the language of Plato in the dialogue Phædrus, where Isokrates is mentioned by name along with Lysias. In the Phædrus, moreover, Plato speaks of Isokrates with unusual esteem, especially as a favourable contrast with Lysias, and as a person who, though not yet a philosopher, may be expected to improve, so as in no long time to deserve that appellation.[74] We must remember that Plato in the Phædrus attacks by name, and with considerable asperity, first Lysias, next Theodorus and Thrasymachus the rhetors--all three persons living and of note. Being sure to offend all these, Plato might well feel disposed to avoid making an enemy of Isokrates at the same time, and to except him honourably by name from the vulgar professors of rhetoric. In the Euthydêmus (where the satire is directed not against the rhetors, but against their competitors the dialecticians or pseudo-dialecticians) he had no similar motive to address compliments to Isokrates: respecting whom he speaks in a manner probably more conformable to his real sentiments, as the unnamed representative of a certain type of character--a semi-philosopher, fancying himself among the first men in Athens, and assuming unwarrantable superiority over the genuine philosopher; but entitled to nothing more than a decent measure of esteem, such as belonged to sincere mediocrity of intelligence. [Footnote 73: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyd. p. 47; Winckelmann. Proleg. p. xxxv. Heindorf, in endeavouring to explain the difference between Plato's language in the Phædrus and in the Euthydêmus respecting Isokrates, assumes as a matter beyond question the theory of Schleiermacher, that the Phædrus was composed during Plato's early years. I have already intimated my may dissent from this theory.] [Footnote 74: Plato, Phædrus, p. 278 E. I have already observed that I do not agree with Schleiermacher and the other critics who rank the Phædrus as the earliest or even among the earliest compositions of Plato. That it is of much later composition I am persuaded, but of what particular date can only be conjectured. The opinion of K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, and others, that it was composed about the time when Plato began his school at Athens (387-386 B.C.) is sufficiently probable. The Euthydêmus may be earlier or may be later than the Phædrus. I incline to think it later. The opinion of Stallbaum (resting upon the mention of Alkibiadês, p. 275 A), that it was composed in or before 404 B.C., appears to me untenable (Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 64). Plato would not be likely to introduce Sokrates speaking of Alkibiadês as a deceased person, whatever time the dialogue was composed. Nor can I agree with Steinhart, who refers it to 402 B.C. (Einleitung, p. 26). Ueberweg (Untersuch. über die Zeitfolge der Plat. Schr. pp. 265-267) considers the Euthydêmus later (but not much later) than the Phædrus, subsequent to the establishment of the Platonic school at Athens (387-386 B.C.) This seems to me more probable than the contrary. Schleiermacher, in arranging the Platonic dialogues, ranks the Euthydêmus as an immediate sequel to the Menon, and as presupposing both Gorgias and Theætêtus (Einl. pp. 400-401). Socher agrees in this opinion, but Steinhart rejects it (Einleit. p. 26), placing the Euthydêmus immediately after the Protagoras, and immediately before the Menon and the Gorgias; according to him, Euthydêmus, Menon, and Gorgias, form a well marked Trilogy. Neither of these arrangements rests upon any sufficient reasons. The chronological order cannot be determined.] [Side-note: Variable feeling at different times, between Plato and Isokrates.] That there prevailed at different times different sentiments, more or less of reciprocal esteem or reciprocal jealousy, between Plato and Isokrates, ought not to be matter of surprise. Both of them were celebrated teachers of Athens, each in his own manner, during the last forty years of Plato's life: both of them enjoyed the favour of foreign princes, and received pupils from outlying, sometimes distant, cities--from Bosphorus and Cyprus in the East, and from Sicily in the West. We know moreover that during the years immediately preceding Plato's death (347 B.C.), his pupil Aristotle, then rising into importance as a teacher of rhetoric, was engaged in acrimonious literary warfare, seemingly of his own seeking, with Isokrates (then advanced in years) and some of the Isokratean pupils. The little which we learn concerning the literary and philosophical world of Athens, represents it as much distracted by feuds and jealousies. Isokrates on his part has in his compositions various passages which appear to allude (no name being mentioned) to Plato among others, in a tone of depreciation.[75] [Footnote 75: Isokrates, ad Philipp. Or. v. s. 14, p. 84; contra Sophistas, Or. xiii.; Or. xiii. s. 2-24, pp. 291-295; Encom. Helenæ, Or. x. init.; Panathenaic. Or. xii. s. 126, p. 257; Or. xv. De Permutatione, s. 90, p. 440, Bekk.] Isokrates seems, as far as we can make out, to have been in early life, like Lysias, a composer of speeches to be spoken by clients in the Dikastery. This lucrative profession was tempting, since his family had been nearly ruined during the misfortunes of Athens at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Having gained reputation by such means, Isokrates became in his mature age a teacher of Rhetoric, and a composer of discourses, not for private use by clients, but for the general reader, on political or educational topics. In this character, he corresponded to the description given by Plato in the Euthydêmus: being partly a public adviser, partly a philosopher. But the general principle under which Plato here attacks him, though conforming to the doctrine of the Platonic Republic, is contrary to that of Plato in other dialogues, "You must devote yourself either wholly to philosophy, or wholly to politics: a mixture of the two is worse than either"--this agrees with the Republic, wherein Plato enjoins upon each man one special and exclusive pursuit, as well as with the doctrine maintained against Kalliklês in the Gorgias--but it differs from the Phædrus, where he ascribes the excellence of Perikles as a statesmen and rhetor, to the fact of his having acquired a large tincture of philosophy.[76] Cicero quotes this last passage as applicable to his own distinguished career, a combination of philosophy with politics.[77] He dissented altogether from the doctrine here laid down by Plato in the Euthydêmus, and many other eminent men would have dissented from it also. [Footnote 76: See the facts about Isokrates in a good Dissertation by H. P. Schröder, Utrecht, 1859, Quæstiones Isocrateæ, p. 51, seq. Plato, Phædrus, p. 270; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 23; Plato, Republic, iii. p. 397.] [Footnote 77: Cicero, De Orator. iii. 34, 138; Orator. iv. 14; Brutus, 11, 44.] As a doctrine of universal application, in fact, it cannot be defended. The opposite scheme of life (which is maintained by Isokrates in De Permutatione and by Kalliklês in the Platonic Gorgias)[78]--that philosophy is to be attentively studied in the earlier years of life as an intellectual training, to arm the mind with knowledge and capacities which may afterwards be applied to the active duties of life--is at least equally defensible, and suits better for other minds of a very high order. Not only Xenophon and other distinguished Greeks, but also most of the best Roman citizens, held the opinion which Plato in the Gorgias ascribes to Kalliklês and reprobates through the organ of Sokrates--That philosophical study, if prolonged beyond what was necessary for this purpose of adequate intellectual training, and if made the permanent occupation of life, was more hurtful than beneficial.[79] Certainly, a man may often fail in the attempt to combine philosophy with active politics. No one failed in such a career more lamentably than Dion, the friend of Plato--and Plato himself, when he visited Sicily to second Dion. Moreover Alkibiadês and Kritias were cited by Anytus and the other accusers of Sokrates as examples of the like mischievous conjunction. But on the other hand, Archytas at Tarentum (another friend of Plato and philosopher) administered his native city with success, as long (seemingly) as Periklês administered Athens. Such men as these two are nowise inferior either to the special philosopher or to the special politician. Plato has laid down an untenable generality, in this passage of the Euthydêmus, in order to suit a particular point which he wished to make against Isokrates, or against the semi-philosopher indicated, whoever else he may have been. [Footnote 78: Isokrates, De Permutatione, Or. xv. sect. 278-288, pp. 485-480, Bekk.; Plato, Gorgias, pp. 484-485.] [Footnote 79: The half-philosophers and half-politicians to whom Sokrates here alludes, are characterised by one of the Platonic critics as "jene oberflächlichen und schwächlichen Naturen die sich zwischen beiden Richtungen stellen, und zur Erreichung selbstsüchtiger und beschränkter Zwecke von beiden aufnehmen was sie verstehen und was ihnen gefällt" (Steinhart, Einleit. p. 25). On the other hand we find in Tacitus a striking passage respecting the studies of Agricola in his youth at Massilia. "Memoriâ teneo, solitum ipsum narrare, se in primâ juventâ studium philosophiæ acrius, ultra quam concessum Romano ac senatori, hausisse--ni prudentia matris incensum ac flagrantem animum exercuisset: Scilicet sublime et erectum ingenium, pulchritudinem ac speciem excelsæ magnæque gloriæ vehementius quam lauté appetebat: retinuitque, quod est difficillimum, ex sapientiâ modum" (Vit. Agr. c. 4). Tacitus expresses himself in the same manner about the purpose with which Helvidius Priscus applied himself to philosophy (Hist. iv. 6): "non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo constantior adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret". Compare also the memorable passage in the Funeral Oration pronounced by Periklês (Thuc. ii. 40)--[Greek: philosophou=men a)/neu malaki/as], &c., which exhibits the like views. Aulus Gellius (x. 22), who cites the doctrine which Plato ascribes to Kalliklês in the Gorgias (about the propriety of confining philosophy to the function of training and preparation for active pursuits), tries to make out that this was Plato's own opinion.] CHAPTER XXII. MENON. [Side-note: Persons of the Dialogue.] This dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Menon, a man of noble family, wealth, and political influence, in the Thessalian city of Larissa. He is supposed to have previously frequented, in his native city, the lectures and society of the rhetor Gorgias.[1] The name and general features of Menon are probably borrowed from the Thessalian military officer, who commanded a division of the Ten Thousand Greeks, and whose character Xenophon depicts in the Anabasis: but there is nothing in the Platonic dialogue to mark that meanness and perfidy which the Xenophontic picture indicates. The conversation between Sokrates and Menon is interrupted by two episodes: in the first of these, Sokrates questions an unlettered youth, the slave of Menon: in the second, he is brought into conflict with Anytus, the historical accuser of the historical Sokrates. [Footnote 1: Cicero notices Isokrates as having heard Gorgias in Thessaly (Orator. 53, 176).] The dialogue is begun by Menon, in a manner quite as abrupt as the Hipparchus and Minos: [Side-note: Question put by Menon--Is virtue teachable? Sokrates confesses that he does not know what virtue is. Surprise of Menon.] _Menon._--Can you tell me, Sokrates, whether virtue is teachable--or acquirable by exercise--or whether it comes by nature--or in what other manner it comes? _Sokr._--I cannot answer your question. I am ashamed to say that I do not even know what virtue is: and when I do not know what a thing is, how can I know any thing about its attributes or accessories? A man who does not know, Menon, cannot tell whether he is handsome, rich, &c., or the contrary. _Menon._--Certainly not. But is it really true, Sokrates, that you do not know what virtue is? Am I to proclaim this respecting you, when I go home?[2] _Sokr._--Yes--undoubtedly: and proclaim besides that I have never yet met with any one who _did_ know. _Menon._--What! have you not seen Gorgias at Athens, and did not he appear to you to know? _Sokr._--I have met him, but I do not quite recollect what he said. We need not consider what he said, since he is not here to answer for himself.[3] But you doubtless recollect, and can tell me, both from yourself, and from him, what virtue is? _Menon._--There is _no difficulty_ in telling you.[4] [Footnote 2: Plato, Menon, p. 71 B-C. [Greek: A)lla\ su/, ô)= Sô/krates, ou)d' o(/ ti a)retê/ e)stin oi)=stha, a)lla\ tau=ta peri\ sou= kai\ oi)/kade a)pagge/llômen?]] [Footnote 3: Plato, Menon, p. 71 D. [Greek: a)kei=non me/ntoi nu=n e)ô=men, e)peidê\ kai\ a)/pestin.] Sokrates sets little value upon opinions unless where the person giving them is present to explain and defend: compare what he says about the uselessness of citation from poets, from whom you can ask no questions, Plato, Protagor. p. 347 E.] [Footnote 4: Plato, Menon, p. 71 E. [Greek: A)ll' ou) chalepo/n, ô)= Sô/krates, ei)pei=n], &c.] [Side-note: Sokrates stands alone in this confession. Unpopularity entailed by it.] Many commentators here speak as if such disclaimer on the part of Sokrates had reference merely to certain impudent pretensions to universal knowledge on the part of the Sophists. But this (as I have before remarked) is a misconception of the Sokratic or Platonic point of view. The matter which Sokrates proclaims that _he_ does not know, is, what, not Sophists alone, but every one else also, professes to know well. Sokrates stands alone in avowing that he does not know it, and that he can find no one else who knows. Menon treats the question as one of no difficulty--one on which confessed ignorance was discreditable. "What!" says Menon, "am I really to state respecting you, that you do not know what virtue is?" The man who makes such a confession will be looked upon by his neighbours with surprise and displeasure--not to speak of probable consequences yet worse. He is one whom the multifarious agencies employed by King Nomos (which we shall find described more at length in the Protagoras) have failed to mould into perfect and uninquiring conformity, and he is still in process of examination to form a judgment for himself. [Side-note: Answer of Menon--plurality of virtues, one belonging to each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the property common to all of them.] Menon proceeds to answer that there are many virtues: the virtue of a man--competence to transact the business of the city, and in such business to benefit his friends and injure his enemies: the virtue of a woman--to administer the house well, preserving every thing within it and obeying her husband: the virtue of a child, of an old man, a slave, &c. There is in short a virtue--and its contrary, a vice--belonging to each of us in every work, profession, and age.[5] [Footnote 5: Plato, Menon, p. 72 A. [Greek: kath' e(ka/stên ga\r tô=n pra/xeôn kai\ tô=n ê(likô=n pro\s e(/kaston e)/rgon e(ka/stô| ê(mô=n ê( a)retê/ e)stin. ô(sau/tôs de\ kai\ ê( kaki/a.] Though Sokrates disapproves this method of answering--[Greek: to\ e)xarithmei=n ta\s a)reta/s] (to use the expression of Aristotle)--yet Aristotle seems to think it better than searching for one general definition. See Politica, i. 13, p. 1260, a. 15-30, where he has the Platonic Menon in his mind.] But (replies Sokrates) are they not all the same, _quatenus_ virtue? Health, _quatenus_ Health, is the same in a man or a woman: is not the case similar with virtue? _Menon._--Not exactly similar. _Sokr._--How so? Though there are many diverse virtues, have not all of them one and the same form in common, through the communion of which they _are_ virtues? In answer to my question, you ought to declare what this common form is. Thus, both the man who administers the city, and the woman who administers the house, must act both of them with justice and moderation. Through the same qualities, both the one and the other are good. There is thus some common constituent: tell me what it is, according to you and Gorgias? _Menon._--It is to be competent to exercise command over men.[6] _Sokr._--But that will not suit for the virtue of a child or a slave. Moreover, must we not superadd the condition, to command justly, and not unjustly? _Menon._--I think so: justice is virtue. _Sokr._--Is it virtue--or is it one particular variety of virtue?[7] _Menon._--How do you mean? _Sokr._--Just as if I were to say about roundness, that it is not figure, but a particular variety of figure: because there are other figures besides roundness. _Menon._--Very true: I say too, that there are other virtues besides justice--namely, courage, moderation, wisdom, magnanimity, and several others also. _Sokr._--We are thus still in the same predicament. In looking for one virtue, we have found many; but we cannot find that one form which runs through them all. _Menon._--I cannot at present tell what that one is.[8] [Footnote 6: Plato, Menon, p. 73 D.] [Footnote 7: Plato, Menon, p. 73 E. [Greek: Po/teron a)retê/, ô)= Me/nôn, ê)\ a)retê/ tis?]] [Footnote 8: Plato, Menon, p. 74 A. [Greek: ou) ga\r du/namai/ pô, ô)= Sô/krates, ô(s su\ zêtei=s, mi/an a)retê\n labei=n kata\ pa/ntôn.]] [Side-note: Analogous cases cited--definitions of figure and colour.] Sokrates proceeds to illustrate his meaning by the analogies of figure and colour. You call _round_ a figure, and _square_ a figure: you call _white_ and _black_ both colour, the one as much as the other, though they are unlike and even opposite.[9] Tell me, What is this same common figure and property in both, which makes you call both of them figure--both of them colour? Take this as a preliminary exercise, in order to help you in answering my enquiry about virtue.[10] Menon cannot answer, and Sokrates answers his own question. He gives a general definition, first of figure, next of colour. He first defines figure in a way which implies colour to be known. This is pointed out; and he then admits that in a good definition, suitable to genuine dialectical investigation, nothing should be implied as known, except what the respondent admits himself to know. Figure and colour are both defined suitably to this condition.[11] [Footnote 9: Plato, Menon, p. 74 D.] [Footnote 10: Plato, Menon, c. 7, pp. 74-75. [Greek: Peirô= ei)pei=n, i(/na kai\ ge/nêtai/ soi mele/tê pro\s tê\n peri\ tê=s a)retê=s a)po/krisin] (75 A). The purpose of practising the respondent is here distinctly announced.] [Footnote 11: Plato, Menon, p. 75 C-E.] [Side-note: Importance at that time of bringing into conscious view, logical subordination and distinctions--Neither logic nor grammar had then been cast into system.] All this preliminary matter seems to be intended for the purpose of getting the question clearly conceived as a general question--of exhibiting and eliminating the narrow and partial conceptions which unconsciously substitute themselves in the mind, in place of that which ought to be conceived as a generic whole--and of clearing up what is required in a good definition. A generic whole, including various specific portions distinguishable from each other, was at that time little understood by any one. There existed no grammar, nor any rules of logic founded on analysis of the intellectual processes. To predicate of the genus what was true only of the species--to predicate as distinctively characterizing the species, what is true of the whole genus in which it is contained--to lose the integrity of the genus in its separate parcels or fragments[12]--these were errors which men had never yet been expressly taught to avoid. To assign the one common meaning, constituent of or connoted by a generic term, had never yet been put before them as a problem. Such preliminary clearing of the ground is instructive even now, when formal and systematic logic has become more or less familiar: but in the time of Plato, it must have been indispensably required, to arrive at a full conception of any general question.[13] [Footnote 12: Plato, Menon, p. 79 A. [Greek: e)mou= deêthe/ntos sou mê\ katagnu/mai mêde\ kermati/zein tê\n a)retên], &c. 79 B: [Greek: e)mou= deêthe/ntos o(/lên ei)pei=n tê\n a)retê/n], &c.] [Footnote 13: These examples of trial, error, and exposure, have great value and reflect high credit on Plato, when we regard them as an intellectual or propædeutic discipline, forcing upon hearers an attention to useful logical distinctions at a time when there existed no systematic grammar or logic. But surely they must appear degraded, as they are presented in the Prolegomena of Stallbaum, and by some other critics. We are there told that Plato's main purpose in this dialogue was to mock and jeer the Sophists and their pupil, and that for this purpose Sokrates is made to employ not his own arguments but arguments borrowed from the Sophists themselves--"ut callidé suam ipsius rationem occultare existimandus sit, quo magis illudat Sophistarum alumnum" (p. 15). "Quæ quidem argumentatio" (that of Sokrates) "admodum cavendum est ne pro Socraticâ vel Platonicâ accipiatur. Est enim prorsus ad mentem Sophistarum aliorumque id genus hominum comparata," &c. (p. 16). Compare pp. 12-13 seq. The Sophists undoubtedly had no distinct consciousness, any more than other persons, of these logical distinctions, which were then for the first pressed forcibly upon attention.] [Side-note: Definition of virtue given by Menon: Sokrates pulls it to pieces.] Menon having been thus made to understand the formal requisites for a definition, gives as his definition of virtue the phrase of some lyric poet--"To delight in, or desire, things beautiful, fine, honourable--and to have the power of getting them". But Sokrates remarks that honourable things are good things, and that every one without exception desires good. No one desires evil except when he mistakes it for good. On this point all men are alike; the distinctive feature of virtue must then consist in the second half of the definition--in the power of acquiring good things, such as health, wealth, money, power, dignities, &c.[14] But the acquisition of these things is not virtuous, unless it be made consistently with justice and moderation: moreover the man who acts justly is virtuous, even though he does not acquire them. It appears then that every agent who acts with justice and moderation is virtuous. But this is nugatory as a definition of virtue: for justice and moderation are only known as parts of virtue, and require to be themselves defined. No man can know what a part of virtue is, unless he knows what virtue itself is.[15] Menon must look for a better definition, including nothing but what is already known or admitted. [Footnote 14: Plato, Menon, p. 77 B. [Greek: dokei= toi/nun moi a)retê\ ei)=nai, katha/per o( poiêtê\s le/gei, chai/rein te kaloi=si kai\ du/nasthai. Kai\ e)gô\ tou=to le/gô a)retê\n e)pithumou=nta tô=n kalô=n dunato\n ei)=nai pori/zesthai.] Whoever this lyric poet was, his real meaning is somewhat twisted by Sokrates in order to furnish a basis for ethical criticism, as the song of Simonides is in the Protagoras. A person having power, and taking delight in honourable or beautiful things--is a very intelligible Hellenic idéal, as an object of envy and admiration. Compare Protagoras, p. 351 C: [Greek: ei)/per toi=s kaloi=s zô/|ê ê(do/menos.] A poor man may be [Greek: philo/kalos] as well as a rich man: [Greek: philokalou=men met' eu)telei/as], is the boast of Periklês in the name of the Athenians, Thucyd. ii. 40. Plato, Menon, p. 78 C. _Sokr._ [Greek: A)gatha\ de\ kalei=s ou)chi oi(=on u(gi/eia/n te kai\ plou=ton? kai\ chrusi/on le/gô kai\ a)rgu/rion kta=sthai kai\ tima\s e)n po/lei kai\ a)rcha/s? mê\ a)/ll' a)/tta le/geis ta)gatha\ ê)\ ta\ toiau=ta?] _Menon._ [Greek: Ou)k; a)lla\ pa/nta le/gô ta\ toiau=ta.]] [Footnote 15: Plato, Menon, p. 79.] [Side-note: Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds him like an electric shock--Sokrates replies that he is himself in the same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of search by both.] _Menon._--Your conversation, Sokrates, produces the effect of the shock of the torpedo: you stun and confound me: you throw me into inextricable perplexity, so that I can make no answer. I have often discoursed copiously--and, as I thought, effectively--upon virtue; but now you have shown that I do not even know what virtue is. _Sokr._--If I throw you into perplexity, it is only because I am myself in the like perplexity and ignorance. I do not know what virtue is, any more than you: and I shall be glad to continue the search for finding it, if you will assist me. [Side-note: But how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man searches for what he already knows: and for what he does not know, it is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he has found it.] _Menon._--But how are you to search for that of which you are altogether ignorant? Even if you do find it, how can you ever know that you have found it? _Sokr._--You are now introducing a troublesome doctrine, laid down by those who are averse to the labour of thought. They tell us that a man cannot search either for what he knows, or for what he does not know. For the former, research is superfluous: for the latter it is unprofitable and purposeless, since the searcher does not know what he is looking for. [Side-note: Theory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates--anterior immortality of the soul--what is called teaching is the revival and recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten.] I do not believe this doctrine (continues Sokrates). Priests, priestesses, and poets (Pindar among them) tell us, that the mind of man is immortal and has existed throughout all past time, in conjunction with successive bodies; alternately abandoning one body, or dying--and taking up new life or reviving in another body. In this perpetual succession of existences, it has seen every thing,--both here and in Hades and everywhere else--and has learnt every thing. But though thus omniscient, it has forgotten the larger portion of its knowledge. Yet what has been thus forgotten may again be revived. What we call learning, is such revival. It is reminiscence of something which the mind had seen in a former state of existence, and knew, but had forgotten. Since then all the parts of nature are analogous, or cognate--and since the mind has gone through and learnt them all--we cannot wonder that the revival of any one part should put it upon the track of recovering for itself all the rest, both about virtue and about every thing else, if a man will only persevere in intent meditation. All research and all learning is thus nothing but reminiscence. In our researches, we are not looking for what we do not know: we are looking for what we do know, but have forgotten. There is therefore ample motive, and ample remuneration, for prosecuting enquiries: and your doctrine which pronounces them to be unprofitable, is incorrect.[16] [Footnote 16: Plato, Menon, pp. 81 C-D. [Greek: A(=te ou)=n ê( psuchê\ a)tha/nato/s te ou)=sa kai\ polla/kis gegonui=a, kai\ e(ôrakui=a kai\ ta\ e)ntha/de kai\ ta\ e)n Ai)/dou kai\ pa/nta chrê/mata, ou)k e)/stin o(/ ti ou) mema/thêken; ô(/ste ou)de\n thaumasto\n kai\ peri\ a)retê=s kai\ peri\ a)/llôn oi(=o/n te ei)=nai au)tê\n a)namnêsthê=nai a(/ ge kai\ pro/teron ê)pi/stato. A(=te ga\r tê=s phu/seôs a(pa/sês suggenou=s ou)/sês kai\ memathêkui/as tê=s psuchê=s a(/panta, ou)de\n kôlu/ei e(\n mo/non a)namnêsthe/nta, o(\ dê\ ma/thêsin kalou=sin a)/nthrôpoi, ta)/lla pa/nta au)to\n a)neurei=n, e)a/n tis a)ndrei=os ê)=| kai\ mê\ a)poka/mnê| zêtô=n. To\ ga\r zêtei=n a)/ra kai\ to\ mantha/nein a)na/mnêsis o(/lon e)sti/n.]] [Side-note: Illustration of this theory--knowledge may be revived by skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught. Sokrates questions the slave of Menon.] Sokrates proceeds to illustrate the position, just laid down, by cross-examining Menon's youthful slave, who, though wholly untaught and having never heard any mention of geometry, is brought by a proper series of questions to give answers out of his own mind, furnishing the solution of a geometrical problem. The first part of the examination brings him to a perception of the difficulty, and makes him feel a painful perplexity, from which he desires to obtain relief:[17] the second part guides his mind in the efforts necessary for fishing up a solution out of its own pre-existing, but forgotten, stores. True opinions, which he had long had within him without knowing it, are awakened by interrogation, and become cognitions. From the fact that the mind thus possesses the truth of things which it has not acquired in this life, Sokrates infers that it must have gone through a pre-existence of indefinite duration, or must be immortal.[18] [Footnote 17: Plato, Menon, p. 84 C. [Greek: Oi)/ei ou)=n a)\n au)to\n pro/teron e)picheirê=sai zêtei=n ê)\ mantha/nein tou=to o(\ ô)=|eto ei)de/nai ou)k ei)dô/s, pri\n ei)s a)pori/an kate/pesen ê(gêsa/menos mê\ ei)de/nai, kai\ e)po/thêse to\ ei)de/nai? Ou)/ moi dokei=. Ô)/nêto a)/ra narkê/sas?]] [Footnote 18: Plato, Menon, p. 86. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei) a)ei\ ê( a)lê/theia ê(mi=n tô=n o)/ntôn e)sti\n e)n tê=| psuchê=|, a)tha/natos a)\n ê( psuchê\ ei)/ê?]] [Side-note: Enquiry taken up--Whether virtue is teachable? without determining what virtue is.] The former topic of enquiry is now resumed: but at the instance of Menon, the question taken up, is not--"What is virtue?" but--"Is virtue teachable or not?" Sokrates, after renewing his objection against the inversion of philosophical order by discussing the second question without having determined the first, enters upon the discussion hypothetically, assuming as a postulate, that nothing can be taught except knowledge. The question then stands thus--"Is virtue knowledge?" If it be, it can be taught: if not, it cannot be taught.[19] [Footnote 19: Plato, Menon, p. 87.] [Side-note: Virtue is knowledge--no possessions, no attributes, either of mind or body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance of knowledge.] Sokrates proceeds to prove that virtue is knowledge, or a mode of knowledge. Virtue is good: all good things are profitable. But none of the things accounted good are profitable, unless they be rightly employed; that is, employed with knowledge or intelligence. This is true not only of health, wealth, beauty, strength, power, &c., but also of the mental attributes justice, moderation, courage, quick apprehension, &c. All of these are profitable, and therefore good, if brought into action under knowledge or right intelligence; none of them are profitable or good, without this condition--which is therefore the distinctive constituent of virtue.[20] [Footnote 20: Plato, Menon, p. 89.] Virtue, therefore, being knowledge or a mode of knowledge, cannot come by nature, but must be teachable. [Side-note: Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No teachers of it can be found.] Yet again there are other contrary reasons (he proceeds) which prove that it cannot be teachable. For if it were so, there would be distinct and assignable teachers and learners of it, and the times and places could be pointed out where it is taught and learnt. We see that this is the case with all arts and professions. But in regard to virtue, there are neither recognised teachers, nor learners, nor years of learning. The Sophists pretend to be teachers of it, but are not:[21] the leading and esteemed citizens of the community do not pretend to be teachers of it, and are indeed incompetent to teach it even to their own sons--as the character of those sons sufficiently proves.[22] [Footnote 21: Plato, Menon, p. 92.] [Footnote 22: Plato, Menon, p. 97. Isokrates (adv. Sophistas, s. 25, p. 401) expressly declares that he does not believe [Greek: ô(/s e)sti dikaiosu/nê didakto/n]. There is no [Greek: te/chnê] which can teach it, if a man be [Greek: kakô=s pephukô/s]. But if a man be well-disposed, then education in [Greek: lo/goi politikoi/] will serve [Greek: sumparakeleu/sasthai/ ge kai\ sunaskê=sai]. For a man to announce himself as a teacher of justice or virtue, was an unpopular and invidious pretension. Isokrates is anxious to guard himself against such unpopularity.] [Side-note: Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can teach virtue.] Here, a new speaker is introduced into the dialogue--Anytus, one of the accusers of Sokrates before the Dikastery. The conversation is carried on for some time between Sokrates and him. Anytus denies altogether that the Sophists are teachers of virtue, and even denounces them with bitter contempt and wrath. But he maintains that the leading and esteemed citizens of the state do really teach it. Anytus however presently breaks off in a tone of displeasure and menace towards Sokrates himself.[23] The conversation is then renewed with Menon, and it is shown that the leading politicians cannot be considered as teachers of virtue, any more than the Sophists. There exist no teachers of it; and therefore we must conclude that it is not teachable. [Footnote 23: Plato, Menon, p. 94 E.] [Side-note: Confused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring virtue is shown.] The state of the discussion as it stands now, is represented by two hypothetical syllogisms, as follows: 1. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable: But virtue is knowledge: Therefore virtue is teachable. 2. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable: But virtue is not teachable: Therefore virtue is not knowledge. The premisses of each of these two syllogisms contradict the conclusion of the other. Both cannot be true. If virtue is not acquired by teaching and does not come by nature, how are there any virtuous men? [Side-note: Sokrates modifies his premisses--knowledge is not the only thing which guides to good results--right opinion will do the same.] Sokrates continues his argument: The second premiss of the first syllogism--that virtue is knowledge--is true, but not the whole truth. In proving it we assumed that there was nothing except knowledge which guided us to useful and profitable consequences. But this assumption will not hold. There is something else besides knowledge, which also guides us to the same useful results. That something is _right opinion_, which is quite different from knowledge. The man who holds right opinions is just as profitable to us, and guides us quite as well to right actions, as if he knew. Right opinions, so long as they stay in the mind, are as good as knowledge, for the purpose of guidance in practice. But the difference is, that they are evanescent and will not stay in the mind: while knowledge is permanent and ineffaceable. They are exalted into knowledge, when bound in the mind by a chain of causal reasoning:[24] that is, by the process of reminiscence, before described. [Footnote 24: Plato, Menon, pp. 97 E--98 A. [Greek: kai\ ga\r ai( do/xai ai( a)lêthei=s, o(/son me\n a)\n chro/non parame/nôsin, kalo/n ti chrê=ma kai\ pa/nta ta)gatha\ e)rga/zontai; polu\n de\ chro/non ou)k e)the/lousi parame/nein, a)lla\ drapeteu/ousin e)k tê=s psuchê=s tou= a)nthrô/pou. ô(/ste ou) pollou= a)/xiai/ ei)sin, _e(/ôs a)\n tis au)ta\s dê/sê| ai)ti/as logismô=|_; tou=to d' e)sti\n _a)na/mnêsis_, ô(s e)n toi=s pro/sthen ê(mi=n ô(molo/gêtai.]] [Side-note: Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind, and can never give rational explanations, nor teach others--good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the Gods.] Virtue then (continues Sokrates)--that which constitutes the virtuous character and the permanent, trustworthy, useful guide--consists in knowledge. But there is also right opinion, a sort of _quasi-knowledge_, which produces in practice effects as good as knowledge, only that it is not deeply or permanently fixed in the mind.[25] It is this right opinion, or _quasi-knowledge_, which esteemed and distinguished citizens possess, and by means of which they render useful service to the city. That they do not possess knowledge, is certain; for if they did, they would be able to teach it to others, and especially to their own sons: and this it has been shown that they cannot do.[26] They deliver true opinions and predictions, and excellent advice, like prophets and oracular ministers, by divine inspiration and possession, without knowledge or wisdom of their own. They are divine and inspired persons, but not wise or knowing.[27] [Footnote 25: Plato, Menon, p. 99 A. [Greek: ô(=| de\ a)/nthrôpos ê(gemô/n e)stin e)pi\ to\ o)rtho/n, du/o tau=ta, do/xa a)lêthê\s kai\ e)pistê/mê.]] [Footnote 26: Plato, Menon, p. 99 B. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra sophi/a tini\ ou)de\ sophoi\ o)/ntes oi( toiou=toi a)/ndres ê(gou=nto tai=s po/lesin, oi( a)mphi\ Themistokle/a. . . . dio\ kai\ ou)ch oi(=oi/ te a)/llous poiei=n toiou/tous oi(=oi au)toi/ ei)sin, a(/te ou) di' e)pistê/mên o)/ntes toiou=toi.]] [Footnote 27: Plato, Menon, p. 99 D. [Greek: kai\ tou\s politikou\s ou)ch ê(/kista tou/tôn phai=men, a)\n thei/ous te ei)=nai kai\ e)nthousia/zein, e)pi/pnous o)/ntas kai\ katechome/nous e)k tou= theou=, o(/tan katorthô=si le/gontes polla\ kai\ mega/la pra/gmata, mêde\n ei)do/tes ô(=n le/gousin.]] [Side-note: All the real virtue that there is, is communicated by special inspiration from the Gods.] And thus (concludes Sokrates) the answer to the question originally started by Menon--"Whether virtue is teachable?"--is as follows. Virtue in its highest sense, in which it is equivalent to or coincident with knowledge, is teachable: but no such virtue exists. That which exists in the most distinguished citizens under the name of virtue,--or at least producing the results of virtue in practice--is not teachable. Nor does it come by nature, but by special inspiration from the Gods. The best statesmen now existing cannot make any other person like themselves: if any one of them could do this, he would be, in comparison with the rest, like a real thing compared with a shadow.[28] [Footnote 28: Plato, Menon, p. 100.] [Side-note: But what virtue itself is, remains unknown.] Nevertheless the question which we have just discussed--"How virtue arises or is generated?"--must be regarded as secondary and dependent, not capable of being clearly understood until the primary and principal question--"What is virtue?"--has been investigated and brought to a solution.[29] [Footnote 29: Plato, Menon, p. 100 B.] * * * * * [Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. Proper order for examining the different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates.] This last observation is repeated by Sokrates at the end--as it had been stated at the beginning, and in more than one place during the continuance--of the dialogue. In fact, Sokrates seems at first resolved to enforce the natural and necessary priority of the latter question: but is induced by the solicitation of Menon to invert the order.[30] [Footnote 30: Plato, Menon, p. 86.] [Side-note: Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions when the fundamental notions and word are unsettled.] The propriety of the order marked out, but not pursued, by Sokrates is indisputable. Before you can enquire how virtue is generated or communicated, you must be satisfied that you know what virtue is. You must know the essence of the subject--or those predicates which the word connotes ( = the meaning of the term) before you investigate its accidents and antecedents.[31] Menon begins by being satisfied that he knows what virtue is: so satisfied, that he accounts it discreditable for a man not to know: although he is made to answer like one who has never thought upon the subject, and does not even understand the question. Sokrates, on the other hand, not only confesses that he does not himself know, but asserts that he never yet met with a man who did know. One of the most important lessons in this, as in so many other Platonic dialogues, is the mischief of proceeding to debate ulterior and secondary questions, without having settled the fundamental words and notions: the false persuasion of knowledge, common to almost every one, respecting these familiar ethical and social ideas. Menon represents the common state of mind. He begins with the false persuasion that he as well as every one else knows what virtue is: and even when he is proved to be ignorant, he still feels no interest in the fundamental enquiry, but turns aside to his original object of curiosity--"Whether virtue is teachable". Nothing can be more repugnant to an ordinary mind than the thorough sifting of deep-seated, long familiarised, notions--[Greek: to\ ga\r o)rthou=sthai gnô/man, o)duna=|]. [Footnote 31: To use the phrase of Plato himself in the Euthyphron, p. 11 A, the [Greek: ou)si/a] must be known before the [Greek: pa/thê] are sought--[Greek: kinduneu/eis, ô)= Eu)thu/phron, e)rôtô/menos to\ o(/sion, o(/, ti/ pot' e)sti, _tê\n me\n ou)si/an_ moi au)tou= ou) bou/lesthai dêlô=sai, _pa/thos de/ ti peri\ au)tou=_ le/gein, o(/, ti pe/ponthe tou=to to\ o(/sion, philei=sthai u(po\ pa/ntôn theô=n; _o(/ ti de\ o)/n, ou)/pô ei)=pes_.] Compare Lachês, p. 190 B and Gorgias, pp. 448 E, 462 C.] [Side-note: Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon--desire of good alleged to be universally felt--in what sense this is true.] The confession of Sokrates that neither he nor any other person in his experience knows what virtue is--that it must be made a subject of special and deliberate investigation--and that no man can know what justice, or any other part of virtue is, unless he first knows what virtue as a whole is[32]--are matters to be kept in mind also, as contrasting with other portions of the Platonic dialogues, wherein virtue, justice, &c., are tacitly assumed (according to the received habit) as matters known and understood. The contributions which we obtain from the Menon towards finding out the Platonic notion of virtue, are negative rather than positive. The comments of Sokrates upon Menon's first definition include the doctrine often announced in Plato--That no man by nature desires suffering or evil; every man desires good: if he seeks or pursues suffering or evil, he does so merely from error or ignorance, mistaking it for good.[33] This is true, undoubtedly, if we mean what is good or evil for himself: and if by good or evil we mean (according to the doctrine enforced by Sokrates in the Protagoras) the result of items of pleasure and pain, rightly estimated and compared by the Measuring Reason. Every man naturally desires pleasure, and the means of acquiring pleasure, for himself: every man naturally shrinks from pain, or the causes of pain, to himself: every one compares and measures the items of each with more or less wisdom and impartiality. But the proposition is not true, if we mean what is good or evil for others: and if by good we mean (as Sokrates is made to declare in the Gorgias) something apart from pleasure, and by evil something apart from pain (understanding pleasure and pain in their largest sense). A man sometimes desires what is good for others, sometimes what is evil for others, as the case may be. Plato's observation therefore cannot be admitted--That as to the wish or desire, all men are alike: one man is no better than another.[34] [Footnote 32: Plato, Menon, p. 79 B-C. [Greek: tê\n ga\r dikaiosu/nên mo/rion phê\| a)retê=s ei)=nai kai\ e(/kasta tou/tôn. . . . oi)/ei tina ei)de/nai mo/rion a)retê=s o(/ ti e)/stin, au)tê\n mê\ ei)do/ta? Ou)k e)/moige dokei=.]] [Footnote 33: Plato, Menon, p. 77.] [Footnote 34: Plato, Menon, p. 78 B. [Greek: to\ me\n bou/lesthai pa=sin u(pa/rchei, kai\ tau/tê| ge ou)de\n o( e(/teros tou= e(te/rou belti/ôn.]] [Side-note: Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what?] The second portion of Plato's theory, advanced to explain what virtue is, presents nothing more satisfactory. Virtue is useful or profitable: but neither health, strength, beauty, wealth, power, &c., are profitable, unless rightly used: nor are justice, moderation, courage, quick apprehension, good memory, &c., profitable, unless they are accompanied and guided by knowledge or prudence.[35] Now if by _profitable_ we have reference not to the individual agent alone, but to other persons concerned also, the proposition is true, but not instructive or distinct. For what is meant by _right use_? To what ends are the gifts here enumerated to be turned, in order to constitute right use? What again is meant by _knowledge_? knowledge of what?[36] This is a question put by Sokrates in many other dialogues, and necessary to be put here also. Moreover, knowledge is a term which requires to be determined, not merely to some assignable object, but also in its general import, no less than virtue. We shall come presently to an elaborate dialogue (Theætêtus) in which Plato makes many attempts to determine knowledge generally, but ends in a confessed failure. Knowledge must be knowledge _possessed by some one_, and must be knowledge of _something_. What is it, that a man must know, in order that his justice or courage may become profitable? Is it pleasures and pains, with their causes, and the comparative magnitude of each (as Sokrates declares in the Protagoras), in order that he may contribute to diminish the sum of pains, increase that of pleasures, to himself or to the society? If this be what he is required to know, Plato should have said so--or if not, what else--in order that the requirement of knowledge might be made an intelligible condition. [Footnote 35: Plato, Menon, pp. 87-88.] [Footnote 36: See Republic, vi. p. 505 B, where this question is put, but not answered, respecting [Greek: phro/nêsis].] [Side-note: Subject of Menon; same as that of the Protagoras--diversity of handling--Plato is not anxious to settle a question and get rid of it.] Though the subject of direct debate in the Menon is the same as that in the Protagoras (whether virtue be teachable?) yet the manner of treating this subject is very different in the two. One point of difference between the two has been just noticed. Another difference is, that whereas in Menon the teachability of virtue is assumed to be disproved, because there are no recognised teachers or learners of it--in the Protagoras this argument is produced by Sokrates, but is combated at length (as we shall presently see) by a counter-argument on the part of the Sophists, without any rejoinder from Sokrates. Of this counter-argument no notice is taken in the Menon: although, if it be well-founded, it would have served Anytus no less than Protagoras, as a solution of the difficulties raised by Sokrates. Such diversity of handling and argumentative fertility, are characteristic of the Platonic procedure. I have already remarked, that the establishment of positive conclusions, capable of being severed from their premisses, registered in the memory, and used as principles for deduction--is foreign to the spirit of these Dialogues of Search. To settle a question and finish with it--to get rid of the debate, as if it were a troublesome temporary necessity--is not what Plato desires. His purpose is, to provoke the spirit of enquiry--to stimulate responsive efforts of the mind by a painful shock of exposed ignorance--and to open before it a multiplicity of new roads with varied points of view. [Side-note: Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of research.] Nowhere in the Platonic writings is this provocative shock more vividly illustrated than in the Menon, by the simile of the electrical fish: a simile as striking as that of the magnet in Ion.[37] Nowhere, again, is the true character of the Sokratic intellect more clearly enunciated. "You complain, Menon, that I plunge your mind into nothing but doubt, and puzzle, and conscious ignorance. If I do this, it is only because my own mind is already in that same condition.[38] The only way out of it is, through joint dialectical colloquy and search; in which I invite you to accompany me, though I do not know when or where it will end." And then, for the purpose of justifying as well as encouraging such prolonged search, Sokrates proceeds to unfold his remarkable hypothesis--eternal pre-existence, boundless past experience, and omniscience, of the mind--identity of cognition with recognition, dependent on reminiscence. "Research or enquiry (said some) is fruitless. You must search either for that which you know, or for that which you do not know. The first is superfluous--the second impossible: for if you do not know what a thing is, how are you to be satisfied that the answer which you find is that which you are looking for? How can you distinguish a true solution from another which is untrue, but plausible?" [Footnote 37: Plato, Menon, p. 80 A. [Greek: na/rkê thalassi/a]. Compare what I have said above about the Ion, ch. XVII., p. 128.] [Footnote 38: Plato, Menon, p. 80 D.] [Side-note: Great question discussed among the Grecian philosophers--criterion of truth--Wherein consists the process of verification?] Here we find explicitly raised, for the first time, that difficulty which embarrassed the different philosophical schools in Greece for the subsequent three centuries--What is the criterion of truth? Wherein consists the process called verification and proof, of that which is first presented as an hypothesis? This was one of the great problems debated between the Academics, the Stoics, and the Sceptics, until the extinction of the schools of philosophy.[39] [Footnote 39: Sokrates here calls this problem an [Greek: e)ristiko\s lo/gos]. Stallbaum (in his Prolegom. to the Menon, p. 14) describes it as a "quæstiunculam, haud dubie e sophistarum disciplinâ arreptam". If the Sophists were the first to raise this question, I think that by doing so they rendered service to the interests of philosophy. The question is among the first which ought to be thoroughly debated and sifted, if we are to have a body of "reasoned truth" called philosophy. I dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum (p. 20), though it is adopted both by Socher (Ueber Platon, p. 185) and by Steinhart (Einleitung zum Menon, p. 123), that the Menon was composed by Plato during the lifetime of Sokrates. Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 22; Einleitung zum Menon, pp. 329-330), Ueberweg (Aechth. Plat. Schr. p. 226), and K. F. Hermann, on the other hand, regard the Menon as composed after the death of Sokrates, and on this point I agree with them, though whether it was composed not long after that event (as K. F. Hermann thinks) or thirteen years after it (as Schleiermacher thinks), I see no sufficient grounds for deciding. I incline to the belief that its composition is considerably later than Hermann supposes; the mention of the Theban Ismenias is one among the reasons rendering such later origin probable. Plato probably borrowed from the Xenophontic Anabasis the name, country, and social position of Menon, who may have received teaching from Gorgias, as we know that Proxenus did, Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 16. The reader can compare the Einleitung of Schleiermacher (in which he professes to prove that the Menon is a corollary to the Theætêtus and Gorgias, and an immediate antecedent to the Euthydêmus,--that it solves the riddle of the Protagoras--and that it presupposes and refers back to the Phædrus) with the Einleitung of Steinhart (p. 120 seq.), who contests all these propositions, saying that the Menon is decidedly later than the Euthydêmus, and decidedly earlier than the Theætêtus, Gorgias, and Phædrus; with the opinions of Stallbaum and Hermann, who recognise an order different from that either of Steinhart or Schleiermacher; and with that of Ast, who rejects the Menon altogether as unworthy of Plato. Every one of these dissentient critics has _something_ to say for his opinion, while none of them (in my judgment) can make out anything like a conclusive case. The mistake consists in assuming that there must have been a peremptory order and intentional interdependence among the Platonic Dialogues, and next in trying to show by internal evidence what that order was.] [Side-note: None of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer here made by Plato--that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal experience.] Not one of these schools was satisfied with the very peculiar answer which the Platonic Sokrates here gives to the question. When truth is presented to us (he intimates), we recognise it as an old friend after a long absence. We know it by reason of its conformity to our antecedent, pre-natal, experience (in the Phædon, such pre-natal experience is restricted to commerce with the substantial, intelligible, Ideas, which are not mentioned in the Menon): the soul or mind is immortal, has gone through an indefinite succession of temporary lives prior to the present, and will go through an indefinite succession of temporary lives posterior to the present--"longæ, canitis si cognita, vitæ Mors media est". The mind has thus become omniscient, having seen, heard, and learnt every thing, both on earth and in Hades: but such knowledge exists as a confused and unavailable mass, having been buried and forgotten on the commencement of its actual life. Since all nature is in universal kindred, communion, or interdependence, that which we hear or see here, recalls to the memory, by association, portions of our prior forgotten omniscience.[40] It is in this recall or reminiscence that search, learning, acquisition of knowledge, consists. Teaching and learning are words without meaning: the only process really instructive is that of dialectic debate, which, if indefatigably prosecuted, will dig out the omniscience buried within.[41] So vast is the theory generated in Plato's mind, by his worship of dialectic, respecting that process of search to which more than half of his dialogues are devoted. [Footnote 40: The doctrine of communion or interdependence pervading all Nature, with one continuous cosmical soul penetrating everywhere, will be found set forth in the kosmology of the Timæus, pp. 37-42-43. It was held, with various modifications, both by the Pythagoreans and the Stoics. Compare Cicero, Divinat. ii. 14-15; Virgil, Æneid vi. 715 seqq.; Georgic. iv. 220; Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. ix. 127; Ekphantus Pythagoreus ap. Stobæum, Tit. 48, vol. ii. p. 320, Gaisford. The view here taken by Plato, that all nature is cognate and interdependent--[Greek: a(/te ga\r tê=s phu/seôs a(pa/sês suggenou=s ou)/sês]--is very similar to the theory of Leibnitz:--"Ubique per materiam disseminata statuo principia vitalia seu percipientia. Omnia in naturâ sunt analogica" (Leibnitz, Epist. ad Wagnerum, p. 466; Leibn. Opp. Erdmann). Farther, that the human mind by virtue of its interdependence or kindred with all nature, includes a confused omniscience, is also a Leibnitzian view. "Car comme tout est plein (ce qui rend toute la matière liée) et comme dans le plein tout mouvement fait quelqu' effet sur les corps distans à mesure de la distance, de sorte que chaque corps est affecté non seulement par ceux qui le touchent, et se ressent en quelque façon de tout ce qui leur arrive--mais aussi par leur moyen se ressent de ceux qui touchent les premiers dont il est touché immédiatement. Il s'ensuit que cette communication va à quelque distance que ce soit. Et par consequent tout corps se ressent de tout ce qui se fait dans l'Univers: tellement que celui, qui voit tout, pourroit lire dans chacun ce qui se fait partout et même ce qui s'est fait et se fera, en remarquant dans le présent ce qui est éloigné tant selon les temps que selon les lieux: [Greek: su/mpnoia pa/nta], disoit Hippocrate. Mais une âme ne peut lire en elle même que ce qui y est representé distinctement: elle ne sauroit developper tout d'un coup ses règles, car elles vont à l'infini. Ainsi quoique chaque monade créée représente tout l'Univers, elle représente plus distinctement le corps qui lui est particulièrement affecté, et dont elle fait l'Entéléchie. Et comme ce corps exprime tout l'Univers par la connexion de toute la matière dans le plein, l'âme représente aussi tout l'Univers en représentant ce corps qui lui appartient d'une manière particulière" (Leibnitz, Monadologie, sect. 61-62, No. 88, p. 710; Opp. Leibn. ed. Erdmann). Again, Leibnitz, in another Dissertation: "Comme à cause de la plénitude du monde tout est lié, et chaque corps agit sur chaque autre corps, plus ou moins, selon la distance, et en est affecté par la réaction--il s'ensuit que chaque monade est un miroir vivant, ou doué d'action interne, représentatif de l'Univers, suivant son point de vue, et aussi réglé que l'Univers même" (Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, p. 714, ed. Erdmann; also Système Nouveau, p. 128, a. 36). Leibnitz expresses more than once how much his own metaphysical views agreed with those of Plato. Lettre à M. Bourguet, pp. 723-725. He expresses his belief in the pre-existence of the soul: "Tout ce que je crois pouvoir assurer, est, que l'âme de tout animal a préexisté, et a été dans un corps organique: qui enfin, par beaucoup de changemens, involutions, et évolutions, est devenu l'animal présent" (Lettre à M. Bourguet, p. 731). And in the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence to a certain point: "II y a quelque chose de solide dans ce que dit Platon de la réminiscence" (p. 137, b. 10). Also Leibnitz's Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, p. 196, b. 28; and Epistol. ad Hanschium, p. 446, a. 12. See the elaborate account of the philosophy of Leibnitz by Dr. Kuno Fischer--Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 226-232.] [Footnote 41: Plato, Menon, p. 81 D. [Greek: e)a/n tis a)ndrei=os ê)=|, kai\ mê\ a)poka/mnê| zêtô=n.] Compare also p. 86 B.] [Side-note: Plato's view of the immortality of the soul--difference between the Menon, Phædrus, and Phædon.] In various other dialogues of Plato, the same hypothesis is found repeated. His conception of the immortality of the soul or mind, includes pre-existence as well as post-existence: a perpetual succession of temporary lives, each in a distinct body, each terminated by death, and each followed by renewed life for a time in another body. In fact, the pre-existence of the mind formed the most important part of Plato's theory about immortality: for he employed it as the means of explaining how the mind became possessed of general notions. As the doctrine is stated in the Menon, it is made applicable to all minds (instead of being confined, as in Phædrus, Phædon, and elsewhere, to a few highly gifted minds, and to commerce with the intelligible substances called Ideas). This appears from the person chosen to illustrate the alleged possibility of stimulating artificial reminiscence: that person is an unlettered youth, taken at hazard from among the numerous slaves of Menon.[42] [Footnote 42: Plato, Menon, pp. 82 A, 85 E. [Greek: proska/leson tô=n pollô=n a)kolou/thôn toutôni\ tô=n sautou= e(/na, o(/ntina bou/lei, i(/na e)n tou/tô| soi e)pidei/xômai.] Stallbaum says that this allusion to the numerous slaves in attendance is intended to illustrate conspicuously the wealth and nobility of Menon. In my judgment, it is rather intended to illustrate the operation of pure accident--the perfectly ordinary character of the mind worked upon--"one among many, which you please".] [Side-note: Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind--how far correct?] It is true, indeed (as Schleiermacher observes), that the questions put by Sokrates to this youth are in great proportion leading questions, suggesting their own answers. They would not have served their purpose unless they had been such. The illustration here furnished, of the Sokratic interrogatory process, is highly interesting, and his theory is in a great degree true.[43] Not all learning, but an important part of learning, consists in reminiscence--not indeed of acquisitions made in an antecedent life, but of past experience and judgments in this life. Of such experience and judgments every one has travelled through a large course; which has disappeared from his memory, yet not irrevocably. Portions of it may be revived, if new matter be presented to the mind, fitted to excite the recollection of them by the laws of association. By suitable interrogations, a teacher may thus recall to the memory of his pupils many facts and judgments which have been hitherto forgotten: he may bring into juxtaposition those which have never before been put together in the mind: and he may thus make them elicit instructive comparisons and inferences. He may provoke the pupils to strike out new results for themselves, or to follow, by means of their own stock of knowledge, in the path suggested by the questions. He may farther lead them to perceive the fallacy of erroneous analogies which at first presented themselves as plausible; and to become painfully sensible of embarrassment and perplexing ignorance, before he puts those questions which indicate the way of escape from it. Upon the necessity of producing such painful consciousness of ignorance Plato insists emphatically, as is his custom.[44] [Footnote 43: Plutarch (Fragment. [Greek: Peri\ psuchê=s]). Ei) a)ph' e(te/rou e(/teron e)nnoou=men? ou)k a)/n, ei) mê\ proe/gnôsto. To\ e)pichei/rêma Platôniko/n. Ei) prosti/themen to\ e)/lleipon toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s?--kai\ au)to\ Platôniko/n.] Plutarch, in the same fragment, indicates some of the objections made by Bion and Straton against the doctrine of [Greek: a)na/mnêsis]. How (they asked) does it happen that this reminiscence brings up often what is false or absurd? (asked Bion). If such reminiscence exists (asked Straton) how comes it that we require demonstrations to conduct us to knowledge? and how is it that no man can play on the flute or the harp without practice? [Greek: O(/ti Bi/ôn ê)po/rei peri\ tou= pseu/dous, ei) kai\ au)to\ kat' a)na/mnêsin, ô(s to\ e)nanti/on ge, ê)\ ou)/? kai\ ti/ ê( a)logi/a? O(/ti Stra/tôn ê)po/rei, ei) e)/stin a)namnêsis, pô=s a)/neu a)podei/xeôn ou) gigno/metha e)pistê/mones? pô=s de\ ou)dei\s au)lêtê\s ê)\ kitharistê\s ge/gonen a)/neu mele/tês?]] [Footnote 44: Plato, Menon, p. 84. The sixteenth Dissertation of Maximus Tyrius presents a rhetorical amplification of this doctrine--[Greek: pa=sa ma/thêsis, a)na/mnêsis]--in which he enters fully into the spirit of the Menon and the Phædon--[Greek: au)todi/dakto/n ti chrê=ma ê( psuchê/--ê( psuchê=s eu(/resis, au)togenê/s tis ou)=sa, kai\ au)tophuê\s, kai\ xu/mphutos, ti/ a)/llo e)/stin ê)\ do/xai a)lêthei=s e)geiro/menai, ô(=n tê=| e)pege/rsei te kai\ xunta/xei e)pistê/mê o)/noma?] (c. 6). Compare also Cicero, Tusc. D. i. 24. The doctrine has furnished a theme for very elegant poetry: both in the Consolatio Philosophiæ of Boethius--the piece which ends with "Ac si Platonis Musa personat verum, Quod quisque discit, immemor recordatur"-- and in Wordsworth--"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting," &c. On the other hand Aristotle alludes also to the same doctrine and criticises it; but he does not seem (so far as I can understand this brief allusion) to seize exactly Plato's meaning. This is the remark of the Scholiast on Aristotle: and I think it just. It is curious to compare the way in which [Greek: a)na/mnêsis] is handled by Plato in the Menon and Phædon, and by Aristotle in the valuable little tract--[Greek: Peri\ mnê/nês kai\ a)namnê/seôs] (p. 451, b.). Aristotle has his own way of replying to the difficulty raised in the question of Menon, and tries to show that sometimes we _know_ in one sense and _do not know_ in another. See Aristotel. Anal. Prior., ii. p. 67, a. 22; Anal. Poster. i. p. 71, a. 27; and the Scholia on the former passage, p. 193, b. 21, ed. Brandis. Sir William Hamilton, in one of the Appendixes to his edition of Reid's Works (Append. D. p. 890 seq.), has given a learned and valuable translation and illustration of the treatise of Aristotle [Greek: Peri\ A)namnê/seôs]. I note, however, with some surprise, that while collecting many interesting comments from writers who lived _after_ Aristotle, he has not adverted to what was said upon this same subject by Plato, _before_ Aristotle. It was the more to be expected that he would do this, since he insists so emphatically upon the complete originality of Aristotle.] [Side-note: Plato's doctrine about _à priori_ reasonings--Different from the modern doctrine.] Plato does not intend here to distinguish (as many modern writers distinguish) geometry from other sciences, as if geometry were known _à priori_, and other sciences known _à posteriori_ or from experience. He does not suppose that geometrical truths are such that no man can possibly believe the contrary of them; or that they are different in this respect from the truths of any other science. He here maintains that all the sciences lie equally in the untaught mind,[45] but buried, forgotten, and confused: so as to require the skill of the questioner not merely to recall them into consciousness, but to disentangle truth from error. Far from supposing that the untaught mind has a natural tendency to answer correctly geometrical questions, he treats erroneous answers as springing up more naturally than true answers, and as requiring a process of painful exposure before the mind can be put upon the right track. The questioner, without possessing any knowledge himself, (so Plato thinks,) can nevertheless exercise an influence at once stimulating, corrective, and directive. He stimulates the action of the associative process, to call up facts, comparisons, and analogies, bearing on the question: he arrests the respondent on a wrong answer, creating within him a painful sense of ignorance and embarrassment: he directs him by his subsequent questions into the path of right answers. His obstetric aid (to use the simile in Plato's Theætetus), though presupposing the pregnancy of the respondent mind, is indispensable both to forward the childbirth, and to throw away any offspring which may happen to be deformed. In the Theætetus, the main stress is laid on that part of the dialogue which is performed by the questioner: in the Menon, upon the latent competence and large dead stock of an untaught respondent. [Footnote 45: Plato, Menon, p. 85 E. [Greek: ou(=tos ga\r] (the untaught slave) [Greek: poiê/sei peri\ pa/sês geômetri/as tau)ta\ tau=ta, kai\ tô=n a)/llôn mathêma/tôn a(pa/ntôn.]] The mind of the slave questioned by Sokrates is discovered to be pregnant. Though he has received no teaching from any professed geometer, he is nevertheless found competent, when subjected to a skilful interrogatory, to arrive at last, through a series of mistakes, at correct answers, determining certain simple problems of geometry. He knows nothing about geometry: nevertheless there exist in his mind true opinions respecting that which he does not know. These opinions are "called up like a dream" by the interrogatories: which, if repeated and diversified, convert the opinions into knowledge, taken up by the respondent out of himself.[46] The opinions are inherited from an antecedent life and born with him, since they have never been taught to him during this life. [Footnote 46: Plato, Menon, p. 85. [Greek: tô=| ou)k eido/ti a)/ra peri\ ô(=n a)\n mê\ ei)dê=| e)/neisin a)lêthei=s do/xai. . . . kai\ nu=n me/n ge _au)tô=| ô(/sper o)/nar_ a)/rti a)nakeki/nêntai ai( do/xai au(=tai; ei) de\ au)to/n tis a)nerê/setai polla/kis ta\ au)ta\ tau=ta kai\ pollachê=, oi)=sth' o(/ti teleutô=n ou)deno\s ê(=tton a)kribô=s e)pistê/setai peri\ au)tôn. . . . Ou)kou=n ou)deno\s dida/xantos a)ll' e)rôtê/santos e)pistê/setai, a)nalabô\n au)to\s e)x au)tou= tê\n e)pistê/mên?]] [Side-note: Plato's theory about pre-natal experience. He took no pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience.] It is thus that Plato applies to philosophical theory the doctrine (borrowed from the Pythagoreans) of pre-natal experience and cognitions: which he considers, not as inherent appurtenances of the mind, but as acquisitions made by the mind during various antecedent lives. These ideas (Plato argues) cannot have been acquired during the present life, because the youth has received no special teaching in geometry. But Plato here takes no account of the multiplicity and diversity of experiences gone through, comparisons made, and acquirements lodged, in the mind of a youthful adult however unlettered. He recognises no acquisition of knowledge except through special teaching. So, too, in the Protagoras, we shall find him putting into the mouth of Sokrates the doctrine--That virtue is not taught and cannot be taught, because there were no special masters or times of teaching. But in that dialogue we shall also see Plato furnishing an elaborate reply to this doctrine in the speech of Protagoras; who indicates the multifarious and powerful influences which are perpetually operative, even without special professors, in creating and enforcing ethical sentiment. If Plato had taken pains to study the early life of the untaught slave, with its stock of facts, judgments, comparisons, and inferences suggested by analogy, &c., he might easily have found enough to explain the competence of the slave to answer the questions appearing in the dialogue. And even if enough could not have been found, to afford a direct and specific explanation--we must remember that only a very small proportion of the long series of mental phenomena realised in the infant, the child, the youth, ever comes to be remembered or recorded. To assume that the large unknown remainder would be insufficient, if known, to afford the explanation sought, is neither philosophical nor reasonable. This is assumed in every form of the doctrine of innate ideas: and assumed by Plato here without even trying any explanation to dispense with the hypothesis: simply because the youth interrogated had never received any special instruction in geometry. [Side-note: Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic Ideas or Forms.] I have already observed, that though great stress is laid in this dialogue upon the doctrine of opinions and knowledge inherited from an antecedent life--upon the distinction between true opinion and knowledge--and upon the identity of the process of learning with reminiscence--yet nothing is said about universal Ideas or Forms, so much dwelt upon in other dialogues. In the Phædrus and Phædon, it is with these universal Ideas that the mind is affirmed to have had communion during its prior existence, as contrasted with the particulars of sense apprehended during the present life: while in the Menon, the difference pointed out between true opinions and knowledge is something much less marked and decisive. Both the one and the other are said to be, not acquired during this life, but inherited from antecedent life: to be innate, yet unperceived--revived by way of reminiscence and interrogation. True opinions are affirmed to render as much service as knowledge, in reference to practice. There is only this distinction between them--that true opinions are transient, and will not remain in the mind until they are bound in it by causal reasoning, or become knowledge. [Side-note: What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning--his distinction between knowledge and right opinion.] What Plato meant by this "causal reasoning, or computation of cause," is not clearly explained. But he affirms very unequivocally, first, that the distinction between true opinion and knowledge is one of the few things of which he feels assured[47]--next, with somewhat less confidence, that the distinction consists only in the greater security which knowledge affords for permanent in-dwelling in the mind. This appears substantially the same distinction as what is laid down in other words towards the close of the dialogue--That those, who have only true opinions and not knowledge, judge rightly without knowing how or why; by an aptitude not their own but supplied to them from without for the occasion, in the nature of inspiration or prophetic _oestrus_. Hence they are unable to teach others, or to transfer this occasional inspiration to any one else. They cannot give account of what they affect to know, nor answer scrutinizing questions to test it. This power of answering and administering cross-examination, is Plato's characteristic test of real knowledge--as I have already observed in my eighth** chapter. [Footnote 47: Plato, Menon, p. 98 B. [Greek: o(/ti de/ e)sti/ ti a)lloi=on o)rthê\ do/xa kai\ e)pistê/mê, ou) pa/nu moi dokô= tou=to ei)ka/zein; a)ll' ei)/per ti a)/llo phai/ên a)\n ei)de/nai, _o)li/ga d' a)\n phai/ên, e(\n d' ou)=n kai\ tou=to e)kei/nôn thei/ên a)\n ô(=n oi)=da_.]] [Side-note: This distinction compared with modern philosophical views.] To translate the views of Plato into analogous views of a modern philosopher, we may say--That right opinion, as contrasted with knowledge, is a discriminating and acute empirical judgment: inferring only from old particulars to new particulars (without the intermediate help and guarantee of general propositions distinctly enunciated and interpreted), but selecting for every new case the appropriate analogies out of the past, with which it ought to be compared. Many persons judge in this manner fairly well, and some with extreme success. But let them be ever so successful in practice, they proceed without any conscious method; they are unable to communicate the grounds of their inferences to others: and when they are right, it is only by haphazard--that is (to use Plato's language), through special inspiration vouchsafed to them by the Gods. But when they ascend to knowledge, and come to judge scientifically, they then distribute these particular facts into classes--note the constant sequences as distinguished from the occasional--and draw their inferences in every new case according to such general laws or uniformities of antecedent and consequent. Such uniform and unconditional antecedents are the only causes of which we have cognizance. They admit of being described in the language which Plato here uses ([Greek: ai)ti/as logismô=|]), and they also serve as reasons for justifying or explaining our inferences to others.[48] [Footnote 48: We have seen that in the Menon Plato denies all [Greek: didachê/], and recognises nothing but [Greek: a)na/mnêsis]. The doctrine of the Timæus (p. 51 D-E) is very different. He there lays especial stress on the distinction between [Greek: didachê\] and [Greek: peithô/]--the first belonging to [Greek: e)pistê/mê], the second to [Greek: do/xa]. Also in Gorgias, 454, and in Republic, v. pp. 477-479, about [Greek: do/xa] and [Greek: e)pistê/mê]. In those dialogues the distinction between the two is presented as marked and fundamental, as if [Greek: do/xa] alone was fallible and [Greek: e)pistê/mê] infallible. In the Menon the distinction appears as important, but not fundamental; the Platonic Ideas or Universals being _not_ recognised as constituting a substantive world by themselves. In this respect the Menon is nearer to the truth in describing the difference between [Greek: o)rthê\ do/xa] and [Greek: e)pistê/mê]. Mr. John Stuart Mill (in the chapter of his System of Logic wherein the true theory of the Syllogism is for the first time expounded) has clearly explained what that difference amounts to. All our inferences are _from_ particulars, sometimes _to_ new particulars directly and at once ([Greek: do/xa]), sometimes _to_ generals in the first instance, and through them _to_ new particulars; which latter, or scientific process, is highly valuable as a security for correctness ([Greek: e)pistê/mê]). "Not only" (says Mr. Mill) "_may_ we reason from particulars to particulars without passing through generals, but we perpetually _do_ so reason. All our earliest inferences are of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences, but years elapse before we learn the use of general language. We are constantly reasoning from ourselves to other people, or from one person to another, without giving ourselves the trouble to erect our observations into general maxims of human or external nature. If we have an extensive experience and retain its impressions strongly, we may acquire in this manner a very considerable power of accurate judgment, which we may be utterly incapable of justifying or of communicating to others. Among the higher order of practical intellects, there have been many of whom it was remarked how admirably they suited their means to their ends, without being able to give any sufficient account of what they did; and applied, or seemed to apply, recondite principles which they were wholly unable to state. This is a natural consequence of having a mind stored with appropriate particulars, and having been accustomed to reason at once from these to fresh particulars, without practising the habit of stating to one's self or others the corresponding general propositions. The cases of men of talent performing wonderful things they know not how, are examples of the rudest and most spontaneous forms of the operations of superior minds. It is a defect in them, and often a source of errors, not to have generalised as they went on; but generalisation, though a help, the most important indeed of all helps, is not an essential" (Mill, Syst. of Logic, Book II. ch. iii.). Compare the first chapter of the Metaphysica of Aristotle, p. 980, a. 15, b. 7.] [Side-note: Manifestation of Anytus--intense antipathy to the Sophists and to philosophy generally.] The manner in which Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates before the Dikastery, is introduced into this dialogue, deserves notice. The questions are put to him by Sokrates--"Is virtue teachable? How is Menon to learn virtue, and from whom? Ought he not to do as he would do if he wished to learn medicine or music: to put himself under some paid professional man as teacher?" Anytus answers these questions in the affirmative: but asks, where such professional teachers of virtue are to be found. "There are the Sophists," replies Sokrates. Upon this Anytus breaks out into a burst of angry invective against the Sophists; denouncing them as corruptors of youth, whom none but a madman would consult, and who ought to be banished by public authority. Why are you so bitter against the Sophists? asks Sokrates. Have any of them ever injured you? _Anyt._--No; never: I have never been in the company of any one of them, nor would I ever suffer any of my family to be so. _Sokr._--Then you have no experience whatever about the Sophists? _Anyt._--None: and I hope that I never may have. _Sokr._--How then can you know about this matter, how far it is good or bad, if you have no experience whatever about it? _Anyt._--Easily. I know what sort of men the Sophists are, whether I have experience of them or not. _Sokr._--Perhaps you are a prophet, Anytus: for how else you can know about them, I do not understand, even on your own statement.[49] [Footnote 49: Plato, Menon, p. 92.] Anytus then declares, that the persons from whom Menon ought to learn virtue are the leading practical politicians; and that any one of them can teach it. But Sokrates puts a series of questions, showing that the leading Athenian politicians, Themistoklês, Periklês, &c., have not been able to teach virtue even to their own sons: _à fortiori_, therefore, they cannot teach it to any one else. Anytus treats this series of questions as disparaging and calumnious towards the great men of Athens. He breaks off the conversation abruptly, with an angry warning to Sokrates to be cautious about his language, and to take care of his own safety. The dialogue is then prosecuted and finished between Sokrates and Menon: and at the close of it, Sokrates says--"Talk to Anytus, and communicate to him that persuasion which you have yourself contracted,[50] in order that he may be more mildly disposed: for, if you persuade him, you will do some good to the Athenians as well as to himself." [Footnote 50: Plato, Menon, ad fin. [Greek: su\ de\ tau=ta a(/per au)to\s pe/peisai, pei=the kai\ to\n xe/non to/nde A)/nuton, i(/na pra|o/teros ê)=|; ô(s e)a\n pei/sê|s tou=ton, e)/stin o(/, ti kai\ A)thênai/ous o)nê/seis.]] [Side-note: The enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the sophists--Practical statesmen.] The enemy and accuser of Sokrates is here depicted as the bitter enemy of the Sophists also. And Plato takes pains to exhibit the enmity of Anytus to the Sophists as founded on no facts or experience. Without having seen or ascertained anything about them, Anytus hates them as violently as if he had sustained from them some personal injury; a sentiment which many Platonic critics and many historians of philosophy have inherited from him.[51] Whether the corruption which these Sophists were accused of bringing about in the minds of youth, was intentional or not intentional on their part--how such corruption could have been perpetually continued, while at the same time the eminent Sophists enjoyed long and unabated esteem from the youth themselves and from their relatives--are difficulties which Anytus does not attempt to explain, though they are started here by Sokrates. Indeed we find the same topics employed by Sokrates himself, in his defence before the Dikasts against the same charge.[52] Anytus has confidence in no one except the practical statesmen: and when a question is raised about _their_ power to impart their own excellence to others, he presently takes offence against Sokrates also. The same causes which have determined his furious antipathy against the Sophists, make him ready to transfer the like antipathy to Sokrates. He is a man of plain sense, practical habits, and conservative patriotism--who worships what he finds accredited as virtue, and dislikes the talkers and theorisers about virtue in general: whether they debated in subtle interrogation and dialectics, like Sokrates--or lectured in eloquent continuous discourse, like Protagoras. He accuses the Sophists, in this dialogue, of corrupting the youth; just as he and Melêtus, before the Dikastery, accused Sokrates of the same offence. He understands the use of words, to discuss actual business before the assembly or dikastery; but he hates discourse on the generalities of ethics or philosophy. He is essentially [Greek: miso/logos]. The point which he condemns in the Sophists, is that which they have in common with Sokrates. [Footnote 51: Upon the bitter antipathy here expressed by Anytus against the Sophists, whom nevertheless he admits that he does not at all know, Steinhart remarks as follows:--"Gerade so haben zu allen Zeiten Orthodoxe und Fanatiker aller Arten über ihre Gegner abgeurtheilt, ohne sie zu kennen oder auch nur kennen lernen zu wollen" (Einleit. zum Menon, not. 15, p. 173). Certainly orthodox and fanatical persons often do what is here imputed to them. But Steinhart might have found a still closer parallel with Anytus, in his own criticisms, and in those of many other Platonic critics on the Sophists; the same expressions of bitterness and severity, with the same slender knowledge of the persons upon whom they bear.] [Footnote 52: Plato, Apol. Sokr. pp. 26 A, 33 D, 34 B.] [Side-note: The Menon brings forward the point of analogy between Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the practical statesmen.] In many of the Platonic dialogues we have the antithesis between Sokrates and the Sophists brought out, as to the different point of view from which the one and the other approached ethical questions. But in this portion of the Menon, we find exhibited the feature of analogy between them, in which both one and the other stood upon ground obnoxious to the merely practical politicians. Far from regarding hatred against the Sophists as a mark of virtue in Anytus, Sokrates deprecates it as unwarranted and as menacing to philosophy in all her manifestations. The last declaration ascribed to Anytus, coupled with the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue, show us that Plato conceives the anti-Sophistic antipathy as being anti-Sokratic also, in its natural consequences. That Sokrates was in common parlance a Sophist, disliked by a large portion of the general public, and ridiculed by Aristophanes, on the same grounds as those whom Plato calls Sophists--is a point which I have noticed elsewhere. CHAPTER XXIII. PROTAGORAS. [Side-note: Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue.] The dialogue called Protagoras presents a larger assemblage of varied and celebrated characters, with more of dramatic winding, and more frequent breaks and resumptions in the conversation, than any dialogue of Plato--not excepting even Symposion and Republic. It exhibits Sokrates in controversy with the celebrated Sophist Protagoras, in the presence of a distinguished society, most of whom take occasional part in the dialogue. This controversy is preceded by a striking conversation between Sokrates and Hippokrates--a youth of distinguished family, eager to profit by the instructions of Protagoras. The two Sophists Prodikus and Hippias, together with Kallias, Kritias, Alkibiades, Eryximachus, Phædrus, Pausanias, Agathon, the two sons of Periklês (Paralus and Xanthippus), Charmides, son of Glaukon, Antimoerus of Mende, a promising pupil of Protagoras, who is in training for the profession of a Sophist--these and others are all present at the meeting, which is held in the house of Kallias.[1] Sokrates himself recounts the whole--both his conversation with Hippokrates and that with Protagoras--to a nameless friend. [Footnote 1: Plato, Protag. p. 315.] This dialogue enters upon a larger and more comprehensive ethical theory than anything in the others hitherto noticed. But it contains also a great deal in which we hardly recognise, or at least cannot verify, any distinct purpose, either of search or exposition. Much of it seems to be composed with a literary or poetical view, to enhance the charm or interest of the composition. The personal characteristics of each speaker--the intellectual peculiarities of Prodikus and Hippias--the ardent partisanship of Alkibiades--are brought out as in a real drama. But the great and marked antithesis is that between the Sophist Protagoras and Sokrates--the Hektor and Ajax of the piece: who stand forward in single combat, exchange some serious blows, yet ultimately part as friends. [Side-note: Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates to become acquainted with Protagoras.] An introduction of some length impresses upon us forcibly the celebrity of the Great Sophist, and the earnest interest excited by his visit to Athens. Hippokrates, a young man of noble family and eager aspirations for improvement, having just learnt the arrival of Protagoras, comes to the house of Sokrates and awakens him before daylight, entreating that Sokrates will introduce him to the new-comer. He is ready to give all that he possesses in order that he may become wise like Protagoras.[2] While they are awaiting a suitable hour for such introduction, Sokrates puts a series of questions to test the force of Hippokrates.[3] [Footnote 2: Plato, Protag. pp. 310-311 A.] [Footnote 3: Plato, Protag. p. 311 B. [Greek: kai\ e)gô\ popeirô/menos tou= I(ppokra/tous tê=s r(ô/mês diesko/poun au)to\n kai\ ê)rô/tôn], &c.] [Side-note: Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose and expectations from Protagoras.] _Sokr._--You are now intending to visit Protagoras, and to pay him for something to be done for you--tell me what manner of man it is that you are going to visit--and what manner of man do you wish to become? If you were going in like manner to pay a fee for instruction to your namesake Hippokrates of Kos, you would tell me that you were going to him as to a physician--and that you wished to qualify yourself for becoming a physician. If you were addressing yourself with the like view to Pheidias or Polykleitus, you would go to them as to sculptors, and for the purpose of becoming yourself a sculptor. Now then that we are to go in all this hurry to Protagoras, tell me who he is and what title he bears, as we called Pheidias a sculptor? _Hipp._--They call him a Sophist.[4] _Sokr._--We are going to pay him then as a Sophist? _Hipp._--Certainly. _Sokr._--And what are you to become by going to him? _Hipp._--Why, judging from the preceding analogies, I am to become a Sophist. _Sokr._--But would not you be ashamed of presenting yourself to the Grecian public as a Sophist? _Hipp._--Yes: if I am to tell you my real opinion.[5] _Sokr._--Perhaps however you only propose to visit Protagoras, as you visited your schoolmaster and your musical or gymnastical teacher: not for the purpose of entering that career as a professional man, but to acquire such instruction as is suitable for a private citizen and a freeman? _Hipp._--That is more the instruction which I seek from Protagoras. _Sokr._--Do you know then what you are going to do? You are consigning your mind to be treated by one whom you call a Sophist: but I shall be surprised if you know what a Sophist is[6]--and if you do not know, neither do you know what it is--good or evil--to which you are consigning your mind. _Hipp._--I think I _do_ know. The Sophist is, as the name implies, one cognizant of matters wise and able.[7] _Sokr._--That may be said also of painters and carpenters. If we were asked in what special department are painters cognizant of matters wise and able, we should specify that it was in the workmanship of portraits. Answer me the same question about the Sophist. What sort of workmanship does he direct? _Hipp._--That of forming able speakers.[8] _Sokr._--Your answer may be correct, but it is not specific enough: for we must still ask, About _what_ is it that the Sophist forms able speakers? just as the harp-master makes a man an able speaker about harping, at the same time that he teaches him harping. About _what_ is it that the Sophist forms able speakers: of course about that which he himself knows?[9] _Hipp._--Probably. _Sokr._--What then is that, about which the Sophist is himself cognizant, and makes his pupil cognizant? _Hipp._--By Zeus, I cannot give you any farther answer.[10] [Footnote 4: Plato, Protagoras, p. 311.] [Footnote 5: Plato, Protag. p. 312 A. [Greek: su\ de/, ê)=n d' e)gô/, pro\s theô=n, ou)k a)\n ai)schu/noio ei)s tou\s E(/llênas sauto\n sophistê\n pare/chôn? Nê\ to\n Di/', ô)= Sô/krates, ei)/per ge a)\ dianoou=mai chrê\ le/gein.] Ast (Platon's Leben, p. 78) and other Platonic critics treat this _Sophistomanie_ (as they call it) of an Athenian youth as something ludicrous and contemptible: all the more ludicrous because (they say) none of them goes to qualify himself for becoming a Sophist, but would even be ashamed of the title. Yet if we suppose the same question addressed to a young Englishman of rank and fortune (as Hippokrates was at Athens), "Why do you put yourself under the teaching of Dr. ---- at Eton or Professor ---- at Oxford? Do you intend to qualify yourself for becoming a schoolmaster or a professor?" He will laugh at you for the question; if he answers it seriously, he will probably answer as Hippokrates does. But there is nothing at all in the question to imply that the schoolmaster or the professor is a worthless pretender--or the youth foolish, for being anxious to obtain instruction from him; which is the inference that Ast and other Platonic critics desire us to draw about the Athenian Sophists.] [Footnote 6: Plato, Protag. p. 312 C. [Greek: o(/, ti de/ pote o( sophistê/s e)sti, thauma/zoim' a)\n ei) oi)=stha], &c.] [Footnote 7: Plato, Protag. p. 312 C. [Greek: ô(/s per tou)/noma le/gei, to\n tô=n sophô=n e)pistê/mona.] (Quasi sophistes sit--[Greek: o( tô=n sophô=n i)/stês], Heindorf.) If this supposition of Heindorf be just, we may see in it an illustration of the etymological views of Plato, which I shall notice when I come to the Kratylus.] [Footnote 8: Plato, Protag. p. 312 D. [Greek: poi/as e)rgasi/as e)pista/tês? e)pista/tên tou= poiê=sai deino\n le/gein.]] [Footnote 9: Plato, Protag. p. 312 D-E. [Greek: e)rôtê/seôs ga\r e)/ti ê( a)po/krisis ê(mi=n dei=tai, peri\ o(/tou o( sophistê\s deino\n poiei= le/gein; ô(/sper o( kitharistê\s deino\n dê/pou poiei= le/gein peri\ ou(=per kai\ e)pistê/mona, peri\ kithari/seôs.]] [Footnote 10: Plato, Protag. p. 312 E.] [Side-note: Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a Sophist without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach.] _Sokr._--Do you see then to what danger you are going to submit your mind? If the question were about going to trusting your body to any one, with the risk whether it should become sound or unsound, you would have thought long, and taken much advice, before you decided. But now, when it is about your mind, which you value more than your body, and upon the good or evil of which all your affairs turn[11]--you are hastening without reflection and without advice, you are ready to pay all the money that you possess or can obtain, with a firm resolution already taken to put yourself at all hazard under Protagoras: whom you do not know--with whom you have never once talked--whom you call a Sophist, without knowing what a Sophist is? _Hipp._--I must admit the case to be as you say.[12] _Sokr._--Perhaps the Sophist is a man who brings for sale those transportable commodities, instruction or doctrine, which form the nourishment of the mind. Now the traders in food for the body praise indiscriminately all that they have to sell, though neither they nor their purchasers know whether it is good for the body; unless by chance any one of them be a gymnastic trainer or a physician.[13] So, too, these Sophists, who carry about food for the mind, praise all that they have to sell: but perhaps some of them are ignorant, and assuredly their purchasers are ignorant, whether it be good or bad for the mind: unless by accident any one possess medical knowledge about the mind. Now if you, Hippokrates, happen to possess such knowledge of what is good or bad for the mind, you may safely purchase doctrine from Protagoras or from any one else:[14] but if not, you are hazarding and putting at stake your dearest interests. The purchase of doctrines is far more dangerous than that of eatables or drinkables. As to these latter, you may carry them away with you in separate vessels, and before you take them into your body you may invoke the _Expert_, to tell you what you may safely eat and drink, and when, and how much. But this cannot be done with doctrines. You cannot carry away _them_ in a separate vessel to be tested; you learn them and take them into the mind itself; so that you go away, after having paid your money, actually damaged or actually benefited, as the case may be.[15] We will consider these matters in conjunction with our elders. But first let us go and talk with Protagoras--we can consult the others afterwards. [Footnote 11: Plato, Protag. p. 313 A. [Greek: o(\ de\ peri\ plei/onos tou= sô/matos ê(gei=, tê\n psuchê\n, kai\ e)n ô)=| pa/nt' e)sti\ ta\ sa\ ê)\ eu)= ê)\ kalô=s pra/ttein, chrêstou= ê)\ ponêrou= au)tou= genome/nou], &c.] [Footnote 12: Plato, Protag. p. 313 C.] [Footnote 13: Plato, Protag. p. 313 D.] [Footnote 14: Plato, Protag. p. 313 E. [Greek: e)a\n mê/ tis tu/chê| peri\ tê\n psuchê\n au)= i)atriko\s ô)/n. ei) me\n ou)=n su\ tugcha/neis e)pistê/môn tou/tôn ti/ chrêsto\n kai\ ponêro/n, a)sphale/s soi ô)nei=sthai mathê/mata kai\ para\ Prôtago/rou kai\ par' a)/llou o(tounou=n; ei) de\ mê/, o(/ra, ô)= phi/ltate, mê\ peri\ toi=s philta/tois kubeu/ê|s te kai\ kinduneu/ê|s.]] [Footnote 15: Plato, Protag. p. 314 A. [Greek: siti/a me\n ga\r kai\ pota\ pria/menon e)/xestin e)n a)/llois a)ggei/ois a)pophe/rein, kai\ pri\n de/xasthai au)ta\ e)s to\ sô=ma pio/nta ê)\ phago/nta, katathe/menon oi)/kade e)/xesti sumbouleu/sasthai parakale/santa to\n e)pai+/onta, o(/, ti te e)deste/on ê)\ pote/on kai\ o(/, ti mê/, kai\ o(po/son, kai\ o(po/te; . . . . mathê/mata de\ ou)k e)/stin e)n a)/llô| a)ggei/ô| a)penegkei=n, a)ll' a)na/gkê katathe/nta tê\n timê\n to\ ma/thêma e)n au)tê=| tê=| psuchê=| labo/nta kai\ matho/nta a)pie/nai ê)\ beblamme/non ê)\ ô)phelême/non.]] * * * * * [Side-note: Remarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of knowledge brought to light.] Such is the preliminary conversation of Sokrates with Hippokrates, before the interview with Protagoras. I have given it (like the introduction to the Lysis) at considerable length, because it is a very characteristic specimen of the Sokratico-Platonic point of view. It brings to light that false persuasion of knowledge, under which men unconsciously act, especially in what concerns the mind and its treatment. Common fame and celebrity suffice to determine the most vehement aspirations towards a lecturer, in one who has never stopped to reflect or enquire what the lecturer does. The pressure applied by Sokrates in his successive questions, to get beyond vague generalities into definite particulars--the insufficiency, thereby exposed, of the conceptions with which men usually rest satisfied--exhibit the working of his Elenchus in one of its most instructive ways. The parallel drawn between the body and the mind--the constant precaution taken in the case of the former to consult the professional man and to follow his advice in respect both to discipline and nourishment--are in the same vein of sentiment which we have already followed in other dialogues. Here too, as elsewhere, some similar _Expert_, in reference to the ethical and intellectual training of mind, is desiderated, as still more imperatively necessary. Yet where is he to be found? How is the business of mental training to be brought to a beneficial issue without him? Or is Protagoras the man to supply such a demand? We shall presently see. * * * * * [Side-note: Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias. Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras.] Sokrates and Hippokrates proceed to the house of Kallias, and find him walking about in the fore-court with Protagoras, and some of the other company; all of whom are described as treating the Sophist with almost ostentatious respect. Prodikus and Hippias have each their separate hearers, in or adjoining to the court. Sokrates addresses Protagoras. [Side-note: Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter, declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own openness in avowing himself a sophist.] _Sokr._--Protagoras, I and Hippokrates here are come to talk to you about something. _Prot._--Do you wish to ta]k to me alone, or in presence of the rest? _Sokr._--To us it is indifferent: but I will tell you what we come about, and you may then determine for yourself. This Hippokrates is a young man of noble family, and fully equal to his contemporaries in capacity. He wishes to become distinguished in the city; and he thinks he shall best attain that object through your society. Consider whether you would like better to talk with him alone, or in presence of the rest.[16] _Prot._--Your consideration on my behalf, Sokrates, is reasonable. A person of my profession must be cautious in his proceedings. I, a foreigner, visit large cities, persuading the youth of best family to frequent my society in preference to that of their kinsmen and all others; in the conviction that I shall do them good. I thus inevitably become exposed to much jealousy and even to hostile conspiracies.[17] The sophistical art is an old one;[18] but its older professors, being afraid of enmity if they proclaimed what they really were, have always disguised themselves under other titles. Some, like Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, called themselves poets: others, Orpheus, Musæus, &c., professed to prescribe religious rites and mysteries: others announced themselves as gymnastic trainers or teachers of music. But I have departed altogether from this policy; which indeed did not succeed in really deceiving any leading men--whom alone it was intended to deceive--and which, when found out, entailed upon its authors the additional disgrace of being considered deceivers. The true caution consists in open dealing; and this is what I have always adopted. I avow myself a Sophist, educating men. I am now advanced in years, old enough to be the father of any of you, and have grown old in the profession: yet during all these years, thank God, I have suffered no harm either from my practice or my title.[19] If therefore you desire to converse with me, it will be far more agreeable to me to converse in presence of all who are now in the house.[20] [Footnote 16: Plat. Prot. p. 316. The motive assigned by Hippokrates, for putting himself under the teaching of Protagoras, is just the same as that which Xenophon assigns to his friend Proxenus for taking lessons and paying fees to the Leontine Gorgias (Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 16).] [Footnote 17: The jealousy felt by fathers, mothers, and relatives against a teacher or converser who acquired great influence over their youthful relatives, is alluded to by Sokrates in the Platonic Apology (p. 37 E), and is illustrated by a tragical incident in the Cyropædia of Xenophon, iii. 1. 14-38. Compare also Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 52.] [Footnote 18: Plat. Prot. p. 316 D. [Greek: e)gô\ de\ tê\n sophistikê\n te/chnên phêmi\ me\n ei)=nai palaia/n.]] [Footnote 19: Plat. Prot. p. 317 C. [Greek: ô(/ste su\n theô=| ei)pei=n mêde\n deino\n pa/schein dia\ to\ o(mologei=n sophistê\s ei)=nai.]] [Footnote 20: Plat. Prot. p. 317 D. In the Menon, the Platonic Sokrates is made to say that Protagoras died at the age of seventy; that he had practised forty years as a Sophist; and that during all that long time he had enjoyed the highest esteem and reputation, even after his death, "down to the present day" (Menon, p. 91 E). It must be remembered that the speech, of which I have just given an abstract, is delivered not by the historical, real, Protagoras, but by the character named _Protagoras_, depicted by Plato in this dialogue: _i.e._ the speech is composed by Plato himself. I read, therefore, with much surprise, a note of Heindorf (ad p. 316 D), wherein he says about Protagoras: "Callidé in postremis reticet, quod addere poterat, [Greek: chrê/mata dido/ntas]." "Protagoras cunningly keeps back, what he might have here added, that people gave him money for his teaching." Heindorf must surely have supposed that he was commenting upon a real speech, delivered by the historical person called Protagoras. Otherwise what can be meant by this charge of "cunning reticence or keeping back?" Protagoras here speaks what Plato puts into his mouth; neither more nor less. What makes the remark of Heindorf the more preposterous is, that in page 328 B the very fact, which Protagoras is here said "cunningly to keep back," appears mentioned by Protagoras; and mentioned in the same spirit of honourable frankness and fair-dealing as that which pervades the discourse which I have just (freely) translated. Indeed nothing can be more marked than the way in which Plato makes Protagoras dwell with emphasis on the frankness and openness of his dealing: nothing can be more at variance with the character which critics give us of the Sophists, as "cheats, who defrauded pupils of their money while teaching them nothing at all, or what they themselves knew to be false".] [Side-note: Protagoras prefers to converse in presence of the assembled company.] On hearing this, Sokrates--under the suspicion (he tells us) that Protagoras wanted to show off in the presence of Prodikus and Hippias--proposes to convene all the dispersed guests, and to talk in their hearing. This is accordingly done, and the conversation recommences--Sokrates repeating the introductory request which he had preferred on behalf of Hippokrates. [Side-note: Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young men as virtuous citizens.] _Sokr._--Hippokrates is anxious to distinguish himself in the city, and thinks that he shall best attain this end by placing himself under your instruction. He would gladly learn, Protagoras, what will happen to him, if he comes into intercourse with you. _Prot._--Young man, if you come to me, on the day of your first visit, you will go home better than you came, and on the next day the like: each successive day you will make progress for the better.[21] _Sokr._--Of course he will; there is nothing surprising in that: but towards _what_, and about _what_, will he make progress? _Prot._--Your question is a reasonable one, and I am glad to reply to it. I shall not throw him back--as other Sophists do, with mischievous effect--into the special sciences, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, &c., just after he has completed his course in them. I shall teach him what he really comes to learn: wisdom and good counsel, both respecting his domestic affairs, that he may manage his own family well--and respecting the affairs of the city, that he may address himself to them most efficaciously, both in speech and act. _Sokr._--You speak of political or social science. You engage to make men good citizens. _Prot._--Exactly so.[22] [Footnote 21: Plato, Protag. p. 318 A. "Qui ad philosophorum scholas venit, quotidie secum aliquid boni ferat: aut sanior domum redeat, aut sanabilior." Seneca, Epistol. 108, p. 530.] [Footnote 22: Plato, Protag. pp. 318-319. The declaration made by Protagoras--that he will not throw back his pupils into the special arts--is represented by Plato as intended to be an indirect censure on Hippias, then sitting by.] [Side-note: Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not.] _Sokr._--That is a fine talent indeed, which you possess, if you _do_ possess it; for (to speak frankly) I thought that the thing had not been teachable, nor intentionally communicable, by man to man.[23] I will tell you why I think so. The Athenians are universally recognised as intelligent men. Now when our public assembly is convened, if the subject of debate be fortification, ship-building, or any other specialty which they regard as learnable and teachable, they will listen to no one except a professional artist or craftsman.[24] If any non-professional man presumes to advise them on the subject, they refuse to hear him, however rich and well-born he may be. It is thus that they act in matters of any special art;[25] but when the debate turns upon the general administration of the city, they hear every man alike--the brass-worker, leather-cutter, merchant, navigator, rich, poor, well-born, low-born, &c. Against none of them is any exception taken, as in the former case--that he comes to give advice on that which he has not learnt, and on which he has had no master.[26] It is plain that the public generally think it not teachable. Moreover our best and wisest citizens, those who possess civic virtue in the highest measure, cannot communicate to their own children this same virtue, though they cause them to be taught all those accomplishments which paid masters can impart. Periklês and others, excellent citizens themselves, have never been able to make any one else excellent, either in or out of their own family. These reasons make me conclude that social or political virtue is not teachable. I shall be glad if you can show me that it is so.[27] [Footnote 23: Plato, Protag. p. 319 B. [Greek: ou) didakto\n ei)=nai, mêd' u(p' a)nthrô/pôn paraskeuasto\n a)nthrô/pois.]] [Footnote 24: Plato, Protag. p. 319 C. [Greek: kai\ ta)/lla pa/nta ou(/tôs, o(/sa ê(gou=ntai mathêta/ te kai\ didakta\ ei)=nai. e)a/n de/ tis a)/llos e)picheirê=| au)toi=s sumbouleu/ein o(\n e)kei=noi mê\ oi)/ontai dêmiourgo\n ei)=nai], &c.] [Footnote 25: Plato, Protag. p. 319 D. [Greek: Peri\ me\n ou)=n ô(=n _oi)/ontai e)n te/chnê| ei)=nai_, ou(/tô diapra/ttontai.]] [Footnote 26: Plato, Protag. p. 319 D. [Greek: kai\ tou/tois ou)dei\s tou=to e)piplê/ssei ô(sper toi=s pro/teron, o(/ti ou)damo/then mathô/n, ou)de\ o)/ntos didaska/lou ou)deno\s au)tô=|, e)/peita sumbouleu/ein e)picheirei=; dê=lon ga\r o(/ti ou)ch ê(gou=ntai didakto\n ei)=nai.]] [Footnote 27: Plato, Protag. pp. 319-320.] [Side-note: Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe.] _Prot._--I will readily show you. But shall I, like an old man addressing his juniors, recount to you an illustrative mythe?[28] or shall I go through an expository discourse? The mythe perhaps will be the more acceptable of the two. [Footnote 28: Plato, Protag. p. 320 C. [Greek: po/teron u(mi=n, ô(s presbu/teros neôte/rois, mu=thon le/gôn e)pidei/xô, ê)\ lo/gô| diexelthô/n?] It is probable that the Sophists often delivered illustrative mythes or fables as a more interesting way of handling social matters before an audience. Such was the memorable fable called the choice of Hêraklês by Prodikus.] [Side-note: Mythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods. Prometheus and Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter. It is partly amended by Prometheus.] There was once a time when Gods existed, but neither men nor animals had yet come into existence. At the epoch prescribed by Fate, the Gods fabricated men and animals in the interior of the earth, out of earth, fire, and other ingredients: directing the brothers Prometheus and Epimetheus to fit them out with suitable endowments. Epimetheus, having been allowed by his brother to undertake the task of distributing these endowments, did his work very improvidently, wasted all his gifts upon the inferior animals, and left nothing for man. When Prometheus came to inspect what had been done, he found that other animals were adequately equipped, but that man had no natural provision for clothing, shoeing, bedding, or defence. The only way whereby Prometheus could supply the defect was, by breaking into the common workshop of Athênê and Hephæstus, and stealing from thence their artistic skill, together with fire.[29] Both of these he presented to man, who was thus enabled to construct for himself, by art, all that other animals received from nature and more besides. [Footnote 29: Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322. [Greek: a)pori/a| ou)=n e)cho/menos o( Promêtheu\s ê(/ntina sôtêri/an tô=| a)nthrô/pô| eu(/roi, kle/ptei Ê(phai/stou kai\ A)thêna=s tê\n e(/ntechnon sophi/an su\n puri/. . . . Tê\n me\n ou)=n peri\ to\n bi/on sophi/an a)/nthrôpos tau/tê| e)/sche, tê\n de\ politikê\n ou)k ei)=chen; ê)=n ga\r para\ tô=| Di/i+], &c. If the reader will compare this with the doctrine delivered in the Platonic Timæus--that the inferior animals spring from degenerate men--he will perceive the entire variance between the two (Timæus, pp. 91-92).] [Side-note: Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of individual wants, but could not give them the social art. Mankind are on the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions essential for society.] Still however, mankind did not possess the political or social art; which Zeus kept in his own custody, where Prometheus could not reach it. Accordingly, though mankind could provide for themselves as individuals, yet when they attempted to form themselves into communities, they wronged each other so much, from being destitute of the political or social art, that they were presently forced again into dispersion.[30] The art of war, too, being a part of the political art, which mankind did not possess--they could not get up a common defence against hostile animals: so that the human race would have been presently destroyed, had not Zeus interposed to avert such a consummation. He sent Hermês to mankind, bearing with him Justice and the sense of Shame (or Moderation), as the bonds and ornaments of civic society, coupling men in friendship.[31] Hermês asked Zeus--Upon what principle shall I distribute these gifts among mankind? Shall I distribute them in the same way as artistic skill is distributed, only to a small number--a few accomplished physicians, navigators, &c., being adequate to supply the wants of the entire community? Or are they to be apportioned in a certain dose to every man? Undoubtedly, to every man (was the command of Zeus). All without exception must be partakers in them. If they are confined exclusively to a few, like artistic or professional skill, no community can exist.[32] Ordain, by my authority, that every man, who cannot take a share of his own in justice and the sense of shame, shall be slain, as a nuisance to the community. [Footnote 30: Plato, Protag. p. 322 B. [Greek: e)zê/toun dê\ a)throi/zesthai kai\ sô/zesthai kti/zontes po/leis; o(/t' ou)=n a)throisthei=en, ê)di/koun a)llê/lous, a(/te ou)k e)/chontes tê\n politikê\n te/chnên, ô(/ste pa/lin skedannu/menoi diephthei/ronto.] Compare Plato, Republic, i. p. 351 C, p. 352 B, where Sokrates sets forth a similar argument.] [Footnote 31: Plato, Protagor. p. 322 C. [Greek: E(rmê=n pe/mpei a)/gonta ei)s a)nthrô/pous ai)dô= te kai\ di/kên, i(/n' ei)=en po/leôn ko/smoi te kai\ desmoi\ phili/as sunagôgoi/.]] [Footnote 32: Plato, Protag. p. 322 C-D. [Greek: ei)=s e)/chôn i)atrikê\n polloi=s i(kano\s i)diô/tais, kai\ oi( a)/lloi dêmiourgoi/. kai\ di/kên dê\ kai\ ai)dô= ou(/tô thô= e)n toi=s a)nthrô/pois, ê)\ e)pi\ pa/ntas nei/mô? E)pi\ pa/ntas, e)/phê o( Zeu/s, kai\ pa/ntes metecho/ntôn; ou) ga\r a)\n ge/nointo po/leis, ei) o)li/goi au)tô=n mete/choien ô(/sper a)/llôn technô=n. kai\ no/mon ge the\s par' e)mou=, to\n mê\ duna/menon ai)doou=s kai\ di/kês mete/chein, ktei/nein ô(s no/son po/leôs.] We see by p. 323 A that [Greek: sôphrosu/nê] is employed as substitute or equivalent for [Greek: ai)dô/s]: yet still [Greek: ai)dô\s] is the proper word to express Plato's meaning, as it denotes a distinct and positive regard to the feelings of others--a feeling of pain in each man's mind, when he discovers or believes that he is disapproved by his comrades. Hom. Il. O. 561--[Greek: ai)dô= the/sth' e)ni\ thumô=| A)llê/lous t' ai)dei=sthe kata\ kratera\s u(smi/nas.]] [Side-note: Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse. Justice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but are possessed by all citizens and taught by all to all.] This fable will show you, therefore, Sokrates (continues Protagoras), that the Athenians have good reason for making the distinction to which you advert. When they are discussing matters of special art, they will hear only the few to whom such matters are known. But when they are taking counsel about social or political virtue, which consists altogether in justice and moderation, they naturally hear every one; since every one is presumed, as a condition of the existence of the commonwealth, to be a partaker therein.[33] Moreover, even though they know a man not to have these virtues in reality, they treat him as insane if he does not proclaim himself to have them, and make profession of virtue: whereas, in the case of the special arts, if a man makes proclamation of his own skill as a physician or musician, they censure or ridicule him.[34] [Footnote 33: Plat. Prot. pp. 322-323.] [Footnote 34: Plato, Protag. p. 323 C.] [Side-note: Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of punishment.] Nevertheless, though they account this political or social virtue an universal endowment, they are far from thinking that it comes spontaneously or by nature. They conceive it to be generated by care and teaching. For in respect of all those qualities which come by nature or by accident, no one is ever angry with another or blames another for being found wanting. An ugly, dwarfish, or sickly man is looked upon simply with pity, because his defects are such as he cannot help. But when any one manifests injustice or other qualities the opposite of political virtue, then all his neighbours visit him with indignation, censure, and perhaps punishment: implying clearly their belief that this virtue is an acquirement obtained by care and learning.[35] Indeed the whole institution of punishment has no other meaning. It is in itself a proof that men think social virtue to be acquirable and acquired. For no rational man ever punishes malefactors because they _have_ done wrong, or simply with a view to the past:--since what is already done cannot be undone. He punishes with a view to the future, in order that neither the same man, nor others who see him punished, may be again guilty of similar wrong. This opinion plainly implies the belief, that virtue is producible by training, since men punish for the purpose of prevention.[36] [Footnote 35: Plato, Protag. pp. 323-324.] [Footnote 36: Plato, Protag. p. 324 A-B. [Greek: ou)dei\s ga\r kola/zei tou\s a)dikou=ntas pro\s tou/tô| to\n nou=n e)/chôn kai\ tou/tou e(/neka o(/ti ê)di/kêsen, o(/stis mê\ ô(/sper thêri/on a)logi/stôs timôrei=tai; o( de\ meta\ lo/gou e)picheirô=n kola/zein ou) tou= parelêlutho/tos e(/neka a)dikê/matos timôrei=tai--ou) ga\r a)\n to/ ge prachthe\n a)ge/nêton thei/ê--a)lla\ tou= me/llontos cha/rin, i(/na mê\ au)=this a)dikê/sê| mê/te au)to\s ou(=tos mê/te a)/llos o( tou=ton i)dô\n kolasthe/nta. kai\ toiau/tên ei)=nai a)retê/n; _a)potropê=s gou=n e(/neka kola/zei_.] This clear and striking exposition of the theory of punishment is one of the most memorable passages in Plato, or in any ancient author. And if we are to believe the words which immediately follow, it was the theory universally accepted at that time--[Greek: tau/tên ou)=n tê\n do/xan pa/ntes e)/chousin, o(/soi per timôrou=ntai kai\ i)di/a| kai\ dêmosi/a|.] Compare Plato, Legg. xi. p. 933, where the same doctrine is announced: Seneca, De Irâ, i. 16. "Nam, ut Plato ait, nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. Revocari enim præterita non possunt: futura prohibentur." Steinhart (Einleit. zum Protag. p. 423) pronounces a just encomium upon this theory of punishment, which, as he truly observes, combines together the purposes declared in the two modern theories--Reforming and Deterring. He says further, however, that the same theory of punishment reappears in the Gorgias, which I do not think exact. The purpose of punishment, as given in the Gorgias, is simply to cure a distempered patient of a terrible distemper, and thus to confer great benefit on him--but without any allusion to tutelary results as regards society.] [Side-note: Why eminent men cannot make their sons eminent.] I come now to your remaining argument, Sokrates. You urge that citizens of eminent civil virtue cannot communicate that virtue to their own sons, to whom nevertheless they secure all the accomplishments which masters can teach. Now I have already shown you that civil virtue is the one accomplishment needful,[37] which every man without exception must possess, on pain of punishment or final expulsion, if he be without it. I have shown you, moreover that every one believes it to be communicable by teaching and attention. How can you believe then that these excellent fathers teach their sons other things, but do not teach them this, the want of which entails such terrible penalties? [Footnote 37: Plato, Protag. p. 324 E. [Greek: Po/teron e)/sti ti e(/n, ê)\ ou)k e)/stin, ou)= a)nagkai=on pa/ntas tou\s poli/tas mete/chein, ei)/per me/llei po/lis ei)=nai? e)n tou/tô| ga\r au(/tê lu/etai ê( a)pori/a ê(\n su\ a)porei=s.]] [Side-note: Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws, dikastery, &c.] The fact is, they _do_ teach it: and that too with great pains.[38] They begin to admonish and lecture their children, from the earliest years. Father, mother, tutor, nurse, all vie with each other to make the child as good as possible: by constantly telling him on every occasion which arises, This is right--That is wrong--This is honourable--That is mean--This is holy--That is unholy--Do these things, abstain from those.[39] If the child obeys them, it is well: if he do not, they straighten or rectify him, like a crooked piece of wood, by reproof and flogging. Next, they send him to a schoolmaster, who teaches him letters and the harp; but who is enjoined to take still greater pains in watching over his orderly behaviour. Here the youth is put to read, learn by heart, and recite, the compositions of able poets; full of exhortations to excellence and of stirring examples from the good men of past times.[40] On the harp also, he learns the best songs, his conduct is strictly watched, and his emotions are disciplined by the influence of rhythmical and regular measure. While his mind is thus trained to good, he is sent besides to the gymnastic trainer, to render his body a suitable instrument for it,[41] and to guard against failure of energy under the obligations of military service. If he be the son of a wealthy man, he is sent to such training sooner, and remains in it longer. As soon as he is released from his masters, the city publicly takes him in hand, compelling him to learn the laws prescribed by old and good lawgivers,[42] to live according to their prescriptions, and to learn both command and obedience, on pain of being punished. Such then being the care bestowed, both publicly and privately, to foster virtue, can you really doubt, Sokrates, whether it be teachable? You might much rather wonder if it were not so.[43] [Footnote 38: Plato, Protag. p. 325 B.] [Footnote 39: Plato, Protag. p. 325 D. [Greek: par' e(/kaston kai\ e)/rgon kai\ lo/gon dida/skontes kai\ e)ndeiknu/menoi o(/ti to\ me\n di/kaion, to\ de\ a)/dikon, kai\ to/de me\n kalo/n, to/de de\ ai)schro/n], &c.] [Footnote 40: Plato, Protag. p. 325 E--326 A. [Greek: paratithe/asin au)toi=s e)pi\ tô=n ba/thrôn a)naginô/skein poiêtô=n a)gathô=n poiê/mata kai\ e)kmantha/nein a)nagka/zousin, e)n oi(=s pollai\ me\n nouthetê/seis e)/neisi, pollai\ de\ die/xodoi kai\ e)/painoi kai\ e)gkô/mia palaiô=n a)ndrô=n a)gathô=n, i(/na o( pai=s zêlô=n mimê=tai kai\ o)re/gêtai toiou=tos gene/sthai.]] [Footnote 41: Plato, Protag. p. 326 B. [Greek: i(/na ta\ sô/mata belti/ô e)/chontes u(pêretô=si tê=| dianoi/a| chrêstê=| ou)/sê|], &c.] [Footnote 42: Plato, Protag. p. 326 D. [Greek: no/mous u(pogra/psasa, a)gathô=n kai\ palaiô=n nomothetô=n eu(rê/mata], &c.] [Footnote 43: Plato, Protag. p. 326 E.] [Side-note: All learn virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his own individual aptitude.] How does it happen, then, you ask, that excellent men so frequently have worthless sons, to whom, even with all virtue from these precautions, they cannot teach their own virtue? This is not surprising, when you recollect what I have just said--That in regard to social virtue, every man must be a craftsman and producer; there must be no non-professional consumers.[44] All of us are interested in rendering our neighbours just and virtuous, as well as in keeping them so. Accordingly, every one, instead of being jealous, like a professional artist, of seeing his own accomplishments diffused, stands forward zealously in teaching justice and virtue to every one else, and in reproving all short-comers.[45] Every man is a teacher of virtue to others: every man learns his virtue from such general teaching, public and private. The sons of the best men learn it in this way, as well as others. The instruction of their fathers counts for comparatively little, amidst such universal and paramount extraneous influence; so that it depends upon the aptitude and predispositions of the sons themselves, whether they turn out better or worse than others. The son of a superior man will often turn out ill; while the son of a worthless man will prove meritorious. So the case would be, if playing on the flute were the one thing needful for all citizens; if every one taught and enforced flute-playing upon all others, and every one learnt it from the teaching of all others.[46] You would find that the sons of good or bad flute-players would turn out good or bad, not in proportion to the skill of their fathers, but according to their own natural aptitudes. You would find however also, that all of them, even the most unskilful, would be accomplished flute-players, if compared with men absolutely untaught, who had gone through no such social training. So too, in regard to justice and virtue.[47] The very worst man brought up in your society and its public and private training, would appear to you a craftsman in these endowments, if you compared him with men who had been brought up without education, without laws, without dikasteries, without any general social pressure bearing on them, to enforce virtue: such men as the savages exhibited last year in the comedy of Pherekrates at the Lenæan festival. If you were thrown among such men, you, like the chorus of misanthropes in that play, would look back with regret even upon the worst criminals of the society which you had left, such as Eurybatus and Phrynondas.[48] [Footnote 44: Plato, Protag. p. 326 E. [Greek: o(/ti tou/tou tou= pra/gmatos, tê=s a)retê=s, ei) me/llei po/lis ei)=nai, ou)de/na dei= _i)diôteu/ein_.] It is to be regretted that there is no precise word to translate exactly the useful antithesis between [Greek: i)diô/tês] and [Greek: techni/tês] or [Greek: dêmiourgo/s].] [Footnote 45: Plato, Protag. p. 327 A. [Greek: ei) kai\ tou=to kai\ i)di/a| kai\ dêmosi/a| pa=s pa/nta kai\ e)di/daske kai\ e)pe/plêtte to\n mê\ kalô=s au)lou=nta, kai\ mê\ e)phtho/nei tou/tou, ô(/sper nu=n tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ tô=n nomi/môn ou)dei\s phthonei= ou)d' a)pokru/ptetai, ô(/sper tô=n a)/llôn technêma/tôn--lusitelei= ga\r, oi)=mai, ê(mi=n ê( a)llê/lôn dikaiosu/nê kai\ a)retê\; dia\ tau=ta pa=s panti\ prothu/môs le/gei kai\ dida/skei kai\ ta\ di/kaia kai\ ta\ no/mima.]] [Footnote 46: Plato, Protag. p. 327 C.] [Footnote 47: Plato, Protag. p. 327 C-D. [Greek: O(/stis soi a)dikô/tatos phai/netai a)/nthrôpos tô=n e)n no/mois kai\ a)nthrô/pois tethramme/nôn, di/kaion au)to\n ei)=nai kai\ _dêmiourgo\n tou/tou tou= pra/gmatos_, ei) de/oi au)to\n kri/nesthai pro\s a)nthrô/pous, oi(=s mê/te paidei/a e)sti\ mê/te dikastê/ria mê/te no/moi mê/te a)na/gkê mêdemi/a dia\ panto\s a)nagka/zoousa a)retê=s e)pimelei=sthai.]] [Footnote 48: Plato, Protag. p. 327 D.] [Side-note: Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special teacher thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others.] But now, Sokrates, you are over-nice, because all of us are teachers of virtue, to the best of every man's power; while no particular individual appears to teach it specially and _ex professo_[49] By the same analogy, if you asked who was the teacher for speaking our vernacular Greek, no one special person could be pointed out:[50] nor would you find out who was the finishing teacher for those sons of craftsmen who learnt the rudiments of their art from their own fathers--while if the son of any non-professional person learns a craft, it is easy to assign the person by whom he was taught.[51] So it is in respect to virtue. All of us teach and enforce virtue to the best of our power; and we ought to be satisfied if there be any one of us ever so little superior to the rest, in the power of teaching it. Of such men I believe myself to be one.[52] I can train a man into an excellent citizen, better than others, and in a manner worthy not only of the fee which I ask, but even of a still greater remuneration, in the judgment of the pupil himself. This is the stipulation which I make with him: when he has completed his course, he is either to pay me the fee which I shall demand--or if he prefers, he may go into a temple, make oath as to his own estimate of the instruction imparted to him, and pay me according to that estimate.[53] [Footnote 49: Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. [Greek: nu=n de\ trupha=|s, ô)= Sô/krates, dio/ti pa/ntes dida/skaloi/ ei)sin a)retê=s, kath' o(/son du/natai e(/kastos, kai\ ou)dei/s soi phai/netai.]] [Footnote 50: Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. [Greek: ei)=th' ô(/s per a)\n ei) zêtoi=s ti/s dida/skalos tou= e(llêni/zein, ou)d' a)\n ei(=s phanei/ê.]] [Footnote 51: Plato, Protag. p. 328 A.] [Footnote 52: Plato, Protag. p. 328 B. [Greek: A)lla\ ka)\n ei) o)li/gon e)/sti tis o(/stis diaphe/rei ê(mô=n probiba/sai ei)s a)retê/n, a)gapêto/n. Ô(=n dê\ e)gô\ oi)=mai ei(=s ei)=nai], &c.] [Footnote 53: Plato, Protag. p. 328 B.] [Side-note: The sons of great artists do not themselves become great artists.] I have thus proved to you, Sokrates--That virtue is teachable--That the Athenians account it to be teachable--That there is nothing wonderful in finding the sons of good men worthless, and the sons of worthless men good. Indeed this is true no less about the special professions, than about the common accomplishment, virtue. The sons of Polyklêtus the statuary, and of many other artists, are nothing as compared with their fathers.[54] [Footnote 54: Plato, Protag. p. 328 C.] * * * * * [Side-note: Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain the manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates and perpetuates itself.] Such is the discourse composed by Plato and attributed to the Platonic Protagoras--showing that virtue is teachable, and intended to remove the difficulties proposed by Sokrates. It is an exposition of some length: and because it is put into the mouth of a Sophist, many commentators presume, as a matter of course, that it must be a manifestation of some worthless quality:[55] that it is either empty verbiage, or ostentatious self-praise, or low-minded immorality. I am unable to perceive in the discourse any of these demerits. I think it one of the best parts of the Platonic writings, as an exposition of the growth and propagation of common sense--the common, established, ethical and social sentiment, among a community: sentiment neither dictated in the beginning, by any scientific or artistic lawgiver, nor personified in any special guild of craftsmen apart from the remaining community--nor inculcated by any formal professional teachers--nor tested by analysis--nor verified by comparison with any objective standard: but self-sown and self-asserting, stamped, multiplied, and kept in circulation, by the unpremeditated conspiracy of the general[56] public--the omnipresent agency of King Nomos and his numerous volunteers. [Footnote 55: So Serranus (ad 326 E), who has been followed by many later critics. "Quæstio est, Virtusne doceri possit? Quod instituit demonstrare Sophista, sed ineptissimis argumentis et quæ contra seipsum faciant." To me this appears the reverse of the truth. But even if it were true, no blame could fall on Protagoras. We should only be warranted in concluding that it suited the scheme of Plato here to make him talk nonsense.] [Footnote 56: This is what the Platonic Sokrates alludes to in the Phædon and elsewhere. [Greek: oi( tê\n dêmotikê\n te kai\ politikê\n a)retê\n e)pitetêdeuko/tes, ê(\n dê\ kalou=si sôphrosu/nên te kai\ dikaiosu/nêv, e)x e)/thous te kai\ mele/tês gegonui=an, a)/neu philosophi/as te kai\ nou=.] Phædon, p. 82 B; compare the same dialogue, p. 68 C; also Republic, x. p. 619 C--[Greek: e)/thei a)/neu philosophi/as a)retê=s meteilêpho/ta].] The account given by Mr. James Mill (Fragment on Mackintosh, p. 259-260) of the manner in which the established morality of a society is transmitted and perpetuated, coincides completely with the discourse of the Platonic Protagoras. The passage is too long to be cited: I give here only the concluding words, which describe the [Greek: dêmotikê\ a)retê\ a)/neu philosophi/as]-- "In this manner it is that men, in the social state, acquire the habits of moral acting, and certain affections connected with it, before they are capable of reflecting upon the grounds which recommend the acts either to praise or blame. Nearly at this point the greater part of them remain: continuing to perform moral acts and to abstain from the contrary, chiefly from the habits which they have acquired, and the authority upon which they originally acted: though it is not possible that any man should come to the years and blessing of reason, without perceiving at least in an indistinct and general way, the advantage which mankind derive from their acting towards one another in one way rather than another."] [Side-note: Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is to be assimilated to a special art.] In many of the Platonic dialogues, Sokrates is made to dwell upon the fact that there are no recognised professional teachers of virtue; and to ground upon this fact a doubt, whether virtue be really teachable. But the present dialogue is the only one in which the fact is accounted for, and the doubt formally answered. There are neither special teachers, nor professed pupils, nor determinate periods of study, nor definite lessons or stadia, for the acquirement of virtue, as there are for a particular art or craft: the reason being, that in that department every man must of necessity be a practitioner, more or less perfectly: every man has an interest in communicating it to his neighbour: hence every man is constantly both teacher and learner. Herein consists one main and real distinction between virtue and the special arts; an answer to the view most frequently espoused by the Platonic Sokrates, assimilating virtue to a professional craft, which ought to have special teachers, and a special season of apprenticeship, if it is to be acquired at all. The speech is censured by some critics as prolix. But to me it seems full of matter and argument, exceedingly free from superfluous rhetoric. The fable with which it opens presents of course the poetical ornament which belongs to that manner of handling. It is however fully equal, in point of perspicuity as well as charm--in my judgment, it is even superior to any other fable in Plato. [Side-note: Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of Protagoras--he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of the fundamental assumptions.] When the harangue, lecture, or sermon, of Protagoras is concluded, Sokrates both expresses his profound admiration of it, and admits the conclusion--That virtue is teachable--to be made out, as well as it can be made out by any continuous exposition.[57] In fact, the speaker has done all that could be done by Perikles or the best orator of the assembly. He has given a long series of reasonings in support of his own case, without stopping to hear the doubts of opponents. He has sailed along triumphantly upon the stream of public sentiment, accepting all the established beliefs--appealing to his hearers with all those familiar phrases, round which the most powerful associations are grouped--and taking for granted that justice, virtue, good, evil, &c., are known, indisputable, determinate data, fully understood, and unanimously interpreted. He has shown that the community take great pains, both publicly and privately, to inculcate and enforce virtue: that is, what _they_ believe in and esteem as virtue. But is their belief well founded? Is that which they esteem, really virtue? Do they and their elegant spokesman Protagoras, know what virtue is? If so, _how_ do they know it, and can they explain it? [Footnote 57: Plato, Protag. pp. 328-329. Very different indeed is the sentiment of the principal Platonic commentators. Schleiermacher will not allow the mythus of Protagoras to be counted among the Platonic mythes: he says that it is composed in the style of Protagoras, and perhaps copied from some real composition of that Sophist. He finds in it nothing but a "grobmaterialistiche Denkungsart, die über die sinnliche Erfahrung nicht hinaus philosophirt" (Einleitung zum Protagoras, vol. i. pp. 233-234). To the like purpose Ast (Plat. Leb. p. 71)--who tells us that what is expressed in the mythus is, "the vulgar and mean sentiment and manner of thought of the Sophist: for it deduces every thing, both arts and the social union itself, from human wants and necessity". Apparently these critics, when they treat this as a proof of meanness and vulgarity, have forgotten that the Platonic Sokrates himself does exactly the same thing in the Republic--deriving the entire social union from human necessities (Republ. ii. 369 C). K. F. Hermann is hardly less severe upon the Protagorean discourse (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 460). For my part, I take a view altogether opposed to these learned persons. I think the discourse one of the most striking and instructive portions of the Platonic writings: and if I could believe that it was the composition of Protagoras himself, my estimation of him would be considerably raised. Steinhart pronounces a much more rational and equitable judgment than Ast and Schleiermacher, upon the discourse of Protagoras (Einleitung zum Prot. pp. 422-423).] [Side-note: One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer.] This is the point upon which Sokrates now brings his Elenchus to bear: his method of short question and answer. We have seen what long continuous speaking can do: we have now to see what short cross-questioning can do. The antithesis between the two is at least one main purpose of Plato--if it be not even _the_ purpose (as Schleiermacher supposes it to be) in this memorable dialogue. [Side-note: Questions by Sokrates--Whether virtue is one and indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous?] After your copious exposition, Protagoras (says Sokrates), I have only one little doubt remaining, which you will easily explain.[58] You have several times spoken of justice, moderation, holiness, &c., as if they all, taken collectively, made up virtue. Do you mean that virtue is a Whole, and that these three names denote distinct parts of it? Or are the three names all equivalent to virtue, different names for one and are the same thing? _Prot._--They are names signifying distinct parts of virtue. _Sokr._--Are these parts like the parts of the face,--eyes, nose, mouth, ears--each part not only distinct from the rest, but having its own peculiar properties? Or are they like the parts of gold, homogeneous with each other and with the whole, differing only in magnitude? _Prot._--The former. _Sokr._--Then some men may possess one part, some another. Or is it necessary that he who possesses one part, should possess all? _Prot._--By no means necessary. Some men are courageous, but unjust: others are just, but not intelligent. _Sokr._--Wisdom and courage then, both of them, are parts of virtue? _Prot._--They are so. Wisdom is the greatest of the parts: but no one of the parts is the exact likeness of another: each of them has its own peculiar property.[59] [Footnote 58: Plato, Protag. pp. 328 E--329 B. [Greek: plê\n smikro/n ti/ moi e)mpodô/n, o(\ dê=lon o(/ti Prôtago/ras r(a|di/ôs e)pekdida/xei. . . . smikrou= tinos e)ndeê/s ei)mi pa/nt' e)/chein], &c.] [Footnote 59: Plato, Protag, pp. 329-330.] [Side-note: Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? How far justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, "If you please".] _Sokr._--Now let us examine what sort of thing each of these parts is. Tell me--is justice some thing, or no thing? I think it is some thing: are you of the same opinion?[60] _Prot._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now this thing which you call _justice_: is it itself just or unjust? I should say that it was just: what do you say?[61] _Prot._--I think so too. _Sokr._--Holiness also is some thing: is the thing called _holiness_, itself holy or unholy? As for me, if any one were to ask me the question, I should reply--Of course it is: nothing else can well be holy, if holiness itself be not holy. Would you say the same? _Prot._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--Justice being admitted to be just, and holiness to be holy--do not you think that justice also is holy, and that holiness is just? If so, how can you reconcile that with your former declaration, that no one of the parts of virtue is like any other part? _Prot._--I do not altogether admit that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. But the matter is of little moment: if you please, let both of them stand as admitted. _Sokr._--Not so:[62] I do not want the debate to turn upon an "If you please": You and I are the debaters, and we shall determine the debate best without "Ifs". _Prot._--I say then that justice and holiness are indeed, in a certain way, like each other; so also there is a point of analogy between white and black,[63] hard and soft, and between many other things which no one would pronounce to be like generally. _Sokr._--Do you think then that justice and holiness have only a small point of analogy between them? _Prot._--Not exactly so: but I do not concur with you when you declare that one is like the other. _Sokr._--Well then! since you seem to follow with some repugnance this line of argument, let us enter upon another.[64] [Footnote 60: Plato, Protag. p. 330 B. [Greek: koinê=| skepsô/metha _poi=o/n ti au)tô=n e)stin e(/kaston_. prô=ton me\n to\ toio/nde; ê( dikaiosu/nê pra=gma/ ti/ e)stin? ê)\ ou)de\n pra=gma? e)moi\ me\n ga\r dokei=; ti/ de\ soi/?]] [Footnote 61: Plato, Protag. p. 330 C. [Greek: tou=to to\ pra=gma o(/ ô)noma/sate a)/rti, ê( dikaiosu/nê, au)to\ tou=to di/kaio/n e)stin ê)\ a)/dikon?]] [Footnote 62: Plato, Protag. p. 331 C. [Greek: ei) ga\r bou/lei, e)/stô ê(mi=n kai\ dikaiosu/nê o(/sion kai\ o(sio/tês di/kaion. Mê/ moi, ê(=n d' e)gô/; ou)de\n ga\r de/omai to\ "ei/ bou/lei" tou=to kai\ "_ei) soi dokei=_" e)le/gchesthai, a)ll' e)me/ te kai\ se/.] This passage seems intended to illustrate the indifference of Protagoras for dialectic forms and strict accuracy of discussion. The [Greek: a)kribologi/a] of Sokrates and Plato was not merely unfamiliar but even distasteful to rhetorical and practical men. Protagoras is made to exhibit himself as thinking the distinctions drawn by Sokrates too nice, not worth attending to. Many of the contemporaries of both shared this opinion. One purpose of our dialogue is to bring such antitheses into view.] [Footnote 63: Plat. Prot. p. 331 D.] [Footnote 64: Plat. Prot. p. 332 A.] [Side-note: Intelligence and moderation are identical, because they have the same contrary.] Sokrates then attempts to show that intelligence and moderation are identical with each other ([Greek: sophi/a] and [Greek: sôphrosu/nê]). The proof which he produces, elicited by several questions, is--that both the one and the other are contrary to folly ([Greek: a)phrosu/nê]), and, that as a general rule, nothing can have more than one single contrary.[65] [Footnote 65: Plat. Protag. p. 332.] * * * * * [Side-note: Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term.] Sokrates thus seems to himself to have made much progress in proving all the names of different virtues to be names of one and the same thing. Moderation and intelligence are shown to be the same: justice and holiness had before been shown to be nearly the same:[66] though we must recollect that this last point had not been admitted by Protagoras. It must be confessed however that neither the one nor the other is proved by any conclusive reasons. In laying down the maxim--that nothing can have more than one single contrary--Plato seems to have forgotten that the same term may be used in two different senses. Because the term folly ([Greek: a)phrosu/nê]), is used sometimes to denote the opposite of moderation ([Greek: sôphrosu/nê]), sometimes the opposite of intelligence ([Greek: sophi/a]), it does not follow that moderation and intelligence are the same thing.[67] Nor does he furnish more satisfactory proof of the other point, _viz._: That holiness and justice are the same, or as much alike as possible. The intermediate position which is assumed to form the proof, _viz._: That holiness is holy, and that justice is just--is either tautological, or unmeaning; and cannot serve as a real proof of any thing. It is indeed so futile, that if it were found in the mouth of Protagoras and not in that of Sokrates, commentators would probably have cited it as an illustration of the futilities of the Sophists. As yet therefore little has been done to elucidate the important question to which Sokrates addresses himself--What is the extent of analogy between the different virtues? Are they at bottom one and the same thing under different names? In what does the analogy or the sameness consist? [Footnote 66: Plato, Protag. p. 338 B. [Greek: sche/don ti tau)to\n o)/n.]] [Footnote 67: Aristotle would probably have avoided such a mistake as this. One important point (as I have already remarked, vol. ii. p. 170) in which he is superior to Plato is, in being far more careful to distinguish the different meanings of the same word--[Greek: ta\ pollachô=s lego/mena]. Plato rarely troubles himself to notice such distinction, and seems indeed generally unaware of it. He constantly ridicules Prodikus, who tried to distinguish words apparently synonymous.] [Side-note: Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated.] But though little progress has been made in determining the question mooted by Sokrates, enough has been done to discompose and mortify Protagoras. The general tenor of the dialogue is, to depict this man, so eloquent in popular and continuous exposition, as destitute of the analytical acumen requisite to meet cross-examination, and of promptitude for dealing with new aspects of the case, on the very subjects which form the theme of his eloquence. He finds himself brought round, by a series of short questions, to a conclusion which--whether conclusively proved or not--is proved in a manner binding upon him, since he has admitted all the antecedent premisses. He becomes dissatisfied with himself, answers with increasing reluctance,[68] and is at last so provoked as to break out of the limits imposed upon a respondent. [Footnote 68: Plato, Protag. pp. 333 B, 335 A.] * * * * * [Side-note: Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry prolixity.] Meanwhile Sokrates pursues his examination, with intent to prove that justice ([Greek: dikaiosu/nê]) and moderation ([Greek: sôphrosu/nê]) are identical. Does a man who acts unjustly conduct himself with moderation? I should be ashamed (replies Protagoras) to answer in the affirmative, though many people say so. _Sokr._--It is indifferent to me whether you yourself think so or not, provided only you consent to make answer. What I principally examine is the opinion itself: though it follows perhaps as a consequence, that I the questioner, and the respondent along with me, undergo examination at the same time.[69] You answer then (though without adopting the opinion) that men who act unjustly sometimes behave with moderation, or with intelligence: that is, that they follow a wise policy in committing injustice. _Prot._--Be it so. _Sokr._--You admit too that there exist certain things called good things. Are those things good, which are profitable to mankind? _Prot._--By Zeus, I call some things good, even though they be not profitable to men (replies Protagoras, with increasing acrimony).[70] _Sokr._--Do you mean those things which are not profitable to any _man_, or those which are not profitable to any creature whatever? Do you call these latter _good_ also? _Prot._--Not at all: but there are many things profitable to men, yet unprofitable or hurtful to different animals. Good is of a character exceedingly diversified and heterogeneous.[71] [Footnote 69: Plato, Protag. p. 333 C. [Greek: to\n ga\r lo/gon e)/gôge ma/lista e)xeta/zô, sumbai/nei me/ntoi i)/sôs kai\ e)me\ to\n e)rôtô=nta kai\ to\n e)rôtô/menon e)xeta/zesthai.] Here again we find Plato drawing special attention to the conditions of dialectic debate.] [Footnote 70: Plato, Protag. p. 333 E.] [Footnote 71: Plato, Protag. p. 334 B. [Greek: Ou(/tô de\ poiki/lon ti/ e)sti to\ a)gatho\n kai\ pantodapo/n], &c. The explanation here given by Protagoras of _good_ is the same as that which is given by the historical Sokrates himself in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (iii. 8). Things called good are diverse in the highest degree; but they are all called _good_ because they all contribute in some way to human security, relief, comfort, or prosperity. To one or other of these ends _good_, in all its multifarious forms, is relative.] [Side-note: Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates rises to depart.] Protagoras is represented as giving this answer at considerable length, and in a rhetorical manner, so as to elicit applause from the hearers.[72] Upon this Sokrates replies, "I am a man of short memory, and if any one speaks at length, I forget what he has said. If you wish me to follow you, I must entreat you to make shorter answers." _Prot._--What do you mean by asking me to make shorter answers? Do you mean shorter than the case requires? _Sokr._--No, certainly not. _Prot._--But who is to be judge of the brevity necessary, you or I? _Sokr._--I have understood that you profess to be master and teacher both of long speech and of short speech: what I beg is, that you will employ only short speech, if you expect me to follow you. _Prot._--Why, Sokrates, I have carried on many debates in my time; and if, as you ask me now, I had always talked just as my opponent wished, I should never have acquired any reputation at all. _Sokr._--Be it so: in that case I must retire; for as to long speaking, I am incompetent: I can neither make long speeches, nor follow them.[73] [Footnote 72: Plato, Protag. p. 334 D.] [Footnote 73: Plato, Prot. pp. 334 E, 335 A-C.] [Side-note: Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue.] Here Sokrates rises to depart; but Kallias, the master of the house, detains him, and expresses an earnest wish that the debate may be continued. A promiscuous conversation ensues, in which most persons present take part. Alkibiades, as the champion of Sokrates, gives, what seems really to be the key of the dialogue, when he says--"Sokrates admits that he has no capacity for long speaking, and that he is no match therein for Protagoras. But as to dialectic debate, or administering and resisting cross-examination, I should be surprised if any one were a match for him. If Protagoras admits that on this point he is inferior, Sokrates requires no more: if he does not, let him continue the debate: but he must not lengthen his answers so that hearers lose the thread of the subject." [Side-note: Claim of a special _locus standi_ and professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric.] This remark of Alkibiades, speaking altogether as a vehement partisan of Sokrates, brings to view at least one purpose--if not the main purpose--of Plato in the dialogue. "Sokrates acknowledges the superiority of Protagoras in rhetoric: if Protagoras acknowledges the superiority of Sokrates in dialectic, Sokrates is satisfied."[74] An express _locus standi_ is here claimed for dialectic, and a recognised superiority for its professors on their own ground. Protagoras professes to be master both of long speech and of short speech: but in the last he must recognise a superior. [Footnote 74: Plat. Prot. p. 336 C-D.] [Side-note: Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites Protagoras to question him.] Kritias, Prodikus, and Hippias all speak (each in a manner of his own) deprecating marked partisanship on either side, exhorting both parties to moderation, and insisting that the conversation shall be continued. At length Sokrates consents to remain, yet on condition that Protagoras shall confine himself within the limits of the dialectic procedure. Protagoras (he says) shall first question me as long as he pleases: when he has finished, I will question him. The Sophist, though at first reluctant, is constrained, by the instance of those around, to accede to this proposition.[75] [Footnote 75: Plat. Prot. pp. 337-338.] [Side-note: Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides. Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song.] For the purpose of questioning, Protagoras selects a song of Simonides: prefacing it with a remark, that the most important accomplishment of a cultivated man consists in being thorough master of the works of the poets, so as to understand and appreciate them correctly, and answer all questions respecting them.[76] Sokrates intimates that he knows and admires the song: upon which Protagoras proceeds to point out two passages in it which contradict each other, and asks how Sokrates can explain or justify such contradiction.[77] The latter is at first embarrassed, and invokes the aid of Prodikus; who interferes to uphold the consistency of his fellow-citizen Simonides, but is made to speak (as elsewhere by Plato) in a stupid and ridiculous manner. After a desultory string of remarks,[78] with disputed interpretation of particular phrases and passages of the song, but without promise of any result--Sokrates offers to give an exposition of the general purpose of the whole song, in order that the company may see how far he has advanced in that accomplishment which Protagoras had so emphatically extolled--complete mastery of the works of the poets.[79] [Footnote 76: Plat. Prot. p. 339 A. [Greek: ê(gou=mai e)gô\ a)ndri\ paidei/as me/giston me/ros ei)=nai, peri\ e)pô=n deino\n ei)=nai.]] [Footnote 77: Plat. Prot. p. 339 C-D.] [Footnote 78: Plat. Prot. pp. 340-341.] [Footnote 79: Plat. Prot. p. 342 A. [Greek: ei) bou/lei labei=n mou pei=ran o(/pôs e)/chô, o(\ su\ le/geis tou=to, peri\ e)pô=n.]] [Side-note: Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech.] He then proceeds to deliver a long harangue, the commencement of which appears to be a sort of counter-part and parody of the first speech delivered by Protagoras in this dialogue. That Sophist had represented that the sophistical art was ancient:[80] and that the poets, from Homer downward, were Sophists, but dreaded the odium of the name, and professed a different avocation with another title. Sokrates here tells us that philosophy was more ancient still in Krete and Sparta, and that there were more Sophists (he does not distinguish between the Sophist and the philosopher), female as well as male, in those regions, than anywhere else: but that they concealed their name and profession, for fear that others should copy them and acquire the like eminence:[81] that they pretended to devote themselves altogether to arms and gymnastic--a pretence whereby (he says) all the other Greeks were really deluded. The special characteristic of these philosophers or Sophists was, short and emphatic speech--epigram shot in at the seasonable moment, and thoroughly prostrating an opponent.[82] The Seven Wise Men, among whom Pittakus was one, were philosophers on this type, of supreme excellence: which they showed by inscribing their memorable brief aphorisms at Delphi. So great was the celebrity which Pittakus acquired by his aphorism, that Simonides the poet became jealous, and composed this song altogether for the purpose of discrediting him. Having stated this general view, Sokrates illustrates it by going through the song, with exposition and criticism of several different passages.[83] As soon as Sokrates has concluded, Hippias[84] compliments him, and says that he too has a lecture ready prepared on the same song: which he would willingly deliver: but Alkibiades and the rest beg him to postpone it. [Footnote 80: Plat. Prot. pp. 316-317.] [Footnote 81: Plat. Prot. p. 342.] [Footnote 82: Plat. Prot. p. 342 E, 343 B-C. [Greek: O(/ti ou(=tos o( tro/pos ê)=n tô=n palaiô=n tê=s philosophi/as, brachulogi/a tis Lakônikê/.]] [Footnote 83: Plat. Prot. pp. 344-347.] [Footnote 84: Plat. Prot. p. 347.] [Side-note: Character of this speech--its connection with the dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in continuous speech.] No remark is made by any one present, either upon the circumstance that Sokrates, after protesting against long speeches, has here delivered one longer by far than the first speech of Protagoras, and more than half as long as the second, which contains a large theory--nor upon the sort of interpretation that he bestows upon the Simonidean song. That interpretation is so strange and forced--so violent in distorting the meaning of the poet--so evidently predetermined by the resolution to find Platonic metaphysics in a lyric effusion addressed to a Thessalian prince[85]--that if such an exposition had been found under the name of Protagoras, critics would have dwelt upon it as an additional proof of dishonest perversions by the Sophists.[86] It appears as if Plato, intending in this dialogue to set out the contrast between long or continuous speech (sophistical, rhetorical, poetical) represented by Protagoras, and short, interrogatory speech (dialectical) represented by Sokrates--having moreover composed for Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue, an harangue claiming venerable antiquity for his own accomplishment--has thought it right to compose for Sokrates a pleading with like purpose, to put the two accomplishments on a par. And if that pleading includes both pointless irony and misplaced comparisons (especially what is said about the Spartans)--we must remember that Sokrates has expressly renounced all competition with Protagoras in continuous speech, and that he is here handling the weapon in which he is confessedly inferior. Plato secures a decisive triumph to dialectic, and to Sokrates as representing it: but he seems content here to leave Sokrates on the lower ground as a rhetorician. [Footnote 85: Especially his explanation of [Greek: e(kô\n e)rdê=|] (p. 345 D.). Heyne (Opuscula, i. p. 160) remarks upon the strange interpretation given by Sokrates of the Simonidean song. Compare Plato in Lysis, p. 212 E, and in Alkib. ii. p. 147 D. In both these cases, Sokrates cites passages of poetry, assigning to them a sense which their authors plainly did not intend them to bear. Heindorf in his note on the Lysis (l. c.) observes--"Videlicet, ut exeat sententia, quam Solon ne somniavit quidem, versuum horum structuram, neglecto plané sermonis usu, hanc statuit.--Cujusmodi interpretationis aliud est luculentum exemplum in Alcib. ii. p. 147 D." See also Heindorf's notes on the Charmidês, p. 163 B; Lachês, p. 191 B; and Lysis, p. 214 D. M. Boeckh observes (ad Pindar. Isthm. v. p. 528) respecting an allusion made by Pindar to Hesiod-- "Num malé intellexit poeta intelligentissimus perspicua verba Hesiodi? Non credo: sed bene sciens, consulto alium sensum intulit, suo consilio accommodatum! Simile exemplum offert gravissimus auctor Plato Theætet. p. 155 D." Stallbaum in his note on the Theætêtus adopts this remark of Boeckh. Groen van Prinsterer gives a similar opinion. (Prosopographia Platonica, p. 17.)] [Footnote 86: K. F. Hermann observes (Gesch. der Plat. Philos, p. 460) that Sokrates, in his interpretation of the Simonidean song, shows that he can play the Sophist as well as other people can.] [Side-note: Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering.] Moreover, when Sokrates intends to show himself off as a master of poetical lore ([Greek: peri\ e)pô=n deino\s]), he at the same time claims a right of interpreting the poets in his own way. He considers the poets either as persons divinely inspired, who speak fine things without rational understanding (we have seen this in the Apology and the Ion)--or as men of superior wisdom, who deliver valuable truth lying beneath the surface, and not discernible by vulgar eyes. Both these views differ from that of literal interpretation, which is here represented by Protagoras and Prodikus. And these two Sophists are here contrasted with Sokrates as interpreters of the poets. Protagoras and Prodikus look upon poetical compositions as sources of instruction: and seek to interpret them literally, as an intelligent hearer would have understood them when they were sung or recited for the first time. Towards that end, discrimination of the usual or grammatical meaning of words was indispensable. Sokrates, on the contrary, disregards the literal interpretation, derides verbal distinctions as useless, or twists them into harmony with his own purpose: Simonides and other poets are considered as superior men, and even as inspired men in whose verses wisdom and virtue must be embodied and discoverable[87]--only that they are given in an obscure and enigmatical manner: requiring to be extracted by the divination of the philosopher, who alone knows what wisdom and virtue are. It is for the philosopher to show his ingenuity by detecting the traces of them. This is what Sokrates does with the song of Simonides. He discovers in it supposed underlying thoughts ([Greek: u(ponoi/as]):[88] distinctions of Platonic Metaphysics (between [Greek: ei)=nai] and [Greek: gene/sthai]), and principles of Platonic Ethics ([Greek: ou)dei\s e(/kô kako/s])--he proceeds to point out passages in which they are to be found, and explains the song conformably to them, in spite of much violence to the obvious meaning and verbal structure.[89] But though Sokrates accepts, when required, the task of discussing what is said by the poets, and deals with them according to his own point of view--yet he presently lets us see that they are witnesses called into court by his opponent and not by himself. Alkibiades urges that the debate which had been interrupted shall be resumed and Sokrates himself requests Protagoras to consent. "To debate about the compositions of poets" (says Sokrates), "is to proceed as silly and common-place men do at their banquets: where they cannot pass the time without hiring musical or dancing girls. Noble and well-educated guests, on the contrary, can find enough to interest them in their own conversation, even if they drink ever so much wine.[90] Men such as we are, do not require to be amused by singers nor to talk about the poets, whom no one can ask what they mean; and who, when cited by different speakers, are affirmed by one to mean one thing, and by another to mean something else, without any decisive authority to appeal to. Such men as you and I ought to lay aside the poets, and test each other by colloquy of our own. If you wish to persist in questioning, I am ready to answer: if not, consent to answer me, and let us bring the interrupted debate to a close."[91] [Footnote 87: See Plato, Phædrus, p. 245 A-B; Apol. p. 22 B-C; Ion, pp. 533-534. Compare the distinction drawn in Timæus, p. 72 A-B, between the [Greek: ma/ntis] and the [Greek: prophê/tês].] [Footnote 88: About the [Greek: u(po/noiai] ascribed to the poets, see Repub. ii. p. 378 D.; Xen. Sympos. iii. 6; and F. A. Wolf, Prolegom. Homer. p. clxii.-clxiv. F. A. Wolf remarks, respecting the various allegorical interpretations of Homer and other Greek poets-- "Sed nec prioribus illis, sive allegorica et anagogica somnia sua ipsi crediderunt, sive ab aliis duntaxat credi voluerunt, idonea deest excusatio. Ita enim ratio comparata est, ut libris, quos a teneris statim annis cognoscimus, omnes propé nostras nostræque ætatis opiniones subjiciamus: ac si illi jampridem populari usu consecrati sunt, ipsa obstat veneratio, quominus in iis absurda et ridicula inesse credamus. Lenimus ergo atque adeo ornamus interpretando, quicquid proprio sensu non ferendum videtur. Atque ita factum est omni tempore in libris iis, qui pro sacris habiti sunt." The distinction was similar in character, and even more marked in respect of earnest reciprocal antipathy, between the different schools of the Jews in Alexandria and Palestine about the interpretation of the Pentateuch. 1. Those who interpreted literally, [Greek: kata\ tê\n r(êtê\n dia/noian]. 2. Those who set aside the literal interpretation, and explained the text upon a philosophy of their own, above the reach of the vulgar (Eusebius, Præp. Ev. viii. 10). Some admitted both the two interpretations, side by side. Respecting these allegorising schools of the Hellenistic Jews, from Aristobulus (150 B.C.) down to Philo, see the learned and valuable work of Gfrörer--_Philo und die Jüdisch.-Alexandr. Theosophie_, vol. i. pp. 84-86, ii. p. 356 seq.] [Footnote 89: Plat. Prot. p. 345.] [Footnote 90: Plato, Prot. p. 347 D. [Greek: ka)\n ma/nu polu\n oi)=non pi/ôsin]--a phrase which will be found suitably illustrated by the persistent dialectic of Sokrates, even at the close of the Platonic Symposion, after he has swallowed an incredible quantity of wine.] [Footnote 91: Plat. Prot. pp. 347-348. This remark--that the poet may be interpreted in many different ways, and that you cannot produce him in court to declare or defend his own meaning--is highly significant, in regard to the value set by Sokrates on living conversation and dialectic.] [Side-note: Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose.] In spite of this appeal, Protagoras is still unwilling to resume, and is only forced to do so by a stinging taunt from Alkibiades, enforced by requests from Kallias and others. He is depicted as afraid of Sokrates, who, as soon as consent is given, recommences the discussion by saying--"Do not think, Protagoras, that I have any other purpose in debating, except to sift through and through, in conjunction with you, difficulties which puzzle my own mind. Two of us together can do more in this way than any one singly.[92] [Footnote 92: Plat. Prot. p. 348 C. [Greek: mê\ oi)/ou diale/gesthai me/ soi a)/llo ti boulo/menon ê)\ a)\ au)to\s a)porô=, e(ka/stote tau=ta diaske/psasthai.] The remark here given should be carefully noted in appreciating the Sokratic frame of mind. The cross-examination which he bestows, is not that of one who himself knows--and who only gets up artificial difficulties to ascertain whether others know as much as he does. On the contrary, it proceeds from one who is himself puzzled; and that which puzzles him he states to others, and debates with others, as affording the best chance of clearing up his own ideas and obtaining a solution. The grand purpose with Sokrates is to bring into clear daylight the difficulties which impede the construction of philosophy or "reasoned truth," and to sift them thoroughly, instead of slurring them over or hiding them.] "We are all more fertile and suggestive, with regard to thought, word, and deed, when we act in couples. If a man strikes out anything new by himself, he immediately goes about looking for a companion to whom he can communicate it, and with whom he can jointly review it. Moreover, you are the best man that I know for this purpose, especially on the subject of virtue: for you are not only virtuous yourself, but you can make others so likewise, and you proclaim yourself a teacher of virtue more publicly than any one has ever done before. Whom can I find so competent as you, for questioning and communication on these very subjects?"[93] [Footnote 93: Plato, Protag. pp. 348-349.] [Side-note: The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue.] After this eulogy on dialectic conversation (illustrating still farther the main purpose of the dialogue), Sokrates resumes the argument as it stood when interrupted. _Sokr._--You, Protagoras, said that intelligence, moderation, justice, holiness, courage, were all parts of virtue; but each different from the others, and each having a separate essence and properties of its own. Do you still adhere to that opinion? _Prot._--I now think that the first four are tolerably like and akin to each other, but that courage is very greatly different from all the four. The proof is, that you will find many men pre-eminent for courage, but thoroughly unjust, unholy, intemperate, and stupid.[94] _Sokr._--Do you consider that all virtue, and each separate part of it, is fine and honourable? _Prot._--I consider it in the highest degree fine and honourable: I must be mad to think otherwise.[95] [Footnote 94: Plato, Protag. p, 349 D. [Greek: ta\ me\n te/ttara au)tô=n e)pieikô=s paraplê/sia a)llê/lois e)sti/n, ê( de\ a)ndrei/a pa/nu polu\ diaphe/ron pa/ntôn tou/tôn.]] [Footnote 95: Plato, Protag. p. 349 E. [Greek: ka/lliston me\n ou)=n, ei) mê\ mai/nomai/ ge. o(/lon pou kalo\n ô(s oi(=o/n te ma/lista.] It is not unimportant to notice such declarations as this, put by Plato into the mouth of Protagoras. They tend to show that Plato did not seek (as many of his commentators do) to depict Protagoras as a corruptor of the public mind.] [Side-note: Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates changes his attack.] Sokrates then shows that the courageous men are confident men, forward in dashing at dangers, which people in general will not affront: that men who dive with confidence into the water, are those who know how to swim; men who go into battle with confidence as horse-soldiers or light infantry, are those who understand their profession as such. If any men embark in these dangers, without such preliminary knowledge, do you consider them men of courage? Not at all (says Protagoras), they are madmen: courage would be a dishonourable thing, if _they_ were reckoned courageous.[96] Then (replies Sokrates) upon this reasoning, those who face dangers confidently, with preliminary knowledge, are courageous: those who do so without it, are madmen. Courage therefore must consist in knowledge or intelligence?[97] Protagoras declines to admit this, drawing a distinction somewhat confused:[98] upon which Sokrates approaches the same argument from a different point. [Footnote 96: Plato, Protag. p. 350 B. [Greek: Ai)schro\n me/nt' a)\n, e)/phê, ei)/ê, ê( a)ndrei/a; e)pei\ ou(=toi/ ge maino/menoi/ ei)sin.]] [Footnote 97: Plato, Protag. p. 350 C.] [Footnote 98: Plato, Protag. pp. 350-351.] [Side-note: Identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate.] _Sokr._--You say that some men live well, others badly. Do you think that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress? _Prot._--No. _Sokr._--But if he passes his life pleasurably until its close, does he not then appear to you to have lived well? _Prot._--I think so. _Sokr._--To live pleasurably therefore is good: to live disagreeably is evil. _Prot._--Yes: at least provided he lives taking pleasure in fine or honourable things.[99] _Sokr._--What! do you concur with the generality of people in calling some pleasurable things evil, and some painful things good? _Prot._--That is my opinion. _Sokr._--But are not all pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, to that extent good, unless some consequences of a different sort result from them? And again, subject to the like limitation, are not all painful things evil, so far forth as they are painful? _Prot._--To that question, absolutely as you put it, I do not know whether I can reply affirmatively--that all pleasurable things are good, and all painful things evil. I think it safer--with reference not merely to the present answer, but to my manner of life generally--to say, that there are some pleasurable things which are good, others which are not good--some painful things which are evil, others which are not evil: again, some which are neither, neither good nor evil.[100] _Sokr._--You call those things pleasurable, which either partake of the nature of pleasure, or cause pleasure? _ Prot._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--When I ask whether pleasurable things are not good, in so far forth as pleasurable--I ask in other words, whether pleasure itself be not good? _Prot._--As you observed before, Sokrates,[101] let us examine the question on each side, to see whether the pleasurable and the good be really the same. [Footnote 99: Plat. Prot. p. 351 C. [Greek: To\ me\n a)/ra ê(de/ôs zê=n, a)gatho/n, to\ d' a)êdô=s, kako/n? Ei)/per toi=s kaloi=s g', e)/phê, zô/|ê ê(do/menos.]] [Footnote 100: Plato, Protag. p. 351 D. [Greek: a)lla/ moi dokei= ou) mo/non pro\s tê\n nu=n a)po/krisin e)moi\ a)sphale/steron ei)=nai a)pokri/nasthtai, _a)lla\ kai\ pro\s pa/nta to\n a)/llon bi/on to\n e)mo/n_, o(/ti e)/sti me\n a)\ tô=n ê(de/ôn ou)k e)/stin a)gatha/, e)/sti d' au)= kai\ a(\ tô=n a)niarô=n ou)k e)sti kaka/, e)/sti d' a(\ e)/sti, kai\ tri/ton a(\ ou)de/tera, ou)/te kaka\ ou)/t' a)gatha/.] These words strengthen farther what I remarked in a recent note, about the character which Plato wished to depict in Protagoras, so different from what is imputed to that Sophist by the Platonic commentators.] [Footnote 101: Plato, Protag. p. 351 E. [Greek: ô(/sper su\ le/geis, e(ka/stote, ô)= Sô/krates, skopô/metha au)to/.] This is an allusion to the words used by Sokrates not long before,--[Greek: a(\ au)to\s a)porô= e(ka/stote tau=ta diaske/psasthai], p. 348 C.] [Side-note: Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant.] _Sokr._--Let us penetrate from the surface to the interior of the question.[102] What is your opinion about knowledge? Do you share the opinion of mankind generally about it, as you do about pleasure and pain? Mankind regard knowledge as something neither strong nor directive nor dominant. Often (they say), when knowledge is in a man, it is not knowledge which governs him, but something else--passion, pleasure, pain, love, fear--all or any of which overpower knowledge, and drag it round about in their train like a slave. Are you of the common opinion on this point also?[103] Or do you believe that knowledge is an honourable thing, and made to govern man: and that when once a man knows what good and evil things are, he will not be over-ruled by any other motive whatever, so as to do other things than what are enjoined by such knowledge--his own intelligence being a sufficient defence to him?[104] _Prot._--The last opinion is what I hold. To me, above all others, it would be disgraceful not to proclaim that knowledge or intelligence was the governing element of human affairs. [Footnote 102: Plato, Protag. p. 352 A.] [Footnote 103: Plato, Protag. p. 352 B-C. [Greek: po/teron kai\ tou=to/ soi dokei= ô(/sper toi=s polloi=s a)nthrô/pois ê)\ a)/llôs? . . . dianoou/menoi peri\ tê=s e)pistê/mês ô(/sper peri\ a)ndrapo/don, perielkome/nês u(po\ tô=n a)/llôn a(pa/ntôn.] Aristotle in the Nikomachean Ethics cites and criticises the opinion of Sokrates, wherein the latter affirmed the irresistible supremacy of knowledge, when really possessed, over all passions and desires. Aristotle cites it with the express phraseology and illustration contained in this passage of the Protagoras. [Greek: E)pista/menon me\n ou)=n ou)/ phasi/ tines oi(=o/n te ei)=nai [a)krateu/esthai]. deino\n ga/r, e)pistê/mês e)nou/sês, ô(s ô)/|eto Sôkra/tês, a)/llo ti kratei=n, kai\ perie/lkein au)tê\n ô(/sper a)ndra/podon. Sôkra/tês me\n ga\r o(/lôs e)ma/cheto pro\s to\n lo/gon, ô(s ou)k ou)/sês a)krasi/as; ou)the/na ga\r u(polamba/nonta, pra/ttein para\ to\ be/ltiston, a)lla\ di' a)/gnoian] (Ethic. N. vii. 2, vii. 3, p. 1145, b. 24). The same metaphor [Greek: perie/lketai e)pistê/mê] is again ascribed to Sokrates by Aristotle, a little farther on in the same treatise, p. 1147, b. 15. We see from hence that when Aristotle comments upon _the doctrine of Sokrates_, what he here means is, the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras; the citation of this particular metaphor establishes the identity. In another passage of the Nikom. Eth., Aristotle also cites a fact respecting the Sophist Protagoras, which fact is mentioned in the Platonic dialogue Protagoras--respecting the manner in which that Sophist allowed his pupils to assess their own fee for his teaching (Ethic. Nik. ix. 1, 1164, a. 25).] [Footnote 104: Plato, Protag. p. 352 C. [Greek: a)ll' i(kanê\n ei)=nai tê\n phro/nêsin boêthei=n tô=| a)nthrô/pô|.]] [Side-note: Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures.] _Sokr._--You speak well and truly. But you are aware that most men are of a different opinion. They affirm that many who know what is best, act against their own knowledge, overcome by pleasure or by pain. _Prot._--Most men think so: incorrectly, in my judgment, as they say many other things besides.[105] _Sokr._--When they say that a man, being overcome by food or drink or other temptations, will do things which he knows to be evil, we must ask them, On what ground do you call these things evil? Is it because they impart pleasure at the moment, or because they prepare disease, poverty, and other such things, for the future?[106] Most men would reply, I think, that they called these things evil not on account of the present pleasure which the things produced, but on account of their ulterior consequences--poverty and disease being both of them distressing? _Prot._--Most men would say this. _Sokr._--It would be admitted then that these things were evil for no other reason, than because they ended in pain and in privation of pleasure.[107] _Prot._--Certainly. _Sokr._--Again, when it is said that some good things are painful, such things are meant as gymnastic exercises, military expeditions, medical treatment. Now no one will say that these things are good because of the immediate suffering which they occasion, but because of the ulterior results of health, wealth, and security, which we obtain by them. Thus, these also are good for no other reason, than because they end in pleasures, or in relief or prevention of pain.[108] Or can you indicate any other end, to which men look when they call these matters evil? _Prot._--No other end can be indicated. [Footnote 105: Plato, Protag. pp. 352-353.] [Footnote 106: Plato, Protag. p. 353 D. [Greek: ponêra\ de\ au)ta\ pê=| phate ei)=nai? po/teron o(/ti tê\n ê(donê\n tau/tên e)n tô=| parachrê=ma pare/chei kai\ ê(du/ e)stin e(/kaston au)tô=n, ê)\ o(/ti ei)s to\n u(/steron chro/non no/sous te poiei= kai\ peni/as kai\ a)/lla toiau=ta polla\ paraskeua/zei?]] [Footnote 107: Plato, Protag. p. 353 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n phai/netai. . . . di' ou)de\n a)/llo tau=ta kaka\ o)/nta, ê)\ dio/ti ei)s a)ni/as te a)poteleuta=| kai\ a)/llôn ê(donô=n a)posterei=?]] [Footnote 108: Plato, Protag. p. 354 B-C. [Greek: Tau=ta de\ a)gatha/ e)sti di' a)/llo ti ê)\ o(/ti ei)s ê(dona\s a)poteleuta=| kai\ lupô=n a)pallaga\s kai\ a)potropa/s? ê)\ e)/chete/ ti a)/llo te/los le/gein, ei)s o(\ a)poble/psantes au)ta\ a)gatha\ kalei=te, a)ll' ê)\ ê(dona/s te kai\ lu/pas? ou)k a)\n phai=en, ô(s e)gô)=|mai. . . . Ou)kou=n tê\n me\n ê(donê\n diô/kete ô(s a)gatho\n o)/n, tê\n de\ lu/pên pheu/gete ô(s kako/n?]] [Side-note: Pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil. No man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and pain.] _Sokr._--It thus appears that you pursue pleasure as good, and avoid pain as evil. Pleasure is what you think good: pain is what you think evil: for even pleasure itself appears to you evil, when it either deprives you of pleasures greater than itself, or entails upon you pains outweighing itself. Is there any other reason, or any other ulterior end, to which you look when you pronounce pleasure to be evil? If there be any other between reason, or any other end, tell us what it is.[109] _Prot._--There is none whatever. _Sokr._--The case is similar about pains: you call pain good, when it preserves you from greater pains, or procures for you a future balance of pleasure. If there be any other end to which you look when you call pain good, tell us what it is. _Prot._--You speak truly. _Sokr._--If I am asked why I insist so much on the topic now before us, I shall reply, that it is no easy matter to explain what is meant by being overcome by pleasure; and that the whole proof hinges upon this point--whether there is any other good than pleasure, or any other evil than pain; and whether it be not sufficient, that we should go through life pleasurably and without pains.[110] If this be sufficient, and if no other good or evil can be pointed out, which does not end in pleasures and pains, mark the consequences. Good and evil being identical with pleasurable and painful, it is ridiculous to say that a man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil, under the overpowering influence of pleasure: that is, under the overpowering influence of good.[111] How can it be wrong, that a man should yield to the influence of good? It never can be wrong, except in this case--when the good obtained is of smaller amount than the consequent good forfeited or the consequent evil entailed. What other exchangeable value can there be between pleasures and pains, except in the ratio of quantity--greater or less, more or fewer?[112] If an objector tells me that there is a material difference between pleasures and pains of the moment, and pleasures and pains postponed to a future time, I ask him in reply, Is there any other difference, except in pleasure and pain? An intelligent man ought to put them both in the scale, the pleasures and the pains, the present and the future, so as to determine the balance. Weighing pleasures against pleasures, he ought to prefer the more and the greater: weighing pains against pains, the fewer and the less. If pleasures against pains, then when the latter outweigh the former, reckoning distant as well as near, he ought to abstain from the act: when the pleasures outweigh, he ought to do it. _Prot._--The objectors could have nothing to say against this.[113] [Footnote 109: Plato, Protag, p. 354 D. [Greek: e)pei\ ei) kat' a)/llo ti au)to\ to\ chai/rein kako\n kalei=te kai\ ei)s a)/llo ti te/los a)poble/psantes, e)/choite a)\n kai\ ê(mi=n ei)pei=n; a)ll' ou)ch e(/xete. Ou)d' e)moi\ dokou=sin, e)/phê o( Prôtago/ras.]] [Footnote 110: Plato, Protag. p. 354 E. [Greek: e)/peita e)n tou/tô| ei)si\ pa=sai ai( a)podei/xeis; a)ll' e)/ti kai\ nu=n a)nathe/sthai e)/xestin, ei) pê| e)/chete a)/llo ti pha/nai ei)=nai to\ a)gatho\n ê)\ tê\n ê(donê/n, ê)\ to\ kako\n a)/llo ti ê)\ tê\n a)ni/an, ê)\ a)rkei= u(mi=n to\ ê(de/ôs katabiô=nai to\n bi/on a)/neu lupô=n?]] [Footnote 111: Plato, Protag. p. 355 C.] [Footnote 112: Plato, Protag. p. 356 A. [Greek: kai\ ti/s a)/llê a)xi/a ê(donê=| pro\s lu/pôn e)sti\n a)ll' ê)\ u(perbolê\ a)llê/lôn kai\ e)/lleipsis? tau=ta d' e)sti\ mei/zô te kai\ smikro/tera gigno/mena a)llê/lôn, kai\ plei/ô kai\ e)la/ttô, kai\ ma=llon kai\ ê(=tton.]] [Footnote 113: Plato, Protag. p. 356 C.] [Side-note: Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it.] _Sokr._--Well then--I shall tell them farther--you know that the same magnitude, and the same voice, appears to you greater when near than when distant. Now, if all our well-doing depended upon our choosing the magnitudes really greater and avoiding those really less, where would the security of our life be found? In the art of mensuration, or in the apparent impression?[114] Would not the latter lead us astray, causing us to vacillate and judge badly in our choice between great and little, with frequent repentance afterwards? Would not the art of mensuration set aside these false appearances, and by revealing to us the truth, impart tranquillity to our minds and security to our lives? Would not the objectors themselves acknowledge that there was no other safety, except in the art of mensuration? _Prot._--They would acknowledge it. _Sokr._--Again, If the good conduct of our lives depended on the choice of odd and even, and in distinguishing rightly the greater from the less, whether far or near, would not our safety reside in knowledge, and in a certain knowledge of mensuration too, in Arithmetic? _Prot._--They would concede to you that also. _Sokr._--Well then, my friends, since the security of our lives has been found to depend on the right choice of pleasure and pain--between the more and fewer, greater and less, nearer and farther--does it not come to a simple estimate of excess, deficiency, and equality between them? in other words, to mensuration, art, or science?[115] What kind of art or science it is, we will enquire another time: for the purpose of our argument, enough has been done when we have shown that it _is_ science. [Footnote 114: Plato, Protag. p. 356 D. [Greek: ei) ou)=n e)n tou/tô| ê(mi=n ê)=n to\ eu)= pra/ttein, e)n tô=| ta\ me\n mega/la mê/kê kai\ pra/ttein kai\ lamba/nein, ta\ de\ smikra\ kai\ pheu/gein kai\ mê\ pra/ttein, ti/s a)\n ê(mi=n sôtêri/a e)pha/nê tou= bi/ou? a)=ra ê( metrêtikê\ te/chnê, ê)\ ê( tou= phainome/nou du/namis? . . . A)=r' a)\n o(mologoi=en oi( a)/nthrôpoi pro\s tau=ta ê(ma=s tê\n metrêtikê\n sô/zein a)\n te/chnên, ê)\ a)/llên?]] [Footnote 115: Plato, Protag. p. 357 A-v. [Greek: e)peidê\ de\ ê(donê=s te kai\ lu/pês e)n o)rthê=| tê=| ai(re/sei e)pha/nê _ê(mi=n ê( sôtêri/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa, tou= te ple/onos_ kai\ e(la/ttonos kai\ mei/zonos kai\ smikrote/ron kai\ por)r(ôte/rô kai\ e)ggute/rô, a)=ra prô=ton me\n ou) metrêtikê\ phai/netai, u(perbolê=s te kai\ e)ndei/as ou)=sa kai\ i)so/têtos pro\s a)llê/las ske/psis? A)ll' a)na/gkê. E)pei\ de\ metrêtikê/, a)na/gkê| dê/pou te/chnê kai\ e)pistê/mê.]] [Side-note: To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance.] For when _we_ (Protagoras and Sokrates) affirmed, that nothing was more powerful than science or knowledge, and that this, in whatsoever minds it existed, prevailed over pleasure and every thing else--_you_ (the supposed objectors) maintained, on the contrary, that pleasure often prevailed over knowledge even in the instructed man: and you called upon us to explain, upon our principles, what that mental affection was, which people called, being overcome by the seduction of pleasure. We have now shown you that this mental affection is nothing else but ignorance, and the gravest ignorance. You have admitted that those who go wrong in the choice of pleasures and pains--that is, in the choice of good and evil things--go wrong from want of knowledge, of the knowledge or science of mensuration. The wrong deed done from want of knowledge, is done through ignorance. What you call being overcome by pleasure is thus, the gravest ignorance; which these Sophists, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias, engage to cure: but you (the objectors whom we now address) not believing it to be ignorance, or perhaps unwilling to pay them their fees, refuse to visit them, and therefore go on doing ill, both privately and publicly.[116] [Footnote 116: Plato, Protag. p. 357 E.] [Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable.] Now then, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias (continues Sokrates), I turn to you, and ask, whether you account my reasoning true or false? (All of them pronounced it to be surpassingly true.) _Sokr._--You all agree, then, all three, that the pleasurable is good, and that the painful is evil:[117] for I take no account at present of the verbal distinctions of Prodikus, discriminating between the _pleasurable_, the _delightful_, and the _enjoyable_. If this be so, are not all those actions, which conduct to a life of pleasure or to a life free from pain, honourable? and is not the honourable deed, good and profitable?[118] (In this, all persons present concurred.) If then the pleasurable is good, no one ever does anything, when he either knows or believes other things in his power to be better. To be inferior to yourself is nothing else than ignorance: to be superior to yourself, is nothing else than wisdom. Ignorance consists in holding false opinions, and in being deceived respecting matters of high importance. (Agreed by all.) Accordingly, no one willingly enters upon courses which are evil, or which he believes to be evil; nor is it in the nature of man to enter upon what he thinks evil courses, in preference to good. When a man is compelled to make choice between two evils, no one will take the greater when he might take the less.[119] (Agreed to by all three.) Farther, no one will affront things of which he is afraid, when other things are open to him, of which he is not afraid: for fear is an expectation of evil, so that what a man fears, he of course thinks to be an evil,--and will not approach it willingly. (Agreed.)[120] [Footnote 117: Plato, Protag. p. 358 A. [Greek: u(perphuô=s e)do/kei a(/pasin a)lêthê= ei)=nai ta\ ei)rême/na. O(mologei=te a)/ra, ê)=n d' e)gô/, to\ me\n ê(du\ a)gatho\n ei)=nai, to\ de\ a)niaro\n kako/n.]] [Footnote 118: Plato, Protag. p. 358 B. [Greek: ai( e)pi\ tou/tou pra/xeis a(/pasai e)pi\ tou= a)lu/pôs zê=n kai\ ê)de/ôs, a)=r' ou) kalai/? kai\ to\ kalo\n e)/rgon, a)gatho/n te kai\ ô)phe/limon?]] [Footnote 119: Plato, Protag. p. 358 C-D. [Greek: e)pi/ ge ta\ kaka\ ou)dei\s e(kô\n e)/rchetai, ou)de\ e)pi\ a(\ oi)/etai kaka\ ei)=nai, ou)d' e)sti\ tou=to, ô(s e)/oiken, e)n a)nthrô/pou phu/sei, e)pi\ a(\ oi)/etai kaka\ ei)=nai e)the/lein i)e/nai a)nti\ tô=n a)gathô=n; o(/tan te a)nagka/sthê| duoi=n kakoi=n to\ e(/teron ai)rei=sthai, ou)dei\s to\ mei=zon ai(rê/setai, e)xo\n to\ e)/latton.]] [Footnote 120: Plato, Protag. p. 358 E.] [Side-note: Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible.] _Sokr._--Let us now revert to the explanation of courage, given by Protagoras. He said that four out of the five parts of virtue were tolerably similar; but that courage differed greatly from all of them. And he affirmed that there were men distinguished for courage; yet at the same time eminently unjust, immoderate, unholy, and stupid. He said, too, that the courageous men were men to attempt things which timid men would not approach. Now, Protagoras, what are these things which the courageous men alone are prepared to attempt? Will they attempt terrible things, believing them to be terrible? _Prot._--That is impossible, as you have shown just now. _Sokr._--No one will enter upon that which he believes to be terrible,--or, in other words, will go into evil knowing it to be evil: a man who does so is inferior to himself--and this, as we have agreed, is ignorance, or the contrary of knowledge. All men, both timid and brave, attempt things upon which they have a good heart: in this respect, the things which the timid and the brave go at, are the same.[121] _Prot._--How can this be? The things which the timid and the brave go at or affront, are quite contrary: for example, the latter are willing to go to war, which the former are not. _Sokr._--Is it honourable to go to war, or dishonourable? _Prot._--Honourable. _Sokr._--If it be honourable, it must also be good:[122] for we have agreed, in the preceding debate, that all honourable things were good. _Prot._--You speak truly.[123] I at least always persist in thinking so. _Sokr._--Which of the two is it, who (you say) are unwilling to go into war; it being an honourable and good thing? _Prot._--The cowards. _Sokr._--But if going to war be an honourable and good thing, it is also pleasurable? _Prot._--Certainly that has been admitted.[124] _Sokr._--Is it then knowingly that cowards refuse to go into war, which is both more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? _Prot._--We cannot say so, without contradicting our preceding admissions. _Sokr._--What about the courageous man? does not he affront or go at what is more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? _Prot._--It cannot be denied. _Sokr._--Courageous men then, generally, are those whose fears, when they are afraid, are honourable and good--not dishonourable or bad: and whose confidence, when they feel confident, is also honourable and good?[125] On the contrary, cowards, impudent men, and madmen, both fear, and feel confidence, on dishonourable occasions? _Prot._--Agreed. _Sokr._--When they thus view with confidence things dishonourable and evil, is it from any other reason than from ignorance and stupidity? Are they not cowards from stupidity, or a stupid estimate of things terrible? And is it not in this ignorance, or stupid estimate of things terrible, and things not terrible--that cowardice consists? Lastly,[126]--courage being the opposite of cowardice--is it not in the knowledge, or wise estimate, of things terrible and things not terrible, that courage consists? [Footnote 121: Plato, Protag. p. 359 D. [Greek: e)pi\ me\n a(\ deina\ ê(gei=tai ei)=nai ou)dei\s e)/rchetai, e)peidê\ to\ ê(/ttô ei)=nai e(autou= eu(re/thê a)mathi/a ou)=sa. Ô(molo/gei. A)lla\ mê\n e)pi\ a(/ ge thar)r(ou=si pa/ntes au)= e)/rchontai, kai\ deiloi\ kai\ a)ndrei=oi, kai\ tau/tê| ge e)pi\ ta\ au)ta\ e)/rchontai oi( deiloi/ te kai\ oi( a)ndrei=oi.]] [Footnote 122: Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. [Greek: po/teron kalo\n o(\n i)e/nai (ei)s to\n po/lemon) ê)\ ai)schro/n? Kalo/n, e)/phê. Ou)kou=n, ei)/per kalo/n, kai\ a)gatho\n ô(mologê/samen e)n toi=s e)/mprosthen; ta\s ga\r kala\s pra/xeis a(pa/sas a)gatha\s ô(mologê/samen?]] [Footnote 123: Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. [Greek: A)lêthê= le/geis, kai\ a)ei\ e)/moige dokei= ou(/tôs.] This answer, put into the mouth of Protagoras, affords another proof that Plato did not intend to impute to him the character which many commentators impute.] [Footnote 124: Plato, Protag. p. 360 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n, ê)\n d' e)gô/, ei)/per kalo\n kai\ a)gatho/n, kai\ ê(du/? Ô(molo/gêtai gou=n, e)/phê.]] [Footnote 125: Plato, Protag. p. 360 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n o(/lôs oi( a)ndrei=oi ou)k ai)schrou\s pho/bous phobou=ntai, o(/tav phobô=ntai, ou)de\ ai)schra\ tha/r)r(ê tha/r)r(ou=sin? . . . Ei) de\ mê\ ai)schra/, a)=r' ou) kala/? . . . Ei) de\ kala/, kai\ a)gatha/?]] [Footnote 126: Plato, Protag. p. 360 D. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ê( tô=n deinôn kai\ mê\ deinô=n a)mathi/a deili/a a)\n ei)/ê? . . . Ê( sophi/a a)/ra tô=n deinô=n kai\ mê\ deinô=n, a)ndrei/a e)sti/n, e)nanti/a ou)=sa tê=| tou/tôn a)mathi/a|?]] [Side-note: Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras. Amicable reply of Protagoras.] Protagoras is described as answering the last few questions with increasing reluctance. But at this final question, he declines altogether to answer, or even to imply assent by a gesture.[127] _Sokr._--Why will you not answer my question, either affirmatively or negatively? _Prot._--Finish the exposition by yourself. _Sokr._--I will only ask you one more question. Do you still think, as you said before, that there are some men extremely stupid, but extremely courageous? _Prot._--You seem to be obstinately bent on making me answer: I will therefore comply with your wish: I say that according to our previous admissions, it appears to me impossible. _Sokr._--I have no other motive for questioning you thus, except the wish to investigate how the truth stands respecting virtue and what virtue is in itself.[128] To determine this, is the way to elucidate the question which you and I first debated at length:--I, affirming that virtue was not teachable--you, that it was teachable. The issue of our conversation renders both of us ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be teachable, have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things: while Protagoras, who affirmed that it was teachable, has tried to show that it consisted in every thing rather than knowledge: on which supposition it would be hardly teachable at all. I therefore, seeing all these questions sadly confused and turned upside down, am beyond measure anxious to clear them up;[129] and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through the whole investigation--First, what Virtue is,--Next, whether it is teachable or not. It is with a provident anxiety for the conduct of my own life that I undertake this research, and I should be delighted to have you as a coadjutor.[130] _Prot._--I commend your earnestness, Sokrates, and your manner of conducting discussion. I think myself not a bad man in other respects: and as to jealousy, I have as little of it as any one. For I have always said of you, that I admire you much more than any man of my acquaintance--decidedly more than any man of your own age. It would not surprise me, if you became one day illustrious for wisdom. [Footnote 127: Plato, Protag. p. 360 D. [Greek: ou)ke/ti e)ntau=tha ou)/t' e)pineu=sai ê)the/lêsen, e)si/ga te.]] [Footnote 128: Plato, Protag. p. 360-361. [Greek: Ou)/toi a)/llou e(/neka e)rôtô= pa/nta tau=ta, ê)\ ske/psasthai boulo/menos pô=s pot' e)/chei ta\ peri\ tê=s a)retê=s, kai\ _ti/ pot' e)sti\n au)to\ ê( a)retê/_. Oi)=da ga\r o(/ti tou/tou phanerou= genome/nou ma/list' a)\n kata/dêlon ge/noito e)kei=no, peri\ ou)= e)gô/ te kai\ su\ makro\n lo/gon e(ka/teros a)petei/namen, e)gô\ me\n le/gôn, ô(s ou) didakto\n a)retê/, su\ d', ô(s didakto/n.]] [Footnote 129: Plato, Protag. p. 361 C. [Greek: e)gô\ ou)=n pa/nta tau=ta kathorô=n a)/nô ka/tô taratto/mena deinô=s, pa=san prothumi/an e)/chô kataphanê= au)ta\ gene/sthai, kai\ bouloi/mên a)\n _tau=ta diexeltho/ntas ê(ma=s e)xelthei=n kai\ e)pi\ tê\n a)retê\n o(/ ti e)/stin_.]] [Footnote 130: Plato, Protag. p. 361 D. [Greek: promêthou/menos u(pe\r tou= bi/ou tou= e)mautou= panto/s.]] * * * * * [Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least allusion to Hippokrates.] Such is the end of this long and interesting dialogue.[131] We remark with some surprise that it closes without any mention of Hippokrates, and without a word addressed to him respecting his anxious request for admission to the society of Protagoras: though such request had been presented at the beginning, with much emphasis, as the sole motive for the intervention of Sokrates. Upon this point[132] the dialogue is open to the same criticism as that which Plato (in the Phædrus) bestows on the discourse of Lysias: requiring that every discourse shall be like a living organism, neither headless nor footless, but having extremities and a middle piece adapted to each other. [Footnote 131: Most critics treat the Protagoras as a composition of Plato's younger years--what they call his _first period_--before the death of Sokrates. They fix different years, from 407 B.C. (Ast) down to 402 B.C. I do not agree with this view. I can admit no dialogue earlier than 399 B.C.: and I consider the Protagoras to belong to Plato's full maturity.] [Footnote 132: Plato, Phædrus, p. 264 C. [Greek: dei=n pa/nta lo/gon ô(/sper zô=on sunesta/nai, sô=ma/ ti e)/chonta au)to\n au(tou=, ô/ste mê/te a)ke/phalon ei)=nai mê/te a)/poun], &c.] [Side-note: Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates.] In our review of this dialogue, we have found first, towards the beginning, an expository discourse from Protagoras, describing the maintenance and propagation of virtue in an established community: next, towards the close, an expository string of interrogatories by Sokrates, destined to establish the identity of Good with Pleasurable, Evil with Painful; and the indispensable supremacy of the calculating or measuring science, as the tutelary guide of human life. Of the first, I speak (like other critics) as the discourse of Protagoras: of the second, as the theory of Sokrates. But I must again remind the reader, that both the one and the other are compositions of Plato; both alike are offspring of his ingenious and productive imagination. Protagoras is not the author of that which appears here under his name: and when we read the disparaging epithets which many critics affix to his discourse, we must recollect that these epithets, if they were well-founded, would have no real application to the historical Protagoras, but only to Plato himself. He has set forth two aspects, distinct and in part opposing, of ethics and politics: and he has provided a worthy champion for each. Philosophy, or "reasoned truth," if it be attainable at all, cannot most certainly be attained without such many-sided handling: still less can that which Plato calls knowledge be attained--or such command of philosophy as will enable a man to stand a Sokratic cross-examination in it. [Side-note: Order of ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates.] In the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue,[133] we find him proclaiming, that the first of all problems to be solved was, What virtue really is? upon which there prevails serious confusion of opinions. It was a second question--important, yet still second and presupposing the solution of the first--Whether virtue is teachable? We noticed the same judgment as to the order of the two questions delivered by Sokrates in the Menon.[134] [Footnote 133: Plato, Protag. p. 361 C.] [Footnote 134: See the last preceding chapter of this volume, p. 242.** Upon this order, necessarily required, of the two questions, Schleiermacher has a pertinent remark in his general Einleitung to the works of Plato, p. 26. Eberhard (he says) affirms that the end proposed by Plato in his dialogues was to form the minds of the noble Athenian youth, so as to make them virtuous citizens. Schleiermacher controverts the position of Eberhard; maintaining "that this is far too subordinate a standing-point for philosophy,--besides that it is reasoning in a circle, since philosophy has first to determine what the virtue of a citizen is".] [Side-note: Difference of method between him and Protagoras flows from this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without enquiry.] Now the conception of ethical questions in this order--the reluctance to deal with the second until the first has been fully debated and settled--is one fundamental characteristic of Sokrates. The difference of method, between him and Protagoras, flows from this prior difference between them in fundamental conception. What virtue is, Protagoras neither defines nor analyses, nor submits to debate. He manifests no consciousness of the necessity of analysis: he accepts the ground already prepared for him by King Nomos: he thus proceeds as if the first step had been made sure, and takes his departure from hypotheses of which he renders no account--as the Platonic Sokrates complains of the geometers for doing.[135] To Protagoras, social or political virtue is a known and familiar datum, about which no one can mistake: which must be possessed, in greater or less measure, by every man, as a condition of the existence of society: which every individual has an interest in promoting in all his neighbours: and which every one therefore teaches and enforces upon every one else. It is a matter of common sense or common sentiment, and thus stands in contrast with the special professional accomplishments; which are confined only to a few--and the possessors, teachers, and learners of which are each an assignable section of the society. The parts or branches of virtue are, in like manner, assumed by him as known, in their relations to each other and to the whole. This persuasion of knowledge, without preliminary investigation, he adopts from the general public, with whom he is in communion of sentiment. What they accept and enforce as virtue, he accepts and enforces also. [Footnote 135: See suprà, vol. i. ch. viii. p. 358 and ch. xvii.** p. 136, respecting these remarks of Plato on the geometers.] [Side-note: Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in harmony.] Again, the method pursued by Protagoras, is one suitable to a teacher who has jumped over this first step; who assumes virtue, as something fixed in the public sentiments--and addresses himself to those sentiments, ready-made as he finds them. He expands and illustrates them in continuous lectures of some length, which fill both the ears and minds of the listener--"Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna": he describes their growth, propagation, and working in the community: he gives interesting comments on the poets, eulogising the admired heroes who form the theme of their verses, and enlarging on their admonitions. Moreover, while resting altogether upon the authority of King Nomos, he points out the best jewel in the crown of that potentate; the great social fact of punishment prospective, rationally apportioned, and employed altogether for preventing and deterring--instead of being a mere retrospective impulse, vindictive or retributive for the past. He describes instructively the machinery operative in the community for ensuring obedience to what they think right: he teaches, in his eloquent expositions and interpretations, the same morality, public and private, that every one else teaches: while he can perform the work of teaching, somewhat more effectively than they. Lastly, his method is essentially showy and popular; intended for numerous assemblies, reproducing the established creeds and sentiments of those assemblies, to their satisfaction and admiration. He is prepared to be met and answered in his own way, by opposing speakers; and he conceives himself more than a match for such rivals. He professes also to possess the art of short conversation or discussion. But in the exercise of this art, he runs almost involuntarily into his more characteristic endowment of continuous speech: besides that the points which he raises for discussion assume all the fundamental principles, and turn only upon such applications of those principles as are admitted by most persons to be open questions, not foreclosed by a peremptory orthodoxy. [Side-note: Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem which Protagoras had left out.] Upon all these points, Sokrates is the formal antithesis of Protagoras. He disclaims altogether the capacities to which that Sophist lays claim. Not only he cannot teach virtue, but he professes not to know what it is, nor whether it be teachable at all, He starts from a different point of view: not considering virtue as a known datum, or as an universal postulate, but assimilating it to a special craft or accomplishment, in which a few practitioners suffice for the entire public: requiring that in this capacity it shall be defined, and its practitioners and teachers pointed out. He has no common ground with Protagoras; for the difficulties which he moots are just such as the common consciousness (and Protagoras along with it) overleaps or supposes to be settled. His first requirement, advanced under the modest guise of a small doubt[136] which Protagoras must certainly be competent to remove, is, to know--What virtue is? What are the separate parts of virtue--justice, moderation, holiness, &c.? What is the relation which they bear to each other and to the whole--virtue? Are they homogeneous, differing only in quantity or has each of them its own specific essence and peculiarity?[137] Respecting virtue as a whole, we must recollect, Protagoras had discoursed eloquently and confidently, as of a matter perfectly known. He is now called back as it were to meet an attack in the rear: to answer questions which he had never considered, and which had never even presented themselves to him as questions. At first he replies as if the questions offered no difficulty;[138] sometimes he does not feel their importance, so that it seems to him a matter of indifference whether he replies in the affirmative or negative.[139] But he finds himself brought round, by a series of questions, to assent to conclusions which he nevertheless thinks untrue, and which are certainly unwelcome. Accordingly, he becomes more and more disgusted with the process of analytical interrogation: and at length answers with such impatience and prolixity, that the interrogation can no longer be prosecuted. Here comes in the break--the remonstrance of Sokrates--and the mediation of the by-standers. [Footnote 136: Plato, Protag. p. 328 E. [Greek: plê\n smikro/n ti/ moi e)mpodô/n, o(/ dê=lon o(/ti Prôtago/ras r(a|di/ôs e)pekdida/xei], &c.] [Footnote 137: Respecting Ariston of Chios, Diogenes Laertius tells us--[Greek: A)reta\s d' ou)/te polla\s ei)sê=gen, ô(s o( Zê/nôn, ou)/te mi/an polloi=s o)no/masin kaloume/nên--a)lla\ kai\ to\ pro\s ti/ pôs e)/chein] (Diog. Laert. vii. 161).] [Footnote 138: Plato, Protag. p. 329 D. [Greek: A)lla\ r(a/|dion tou=to/ g', e)/phê, a)pokri/nasthai], &c.] [Footnote 139: Plato, Protag. p. 321 D. [Greek: ei) ga\r bou/lei, e)/stô ê(mi=n kai\ dikaiosu/nê o(/sion kai\ o(sio/tês di/kaion. Mê/ moi, ê)=n d' e)gô/; ou)de\n ga\r de/omai to\ "_ei) bou/lei_" tou=to kai\ "_ei) soi dokei=_" e)le/gchesthai, a)ll' e)me/ te kai\ se/.]] [Side-note: Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner.] It is this antithesis between the eloquent popular lecturer, and the analytical enquirer and cross-examiner, which the dialogue seems mainly intended to set forth. Protagoras professes to know that which he neither knows, nor has ever tried to probe to the bottom. Upon this false persuasion of knowledge, the Sokratic Elenchus is brought to bear. We are made to see how strange, repugnant, and perplexing, is the process of analysis to this eloquent expositor: how incompetent he is to go through it without confusion: how little he can define his own terms, or determine the limits of those notions on which he is perpetually descanting. [Side-note: Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though he is described as brought to a contradiction.] It is not that Protagoras is proved to be wrong (I speak now of this early part of the conversation, between chapters 51-62--pp. 329-335) in the substantive ground which he takes. I do not at all believe (as many critics either affirm or imply) that Plato intended all which he in the composed under the name of Protagoras to be vile perversion of truth, with nothing but empty words and exorbitant pretensions. I do not even believe that Plato intended all those observations, to which the name of Protagoras is prefixed, to be accounted silly--while all that is assigned to Sokrates,[140] is admirable sense and acuteness. It is by no means certain that Plato intended to be understood as himself endorsing the opinions which he ascribes everywhere to Sokrates: and it is quite certain that he does not always make the Sokrates of one dialogue consistent with the Sokrates of another. For the purpose of showing the incapacity of the respondent to satisfy the exigencies of analysis, we need not necessarily suppose that the conclusion to which the questions conduct should be a true one. If the respondent be brought, through his own admissions, to a contradiction, this is enough to prove that he did not know the subject deeply enough to make the proper answers and distinctions. [Footnote 140: Schöne, in his Commentary on the Protagoras, is of opinion that a good part of Plato's own doctrine is given under the name of Protagoras (Ueber den Protag. von Platon, p. 180 seq.).] [Side-note: Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by Plato himself elsewhere.] But whatever may have been the intention of Plato, if we look at the fact, we shall find that what he has assigned to Sokrates is not always true, nor what he has given to Protagoras, always false. The positions laid down by the latter--That many men are courageous, but unjust: that various persons are just, without being wise and intelligent: that he who possesses one virtue, does not of necessity possess all:[141]--are not only in conformity with the common opinion, but are quite true, though Sokrates is made to dispute them. Moreover, the arguments employed by Sokrates (including in those arguments the strange propositions that justice is just, and that holiness is holy) are certainly noway conclusive.[142] Though Protagoras, becoming entangled in difficulties, and incapable of maintaining his consistency against an embarrassing cross-examination, is of course exhibited as ignorant of that which he professes to know--the doctrine which he maintains is neither untrue in itself, nor even shown to be apparently untrue. [Footnote 141: Plato, Protag. p. 329 E. Protagoras is here made to affirm that many men are courageous who are neither just, nor temperate, nor virtuous in other respects. Sokrates contradicts the position. But in the Treatise De Legibus (i. p. 630 B), Plato himself says same thing as Protagoras is here made to say: at least assuming that the Athenian speaker in De Legg. represents the sentiment of Plato himself at the time when he composed that treatise.] [Footnote 142: Plato, Protag. p. 330 C, p. 333 B. To say "Justice is just," or "Holiness is holy," is indeed either mere tautology, or else an impropriety of speech. Dr. Hutcheson observes on an analogous case: "None can apply moral attributes to the very faculty of perceiving moral qualities: or call his moral Sense morally Good or Evil, any more than he calls the power of tasting, sweet or bitter--or the power of seeing, straight or crooked, white or black" (Hutcheson on the Passions, sect. i. p. 234).] [Side-note: The harsh epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the common consciousness.] As to the arrogant and exorbitant pretensions which the Platonic commentators ascribe to Protagoras, more is said than the reality justifies. He pretends to know what virtue, justice, moderation, courage, &c., are, and he is proved not to know. But this is what every one else pretends to know also, and what every body else teaches as well as he--"_Hæc Janus summus ab imo Perdocet: hæc recinunt juvenes dictata senesque_". What he pretends to do, beyond the general public, he really can do. He can discourse, learnedly and eloquently, upon these received doctrines and sentiments: he can enlist the feelings and sympathies of the public in favour of that which he, in common with the public, believes to be good--and against that which he and they believe to be bad: he can thus teach virtue more effectively than others. But whether that which is received as virtue, be really such--he has never analysed or verified: nor does he willingly submit to the process of analysis. Here again he is in harmony with the general public; for they hate, as much as he does, to be dragged back to fundamentals, and forced to explain, defend, revise, or modify, their established sentiments and maxims: which they apply as _principia_ for deduction to particular cases, and which they recognise as axioms whereby other things are to be tried, not as liable to be tried themselves. Protagoras is one of the general public, in dislike of, and inaptitude for, analysis and dialectic discussion: while he stands above them in his eloquence and his power of combining, illustrating, and adorning, received doctrines. These are points of superiority, not pretended, but real. [Side-note: Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the song of Simonides.] The aversion of Protagoras for dialectic discussion--after causing an interruption of the ethical argument, and an interlude of comment on the poet Simonides--is at length with difficulty overcome, and the argument is then resumed. The question still continues, What is virtue? What are the five different parts of virtue? Yet it is so far altered that Protagoras now admits that the four parts of virtue which Sokrates professed to have shown to be nearly identical, really are tolerably alike: but he nevertheless contends that courage is very different from all of them, repeating his declaration that many men are courageous, but unjust and stupid at the same time. This position Sokrates undertakes to refute. In doing so, he lays out one of the largest, most distinct, and most positive theories of virtue, which can be found in the Platonic writings. [Side-note: Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at length clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of pleasures and pains of the agent.] Virtue, according to this theory, consists in a right measurement and choice of pleasures and pains: in deciding correctly, wherever we have an alternative, on which side lies the largest pleasure or the least pain--and choosing the side which presents this balance. To live pleasurably, is pronounced to be good: to live without pleasure or in pain, is evil. Moreover, nothing but pleasure, or comparative mitigation of pain, is good: nothing but pain is evil.[143] Good, is identical with the greatest pleasure or least pain: evil, with greatest pain: meaning thereby each pleasure and each pain when looked at along with its consequences and concomitants. The grand determining cause and condition of virtue is knowledge: the knowledge, science, or art, of correctly measuring the comparative value of different pleasures and pains. Such knowledge (the theory affirms), wherever it is possessed, will be sure to command the whole man, to dictate all his conduct, and to prevail over every temptation of special appetite or aversion. To say that a man who knows on which side the greatest pleasure or the least pain lies, will act against his knowledge--is a mistake. If he acts in this way, it is plain that he does not possess the knowledge, and that he sins through ignorance. [Footnote 143: The substantial identity of Good with Pleasure, of Evil with Pain, was the doctrine of the historical Sokrates as declared in Xenophon's Memorabilia. See, among other passages, i. 6, 8. [Greek: Tou= de\ mê\ douleu/ein gastri\ mêde\ u(/pnô| kai\ lagnei/a|, oi)/ei ti a)/llo ai)tiô/teron ei)=nai, ê)\ to\ e(/tera e)/chein tou/tôn ê(di/ô, a(\ ou) mo/non e)n chrei/a| o)/nta eu)phrai/nei, a)lla\ kai\ e)lpi/das pare/chonta ô)phelê/sein a)ei/? Kai\ mê\n tou=to/ ge oi)=stha, o(/ti oi( me\n oi)o/menoi mêde\n eu)= pra/ttein ou)k eu)phrai/nontai, oi( de\ ê(gou/menoi kalô=s prochôrei=n e(autoi=s, ê)\ geôrgi/an ê)\ nauklêri/an ê)\ a)/ll' o(/, ti a)\n tugcha/nôsin e)rgazo/menoi, ô(s eu)= pra/ttontes eu)phrai/nontai. Oi)/ei ou)=n a)po\ pa/ntôn tou/tôn tosau/tên ê(donê\n ei)=nai, o(/sên a)po\ tou= e(auto/n te ê(gei=sthai belti/ô gi/gnesthai kai\ phi/lous a)mei/nous kta=sthai? E)gô\ toi/nun diatelô= tau=ta nomi/zôn.] Locke says, 'Essay on Human Understanding,' Book ii. ch. 28, "Good or Evil is nothing but pleasure or pain to us--or that which procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good or evil then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker; which good or evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the law, is that we call reward or punishment." The formal distinction here taken by Locke between pleasure and that which procures pleasure--both the one and the other being called Good--(the like in regard to pain and evil) is not distinctly stated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, though he says nothing inconsistent with it: but it is distinctly stated in the Republic, ii. p. 357, where Good is distributed under three heads. 1. That which we desire immediately and for itself--such as Enjoyment, Innocuous pleasure. 2. That which we desire both for itself and for its consequences--health, intelligence, good sight or hearing, &c. 3. That which we do not desire (perhaps even shun) for itself, but which we accept by reason of its consequences in averting greater pains or procuring greater pleasures. This discrimination of the varieties of Good, given in the Republic, is quite consistent with what is stated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, though it is more full and precise. But it is not consistent with what Sokrates says in the Gorgias, where he asserts a radical dissimilarity of nature between [Greek: ê(du\] and [Greek: a)gatho/n].] [Side-note: Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory.] Protagoras agrees with Sokrates in the encomiums bestowed on the paramount importance and ascendancy of knowledge: but does not at first agree with him in identifying good with pleasure, and evil with pain. Upon this point, too, he is represented as agreeing in opinion with the Many. He does not admit that to live pleasurably is good, unless where a man takes his pleasure in honourable things. He thinks it safer, and more consistent with his own whole life, to maintain--That pleasurable things, or painful things, may be either good, or evil, or indifferent, according to the particular case. [Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates.] This doctrine Sokrates takes much pains to refute. He contends that pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, are always good--and painful things, so far forth as painful, always evil. When some pleasures are called evil, that is not on account of any thing belonging to the pleasure itself, but because of its ulterior consequences and concomitants, which are painful or distressing in a degree more than countervailing the pleasure. So too, when some pains are pronounced to be good, this is not from any peculiarity in the pain itself, but because of its consequences and concomitants: such pain being required as a condition to the attainment of health, security, wealth, and other pleasures or satisfactions more than counter-balancing. Sokrates challenges opponents to name any other end, with reference to which things are called _good_, except their tendency to prevent or relieve pains and to ensure a balance of pleasure: he challenges them to name any other end, with reference to which things are called _evil_, except their tendency to produce pains and to intercept or destroy pleasures. In measuring pleasures and pains against each other, there is no other difference to be reckoned except that of greater or less, more or fewer. The difference between near and distant, does indeed obtrude itself upon us as a misleading element. But it is the special task of the "measuring science" to correct this illusion--and to compare pleasures or pains, whether near or distant, according to their real worth: just as we learn to rectify the illusions of the sight in regard to near and distant objects. [Side-note: Application of that reasoning to the case of courage.] Sokrates proceeds to apply this general principle in correcting the explanation of courage given by Protagoras. He shows, or tries to show, that courage, like all the other branches of virtue, consists in acting on a just estimate of comparative pleasures and pains. No man affronts evil, or the alternative of greater pain, knowing it to be such: no man therefore adventures himself in any terrible enterprise, knowing it to be so: neither the brave nor the timid do this. Both the brave and the timid affront that which they think not terrible, or the least terrible of two alternatives: but they estimate differently what is such. The former go readily to war when required, the latter evade it. Now to go into war when required, is honourable: being honourable, it is good: being honourable and good, it is pleasurable. The brave know this, and enter upon it willingly: the timid not only do not know it, but entertain the contrary opinion, looking upon war as painful and terrible, and therefore keeping aloof. The brave men fear what it is honourable to fear, the cowards what it is dishonourable to fear: the former act upon the knowledge of what is really terrible, the latter are misled by their ignorance of it. Courage is thus, like the other virtues, a case of accurate knowledge of comparative pleasures and pains, or of good and evil.[144] [Footnote 144: Compare, respecting Courage, a passage in the Republic, iv. pp. 429 C, 430 B, which is better stated there (though substantially the same opinion) than here in the Protagoras. The opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be illustrated by a sentence from the funeral oration delivered by Periklês, Thucyd. ii. 43, fin. [Greek: A)lgeinote/ra ga\r a)ndri/ ge phro/nêma e)/chonti ê( e)n tô=| meta\ tou= malakisthê=nai ka/kôsis, ê)\ o( meta\ r(ô/mês kai\ koinê=s e)lpi/dos a(/ma gigno/menos a)nai/sthêtos tha/natos]--which Dr. Arnold thus translates in his note: "For more grievous to a man of noble mind is the misery which comes together with cowardice, than the unfelt death which befalls him in the midst of his strength and hopes for the common welfare." So again in the Phædon (p. 68) Sokrates describes the courage of the ordinary unphilosophical citizen to consist in braving death from fear of greater evils (which is the same view as that of Sokrates in the Protagoras), while the philosopher is courageous on a different principle; aspiring only to reason and intelligence, with the pleasures attending it, he welcomes death as releasing his mind from the obstructive companionship of the body. The fear of disgrace and dishonour, in his own eyes and in those of others, is more intolerable to the brave man than the fear of wounds and death in the service of his country. See Plato, Leg. i. pp. 646-647. He is [Greek: phobero\s meta\ no/mou, meta\ di/kês], p. 647 E. Such is the way in which both Plato and Thucydides conceive the character of the brave citizen as compared with the coward. It is plain that this resolves itself ultimately into a different estimate of prospective pains; the case being one in which pleasure is not concerned. That the pains of self-reproach and infamy in the eyes of others are among the most agonising in the human bosom, need hardly be remarked. At the same time the sentiments here conceived embrace a wide field of sympathy, comprising the interests, honour, and security, of others as well as of the individual agent.] [Side-note: The theory which Plato here lays down is more distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues.] Such is the ethical theory which the Platonic Sokrates enunciates in this dialogue, and which Protagoras and others accept. It is positive and distinct, to a degree very unusual with Plato. We shall find that he theorises differently in other dialogues; whether for the better or the worse, will be hereafter seen. He declares here explicitly that pleasure, or happiness, is the end to be pursued; and pain, or misery, the end to be avoided: and that there is no other end, in reference to which things can be called good or evil, except as they tend to promote pleasure or mitigate suffering, on the one side--to entail pain or suffering on the other. He challenges objectors to assign any other end. And thus much is certain--that in those other dialogues where he himself departs from the present doctrine, he has not complied with his own challenge. Nowhere has he specified a different end. In other dialogues, as well as in the Protagoras, Plato has insisted on the necessity of a science or art of calculation: but in no other dialogue has he told us distinctly what are the items to be calculated. [Side-note: Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is too narrow, and exclusively prudential.] I perfectly agree with the doctrine laid down by Sokrates in the Protagoras, that pain or suffering is the End to be avoided or lessened as far as possible--and pleasure or happiness the End to be pursued as far as attainable--by intelligent forethought and comparison: that there is no other intelligible standard of reference, for application of the terms Good and Evil, except the tendency to produce happiness or misery: and that if this standard be rejected, ethical debate loses all standard for rational discussion, and becomes only an enunciation of the different sentiments, authoritative and self-justifying, prevalent in each community. But the End just mentioned is highly complex, and care must be taken to conceive it in its full comprehension. Herein I conceive the argument of Sokrates (in the Protagoras) to be incomplete. It carries attention only to a part of the truth, keeping out of sight, though not excluding, the remainder. It considers each man as an individual, determining good or evil for himself by calculating his own pleasures and pains: as a prudent, temperate, and courageous agent, but neither as just nor beneficent. It omits to take account of him as a member of a society, composed of many others akin or co-ordinate with himself. Now it is the purpose of an ethical or political reasoner (such as Plato both professes to be and really is) to study the means of happiness, not simply for the agent himself, but for that agent together with others around him--for the members of the community generally.[145] The Platonic Sokrates says this himself in the Republic: and accordingly, he there treats of other points which are not touched upon by Sokrates in the Protagoras. He proclaims that the happiness of each citizen must be sought only by means consistent with the security, and to a certain extent with the happiness, of others: he provides as far as practicable that all shall derive their pleasures and pains from the same causes: common pleasures, and common pains, to all.[146] The doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras requires to be enlarged so as to comprehend these other important elements. Since the conduct of every agent affects the happiness of others, he must be called upon to take account of its consequences under both aspects, especially where it goes to inflict hurt or privation upon others. Good and evil depend upon that scientific computation and comparison of pleasures and pains which Sokrates in the Protagoras prescribes: but the computation must include, to a certain extent, the pleasures and pains (security and rightful expectations) of others besides the agent himself, implicated in the consequences of his acts.[147] [Footnote 145: Plato, Republ. iv. pp. 420-421, v. p. 466 A.] [Footnote 146: Plato, Republ. v. pp. 462 A-B-D, 464 A-D. Throughout the first of these passages we see [Greek: a)gatho\n] used as the equivalent of [Greek: ê(donê/], [Greek: kako\n] as the equivalent of [Greek: lu/pê].] [Footnote 147: See, especially on this point, the brief but valuable Tract on Utilitarianism by Mr. John Stuart Mill. In page 16 of that work attention is called to the fact, that in Utilitarianism the standard is not the greatest happiness of the agent himself alone, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. So that we cannot with exactness call the doctrine of Sokrates, in his conversation with Protagoras, "the theory of Utilitarianism," as Mr. Mill calls it in page 1.] [Side-note: Comparison with the Republic.] As to this point, we shall find the Platonic Sokrates not always correct, nor even consistent with himself. This will appear especially when we come to see the account which he gives of Justice in the Republic. In that branch of the Ethical End, a direct regard to the security of others comes into the foreground. For in an act of injustice, the prominent characteristic is that of harm, done to others--though that is not the whole, since the security of the agent himself is implicated with that of others in the general fulfilment of these obligations. It is this primary regard to others, and secondary regard to self, implicated in one complex feeling--which distinguishes justice from prudence. The Platonic Sokrates in the Republic (though his language is not always clear) does not admit this; but considers justice as a branch of prudence, necessary to ensure the happiness of the individual agent himself. [Side-note: The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates.] Now in the Protagoras, what the Platonic Sokrates dwells upon (in the argument which I have been considering) is prudence, temperance, courage: little or nothing is said about justice: there was therefore the less necessity for insisting on that prominent reference to the security of others (besides the agent himself) which justice involves. If, however, we turn back to the earlier part of the dialogue, to the speech delivered by Protagoras, we see justice brought into the foreground. It is not indeed handled analytically (which is not the manner of that Sophist), nor is it resolved into regard to pleasure and pain, happiness and misery: but it is announced as a social sentiment indispensably and reciprocally necessary from every man towards every other ([Greek: di/kê--ai)dô\s]), distinguishable from those endowments which supply the wants and multiply the comforts of the individual himself. The very existence of the social union requires, that each man should feel a sentiment of duties on his part towards others, and duties on their parts towards him: or (in other words) of rights on his part to have his interests considered by others, and rights on their parts to have their interests considered by him. Unless this sentiment of reciprocity--reciprocal duty and right--exist in the bosom of each individual citizen, or at least in the large majority--no social union could subsist. There are doubtless different degrees of the sentiment: moreover the rights and duties may be apportioned better or worse, more or less fairly, among the individuals of a society; thus rendering the society more or less estimable and comfortable. But without a certain minimum of the sentiment in each individual bosom, even the worst constituted society could not hold together. And it is this sentiment of reciprocity which Protagoras (in the dialogue before us) is introduced as postulating in his declaration, that justice and the sense of shame (unlike to professional aptitudes) must be distributed universally and without exception among all the members of a community. Each man must feel them, in his conduct towards others: each man must also be able to reckon that others will feel the like, in their behaviour towards him.[148] [Footnote 148: Professor Bain (in his work on the Emotions and the Will, ch. xv. On the Ethical Emotions, pp. 271-3) has given remarks extremely pertinent to the illustration of that doctrine which Plato has here placed under the name of Protagoras. "The supposed uniformity of moral distinctions resolves itself into the two following particulars. First, the common end of _public security_, which is also individual preservation, demands certain precautions that are everywhere very much alike, and can in no case be dispensed with. Some sort of constituted authority to control the individual impulses and to protect each man's person and property, must exist wherever a number of human beings live together. The duties springing out of this necessary arrangement are essentially the same in all societies. . . They have a pretty uniform character all over the globe. If the sense of the common safety were not sufficiently strong to constitute the social tie of obedience to some common regulations, society could not exist. . . . It is no proof of the universal spread of a special innate faculty of moral distinctions, but of a certain rational appreciation of what is necessary for the very existence of every human being living in the company of others: Doubtless, if the sad history of the human race had been preserved in all its details, we _should have many examples of tribes that perished from being unequal to the conception of a social system, or to the restraints imposed by it_. We know enough of the records of anarchy, to see how difficult it is for human nature to comply in full with the social conditions of security; but if this were not complied with at all, the result would be mutual and swift destruction. . . . In the second place, mankind have been singularly unanimous in the practice of imposing upon individual members of societies some observances or restraints of purely _sentimental_ origin, having no reference, direct or indirect, to the maintenance of the social tie, with all the safeguards implied in it. Certain maxims founded in taste, liking, aversion, or fancy, have, in every community known to us, been raised to the dignity of authoritative morality; being rendered (so to speak) 'terms of communion,' and have been enforced by punishment. . . . In the rules, founded on men's sentiments, likings, aversions, and antipathies, there is nothing common but the fact that some one or other of these are carried to the length of public requirement, and mixed up in one code with the imperative duties that hold society together." The postulate of the Platonic Protagoras--that [Greek: di/kê] and [Greek: ai)dô\s] must be felt to a certain extent in each man's bosom, as a condition to the very existence of society--agrees with the first of the two elements here distinguished by Mr. Bain, and does not necessarily go beyond it. But the unsystematic teaching and universal propagandism, which Protagoras describes as the agency whereby virtue is communicated, applies alike to both the two elements distinguished by Mr. Bain: to the factitious exigencies of King Nomos, as well as to his tutelary control. It is this mixed mass that the Sokratic analysis is brought to examine.] [Side-note: The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of other persons besides the agent himself.] If we thus compare the Ethical End, as implied, though not explicitly laid down, by Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue,--and as laid down by Sokrates in the later part--we shall see that while Sokrates restricts it to a true comparative estimate of the pains and pleasures of the agent himself, Protagoras enlarges it so as to include a direct reference to those of others also, coupled with an expectation of the like reference on the part of others.[149] Sokrates is satisfied with requiring from each person calculating prudence for his own pleasures and pains: while Protagoras proclaims that after this attribute had been obtained by man, and individual wants supplied, still there was a farther element necessary in the calculation--the social sentiment or reciprocity of regard implanted in every one's bosom: without this the human race would have perished. Prudence and skill will suffice for an isolated existence; but if men are to live and act in social communion, the services as well as the requirements of each man must be shaped, in a certain measure, with a direct view to the security of others as well as to his own. [Footnote 149: Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322.] In my judgment, the Ethical End, exclusively self-regarding, here laid down by Sokrates, is too narrow. And if we turn to other Platonic dialogues, we shall find Sokrates still represented as proclaiming a self-regarding Ethical End, though not the same as what we read in the Protagoras. In the Gorgias, Republic, Phædon, &c., we shall find him discountenancing the calculation (recommended in the Protagoras) of pleasures and pains against each other, as greater, more certain, durable, &c., and insisting that all shall be estimated according as they bear on the general condition or health of the mind, which he assimilates to the general condition or health of the body. The health of the body, considered as an End to be pursued, is essentially self-regarding: so also is the health of the mind. I shall touch upon this farther when I consider the above-mentioned dialogues: at present, I only remark that they agree with the Sokrates of the Protagoras in assuming a self-regarding Ethical End, though they do not agree with him in describing what that End should be. [Side-note: Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or satisfactory, especially about courage.] The application which Sokrates makes (in the Protagoras) of his own assumed Ethical End to the explanation of courage, is certainly confused and unsatisfactory. And indeed, we may farther remark that the general result at which Plato seems to be aiming in this dialogue, viz.: That all the different virtues are at the bottom one and the same, and that he who possesses one of them must also possess the remainder--cannot be made out even upon his own assumptions. Though it be true that all the virtues depend upon correct calculation, yet as each of them applies to a different set of circumstances and different disturbing and misleading causes, the same man who calculates well under one set of circumstances, may calculate badly under others. The position laid down by Protagoras, that men are often courageous but unjust--just, but not wise--is noway refuted by Plato. Nor is it even inconsistent with Plato's own theory, though he seems to think it so. [Side-note: Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct. That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists.] Some of the Platonic commentators maintain,[150] that the doctrine here explicitly laid down and illustrated by Sokrates, _viz._: the essential identity of the pleasurable with the good, of the painful with the evil--is to be regarded as not serious, but as taken up in jest for the purpose of mocking and humiliating Protagoras. Such an hypothesis appears to me untenable; contradicted by the whole tenor of the dialogue. Throughout all the Platonic compositions, there is nowhere to be found any train of argument more direct, more serious, and more elaborate, than that by which Sokrates here proves the identity of good with pleasure, of pain with evil (p. 351 to end). Protagoras begins by denying it, and is only compelled to accept the conclusion against his own will, by the series of questions which he cannot otherwise answer.[151] Sokrates admits that the bulk of mankind are also opposed to it: but he establishes it with an ingenuity which is pronounced to be triumphant by all the hearers around.[152] The commentators are at liberty to impeach the reasoning as unsound; but to set it aside as mere banter and mockery, is preposterous. Assume it even to be intended as mockery--assume that Sokrates is mystifying the hearers, by a string of delusive queries, to make out a thesis which he knows to be untrue and silly--how can the mockery fall upon Protagoras, who denies the thesis from the beginning?[153] The irony, if it were irony, would be misplaced and absurd. [Footnote 150: See Brandis, Gesch. d. Griech.-Röm., Phil. Part ii. sect. 114, note 3 p. 458; Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Protag. pp. 15-33-34. So too Ficinus says in his Argumentum to the Protagoras: (p. 765) "Tum vero de bono et malo multa tractantur. Siquidem prudentia est scientia eligendi boni, malique vitandi. Ambigitur autem utrum bonum malumque idem sit penitus quod et voluptas et dolor. _Neque affirmatur id quidem omnino, neque manifesté omnino negatur._ De hoc enim in Gorgiâ Phileboque et alibi," &c. When a critic composes an Argument to the Protagoras, he is surely under obligation to report faithfully and exactly what is declared by Sokrates _in the Protagoras_, whether it be consistent or not with the Gorgias and Philêbus. Yet here we find Ficinus misrepresenting the Protagoras, in order to force it into harmony with the other two.] [Footnote 151: This is so directly stated that I am surprised to find Zeller (among many other critics) announcing that Plato here accepts for the occasion the _Standpunkt_ of his enemies (Philos. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 380, ed. 2nd).] [Footnote 152: Plato, Protag. p. 358 A. [Greek: u(perphuô=s e)do/kei a(/pasin a)lêthê= ei)=nai ta\ ei)rême/na.]] [Footnote 153: When Stallbaum asserts that the thesis is taken up by Sokrates as one which was maintained by Protagoras and the other Sophists (Proleg. p. 33), he says what is distinctly at variance with the dialogue, p. 351. Schleiermacher maintains that this same thesis (the fundamental identity of good with pleasure, evil with pain) is altogether "unsokratic and unplatonic"; that it is handled here by Sokrates in a manner visibly ironical (sichtbar ironisch); that the purpose of the argument is to show the stupidity of Protagoras, who is puzzled and imposed upon by such obvious fallacies (Einleitung zum Protag. 230, bottom of p. 232), and who is made to exhibit (so Schleiermacher says, Einl. zum Gorgias, p. 14) a string of ludicrous absurdities. Upon this I have to remark first, that if the stupidity of Protagoras is intended to be shown up, that of all the other persons present must be equally manifested; for all of them assent emphatically, at the close, to the thesis as having been proved (Prot. p. 358 A): next, that I am unable to see either the absurdities of Protagoras or the irony of Sokrates, which Schleiermacher asserts to be so visible. The argument of Sokrates is as serious and elaborate as any thing which we read in Plato. Schleiermacher seems to me to misconceive altogether (not only here but also in his Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 10) the concluding argument of Sokrates in the Protagoras. To describe the identity between [Greek: ê(du\] and [Greek: a)gatho\n] as a "scheinbare Voraussetzung" is to depart from the plain meaning of words. Again, Steinhart contends that Sokrates assumes this doctrine (identity of pleasure with good, pain with evil), "not as his own opinion, but only hypothetically, with a sarcastic side-glance at the absurd consequences which many deduced from it--only as the received world-morality, as the opinion of the majority" (Einleit. zum Protag. p. 419). How Steinhart can find proof of this in the dialogue, I am at a loss to understand. The dialogue presents to us Sokrates introducing the opinion as his own, against that of Protagoras and against that of the multitude (p. 351 C). On hearing this opposition from Protagoras, Sokrates invites him to an investigation, whether the opinion be just; Sokrates then conducts the investigation himself, along with Protagoras, at considerable length, and ultimately brings out the doctrine as proved, with the assent of all present. These forced interpretations are resorted to, because the critics cannot bear to see the Platonic Sokrates maintaining a thesis substantially the same as that of Eudoxus and Epikurus. Upon this point, K. F. Hermann is more moderate than the others; he admits the thesis to be seriously maintained in the dialogue--states that it was really the opinion of the historical Sokrates--and adds that it was also the opinion of Plato himself during his early Sokratic stadium, when the Protagoras (as he thinks) was composed (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. pp. 462-463). Most of the critics agree in considering the Protagoras to be one of Plato's earlier dialogues, about 403 B.C. Ast even refers it to 407 B.C. when Plato was about twenty-one years of age. I have already given my reasons for believing that none of the Platonic dialogues were composed before 399 B.C. The Protagoras belongs, in my opinion, to Plato's most perfect and mature period.] [Side-note: Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency.] The commentators resort to this hypothesis, partly because the doctrine in question is one which they disapprove--partly because doctrines inconsistent with it are maintained in other Platonic dialogues. These are the same two reasons upon which, in other cases, various dialogues have been rejected as not genuine works of Plato. The first of the two reasons is plainly irrelevant: we must accept what Plato gives us, whether we assent to it or not. The second reason also, I think, proves little. The dialogues are distinct compositions, written each with its own circumstances and purpose: we have no right to require that they shall be all consistent with each other in doctrine, especially when we look to the long philosophical career of Plato. To suppose that the elaborate reasoning of Sokrates in the latter portion of the Protagoras is mere irony, intended to mystify both Protagoras himself and all the by-standers, who accept it as earnest and convincing--appears to me far less reasonable than the admission, that the dialectic pleading ascribed to Sokrates in one dialogue is inconsistent with that assigned to him in another. [Side-note: Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close of the dialogue.] Though there is every mark of seriousness, and no mark of irony, in this reasoning of Sokrates, yet we must remember that he does not profess to leave the subject settled at the close of the dialogue. On the contrary, he declares himself to be in a state of puzzle and perplexity. The question, proposed at the outset, Whether virtue is teachable? remains undecided. CHAPTER XXIV. GORGIAS. [Side-note: Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the historical Gorgias.] Aristotle, in one of his lost dialogues, made honourable mention of a Corinthian cultivator, who, on reading the Platonic Gorgias, was smitten with such vehement admiration, that he abandoned his fields and his vines, came to Athens forthwith, and committed himself to the tuition of Plato.[1] How much of reality there may be in this anecdote, we cannot say: but the Gorgias itself is well calculated to justify such warm admiration. It opens with a discussion on the nature and purpose of Rhetoric, but is gradually enlarged so as to include a comparison of the various schemes of life, and an outline of positive ethical theory. It is carried on by Sokrates with three distinct interlocutors--Gorgias, Polus, and Kalliklês; but I must again remind the reader that all the four are only spokesmen prompted by Plato himself.[2] It may indeed be considered almost as three distinct dialogues, connected by a loose thread. The historical Gorgias, a native of Leontini in Sicily, was the most celebrated of the Grecian rhetors; an elderly man during Plato's youth. He paid visits to different cities in all parts of Greece, and gave lessons in rhetoric to numerous pupils, chiefly young men of ambitious aspirations.[3] [Footnote 1: Themistius, Or. xxiii. p. 356, Dindorf. [Greek: O( de\ geôrgo\s o( Kori/nthios tô=| Gorgi/a| xuggeno/menos--ou)k au)tô=| e)kei/nô| Gorgi/a|, a)lla\ tô=| lo/gô| o(\n Pla/tôn e)/grapsen e)p' e)le/gchô| tou= sophistou=--au)ti/ka a)phei\s to\n a)/gron kai\ tou\s a)mpe/lous, Pla/tôni u(pe/thêke tê\n psuchê\n kai\ ta\ e)kei/nou e)spei/reto kai\ e)phuteu/eto; kai\ ou(=to/s e)stin o(\n tima=| A)ristote/lês e)n tô=| dialo/gô| tô=| Korinthi/ô|.]] [Footnote 2: Aristeides, Orat. xlvi. p. 387, Dindorf. [Greek: Ti/s ga\r ou)k oi)=den, o(/ti kai\ o( Sôkra/tês kai\ o( Kalliklê=s kai\ o( Gorgi/as kai\ o( Pô=los, pa/nta tau=t' e)sti\ Pla/tôn, pro\s to\ dokou=n au)tô=| tre/pôn tou\s lo/gous?] Though Aristeides asks reasonably enough, Who is ignorant of this?--the remarks of Stallbaum and others often imply forgetfulness of it.] [Footnote 3: Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, vol. iii. p. 22) is of opinion that Plato composed the Gorgias shortly after returning from his first voyage to Sicily, 387 B.C. I shall not contradict this: but I see nothing to prove it. At the same time, Schleiermacher assumes as certain that Aristophanes in the Ekklesiazusæ alludes to the doctrines published by Plato in his Republic (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 20). Putting these two statements together, the Gorgias would be later in date of composition than the Republic, which I hardly think probable. However, I do not at all believe that Aristophanes in the Ekklesiazusæ makes any allusion to the Republic of Plato. Nor shall I believe, until some evidence is produced, that the Republic was composed at so early a date as 390 B.C.] [Side-note: Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and Kalliklês.] Sokrates and Chærephon are described as intending to come to a rhetorical lecture of Gorgias, but as having been accidentally detained so as not to arrive until just after it has been finished, with brilliant success. Kalliklês, however, the host and friend of Gorgias, promises that the rhetor will readily answer any questions put by Sokrates; which Gorgias himself confirms, observing at the same time that no one had asked him any new question for many years past.[4] Sokrates accordingly asks Gorgias what his profession is? what it is that he teaches? what is the definition of rhetoric? Not receiving a satisfactory answer, Sokrates furnishes a definition of his own: out of which grow two arguments of wide ethical bearing: carried on by Sokrates, the first against Polus, the second against Kalliklês. Both these two are represented as voluble speakers, of confident temper, regarding the acquisition of political power and oratorical celebrity as the grand objects of life. Polus had even composed a work on Rhetoric, of which we know nothing: but the tone of this dialogue would seem to indicate (as far as we can judge from such evidence) that the style of the work was affected, and the temper of the author flippant. [Footnote 4: Plato, Gorg. pp. 447-448 A. The dialogue is supposed to be carried on in the presence of many persons, seemingly belonging to the auditory of the lecture which Gorgias has just finished, p. 455 C.] [Side-note: Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good definition.] Here, as in the other dialogues above noticed, the avowed aim of Sokrates is--first, to exclude long speaking--next, to get the question accurately conceived, and answered in an appropriate manner. Specimens are given of unsuitable and inaccurate answers, which Sokrates corrects. The conditions of a good definition are made plain by contrast with bad ones; which either include much more than the thing defined, or set forth what is accessory and occasional in place of what is essential and constant. These tentatives and gropings to find a definition are always instructive, and must have been especially so in the Platonic age, when logical distinctions had never yet been made a subject of separate attention or analysis. [Side-note: Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the artisan of persuasion.] About what is Rhetoric as a cognition concerned, Gorgias? _Gorg._--About words or discourses. _Sokr._--About what discourses? such as inform sick men how they are to get well? _Gorg._--No. _Sokr._--It is not about all discourses? _Gorg._--It makes men competent to speak: of course therefore also to think, upon the matters on which they speak.[5] _Sokr._--But the medical and gymnastic arts do this likewise, each with reference to its respective subject: what then is the difference between them and Rhetoric? _Gorg._--The difference is, that each of these other arts tends mainly towards some actual work or performance, to which the discourses, when required at all, are subsidiary: but Rhetoric accomplishes every thing by discourses alone.[6] _Sokr._--But the same may be said about arithmetic, geometry, and other sciences. How are they distinguished from Rhetoric? You must tell me upon what matters the discourses with which Rhetoric is conversant turn; just as you would tell me, if I asked the like question about arithmetic or astronomy. _Gorg._--The discourses, with which Rhetoric is conversant, turn upon the greatest of all human affairs. _Sokr._--But this too, Gorgias, is indistinct and equivocal. Every man, the physician, the gymnast, the money-maker, thinks his own object and his own affairs the greatest of all.[7] _Gorg._--The function of Rhetoric, is to persuade assembled multitudes, and thus to secure what are in truth the greatest benefits: freedom to the city, political command to the speaker.[8] _Sokr._--Rhetoric is then the artisan of persuasion. Its single purpose is to produce persuasion in the minds of hearers? _Gorg._--It is so. [Footnote 5: Plato, Gorgias, p. 449 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n peri\ ô(=nper le/gein, kai\ phronei=n? Pô=s ga\r ou)/?]] [Footnote 6: Plato, Gorgias, p. 450 B-C. [Greek: tê=s r(êtorikê=s . . . . pa=sa ê( pra=xis kai\ ê( ku/rôsis dia\ lo/gôn e)sti/n . . . .]] [Footnote 7: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 451-452.] [Footnote 8: Plato, Gorgias, p. 452 D. [Greek: O(/per e)/sti tê=| a)lêthei/a| me/giston a)gatho/n, kai\ ai)/tion, a)/ma me\n e)leutheri/as au)toi=s toi=s a)nthrô/pois, a)/ma de\ tou= a)/llôn a)/rchein e)n tê=| au(tou= po/lei e(ka/stô|.]] [Side-note: The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what matters is he competent to advise?] _Sokr._--But are there not other persons besides the Rhetor, who produce persuasion? Does not the arithmetical teacher, and every other teacher, produce persuasion? How does the Rhetor differ from them? What mode of persuasion does he bring about? Persuasion about what? _Gorg._--I reply--it is that persuasion which is brought about in Dikasteries, and other assembled multitudes--and which relates to just and unjust.[9] _Sokr._--You recognise that to have learnt and to know any matter, is one thing--to believe it, is another: that knowledge and belief are different--knowledge being always true, belief sometimes false? _Gorg._--Yes. _Sokr._--We must then distinguish two sorts of persuasion: one carrying with it knowledge--the other belief without knowledge. Which of the two does the Rhetor bring about? _Gorg._--That which produces belief without knowledge. He can teach nothing. _Sokr._--Well, then, Gorgias, on what matters will the Rhetor be competent to advise? When the people are deliberating about the choice of generals or physicians, about the construction of docks, about practical questions of any kind--there will be in each case a special man informed and competent to teach or give counsel, while the Rhetor is not competent. Upon what then can the Rhetor advise--upon just and unjust--nothing else?[10] [Footnote 9: Plato, Gorgias, p. 454 B.] [Footnote 10: Plato, Gorgias, p. 455 D.] [Side-note: The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among the ignorant.] The Rhetor (says Gorgias) or accomplished public speaker, will give advice about all the matters that you name, and others besides. He will persuade the people and carry them along with him, even against the opinion of the special _Expert_. He will talk more persuasively than the craftsman about matters of the craftsman's own business. The power of the Rhetor is thus very great: but he ought to use it, like all other powers, for just and honest purposes; not to abuse it for wrong and oppression. If he does the latter, the misdeed is his own, and not the fault of his teacher, who gave his lessons with a view that they should be turned to proper use. If a man, who has learnt the use of arms, employs them to commit murder, this abuse ought not to be imputed to his master of arms.[11] [Footnote 11: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 456-457.] You mean (replies Sokrates) that he, who has learnt Rhetoric from you, will become competent not to teach, but to persuade the multitude:--that is, competent among the ignorant. He has acquired an engine of persuasion; so that he will appear, when addressing the ignorant, to know more than those who really do know.[12] [Footnote 12: Plato, Gorgias, p. 459 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\ peri\ ta\s a)/llas a(pa/sas te/chnas ô(sau/tôs e)/chei o( r(ê/tôr kai\ ê( r(êtorikê/; au)ta\ me\n ta\ pra/gmata ou)de\n dei= au)tê\n ei)de/nai o(/pôs e)/chei, mêchanê\n de/ tina peithou=s eu(rêke/nai, ô(/ste phai/nesthai toi=s ou)k ei)do/si ma=llon ei)de/nai tô=n ei)do/tôn.]] * * * * * [Side-note: Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes up the debate with Sokrates.] Thus far, the conversation is carried on between Sokrates and Gorgias. But the latter is now made to contradict himself--apparently rather than really--for the argument whereby Sokrates reduces him to a contradiction, is not tenable, unless we admit the Platonic doctrine that the man who has learnt just and unjust, may be relied on to act as a just man;[13] in other words, that virtue consists in knowledge. [Footnote 13: Plato, Gorgias, p. 460 B. [Greek: o( ta\ di/kaia memathêkô/s, di/kaios]. Aristotle notices this confusion of Sokrates, who falls into it also in the conversation with Euthydemus, Xenoph. Memorab. iv. 2, 20, iii. 9, 5.] [Side-note: Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to cookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery.] Polus now interferes and takes up the conversation: challenging Sokrates to furnish what _he_ thinks the proper definition of Rhetoric. Sokrates obeys, in a tone of pungent polemic. Rhetoric (he says) is no art at all, but an empirical knack of catering for the pleasure and favour of hearers; analogous to cookery.[14] It is a talent falling under the general aptitude called Flattery; possessed by some bold spirits, who are forward in divining and adapting themselves to the temper of the public.[15] It is not honourable, but a mean pursuit, like cookery. It is the shadow or false imitation of a branch of the political art.[16] In reference both to the body and the mind, there are two different conditions: one, a condition really and truly good--the other, good only in fallacious appearance, and not so in reality. To produce, and to verify, the really good condition of the body, there are two specially qualified professions, the gymnast or trainer and the physician: in regard to the mind, the function of the trainer is performed by the law-giving power, that of the physician by the judicial power. Law-making, and adjudicating, are both branches of the political art, and when put together make up the whole of it. Gymnastic and medicine train and doctor the body towards its really best condition: law-making and adjudicating do the same in regard to the mind. To each of the four, there corresponds a sham counterpart or mimic, a branch under the general head _flattery_--taking no account of what is really best, but only of that which is most agreeable for the moment, and by this trick recommending itself to a fallacious esteem.[17] Thus Cosmetic, or Ornamental Trickery, is the counterfeit of Gymnastic; and Cookery the counterfeit of Medicine. Cookery studies only what is immediately agreeable to the body, without considering whether it be good or wholesome: and does this moreover, without any truly scientific process of observation or inference, but simply by an empirical process of memory or analogy. But Medicine examines, and that too by scientific method, only what is good and wholesome for the body, whether agreeable or not. Amidst ignorant men, Cookery slips in as the counterfeit of medicine; pretending to know what food is _good_ for the body, while it really knows only what food is _agreeable_. In like manner, the artifices of ornament dress up the body to a false appearance of that vigour and symmetry, which Gymnastics impart to it really and intrinsically. [Footnote 14: Plato, Gorgias, p. 462 C. [Greek: e)mpeiri/a . . . . cha/rito/s tinos kai\ ê(donê=s a)pergasi/as]. In the Philêbus (pp. 55-56) Sokrates treats [Greek: i)atrikê\] differently, as falling short of the idea of [Greek: te/chnê], and coming much nearer to what is here called [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] or [Greek: stochastikê/]. Asklepiades was displeased with the Thracian Dionysius for calling [Greek: grammatikê\] by the name of [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] instead of [Greek: te/chnê]: see Sextus Empiric. adv. Grammat. s. 57-72, p. 615, Bekk.] [Footnote 15: Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 A. [Greek: dokei= moi ei)=nai/ ti e)pitê/deuma, techniko\n me\n ou)/, psuchê=s de\ stochastikê=s kai\ a)ndrei/as kai\ phu/sei deinê=s prosomilei=n toi=s a)nthrô/pois; kalô= de\ au)tou= e)gô\ to\ kepha/laion _kolakei/an_.]] [Footnote 16: Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 D. [Greek: politikê=s mori/ou ei)/dôlon].] [Footnote 17: Plato, Gorgias, p. 464 C. [Greek: tetta/rôn dê\ tou/tôn ou)sô=n, kai\ a)ei\ pro\s to\ be/ltiston therapeuousô=n, tô=n me\n to\ sô=ma, tô=n de\ tê\n psuchê/n, ê( kolakeutikê\ ai)sthome/nê, ou) gnou=sa le/gô a)lla\ stochasame/nê, te/tracha e(autê\n dianei/masa, u(podu=sa u(po\ e(/kaston tô=n mori/ôn, prospoiei=tai ei)=nai tou=to o(/per u(pe/du; kai\ tou= me\n belti/stou ou)de\n phronti/zei, tô=| de\ a)ei\ ê(di/stô| thêreu/etai tê\n a)/noian kai\ e)xapata=|, ô(/ste dokei= plei/stou a)xi/a ei)=nai.]] [Side-note: Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure.] The same analogies hold in regard to the mind. Sophistic is the shadow or counterfeit of law-giving: Rhetoric, of judging or adjudicating. The lawgiver and the judge aim at what is good for the mind: the Sophist and the Rhetor aim at what is agreeable to it. This distinction between them (continues Sokrates) is true and real: though it often happens that the Sophist is, both by himself and by others, confounded with and mistaken for the lawgiver, because he deals with the same topics and occurrences: and the Rhetor, in the same manner, is confounded with the judge.[18] The Sophist and the Rhetor, addressing themselves to the present relish of an undiscerning public, are enabled to usurp the functions and the credit of their more severe and far-sighted rivals. [Footnote 18: Plato, Gorgias, p. 465 C. [Greek: die/stêke me\n ou(/tô phu/sei; a(/te de\ e)ggu\s o)/ntôn, phu/rontai e)n tô=| au)tô=| kai\ peri\ tau)ta\ sophistai\ kai\ r(ê/tores, kai\ ou)k e)/chousin o(/, ti chrê/sôntai ou)/te au)toi\ e(autoi=s ou)/te oi( a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi tou/tois.] It seems to me that the persons whom Plato here designates as being confounded together are, the Sophist with the lawgiver, the Rhetor with the judge or dikast; which is shown by the allusion, three lines farther on, to the confusion between the cook and the physician. Heindorf supposes that the persons designated as being confounded are, the Sophist with the Rhetor; which I cannot think to be the meaning of Plato.] [Side-note: Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish.] This is the definition given by Sokrates of Rhetoric and of the Rhetor. Polus then asks him: You say that Rhetoric is a branch of Flattery: Do you think that good Rhetors are considered as flatterers in their respective cities? _Sokr._--I do not think that[19] they are considered at all. _Polus._--How! not considered? Do not good Rhetors possess great power in their respective cities? _Sokr._--No: if you understand the possession of power as a good thing for the possessor. _Polus._--I do understand it so. _Sokr._--Then I say that the Rhetors possess nothing beyond the very minimum of power. _Polus._--How can that be? Do not they, like despots, kill, impoverish, and expel any one whom they please? _Sokr._--I admit that both Rhetors and Despots can do what seems good to themselves, and can bring penalties of death, poverty, or exile upon others: but I say that nevertheless they have no power, because they can do nothing which they really wish.[20] [Footnote 19: Plat. Gorg. p. 466 B. _Polus._ [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n dokou=si/ soi ô(s ko/lakes e)n tai=s po/lesi phau=loi nomi/zesthai oi( a)gathoi\ r(ê/tores? . . . . ] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)de\ nomi/zesthai e)/moige dokou=sin.] The play on words here--for I see nothing else in it--can be expressed in English as well as in Greek. It has very little pertinence; because, as a matter of fact, the Rhetors certainly had considerable importance, whether they deserved it or not. How little Plato cared to make his comparisons harmonise with the fact, may be seen by what immediately follows--where he compares the Rhetors to Despots? and puts in the mouth of Polus the assertion that they kill or banish any one whom they choose.] [Footnote 20: Plato, Gorgias, p. 466 E. [Greek: ou)de\n ga\r poiei=n ô(=n bou/lontai, ô(s e)/pos ei)pei=n; poiei=n me/ntoi o(\, ti a)\n au)toi=s do/xê| be/ltiston ei)=nai.]] [Side-note: All men wish for what is good for them. Despots and Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, and therefore have no real power.] That which men wish (Sokrates lays down as a general proposition) is to obtain good, and to escape evil. Each separate act which they perform, is performed not with a view to its own special result, but with a view to these constant and paramount ends. Good things, or profitable things (for Sokrates alternates the phrases as equivalent), are wisdom, health, wealth, and other such things. Evil things are the contraries of these.[21] Many things are in themselves neither good nor evil, but may become one or the other, according to circumstances--such as stones, wood, the acts of sitting still or moving, &c. When we do any of these indifferent acts, it is with a view to the pursuit of good, or to the avoidance of evil: we do not wish for the act, we wish for its good or profitable results. We do every thing for the sake of good: and if the results are really good or profitable, we accomplish what we wish: if the contrary, not. Now, Despots and Rhetors, when they kill or banish or impoverish any one, do so because they think it will be better for them, or profitable.[22] If it be good for them, they do what they wish: if evil for them, they do the contrary of what they wish and therefore have no power. [Footnote 21: Plato, Gorgias, p. 467 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n le/geis ei)=nai a)gatho\n me\n sophi/an te kai\ u(gi/eian kai\ plou=ton kai\ ta)/lla ta\ toiau=ta, kaka\ de\ ta)nanti/a tou/tôn? E)/gôge.]] [Footnote 22: Plato, Gorgias, p. 468 B-C. [Greek: ou)kou=n kai\ a)pokti/nnumen, ei)/ tin' a)pokti/nnumen, . . . . oi)o/menoi a)/meinon ei)=nai ê(mi=n tau=ta ê)\ mê/? . . . e(/nek' a)/ra tou= a)gathou= a(/panta tau=ta poiou=sin oi( poiou=ntes . . . . e)a\n me\n ô)phe/lima ê)=| tau=ta, boulo/metha pra/ttein au)ta/; blabera\ de\ o)/nta, ou) boulo/metha. . . . . ta\ ga\r a)gatha\ boulo/metha, ô(=s phê\|s su/], &c.] To do evil (continues Sokrates), is the worst thing that can happen to any one; the evil-doer is the most miserable and pitiable of men. The person who suffers evil is unfortunate, and is to be pitied; but much less unfortunate and less to be pitied than the evil-doer. If I have a concealed dagger in the public market-place, I can kill any one whom I choose: but this is no good to me, nor is it a proof of great power, because I shall be forthwith taken up and punished. The result is not profitable, but hurtful: therefore the act is not good, nor is the power to do it either good or desirable.[23] It is sometimes good to kill, banish, or impoverish--sometimes bad. It is good when you do it justly: bad, when you do it unjustly.[24] [Footnote 23: Plato, Gorgias, p. 469-470.] [Footnote 24: Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 C.] [Side-note: Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia--Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it.] _Polus._--A child can refute such doctrine. You have heard of Archelaus King of Macedonia. Is he, in your opinion, happy or miserable? _Sokr._--I do not know: I have never been in his society. _Polus._--Cannot you tell without that, whether he is happy or not? _Sokr._--No, certainly not. _Polus._--Then you will not call even the Great King happy? _Sokr._--No: I do not know how he stands in respect to education and justice. _Polus._--What! does all happiness consist in that? _Sokr._--I say that it does. I maintain that the good and honourable man or woman is happy: the unjust and wicked, miserable.[25] _Polus._--Then Archelaus is miserable, according to your doctrine? _Sokr._--Assuredly, if he is wicked. _Polus._--Wicked, of course; since he has committed enormous crimes: but he has obtained complete kingly power in Macedonia. Is there any Athenian, yourself included, who would not rather be Archelaus than any other man in Macedonia?[26] _Sokr._--All the public, with Nikias, Perikles, and the most eminent men among them, will agree with you in declaring Archelaus to be happy. I alone do not agree with you. You, like a Rhetor, intend to overwhelm me and gain your cause, by calling a multitude of witnesses: I shall prove my case without calling any other witness than yourself.[27] Do you think that Archelaus would have been a happy man, if he had been defeated in his conspiracy and punished? _Polus._--Certainly not: he would then have been very miserable. _Sokr._--Here again I differ from you: I think that Archelaus, or any other wicked man, is under all circumstances miserable; but he is less miserable, if afterwards punished, than he would be if unpunished and successful.[28] _Polus._--How say you? If a man, unjustly conspiring to become despot, be captured, subjected to torture, mutilated, with his eyes burnt out and with many other outrages inflicted, not only upon himself but upon his wife and children--do you say that he will be more happy than if he succeeded in his enterprise, and passed his life in possession of undisputed authority over his city--envied and extolled as happy, by citizens and strangers alike?[29] _Sokr._--More happy, I shall not say: for in both cases he will be miserable; but he will be less miserable on the former supposition. [Footnote 25: Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 E.] [Footnote 26: Plato, Gorgias, p. 471 B-C.] [Footnote 27: Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 B. [Greek: A)ll' e)gô/ soi ei)=s ô)\n ou)ch o(mologô=. . . . e)gô\ de\ a)\n mê\ se\ au)to\n e(/na o)/nta ma/rtura para/schômai o(mologou=nta peri\ ô(=n le/gô, ou)de\n oi)=mai a)/xion lo/gou pepera/nthai peri\ ô(=n a)\n ê(mi=n o( lo/gos ê)=|; oi)=mai de\ ou)de\ soi/, e)a\n mê\ e)gô/ soi marturô= ei(=s ô)\n mo/nos, tou\s d' a)/llous pa/ntas tou/tous chai/rein e)a=|s.]] [Footnote 28: Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 C.] [Footnote 29: Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 D.] [Side-note: Sokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished.] _Sokr._--Which of the two is worst: to do wrong, or to suffer wrong? _Polus._--To suffer wrong. _Sokr._--Which of the two is the most disgraceful? _Polus._--To do wrong. _Sokr._--If more ugly and disgraceful, is it not then worse? _Polus._--By no means. _Sokr._--You do not think then that the good--and the fine or honourable--are one and the same; nor the bad--and the ugly or disgraceful? _Polus._--No: certainly not. _Sokr._--How is this? Are not all fine or honourable things, such as bodies, colours, figures, voices, pursuits, &c., so denominated from some common property? Are not fine bodies said to be fine, either from rendering some useful service, or from affording some pleasure to the spectator who contemplates them?[30] And are not figures, colours, voices, laws, sciences, &c., called fine or honourable for the same reason, either for their agreeableness or their usefulness, or both? _Polus._--Certainly: your definition of the fine or honourable, by reference to pleasure, or to good, is satisfactory. _Sokr._--Of course therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be defined by the contrary, by reference to pain or to evil? _Polus._--Doubtless.[31] _Sokr._--If therefore one thing be finer or more honourable than another, this is because it surpasses the other either in pleasure, or in profit: if one thing be more ugly or disgraceful than another, it must surpass that other either in pain, or in evil? _Polus._--Yes. [Footnote 30: Plat. Gorg. p. 474 D. [Greek: e)a\n e)n tô=| theôrei=sthai chai/rein poiê=| tou\s theôrou=ntas?]] [Footnote 31: Plato, Gorgias, p. 474 E. _Sokr._ [Greek: Kai\ mê\n ta/ ge kata\ tou\s no/mous kai\ ta\ e)pitêdeu/mata, ou) dê/pou e)kto\s tou/tôn e)sti\ ta\ kala/, tou= ê)\ _ô)phe/lima ei)=nai ê)\ ê(de/a ê)\_ a)mpho/tera.] _Pol._ [Greek: Ou)k e)/moige dokei=.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\ tô=n mathêma/tôn ka/llos ô(sau/tôs?] _Pol._ [Greek: Pa/nu ge; kai\ kalô=s ge nu=n o(rizei, _ê(donê=| te kai\ a)gathô=|_ o(rizo/menos to\ kalo/n.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n to\ ai)schro\n tô=| e)nanti/ô|, _lu/pê| te kai\ kakô=|_?] _Pol._ [Greek: A)na/gkê.] A little farther on [Greek: blabê\] is used as equivalent to [Greek: kako/n]. These words--[Greek: kalo/n, ai)schro/n]--(very difficult to translate properly) introduce a reference to the feeling or judgment of spectators, or of an undefined public, not concerned either as agents or sufferers.] [Side-note: Sokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and Turpe--Proof of the first point.] _Sokr._--Well, then! what did you say about doing wrong and suffering wrong? You said that to suffer wrong was the worst of the two, but to do wrong was the most ugly or disgraceful. Now, if to do wrong be more disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be because it has a preponderance either of pain or of evil? _Polus._--Undoubtedly. _Sokr._--Has it a preponderance of pain? Does the doer of wrong endure more pain than the sufferer? _Polus._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--Then it must have a preponderance of evil? _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--To do wrong therefore is worse than to suffer wrong, as well as more disgraceful? _Polus._--It appears so. _Sokr._--Since therefore it is both worse and more disgraceful, I was right in affirming that neither you, nor I, nor any one else, would choose to do wrong in preference to suffering wrong. _Polus._--So it seems.[32] [Footnote 32: Plato, Gorgias, p. 475 C-D.] [Side-note: Proof of the second point.] _Sokr._--Now let us take the second point--Whether it be the greatest evil for the wrong-doer to be punished, or whether it be not a still greater evil for him to remain unpunished. If punished, the wrong-doer is of course punished justly; and are not all just things fine or honourable, in so far as they are just? _Polus._--I think so. _Sokr._--When a man does anything, must there not be some correlate which suffers; and must it not suffer in a way corresponding to what the doer does? Thus if any one strikes, there must also be something stricken: and if he strikes quickly or violently, there must be something which is stricken quickly or violently. And so, if any one burns or cuts, there must be something burnt or cut. As the agent acts, so the patient suffers. _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now if a man be punished for wrong doing, he suffers what is just, and the punisher does what is just? _Polus._--He does. _Sokr._--You admitted that all just things were honourable: therefore the agent does what is honourable, the patient suffers what is honourable.[33] But if honourable, it must be either agreeable--or good and profitable. In this case, it is certainly not agreeable: it must therefore be good and profitable. The wrong-doer therefore, when punished, suffers what is good and is profited. _Polus._--Yes.[34] _Sokr._--In what manner is he profited? It is, as I presume, by becoming better in his mind--by being relieved from badness of mind. _Polus._--Probably. _Sokr._--Is not this badness of mind the greatest evil? In regard to wealth, the special badness is poverty: in regard to the body, it is weakness, sickness, deformity, &c.: in regard to the mind, it is ignorance, injustice, cowardice, &c. Is not injustice, and other badness of mind, the most disgraceful of the three? _Polus._--Decidedly. _Sokr._--If it be most disgraceful, it must therefore be the worst. _Polus._--How? _Sokr._--It must (as we before agreed) have the greatest preponderance either of pain, or of hurt and evil. But the preponderance is not in pain: for no one will say that the being unjust and intemperate and ignorant, is more painful than being poor and sick. The preponderance must therefore be great in hurt and evil. Mental badness is therefore a greater evil than either poverty, or disease and bodily deformity. It is the greatest of human evils. _Polus._--It appears so.[35] [Footnote 33: See Aristotle, Rhet. i. 9, p. 1366, b. 30, where the contrary of this opinion is maintained, and maintained with truth.] [Footnote 34: Plato, Gorgias, p. 476 D-E.] [Footnote 35: Plato, Gorgias, p. 477 E.] [Side-note: The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure for him. To be punished is best for him.] _Sokr._--The money-making art is, that which relieves us from poverty: the medical art, from sickness and weakness: the judicial or punitory, from injustice and wickedness of mind. Of these three relieving forces, which is the most honourable? _Polus._--The last, by far. _Sokr._--If most honourable, it confers either most pleasure or most profit? _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now, to go through medical treatment is not agreeable; but it answers to a man to undergo the pain, in order to get rid of a great evil, and to become well. He would be a happier man, if he were never sick: he is less miserable by undergoing the painful treatment and becoming well, than if he underwent no treatment and remained sick. Just so the man who is mentally bad: the happiest man is he who never becomes so; but if a man has become so, the next best course for him is, to undergo punishment and to get rid of the evil. The worst lot of all is, that of him who remains mentally bad, without ever getting rid of badness.[36] [Footnote 36: Plato, Gorgias, p. 478 D-E.] [Side-note: Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our friend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought to keep him unpunished.] This last, Polus (continues Sokrates), is the condition of Archelaus, and of despots and Rhetors generally. They possess power which enables them, after they have committed injustice, to guard themselves against being punished: which is just as if a sick man were to pride himself upon having taken precautions against being cured. They see the pain of the cure, but they are blind to the profit of it; they are ignorant how much more miserable it is to have an unhealthy and unjust mind than an unhealthy body.[37] There is therefore little use in Rhetoric: for our first object ought to be, to avoid doing wrong: our next object, if we have done wrong, not to resist or elude punishment by skilful defence, but to present ourselves voluntarily and invite it: and if our friends or relatives have done wrong, far from helping to defend them, we ought ourselves to accuse them, and to invoke punishment upon them also.[38] On the other hand, as to our enemy, we ought undoubtedly to take precautions against suffering any wrong from him ourselves: but if he has done wrong to others, we ought to do all we can, by word or deed, not to bring him to punishment, but to prevent him from suffering punishment or making compensation: so that he may live as long as possible in impunity.[39] These are the purposes towards which rhetoric is serviceable. For one who intends to do no wrong, it seems of no great use.[40] [Footnote 37: Plato, Gorgias, p. 479 B. [Greek: to\ a)lgeino\n au)tou= kathora=|n, pro\s de\ to\ ô)phe/limon tuphlô=s e)/chein, kai\ a)gnoei=n o(/sô| a)thliô/tero/n e)sti mê\ u(giou=s sô/matos mê\ u(giei= psuchê=| sunoikei=n, a)lla\ sathra=| kai\ a)di/kô| kai\ a)nosi/ô|.]] [Footnote 38: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 480 C, 508 B. [Greek: katêgorête/on ei)/ê kai\ au(tou= kai\ ui(e/os kai\ e(tai/ron, e)a/n ti a)dikê=|], &c. Plato might have put this argument into the mouth of Euthyphron as a reason for indicting his own father on the charge of murder: as I have already observed in reviewing the Euthyphron, which see above, vol. i. ch. xi., p. 442.] [Footnote 39: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481 A. [Greek: e)a\n de\ a)/llon a)dikê=| o( e)chthro/s, panti\ tro/pô| paraskeuaste/on kai\ pra/ttonta kai\ le/gonta, o(/pôs mê\ dô=| di/kên. . . . e)a/n te chrusi/on ê(rpakô\s ê)=| polu/, mê\ a)podidô=| tou=to, a)ll' e)/chôn a)nali/skêtai . . . a)di/kôs kai\ a)the/ôs], &c.] [Footnote 40: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.] * * * * * This dialogue between Sokrates and Polus exhibits a representation of Platonic Ethics longer and more continuous than is usual in the dialogues. I have therefore given a tolerably copious abridgment of it, and shall now proceed to comment upon its reasoning. [Side-note: Argument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed by Kallikles whether he means it seriously.] The whole tenor of its assumptions, as well as the conclusions in which it ends, are so repugnant to received opinions, that Polus, even while compelled to assent, treats it as a paradox: while Kallikles, who now takes up the argument, begins by asking from Chærephon--"Is Sokrates really in earnest, or is he only jesting?"[41] Sokrates himself admits that he stands almost alone. He has nothing to rely upon, except the consistency of his dialectics--and the verdict of philosophy.[42] This however is a matter of little moment, in discussing the truth and value of the reasoning, except in so far as it involves an appeal to the judgment of the public as a matter of fact. Plato follows out the train of reasoning--which at the time presents itself to his mind as conclusive, or at least as plausible--whether he may agree or disagree with others. [Footnote 41: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.] [Footnote 42: Plato, Gorgias, p. 482.] [Side-note: Principle laid down by Sokrates--That every one acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery.] Plato has ranked the Rhetor in the same category as the Despot: a classification upon which I shall say something presently. But throughout the part of the dialogue just extracted, he treats the original question about Rhetoric as part of a much larger ethical question.[43] Every one (argues Sokrates) wishes for the attainment of good and for the avoidance of evil. Every one performs each separate act with a view not to its own immediate end, but to one or other of these permanent ends. In so far as he attains them, he is happy: in so far as he either fails in attaining the good, or incurs the evil, he is unhappy or miserable. The good and honourable man or woman is happy, the unjust and wicked is miserable. Power acquired or employed unjustly, is no boon to the possessor: for he does not thereby obtain what he really wishes, good or happiness; but incurs the contrary, evil and misery. The man who does wrong is more miserable than he who suffers wrong: but the most miserable of all is he who does wrong and then remains unpunished for it.[44] [Footnote 43: I may be told that this comparison is first made by Polus (p. 466 C), and that Sokrates only takes it up from him to comment upon. True, but the speech of Polus is just as much the composition of Plato as that of Sokrates. Many readers of Plato are apt to forget this.] [Footnote 44: Isokrates, in his Panathenaic Oration (Or. xii. sect. 126, pp. 257-347), alludes to the same thesis as this here advanced by Plato, treating it as one which all men of sense would reject, and which none but a few men pretending to be wise would proclaim--[Greek: a(/per a(/pantes me\n a)\n oi( nou=n e)/chontes e)/lointo kai\ boulêthei=en, o)li/goi de/ tines tô=n prospoioume/nôn ei)=nai sophô=n, e)rôtêthe/ntes ou)k a)\n phê/saien.] In this last phrase Isokrates probably has Plato in his mind, though without pronouncing the name.] Polus, on the other hand, contends, that Archelaus, who has "waded through slaughter" to the throne of Macedonia, is a happy man both in his own feelings and in those of every one else, envied and admired by the world generally: That to say--Archelaus would have been more happy, or less miserable, if he had failed in his enterprise and had been put to death under cruel torture--is an untenable paradox. [Side-note: Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness.] The issue here turns, and the force of Plato's argument rests (assuming Sokrates to speak the real sentiments of Plato), upon the peculiar sense which he gives to the words Good--Evil--Happiness:--different from the sense in which they are conceived by mankind generally, and which is here followed by Polus. It is possible that to minds like Sokrates and Plato, the idea of themselves committing enormous crimes for ambitious purposes might be the most intolerable of all ideas, worse to contemplate than any amount of suffering: moreover, that if they could conceive themselves as having been thus guilty, the sequel the least intolerable for them to imagine would be one of expiatory pain. This, taken as the personal sentiment of Plato, admits of no reply. But when he attempts to convert this subjective judgment into an objective conclusion binding on all, he fails of success, and misleads himself by equivocal language. [Side-note: Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the Platonic meaning.] Plato distinguishes two general objects of human desire, and two of human aversion. 1. The immediate, and generally transient, object--Pleasure or the Pleasurable--Pain or the Painful. 2. The distant, ulterior, and more permanent object--Good or the profitable--Evil or the hurtful.--In the attainment of Good and avoidance of Evil consists happiness. But now comes the important question--In what sense are we to understand the words Good and Evil? What did Plato mean by them? Did he mean the same as mankind generally? Have mankind generally one uniform meaning? In answer to this question, we must say, that neither Plato, nor mankind generally, are consistent or unanimous in their use of the words: and that Plato sometimes approximates to, sometimes diverges from, the more usual meaning. Plato does not here tell us clearly what he himself means by Good and Evil: he specifies no objective or external mark by which we may know it: we learn only, that Good is a mental perfection--Evil a mental taint--answering to indescribable but characteristic sentiments in Plato's own mind, and only negatively determined by this circumstance--That they have no reference either to pleasure or pain. In the vulgar sense, Good stands distinguished from pleasure (or relief from pain), and Evil from pain (or loss of pleasure), as the remote, the causal, the lasting from the present, the product, the transient. Good and Evil are explained by enumerating all the things so called, of which enumeration Plato gives a partial specimen in this dialogue: elsewhere he dwells upon what he calls the Idea of Good, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. Having said that all men aim at good, he gives, as examples of good things--Wisdom, Health, Wealth, and other such things: while the contrary of these, Stupidity, Sickness, Poverty, are evil things: the list of course might be much enlarged. Taking Good and Evil generally to denote the common property of each of these lists, it is true that men perform a large portion of their acts with a view to attain the former and avoid the latter:--that the approach which they make to happiness depends, speaking generally, upon the success which attends their exertions for the attainment of and avoidance of these permanent ends: and moreover that these ends have their ultimate reference to each man's own feelings. But this meaning of Good is no longer preserved, when Sokrates proceeds to prove that the triumphant usurper Archelaus is the most miserable of men, and that to do wrong with impunity is the greatest of all evils. [Side-note: Examination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency between the general answer of Polus and his previous declarations--Law and Nature.] Sokrates provides a basis for his intended proof by asking Polus,[45] which of the two is most disgraceful--To do wrong--or to suffer wrong? Polus answers--To do wrong: and this answer is inconsistent with what he had previously said about Archelaus. That prince, though a wrong-doer on the largest scale, has been declared by Polus to be an object of his supreme envy and admiration: while Sokrates also admits that this is the sentiment of almost all mankind, except himself. To be consistent with such an assertion, Polus ought to have answered the contrary of what he does answer, when the general question is afterwards put to him: or at least he ought to have said--"Sometimes the one, sometimes the other". But this he is ashamed to do, as we shall find Kallikles intimating at a subsequent stage of the dialogue:[46] because of King Nomos, or the established habit of the community--who feel that society rests upon a sentiment of reciprocal right and obligation animating every one, and require that violations of that sentiment shall be marked with censure in general words, however widely the critical feeling may depart from such censure in particular cases.[47] Polus is forced to make profession of a faith, which neither he nor others (except Sokrates with a few companions) universally or consistently apply. To bring such a force to bear upon the opponent, was one of the known artifices of dialecticians:[48] and Sokrates makes it his point of departure, to prove the unparalleled misery of Archelaus. [Footnote 45: Plat. Gorg. p. 474 C.] [Footnote 46: Plat. Gorg. p. 482 C. To maintain that [Greek: to\ a)dikei=n be/ltion tou= a)dikei=sthai] was an [Greek: a)/doxos u(po/thesis]--one which it was [Greek: chei/ronos ê)/thous e(le/sthai]: which therefore Aristotle advises the dialectician not to defend (Aristot. Topic. viii. 156, 6-15).] [Footnote 47: This portion of the Gorgias may receive illustration from the third chapter (pp. 99-101) of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, entitled, "Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by the disposition to admire the rich and great, and to neglect or despise persons of poor and mean condition". He says--"The disposition to admire and almost to worship the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or at least to neglect, persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments. . . . They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly--a select, though I am afraid, a small party--who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers--and what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers--of wealth and greatness. . . . . It is scarce _agreeable to good morals_, or even to good language, perhaps, to say that mere wealth and greatness, abstracted from merit and virtue, deserve our respect. We must acknowledge, however, that they _almost constantly obtain it_: and _that they may therefore in a certain sense be considered as the natural objects of it_." Now Archelaus is a most conspicuous example of this disposition of the mass of mankind to worship and admire, disinterestedly, power and greatness: and the language used by Adam Smith in the last sentence illustrates the conversation of Sokrates, Polus, and Kalliklês. Adam Smith admits that energetic proceedings, ending in great power, such as those of Archelaus, obtain honour and worship from the vast majority of disinterested spectators: and that, therefore they are in a certain sense the _natural objects_ of such a sentiment ([Greek: kata\ phu/sin]). But if the question be put to him, Whether such proceedings, with such a position, are _worthy of honour_, he is constrained by good morals ([Greek: kata\ no/mon]) to reply in the negative. It is true that Adam Smith numbers himself with the small minority, while Polus shares the opinion of the large majority. But what is required by King Nomos must be professed even by dissentients, unless they possess the unbending resolution of Sokrates.] [Footnote 48: Aristot. De Soph. Elench. pp. 172-173, where he contrasts the opinions which men must make a show of holding, with those which they really do--[Greek: ai( phanerai\ do/xai--ai( a)phanei=s, a)pokekrumme/nai, do/xai.]] [Side-note: The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates, will not hold.] He proceeds to define Pulchrum and Turpe ([Greek: kalo\n-ai)schro/n]). When we recollect the Hippias Major, in which dialogue many definitions of Pulchrum were canvassed and all rejected, so that the search ended in total disappointment--we are surprised to see that Sokrates hits off at once a definition satisfactory both to himself and Polus: and we are the more surprised, because the definition here admitted without a remark, is in substance one of those shown to be untenable in the Hippias Major.[49] It depends upon the actual argumentative purpose which Plato has in hand, whether he chooses to multiply objections and give them effect--or to ignore them altogether. But the definition which he here proposes, even if assumed as incontestable, fails altogether to sustain the conclusion that he draws from it. He defines Pulchrum to be that which either confers pleasure upon the spectator when he contemplates it, or produces ulterior profit or good--we must presume profit to the spectator, or to him along with others--at any rate it is not said _to whom_. He next defines the ugly and disgraceful ([Greek: to\ ai)schro\n]) as comprehending both the painful and the hurtful or evil. If then (he argues) to do wrong is more ugly and disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be either because it is more painful--or because it is more hurtful, more evil (worse). It certainly is not more painful: therefore it must be worse. [Footnote 49: Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 45-46. See above, vol. ii. ch. xiii.] [Side-note: Worse or better--for whom? The argument of Sokrates does not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference, the definition would be inadmissible.] But worse, for whom? For the spectators, who declare the proceedings of Archelaus to be disgraceful? For the persons who suffer by his proceedings? Or for Archelaus himself? It is the last of the three which Sokrates undertakes to prove: but his definition does not help him to the proof. Turpe is defined to be either what causes immediate pain to the spectator, or ulterior hurt--to whom? If we say to the spectator--the definition will not serve as a ground of inference to the condition of the agent contemplated. If on the other hand, we say--to the agent--the definition so understood becomes inadmissible: as well for other reasons, as because there are a great many Turpia which are not agents at all, and which the definition therefore would not include. Either therefore the definition given by Sokrates is a bad one--or it will not sustain his conclusion. And thus, on this very important argument, where Sokrates admits that he stands alone, and where therefore the proof would need to be doubly cogent--an argument too where the great cause (so Adam Smith terms it) of the corruption of men's moral sentiments has to be combated--Sokrates has nothing to produce except premisses alike far-fetched and irrelevant. What increases our regret is, that the real arguments establishing the turpitude of Archelaus and his acts are obvious enough, if you look for them in the right direction. You discover nothing while your eye is fixed on Archelaus himself: far from presenting any indications of misery, which Sokrates professes to discover, he has gained much of what men admire as good wherever they see it. But when you turn to the persons whom he has killed, banished, or ruined--to the mass of suffering which he has inflicted--and to the widespread insecurity which such acts of successful iniquity spread through all societies where they become known--there is no lack of argument to justify that sentiment which prompts a reflecting spectator to brand him as a disgraceful man. This argument however is here altogether neglected by Plato. Here, as elsewhere, he looks only at the self-regarding side of Ethics. [Side-note: Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it.] Sokrates proceeds next to prove--That the wrong-doer who remains unpunished is more miserable than if he were punished. The wrong-doer (he argues) when punished suffers what is just: but all just things are honourable: therefore he suffers what is honourable. But all honourable things are so called because they are either agreeable, or profitable, or both together. Punishment is certainly not agreeable: it must therefore be profitable or good. Accordingly the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good. He is benefited, by being relieved of mental evil or wickedness, which is a worse evil than either bodily sickness or poverty. In proportion to the magnitude of this evil, is the value of the relief which removes it, and the superior misery of the unpunished wrong-doer who continues to live under it.[50] [Footnote 50: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 477-478.] Upon this argument, I make the same remark as upon that immediately preceding. We are not expressly told, whether good, evil, happiness, misery, &c., refer to the agent alone or to others also: but the general tenor implies that the agent alone is meant. And in this sense, Plato does not make out his case. He establishes an arbitrary standard of his own, recognised only by a few followers, and altogether differing from the ordinary standard, to test and compare happiness and misery. The successful criminal, Archelaus himself, far from feeling any such intense misery as Plato describes, is satisfied and proud of his position, which most others also account an object of envy. This is not disputed by Plato himself. And in the face of this fact, it is fruitless as well as illogical to attempt to prove, by an elaborate process of deductive reasoning, that Archelaus _must_ be miserable. That step of Plato's reasoning, in which he asserts, that the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good--is only true if you take in (what Plato omits to mention) the interests of society as well as those of the agent. His punishment is certainly profitable to (conducive to the security and well being of) society: it may possibly be also profitable to himself, but very frequently it is not so. The conclusion brought out by Plato, therefore, while contradicted by the fact, involves also a fallacy in the reasoning process. [Side-note: If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in which punishment is considered would be reversed.] Throughout the whole of this dialogue, Plato intimates decidedly how great a paradox the doctrine maintained by Sokrates must appear: how diametrically it was opposed to the opinion not merely of the less informed multitude, but of the wiser and more reflecting citizen--even such a man as Nikias. Indeed it is literally exact--what Plato here puts into the mouth of Kallikles--that if the doctrine here advocated by Sokrates were true, the whole of social life would be turned upside down.[51] If, for example, it were true, as Plato contends,--That every man who commits a crime, takes upon him thereby a terrible and lasting distemper, incurable except by the application of punishment, which is the specific remedy in the case--every theory of punishment would, literally speaking, be turned upside down. The great discouragement from crime would then consist in the fear of that formidable distemper with which the criminal was sure to inoculate himself: and punishment, instead of being (as it is now considered, and as Plato himself represents it in the Protagoras) the great discouragement to the commission of crime, would operate in the contrary direction. It would be the means of removing or impairing the great real discouragement to crime: and a wise legislator would hesitate to inflict it. This would be nothing less than a reversal of the most universally accepted political or social precepts (as Kallikles is made to express himself). [Footnote 51: Plato, Gorg. p. 481 C. _Kall._--[Greek: ei) me\n ga\r spouda/zeis te kai\ tugcha/nei tau=ta a)lêthê= o)/nta a(\ le/geis, a)/llo ti ê)\ ê(mô=n o( bi/os a)natetramme/nos a)\n ei)/ê tô=n a)nthrô/pôn, kai\ pa/nta ta\ e)nanti/a pra/ttomen, ê)\ a(\ dei=?]] [Side-note: Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper and bodily distemper--Material difference between the two--Distemper must be felt by the distempered persons.] It will indeed be at once seen, that the taint or distemper with which Archelaus is supposed to inoculate himself, when he commits signal crime--is a pure fancy or poetical metaphor on the part of Plato himself.[52] A distemper must imply something painful, enfeebling, disabling, to the individual who feels it: there is no other meaning: we cannot recognise a distemper, which does not make itself felt in any way by the distempered person. Plato is misled by his ever-repeated analogy between bodily health and mental health: real, on some points--not real on others. When a man is in bad bodily health, his sensations warn him of it at once. He suffers pain, discomfort, or disabilities, which leave no doubt as to the fact: though he may not know either the precise cause, or the appropriate remedy. Conversely, in the absence of any such warnings, and in the presence of certain positive sensations, he knows himself to be in tolerable or good health. If Sokrates and Archelaus were both in good bodily health, or both in bad bodily health, each would be made aware of the fact by analogous evidences. But by what measure are we to determine _when_ a man is in a good or bad mental state? By his own feelings? In that case, Archelaus and Sokrates are in a mental state equally good: each is satisfied with his own. By the judgment of by-standers? Archelaus will then be the better of the two: at least his admirers and enviers will outnumber those of Sokrates. By my judgment? If my opinion is asked, I agree with Sokrates: though not on the grounds which he here urges, but on other grounds. Who is to be the ultimate referee--the interests or security of other persons, who have suffered or are likely to suffer by Archelaus, being by the supposition left out of view? [Footnote 52: The disposition of Plato to build argument on a metaphor is often shown. Aristotle remarks it of him in respect to his theory of Ideas; and Aristotle in his Topica gives several precepts in regard to the general tendency--precepts enjoining disputants to be on their guard against it in dialectic discussion (Topica, iv. 123, a. 33, vi. 139-140)--[Greek: pa=n ga\r a)saphe\s to\ kata\ metaphora\n lego/menon], &c.] Polus is now dismissed as vanquished, after having been forced, against his will, to concede--That the doer of wrong is more miserable than the sufferer: That he is more miserable, if unpunished,--less so, if punished: That a triumphant criminal on a great scale, like Archelaus, is the most miserable of men. [Side-note: Kallikles begins to argue against Sokrates--he takes a distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature--Reply of Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly understood.] Here, then, we commence with Kallikles: who interposes, to take up the debate with Sokrates. Polus (says Kallikles), from deference to the opinions of mankind, has erroneously conceded the point--That it is more disgraceful to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. This is indeed true (continues Kallikles), according to what is just by law or convention, that is, according to the general sentiment of mankind: but it is not true, according to justice by nature, or natural justice. Nature and Law are here opposed.[53] The justice of Nature is, that among men (as among other animals) the strong individual should govern and strip the weak, taking and keeping as much as he can grasp. But this justice will not suit the weak, who are the many, and who defeat it by establishing a different justice--justice according to law--to curb the strong man, and prevent him from having more than his fair share.[54] The many, feeling their own weakness, and thankful if they can only secure a fair and equal division, make laws and turn the current of praise and blame for their own protection, in order to deter the strong man from that encroachment and oppression to which he is disposed. _The just according to law_ is thus a tutelary institution, established by the weak to defend themselves against _the just according to nature_. Nature measures right by might, and by nothing else: so that according to the right of nature, suffering wrong is more disgraceful than doing wrong. Hêraklês takes from Geryon his cattle, by the right of nature or of the strongest, without either sale or gift.[55] [Footnote 53: Plato, Gorgias, p. 482 E. [Greek: ô(s ta\ polla\ de\ tau=ta e)nanti/a a)llê/lois e)sti/n, ê(/ te phu/sis kai\ o( no/mos.]] [Footnote 54: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 B. [Greek: a)ll', oi)=mai, oi( tithe/menoi tou\s no/mous oi( a)sthenei=s a)/nthrôpoi/ ei)si kai\ oi( polloi\. Pro\s au(tou\s ou)=n kai\ to\ au)toi=s sumphe/ron tou/s te no/mous ti/thentai kai\ tou\s e)pai/nous e)painou=si kai\ tou\s pso/gous pse/gousin, e)kphobou=nte/s te tou\s e)r)r(ômeneste/rous tô=n a)nthrô/pôn kai\ dunatou\s o)/ntas ple/on e)/chein, i(/na mê\ au)tô=n ple/on e)/chôsin, le/gousin ô(s ai)schro\n kai\ a)/dikon to\ pleonektei=n, kai\ tou=to e)sti to\ a)dikei=n, to\ zêtei=n tô=n a)/llôn ple/on e)/chein; a)gapô=si ga/r, oi)=mai, au)toi\ a)\n to\ i)/son e)/chôsi phaulo/teroi o)/ntes.]] [Footnote 55: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 484-488.] But (rejoins Sokrates) the many are by nature stronger than the one; since, as you yourself say, they make and enforce laws to restrain him and defeat his projects. Therefore, since the many are the strongest, the right which they establish is the right of (or by) nature. And the many, as you admit, declare themselves in favour of the answer given by Polus--That to do wrong is more disgraceful than to suffer wrong.[56] Right by nature, and right by institution, sanction it alike. [Footnote 56: Plato, Gorgias, p. 488 D-E.] * * * * * [Side-note: What Kalliklês says is not to be taken as a sample of the teachings of Athenian sophists. Kalliklês--rhetor and politician.] Several commentators have contended, that the doctrine which Plato here puts into the mouth of Kalliklês was taught by the Sophists at Athens: who are said to have inculcated on their hearers that true wisdom and morality consisted in acting upon the right of the strongest and taking whatever they could get, without any regard to law or justice. I have already endeavoured to show, in my History of Greece, that the Sophists cannot be shown to have taught either this doctrine, or any other common doctrine: that one at least among them (Prodikus) taught a doctrine inconsistent with it: and that while all of them agreed in trying to impart rhetorical accomplishments, or the power of handling political, ethical, judicial, matters in a manner suitable for the Athenian public--each had his own way of doing this. Kalliklês is not presented by Plato as a Sophist, but as a Rhetor aspiring to active political influence; and taking a small dose of philosophy, among the preparations for that end.[57] He depreciates the Sophists as much as the philosophers, and in fact rather more.[58] Moreover Plato represents him as adapting himself, with accommodating subservience, to the Athenian public assembly, and saying or unsaying exactly as they manifested their opinion.[59] Now the Athenian public assembly would repudiate indignantly all this pretended right of the strongest, if any orator thought fit to put it forward as over-ruling established right and law. Any aspiring or subservient orator, such as Kalliklês is described, would know better than to address them in this strain. The language which Plato puts into the mouth of Kalliklês is noway consistent with the attribute which he also ascribes to him--slavish deference to the judgments of the Athenian Dêmos. [Footnote 57: Plato, Gorgias, p. 487 C, 485.] [Footnote 58: Plato, Gorgias, p. 520 A.] [Footnote 59: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481-482.] [Side-note: Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kalliklês is made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it.] Kalliklês is made to speak like one who sympathises with the right of the strongest, and who decorates such iniquity with the name and authority of that which he calls Nature. But this only shows the uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority.[60] It may be pleaded in favour of different and opposite theories. Nature prompts the strong man to take from weaker men what will gratify his desires: Nature also prompts these weaker men to defeat him and protect themselves by the best means in their power. The many are weaker, taken individually--stronger taken collectively: hence they resort to defensive combination, established rules, and collective authority.[61] The right created on one side, and the opposite right created on the other, flow alike from Nature: that is, from propensities and principles natural, and deeply seated, in the human mind. The authority of Nature, considered as an enunciation of actual and wide-spread facts, may be pleaded for both alike. But a man's sympathy and approbation may go either with the one or the other; and he may choose to stamp that which he approves, with the name of Nature as a personified law-maker. This is what is here done by Kalliklês as Plato exhibits him.[62] He sympathises with, and approves, the powerful individual. Now the greater portion of mankind are, and always have been, governed upon this despotic principle, and brought up to respect it: while many, even of those who dislike Kalliklês because they regard him as the representative of Athenian democracy (to which however his proclaimed sentiments stand pointedly opposed), when they come across a great man or so-called hero, such as Alexander or Napoleon, applaud the most exorbitant ambition if successful, and if accompanied by military genius and energy--regarding communities as made for little else except to serve as his instruments, subjects, and worshippers. Such are represented as the sympathies of Kalliklês: but those of the Athenians went with the second of the two rights--and mine go with it also. And though the language which Plato puts into the mouth of Kalliklês, in describing this second right, abounds in contemptuous rhetoric, proclaiming offensively the individual weakness of the multitude[63]--yet this very fact is at once the most solid and most respectable foundation on which rights and obligations can be based. The establishment of them is indispensable, and is felt as indispensable, to procure security for the community: whereby the strong man whom Kalliklês extols as the favourite of Nature, may be tamed by discipline and censure, so as to accommodate his own behaviour to this equitable arrangement.[64] Plato himself, in his Republic,[65] traces the generation of a city to the fact that each man individually taken is not self-sufficing, but stands in need of many things: it is no less true, that each man stands also in fear of many things, especially of depredations from animals, and depredations from powerful individuals of his own species. In the mythe of Protagoras,[66] we have fears from hostile animals--in the speech here ascribed to Kalliklês, we have fears from hostile strong men--assigned as the generating cause, both of political communion and of established rights and obligations to protect it. [Footnote 60: Aristotle (Sophist. Elench. 12, p. 173, a. 10) makes allusion to this argument of Kalliklês in the Gorgias, and notices it as a frequent point made by disputants in Dialectics--to insist on the contradiction between the Just according to Nature and the Just according to Law: which contradiction (Aristotle says) all the ancients recognised as a real one ([Greek: oi( a)rchai=oi pa/ntes ô)/|onto sumbai/nein]). It was doubtless a point on which the Dialectician might find much to say on either side.] [Footnote 61: In the conversation between Sokrates and Kritobulus, one of the best in Xenophon's Memorabilia (ii. 6, 21), respecting the conditions on which friendship depends, we find Sokrates clearly stating that the causes of friendship and the causes of enmity, though different and opposite, nevertheless both exist _by nature_. [Greek: A)ll' e)/chei me/n, e)/phê o( Sôkra/tês, poiki/lôs pôs tau=ta: Phu/sei ga\r e)/chousin oi( a)/nthrôpoi ta\ me\n philika/--de/ontai/ te ga\r a)llê/lôn, kai\ e)leou=si, kai\ sunergou=ntes ô)phelou=ntai, kai\ tou=to sunie/ntes cha/rin e)/chousin a)llê/lois--ta\ de\ polemika/--ta/ te ga\r au)ta\ kala\ kai\ ê(de/a nomi/zontes u(pe\r tou/tôn ma/chontai kai\ dichognômonou=ntes e)nantiou=ntai; polemiko\n de\ kai\ e)/ris kai\ o)rgê/, kai\ dusmene\s me\n o( tou= pleonektei=n e)/rôs, misêto\n de\ o( phtho/nos. A)ll' o(/môs dia\ tou/tôn pa/ntôn ê( phili/a diaduome/nê suna/ptei tou\s kalou/s te ka)gathou/s], &c. We read in the speech of Hermokrates the Syracusan, at the congress of Gela in Sicily, when exhorting the Sicilians to unite for the purpose of repelling the ambitious schemes of Athens, Thucyd. iv. 61: [Greek: kai\ tou\s me\n A)thênai/ous tau=ta pleonektei=n te kai\ pronoei=sthai pollê\ xuggnô/mê, kai\ ou) toi=s a)/rchein boulome/nois me/mphomai a)lla\ toi=s u(pakou/ein e(toimote/rois ou)=si; _ pe/phuke ga\r to\ a)nthrô/peion dia\ panto\s a)/rchein me\n tou= ei)/kontos, phula/ssesthai de\ to\ e)pio/n_. o(/soi de\ gignô/skontes au)ta\ mê\ o)rthô=s proskopou=men, mêde\ tou=to/ tis presbu/taton ê(/kei kri/nas, to\ koinô=s phobero\n a(/pantas eu)= the/sthai, a(marta/nomen.] A like sentiment is pronounced by the Athenian envoys in their debate with the Melians, Thuc. v. 105: [Greek: ê(gou/metha ga\r to/ te thei=on do/xê|, to\ a)nthrô/peio/n te saphô=s dia\ panto/s, u(po\ _phu/seôs a)nagkai/as_, ou)= a)\n kratê=|, a)/rchein.] Some of the Platonic critics would have us believe that this last-cited sentiment emanates from the corrupt teaching of Athenian Sophists: but Hermokrates the Syracusan had nothing to do with Athenian Sophists.] [Footnote 62: Respecting the vague and indeterminate phrases--Natural Justice, Natural Right, Law of Nature--see Mr. Austin's Province of Jurisprudence Determined, p. 160, ed. 2nd. [Jurisp., 4th ed, pp. 179, 591-2], and Sir H. S. Maine's Ancient Law, chapters iii. and iv. Among the assertions made about the Athenian Sophists, it is said by some commentators that they denied altogether any Just or Unjust by _nature_--that they recognised no Just or Unjust, except by _law or convention_. To say that the _Sophists_ (speaking of them collectively) either affirmed or denied anything, is, in my judgment, incorrect. Certain persons are alluded to by Plato (Theætêt. 172 B) as adopting partially the doctrine of Protagoras (_Homo Mensura_) and as denying altogether the Just by _nature_. In another Platonic passage (Protagor. 337) which is also cited as contributing to prove that the Sophists denied [Greek: to\ di/kaion phu/sei]--nothing at all is said about [Greek: to\ di/kaion]. Hippias the Sophist is there introduced as endeavouring to appease the angry feeling between Protagoras and Sokrates by reminding them, "I am of opinion that we all (_i.e._ men of literature and study) are kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by _nature_ though not by _law_: for law, the despot of mankind, carries many things by force, contrary to nature". The remark is very appropriate from one who is trying to restore good feeling between literary disputants: and the cosmopolitan character of literature is now so familiar a theme, that I am surprised to find Heindorf (in his note) making it an occasion for throwing the usual censure upon the Sophist, because some of them distinguished Nature from the Laws, and despised the latter in comparison with the former. Kalliklês here, in the Gorgias, maintains an opinion not only different from, but inconsistent with, the opinion alluded to above in the Theætêtus, 172 B. The persons noticed in the Theætêtus said--There is no Natural Justice: no Justice, except Justice by Law. Kalliklês says--There is a Natural Justice quite distinct from (and which he esteems more than) Justice by Law: he then explains what he believes Natural Justice to be--That the strong man should take what he pleases from the weak. Though these two opinions are really inconsistent with each other, yet we see Plato in the Leges (x. 889 E, 890 A) alluding to them both as the same creed, held and defended by the same men; whom he denounces with extreme acrimony. Who they were, he does not name; he does not mention [Greek: sophistai/], but calls them [Greek: a)ndrô=n sophô=n, i)diôtô=n te kai\ poiêtô=n]. We see, in the third chapter of Sir H. S. Maine's excellent work on Ancient Law, the meaning of these phrases--Natural Justice, Law of Nature. It designated or included "a set of legal principles entitled to supersede the existing laws, on the ground of intrinsic superiority". It denoted an ideal condition of society, supposed to be much better than what actually prevailed. This at least seems to have been the meaning which began to attach to it in the time of Plato and Aristotle. What this ideal perfection of human society was, varied in the minds of different speakers. In each speaker's mind the word and sentiment was much the same, though the objects to which it attached were often different. Empedokles proclaims in solemn and emphatic language that the Law of Nature peremptorily forbids us to kill any animal. (Aristot. Rhetor. i. 13, 1373 b. 15.) Plato makes out to his own satisfaction, that his Republic is thoroughly in harmony with the Law of Nature: and he insists especially on this harmony, in the very point which even the Platonic critics admit to be wrong--that is, in regard to the training of women and the relations of the sexes (Republic, v. 456 C, 466 D). We learn from Plato himself that the propositions of the Republic were thoroughly adverse to what other persons reverenced as the Law of Nature. In the notes of Beck and Heindorf on Protagor. p. 337 we read, "Hippias præ cæteris Sophistis contempsit leges, iisque opposuit Naturam. Naturam legibus plures certé Sophistarum opposuisse, easque præ illâ contempsisse, multis veterum locis constat." Now this allegation is more applicable to Plato than to the Sophists. Plato speaks with the most unmeasured contempt of existing communities and their laws: the scheme of his Republic, radically departing from them as it does, shows what he considered as required by the exigencies of human nature. Both the Stoics and the Epikureans extolled what they called the Law of Nature above any laws actually existing. The other charge made against the Sophists (quite opposite, yet sometimes advanced by the same critics) is, that they recognised no Just by Nature, but only Just by Law: _i.e._ all the actual laws and customs considered as binding in each different community. This is what Plato ascribes to some persons (Sophists or not) in the Theætêtus, p. 172. But in this sense it is not exact to call Kalliklês (as Heindorf does, Protagor. p. 337) "germanus ille Sophistarum alumnus in Gorgià Callicles," nor to affirm (with Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Theætêt. p. 183) that Plato meant to refute Aristippus under the name of Kallikles, Aristippus maintaining that there was no Just by Nature, but only Just by Law or Convention.] [Footnote 63: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 B, p. 492 A. [Greek: oi( polloi\, a)pokrupto/menoi tê\n e(autô=n a)dunami/an], &c.] [Footnote 64: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 E.] [Footnote 65: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B. [Greek: o(/ti tugcha/nei ê(mô=n e(/kastos ou)k au)tarkê\s ô)/n, a)lla\ pollô=n e)ndeê/s.]] [Footnote 66: Plato, Protag. p. 322 B.] * * * * * [Side-note: Sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kalliklês defends the negative.] Kalliklês now explains, that by _stronger_ men, he means better, wiser, braver men. It is they (he says) who ought, according to right by nature, to rule over others and to have larger shares than others. _Sokr._--Ought they not to rule themselves as well as others:[67] to control their own pleasures and desires: to be sober and temperate? _Kall._--No, they would be foolish if they did. The weak multitude must do so; and there grows up accordingly among _them_ a sentiment which requires such self-restraint from all. But it is the privilege of the superior few to be exempt from this necessity. The right of nature authorises them to have the largest desires, since their courage and ability furnish means to satisfy the desires. It would be silly if a king's son or a despot were to limit himself to the same measure of enjoyment with which a poor citizen must be content; and worse than silly if he did not enrich his friends in preference to his enemies. He need not care for that public law and censure which must reign paramount over each man among the many. A full swing of enjoyment, if a man has power to procure and maintain it, is virtue as well as happiness.[68] [Footnote 67: Plato, Gorgias, p. 491 D.] [Footnote 68: Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 A-C.] [Side-note: Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical?] _Sokr._--I think on the contrary that a sober and moderate life, regulated according to present means and circumstances, is better than a life of immoderate indulgence.[69] _Kall._--The man who has no desires will have no pleasure, and will live like a stone. The more the desires, provided they can all be satisfied, the happier a man will be. _Sokr._--You mean that a man shall be continually hungry, and continually satisfying his hunger: continually thirsty, and satisfying his thirst; and so forth. _Kall._--By having and by satisfying those and all other desires, a man will enjoy happiness. _Sokr._--Do you mean to include all varieties of desire and satisfaction of desire: such for example as itching and scratching yourself:[70] and other bodily appetites which might be named? _Kall._--Such things are not fit for discussion. _Sokr._--It is you who drive me to mention them, by laying down the principle, that men who enjoy, be the enjoyment of what sort it may, are happy; and by not distinguishing what pleasures are good and what are evil. Tell me again, do you think that the pleasurable and the good are identical? Or are there any pleasurable things which are not good?[71] _Kall._--I think that the pleasurable and the good are the same. [Footnote 69: Plato, Gorgias, p. 493 C. [Greek: e)a/n pôs oi(=o/s t' ô)= pei=sai metathe/sthai kai\ a)nti\ tou= a)plê/stôs kai\ a)kola/stôs e)/chontos bi/ou to\n kosmi/ôs kai\ toi=s a)ei\ parou=sin i(kanô=s kai\ e)xarkou/ntôs e)/chonta bi/on e(le/sthai.]] [Footnote 70: Plato, Gorg. p. 494 E.] [Footnote 71: Plato, Gorg. pp. 494-495. [Greek: ê)= ga\r e)gô\ a)/gô e)ntau=tha, ê)\ e)kei=nos o(\s a)\n phê=| a)ne/dên ou(/tô tou\s chai/rontas, o(/pôs a)\n chairôsin, eu)dai/monas ei)=nai, kai\ mê\ diori/zêtai tô=n ê(donô=n o(poi=ai a)gathai\ kai\ kakai/? a)ll' e)/ti kai\ nu=n le/ge, po/teron phê\| ei)=nai to\ au)to\ ê(du\ kai\ a)gatho/n, ê)\ ei)=nai ti tô=n ê(de/ôn o(\ ou)k e)/stin a)gatho/n?]] [Side-note: Kalliklês maintains that pleasurable and good are identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad. A scientific adviser is required to discriminate them.] Upon this question the discussion now turns: whether pleasure and good are the same, or whether there are not some pleasures good, others bad. By a string of questions much protracted, but subtle rather than conclusive, Sokrates proves that pleasure is not the same as good--that there are such things as bad pleasures and good pains. And Kalliklês admits that some pleasures are better, others worse.[72] Profitable pleasures are good: hurtful pleasures are bad. Thus the pleasures of eating and drinking are good, if they impart to us health and strength--bad, if they produce sickness and weakness. We ought to choose the good pleasures and pains, and avoid the bad ones. It is not every man who is competent to distinguish what pleasures are good, and what are bad. A scientific and skilful adviser, judging upon general principles, is required to make this distinction.[73] [Footnote 72: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 496-499.] [Footnote 73: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 499-500. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n panto\s a)ndro/s e)stin e)kle/xasthai poi=a a)gatha\ tô=n ê(de/ôn e)sti\ kai\ o(poi=a kaka/, ê)= technikou= dei= ei)s e(/kaston? Technikou=.]] * * * * * [Side-note: Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and Sokrates in the Protagoras.] This debate between Sokrates and Kalliklês, respecting the "Quomodo vivendum est,"[74] deserves attention on more than one account. In the first place, the relation which Sokrates is here made to declare between the two pairs of general terms, Pleasurable--Good: Painful--Evil: is the direct reverse of that which he both declares and demonstrates in the Protagoras. In that dialogue, the Sophist Protagoras is represented as holding an opinion very like that which is maintained by Sokrates in the Gorgias. But Sokrates (in the Protagoras) refutes him by an elaborate argument; and demonstrates that pleasure and good (also pain and evil) are names for the same fundamental ideas under different circumstances: pleasurable and painful referring only to the sensation of the present moment--while good and evil include, besides, an estimate of its future consequences and accompaniments, both pleasurable and painful, and represent the result of such calculation. In the Gorgias, Sokrates demonstrates the contrary, by an argument equally elaborate but not equally convincing. He impugns a doctrine advocated by Kalliklês, and in impugning it, proclaims a marked antithesis and even repugnance between the pleasurable and the good, the painful and the evil: rejecting the fundamental identity of the two, which he advocates in the Protagoras, as if it were a disgraceful heresy. [Footnote 74: Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 D. [Greek: i(/na tô=| o)/nti kata/dêlon ge/nêtai, pô=s biôte/on], &c. 500 C: [Greek: o(/ntina chrê\ tro/pon zê=|n.]] [Side-note: Views of critics about this contradiction.] The subject evidently presented itself to Plato in two different ways at different times. Which of the two is earliest, we have no means of deciding. The commentators, who favour generally the view taken in the Gorgias, treat the Protagoras as a juvenile and erroneous production: sometimes, with still less reason, they represent Sokrates as arguing in that dialogue, from the principles of his opponents, not from his own. For my part, without knowing whether the Protagoras or the Gorgias is the earliest, I think the Protagoras an equally finished composition, and I consider that the views which Sokrates is made to propound in it, respecting pleasure and good, are decidedly nearer to the truth. [Side-note: Comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of Sokrates in both dialogues.] That in the list of pleasures there are some which it is proper to avoid,--and in the list of pains, some which it is proper to accept or invite--is a doctrine maintained by Sokrates alike in both the dialogues. Why? Because some pleasures are good, others bad: some pains bad, others good--says Sokrates in the Gorgias. The same too is said by Sokrates in the Protagoras; but then, he there explains what he means by the appellation. All pleasure (he there says), so far as it goes, is good--all pain is bad. But there are some pleasures which cannot be enjoyed without debarring us from greater pleasures or entailing upon us greater pains: on that ground therefore, such pleasures are bad. So again, there are some pains, the suffering of which is a condition indispensable to our escaping greater pains, or to our enjoying greater pleasures: such pains therefore are good. Thus this apparent exception does not really contradict, but confirms, the general doctrine--That there is no good but the pleasurable, and the elimination of pain--and no evil except the painful, or the privation of pleasure. Good and evil have no reference except to pleasures and pains; but the terms imply, in each particular case, an estimate and comparison of future pleasurable and painful consequences, and express the result of such comparison. "You call enjoyment itself evil" (says Sokrates in the Protagoras),[75] "when it deprives us of greater pleasures or entails upon us greater pains. If you have any other ground, or look to any other end, in calling it evil, you may tell us what that end is; but you will not be able to tell us. So too, you say that pain is a good, when it relieves us from greater pains, or when it is necessary as the antecedent cause of greater pleasures. If you have any other end in view, when you call pain good, you may tell us what that end is; but you will not be able to tell us."[76] [Footnote 75: Plato, Protagoras,** p. 354 D. [Greek: e)pei/, ei) kat' a)/llo ti au)to\ to\ chai/rein kako\n kalei=te kai\ ei)s a)/llo ti te/los a)poble/psantes, e)/choite a)\n kai\ ê(mi=n ei)pei=n; a)ll' ou)ch e(/xete. . . . e)pei\ ei) pro\s a)/llo ti te/los a)poble/pete, o(/tan kalê=te au)to\ to\ lupei=sthai a)gatho/n, ê)\ pro\s o(\ e)gô\ le/gô, e)/chete ê(mi=n ei)pein; a)ll' ou)ch e(/xete.]] [Footnote 76: In a remarkable passage of the De Legibus, Plato denies all essential distinction between Good and Pleasure, and all reality of Good apart from Pleasure (Legg. ii. pp. 662-663). [Greek: ei) d' au)= to\n dikaio/taton eu)daimone/staton a)pophai/noito bi/on ei)=nai, zêtoi= pou pa=s a)\n o( a)kou/ôn, oi)=mai, ti/ pot' e)n au)tô=| to\ tê=s ê(donê=s krei=tton a)gatho/n te kai\ kalo\n o( no/mos e)no\n e)painei=? ti/ ga\r dê\ dikai/ô| chôrizo/menon ê(donê=s a)gatho\n a)\n ge/noito?] Plato goes on to argue as follows: Even though it were not true, as I affirm it to be, that the life of justice is a life of pleasure, and the life of injustice a life of pain--still the law-giver must proclaim this proposition as a useful falsehood, and compel every one to chime in with it. Otherwise the youth will have no motive to just conduct. For no one will willingly consent to obey any recommendation from which he does not expect more pleasure than pain; [Greek: ou)dei\s ga\r a)\n e(/kôn e)/theloi pei/thesthai pra/ttein tou=to o(/, tô| mê\ to\ chai/rein tou= lupei=sthai ple/on e(/petai] (663 B).] [Side-note: Distinct statement in the Protagoras. What are good and evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed in discriminating them. No such distinct statement in the Gorgias.] In the Gorgias, too, Sokrates declares that some pleasures are good, others bad--some pains bad, others good. But here he stops. He does not fulfil the reasonable demand urged by Sokrates in the Protagoras--"If you make such a distinction, explain the ground on which you make it, and the end to which you look". The distinction in the Gorgias stands without any assigned ground or end to rest upon. And this want is the more sensibly felt, when we read in the same dialogue, that--"It is not every man who can distinguish the good pleasures from the bad: a scientific man, proceeding on principle, is needed for the purpose".[77] But upon what criterion is the scientific man to proceed? Of what properties is he to take account, in pronouncing one pleasure to be bad, another good--or one pain to be bad and another good--the estimate of consequences, measured in future pleasures and pains, being by the supposition excluded? No information is given. The problem set to the scientific man is one of which all the quantities are unknown. Now Sokrates in the Protagoras[78] also lays it down, that a scientific or rational calculation must be had, and a mind competent to such calculation must be postulated, to decide which pleasures are bad or fit to be rejected--which pains are good, or proper to be endured. But then he clearly specifies the elements which alone are to be taken into the calculation--_viz._, the future pleasures and pains accompanying or dependent upon each with the estimate of their comparative magnitude and durability. The theory of this calculation is clear and intelligible: though in many particular cases, the data necessary for making it, and the means of comparing them, may be very imperfectly accessible. [Footnote 77: Plato, Gorgias, p. 500 A. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n panto\s a)ndro/s** e)stin e)kle/xasthai poi=a a)/gatha\ tô=n ê(de/ôn e)sti\ kai\ o(poi=a kaka/? ê)\ technikou= dei= ei)s e(/kaston? Technikou=.]] [Footnote 78: Plato, Protagoras, pp. 357 B, 356 E.] [Side-note: Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense--not recognised by Plato in either of the dialogues.] According to various ethical theories, which have chiefly obtained currency in modern times, the distinction--between pleasures good or fit to be enjoyed, and pleasures bad or unfit to be enjoyed--is determined for us by a moral sense or intuition: by a simple, peculiar, sentiment of right and wrong, or a conscience, which springs up within us ready-made, and decides on such matters without appeal; so that a man has only to look into his own heart for a solution. We need not take account of this hypothesis, in reviewing Plato's philosophy: for he evidently does not proceed upon it. He expressly affirms, in the Gorgias as well as in the Protagoras, that the question is one requiring science or knowledge to determine it, and upon which none but the man of science or _expert_ ([Greek: techniko\s]) is a competent judge. [Side-note: In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is self-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the pleasures and pains of other persons, so far as affected by the agent.] Moreover, there is another point common to both the two dialogues, deserving of notice. I have already remarked when reviewing the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras, that it appears to me seriously defective, inasmuch as it takes into account the pleasures and pains of the agent only, and omits the pleasures and pains of other persons affected by his conduct. But this is not less true respecting the doctrine of Sokrates in the Gorgias: for whatever criterion he may there have in his mind to determine which among our pleasures are bad, it is certainly not this--that the agent in procuring them is obliged to hurt others. For the example which Sokrates cites as specially illustrating the class of bad pleasures--_viz._, the pleasure of scratching an itching part of the body[79]--is one in which no others besides the agent are concerned. As in the Protagoras, so in the Gorgias--Plato in laying down his rule of life, admits into the theory only what concerns the agent himself, and makes no direct reference to the happiness of others as affected by the agent's behaviour. [Footnote 79: The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have reckoned this among the bad pleasures, because the discomfort and distress of body out of which it arises more than countervail the pleasure.] [Side-note: Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in substance the same, but differing in classification.] There are however various points of analogy between the Protagoras and the Gorgias, which will enable us, after tracing them out, to measure the amount of substantial difference between them; I speak of the reasoning of Sokrates in each. Thus, in the Protagoras,[80] Sokrates ranks health, strength, preservation of the community, wealth, command, &c., under the general head of Good things, but expressly on the ground that they are the producing causes and conditions of pleasures and of exemption from pains: he also ranks sickness and poverty under the head of Evil things, as productive causes of pain and suffering. In the Gorgias also, he numbers wisdom, health, strength, perfection of body, riches, &c., among Good things or profitable things[81]--(which two words he treats as equivalent)--and their contraries as Evil things. Now he does not expressly say here (as in the Protagoras) that these things are _good_, because they are productive causes of pleasure or exemption from pain: but such assumption must evidently be supplied in order to make the reasoning valid. For upon what pretence can any one pronounce strength, health, riches, to be _good_--and helplessness, sickness, poverty, to be _evil_--if no reference be admitted to pleasures and pains? Sokrates in the Gorgias[82] declares that the pleasures of eating and drinking are good, in so far as they impart health and strength to the body--evil, in so far as they produce a contrary effect. Sokrates in the Protagoras reasons in the same way--but with this difference--that he would count the pleasure of the repast itself as one item of good: enhancing the amount of good where the future consequences are beneficial, diminishing the amount of evil where the future consequences are Unfavourable: while Sokrates in the Gorgias excludes immediate pleasure from the list of good things, and immediate pain from the list of evil things. [Footnote 80: Plato, Protagor. pp. 353 D, 354 A.] [Footnote 81: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 467-468-499.] [Footnote 82: Plato, Gorgias, p. 499 D.] This last exclusion renders the theory in the Gorgias untenable and inconsistent. If present pleasure be not admitted as an item of good so far as it goes--then neither can the future and consequent aggregates of pleasure, nor the causes of them, be admitted as good. So likewise, if present pain be no evil, future pain cannot be allowed to rank as an evil.[83] [Footnote 83: Compare a passage in the Republic (ii. p. 357) where Sokrates gives (or accepts, as given by Glaukon) a description of Good much more coincident with the Protagoras than with the Gorgias. The common property of all Good is to be desired or loved; and there are three varieties of it--1. That which we desire for itself, and for its own sake, apart from all ulterior consequences, such as innocuous pleasures or enjoyments. 2. That which we desire both for itself and for its ulterior consequences, such as good health, good vision, good sense, &c. 3. That which we do not desire--nay, which we perhaps hate or shun, _per se_: but which we nevertheless desire and invite, in connection with and for the sake of ulterior consequences: such as gymnastic training, medical treatment when we are sick, labour in our trade or profession. Here Plato admits the immediately pleasurable _per se_ as one variety of good, always assuming that it is not countervailed by consequences or accompaniments of a painful character. This is the doctrine of the Protagoras, as distinguished from the Gorgias, where Sokrates sets pleasure in marked opposition to good.] [Side-note: Kalliklês, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, maintains a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in the Protagoras.] Each of the two dialogues, which I am now comparing, is in truth an independent composition: in each, Sokrates has a distinct argument to combat; and in the latest of the two (whichever that was), no heed is taken of the argumentation in the earlier. In the Protagoras, he exalts the dignity and paramount force of knowledge or prudence: if a man knows how to calculate pleasures and pains, he will be sure to choose the result which involves the greater pleasure or the less pain, on the whole: to say that he is overpowered by immediate pleasure or pain into making a bad choice, is a wrong description--the real fact being, that he is deficient in the proper knowledge how to choose. In the Gorgias, the doctrine assigned to Kalliklês and impugned by Sokrates is something very different. That justice, temperance, self-restraint, are indeed indispensable to the happiness of ordinary men; but if there be any one individual, so immensely superior in force as to trample down and make slaves of the rest, this one man would be a fool if he restrained himself: having the means of gratifying all his appetites, the more appetites he has, the more enjoyments will he have and the greater happiness.[84] Observe--that Kalliklês applies this doctrine only to the one omnipotent despot: to all other members of society, he maintains that self-restraint is essential. This is the doctrine which Sokrates in the Gorgias undertakes to refute, by denying community of nature between the pleasurable and the good--between the painful and the evil. [Footnote 84: Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 B.] [Side-note: The refutation of Kalliklês by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is unsuccessful--it is only so far successful as he adopts unintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras.] To me his refutation appears altogether unsuccessful, and the position upon which he rests it incorrect. The only parts of the refutation really forcible, are those in which he unconsciously relinquishes this position, and slides into the doctrine of the Protagoras. Upon this latter doctrine, a refutation might be grounded: you may show that even an omnipotent despot (regard for the comfort of others being excluded by the hypothesis) will gain by limiting the gratification of his appetites to-day so as not to spoil his appetites of tomorrow. Even in his case, prudential restraint is required, though his motives for it would be much less than in the case of ordinary social men. But Good, as laid down by Plato in the Gorgias, entirely disconnected from pleasure--and Evil, entirely disconnected from pain--have no application to this supposed despot. He has no desire for such Platonic Good--no aversion for such Platonic Evil. His happiness is not diminished by missing the former or incurring the latter. In fact, one of the cardinal principles of Plato's ethical philosophy, which he frequently asserts both in this dialogue and elsewhere,[85]--That every man desires Good, and acts for the sake of obtaining Good, and avoiding Evil--becomes untrue, if you conceive Good and Evil according to the Gorgias, as having no reference to pleasure or the avoidance of pain: untrue, not merely in regard to a despot under these exceptional conditions, but in regard to the large majority of social men. They desire to obtain Good and avoid Evil, in the sense of the Protagoras: but not in the sense of the Gorgias.[86] Sokrates himself proclaims in this dialogue: "I and philosophy stand opposed to Kalliklês and the Athenian public. What I desire is, to reason consistently with myself." That is, to speak the language of Sokrates in the Protagoras--"To me, Sokrates, the consciousness of inconsistency with myself and of an unworthy character, the loss of my own self-esteem and the pungency of my own self-reproach, are the greatest of all pains: greater than those which you, Kalliklês, and the Athenians generally, seek to avoid at all price and urge me also to avoid at all price--poverty, political nullity, exposure to false accusation, &c."[87] The noble scheme of life, here recommended by Sokrates, may be correctly described according to the theory of the Protagoras: without any resort to the paradox of the Gorgias, that Good has no kindred or reference to Pleasure, nor Evil to Pain. [Footnote 85: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 467 C, 499 E.] [Footnote 86: The reasoning of Plato in the Gorgias, respecting this matter, rests upon an equivocal phrase. The Greek phrase [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein] has two meanings; it means _recté agere_, to act rightly; and it also means _felicem esse_, to be happy. There is a corresponding double sense in [Greek: kakô=s pra/ttein]. Heindorf has well noticed the fallacious reasoning founded by Plato on this double sense. We read in the Gorgias, p. 507 C: [Greek: a)na/gkê to\n sô/phrona, di/kaion o)/nta kai\ a)ndrei=on kai\ o(/sion, a)gatho\n a)/ndra ei)=nai tele/ôs, to\n de\ a)gatho\n ei)= te kai\ kalô=s pra/ttein a)\ a)\n pra/ttê|, to\n d' eu)= pra/ttonta maka/rio/n te kai\ eu)dai/mona ei)=nai, to\n de\ ponêro\n kai\ kakô=s pra/ttonta a)/thlion.] Upon which Heindorf remarks, citing a note of Routh, who says, "Vix enim potest credi, Platonem duplici sensu verborum [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein] ad argumentum probandum abuti voluisse, quæ fallacia esset amphiboliæ". "Non meminerat" (says Heindorf) "vir doctus ceteros in Platone locos, ubi eodem modo ex duplici illâ potestate argumentatio ducitur, cujusmodi plura attulimus ad Charmidem, 42, p. 172 A." Heindorf observes, on the Charmidês l. c.: "Argumenti hujus vim positam apparet in duplici dictionis [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein] significatu: quum vulgo sit _felicem esse_, non _recté facere_. Hoc aliaque ejusdem generis sæpius sic ansam præbuerunt sophismatis magis quam justi syllogismi." Heindorf then refers to analogous passages in Plato, Repub. i. p. 354 A: Alkib. i. p. 116 B, p. 134 A. A similar fallacy is found in Aristotle, Politic. vii. i. p. 1323, a. 17, b. 32--[Greek: a)/rista ga\r pra/ttein prosê/kei tou\s a)/rista politeuome/nous--a)du/naton de\ kalô=s pra/ttein toi=s mê\ ta\ kala\ pra/ttousin.] This fallacy is recognised and properly commented on as a "logisches Wortspiel," by Bernays, in his instructive volume, _Die** Dialoge des Aristoteles_, pp. 80-81 (Berlin, 1863).] [Footnote 87: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 481 D, 482 B.] [Side-note: Permanent elements--and transient elements--of human agency--how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues.] Lastly I will compare the Protagoras and the Gorgias (meaning always, the reasoning of Sokrates in each of them) under one more point of view. How does each of them describe and distinguish the permanent elements, and the transient elements, involved in human agency? What function does each of them assign to the permanent element? The distinction of these two is important in its ethical bearing. The whole life both of the individual and of society consists of successive moments of action or feeling. But each individual (and the society as an aggregate of individuals) has within him embodied and realised an element more or less permanent--an established character, habits, dispositions, intellectual acquirements, &c.--a sort of capital accumulated from the past. This permanent element is of extreme importance. It stands to the transient element in the same relation as the fixed capital of a trader or manufacturer to his annual produce. The whole use and value of the fixed capital, of which the skill and energy of the trader himself make an important part, consists in the amount of produce which it will yield: but at the same time the trader must keep it up in its condition of fixed capital, in order to obtain such amount: he must set apart, and abstain from devoting to immediate enjoyment, as much of the annual produce as will suffice to maintain the fixed capital unimpaired--and more, if he desires to improve his condition. The capital cannot be commuted into interest; yet nevertheless its whole value depends upon, and is measured by, the interest which it yields. Doubtless the mere idea of possessing the capital is pleasurable to the possessor, because he knows that it can and will be profitably employed, so long as he chooses. [Side-note: In the Protagoras.] Now in the Protagoras, the permanent element is very pointedly distinguished from the transient, and is called Knowledge--the Science or Art of Calculation. Its function also is clearly announced--to take comparative estimate and measurement of the transient elements; which are stated to consist of pleasures and pains, present and future--near and distant--certain and uncertain--faint and strong. To these elements, manifold yet commensurable, the calculation is to apply. "The safety of life" (says Sokrates[88]) "resides in our keeping up this science or art of calculation." No present enjoyment must be admitted, which would impair it; no present pain must be shunned, which is essential to uphold it. Yet the whole of its value resides in its application to the comparison of the pleasures and pains. [Footnote 88: Plato, Protag. p. 357 A. [Greek: e)peidê\ de\ ê(donê=s te kai\ lu/pês e)n o)rthê=| tê=| ai(re/sei e)pha/nê ê(mi=n ê( sôtêri/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa, tou= te ple/onos kai\ e)lattonos kai\ mei/zonos kai\ smikrote/rou kai\ por)r(ôte/rô kai\ e)ggute/rô], &c.] [Side-note: In the Gorgias.] In the Gorgias the same two elements are differently described, and less clearly explained. The permanent is termed, Order, arrangement, discipline, a lawful, just, and temperate, cast of mind (opposed to the doctrine ascribed to Kalliklês, which negatived this element altogether, in the mind of the despot), parallel to health and strength of body: the unordered mind is again the parallel of the corrupt, distempered, helpless, body; life is not worth having until this is cured.[89] This corresponds to the knowledge or Calculating Science in the Protagoras; but we cannot understand what its function is, in the Gorgias, because the calculable elements are incompletely enumerated. [Footnote 89: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 504 B-C, 506 D-E. [Greek: Ta/xis--ko/smos--psuchê\ kosmi/a a)mei/nôn tou= a)kosmê/tou.]] In the Protagoras, these calculable elements are two-fold--immediate pleasures and pains--and future or distant pleasures and pains. Between these two there is intercommunity of nature, so that they are quite commensurable; and the function of the calculating reason is, to make a right estimate of the one against the other.[90] But in the Gorgias, no mention is made of future or distant pleasures and pains: the calculable element is represented only by immediate pleasure or pain--and from thence we pass at once to the permanent calculator--the mind, sound or corrupt. You must abstain from a particular enjoyment, because it will taint the soundness of your mind: this is a pertinent reason (and would be admitted as such by Sokrates in the Protagoras, who instead of sound mind would say, calculating intelligence), but it is neither the ultimate reason (since this soundness of mind is itself valuable with a view to future calculations), nor the only reason: for you must also abstain, if it will bring upon yourself (or upon others) preponderating pains in the particular case--if the future pains would preponderate over the present pleasure. Of this last calculation no notice is taken in the Gorgias: which exhibits only the antithesis (not merely marked but even over-done[91]) between the immediate pleasure or pain and the calculating efficacy of mind, but leaves out the true function which gives value to the sound mind as distinguished from the unsound and corrupt. That function consists in its application to particular cases: in right dealing with actual life, as regards the agent himself and others: in [Greek: e)nergei/a], as distinguished from [Greek: e(/xis], to use Aristotelian language.[92] I am far from supposing that this part of the case was absent from Plato's mind. But the theory laid out in the Gorgias (as compared with that in the Protagoras) leaves no room for it; giving exclusive prominence to the other elements, and acknowledging only the present pleasure or pain, to be set against the permanent condition of mind, bad or good as it may be. [Footnote 90: There would be also the like intercommunity of nature, if along with the pains and pleasures of the agent himself (which alone are regarded in the calculation of Sokrates in the Protagoras) you admit into the calculation the pleasures and pains of others concerned, and the rules established with a view to both the two together with a view to the joint interest both of the agent and of others.] [Footnote 91: Epikurus and his followers assigned the greatest value, in their ethical theory, to the permanent element, or established character of the agent, intellectual and emotional. But great as they reckoned this value to be, they resolved it all into the diminution or mitigation of pains, and, in a certain though inferior degree, the multiplication of pleasures. They did not put it in a separate category of its own, altogether disparate and foreign to pleasures and pains. See the letter of Epikurus to Menoekeus, Diog. L. x. 128-132; Lucretius, v. 18-45, vi. 12-25; Horat. Epist. i. 2, 48-60.] [Footnote 92: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. i. 7. The remark of Aristotle in the same treatise, i. 5--[Greek: dokei= ga\r e)nde/chesthai kai\ katheu/dein e)/chonta tê\n a)retê/n, ê)\ a)praktei=n dia\ bi/ou]--might be applied to the theory of the Gorgias. Compare also Ethic. Nik. vii. 3 (vii. 4, p. 1146, b. 31, p. 1147, a. 12).] [Side-note: Character of the Gorgias generally--discrediting all the actualities of life.] Indeed there is nothing more remarkable in the Gorgias, than the manner in which Sokrates not only condemns the unmeasured, exorbitant, maleficent desires, but also depreciates and degrades all the actualities of life--all the recreative and elegant arts, including music and poetry, tragic as well as dithyrambic--all provision for the most essential wants, all protection against particular sufferings and dangers, even all service rendered to another person in the way of relief or of rescue[93]--all the effective maintenance of public organised force, such as ships, docks, walls, arms, &c. Immediate satisfaction or relief, and those who confer it, are treated with contempt, and presented as in hostility to the perfection of the mental structure. And it is in this point of view that various Platonic commentators extol in an especial manner the Gorgias: as recognising an Idea of Good superhuman and supernatural, radically disparate from pleasures and pains of any human being, and incommensurable with them: an Universal Idea, which, though it is supposed to cast a distant light upon its particulars, is separated from them by an incalculable space, and is discernible only by the Platonic telescope. [Footnote 93: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 501-502-511-512-517-519. [Greek: a)/neu ga\r dikaiosu/nês kai\ sôphrosu/nês lime/nôn kai\ neôri/ôn kai\ teichô=n kai\ pho/rôn kai\ toiou/tôn phluariô=n e)mpeplê/kasi tê\n po/lin.] This is applied to the p