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Title: England and the Orléans Monarchy

Author: John Hall

Release date: July 21, 2019 [eBook #59961]

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ENGLAND AND THE ORLÉANS MONARCHY *** 








 [Pg iii]




 


 H.M. Louis Philippe, King of the French

1841






 [Pg iv]


 ENGLAND AND THE



    ORLEANS MONARCHY


 BY


 MAJOR JOHN HALL


 AUTHOR OF “THE BOURBON RESTORATION”





“The history of the day before yesterday is the




least known, it may be said, the most forgotten,




by the public of to-day.”






 Guizot, Mémoires, viii. p. 515









    WITH A PORTRAIT


 


 LONDON


 SMITH, ELDER & CO., 15 WATERLOO PLACE


 1912



All rights reserved






 [Pg v]


 PRINTED BY

    WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED

    LONDON AND BECCLES






 [Pg vi]


TO

    S. H.






 [Pg vii]


PREFACE


In this volume the story is told of the first entente
    cordiale and of the circumstances which led to its
    disruption. The questions which occupied the attention
    of the French and the British governments at that
    period have now passed into the domain of history.
    The resentment evoked by the Egyptian crisis of 1840
    and the controversies raised by the Spanish marriages
    has died away. The attitude towards the Liberal
    and national movements in Europe, adopted, on the
    one side, by Louis Philippe and M. Guizot and, on
    the other, by Lord Palmerston, can, at this distance
    of time, be reviewed dispassionately. In the light of
    the knowledge of to-day, the difficulties which beset
    the “Citizen King” may be estimated, and the injustice
    of many of the attacks made upon the policy
    of Palmerston can be demonstrated.


Researches in the diplomatic correspondence of the
    period, both in London and in Paris, have enabled
    me to place in print, for the first time, many documents
    bearing upon the part played by Talleyrand in
    the Belgian question and upon the secret policy of
    Louis Philippe in the same affair. In these pages
    some new light has, I venture to think, been thrown
    upon the situation in Spain during the regencies of
    Christina and Espartero, and during the early years
    of the rule of Isabella. In connection, also, with
    Palmerston’s Eastern policy, certain facts, hitherto
    unpublished, are now presented for consideration.


 [Pg viii]


During the eighteen years covered by this volume
    the Whigs were, for the greater part of the time,
    in office. Amidst the Russells, the Greys, the
    Spencers and the other powerful Whig families
    Palmerston was an interloper. Nor was he ever a
    Whig. In external affairs he remained always a Canningite. Some of the worst miscalculations of
    Louis Philippe and his ministers were due to their
    inability to grasp the fact that the foreign policy
    of the Whigs was in the hands of the most “un-Whiggish”
    of statesmen. The period was one of
    political unrest, the precursor of great wars and
    revolutions. France was disenchanted and profoundly
    dissatisfied with her “Citizen King.” In Germany
    and Italy Metternich still maintained his system, but
    there were symptoms that the end of his long rule
    was fast approaching. In Spain the transition from
    autocracy to constitutionalism coincided with a fiercely
    disputed succession to the throne. Turkey, in the
    words of Nicholas, was “the sick man of Europe.”


 J. H.


Sept., 1912.




 [Pg ix]


CONTENTS





CHAPTER I




 




LOUIS PHILIPPE




 




 
 PAGES




The Revolution of July, 1880—Louis Philippe—Louis Philippe and the




military democratic party—First communications with the




Sovereigns 
1-13




 




 




CHAPTER II




 




THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING




 




Effect of the Revolution of July in England—Character and system




of Metternich—The chiffon de Carlsbad—Metternich’s policy




towards the Germanic Confederation and Prussia—Hostility of Tsar




Nicholas to the new régime in France—Revolution at Brussels—Talleyrand




in London—France proclaims the principle of non-intervention—The




Duchesse de Dino and the Comte de Montrond—Great




Britain proposes that the Belgian question be submitted




to a conference—Molé and Talleyrand—Change of government in




France and England 
14-39




 




 




CHAPTER III




 




THE CREATION OF BELGIUM




 




The Whigs in office—Talleyrand insists upon the necessity of




establishing a good understanding with England—Palmerston’s




distrust of the French Liberals—State of Europe—Revolution at




Warsaw—“The Frenchmen of the North”—Belgium declared




 [Pg x]independent and neutral—Candidates for the Belgian throne—Bresson




and Ponsonby at Brussels—British government will treat




as a case for war the enthronement of a French prince—Flahaut




in London—Lawoëstine at Brussels—The Duc de Nemours elected




King of the Belgians—Critical situation—Louis Philippe declines




the throne for his son—Proceedings of Bresson—Anger of




Talleyrand—Casimir Périer forms a government—War in Poland




and insurrection in the Papal States—The Austrians at Bologna—Leopold




of Saxe-Coburg—Dissatisfaction of the Belgians—Reluctance




of French government to see coercion applied to the




Belgians—The protocol of 18 articles accepted by Belgium,




refused by Holland—Leopold enthroned—Roussin at Lisbon—The




Dutch invade Belgium—French army enters Belgium—Palmerston’s




suspicions of Talleyrand—Stockmar’s suspicions of




Palmerston—Excitement in London—Talleyrand’s warning—Why




the French army remained in Belgium—King Leopold’s




dilemma—The French evacuate Belgium—Londonderry attacks




Talleyrand in the House of Lords—“l’ordre règne à Varsovie”—Palmerston’s




despatch on the Polish question—The treaty of the




24 articles—The Fortress Convention—Talleyrand’s advice—French




threaten King Leopold—Palmerston stands firm—Casimir




Périer gives way—Austrians re-occupy Bologna—The




French at Ancona—Palmerston exerts himself to avert a




rupture—Solution of the difficulty—Orloff’s mission to the Hague—Lamb




furnishes Palmerston with a copy of Orloff’s secret instructions—Austria




and Prussia ratify—Orloff in London—Russia




ratifies with certain reservations 
40-117




 




 




CHAPTER IV




 




THE COERCION OF HOLLAND




 




The Reform Bill and the House of Lords—Death of Casimir Périer—A




Republican insurrection in Paris and a Royalist rebellion in




La Vendée—Death of the Duc de Reichstadt—The Belgian treaty—Durham




at St. Petersburg—Palmerston’s proposals to the Court of




the Hague—Stockmar’s advice to Leopold—France and England




resolved to coerce the King of the Netherlands—The absolute




Courts—London Conference breaks up—Scene between Louis




Philippe and M. Dupin—The Doctrinaires—Broglie’s conditions—The




position in England—The Tories—King William IV.—Granville’s




warning—Attitude of the Northern Courts—The Convention




of October 22nd, 1832—Claim put forward by French




minister at Brussels—Siege of Antwerp—Sympathies of the




Tories with the Dutch—Proposal made to Prussia by France and




England—Capitulation of Antwerp—Convention of May 21, 1833—Palmerston’s




 [Pg xi]skilful conduct of the negotiations—Talleyrand 
118-144




 




 




CHAPTER V




 




MEHEMET ALI




 




The Sultan Mahmud II.—The Greek insurrection—Sultan invokes the




aid of Mehemet Ali—Intervention of the Christian Powers—Navarino—Russo-Turkish




War—Mehemet Ali—Ibrahim Pasha lays




siege to Acre—Mahmud resolves to crush his rebellious vassal—Defeat




of Hussein Pasha—Stratford Canning at Constantinople—Mahmud




appeals to England for help—Battle of Konieh—Muravieff




at Constantinople—Russia offers help—The policy of




Russia towards Turkey—Ibrahim advancing—Sultan accepts the




aid of Russia—Mehemet Ali rejects the Sultan’s terms—Russian




fleet in the Bosphorus—Roussin at Constantinople—Ultimatum




of the Pasha—The Convention of Kiutayeh—Anger of Nicholas—Why




Mahmud surrendered Adana—Ponsonby and Orloff at Constantinople—Treaty




of Unkiar-Skelessi—Great Britain and




France protest—Meeting of the two Emperors at Münchengrätz—Treaty




of October 15, 1833—Secret treaty of September 18, 1833—Palmerston




and Broglie vainly endeavour to arouse the fears of




Metternich 
145-170




 




 




CHAPTER VI




 




TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS




 




Dom Miguel usurps the throne of Portugal—Dom Pedro prepares to




reconquer his daughter’s kingdom—Ferdinand VII. marries




Maria Christina—The Salic Law of Spain repealed—Birth of




Isabella—Stratford Canning at Madrid—Napier destroys the




Miguelite fleet—Great Britain recognizes Maria II. as Queen of




Portugal—Death of Ferdinand VII.—France and England acknowledge




the sovereignty of Isabella—Don Carlos and Dom Miguel—Negotiations




in London—Quadruple Treaty—Capitulation of the




two Pretenders—Don Carlos returns to Spain—Scope of Quadruple




Treaty enlarged—Palmerston’s policy in the Spanish question—Views




and secret leanings of Louis Philippe—Zumalacárregui—The




Whigs dismissed—Wellington at the Foreign Office—Eliot




sent to Spain—Louis Philippe refuses to take part in the negotiation—Palmerston




again at the Foreign Office—The Queen Regent




appeals to France for help—The Spanish legion—The Decree of




Durango—Louis Philippe refuses to protest—French intrigues at




Lisbon—The Moderados and the Progressistas—Advice given to




Christina by Mr. Villiers—No vigilance maintained on the French




frontier—Mendizabal and the British minister—The secret




divulged—Threatening language of the Duc de Broglie—British




government declines Mendizabal’s proposal—Palmerston’s




counter-proposal—Plans of M. Thiers—Talleyrand and England—Death




 [Pg xii]of Zumalacárregui—Palmerston proposes that the French




should enter Spain—Mendizabal dismissed—Military revolution




in Spain—Scene at the Palace of La Granja—Resignation of




Thiers—The “No mention” incident—Why Don Carlos retreated




from before Madrid—Dissensions among the Carlists fomented by




Villiers—Palmerston’s suspicions of Louis Philippe—Muñagorri—Reasons




which compelled Maroto to bring the war to an end—Soult—The




Convention of Bergara—Don Carlos driven across the




frontier—Cabrera and España—The Municipal Bill—Espartero—Christina




and Espartero—Abdication of Christina 
171-218




 




 




CHAPTER VII




 




SULTAN AND PASHA




 




Efforts to prevent a renewal of the struggle between the Sultan and




the Pasha—Strained relations between Great Britain and Russia—Wellington




and the Dardanelles—Ponsonby at Constantinople—Durham




at St. Petersburg—M. Thiers—M. de Lesseps—Secret




negotiations—General Chrzanowski—The Pasha’s monopolies—Ponsonby




negotiates a commercial treaty—Indian government




occupies Aden—Importance of the victories of Mehemet Ali over




the Wahabites—The Pasha announces his intention of declaring




his independence—Russia and the Court of Teheran—The Shah




lays siege to Herat—Palmerston protests—Disavowal of




Simonitch and Witkewitch—The general situation in the East—Mahmud




resolves on war—Policy of Lord Palmerston—French




government obtains a credit of 10 millions of francs—Harmony




of French and British relations—Self-restraint of Mehemet Ali—Ibrahim




defeats the Turks at Nezib—Death of Mahmud and




suspension of hostilities—The Turkish fleet treacherously




surrendered to Mehemet Ali—Strange conduct of the French




admiral—France seeks to isolate Russia—The Collective Note of




 July 27, 1839—Satisfaction of Palmerston and uneasiness of the




French government—Conversation between Bulwer and Louis




Philippe—Palmerston does not share in the general illusion




respecting the military strength of the Pasha—Brunnow’s mission




to London—The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi—France scouts the




Russian proposal—The French party in the English Cabinet—Return




of Brunnow—Palmerston’s letter to Sébastiani—Guizot




in London—Thiers, President of the Council and Minister for




Foreign Affairs—Guizot’s despatches—Thiers mediates in the




sulphur dispute—Remains of the Emperor to be removed to




France—Proceedings of “Bear” Ellice—Metternich alarmed—Palmerston




accepts the Austrian proposal—Attitude of M. Thiers—M.




Coste and the French agents at Constantinople and Cairo—Princess




Lieven in London—Palmerston tenders his resignation—Insurrection




in Syria—The Quadrilateral Treaty of July 15,




 [Pg xiii]1840—Palmerston informs Guizot of the treaty 
219-278




 




 




CHAPTER VIII




 




THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE




 




Language of M. Thiers and Louis Philippe on learning of the




conclusion of the treaty—Warlike declamations of the French




press—Attitude of different parties in England—Thiers’ instructions




to Guizot—The conference at the Château d’Eu—Louis




Philippe seeks to alarm Queen Victoria—Louis Napoleon at




Boulogne—Guizot at Windsor Castle—Leopold’s proposals—Ibrahim




suppresses the insurrection in Syria—Palmerston’s




despatch of August 31—The Sultan’s ultimatum—Movements




of the British fleet—Threatening language of M. de Pontois—The




French armaments—Warlike language of Louis Philippe




and M. Thiers—Mehemet Ali invokes the protection of France—Interview




at Auteuil between Thiers and Bulwer—Intrigues




against Palmerston in London—A Cabinet crisis impending—Why




Lord John Russell “disappointed” Greville—Meeting of the




Cabinet of October 1—Bombardment of Beyrout—Warlike excitement




in Paris—Henry Reeve—Lord John Russell calls a Cabinet




for October 10—Two despatches from Thiers—A Cabinet crisis




averted—French government reported to have designs upon




the Balearic Islands—Melbourne writes to King Leopold—Louis




Philippe and M. Thiers—Resignation of M. Thiers—Thiers’




proceedings reviewed—M. Guizot’s plans—Palmerston’s communications




with Guizot—Successful progress of the operations




in Syria—Proposals to Mehemet Ali—Napier’s convention and his




disavowal—Mehemet Ali submits—The firman of February 13,




1841—M. Guizot manœuvres to bring back France into the Concert




of Europe—Nicholas’ proposal—Palmerston’s reply—Policy of




M. Guizot—Bourqueney and Palmerston—The Convention of the




Straits drafted and initialed—Mehemet Ali refuses to accept the




 firman of heredity—Ponsonby’s advice to the Porte—Procrastinations




of the Porte—Mehemet Ali accepts the amended firman—Convention




of the Straits signed—Unsatisfactory character of the




criticisms passed upon Palmerston 
279-330




 




 




CHAPTER IX




 




THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING




 




Aberdeen and Palmerston contrasted—Why Guizot would not conclude




the right of search treaty with Palmerston—The Chamber refuses




to ratify the slave trade treaty of November 20, 1841—Conspiracies




in Paris against Espartero—The question of Isabella’s




 [Pg xiv]marriage—Designs imputed to Louis Philippe by Bulwer—Insurrections




in Spain—The Spanish government demands the




expulsion of Christina from France—The Salvandy affair—Pageot’s




mission—Count Toreno and Lord Cowley—Louis




Philippe connives at the Spanish plots—Insurrection at Barcelona—Conduct




of M. de Lesseps—Military revolution in Spain—Fall




of Espartero—Aberdeen alarmed—Queen Victoria at the




Château d’Eu—“The cordial understanding”—The Duc de




Bordeaux in Belgrave Square—Admiral Dupetit-Thouars in the




Pacific—France proclaims a protectorate over Tahiti—Mr. Pritchard—Queen




Pomare deposed and Tahiti annexed—Dupetit-Thouars




disavowed—The Prince de Joinville’s pamphlet—The Tsar




Nicholas in London—France quarrels with Morocco—Imprisonment




and expulsion of Mr. Pritchard—Excitement in London—Guizot




and Aberdeen—Bombardment of Tangier—Violence of the




press in both countries—The Comte de Jarnac—The Pritchard




affair settled—France concludes peace with the Emperor of




Morocco—Louis Philippe at Windsor Castle—Condition of Spain—The




descendants of Philip V.—Bulwer and Bresson at Madrid—Montpensier




to marry the Infanta—Queen Victoria’s second visit




to Eu—The compact with Louis Philippe—State of affairs at




Madrid—The Memorandum of February 27, 1846—Christina and




Narvaez—The Queen-Mother entrusts to Bulwer her proposal to




the Duke of Saxe-Coburg—Aberdeen reprimands Bulwer and




informs M. Guizot of the negotiation—The Whigs once more in




office 
331-380




 




 




CHAPTER X




 




THE SPANISH MARRIAGES




 




Lord Palmerston in Paris—Louis Philippe and M. Guizot disconcerted




by Christina’s proposal to the Coburgs—Palmerston’s despatch of




July 19, 1846—Bresson’s letter to Guizot of July 12—Anger of




Louis Philippe—Bulwer implores Palmerston to promote the




Coburg marriage—Palmerston puts forward Don Enrique—Effect




at Madrid of the despatch of July 19—The double marriage




announced—Correspondence between the French Queen and




Queen Victoria—Guizot’s letter to Lord John Russell—Louis




Philippe’s letter to his daughter—Queen Victoria’s reply—Palmerston’s




protest founded upon the renunciations at Utrecht—Attitude




of the Northern Courts—Palmerston’s despatches of




October 31, 1846, and January 8, 1847—Debates in the French




Chamber and the British Parliament—Christina’s conduct




reviewed—Louis Philippe’s Bourbon policy—Why Louis Philippe




broke the compact of Eu—Palmerston’s Spanish policy from 1834




 [Pg xv]to 1846—Weakness of Aberdeen 
381-405




 




 




CHAPTER XI




 




PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF ’48




 




Annexation of Cracow—Political unrest in Europe—Charles Albert




and Pius IX.—Enthusiasm in Italy—Attitude of French government—Revival




of French and British rivalry—Guizot sends a




secret agent to Vienna—Metternich realizes the danger in Italy—The




Roman plot and occupation of Ferrara—Palmerston’s




despatch of September 11, 1847—Minto’s mission—Prince




Consort’s Memorandum—The situation in Switzerland—Sympathies




of the absolute Courts with the Sonderbund—Palmerston’s




attitude—Probable reason of Morier’s recall—Palmerston’s




despatch of October 29, 1847—The French proposal—Palmerston’s




counter-proposal—Palmerston master of the situation—Battle




of Lucerne and dissolution of the Sonderbund—Crafty designs




imputed to Palmerston—Policy of the Swiss Radicals—Stratford




Canning at Berne—The absolute Courts and France present the




 identic note—Haughty reply of the Swiss Diet—Alarm of the




absolute Courts—Coloredo and Radowitz in Paris—Revolution in




Paris, Berlin and Vienna—Charles Albert in Lombardy—Une




revolution de mépris—Why the rupture of “the cordial understanding”




displeased the French middle-classes—Effect of M.




Guizot’s rapprochement with Austria—Palmerston and Thiers—Palmerston’s




policy substantially the same as Aberdeen’s—Why




“the cordial understanding” failed to justify expectations 
406-444




 




 




 Index
445-452





 






 [Pg 1]


ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS

    MONARCHY




 CHAPTER I


LOUIS PHILIPPE


The spontaneous rising of the French people to expel
    their King, Charles X., who had ventured to infringe
    the Constitution, aroused the enthusiasm of Liberals
    all over Europe. But the real character of the movement
    which brought about the downfall of the elder
    branch of the Bourbons was, at the time, very imperfectly
    understood. It was not a determination to
    preserve at all costs the parliamentary system which
    animated the combatants in the “glorious days of
    July.” “Long live the Charter” was the watchword
    of the peaceful bourgeois. “Down with the Bourbons”
    was the war cry of the men of the barricades.


Outside the limited circle of the old Royalist
    families the restored monarchy had never been popular.
    Yet it was unquestionably the best and freest form of
    government which the country had ever enjoyed. The
    reason of the unpopularity of the Bourbons lay in the
    circumstances which had attended their return to
    France. By the large majority of Frenchmen their
    restoration was deeply resented, as one of the humiliating
    conditions imposed upon their country by the allied
    sovereigns, after Waterloo.


 [Pg 2]


In respect to her frontiers, France in 1815 had
    been replaced in the position which she had occupied
    in 1789. Seeing the expenditure of blood and treasure
    which her wars had entailed upon Europe, these terms
    cannot be regarded as onerous. Nevertheless, it is
    not surprising that the treaties of 1815 should have
    been extremely distasteful to her. They were conceived
    in a spirit of suspicion and were directed mainly
    towards securing Europe from a fresh outbreak of her
    aggressiveness. Nor were the barriers, by which it
    was hoped to confine her within her boundaries, the
    only cause of her irritation. Her vanity and love of
    military glory had been dangerously stimulated by the
    Republican and Imperial wars, and it was a bitter blow
    to find that, in the final settlement, France, alone of
    all the great Powers, was to acquire no increase of
    territory. Vexation at these conditions was not confined
    to Republicans and Bonapartists. Hatred for the
    treaties of 1815 was the one political sentiment which
    Liberals and Royalists possessed in common.


In 1830, there was no Bonapartist party, but a
    strong Bonapartist spirit existed throughout the
    country. Veneration for the memory of “the man”[1] constituted the whole political philosophy of many
    thousands of Frenchmen. It was to the Bonapartist
    element that the Liberal party owed its chief strength
    and influence. Notwithstanding that the Liberals had
    opposed the Emperor during the Hundred Days, and
    had insisted upon his abdication after Waterloo, their
    alliance with the Bonapartists was cemented in the
    early days of the second Restoration. A common hatred
    of the Bourbons was the bond of union between them.
    In the Masonic and Carbonari lodges the bolder spirits
    of the two parties plotted together against the monarchy.
    When the reigning dynasty should have been overthrown, [Pg 3]the conspirators proposed to proclaim the
    sovereignty of the people and to declare once more the
    tricolour the national flag. Then, and not till then,
    could France regain her “natural frontiers.”[2] It was
    the practice of these military democrats invariably to
    assert that the Bourbons were responsible for all the
    misfortunes of 1814 and 1815. They believed, or
    professed to believe, that the loss of territory, which
    France had sustained, was the price which the Bourbons
    had agreed to pay for their restoration. So long as a
    Bourbon was upon the throne Waterloo must go
    unavenged and France must submit to be deprived
    of her natural boundaries. It was this spirit which
    had animated the combatants in the Revolution of
    July. Men who understood and cared nothing for
    constitutional questions took up arms, believing that a
    victory over Charles’ guards would be a first defeat
    inflicted upon the allied sovereigns, and that a successful
    invasion of the Tuileries would be followed by a
    great national war upon the Rhine.[3]


The enthronement of the Duc d’Orléans was the
    strange termination of a revolution, carried out mainly
    by men who were animated by sentiments such as
    these. Even on the evening of the third day’s fighting,
    when the Royal troops had been driven from
    Paris and when the people were in possession of the
    Tuileries, the Duke’s name was still unmentioned.
    Most of the Liberal deputies were disposed to make
    their peace with their lawful king, and to be satisfied
    with the withdrawal of the unconstitutional ordinances
    and with the dismissal of the Prince de Polignac and
    his colleagues in the government. The extreme party,
    the old soldiers, the members of the former Carbonari lodges, the students of the polytechnique, the men who [Pg 4]had borne the burden of the struggle, were not prepared
    with an immediate solution of the question.
    Beyond declaring that they would take up arms again,
    rather than accept any concessions at the hands of
    Charles X. or the Dauphin, they had no definite plan
    to bring forward. Louis Philippe was to owe his
    crown to a skilfully worded placard, the work of
    Laffitte the Liberal banker, and of Thiers, a clever
    young journalist, which on the following morning,
    greeted the Parisians at every street corner. In this
    proclamation the enthronement of the Duc d’Orléans
    was held up as the one solution which would restore
    public order without further bloodshed. A republic,
    it was declared, would entail both internal strife and
    war abroad, whilst Charles X., the monarch who had
    shed the blood of the people, must be adjudged unworthy
    to retain his crown. The Duc d’Orléans, on
    the other hand, was a prince devoted to the cause of
    the Revolution, who had never borne arms against his
    own countrymen, but who, on the contrary, had worn
    the tricolour at Valmy and at Jemappes. Let the
    people call for him and the Duke would come forward,
    content to accept the Charter and his crown from their
    hands.


The prospect of concluding the revolution in this
    fashion was eagerly adopted by the Liberal deputies
    and by the middle classes generally. But the more
    turbulent members of the so-called Hotel de Ville
    party indignantly repudiated the notion of allowing
    their glorious achievements to culminate in the enthronement
    of “another Bourbon.” The allusions in
    Laffitte’s and Thiers’ placard to the tricolour, to Valmy,
    and to the crown as the free gift of the people, left
    them cold. Nor were they to be mollified by a second
    proclamation, in which it was boldly asserted that
    the Duc d’Orléans was a Valois, not a Bourbon.[4] No [Pg 5]sooner was the Duke put forward as a candidate for
    the throne, than the demagogues began to exhort the
    people to call upon La Fayette to assume the presidency
    of the republic. The old man was, as he had
    been forty years before, in command of the national
    guards, and was once more the hero of the mob. He
    was, however, little disposed to undertake the responsibility
    which his ultra-democratic friends wished him
    to assume. Under these circumstances, Rémusat and
    other of his colleagues in the Chamber, assisted, it is
    said, by Mr. Rives, the American minister, had little
    difficulty in persuading him that, were he to play the
    leading part in founding a Liberal monarchy, it would
    be accounted, throughout the Old and the New World,
    the most honourable act of his declining years. Accordingly,
    on the following day, July 31, 1830, he agreed
    to receive the Duc d’Orléans, the Lieutenant-General
    of the Kingdom, at the Hotel de Ville. Upon his
    arrival he led him to the window and, placing the
    tricolour in his hands, embraced him warmly before the
    dense crowd upon the Place de Grève. When this
    ceremony had been completed the elect of the people
    rode back in triumph to the Palais Royal, exchanging
    enthusiastic handgrips with citizens along the road.
    For the moment, even the most truculent democrats
    were willing to accept La Fayette’s assurance that in
    an Orleans monarchy they had found “the best of
    republics.” Ten days later, on August 9, 1830, the
    Duke having sworn fidelity to the Charter was formally
    invested with sovereign power in the Chamber of
    Deputies, under the title of Louis Philippe, King of
    the French.


At the time of the Revolution of July Louis
    Philippe was in his fifty-third year. He was the son
    of Egalité, and had been educated according to the
    Liberal views of his father and of Madame de Genlis.
    Although in 1794 he had deserted from the national [Pg 6]armies along with Dumouriez, his commander-in-chief,
    he could assert truthfully that, throughout the long
    years of his subsequent exile, he had never turned his
    arms against his own country. During his wanderings
    in America and upon the continent, he had mixed
    with men of all sorts and all conditions. In Switzerland,
    indeed, he is said to have earned a livelihood by
    teaching in a school. In 1814 the idea of conferring
    the crown upon him, rather than upon Louis XVIII.,
    had found favour in some quarters. But although,
    from this time forward, there had always existed some
    kind of a party, to which the name of Orleanist might
    have been applied, the Duke himself would appear to
    have been innocent of any participation in the proceedings
    of his adherents.


After Waterloo the plan of substituting him for
    Louis XVIII. had an increased number of supporters.
    Louis, who had never liked him, began from this
    moment to treat him with great suspicion. Both in
    England, where he continued to reside in a kind of
    disgrace till 1817, and at the Palais Royal, after his
    return to France, he was beset constantly by the spies
    of the police.[5] Charles X. had no share in his brother’s
    dislike and distrust of the Duc d’Orléans, and one of
    his first acts, after his accession, was to raise him to
    the rank of a Royal Highness. But, notwithstanding
    that, from the beginning of the new reign, more cordial
    relations were established between the Tuileries and
    the Palais Royal, there was never any real intimacy
    between the King and his sagacious relative. Charles
    was a man of limited intelligence and a bigot in religion.
    Politically he had not changed since the time
    when, as the Comte d’Artois, he had emigrated to
    Coblentz, and had called upon the Powers to assist him
    with men and with money to re-establish the old [Pg 7]régime in France. The Duc d’Orléans, on the other
    hand, was a well-informed man of the world, a Liberal,
    who was neither a friend nor an enemy of the clergy.


It is clear that during the whole period of the
    Restoration the Duc d’Orléans was at pains to impress
    upon the public how greatly he differed in all matters,
    both great and small, from his cousins of the elder
    branch. When the return of Bonaparte from Elba
    compelled the Royal family to fly once more from
    France, he had not joined Louis XVIII. at Ghent, but
    had gone to England and had resided, throughout the
    Hundred Days, in complete retirement at Twickenham.
    Moreover, before quitting Lille he had addressed a
    farewell letter to the general officers serving under him,
    bidding them act, after his departure, in whatever
    manner might appear to them the most calculated to
    promote the highest interests of their country—an injunction
    which aroused as much indignation among the
    “pure Royalists” as it elicited commendation from the
    majority of Frenchmen. As they grew up, his sons,
    the young princes, were educated like ordinary citizens
    at the Lycée, and at the Palais Royal a simplicity was
    observed which contrasted strongly with the ceremony
    maintained, on all occasions, at the Court and in the
    apartments of the Dauphin. Nor could it fail to
    attract remark that men whose fidelity to the reigning
    dynasty was doubtful and prominent members of the
    Opposition were his habitual guests.


But, although there may be some circumstances of
    a suspicious nature in Louis Philippe’s conduct under
    the Restoration, it is improbable that he ever seriously
    harboured any thoughts of usurping the crown. His
    general behaviour is capable of a different explanation.
    He had tasted the bitterness of poverty, and appears to
    have been haunted constantly by the dread that his children
    might, some day, be reduced to the straits under
    which he had suffered in the early years of his exile. He [Pg 8]was too clear-sighted a man not to perceive that the
    restored monarchy had no place in the affections of the
    people, and that the first serious mistake on Charles’
    part would be the signal for his overthrow. It became,
    therefore, his policy to dissociate himself, as far as
    possible, from the Court in the hope that, should the
    Bourbons be expelled, he might escape from the necessity
    of sharing in their misfortunes. It is scarcely
    doubtful that the true motives of his somewhat equivocal
    attitude, at this period, should be ascribed to a
    keen desire to be allowed to remain in possession of
    his great estates, whatever political changes might
    take place, rather than to any deep-laid schemes of
    personal aggrandizement.[6]


At the time of the promulgation of the famous
    ordinances of July the Duke was with his family at
    Neuilly. For the past four months he had viewed
    Charles’ obstinate determination to retain his ministers,
    in defiance of the Chamber, with alarm. Nevertheless,
    the King’s coup d’état seems to have taken him completely
    by surprise. His chief endeavour, from the
    moment that it became apparent that the execution of
    the ordinances would lead to serious trouble, was to
    avoid committing himself with either party. Between
    Monday, July 26, the day on which the decrees
    were published in the Moniteur, and Friday, July 30,
    when the success of the revolution was assured, he
    would not appear to have had any communication
    with either the Court at Saint-Cloud or the Liberal
    deputies in Paris. Indeed, on Wednesday, July 28,
    when the fighting in the streets assumed a very serious
    character, he secretly withdrew from Neuilly and went
    into hiding at Le Raincy, another of his residences
    near Paris. Thiers, in consequence, when he visited
    Neuilly on Friday morning, was unable to see him,
    and it was only at last, after repeated messages had [Pg 9]been sent him by Laffitte and other supporters, that
    he ventured to emerge from his retreat and to return
    secretly, and in the dead of night, to the Palais Royal.
    It is said that in arriving at this decision he was
    greatly influenced by his sister, henceforward to be
    generally known as Madame Adelaïde, to whose opinion
    in political matters he was accustomed to attach greater
    weight than to that of his wife, the sweet-natured and
    dignified Marie Amélie.


After a few hours in Paris any doubts and hesitations
    with which he may have been beset vanished
    completely. The old King was in full flight from Saint
    Cloud, his guards even were demoralized and were
    deserting him. From country towns came the news
    that the tricolour had been hoisted, amidst the greatest
    enthusiasm, and that the revolution was spreading
    rapidly. When, on that Saturday afternoon, the Duc
    d’Orléans mounted his horse to meet La Fayette at the
    Hotel de Ville, he was fully determined to seize the
    crown, which his unfortunate kinsman had let fall into
    the gutter.


Legitimist historians and others, professing to
    write in a more impartial spirit, have commented most
    adversely upon his conduct in this, the supreme crisis
    of his eventful life. It must, however, be admitted
    by everybody who studies the question with an open
    mind that France was irrevocably resolved to expel
    the Bourbons. It has, nevertheless, been contended
    that, had the Duc d’Orléans consented to undertake
    the regency, no serious objections would have been
    made to the enthronement of the Duc de Bordeaux,[7] in whose favour Charles and the Dauphin had abdicated [Pg 10]on August 2. Unfortunately, however, it was
    notorious that this young prince was the pupil of
    the Jesuits, and the prejudice against him, on that
    account, was unquestionably very strong. Without
    doubt, had the plan been given a trial, it must have
    speedily ended in disaster. In addition to the many
    and great difficulties with which Louis Philippe was
    confronted, during the whole course of his reign, he
    must, as Regent, have been perpetually exposed to the
    suspicion of acting under the inspiration of the young
    King’s family, and that suspicion would quickly have
    proved fatal. There were, therefore, but two alternatives,
    either a republic or an Orleans monarchy. Seeing
    the dispositions of the continental sovereigns and the
    condition of France in 1830, the proclamation of a
    republic, if it had not entailed war, must certainly
    have produced anarchy and brought untold misery
    upon the people. On the other hand, the statutory
    monarchy, at the time when it was set up, had the
    support of the best elements of the nation, and Louis
    Philippe, by accepting the crown, can justly claim to
    have preserved France from the imminent danger of
    civil and foreign war.


Louis Philippe was a man of more than usual
    courage. In his early life he had displayed it at a
    critical moment upon the battlefield. In his middle
    age, in his famous progress to the Hotel de Ville, he
    had never hesitated to ride, without a military escort,
    through an armed and hostile mob. No king has
    probably been the object of attacks upon his life of so
    determined a character as Louis Philippe. The ever-present
    danger of assassination is said to have broken
    down the nerves of some of the boldest of men. But,
    throughout his reign, the “citizen king” always confronted
    this particular peril, to which he was so constantly
    exposed, with a serene and lofty courage. In
    the face of political difficulties, however, he was as [Pg 11]timid as he was brave when it was a question of
    meeting physical danger. His attitude towards the
    Jacobinical spirit, which the “glorious days of July”
    had so greatly stimulated, is characteristic of his weakness
    in this respect. It is not improbable that in his
    heart he was secretly convinced of the ultimate triumph
    of revolutionary principles. Be that as it may, he
    appears to have shrunk from attacking Jacobinism
    openly and boldly. He seems to have looked upon it
    as a most dangerous monster which it was advisable
    to coax and to humour, in the hope that, by careful
    handling, it might be temporarily subjugated.[8]


In the days which intervened between La Fayette’s
    acceptation of him and his actual enthronement, he
    lost no opportunity of putting his theory into practice.
    Youthful Republicans were admitted into his presence,
    and he submitted to be questioned about his political
    principles.[9] It is probable that in some of these discussions
    he was induced to promise far more than he
    afterwards found it convenient, or even possible, to
    perform. On many occasions afterwards he was, in
    consequence, reminded of a more or less mythical Hotel de Ville Programme, with the conditions of
    which he was accused of having broken faith. But of
    all the difficulties by which he was confronted in these
    early days, the demand for a vigorous foreign policy
    was by far the most serious to deal with. The convinced
    democrats, who had been so bitterly opposed
    to his enthronement, were now the most vehement in
    insisting upon the adoption of a spirited course of
    action abroad. Without doubt, these men represented
    only a small minority of the nation, but, when they
    talked of military glory and of “natural frontiers,”they appealed to sentiments which a “king of the [Pg 12]barricades” could not afford to disregard. It was a
    matter of indifference to the demagogues of the party
    that the flower of the army was in Algeria, that many
    of the regiments at home were demoralized by their
    recent collision with the people, and that France had
    neither allies nor financial credit. The war for which
    they clamoured was to be conducted upon strictly
    revolutionary principles. “Peace with the nations,
    war with the kings,” the old cry was to be raised once
    more under cover of which, in former days, France had
    acquired her coveted boundaries.


Apart from the question as to whether the conditions
    of France and of Europe, in 1830, were such as
    to render it probable that a repetition of the methods
    of 1793 would be attended with success, the fact that
    the first shot fired on the frontiers would be the signal
    for the opening of the floodgates of revolutionary propagandism,
    made it of vital moment to Louis Philippe
    to avert the outbreak of hostilities. In a war, having
    for its loudly proclaimed object the destruction of
    kings, what hope could he have that his throne, resting
    upon new and untried foundations, would escape the
    general ruin? But although he was resolved to use
    every effort to maintain the peace, it was thoroughly
    in accordance with his habitual practice to cajole and
    flatter the faction which desired war. Accordingly,
    in his replies to the numerous patriotic addresses which
    were presented to him, he would dilate in fulsome
    language upon the heroic conduct of the citizens in
    the recent street fighting. All his speeches and his
    public utterances teemed with references to Valmy and
    Jemappes. When the band struck up the Marseillaise,
    he would beat time with his finger, “casting ecstatic
    glances at the tricolor like one who has found a long-lost
    mistress.”[10] Yet, whilst he was thus appealing to [Pg 13]the revolutionary recollections and flattering the military
    vanity of the people, all his thoughts were bent
    upon obtaining his recognition by the great European
    Courts. No sooner, therefore, was he enthroned, than
    he sent off emissaries, upon whose discretion he could
    depend, bearing letters to his brother monarchs announcing
    his accession. But in these communications,
    intended only for the eyes of the sovereigns and their
    confidential advisers, he was careful to speak of the
    “glorious revolution” as a lamentable catastrophe which
    he sincerely deplored.[11]




 [Pg 14]


 CHAPTER II


THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING


In 1830 England was still suffering acutely from the
    financial crisis of five years before. The losses of the
    capitalists entailed distress upon the working classes
    in the shape of unemployment and diminished wages.
    The misery of the people led to the commission of acts
    of violence and incendiarism upon a scale unparalleled
    in the recent history of England. The advocates of
    parliamentary reform drew their best arguments, in
    support of their cause, from the wretched condition of
    the country. The elections, rendered necessary by the
    death of George IV., began in the very week which
    saw France in the throes of her revolution. By the
    Opposition the victory of the Parisians was acclaimed
    enthusiastically as the triumph of a neighbouring
    people over despotism and aristocratic privilege. The
    downfall of Polignac was celebrated as a crushing blow
    to Wellington. The belief that the Duke had connived
    at, if not directly inspired, the French King’s attempted coup d’état, was not confined to ignorant people, but
    was professed by the leaders of the Whig party.[12] Whilst this supposed connection of Wellington with
    Polignac increased the voting power of the Opposition,
    Tory patrons of rotten boroughs, incensed at his
    Catholic policy, withheld from him their support. [Pg 15]The Duke returned from the elections with a diminished
    majority, and one, moreover, which, such as it was, in
    no way represented the real opinion of the country.


Wellington had been chiefly instrumental in effecting
    the restoration of the Bourbons after Waterloo.
    The news of their expulsion could not, under these
    circumstances, fail to cause him some personal regret.
    But, in addition, he was too well acquainted with
    French affairs not to be aware that the triumph of the
    democratic party was a grave menace to the peace of
    Europe. On the other hand, however, far from being,
    as was supposed, upon confidential terms with Polignac,
    the French expedition to Algiers had strained seriously
    the official relations which alone subsisted between
    them. But any reluctance, which he and his colleagues
    might have entertained, to recognizing the new régime in France, had to give way before the popular enthusiasm
    which the revolution called forth throughout
    England. The Duke, accordingly, lost no time in
    advising the King to acknowledge Louis Philippe. It
    was a policy, he maintained, which not only offered
    the best prospect of preserving peace, but which would
    meet with the approval of all the great Powers.[13] Consequently, when on August 22 General Baudrand
    arrived in London, bringing with him a letter
    from Louis Philippe to William IV., he was accorded
    a good reception in ministerial circles. Although he
    fancied he could detect a little coldness in Wellington’s
    manner, his mission achieved a complete success.
    After a stay of about a week in London he returned
    to Paris, taking back with him King William’s answer
    together with a box ornamented with a portrait of
    that monarch set in diamonds.[14] Meanwhile, on [Pg 16]August 18, Charles X. and the members of his family
    had arrived at Spithead on board The Great Britain,
    the American vessel chartered by the French government
    to convey them to England. The state of public
    feeling made it inadvisable that they should proceed to
    London or even land at Portsmouth, and they were, in
    consequence, taken, a few days later, by steamer to
    Lulworth Castle, in Dorsetshire, which had been
    prepared for their reception. The mob which had
    cheered exultingly as Castlereagh’s body was borne
    through the streets to its last resting-place at Westminster
    Abbey, which, two years later, was to threaten
    Wellington with violence on the anniversary of
    Waterloo, would have shown scant respect for the
    misfortunes of the fallen King.


Ever since the days of her crowning disaster at
    Wagram, Metternich had directed the foreign policy of
    Austria. Clement Wenceslas von Metternich, Chancellor
    of the Court and of the State, was descended
    from a family of counts of the empire and was born
    at Coblentz in 1773. His predecessors in office, old
    Kaunitz, the minister of Maria Theresa, Thugut,
    Cobenyl, and Stadion, had in vain attempted to cope
    with republican and imperial France. Without doubt,
    Metternich in the final struggle with Bonaparte was
    assisted by circumstances not of his own creation,
    nevertheless he unquestionably proved himself, on
    many occasions, a crafty, wary adversary, who could
    await his opportunity patiently. The flattery which
    was lavished upon him at the peace and the prominent
    part which he was enabled to play in the great territorial
    settlement at Vienna stimulated greatly his
    natural vanity and presumption. In addition, as he
    grew older, he began to indulge more and more in
    long philosophical disquisitions upon every kind of
    political subject. But under his pedantic manner, he
    retained always his alert resourcefulness and shrewd [Pg 17]common sense. In the words of Sir Frederick Lamb,
    who had transacted much business with him, “he was
    far too practical a man to regulate his conduct by his
    doctrines, and far too ingenious a one to be at a loss
    for a doctrine to cover his conduct.”[15]


Without doubt, Metternich was a man of aristocratic
    and conservative instincts, but, had he been
    differently disposed, the conditions of the Empire must
    have rendered very difficult the adoption of a Liberal
    policy. At the Congress of Vienna Austria had renounced
    all claim to her former possessions in the
    Low Countries and in Western Germany, and had
    withdrawn to the south and south-east to exercise an
    uneasy dominion over Slavs and Italians. Progress
    on national lines was hardly possible in an empire
    thus constituted, and circumstances contributed to
    facilitate the imposition of a strictly conservative
    system. The Liberal impulse, to which the War of
    Liberation had given birth in Prussia, had no counterpart
    in Austria, nor had Francis II., like Frederick
    William III., even in his darkest days, promised
    constitutional reforms. At the peace, accordingly,
    Austria reverted uncomplainingly to her old absolutist
    traditions.


In Italy Bonaparte had encouraged deliberately
    a spirit of nationality. But the patriotic hopes, which
    he had raised, were extinguished at the Congress of
    Vienna. Italy, Metternich decreed, was to be henceforward
    merely “a geographical expression.” By the
    settlement of 1815 Austria acquired actually the
    provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, but her influence
    extended far beyond these districts. Austrian princes
    ruled over the Duchies of Tuscany, Modena and
    Parma. Treaties which provided that Piacenza,
    Commachio and Ferrara should be garrisoned by
    Austrian troops gave her military control of the [Pg 18]valley of the Po. Tuscany was forbidden to make
    either peace or war without her consent, and the
    King of Naples was pledged to introduce no constitutional
    changes, other than those sanctioned in the
    Austrian dominions.


In the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, as it was
    termed, it was Metternich’s policy to make the
    Lombards “forget that they were Italians.” The
    Austrian code of laws was introduced without regard
    to native customs and prejudices. The civil service
    was composed almost exclusively of Germans, and
    the most trifling administrative questions had to be
    referred to Vienna.[16] The stagnation engendered by
    this system could not fail to have a demoralizing
    effect. At Venice two-fifths of the population were in
    receipt of charitable relief, the middle classes were
    without enterprise, the aristocracy fawned upon the
    Austrians. On the other hand, in Lombardy and
    Venetia there were few monks and a comparatively
    good system of popular education existed. The people,
    moreover, enjoyed equality before the law which,
    except in political cases, was justly administered.
    But as in all Italian States, the police were arbitrary
    and interfering and the censorship of the press was
    enforced rigidly.


The heterogeneous composition of the Austrian
    Empire, which demanded a strictly conservative policy
    at home, prescribed no less urgently the preservation
    of peaceful relations abroad. Since the conclusion of
    the great war Metternich’s foreign policy had had no
    other object than the maintenance of the status quo,
    by the strict observation of existing treaties. The
    revolutionary spirit was the most serious danger to
    the settlement of 1815. Bonaparte might be dead or
    a prisoner at St. Helena, but Metternich was under no
    illusion that the peril had passed away for ever. The [Pg 19]revolutionary monster still survived and required
    ceaseless watching. Only, he conceived, by a European
    Confederation, ruled over by a council of the
    Great Powers, could complete security be obtained
    against the common enemy of all established governments.
    Metternich’s combination of the Powers “for
    the maintenance of everything lawfully existing,”[17] which has been held up to execration under the name
    of the Holy Alliance, was an adaptation to practical
    politics of the fantastic scheme, which Alexander had
    propounded, on September 26, 1815, after a review
    of his army on the plain of Vertus. According to the
    Tsar’s manifesto the relations of all European sovereigns
    were in the future to be guided by the teachings
    of Christ. They were to regard each other in the light
    of brothers and to look upon their subjects as their
    children. The policy of Metternich’s Holy Alliance
    was set forth in the famous preliminary protocol of the
    conference of Troppau, signed, on November 19, 1820,
    by the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, and Prussia.
    “States,” it was laid down, “which have undergone a
    change of government due to a revolution, the results
    of which affect other States, shall cease to be members
    of the European Alliance. If owing to these alterations
    immediate danger threaten neighbouring States,
    the Powers bind themselves to bring back by force of
    arms the erring State into the folds of the Alliance.”


Acting upon this principle, Austria, in 1821,
    invaded the Kingdom of Naples and abolished the
    constitution which the Carbonari had compelled Ferdinand
    to accept, whilst Bubna, the Austrian general
    commanding at Milan, entered Piedmont and suppressed
    the revolution which had broken out at Turin.
    The Tsar, Alexander, during these operations, held an
    army upon the Galician frontier ready to march into [Pg 20]Italy, should his assistance be invoked. The same
    policy, in 1823, dictated the French armed intervention
    in Spain, when the constitution, which the Liberals had
    proclaimed three years before, was abolished and the
    absolute rule of King Ferdinand VII. was restored.
    But the determination of England “to abstain rigidly
    from interference in the affairs of other States”
    deprived the alliance of that appearance of complete
    unanimity which Metternich hoped would convince
    the peoples of the futility of attempting revolutions.
    The Greek insurrection, the quarrel between Russia and
    the Porte and the conflict of national interests to
    which the Eastern question gave rise, completed the
    work of disruption which Castlereagh and Canning
    had begun.


Metternich received the news of the revolution in
    Paris and of the downfall of Charles X. at Koenigswart,
    his country seat in Bohemia. Ever since the termination
    of the Russo-Turkish war he had been striving to
    re-establish the concert of the Powers and, more
    especially, to place the relations of Austria and Russia
    upon their former friendly footing. Deeply as Austria
    was interested in all developments affecting the
    integrity of Turkey, greatly as Metternich mistrusted
    Nicholas’ designs upon the Porte, the spread of
    Liberalism constituted in his eyes an even graver
    danger. The Russian government was intensely conservative
    and the people were little likely to be affected
    by the revolutionary spirit of Western Europe. Were
    a serious crisis to arise it was essential that Austria
    should be in a position to look to St. Petersburg for
    support. A visit which Nesselrode, the Russian
    Chancellor, paid to Carlsbad, in the summer of 1830,
    afforded Metternich an opportunity of sounding him
    as to the views of his Court, and it was upon his
    return from a satisfactory interview with his old friend
    that he found awaiting him at Koenigswart the first [Pg 21]intelligence of Charles X.’s violation of the constitution.
    On August 6, when the complete triumph of the
    revolutionists in Paris was known to him, Metternich
    determined to return at once to Vienna, making
    another short stay at Carlsbad upon the way. At this,
    their second meeting, both statesmen affixed their
    signatures to a short document, which was to acquire a
    certain celebrity in the chanceries of Europe under the
    name of the chiffon de Carlsbad. By this agreement
    the basis was established of the policy which the
    absolute Powers were to adopt towards France. No
    attempt would be made to interfere with her, provided
    that she should abstain from seeking to infringe
    existing treaties and from disturbing the internal peace
    of neighbouring States.[18]


Soon after Metternich’s return to Vienna, on August
    26, General Belliard arrived, bringing with him a
    letter from Louis Philippe to the Emperor Francis.
    Some days were allowed to elapse before he was admitted
    to an audience, but in the interval he had two
    interviews with Metternich. The Chancellor accepted
    his assurances that the King of the French would do
    all in his power to maintain peace at home and abroad.
    At the same time, however, he gave him plainly to
    understand that he had no confidence in Louis Philippe’s
    ability to carry out his intentions. Both the private
    and the official answers of the Emperor were coldly expressed,
    but they contained the definite assurance that
    he had no wish to interfere with the domestic affairs of
    France, in which country he sincerely desired to see
    tranquillity restored. He was determined to abide by
    treaties, and was gratified to learn that His Majesty,
    the King of the French, was animated by the same
    resolution. As Metternich, on September 8, placed
    these documents in Belliard’s hands he took the
    opportunity of impressing upon him solemnly that his [Pg 22]Imperial master, although he had decided to acknowledge
    the sovereignty of Louis Philippe, viewed the
    events which had taken place in France with the utmost
    abhorrence and was convinced that the new régime could
    have only a brief existence. In truth Metternich was
    full of apprehensions, and, in a private letter to Nesselrode,
    unburdened himself of the conviction that “the
    end of old Europe was fast approaching.”[19]


The Germanic Confederation had been formed with
    the object of protecting Germany from external and
    internal dangers. The thirty-eight States and the
    four free cities of which it was composed were debarred
    from entering into any alliance with foreign governments
    against another member of the Confederation
    and, in case of need, were pledged to furnish contingents
    to the federal army. Austria and Prussia,
    however, in order to preserve the independence of
    their foreign policy, brought portions only of their
    territories into the Confederation, which, in consequence,
    was not committed to the defence of Hungary,
    Gallicia, Lombardy and Venetia, on behalf of Austria,
    or to the protection of the Polish provinces of Prussia.
    Each State was represented at the federal Diet at
    Frankfort, which assembly was in no sense a federal
    parliament, but resembled rather a conference of
    diplomatists, the ministers attending it being strictly
    bound by the instructions furnished them by their
    respective Courts. Austria and Prussia had only one
    vote apiece, Austria, however, held the perpetual
    presidency.


Prussia in 1815 had been regarded as the champion
    of Liberalism. The Constitutionalists, however, soon
    discovered that the hopes which they placed in her
    were not destined to be realized. In the counsels of
    Frederick William, the influence of Wittgenstein, the
    leader of the reactionary party, and the friend of [Pg 23]Metternich, soon superseded that of Stein, Hardenburg
    and the heroes of the War of Liberation. The conditions
    of the country, it must be admitted, were
    hardly suitable to the immediate establishment of
    representative institutions. The inhabitants of the
    nine provinces which, it had been decreed at the
    Congress of Vienna, were to constitute the Kingdom
    of Prussia, were not agreed as to the form of government
    under which they desired to live. Until they
    had become Prussians, the Poles of the Duchy of
    Posen, the Westphaliand, the Saxons, and the Rhinelanders
    had existed under different codes of law and
    of administration. The imposition of a uniform
    system upon the kingdom was a matter of urgent
    necessity, and it was to administrative measures that
    the Prussian government devoted its attention exclusively
    in the years which followed Waterloo. It is
    clear that there was no strong demand for a constitution
    among the mass of the people, and Frederick
    William III. could listen, in consequence, without
    much danger, to Metternich’s warning that representative
    institutions must prove incompatible with military
    strength.


Successful as he had been in persuading Frederick
    William to withhold a constitution from Prussia,
    Metternich could not prevent certain rulers of the
    minor States from complying with Article XIII. of the
    Federal Act, and from establishing representative
    government within their dominions. In 1816, the
    Liberal Duke of Saxe-Weimar granted a constitution,
    and his example was followed by the Kings of Bavaria
    and of Wurtemburg and the Duke of Baden. A wave
    of Liberalism swept over Northern Germany. The
    universities were affected profoundly by the new ideas.
    In their lecture-rooms, professors denounced existing
    governments and harangued their pupils in the
    language of demagogues. The agitation culminated, [Pg 24]on March 23, 1819, in the murder of the dramatist
    and publicist Kotzebue, who was said to be in the pay
    of Russia, by Karl Sand, a student of Jena University
    and a lecturer to the Burschenschaft. This crime and
    an attempt to assassinate Ibell, the minister of Nassau,
    gave Metternich the opportunity for which he had
    been waiting. In the month of July of this same year
    he had an interview with Frederick William at Teplitz,
    in the course of which the King promised never to give
    Prussia a constitution, to place his confidence only in
    ministers of the type of Bernstorff and Wittgenstein,
    and to sanction such repressive measures as the Austrian
    Chancellor might see fit to suggest. After a conference
    of the ministers of the different States at
    Carlsbad, Metternich’s decrees were submitted to the
    Frankfort Diet, on September 20, 1819, and adopted
    forthwith.


Under the provisions of the celebrated Carlsbad
    decrees, the ruler of every German State was bound to
    appoint commissioners to regulate the universities and
    to impose a censorship upon all newspapers and matter
    printed within his dominions. Furthermore, a central
    tribunal was established at Mainz to inquire into the
    doings of the secret societies, and upon the members
    of this court was conferred the power of arresting the
    subjects of any German sovereign, and of demanding
    from any law court the production of documents.
    These decrees, however, did not constitute the sum
    total of Metternich’s measures of precaution. In
    November, 1819, he convened a council of German
    ministers at Vienna, when, under the pretext of defining
    the functions of the Diet, sixty-five new articles of a
    repressive character were introduced into the Federal
    Act. The general effect of the Vienna resolutions,
    as these measures were termed, was to impose upon
    the Federation the duty of defending absolutism by
    force of arms in small States in which the sovereigns [Pg 25]might prove incapable themselves of maintaining a
    despotic form of government.


Metternich’s manipulation of the Diet was the
    great triumph of his home policy. By converting the
    Federation from a combination of States into a league
    of sovereigns against their own subjects, he averted
    the danger that it might promote the cause of Liberalism
    or of national unity. From this time forward
    Metternich, to all appearance, dominated the Court
    and the Cabinet of Berlin, and held in leading strings
    the minor princes of the Confederation. Nevertheless,
    the position of Austria as a German Power was weakening
    steadily. At the Congress of Vienna he had
    craftily withdrawn the empire from the post of danger,
    and had thrust upon Prussia the task of protecting the
    western flank of Germany. To his secret satisfaction,
    he saw her pour out her treasure to defend the frontier
    from which Austria had recoiled. He believed that by
    his Carlsbad decrees and his Vienna resolutions he had
    rendered national unity impossible, and had condemned
    Northern Germany to the political stagnation in which
    the empire appeared contented to repose. But the enlightened
    bureaucratic system of Prussia was incomparably
    superior to that of Austria. In educational matters
    she was the foremost State in Europe, and already
    she was drawing the minor States into her system of
    internal free trade—the famous Zollverein which was
    to prove so important a factor in the struggle for
    Prussian hegemony and national unity. Even in 1830,
    acute observers could perceive that the people were
    stifling within the narrow confines of their duchies,
    and that, when the day of Germany’s awakening should
    come, it would be to the Power standing on guard
    upon the Rhine that they would look for leadership.[20] But that hour had not yet struck, and, in the question [Pg 26]of the attitude to be observed towards France, after
    the Revolution of July, Prussia, as was her wont,
    shaped her policy upon that of Austria. The Emperor’s
    acknowledgment of Louis Philippe carried with it,
    accordingly, Frederick William’s recognition of the
    King of the French.


At St. Petersburg it was not until August 19 that
    any mention of the Revolution of July was allowed
    to appear in the newspapers. Two days earlier a
    new levy of two men in five hundred had been called
    up for service in the army, all Russians had been
    ordered to leave France, Frenchmen had been refused
    admission to Russia, and any display of the tricolour
    had been forbidden. But Lord Heytesbury,[21] the
    British ambassador, was informed that this increase
    of military strength had no reference to French affairs,
    and that the recall of Russian subjects from France
    was a simple measure of precaution.[22] In the eyes of
    Nicholas any rising of the people against their lawful
    sovereign was necessarily a highly offensive proceeding,
    and in this instance it had the additional disadvantage
    of disturbing a condition of affairs, the continued duration
    of which was very favourable to the national
    policy of Russia. Under the different governments of
    the Restoration an excellent understanding had been
    established between the Courts of the Tuileries and
    of St. Petersburg. The Eastern question, which had
    brought Russia to the verge of war with England
    and which had interrupted the smooth course of her
    relations with Vienna, had, on the contrary, drawn
    France towards her. When, in the campaign of the
    previous year, Constantinople had appeared to lie at
    the mercy of General Diebitsch, politicians as opposed
    as Chateaubriand and Polignac had been disposed to
    look upon the situation complacently, in the hope that [Pg 27]the disruption of the Turkish Empire might lead to
    a readjustment of the map of Europe, which might
    enable France to rectify in her favour the treaties of
    1815. Furthermore, since the intervention in Spain,
    in 1823, there had been little cordiality between the
    Cabinets of London and Paris. This estrangement
    had been intensified by the French occupation of
    Algiers, the one important measure of foreign policy
    of the last government of the Restoration. These
    circumstances rendered it very improbable that Russia
    in the near future would have to confront a coalition
    of the maritime Powers. But now that a new régime had been set up in France, the possibility of that
    dreaded contingency would have to be seriously
    considered.


In spite of the Tsar’s military preparations, Lord
    Heytesbury had no fears that he proposed to attack
    France. Nicholas informed him that he had directed
    his ambassador “to remain in Paris, but to remove
    immediately from the house furnished to the Russian
    embassy by the government of France.” He was
    constantly to hold himself in readiness to quit Paris
    at an hour’s notice, and to leave at once, should the
    English, the Prussian, the Austrian or the Dutch
    ambassadors be compelled to depart. “En âme et en
    conscience he never would consider the Duc d’Orléans
    in any light except that of a usurper.” Nevertheless
    he had no intention of intervening, unless France were
    to attempt to disseminate revolutionary doctrines in
    other countries or to carry her arms beyond her
    frontiers.[23] In due course Baron Atthalin arrived at
    St. Petersburg, bringing with him a letter from Louis
    Philippe to the Tsar, and, on September 8, was
    received in private audience by Nicholas. On this
    occasion the question of the acknowledgment of the [Pg 28]King of the French was avoided, the Emperor being
    resolved to reserve the matter for further consideration.
    But at Tsarskoye Selo, a week later, Nicholas, whilst
    regretting that the British government should have
    so hastily decided to recognize Louis Philippe, gave
    Lord Heytesbury to understand that his own acknowledgment
    of the King of the French would not be
    deferred much longer.[24]


In the meantime, an event had occurred which
    threatened seriously to aggravate the embarrassments
    of the situation. The creation of the Kingdom of
    the Netherlands occupied a most important place in
    the territorial settlement following the overthrow of
    Bonaparte. British statesmanship had been largely
    responsible for the union of Belgium with Holland,
    and for the formation of a strong State of secondary
    rank which was to act as a barrier against France.
    Under Wellington’s advice the great Powers, at their
    own expense, erected a line of fortresses, connected
    with Prussian territory upon the left bank of the
    Rhine, to protect the southern frontier of the new
    kingdom. From a purely military point of view the
    plan may have been sound, but to propose to mould
    the Belgians and the Dutch into a nation was to treat
    as of no account the differences of race and of religion
    which divided the two peoples. The Belgians soon
    began to complain that they were very inadequately
    represented in all branches of the public service.
    Questions relating to education, taxation, and the
    freedom of the press increased their discontent. The
    Dutch, who could look back proudly upon two
    centuries of independence, despised them as having
    been constantly under the dominion of a foreign
    Power. In 1830 it was generally recognized that the
    attempt to fuse the two peoples into one nationality
    had failed. The Belgians, however, still remained loyal [Pg 29]to the House of Nassau and desired only administrative
    separation under the reigning dynasty.


The Revolution of July in Paris created an immense
    excitement at Brussels. The town was the favourite
    place of refuge for the political offenders of all countries.
    Yet in spite of the prevailing unrest the authorities
    neglected to take the most ordinary precautions against
    a popular rising. A performance of Scribe’s opera, La
    Muette de Portici, which treats of the insurrection of
    the Neapolitans against the Spaniards, furnished the
    spark which was to cause the explosion. Serious
    rioting began on the night of August 25, and continued
    throughout the following day. The military
    commander appears to have acted with a strange
    irresolution, and on the 28th, the insurgents being
    complete masters of the town, a deputation of notables
    carried a respectful address to the Hague praying for
    the redress of their grievances. The next three weeks
    were spent in fruitless attempts to arrange a compromise.
    The Prince of Orange, who was personally
    popular, visited Brussels, but his efforts to solve the
    question met with no success. After the failure of his
    eldest son’s mission the King consented to dismiss van
    Maanen, the unpopular governor of Brussels. But
    this concession was made too late. Encouraged by
    emissaries of the revolutionary clubs in Paris, and
    emboldened by the weakness of the government, the
    advocates of complete separation pressed their demands
    with increasing violence. At last the King ordered
    Prince Frederick of Orange to advance from the camp
    of Vilvorde against the town. On September 23 the
    attack began. The troops penetrated into the park,
    but failed to carry the barricades which obstructed
    the streets beyond. After three days’ fighting the
    Prince abandoned the struggle and withdrew from the
    neighbourhood of Brussels. The discomfiture of his
    army left King William no alternative but to appeal [Pg 30]for assistance to the Powers, whilst at Brussels a provisional
    government declared Belgium independent,
    and convened a national congress.


This attempt on the part of a neighbouring people
    to imitate “the glorious days of July” was exceedingly
    gratifying to the republicans and the military
    democratic party in Paris. Their orators and journalists
    loudly declared that the revolt of the Belgians was an
    opportunity both for extending the French frontiers,
    and for effecting a breach in the treaties of 1815.
    Louis Philippe, however, was resolved not to be
    drawn into an adventure of this kind. He knew that
    the powers would never tolerate an invasion of the
    Low Countries, and he realized that the French army
    was in no condition to oppose a European coalition.
    Accordingly, as it was not in his power to silence the
    cries for intervention or to repress the noisy sympathy
    for the Belgians indulged in by a large section of the
    press, he determined to give to foreign governments a
    practical proof of his pacific intentions by despatching
    to London, as his ambassador, the aged statesman who,
    sixteen years before, had figured so conspicuously at
    the Congress of Vienna.


The Prince de Talleyrand was in his seventy-third
    year. Notwithstanding the great services which, in
    1814, he had rendered to the cause of Legitimate
    Sovereignty, the Bourbons of the elder branch had
    never been able to forget his conduct under the
    Republic and the Empire. At the second Restoration he
    had been appointed President of the Council, but had
    retired before the Chambre introuvable and the Royalist
    reaction, and neither Louis XVIII. nor Charles X.
    had given him a second opportunity of returning to
    office. Upon the triumph of the popular party in
    July, he had promptly placed his services at the
    disposal of Louis Philippe. But, in spite of his Liberal
    opinions, Talleyrand retained the language, the habits, [Pg 31]and the appearance of a noble of the old régime. It
    might have been expected that all the King’s ingenuity
    would have been required to impose so fine a gentleman
    upon a Cabinet, which counted among its members
    the democratic M. Dupont and the elder M. Dupin,
    famous for his hobnailed boots and his affectations
    of middle-class simplicity. Louis Philippe’s ministers,
    however, were agreed upon the necessity of preserving
    the peace, and, when it was proposed at the Council
    table that Talleyrand should be sent to London, no
    opposition was made to the suggestion. Guizot, who
    was Minister of the Interior at the time, supposes
    that those who disliked the appointment must have
    stated their objections to the King in private.[25]


But if Louis Philippe and his ministers were
    determined to abstain from any intervention in
    Belgium, they were bound to insist that other Powers
    should adopt the same attitude. It was, therefore,
    notified to foreign governments that French policy, in
    the future, would be based strictly upon the principle
    of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other
    nations. It was a system to which both the great
    parties in England had declared their adherence, and
    its adoption by France might, in consequence, be
    expected to facilitate the establishment of cordial
    relations between the two countries. But the declaration
    of such a principle could not fail to be highly
    displeasing to the absolute Courts. Already movements
    of troops were in progress in the Rhine
    provinces which suggested an intention on the part
    of Frederick William of rendering military assistance
    to his brother-in-law, the King of the Netherlands.
    Baron Werther, the Prussian ambassador, although
    still without official credentials, had been instructed
    to remain in Paris. Molé, Louis Philippe’s first
    Minister for Foreign Affairs, accordingly arranged [Pg 32]to meet him at a private house, where he gave him
    clearly to understand that the entry of a Prussian
    army into the Low Countries would be regarded as
    an act of war directed against France. This threat,
    which evoked much indignation in Berlin and at
    Vienna, was effectual in inducing King Frederick
    William III. to renounce any thoughts, which he may
    have entertained, of reducing the Belgians to submission
    by force of arms.[26]


Talleyrand arrived in London on September 24,
    and in a despatch, sent off the next day, expressed his
    satisfaction at the reception accorded him.[27] He was
    accompanied by the Duchesse de Dino, who officiated
    as hostess at his table, and presided over his household.
    In 1807, at the conclusion of the campaign in
    Poland, Talleyrand, then Napoleon’s Minister for
    Foreign Affairs, had obtained for his nephew, Edmond
    de Périgord, the hand of Dorothée, the daughter of the
    last reigning Duke of Courland. After a few years
    of married life, however, husband and wife agreed to
    live apart, and Madame Edmond from that time forward
    took up her residence with Talleyrand. She
    accompanied him to Vienna, in 1814, and brought
    back from the Congress the title of Duchesse de Dino.
    In return for the services he had rendered him, the
    King of Naples had conferred this dukedom upon
    Talleyrand, who had asked that the title might be
    assumed by his nephew. The duchess’ position in
    Talleyrand’s household was so generally recognized
    that, upon their arrival in London, King William IV.,
    at Wellington’s request, allowed her to take rank
    as an ambassadress.[28] The Comte Casimir de Montrond,
    another frequent guest at Valençay, and at the house [Pg 33]in the Rue Saint-Florentin, followed the ambassador
    to London. Talleyrand’s friendship with this curious
    individual appears to have begun under the Directory.
    In the terrible days which preceded the downfall of
    Robespierre, Montrond had been an inmate of the
    prison of Saint-Lazare. The fortunate possession of
    some ready money, a rare commodity at the time,
    had, however, enabled him to effect his escape, and
    that of the citizeness Franquetot, the heretofore Aimée
    de Coigny, Duchesse de Fleury, the heroine of André
    Chénier’s poem.[29] After this miraculous deliverance,
    Aimée de Coigny, who under the emigration laws had
    divorced the Duc de Fleury, married the man to whom
    she owed her life. But, after a brief and most unsatisfactory
    experience of matrimony with the gay incroyable,
    she again contrived to obtain her freedom.
    Montrond’s introduction to London society appears
    to date from the year 1812, when, having incurred
    the grave displeasure of Bonaparte, he succeeded in
    eluding the French police and in reaching England.
    He seems to have become very rapidly a well-known
    and popular member of the fashionable world in
    London. During all this period of his life he is
    believed to have been totally without regular means
    of subsistence, and to have existed solely by play,
    assisted by an occasional windfall in the shape of
    employment upon any secret political work which
    Talleyrand, when in favour, was enabled to procure
    for him. But from the earliest days of the Monarchy
    of July his circumstances began to improve. From
    this time forward he appears to have drawn a
    pension of about £1000 per annum from the secret
    service funds of the French Foreign Office.[30] This [Pg 34]allowance is said to have been granted him in order
    that “he should speak well of Louis Philippe in the
    London clubs.” It was, moreover, strongly suspected
    that he had obtained knowledge of certain of the
    King’s proceedings during the emigration which His
    Majesty had good reasons for wishing to keep
    secret.[31]


The uneasiness aroused in London by the first
    news of the insurrection in Brussels developed into
    serious alarm, when the triumph of the revolutionists
    over the Royal troops became known. Wellington
    openly declared that it was a “devilish bad business,”and many people began to fear that a great European
    war was inevitable.[32] The British government, whilst
    prepared to accept as an accomplished fact the
    complete separation of Belgium from the Kingdom
    of the Netherlands, held that no changes must
    take place of a nature to interfere with the efficiency
    of the barrier fortresses, these defences “being
    necessary for the security of other States.” After
    drawing up instructions to this effect for Lord Stuart
    de Rothesay, Aberdeen intimated that the government
    was desirous of conferring upon the situation “in
    friendly concert with France and the other Powers.”[33] Talleyrand was of opinion that it was a matter for
    congratulation that the first offer of co-operation
    should have come from England, and strongly
    recommended that the proposal should be responded
    to cordially. An entirely passive attitude, he wrote, [Pg 35]must deprive France “of that influence which they
    are disposed to ascribe to her over here.”[34]


Meanwhile, in Paris, notices were appearing in the
    papers calling upon men to enroll themselves to
    assist their Belgian brothers. The Society of the
    Friends of the People equipped a battalion which
    actually set out for the northern frontier. La
    Fayette was still the recognized leader of the ultra-Liberals,
    and his house was a meeting-place for the Carbonari and the revolutionists of every country.
    But he was occupied chiefly in encouraging insurrectionary
    movements in Spain and Italy. The
    union of Belgium with France was advocated mainly
    in the ranks of the Bonapartist or military democratic
    section of the party. The protestations of Louis
    Philippe and Comte Molé were probably true that
    the government in no way favoured their designs,
    and that strict orders had been given to the prefects
    to prevent the passage of arms into Belgium. On the
    other hand, however, their assertions to Lord Stuart
    were untrue that they were innocent of conniving at the
    proceedings of the Spanish revolutionists. Broglie and
    Guizot, both members of the Cabinet, admit that in
    order to compel the King of Spain to acknowledge Louis
    Philippe, facilities for assembling their followers upon
    French territory were accorded to the Spanish insurrectionary
    leaders. This rather disingenuous policy appears,
    without question, to have contributed materially
    to the establishment of diplomatic relations between
    Paris and Madrid at the end of the month of October.[35]


None of the Powers evinced any intention of
    responding to the King of Holland’s request for [Pg 36]military assistance to subdue the revolted Belgians.
    The English proposal that a conference should be held
    to consider the situation was generally regarded as
    the best solution of the question. “Austria and
    Prussia,” wrote Talleyrand on October 11, “intend
    to follow the lead of England with respect to
    Belgium, and there can be little doubt that Russia
    will adopt the same course.”[36] The French government
    at this time was greatly incensed at the conduct
    of the Cabinet of the Hague. No official appeal for
    help had been sent to Paris, but in a letter to Louis
    Philippe the Prince of Orange openly accused the
    French authorities of encouraging the disturbances
    in Belgium, and suggested that the King should make
    a public declaration of his intention not to meddle
    with the affairs of the Low Countries. In return, the
    Prince undertook to use all his influence with the Tsar
    in favour of the acknowledgment of the sovereignty
    of the King of the French. At a Council of Ministers
    it was resolved that Talleyrand should be instructed
    to bring the affair to the notice of the British Cabinet,
    and that Molé should draw up a note for presentation
    at the Hague, expressing surprise at the continued
    silence observed towards the French government. Two
    days later, however, the news was telegraphed from
    Strasburg that General Atthalin had passed through the
    town, bringing with him the Tsar’s recognition of
    Louis Philippe. But, upon the general’s arrival, the
    satisfaction caused by this intelligence was diminished
    by the cold and formal language of Nicholas’s letter,
    and by his pointed omission to address the King as
    “his brother,” the designation generally employed by
    sovereigns in their communications with each other.[37]


 [Pg 37]


The proposal of the English government that a
    conference should be held upon Belgian affairs having
    been accepted by the Powers, it remained only to
    decide upon the town in which the deliberations should
    take place. London, where for some time past the
    representatives of Russia, France, and Great Britain
    had been engaged in settling the frontiers and discussing
    the future of Greece, appeared to be the capital in
    which, by reason of its proximity to Brussels, the
    plenipotentiaries could assemble with the least inconvenience.
    France alone dissented from this view, and
    urgently demanded that the conference should be held
    in Paris. Aberdeen, when Talleyrand communicated
    to him his instructions upon the subject, would appear
    to have seen little to object to in the French proposal.
    Wellington, however, refused to entertain the suggestion,
    for a moment. It was highly important, the
    Duke contended, that matters should be settled
    promptly, and he was confident that he could induce
    the ministers attending the conference to agree to
    the French and English proposals, provided they
    were to meet in London. On the other hand, were
    Paris to be the scene of their deliberations, they
    would insist upon referring every question to their
    respective Courts. Talleyrand, who considered that
    there was much sound reason in the Duke’s contention,
    was nevertheless directed to reiterate his demand.
    But his further representations only evoked the reply
    that the English Cabinet regarded Paris as un
    terrain trop agité, and at a subsequent interview, on
    October 25, in the presence of the ambassadors
    of Austria and Prussia, the Duke assured him that
    the Powers were unanimous in opposing the notion
    of discussing the affairs of the Low Countries
    amidst the tourbillon révolutionaire of the French
    capital.[38]


 [Pg 38]


In his conversations with Lord Stuart de Rothesay
    in Paris, Molé, in order to gain his ends, had recourse
    to a singular argument. Talleyrand himself, he explained,
    constituted the true reason why the government
    was desirous that the Belgian conference should
    not take place in London. He never would have been
    accredited to the Court of St. James’ had ministers
    foreseen how greatly the public would resent his
    appointment. To allow him to represent France at a
    very important conference would expose the Cabinet
    to attacks which must prove fatal to its existence.
    “This extraordinary reason for objecting to our proposition,”wrote Aberdeen, “does not appear to His
    Majesty’s government to be entitled to serious consideration.”
    Molé nevertheless continued to press his
    point with much warmth, and it was only after several
    more interviews with Lord Stuart that he began to
    talk of sending a second plenipotentiary to the London
    conference to be associated with Talleyrand.[39] This
    plan, which was probably not put forward seriously,
    was certainly never carried into execution. At the end
    of October, the Cabinet was reconstructed, and Molé
    resigned the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. After his
    retirement no further allusion appears to have been
    made to the alleged inconvenience of Talleyrand’s
    presence at the London conference. Molé was perhaps
    jealous of allowing him to conduct these important
    negotiations, in which he probably desired himself to
    play the chief part. He was a highly cultivated man,
    with much charm of manner, and of an ancient family,
    and in Imperial days had enjoyed the favour of the
    Emperor, and had held important positions. Under
    the Restoration he had been Minister of Marine in
    Richelieu’s first administration, and in this capacity [Pg 39]had incurred Louis XVIII.’s displeasure by intriguing
    against his favourite the Duc Décazes.


The Cabinet, known as that of August 11th, had
    never been a united body. Guizot, Broglie, Molé and
    Casimir Périer constituted the Conservative element,
    whilst Laffitte and Dupont were opposed to all
    measures which savoured of resistance to progress
    upon democratic lines. The riots of October 17 and
    18, in Paris, the mob’s protest against the apparent
    intention of the government to abolish the death
    penalty in political cases, in order to save the lives of
    the imprisoned ex-ministers of Charles X., brought
    matters to a crisis. Seeing that the King decidedly
    inclined to the views of Laffitte and the so-called party
    of laissez-aller the Conservatives, advising him to give
    the policy of their dissenting colleagues a fair trial,
    tendered their resignations. Laffitte was accordingly
    charged with the task of reconstructing the Cabinet.[40]


On November 2, the day on which the composition
    of the new French ministry was published in the Moniteur, King William IV. formally opened the
    British Parliament. In the Speech from the Throne,
    the Belgians were described as “revolted subjects”
    and the intention was expressed of repressing sternly
    disturbances at home. In the House of Lords, Grey
    deprecated the employment of such language, and,
    in reply, Wellington made his declaration against
    Reform. A fortnight later, upon a motion of Sir
    Henry Parnell for referring the Civil List to a select
    committee, the government was placed in a minority.
    The Duke thereupon resigned and advised the King to
    send for Grey. Lord Grey undertook to form a ministry
    upon the understanding that he was to bring forward
    a measure of Reform.




 [Pg 40]


 CHAPTER III


THE CREATION OF BELGIUM


The accession to power of Lord Grey was an event
    justly calculated to raise the hopes of those who wished
    to see more cordial relations established between France
    and England. The Whigs had been out of office during
    the whole period of the Imperial wars; they had not
    been concerned in the territorial settlement at the
    peace, nor were they responsible for the measures
    which had been taken to ensure the safe custody of
    Bonaparte after Waterloo. Many prominent members
    of the party had avowed their sympathy for France,
    and, moreover, the revolution of July had, unquestionably,
    contributed to the overthrow of the Tories.
    Under the new régime in France political power was to
    rest with the bourgeoisie. It was by the support of
    the trading and commercial classes that the Whigs
    purposed to carry out their scheme of Parliamentary
    Reform. Nor were these the only circumstances
    which seemed to indicate that the two countries would,
    in the future, develop upon parallel lines. Although
    William IV. had succeeded to the throne legitimately,
    whilst a revolution had placed the crown upon the
    head of Louis Philippe, and although no two men could
    be more different in character, there were, upon the
    surface, curious points of resemblance between them.
    Both were, or were supposed to be, Liberals, both were
    simple and unostentatious in their tastes and habits,
    both had succeeded sovereigns of reactionary views [Pg 41]who had been rigid observers of courtly ceremony and
    etiquette.


“England,” wrote Talleyrand in a despatch in
    which he reviewed the situation created by the change
    of government, “is the country with which France
    should cultivate the most friendly relations. Her
    colonial losses have removed a source of rivalry between
    them. The Powers still believe in the divine
    right of kings; France and England alone no longer
    subscribe to that doctrine. Both governments have
    adopted the principle of non-intervention. Let both
    declare loudly that they are resolved to maintain
    peace, and their voices will not be raised in vain.”[41]


Lord Palmerston, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
    was in his forty-sixth year. From 1811 he had
    continuously held the post of Secretary-at-War in
    succeeding Tory administrations until the year 1828,
    when, with other Canningites, he had seceded from
    the Duke of Wellington. He was an excellent
    linguist; indeed, in the opinion of so competent a
    critic as Victor Cousin, there were not twenty Frenchmen
    who could lay claim to his knowledge of their
    language.[42] In the course of a visit which he had paid
    to Paris, in the year 1829, Palmerston had made the
    acquaintance of most of the prominent members of the
    Liberal party under the Restoration. From his conversations
    with these men, who were now the masters
    of France, he had carried away the conviction that they
    chafed bitterly at the treaties of 1815 and were
    determined, at the first opportunity, to extend the
    French frontiers to the Rhine. General Sébastiani,
    who, on November 15, had succeeded Marshal Maison
    as Minister for Foreign Affairs, had, whilst in opposition, [Pg 42]been one of the loudest advocates of a policy of expansion.[43] The recollection of his boastful language
    and of the aggressive schemes which he had heard
    him propound was always present in Palmerston’s
    memory, and was sensibly to influence his conduct of
    his first negotiations with the French government.


The general outlook in Europe in the autumn of
    1830 augured ill for the continued maintenance of
    peace. Great military preparations were reported to
    be in progress in Russia. Marshal Diebitsch, the hero
    of the recent war with Turkey, was at Berlin upon a
    mission which, although it was described, as “wholly
    extra official,”[44] excited considerable apprehension in
    Paris. Insurrectionary movements, the repercussion
    of the Revolution of July, had taken place in Saxony
    and other States of Northern Germany. Metternich
    was said “to have proposed certain armaments to the
    Diet, wholly out of proportion to the necessities of the
    situation.” The King of Prussia, although he was
    universally credited with a sincere desire for peace,
    was suspected, nevertheless, “of preparing quietly for
    war.” The alarm was not dispelled by the assurances
    which, in London, Prince Lieven gave to both Palmerston
    and Talleyrand that the Russian armament was
    merely a measure of precaution necessitated by treaty
    obligations with the King of the Netherlands, and
    that, under no circumstances, would his Imperial
    master take action except in combination with the
    Powers.[45] On December 1 the French Chamber voted
    supplies for a considerable increase of the army.


The suspicion that the three Northern Courts were
    meditating an unprovoked attack upon France was
    unfounded. As Lord Heytesbury pointed out, the [Pg 43]cholera, which had made its appearance in the Tsar’s
    dominions, threw an insuperable obstacle in the way of
    recruiting upon a large scale. Russia indeed, he considered,
    might almost be looked upon as hors de combat.[46] Nor was Metternich proposing to begin hostilities
    against France. “Austria’s task,” he instructed
    Esterhazy, the ambassador in London, “consists in
    suppressing any insurrectionary movement in Italy.”
    But should the French interpose in favour of the
    revolutionists, their action must be resisted vigorously.
    It was expedient, therefore, for the three great continental
    Powers to hold their armies in readiness.
    “The British government must be brought to understand
    that Austria cannot accept the principle of non-intervention.
    England, as an insular State, can adhere
    to it without danger, but when adopted by France it
    imperils the existence of neighbouring Powers. The
    proclamation of such a doctrine can be compared only
    to the complaints of thieves about the interference of
    the police.”[47] But, although the absolute Courts were
    certainly innocent of any desire to provoke a war
    deliberately, there were serious elements of danger in
    the situation. The King of the Netherlands, without
    doubt, looked upon the outbreak of a great European
    war as the only chance of regaining his Belgian
    provinces. Charles X. was once more installed quietly
    in his old quarters at Holyrood, but his adherents, the
    Legitimists, or Carlists, as they were more usually
    termed, were convinced that a war must prove fatal to
    the new régime in France. Talleyrand suspected that
    they were in league with the military party in Paris,
    and suggested that an agent should be sent over to
    London to watch them. He had no complaints to
    make about the assistance afforded him by the Home [Pg 44]Secretary, who placed all the information he could
    obtain about them at his disposal, but, “in a country
    in which the police system was so bad, such reports had
    little value.”[48]


At the Congress of Vienna nearly the whole of
    those territories, known as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw,
    had been constituted into the Kingdom of Poland
    and assigned to the Tsar. Under the terms of the
    treaty, which was guaranteed by the Five Powers, the
    crown of the Kingdom was to be hereditary in the
    Imperial family of Russia. The Poles, however, were
    to be granted a constitution, and were to be allowed
    to maintain a national army. These stipulations were
    duly carried out by Alexander. But, as the Tsar’s
    Liberalism waned, the first conditions were considerably
    modified, and, after the accession of Nicholas,
    the Poles appear to have suspected, with perhaps good
    reason, that the Imperial Cabinet purposed to abolish
    gradually all their special privileges. Suddenly, on
    November 28, 1830, an insurrection broke out at
    Warsaw. The Viceroy, the Grand Duke Constantine,
    was driven from the town and several of his generals
    were murdered. The revolution spread rapidly through
    the country, and, after some vain attempts to negotiate
    a compromise, the Grand Duke retreated across the
    frontier with his Russian troops. On December 5,
    Chlopicki, a popular Polish general, who had served
    with distinction under Bonaparte, was proclaimed
    Dictator. Nicholas, whilst collecting his troops to reconquer
    his revolted kingdom, declared that the French
    revolutionary propaganda and the creation of Lancastrian
    schools[49] were responsible for the insurrection.[50]


 [Pg 45]


The rebellion evoked the utmost enthusiasm in
    Paris. The designation of “the Frenchmen of the
    North,” which it became the fashion to apply to the
    Poles, tickled the national vanity. It was remembered
    that they had remained true to Bonaparte in his misfortunes,
    and that the unsympathetic treatment which
    they had experienced at the hands of the sovereigns
    at Vienna had been the penalty of their fidelity.
    Moreover, it was a natural consequence of their hatred
    of the treaties of 1815 that Frenchmen should feel
    drawn towards those countries which, like Poland or
    Italy, had cause for dissatisfaction with the conditions
    settled at the Congress of Vienna. Unquestionably
    this was the secret of much of that sympathy for
    “oppressed nationalities” which, from 1830 onwards,
    manifested itself so keenly in France. The war party
    and other factions hostile to the monarchy encouraged
    the popular ferment. Lord Stuart de Rothesay was disposed
    to think that Louis Philippe and his ministers
    regarded the excitement with secret approval, in the
    hope that it would distract public attention from the
    impending trial of the ex-ministers of Charles X.[51] In addition to Polignac himself three members of the
    Cabinet, who had signed the ordinances of July, had
    failed to escape abroad. The King, however, notwithstanding
    that the populace called furiously for their
    heads, was determined to save their lives. This
    merciful intention he was enabled to carry out successfully.
    On December 21 the peers adjudged them
    guilty of high treason but, in deference to Louis
    Philippe’s wishes, sentenced them only to perpetual
    confinement. Meanwhile Montalivet, the Minister of
    the Interior, had personally conducted the prisoners
    back to Vincennes, where they were lodged in safety [Pg 46]before the mob, which thronged all the approaches to
    the Luxembourg, realized that it had been baulked of
    its prey. The satisfactory conclusion of this momentous
    trial was followed by an event of no less happy
    augury for the future. Nettled by a resolution of the
    Chamber affecting his position, La Fayette retired from
    the command of the national guard. The government
    accepted his resignation with grave misgivings, but,
    to the general surprise, the fickle multitude saw their
    hero replaced by Mouton de Lobau with comparative
    indifference.


But of all the questions which threatened to disturb
    the peace of Europe, that of Belgium, by reason
    of the conflict of national interests to which it gave
    rise, was by far the most delicate. It is not without
    cause that, for centuries, the Low Countries have been
    the chief battle ground of the Powers. Bonaparte is
    supposed to have described the possession of Antwerp
    as “a loaded pistol held at England’s head.” Unquestionably,
    during the great war, England had had
    experience of the difficulties of watching the coastline
    of Belgium and Holland united to that of France.
    The lesson had not been thrown away upon Lords
    Grey and Palmerston, who were fully determined to
    resist, at all costs, the acquisition of any portion of the
    Low Countries by a first-class military Power. On the
    other hand France had excellent reasons for objecting
    to the system under which the Kingdom of the Netherlands
    had been created, and the barrier fortresses
    erected. In the words of General Lamarque, the chief
    parliamentary spokesman of the war party, these defences
    constituted, within four days’ march of Paris, a tête de pont behind which the armies of a hostile coalition
    might assemble at leisure. Moreover, France, in 1815,
    had been deprived of the fortresses of Marienburg and
    Philippeville, both of which had been incorporated into
    the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and it was hoped [Pg 47]that in any scheme of re-arrangement these two places
    would be restored to her. All supporters of the new
    monarchy were keenly alive to the immense satisfaction
    with which the smallest modification of the hated treaties
    of 1815 would be received throughout the country. Men
    of moderate views, such as Charles de Rémusat and
    Guizot, looked upon “a brilliant diplomatic triumph”
    or “some acquisition of territory towards Belgium”
    as conditions essential to the stability of the Orleans
    throne.[52] On the other hand, it was the policy of Austria,
    Prussia and Russia, as it was that of Great Britain,
    to preserve intact the territorial settlement of 1815
    and to resist the aggrandisement of France. But the
    attitude of the Northern Courts was also greatly influenced
    by the marriages which connected the King of
    the Netherlands and the Prince of Orange with the
    Royal family of Prussia and the Imperial House of
    Russia. In addition to these considerations of relationship
    the sympathies of the absolute sovereigns necessarily
    went out to a monarch struggling with a rebellion
    of his subjects, and they could not but be reluctant to
    participate in measures tending to legalize a revolution.


The first sitting of the conference of the five
    Powers upon Belgian affairs took place at the Foreign
    Office in London, on November 4, on which occasion
    it was decided to impose an armistice upon the contending
    parties. According to the protocol, the Dutch
    and Belgian armies “were to retire behind the line
    which, previous to the treaty of May 30, 1814,
    separated the possessions of the sovereign prince of
    the United Provinces from the territories which have
    since been joined to them.”[53] No further step of much
    importance was taken until December 20, when [Pg 48]Talleyrand proposed that the conference should proclaim
    the independence of Belgium.[54] After a discussion of
    seven hours’ duration, the objections of the plenipotentiaries
    of the absolute Powers were withdrawn, and
    the plan was acceded to unanimously. A month later,
    on January 20, 1831, the frontiers of Holland and
    Belgium were defined, and Belgium was declared
    neutral under the guarantee of the Powers. At the
    sitting of January 27, the plenipotentiaries apportioned
    the share of the general debt which each State
    would be called upon to bear.[55]


The difficult question of selecting a sovereign for
    Belgium was not lost sight of, whilst the delimitation
    of frontiers had been proceeding. As early as October
    19, Molé informed Lord Stuart in confidence that
    M. Gendebien had brought proposals from the provisional
    government in Brussels for the enthronement
    of one of Louis Philippe’s younger sons. But he
    assured the British ambassador that, as France was
    about to confer upon the situation with the other
    Powers, the offer would not be entertained for a
    moment.[56] Again Talleyrand, on November 7,
    reported that “a kind of agent of the provisional
    government” was in London seeking to ascertain
    whether the elevation to the Belgian throne of the
    Duc de Leuchtenberg, a son of Eugène de Beauharnais,
    would be permitted.[57] At first the Powers, France
    included, had regarded the enthronement of the Prince
    of Orange as the safest solution of the difficulty. But
    after the bombardment of the town of Antwerp by the
    Dutch, at the end of October, he became very unpopular,
    and, on November 24, the national congress at [Pg 49]Brussels resolved that all members of the House of
    Orange-Nassau should be excluded from the throne.[58] In consequence, possibly, of this action by the Belgian
    deputies, Lords Grey and Palmerston appear to have
    mentioned the Archduke Charles of Austria to Talleyrand
    as a suitable candidate. But he objected, reminding
    them that his enthronement would constitute
    a restoration, which the most famous of Whigs had
    once described as “the worst of revolutions.” Moreover,
    Metternich, who had no desire to extend the
    influence of Austria in that direction, soon afterwards
    declared that the Archduke would decline the crown,
    both for himself and for his children, were it to be
    offered to him.[59] Talleyrand himself appears to have
    been the first to suggest that Leopold of Saxe-Coburg
    might with advantage be chosen to rule over the new
    State.[60] In putting forward this plan he seems to have
    been actuated chiefly by a desire to please the British
    government, but, for reasons which will be explained
    later, his proposal met with very little response.
    Meanwhile, the language of Mauguin and Lamarque
    in the Chamber, and the evident intention of the
    military party to object to any settlement which
    should not admit of the future union of Belgium
    with France, were rapidly impelling Louis Philippe
    to adopt an attitude of opposition to Great Britain
    and the other Powers.[61]


At the first sitting of the conference it had been
    decided that M. Bresson, the first secretary of the
    French embassy in London, and Mr. Cartwright, who
    held a similar position at the British embassy at the [Pg 50]Hague, should act as the commissioners of the Powers
    at Brussels. Cartwright, however, had soon been
    recalled in order that he might assume the duties of
    British minister at Frankfort, and Lord Ponsonby had
    been sent to take his place at Brussels. Ponsonby
    was the brother-in-law of Lord Grey and was reputed
    to be the handsomest man of his time. There was a
    story that as a youth he had been set upon by the
    mob in the Rue Saint-Honoré, in the early days of the
    revolution, and that it was only the protests of the
    women, that he was too good-looking to be hanged,
    which had saved him from “la lanterne.” Canning
    is said to have sent him to Buenos Ayres, in
    1826, upon his first diplomatic mission of importance,
    in order to please George IV., whose peace of
    mind was disturbed by Lady Cunningham’s too
    evident admiration of him.[62] In Belgium, at this
    time, the two chief political parties were the French
    party, consisting of the advocates of a union with
    France, and the Orange party, the members of which
    favoured the enthronement of the Prince of Orange.
    The first were unquestionably by far the most numerous,
    but the Orangists, who were to be found chiefly in
    business and commercial circles, were not without
    power and influence. Bresson, from the first moment
    of his arrival at Brussels, appears to have identified
    himself closely with the aspirations of the French
    party, whilst Ponsonby espoused no less zealously the
    cause of the Prince of Orange.[63] There was, thus,
    keen rivalry and apparently much personal dislike
    between these two representatives of the conference.


Louis Philippe would never appear seriously to have [Pg 51]entertained the notion of allowing one of his younger
    sons to accept the crown of Belgium, or of consenting
    to the union of Belgium with France. Lord Grey had
    given Talleyrand, who had been directed to sound the
    British government upon the subject, clearly to understand
    that the enthronement of a French prince would
    be regarded as a case for war—a declaration, which, in
    the words of Sébastiani, “had at least the merit of
    frankness.”[64] Of all the possible candidates for the
    Belgian crown Louis Philippe justly considered the
    Duc de Leuchtenberg to be the most undesirable. To
    have allowed any one connected with the Bonaparte
    family to become King of Belgium would have been
    exceedingly dangerous to the French monarchy.
    “There are no personal objections to him,” wrote
    Sébastiani to Bresson, “but all considerations must
    give way before the raison d’état.”[65] The candidate
    for whose success Louis Philippe was in reality most
    anxious, and whose selection Sébastiani instructed
    both Bresson and Talleyrand to advocate cautiously,
    was Prince Charles of Naples. This young prince was
    a Neapolitan Bourbon, a brother of the Duchesse de
    Berri and a nephew of the French queen, Marie Amélie,
    and Louis Philippe was always as desirous as any king
    of the old régime to promote the aggrandizement of
    his family. But when Talleyrand mentioned his name
    to Lord Grey he was told at once that his connection
    with the reigning House in France constituted an
    insuperable objection,[66] whilst from Brussels Bresson
    reported that “the Prince of Naples had no following.”[67]


 [Pg 52]


A second attempt, on the part of the provisional
    government at Brussels to persuade Louis Philippe to
    accept the crown for his son, was made in December
    1830. On that occasion M. Van de Weyer carried
    the proposal to Paris. British hostility was to be
    overcome by the marriage of Nemours, the young
    prince whom it was proposed to elevate to the throne,
    to an English princess, and by the conversion of
    Antwerp into a free port and by the destruction of
    its fortifications.[68] Louis Philippe declined the offer,
    but the already-mentioned instructions sent to Talleyrand
    to ascertain the views of the British government
    upon the subject were probably a consequence of Van
    de Weyer’s mission. Bresson, however, soon after he
    had received Sébastiani’s despatch, informing him of
    the King’s determination to refuse the crown for his
    son, expressed great fear lest Leuchtenberg should be
    selected. His candidature was, he reported, the result
    of a Bonapartist intrigue organized in Paris, but the
    Belgians were tired of their unsettled condition and
    were anxious that a ruler of some kind should be
    chosen.[69] Some ten days later he forwarded intelligence
    of a more precise and of a yet more disquieting
    nature. The French party, led by M. Gendebien, in
    consequence of the refusal of Nemours, had now
    definitely adopted Leuchtenberg as their candidate.
    Moreover, three notorious Bonapartist generals,
    Excelmans, Lallemand and Fabvier, were reported to
    have arrived at Namur and Liège. This news was
    followed the next day by a despatch in which he complained
    of Ponsonby’s activity on behalf of the Prince
    of Orange and, at the same time, accused him of being
    favourable to the election of Leuchtenberg.[70]


 [Pg 53]


Louis Philippe was genuinely disquieted by
    Bresson’s news. He was resolved, he told Lord
    Granville, who, early in January, had replaced Lord
    Stuart de Rothesay at the British embassy, to send
    the Comte de Flahaut to London to impress upon the
    government the keen anxiety with which he regarded
    the march of events at Brussels. By existing treaties,
    he reminded him, no member of the Bonaparte family
    was allowed to live in Belgium, and, in the course of
    conversation, he hinted that a Neapolitan prince would
    be the best king for the new State.[71] Flahaut was a
    distinguished general officer of the empire and was,
    besides, the admitted father of that half-brother of
    Louis Napoleon, who was to acquire celebrity under
    the name of the Duc de Morny. During the greater
    part of the Restoration period Flahaut had lived in
    London, where his attractive manners and charm of
    conversation had made him a popular member of
    society. Moreover, during his residence in England,
    he had married Miss Mercer Elphinstone, a great
    heiress of her day.[72] The mission, upon which he was
    now despatched to London, was not confined merely
    to the communication to the British government of
    Louis Philippe’s fears respecting a Bonapartist candidate
    for the Belgian throne. But, as his instructions
    are not to be found among the diplomatic papers of
    the period, the exact nature of the proposals he was
    empowered to make can only be conjectured. In a
    private letter to Granville, on February 8, Palmerston
    speaks of a suggested offensive and defensive alliance
    between France and Great Britain “which was to be
    kept an entire secret from all the world,” to which
    proposal he had replied, “that these alliances are not
    popular in England, but that if France were attacked [Pg 54]unjustly, England would be found upon her side.”[73] From the despatches of Granville and of Talleyrand
    it may be inferred with certainty that some scheme
    was on foot whereby France was to acquire a part of
    Belgium and, in return for her consent to this plan,
    England was to have the right of garrisoning Antwerp,
    which was to be declared a free port.[74] Talleyrand,
    whilst favourable to the idea of converting Antwerp
    into a Hanseatic town, was very much opposed to the
    notion of assisting England to regain a footing upon
    the continent. It would be too high a price to pay,
    he contended, even for so popular a measure as the
    extension of the French frontiers into Belgium.[75]


Whilst Flahaut was thus engaged in London,
    Colonel the Marquis de Lawoëstine, a former aide-de-camp of Sébastiani and a Belgian of good family, had
    been despatched to Brussels. In his case also the
    precise object of his errand can only be surmised. It
    is clear, however, that M. Juste[76] is mistaken in
    supposing that he was sent to urge the national
    congress to elect the Duc de Nemours. “In general,”wrote Sébastiani to Bresson, when announcing the
    despatch of Lawoëstine, “you must say as little as
    possible about his mission, but you need make no
    mystery about it to Lord Ponsonby,”[77] a sentence which
    precludes the possibility that his journey to Brussels
    can have been connected with the election of a son of
    Louis Philippe. Without doubt Lawoëstine was
    primarily charged to combat the candidature of
    Leuchtenberg, but it would seem that he was directed [Pg 55]quietly to oppose Prince Charles of Naples to him.
    “It will be difficult,” answered Bresson upon receipt of
    Sébastiani’s despatch, “to keep secret the object of
    Lawoëstine’s mission. The candidature of Prince
    Charles of Naples has been talked about and the
    factions in Paris are working against him. Even M.
    de Mérode[78] is threatening to abandon Prince Charles
    and to vote in favour of the Duc de Leuchtenberg.”[79]


Lawoëstine, after “seeing all the chief people,”appears to have returned to Paris to lay before the
    King the urgency of the situation, whilst the tone
    of Bresson’s despatches, during the next few days,
    became yet more alarming. The bust of the Duc
    de Leuchtenberg, he reported, had been crowned at the
    theatre amidst cries of “Vive August 1er, Roi des
    Belges.” Only, he considered, by the nomination of
    the Duc de Nemours could Leuchtenberg be combated
    effectually.[80] Bresson himself, probably on either
    January 25 or 26, seems to have paid a hurried visit
    to Paris. On February 1 the national congress was
    to proceed to elect a King for Belgium, and, presumably,
    he wished to obtain fuller instructions as to the
    attitude he was to adopt in the different eventualities
    which might arise. By this time the 11th protocol of
    the London conference, that of January 20, 1831,
    defining the boundaries of Holland and Belgium, had
    been received by Lord Ponsonby and himself for
    communication to the provisional government. The
    conditions of separation, as laid down in that
    document, fell far short of the hopes of the Belgians.
    They claimed the districts of Luxemburg and Limburg,
    but the Powers assigned these provinces to Holland.
    The King of the Netherlands was also Grand Duke of [Pg 56]Luxemburg and as such was a member of the Germanic
    Confederation. His position had been recognized by the
    conference which, in its protocol of December 20, 1830,
    had formally declared its incompetence to interfere with
    territories forming part of the Confederation, a decision
    which excited equal dissatisfaction in Paris and in
    Brussels. If she could not obtain Luxemburg for herself,
    France hoped to see this province withdrawn from the
    Germanic Confederation and handed over to Belgium.


On January 29 Bresson reported his return to
    Brussels, having performed the journey from the
    French capital in twenty-five hours. He would appear
    to have been empowered by Louis Philippe himself to
    assure the members of the national congress that, were
    Nemours to be elected, he would be allowed to accept
    the crown. It is probable, however, that he was
    instructed only to resort to this step should he find it
    impossible to oppose Leuchtenberg successfully by
    other means. It may be inferred that neither Bresson
    nor Lawoëstine felt any enthusiasm about the election
    of a Neapolitan Bourbon, and were only too anxious to
    bestir themselves actively on behalf of a French prince.
    “Ponsonby supports Leuchtenberg as leading up to
    the Prince of Orange,” wrote Bresson on the day of his
    return.[81] “The effect of Lord Ponsonby’s communication
    to the congress of the protocol of January 20 has
    been very great,” reported Lawoëstine, who also was
    back in Brussels. “The only way of preventing the
    election of the Duc de Leuchtenberg is by bringing forward
    the Duc de Nemours. Even at the risk of a war
    with the Powers this course should be adopted. Belgium
    would be with us heart and soul, and we should begin
    the campaign in possession of the 23 frontier fortresses,
    all of which are provided with an immense matériel.”[82]


 [Pg 57]


On receipt of this news from his agents at Brussels
    Sébastiani, in order, presumably, to influence the
    national congress in favour of the French candidate,
    despatched a letter to Bresson the contents of which
    were intended for communication to the Belgian
    deputies. In this document, dated February 1,
    Sébastiani stated that France could not give her
    consent to the delimitation of frontiers or to the
    apportionment of the debt, as laid down in the 11th
    and 12th protocols of the London conference, unless
    these conditions should be deemed satisfactory by
    both the States concerned. The French government,
    holding that the conference had been convened for
    purposes of mediation only, could not allow it to
    assume a different character.[83] On February 3 the
    Duc de Nemours was elected King of the Belgians,
    and a deputation started at once for Paris to communicate
    the news officially to Louis Philippe.


In the meantime Sébastiani, on February 2, had
    informed Talleyrand that, were the Belgians to elect
    a son of Louis Philippe for their King, he would
    decline to accept the crown, but the occasion was to
    be utilized for bringing forward the Prince of Naples.
    He was confident that, in order to escape from the
    complications entailed by Nemours’ election, the
    Powers, at present hostile to the Neapolitan prince,
    would look upon his enthronement as a happy
    alternative. On February 4 he again affirmed the
    King’s intention of declining the crown for his son,
    but his despatch of the following day was replete
    with complaints of Ponsonby’s efforts upon behalf
    of the Prince of Orange, a course of conduct
    which, he declared, would inevitably lead to civil
    war. Were serious disturbances to break out in
    Belgium, France would be driven to intervene, and
    it was, therefore, necessary for Lords Grey and [Pg 58]Palmerston to understand that the situation was
    extremely critical.[84]


Talleyrand, however, was doing all in his power to
    convince his government of the disastrous effect which
    the rumours from Brussels were having upon public
    opinion in London. His declaration to the conference,
    on February 7, that the King of the French would
    refuse the crown of Belgium for his son had made a
    very good impression, and it had induced the plenipotentiaries
    to guarantee that, were Leuchtenberg to
    be elected, he would not be acknowledged by their
    respective Courts.[85] But, on the same day, he reported
    that the Cabinet, after a prolonged sitting, had
    resolved to declare war upon France, should the crown
    of Belgium be accepted by Nemours, and he begged
    Sébastiani to reflect most seriously upon the
    consequences of a naval conflict. Bresson’s behaviour
    at Brussels, he complained, had placed him in a very
    difficult position, and if the King could not see his
    way to follow his advice, his continued presence in
    London could no longer serve any useful purpose,
    Montrond, who by his desire was returning to Paris,
    would tell the King and his ministers that in London,
    at the clubs and in society, the prospects of a war
    with France were the chief topic of conversation.[86]


Although Louis Philippe and Sébastiani repeatedly
    assured Lord Granville that there was no intention
    of accepting the crown for Nemours,[87] it was not until
    February 17 that the King officially received the
    members of the deputation and signified to them his
    refusal. The interval, between their arrival in Paris
    and their formal interview with Louis Philippe, appears [Pg 59]to have been employed in vain attempts to induce them
    to pronounce themselves in favour of the Neapolitan
    prince. “We have tried to make them see,” wrote
    Sébastiani to Talleyrand, “the advantages which
    would accrue to all parties from the enthronement
    of Prince Charles of Naples.”[88] But, in the meantime,
    his letter to Bresson of February 1, in which he
    had declared that the French government could not
    adhere to the 11th and 12th protocols of the conference,
    had been published in the Belgian newspapers and had
    caused Palmerston to instruct Granville to demand
    an explanation. The ambassador was to point out
    that, “when a government sees fit to disavow the acts
    of its plenipotentiary, it should acquaint the parties
    with whom the engagement has been made of the
    fact, not, as in this case, communicate its disavowal to
    third parties.” Palmerston’s despatch concluded with
    the intimation that “His Majesty’s government had
    only allowed the conference to continue because it
    was convinced that satisfactory explanations would
    be forthcoming.” Instructions of a like nature were
    received by the Russian, the Prussian and the
    Austrian ambassadors.”[89]


Sébastiani, whilst pretending that Bresson had no
    authority to make public his letter, maintained that
    the London conference had no power to do more than
    mediate between the contending parties, and that
    France “could not be a member of a revised Holy
    Alliance which was to decide arbitrarily upon the
    affairs of nations.” Furthermore he declined to recall
    M. Bresson from Brussels, unless Lord Ponsonby were
    removed at the same time.[90] Fresh instances were
    soon forthcoming, however, of Bresson’s opposition to [Pg 60]the decisions of the conference of which he was
    nominally the agent. Since the conclusion of the
    armistice between the Belgians and the Dutch,
    disputes had been frequent as to the infractions of
    its conditions. The Dutch, in violation of the terms
    imposed by the Powers, held the citadel of Antwerp
    and closed the navigation of the Scheldt, whilst, as a
    reprisal, the Belgians set up a blockade of Maëstricht.
    The conference had, in consequence, instructed its
    representatives at Brussels to warn the provisional
    government that, unless communications were opened
    between Maëstricht and the surrounding country, the
    Federal Diet would be invited to raise the blockade
    by force of arms. But M. Bresson, alleging as a
    reason for his conduct des motifs à lui personnels,
    declined to sign the note which Lord Ponsonby duly
    presented to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.[91] Lord Granville was in consequence directed to inform
    Sébastiani that the conference could no longer regard
    M. Bresson as its agent.[92] When the contents of
    Palmerston’s despatch were read out to him Sébastiani
    declared that he should retain him at Brussels as
    French minister.[93] This was, however, but an empty
    threat. Bresson, since Louis Philippe’s refusal to
    allow his son to be proclaimed King, was most
    unpleasantly situated towards the members of the
    national congress, to whom he had given the most
    positive assurances that, were Nemours to be elected,
    he would be permitted to accept the crown. It is
    very probable that in order to overcome the hesitation
    of his government he may deliberately have expressed
    exaggerated fears about the prospects of Leuchtenberg’s
    enthronement. The complete subsidence[94] of the [Pg 61]agitation on behalf of the Bonapartist candidate
    certainly accords ill with the alarming reports about
    the strength of the movement in his favour which he
    had transmitted to Sébastiani. But it would appear
    that when he paid his visit to Paris, at the end of
    January, he was himself deceived by Louis Philippe,
    and that his promises to the Belgian deputies, that
    Nemours would accept the crown, were made under
    the honest impression that the King’s objection had
    been withdrawn. “You know the august mouth
    from which issued my last orders,” he wrote to
    Sébastiani on February 9. “You heard them. Do not
    fear, they shall remain hidden at the bottom of my
    heart. But I cannot go back upon my footsteps. I
    cannot be the agent of another change of policy. I
    must ask you to replace me. I can sacrifice my
    interests, not my honour.”[95] “The painful and
    difficult situation in which you are placed,” answered
    Sébastiani, “is well understood here, but the King
    does full justice to your conduct and to your zeal for
    his service.”[96]


On March 6 Bresson formally transmitted to
    London his resignation of the post of commissioner to
    the conference and returned to Paris, being replaced
    at Brussels, as the agent of the French government,
    by General Belliard. The rapid advancement which
    awaited him was to compensate him amply for the
    loss of this appointment. But it was not alone from
    foreign governments that Sébastiani received complaints
    about these proceedings at Brussels. Talleyrand
    expressed the greatest indignation at the
    ignorance in which he had been kept of the instructions
    sent to Bresson. The whole affair, he pointed
    out, had placed him in a false position with Palmerston [Pg 62]and the ministers of the Powers, and had laid him
    open to the most injurious suspicions. It must
    appear either that he was unacquainted with the
    intentions of his government, or that he was in league
    with Bresson to deceive the conference.[97]


In the meantime, Paris had been the scene of
    disturbances which were to change completely the
    course of French policy. On February 14, the
    anniversary of the death of the Duc de Berri, the
    Carlists decided to hold a memorial service in the
    church of Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois. But the ceremony
    was interrupted by a mob, which had collected
    at the rumour that a portrait of the Duc de Bordeaux[98] had been crowned. The church and the palace of the
    archbishop were sacked, and much valuable and
    beautiful property was destroyed. The authorities
    made only the feeblest attempts to restrain the rioters,
    and cast the whole blame for the disorder upon the
    Carlists.[99] Moreover, as a concession to the rabble,
    all crosses were removed from in front of churches, the
    bust of Louis XVIII. was destroyed at the Louvre, and
    Louis Philippe even sanctioned the erasure of the
    lilies from his coat of arms. The indignation with
    which these despicable signs of weakness were greeted,
    soon convinced him, however, that he might
    with safety abandon his policy of truckling to the
    mob. For some time past, the hopes of all lovers
    of order had been centred in, Casimir Périer, as the
    one man capable of maintaining peace abroad, and
    of combating anarchy at home. Negotiations were
    accordingly begun, and, on March 14, the Moniteur announced that Laffitte had been replaced as President [Pg 63]of the Council by Casimir Périer, who had, besides,
    assumed the duties of Minister of the Interior.
    With two exceptions the members of the new Cabinet
    had all held office in the Laffitte administration. But
    so little were the rules of the party system observed,
    that they were quite prepared to enter a government,
    formed upon principles diametrically opposed to those
    which had guided the policy of the former Cabinet.
    Casimir Périer was pledged to the stern repression
    of internal disorder, and to the maintenance of
    external peace. In addition, he had asked that the
    King should be absent from meetings of the Cabinet—request
    to which Louis Philippe had given a
    grudging and a qualified assent.[100]


The news that M. Casimir Périer had assumed
    office was received with feelings of intense relief at
    the Courts and in the Cabinets of Europe.[101] The new
    President of the Council belonged to a family of high
    repute in banking and commercial circles. Under the
    Restoration he had been an eloquent and much
    respected member of the Liberal party. Heinrich
    Heine, who disliked the French as keenly as he
    admired the English statesman, has declared that
    Casimir Périer strangely resembled George Canning
    in personal appearance. In both he perceived the
    same expression of “invalidity, over-excitement and
    lassitude.”[102] Sébastiani’s continued retention of the
    portfolio of Foreign Affairs was also a subject for
    congratulation. In spite of his Corsican excitability,
    he had, upon the whole, won the confidence of the
    ministers with whom he had had business to transact.
    “The Dips,” wrote Lady Granville to her sister, “are [Pg 64]all pleased that Sébastiani remains, he is decidedly
    pacific.”[103]


The state of affairs in Europe, at the time of the
    formation of Casimir Périer’s government, still bore a
    most disquieting appearance. At the beginning of
    February, 1831, General Diebitsch entered Poland at
    the head of a strong Russian army, and, on the 25th,
    there was fought at Grochov one of the fiercest battles
    of the century, with results rather favourable to the
    Poles. At the same time the Italian States were in a
    condition of acute discontent. The Duke of Modena
    had been compelled to invoke Austrian assistance
    against his revolted subjects, and, on February 5, the Carbonari raised the standard of rebellion at Bologna.
    The States of the Pope extended from the Latin coast
    across the Campagna to the marches of Ancona, and,
    spreading out into the plains of Romagna, were
    bounded by the Po. In the opinion of Chateaubriand,[104] who was ambassador at Rome in 1828, one of
    the chief defects of the Papal government lay in
    the fact that “old men appoint an old man, and he
    in turn makes none but old men cardinals.” This
    feature of the Pontifical rule seems to have attracted
    the attention of Charles Greville[105] when he visited
    Rome, in 1830. “The cardinals,” he records, “appear
    a wretched set of old twaddlers, all but about three in
    extreme decrepitude. On seeing them and knowing
    that the sovereign is elected by and from them,
    nobody can wonder that the country is so miserably
    governed.” But it was the doctrine that only
    ecclesiastics could administer a government of divine
    appointment which constituted the radical vice of the
    Papal system. Cardinals ruled over the four
    Legations of Romagna—Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna [Pg 65]and Forli. Generally speaking, their administration
    was both bigoted and corrupt. The finances were
    constantly in a condition of hopeless confusion—a
    circumstance hardly to be wondered at, seeing that a
    prelate in charge of the Exchequer is said to have
    refused to study political economy, because some of
    the text books were upon the Index. The roads
    were bad, few in number, and infested with brigands.
    Taxation was light, but trade was hampered by
    customs barriers. An arbitrary and interfering police
    system was supplemented by the Holy Office of the
    Inquisition, which still repressed heresy among
    Roman subjects, although it did not venture to
    meddle with foreigners. Lastly, it was estimated that
    not more than two per cent. of the population attended
    school.


Bologna was the most flourishing manufacturing
    town in the dominions of His Holiness, and Ancona
    the only port which could boast of a real trade.
    Probably it was because of their comparative prosperity
    that the people of Romagna were in a chronic state of
    unrest. The Pontifical troops, sent to suppress the
    insurrection, quickly proved their inability to carry
    out the task, and His Holiness appealed to Vienna
    for assistance. Sébastiani, so soon as he received
    intelligence that this request had been made,
    instructed Marshal Maison to warn Metternich that
    France could not consent to the entry of Austrian
    troops into the Papal States, and, on February 24, he
    informed Apponyi in Paris that, in accordance with its
    principle of non-intervention, the French government
    would regard the passage of the Piedmontese or
    Roman frontiers by an Imperial army as a declaration
    of war.[106] But Metternich had already sent off the
    Comte Athanase d’Otrante, a son of Fouché, the
    famous regicide and Minister of Police, to Paris, with [Pg 66]documents to prove that the Italian insurrections
    were fomented by the Bonapartists. It was always
    in the power of Austria, he pointed out significantly,
    to put an end to the republican agitation in Italy,
    Spain, Germany or France, by simply allowing the Duc
    de Reichstadt, the heretofore King of Rome, to be
    proclaimed Emperor of the French.[107] It was perfectly
    true that the Bonapartes were concerned in the Italian
    revolutionary movement. Both Prince Charles and
    his brother Prince Louis Napoleon held commands in
    the rebel army at Civita Castellana. Without doubt
    this was a circumstance calculated to induce Louis
    Philippe to exercise the greatest caution. It was
    decided, accordingly, to despatch the Comte de Sainte-Aulaire
    to Rome to urge upon the Papal government
    the expediency of withdrawing from ecclesiastics the
    administration of the provincial affairs of Romagna,
    and of confiding the management of local business to
    the nobility and middle classes. Maison was to press
    the Cabinet of Vienna to join with France in persuading
    His Holiness to inaugurate these reforms, whilst
    in London Talleyrand was to seek to obtain the co-operation
    of the British government. Palmerston, who
    looked upon the condition of Italy as a perpetual menace
    to the peace of Europe, readily consented to instruct
    Sir Brooke Taylor, the British Minister at Florence,
    to proceed to Rome to take part in the conference.[108] Metternich agreed with equal alacrity to the French
    proposals. But it was not his policy to allow reforms
    of any kind to be introduced into Italy, and he was
    fully resolved that the deliberations should lead to no
    results of any consequence. “We risk nothing,” he [Pg 67]wrote to Apponyi. . . . “Count Lützow[109] is a man of
    character, he knows what is practicable.”[110]


But the good effect of Metternich’s consent to
    confer with the Powers, upon the condition of affairs,
    in the Papal States, was dispelled by a false report
    which reached Paris of the conclusion of a treaty
    between Austria and His Holiness. This news was
    followed, on March 18, by the intelligence that an
    Imperial army had entered Bologna. War, Sébastiani
    informed Granville, was now inevitable. Nevertheless,
    in the evening, when the ambassador read over to him
    the account of their conversation which he proposed
    to send to London, he suggested that the words “war
    was very probable” should be substituted for his
    statement that “war was inevitable.”[111] For the next
    fortnight the situation continued to wear a most
    critical appearance. At a Cabinet Council, held on
    March 28, it was resolved to demand the evacuation
    of the Papal States, and to ask the Chambers for a
    vote of credit, to enable the King to mobilize the
    army. Casimir Périer,[112] however, reassured Lord
    Granville by telling him that the Austrians would
    assuredly have crushed the insurrection in Romagna
    before Maison’s instructions could reach Vienna, and
    that the message to the Chambers, far from being a
    measure calculated to bring about war, would, on the
    contrary, assist the King to preserve peace. Were
    the government to appear indifferent to the entry of
    the Austrians into the Papal States, the military party
    would at once raise the cry that ministers wanted
    peace at any price. Louis Philippe himself expressed
    to the British ambassador the greatest confidence that [Pg 68]hostilities would be avoided. The preservation of the
    temporal power of the Pope, he went on to tell him,
    was a cardinal feature of French policy. Five or six
    millions of his subjects professed the Roman Catholic
    religion,[113] and he was determined to remain upon good
    terms with the head of the Church.[114] The King of
    Prussia, Lord Granville was satisfied, was resolved
    to take no part in the struggle, should the Austrian
    intervention in Italy lead to a collision with France.[115] Heytesbury, on the other hand, reported that Nicholas,
    although the cholera was raging in Russia and notwithstanding
    that he had still the Polish war upon his
    hands, had announced his determination “to bring the
    whole force of his Empire to the assistance of his
    Austrian ally.”[116] But Metternich, in the meanwhile,
    had empowered Apponyi to declare that no treaty had
    been concluded, and to support his statement by the
    production of a copy of His Holiness’ appeal for help
    to the Emperor Francis. Moreover, he promised that
    the Legations should be evacuated “as soon as they
    should have been purged of the Carbonari vermin
    with which they were infested.”[117] In effect the
    Austrians experienced little difficulty in dispersing
    the insurgents and in restoring a semblance of
    tranquillity in the disturbed districts, whilst at Rome
    His Holiness undertook to initiate certain reforms, in
    accordance with the spirit of the proposals which the
    western Powers urged him to adopt. By July 17 the
    complete withdrawal of the Imperial troops from
    the territories of the Pope had been carried out.


The effect of Casimir Périer’s assumption of office
    upon the course of the Belgian negotiations was soon [Pg 69]apparent. Nothing more was heard of the candidature
    of Prince Charles of Naples. “As a member of the
    elder branch of the Bourbons, France,” wrote
    Sébastiani, “would reject him with indignation.”[118] Under these circumstances the French government
    decided to exert its influence in favour of Leopold of
    Coburg, although his enthronement, Louis Philippe
    assured Lord Granville, would not be well received in
    France. He will be looked upon as an English viceroy,
    but, insinuated the King, the nation could be
    reconciled to the choice of this prince, were it possible
    to announce that those portions of her northern
    territory, of which she had been deprived by the
    treaties of 1815, were to be restored to France.[119]


Leopold, the youngest son of Francis Duke of
    Coburg, was born in 1790. On May 2, 1816, he
    married the only daughter of George IV., the Princess
    Charlotte, who died the following year, five hours
    after giving birth to a dead child. As a widower, the
    Prince continued to live in England in enjoyment of
    the pension of £50,000 a year which Parliament had
    settled upon him for life. In 1829 he was chosen by
    the Powers for the throne of Greece, but, after
    signifying his acceptation of the crown, he saw fit to
    change his mind, alleging that the frontiers, which the
    conference purposed to impose upon the new State,
    were regarded as unsatisfactory by the Greek nation.
    There would appear to have been good reasons for his
    withdrawal, but it, nevertheless, caused the greatest
    annoyance to the Tories who were then in office. The
    Whigs, although less bitter against the Marquis
    Peu-à-Peu, as George IV. nicknamed him, had
    certainly no very high opinion of his ability to fill [Pg 70]a difficult position.[120] It was clear, however, that all
    hope must be abandoned of inducing the Belgians to
    accept the Prince of Orange for their King. This
    Prince had been spending the winter in London where,
    according to Greville, “he made a great fool of
    himself and destroyed any sympathy there might have
    been for his political misfortunes.”[121] In the words of
    Talleyrand, Palmerston was, in consequence, prepared
    to accept “sans chaleur,”[122] the candidature of Leopold
    of Coburg, whilst maintaining that, before electing
    their Sovereign, the Belgians must adhere to the 11th
    and 12th protocols, which laid down the conditions
    under which their country was to be separated from
    Holland.[123]


On April 17 Talleyrand was in a position to
    announce to the conference that France now gave her
    unqualified assent to the proposed terms of separation.
    On this occasion it was resolved, at the suggestion of
    the French plenipotentiary, that, should Belgium
    decline to adhere to the conditions in question, which
    the King of the Netherlands had accepted, all relations
    should be broken off between the five Powers and the
    Belgian authorities. To prove the satisfaction which
    this changed attitude on the part of the French
    government afforded them the plenipotentiaries of
    Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain met, and
    recorded their agreement to the principle of the
    destruction of the barrier fortresses, the protocol of
    this conference of the four Powers being communicated
    in confidence to Talleyrand.[124]


 [Pg 71]


The question of the nature of the coercion which
    should be applied to the Belgians, should they
    persist in laying claim to Luxemburg, was not easy
    of solution. The Grand Duchy formed part of the
    Germanic Confederation, and therefore it should
    have devolved upon the Federal Diet to take the
    steps required for restoring the sovereignty of
    the King of the Netherlands. Sébastiani, however,
    deprecated the idea of employing German troops for
    the purpose of enforcing the decisions of the conference.
    But on the understanding that both the strength of
    the contingent, which was to enter Belgium, and the
    date on which the military operations were to begin
    should be settled by the five Powers, the French
    government withdrew its objections.[125] Prince Leopold,
    at the same time, informed the members of the
    deputation, who had come to London to offer him
    the crown of Belgium, that he could not listen to
    their proposals, until the national congress should
    have accepted the conditions of the 11th and 12th
    protocols. No persuasion could move him from this
    resolution which met with the full approval of the
    British government. Talleyrand, however, as a compromise
    appears to have suggested the plan of proposing
    to the King of the Netherlands the cession
    of the province of Luxemburg, without the fortress,
    in return for a pecuniary indemnity.[126] This solution
    of the difficulty was considered so practicable by Lord
    Ponsonby that, upon his own responsibility, he left
    Brussels and journeyed to London to urge its adoption.
    The conference, in consequence of his representations, [Pg 72]agreed to open negotiations with the King of the
    Netherlands for the purchase of Luxemburg and for
    “so much of the province of Limburg as would
    connect Maëstricht with North Brabant.”[127] But when
    June 1, the date which had been assigned as that
    on which the Belgians must signify their agreement
    to les bases de separation, went by without a favourable
    answer having been received from Brussels, the
    conference withdrew Ponsonby and decided to resort
    to measures of coercion. The action of the national
    congress, in electing Prince Leopold King of the
    Belgians on June 4, had no effect upon the decision of
    the Powers. “It has been used,” wrote Palmerston,
    “as a fresh opportunity for putting forward pretensions
    to portions of the territory of the King of
    Holland and by implication, at least, of repeating
    their determination to gain possession of them by
    force.”[128]


But, as the moment approached for setting in
    motion General Hinüber’s Federal corps d’armée, the
    French government evinced symptoms of alarm.
    Sébastiani begged Talleyrand to try by all means in
    his power to discover some less objectionable method
    of terminating the difficulty. The King and his
    ministers, he assured him, placed their entire trust in
    his wisdom and vast experience.[129] Casimir Périer
    impressed upon Lord Granville that he would be
    powerless to restrain the army, were the Prussians and
    the Dutch to attack the Belgians “ranged under the
    tricolour.” “Sufficient allowance,” he pleaded, “was
    not made for the weakness of a government sprung
    from a revolution.”[130] Talleyrand, however, reported
    that, in spite of his efforts and of those of Prince [Pg 73]Leopold to make the Belgians listen to reason, they
    refused obstinately to accept the conditions imposed
    upon them. At the Hague there was, he believed, a
    keen desire to bring on a general war, whilst the Tsar
    Nicholas was not sorry that the attention of the
    western Powers should be diverted from Poland to the
    Low Countries. In England men’s minds were concentrated
    exclusively upon the Reform Bill, and the
    knowledge that France and Great Britain were confronted
    by grave domestic problems undoubtedly
    encouraged the Belgians to defy the conference.
    Under these circumstances, his favourite scheme, the
    partition of the country, appeared to him the only
    practicable solution of the question. But on this
    occasion the idea of acquiring some part of Belgium
    offered no attractions to the French government.
    “We are disposed to think,” answered Sébastiani,
    “that any partition would recall that of Poland, and
    would not be popular.”[131]


The determination of the Powers to impose by
    force of arms the terms of the protocols of January 20
    and 27 was, however, growing weaker. In their desire
    to avoid a general war they agreed to depart from a
    decision, which they had once pronounced to be irrevocable.
    The event was to prove that by this concession
    they had sensibly increased the danger of that armed
    conflict between the nations, which they were so
    anxious to avert. At the sitting of the conference, on
    June 26, the plenipotentiaries, “in the interests of the
    general peace,” affixed their signatures to a protocol of
    eighteen articles for acceptance by Holland and
    Belgium.[132] The altered conditions, although they did
    not fulfil all their aspirations, were far more favourable
    to the Belgians than the terms of the former bases de [Pg 74]séparation. The most important modification consisted
    in a provision for maintaining a status quo in Luxemburg,
    pending the negotiations which were to be
    carried out between Belgium, on the one hand, and
    Holland and the Germanic Confederation, on the other.
    Prince Leopold, when the protocol of the eighteen
    articles was laid before him, agreed to accept the crown
    provided, always, that the national congress could be
    brought to assent to the new conditions which it set
    forth. After several stormy debates in the assembly
    this stipulation was complied with, and on July 11, a
    deputation arrived in London to conduct the King to
    Belgium.


Leopold had been assured that, even should the
    King of the Netherlands decline to accept the eighteen
    articles, the Powers would none the less recognize him
    as the Sovereign of Belgium. But, when the refusal of
    King William was known in London, the plenipotentiaries
    of Austria, Prussia and Russia declared that
    their respective governments had decided to withhold
    their recognition of him. Leopold, however, wisely determined
    to adhere to his resolution and to be satisfied
    with the acknowledgment of France and Great Britain.
    Before finally leaving London he informed Lord Grey
    of his intention to renounce his English pension.
    Claremont was to be kept up and all his debts were to
    be paid, but, when these conditions had been fulfilled,
    his trustees would pay the balance of his annuity into
    the English exchequer. His decision to act in this
    manner was quickened, without doubt, by learning that
    in the House of Lords, Londonderry, an Opposition
    peer, purposed to raise the question of his retention of
    his English pension.[133]


During the month of July an affair of some
    delicacy was amicably settled between the Cabinets of
    London and Paris. For some time past the government [Pg 75]of M. Périer had been trying to obtain redress for
    the indignities to which French subjects, especially
    those suspected of affiliation to masonic lodges, were
    exposed in Portugal. Palmerston admitted the justice
    of the French complaints and raised no objections when
    it was proposed to send a fleet to Lisbon to demand
    satisfaction.[134] On July 8, accordingly, Admiral Roussin
    forced the entrance to the Tagus and ranged his
    squadron within gunshot of the quays of Lisbon.
    The Portuguese government, under these circumstances,
    was compelled to accede to the demands which the
    admiral had been instructed to make, and the French
    fleet, shortly afterwards, withdrew, carrying off with
    it, however, several Portuguese vessels of war. But,
    although the affair gave rise to no complications
    between England and France, it was seized upon by an
    embittered Opposition in London, as an opportunity for
    denouncing the failure of the government to protect
    England’s “most ancient ally.”[135]


The refusal of the King of the Netherlands to
    accept the new conditions of separation, as defined in the
    protocol of the eighteen articles, was communicated to
    the conference by the Dutch minister, Verstolk. The
    despatch, dated July 12, 1831, concluded with the
    menace that, “were any Prince to accept the crown of
    Belgium without having acceded to les bases de
    séparation as laid down in the protocol of January 20,
    he would be regarded as in a state of war with His
    Majesty and as his enemy.”[136] The representatives of the
    Powers appear to have treated these ominous words
    very lightly. An intimation was conveyed to the
    Hague that hostilities must not break out afresh, but
    no active measures were taken to prevent a rupture of [Pg 76]the peace. It was soon evident, however, that the
    King was fully resolved to put his threat into execution.
    On August 1, Chassé, the Dutch general commanding
    the citadel of Antwerp, denounced the armistice and
    gave notice that hostilities would begin on the 4th.
    Leopold at once appealed for help to France and
    England, and then placed himself at the head of a
    wing of his army upon the Scheldt. But the retreat
    of General Daine, commanding the Belgian division
    upon the Meuse, who abandoned his positions without
    firing a shot, compelled the King to fall back to
    Louvain. Here he made his dispositions for withstanding
    the Dutch inroad, but, in spite of the gallant
    example which he set his men, his army, at the first
    contact with the enemy, fled in wild confusion. In
    the meantime, however, Marshal Gérard had entered
    Belgium in command of 50,000 French troops, and,
    when Leopold was upon the point of being surrounded,
    Sir Robert Adair, the British minister at Brussels, prevailed
    upon the Prince of Orange to suspend hostilities.
    The Dutch, shortly afterwards, began their retreat
    closely followed by the French, and, by August 20,
    the last of the invaders had evacuated the territory of
    Belgium.


It had been an easy matter to bring the actual
    hostilities to a close, but the Dutch raid had none the
    less created precisely that situation which British
    diplomacy had always striven to avoid. The French
    were now in complete possession of Belgium. Palmerston,
    indeed, strongly suspected them of having instigated
    the King of the Netherlands to break the peace.
    Sir Richard Bagot, the British ambassador at the
    Hague, inclined to the belief that a secret understanding
    existed between the Dutch and French governments.
    “Talleyrand,” wrote Palmerston in a private
    letter to Granville, “proposed to me some time ago
    that we should goad the Dutch on to break the armistice, [Pg 77]cry out shame upon them, fly to the aid of the Belgians,
    cover Belgium with troops and settle everything as we
    choose.” “It would seem,” reported Granville, “that
    the King of Holland rather expected from the French
    government approbation than opposition to his invasion.”[137] It is not improbable that the Cabinet of the
    Hague may have been led to believe that a rupture of
    the armistice would meet with approval in Paris. But,
    in order to have furthered French designs, it should
    have taken place at an earlier date. Talleyrand’s
    proposal to Palmerston, it is clear, must have been
    made in June, when he was telling Sébastiani that he
    could devise no other plan for settling the question of
    Belgium but that of partition. Once Leopold had
    been enthroned, however, he knew full well that no
    British government could acquiesce in the appropriation
    by France of any portion of his kingdom. The Dutch
    invasion, which might have served French policy, had
    it occurred whilst matters were still unsettled in
    Belgium, became simply an embarrassment and a
    certain cause of discord between France and England,
    after Leopold’s arrival at Brussels.[138] Talleyrand, therefore,
    who regarded the maintenance of cordial relations
    between the two countries as an object of far higher
    importance that any extension of French frontiers into
    Belgium, strove by all means in his power to second the
    efforts of the British government to bring the French
    occupation to a close as speedily as possible. But,
    whilst Palmerston attributed to French intrigues the
    Dutch attack upon Belgium, he himself was suspected
    by Stockmar[139] of having known of the King of Holland’s [Pg 78]plans and of having connived at the invasion. A few
    weeks later, however, when in London upon a confidential
    mission, Leopold’s trusted counsellor satisfied
    himself that Palmerston was wholly innocent of any
    double dealing in the affair.


Casimir Périer had been on the point of resigning, in
    consequence of the defeat of the ministerial candidate
    for the post of President of the Chamber, when the
    news reached Paris of the Dutch inroad into Belgium.
    This new development at once caused him to change
    his plans and to decide to remain in office. Talleyrand
    was instructed to explain in London that it was only
    the necessity for immediate action which had induced
    the French government to order a French corps to
    enter Belgium, without previous consultation with the
    Powers. Lord Granville, at the same time, was informed
    that, upon the withdrawal of the Dutch, the
    French troops would return to France.[140] The news of
    the French intervention in Belgium aroused great
    excitement in London. The funds fell, and Palmerston
    was sharply questioned upon the matter in the House.[141] Ministers, however, reassured by the accounts of the
    intentions of the French government transmitted by
    Granville, took a cheerful view of the situation.[142] At a
    sitting of the conference, on August 6, Talleyrand
    announced that Marshal Gérard’s occupation of Belgium
    would cease directly the Dutch should evacuate the
    country. On this same occasion it was agreed that
    the scope of the French operations should be decided
    by the conference and that, under no circumstances,
    should they be extended to the right bank of the
    Meuse. It was further resolved that siege should not [Pg 79]be laid to either Maëstricht or Venlo, on account of
    their proximity to the Prussian frontier.[143]


But, when the Dutch withdrew and the French
    showed no disposition to follow their example, the
    affair began to assume a very different complexion.
    Sébastiani, changing his ground completely, declared
    that Marshal Gérard’s occupation must continue until
    the conclusion of a definite treaty of peace between
    Holland and Belgium. In the Chamber, Soult, the
    Minister of War, stated explicitly that the retreat of
    the Dutch did not entail the evacuation of Belgium
    by the French army. The unfavourable impression
    created by these words was not removed by Casimir
    Périer’s promise to Lord Granville, that he would
    say something from the tribune calculated to diminish
    the importance of the Marshal’s pronouncement.
    Sébastiani’s conversations with the British ambassador,
    and the reports forwarded by Adair from Brussels
    made it too clear that the French government purposed
    to avail itself of the presence of its troops in Belgium
    for coming to a separate agreement with King Leopold,
    respecting the immediate destruction of the frontier
    fortresses. This was an arrangement which the Cabinet
    of Lord Grey was determined to oppose, even to the
    point of war.[144]


Talleyrand, as was his invariable practise in these
    disputes between France and England, left no stone
    unturned to dissuade his government from embarking
    upon a course of conduct destined inevitably to revive
    the old rivalry between the two countries. Were
    France to break her word and to retain her troops in
    Belgium, he was convinced that Lord Grey and his
    colleagues would be driven from office and their successors
    would be men far less well disposed towards [Pg 80]France. Palmerston, he wrote, was assailed by
    questions in the House and must before long make
    some definite statement. Sébastiani, in reply, expressed
    regret for the difficulties by which Lord Grey
    was beset, but maintained that the French government,
    were it to allow the army to return home empty
    handed, would be confronted by a still more unpleasant
    situation. Talleyrand, however, might announce that,
    in consequence of the retirement of the Dutch, 20,000
    of Marshal Gérard’s troops would be recalled and that
    the remaining 30,000 would be concentrated at
    Nivelle.[145] The news of this partial evacuation caused
    much satisfaction in London, but none the less Palmerston,
    on August 17, instructed Lord Granville formally
    to demand the complete withdrawal of the French
    army corps. He was directed to remind the French
    government of its pledges and to point out that, by
    the protocol of April 17, the four Powers had agreed
    to the principle of the destruction of the frontier fortresses,
    “the satisfactory execution of which arrangement
    could only be impeded by any measures having
    the appearance of making the protracted occupation of
    Belgium by the French army bear upon it. . . .” He
    was to speak “in terms of friendship and goodwill,
    enforcing at the same time the just expectations of
    His Majesty with firmness and decision.”[146]


On August 23 the conference decided to impose
    an armistice upon the Dutch and Belgians, to expire on
    October 10.[147] The French government, however,
    declared that a mere undertaking by the King of the
    Netherlands, not to begin hostilities afresh, could not
    provide a guarantee for the maintenance of peace of
    sufficient weight to permit of the complete withdrawal [Pg 81]of the French army. General Baudrand, moreover,
    was sent to London with a letter from Louis Philippe
    to Talleyrand, in which the King expressed his displeasure
    with his action in signing a document of that
    nature. Baudrand during his stay in England had
    interviews both with Grey and Palmerston.[148] He
    appears to have expatiated upon the outcry which
    would be raised in the Chamber, were France to
    gain neither moral nor material advantages, in return
    for the expense to which she had been put by her
    intervention in aid of the King of the Belgians.
    Palmerston assured him that his colleagues and himself
    were sincerely anxious that M. Casimir Périer should
    remain in office, but, he added pointedly, “when to keep
    in a ministry of peace it became necessary to comply
    with the demands of the party which was for war, it
    was problematical what decree of advantage was
    thereby to be acquired.”[149] Talleyrand appears to have
    been little moved by the censure passed upon him.
    He contended that he had acted for the best, and that
    no fears need be entertained that the Dutch would
    again attack Belgium. At the same time he continued
    to urge the necessity of bringing the occupation of
    Belgium to a close. “There is more real anxiety over
    here than I have yet seen,” he wrote on August 27.
    “People are all talking of an interview between the
    Duke of Wellington and Lord Grey.” A few days
    later he again pleaded earnestly for evacuation,
    suggesting that the withdrawal of the troops might be
    carried out so slowly that some portion of them should
    still be in Belgium, at the expiration of the armistice.[150]


 [Pg 82]


In the meantime General La Tour-Maubourg had
    arrived at Brussels, on August 18, furnished with the
    draft of a treaty which he was to conclude with the
    Belgian government for the destruction of the barrier
    fortresses. In the first instance it was probably
    intended to keep his mission a secret, but different
    counsels seem to have prevailed, and, a few days after
    his departure, Sébastiani informed Granville of the
    reason of this officer’s journey to Brussels. France,
    he told the British ambassador, claimed the right to
    negotiate with regard to the fortresses and it was hoped
    that powers would be given to Sir Robert Adair to act
    with La Tour-Maubourg in the matter. This request,
    when in due course Granville transmitted it to London,
    was refused. Palmerston, in a long interview with
    Talleyrand, had already declared, in the most uncompromising
    language, that the pretensions of the French
    government to have a voice in determining the fate of
    these fortresses, erected at the expense of Great Britain,
    Russia, Austria and Prussia, could not be entertained.[151] Immediately on hearing of La Tour-Maubourg’s arrival
    at Brussels Sir Robert Adair, guessing the object of
    his mission, sought an audience with Leopold. Both
    to the King and to Meulinäer, the Minister for Foreign
    Affairs, he asserted emphatically that his government
    could never admit that the withdrawal of Gérard’s
    troops could be made to depend upon the conclusion
    of an arrangement between France and Belgium,
    respecting the fortresses.[152]


Leopold was in a most difficult situation. Although [Pg 83]he had invoked the assistance of France and England
    the moment the Dutch had announced their intention
    of beginning hostilities, he had only invited Marshal
    Gérard actually to cross the frontier when the misconduct
    of General Daine had seriously compromised
    his position.[153] He appears to have greatly distrusted
    the intentions of the French and to have proposed that
    England should occupy Antwerp in the name of the
    five Powers. Three days later, however, he desired
    Sir Robert Adair to consider this suggestion as withdrawn,
    stating that he was satisfied with Belliard’s
    assurances that the French would withdraw, as soon as
    the Dutch should have effected their retreat.[154] After
    the retirement of the Prince of Orange he was pressed,
    on the one side, by Sir Robert Adair to declare that
    he no longer required the presence of the French for
    his protection, whilst, on the other hand, General
    Belliard urged him no less vigorously to invite
    Marshal Gérard to remain in Belgium. Without
    doubt he was in a most cruel dilemma. He had no
    army worthy of the name, and was at the mercy of the
    Dutch should they return to the attack. Moreover, he
    had every reason to apprehend that the Republican and
    Orangist factions would regard the disturbed condition,
    to which the invasion had reduced the country, as a
    favourable opportunity for putting their designs into
    execution. Against the external and internal perils by
    which he was threatened he could only look for active
    assistance to the French. England was very jealous
    of French intervention in the Low Countries, but he
    had no grounds for supposing that Lord Grey would
    stir a finger to defend him from a rebellion of his subjects.
    The British government, indeed, had declined
    to send the fleet to the mouth of the Scheldt. The [Pg 84]desire to afford the French no pretext for remaining
    in Belgium undoubtedly dictated this refusal, which
    nevertheless increased Stockmar’s distrust of Palmerston’s
    policy. Adair soon discovered that, in his
    endeavours to obtain the speedy departure of the
    French, he could expect no assistance from Leopold.
    He could discern, he reported, no sense of shame nor
    of humiliation in the attitude of ministers or of the
    people generally. They appeared to regard the
    presence of Marshal Gérard’s troops simply as a means
    of extorting better terms from the Dutch.[155]


When Palmerston was informed of La Tour-Maubourg’s
    mission he at once directed Adair to
    remonstrate against any separate negotiation between
    France and Belgium, on the question of the fortresses.
    But his first interview with Meulinäer, after the
    receipt of his instructions, convinced Adair that “this
    delicate matter had already proceeded so far that no
    choice was left to him except to object in toto to every
    sort of communication on the subject.” A solution of
    the difficulty was discovered, however, in a suggestion,
    brought forward by the British minister, that “the
    King of the Belgians should declare to the King of
    the French, through M. de La Tour-Maubourg, that he
    was taking measures, in concert with Great Britain,
    Austria, Russia and Prussia, for the demolition of
    some of the fortresses erected since 1815.” A few
    days later Adair was informed that General Goblet
    would be despatched to London to negotiate a convention,
    whilst Leopold, on September 8, affixed his
    signature to a document, wherein he undertook to
    instruct his plenipotentiary to act in accordance with [Pg 85]the wishes of the French government in the matter of
    the selection of the fortresses to be dismantled.[156]


But in Paris the ambassadors of the four Powers
    had protested formally against the protracted occupation
    of Belgium by a French army. Palmerston, in
    forwarding to Granville a memorandum of the points
    he was to urge in his conference with Sébastiani,
    directed that this document “was not to be handed
    to that minister as a note, but that it was to be read
    to him confidentially . . . a course which has been
    adopted out of delicacy, and under the conviction that
    we shall hear in a few days that the French government
    has, of its own accord, given orders for the
    evacuation of Belgium.”[157] These representations
    obtained the desired effect. At Brussels Leopold
    suddenly discovered that the presence of Marshal
    Gérard’s soldiers were no longer necessary for his
    safety.[158] The announcement in the Moniteur, of
    September 15, of the ministerial decision to recall the
    army from Belgium was the signal for a violent outburst
    in the newspapers against the poltroonery of
    the government, in yielding to the dictation of the
    conference.[159] In London satisfaction at the French
    withdrawal was marred by the publication of a long
    list of officers, appointed by Marshal Soult, to inspect
    and organize the Belgian army. This circumstance
    was seized upon by the Opposition as an opportunity
    for attacking the foreign policy of the government.
    The Reform Bill was before the House of Lords and
    party spirit was running high. “King Leopold’s
    intention to employ French officers in his army,”declared Lord Londonderry, “was more prejudicial [Pg 86]to his independence than the retention of 12,000
    French troops in Belgium.” His Lordship then
    proceeded to review Talleyrand’s career, and to asperse
    his conduct, under the various régimes which he had
    served, with a virulence of language which has never
    since been used in that dignified assembly about the
    ambassador of a friendly Power. “There was a
    flirtation,” he asserted amidst much laughter, “going
    on between the government and France which he
    thought most improper. . . . To see ministers running
    to consult with that individual (Talleyrand) was creating
    a disgust which he thought most natural.” The
    Duke of Wellington, however, spoke up strongly for
    Talleyrand. In the many transactions upon which
    they had been engaged together, he assured the House
    that the Prince had always conducted himself with
    honour and uprightness. “He believed that no man’s
    public and private character had been so much
    maligned as that of that illustrious individual.”[160] Talleyrand was deeply moved by the Duke’s conduct
    on this occasion. “He was especially grateful to
    him,” he told Lord Alvanley, who the next day found
    him perusing an account of the debate, “because he
    was the only public man in the world who had ever
    said a good word for him.”[161]


Following closely upon the announcement that the
    French government had agreed to evacuate Belgium
    came the intelligence of the defeat of the Poles and of
    the entry of the Russians into Warsaw. The news
    was the signal for the outbreak of disturbances in
    Paris. Sébastiani’s famous statement to the Chamber
    “l’ordre règne à Varsovie,” was denounced with
    indignation by the demagogues. Both he and Casimir
    Périer were surrounded by a furious mob upon the
    Place Vendôme, and were for a time in no little [Pg 87]danger. The rioters interrupted the performances at
    the theatres, crying out that all places of amusement
    must be closed on a day of mourning. The marked
    reluctance of the national guards to act against their
    fellow-citizens imparted a serious aspect to the situation.
    But the regular troops retained their discipline
    and dispersed the rabble.[162] At the first outbreak of
    the rebellion in Poland the French government had
    sought to induce England to join with it in a proposal
    to mediate between the Emperor and his revolted
    subjects. Talleyrand, however, who was always
    disposed to create difficulties for Russia, was obliged
    to report regretfully that British ministers were
    extremely averse to embarking upon any diplomatic
    action calculated to add to the Tsar’s embarrassments.[163]


In March, 1831, a false report had reached London
    and Paris of the total defeat of the Poles, whereupon
    Sébastiani again instructed Talleyrand to urge, in
    the most pressing language, the British government
    to unite with France in insisting upon the humane
    treatment of the rebels. Palmerston, believing the
    insurrection to be at an end, readily promised to
    direct Lord Heytesbury to support the representations
    upon their behalf which the Duc de Mortemart had
    been enjoined to make at St. Petersburg.[164] Heytesbury,
    accordingly, intimated to Count Nesselrode that, were
    any measures to be adopted towards Poland at
    variance with existing engagements, both Great
    Britain and France would be under the necessity of
    remonstrating formally. The Kingdom of Poland, it
    should be remembered, had been constituted in 1815
    under the guarantee of the five Powers, and it was, in [Pg 88]consequence, possible to contend, with some show of
    reason, that all of them were equally concerned in the
    maintenance of the liberties conceded to the Poles,
    under the terms of the Vienna treaty. Heytesbury’s
    conversations with Count Nesselrode convinced him,
    however, that, although the letter of that agreement
    might be observed, the Polish constitution would be
    virtually abolished. But, in reporting the nature of
    the intentions by which he conceived the Russian
    government to be animated, the able and experienced
    diplomatist who then represented Great Britain at St.
    Petersburg was at pains to point out the difficulties of
    the Tsar’s position. In Russia there was a strong
    public opinion which even the autocratic Nicholas
    could not afford to disregard. Were former conditions
    to be restored in Poland, and were the authors of the
    cold-blooded assassinations at Warsaw to be permitted
    to escape unpunished, great indignation would be
    aroused throughout the Empire. His representations
    had been well received, but he was plainly allowed to
    see how deeply the St. Petersburg Cabinet regretted
    the existence of the close understanding between
    France and England, which his action had revealed.
    He could perceive clearly from the demeanour of his
    Austrian and Prussian colleagues that neither the
    Court of Vienna nor of Berlin would be disposed to
    interfere upon behalf of the Poles. France not Russia,
    he pointed out, was now looked upon as an object
    of common danger.[165]


French sympathy for the Poles was so keen that,
    in July, Talleyrand was again instructed to invite the
    English government to join with France in proposing
    “a mediation in the bloody struggle raging in Poland.”
    Palmerston, in reply, appears to have suggested that
    the French government should set forth its views
    upon the matter in writing. Talleyrand, accordingly, [Pg 89]transmitted this request and, at the same time, begged
    Sébastiani to remember, when framing his proposals,
    that “he was dealing with cold-blooded people and
    that it would be well therefore to avoid the use of
    emotional language.” But, on July 22, Palmerston
    informed him that the Cabinet could not entertain the
    suggestion of addressing to Russia any demand for a
    cessation of hostilities, nor was he able to report better
    success when, in September, whilst the Belgian difficulty
    was at its height, he was once more directed to approach
    the British government upon the subject of Poland.
    “No party in the Parliament,” he wrote, “was in
    favour of intervention, and the newspapers merely
    spoke of the Poles in sympathetic language.”[166] Heytesbury,
    who at St. Petersburg was in a position to judge
    correctly of the national resentment which any attempt
    at foreign interference in Polish affairs would create,
    strove to convince his government of the unwisdom
    of impairing the good relations of Russia and England
    by raising a question in which no British interests
    were involved. Remonstrances, he was prepared to
    admit, might effect an improvement in the condition
    of the people of the Kingdom of Poland. But, even
    under these circumstances, the sum of human misery,
    which the rebellion must entail, would not be lessened,
    inasmuch as the revolted Russo-Polish provinces, not
    included in the Kingdom, would be treated with
    increased severity.[167]


But, with the complete suppression of the insurrection,
    Lord Grey and his colleagues assumed a more
    sympathetic attitude towards the vanquished Poles.
    In a closely reasoned despatch Palmerston, on November
    23, formulated the arguments which Heytesbury was [Pg 90]instructed to press upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.
    The most important passage in this long document
    was that in which the interpretation was set forth
    which the English government placed upon the wording
    of the treaty of Vienna. The futility of the plea that
    no specific constitution had been guaranteed to Poland,
    a contention which Heytesbury had warned his chief
    the Russian government would certainly set up, was
    clearly exposed. “Surely,” wrote Palmerston, “it
    was no forced construction of the meaning of the
    treaty to consider the constitution, which the Emperor
    had given, as existing under the sanction of the
    treaty.” The constitution contained no clause reserving
    to the Sovereign the right of modifying its provisions.
    The action of the Poles in declaring themselves
    separated from Russia could not be held to absolve
    the Emperor from adhering to his compact. “Wrongs
    committed by one side,” he concluded, “were not to
    be punished by the commission of wrongs on the
    other.”[168]


Heytesbury, after prefacing his disagreeable task
    of communicating these instructions by assurances
    that his government was only desirous of tendering
    friendly advice to a former ally, proceeded to read out
    to Count Nesselrode Lord Palmerston’s despatch.
    “The Count,” he reported, “listened with great
    attention and in silence, but his silence was not the
    silence of assent.” The Russian Chancellor expressed
    his regret that the British government should have
    seen fit to make representations of this nature, notwithstanding
    the intimation, conveyed to it by Prince
    Lieven, that the Tsar could not admit of foreign interference
    in the Polish question. The official answer
    of the Imperial Cabinet was in due course communicated
    to Palmerston by the Russian ambassador. As
    Heytesbury had foreseen, Nicholas, “strong in the [Pg 91]support of Austria and Prussia and in the unanimous
    approbation of the Russian nation,”[169] refused to adopt
    the interpretation of the treaty which it was desired
    to place upon it in London and in Paris.


In the meantime, important progress had been
    made towards a settlement of the Belgian question.
    At the end of August, Baron Stockmar, Leopold’s
    confidential adviser, proceeded to London to watch
    over his interests in conjunction with Van de Weyer,
    the Belgian minister at the Court of St. James’.
    Stockmar realized speedily that the Belgians would
    have to suffer for the defeat inflicted upon them by
    the Dutch. In the treaty of peace and separation,
    which the conference was resolved must be concluded
    without delay, they could not hope to obtain the
    favourable terms conceded to them in the convention
    of the eighteen articles. Should they refuse to agree
    to the necessary concessions, Palmerston warned him
    that the conference would be broken up, and the King
    of Holland would be left free to fight out his quarrel
    with Leopold. Stockmar, however, continually impressed
    upon his master that this was a threat which
    he could safely afford to disregard. The French had
    always considered the union of Holland and Belgium
    and the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
    as a diplomatic combination directed against them.
    Public opinion in France might, therefore, be depended
    upon to compel the government to resist any attempt
    on the part of the Dutch to reconstitute the kingdom
    by force of arms. But, although he admitted that
    Leopold could only expect active assistance from
    France, Stockmar strongly deprecated the idea of
    using French intervention as a means of intimidating
    the conference. Such a course, he was convinced, [Pg 92]would simply incline the four Powers to lean all the
    more towards Holland. Lords Grey and Palmerston
    were well disposed, but they had to reckon with
    national sentiment, which was more favourable to
    “England’s ancient allies,” the Dutch, than to the
    Belgians. Nevertheless, although the British government
    might be unable to render him practical assistance,
    Leopold, Stockmar considered, should strive to
    gain its moral support. The prolonged occupation of
    Belgium by the French was to be deplored, because it
    engendered the suspicion in London that the King
    was over-anxious to place himself under the protection
    of France. In order effectually to put a check upon
    both Dutch and French intrigues Leopold, in
    Stockmar’s opinion, would be well advised to propose
    for the hand of a daughter of Louis Philippe.


After the French evacuation Stockmar urged
    unceasingly the necessity of a speedy conclusion of
    a definite treaty of peace. Russia, he pointed out,
    was no longer distracted by the Polish rebellion, and
    the sympathies of the Tsar were entirely with the
    King of the Netherlands. This was a circumstance
    bound to have a considerable influence upon the policy
    of the Courts of Berlin and of Vienna. It was of the
    highest importance, therefore, that Leopold should
    bring his ministers and the Chambers to recognize that
    the conditions of separation, set forth in the protocol
    of the eighteen articles, could no longer be obtained,
    and that only those stipulations should be insisted
    upon which were essential to the independent existence
    of Belgium. As Stockmar had foreseen, the new treaty,
    known as that of the twenty-four articles, which the
    conference proceeded to frame, imposed harsher terms
    upon Belgium than those contained in the protocol of
    June 26. That part of the province of Limburg which
    lay upon the right bank of the Meuse was now
    assigned to Holland, and Belgium was called upon to [Pg 93]contribute an increased share of the public debt of the
    two countries. In other respects also the Belgians
    had to suffer for their military inferiority to the Dutch.
    Nevertheless, when all efforts to induce the conference
    to modify its terms had proved useless, Stockmar,
    scouting the notion of abdication, counselled Leopold
    to agree to them. “Let the King,” he wrote, “cry
    aloud against the injustice which has been done him
    . . . Let him show that he went to Belgium under
    perfectly different conditions . . . Let the Belgian
    ministry cry out equally loud. But in the meantime
    let everything be done to induce the Chambers to
    accept the treaty.”


Leopold having let it be known that, were the
    deputies to refuse to agree to the terms imposed by
    the conference, he would be driven to abdicate, the
    Chambers, on November 3, authorized him to conclude
    a formal treaty of peace and separation upon the basis
    of the twenty-four articles. This document was accordingly
    signed in London, on November 15, 1831, by the
    plenipotentiaries of Belgium and of the five great
    Powers. The King of Holland refused to be a party
    to the agreement, but, before the expiration of the
    armistice, he had been warned that any act of hostility
    against Belgium would be treated as a declaration of
    war against the Powers. In addition, by a supplementary
    article, the contracting parties guaranteed to
    Belgium the execution of the treaty. Ratifications, it
    was laid down, were to be exchanged within the space
    of two months.[170] At various periods during these
    negotiations Talleyrand had experienced considerable
    difficulty in persuading the French government to
    agree to the decisions of the conference. When at last
    it had reluctantly given its assent to the conditions of
    separation he was at pains to show the advantages
    which France would derive from the treaty. The [Pg 94]Duchy of Bouillon, he pointed out, no longer formed
    part of the Duchy of Luxemburg, whilst the incorporation
    of Arlon with Belgium increased the strength of
    the French frontier towards Longwy. Furthermore,
    the cession of half of the Duchy of Luxemburg to
    Belgium placed the Germanic Confederation at a
    greater distance from France and, inasmuch as the
    fortress was no longer to form part of a military
    system,[171] it would cease to have any importance. With
    regard to the repartition of the debt, which the French
    government had objected to as pressing unduly upon
    Belgium, Talleyrand contended that the general
    interests of Europe urgently demanded a settlement of
    the whole question, and that the Belgians, after their
    wretched display in the summer, had been treated
    with more generosity than they had any right to
    expect.[172]


Whilst the conference had been framing the conditions
    of separation between Holland and Belgium, the
    French government had brought forward a scheme for
    a general disarmament. Sébastiani in the summer had
    proposed a reduction of establishments to a normal
    peace footing, but had found that the German Powers
    were unwilling to revert to ordinary conditions of
    military strength, until the Polish insurrection should
    be at an end. After the Russian entry in Warsaw,
    however, the French overtures met with a ready
    response. The continental Powers agreed to begin
    disarming on January 1, 1832, and to proceed until
    their armies should be reduced to their peace
    establishments. Inasmuch as England had not added
    to her naval or land forces she could not enter into an [Pg 95]agreement to disarm, but Lord Granville was
    instructed to communicate to Sébastiani the satisfaction
    which so practical a manifestation of peaceful
    intentions afforded to the British government.[173]


The question of the demolition of the barrier
    fortresses had been proceeding side by side with the
    settlement of the conditions under which Belgium was
    to be separated from Holland. Talleyrand, however,
    was not admitted to these negotiations which were
    conducted between the plenipotentiaries of Great
    Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia and those of
    Belgium. The result of their deliberations was
    embodied in a document, known as the Fortress Convention,
    which was signed by the representatives of the
    five Powers concerned on December 14, 1831. When
    La Tour-Maubourg had been sent to Brussels, during
    the French occupation of Belgium, he had been
    instructed to press for the demolition of the
    fortifications of Ath, Mons, Menin, Charleroi and
    Tournay. The Powers, however, elected to preserve
    the defences of the two last-named towns and to
    dismantle in their place the works of Philippeville and
    Marienburg. Palmerston, without doubt, was mainly
    responsible for this decision which was to create great
    dissatisfaction in Paris. He was resolved, under no
    circumstance, to admit the principle of allowing
    France to have a voice in determining which of the
    fortresses, erected at the expense of the four Powers,
    should be destroyed. After her attempts to arrive at
    a separate understanding with Belgium concerning
    them, he may have thought that she required to be
    reminded of the true state of the case. Yet it would
    appear that the mere fact that her plenipotentiary had
    not appended his signature to the convention must
    have made her position in the matter sufficiently clear [Pg 96]to the world. But, in persuading the members of the
    conference to substitute Philippeville and Marienburg
    for Charleroi and Tournay, Palmerston was not
    actuated by a desire wantonly to slight France. In
    the question of the destruction of the Belgian
    fortresses Grey’s Cabinet was in a very delicate
    position as regards the Parliament.[174] An embittered
    opposition was bound to demand to know on what
    grounds the government proposed to justify its policy
    of sanctioning the demolition of fortifications, which
    the greatest captain of the day had pronounced to be
    necessary to the security of Europe. Now Wellington,
    it would appear, considered Charleroi and Tournay as
    of more importance to the defence of Belgium than
    Philippeville and Marienburg, and Lord Grey and his
    colleagues could not afford to disregard his opinion.
    It must be remembered also that, on several occasions
    during the course of the negotiations, France had
    shown a strong desire to regain possession of these two
    places of which she had been deprived after Waterloo,
    and it was hoped that, were their fortifications to be
    demolished, they would cease to offer the same
    attractions to her.[175]


Without doubt the decision of the Powers to
    deprive France of any voice in the settlement of the
    question of the fortresses placed her in a very anomalous
    position. She was a party to the treaty which established
    the independence, defined the frontiers and
    guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, nevertheless
    Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain had proceeded
    to conclude at once a separate convention with
    Belgium against her. By her own action, however,
    she was debarred from bringing forward this aspect [Pg 97]of the case as an argument against her exclusion from
    the fortress agreement. Far from raising any objections
    to the conduct of the four Powers in drawing up
    the protocol of April 17, without consultation with her,
    she had expressed the greatest satisfaction with its
    contents. At her request it was communicated to her
    officially, in order that an allusion might be made to it
    in the Speech from the Throne. Louis Philippe, in
    opening the Parliament on July 23, 1831, accordingly
    announced the early destruction of the barrier fortresses,
    as a proof that the four Powers had abandoned the
    system established against France in 1815. In point
    of fact the apprehensions of her aggressive spirit had
    been intensified by the Revolution of July and, in
    deciding to demolish some of the frontier defences of
    the Low Countries, the Powers had not been actuated
    by any desire to propitiate the new régime. But once
    the partition of the Kingdom of the Netherlands had
    been accomplished, it was recognized that the Belgians
    alone could not keep in repair and efficiently defend
    the twenty-three barrier fortresses. Ill-equipped and
    insufficiently garrisoned they would not have contributed
    to the protection of Belgium, but would have
    offered a constant temptation to the French to lay
    hands upon them. If France, however, chose to
    imagine that in this matter the policy of the Powers
    was dictated by a desire to please her, it was unnecessary
    to inform her that she was labouring under a
    delusion. It was probably the knowledge that the
    fiction contained in the paragraph of the King’s Speech,
    referring to the fortresses, could not be maintained for
    long, which had induced the French government to
    attempt to negotiate a separate agreement with
    Belgium.[176]


 [Pg 98]


Both Palmerston and Stockmar appear to have
    been convinced that Talleyrand had prompted his
    government to protest against the fortress convention.[177] But their suspicions with regard to him seem to have
    been unfounded. In pursuance of his instructions, in his
    conversations with Grey and Palmerston, he was bound
    to employ those arguments most calculated to induce
    them to make some concessions to the wishes of his
    Court, but his despatches show that he disapproved
    strongly of the attitude he was directed to adopt.
    On December 15, in forwarding a copy of the fortress
    treaty, the contents of which he knew would be exceedingly
    displeasing to his government, he told
    Sébastiani plainly that La Tour-Maubourg’s mission
    to Brussels was largely responsible for the determination
    of the four Powers to select the fortresses for
    destruction, without regard to the wishes of France.
    That affair, moreover, in his opinion, had been managed
    in a very clumsy fashion. When the government
    decided to try to arrange a separate understanding
    with Belgium, it should have conducted its negotiations
    in the strictest secrecy.[178]


Sébastiani, for the reason which has already been
    explained, was precluded from objecting openly to the
    exclusion of France from the fortress convention, and
    was compelled to confine his protests to remonstrances
    against the selection of Philippeville and Marienburg
    for demolition. Talleyrand was instructed to contend
    that the fortifications of these two places, having been
    erected before 1815, could not be held to fall within
    the category of works constructed at the expense of
    the Powers. Furthermore, he was to urge that it was
    incompatible with the complete independence of [Pg 99]Belgium, which France was anxious to see established,
    that the Powers should specify which fortresses King
    Leopold was to dismantle.[179] Talleyrand, however,
    reported that Lord Palmerston was quite unshaken by
    these arguments. The British minister gave him
    clearly to understand that La Tour-Maubourg’s proceedings
    at Brussels had impressed him most unfavourably.
    At the same time, pointing out that Philippeville
    and Marienburg were the fortresses in closest proximity
    to the frontier of France, he hinted that the French
    government must have some secret reason for objecting
    to their demolition. “Nevertheless,” reported Talleyrand,
    “I still believe that he is well disposed towards
    us. He is, however, in a difficult position as regards
    the Commons. . . . We must bring pressure to bear
    upon the Belgians.”[180] Sébastiani’s fears that the policy
    of the Powers aimed at the re-establishment of the
    Holy Alliance, were, he assured him, in language no
    less emphatic than that used by Granville in Paris,
    entirely without foundation. Far too much importance,
    he urged, was attached to the fortress convention. The
    King’s government, in his opinion, would be well advised
    to accept it, and to declare publicly that its provisions
    were in harmony with the protocol of April 17.
    Russia was no longer occupied with the rebellion of the
    Poles, and the Northern Courts were evincing a strong
    disposition to draw together closely. Under these conditions,
    he regarded it as essential that France should
    maintain friendly relations with England. “It was a
    matter of far more real importance than the question
    of the fortresses.”[181] But his endeavours to soothe the
    irritation of his government met with no success. He
    was instructed to announce in London that France, [Pg 100]seeing that satisfaction was denied her in the affair of
    the fortress convention, would refuse to ratify the
    treaty of separation of November 15, 1831. Furthermore,
    Casimir Périer, who, on account of Sébastiani’s
    state of health, had taken charge of the portfolio of
    Foreign Affairs, declared that, “in view of the general
    uncertainty respecting the course of events in Belgium
    and Holland, the signature of the proposed convention
    of disarmament must be postponed.”[182]


The French agents in the meanwhile had not been
    idle at Brussels. On December 12 General Tiburce
    Sébastiani, the brother of the minister, arrived.
    “Ostensibly,” reported Adair, “he has come to visit
    this town and Antwerp, but his real purpose is to
    prevent the accession of the Belgian government to
    the fortress convention.” This officer certainly brought
    a letter for Belliard containing instructions which
    justified the British minister’s conclusions, but his
    mission appears also to have been connected with some
    unfounded rumour, which had reached the French
    government, that the Orangists were about to put into
    execution their designs against Leopold’s throne.[183] That monarch now found himself once more, as he
    himself described it, “between the hammer and the
    anvil.”[184] Louis Philippe[185] wrote indignantly complaining
    that the agreement of September 8, entered
    into with La Tour-Maubourg, had not been complied
    with. In vain Leopold produced the instructions,
    with which Goblet and Van de Weyer, who had
    negotiated the convention, had been furnished, [Pg 101]and protested that the Belgian plenipotentiaries had
    been forced to sign, under the threat that the
    Powers would refuse to ratify the treaty of separation,
    should they persist in opposing their wishes with
    respect to the fortresses. General Belliard, at the
    same time, intimated that, were the Dutch again to
    attack Belgium, no assistance from France could be
    expected. To Adair, who, on the other hand, begged
    him to stand firm, Leopold had expressed his determination
    to disregard the French objections and to adhere
    to the convention. But at the threat that, were his
    Kingdom again to be overrun, France would leave
    him to his fate, his resolution broke down and Goblet
    was directed to announce in London that the Belgian
    ratification of the fortress agreement would be withheld.[186] Stockmar, writing from London, impressed
    upon King Leopold that his refusal to ratify the
    convention of December 14 would be eagerly seized
    upon by the absolute Powers as an excuse for withholding
    their adhesion to the treaty of separation.
    Already the news that differences had arisen between
    France and England, upon the subject of the fortresses,
    had enabled Metternich to reply to Mr. Forbes, the
    British chargé d’affaires, who had been instructed
    to urge him to transmit to London the necessary
    authority for an exchange of ratifications, that France
    was holding back and that it was important that all
    the Powers should act together in the matter. Prince
    Metternich was torn between his fears that the continued
    state of uncertainty as to the affairs of the
    Low Countries might lead to a war, and his desire
    to propitiate Russia. Nicholas was believed to
    have counselled the King of the Netherlands to agree
    to the treaty, but to be resolved, none the less, to [Pg 102]withhold his own ratification until that sovereign’s
    reluctance to accept the conditions of separation should
    have been overcome.[187] M. Casimir Périer, in the
    meanwhile, however, was beginning to realize that
    Palmerston was determined not to yield to the outcry
    about the fortresses, and that were France, on that
    account, to decline to ratify the treaty of separation
    not only would the labours of the London conference
    for the past year be rendered nugatory, but the good
    relations which had been established with England
    would be seriously impaired. Moreover, should the
    negotiations break down, Lord Grey might be compelled
    to resign, and he had good reason to apprehend,
    that a change of government in England would be
    followed quickly by his own downfall. An important
    group of deputies in the Chamber gave him their votes,
    only because they believed that his alliance with the
    Whigs ensured the maintenance of peace. But this
    reason for their support of him would disappear on the
    day on which the Tories should return to office.[188] Under
    these circumstances Talleyrand was directed to obtain
    from the representatives of the four Powers “some
    declaration calculated to reassure the King’s government
    as to the spirit in which the fortress convention had
    been drawn up.” This result was achieved by means
    of a document in which it was affirmed that the
    arrangements respecting the fortresses were consistent
    with the independence, neutrality and sovereignty of
    Belgium, and that that country stood upon an equal [Pg 103]footing as regards the five guaranteeing Powers.
    Casmir Périer declared himself well pleased to receive
    this empty satisfaction and, forthwith, announced his
    intention of adhering to the treaty of separation.[189] On January 31, accordingly, the two western Powers
    exchanged ratifications with Belgium and, at the same
    time, it was resolved to keep open the protocol, in the
    hope that the Northern Courts would before long
    confirm the signatures of their plenipotentiaries.[190]


Scarcely had this difficulty been settled when
    grave complications arose in another direction. The
    promises of the Pope, that reforms would be introduced
    into the administration of local affairs in Romagna, had
    not been carried out. The intention manifested by
    the Roman government to disregard its pledges was
    followed by a recrudescence of unrest in the Legations.
    M. Casimir Périer, accordingly, proposed that, were
    foreign intervention to be required to maintain the
    authority of His Holiness, a French corps should
    occupy Ancona. But Metternich demurred, and, as an
    alternative, suggested that a French naval force should
    be sent to the Adriatic to act in combination with the
    Austrian squadron. On February 1, however, the
    news arrived that the Austrians had entered Bologna,
    whereupon M. Casimir Périer at once ordered a
    French regiment to be embarked at Toulon for
    Ancona. Were that town to be occupied by the
    Austrians before the French expedition could arrive,
    the troops, Lord Granville was informed in confidence,
    would be landed at Civita Vecchia. The action of
    the French government would, M. Casimir Périer
    declared to the British ambassador, hasten the
    departure of the Austrians and induce Prince [Pg 104]Metternich to press the Court of Rome to adopt
    those reforms by which alone permanent tranquillity
    could be established in the Legations.[191]


The more detailed information as to the course
    of events in Romagna, transmitted by Sainte-Aulaire
    and the British consul at Rome, suggested the
    existence of a secret understanding between His
    Holiness and the Cabinet of Vienna. At Forli the
    Pontifical troops were reported to have shot down
    in cold blood peaceful and unarmed inhabitants, and
    their behaviour created the impression that they were
    anxious to produce disorder, in order to furnish
    Cardinal Albani, the Legate, with a pretext for invoking
    the aid of Austria.[192] Suspicions on this score
    were heightened by the fact that, although Marshal
    Radetzky only received the application for assistance
    on January 23, his orders, in which he styled himself
    commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, were dated
    on the 19th, four days before the arrival of the
    cardinal’s demand for intervention.[193] Upon learning
    of these proceedings the Comte de Sainte-Aulaire at
    once notified to Cardinal Bernetti, the State Secretary,
    that the entry of an Imperial army into the Papal
    States would be followed by the immediate occupation
    of Ancona by a French force. Bernetti appears
    reluctantly to have acquiesced, but, after the expedition
    had sailed from Toulon, acting, without doubt, at
    the dictation of the Austrian ambassador, he formally
    protested against the disembarkation of any French
    troops within the dominions of the Pope.[194] When [Pg 105]the news first reached Vienna that the French had
    taken steps to occupy Ancona, Metternich, concealing
    his annoyance, was at pains to impress upon the
    public that this measure was the result of a previous
    understanding with Austria.[195] On the other hand, at
    St. Petersburg the intelligence that the French had
    intervened in Italy was held to have rendered war inevitable,
    and Nicholas forthwith declared his intention
    of giving armed assistance to Austria.[196] From London
    Talleyrand reported that Palmerston spoke very
    guardedly when he sought to ascertain the views of
    the British government upon the matter. In his
    own opinion, and this aspect of the case he on more
    than one occasion brought to the notice of M. Casimir
    Périer, it was much to be regretted that the demonstrations
    in Italy had taken place before Austria
    should have ratified the Belgian treaty. The accounts,
    moreover, of the lawless proceedings of the French
    commander at Ancona, which soon began to arrive,
    created a very general alarm. Not only had the
    troops forced their way into the citadel, but a
    proclamation was issued by Captain Gallois, drawn up
    in terms so hostile to Austria, as to amount practically
    to a declaration of war. That individual, however,
    who was either a member of, or in league with, the
    French secret societies, the agents of which were
    striving to stir up a revolution in Italy, was promptly
    disavowed and the fact of his recall to France was
    communicated to foreign governments. Nevertheless,
    wrote Talleyrand, the affair has created a most
    painful impression. “The territory of an independent
    sovereign has been violated at a time of profound
    peace and the tricolour has been hoisted over a fortress [Pg 106]which does not belong to France.”[197] In a conversation
    which he had had with William IV. at a levée, His
    Majesty spoke to him most strongly about the impropriety
    of these proceedings which, ministers also
    informed him, had greatly increased their difficulties
    in both Houses. They could have added with perfect
    truth that their relations with their sovereign had
    suffered considerably owing to this affair.[198]


The Austrian policy of deliberately encouraging
    misgovernment in the Italian States and of placing
    every obstacle in the way of reforms was hateful to
    Lord Palmerston. Apart from other considerations he
    was convinced that a continuance of this state of affairs
    must, sooner or later, drive France to intervene in such
    a manner as to render a war inevitable with Austria.[199] Already, on February 20, before he had received the
    news of the arrival of the French expedition at Ancona,
    he had directed Mr. Seymour, the British minister at
    Florence, to proceed to Rome “to represent the
    anxiety of His Majesty’s government to see those
    causes, which have produced so much difficulty,
    effectually removed.” He was to urge that no
    measures would appear “to afford so good a hope of
    success as a complete adoption of those reforms which
    were pointed out in the memorandum of May 21,
    1831.” Lastly, he was to impress upon Cardinal
    Bernetti that, “if the reports be true that the ranks
    of the papal troops, which recently entered the
    Legations, have been replenished by emptying the
    prisons of criminals and by calling down the lawless
    bands from the mountains, the Roman government
    cannot divest itself of a deep responsibility for the [Pg 107]melancholy events which marked the entry into Cesena
    and Forli. The innocent blood which was wantonly
    shed in the streets of those towns might well be
    accepted as a full atonement for the political offences
    of the people of Romagna.”[200] When the story became
    known of the manner in which the French entry into
    Ancona had been carried out, Palmerston readily
    agreed to do all in his power to soothe the irritation of
    Austria and to assist to remove the bad impression
    created by Captain Gallois’ lawlessness. Seymour was
    further instructed to inform Cardinal Bernetti that the
    British government was fully satisfied that the French
    occupation of Ancona was but a temporary measure,
    which the condition of the Legations had occasioned.
    He was to reiterate the necessity for the immediate
    introduction of the promised reforms and “to draw the
    serious attention of the Roman government to the
    fact, that the course which it was pursuing with respect
    to the Legations, had already had the effect of turning
    the eyes of the population of those provinces towards
    Austria. . . . The system of administration established
    in Lombardy and Venetia, although not free from
    defects, was looked upon with envy by the subjects of
    the Pope.[201] At Vienna Sir Frederick Lamb was directed
    to assure Prince Metternich that the occupation of
    Ancona would cease as soon as His Holiness should
    have carried out his engagements.[202]


Metternich, reported Lamb, received the news of
    the French proceedings at Ancona very calmly. He
    expressed himself as confident that Gallois’ actions
    would be disavowed by his government. “The
    Emperor,” he declared, “would be justified in falling
    upon the French at Ancona, but he was too great a [Pg 108]sovereign to receive an insult from the captain of a
    frigate or the colonel of a regiment.” It was to
    England that Austria looked for support at this crisis.
    She ruled the seas and it rested with her to decide
    whether, or not, France should hold the command of the
    Mediterranean. About a week after this conversation
    had taken place Metternich informed Lamb that he
    was perfectly satisfied with the explanations which
    Marshal Maison had been instructed to give, and that
    no demand would be made to the French government
    for the evacuation of Ancona, so long as the Austrians
    continued to occupy the Legations.[203]


This condition of affairs was allowed to prevail for
    some years. Both Powers retained their troops in the
    Papal States, and the embarrassing necessity under
    which the French government was placed of making
    the occupation of Ancona depend upon the presence of
    an Austrian garrison at Bologna constituted Metternich’s
    revenge for M. Périer’s intervention in Italy.


The attention of the corps diplomatique had not
    been concentrated exclusively upon the complications
    to which the French proceedings at Ancona might give
    rise. Early in the month of February it was known
    that Count Orloff had been despatched by the Tsar on
    a special mission to the Hague. It was in deference to
    the wishes of Nicholas that the Courts of Vienna and
    of Berlin had decided to withhold their ratification of
    the treaty of separation of November 15, 1831, and the
    keenest curiosity prevailed as to the instructions with
    which the Tsar’s emissary had been furnished. In
    respect to the condition of affairs in the Low Countries
    Russia was in a somewhat peculiar situation as regards
    England. During the Napoleonic war Russia had
    borrowed at Amsterdam a sum of 25,000,000 florins. [Pg 109]At the peace the King of the Netherlands and the King
    of Great Britain agreed respectively to bear one-half
    of the charge of this debt. But it was provided that,
    should at any time the King of the Netherlands be
    deprived of his sovereignty over the Belgian provinces,
    this charge should cease. The contingency referred to
    in the treaty had come about, under circumstances
    never contemplated by the statesmen by whom it had
    been drawn up. They had hoped to give Russia a
    direct interest in preserving the union, but it was now
    the British government which desired to see it abolished
    and the Tsar who wished it to be maintained. Without
    doubt, according to the letter of the treaty, England
    was no longer bound to pay a share of the Russian-Dutch
    loan. Judged by the spirit of it, however, she
    could not honestly escape from the charge which she
    had undertaken to bear. This last construction of the
    agreement was adopted by Palmerston, who admitted
    the British liability in a new convention, by the terms
    of which the Tsar guaranteed that, should the stipulations
    made for the independence and neutrality of
    Belgium be endangered by the course of events, he
    would contract no other engagements without a previous
    agreement with his Britannic Majesty. Palmerston
    had thus earned the gratitude of the Tsar and had, in
    addition, made it difficult for him to intervene actively
    on behalf of the King of Holland.[204] Ministers were
    debarred, however from referring to this inner history
    of the affair in Parliament, where their policy in the
    matter of the Russian loan was severely attacked both
    by the Tory Opposition and by the Radicals, who
    deprecated the notion of voting pecuniary assistance to
    the autocratic government of Russia.


The Count Alexis Orloff, whose journey to [Pg 110]the Hague was the subject of so much speculation
    in the chanceries of Europe, was the natural son
    of a younger brother of Gregory Orloff, the lover of
    Catherine II. and a prominent actor in that palace
    revolution of 1762, which cost the Emperor Peter III.
    his throne, and very probably his life. After serving
    in the Napoleonic wars, the Count Alexis had gained
    the lasting gratitude of his imperial master by his
    resolute behaviour, which had contributed not a
    little to upset the designs of the Decembrists, as those
    military conspirators were termed, who, in 1825,
    had sought to prevent the accession of Nicholas.
    Ever afterwards, in consequence, Alexis Orloff was
    selected by the Tsar for the most delicate and
    secret missions. No notice of his departure was
    given to any member of the corps diplomatique at St. Petersburg. Count Nesselrode, after he had
    started, merely informed Lord Heytesbury that he
    had been sent to the Hague to extract a categorical
    statement from the King of the Netherlands as
    to whether he would accept the treaty of separation,
    and, in the event of his declaring that he would
    withhold his consent, to signify to him that he must
    not look to Russia for support.[205] This was in
    substance all that Mr. Chad, the British minister
    at Berlin, could discover about the objects of Orloff’s
    mission during the Count’s stay in the Prussian
    capital. But he noted that the general effect of
    his visit to Berlin had been to incline the Prussian
    government to espouse more warmly the cause
    of the King of the Netherlands, a result which,
    he pointed out, was inconsistent with the purpose
    which the Tsar’s emissary was alleged to have in
    view.[206] Fuller information, however, on that score [Pg 111]was soon forthcoming from Vienna. On February
    25, Sir Frederick Lamb was able to transmit to
    Lord Palmerston a copy of Orloff’s secret instructions.
    These contained a clause to the effect that the
    Emperor of Russia would not recognize the King
    of the Belgians, until he should have been acknowledged
    by the King of the Netherlands. Furthermore,
    the Count was directed to protest against
    any measures of coercion, which France and England
    might decide to adopt against Holland, and to declare
    that the Tsar would regard all concessions, obtained
    by such means, as null and void. Lastly, whilst
    in London, whither he was to proceed when he
    had completed his task at the Hague, Orloff was
    “to assist by all means in his power the endeavours
    which, for the past twelve months, Prince Lieven
    and Count Matuszewic[207] had been making to prevent
    a union of the British Cabinet with that of the Palais
    Royal.”[208]


During his stay at Berlin, Orloff tried to win
    over the Prussian government to the Tsar’s views
    upon the Belgian question. But his attempts were
    unsuccessful. Ancillon, the chief minister, was
    greatly alarmed at the disturbance of the European
    Concert to which he feared the Russian policy
    must lead. Were Austria, Prussia and Russia to
    make their ratification of the separation treaty
    depend upon the acceptation of its conditions by
    the King of the Netherlands, the Powers must
    necessarily fall into two opposing groups: France
    and Great Britain on the one side, and the three
    Northern Courts on the other. Rather than help
    to create so perilous a situation, Prussia would,
    with much regret be obliged to “aller en avant [Pg 112]et de ratifier.” Ancillon seems to have succeeded
    in extracting from Orloff a promise that he would
    for the present, at least, refrain from communicating
    the secret clauses of his instructions to the King of
    the Netherlands, and to have directed the Prussian
    minister at St. Petersburg to endeavour to persuade
    Nicholas to cancel them. Metternich, reported Lamb,
    regarded the matter in the same light as Ancillon, and
    was resolved to assimilate his policy to that of
    the Court of Berlin. It was presumably for the
    purpose of thwarting the Russian plan that a copy of
    Orloff’s secret instructions was placed in the hands
    of the British ambassador.[209]


When France and England had ratified the treaty
    of separation, Palmerston at once instructed the
    British representatives at Vienna and at Berlin
    to urge the Austrian and Prussian Courts to follow
    the example of the western Powers. Metternich,
    wrote Lamb, eluded the question, and insisted upon
    the necessity of waiting to hear the result of Orloff’s
    mission.[210] At Berlin, Mr. Chad was enjoined to
    remind M. Ancillon that the action of the Prussian
    government in refusing to ratify was a violation of
    its promises.[211] In M. Casimir Périer’s opinion, the
    policy of the absolute Courts was dictated by the
    hope that a second rejection of the Reform Bill by the
    House of Lords might lead to a change of government
    in England.[212] In the meanwhile, Count Orloff had
    arrived at the Hague on February 20. At Berlin, he
    had intimated that under no circumstances would his
    stay in Holland be prolonged beyond ten days.[213] Nevertheless, the period which he had assigned for the
    duration of his visit was greatly exceeded. There was [Pg 113]reason to believe, however, that communications had
    reached him from his Court which, if they did not
    absolutely annul, unquestionably modified his instructions
    and brought them more into harmony with the
    views of the constitutional Powers.[214] Without doubt,
    the repugnance evinced at Vienna and at Berlin to
    break with the London conference was largely
    responsible for the changed disposition of Nicholas.
    But the arrival at St. Petersburg, after Orloff had left,
    of the draft of a proposed new treaty of separation,
    in which the King of the Netherlands put forward the
    most absurd pretensions, would seem to have impressed
    the Tsar most unfavourably. He appears
    to have grown very suspicious that the Dutch Court,
    acting under the inspiration of the French legitimists,
    was striving to embroil the Great Powers in a war.[215]


Palmerston, under these circumstances, decided to
    exercise an increased pressure upon the wavering
    resolution of the Northern Courts. The sittings of the
    conference, he announced, would be suspended until
    the signatory Powers of the treaty of separation should
    have ratified that agreement. Furthermore, on March
    16, Sir Charles Bagot, the British ambassador, was
    instructed to protest against Count Orloff’s continued
    stay at the Hague.[216] The threat that the London
    conference would be dissolved appears to have excited
    considerable alarm at Berlin.[217] Although the obstinacy
    of the King of the Netherlands was proof against all
    remonstrances, Palmerston’s action, which had the
    support of the French government, was probably successful
    in bringing Orloff’s mission to an end. In any
    case, on March 22, Verstolk, the Dutch Minister for
    Foreign Affairs, officially informed Nicholas’ envoy [Pg 114]that the King could not accept the separation treaty of
    the twenty-four articles as it existed. No sooner had he
    made this statement than Count Orloff at once handed
    him the declaration which he had been instructed to
    deliver. The note in question was to the effect that,
    although His Imperial Majesty would not participate
    himself in any measures of coercion to force the King
    to accept the treaty, he should not oppose those steps
    which his allies might resolve to take in order to impose
    its conditions upon Holland. Directly they learnt that
    Orloff had delivered his declaration, the Austrian and
    Prussian ministers sent separate notes to M. Verstolk,
    notifying the adhesion of their respective Courts to the
    course pursued by the Russian Cabinet. Orloff, two
    days later, took leave of the King and started for
    London.[218]


The failure of Orloff’s mission deprived the
    Austrian and Prussian Cabinets of all reasonable
    excuse for withholding their assent to the treaty.
    Indeed, before the Russian agent had taken his departure
    from the Hague, Metternich informed Sir
    Frederick Lamb that the Austrian ratification would
    be forwarded to London without further delay. The
    presence of the French in Italy, and the fear that the
    course upon which the absolute Courts had embarked
    would tend to promote a close alliance between
    England and France were factors in the situation,
    which, in the opinion of the British ambassador, had
    greatly influenced Metternich’s decision.[219] Accordingly,
    on April 18, at the London Foreign Office the Austrian
    and Prussian plenipotentiaries exchanged ratifications
    of the treaty of November 15, 1831, with the representative
    of Belgium. The Prussian minister, Bülow,
    had been furnished with a discretionary power either
    to proceed with the matter or to await the Russian [Pg 115]ratification, and he appears to have yielded to the
    pressure brought to bear upon him by Palmerston
    and Talleyrand.[220] Both the Prussian and Austrian
    ratifications were accompanied by reservations with
    respect to the rights of the Germanic Confederation
    in Connection with any cession or exchange of a portion
    of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.[221]


It was resolved, as on former occasions, to keep
    open the protocol in order that Russia might still
    be enabled to become a party to the treaty. Lieven
    and Matuszewic, the Russian plenipotentiaries, had
    authority to ratify, but with reservations respecting
    three articles of the treaty which concerned the
    navigation of the Scheldt, the construction of a road,
    and the share of the debt to be borne by Belgium. But,
    were a limited ratification of this description to be
    accepted, Russia would necessarily be placed in a
    different situation as regards Belgium to that occupied
    by the other contracting parties. This was a development
    to which Palmerston was altogether opposed.
    On the other hand, he was desirous above all things to
    avoid the necessity of excluding Russia from the treaty.
    The rift in the European Concert, which such a result
    would disclose, must encourage the King of the
    Netherlands to resist the decisions of the conference
    and might endanger the general peace. The representatives
    of the Powers, not excepting Orloff, Lieven
    and Matuszewic were, however, sincerely anxious to
    discover a way out of the difficulty. At Brussels it
    was contended with some reason that the limited
    ratification of Russia might be held to invalidate the
    treaty as a whole. But Stockmar, the counsellor of
    Leopold, pointed out that the existing governments
    in France and England considered that their acts of [Pg 116]ratification bound them indissolubly to the treaty. The
    struggle over the Reform Bill had, however, entered
    upon its final stage, and it was doubtful whether Lord
    Grey and his colleagues would emerge from it successfully.
    Under these circumstances, urged Stockmar,
    it was well to remember that both Wellington and
    Aberdeen had declared that they should not consider
    the treaty of the twenty-four articles as binding, until
    it should have been ratified by all the signatory
    Powers. Were Grey to fall, and were a Tory Cabinet
    to be formed, Russia very probably might altogether
    refuse to ratify.[222]


On May 4 the deliberations of the conference at
    the Foreign Office were prolonged far into the night.
    Talleyrand’s powers of persuasion, Palmerston’s determined
    will and skill in argument were alike directed
    to the task of devising some solution of the problem,
    which all parties might accept with dignity. The
    desired result was at last attained by means of an
    explanation of the purpose of the Russian reservation,
    which was inserted into the protocol. According to
    this declaration, the Russian plenipotentiaries asserted
    that their Court had no other intention than to leave
    open the matters contained in the three articles in
    question for subsequent settlement by Holland and
    Belgium. Under these conditions, Van de Weyer
    agreed to accept the Russian ratification with the
    proviso, which was also to be embodied into the
    protocol, that his Court laid claim to the full benefit
    of the engagements contracted towards Belgium by the
    five Powers. That same night Orloff departed from
    England.[223] Nicholas had been very gratified by the
    flattering welcome which had been accorded to his
    favourite in London society.[224] His satisfaction on [Pg 117]this point contributed, doubtless, to the happy
    termination of the negotiation. But the statesmanlike
    conduct of Van de Weyer was, at the time,
    little appreciated in political circles in Brussels,
    where he was censured for accepting the limited
    ratification of Russia.[225]




 [Pg 118]


 CHAPTER IV


THE COERCION OF HOLLAND


The Cabinets of Lord Grey and of M. Casimir Périer
    had always regarded the execution of the separation
    treaty as a measure which must necessarily follow
    its ratification by the five contracting Powers. But,
    during the spring and early summer of 1832, ministers,
    both in France and in England, were confronted by an
    internal situation of exceptional gravity. The Lords,
    on April 14, had passed the second reading of the
    third Reform Bill by a narrow majority. On May 7,
    however, three days after Russia had ratified the
    Belgian treaty, Lord Lyndhurst successfully carried
    against the government a motion postponing the
    clause which disfranchised the boroughs. The Cabinet,
    therefore, decided to advise the King “to advance to
    the honour of the peerage such a number of persons
    as might ensure the success of the Bill in all its
    essential principles.”[226]


In the early days of the struggle the King had
    been a keen advocate of parliamentary reform. But
    the violent opposition which the measure had excited
    had sensibly altered his feelings. Nor was it only
    with respect to the Bill that His Majesty was beginning
    to entertain misgivings. The conduct of foreign
    affairs had, for some time past, caused him grave
    anxiety. He perceived, he wrote to Lord Grey, a
    dangerous tendency on the part of the government [Pg 119]to subscribe to all the democratic theories which found
    favour in Paris. He realized the importance of good
    relations with France, and he was prepared to admit
    that it might be due to the existence of such an understanding
    that war had been avoided in the Belgian
    question. But he mistrusted France and could not
    believe that she had abandoned her schemes of conquest
    and of territorial expansion. He held, therefore,
    that it was impolitic to “unite too closely with her in
    the prosecution of measures tending to give umbrage
    and alarm to other Powers.”[227]


In consequence of these criticisms Lord Grey
    signified his willingness to resign. But a second letter
    from the King and a conversation, in which His
    Majesty assured him that he still enjoyed his full confidence,
    induced him to remain in office. A fortnight
    later, however, when the King declined to follow the
    advice, contained in the Cabinet minute of May 8, to
    create a sufficient number of peers to enable the Bill
    to pass, the government resigned. But the excitement
    throughout the country and the attitude of the
    House of Commons compelled Lord Lyndhurst and the
    Duke of Wellington to abandon all hope of forming
    a ministry. In face of their inability to carry out the
    task with which he had entrusted them, the King had
    no alternative but to send for his late ministers and to
    give them the guarantees, which they made an indispensable
    condition to their acceptation of office. Lord
    Grey, however, was spared the necessity of resorting
    to the powers which the crown had placed at his
    disposal. In deference to the King’s wishes[228] Wellington
    and the chief opponents of the measure agreed
    to stay away from the House, and on June 4, in their
    absence, the Bill was passed into law.


 [Pg 120]


France was less fortunate. Her domestic difficulties
    were only temporarily overcome after grave disorder
    and much bloodshed. The cholera, brought back by
    the Russian armies from Turkey, had spread westwards.
    The disease, which made its first appearance in England
    in the latter months of 1831, did terrible execution in
    Paris during the spring and summer of 1832. M.
    Casimir Périer, who had been in bad health for some
    time past, was its most illustrious victim. His death,
    on May 16, 1832, was the signal for a furious outburst
    of hostility on the part of the parliamentary opponents
    of his system. At the same time the avowed enemies of
    the Orleans monarchy, both Republican and Carlist,
    actively prepared to take advantage of the situation. The Society of the Friends of the People, in defiance
    of the police, held meetings at which armed insurrection
    was preached openly. “I was present at one of
    them,” wrote Heinrich Heine, “the smell reminded
    me of an old file of the Moniteur of 1793 grown dirty
    from too much reading.”[229]


The funeral, on June 5, of General Lamarque, the
    most prominent advocate in the Chamber of the union
    of Belgium with France, was chosen by the revolutionary
    leaders as a favourable occasion for striking their
    blow. But the authorities were upon the alert and
    both regular troops and national guards were quickly
    upon the scene of action. Nevertheless, it was not
    until artillery had been brought up that, on the
    following day, June 6, the great barricade at the
    Cloître Saint-Merri was stormed and that this formidable
    insurrection was finally suppressed. Nor was it
    only in the streets of Paris that the government had
    to deal with an armed rising. On June 4 the Duchesse
    de Berri, the mother of the Duc de Bordeaux, the
    lawful King of France in the eyes of the Carlists,
    raised the standard of rebellion in La Vendée. But [Pg 121]her insurrection, which had been undertaken against
    the advice of the wiser of the Carlists and of the old
    Royalist leaders in the West, was, in a few days,
    stamped out completely. The defence of the Château
    de la Pénissière, where a handful of Carlist gentlemen
    made a brave stand against overwhelming odds,
    imparted, however, a tinge of heroism to this, the last
    and the least famous of the Royalist rebellions of La
    Vendée.


Following quickly upon the defeat of the republicans
    in Paris and of the Carlists in the West, came the news
    that the Duc de Reichstadt, the heretofore King of
    Rome, was dying of consumption at Vienna. But
    Metternich, in transmitting this information, desired
    that Louis Philippe’s attention should be especially
    directed “to his successor in the eyes of the Bonapartists.”
    The young Louis Bonaparte, he begged
    him to remember, was not under the safeguard of the
    Emperor of Austria, but, on the contrary, “was deeply
    involved in all the machinations of the revolutionary
    societies.”[230] Few people, however, shared Metternich’s
    forebodings, and the death of the Duc de Reichstadt,
    which took place on July 22, 1832, was generally considered,
    even by staunch Imperialists, to have disposed
    effectually of the chances of a Bonapartist restoration.[231] But neither the successful suppression of two rebellions,
    nor the decease of a dangerous pretender to the throne
    could make up for the loss of the President of the
    Council. The death of M. Casimir Périer had deprived
    the Cabinet of its strength and prestige. Louis
    Philippe, whilst doing full justice to the courage and
    abilities of his late minister, was perhaps not altogether
    sorry that his masterful personality no longer presided
    at the council table. The rôle of a constitutional [Pg 122]monarch was never to his taste. He longed always
    to take a direct part in the management of public
    affairs, and rather liked his people to think that his
    was the hand which guided the ship of State. He
    was, therefore, in no great hurry to appoint a new
    President of the Council. He soon perceived, however,
    that a prolongation of this state of affairs would be
    prejudicial to the best interests of the monarchy both
    at home and abroad.


For the past two months the London conference
    had been engaged upon fruitless efforts to induce the
    King of the Netherlands to agree to the separation
    treaty. Moreover, His Majesty’s obstinacy was not
    the only difficulty with which the representatives of
    the Powers had to deal. The Belgians clamoured
    loudly for the execution of the treaty, and declared
    that, so long as the Dutch retained possession of
    Antwerp, they must decline to discuss any modification
    of its conditions.[232] Oblivious of their disasters of the
    year before, they even began to talk of ejecting the
    Dutch by force, and, as though to prove the seriousness
    of their intentions, proceeded to enrol Polish officers in
    their army, and to make other warlike preparations.[233]


Although determined that the main conditions of
    the treaty must be left untouched, the members of the
    conference were anxious that the minor points in
    dispute should form the subject of amicable discussions
    between the Dutch and Belgian representatives. It
    was on this principle that all their proposals had been
    made. But neither at the Hague nor at Brussels was
    any disposition evinced to listen to reasonable suggestions
    for a compromise.


At last, on July 10, the plenipotentiaries decided
    to forward their final proposals to the Hague and to
    announce, at the same time, that, if they were not [Pg 123]accepted, no further modifications of the original
    treaty would be submitted. Little hope, however, was
    entertained that the King’s obduracy would be overcome
    without a resort to force. But before proceeding
    to adopt more active measures the British government
    decided to dispatch Lord Durham upon a special
    mission to St. Petersburg. Ill-health had recently
    compelled Lord Heytesbury to relinquish his post, and
    his successor had not as yet been appointed. The
    King of the Netherlands, it was believed, still trusted
    that the Tsar would intervene on his behalf, should
    France and England begin hostilities against him.
    Lord Durham was therefore charged to endeavour to
    persuade the Emperor Nicholas “to give immediate
    instructions to the Russian plenipotentiaries at the
    conference to co-operate cordially and effectually in
    whatever measures might appear best calculated to
    effect an early execution of the treaty.” He was to
    state most positively that France and England, under
    any circumstances, were resolved to fulfil the engagements
    which they had contracted towards Belgium.
    Lastly, he was to explain the views of His Majesty’s
    government upon Italian, German and Polish affairs.[234]


Seeing that it was the object of the British government
    to conciliate the Tsar, in order to induce him to
    take part in measures which could not be otherwise
    than extremely distasteful to him, it is strange that this
    particular minister should have been selected for the
    mission. As one of the most advanced politicians in
    the Cabinet Lord Durham would hardly seem to have
    been the person best qualified to propitiate the Emperor
    Nicholas. But at the time his suitability was perhaps
    only a secondary consideration. On the question of
    the creation of peers to enable the Reform Bill to pass,
    he had seriously differed from Lord Grey, his own
    father-in-law, and it may have been the wish to avoid [Pg 124]a complete rupture between them that prompted his
    despatch to St. Petersburg. The Emperor, however,
    whatever may have been the real nature of his feelings
    with respect to Durham’s appointment, evinced not
    the slightest resentment. On the contrary, he appeared
    to be at pains to pay him the greatest honours and,
    during the whole period of his six weeks’ stay in the
    Russian capital, the ambassador was the object of his
    most flattering attentions. Durham, who was highly
    gratified by the warmth of the Imperial reception and
    by the marked deference with which he was treated,
    was, for his part, no less anxious to create a favourable
    impression. When removed from the turmoil of party
    politics he rarely failed to display those statesmanlike
    qualities which he unquestionably possessed. Yet in
    spite of all his efforts, on this occasion, his embassy, in
    so far as its immediate objects were concerned, proved
    a complete failure. Under no circumstances would the
    Tsar agree to join in any hostile action against Holland.
    But, whilst the autocrat assured him that such was
    his irrevocable determination, he told him that he was
    equally resolved not to oppose those measures which
    other Powers might see fit to adopt, in order to obtain
    the execution of the separation treaty.[235] This categorical
    statement of Nicholas’ intention not to interpose,
    should coercion be applied to Holland, was the one
    satisfactory piece of news which Lord Durham was
    enabled to transmit. In all his conversations the Tsar
    manifested his extreme dislike of Louis Philippe and
    expressed his determination to render military assistance
    to Austria and Prussia, should France attempt
    to interfere in German affairs.[236] Lord Durham was not
    long in discovering that no good purpose would be
    served by adverting to Poland. The greatest indignation
    prevailed throughout Russia at the conduct of the [Pg 125]Poles, and he quite agreed with Lord Heytesbury that
    the Tsar dared not disregard the national resentment
    which their insurrection had provoked. Only force,
    he saw clearly, would induce him to admit that other
    Powers had a right to interfere with his treatment of
    his Polish subjects, and England most certainly had
    no intention of making the question a case for war.
    He conceived, therefore, that he might depart from
    the letter of his instructions and confine his observations
    upon the subject to a mere informal expression
    to Count Nesselrode of the interest felt by
    the British government in the general welfare of
    Poland.[237]


Before the end of July, it was known in London
    that the King of the Netherlands was determined to
    reject the proposals which the conference had declared
    must be the last which could be submitted to him.
    Nevertheless Palmerston, encouraged seemingly by
    the language of Van Zuylen, the Dutch plenipotentiary,
    decided to make a further attempt to avert
    the necessity of an appeal to force.[238] Accordingly,
    he drew up a fresh scheme for the settlement of
    the points in dispute, and showed it confidentially to
    the Dutch representative. Van Zuylen professed to
    be on the whole well satisfied with Palmerston’s
    proposals, and held out distinct hopes that they might
    serve as the basis of a definite agreement between
    Holland and Belgium. But, before any progress
    could be made in the matter, it was necessary to
    induce the Belgians to abandon their declared
    intention of refusing to negotiate, until the Dutch
    should have evacuated the citadel of Antwerp. In
    order to try to persuade the Belgian government
    to adopt a less uncompromising attitude, Baron
    Stockmar, early in August, proceeded to Brussels as [Pg 126]the semi-official representative of the conference.
    King Leopold’s confidential adviser saw clearly that
    the Belgians must appear in a very unfavourable light
    should the negotiations break down, owing to their
    obstinate refusal to recede from the position they had
    taken up. He had never approved of the policy
    of the Meulinäer Cabinet, and had always deprecated
    the warlike preparations upon which that minister
    had ostentatiously embarked. As he constantly
    pointed out to the King, the chances of success in
    a single-handed contest with Holland were necessarily
    very doubtful. Moreover, under any circumstances,
    the Great Powers were pledged to intervene to put
    an end to the struggle, and, in such a case, Belgium,
    if the aggressor, would certainly be dealt with very
    harshly. One measure, however, which Stockmar had
    constantly advocated, was now an accomplished fact.
    In the month of May, the Princess Louise, a daughter
    of the King of the French, had been affianced to
    Leopold, and the marriage had been duly celebrated
    on August 9, at the Château de Compiègne. But
    the newly married king showed as little disposition
    to adopt the counsels of his father-in-law[239] as he
    had those of the sagacious Stockmar. Indeed, the
    language of many leading Belgians at this period
    suggested that they were encouraged to defy the
    Powers, from the security which they considered was
    assured to them by the family ties uniting their
    sovereign to the reigning House in France.[240] Leopold,
    without doubt, had no share in so dangerous an
    illusion, but his ministers had pledged themselves to
    the Chambers to insist upon the surrender of Antwerp
    as a preliminary to any fresh negotiations, and [Pg 127]he seems to have thought that it would be too
    unpopular a step to dismiss them on that account.
    Stockmar returned to London on August 18. His
    visit to Brussels had failed in its object, but he still
    continued to press his views upon King Leopold.
    A prolongation of the status quo constituted, he
    argued, no disadvantage to Belgium. Although it
    was the case that the Dutch held the citadel of
    Antwerp, which, by the terms of the treaty, should
    have passed out of their possession, their retention of
    it was counterbalanced by the Belgian occupation of
    parts of Limburg and Luxemburg, which, under
    the conditions of separation, had been assigned
    to Holland. Moreover, even the absolute Powers
    were prepared to admit that a continued refusal
    on the part of the Court of the Hague to evacuate
    Antwerp, would justify the Belgians in declining
    to pay their share of the public debt, jointly
    contracted by the two countries before their separation.
    Before long, the force of this reasoning began
    to be appreciated at Brussels, where both Adair and
    La Tour-Maubourg, the British and French ministers,
    were using their best endeavours to persuade the
    King to conform to the wishes of their respective
    governments. In diplomatic circles the conviction
    was gaining ground that the King of the Netherlands
    was merely trifling with the Powers, and that he had
    still no intention of bringing the negotiations to a
    conclusion.[241] Should these suspicions prove correct,
    Leopold probably realized that it must be to his
    advantage to display a readiness to meet the wishes of
    the conference, at a time when the members of it
    would necessarily be heartily disgusted at the dilatory
    and evasive attitude adopted by the Cabinet of the
    Hague.


Under the influence of these various considerations [Pg 128]his resolution rose to the required point.[242] The
    Meulinäer government was dismissed, General Goblet
    was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and powers
    were transmitted to Van de Weyer to enter into
    negotiations with the Dutch plenipotentiary upon the
    basis of the new proposals, Le thème de Lord Palmerston,
    as they were called by the diplomatists.


Accordingly, on September 20, M. Van de Weyer
    officially informed the conference that he was
    authorized to discuss with the Dutch plenipotentiaries
    the points in dispute between the two countries. But
    in a note dated the same day, Van Zuylen, ignoring
    completely the thème de Lord Palmerston, claimed the
    execution of the treaty on the terms set forth in the
    Dutch counter proposal of June 30. The conference,
    thereupon, called upon him definitely to state whether
    he was empowered to negotiate with Belgium in
    accordance with the proposals submitted by the
    British plenipotentiary. To this demand he returned
    an answer which was unanimously held to be highly
    unsatisfactory, and, on October 1, in consequence, the
    representatives of the five Powers met to consider the
    steps which should now be taken to bring matters to a
    conclusion. As had been foreseen, it was clear at once
    that the prospects of arriving at an agreement were
    hopeless. According to the absolute Powers, coercion
    must be confined to a declaration authorizing the
    Belgians to withhold payment of their share of
    the Dutch-Belgian debt, until the citadel of Antwerp
    should be handed over to them. France and
    England, on the other hand, deriding the notion that
    pressure of this kind would suffice to overcome the
    obstinacy of the King of the Netherlands, called for
    the application of sterner measures. To this demand
    the plenipotentiaries of the northern Powers opposed
    the irrevocable resolution of their respective Courts [Pg 129]not to participate in any hostile acts against Holland.
    In face of this irreconcilable divergence of opinion,
    the conference broke up, the representatives of France
    and England announcing the intention of their
    governments to take steps to ensure the prompt
    execution of the terms of the separation treaty.[243]


But, although the concert of the Powers had thus
    ceased to exist, there was still no distinct understanding
    between France and England, as to the measures
    by which the Dutch were to be compelled to evacuate
    Antwerp. Louis Philippe’s continued inability to
    reconstruct his Cabinet necessarily increased the
    reluctance of the British government to agree definitely
    to combined action with France. When, towards the
    end of June, the King had become convinced of the
    necessity of strengthening the ministry his thoughts,
    in the first place, had turned towards M. Dupin. His
    oratorical powers, the considerable following which he
    commanded in the Chamber, and the support which he
    had given to M. Casimir Périer, furnished excellent
    reasons for his inclusion in a government which was
    to carry on the policy of the late President of the
    Council. But insurmountable difficulties had arisen.
    It is not clear whether M. Dupin’s objections to
    joining the Cabinet should be ascribed to conscientious
    doubts about the future policy of the
    government, or merely to disappointed ambition,
    because the King was not prepared to confer upon him
    the Presidency of the Council. According to one
    account, he is said to have pointed to his hobnailed
    boots and to have asked insolently whether they were
    to debar him from transacting business with “Milord Granville.” But, whatever may have been the true
    cause of his misunderstanding with his royal master,
    their discussion unquestionably grew very heated and
    culminated in the King seizing him by the collar and [Pg 130]ejecting him from the room.[244] A strong sense of
    personal dignity, however, was never a characteristic of
    Louis Philippe, and, notwithstanding this scene, he
    soon reopened negotiations with M. Dupin. But this
    second attempt to arrange matters was attended with
    no better success than the first. Baffled in this direction,
    Louis Philippe was compelled to make overtures
    to the Doctrinaires. Under the Restoration this designation
    had been applied to a small but distinguished
    group of politicians, of whom the best known were
    Royer-Collard, Guizot, Broglie and Barante. All were
    strong advocates of limited monarchy and, generally
    speaking, fervent admirers of the British constitution.
    Their system of government was based upon the
    theory that, in the modern France which the Revolution
    had created, no régime could endure which did not
    depend for support upon the middle classes. The
    political principles which found favour with the bourgeoisie, constituting as they did a juste milieu between
    the reactionary sentiments of the old aristocracy
    and the revolutionary tendencies of the labouring
    classes, were precisely those to which, in the opinion of
    the Doctrinaires, all future governments would have
    to conform. Accordingly, they had accepted the
    Monarchy of July and both Broglie and Guizot had sat
    in Louis Philippe’s first Cabinet. But, holding that
    insurrection must be put down with a firm hand, they
    had always supported Casimir Périer.


Louis Philippe had no great liking for the Doctrinaires. As strict constitutionalists they were
    necessarily opposed to the direct interference of the
    sovereign with the business of the State. Moreover,
    they were unquestionably unpopular in the country.
    On this occasion, however, when compelled by circumstances
    to seek their assistance, he hoped to overcome [Pg 131]this last objection by nominating a popular soldier, in
    the person of Marshal Soult, to the presidency of the
    council. All through his reign Louis Philippe was inclined
    to place a military man at the head of the
    government. Not only were appointments of this kind
    invariably well received, but he soon discovered that
    soldiers, brought up in the school of Bonaparte, were
    seldom troubled with constitutional scruples about the
    exact position of the sovereign in a limited monarchy.
    But, at the same time, he was careful to assure Lord
    Granville that the Marshal’s duties, as President of
    the Council, would be purely nominal. “Under any
    circumstances,” said Louis Philippe, “his appointment
    need excite no apprehensions abroad, his love of
    peace is notorious, indeed, his description of himself as l’apôtre de la paix has almost passed into a byword.”[245] The Duc de Broglie, the son-in-law of Madame de
    Stael, into whose hands the King proposed to confide
    the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, was a cultivated man
    but of reserved and somewhat displeasing manners.
    He enjoyed, however, a high reputation for honourable
    dealing and integrity of purpose and was, moreover, on
    terms of friendship with Lord Lansdowne and other
    prominent members of the Whig party. His selection,
    therefore, might be expected to meet with the cordial
    approval of the British government.


The Duc de Broglie, however, was not prepared
    to accept unconditionally the task which the King
    proposed he should undertake. After one of his first
    interviews with Louis Philippe he met Lord Granville
    at Talleyrand’s house in the Rue Saint-Florentin and
    explained the situation to him. The French public, he
    told the ambassador, were weary of the interminable
    negotiations about Belgium, and it was only by a
    military exploit, such as the capture of the citadel of
    Antwerp, that the Cabinet would be able to obtain the [Pg 132]support of the Chamber. It was useless to attempt to
    disguise the grave character of the situation. Were
    the government to be overthrown by a parliamentary
    majority, the King would be forced to depend upon
    the Left, and be rendered powerless to control the
    violence of extreme members of the party. The Duke
    went on to assure him that he was not ignorant of the
    suspicion with which the entry of a French army into
    Belgium would be regarded. There was no pledge, no
    guarantee, however, which he would not be prepared to
    give that, eight days after the capture of the citadel,
    every French soldier should be withdrawn from
    Belgium.[246] This conversation had been regarded by
    Lord Granville as quite unofficial, but, on the following
    day, October 5, Sébastiani informed him that
    “the King purposed to defer concluding his ministerial
    arrangements until the British ambassador should be
    enabled to state the opinion of his government, respecting
    the conditions under which alone the Duc de
    Broglie would undertake the direction of foreign affairs.”[247] It is evident, however, that other counsels must have
    prevailed seeing that, on the morning of October 11,
    the Moniteur contained the names of the members
    of the new Cabinet. The despatches of Mareuil, the chargé d’affaires in London, respecting the intentions
    of the British government, were, it may be presumed,
    considered so satisfactory as to render further assurances
    unnecessary. The ministry presided over by Marshal
    Soult, assisted by four such men as Broglie, Guizot,
    Humann, and Thiers, could almost aspire to the name
    of “a government of all the talents.”


The British government was in a difficult situation.
    The elections were impending, and a Reformed
    Parliament, bent upon retrenchment and the settlement
    of domestic questions, was little likely to regard [Pg 133]with favour any policy which might conceivably lead
    to serious complications with foreign Powers. The
    very indifferent display of the Belgians, in their short
    campaign of the year before, had deprived them of all
    popular sympathy. In commercial circles, especially,
    the idea of embarking upon hostilities against England’s
    old allies, the Dutch, was strongly deprecated.[248] Although the unreasonable attitude of the King of
    the Netherlands, during the past twelve months, had
    alienated from him the support of The Times[249] and of
    many persons who derived their opinions from its
    columns, there was unquestionably something to be
    said upon his behalf. He had adhered to the protocols
    of January 20 and January 27, 1831, which the
    plenipotentiaries had declared must form the basis
    of any separation treaty. Nevertheless, in order to
    conciliate the Belgians, they had gone back upon their
    decision, and both the convention of the eighteen
    articles and the separation treaty of November 14,
    1831, had been framed upon different conditions.


The Tories had always supported the Dutch, and
    during the stormy months which had preceded the
    passing of the Reform Bill, had delivered some
    damaging attacks upon the foreign policy of the
    government. It was certain that they would
    vehemently denounce any combined action with
    France in the Dutch-Belgian question. Nor would
    it be politic to disregard their attacks and merely to
    treat them as the venomous outburst of party
    animosity. Notwithstanding that the republicans
    had been crushed in the streets of Paris and that the
    Carlist rebellion in La Vendée had been stamped out,
    the situation in France undoubtedly presented many [Pg 134]disquieting symptoms. The hiding place of the
    Duchesse de Berri was still undiscovered, and her
    presence in the west prevented the complete restoration
    of tranquillity. The great difficulty which Louis
    Philippe was experiencing in forming a government
    of moderate men afforded food for yet more serious
    reflection. The possibility could not be ignored that,
    in the near future, he might be compelled to select his
    ministers from the Left—from the party, the leading
    members of which proclaimed unceasingly that the
    treaties of 1815 must be abrogated and that Belgium
    must be united to France.


King William IV., moreover, was strongly opposed
    to hostile action against Holland. The “Jack Tar
    animosity”[250] which he always entertained for the
    French blazed up afresh at the notion of England
    and France engaging upon joint operations in the
    Low Countries. The King’s dislike to the policy of
    his ministers was encouraged by the Howes and the
    Fitzclarences,[251] who used their best endeavours to
    persuade him to refuse his consent to all measures of
    coercion. In view of the little sympathy which the
    cause of Belgium evoked in the country, and of the
    many difficulties by which they were beset, Lords
    Grey and Palmerston might not improbably have felt
    disposed to adopt some middle course, more in
    harmony with the views of the Court and of the
    absolute Powers. But a refusal on their part to
    resort to force, in order to obtain the execution of the
    treaty, would not have restrained the French from
    beginning hostilities. “I should deceive your Lordship,”wrote Granville on October 19, “were I to hold
    out any expectation that the British government, by
    withholding its concurrence, could prevent a French
    army from entering Belgium.”[252] It was to be [Pg 135]apprehended, however, that a refusal of the English
    Cabinet to join with France in the application of
    coercion to Holland might lead to the resignation of
    the Duc de Broglie. In that case it was more than
    probable that the direction of French policy, at a most
    important moment, might pass from the hands of a
    statesman of moderate views into those of some
    politician of advanced opinions, in whom it would be
    impossible to feel the same confidence. This was a
    consideration which, without doubt, carried the
    greatest weight with the English ministers and
    exercised a deciding influence over their resolutions.


It was soon apparent that the withdrawal of their
    plenipotentiaries from the conference would be the
    extent of the support which the Northern Courts
    purposed to give to the King of the Netherlands.
    The neutral attitude, which the Tsar had promised
    Lord Durham he should adopt, rendered it certain
    that Austria would not move a man to the assistance
    of Holland. Metternich was much concerned at the
    recrudescence of a demand for more Liberal institutions
    in Germany, a state of affairs which had called forth
    from the Diet fresh decrees of a repressive character.
    The prevailing unrest, however, made it the more
    desirable that the Dutch-Belgian question, with all
    the possibilities of danger attaching to it, should be
    promptly settled. Furthermore, the burden of military
    establishments was already grievously straining the
    Imperial exchequer.[253] But, although Metternich had
    no thought of opposing the action of the constitutional
    Powers in the Low Countries, he chafed bitterly at
    the undignified attitude which his Court was compelled
    to adopt. At one time he would impute the whole
    blame for the situation which had arisen to the
    plenipotentiaries at the conference who, by manifesting
    too plainly their dread of war, had allowed [Pg 136]Palmerston to see that he might, without danger,
    conduct matters as he chose.[254] At other times the
    Cabinet of Berlin was the object of his fretful complaints.
    Had Prussia on the first outbreak of the
    insurrection at Brussels marched an army into the
    Low Countries, the revolution would have been
    stamped out, and all the subsequent trouble would
    have been avoided. France, in that case, he professed
    to believe, might have threatened, but would never
    have dared to intervene.[255]


The break-up of the conference and the intention
    avowed by the two constitutional Powers of expelling
    the Dutch from Antwerp, although not unexpected,
    caused considerable perturbation at Berlin. Ancillon,
    the chief minister, declared that Prussia would agree
    to the weekly deduction of a million florins from
    Belgium’s share of the debt due to Holland, for so
    long a period as the Dutch should retain possession of
    the citadel of Antwerp. Nor would his Court be
    prepared seriously to oppose a blockade of the Scheldt
    by the two maritime Powers. The entry of a French
    army into the Low Countries, however, was a different
    matter, and one which would compel Prussia to take
    steps to safeguard her interests. But, neither the
    angry language of M. Ancillon at Berlin nor the veiled
    threats indulged in by Baron Werther in Paris, excited
    any real apprehension. Nevertheless, as both the French
    and English governments were sincerely desirous of
    conciliating the absolute Powers, it was resolved to propose
    that, pending the settlement of the Dutch-Belgian
    question, Prussia should occupy Venlo and that part
    of Limburg which the treaty had assigned to Holland.[256]


 [Pg 137]


It was not until October 22 that the convention,
    to regulate the conditions under which France and
    England were to apply coercion to Holland, was signed
    in London. The French government chafed impatiently
    at this delay, for which King William’s
    reluctance to agree to the measures advocated by his
    ministers was chiefly responsible. Notwithstanding
    Talleyrand’s[257] explanations of the delicate situation in
    which Lord Grey was placed, the Duc de Broglie, on
    October 21, informed Lord Granville that his government
    could wait no longer. The very existence of the
    Cabinet, he assured him, was at stake. Unless he
    were to be in a position to announce to the Chambers,
    which were about to reassemble, that definite steps were
    to be taken in order to expel the Dutch from Antwerp,
    he and his colleagues would assuredly be driven from
    office. If no news were received from London within
    the next twenty-four hours, the Cabinet, he had no
    doubt, would resolve to march an army against
    Antwerp, in the event of the King of the Netherlands
    refusing to comply with a summons to evacuate the
    citadel. This resolution would, however, be at once
    transmitted to London, and would be kept entirely
    secret until the British government should have had
    time to reply to it. But, to the great joy of Louis
    Philippe and his ministers, the arrival, on October 29,
    of the convention signed in London relieved them from
    the necessity of deciding upon their course of action,
    without having previously obtained the concurrence of
    the English government.[258]


By the terms of the convention of October 22, [Pg 138]1832, the King of the Netherlands was to be
    summoned to enter into an engagement by November 2
    to withdraw his troops, before the 12th of the same
    month, from the territory which the separation
    treaty had adjudged to Belgium. Should he refuse
    to comply, France and England agreed to lay an
    embargo upon the Dutch shipping within their
    respective harbours, to order their cruisers to seize all
    Dutch vessels at sea, and to blockade the coast of
    Holland with their combined fleets. If, by November 15,
    the required evacuation should not yet have taken
    place, a French army would enter Belgium. But its
    operations were to be limited strictly to the capture of the
    citadel of Antwerp and the forts dependent upon it, and,
    when this result should have been attained, it was to
    withdraw immediately. At the same time, a note was
    to be addressed to the government at Brussels calling
    for the evacuation of Venlo and those places still
    occupied by Belgium, which, under the provisions of
    the separation treaty, had been assigned to Holland.[259] This demand, however, would be of a purely formal
    character, and was to be made upon the understanding
    that it need only be complied with, should the King
    of the Netherlands agree to the concessions required
    of him.[260]


Immediately upon receipt of the convention in
    Paris, the French fleet at Cherbourg was ordered to
    unite with the British squadron at Spithead. This
    junction was duly effected, and, on November 4, the
    King of the Netherlands having declined to comply
    with the demand which had been presented to him,
    the combined fleets set sail for the mouth of the
    Scheldt, whilst, two days later, both governments laid
    an embargo upon the Dutch shipping within their
    ports. The Duc de Broglie, in the meanwhile, had [Pg 139]instructed La Tour-Maubourg, the French minister at
    Brussels, to negotiate a convention for the entry of a
    French army into Belgium. The French government
    had always insisted that the operations, for the reduction
    of the citadel of Antwerp, must be carried out
    exclusively by its own troops. The Belgian army was
    to be entirely separated from them, and was to do no
    more than hold itself in readiness to repel an invasion,
    should the Dutch make an incursion across their
    frontiers. King Leopold reluctantly assented to
    these conditions, which necessarily deprived his
    people of an excellent opportunity of wiping out their
    humiliations of the year before. It came, therefore, as
    a disagreeable surprise when, on the occasion of the
    exchange of the ratifications of the convention, La
    Tour-Maubourg handed in a statement reserving to
    the French government the right of demanding payment
    for the expenses of the expedition. This claim,
    it was afterwards explained, would not be enforced
    immediately, but would be allowed to stand over until
    some future occasion. In Palmerston’s opinion, however,
    the fact that payment was to be deferred made
    the demand no less objectionable. Were it to be
    admitted, Belgium must necessarily be placed in a
    position of dangerous dependence upon France. His
    vigorous protests achieved the desired result. After
    some discussion the French government agreed to
    abandon its claim for the repayment of its expenses.[261] In all other respects matters proceeded with perfect
    smoothness. In accordance with the terms of the
    convention, on November 16th, a French force of
    60,000 men, under the command of Marshal Gérard,
    crossed the Belgian frontier and laid siege to the
    citadel of Antwerp, the Duc d’Orléans and the Duc de
    Nemours, the two eldest sons of Louis Philippe, [Pg 140]accompanying the headquarters staff of the army of
    operations.


In London the application of coercion of so
    vigorous a nature was far from evoking the universal
    applause which it called forth in Paris. Among the
    general public the entry of Marshal Gérard’s army into
    Belgium was regarded with suspicion, and a meeting
    of London merchants was held, and a petition was
    forwarded to the King, praying that hostile measures
    might not be taken against the Dutch. The Tories
    openly declared that they placed all their hopes in
    General Chassé, the commandant of the citadel of
    Antwerp. If only that gallant officer could contrive
    to repel the French, the Grey Cabinet, they conceived,
    might be forced to resign. Possibly there were
    sanguine members of the party who fancied that the
    prowess of a Dutch general might pave the way to the
    repeal of the Reform Act. In the meantime all their
    sympathies went out to a drunken sailor who, from
    the dock in the police-court, proclaimed the union
    of the British flag with the tricolour to be a national
    disgrace.[262]


The proposal that Prussia should occupy Venlo
    and parts of Limburg, and the limitations which the
    convention of October 22 set upon the scope of the
    French operations, somewhat reconciled the German
    Powers to the forcible ejection of the Dutch from
    Antwerp.[263] Nevertheless, after having in the first
    instance declared its readiness to take temporary
    possession of portions of the disputed territory, the
    Court of Berlin, at the instigation, it was suspected, of
    the Tsar, declined to entertain the suggestion.
    Inasmuch as the acquisition of the citadel of Antwerp [Pg 141]by the Belgians depended upon the success of the
    French arms, they could not reasonably be expected to
    yield up, even to a third party, any territory which
    they actually occupied, before the operations under
    Marshal Gérard should have achieved their desired
    result. Accordingly, in the formal proposal of
    Talleyrand and Palmerston, which was submitted to
    Bülow on October 30, it was provided that the
    Prussian occupation of Venlo and parts of Limburg
    and Luxemburg should begin, only when the French
    expedition should have accomplished its object.
    Ancillon, however, declared that this suggestion was
    altogether inadmissible. Prussia, it was true, had
    signified her willingness to hold certain districts of
    the Low Countries. But she had only consented to
    take temporary possession of them for the security of
    her own interests during the French operations against
    Antwerp. To occupy any portion of Holland, after
    the withdrawal of Marshal Gérard’s army, would
    amount, in effect, to the application of military
    pressure to the King of the Netherlands to compel
    him to accept the conditions of the separation treaty.
    Such a proceeding would be wholly inconsistent with
    the policy which the Court of Berlin had invariably
    pursued, and to which it was resolved to adhere.
    Prussia, therefore, would content herself with the
    concentration of an army of observation upon the
    Meuse, for so long a period as the French might see
    fit to remain in Belgium.[264]


In the meantime the siege of the citadel of
    Antwerp had been proceeding steadily, although
    hardly with the rapidity which the British government,
    in its impatience to see the affair concluded,
    could have wished.[265] At last, after having sustained a [Pg 142]very heavy bombardment and having done all that
    honour required, General Chassé, on December 22,
    agreed to surrender. But the two detached forts of
    Lillo and Liefkenshoek, which, owing to the opening
    of the dykes, could only have been reduced by a long
    blockade, were not included in the capitulation. The
    arrangements connected with the transference of the
    fortress to the Belgian military authorities were
    quickly carried out, and, on December 27, the French
    army began its homeward march.


The operations of Marshal Gérard had placed the
    Belgians in possession of the citadel of Antwerp, and
    had infused vitality into the Soult government, but
    they had not succeeded in overcoming the reluctance
    of the King of the Netherlands to adhere to the
    separation treaty. It remained to be seen whether
    the embargo which France and England continued
    to maintain, and the loss entailed by the non-payment
    of the Belgian share of the Netherlands debt, would
    suffice to break down his obstinacy. After this state
    of affairs had continued for some four months distinct
    symptoms began to manifest themselves in Dutch
    commercial circles of discontent at the prolongation
    of the crisis. About this same time also the Russian
    and Prussian Cabinets became imbued with the notion
    that the conclusion of the Dutch-Belgian affair might
    lead to a separation between France and England.
    Their intimate union had grown up in the course of
    the negotiations, the final settlement of the question,
    it was hoped, might cause them to drift asunder.
    The agents of the northern Courts at the Hague were,
    accordingly, instructed to urge the King to terminate
    definitely his troublesome quarrel with Belgium and the
    maritime Powers.[266]


 [Pg 143]


This combination of internal and external pressure
    was more than the Dutch Cabinet could withstand.
    On May 21, 1833 a convention was signed in London
    by the plenipotentiaries of Holland, on the one side,
    and those of Great Britain and France, on the other,
    stipulating that, so long as the relations between
    Holland and Belgium should not be settled by a
    definite treaty, His Netherlands Majesty would never
    begin hostilities against Belgium, and would leave the
    navigation of the Scheldt entirely free. France and
    England in return engaged to remove the embargo,
    immediately upon the ratification of this convention.[267]


The convention of May 21, 1833, was, in effect, an
    agreement for the maintenance of the status quo. It
    constituted, however, a condition of affairs very
    favourable to the Belgians. The retention of the
    districts of Limburg and Luxemburg, which, according
    to the twenty-four articles, should have formed part
    of Holland, compensated them amply for the small
    inconveniences imposed upon them by the refusal of
    the Court of the Hague to acknowledge their
    independence and the sovereignty of their King.
    Five years later, in 1838, this fact was brought home
    to them when, the King of the Netherlands having
    announced his intention of adhering to the separation
    treaty, the Powers insisted upon the surrender to him
    of those territories. By that time, however, Leopold
    had obtained the recognition of all the great European
    Courts with the exception of that of Russia, whilst,
    relieved from the fear of aggression on the part of the
    Dutch, his kingdom had already begun to thrive and
    to prosper greatly.


It was the firm and skilful hand of Palmerston
    which had guided the conference through a sea of
    dangers to the creation of a free and independent
    Belgium. But if the chief credit for the successful [Pg 144]termination of these protracted negotiations should
    be given to the English statesman, second honours,
    without doubt, should be assigned to Talleyrand.
    The veteran diplomatist was no friend to Belgium,
    but he was a consistent supporter of the British
    alliance. The exceptional position, which his age
    and his reputation permitted him to assume, enabled
    him on many occasions to uphold successfully the
    English policy against his own sovereign and his
    government. In 1814, at the Congress of Vienna,
    friendship with England had been the object of his
    untiring efforts. But, if he looked upon a close understanding
    with that Power as highly advantageous to
    the restored Bourbons, he regarded it as a matter
    of vital necessity to the Monarchy of July. An
    intimate union with England, he was convinced, was
    Louis Philippe’s best security against the malevolent
    hostility of the Northern Courts.


The Belgian conference had shown that, in the
    person of Lord Palmerston, a worthy successor to
    Canning had entered the arena of European politics.
    As was the case with that statesman, Palmerston soon
    came to be regarded with the bitterest dislike in
    the Courts and Cabinets of the absolute Powers.
    Metternich hoped devoutly that the Tories might soon
    be back in office, and, not without good reason,
    expressed a pious wish that never again might a
    conference take place in London.[268] The real weakness
    of the absolute Courts had transpired all too clearly in
    the course of the negotiations.




 [Pg 145]


 CHAPTER V


MEHEMET ALI


Scarcely had the withdrawal of the French troops
    from Belgium been effected, than grave news was
    received from the east. At Konieh, in Asia Minor,
    on December 21, 1832, Ibrahim Pasha, the son of
    Mehemet Ali, the rebellious viceroy of Egypt, was
    reported to have inflicted so signal a defeat upon the
    Turkish army, as to place it beyond the Sultan’s power
    to resist his advance to the shores of the Bosphorus.
    The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, with all the
    fearful complications which it would entail, appeared
    to be upon the point of taking place.


The Sultan, Mahmud II., had always been keenly
    alive to the necessity of remedying the decrepit condition
    of his Empire. But only a Peter the Great could
    have eradicated effectually the many evils from which
    Turkey was suffering, and Mahmud was merely an
    Oriental despot. All through his reign, however, he
    set himself resolutely to destroy the almost independent
    power which some of his Pashas had begun to
    assume over the provinces which they governed. He
    imposed the European dress upon his ministers and
    officials, he introduced the French system of drill
    into his army, and he exterminated the janissaries,
    when they rebelled against his innovations. Even at
    a time of profound peace reforms of this superficial
    character could have effected little real improvement.
    Under the actual conditions under which they were [Pg 146]carried out they proved a cause of anarchy and a
    further source of weakness to the State.


In 1821 the Sublime Porte was called upon to deal
    at the same time with the rebellion of Ali, the celebrated
    “Lion of Janina,” and with the more serious
    national rising of the Greeks. After the struggle in
    the Morea had been carried on for three years, with
    ruthless barbarity on both sides, the Sultan was reluctantly
    compelled to invoke the aid of his too powerful
    vassal, the Pasha of Egypt. The intervention of the
    well-equipped fleet of Mehemet Ali deprived the Greeks
    of the sea power, which had been the secret of their
    success. Nevertheless, Ibrahim’s invasion of the Morea
    in 1825, by compelling the Powers to interfere, gave
    Greece her independence. The romantic episodes of
    the struggle, the classic memories with which the
    theatre of war was associated, had gained for the
    insurgents the popular sympathies of the western
    nations. The philhellenism of the French and
    English people gradually drove Villèle[269] and Canning
    to concert measures for terminating the conflict with
    Nicholas, whose subjects were eager to strike a blow
    on behalf of their co-religionists.


Negotiations proceeded slowly, but, on July 6,
    1827, Great Britain, France and Russia bound themselves
    by treaty to obtain the autonomy of the Morea.
    Moreover, in a secret article, it was provided that
    an armistice was to be proposed to both sides to be
    enforced by such means as might “suggest themselves
    to the prudence of the High Contracting Parties.”
    Three months later, on October 20, the allied fleets
    of the three Christian Powers, under the command of
    Codrington, the senior admiral, were face to face with
    the Mussulman armada in the Bay of Navarino. Immediate
    hostilities were probably not intended, but
    a dispute about the position of a fire-ship led to an [Pg 147]exchange of shots. Before nightfall the “untoward
    event” had come to pass—the Turkish and Egyptian
    fleets had been destroyed completely.


Mahmud in his fury proclaimed a holy war, and
    declared null and void the convention of Akkerman,
    which he had recently concluded with Russia for the
    settlement of certain points, long in dispute between
    the two Powers. Canning was dead and Wellington
    was determined to abstain rigidly from anything in
    the nature of hostile action against Turkey. Nevertheless,
    under the conditions which had been created by
    Canning’s departure from the traditional policy of his
    party, he could do nothing to prevent Nicholas from
    appealing to the last argument of princes. On May 6,
    1828, the Russians crossed the Pruth and the war
    began, which British and Austrian diplomacy had
    always striven to avert. The Turks, however, in a
    struggle with their hereditary foes displayed unexpected
    powers of resistance, and it was not until
    September 14, 1829, when Constantinople appeared
    to lie at the mercy of the invaders, that peace was
    concluded at Adrianople.


In accordance with his promises to the Powers,
    Nicholas had exacted no cession of territory in Europe.
    But Turkey had been compelled to grant a practical
    independence to the Danubian principalities, to pay
    a heavy war indemnity and to surrender to Russia
    Anapi and Poti on the eastern shore of the Black Sea.
    Moreover, the Sultan was forced to acknowledge the
    complete independence of Greece, which was placed
    under the guarantee of Great Britain, France and
    Russia. The loss of the Morea was a serious blow to
    the Porte. Not only was the Turkish navy deprived
    of its finest recruiting ground, but the countenance
    given by the Powers to the rising of the Greeks
    necessarily had a most disturbing effect upon all the
    Christian subjects of the Sultan.


 [Pg 148]


Whilst the power of the Sultan was thus sensibly
    diminished, Mehemet Ali, who had taken no part in
    the Russian war, was preparing to avail himself of the
    embarrassed condition of the Empire for the prosecution
    of his own designs. This remarkable man was
    born at Cawala, a small seaport town in Roumelia, in
    1769, the year which gave birth to Napoleon Bonaparte
    and to Wellington. His father was a yeoman farmer
    and he himself, in early life, was a small trader in
    tobacco. In 1798, however, Bonaparte’s descent upon
    Egypt gave him his opportunity. Young Ali sailed
    for the country in which he was so rapidly to acquire
    fame, in the rank of second-in-command to a regiment
    of Bashi-Bazouks. In the troublous times which
    followed, his military talents and his statesmanlike
    qualities soon brought him into prominence. In 1804,
    the sheikhs of Cairo elected him Pasha, and, two years
    later, a, firman of the Sultan confirmed their selection.
    The last obstacle to his complete ascendency over
    Egypt was removed, on March 1, 1811, by the terrible
    affair known as the massacre of the Mamelukes. The
    Beys and chiefs, to the number of 470, were invited to
    witness the ceremony of investing his second son with
    the command of the army destined for operations
    against the Wahabites. These men versed in all the
    wiles and stratagems of eastern politics complied, and
    walked blindly into the trap set for them by one who,
    they must have known, was their deadly enemy. On
    leaving the citadel of Cairo they were relentlessly shot
    down by a picked body of the Pasha’s Albanian troops,
    at a point where the road becomes a narrow winding
    pathway cut out of the rock. Alone Emin Bey, by
    blindfolding his horse and by forcing him through a
    gap and down a high, precipitous bank, succeeded in
    escaping from the scene of slaughter.[270]


During the next few years Mehemet Ali won a [Pg 149]high reputation in the Moslem world by his wars
    against the Wahabites, and by his deliverance of the
    Holy Cities of Medina and Mecca from these enemies
    of the true faith. He had always entertained a great
    liking and admiration for Europeans, and his
    experience of French and English troops had
    impressed him with the superiority of western over
    eastern methods. As early as 1803 he had begun to
    build up a fleet, and with the assistance of Colonel
    Sèves, known in Egypt as Soliman Pasha, a former
    aide-de-camp of Marshal Ney, he hoped to obtain an
    army trained and disciplined on a European model.
    His efforts had been so far crowned with success, that,
    but for the intervention of the Powers, his son
    Ibrahim would, unquestionably, have crushed the
    Greek rebellion.


Mehemet Ali’s curious experiment in state
    socialism can be discussed more conveniently later on.
    Suffice it to say that, unsound as was his economic
    system, and destined as it was largely to contribute
    to his ultimate undoing, it, for a time, furnished him
    with ample funds for the prosecution of his ambitious
    schemes. By nature he appears to have been rather a
    kind-hearted than a cruel man. To some extent,
    without doubt, he was an oppressor of the people, yet
    at the same time he constantly protected them from
    the ill-treatment and exactions of his officials. But,
    although he was too large-minded to find any
    satisfaction in useless tyranny, when he conceived that
    reasons of state called for their application, he would
    resort unhesitatingly to the most ruthless measures.[271] In passing judgment on Mehemet Ali, however, it
    must always be remembered that he was an
    altogether illiterate man, who had only taught
    himself to read in middle life by dint of great [Pg 150]perseverance. Nor should it be forgotten that Egypt,
    when he assumed the supreme control, was in a
    state of confusion and anarchy almost impossible
    to realize.


It was not loyalty which had prompted Mehemet
    Ali to assist the Porte to crush the Greek insurrection.
    In 1822 he had obtained the island of Crete from the
    Sultan, and the Morea and the pashalics of Syria and
    Damascus were to have been his rewards in 1825.
    The intervention of the Powers had deprived him of
    the Morea, which he had always regarded as one of
    the gates of Constantinople. After the Russo-Turkish
    war, however, he felt confident of his ability to take
    forcible possession of Syria, the eastern avenue of
    approach to the Imperial city. A quarrel with
    Abdullah Pasha of Acre furnished him with an excuse
    for setting his army and his fleet in motion. On
    November 1, 1831, a force of about 10,000 Egyptians,
    under Ibrahim, entered Syria and laid siege to the
    fortress of Saint-Jean d’Acre.


To the commissioner of the Porte sent to remonstrate
    with him for thus invading a neighbouring
    pashalic, without the permission of the Sultan,
    Mehemet Ali loudly protested the loyalty of his
    intentions. The presumptuous Abdullah, he swore,
    had “insulted his beard whitened in the service of his
    sovereign,” and, in the interests of the Porte, he now
    proposed to chastise his arrogance. These assurances
    were, however, estimated at their true value, and
    neither the Sultan nor his ministers had had any
    doubts that the Pasha was now launched upon a career
    of conquest.[272] The destruction of his powerful vassal
    had, for many years past, been an object very near to
    Mahmud’s heart. To accomplish this purpose, he was
    prepared to strain to their uttermost the exhausted
    resources of the empire. His favourite, Hosrew, the [Pg 151]Seraskier,[273] was the sworn enemy of Mehemet Ali, and
    both the Grand Vizier and the Capudan Pasha[274] were
    the creatures of this minister.[275] On the other hand,
    however, the Ulemas and the Mullahs argued in
    favour of an arrangement with the rebellious viceroy,
    even at the price of large concessions. The three
    guaranteeing Powers had settled upon the boundaries
    of the new Kingdom of Greece, and Sir Stratford
    Canning was about to arrive at Constantinople to
    arrange the final conditions of separation with the
    Porte. But, were peace to be maintained with the
    Pasha of Egypt, contended the true Mussulman
    party, a united front could be turned to Europe, and
    the concessions demanded, in respect of Greece, might
    be scornfully rejected.[276]


Notwithstanding his wrath, this consideration
    appears to have carried some weight with the Sultan.
    But his hesitation was not of long duration. Hussein
    Pasha, a former janissary, and Mahmud’s chief
    instrument in the destruction of his comrades, was
    appointed to the command of the troops in Syria. No
    pains were spared to render the army of operations as
    efficient and as numerous as possible, and, early in
    May, both Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim were declared
    outlaws. Meanwhile, the siege of Acre had been
    proceeding, but the defence was stubborn, and it was
    not until May 27, 1832, that Ibrahim carried the
    fortress by storm. The victorious general now set his
    face northwards. On June 15, Damascus opened its
    gates, and, on July 9, he defeated the advanced
    Turkish troops at Homs. A week later, he entered
    Aleppo, and, on July 29, routed Hussein Pasha
    himself, who had taken up a strong position near [Pg 152]Alexandretta. This victory left him free to pass the
    Taurus mountains and to enter Asia Minor.


It was to the politic attitude which he had
    observed towards the people of the country through
    which he had passed, rather than to any superiority of
    his Arab troops over the Turks, that the success of
    Ibrahim’s invasion should be ascribed. In those wild
    and mountainous districts any resistance on the part
    of the inhabitants must have greatly impeded the
    advance of an army. Ibrahim, however, maintained
    the strictest discipline, and paid promptly for all the
    requirements of his troops. The people, contrasting
    his behaviour with the treatment they had been
    accustomed to experience at the hands of the
    Turks, were strongly impressed in favour of the
    Egyptians.[277] The Emir Beshir, the powerful chief of
    the Lebanon, threw in his lot with the invaders. The
    warlike Druses and the Maronites tendered Ibrahim
    their services. Christians were won over by promises
    of equal rights, and Moslems by the prospect of
    escaping from Ottoman oppression. Ibrahim’s troops
    were equipped in European fashion, but there was
    nothing about their uniform which could offend the
    most rigid Mussulman. He himself was dressed in
    the same simple manner as his soldiers, and he
    affected always to be a strict observer of Turkish
    customs. Although in private, in the company of the
    Christian officers of his staff, he would often indulge
    freely in French wine, in public he was never seen to
    drink anything stronger than water.[278]


Ibrahim’s rapid succession of victories and his
    continued advance filled the Sultan with consternation.
    Having resolved to throw all the resources of the [Pg 153]Empire into the struggle with Mehemet Ali he could
    not afford to quarrel with the Christian Powers.
    Stratford Canning, accordingly, experienced little
    difficulty in bringing the Porte to agree to the conditions
    under which it was proposed that Greece should
    be separated from Turkey. Soon after his arrival,
    however, on May 17, in the course of a confidential
    talk, Mustafa-Effendi, the Sultan’s private secretary,
    let fall certain expressions indicative of a desire on the
    part of his master to enter into a close and intimate
    connection with England.[279] On August 7, 1832, on
    the occasion of Sir Stratford’s audience for the purpose
    of taking leave, the Sultan “honoured him with the
    gift of his portrait suspended by a gold chain and
    set in brilliants,” a mark of His Highness’ consideration
    which, the ambassador reported, “was without
    precedent.”[280] Direct proposals for the conclusion of
    an alliance between England and Turkey were immediately
    afterwards made to him both by the Reis-Effendi[281] and by the Sultan himself.[282] Furthermore, M.
    Maurojeni, the Turkish chargé d’affaires at Vienna,
    was sent to London to sound the British government
    upon the subject, and, on October 18, Namic Pasha, a
    major-general of the Imperial Guard, set out for
    England with a letter from His Highness to King
    William IV. praying for naval assistance on the coast
    of Syria.[283]


Had the decision rested with Palmerston alone it
    is possible that aid of some kind might have been
    furnished to the Porte. But the majority of the
    members of the Cabinet were strongly averse to
    embarking upon any fresh adventure, while the Belgian [Pg 154]question was still unsettled. Moreover, since the
    conclusion of the great war, the naval establishments
    had been cut down to so low a point that it would
    have been highly inconvenient to reinforce the
    Mediterranean squadron. The British chargé d’affaires at Constantinople was, therefore, instructed to inform
    the Porte that “naval assistance was a matter of greater
    difficulty than at first sight it would appear to be.”
    Nevertheless, the request was regarded as a striking
    proof of the Sultan’s confidence in British friendship,
    and His Majesty’s government would at once convey
    to Mehemet Ali “an expression of regret that he
    should so far have forgotten what was due to his
    Sovereign.”[284] This was all the comfort which
    Mandeville was able to give to the distracted Turkish
    ministers, at the moment when the news reached
    Constantinople that the Grand Vizier had been
    completely defeated at Konieh, that he himself was a
    prisoner in Ibrahim’s hands and that, in the words of
    the Reis-Effendi, “the Turkish army existed no
    longer.”[285]


A few days before the arrival of the news of the
    disaster at Konieh, the Russian general, Muravieff,
    suddenly appeared at Constantinople. On December 23
    both he and Boutenieff, the Russian ambassador, had
    a conference with the Reis-Effendi and the Seraskier,
    and, on the 27th, the general was received in private
    audience by the Sultan, to whom he presented a letter
    from the Tsar. No mystery was made of the fact that
    Muravieff had been charged to proceed to Cairo, to
    warn Mehemet Ali that, should he persist in refusing
    to make his submission to the Sultan, he would bring
    down upon himself the wrath of the Emperor Nicholas.
    But both Mandeville and Varennes, the French chargé d’affaires,
    were soon satisfied, notwithstanding the [Pg 155]secrecy with which the Russian proceedings were
    surrounded, that an offer of military assistance had
    been tendered to the Porte. Their information was
    correct.[286] Boutenieff had offered to place a squadron
    of the Black Sea fleet at the Sultan’s disposal, but his
    Highness, with profuse expressions of gratitude, had
    declined the proffered assistance. Rather than accept
    help from Russia, he was prepared to humble his pride
    and to send Halil Pasha to attempt to arrange a settlement
    with his rebellious vassal. On January 5, 1833,
    this decision was conveyed to Boutenieff, whereupon
    Muravieff at once set out upon his mission to Mehemet
    Ali, the Sultan’s envoy, Halil Pasha, having already
    started upon his way to Alexandria.


There had, for a long time past, been a disposition
    in England to regard French relations with Egypt
    with suspicion. Ever since Bonaparte’s descent upon
    the country, Egypt was believed to have a sentimental
    attraction for the French. Now that by their acquisition
    of Algiers, they had gained a footing upon the
    African shore of the Mediterranean, this feeling of
    distrust had increased. It was remembered that
    Polignac had seriously entertained the notion of subsidizing
    Mehemet Ali and of employing a corps of
    Egyptian troops in the Algerian expedition. During
    the course of Ibrahim’s campaign in Syria, both
    Stratford Canning and Mandeville had looked with sour
    disapproval upon Varennes’ efforts to persuade the
    Porte to allow France to mediate between the Sultan
    and the Pasha.[287] But both the French and English
    governments were agreed as to the necessity of [Pg 156]preserving the Ottoman Empire and were resolved to
    prevent, if possible, the Porte from falling completely
    under the influence of Russia. The Duc de Broglie,
    when he learnt that offers of assistance had
    been made to the Sultan by Boutenieff, at once
    suggested the joint mediation of France and England
    in the Turco-Egyptian dispute, and was greatly
    disappointed to find that his proposal met with no
    response in London. Palmerston, for the present, was
    content to direct Lord Ponsonby to proceed from
    Naples to Constantinople, as ambassador to the Porte,
    and to despatch Colonel Campbell to Egypt, in the
    capacity of British agent and consul-general, with
    instructions to communicate “freely and confidentially”
    with the French and Austrian representatives
    at Alexandria.[288]


It was one of the ironies of the situation that, at
    this time, when Russia was suspected of intending to
    put into execution long-matured schemes against the
    integrity of the Ottoman Empire, her traditional
    policy towards Turkey had in fact been completely
    reversed. As far back as the year 1802 the minister,
    Kotchuby, taking as his text Montesquieu’s doctrine
    that no Power can have a better neighbour than a
    weak State, had drawn up a memorandum to prove
    that the preservation, not the destruction, of Turkey
    should be the object of Russian policy. More recently,
    in 1829, when the terms of the peace of Adrianople
    were under consideration, the members of the eastern
    committee had endorsed Kotchuby’s views, and the
    Tsar Nicholas had reluctantly adopted their conclusions.[289] Muravieff’s instructions had been drawn
    strictly in this spirit. Mehemet Ali, Nesselrode laid [Pg 157]down, must not be allowed to reach Constantinople
    and to overthrow the existing régime. Such a development
    would be opposed to the Imperial policy, which
    aimed at maintaining Turkey in her present “stationary
    condition.” Should the Pasha succeed in establishing
    himself at Constantinople, Russia would be placed “in
    contact with a strong and victorious Power instead of
    a weak and defeated neighbour.”[290]


Meanwhile, Ibrahim who was still at Konieh was
    believed to be on the point of moving forward to
    Brusa.[291] Both to Colonel Duhamel, Muravieff’s aide-de-camp,
    and to a messenger despatched to him by
    M. de Varennes, he returned the same answer. He
    was a soldier and must obey his orders, his father
    alone could decide upon his movements. He should
    be sorry to displease the Emperor Nicholas, but he
    must abide by his instructions.[292] Ibrahim’s uncompromising
    attitude overcame the Sultan’s hesitation.
    Boutenieff was informed that the promised naval
    assistance would be thankfully accepted and that, in
    addition, His Highness craved for the despatch of
    30,000 Russian troops for the defence of his capital.
    The Sultan knew well that to invoke the military
    protection of the Tsar must lower him in the eyes of
    his subjects and of every true Mussulman. But, upon
    the whole, he regarded it as less dangerous than to
    allow Ibrahim to advance to the shores of the
    Bosphorus. It was in vain, therefore, that Varennes
    and Mandeville exerted themselves to induce the
    Porte to withdraw the demand for Russian help.[293] “A drowning man,” said the Reis-Effendi, “will
    clutch at a serpent.”[294]


 [Pg 158]


Early in February Muravieff was back at Constantinople.
    The terms which Halil Pasha had been
    empowered to offer had not been accepted, but
    Mehemet Ali had promised Muravieff that, for the
    present, the Egyptian army should not advance
    beyond Kiutayeh.[295] Upon the news that no immediate
    forward movement on the part of Ibrahim was to be
    apprehended, both the French and British ministers
    again endeavoured to persuade the Porte to ask that
    the despatch of the Russian succour might be delayed.
    According to the Reis-Effendi such a request was
    actually made to Boutenieff, who replied that he had
    no ship at his disposal to send to Sevastopol, although
    a Russian brig of war was at the time at anchor in
    front of the embassy.[296] On the other hand, accounts
    of these proceedings, derived from Russian sources,
    state that the question of postponing the departure of
    the fleet was never seriously raised.[297] Be that as it
    may, on February 20, 1833, the Russian squadron,
    consisting of four sail of the line, three large frigates,
    a corvette and a brig, entered the Bosphorus and
    anchored at Buyukdere.


Three days earlier, on February 17, Admiral
    Roussin, the newly appointed French ambassador to
    the Sublime Porte, arrived at Constantinople. Upon
    the appearance of the Russian fleet he at once instructed
    his dragoman to warn the Porte that, unless the
    admiral in command were requested to depart within
    twenty-four hours, he should consider his mission at
    an end. At the same time he tried to induce the
    British minister to make a similar representation.
    Mandeville, however, could only reply that he had no
    authority “to hold language of so high and energetic
    a character.” Roussin appears to have seen very soon [Pg 159]that he had acted with undue precipitation, and that
    his own withdrawal would not hasten by an hour the
    departure of the Russian ships. But his next step
    was scarcely more judicious. On the 21st, he affixed
    his signature to a document guaranteeing that
    Mehemet Ali would make peace with the Sultan, upon
    the terms proposed by Halil Pasha and which had
    already been rejected. In return the Sublime Porte
    was to undertake to refuse “foreign succour” of any
    kind in the future.[298]


It was hoped to satisfy Mehemet Ali by conferring
    upon him the government of the districts of Acre,
    Naplous, Jerusalem and Tripoli. He, however, was
    resolved to extend his rule over the whole of Syria,
    and to acquire, in addition, the pashalic of Adana
    and the seaports of Selefkeh and Alaia. Adana
    possessed an especial value in his eyes, by reason of its
    forests from which he proposed to obtain the timber
    necessary for the building of his ships. He understood
    the difficulties of the Sultan’s position and he
    was well informed about the rivalries of the Powers.[299] He perceived clearly that he was never likely again to
    have so favourable an opportunity for pressing his
    demands upon the Porte. On March 23, accordingly,
    Reshid Bey arrived at Constantinople bringing a letter
    in which Mehemet Ali rejected scornfully Admiral
    Roussin’s proposals. He would rather, he declared,
    meet with an honourable death than submit to be
    deprived of territories which were his by right of
    conquest. At the same time, Ibrahim was directed to
    march on Constantinople if, within five days of
    Reshid’s arrival, the Sultan should not have agreed to
    the required concessions.[300]


Terrible consternation prevailed in the Seraglio, [Pg 160]and great was the perplexity at the French and
    British embassies. Roussin counselled a complete
    surrender to Mehemet Ali, and Mandeville had no
    alternative to propose. It was decided, finally, that a
    Turkish plenipotentiary should proceed, accompanied
    by M. de Varennes, to Ibrahim’s headquarters at
    Kiutayeh with authority to offer the pashalics of
    Damascus and Aleppo.[301] Ibrahim, however, would not
    entertain the idea of a compromise, and Varennes
    could only report the failure of his mission and advise
    the cession of Adana. In opposition to the recommendations
    of Mandeville, but with the approbation of
    Admiral Roussin, the Sultan consented to yield up to
    his vassal this valuable district.[302] The preliminaries of
    this agreement, known as the Convention of Kiutayeh
    were signed on April 8, 1833, and Ibrahim forthwith
    began his preparations for retiring into Syria.


In the meantime, however, on April 6, a second
    division of the Russian fleet had arrived in the
    Bosphorus and 5000 troops had been disembarked
    on the Asiatic shore opposite to the British embassy
    at Therapia. The Tsar Nicholas was greatly incensed
    at Admiral Roussin’s attempts to induce the Porte to
    ask for the withdrawal of his squadron. Pozzo di
    Borgo was, in consequence, charged to protest
    vigorously in Paris against the admiral’s conduct,
    and the complaints of the Russian ambassador were
    warmly supported by his colleagues of Austria and
    Prussia. Broglie, although he might allow Lord
    Granville to perceive that he was not altogether
    convinced of the wisdom of Roussin’s actions,
    invariably met the representations of the agents of
    the Northern Courts with the reply that the admiral’s
    conduct was fully approved of by his government.[303] [Pg 161]At Constantinople Boutenieff declared emphatically
    that nothing short of the complete evacuation of Asia
    Minor by the Egyptians would induce his Imperial
    master to recall either his fleet or his troops to
    Sevastopol.[304]


When the list of the pashalics to which Mehemet
    Ali had been appointed was officially made public, it
    was seen that no mention had been made of the
    province of Adana. Upon hearing of this breach of
    the Convention of Kiutayeh, Ibrahim promptly
    arrested the homeward march of his army.[305] A few
    days later, however, on April 22, a third division of
    the Russian fleet and a second detachment of troops
    entered the Bosphorus. These reinforcements, which
    should have added to the Sultan’s powers of resistance,
    became, in effect, the determining cause of his decision
    finally to give way about Adana. Ever since the
    entry of Ibrahim into Asia Minor, the people of
    Constantinople had been deprived of their usual
    sources of supply. The necessity of provisioning the
    Russian fleet and corps d’armée had greatly
    aggravated the difficulties of the situation. Confronted
    by the prospect of a famine and a rising of the
    populace, Mahmud elected to humble his pride and to
    obtain the withdrawal of the Egyptians at the price of
    the surrender of Adana.[306] Yet he could not bring
    himself openly to nominate his rebellious vassal to
    the governorship of this important province. Ibrahim
    was, in consequence, officially appointed collector of
    the crown revenues of the district. Mehemet Ali,
    provided he could exercise an effective dominion over
    Adana, was content, in this instance, to waive his claim
    to be styled its Pasha. In point of fact he was
    delighted that matters had been so satisfactorily [Pg 162]arranged. Under Campbell’s threat that, should he
    persist in claiming Adana, the coast of Egypt would
    be blockaded by the British fleet, he had actually
    announced his intention of withdrawing his demand,
    when the news arrived that the Sultan had invested
    his son with the administration of the territory in
    dispute.[307] Relations of amity were thus once more
    officially established between the Sublime Porte and
    the Pasha.


On May 1 Lord Ponsonby, the newly appointed
    British ambassador, arrived at Constantinople, preceding
    by three days Count Orloff, the generalissimo of the Russian military and naval forces in the
    Black Sea and the Bosphorus, and Ambassador-Extraordinary
    to the Sublime Porte. His appointment
    was due to the Tsar’s desire to be represented at
    Constantinople by some one who could be depended
    upon resolutely to oppose Admiral Roussin.
    Boutenieff appears to have been considered as somewhat
    deficient both in energy and strength of
    character. Orloff had been furnished with very wide
    powers, but he was charged to regard the task of
    convincing the Sultan and his ministers that their
    safety entirely depended upon the degree of support
    which, in the future, the Tsar might be disposed to
    afford them, as the primary object of his mission. He
    must be admitted to have carried out his instructions
    most faithfully. From the day of his arrival Russian
    influence was supreme at the Porte and in the Divan.
    Roussin’s request that French war ships should be
    allowed to pass through the Dardanelles was
    peremptorily refused. Ponsonby saw clearly that,
    for the time being, he must submit to be overshadowed
    completely by the Russian ambassador.
    For the present he could only gaze moodily from [Pg 163]his windows at the Russian encampment in the
    valley of Unkiar-Skelessi and endeavour to restrain
    his French colleague from affording Orloff any
    excuse for delaying the departure of his troops. At last,
    on July 9 and 10, the Egyptian withdrawal behind the
    Taurus mountains having been completely carried out,
    the Tsar’s soldiers were embarked and his ships sailed
    out of the Bosphorus.[308]


For some weeks prior to the departure of the
    Russian expedition, it had been reported that an
    offensive and defensive treaty was on the point of
    being concluded between the Tsar and the Sultan.[309] The truth of this rumour was confirmed after Orloff
    had quitted Constantinople. It would appear that
    it was the Sultan himself who first suggested an
    alliance, at an audience accorded to Orloff shortly
    after his arrival, and that Ahmed Pasha acted as
    the intermediary between the palace and the Russian
    embassy in the very secret negotiations which
    followed. The diplomatic instrument, known as
    the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, concluded between
    the Porte and Russia on July 8, 1833, for a
    duration of eight years, consisted of six public
    and one secret article. The public articles merely
    proclaimed the existence of peace and friendship
    between the two Empires and provided for their
    mutual succour in case of need. The whole
    importance of the treaty lay in the secret clause
    in which it was stipulated that, inasmuch as
    Russia had no intention of exercising her right to
    ask for military assistance, the Porte, in return,
    would, “upon demand and in accordance with the [Pg 164]principle of reciprocity,”[310] close the Dardanelles to
    the warships of all nations.


It appears that, when it became necessary to inform
    the Turkish ministers of the projected treaty, they one
    and all evinced the greatest repugnance to the idea of
    an alliance with their hereditary enemies. But, at the
    news that the British fleet was approaching the
    Dardanelles, they withdrew their objections. They
    had besought the British government for naval assistance
    in the struggle with Mehemet Ali, and their
    request had been refused. The arrival, on June 25,
    in the Bay of Tenedos of Sir Pulteney Malcolm’s
    squadron, which, a few months earlier, could have
    intercepted the communications with Egypt and
    changed the course of the campaign, now only served
    to revive painful recollections of Admiral Duckworth’s
    proceedings in 1807.[311]


The question of access to the sea, which bathes the
    coasts of the richest provinces of the Empire, must
    necessarily be a matter of the highest importance to
    Russia. The principle of regarding the Black Sea as a mare clausum found a place in the treaty concluded
    between the Porte and Russia, on December 23, 1798.
    It was again inserted into the treaty of September 23,
    1805, but with this important addition—that to the
    Russian fleet was granted a right of passage to the
    Mediterranean through the straits. These conditions,
    however, had been terminated by the outbreak of
    hostilities in 1806, and in the subsequent treaty of
    peace, signed at Bucharest on May 10, 1812, no mention
    was made of the special privilege which Russia
    had obtained seven years before. Again in the treaty
    of peace concluded between Great Britain and Turkey,
    on January 5, 1809, England undertook to observe
    “the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire,” which [Pg 165]declared the straits of Constantinople closed to the
    warships of the Powers. But this arrangement, which
    had ever since been regarded as a law of nations, was
    suddenly terminated by the act, signed at the palace
    of Unkiar-Skelessi, restoring Russia to the favoured
    position which she had enjoyed for a brief space of
    time in 1805. No specific mention, it was true,
    had been made of her right of passage to and
    from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Nevertheless,
    although for obvious reasons both Russian and
    Turkish ministers might prefer to elude a direct statement
    on the subject, they unquestionably placed this
    interpretation upon Orloff’s treaty.[312] It was in this
    light also that it was looked upon by Lord Palmerston
    and the Duc de Broglie.


At the suggestion of Broglie,[313] as it would appear,
    the French and English governments resolved to
    instruct their representatives at Constantinople to
    advise the Porte not to ratify the treaty. But, should
    the Sultan confirm the signatures of his plenipotentiaries,
    they were to hand in a note, pointing out
    that by the treaty the relations of Turkey with Russia
    seemed to have been placed upon an entirely new
    footing. In the event of this changed situation leading
    to the armed interference of Russia in the internal
    affairs of Turkey, France and Great Britain were
    resolved to act as the circumstances might appear
    to require, “equally as if the treaty above mentioned
    were not in existence.”[314] Directly it had been reported
    that this note had been presented to the Porte, a copy
    of it was transmitted to the French and British
    ministers at St. Petersburg, for communication to the
    Imperial Cabinet. Nesselrode in reply contended that
    the treaty was purely defensive and aimed solely at [Pg 166]the preservation of Turkey. It had, it was true,
    changed the relations of the two Empires towards each
    other. It had converted a state of hostility and suspicion
    into one of friendship and confidence. His
    Majesty the Emperor was determined, should circumstances
    demand it, faithfully to carry out the obligations
    which he had contracted, “as though the declaration
    contained in the French and British notes did
    not exist.”[315] In return Lord Palmerston reiterated the
    dissatisfaction with which the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi
    was regarded in England. This despatch was in due
    course communicated to Count Nesselrode by Mr.
    Bligh, the British chargé d’affaires, who, as he placed
    it in the hands of the Russian chancellor, added that
    his government “was resolved not to be drawn into a
    controversy upon a question in which it differed so
    widely from the Imperial Cabinet.”[316]


In the meantime, a meeting had taken place, in
    September, at Münchengrätz, between the Tsar of
    Russia, the Emperor of Austria and the Crown Prince
    of Prussia. The object of this interview had been
    officially ascribed solely to a desire upon the part
    of Nicholas to become better acquainted with the
    Emperor Francis.[317] This explanation, which was
    received with contemptuous derision by Palmerston,[318] and which Bligh “could scarcely read with becoming
    gravity,” deceived nobody. In point of fact weighty
    political matters were the subject of the deliberations
    of these potentates and their confidential advisers.
    The formation of a league of the three Northern Courts
    to resist the doctrine of non-intervention had, ever
    since the Revolution of July, been the favourite scheme
    of Nicholas and Metternich. Frederick William III., [Pg 167]however, was doubtful of the wisdom of openly resuscitating
    the Holy Alliance. He was strongly impressed
    with the dangers of a policy, which must necessarily
    draw a sharp dividing line between the absolute and
    the constitutional Powers. For this reason neither
    the King of Prussia nor his chief minister travelled
    to the little town on the Bohemian frontier to assist
    at the deliberations. But, after the two Emperors had
    set out on their return to their respective capitals,
    Nesselrode journeyed to Berlin and succeeded in inducing
    the King of Prussia to become a party to
    the convention to which Nicholas and Francis had
    given their adherence. By this treaty, signed
    at Berlin, on October 15, 1833, the right of every
    independent sovereign to call to his aid another sovereign
    was proclaimed. Should one of the three Courts
    see fit to render material assistance to any sovereign,
    and should such action be opposed by another Power,
    the three Courts would consider any interference of
    this kind in the light of an act of hostility directed
    against them all.


In consequence of the objections of the King of
    Prussia, the plan of transmitting this convention to
    the French government was abandoned. But the
    principle, which it involved, formed the subject of
    separate despatches, couched in more or less threatening
    language, which the agents of the three Northern
    Courts in Paris duly communicated to the Duc de
    Broglie. The Duke, however, declared emphatically
    that, whatever her attitude might be as regards more
    distant States, France would assuredly resist by force
    of arms any intervention in Switzerland, Belgium or
    Piedmont. Moreover, he caused a circular to be sent
    to all French representatives at foreign Courts clearly
    defining the line of action which would be adopted in
    cases of intervention. The boldness of his language
    came as a disagreeable surprise to Metternich. The [Pg 168]Northern Courts, when they made their communications
    to the French government, had not intended to
    provoke a defiant rejoinder of this kind.


At their meeting at Münchengrätz, however, the
    two Emperors had not been concerned exclusively
    with the question of intervention, and with their
    policy towards France. On September 18, 1833,
    Nesselrode and Metternich signed a convention,
    pledging Russia and Austria to combine for the
    preservation of the Ottoman empire. The contracting
    parties specifically undertook to oppose any
    extension of the authority of Mehemet Ali over the
    European provinces of Turkey. Lastly, should the
    existing régime at Constantinople be overturned,
    Russia and Austria agreed to act in concert on every
    point relating to the establishment of a new order of
    affairs.[319]


Unfortunately, Nicholas saw fit to insist that
    absolute secrecy should be observed with regard to
    this convention, which might, with so much advantage,
    have been communicated to the western Powers.
    He probably feared that Russia’s changed policy
    towards Turkey would be ascribed to alarm, engendered
    by Admiral Roussin’s hostile attitude at Constantinople.
    Sincerely desirous as he was to conciliate the
    English government, he would not consent to admit,
    so long as France and Great Britain were intimately
    united, that Russia had renounced her old ambition of
    establishing her power upon the Bosphorus. But,
    although his pride would not allow him frankly to
    explain his eastern policy to the British government,
    he was at pains to convince Mr. Bligh of the purity of
    his intentions. He was a “chevalier anglais,” he
    reminded him at the conclusion of a long talk about
    the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and, pointing to his
    star of the Garter, twice repeated the words “Honi soit [Pg 169]qui mal y pense.”[320] But assurances of this kind
    carried no weight with the English government.
    Russia was universally believed to be moving steadily
    towards Constantinople. The chief organs of the
    press accused her daily of secretly preparing to
    conquer or to absorb the Ottoman empire. The most
    extreme Radicals in the reformed Parliament, and
    Tory gentlemen, the hunting friends of Matuszewic,[321] at Melton, were alike convinced of the duplicity and
    of the aggressive character of Russian policy.


It was necessarily a matter of the deepest interest
    to both Palmerston and Broglie to ascertain the spirit
    in which Metternich would regard the Treaty of
    Unkiar-Skelessi. The despatches from Vienna, however,
    speedily dispelled the hope that the dominant
    position which Russia had acquired at Constantinople
    would meet with the disapproval of Austria. Metternich’s
    lips were sealed on the subject of the Austro-Russian
    convention respecting Turkey, and he could,
    in consequence, only declare emphatically that he felt
    no distrust of Russia, and was satisfied that she
    harboured no hostile designs against Turkey. If
    England, he reminded Lamb,[322] had not refused the
    Sultan the assistance for which he had asked, he
    would not have been driven to look to Russia as his
    sole protector against Mehemet Ali. Neither Palmerston
    nor Broglie believed that these expressions of
    confidence in the honest intentions of Russia represented
    Metternich’s real convictions. Both attributed
    his attitude to his intense fear of revolution,
    which made him wilfully blind to the schemes which
    Russia was maturing so craftily. But, so long as he [Pg 170]should continue in this frame of mind, they were
    agreed that it would be “imprudent for Great Britain
    and France to found upon the treaty any measures
    of decided hostility.”[323] For the present, therefore,
    they were content to exercise the greatest vigilance,
    and to be prepared for fresh developments. Every
    endeavour, however, was to be made to open the eyes
    of the Sultan to the real nature of his position, and to
    induce him to withdraw from the fatal alliance into
    which he had been inveigled. At the same time it
    was greatly to be desired that Russia should be
    afforded no excuse for intervening under the stipulations
    of Orloff’s treaty. A fresh quarrel between the
    Porte and Mehemet Ali was the only circumstance
    which could possibly justify such action on her part.
    The whole influence of Great Britain and France
    must, accordingly, be exerted to prevent the Pasha
    from committing any renewed act of aggression.[324]




 [Pg 171]


 CHAPTER VI


TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS


The growing power of Mehemet Ali, and the increasing
    decrepitude of the Ottoman Empire were not the
    only subjects which, in the year 1833, engaged the
    serious attention of the European Cabinets. A civil
    war was in progress in Portugal, and Spain was
    threatened with the same calamity. Dom Pedro, the
    Emperor of Brazil, had, on the death of his father,
    abdicated the crown of Portugal in favour of his seven
    year old daughter, Donna Maria de Gloria. At the
    same time he had appointed his brother, Dom Miguel,
    to the Regency, on the understanding that he would
    agree to observe the Charter, and to marry his niece,
    the young Queen. Dom Miguel gave the required
    assurances, but upon his arrival at Lisbon, early in
    the year 1828, he proceeded to abrogate the constitution,
    and shortly afterwards to usurp the throne. His
    unlawful assumption of the crown was followed by
    harsh and reactionary measures against Liberals and
    Freemasons, which culminated in the establishment
    of a veritable reign of terror. It was in consequence
    of this state of affairs, that, in July, 1831, a French
    fleet had, with the full approval of the British
    government, been dispatched to the Tagus to exact
    reparation for outrages committed on French subjects.[325]


Meanwhile, a successful revolution in Brazil had
    compelled Dom Pedro to seek refuge in England, [Pg 172]where he arrived with his daughter at the very
    moment when Admiral Roussin’s squadron was before
    Lisbon. The fallen Emperor threw himself heart and
    soul into the task of reconquering his daughter’s
    kingdom. Lord Grey’s Cabinet regarded his warlike
    preparations with tacit approval, whilst the French
    government openly encouraged him, and allowed his
    followers to assemble at Belle-Isle. The constitutional
    fleet, commanded by Sartorius, a British naval
    officer, set sail from that port on February 10, 1832,
    and, by the following month of July, Dom Pedro was
    master of Oporto. But, though he constantly succeeded
    in defeating the Miguelite forces sent to
    re-take the city, his cause made little or no progress
    in other parts of the country.


Whilst these events were taking place in Portugal
    the health of the King of Spain had been visibly
    declining. Under ordinary circumstances it would
    have been a matter for congratulation, rather than for
    regret, that any country should be relieved from the
    rule of such a man as Ferdinand VII. In this
    particular instance, however, it was too probable that
    a fiercely disputed succession would be the legacy
    which he would bequeath to his unfortunate subjects.
    His third wife, Maria Amalia of Saxony, had died on
    May 17, 1829, and he, thereupon, announced his
    intention of re-marrying. His choice fell upon an
    intelligent and attractive woman in the person of his
    niece, Maria Christina of Naples. His first three
    marriages had been childless, but his fourth wife,
    Christina, presented him with a daughter on October 10,
    1830. By the ancient law of Spain females could
    succeed to the throne, in the event of there being no
    direct male heirs. But in 1713, Philip V., in order to
    prevent the union of the Spanish and French crowns,
    had been forced to issue a Pragmatic Sanction, which
    gave the preference of succession always to the male [Pg 173]line. This act, however, was repealed in 1789 by
    Charles IV., who restored the ancient law.


This return to the old order of succession was not,
    however, made public until May 19, 1830, when
    Christina succeeded in persuading Ferdinand to allow
    the decree of Charles IV. to be promulgated. Consequently,
    when some five months later her daughter
    was born, she was promptly proclaimed Princess of
    the Asturias, a title only conferred upon an heiress to
    the throne. A fierce struggle then began between
    Christina and Don Carlos, who had hitherto been
    looked upon as his brother’s successor. This prince
    was the champion of the ultra clerical—the so-called Apostolical party—whereas Christina, who, during
    her passage through France, had promised to use her
    influence on behalf of the Spanish political exiles,
    represented the hopes of the Liberals. Thus, in
    September, 1832, when Ferdinand was supposed to
    be at the point of death, the Apostolical minister,
    Calomarde, succeeded in procuring the abrogation of
    the law of 1789. But the King most unexpectedly
    recovered, and, under the influence of Christina, caused
    the decree of Charles IV. to be promulgated a second
    time. Calomarde, moreover, was disgraced and dismissed
    and a comparatively Liberal Cabinet was
    formed.


From the moment of Dom Pedro’s return to
    Europe, the French Cabinet had endeavoured to
    persuade the British government to join with France
    in expelling Dom Miguel from Portugal. Palmerston,
    however, had declined to interfere actively.[326] He was
    very unwilling that France should be afforded an
    opportunity of extending her influence in Portugal,
    and he, moreover, suspected Louis Philippe of scheming
    to marry one of his sons to Donna Maria. But, [Pg 174]provided it could be brought about without a French
    intervention, he was sincerely anxious that the usurper
    should be overthrown and that a Liberal régime should
    be set up at Lisbon. The dismissal of Calomarde
    appears to have suggested to him that the King of
    Spain might not be found unwilling to render assistance
    to the constitutional cause in Portugal. Under
    ordinary circumstances Ferdinand could scarcely have
    been expected to regard with a friendly eye the
    establishment of a limited monarchy in a country
    bordering upon Spain. But the birth of his daughter
    had introduced a new element into the situation.
    Dom Miguel derived his strength from the support of
    the Apostolical party, which in Spain looked upon
    Don Carlos as its champion. There were some
    grounds, therefore, for hoping that Ferdinand’s
    paternal anxiety to see his daughter Isabella’s
    succession to the throne assured might prove stronger
    than his natural aversion to the growth of Liberal
    institutions in a neighbouring State.


The task of inducing Ferdinand to intervene on
    behalf of Donna Maria was entrusted to Sir Stratford
    Canning, who was generally selected for the most
    difficult negotiations. Canning arrived in Madrid,
    upon his special mission, at the beginning of January,
    1833. His first conferences with the Spanish Minister
    for Foreign Affairs convinced him that he had little
    prospect of bringing his task to a successful conclusion.
    Compared to a man of the type of Calomarde, Cea
    Bermúdez, his successor, might seem to be a Liberal.
    In point of fact, however, although he was strongly
    opposed to Don Carlos and the clerical party, he was
    even more hostile to representative institutions in any
    shape. An enlightened despotism, in his opinion,
    constituted the best form of government for Spain.
    Accordingly, he made it very clear that the change of
    ministry had in no way modified the views of the [Pg 175]Court as to the situation in Portugal. It would be,
    he declared, altogether inconsistent with honour and
    good faith for the King to participate in any measures
    directed against the sovereignty of Dom Miguel.[327]


Stratford Canning, notwithstanding that his task
    seemed almost hopeless, remained some four months in
    the Spanish capital. So long as Cea Bermúdez was in
    power it was plainly useless to expect that Ferdinand
    could be induced to enter into the views of the British
    government. Canning, accordingly, set himself to
    work to undermine the position of that minister. For
    a brief moment he seems to have been sanguine that,
    by means of “a difference of opinion in the Cabinet,”he might be able to effect his purpose. But his hopes
    were speedily dispelled. The three ministers opposed
    to Cea Bermúdez with whom he had established
    communication were suddenly dismissed by the King.[328] Nor was he more fortunate with Queen Christina, with
    whom he contrived “to open a direct and confidential
    intercourse.”[329] She appeared to agree with him that
    the triumph of Dom Miguel in Portugal could not
    fail to react disastrously upon the fortunes of her
    daughter, but she either could not, or would not
    influence the King to regard matters in the same
    light.


Sir Stratford’s difficulties had been aggravated by
    the news that Dom Pedro’s resources were exhausted,
    and that his position at Oporto was desperate. But a
    few weeks after Canning’s departure from Madrid the
    situation in Portugal assumed a very different complexion.
    Sartorius, the admiral of the constitutional
    fleet, had been replaced by Charles Napier, who from
    the first appears to have judged the political and
    strategical situation correctly. The mere possession of [Pg 176]Oporto and victorious sallies against the Miguelite
    lines would never, he saw clearly, win the crown for
    Donna Maria. A bold move on Lisbon itself could
    alone give the victory to the constitutionalists. The
    capital, in his opinion, might be captured, provided
    he could obtain the command of the sea. Having
    succeeded in persuading Dom Pedro and his advisers
    to adopt his views, he sought out the Miguelite fleet,
    and, on July 5, 1833, despite the inferiority of his
    ships, completely destroyed it off Cape St. Vincent.[330] Three weeks later, Lisbon was occupied by Terceira,
    the constitutional general, in the name of Donna Maria.


The capture of Lisbon compelled the Miguelites
    to raise the siege of Oporto. The civil war continued,
    nevertheless, in other parts of the country. No
    sooner, however, was Dom Pedro, the Regent,
    installed in the capital than the British government
    recognized the sovereignty of Queen Maria, and undertook
    to protect her from aggression on the part of the
    King of Spain.[331] But the fear that Ferdinand might
    send military assistance to Dom Miguel was speedily
    set at rest. On September 29, 1833, he died, and
    Christina, thereupon, assumed the government in the
    name of her daughter Isabella, who was at once
    acknowledged as Queen of Spain by France and Great
    Britain. The partisans of her uncle Don Carlos were,
    however, upon the alert. The Basque provinces rose
    in arms to the cry of “Long live Carlos V. Long
    live the Inquisition,” and Don Carlos was proclaimed
    King, on October 7, at Vittoria.[332]


Don Carlos himself was fortunately absent from
    Madrid at the time of his brother’s death. Some
    few months earlier he had been practically exiled
    from Spain and had joined Dom Miguel in Portugal. [Pg 177]The presence of the Spanish Pretender at the headquarters
    of the Portuguese Usurper appears at last
    to have brought home to Christina and her minister,
    Cea Bermúdez, that the fortunes of Isabella must
    largely depend upon the success of the constitutional
    cause in Portugal. Mr. Villiers, the British minister
    newly accredited to the Court of Madrid, experienced,
    in consequence, none of those difficulties which had
    baffled Stratford Canning’s ingenuity, whilst Ferdinand
    was alive. The Queen Regent’s government consented,
    after some little hesitation, to propose to the contending
    parties in Portugal the joint mediation of Great
    Britain and Spain, and, when Dom Miguel declined to
    consider this offer, Cea Bermúdez announced that his
    refusal had released Spain from all engagements which
    she had contracted towards him.[333]


At the news that Ferdinand was dead and that
    serious disturbances had broken out, the French
    government proceeded to concentrate troops in
    proximity to the Spanish frontier. These military
    movements excited considerable alarm in London,
    where it was feared that they were a prelude to an
    active intervention. Palmerston, however, was soon
    satisfied that neither Louis Philippe nor the chief
    members of his government wished to despatch an
    army across the Pyrenees.[334] In the opinion of Duc de
    Broglie, the expulsion of Dom Miguel from Portugal
    was a necessary preliminary to any attempt to settle
    Spanish affairs. Both he and his colleagues, he
    declared, were prepared to respect England’s traditional
    dislike to any foreign intrusion in Portugal.
    But, under these circumstances, they had a right to
    expect, he contended, that great Britain should herself [Pg 178]take the necessary measures for terminating a situation,
    which threatened to disturb the tranquillity of
    neighbouring States.[335]


Although very anxious to see peace restored, the
    British government wished to escape from the
    necessity of landing a military force in Portugal. It
    hoped to attain the desired result by concerting
    measures with Spain for the expulsion of both
    Pretenders. Seeing that Don Carlos was levying war
    from Portuguese territory against the government of
    the Queen Regent, the right of Spain to intervene was
    beyond question. In January, 1834, Cea Bermúdez
    had been succeeded by Martinez de la Rosa. The new
    minister entered readily into the plans of the British
    government and agreed to despatch an ambassador
    to London, provided with full powers to conclude a
    convention. Strict secrecy was observed about the
    negotiations, and it was only, on April 13, 1834, when
    all the details had been settled, that Palmerston
    showed Talleyrand a draft of the proposed treaty.
    Spain was to send an army against Dom Miguel,
    whilst England was to furnish Dom Pedro with naval
    assistance. It was not intended to invite France to
    be a party to this agreement; she would merely be
    asked to adhere to it.[336]


Talleyrand’s account of this transaction was sent
    to Admiral de Rigny, not to the Duc de Broglie. The
    refusal of the Chamber to ratify his proposals for
    settling a long-standing dispute with the United
    States, respecting the indemnity to be paid for the
    seizure of certain ships between the years 1806 and
    1812, had driven the Duke to resign. The conditions
    of the projected treaty caused the greatest irritation in [Pg 179]Paris. “The effect would be disastrous,” wrote Rigny,
    “were it to appear that France had entered into
    the agreement under the protection of England.”[337] Talleyrand was, accordingly, directed to insist that
    France should be made a party to the treaty. After
    a lengthy and, at times, a heated discussion,
    Palmerston gave way and, on April 22, 1834, the
    instrument, known as the Quadruple Treaty, was
    signed by the representatives of Great Britain, France,
    Spain and Portugal. An article had been inserted
    into it stipulating that, “should the co-operation of
    France be deemed necessary by the High Contracting
    Parties the King of the French would engage to do,
    in this respect, whatever might be settled by common
    consent between himself and his august allies.”


The immediate object of the alliance was rapidly
    achieved. The junction of a Spanish army under
    General Rodil with the constitutional forces,
    operating in Tras-os-Montes, was followed, on May 16,
    by a decisive victory over Dom Miguel at Asserceira.
    A week later both Pretenders capitulated at Evora
    Monte. Dom Miguel agreed to accept a small
    pension[338] and to retire to Italy, whilst Don Carlos, at
    his own request, was conveyed to England on board
    H.M.S. Donegal. But the elation of the allies at the
    rapid success which had crowned their operations was
    of brief duration. After a stay of little more than a
    week in London Don Carlos departed secretly, and,
    contriving to cross France undetected, reached Spain,
    where he appeared at the head of his followers in
    Biscay on July 9. This new development, both the
    French and British governments agreed, must be met
    by an extension of the scope of the Quadruple Treaty.
    Certain additional articles were, accordingly, formally [Pg 180]annexed to it, on August 18, 1834. By the first of
    these, the King of the French undertook to hinder
    supplies and arms from reaching the Carlists from his
    southern provinces. By the second, His Britannic
    Majesty pledged himself to furnish Her Most Catholic
    Majesty with arms and ammunition and, in case of
    need, to supply naval succour; whilst by the third,
    the Regent of Portugal promised to render whatever
    military assistance it might be in his power to
    give.


In thus deciding to afford Queen Isabella material
    assistance, the French and English governments
    appear to have been strangely oblivious of their loudly
    proclaimed principle of “abstention from interference
    in the affairs of other States.” It was, doubtless,
    the inconsistency of their conduct in this respect
    which elicited from Talleyrand his cynical definition
    of the word non-intervention as “un mot métaphysique
    et politique qui signifie à peu près la même chose qu’
    intervention.”[339] Both governments had, unquestionably,
    excellent reasons for desiring to put an end to a
    state of civil war and anarchy, which interfered with
    English trade, and had a disturbing effect upon the
    internal condition of France. In addition, there was
    the consideration, to which Palmerston attached much
    weight, that the Quadruple Treaty, by proclaiming
    the intimate union of the Liberal Powers, would
    counterbalance the league which the absolute Courts
    had, in the previous autumn, concluded at
    Münchengrätz.[340] Martinez de la Rosa, Christina’s
    chief minister, had been engaged in framing a constitutional
    Charter and the Estatuto Real,—the
    result of his labours—was about to be made public.
    Spain might, therefore, claim to be numbered among
    the Liberal Powers of Europe. But there would [Pg 181]seem to have been another, and a more exclusively
    national reason, for the support which the English
    government decided to extend to the cause of constitutionalism
    in Spain. For the past century Spain
    had constantly followed the impulse of France and
    that state of affairs had, on many occasions, proved
    detrimental to British interests. “Foreign influence,
    however,” wrote Lord Palmerston some years later,
    “can best be exerted over the Court of a despotic
    monarch and becomes much weaker, if not entirely
    paralyzed, when it has to act upon the constitutional
    representatives of a free people. The British government,
    therefore, perceived that, by assisting the
    Spanish people to establish a constitutional form of
    government, they were assisting to secure the political
    independence of Spain, and they had no doubt that the
    maintenance of that independence would be conducive
    to important British interests.”[341]


One of the chief reasons, therefore, which led
    England to enter into the Quadruple Treaty was to
    destroy that influence which, for more than a century,
    France had been striving to establish over the Spanish
    government. Her statesmen had constantly laid it
    down as the first principle of their policy that her
    ascendency must be supreme at the Court at Madrid.
    It was essential, they argued, that France should have
    no fears of an attack from beyond the Pyrenees,
    should she be engaged in war with her powerful
    eastern neighbours. On that account the Salic Law,
    the Duc de Broglie explained to Lord Granville, was
    distinctly advantageous to France, inasmuch as it
    debarred females from succeeding to the Spanish
    throne. Now that it was abolished, he pointed out,
    the French government had to contemplate the
    possibility that an Austrian Archduke might some day [Pg 182]aspire to the hand of the Queen of Spain.[342] Louis
    Philippe not only endorsed the views of his minister
    in this matter, but frankly confessed to the British
    ambassador that the triumph of absolutism, in the
    person of Don Carlos, would suit him infinitely better
    than the establishment of a Liberal monarchy at
    Madrid. In that case “he was greatly afraid that the
    Peninsula would become the resort of all the revolutionists
    and republicans in Europe.”[343]


These being Louis Philippe’s opinions, it seems
    strange that he should not have attempted to dissuade
    his ministers from committing him to the Quadruple
    Treaty. The adoption of such a course, however, would
    have been very dangerous. The “citizen King” might
    in his heart greatly prefer les capuchons to les bonnets
    rouges,[344] but he dared not publicly proclaim these
    sentiments. Moreover, had France abandoned the
    English alliance she would not have been received into
    the league of the absolute Courts. Louis Philippe,
    consequently, if he wished to avoid complete isolation,
    was compelled to appear to adopt the British policy.
    But his secret leanings being what they were and
    Palmerston’s object being what it was, it is not
    surprising that, from the moment of the conclusion
    of the Quadruple Treaty, symptoms of serious disagreement
    should have manifested themselves in the
    relations of the two governments.


Before the close of the year 1834 the Carlists
    were masters of the whole of Biscay and Navarre, with
    the exception of some of the larger towns. It was not [Pg 183]alone the influence of the priests and the monks which
    induced the people of these provinces to espouse the
    cause of the Pretender so enthusiastically. They
    knew well that, were a representative form of government
    to be established throughout Spain, the Fueros,[345] those special rights and privileges to which they were
    devotedly attached, must either be abolished or greatly
    curtailed. A leader arose in Zumalacárregui, who
    quickly proved his superiority over the constitutional
    generals sent against him. Henceforward the struggle
    between the Carlists and the Christinos was carried on
    with a barbarity unknown in Europe for centuries.
    Neither side gave nor expected quarter. After every
    engagement wounded and unwounded prisoners were
    ruthlessly massacred. Such was the condition of
    affairs when a change of government took place in
    England.


Lord Grey had resigned, on July 9, 1834, on a
    question of Irish policy and had been succeeded as
    Prime Minister by Lord Melbourne. Signs were
    plentiful that the Whigs were losing their popularity
    in the country, and the King resolved to dismiss his
    ministers at the first opportunity. The death of Lord
    Spencer gave him the pretext for which he was seeking.
    Althorp’s removal to the Upper House, he told
    Melbourne, had left the government so weakly
    represented in the Commons that he should call upon
    his ministers to resign. Sir Robert Peel, accordingly,
    undertook to form a new government, and Wellington
    accepted the post of Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
    The Duke had never approved of his predecessor’s
    policy of intervening in the disputed succession to the
    Spanish throne. But, soon after he had taken up his [Pg 184]duties at the Foreign Office, an opportunity arose of
    interposing in a manner more in accordance with his
    views. In the course of a conference with Mr.
    Villiers, Martinez de la Rosa had suggested that the
    French and British governments should propose to both
    parties some arrangement for the exchange of prisoners
    and, generally, for mitigating the horrors of the war.
    The opening of communications with Don Carlos on
    these lines might with advantage be made to serve a
    double purpose. The commissioners, selected to proceed
    to the headquarters of the Pretender, might be
    instructed to impress upon him the hopelessness of his
    position, and to explain to him that he could obtain no
    assistance from the absolute Courts. An authoritative
    statement to that effect would, in the opinion of
    Martinez de la Rosa, be more useful than “six victories
    by her Majesty’s troops.” It would furnish Don Carlos
    with the excuse, for which he was believed to be seeking,
    for abandoning the struggle.[346]


Lord Eliot was, accordingly, dispatched to Spain.
    Ostensibly, his mission had no other object than the
    negotiation of some agreement for terminating the
    inhuman methods of warfare, which both parties had
    adopted. In reality, however, he carried with him
    secret instructions based upon the suggestions of
    Martinez de la Rosa. Whilst in Paris he was to
    communicate these to the Duc de Broglie, who was
    once more at the head of the Foreign Office, in order
    that the French commissioner might be furnished with
    identical instructions.[347] Hitherto, there had been no
    great cause for complaint as to the manner in which
    France performed the duties imposed upon her by the
    additional articles of the Quadruple Treaty. It was, [Pg 185]therefore, with the utmost confidence that the request
    would be promptly complied with, that Wellington had
    decided to invite the French government to appoint
    some person to repair with Eliot to the seat of war.
    But Lord Cowley, who, upon the change of government,
    had succeeded Lord Granville as British ambassador in
    Paris, speedily ascertained that the Duke’s proposal was
    regarded with much disfavour. Nor was he long in
    doubt as to the quarter from which the opposition to it
    was inspired. Louis Philippe himself assured him, on
    April 2, that he dared not allow communications to be
    opened with Don Carlos, except in response to an official
    invitation from the government of the Queen Regent.
    But, although the Spanish ambassador shortly afterwards
    made the desired request, the King still hesitated
    to comply with it. He was greatly afraid, he told
    Lord Cowley, that Don Carlos would refuse to entertain
    the suggested proposals. Were the Pretender to
    take such a course, popular indignation would be
    aroused in France, and the government might be forced
    to march an army into Spain to enforce its demands.[348]


Eliot, in the meanwhile, had proceeded, unattended
    by a French colleague, to the headquarters of Don
    Carlos. He experienced little difficulty in inducing
    both contending parties to conclude a convention for
    the proper custody and exchange of prisoners of war.
    But no success attended his efforts to carry out the
    secret and more important part of his mission. Don
    Carlos resolutely declared that he never would abandon
    the struggle. Nor could Eliot flatter himself that any
    of his arguments had in the smallest degree shaken the
    Pretender’s determination to assert his right to the
    crown. Having exhausted all his powers of persuasion [Pg 186]he set out on his return journey. As a result of his
    visit to the theatre of war he brought back to England
    the conviction that, without foreign assistance, the
    government of the Queen Regent would never contrive
    to pacify Alava, Biscay and Navarre.[349] Some weeks
    before he arrived in London Sir Robert Peel’s brief
    administration had come to an end. Melbourne had
    been recalled and Palmerston was once more at the
    Foreign Office.


Upon learning of the failure of Eliot’s mission, the
    government of the Queen Regent resolved to apply
    to France for military assistance against Don Carlos.
    Palmerston, who at this time regarded a French intervention
    as the worst of evils, lost no time in directing
    Villiers to protest. No more telling indictment of the
    whole policy of the Quadruple Treaty exists than the
    despatch which, on this occasion, Palmerston himself
    sent off to Madrid. The British minister was to represent
    that to appeal for foreign aid, before all the resources
    at the disposal of the Queen Regent had been
    exhausted, “would little redound to the honour of the
    Spanish government.” A settlement, he was to remind
    Queen Christina’s advisers, brought about by French
    or British bayonets, “could only be temporary and
    would never be acquiesced in as legitimate and final
    by the nation.”[350] It was very far, however, from
    Louis Philippe’s desire to despatch troops to Spain in
    support of the constitutional throne of Isabella. But,
    as Palmerston was also strongly opposed to direct
    French intervention, the King felt that he might with
    safety consult the British government about the
    propriety of acceding to the Spanish demand. Palmerston,
    as he had foreseen, had numerous objections to
    urge against the entry of a French army into Spain. [Pg 187]The French ambassador at Madrid was, accordingly,
    instructed to inform Martinez de la Rosa that his
    appeal could not be complied with.[351] But, whilst
    making it perfectly clear that direct intervention was
    out of the question, M. de Rayneval was authorized
    to suggest that the foreign legion at Algiers might be
    transferred from the French to the Spanish service,
    and to promise that facilities for enlisting soldiers in
    France would be granted to the Spanish government.


The Cabinet of Madrid readily accepted this
    limited form of assistance. Help of the same description,
    but upon a more extended scale, was also furnished
    by Great Britain. The Foreign Enlistment
    Act was suspended and officers and men were encouraged
    to enter the service of the Queen of Spain.
    In England, where the war in the Peninsula was remembered
    with pride, volunteers were easily obtained.
    In France, for obvious reasons the appeals of the
    Spanish recruiting agents met with far less response.
    Nevertheless, before the autumn of 1835 some 4000
    men, chiefly from Algiers, were transported to Spain,
    whilst rather more than double that number of British
    volunteers, under the command of De Lacy Evans, the
    Radical member for Westminster, were conveyed to
    the seat of war. Don Carlos, however, retaliated
    promptly. From his headquarters at Durango he
    issued a proclamation announcing that the Eliot Convention
    could not be permitted to apply to foreigners.
    Any person not of Spanish nationality, caught in arms
    against him, would be shot. The moment this decree
    was brought to the notice of the British government
    Colonel Wylde, the officer attached to the headquarters
    of the Queen’s armies, was directed to protest against
    it.[352] Wylde obtained access to Don Carlos and read
    out to him the declaration which Palmerston had [Pg 188]drawn up. But the threats contained in it had no
    effect upon the Pretender, who replied that his proclamation
    was lawful, under the circumstances, and that
    his officers had the strictest orders to conform to it.[353] The only reprisal to which the British government
    could resort was to signify to its naval commanders
    that, in the event of Don Carlos applying for protection
    on board any of His Majesty’s ships, such protection
    was to be denied to him.[354]


The French government altogether declined to
    associate itself with Great Britain in protesting against
    the Decree of Durango. Lord Granville, who upon
    the return of the Whigs to office had resumed his post
    in Paris, found Louis Philippe and his chief ministers,
    with the exception of the Duc de Broglie, strongly
    opposed to any step of that kind. France, they
    argued, was differently circumstanced to Great Britain,
    inasmuch as she was not a party to the Eliot Convention.
    Moreover, were she to use threatening
    language to Don Carlos and were he to disregard her
    menaces, she would be driven to send troops across
    the frontier, and both the French and English governments
    had agreed that direct intervention was highly
    inexpedient for the moment. In vain Lord Granville
    protested that to remonstrate against the barbarity
    of the decree was a duty which the government owed
    to the men, who had been transferred from the French
    to the Spanish service. Neither that argument, nor
    the consideration that any appearance of lack of
    harmony between the French and British Cabinets
    must necessarily encourage the Pretender, had the
    smallest effect upon Louis Philippe or upon the
    majority of his ministers.[355]


 [Pg 189]


Lord Palmerston’s indignation at Louis Philippe’s
    conduct was increased by the news which he was
    receiving from Lisbon. Dom Pedro had died on
    September 24, 1834, and the Cortes had, thereupon,
    declared the Queen to be of age, although she was not
    yet sixteen years of age. Shortly afterwards she had
    married Augustus of Leuchtenberg, the young duke
    whose candidature for the Belgian throne had so
    alarmed Louis Philippe in 1830. Their married
    life, however, was of brief duration. On March
    25, 1835, Maria became a widow and the Cortes
    at once urged her to lose no time in contracting
    a second alliance. The young queen was quite
    ready to comply and soon, afterwards, informed
    her ministers, Marshal Saldanha and the Duke of
    Palmella, that she purposed marrying either the Duc
    de Nemours or the Prince de Joinville, both sons of
    Louis Philippe. Her selection of the French princes,
    wrote Lord Howard de Walden,[356] was to be ascribed
    to the influence of her aunt, the Marquise de Loulé,
    who was afterwards discovered to have been in the
    pay of Louis Philippe.[357] The British minister, however,
    succeeded in obtaining from Saldanha a promise
    in writing that he would resign, sooner than allow the
    French marriage to take place.[358] In Paris, meanwhile,
    Louis Philippe emphatically denied to the British [Pg 190]ambassador that he had ever entertained the idea of
    bringing forward one of his sons as a candidate for the
    hand of the Queen of Portugal.[359] It seems certain,
    nevertheless, that some intrigue with that purpose in
    view had been in progress, and that it was not
    persevered with on account of the opposition of the
    British government. In the opinion of Lord Howard
    de Walden, it was to be attributed to the machinations
    of the French party at the Court of Lisbon that Queen
    Maria, about this time, displayed the greatest reluctance
    to sanction the despatch of a Portuguese division
    to the assistance of the Christinos.[360] But before
    long it was announced that she was betrothed
    to Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, a nephew
    of the King of the Belgians. The marriage was
    celebrated on April 9, 1836, and from that moment
    the influence of the French party at the Court
    diminished.


But the proceedings of the French agents at Lisbon
    and Louis Philippe’s sympathy for the Spanish
    Carlists were secrets, as yet known only to certain
    ministers and diplomatists. It was otherwise with
    the increasing rivalry between the British envoy and
    the French ambassador accredited to the Court of the
    Queen Regent at Madrid. It was the subject of
    comment in the newspapers that France openly
    favoured the cause of one, whilst England no less
    ostentatiously gave her support to the other, of the
    two great political parties which Spanish constitutionalism
    had called into existence. Most of the
    leading men in the Cortes had been in exile, until the
    death of Ferdinand, on account of their participation
    in the revolutionary movement of 1820. Some, like [Pg 191]Martinez de la Rosa, had sought refuge in France,
    whilst others, prominent among them being the
    financier Mendizabal, had repaired to England. Their
    political views had, in consequence, been greatly
    influenced by the statesmen with whom they had come
    into contact in the countries in which they had resided.
    Thus Martinez de la Rosa, whose literary abilities had
    brought him to the notice of M. Guizot, had adopted the
    theories of the Doctrinaires and in framing the Estatuto
    Real—the Spanish Constitution of 1834—he had taken
    the French Charter of 1814 for his model. His followers,
    the Moderados as they were called, consisted mainly
    of the nobility, military and civil officials, and,
    generally, of persons who, although opposed to Don
    Carlos, disliked democratic institutions. Their
    opponents, the Exaltados, or Progressistas, as they were
    more usually termed, were made up chiefly of members
    of the trading and commercial classes in the large
    towns. The extreme wing of this party advocated
    the restoration of the Constitution of 1812, which
    recognized the sovereignty of the people and provided
    for government by a single chamber. It was this
    code which, in 1820, Riego and his followers had
    imposed upon King Ferdinand. But, although only
    the more violent of the Progressistas may have desired
    that the very defective Constitution of 1812 should
    be re-established without amendments, the whole
    party derided the Estatuto Real as too timid an
    experiment in representative government.


A party, which aimed at imposing salutary checks
    upon the development of democracy and the leaders
    of which were in close personal relationship with some
    of his ministers, was naturally regarded with a
    friendly eye by Louis Philippe. From 1834 onwards
    the Moderados derived an artificial strength, which to
    some extent counterbalanced the numerical superiority
    of their  opponents, by reason  of the support given [Pg 192]them by Louis Philippe and by Christina, the Queen
    Regent. It was no less logical that the Progressistas should develop rapidly into “the English party.”
    For reasons which have already been explained
    Palmerston desired that Spain should be free and
    independent. But, before Don Carlos could be crushed
    and the civil war terminated, the cause of the Queen
    must be made popular with the Spanish people.
    From Palmerston’s point of view, therefore, it was
    essential that political power should rest with the
    party which sought to place the government upon a
    broad and national basis. Objectionable in many
    respects as were the principles of the Progressistas,
    they were, in the opinion of the British government,
    unquestionably better adapted to the immediate
    requirements of the situation than the narrow and
    restricted views of the Moderados.


The strength of the democratic movement, which
    had begun at the death of Ferdinand, drove Martinez
    de la Rosa from office in June, 1835. But his successor,
    Count Toreno, was not more successful in his efforts
    to stem the rising tide of Liberalism, and, in the following
    month of September, Christina reluctantly
    consented to allow Mendizabal to form a Progressista Cabinet. Louis Philippe and his ministers were
    greatly annoyed and declared that Toreno’s fall was
    due to English intrigue.[361] Villiers, it was perfectly
    true, had taken part in the negotiations which had
    preceded the change of government. He had discussed
    the situation, not only with Toreno and Mendizabal,
    but with the Queen Regent herself. To Christina he
    explained that he had no authority to speak in the
    name of the British government. She, however,
    replied that she required no more than “the advice of
    an Englishman in whom she had entire confidence.”
    Villiers, therefore, told her plainly that, inasmuch as [Pg 193]she had not the necessary force at her disposal for
    arresting by violent means the advance of democracy,
    she must submit to the formation of a more Liberal
    government. The Queen’s dread of Mendizabal
    appears to have been overcome temporarily by
    Villiers’ assurance that that statesman had no
    intention of restoring the Constitution of 1812.[362]


After the downfall of the Moderados, the French
    authorities no longer attempted to prevent supplies
    from reaching the Carlists. Upon the road from
    Bayonne to Irun, an uninterrupted stream of waggons
    was to be seen openly conveying stores and provisions
    of all kinds to the insurgents.[363] The Pretender, wrote
    Villiers, had received assurances from Louis Philippe
    that in the future he intended to remain absolutely
    neutral.[364] To all representations upon this subject,
    whether made by the British or the Spanish
    ambassador, the French ministers returned evasive
    replies. Although from time to time Lord Granville
    succeeded in extracting a promise that greater
    vigilance would be exercised upon the frontier, the
    lucrative trade, which the inhabitants of southern
    France were carrying on with the armies of the
    Pretender, was never interfered with seriously.


Mendizabal, in the meantime, was devoting himself
    assiduously to the task of prosecuting the war against
    Don Carlos. But his efforts to carry on the operations
    vigorously were hampered by the penury of the
    treasury, and by the impossibility of raising a loan
    abroad. It was under these circumstances that he
    made a proposal to Mr. Villiers which, when it was
    divulged to the Duc de Broglie, increased the ill-feeling
    which was rapidly growing up between the [Pg 194]French and the English governments. Modern views
    about the advantages of unrestricted commercial
    intercourse had not as yet penetrated into Spain.
    The imposition of prohibitory duties upon almost all
    articles made abroad was still regarded as essential
    for the protection of Spanish trade. England necessarily
    suffered greatly from this system, which
    brought no revenue into the Spanish exchequer, and
    benefited only the smuggler. The question had often
    been the subject of discussion between the two
    governments, but Spain had hitherto always evaded
    her promises to reform her tariff. Mendizabal,
    however, now undertook that, provided England
    would guarantee the interest of a loan of a million
    and a half sterling, Spain would admit the chief
    articles of British manufacture upon a low scale of
    duty. Villiers was without authority to conclude any
    agreement of that kind. But, as Mendizabal assured
    him that any delay would be most inconvenient, he
    decided to draw up the necessary documents. The
    moment the treaty had been signed by Mendizabal
    and himself, he forwarded it to Palmerston, explaining
    the reasons which had led him to act without
    instructions. “The Queen,” he wrote in conclusion,
    “Mendizabal and his English private secretary,
    Southern,[365] and himself, were the only persons who
    had any knowledge of the transaction.”[366]


When the projected agreement and Villiers’ covering
    despatch reached Paris, whither they had been
    transmitted, as was the custom, under flying seal,
    Granville was so impressed with the necessity of keeping
    the matter secret, that he did not even allow the attachés of his embassy to know of the affair.
    Furthermore, his own observations upon the subject [Pg 195]were conveyed to Lord Palmerston in a private letter.
    “It will not be liked here,” he warned his chief. “It
    is already thought that Mendizabal is entirely under
    English influence, and this admission of English
    manufactures at a reduced duty, even though purchased
    by the guarantee of a loan, will very much confirm
    the impression.”[367] But all these precautions were
    of no avail. Within a few days, Broglie received intelligence
    of the transaction both from the French
    ambassador at Madrid, and from some Spanish agent
    in Paris. It seems highly probable that the secret
    was disclosed by Christina herself. Perhaps she
    wished to ingratiate herself with Louis Philippe,
    whilst by exposing Mendizabal to his wrath, she may
    have hoped to facilitate the return to power of the Moderados.


M. de Rayneval having obtained his information
    “under the seal of the most profound secrecy,”Broglie could not make representations on the subject
    of the proposed treaty to the British government.
    Rayneval, however, was directed to protest against it
    at Madrid, and to warn Mendizabal that, if the affair
    were to be concluded, “the Quadruple Alliance would
    certainly undergo modifications of a nature which
    Spain would regret.”[368] But the British government,
    in the meanwhile, “whilst fully appreciating the
    motives which had prompted Villiers to sign the
    treaty without instructions,” had decided not to
    advise the King to ratify it. “His Majesty’s government,”wrote Palmerston, “does not consider that it
    would be consistent with the spirit of the alliance that
    two out of four should make separately, and without
    previous communication with the others, an engagement. . . .
    Great Britain would expose herself to the [Pg 196]charge of having severed herself from her allies in
    order to grasp at an object conducive to her own
    particular interests.”[369] At the same time, however,
    he enclosed the project of a new commercial treaty,
    which Villiers was to invite Mendizabal to consider.
    England, according to its provisions, asked for no
    exclusive advantages, the only stipulation being that
    British goods should be placed upon a footing of
    equality with those of the most favoured nation. The
    Spanish minister, however, professed his inability to
    proceed with the matter. Great Britain’s guarantee
    to a loan was a condition, he declared, essential to the
    conclusion of any commercial treaty. The proposal
    to admit English cotton goods would be deeply
    resented by Spanish manufacturers, and he must, in
    consequence, be in a position to show that, by
    consenting to it, he had gained some great political
    advantage.[370] Without doubt, also, he was not insensible
    to Broglie’s threats. He foresaw that, although there
    was to be no concealment about Palmerston’s treaty,
    and notwithstanding that France was to be given full
    information about the negotiations, her objections to
    the “reciprocal equality,” and “mutual facilities,” for
    which England stipulated, would not on that account
    be diminished. Nor was he mistaken. When the
    matter was revived under the ministry of Comte Molé,
    that statesman summed up the French case with
    perfect frankness. Equality of opportunity for
    trading in Spain, he informed Lord Granville, would
    act solely for the benefit of England, seeing that the
    French merchants were possessed of less capital, and
    were less industrious and enterprising than their
    British rivals. Palmerston, as may be supposed,
    entered with zest upon the task of denouncing the [Pg 197]selfishness of founding an objection to a reform of the
    Spanish tariff upon so unworthy a reason.[371]


Broglie’s instructions to Rayneval respecting the
    commercial treaty were among his last acts as Minister
    for Foreign Affairs. Parliamentary and other difficulties,
    in the creation of which Louis Philippe is
    supposed to have taken a part, brought about the
    resignation of the government. M. Thiers, thereupon,
    notwithstanding that he had been a member of
    Broglie’s Cabinet, undertook to form a new ministry.
    At the time of the Revolution of July, M. Thiers had
    been known merely as one of the editors of the National and as the author of a very popular and successful History of the French Revolution. Louis Philippe’s
    enthronement, in which he had been so prominently
    concerned, enabled him to abandon journalism and to
    embark upon the career of a politician. Only two years
    later, on October 11, 1832, he was appointed Minister
    of the Interior in Marshal Soult’s first government.
    In that capacity, by means of a bribe judiciously
    administered to the Jew Deutz, he succeeded in
    discovering the hiding-place of the Duchesse de Berri
    at Nantes—a mystery which, until he took the matter
    in hand, had baffled the ingenuity of the police.
    Having accomplished this object and having no desire
    to be remembered in history as “the Fouché of the
    Monarchy of July,” he promptly exchanged the portfolio
    of the Interior for that of Commerce and of Public
    Works.[372]


Ever since the conclusion of the Quadruple Treaty,
    Louis Philippe had been quietly endeavouring to
    improve his relations with the absolute Powers, in
    general, and with Austria, in particular. Early in the
    year 1835 he appears to have embarked, without the [Pg 198]knowledge of his ministers or of Sainte-Aulaire, the
    French ambassador at Vienna, upon a confidential
    correspondence with Metternich.[373] Without doubt, his
    flattering advances to the Chancellor were made with
    the hope that a marriage might be arranged between
    his eldest son, the Duc d’Orléans, and an Austrian
    Archduchess. Neither Broglie nor Sainte-Aulaire
    shared the King’s illusions on that subject. Broglie
    was firmly convinced that there could be no intimacy
    between the Monarchy of July and the Northern Courts,
    and it was chiefly on that account that Louis Philippe
    had been so anxious to drive him from office. But,
    whilst Louis Philippe had frequently been annoyed by
    the independence and uncompromising honesty of the Doctrinaire Duke, he had always admired the resourcefulness
    and political adroitness of M. Thiers. For some
    time past M. Thiers had been desirous of obtaining the
    portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and he appears to have
    satisfied the King that, were it to be confided to him,
    he would promote the dynastic object which was
    constantly in His Majesty’s mind. He was, it was
    said, greatly attracted by the prospect of raising “the
    matrimonial blockade” which the Legitimists exultingly
    declared had been established round the
    Orleans throne.[374]


It has generally been supposed that Talleyrand was
    largely responsible for the overtures made to the
    Court of Vienna by Louis Philippe, and for the coolness
    which set in, about the same time, in the relations of
    France and England. This view of the case may be
    correct, but it is difficult to believe that the reasons,
    usually given to explain his changed attitude towards
    England, can be true. At the end of the year 1834
    Talleyrand had retired from his embassy in London.
    His advanced age and his increasing infirmities were [Pg 199]the reasons officially given for his resignation. It was
    notorious, however, that he had been frequently
    annoyed by Palmerston’s unceremonious behaviour
    towards him, and it has been suggested that the lack of
    deference with which he had been treated had caused him
    greatly to modify his opinions about the advantages of
    a close friendship with England.[375] It is, however, most
    improbable that Talleyrand, who, up to the time of
    his departure from London, unceasingly endeavoured
    to extend the scope of the alliance,[376] should have
    changed his views completely, because Palmerston may
    have kept him waiting in an ante-room or may have
    failed to treat him with that respect to which his age
    and his long diplomatic career entitled him. Nevertheless,
    it is not to be denied that, notwithstanding the
    marked attentions which had been paid him at Court
    and in London society, he had returned to France in a
    somewhat dissatisfied frame of mind. The recently
    published memoirs of the Duchesse de Dino show
    plainly that, in 1834, he no longer entertained his
    former admiration for England and English institutions.
    But it was to the new conditions created by
    the Reform Act that his altered dispositions should be
    ascribed. Although he had been in favour of that
    measure, in his heart he, doubtless, loathed the idea of
    government by the people. Like Lord Grey himself,
    once the Bill had become an accomplished fact, he was
    horrified at the ugly aspect of democracy. Believing,
    therefore, that Great Britain was advancing rapidly
    towards a revolution he would naturally counsel Louis
    Philippe to draw as close as circumstances would [Pg 200]permit to conservative Austria.[377] Nor was there anything
    in this advice which should be regarded as
    unfriendly towards England. At Vienna in 1814, be
    it remembered, he had insisted upon the necessity of
    an alliance between France, Great Britain and Austria,
    as the only means of checking the insatiable ambition
    of Russia.


Meanwhile, the civil war in Spain continued and
    the prospects of the constitutional cause were gloomy.
    During the summer of 1835, however, the Carlists
    sustained a loss the magnitude of which was hardly
    appreciated at the time. Whilst superintending the
    operations against Bilbao Zumalacárregui sustained a
    wound and died a few days later. The original injury
    was of a trifling character and his death has generally
    been ascribed to the unskilful treatment of the doctors.
    But Colonel Wylde, as he was returning from his
    interview with the Pretender on the subject of the
    Decree of Durango, received some curious details about
    the last hours of the famous Carlist chief from an
    English surgeon who had dressed his wound. According
    to this person, a dose of laudanum, not a Christino bullet, was the cause of death. Furthermore, Wylde’s
    informant asserted that the doctors had under various
    pretexts refused to allow the body to be opened.
    This story, taken in connection with the detestation
    with which Zumalacárregui was regarded by the Apostolical section of his party, led Wylde to suspect
    that he might have been the victim of foul play.[378] Be that as it may, his death had an effect upon the
    cause of absolutism and bigotry which may be compared
    with that of Dundee at Killikrankie.


 [Pg 201]


The Christinos, however, appeared incapable of
    taking advantage of the loss which their opponents
    had sustained. Even Mendizabal was unable to
    infuse the required energy into the counsels of the
    Queen’s generals. “Everything,” wrote Wylde on
    February 12, 1836, “seems to stagnate for want of
    money.” The British legion had suffered cruelly
    during the winter. Sickness had thinned its ranks,
    the pay of officers and men was in arrears, and the
    whole force was in a state of acute discontent.[379] Under these circumstances the British government
    decided to intervene more effectually. Hitherto,
    Lord John Hay’s squadron off the north coast of
    Spain had only been allowed to transport troops and
    stores, and to give indirect assistance to the Christinos. But the admiral was now ordered to take
    an active part in the operations of the Queen’s armies.
    At the same time, Lord Palmerston’s objections to the
    entry of a French army into Spain disappeared
    completely. He asked that the French cordon of
    observation should be advanced across the frontier
    and that the valley of Bastan should be occupied.
    The measure which he proposed “would not entail extensive
    military operations, but would enable General
    Cordoba to enclose the Carlists in a small space and to
    deprive them of all supplies.”[380] The British government,
    doubtless, hoped that M. Thiers, who had
    always professed to be in favour of armed intervention,
    would, now that he was President of the Council,
    be able to induce Louis Philippe to consent to it.
    But that illusion, if it was ever entertained, was soon
    dispelled. The course proposed by Palmerston was
    incompatible with that policy of conciliating the
    absolute Courts, upon which M. Thiers had embarked. [Pg 202]He was, consequently, compelled to explain to Lord
    Granville that he had altogether changed his mind
    about the expediency of intervention, owing to the
    wide development of the Carlist insurrection, and to
    the revolutionary character which the government at
    Madrid had recently assumed. Louis Philippe
    expressed himself in more emphatic language. Never,
    he told the British ambassador, would he allow the
    French flag to be carried beyond the frontier.[381]


The unsatisfactory progress of the war necessarily
    had a damaging effect upon the position of Mendizabal’s
    Cabinet. Dissensions broke out among his
    followers, and Christina, who had only accepted him
    with reluctance, most unwisely decided to dismiss
    him. She had been prompted to take this disastrous
    step, Palmerston suspected, by her French advisers.[382] The dissolution of the Cortes, which the change of
    ministry entailed, was followed by a most suspicious
    inaction on the part of the Queen’s generals. The
    Carlists, on the other hand, displayed unwonted
    activity. Insurgent bands penetrated to within
    twenty miles of La Granja, where the Queen Regent
    was in residence. Ramon Cabrera, “the Tiger of the
    Maestrargo,” who, as a reprisal for the murder of his
    mother, refused to recognize the Eliot Convention,
    desolated Aragon, whilst de Lacy Evans, on July 11,
    1836, suffered a reverse at Fuentarabia, on which
    occasion all the British prisoners were shot, in
    accordance with the Pretender’s decree.[383] Meanwhile,
    the Progressistas were carrying all before them at the
    elections, and their victories were followed by grave
    revolutionary outbreaks. But neither civil disorder
    nor military disasters could rouse M. Isturiz, the new [Pg 203]President of the Council, or his colleagues to action.
    In the words of Mr. Villiers, “they appeared to
    consider that calmness in adversity constituted the
    whole duty of the responsible advisers of the
    crown.”[384]


The condition of affairs rapidly assumed a most
    alarming appearance. The Constitution of 1812, was
    proclaimed in many of the chief towns. At Madrid,
    Quesada, the Captain-General, disarmed the national
    guards, and declared the city in a state of siege,
    whilst at La Granja, the Queen Regent announced
    her firm intention of resisting the demands of the
    revolutionists. But, on the evening of August 12,
    her guards mutinied, and, led by their sergeants,
    invaded the palace. On two nights in succession, the
    unfortunate Christina was compelled to receive
    deputations of non-commissioned officers, many of
    whom were under the influence of liquor. Circumstanced
    as she was, with no loyal troops at her
    disposal, she had no alternative but to yield. After
    promising to accept the Constitution of 1812, to raise
    the state of siege, and to re-establish the national
    guards, she was allowed to depart for the capital.
    But when the news of these events reached Madrid,
    the people rose, murdered Quesada, and carried his
    head in triumph through the streets. Order was,
    however, gradually restored by Calatrava, the Progressista minister, whom the revolted sergeants
    had imposed upon Christina.[385]


Some weeks before these events took place M.
    Thiers had had to abandon all hope of bringing his
    matrimonial negotiations to a successful conclusion.
    It was in vain that he had refused to join with
    England in protesting against the Austrian occupation [Pg 204]of the free town of Cracow. It was to no purpose
    that he had forced the Federal government to expel
    all political refugees from Switzerland. The Duc
    d’Orléans’[386] proposal for the hand of an Austrian
    Archduchess was declined. In order to hide his discomfiture
    and to punish Metternich, M. Thiers resolved
    to take up the Spanish affair vigorously.
    Direct intervention, however, he looked upon as out
    of the question. Not only would the King oppose it,
    but it would be very unpopular with the country.
    Nevertheless, by a process to which he gave the name
    of “armed co-operation” he proposed to attain the
    desired result. He prepared, accordingly, largely to
    reinforce the French legion in Spain, which he intended
    should be commanded by some well-known general.
    Louis Philippe reluctantly assented to these initial
    proceedings, but, when the news arrived of the military
    revolt at La Granja, he promptly placed his veto upon
    all measures of that kind. Never, he declared, would
    he allow assistance to be supplied to the Jacobins
    in power at Madrid.[387] Thiers and his fellow-ministers,
    in consequence, resigned.


Under Molé, to whom the King confided the
    portfolio of Foreign Affairs and the formation of a
    new Cabinet, France for all practical purposes withdrew
    from the Quadruple Treaty. The depôts formed
    by Thiers were broken up and three battalions, which
    he had raised for the service of Queen Isabella, were
    sent to Algiers. It would be highly dangerous, Molé
    informed the British ambassador, to expose French
    soldiers to the influence of the revolutionary societies
    in Spain.[388] In vain Lord Palmerston protested that in
    no way could the spirit of anarchy be combated so [Pg 205]effectually as by the expulsion of Don Carlos from the
    Peninsula.[389] That argument and his contention that
    the stability of the Orleans monarchy depended upon
    the triumph of the constitutional cause in Spain were
    alike unheeded.[390] In order to show their displeasure
    at the manner in which the French government was
    thus evading its engagements, Lord Melbourne and
    his colleagues decided to omit the customary reference
    to France from the King’s Speech at the opening of
    Parliament in 1837. But the “no mention” incident,
    although it caused Louis Philippe the keenest annoyance
    and created a great sensation in Paris,[391] had no effect
    upon Molé’s resolution to refuse assistance of any kind
    to the government at Madrid. The only safe policy
    for France, the King informed Granville a few months
    later, was to look upon Spain as infected with the
    plague and to have as little communication with her as
    possible.[392]


Although Calatrava, whom the sergeants at La
    Granja had raised to the head of the Queen Regent’s
    government, was invariably spoken of by Louis
    Philippe and Comte Molé as a dangerous revolutionist,
    he was far from deserving that appellation. Not only
    was he successful in infusing a certain vigour into the
    conduct of the war, but he contrived, in addition, to
    frame a constitution which, in spite of its imperfections,
    effected a happy compromise between the Jacobinical
    code of 1812 and the ultra-monarchical Estatuto Real.
    The year 1836 closed with a brilliant success for the
    arms of the Queen Regent. Powerfully assisted by [Pg 206]the bluejackets and marines of Lord John Hay’s
    squadron, the Christinos stormed the formidable lines
    of Luchana and relieved the city of Bilbao. Henceforward
    the name of Baldomero Espartero, the
    victorious general, was to figure very prominently in
    Spanish politics. Nevertheless, during the campaign
    of the ensuing year, complete success appeared to be
    within the grasp of the Pretender. Eluding Espartero,
    who was preparing to attack him in the Basque
    provinces, Don Carlos, who had been liberally supplied
    with money by the Tsar and the Kings of the Netherlands[393] and of Sardinia, marched southwards on Madrid.
    But, when the capital lay at their mercy, his generals
    were ordered to retrace their footsteps, recross the
    Ebro and re-enter the northern provinces.


Various reasons have been given for the sudden
    retreat of the Carlists from before Madrid.[394] The most
    probable explanation appears to be that Don Carlos
    had secretly arranged with Christina that, upon the
    arrival of his army in the vicinity of the capital, the
    gates were to be thrown open, and that the marriage
    of his son with Isabella was to be announced and
    peace proclaimed.[395] It would seem, however, that at
    the last moment Christina decided that this scheme
    was impracticable and the Pretender, finding, in
    consequence, that no movement in his favour was
    likely to break out in Madrid, gave the order to
    retreat. The remainder of the year 1837 was spent
    by the Carlist leaders in fierce quarrels and bitter
    recriminations. But the condition of the Queen’s
    armies was still more pitiable. Officers and men were
    unpaid and wholly without confidence in their generals.
    Horrible excesses were committed by the mutinous [Pg 207]regiments. Generals Escalera and Sarsfield were
    murdered by their men, and, although Espartero upon
    his arrival from Madrid, succeeded in restoring some
    semblance of discipline, he dared not undertake offensive
    operations with troops so completely demoralized.


The Pretender’s advance upon Madrid proved fatal
    to the Calatrava Cabinet. That government, which
    had been created by the action of the sergeants at La
    Granja, was destroyed by a pronunciamento on the part
    of the officers of a brigade which had been hurried
    south, when Don Carlos was threatening the capital.[396] The downfall of the Progressista Cabinet was, doubtless,
    one of the reasons which led the Queen Regent to
    break her compact with the Pretender. A transition
    ministry was formed, whilst Christina cautiously prepared
    to recall the Moderados. Throughout the
    country party differences were submerged in the
    general desire for peace, and the opinion was rapidly
    gaining ground that, without French assistance, the
    Pretender could never be expelled. This idea was
    sedulously encouraged by the Court party, and, as was
    suspected, by agents of the French government. These
    conditions at the elections, at the close of the year
    1837, produced an overwhelming majority for the Moderados. It was soon evident, however, that the
    electors had been completely deluded in imagining
    that the triumph of the Conservative party would be
    followed by French intervention. The political
    effacement of the Progressistas had not altered the
    determination of Louis Philippe and Comte Molé to
    withhold all assistance from the government of the
    Queen Regent.[397]


Villiers, the British minister at Madrid, was now [Pg 208]convinced that in the dissensions of the Carlists lay
    the only hope of preserving the crown for Isabella.
    The animosity was extreme between the Provinciales,
    whose chief object in supporting the Pretender was to
    ensure the maintenance of their highly prized Fueros,
    and the Castillanos, as that section of the party was
    called which followed the lead of the fanatical Bishop
    of Léon.[398] In order to widen this breach Villiers
    instructed Lieutenant Turner, a British officer attached
    to the division of the Queen’s army at Pampeluna,
    to open up a secret communication with the discontented
    Navarrese chiefs. Turner experienced little
    difficulty in executing his mission, and was soon able
    to report that the men of Biscay and Navarre would
    be prepared to discuss terms of peace upon the basis
    of the recognition of their local rights and privileges.
    But all the leaders with whom he had conferred had
    stipulated that any compromise which, might be
    arrived at, must have the guarantee of Great Britain.[399]


The news of these proceedings was most agreeable
    to Lord Palmerston, who forthwith drew up precise
    instructions for the future conduct of the negotiations.
    Whilst suggesting that on the subject of the Fueros the Queen Regent’s government would be well advised
    to make concessions, he laid it down distinctly that
    Great Britain could not guarantee the conditions of
    peace.[400] A copy of this despatch was sent to Lord
    Granville in Paris, who was directed to invite the
    French government to act with England in the affair.
    In Palmerston’s opinion it was most important to
    draw France “into an open and avowed mediation for
    the purpose of reuniting the northern provinces to the
    rest of the Spanish dominions.”[401] He was convinced [Pg 209]that Louis Philippe cherished secret hopes that the
    civil war might lead to the secession of Biscay and
    Navarre and their incorporation into France. There
    can be little doubt that he was entirely mistaken in
    imagining that either the King of the French or his
    ministers entertained any views of this kind. It is
    possible, however, that the separatist movement,
    which unquestionably existed in Catalonia, may have
    been encouraged by French agents, with the object
    of preventing the conclusion of a commercial treaty
    with England. The threat of the manufacturers of
    Barcelona that the Catalans would proclaim their
    independence, should the duty upon English cotton
    goods be lowered, was one of the chief reasons which
    deterred the Cabinet of Madrid from accepting
    Palmerston’s commercial proposals.[402]


Louis Philippe, however, would not hear of allowing
    the French ambassador to be the organ of any
    communications with the discontented Carlist chieftains.
    He had been accused most unfairly, he told Lord
    Granville, of sympathizing with Don Carlos, and to
    accede to the British request would expose him to
    further suspicion.[403] A new French ambassador was at
    this moment about to proceed to Madrid, who appears
    to have been admirably adapted for the part which
    the King desired that his envoy should play at
    Christina’s Court, whilst the issue of the struggle
    between constitutionalism and absolutism was so
    extremely uncertain. “A more inoffensive person,”wrote the British chargé d’affaires about a year later,
    “than the Duc de Fezensac does not exist. He has
    no political principles and has never taken the
    slightest interest in the questions which agitate the [Pg 210]country. I have observed that, as a soldier, he would
    now and then demonstrate some curiosity about the
    movements of the armies and seem glad when the
    advantage had been on the side of the Queen’s
    troops.”[404]


In the meantime Mr. Turner’s secret relations with
    the Navarrese chiefs had been betrayed. The sudden
    imprisonment of the disaffected officers and the
    murder of one of his emissaries compelled him to
    suspend his proceedings.[405] A counter-insurrection,
    however, broke out against Don Carlos to the cry of
    “Peace and the Fueros,” under the leadership of an
    individual named Muñagorri. From Bayonne, where
    “the French authorities coldly permitted him to
    remain,” he endeavoured to foment disaffection in,
    and to encourage desertion from, the Pretender’s
    armies.[406] Villiers at one time expected great results
    from this new development, but, before long, he was
    forced to realize that Muñagorri, a Basque lawyer, had
    not the influence required for bringing the enterprise
    to a successful conclusion.[407]


Never, in the opinion of both Villiers and of
    Wylde, had the constitutional cause presented so
    gloomy an appearance as in the closing months of the
    year 1838. The Queen’s generals had suffered heavy
    defeats in the open field and Espartero had been
    compelled to abandon his operations against Morella,
    Cabrera’s stronghold. Political rather than strategical
    considerations appear to have dictated the conduct
    of the campaign. Fearing that Espartero might grow
    too powerful, the Cabinet was suspected of having
    deliberately neglected to reinforce him, whilst keeping [Pg 211]his rival and enemy, Narvaez, who commanded the
    army of reserve, liberally supplied with troops.[408] In
    England no minister would have ventured to propose
    that any further assistance, either in men or money,
    should be sent to the Christinos, who had greatly
    fallen in the public estimation. The commercial
    classes were indignant that, notwithstanding the help
    which the Queen’s cause had received, prohibitory
    duties upon British manufactures should still be maintained.
    The newspapers were full of the complaints
    of the soldiers of the legion, who had returned home
    with their claims upon the Spanish treasury unsatisfied.
    The policy of encouraging these men to enter Isabella’s
    services was now universally condemned. The good
    name of the British army had, it was feared, suffered
    from their misconduct at the seat of war. The action
    of the government, in conferring a knighthood of the
    Bath upon De Lacy Evans, in no way lessened this
    impression.[409]


But, in the early spring of 1839, the news arrived
    of strange proceedings in the Pretender’s camp.
    Maroto, the Carlist commander-in-chief, having discovered
    the existence of a plot to overthrow him, had
    caused four general officers to be shot at Estella, on
    February 18. Don Carlos, who was in secret sympathy
    with the conspirators, thereupon deprived Maroto
    of his command and proclaimed him a traitor. That
    officer, however, knew that he could count upon the
    devotion of his men, and he, accordingly, boldly marched
    upon Tolosa, where the wretched Don Carlos was
    residing, and compelled him both to revoke his
    decree and to dismiss his Apostolical advisers. But
    Maroto, although he had on this occasion triumphed
    so completely, was well aware that at any moment
    his troops might turn against him, and that his life [Pg 212]depended upon a speedy termination of the war. Notwithstanding
    that Turner’s attempts to incite the
    Navarrese chieftains to rebellion had failed, and that
    Muñagorri’s insurrection had practically collapsed, the
    longing for peace had not diminished among the men
    of Biscay and Navarre. After the executions at Estella
    and his coercion of Don Carlos, Maroto had no alternative
    but to adopt the popular cry of “Paz y
    Fueros.” Instead of an obscure lawyer, the commander-in-chief
    of the Pretender’s armies was now at
    the head of the counter-insurrection against him.[410]


Whilst the Carlist general had thus the strongest
    possible inducement for coming to terms with the Christinos, other circumstances had arisen which contributed
    to the undoing of the Pretender. Espartero
    was now all powerful and in a position to carry on the
    war, untrammelled by the intrigues of the Court and
    of the Cabinet.[411] In France Molé had fallen and Soult
    was once more at the head of the government. The
    Marshal, in the previous year, had represented Louis
    Philippe at the coronation of Queen Victoria, and had
    returned to France delighted with the welcome
    accorded him in London by all classes of the population.[412] He was, consequently, very well disposed
    towards England and far more inclined than any of
    his predecessors to act up to the spirit of the Quadruple
    Treaty. No sooner was he in power than orders
    were sent to the French ships, stationed off the north
    coast of Spain, identical in every respect with those
    with which the British admiral was furnished. At
    the same time, the authorities upon the frontier
    were strictly enjoined both to prevent supplies from
    reaching the Carlists and to embarrass the movements [Pg 213]of the Pretender’s armies by all means in their
    power.[413]


Maroto’s first definite proposals of peace seem to
    have been made to Lord John Hay, either on July 27
    or 28. It is probable, however, that for some
    time past he had been in more or less direct communication
    with Espartero, with whom he had served
    in South America. The negotiations, once formally
    begun, continued for the next month. Espartero,
    however, wisely refused to grant any suspension of
    hostilities, and, whilst showing himself always ready to
    listen to reasonable proposals, pushed on his military
    operations vigorously. The question which proved the
    most difficult of settlement was that of the Fueros,
    which the Biscayans and Navarrese stipulated must be
    maintained in their integrity. The Queen Regent’s
    government, in accordance with Palmerston’s advice,
    was only prepared to make such concessions with
    regard to them, as might be compatible with the representative
    form of government which Spain had adopted.
    The recognition of the sovereignty of Isabella, the
    regency of Christina and the Constitution of 1837 were
    also insisted upon. Colonel Wylde was present at
    most of the conferences which took place. He was
    authorized to explain to any Carlist officers, with whom
    he might be enabled to converse, that, “although it
    would not be consistent with the dignity of the
    Spanish nation that Her Majesty’s government should
    guarantee any arrangement, they could rely upon the
    good offices of the British government should, at any
    time, the government of Madrid depart from its
    agreements.”[414]


Espartero’s skilful conduct of the negotiations, [Pg 214]combined with the personal reasons which made it
    imperative for Maroto to conclude a peace, triumphed
    at last over all obstacles. On August 29, a convention
    was signed at Vergara settling the points in dispute
    and providing for the capitulation of Maroto’s army.
    Two days later the 21 battalions specified in the treaty
    marched into the camp of the Christinos and, having
    been harangued by Espartero, proceeded to fraternize
    joyfully with the Queen’s troops.[415] Don Carlos, nevertheless,
    was still able to command the fidelity of a certain
    number of his regiments. But Espartero, the moment
    the capitulation of Maroto’s people had been completed,
    pressed these remnants of the insurgent army with the
    utmost vigour. Their resistance was soon overcome,
    and, on September 15, 1839, Don Carlos with a few
    thousand followers was driven across the frontier.
    On reaching French territory they were at once disarmed,
    the Pretender and the members of his family
    being conveyed to Bourges, where they were detained
    under strict supervision. It was not without difficulty
    that Louis Philippe’s ministers had obtained his
    consent to that measure of precaution.


Although Don Carlos had abandoned the struggle,
    Cabrera in the Maestrargo, and the no less bloodthirsty
    Count of España in Catalonia, still carried on the war
    with ruthless barbarity. In November, however,
    España, having incurred the displeasure of the Carlist junta, was removed from his command. His body
    shortly afterwards was taken out of the river Segre
    “tied neck and heels.”[416] Without doubt he had been
    murdered by the escort which was supposed to convey
    him to a place of confinement. But it was not
    till the month of July, 1840, that Espartero succeeded [Pg 215]in driving Cabrera and his lieutenant, Balmaceda, into
    France and in breaking up the last of the Carlist
    bands.


Spain, however, was not destined to enjoy the
    blessings of internal peace and tranquillity. Christina
    had never really accepted the principles of constitutional
    government, and most of the leading Moderados shared her dislike to democratic institutions. With
    the object, accordingly, of rendering nugatory certain
    of the Liberal provisions of the constitution the
    party, during the session of 1840, introduced a bill
    abolishing the election of municipal officers, and
    establishing a system under which they were, in the
    future, to be appointed by the central government.
    The Spaniards, however, have always been tenacious
    of their municipal rights and privileges, and the proposed
    law was, in consequence, greatly disliked by the
    people. The Queen Regent and her Moderado advisers
    would have cared little for popular opposition, provided
    always that they could have obtained the
    support of one man. “Espartero,” in the words of
    Mr. Southern, the British chargé d’affaires, “now
    formed one of the bodies of the State.”[417] The general
    who had succeeded in terminating the civil war was,
    for the time being, the idol of the nation.


Espartero, however, was deaf to the blandishments
    of the Moderados, and publicly declared that he
    regarded the municipal bill as unconstitutional.[418] Christina, nevertheless, was confident that he would
    never resist her personal appeal. She had always
    recognized the importance of winning his gratitude.
    For his services he had been created Count of
    Luchana, Duke de la Victoria, and a Spanish grandee
    of the first class. After his capture of Cabrera’s [Pg 216]stronghold, in 1840, she had conferred upon him the
    additional title of Duke of Morella. When the
    municipal law was under discussion in the Chamber,
    she suddenly announced her intention of proceeding
    to Caldes, near Barcelona, with Isabella, who was
    alleged to have been ordered sea bathing. But the
    significance of her journey to the coast lay in the fact
    that it would enable her to meet, and to confer with,
    Espartero, who was directing the final operations in
    Cabrera’s country.[419] Her interview with the all-powerful
    general took place, in due course, at Lerida,
    but it disappointed her expectations. Espartero
    advised her strongly to refuse her assent to the bill,
    although it had been passed by both Chambers. It
    was notorious that the Moderado majority had been
    obtained by means of corruption and intimidation at
    the elections of the previous year, and that it in no
    way represented the will of the nation. Christina
    wavered. At one time she decided to follow the
    counsels of Espartero, at another she resolved to
    adhere firmly to her Moderado policy. Meanwhile,
    the country was growing dangerously excited, and
    Barcelona was the scene of serious rioting. Christina,
    in consequence, decided to move the Court to
    Valencia, where O’Donnell, on whom she could depend,
    commanded the troops. Upon her arrival, she boldly
    announced that she purposed to commission Modesto
    Cortazar, a former minister of Joseph Bonaparte, to
    form an ultra-Moderado Cabinet. At the news, the
    country rose, juntas sprang into existence in the
    principal towns, and a provisional government was
    established at Madrid.[420]


Villiers was no longer at Madrid. On succeeding
    to the earldom of Clarendon, he had returned home, [Pg 217]where a seat in the Cabinet had been found for him.
    When he learnt of the critical state of affairs in Spain,
    Palmerston at once directed Mr. Aston, Clarendon’s
    successor, to seek out Christina, wherever she might
    be, and to attempt to convince her of the imprudence
    of the course upon which she had embarked.[421] But
    before he could reach Valencia, she had abandoned the
    struggle, and had sullenly surrendered the direction of
    affairs to Espartero. She fully intended, she informed
    Aston at his first audience, to resign the regency, and
    no words of his could turn her from her resolution.[422] It was not alone the desire to avoid the disagreeable
    necessity of having to accept a Progressista government
    which had prompted her to arrive at this
    decision. Gonzalez Bravo and the Radicals possessed
    the proof of her marriage to Nuñoz, the guardsman,
    by whom she had already had several children. In
    order to retain the regency, and especially the emoluments
    appertaining to it, she had allowed it to be
    generally believed that she was the mistress of the
    handsome and low-born soldier. But now that her
    secret had been betrayed, her marriage might be
    adduced at any moment as a reason for declaring her
    incompetent to hold the post of Regent.[423] Only by
    a voluntary abdication could she escape from this
    further humiliation. Accordingly, on October 12,
    1840, she signed the act whereby she resigned the
    regency, and left it to the Cortes to appoint her
    successor. A few days later she parted from her
    daughters, and set out for France. On May 18 of the
    following year, Espartero was duly elected Regent, [Pg 218]whilst Argüelles, a veteran Progressista, was nominated
    guardian of Queen Isabella.


Christina’s abdication passed almost unnoticed
    outside Spain. The quarrel between the Sultan
    and the Pasha had broken out afresh, and England
    and France were upon the verge of war.




 [Pg 219]


 CHAPTER VII


SULTAN  AND  PASHA


It will be remembered that, in the autumn of
    1833, both France and Great Britain ineffectually
    protested against the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. But
    so long as Russia and Austria were closely united,
    neither Palmerston nor Broglie were prepared to
    enforce their demands by actual measures of hostility.
    Both, however, were resolved vigilantly to watch the
    course of events at Constantinople, and to interpose
    should the Russian fleet return to the Bosphorus.
    Being thus anxious to avoid a collision with Russia, it
    became their policy to prevent a fresh outbreak
    of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, in
    order that the Tsar should be furnished with no
    excuse for intervention. It was soon apparent,
    however, that the preservation of peace between
    Mahmud and his powerful vassal would prove a
    difficult matter. Already, in the summer of 1834,
    only a little more than a year after the conclusion of
    the Convention of Kiutayeh, there was once more
    grave danger of an armed conflict between the Sultan
    and the Pasha of Egypt.


In 1832, the Syrians had welcomed Ibrahim
    as their deliverer from Turkish misrule. But no
    sooner had they become the subjects of the Pasha,
    than their disenchantment began. The introduction
    of the conscription into Syria was fiercely resented.
    In the spring of 1834, the whole country was in a [Pg 220]state of rebellion, and it required sixteen months of
    arduous operations, attended with much bloodshed,
    before Ibrahim could disarm the tribes, and restore the
    authority of his father over the revolted districts.[424] But in the eyes of the Sultan, the insurrection was an
    opportunity for attacking Ibrahim under favourable
    conditions, and for wiping out the humiliations of the
    former campaign. Accordingly, he prepared to
    renew the struggle, and it was only in deference to
    the protests of the Powers that he refrained from
    carrying out his intention.[425] At the same time
    the consuls at Alexandria insisted that Mehemet Ali
    must strictly comply with the conditions of the
    Convention of Kiutayeh, and afford Mahmud no
    pretext for beginning hostilities. Nevertheless, on
    September 4, 1834, the Pasha officially informed
    the agents of the Powers that he was resolved to
    proclaim his complete independence.[426] He soon,
    however, perceived the necessity of postponing the
    execution of this design, in face of the unanimous
    declaration of the different Cabinets that he must
    abandon “a project which the policy of Europe could
    not allow him to realize.”[427]


But, although the five Powers thus combined to
    check the ambitious schemes of Mehemet Ali, the
    suspicion with which the policy of Russia towards
    Turkey was regarded by France and England was in
    no way diminished. So strained were the relations of
    Great Britain and Russia, at the beginning of 1834,
    that Nicholas, notwithstanding his inveterate dislike
    of Louis Philippe, allowed Nesselrode to make certain [Pg 221]discreet advances towards France. These half-hearted
    overtures, however, led to no results. Although
    Broglie indulged in less provocative language than the
    British minister, and deprecated the idea of another
    naval demonstration in Levantine waters, he was in
    complete agreement with Palmerston in the eastern
    question.[428] A personal dispute served to increase the
    tension which existed between the Imperial Cabinet
    and the English government. Notwithstanding
    Prince Lieven’s intimation that the Tsar would greatly
    dislike the appointment,[429] Palmerston had allowed Sir
    Stratford Canning to be gazetted as ambassador to the
    Russian Court. Nesselrode, thereupon, informed Mr.
    Bligh, the British chargé d’affaires, that Sir Stratford
    would not be received. His “suspicious, overbearing
    and irritable disposition” appears to have been the
    reason assigned for the objections which were made
    to his appointment. Palmerston, however, absolutely
    refused to send any one else in his place. “The whole
    thing,” he believed or affected to believe, “was a mere
    remnant of the Apostolical and Holy Alliance abomination
    of the name of Canning.”[430] But Nesselrode was
    equally unyielding and no British ambassador was, in
    consequence, accredited to the Russian Court. Matters
    continued upon this footing until Nicholas, in the
    spring of 1834, decided to recall Prince Lieven from
    London and merely to appoint a chargé d’affaires to
    replace him. The departure of the Lievens created a [Pg 222]great sensation, and was by many people regarded as a
    prelude to a complete rupture between Russia and
    Great Britain. The ambassador was a commonplace
    person, but his wife[431] was a conspicuous figure in the
    fashionable and political world. Besides being well
    acquainted with most of the prominent diplomatists in
    Europe, she had, during her long stay in England,
    enjoyed the confidence of Grey, Aberdeen and other
    statesmen. It may be imagined how bitterly she
    deplored the necessity of exchanging a life, replete with
    political interest in London, for an existence at the
    Court of St. Petersburg, bereft of all the excitement in
    which she delighted. It was to her influence, she
    considered, that Palmerston owed his appointment as
    Foreign Secretary, and she never forgave him for his
    share in the events which led up to her husband’s
    recall.[432]


Whilst the Duke of Wellington was at the Foreign
    Office, during Sir Robert Peel’s “Hundred Days,”Anglo-Russian relations perceptibly improved. The
    Duke’s views upon the question of the Dardanelles
    differed from those which Broglie and Palmerston
    had hitherto entertained. In his opinion England
    and France should endeavour to effect the closure of
    the straits to the warships of all nations. The evil
    arising from the passage of Russian ships from the
    Black Sea to the Mediterranean would not, he maintained,
    be diminished by the opening of the Dardanelles
    to the fleets of the Powers. Accordingly, he cancelled [Pg 223]Palmerston’s secret instructions of March 10, 1834,[433] authorizing Ponsonby, should the Porte ask for assistance
    against Russia, to call upon the Mediterranean
    squadron to enter the Dardanelles. Moreover, apart
    from this particular question, it was not fitting, in the
    eyes of the Duke, that “the King’s ambassador should
    have the power of placing the country in a state of
    war with another Power.”[434] Wellington also proposed
    to restore the diplomatic relations of the two countries
    to their normal condition by the despatch of an
    ambassador to St. Petersburg. But his selection of
    Lord Londonderry for this post was disapproved of by
    the House of Commons. Londonderry was an ultra-Tory
    who was supposed to have used unsympathetic
    language about the Polish insurrection, and, had he
    not voluntarily declined the mission, the government
    would certainly have suffered a defeat upon the question
    of his appointment.[435]


Palmerston, upon his return to the Foreign Office in
    the spring of 1835, was struck by the soundness of the
    Duke’s opinion upon the subject of the Dardanelles.[436] Ponsonby was, in consequence, given no further
    authority over the movements of the Mediterranean
    squadron. No man at this time was more absolutely
    persuaded of the Machiavellian character of Russian
    policy than Lord Ponsonby. Neither words nor deeds
    could shake his opinion upon that point. Although
    the Russian envoy at Constantinople had co-operated
    with his colleagues in preventing a renewal of the
    struggle between the Sultan and the Pasha, the
    British ambassador was none the less convinced that
    Nicholas was secretly scheming to create a pretext for
    intervention. Again, when M. de Boutenieff assisted [Pg 224]him in obtaining redress for the ill-treatment of a
    British subject at the hands of the Turkish police, he
    explained his conduct by suggesting that “the Russian
    minister was perhaps taken by surprise, and that those
    honourable feelings, which are natural to him, operated
    upon him.”[437] Nor would he allow that the Cabinet of
    St. Petersburg was actuated either by disinterested or
    generous motives when, in 1836, it consented to remit
    some of the indemnity due from Turkey and to
    evacuate Silistria. That fortress, he declared, was of no
    value to Russia, and, by relinquishing it, she “would
    obtain the advantage of making the world believe in
    her moderation.”[438] Being thus convinced that the
    Tsar and his advisers entertained the most sinister
    designs against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire,
    he concluded that a secret understanding must exist
    between Russia and Mehemet Ali, the powerful and
    disaffected vassal of the Sultan.


The effect of Lord Ponsonby’s alarmist despatches
    was to some extent counteracted by the more
    statesmanlike reports of Lord Durham, his nephew
    by marriage. The Duke of Wellington’s intention
    to send an ambassador of St. Petersburg had enabled
    the Whigs, upon their return to power, to despatch
    Lord Durham in that capacity to the Russian capital.
    Durham, during the two years he was in Russia,
    travelled through the southern provinces and made an
    exhaustive study of the resources of the country. The
    result of his observations and enquiries convinced him
    that Russia’s power for offensive war had been greatly
    exaggerated. Furthermore, he was persuaded that
    the Tsar Nicholas and almost all intelligent Russians
    were sincerely desirous of establishing a good understanding
    with England, and had altogether abandoned
    the idea of acquiring Constantinople. In short, he saw [Pg 225]no reason why “a rival and an enemy should not be
    converted into a friend and an ally.”[439]


Meanwhile, Palmerston and Broglie had been
    quietly endeavouring to induce Austria to join with
    France and Great Britain in guaranteeing the integrity
    of Turkey. But Metternich, having contracted the
    secret agreement with Russia[440] for the maintenance
    of the Ottoman Empire, was not disposed to incur the
    Tsar’s displeasure by entering into a second compact.
    Broglie, finding that his advances met with no
    response, suggested that France and England should
    separately conclude a treaty for the object which
    both their governments had at heart and invite
    Austria to adhere to it. Palmerston[441] acquiesced in
    this plan, but was unable to obtain the assent of
    his colleagues to its execution. Before any further
    discussion of the subject could take place Broglie
    fell, and the Presidency of the Council and the
    direction of Foreign Affairs passed into the hands of
    M. Thiers. The new minister professed to be as
    anxious as his predecessor to preserve the integrity
    of the Ottoman Empire, but it was apparent, at
    once, that his first political object, to which all other
    questions of European diplomacy would for the
    present be subordinated, was the negotiation of a
    marriage between the Duc d’Orléans and an Austrian
    Archduchess.[442]


With the downfall of the Duc de Broglie the
    harmony, which had hitherto characterized French
    and British relations, began to diminish. Both
    Whigs and Tories had scrupulously abstained from [Pg 226]raising the delicate question of the French occupation
    of Algiers.[443] Broglie and the Doctrinaires were
    opposed to the permanent retention of the colony,
    and a considerable section of the Chamber looked
    upon it as a useless and expensive encumbrance.
    M. Thiers, however, thought otherwise. He was in
    favour of “nationalizing the Arabs”—an expression
    which Mr. Aston[444] interpreted to mean that he was
    contemplating their extermination. No sooner was
    he in office than he began to prepare an expedition
    against the Bey of Constantine, with whom the
    French authorities had a long-standing dispute. At
    the same time, whilst protesting that he had no
    thought of extending French domination over either
    Tunis or Tripoli, he refused to recognize the
    sovereignty of the Sultan over those regencies. To
    support this policy he sent Admiral Hugon to Tunis
    to oppose, by force if necessary, the entry of the
    Ottoman squadron into the bay. “I really believe,”privately wrote the British chargé d’affaires to Lord
    Palmerston, “that in order to gain popularity he
    wishes for a war with Turkey, provided he could make
    it appear that it was undertaken to protect French
    interests.”[445]


Whilst M. Thiers thus set himself to consolidate
    the French rule over Algeria a secret negotiation was
    initiated, at Constantinople and at Cairo, for the
    purpose of establishing, under the guarantee of the
    French government, the relations of the Sultan and
    the Pasha of Egypt upon a more secure foundation.
    Campbell appears to have received the first
    intelligence of what was taking place from his
    Austrian colleague. The news caused him to pay a [Pg 227]visit to M. Ferdinand de Lesseps,[446] who, in the
    absence of M. Mimaut, was acting as French consul-general.
    Lesseps was in a great state of indignation,
    and in his wrath was inclined to be communicative. M.
    Thiers, he confided to Campbell, before he left Paris,
    had told him that an important negotiation was in
    progress, but that he would not discuss it with him
    as, upon his arrival at Alexandria, he could learn all
    about it from a perusal of the documents at the
    consulate. Mimaut, however, had carefully removed
    every paper relating to the affair, and he was, in
    consequence, in complete ignorance of all that had
    passed. He had endeavoured, he added ingenuously,
    to make Boghos Bey believe that he was acquainted
    with the transaction, but the astute
    secretary of the Pasha had discovered the true
    state of the case and had promptly changed the
    conversation.[447]


Soon after Campbell’s interview with Lesseps, on
    December 11, 1836, Sarim Effendi, who was described
    by Mehemet Ali as a confidential agent of the Sultan,
    arrived at Alexandria. Ostensibly his mission was
    concerned with questions of arrears of tribute. In
    reality, however, he appears to have been empowered
    to propose some repartition of territory. The statements
    upon the subject which Campbell succeeded in
    extracting from Mehemet Ali were conflicting. At one
    time he told the British consul that the Sultan was
    willing to invest him with the hereditary government
    of Egypt and the Pashalic of Acre, whilst, on another
    occasion, he asserted that the hereditary tenure of all
    the territories which he actually occupied had been
    offered to him, on condition that he would undertake [Pg 228]to reduce his army.[448] In Paris Lord Granville was
    unable to obtain any information about this affair.
    In answer to his enquiries he was told that Roussin
    had, “with the object of saving the dignity of the
    Sultan, held out to the Pasha the prospect of obtaining
    for his son the reversion of his Syrian possessions, in
    return for the abandonment of the other territories
    which he occupied.” But he was assured that the
    admiral had acted without instructions from his
    government, which had, on the contrary, “discountenanced
    his proceedings.”[449]


If Mahmud really empowered Sarim Effendi to
    make substantial concessions to the Pasha, such
    conduct on his part is altogether inconsistent with the
    sentiments of implacable hostility which he had
    constantly entertained towards his powerful vassal.
    In the spring of 1836 he had shown a strong disposition
    to renew the struggle, and had sent a secret agent
    to London to solicit help. His appeal was rejected,
    but Palmerston intimated that the British government
    was constrained to urge him to keep the peace from
    fear that his military resources would be unequal to
    the contest, rather than from any desire to see the status quo in Syria maintained.[450] Finding that no
    assistance would be forthcoming from England,
    Mahmud may have listened to the advice of the
    French government to make further concessions to
    Mehemet Ali, in order to put an end to the armed
    peace which was draining his depleted treasury. But
    the conditions, whatever they may have been, which [Pg 229]were proposed to the Pasha were not accepted. Nevertheless,
    the negotiation, although it led to no direct
    results, had an important influence upon the march of
    events. It disclosed to Mehemet Ali that France and
    England were pursuing different objects in the East,
    and gave him grounds for hoping that he need no
    longer fear a combination of the two naval Powers
    against him.


But, although the Sultan may have been disappointed
    and annoyed at the refusal of Great Britain
    to assist him actively, he could derive comfort from
    the knowledge that the power of Mehemet Ali was
    regarded with misgivings in England. Ponsonby’s
    influence at the Porte grew in proportion as it became
    more and more evident that his government disapproved
    of the Egyptian occupation of Syria, and
    was prepared to uphold the sovereignty of Turkey
    over Tunis and to resist French encroachments. On
    the other hand, the Russian ambassador, who declared
    unceasingly that under no circumstances must the status quo, as established by the Convention of
    Kiutayeh, be disturbed, found his authority diminish.
    Early in 1836, shortly before the arrival in England
    of the Sultan’s secret agent, Palmerston had despatched
    General Chrzanowski, an able and experienced Polish
    officer, to Asia Minor. He had served in the Turkish
    campaign of 1828-1829, and was, Palmerston considered,[451] “just the sort of man to be of the greatest
    use to Reshid Pasha.”[452] But as the Russians, by
    whom he was looked upon as a deserter, would
    greatly resent his employment, he was instructed
    to avoid Constantinople, and to proceed direct
    to Smyrna. He would never appear to have been
    given a command or to have been employed officially [Pg 230]by the Sultan, who probably scarcely ventured to defy
    his powerful neighbour so openly. He was allowed,
    however, to travel about Asia Minor, and to study the
    strategical situation. He was thus enabled to furnish
    Palmerston with excellent military advice, in return for
    the salary which Lord Ponsonby was instructed to pay
    him, from the moment of his arrival in the East.[453] Several Prussian officers, among them a certain Major
    von Moltke, destined to become very famous, were at
    this time serving with the Turkish army, to the
    re-organization of which, in preparation for the coming
    struggle, Palmerston unceasingly urged the Sultan to
    devote his whole attention.


Whilst instructing Ponsonby to impress upon the
    Turkish ministers the necessity of increasing the
    efficiency of the army, Palmerston was intent on
    creating embarrassments for Mehemet Ali. The
    economic system, which he had established in Egypt,
    and which he was imposing upon Syria, presented an
    excellent field for hostile criticism. By often very
    equivocal methods the Pasha had gradually expropriated
    the former freeholders, and had converted
    them into his own tenants. He would then buy at a
    fixed rate their produce, and thus, before long, the
    sale of almost all articles of prime necessity became a
    monopoly of the State. At first his system appeared
    to work well, but, when he began to pile up his
    armaments, he met the increased expenditure which
    they entailed by reducing the price, which he had
    hitherto paid to the unfortunate occupiers of the soil.
    In order to compensate themselves these people were
    necessarily compelled to raise the price of all articles
    which the government did not take from them. In
    1838 Colonel Campbell computed that, as the result
    of the Pasha’s administration, articles of ordinary [Pg 231]consumption in Egypt were from six to ten times
    dearer than they had been under the rule of the
    Mamelukes. Moreover, Mehemet Ali, ever since the
    year 1816, had been busily endeavouring to convert
    Egypt into a manufacturing country. With this
    object he had imported at great expense skilled workmen
    and machinery from France and England. The
    native labour required was obtained in the same
    manner as the army was recruited. Men, women and
    children were impressed and compelled to work in the
    factories. But by their unskilfulness they injured the
    machinery, nor did the articles which they turned out
    pay the cost of manufacture. The result of this
    experiment was that some 30,000 peasants, who might
    with advantage have been engaged in agriculture,
    were forced to labour unprofitably in the factories
    of the government. The Pasha, however, was too
    ignorant of the most elementary principles of political
    economy to understand the folly of these proceedings,
    in which he was encouraged to persevere by the
    foreign merchants, who sold him machinery or who
    bought his cotton and his indigo upon very advantageous
    terms.[454]


The British government had always been desirous
    to put an end to the old system of capitulations,[455] and
    to negotiate a new commercial treaty with the Porte.
    But as many influential persons in Turkey were
    interested in the preservation of existing abuses, the
    proposals of successive ambassadors had constantly
    been eluded. At the beginning of 1838, however,
    Palmerston directed Ponsonby to bring the matter
    forward again, and to lay great stress upon the
    prejudicial effect which the abolition of monopolies
    throughout the Ottoman Empire would not fail to [Pg 232]have upon the personal position of Mehemet Ali.[456] This argument attained the desired result. Mahmud
    quickly resolved that no vested interests should be
    allowed to interfere with a commercial arrangement,
    which must either seriously embarrass Mehemet Ali
    or, should he refuse to adhere to it, bring him into
    conflict with Great Britain. The Sultan’s consent
    having been obtained, Ponsonby entrusted to Henry
    Bulwer the negotiation which was brought to a
    satisfactory conclusion on August 19, 1838.[457]


In the meantime, it had not escaped the vigilance
    of the Indian government that the protracted resistance
    of the Wahabites was weakening, and that Mehemet
    Ali was upon the point of making himself master of
    the whole of Arabia. The importance of Aden as an
    intermediate coaling station between Bombay and
    Suez had been realized, and it happened, most opportunely,
    that a quarrel[458] between the ruler of that port
    and the East India Company enabled the Governor-General
    to take action at the very moment when the
    absorption of the Yemen by the Pasha was imminent.[459] The management of the affair was confided to Captain
    Haines of the Bombay navy, who, early in 1838, was
    able to inform Ibrahim that the Sultan of Aden had
    ceded the port to the East India Company “par simple
    motif d’amitié et de son cosentement.”[460] Nevertheless,
    the expedition sent from India to take possession of the
    place encountered, on January 16, 1839, a fierce resistance
    which was only overcome after a sharp engagement.
    Palmerston, upon receipt of the news of its cession, at
    once directed Campbell to warn Mehemet Ali that any
    movement of his troops against Aden would be treated [Pg 233]as an attack upon a British possession. The Pasha,
    although unable wholly to conceal his chagrin, accepted
    the situation with a good grace.[461]


Ever since the beginning of the year 1838, great
    military preparations had been in progress both in
    Egypt and Syria. The consuls, had in consequence,
    been instructed to inquire of Mehemet Ali the reason
    of his armaments. It was whilst they were engaged
    in warning him that any aggression upon the Sultan
    would bring down upon him the vengeance of the
    Powers that the news arrived of the submission of
    Nejd, the great central district of Arabia, extending
    from Medina and Mecca to the Persian Gulf.[462] It was
    impossible to calculate what might result from the
    enhanced prestige which he had thus acquired in the
    eyes of the faithful. The immediate effect was seen, a
    few days later, when he sent for the consuls and
    announced to each of them separately his unalterable
    resolution to proclaim his independence. “The
    interests of his family,” he declared to Campbell,
    “imperiously called upon him to fix their future state,
    and it was les larmes aux yeux et le coeur serré that he
    had taken his present resolution.” Nevertheless, he
    would wait a reasonable time in the full persuasion
    that the British government would take such steps as
    would permit of an amicable and satisfactory settlement.[463]


The Cabinets of the Powers were not greatly
    disturbed by the Pasha’s threats. Palmerston alone
    showed any anxiety to arrange the military measures
    which might be put into force against Mehemet Ali,
    should he proceed to carry out his declared intentions.[464] [Pg 234]But it was soon evident that the Pasha had no desire
    to bring on a crisis. Although he continued to
    impress upon the consuls that he was fully as determined
    as ever to obtain for his children the succession
    of the countries which he governed, he at the same
    time announced his intention of proceeding to Upper
    Egypt to inspect his gold mines. Furthermore, he
    duly transmitted his yearly tribute to the Sultan.
    Nevertheless, his military preparations were not relaxed
    and reinforcements were continuously despatched
    to Ibrahim in Syria. It was clear that he had no
    intention of affording the Powers a pretext for taking
    active measures against him, but hoped, by keeping
    them and the Porte in a constant state of apprehension,
    to weary them into conceding him some of his
    demands.[465] In pursuance of this astute policy he
    accepted the British commercial treaty with the
    utmost unconcern. He was confident, he assured
    Campbell, that he could derive a larger revenue from
    duties on exports and imports than he had ever
    obtained under his system of monopolies.[466] M. Molé,
    on the other hand, testified his surprise and annoyance
    at the success which had attended Lord Ponsonby’s
    negotiations. He was greatly afraid, he told
    Granville, that Mehemet Ali would now be provoked
    into an immediate declaration of independence.
    But, upon learning that the Pasha had announced his
    intention of adhering to the terms of the British
    treaty, he promptly instructed Roussin to conclude,
    on behalf of France, a similar arrangement with the
    Porte.[467]


Whilst the aims and ambitions of Mehemet Ali [Pg 235]were once more attracting the attention of the Powers,
    Anglo-Russian relations again assumed a threatening
    aspect. Both the British and Indian governments
    had, for some time past, been disturbed by the ascendency
    which Russia was acquiring over the Court of
    Teheran, and by the intrigues of her agents in Afghanistan.
    Encouraged by Count Simonitch, the Russian
    envoy, the Shah, who entertained pretensions to the
    sovereignty of Afghanistan, at the close of the year
    1837, marched against Herat. Before the siege had
    been long in progress both the British and Russian
    ministers arrived upon the scene—the one to endeavour
    to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and
    the other to direct the operations of the Persian
    army. Whilst Macneil and Simonitch thus strove
    for supremacy in the camp of Mohammad, Eldred
    Pottinger, a subaltern of the Indian army, who had
    reached Herat disguised as a horse-dealer, stimulated
    by his example the courage of the garrison. At the
    same time Captain Witkewitch, a secret agent of Count
    Simonitch, arrived at Cabul, for the purpose of drawing
    Dost Mohammad into the Russo-Persian alliance and of
    counteracting the influence of Alexander Burnes, who,
    like his Russian rival, was in Afghanistan upon a
    mission which was described as commercial. The idea
    of a Russian agent established at Cabul, free to intrigue
    with Ranjit Singh, the Maharajah of Lahore, and supported
    by the whole weight of Mohammedan Persia,
    seriously alarmed Lord Auckland, the Governor-General.[468] To combat this danger he conceived the
    fatal plan of sending an Anglo-Indian army into
    Afghanistan to overthrow the Barakzai dynasty, and
    to set up in the place of Dost Mohammad an exiled
    Sadozai prince, a pensioner of the Indian government.


The conduct of the Russian agents in Persia and
    Afghanistan was made the subject of a note which, on [Pg 236]October 26, 1838, Clanricarde, the British ambassador
    at St. Petersburg, was directed to deliver to Count
    Nesselrode. The Russian Chancellor, whilst deprecating
    the construction placed by Palmerston on some of
    Count Simonitch’s actions, admitted that he had
    exceeded his instructions and undertook to recall him.[469] This promise was duly carried out. Consequently,
    when Witkewitch arrived at St. Petersburg he was
    coldly informed that he must forthwith return to his
    post at Orenburg. In despair at finding that the
    negotiations, which he had conducted so skilfully, were
    to be disavowed, the unfortunate man blew out his
    brains.[470] Only a little more than two years later
    Burnes, his rival, perished at Cabul at the hands of an
    infuriated mob.


The assurances and explanations of Count Nesselrode
    were accepted as satisfactory by Lord Palmerston.
    The visit of the Tsarewitch, the future Alexander II.,
    to London, in the spring of 1839, contributed still
    further to restore harmonious relations. Nevertheless,
    the general situation which confronted Palmerston was
    disquieting. Russia, which by means of the Treaty
    of Unkiar-Skelessi had assumed the exclusive protectorship
    of Turkey, now appeared to exercise a
    dangerous ascendency over the Court of Persia.
    Although the Shah had been compelled to raise the
    siege of Herat, and although the proceedings of
    Simonitch and Witkewitch had been disavowed, there
    was room for grave anxiety. Distant as was the
    frontier line of the Sutlej from the most advanced
    Cossack posts, the presence of Russian agents in the
    intervening States foreboded trouble. At Lahore,
    Hyderabad and Cabul, the appearance of a new [Pg 237]power in Central Asia could not fail to be eagerly
    discussed.


But it was not alone the advance of Russia beyond
    the Caspian which gave those responsible for the
    safety of British India cause for uneasy reflection. At
    this time, when the introduction of steam as a means
    of transport was making the question of rapid
    communication a matter of the first importance,
    Mehemet Ali was building up an Arab Empire which
    already extended from Khartum to the Taurus
    mountains and the Persian Gulf. Whether in the
    future the Indian mail would be carried over the
    Isthmus of Suez, or whether Colonel Chesney should
    succeed in establishing steam communication by way
    of the Euphrates, the ruler of Egypt was master of
    either route. Nor did he stand alone. Whilst busily
    engaged in strengthening her own position as a
    Mediterranean power, England’s most formidable naval
    rival was showing a marked disposition to befriend
    him. In Syria France was the acknowledged protector
    of the Catholics, and her influence was reported to
    have increased of late years.[471] From Algiers she was
    extending her grasp over the whole north coast of
    Africa, whilst in Spain she was striving to re-establish
    that predominating influence which she had formerly
    exercised. It seemed possible that France, in alliance
    with Spain and Mehemet Ali, might yet be enabled
    to realize Napoleon’s dream of converting the Mediterranean
    into a “French lake.”


When Mehemet Ali had announced his intention
    of shaking off his allegiance, Mahmud had seemed to
    defer to the pacific counsels of the Powers, and had
    refrained from ordering his troops in Asia Minor to
    invade Syria. But, before the spring of 1839, it was
    clear that he was resolved to appeal to arms, and that
    all the efforts of diplomacy to prevent a renewal of [Pg 238]the conflict would be fruitless. It was not alone his
    bitter hatred of his rebellious vassal which prompted
    the Sultan to disregard the advice of the ambassadors
    at Constantinople. His sole claim to the Khalifate
    rested upon the protection of Mecca, and, inasmuch as
    Mehemet Ali was in possession of the Holy Cities,
    were he to declare himself independent, Mahmud
    must forfeit his right to command the temporal
    obedience of Mohammedans. Already Constantinople
    was seething with disaffection, and he is said to have
    been aware that a plot had been formed to depose
    him and to enthrone his son, under the guardianship
    of Mehemet Ali.[472]


Mahmud was dying from a complication of disorders,
    but he gave his whole expiring strength to his
    military preparations. Men, horses and guns were
    hurried across the Bosphorus and forwarded to Hafiz
    Pasha in Asia Minor. Moltke with his plane-table was
    busily engaged in exploring the country up to Nezib,
    “a small town hidden among the olive trees close against
    the Syrian frontier.”[473] At the news that the Porte
    was bent upon war, Mehemet Ali, curtailing his visit
    to Khartum, hastily returned to Cairo, whilst at
    Constantinople the ambassadors made a last endeavour
    to dissuade the Sultan from disturbing the peace.[474] But Mahmud was not to be diverted from his object,
    and in Paris, on May 23, 1839, it was known that
    Hafiz Pasha had crossed the Euphrates and that
    hostilities were about to begin.


French historians have generally imputed duplicity
    to the British government in this affair. Palmerston,
    they say, whilst pretending that he was anxious to
    dissuade the Sultan from war, was in point of fact [Pg 239]allowing Lord Ponsonby, his agent at Constantinople,
    to encourage the Turkish ministers to break the peace.
    Ponsonby was unquestionably opposed to the policy of
    maintaining the status quo in Syria. In his opinion
    Mehemet Ali was the sore which was sapping the
    strength of the Ottoman Empire, and, seeing that it
    was a British interest that Turkey should be in a
    condition to resist Russia, he held that England
    should assist the Sultan to crush his too-powerful
    vassal.[475] It is undeniable that Palmerston allowed
    him a liberty of action and of language which he
    would not have tolerated in any other ambassador.
    There can be no doubt, moreover, that he regarded
    the Egyptian question in very much the same light as
    Ponsonby. But he differed from him in one very
    important particular, inasmuch as he considered that
    the moment had not yet come when Mahmud could,
    with a reasonable chance of success, try conclusions
    with the Pasha. France, he was well aware, would
    never join in an attack upon Mehemet Ali. Indeed,
    it was rather a question whether she would not openly
    espouse his cause. The possibility of a combination
    between Russia and France could not be dismissed as
    a development outside the range of practical politics.[476] Hitherto, Nicholas’ dislike of Louis Philippe had
    rendered the chance of such a contingency very
    remote. But, were England to adopt a separate
    policy in the east, it was improbable that the Tsar
    would allow his personal animosity to stand in the
    way of an alliance, which he might consider would
    serve the best interests of his Empire. Accordingly,
    when, at the close of the year 1838, Reshid Pasha,
    the Reis-Effendi, arrived upon a special mission to [Pg 240]London, he discovered, to his disappointment, that
    Palmerston was not prepared to hold out any
    hopes that the British government would join in an
    attack upon Mehemet Ali. Only, Palmerston
    explained, in the event of the Pasha beginning
    hostilities, could England furnish the Sultan with
    naval assistance. Mahmud being intent upon war, a
    purely defensive alliance could be of no service to him,
    and was declined.[477] If the bellicose policy of the
    Sultan had received any encouragement from Lord
    Ponsonby, Reshid’s conferences at the Foreign Office
    in London must have made it clear that the
    ambassador had been using language which he had no
    authority to employ. When, therefore, the Sultan
    ordered Hafiz Pasha to advance, he was perfectly
    aware that he was acting in opposition to the wishes
    of the British government, which did not believe
    that he had an army capable of defeating Ibrahim’s
    Arab and Egyptian troops.


Directly it was known that the Turkish army had
    been set in motion and that all hope of maintaining
    the peace must be abandoned, the Soult Cabinet asked
    the Chamber for a credit of ten million francs. The
    sum demanded was accorded by an overwhelming
    majority and, in the debates which followed, the
    deputies were enabled to declare their views upon the
    eastern question. The sympathies of the majority
    were plainly on the side of Mehemet Ali, and ministers
    were given clearly to understand, by the long
    succession of orators who in turn ascended the tribune,
    that with the large sum which had been placed at their
    disposal they must do something both great and
    glorious.[478] Soult, in the meanwhile, had despatched [Pg 241]two officers, the one to Constantinople and the other
    to Alexandria, with instructions to proceed, after
    conferring with Admiral Roussin and M. Cochelet,
    to the headquarters of the two armies, in order to
    endeavour to bring about a suspension of hostilities.
    The friendly feelings towards England entertained by
    Marshal Soult, and the better understanding with
    regard to Spanish affairs between the French and
    English governments, which followed his assumption
    of office, have already been mentioned. Their co-operation
    in the eastern question was no less cordial.
    “We are in complete accord,” said Palmerston to
    Bourqueney, the French chargé d’affaires in London;
    “our communications are not those of one government
    with another but of two colleagues in the
    same Cabinet.”[479] It was decided that both the French
    and British fleets should proceed to the Levant, and
    that the admirals should be instructed to do all in
    their power to induce the opposing generals to suspend
    hostilities. Both Soult and Palmerston, however,
    were agreed that the great danger in the situation
    lay in the possibility that Nicholas might avail himself
    of the outbreak of war for invading Turkey, under
    the plea that Constantinople must be protected against
    Ibrahim. They, accordingly, resolved to intimate to
    the Porte that, in the event of Russian aid being
    invoked, or of a Russian fleet entering the Bosphorus,
    permission should be given to the French and British
    squadrons to pass through the Dardanelles into the
    Sea of Marmora.[480]


Mehemet Ali, when the news arrived that the Turks
    had crossed the Euphrates, displayed the greatest self-restraint.
    In his heart he was, doubtless, eager for the [Pg 242]fray, but he was determined that the responsibility for
    the outbreak of the war should rest with the Sultan.
    Accordingly, he delivered a written communication to
    the representatives of the Powers, in which he undertook
    to withdraw his troops to Damascus, provided
    the Turkish army would recross the river.[481] It was
    only on June 10, upon receipt of a report from
    Ibrahim that his cavalry had been attacked within the
    Egyptian frontier, that he directed him to assume the
    offensive.[482] But three days after these orders had been
    despatched Captain Caillier, the officer sent off by
    Marshal Soult, arrived at Alexandria. He was the
    bearer of despatches from the Marshal to M. Cochelet,
    instructing him to declare to Mehemet Ali that the
    Powers were taking steps to settle the eastern question,
    and that they must insist upon the immediate withdrawal
    of the Egyptian army within the boundaries of
    Syria. The Pasha, after some little hesitation, consented
    to write to his son enjoining him not to pursue
    the Turks beyond the frontiers of Syria and to halt
    wherever Caillier might come up with him.[483] But
    before Marshal Soult’s emissary could reach Ibrahim’s
    headquarters that general had completely defeated the
    Turks, on June 24, 1839, in a great battle near Nezib.


Before the news of this disaster could reach Constantinople
    Mahmud was dead, and when, shortly
    afterwards, the intelligence of the complete defeat of
    Hafiz Pasha was brought to the Turkish ministers,
    they kept the matter strictly secret. Abd-ul-Mejid,
    the sixteen-year-old son of the deceased Mahmud, was
    proclaimed Sultan, and the ambassadors of the Powers
    were invited to a conference on July 3. On this
    occasion Nourri-Effendi, the Minister for Foreign
    Affairs, announced that the Porte had no reason to [Pg 243]suppose that any engagement had yet taken place
    between the two armies. Nevertheless, the Sultan
    purposed to send “one of the eminent men of his
    Court” to offer Mehemet Ali a full pardon for the
    past and to assure him of his favour in the future.
    Furthermore, he was prepared to confer upon him
    the hereditary government of Egypt, provided he
    would abandon Syria and the other territories over
    which he now exercised his dominion. Pending the
    result of this negotiation orders had been sent to Hafiz
    Pasha to suspend hostilities.[484]


It was not until July 8 that the true facts were
    generally known in Constantinople, and, on the
    evening of that day, Lord Ponsonby was informed
    by the French ambassador of a fresh disaster.
    Admiral Lalande, who with a small French squadron
    was lying at the entrance to the Dardanelles, reported
    that the Capudan Pasha had sailed away with, he
    believed, the intention of delivering up his fleet to
    Mehemet Ali. Osman Bey, the second in command
    of the Turkish squadron, had had an interview with
    the French admiral,[485] and had declared that the
    Sultan had been murdered by Halil and Hosrew
    Pasha, both of whom were in league with the
    Russians. Under these circumstances the Capudan
    Pasha determined to place his ships in safety. On
    this pretext he proceeded with all speed to Alexandria,
    where he delivered up to the Pasha his whole fleet,
    consisting of twenty-one sail, of which eight were of
    the line.


The indifference with which Admiral Lalande had
    heard of the treacherous intentions of the Capudan
    Pasha, and the apathy which had characterized his
    proceedings, could not fail to attract attention.
    Marshal Boult himself, in discussing the surrender [Pg 244]of the Turkish fleet with Lord Granville, was forced
    to admit that Lalande’s conduct appeared to him
    inexplicable.[486] In the course of the next few months,
    however, further light was thrown upon the matter.
    An Armenian, a certain Avedick, the confidential dragoman of the Capudan Pasha, was smuggled out of
    Alexandria on board a British ship. This man, when
    he arrived at Constantinople, agreed to disclose all he
    knew to Reshid Pasha. According to his statement,
    Admiral Lalande, accompanied by the Prince de
    Joinville, came on board the Turkish flagship, and
    held a consultation with Osman, the Reala Bey,[487] who
    seems to have been the evil genius of the Capudan
    Pasha. On learning of his intention to proceed to
    Alexandria, the French officers, far from attempting to
    detain him, applauded his resolution, bidding him only
    to be careful to avoid H.M.S. Vanguard, which was in
    Besika Bay. Ponsonby, in forwarding the papers
    connected with this affair, emitted the opinion that,
    although many circumstances appeared to confirm the
    truth of the dragoman’s story, “he could not feel it to
    be true of an honourable man like Admiral Lalande.”[488] Palmerston either adopted this view, or more probably,
    deemed it impossible to base a formal representation
    to the French government upon Avedick’s unsupported
    statement. But after the abdication and death of his
    father, the Prince de Joinville saw fit to publish,
    under an assumed name in the Revue des Deux
    Mondes;[489] an account of these transactions which
    confirmed the dragoman’s allegations in every particular.
    Throughout the French fleet there was, says [Pg 245]His Royal Highness, a bitter hatred of England and
    an intense desire to avenge former defeats. The
    Pasha of Egypt was regarded as the ally of France in
    a struggle, which every man hoped and believed, would
    take place in the near future. Admiral Lalande was,
    therefore, clearly justified in encouraging the Capudan
    Pasha to surrender his fleet to Mehemet Ali. Although
    thirteen years had elapsed since the events referred to
    in this article had taken place, the Prince evidently
    experienced the greatest satisfaction in remembering
    that Captain Walker, and the other British naval
    instructors of the Ottoman fleet, had been carried off
    to Alexandria on ships which were to be handed over
    to England’s enemy, the Pasha of Egypt.


These successive disasters, Lord Palmerston maintained,
    should make no difference in the policy of the
    Powers. On the contrary, the battle of Nezib had
    made it the more imperative that steps should be
    taken to check the progress of the victorious Ibrahim.[490] Metternich held the same opinion. Russia, however,
    appeared disposed to adopt a different view of the
    situation. In 1838, when Mehemet Ali was threatening
    to proclaim his independence, she had refused to
    acquiesce in Palmerston’s proposal that the Turco-Egyptian
    question should be submitted to a conference
    of the Powers.[491] But in the following spring, when it
    was plain that the Sultan was resolved to embark
    upon war, she had not appeared disinclined to entertain
    Metternich’s suggestion that the seat of the
    negotiations should be established at Vienna. “Each
    Cabinet,” Metternich proposed, “might send its opinion
    to its representatives at Vienna, leaving a certain
    latitude for discussion, and from a comparison of [Pg 246]the five opinions, one should be sought in which all
    might coincide.”[492] By this arrangement much delay
    would be obviated, and the same advantages could be
    obtained as by the summoning of the conference, to
    which Nicholas had objected. But at the news that,
    as a consequence of the death of Mahmud and of the
    defeat sustained by the Turkish arms at Nezib, the
    Porte purposed to open a direct negotiation with
    the Pasha, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg once more
    evinced a strong disinclination to assent to the plan of
    establishing a European concert for the settlement of
    the eastern question.[493] The disposition which Nicholas
    thus manifested to diverge from the policy advocated
    by Great Britain and Austria, was hastily seized by
    France as an opportunity for isolating Russia. The
    Soult Cabinet, accordingly, insisted upon the necessity
    of counselling the Porte to avoid any precipitate action,
    and only to treat with Mehemet Ali through the
    intermediary of the Powers.[494] Palmerston, as may be
    supposed, lost no time in expressing to the Marshal
    the satisfaction which he derived from seeing that he
    was animated by sentiments coinciding so completely
    with his own.[495]


In the meanwhile Akiff-Effendi, the Turkish envoy,
    sent to treat with Mehemet Ali, had returned to Constantinople,
    after a fruitless mission to Cairo. The
    Pasha had protested his loyalty to the young Sultan,
    but he had none the less received the Capudan Pasha and his officers with open arms and clearly meant to [Pg 247]retain the Ottoman fleet. Moreover, he had declared
    emphatically that he must be invested with the
    hereditary government of both Syria and Egypt, and
    had expressed indignation that his old enemy Hosrew
    Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had not been dismissed. He
    had, however, undertaken that, for the present,
    Ibrahim should not advance into Asia Minor.[496] It
    was clear to the ambassadors at Constantinople that
    the Porte, if left to itself, would consent to all the
    Pasha’s demands. “I consider the Ottoman Empire
    to be delivered over to Mehemet Ali,” wrote Ponsonby
    on July 26.[497] But, on the following day, Baron
    Stürmer received despatches from Vienna.[498] Metternich
    had either foreseen, or had obtained early information,
    that the Turkish ministers would make further
    concessions, and he, accordingly, informed the Internuncio that the five Powers were determined to resist
    the pretensions of Mehemet Ali, and directed him to
    urge his colleagues to unite with him in representing
    to the Porte the necessity of allowing the conditions of
    peace to be settled by the Powers. Lord Beauvale[499] and M. de Sainte-Aulaire had, it is said, at Metternich’s
    request, written in the same strain to Ponsonby and
    to Roussin.[500] A meeting of the representatives of the
    five Powers was immediately convened and a note was
    drawn up, informing the Porte “that agreement among
    the five Great Powers, on the question of the East,
    was secured,” and inviting it to suspend any definitive
    resolution without their concurrence. M. de Boutenieff,
    the Russian minister, appears to have made no difficulty
    about affixing his signature to this document, which
    was to be known as the collective note of July 27,
    1839. When it was presented to them, the Turkish [Pg 248]ministers expressed the utmost gratitude, and promised
    to suspend all negotiations and to inform Mehemet
    Ali that the affair was now in the hands of the five
    Powers.[501]


The news that the collective note had been
    delivered, and that it had been accepted by the Porte
    in the desired spirit, afforded the keenest satisfaction
    at Vienna and in London. Palmerston, agreeing with
    Ponsonby, perceived that it had destroyed the Treaty
    of Unkiar-Skelessi, and that the days of Russia’s
    exclusive protectorship over Turkey were at an
    end. One of the chief objects of his eastern policy
    had thus been attained, and he could devote his whole
    attention to the other—the curtailment of the power
    of Mehemet Ali. In Paris, on the other hand,
    the situation created by the collective note awoke
    serious misgivings. Since the battle of Nezib, French
    enthusiasm for Mehemet Ali had increased alarmingly.
    “Men,” wrote Véron,[502] “defended the claims of
    the Pasha with the same fervour as, in 1828, they
    had espoused the cause of Greek independence.”
    Ministers, under these circumstances, could only
    reflect ruefully that, now that France was a party
    to the collective note, they must join with the
    Powers in devising measures for depriving Mehemet
    Ali of the fruits of his victories. Nor could they
    escape from the dilemma by disavowing Admiral
    Roussin, seeing that he had only acted in strict
    accordance with the policy which Soult himself
    had advocated, in the secret hope of isolating
    Russia. But it was evident that the Cabinet of
    St. Petersburg was reconciled to the necessity of
    allowing the eastern question to be settled by the
    Powers, and it was to be apprehended that both
    Russia and Austria would adopt the hostile attitude [Pg 249]towards Mehemet Ali which Palmerston had already
    assumed.


Palmerston had invariably proclaimed the opinion
    that the whole of Syria must be restored to the
    Sultan, before a permanent peace could be established
    in the East. The Egyptian desert, he had always
    insisted, must be interposed between the Pasha
    and the territories under the direct rule of the
    Porte.[503] Soult had hitherto contrived to elude a
    discussion upon this point by declaring that France
    and England must, in the first place, concert
    measures for checkmating the designs of Russia
    upon the integrity of Turkey.[504] Palmerston, so
    long as he was doubtful about the Tsar’s intentions,
    had been content to leave in abeyance the question
    of the future position of Mehemet Ali. But his tone
    changed from the moment that he became aware that
    Russia had adhered to the collective note. The French
    government on various pleas had declined to entertain
    his proposal that the French and English squadrons
    should combine for the purpose of obtaining from
    Mehemet Ali the surrender of the Turkish fleet.[505] On
    August 20, however, in a dispatch which Mr. Bulwer,
    the British chargé d’affaires was directed to communicate
    to Marshal Soult, he insisted that the restitution
    of the Turkish ships must be regarded as an indispensable
    preliminary to any negotiations between
    the five Powers and the Pasha. Furthermore, he
    declared that the decision as to the measures, which
    should be taken to obtain this result, “should emanate
    from Vienna, which was to be the central point of the
    negotiations instead of London or Paris,” and that Sir
    Robert Stopford would be instructed to comply with [Pg 250]whatever directions he might receive from Lord
    Beauvale, “either with or without the co-operation
    of anyone of the other squadrons.”[506]


The French government, however, displayed a
    marked reluctance to enter into any general discussion
    of the Egyptian question. Notwithstanding that
    Soult had himself suggested Vienna as the seat
    of the negotiation, when he was under the impression
    that Russia would object to confer with the
    Powers on the affairs of the East, he now deprecated
    the selection of that capital.[507] The French government,
    reported Bulwer, on August 30, will refuse
    to consent to any measures of coercion against
    the Pasha, “until the whole question—that portion
    of it relative to the Dardanelles and Russia as
    well as that relating to Egypt and Mehemet Ali—is
    decided.”[508] About a fortnight later, Bulwer was
    enabled to ascertain Louis Philippe’s opinions upon
    the situation. It was advisable, the King considered,
    to discover what would satisfy the Pasha, and
    then to insist upon the Porte making the required
    concessions. When Bulwer objected that such a
    course was hardly consistent with the collective
    note of July 27, His Majesty gave him to understand
    that “in affairs of this kind, all notions
    of honour and dignity among States need not
    be greatly considered. I want peace,” said he,
    “nothing but peace, and I see no way of preserving
    it but by soldering up this affair as soon as
    possible.” The discussion then turned upon the
    military means which were available for the coercion
    of the Pasha. “Naval measures,” Louis Philippe
    declared, “would prove insufficient; bayonets were [Pg 251]needed, and we (England?) had no bayonets to employ.”[509]


The very high estimate which had been formed
    in France of the power of Mehemet Ali was
    the chief reason of the attitude which her government
    now proceeded to adopt. Palmerston, on
    the other hand, had no share in the illusions which
    were very generally entertained as to the strength
    of the Pasha. Nor had the battle of Nezib caused
    him to alter his views. Yet neither Sir Robert
    Stopford,[510] the admiral of the Mediterranean squadron,
    nor Colonel Campbell, the British consul-general
    at Alexandria, agreed with him. Both were convinced
    that the expulsion of Ibrahim from Syria
    would prove a most difficult undertaking, and Campbell
    was to owe his recall to his strongly expressed
    opinion upon this point.[511] Palmerston appears to
    have placed the greatest faith in General Chrzanowski,
    the Pole, who for the past three years had been
    attached to the British embassy at Constantinople.
    This officer had made a careful study of the brief
    campaign which had terminated at Nezib, and was
    not prepared to admit that Ibrahim’s victory was due
    to the superiority of the Egyptian army over that
    of the Turks.[512] The result, he considered, would have
    been very different had Hafiz Pasha elected to follow
    the advice of Moltke, instead of listening to the
    foolish talk of the Mullahs, who ranked as lieutenant-generals,
    and were present in large numbers at his
    headquarters.[513] On the morning of June 24, when the [Pg 252]battle had only lasted an hour, no less than twelve
    Egyptian battalions fled from the field, whilst three
    others deserted in a body to the Turks. The
    panic, which set in shortly afterwards among the
    troops of Hafiz Pasha, was caused by a change of
    position on the part of a brigade of their own cavalry.
    It was significant that, although the battle had
    consisted only of an artillery duel, and although the
    Egyptian infantry had never been really engaged,
    Ibrahim had not ventured to pursue. The report of
    General Jochmus,[514] a Hanoverian who had served
    upon the staff of the British legion in Spain, and who
    was now in the pay of the Foreign Office, pointed
    to the same conclusions. Chrzanowski, moreover, was
    convinced that Ibrahim would be unable to keep up
    his communications with Egypt, were he to be
    deprived of the command of the sea. A corps of
    15,000 Turkish troops acting in combination with
    the disaffected tribes, and supported by the British
    fleet, would, he believed, suffice to compel him to
    evacuate Syria.[515]


Whilst symptoms of disagreement between the
    French and English governments were beginning to
    appear, Russia made an unexpected move. Shortly
    after the arrival at St. Petersburg of a despatch from
    Count Medem, in which he reported that Marshal
    Soult had declared to him that France would never
    consent to apply coercion to the Pasha, Baron
    Brunnow, the Russian minister at Stuttgart, was sent
    upon a special mission to London. “It would not be
    possible,” Nesselrode informed Clanricarde, “for the
    Emperor to have chosen any person more thoroughly
    acquainted with the foreign affairs and policy of Russia [Pg 253]than the Baron.”[516] The proposals, which upon his
    arrival in London, on September 15, Brunnow was
    empowered to make, filled Lord Palmerston with
    astonishment. The Imperial Cabinet, he was instructed
    to declare, agreed with the English government
    in thinking that alone the hereditary pashalic of Egypt
    should be conferred upon Mehemet Ali, who must be
    made to restore to the Sultan Arabia, Syria and Crete.
    The Emperor was ready to enter into a treaty to
    enforce these measures upon the Pasha, and he, therefore,
    suggested that such military operations as might
    be necessary in Syria or in Egypt should be undertaken
    by Great Britain, France and Austria, whilst, in the
    event of Ibrahim advancing to the Bosphorus, the
    defence of Constantinople should devolve upon Russia.
    It was, however, to be clearly understood that any
    assistance which Russia might afford would be given,
    not by reason of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, but in
    virtue of engagements about to be contracted between
    the Powers of Europe and the Sultan. Furthermore,
    the Emperor was ready to adopt the view of the
    British government and to consider “as a permanent
    principle and standing rule,” that the Bosphorus and
    the Dardanelles should be closed to the war ships of all
    nations. Lastly, Baron Brunnow was authorized to
    promise that, if Russia and England should come to an
    understanding on these matters, the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi
    would not be renewed.[517]


The Tsar’s sudden determination to abandon those
    advantages, which he was supposed to have acquired
    by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, has always been
    ascribed to his desire to separate France and England.
    Without doubt, this consideration entered largely into
    his calculations. But he was also annoyed with [Pg 254]Metternich and was anxious to thwart his plan of
    establishing the seat of the negotiations at Vienna.
    Moreover, it was now realized that Orloff’s treaty was
    a document of no practical value. Russia, by reason
    alone of her geographical position, could never be
    prevented from exercising her influence over the
    counsels of the Porte. Nor could the stipulation that
    the Sultan must close the Dardanelles at the demand
    of Russia be of any real utility, seeing that the
    maritime Powers had refused to accept this condition,
    and that Turkey would be unable to carry out her
    engagements in the face of their opposition. In a
    general way the doctrine that a weak State makes an
    excellent neighbour might be sound, but it was plainly
    inapplicable to Turkey—the custodian of straits so
    vitally important to Russia as the Bosphorus and the
    Dardanelles. Under these circumstances, there was
    much to be gained by waiving the purely illusory
    advantage to be derived from the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi,
    and by agreeing that the closure of the straits
    to the warships of the Powers should be declared a law
    of nations.[518] Brunnow made no secret of the fact that
    his Imperial master would be only too pleased, were
    France to refuse to accede to his proposals. His desire
    was soon gratified. When the project was communicated
    to it by Lord Palmerston, the French government
    flatly declined to entertain it. The Russian overture,
    wrote Marshal Soult, was clearly a device for separating
    France and England, and it was with “feelings of
    painful astonishment” that he perceived “a man of
    such enlightened judgment as Lord Palmerston entertain
    it with so much complacency.” Russia, he
    proceeded, had betrayed her real intentions by insisting
    that she alone should undertake the defence of
    Constantinople. If her motives were such as she [Pg 255]pretended, why this repugnance to the idea of “the
    flags of the allied Courts floating side by side with her
    own” in the Bosphorus? “Never,” he concluded,
    “with our consent shall a foreign squadron of war
    appear before Constantinople, unless ours appears there
    also.”[519] Whilst he thus declined absolutely to consider
    Baron Brunnow’s propositions, Marshal Soult put
    forward a plan for the settlement of the questions in
    dispute between the Porte and Mehemet Ali. But
    the solution of the difficulty, suggested by the French
    government, when it came to be examined, was found
    to amount to little more than an arrangement whereby
    the Pasha was to obtain the hereditary tenure of
    Arabia, Syria and Egypt, in return for which he was
    to restore to the Sultan the district of Adana.[520]


In Palmerston’s opinion the entry of a Russian
    fleet into the Bosphorus, or of a Russian army into
    Asia Minor, at the demand of the Powers, was a very
    different proceeding to an intervention in virtue of a
    separate engagement between the Porte and the Cabinet
    of St. Petersburg. Had the decision rested with him
    alone he would gladly have accepted the Russian
    proposal. But both it and Marshal Soult’s despatch
    had to be considered by the Cabinet, some of the
    members of which held opinions very opposed to his
    own. Lord Holland and several of his colleagues—“our
    Whig friends”[521] as Lord Palmerston called them—were
    either completely indifferent to the Imperial
    aspect of the question, or regarded it as a minor
    consideration. In their eyes the point at issue was
    simply whether England should break with Liberal
    France, in order to enter into a compact with autocratic
    Russia. The French party in the Cabinet
    gained the upper hand and Palmerston had to agree to [Pg 256]certain concessions. He had already consented, in
    deference to the wishes of France and Austria, to allow
    his demand for the restoration by Mehemet Ali of the
    Turkish fleet to be merged in the larger question of the
    territorial settlement, and he was now obliged to
    inform Sébastiani that the English government would
    be prepared to see, in addition to that of Egypt, the
    hereditary tenure of the province of Acre, exclusive of
    the fortress, conferred upon the Pasha. At the same
    time Baron Brunnow was to be told that Her Majesty’s
    government was ready to adopt the whole arrangement
    which he had proposed, with the exception of one single
    point—should it be necessary for a Russian force to
    enter the Bosphorus, a British force must enter the
    Dardanelles.[522]


Brunnow had no instructions to discuss the
    question raised by the English Cabinet, and he was,
    in consequence, obliged to bring his mission to an
    unsuccessful conclusion. But he and Palmerston
    parted from each other upon most excellent terms
    and with little doubt that their negotiations were
    suspended, rather than finally broken off. The
    French government heard of the Baron’s departure
    with intense satisfaction, and, a few days later, on
    October 15, Sébastiani communicated to Lord Palmerston
    a despatch, in which Marshal Soult emphatically
    declared that the proposal to cede to Mehemet Ali the
    Pashalic of Acre was inadmissible. So trifling a concession,
    he averred, would merely drive the Pasha to seek to
    obtain by the sword the frontiers to which he considered
    himself entitled. Palmerston listened to the words of
    the ambassador in silence, and when he had concluded
    his statement, informed him that the offer regarding
    Acre must now be considered as definitely withdrawn.[523]


 [Pg 257]


It was significant of the divergent courses upon
    which the two governments were embarked that,
    almost at the same time, Admiral Roussin was
    recalled from Constantinople, and Colonel Campbell
    from Alexandria—the Frenchman because of his
    hostility to,[524] and the Englishman because of his
    sympathy with, Mehemet Ali.[525] For several weeks
    after Brunnow’s departure from London, the situation
    remained unchanged. Palmerston was content to
    wait in the confident expectation that Nicholas
    would not refuse to accede to the British proposal.
    The Soult Cabinet, convinced that no agreement
    between England and Russia on the question of the
    Dardanelles was to be apprehended, was equally
    satisfied to remain inactive. “In the French
    councils,” reported Bulwer, “there is a mixture of
    positiveness and of vagueness—positiveness as to
    what will not be done, vagueness as to what may
    be done.”[526]


Early in December Sébastiani transmitted to his
    government the information, which he had received
    from Palmerston, that the Emperor had agreed
    to the English conditions, and that Brunnow would
    shortly return to London to negotiate a convention.
    This news came as an unpleasant surprise to the
    French Cabinet. Under the circumstances, however,
    Soult could only express satisfaction at this most
    unexpected concession, which, he admitted, completely
    altered the character of the Russian proposals. But,
    at the same time, he cast the gravest doubts upon the
    good faith of the Imperial Cabinet, and reiterated his
    conviction that its real object was to effect a breach
    in French and English relations.[527] In due course [Pg 258]Brunnow arrived in London, and in a note written
    at Holland House, on January 5, 1840, Palmerston
    made Sébastiani acquainted with the result of his
    first deliberations with the Russian envoy. “Brunnow,”he informed him, “is empowered to negotiate
    with the object of bringing about a permanent
    and definite solution of the Turkish and Egyptian
    question, in order to ensure the independence and
    integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Baron Neumann
    has arrived from Vienna and has expressed to us
    that Austria is entirely with us and Russia in this
    important affair. I think I can say for certain
    that Prussia will look at matters in the same light.
    It only remains for us, therefore, to secure a European
    accord on a question which is incontestably the
    most important that we have had to deal with these
    last years. We sincerely hope that the co-operation
    of France will not be refused. . . .”[528]


Louis Philippe and his ministers were convinced,
    however, that, when the Powers came to consider
    the measures which would be required for expelling
    the Pasha from the territories which he occupied,
    they would soon discover the magnitude of the
    task upon which they purposed to embark. Harsh
    conditions, they were confident, would never be
    imposed upon him, once it was realized that their
    enforcement would entail the invasion of Syria by a
    large Russian army. They were, in consequence, not
    apprehensive, although fully informed that negotiations
    were in progress, that any definite arrangement
    would be concluded without their participation.
    Nevertheless, on January 27, 1840, Sébastiani[529] reported that Palmerston had replied in the affirmative
    to Neumann’s official inquiry as to whether, in the [Pg 259]event of the four Powers arriving at an agreement,
    and France withholding her consent, the clauses
    of the treaty would be acted upon in spite of her
    abstention. But, on the following day, the ambassador
    informed his government that the English
    Cabinet had decided that the Porte must be a party
    to any convention which might be concluded, and
    that the negotiations would, in consequence, be
    suspended until the arrival of the Turkish plenipotentiary.
    This was the last news of any importance
    transmitted by Sébastiani. Soult and his colleagues,
    in order to propitiate the Doctrinaires, whose support
    was essential to their parliamentary existence, had
    insisted upon his recall and upon the appointment
    of M. Guizot to the embassy in London.[530]


Although he had studied English constitutional
    history so deeply, Guizot had never visited England,
    and, moreover, he had not before been engaged upon
    a diplomatic mission. He had, however, formed a
    friendship with Princess Lieven, who was well
    acquainted with most of the chief statesmen and
    members of the corps diplomatique of the time, and
    who, besides, had been a leader of English society.
    After her husband’s recall from London,[531] the Princess
    quickly tired of St. Petersburg, and, upon the plea
    of ill-health, took up her abode in Paris. At Talleyrand’s
    death in 1838, she moved into an apartment
    in his famous house in the Rue Saint-Florentin, where
    her salon soon acquired a European celebrity. Her
    friendship with Guizot, which was to endure to the
    day of her death, is said to have begun, in 1837, at
    Chatenay, Madame de Boigne’s house, near Paris.
    The Princess was at the time fifty-three years of age,
    whilst the grave Doctrinaire was three years her
    junior.[532]


 [Pg 260]


Guizot arrived in London on February 28, and, on
    the following day in Paris, the Soult Cabinet
    was defeated and resigned. The King was, in
    consequence, reluctantly compelled to commission
    M. Thiers to form a government. Thiers, who
    himself assumed the direction of Foreign Affairs,
    was probably honestly desirous of maintaining a
    good understanding with England. But he was a
    convinced believer in the military strength of
    Mehemet Ali, and was determined to uphold his claim
    to the hereditary tenure of Syria. In his opinion, the collective note of July 27, 1839, was the cause of all
    the difficulty; it was “the rut in which the coach had
    stuck.”[533] But, although he was secretly resolved
    to escape from the obligations which his predecessors
    had contracted, he was not prepared openly to
    repudiate them. On the contrary, he admitted
    readily that he was bound to refrain from attempting
    to arrange matters between the Porte and Mehemet
    Ali, except in co-operation with the other signatory
    Powers. Should, however, the Sultan spontaneously
    agree to terms acceptable to the Pasha, the Powers
    could hardly interfere to prevent a settlement which
    the Porte itself pronounced satisfactory.[534] If such a
    result could be brought about, the collective note would become a dead letter, and France would regain
    her full liberty of action. Moreover, Mehemet Ali
    would attain the object of his ambition in a large
    measure owing to the goodwill of the French government.


Soult had instructed Guizot to declare that France
    was sincerely anxious to establish a permanent and
    lasting peace in the East. But to attain the desired [Pg 261]result, she was convinced that Mehemet Ali must, at
    least, be given the hereditary tenure of Syria and
    Egypt. He was to impress upon Palmerston that the
    real object of the “trifling concessions,” which Brunnow
    had been empowered to make, was to obtain the signature
    of England to some agreement to which France
    would refuse to adhere.[535] Thiers, in his first despatch,
    expressed his approval of these instructions, and of the
    language which M. Guizot had employed in carrying
    them out. He directed him to persevere with his
    arguments and constantly to impress upon the British
    government that France had no “parti pris,” no
    “système irrévocable,” nor was she bound by either
    promises or engagements to the Pasha. Her sole
    desire was to contribute to the establishment of peace
    upon a firm and durable foundation. The coercion of
    Mehemet Ali would demand a vast expenditure of
    military strength, and Lord Palmerston would, doubtless,
    agree that the armed intervention of Russia would
    greatly menace the independent existence of the
    Ottoman Empire.[536] Thiers, whose judgment on this,
    as on many other occasions, was greatly influenced by
    his hopes, was persuaded that the decision to call in a
    Turkish plenipotentiary, and the delay which it entailed,
    signified that the plans of Palmerston and Brunnow
    had encountered some serious obstacle. But the
    longer the negotiations could be drawn out, the better
    he would be pleased. Whilst matters were drifting to
    a deadlock in London, his agents, he trusted, would be
    enabled quietly to effect some definite arrangement at
    Constantinople or at Cairo.[537]


Guizot in his Mémoires has described at length his [Pg 262]proceedings in London. As he himself admits, he
    entertained an exaggerated belief in the strength of
    Mehemet Ali.[538] But, on the other hand, he had not
    Thiers’ serene confidence that England would never
    conclude an agreement for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian
    question without the co-operation of France.
    On March 12, when relating a conversation he had had
    with Lord Palmerston in one of the drawing-rooms at
    Stafford House, he expressed the opinion “that the
    British government regarded the present moment as a
    favourable opportunity for settling affairs in the East,
    and that a sudden resolve might be taken to act without
    us.” Again, a few days later, he sent M. Thiers a
    warning couched in more emphatic language. Full
    powers to conclude a convention, Lord Palmerston
    informed him, had been transmitted to Nourri-Effendi,
    the Turkish ambassador in Paris, who would shortly
    arrive in London. “It is possible, therefore, that we
    may be on the eve of important decisions. . . . The
    British government has two interests at stake in the
    eastern question—the wish to keep Russia from Constantinople
    and the fear of French influence in Egypt.
    . . . The present moment is looked upon as favourable
    for the attainment of these objects. By a singular
    combination of circumstances, Russia is both prepared
    to abandon her pretensions to exercise an exclusive
    protectorship over the Ottoman Empire, and to assist
    England to weaken the Pasha of Egypt. . . . Great
    Britain, consequently, is far from regarding the present
    situation as embarrassing, but on the contrary deems
    it a most fortunate development which she must make
    use of to the best advantage. . . . She is aware, however,
    that in prosecuting this policy she may impair
    her good understanding with France. To retain our
    friendship she will make some concessions, but I am
    disposed to think that she has no intention of allowing [Pg 263]the present opportunity of attaining her ends in the
    East to escape.”[539]


Matters, nevertheless, proceeded very slowly. Nor
    was the situation altered by the arrival, early in
    April, of Nourri-Effendi. The Porte in sending him to
    London only desired to make manifest its intention of
    conferring with its allies. When the deliberations
    should begin in earnest, it purposed to be represented
    by Chekib-Effendi, who had been appointed Ottoman
    ambassador at the Court of St. James’, and another
    month must elapse before he could reach England.
    Guizot, however, reported that he perceived a strong
    tendency upon the part of both Austria and Prussia to
    draw closer to France. Bülow had asked him in
    confidence whether the concession to Mehemet Ali of
    the governorship of Syria for his life would meet with
    the approval of his government. Neumann had also
    talked to him in the same strain. But Thiers was
    little disposed to accept any compromise. These overtures,
    in his opinion, were symptoms that the Powers
    were beginning to realize that they were in a false
    position. Before long, he was certain, they would
    adopt the French view of the question in its entirety.
    Until some agreement should be arrived at with
    England, he recommended that Guizot should abstain,
    as far as possible, from any discussions with the
    ministers of the Northern Courts.[540] Nor was Palmerston’s
    suggestion admissible that the Turco-Egyptian
    difficulty should be submitted to a conference of the
    Powers. Under existing conditions, “the differences
    between France and her allies were too marked to
    permit of any general deliberation conducing to a
    satisfactory result.”


 [Pg 264]


In the month of March, Palmerston’s brother, Sir
    William Temple, the British minister at Naples, had
    been instructed to insist upon the immediate execution
    of the King’s promise to abolish the sulphur monopoly
    and to ask for an indemnity on behalf of the English
    merchants who had suffered by its imposition. Upon
    King Ferdinand’s refusal to comply with this demand,
    Admiral Sir Robert Stopford was directed to blockade
    the coast and to seize and send to Malta such Neapolitan
    merchant vessels as he could capture. Thiers, having
    ascertained that his offer would be acceptable to both
    parties, proposed to mediate in the dispute. He was
    glad of the opportunity, which was thus afforded him,
    of displaying both that France and England were still
    upon excellent terms and of extending French influence
    in Italy. Thiers’ mediation was successful. The
    Neapolitan Court conceded the British demands, and,
    early in July in consequence, the blockading squadron
    was free to carry out Palmerston’s policy in another
    direction. Soon after it had accepted his offer to settle
    the sulphur dispute, Thiers made a second proposal to
    the English government. In this instance he was
    probably desirous simply of acquiring popularity at
    home.[541] On May 10, Guizot formally asked that the
    remains of Napoleon might be handed over to a deputation
    of officers and conveyed back to France, on board
    a French warship, for interment in Paris. Palmerston
    made no difficulty about immediately complying with
    this request.


The extraordinary confidence of both Louis
    Philippe and of M. Thiers that, under no circumstances,
    would Great Britain separate herself from
    France in the eastern question[542] reposed upon their
    joint conviction that Palmerston’s colleagues in the
    government would never allow him to disturb the [Pg 265]harmony of French and English relations. Mr.
    Ellice,[543] the brother-in-law of Lord Grey, and a former
    Cabinet minister, was largely responsible for
    encouraging this erroneous belief, which was to bring
    the two countries to the verge of war. Since about
    the year 1835, “Bear Ellice,” as he was generally
    known, by reason of his connection with the Canadian
    fur trade, had been much in Paris. Although he
    appears to have disliked the responsibilities of office,
    he was keenly interested in public affairs and was an
    inveterate political gossip. Grey, who was well
    aware of his brother-in-law’s vanity and peculiarities,
    nicknamed him le grand faiseur. In Paris he
    frequented Princess Lieven’s salon, where he was
    consulted and listened to with a deference which he
    enjoyed exceedingly.[544] Not only was he very intimate
    with M. Thiers, but, according to Creevey,[545] “Louis
    Philippe could scarcely bear to have him out of his
    sight.” “I hear,” wrote Palmerston at a most critical
    time, “that Thiers says he has three agents upon
    whom he can rely—Guizot, Flahaut[546] and Ellice.”[547]


Guizot had quickly discovered that the Cabinet
    was not united upon the eastern question. At
    Holland House, where he was a constant guest,
    neither his host nor hostess concealed from him their
    antagonism to Palmerston. Clarendon, notwithstanding
    the insight into Louis Philippe’s diplomacy which
    he had acquired at Madrid, was a declared opponent of
    any solution of the Turco-Egyptian difficulty which
    might endanger the French alliance. Charles Greville, [Pg 266]with whom Guizot appears to have become very
    friendly, had no scruples about informing him of any
    dissensions in ministerial circles. The vindictive clerk
    of the council detested Palmerston and distrusted his
    policy. Dedel, the Dutch minister, in talking over
    these events a year or two later with the Duchesse de
    Dino,[548] expressed the opinion that Guizot’s great mistake
    lay in imagining that intrigue played as large a part in
    public affairs in London as in Paris. Palmerston, he
    told her, had proofs of his proceedings, which would
    have justified him in demanding his recall. This last
    statement is probably somewhat exaggerated. Guizot,
    however, whatever he may have done, appears to
    have judged the situation with great discernment.
    “Not to mention Lords Holland and Clarendon,”he wrote to Thiers on June 1, “Melbourne and
    Lansdowne would be very loath to see the French
    alliance dissolved. . . Yet Palmerston, I believe, is as
    firm as ever, and I am far from certain whether
    those of his colleagues who disagree with him would
    stand up to him very firmly, when it comes to the
    point.”[549]


The overtures which Bülow and Neumann had
    made to Guizot were followed by a definite proposal
    from Austria. Metternich was alarmed. He believed
    that Palmerston had formed a totally erroneous
    opinion of the military situation. He was certain
    that naval assistance alone would not enable the
    Turks to regain possession of Syria. He had no
    intention of allowing Austrian troops to be employed
    in the East, and Russia had recently sustained reverses
    in the Caucasus which might make it difficult for her
    to send an imposing force into Asia Minor. Great
    Britain was engaged upon warlike operations in
    Afghanistan, and was, besides, threatened with trouble [Pg 267]in China and Canada. It would be, therefore, an
    arduous undertaking to attempt to coerce the Pasha
    without the co-operation of France. To obtain her
    assistance, he suggested that Syria should be divided
    into two portions. The southern half, including the
    fortress of Acre, might, he proposed, be given to
    Mehemet Ali. But, should the French government be
    not satisfied with this concession, Austria would agree
    to enforce these conditions upon the Pasha in combination
    with England and Russia and without the
    participation of France.[550]


Palmerston reluctantly decided to agree to the
    Austrian proposal and, on May 8, officially informed
    Guizot that the British government adhered to it.
    But this concession only served to strengthen Thiers’
    belief that the Powers would before long adopt his
    views completely. Chekib-Effendi had not yet arrived,
    and there was, therefore, no necessity for returning an
    immediate answer. Even when the Turkish plenipotentiary
    reached London, Palmerston appeared to be
    in no hurry to resume the negotiations. On the other
    hand, Guizot was inclined to think that the representatives
    of the other Powers were growing restless.
    Even Brunnow seemed disposed to adopt a more
    conciliatory attitude, and there appeared to be a
    growing feeling that no settlement could be concluded
    without the assent of France. Thiers’ answer to the
    Austrian plan of partitioning Syria could not, however,
    be indefinitely postponed, and, on June 16, he directed
    Guizot to tell Lord Palmerston that he could not
    entertain it. “We could not,” he wrote, “suggest it
    to Mehemet Ali; he would refuse it, and we could not
    refute his arguments which we should ourselves
    consider to be sound and well founded.” He was
    greatly struck by the account which Guizot had sent
    him of Brunnow’s attitude, “which could only be [Pg 268]ascribed to disasters in Circassia. It was clear that
    Russia was not ready to embark upon serious operations
    elsewhere.”[551]


When Thiers thus declined to consider the
    Austrian proposal, he believed that his hopes of
    bringing about secretly a direct arrangement between
    the Sultan and the Pasha were about to be realized.
    Mehemet Ali had been unable wholly to conceal his
    disappointment on learning of the collective note of
    July 27, 1839. When it was officially communicated
    to him by the consuls of the Powers, he declared
    firmly that there could be no peace until the hereditary
    tenure of Syria should be conferred upon him and
    until his enemy Hosrew Pasha, the Grand Vizier,
    should be dismissed from office.[552] Since then, he had
    sometimes angrily asserted that he would wait no
    longer and that he should order Ibrahim to march
    upon Constantinople, whilst, on other occasions, he
    had shown a disposition to adopt a more conciliatory
    attitude. Throughout the winter and the spring he
    pressed on his military preparations. Some of these,
    however, proved very unsuccessful—an attempt to
    form a national guard in Egypt itself breaking down
    completely.[553] At the same time he appears to have
    experienced great difficulty in keeping Ibrahim’s army
    in Syria supplied with money, food, and clothing,[554] whilst, to add to his embarrassments, in the spring, the
    Druses and other tribes began to display renewed
    symptoms of disaffection.[555] Palmerston, now that he [Pg 269]no longer feared the separate intervention of Russia,
    would probably have been well pleased could the
    Pasha have been provoked into some act of aggression
    against the Sultan. But he was too sagacious to be
    moved from his attitude of prudent inaction by the
    threatening language of Campbell’s successor, Colonel
    Hodges, which, however, caused some alarm at Vienna
    and at St. Petersburg, where neither Metternich nor
    Nesselrode entertained Palmerston’s contemptuous
    disbelief in the military power of Mehemet Ali.[556] M.
    Thiers seems to have been wilfully blind to the difficulties
    of the Pasha’s position, and to have persuaded
    himself that it was from respect to the wishes of the
    French government that Ibrahim abstained from
    advancing into Asia Minor.


M. Cochelet, the French consul-general, was
    probably instructed[557] to urge Mehemet Ali to refrain
    from hostilities, to limit his demands to the hereditary
    tenure of Syria and Egypt and, generally, to depend
    upon the good offices of France for the attainment of his
    wishes. M. Thiers, however, was well aware that his
    plan of bringing about a direct arrangement between
    the Sultan and the Pasha would encounter far more
    serious difficulties at Constantinople than at Cairo.
    Ever since the arrival of M. de Pontois, the successor
    of Admiral Roussin, Ponsonby had constantly reported
    that the French minister was endeavouring to persuade
    the Porte to conclude a peace with Mehemet Ali, without
    reference to the Powers.[558] But the advice of M. de
    Pontois had hitherto been disregarded. Hosrew,
    Reshid, and Halil Pasha, the most influential of the [Pg 270]Turkish ministers, were very hostile to Mehemet Ali
    and firm supporters of the British policy. Soon after
    his accession to office, Thiers appears to have decided to
    supplement the efforts of the recognized representative
    of the French government by those of an unofficial
    agent. At the beginning of May, a correspondence was
    opened between M. Jacques Coste[559] and Fethi Ahmed
    Pasha, the Minister of Commerce and brother-in-law to
    the young Sultan. Under ordinary circumstances
    there would be nothing to excite attention in the fact
    that a prominent French journalist should write on
    political matters to a Turkish statesman, whom he
    had known as Ottoman ambassador in Paris. But
    the close intimacy which notoriously existed between
    M. Coste and M. Thiers gives importance to this
    particular correspondence. Certainly both Palmerston
    and Ponsonby and, indeed, Ahmed Pasha himself, who
    delivered the original letters into the hands of the
    British ambassador, appear to have been satisfied that
    the sentiments and advice contained in them emanated
    from M. Thiers.[560]


The primary object which M. Coste had in view
    was to persuade Fethi Ahmed Pasha that it was essential
    for the Porte promptly to conclude a peace with
    Mehemet Ali. All the powers, he contended, were
    pursuing selfish ends with the sole exception of France,
    and she was both resolved not to intervene herself and
    not to allow any other Power to interfere actively in [Pg 271]the Turco-Egyptian dispute. Her hands were free and
    she was strong enough to enforce her will upon Europe.
    The perfidy of England’s policy was manifest. As in
    1839, Great Britain now proposed to incite the Porte
    to make war upon the Pasha. If she could achieve
    this object she would, of a surety, encourage Russia to
    intervene in order to crush the Egyptians, whilst at
    the same time she would insist at Vienna and in Paris
    upon the necessity of preventing the occupation of
    Constantinople by the armies of the Tsar. Should she
    be enabled to carry out her Machiavellian plan of
    bringing about a general war she purposed, in the confusion,
    quietly to lay hands upon Egypt, which she
    had long coveted for herself. He was sorry to hear
    that Chekib-Effendi, when passing through Paris, had
    declared to M. Thiers that it would be better that
    England should take Egypt, than that it should continue
    in the possession of a rebellious vassal of the
    Sultan. Such reasoning was deplorably unsound.
    “That which England takes she keeps,” whereas, in
    the future, it should be an easy task for the Sultan to
    compel the descendants of Mehemet Ali to give back
    the territories which must now be surrendered temporarily.
    Writing on June 8, M. Coste suggested, as a
    compromise, that Syria might be given to Ibrahim and
    Adana to another son of the Pasha. They would
    certainly quarrel among themselves, and the Porte
    might avail itself of their dissensions for expelling
    them altogether. Let the Sultan be assured of the
    wisdom of the old saying, “diviser pour regner.”[561] This curious correspondence continued intermittently
    until the fall of M. Thiers in September. But after
    the end of June, Coste’s communications became less
    frequent and were less cordially expressed. On July 8
    he explained that the silence with which his well-meant [Pg 272]advice had been received “had placed him in an
    awkward position with M. Thiers,” whilst to Prince
    Vogoride, a son of the Prince of Samos, another of his
    correspondents, he conveyed his surprise and annoyance
    that his letters, written “en quelque sorte sous la
    dictée d’un tres haut personnage” should have elicited
    no response.[562]


Whilst the French agents at Constantinople were
    thus striving to render nugatory the provisions of the collective note, another attempt to achieve the desired
    result was being made in a different quarter. The
    Sultana Mother was believed to have been concerned
    in the secret negotiation conducted by Sarim-Effendi,[563] under the patronage of Admiral Roussin and M.
    Mimaut, during M. Thiers’ first administration, and
    her support was now obtained to the plan of a direct
    arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha. The
    sudden dismissal, on May 19, of Hosrew, the Grand-Vizier,
    was the result of her intrigues.[564] The first news
    of this event was conveyed to Mehemet Ali by M.
    Cochelet. The Pasha at once declared that the fall of
    his old enemy had removed the last obstacle to a
    satisfactory conclusion of his quarrel with the Sultan.
    He should, he announced, forthwith send back the
    Turkish fleet, and Sami Bey, his confidential secretary,
    should proceed without delay to Constantinople to
    make the necessary arrangements.[565] Nevertheless, some
    three weeks elapsed before the Pasha’s emissary started
    upon his journey, and it was only on June 13, on the
    eve of his departure, that the object of his mission was
    disclosed to Colonel Hodges and the other agents of
    the Powers.[566] But Cochelet, on May 26, duly reported [Pg 273]this new development to his government in a despatch,
    a copy of which M. Thiers transmitted to M. Guizot
    with instructions that its contents must, for the present,
    be kept strictly secret. In spite of these precautions,
    however, Cochelet’s confidential communication appears
    to have been divulged to Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador
    in Paris, who, on June 16, was enabled to inform
    Neumann in London of the negotiation which had
    been initiated between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan.[567] Meanwhile, at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby had
    discovered that a potent influence was at work to
    induce the young Sultan to surrender Syria in exchange
    for his fleet. But, encouraged by the British ambassador,
    both Reshid and Fethi Ahmed Pasha declared
    that they should resign, were any compact of that
    kind to be concluded, and their firm attitude defeated
    the insidious schemes of the Sultana Mother, and
    rendered abortive the mission of Sami Bey.[568]


M. Thiers, however, was confident that the news
    of Hosrew’s dismissal would be followed quickly by
    the intelligence that the Sultan and the Pasha had
    settled their differences amicably. This unexpected
    development would, he was convinced, place a totally
    new complexion upon the Turco-Egyptian question.
    But in point of fact, Palmerston had been informed by
    Neumann of the negotiation which was to be opened
    between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. Thus, when
    the news reached London of the mission of Sami Bey
    to Constantinople, he was fully prepared for it. Far
    from being suddenly confronted by the embarrassing
    prospect that the settlement of the affair was about to
    pass out of his control, he was, on the contrary, enabled
    to adduce the proceedings of the French agents at
    Constantinople and at Cairo, as a reason for promptly [Pg 274]concluding a treaty for the protection of the young
    Sultan from the machinations of his enemies.


Thiers’ illusions were by no means shared by
    Guizot. The ambassador divined correctly that the
    crisis of the affair was approaching. Since the rejection
    of the Austrian proposals Palmerston, he reported, had
    pointedly avoided all discussion of the eastern question
    with him. But from the moment that the news
    arrived that a direct negotiation was in progress between
    Cairo and Constantinople he had been very busy.
    This last development, moreover, had made a great
    impression upon the representatives of the Powers,
    and those of them, who had lately been inclined to
    adopt the French view of the question, were now, it
    was evident, less favourably disposed. Cabinet councils
    had been held, dissensions had arisen, and Palmerston,
    he believed, had threatened to resign. It was probable,
    he considered, that Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and
    Prussia would agree to some form of joint action in
    the East, and that France would be formally asked
    whether or not she would participate in whatever
    measures they might resolve to adopt.[569] This idea
    that no treaty would be actually concluded until
    France should have been invited to adhere to it, was
    the one point upon which M. Guizot may be held to
    have misled M. Thiers. Princess Lieven, who was
    staying at Stafford House, is said to have encouraged
    his delusion. She appears to have tried to extract
    from Bülow, the Prussian minister, some information
    about the progress of the negotiations. Her enquiries,
    however, only elicited from him the fact that he was
    still without the new letters of credence which the
    recent death of Frederick William III. had rendered
    necessary. From this circumstance Guizot seems to
    have inferred that there was no immediate danger of
    the conclusion of a treaty between the four Powers, [Pg 275]inasmuch as Bülow had not yet been officially accredited
    to the Court of St. James’.[570]


As Guizot had correctly surmised, Palmerston experienced
    the greatest difficulty in inducing his
    colleagues to adopt his views. Both Holland and
    Clarendon strongly deprecated the conclusion of any
    treaty to which France would not be a party, and
    Melbourne and Lansdowne seemed disposed to agree
    with them. Palmerston, thereupon, placed his resignation
    in the hands of the Prime Minister.[571] In a long
    letter, on July 5, in which he recapitulated the whole
    history of the Turco-Egyptian question, he explained
    the reasons which made it impossible for him to remain
    at his post. Were Great Britain to elude the engagements
    which she had contracted towards the Sultan,
    because France was not prepared to co-operate with
    the other signatory Powers, Russia would resume once
    more “her separate and isolated position” towards
    Turkey. England, he contended, would thus by her
    own deliberate act, re-establish that protectorship of
    Russia over Turkey, which had for so long been a
    cause of apprehension to other Powers. “The ultimate
    results of such a decision would be the practical division
    of the Ottoman Empire into two separate and independent
    States, whereof one would be a dependency
    of France and the other a satellite of Russia.” Never
    would he consent to be an instrument for the execution
    of a policy which, he believed, must entail disastrous
    consequences upon his country. Unless, therefore, his
    colleagues were prepared to pursue the course which
    he advocated he must retire, even though his resignation
    should lead to a break up of the government.[572]


 [Pg 276]


The most recent intelligence from the East had, moreover,
    supplied Palmerston with an argument which
    had a great effect in overcoming the resistance of his
    opponents in the Cabinet. A formidable insurrection
    was reported to have broken out in Syria, where the
    tribes were in open rebellion against Mehemet Ali.
    He could, therefore, contend that the treaty, which he
    urged his colleagues to conclude with Russia, Austria
    and Prussia, was a Liberal measure, inasmuch as it
    meant the delivery of an oppressed people from a
    tyrannical ruler. This last consideration, combined
    with the desire to avoid the crisis which must result
    from the resignation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
    induced the dissenting members of the Cabinet reluctantly
    to assent to Palmerston’s proposals.[573] Accordingly,
    on July 15, “a convention for the pacification
    of the Levant” was signed by the plenipotentiaries of
    Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, on the one
    side, and that of the Sublime Porte on the other. In
    view of the expediency of speedily affording military
    succour to the Syrians, it appears to have been agreed
    that Bülow should be considered as empowered to act
    on behalf of his Court.


By the convention which was thus concluded the
    four Powers undertook actively to assist the Sultan
    to reduce the Pasha to submission—Austria and Great
    Britain engaging to intercept all communication by
    sea between Egypt and Syria. To this instrument
    was annexed a Separate Act in which were laid down
    the terms which the Porte purposed to offer to
    Mehemet Ali. The hereditary tenure of Egypt was
    to be conferred upon him together with the governorship
    for life of the greater part of the pashalic of
    Acre. But, if he should not accede to these conditions [Pg 277]within a space of ten days, the offer of Acre would be
    withdrawn. A further delay of ten days would,
    however, be accorded him in which to consider the
    second proposal which would be limited to the
    hereditary pashalic of Egypt. If, after the specified
    term had elapsed, he should still refuse to accept the
    proffered conditions, the Sultan would be free to bring
    the negotiations to a conclusion and “to follow such
    ulterior course as his own interests and the counsels
    of his allies might suggest to him.” In a third
    document, known as The Reserved Protocol, it was laid
    down that, inasmuch as “the state of affairs in Syria,
    the interests of humanity and grave considerations
    of European policy” made it desirable that active
    operations should begin with as little delay as possible,
    the naval measures to which Austria and Great Britain
    were pledged would be initiated at once, without waiting
    for the ratification of the convention.[574]


The decision of the four Powers to conclude this
    treaty had not been communicated to M. Guizot.
    French historians have adduced the secrecy which was
    observed as a proof of Palmerston’s malevolent intentions
    towards France. But no other course could
    have been pursued with safety. It was certain that
    France would not take part in coercing the Pasha,[575] and it was no less certain that she would warn him
    of the measures which the allies were proposing to
    adopt against him.[576] Inasmuch, therefore, as it was
    advisable that the naval commander in the Mediterranean
    should receive his orders before Mehemet Ali
    could be aware of the nature of the pressure which was
    to be brought to bear upon him, it was impossible to
    acquaint M. Guizot with the resolution of the Powers. [Pg 278]Nor was the expediency of enabling the British fleet
    to forestall any hostile move on the part of the
    Pasha the only reason which made secrecy desirable.
    Although Palmerston was not apprehensive that the
    French government would proceed to extremities, it
    was possible that M. Thiers might decide actively to
    support the Pasha. In that case war could not be
    avoided and it was very necessary that Sir Robert
    Stopford should receive the earliest information of
    the intentions of his government. No communication,
    accordingly, was made to the French ambassador until
    the couriers from London had obtained a start of forty-eight
    hours. But, on July 17, Palmerston invited
    M. Guizot to call at the Foreign Office, where he read
    out to him a memorandum acquainting him with the
    convention which had been concluded. The numerous
    efforts which had been made to induce France to
    co-operate with the other Powers were insisted upon,
    and great regret was expressed that she had not seen
    fit to comply with the several proposals which had
    been communicated to her. Palmerston then proceeded
    to explain the general nature of the measures
    of coercion which it was intended to apply to Mehemet
    Ali, without, however, supplying the ambassador with
    a copy of the treaty. Guizot, after disputing the
    accuracy of certain statements contained in the memorandum, took his departure. The situation was
    so grave that he must receive instructions from his
    government before he could discuss it.[577]




 [Pg 279]


 CHAPTER VIII


THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE


Henry Bulwer,[578] who during the absence of Lord
    Granville from Paris was in charge of the embassy,
    was agreeably surprised at the calmness with which
    M. Thiers received the news of the conclusion of the
    treaty. At their first interview, after the arrival of
    Guizot’s despatch, he contented himself with expressing
    a pained astonishment that England should have
    treated her ally with so little consideration. The
    affair would, he feared, arouse the greatest indignation
    throughout the country and, for the present, he must
    beg him to observe the strictest secrecy about it.[579] A
    few days later, in the course of a long and confidential
    conversation with Louis Philippe, Bulwer was enabled
    to judge of the King’s opinion of the situation.
    Adopting the contention, which Thiers was instructing
    Guizot to urge in his conferences with Palmerston,
    that no definite proposals for settling the eastern
    question had ever been made to the French government,
    Louis Philippe complained of the secret manner
    in which the treaty had been negotiated. “Ah, Mr.
    Bulwer,” said he, “I know you wished to read me
    a lesson, I know it, but it may be a perilous one for
    all parties.” Assuming a more confidential tone, the
    King then proceeded to explain the difficulties by [Pg 280]which he might be confronted. It would not be easy,
    he feared or affected to fear, to maintain peace.
    Thiers, he had reason to believe, would wish him to go
    to war, and in that case he might be placed in a very
    delicate position. “How do you think I should
    stand,” he asked plaintively, “were Thiers at the
    head of a large parliamentary party to announce that
    he had resigned, sooner than submit to the dishonour
    of France?” It was to be hoped that the coercion
    which the four Powers proposed to apply to Mehemet
    Ali would either at once prove effectual, or fail
    completely and be promptly abandoned. The sooner
    the affair could be settled the better. For his part,
    only this was a circumstance which Bulwer must never
    disclose to M. Thiers, he had taken steps to induce the
    Pasha to refrain from ordering Ibrahim to pass the
    Taurus mountains.[580] On August 3, before leaving
    Paris for the Château d’Eu, Louis Philippe discussed
    the situation in the same spirit with Lord
    Granville.[581]


The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was
    announced in London on the 25th, and two days later,
    the news was published in the Paris papers. The
    expectation of the King and of M. Thiers that it
    would arouse a dangerous excitement was fully
    realized. The bourse was panic-stricken and securities
    fell heavily. The Chambers were not sitting, but the
    press with one accord gave voice to the popular
    indignation. The decision of the four Powers to adopt,
    without consultation with France, hostile measures
    against her protégé Mehemet Ali, was denounced as a
    national insult which must be wiped out in blood.
    The tone of the Constitutionel, which was notoriously
    inspired by the President of the Council, was nearly [Pg 281]as bellicose as that of the National, the organ of the
    republican and military party. M. Thiers, if he did
    not actually encourage, certainly did nothing to allay,
    the excitement, which was increased, on August 1, by
    the publication of a Royal ordinance decreeing substantial
    additions to both the army and the navy.


In London the affair only began to attract much
    public interest, when the extent of the resentment
    which it had aroused in Paris became known. The
    High Tories, who had always disliked the French
    alliance, were delighted to think that that combination
    was at an end. The more moderate members of
    the party, however, who followed the leadership of
    Wellington, Peel and Aberdeen, whilst agreeing as to
    the necessity of driving Mehemet Ali from Syria,
    regretted that means had not been found of inducing
    France to adhere to the treaty. The Times,[582] which
    was very antagonistic to Palmerston, supplied its
    readers, on August 3, with an article by Henry Reeve
    in which he expressed a sincere hope that relations
    with France “would not be imperilled for the sake of
    a desperado like Mehemet Ali,” and, at the same time,
    suggested that throughout the negotiations the Foreign
    Office had not improbably been the dupe of Russia.
    The Radicals adopted this view, and furthermore,
    deprecated any intervention in Turkish affairs. It
    was only in their quarter of the House that the policy
    of the government encountered any real hostility.
    But even their attack was not pressed with much
    spirit, and Palmerston, on August 6, a few days
    before the prorogation of Parliament, had no difficulty
    in repelling Joseph Hume’s allegation that the insurrection
    in the Lebanon had been fomented by British
    agents.[583]


Guizot, in the meanwhile, had had several [Pg 282]conferences at the Foreign Office, and had discussed
    the situation with both Melbourne and John Russell.
    The position which the French government intended
    to assume was set forth in a memorandum which he
    was instructed to read to Lord Palmerston. No
    formal proposals for a treaty, M. Thiers contended, had
    ever been made to France. Various suggestions, it
    was true, for settling the Turco-Egyptian question
    had been put forward, with none of which she had
    been able to agree. She had always looked upon
    Mehemet Ali as an integral part of the Ottoman
    Empire, and considered his strength as necessary to
    the preservation of Turkey. Hence she had constantly
    opposed the idea of wresting Syria from him by force,
    and she was now disposed to think that the four
    Powers had scarcely realized the magnitude of the
    task upon which they had embarked so light-heartedly.
    “Treat Lord Palmerston,” wrote M. Thiers, “as he
    treated you. Read out to him this written declaration.
    Question him boldly. Ask him whether he
    has any plans for helping the rising in Syria, and
    what measures he proposes to adopt should the Pasha
    return a flat refusal to the Sultan’s demands? Press
    him hard. Place him in the position of having to
    confess that he has acted in a very foolhardy fashion.
    . . . Be careful, however, to frame your questions in
    such a way that, should he decline to answer them, you
    are not compelled to announce a rupture of relations.
    For the moment France must restrain herself.”[584]


There is no reason to suppose that Guizot displayed
    any lack of skill in the performance of his
    prescribed task. He was, however, unable to report
    that he had achieved the smallest measure of success.
    Palmerston, whilst expressing his deep regret that a
    divergence of opinion should have alienated the two [Pg 283]Cabinets, and admitting the hope, which Guizot himself
    was convinced was sincere, that their separation
    would be of brief duration, was clearly determined to
    carry out the treaty to the letter. As regards the
    military situation in Syria—the point upon which M.
    Thiers laid the greatest stress—he was full of confidence.
    Ibrahim, surrounded by a hostile population
    and deprived of communication by sea with Egypt,
    would, he felt certain, be reduced to impotence.
    Melbourne, however, displayed far less confidence,
    and the Austrian and the Prussian ministers, with
    whom Guizot also conversed, adopted an almost
    apologetic tone. Indeed, throughout this affair, it
    would seem that the appellation of “time-serving
    dog” applied by Charles Greville to Neumann might
    with equal justice have been applied to Bülow, his
    Prussian colleague.[585]


Whilst news from the East was eagerly awaited
    Guizot was summoned to the Château d’Eu, where he
    would be enabled to confer with both the King and
    M. Thiers. From the subsequent proceedings of the
    chief actors in these transactions, as well as from the
    somewhat meagre account of his visit which M. Guizot
    has given in his Mémoires, it is not difficult to surmise
    the nature of the plan which it was resolved to adopt.
    France was to arm upon an imposing scale, and her
    representatives at the different Courts were to assume
    an attitude of dignified resentment. Such a course
    possessed a twofold advantage. Abroad, it could not
    fail to have a great effect upon the timid Cabinets of
    Vienna and Berlin, and might even incline them to
    withhold their ratification of the treaty. At home,
    warlike preparations would be popular, and might
    prevent people from enquiring too closely into the
    policy which had resulted in the isolation of France.
    Moreover, M. Thiers was glad of the opportunity, [Pg 284]which the crisis afforded him, of strengthening the
    army and of repairing the effect of many yeas of
    military neglect.


But, although the King and his minister were thus
    resolved to show a menacing front to Europe, Guizot
    was supplied with confidential instructions of a most
    pacific character. Palmerston, they were convinced,
    had grossly miscalculated the strength of Mehemet
    Ali, and it was to be hoped that the unexpected
    difficulties which the execution of the treaty could not
    fail to encounter would produce a great revulsion of
    feeling, not only at the continental Courts, but among
    the majority of the members of the British Cabinet.
    Should, therefore, M. Guizot perceive signs of a
    disposition to adopt a less uncompromising attitude
    towards Mehemet Ali and to draw nearer to France,
    he was to encourage it by all means in his power.
    Provided the Treaty of July 15 could be declared to
    be at an end, the French government would gladly
    join with the Powers in guaranteeing the integrity of
    Turkey, on the basis of the maintenance of the conditions
    of the Convention of Kiutayeh. M. Thiers,
    it will be seen, was thus ready to consent to restrict
    Mehemet Ali to the life government of both Syria
    and Egypt, a state of affairs to which he had always
    declared that it was useless to expect him to submit.
    As an alternative to this solution of the difficulty,
    France might be invited to mediate on behalf of the
    Pasha with the allied Powers. In that case the
    hereditary tenure of Egypt and the life government
    of Syria for Mehemet Ali would be the basis of the
    negotiation.[586] This was another arrangement which
    a few weeks before M. Thiers had rejected as
    altogether inadmissible. The Comte Walewski, a
    natural son of Napoleon, who had been sent upon a
    special mission to Egypt, on August 2, for the purpose [Pg 285]of counselling the Pasha to refrain from beginning
    hostilities, was, accordingly, instructed to suggest to
    Mehemet Ali that he should defer his dispute with the
    four Powers and the Porte to the mediation of France.


But in addition to these instructions Guizot carried
    back with him to London a letter from Louis Philippe
    to his son-in-law, the King of the Belgians. Leopold
    was at Windsor Castle, consumed with anxiety at the
    thought of the dangers to which a European war
    must expose his newly established Kingdom. Louis
    Philippe’s letter of August 13 was plainly intended
    to be read by Queen Victoria, and was drawn up with
    the object of seriously alarming her, and of prejudicing
    her against Palmerston. “The situation in which
    France finds herself,” wrote the King, “is neither of
    her choice nor of her creation. It was said of the
    death of the Duc d’Enghien that it was worse than a
    crime, it was a blunder. I say now of the Treaty of
    July 15, that it is worse than a blunder, it is a
    misfortune of which the consequences are incalculable.
    The situation is particularly painful for me who have
    always scouted the notion that England could ever
    enter into an alliance without France. I find I am
    wrong. For the present we can only wait and see.
    But there is one thing we must do and that is to
    arm, and we are doing so vigorously. Our rôle must
    be one of expectation. We must see what England
    means to do, before deciding what France shall do,
    either in the way of restoring or preserving the balance
    of power.”[587]


A few hours before M. Guizot departed from
    England to visit the King at Eu, a steamer left the
    Thames having on board Louis Napoleon, who, with
    some fifty followers, a tame eagle and a bundle of
    proclamations, purposed to overthrow the Orleans [Pg 286]Monarchy. His destination was Boulogne, where a
    subaltern officer of the garrison had been drawn into
    the plot. On the morning of August 6, the Imperial
    Pretender disembarked at Vimereux and presented himself
    before the 42nd regiment upon the barrack square.
    But his appearance aroused no enthusiasm. Finding
    that their plans had miscarried, the conspirators
    attempted to regain their ship. Their flight was,
    however, intercepted by the police and the national
    guards, who captured the whole party and lodged
    them in the gaol. Four years before Louis Napoleon
    had made a similar attempt at Strasburg. On that
    occasion he had not been brought to trial, but had
    simply been placed on board a ship and sent off to
    America. This second offence, however, could not be
    treated with the same leniency. On September 28,
    he was arraigned before the peers and sentenced to
    perpetual imprisonment in the fortress of Ham. The
    affair excited little public interest and was generally
    treated with contemptuous indifference. Certain
    French newspapers, however, published accounts of
    meetings between the Pretender and Palmerston, and
    declared that his attempt must have been connived at
    by the British government. But at his first interview
    with Baron Bourqueney, who had come over to
    London to take charge of the embassy during the
    absence of Guizot, Palmerston was enabled to pledge
    his word of honour that, for “the past two years,
    neither he nor Lord Melbourne had set eyes upon
    Louis Bonaparte or upon any of the adventurers by
    whom he was surrounded.”[588] His assurance was
    readily accepted and the matter was quickly forgotten.


Upon his return to London, Guizot found awaiting
    him an invitation to Windsor. Among the party at
    the Castle were the King of the Belgians, Melbourne, [Pg 287]Palmerston, and Wellington. Leopold, to whom
    Guizot at once delivered Louis Philippe’s letter,
    applied himself diligently to the task of extricating his
    father-in-law from his difficulties. With the view of
    terminating the isolation in which France was placed,
    he proposed that the convention of the four Powers for
    the pacification of the Levant should be merged in a
    larger instrument, to which she might be a party.
    But Palmerston, with whom he had a long conference,
    whilst acknowledging the advantages to be derived
    from a general agreement to uphold the integrity of
    Turkey, declared emphatically that no plan of that
    kind could be considered, until the Treaty of July 15
    should have been executed in all its details. On
    August 20, at the termination of his visit, Guizot
    carried back with him to London the conviction that
    Leopold’s efforts had in no way modified the situation.
    He had, however, been able to derive some small consolation
    from the evident desire of the Queen and of
    Prince Albert to treat him with unusual consideration,
    whilst he had noted with satisfaction that Melbourne
    had appeared depressed and even Palmerston seemed
    out of spirits.[589]


From the French point of view the news from
    Syria was of a distinctly reassuring character. The
    insurrection in the Lebanon, upon the wide development
    of which Palmerston was supposed to have
    confidently depended for the realization of his
    plans, had been suppressed without difficulty by
    Ibrahim Pasha. This circumstance, combined with
    the efforts of King Leopold, revived the active
    opposition of those of Palmerston’s colleagues who
    disapproved of his eastern policy. They urged,
    accordingly, the expediency of making some friendly
    advances towards France. Palmerston consented with [Pg 288]an unexpected alacrity to meet their wishes. He had
    not answered Thiers’ memorandum of July 21, and he
    now proposed that he should reply to it and thus
    re-open communications with the French government.
    But his long despatch of August 31, was scarcely so
    conciliatory as some of his fellow-ministers would have
    desired. It was in effect an amplification of the memorandum which, on July 17, he had read out and
    handed to M. Guizot. It gave a luminous account of
    the negotiations and set forth the British case with
    admirable clearness, but only in the concluding
    paragraphs was a vague hope expressed that, after the
    complete execution of the Treaty of July 15, France
    would once more resume her place in “the union of
    the five Powers.”[590] The document was intended for
    publication and, in drawing it up, Palmerston had
    been more concerned to convince his countrymen of
    the justice of his cause than to conciliate the French
    government. As the event was to prove, he had
    judged correctly in supposing that a lucid exposition of
    his policy would greatly strengthen his hand, and
    enable him to counteract the intrigues of the French
    party, in the Cabinet. When, about a month later,
    his despatch was communicated to the press, it silenced
    the opposition of all fair-minded persons.[591] Guizot,
    suspecting at once the real object which Palmerston
    had in view, lost no time in urging upon Thiers the
    necessity of presenting, no less skilfully, the French
    case to the public.[592]


The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was
    known at Constantinople on August 3. The Porte,
    acting under the advice of the ambassadors of the
    four Powers, proceeded without loss of time to carry
    out its conditions. Rifat Bey, accompanied by Mr. [Pg 289]Alison of the British embassy, was despatched to
    Egypt with the Sultan’s ultimatum, and measures
    were promptly taken for rendering effective aid to
    the Syrian insurgents.[593] At the same time as the
    documents relating to the treaty were sent to Constantinople,
    the instructions of the Admiralty were
    forwarded to Sir Robert Stopford, commanding the
    British Mediterranean Squadron. All communication
    by sea was to be cut off between Egypt and Syria. If
    the Pasha’s fleet should be discovered within the
    harbour of Alexandria, it was not to be allowed to
    leave. Should an Egyptian squadron be cruising off
    the Syrian coast, the admiral was to use his own
    discretion as to the means to be employed for carrying
    out the intentions of his government. Peaceful
    persuasion was to be tried in the first instance, but,
    should it prove ineffectual, force must be resorted
    to without hesitation. Five thousand stands of arms
    from the stores at Malta were placed at his disposal,
    for distribution among the insurgent mountaineers.
    Lastly, Stopford was warned to be on his guard
    against “any sudden movement of the French
    squadron, in consequence of orders which might be
    sent from Paris, under the first impulse of irritation
    which the French government would naturally feel
    at finding itself placed in a separate and isolated
    position.”[594]


The French naval force in the Mediterranean was
    at this time extremely efficient[595] and, in point of
    numbers, slightly superior to the British. Ever since
    the beginning of the year, Palmerston had made
    the strength of the Toulon fleet the subject of [Pg 290]numerous representations to the French government.[596] Should, therefore, warlike counsels prevail in Paris
    the initial advantages of the naval situation would
    be on the side of France. But, as early as July 25,
    Palmerston was so satisfied that no danger of that
    kind was to be apprehended, that he desired that
    Stopford should be informed that the French government
    had clearly “no intention of opposing by force
    the measures which the allies had resolved to execute.”[597] That officer, on receipt of his instructions, had proceeded
    to Alexandria, both to support by his presence
    the demands which Rifat Bey was pressing upon the
    Pasha and to prevent the egress of the Egyptian fleet.
    A few days before his arrival, the squadron, which
    Mehemet Ali had recently sent to the coast of Syria,[598] had hastily returned to Alexandria, upon the advice, as
    it was believed, of the French admiral.


Whilst he was in these waters, Stopford was joined
    by Admiral Bandiera with two Austrian frigates, one
    of which was commanded by the Archduke Charles
    Frederick. Commodore Charles Napier, famous for
    his destruction of the Miguelite Meet, had at the same
    time been detached to the coast of Syria with five sail
    of the line and some smaller vessels. Arriving off
    Beyrout, on August 12, Napier found that the
    insurrection, which he had been informed was in full
    progress, had been suppressed. Nevertheless, two
    days later, he took up a position “abreast of the
    town” and sent an officer on shore to notify to the
    governor that the four Powers had decided to restore
    Syria to the Sultan, and to demand that the arms
    taken from the inhabitants of the Lebanon should be [Pg 291]restored to them. Furthermore, he issued a proclamation
    calling upon the Syrians to return to their
    allegiance to the Sultan, and proceeded to detain a
    number of small vessels carrying provisions and
    military stores for the use of Ibrahim’s army. But, as
    the twenty days allowed Mehemet Ali for considering
    the demands of the Porte had not yet expired, he did
    not consider himself justified in beginning actual
    hostilities. Finding, therefore, that Soliman Pasha[599] was not disposed to comply with his summons and
    that his proclamation produced no effect, he withdrew
    his squadron to a better anchorage and employed his
    time in reconnoitring the coast.[600]


M. de Pontois, the French ambassador to the
    Sublime Porte, had, in the meanwhile, not been idle.
    On August 16, on receipt presumably of instructions
    from M. Thiers, he sent his dragoman to Reshid Pasha,
    the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The
    message, of which M. Cor was the bearer, was to the
    effect that France was deeply offended at the action of
    the Ottoman plenipotentiary in signing the Treaty of
    July 15, and that she was resolved to support Mehemet
    Ali and actively to oppose the measures of coercion
    which the allies were proposing to apply to him.[601] M.
    de Pontois himself further declared to the Russian
    minister that he regarded war between France and
    England as inevitable. This threatening language was
    at once reported by the representatives of the Powers
    to their respective Courts and Lord Ponsonby, at the
    same time, sent to warn the British admirals that an
    outbreak of hostilities with France was to be seriously
    apprehended.[602] A few days later, however, the French [Pg 292]ambassador, whether in consequence of fresh instructions
    from Paris, or whether because on considering
    the matter he was afraid he had said too much, saw
    fit to disavow the language imputed to him.[603] This
    was the attitude adopted by M. Thiers when, in due
    course, representations on the subject of M. de Pontois’
    menaces were made to him by the Powers. The full
    brunt of his ill-humour fell, as was usual, upon the
    Austrian ambassador, who met with a very warm and
    disagreeable reception. “Vous pouvez dire à Reshid
    Pasha qu’il en a menti,”[604] was the only statement which
    Apponyi could extract from him. Guizot, but in more
    courteous terms, conveyed the same explanation to
    Lord Palmerston. No written communication having
    passed between M. de Pontois and Reshid Pasha, the
    matter was allowed to drop.[605] It was evident that
    whatever might have been the precise words used
    by M. Cor, the message of the French ambassador to
    the Reis-Effendi was a rather clumsy attempt to
    frighten the Sultan into withholding his ratification of
    the treaty.


France meanwhile was arming in most ostentatious
    fashion. On September 13 the fortification of Paris
    was decreed by a Royal ordinance. This was a measure
    which had been under consideration for some time past,
    but which had always been set aside on account of the
    difficulty of inducing the Chambers to consent to the
    required expenditure. Thiers, as a student of the
    campaign of 1814, had constantly advocated it, whilst
    Louis Philippe was also in favour of it because, as was
    generally believed, he hoped that a circle of forts round
    the capital would greatly facilitate the suppression of
    any revolutionary  movement. M. Thiers gave his [Pg 293]closest personal attention to the military preparations.
    With the journalists and stock-jobbers, by whom he
    was surrounded,[606] his conversation turned on war unceasingly.
    In the early days of August he had hinted
    at a campaign upon the Rhine, whilst the papers which
    he inspired denounced the treaties of 1815 and talked
    of “natural frontiers.” But his thoughts soon
    assumed a new direction. The débordement,[607] when it
    came, would be in Italy, where Austria was to be
    assailed at her most vulnerable point. Lying on the
    floor, with his maps spread out before him, like the
    great man about whom he had written so much, he
    planned vast military and diplomatic combinations.[608]


Nor was Louis Philippe less warlike than his
    minister. All Paris heard of the indignant and
    threatening language which he had used to the
    Prussian and Austrian ambassadors. Taking them
    aside at the Tuileries, he had bitterly reproached them
    for the ingratitude which their Courts had displayed
    towards him. For ten years he had held the revolution
    in check and his reward had been the Quadrilateral
    Treaty of July. But, and at this point his voice could
    be heard far beyond the confines of the room in which the
    interview took place, “they had better not provoke
    him too far. He had discarded the red cap. Some
    day, perhaps, they might be disagreeably surprised to
    find that he had resumed it.”[609] This threat, which was
    uttered as though it had escaped him in the heat of
    passion, was well calculated to give Metternich much
    cause for uneasy reflection. At the same time the
    King’s eldest son, the Duc d’Orléans, a keen and
    ambitious soldier, loudly proclaimed that France had [Pg 294]been insulted. With perfect sincerity he declared his
    belief in the necessity of war. “If the worst came to
    the worst,” he told his friends, “he had rather be
    killed in action upon the Rhine, than be shot in a
    street fight and die in the gutter.”[610]


Under the influence of the revolutionary recollections
    evoked by the anti-dynastic press, and of the
    threats of war to be waged upon Jacobinical
    principles,[611] indulged in by the organs of M. Thiers,
    public excitement in Paris rose to an alarming pitch.
    The situation was complicated by a series of strikes in
    different trades. Bands of men deprived of their
    employment marched through the streets singing the Marseillaise. The secret republican societies fomented
    the discontent of the working classes and fanned the
    flame of war. Disturbances took place, and the authorities
    were apprehensive of an attack by the mob upon
    the British embassy.


Towards the middle of September the news reached
    Paris that, in consequence of the Sultan’s demands,
    conveyed to him by Rifat Bey, Mehemet Ali had
    invoked the protection and mediation of France.[612] Furthermore, at the instance of the Comte Walewski,
    he had declared his readiness to restore to the Sultan
    the island of Crete, the Holy Cities and the province
    of Adana. Although maintaining his claim to the
    hereditary tenure of Egypt, he had announced that he
    would be satisfied, as regards Syria, were the government
    of Tripoli, Damascus and Aleppo to be conferred
    upon his son Ibrahim for his life. Thiers perceived,
    at once, that in these proposals lay his last chance of
    preventing without war the full execution of the Treaty
    of July 15. Notwithstanding that he still derided the [Pg 295]notion that a blockade of the coast would suffice to
    make Mehemet Ali relax his hold upon Syria, in his
    heart he was, doubtless, beginning to suspect that he
    had overestimated the military power of the Pasha.
    Napier’s proceedings at Beyrout and his detention of
    the Egyptian store ships and transports had not been
    followed by that vigorous offensive, which, he had
    always predicted, Ibrahim would assume the moment
    any act of war was committed against him.


Hitherto M. Thiers, in his intercourse with the
    British chargé d’affaires, with whom he was in private
    life on very friendly terms, had never made use of
    those asperities of language and warlike threats which
    he had sometimes indulged in with Werther and
    Apponyi. But, on the morning of September 18,
    when Mr. Bulwer called upon him, he resolved to adopt
    new tactics. As they paced up and down a long
    gallery in his house at Auteuil, M. Thiers declared
    emphatically that he considered the Pasha’s last
    proposals both just and reasonable. If England would
    agree to join with France in pressing their acceptance
    upon the Porte and the Powers, there would once
    more be established the intimate relations between the
    two governments which the Quadrilateral Treaty had
    interrupted. But if not, then seeing that Mehemet
    Ali had made these concessions at the instance of
    France, she would “be bound to support him.” As he
    concluded he looked Bulwer full in the face and asked
    him whether he realized the full import of these words.
    “Perfectly,” replied he imperturbably, “you mean to
    declare for the Pasha and go to war with us in his
    favour.” Before they parted, however, M. Thiers
    somewhat modified the gravity of his statement, by
    saying that he had spoken as a private individual, not
    as the President of the Council.


A few hours later Bulwer returned to Auteuil.
    Before leaving M. Thiers he had told him that he [Pg 296]would like him to see the account of their conversation
    which he proposed to send to London. The despatch
    which he, accordingly, placed in his hands began by
    stating that, in the writer’s opinion, the moment had
    come when M. Thiers purposed saying to the King,
    “You must follow me even to war, or I will leave you
    exposed to public opinion as expressed by the newspapers.”
    It was certain, however, that the King
    would not accept such a programme, and that, were M.
    Thiers to place his resignation on those grounds, it
    would be unhesitatingly accepted. This was very far
    from the kind of message which Thiers wished conveyed
    to Lord Palmerston. “My dear Bulwer,” he
    said, “you are greatly mistaken, you will ruin your
    promising career. The King is far more warlike than
    I am.”[613] Bulwer saw no occasion to argue that point,
    and, having produced the desired effect, he readily
    agreed merely to relate to his chief the substance of
    their morning’s conversation. In a private and confidential
    despatch, however, he stated that this interview
    had left a strong impression upon his mind that M.
    Thiers had, in reality, an earnest desire to maintain
    peace.[614]


These so-called concessions of Mehemet Ali were,
    Lord Palmerston declared, unworthy of serious consideration.
    Whether Syria were governed by Ibrahim or
    by Mehemet Ali was a matter of very little importance.
    The object with which the treaty had been concluded
    must be relentlessly pursued. Syria must be replaced
    under the direct rule of the Porte. Until the Egyptian
    desert should intervene between the territories of the
    Sultan and those administered by his too-powerful
    vassal, there could be no permanent peace in the East.
    No arguments of M. Guizot could induce him to adopt [Pg 297]a less uncompromising attitude. The Pasha’s proposals
    indicated, he maintained, that he already perceived
    the necessity of bowing to the inevitable, and that he
    would, before long, yield to all the demands of the
    Powers.[615] Certain of his colleagues, however, altogether
    dissented from this view of the case. Mehemet
    Ali’s concessions, they contended, had created an
    opportunity for terminating the differences with France
    and for drawing her into the negotiations.


The French party in the Cabinet had recently
    received a great accession of strength. Lord John
    Russell, the Colonial Secretary and the leader of the
    House of Commons, had cordially approved of the
    Treaty of July 15. Nevertheless, early in September, he
    appears to have been seized with grave misgivings as
    to the wisdom of carrying out its provisions. A letter
    from Lord Spencer to his brother the Duke of Bedford,
    expressing the fear that Palmerston’s policy would
    lead to a war with France, seems to have made a great
    impression upon him.[616] Moreover, “Bear” Ellice[617] was
    actively engaged in propagating alarmist rumours and
    in discoursing upon the indignation which the Anglo-Russian
    alliance had aroused in France. There are
    grounds for believing that the intrigue, of which he was
    the soul, aimed at driving Palmerston to resign, in order
    that Clarendon might replace him at the Foreign
    Office.[618] Be that as it may, the inspiration of M.
    Thiers can plainly be discerned in the correspondence
    of Mr. Ellice with both Russell and with Melbourne.[619] Charles Greville also appears to have spent much time
    with Guizot in inveighing against the presumptuous [Pg 298]recklessness of Palmerston and in discussing the votes
    and opinions of different members of the Cabinet.[620] But the French ambassador could listen to even more
    congenial sentiments in the social circle presided over
    by Lord and Lady Holland. M. Thiers, a few weeks
    after Holland’s death, openly declared in the Chamber
    that, throughout this crisis, he had always been able
    to depend upon the support of that statesman.[621] It is
    impossible to say how far he was justified in making
    such a statement. It is undeniable, however, that
    matters, which should have been treated as Cabinet
    secrets, were known in Paris. In commenting upon
    M. Thiers’ amazing indiscretion, The Times,[622] which
    cannot be charged with partiality to Palmerston,
    positively asserted, as a notorious fact, that “every
    transaction within the doors of the British council-chamber
    were as well known upon the bourse as in the
    deepest recesses of Downing Street or Whitehall.” This
    statement is to a great extent confirmed by Bulwer,
    who relates that, in consequence of certain information
    which he had acquired in Paris, he was enabled to warn
    Palmerston of an attack which was to be made upon
    him in the Cabinet.[623] “The talking at Holland
    House,” wrote Lord Melbourne, “is irremediable.
    They cannot help it, and they are not themselves aware
    how much they talk.”[624] It was always a subject of
    complaint against Palmerston that he would come to
    important decisions and would embark upon grave
    measures of policy, without reference to his colleagues.
    The conduct of certain of his “Whig friends and
    grandees”[625] upon this occasion was, it must be admitted, [Pg 299]calculated to dispose him to confide in them as seldom
    as possible.


Negotiations, John Russell insisted, must be opened
    with France on the basis of the Pasha’s last proposals.
    If this course were not adopted, he announced his
    intention of retiring from office. His resolution was
    not to be shaken either by the remonstrances of
    Melbourne that his resignation must destroy the
    government, or by Palmerston’s representations that
    his present conduct was inconsistent with his former
    approval of the treaty.[626] The French party seemed to
    be on the point of triumphing. Palmerston appeared
    to be placed between two alternatives—he must
    either retire, or consent to suspend coercive measures
    against Mehemet Ali and make conciliatory advances
    to France. Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, a
    crisis was averted. Lord John agreed greatly to
    modify his demands and Palmerston consented to a
    slight compromise. “Russell,” records Greville, “has
    disappointed me. He is not the man I took him for.”[627] But in point of fact an influence, unsuspected by
    Greville, had been brought to bear upon him. Melbourne
    had conveyed to him a message from the Queen
    that she was not in a condition[628] to bear, without
    danger, the anxiety to which she must be subjected by
    the course he threatened to pursue. But Her Majesty
    placed her chief objection to anything in the nature of
    a Cabinet crisis, at this particular moment, on other
    grounds than those of her own state of health. She desired
    Lord John to reflect most seriously upon the injury,
    which the country must suffer in the eyes of foreign
    Powers, from so public an exhibition of ministerial weakness
    and vacillation at a time of national emergency.[629]


 [Pg 300]


Metternich had been greatly alarmed by the
    threatening aspect of affairs, and had, some weeks
    before, submitted a paper to King Leopold, for transmission
    to Louis Philippe, defining the attitude which,
    in his opinion, the French government should adopt.
    Whilst signifying her dissent from the policy of
    coercing Mehemet Ali, she might, he suggested, declare
    her adherence to the main principle of the treaty—the
    necessity of preserving the integrity of Turkey. Should
    the event prove that the Pasha was not to be subdued
    by force, she might announce her readiness to discuss
    with the Powers the means by which, in the future,
    the security of the Ottoman Empire might be maintained.[630] Palmerston, who was in possession of a copy
    of this document, expressed himself as willing to make
    an overture to the French government on the basis of
    Metternich’s suggestions. At a Cabinet Council, on
    October 1, this solution of the difficulty was agreed
    to unanimously.[631] It was a small concession which
    Palmerston could well afford to make. Before the
    French government could be approached on the
    subject, the consent of the Powers, which were parties
    to the Quadrilateral Treaty, would have to be obtained.
    Brunnow, without doubt, would at once declare that
    he must refer the matter to his Court, and long before
    an answer could be received from St. Petersburg, the
    guns would have spoken in the East and the whole
    situation would be altered. Nor was this expectation
    falsified. The representatives of the Powers, following
    the lead of Brunnow, announced that they were without
    instructions and must submit the proposal to their
    Courts. But already the news had arrived of the success
    with which hostilities had been opened in Syria.[632]


 [Pg 301]


At Constantinople Mehemet Ali’s reply to the
    demands made to him by Rifat Bey was held to be
    unsatisfactory, and, with the full approval of the
    ambassadors of the allied Powers, the Porte decided to
    treat his counter-proposals in the light of a rejection
    of the Sultan’s ultimatum. He was, accordingly,
    declared deposed from the governorship of Egypt and
    of the other territories which he ruled, and a blockade
    was proclaimed both of the Syrian and Egyptian
    coasts. The representatives of the Powers at the
    same time recalled the consuls from Alexandria, and
    every effort was made to carry out promptly the
    stipulations of the Treaty of July 15.[633] Sir Robert
    Stopford, leaving a portion of his command to watch
    the Egyptian fleet, sailed with the remainder of his
    force and the Austrian squadron to join Napier off
    Beyrout, where Captain Walker, who had been placed
    in command of the Turkish fleet, had already arrived.
    On September 11, the governor of Beyrout having
    been ineffectually summoned to surrender, fire was
    opened upon the forts. After sustaining a heavy
    bombardment, Soliman Pasha withdrew the garrison
    into the hills. Two days before, a Turkish division
    and detachments of British and Austrian marines had
    landed at Jounié Bay. Commodore Napier, under
    whose direction these operations were carried out,
    entrenched his force securely and proceeded to distribute
    arms and ammunition to the mountaineers,
    who flocked into his camp in large numbers. Meanwhile,
    Ibrahim, who with the main Egyptian army
    was not far distant, looked on helplessly, and appeared
    to be incapable of offering any serious resistance to
    the operations of the allies.[634]


 [Pg 302]


The news from the East created a profound sensation
    in Paris. “The cannon of Beyrout,” wrote
    Heine,[635] “re-echoes painfully in the heart of every
    Frenchman.” Young men eagerly proffered their services
    at the recruiting offices. At the opera and at
    the theatres excited audiences insisted on singing the Marseillaise. On the question of peace or war the
    Cabinet was supposed to be nearly equally divided.
    M. Thiers was reported to have urged the necessity of
    energetic action, but it was notorious that General
    Cubières, the Minister of War, and Roussin, the
    Minister of Marine and the former ambassador at Constantinople,
    were in favour of pacific measures. Henry
    Reeve, the friend of Greville and the future editor of
    his famous journals, was at this time in Paris.
    Politically he was in complete accord with Lord
    Holland and the French party, and, during his stay
    in Paris, was in regular correspondence with Lord
    Lansdowne, a member of the Melbourne Cabinet, who,
    although not actively opposed to Palmerston, only
    gave him a half-hearted support. Reeve was well
    acquainted with most of the French ministers, and
    was on very friendly terms with Léon Faucher and
    several other prominent journalists and politicians.
    In fact, during these critical days, he may be said, in
    his own words, “to have had his board and lodging
    in the Cabinet.” He was in constant communication
    with M. Thiers, “who was everything that he could
    wish.”[636] Consequently, he would ingenuously convey
    to his patron[637] those opinions, which the crafty French
    minister considered might with advantage be disseminated
    in governmental circles in London.


Amidst all this excitement, whilst in Paris the bourse was panic stricken and in London the funds
    were falling, Palmerston remained perfectly calm. He [Pg 303]had never believed in the danger of a conflict with
    France, and, in his opinion, the progress of events in
    the East had rendered still more remote the chances
    of war.[638] He could not admit that the French people
    or the French King would ever allow any government
    to embark upon hostilities with the whole of Europe,
    in order to preserve Syria for Mehemet Ali. He
    wrote reassuringly to the Queen[639] to this effect, and
    strove to calm the apprehensions of his colleagues and
    to instil into them some of his robust common sense.
    But the edict of the Porte, by which Mehemet Ali had
    been deprived of the government of Egypt, had once
    more stirred his opponents to action. According to
    Lord John Russell, it was a measure which had never
    been contemplated by the treaty and had clearly been
    adopted in consequence of the violent counsels of Lord
    Ponsonby. Palmerston, although he personally approved
    of the deposition of the Pasha, had, nevertheless,
    immediately instructed Granville to inform M. Thiers
    that it was merely a measure of coercion, and was not
    intended to prejudge any arrangement which the
    Sultan might, hereafter, be disposed to make in
    favour of Mehemet Ali, should he, “at an early
    moment, accept the conditions of the treaty.”[640] Lord
    John, however, was not to be pacified. War, he
    asserted, appeared to be imminent, and he insisted
    upon the necessity of holding a meeting of the
    Cabinet.[641] Grave consequences, wrote Melbourne to
    the Queen, were to be apprehended from the Council
    which he had called for October 10.[642]


But once again a crisis was averted. On the [Pg 304]morning of the day on which the meeting of the
    Cabinet was to take place, Guizot presented himself
    at the Foreign Office with two despatches from M.
    Thiers. The first, dated October 3, purported to be
    an answer to Lord Palmerston’s despatch of August 31.
    It was a long and rambling statement of the French
    case. The chief argument consisted in an attempt to
    show that France, throughout the negotiations, had
    never departed from the principle embodied in the collective note of July 27, 1839. Then, as now, France
    considered that that instrument had been drawn up
    for the purpose of guaranteeing the independence and
    integrity of Turkey. She had always believed that
    the object which it had in view was to enable the
    Sultan to escape from the exclusive protection of a
    certain great Power. She had never understood that
    the policy of preserving the Ottoman Empire was
    bound up with any question of “territorial limitations,
    more or less advantageous, between the Sultan
    and the Viceroy.”[643] The second, and more important,
    despatch bore the date of October 8, and dealt with
    the firman of the Sultan deposing Mehemet Ali from
    the government of Egypt. France, declared M. Thiers,
    was prepared to leave the question of Syria to the
    chances of the war, which had actually begun. But
    the edict expelling the Pasha from Egypt was a
    different matter. It threatened to disturb the balance
    of power in the East, and France could, therefore, not
    consent to see it carried into execution.[644] Certain
    writers have pompously asserted that, on this occasion,
    M. Thiers “formulated the casus belli.” It must be
    borne in mind, however, that he had already been
    informed by Lord Granville of the light in which the
    British government regarded the Porte’s decree of
    deposition. Hence many of his contemporaries treat his [Pg 305]despatch of October 8 with derision. That famous
    document, they contend, merely “forced an open
    door.”[645]


The extreme moderation with which M. Thiers had
    expressed himself came as a great surprise to the
    British government. M. Guizot, sincerely as he desired
    to see peace maintained, was strongly of opinion that
    so mild an exposition of the French case was strangely
    inconsistent with the warlike attitude which his government
    had adopted, since the beginning of the crisis.
    He contented himself, in consequence, with placing
    M. Thiers’ despatches in Lord Palmerston’s hands, and
    made no attempt to discuss or to defend the opinions
    expressed in them.[646] Their contents, when communicated
    to the assembled British ministers, removed at
    once the danger that acute differences of opinion
    might lead to a disruption of the government. At
    the Cabinet Council of October 10, it was simply
    decided that Lord Ponsonby should be directed to
    urge the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in the
    governorship of Egypt and to make the appointment
    hereditary in his family, provided he would consent to
    make an early submission to the Sultan. At the same
    time, it was agreed that a copy of these instructions
    should be sent to Lord Granville for communication to
    the French government.[647]


But, in spite of the pacific language used by
    M. Thiers in his despatches, the situation still gave
    cause for anxiety. The lower classes in Paris had
    been greatly stirred by the Jacobinical declamations
    of the Radical press. On October 15, as Louis Philippe
    was entering the Tuileries, he narrowly escaped the
    bullet of an assassin. The would-be regicide, an [Pg 306]individual named Darmès, when arrested and questioned,
    declared that he was by profession “a conspirator
    and an exterminator of tyrants.” This outrage
    and other anarchical symptoms were not without
    effect upon the bourgeoisie.[648] The signs of the times
    pointed clearly to the probability that war abroad
    would be followed by a revolution at home. Meanwhile,
    rumours were current that the government
    was preparing some sudden act of aggression—an
    “Anconade”[649] as it was called. It was said that the
    military occupation of some position in Turkey was
    contemplated. The sudden recall, however, to Toulon
    of the French fleet, which had been cruising in Greek
    waters, seemed to prove, not only that the government
    could have no such intention, but that it was desirous
    of avoiding the danger of any chance collision with
    the British squadron operating off the Syrian coast.
    Nevertheless, after the return home of Admiral
    Hugon’s fleet, reports about the warlike plans of
    M. Thiers assumed a more concrete form. Lord Granville,
    on October 12, received information from a
    person, who stipulated for a special remuneration
    should his intelligence prove accurate, that the French
    government had decided to seize one of the Balearic
    Islands.[650]


The strategic importance of these Spanish islands
    had been enhanced by the French occupation of Algiers.
    Situated about midway between Toulon and the
    African coast, they would, in the hands of France,
    enable her to control the western Mediterranean.
    The British Foreign Office and the Admiralty had, in
    consequence, been always on the alert, lest she should
    by any means succeed in establishing herself at Port [Pg 307]Mahon. It had been ascertained that many of the
    inhabitants were not at all averse to the idea of a
    French annexation of Minorca.[651] But, in addition to
    the military advantages to be derived from the occupation
    of the Balearic Islands, there were political
    reasons which made both Palmerston and Bulwer
    suspect that M. Thiers might regard a coup d’éclat in
    Spain as a useful counterstroke to the Treaty of
    July 15.[652] The struggle between Christina[653] and the Progressistas had been raging for some weeks past,
    and now appeared certain to terminate in the complete
    defeat of the Queen Regent. Upon the subject of
    Spanish affairs the British government held views
    which were diametrically opposed to those entertained
    at the absolute Courts. Any stroke directed against
    Espartero and the Radicals could not fail to be applauded
    at Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. A
    French intervention in Spain might, therefore, be the
    means of sowing discord between Great Britain and
    her continental allies.


Lord Granville at once sent off a special messenger
    to Madrid to warn the British minister of the blow
    which was impending, and Palmerston also wrote to
    Mr. Aston to the same effect. Espartero,[654] when the
    news was communicated to him, undertook to strengthen
    the garrison of Port Mahon, and promised to resist
    manfully any French aggression. Melbourne, at the
    same time, took the opportunity of remonstrating
    strongly with Louis Philippe through the King of the
    Belgians.[655] England, he wrote, could not sit still whilst [Pg 308]France continued to arm and to threaten. She must,
    if the present situation were prolonged, take measures
    to safeguard her interests. This communication probably
    reached Louis Philippe on October 19. So long
    as he had believed that Mehemet Ali was capable of
    offering a serious resistance to the allied Powers, he
    had approved of the menacing attitude of his government.
    But, when the Pasha’s impotence was made
    manifest, he realized the expediency of adopting
    different tactics. He understood the difficulties of
    M. Thiers’ position. Already the more extreme of the
    various groups composing his parliamentary majority
    were beginning to testify their displeasure at the
    pacific tone of his despatch of October 8, which had
    been published in the English papers. At the approaching
    meeting of the Chambers heated and violent
    recriminations were to be apprehended. Louis Philippe,
    however, had also perceived that, notwithstanding the
    clamour of the newspapers, a healthy current of public
    opinion was running in the direction of peace. People
    were beginning to realize that, under existing conditions,
    war and revolution were synonymous terms.
    Some of M. Thiers’ colleagues had, moreover, it is said,
    privately intimated that, if peace were to be maintained,
    the King must take upon himself to dismiss his
    present ministers.[656] But the adoption of this disinterested
    advice was fraught with certain unpleasant
    consequences. For the past fortnight the Constitutionel,
    M. Thiers’ chief organ, had been insinuating
    that all his efforts to uphold the honour and dignity
    of France were frustrated by the Sovereign. The
    King was, therefore, under no illusions as to the
    manner in which his minister purposed to cover his
    retreat.


The Chambers were to assemble on October 28. [Pg 309]M. Thiers, about a week before, submitted to Louis
    Philippe a draft of the proposed Speech from the
    Throne. It contained a distinctly warlike paragraph,
    and announced that 150,000 more men would be
    called up for service with the colours. The King
    objected, and whilst the matter was under discussion,
    he received Lord Melbourne’s letter. It is very possible
    that a perusal of its contents may have served to
    overcome his last hesitations. He refused to employ
    the language which his minister proposed to place
    in his mouth. M. Thiers, thereupon, tendered his
    resignation, which was promptly accepted. Marshal
    Soult agreed to form a new government, of which the
    real head was to be M. Guizot, the French ambassador
    in London, into whose charge the King had
    confided the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.


M. Thiers was not wholly responsible for the position
    in which France found herself at the time of his
    downfall. When he took office, the mistakes of his
    predecessor had already carried the country a great
    distance upon the road to isolation. Nevertheless,
    the brief period of his second administration affords an
    instructive example of the many mistakes which a
    very able man may commit. The two principal
    objects which he set himself to achieve were utterly
    incompatible. He sincerely desired to retain the
    friendship of Great Britain and, at the same time, he
    proposed to establish Mehemet Ali as the ruler of an
    independent State, which was to owe its separate
    existence to French patronage. But, inasmuch as
    Lord Palmerston was resolved to drive the Pasha out
    of Syria and greatly to restrict his power, he was
    obliged to seek to attain his ends by tortuous methods.
    Thus, whilst he strove to prolong and to embarrass the
    negotiations in London, he endeavoured secretly, and
    in flagrant violation of the collective note of July 27,
    1839, to cajole the Porte into conceding the demands [Pg 310]of the Pasha. He was able to persuade himself that
    the young Sultan and his ministers, rather than follow
    the congenial advice of the Powers which desired to
    curb the ambition of Mehemet Ali, would listen to the
    unpalatable counsels of France, the friend of their
    arch-enemy the Viceroy of Egypt. A policy founded
    upon so erroneous a conception of human nature was
    fore-doomed to failure. The intrigues of the French
    agents at Alexandria and Constantinople[657] were exposed,
    the correspondence of M. Coste found its way
    into Lord Palmerston’s drawer at the Foreign Office,
    and the treaty between the four Powers and the Porte
    was concluded on July 15.


But M. Thiers was guilty of another error. He, the
    student of war, the Napoleon civil, as Metternich named
    him, altogether failed to understand the strategic situation
    in the East. Unlike Lord Palmerston, who foresaw
    that the Pasha’s position in Syria would be
    untenable, from the moment that he was deprived of
    the command of the sea, Thiers conceived it possible
    that Ibrahim could assume the offensive in Asia Minor,
    and at the same time maintain, in the midst of a
    hostile population and through a most difficult country,
    his communications with Egypt. His plans were,
    accordingly, based upon the supposition that the
    Powers would experience serious difficulty in expelling
    the Egyptians from Syria. The Pasha’s resistance, he
    was confident, would not be overcome before the winter,
    and would, doubtless, necessitate the intervention of a
    Russian army. But, were the Tsar to despatch a large
    force to Asia Minor, national jealousies and suspicion
    would be aroused. Then France, having completed
    her military preparations, could enter upon the scene
    and impose her will upon a disunited and disheartened
    coalition. In pursuance of this plan, M. Thiers made
    divers attempts to draw the chief Italian States into [Pg 311]an alliance with France. But his proposals were unheeded
    both at Turin and at Naples.[658] In one direction
    only would his overtures appear to have met with any
    response. King Otho, the young Bavarian prince
    whom the protecting Powers had placed upon the
    throne of Greece, attracted by the prospect of obtaining
    Crete, seems to have promised to invade Thessaly,
    whenever France should give the signal for a general
    outbreak of hostilities.[659]


But all these schemes were rendered abortive by
    the state of impotence to which Ibrahim was reduced
    by the arrival of the British fleet in Syrian waters.
    After the success of Stopford’s operations at Beyrout,
    M. Thiers was forced either to resign or to plunge
    France, with King Otho for her only ally, into a war
    with the whole of Europe. It is impossible to believe
    that he can ever have thought seriously of adopting
    this last alternative. But Louis Philippe’s unalterable
    resolution to maintain the peace made it safe for him
    to advocate a bellicose policy, seeing that he would
    never be called upon to carry it out. By proposing
    certain warlike measures, such as the seizure of the
    Balearic Islands and a large increase of the army, he
    intended to compel the King to dismiss him. Thus
    he would be enabled to escape from the difficulties
    in which he was involved, whilst upon Louis Philippe
    would rest the reproach of having tamely submitted
    to the dictation of Lord Palmerston.


The injury done to the House of Orleans was not,
    however, the only consequence of M. Thiers’ proceedings
    in 1840. His warlike declamations and the frequent
    allusions in his newspapers to the left bank of
    the Rhine awoke recollections in Germany which had [Pg 312]slumbered for a generation. The amazing popularity
    of Becker’s Song of the Rhine[660] testifies to the strength
    of the national sentiment which the French threats had
    aroused. The significance of this, and other manifestations
    of German feeling, did not escape Prince
    Metternich. “M. Thiers,” he wrote bitterly, “likes
    to be compared to Napoleon. With respect to Germany
    he resembles him closely, indeed, he may justly
    be said to surpass him. In six weeks he has accomplished
    as much in that country as the Emperor
    during ten years of war and oppression.”[661]


The Soult-Guizot Cabinet had been formed upon
    the basis of the maintenance of peace. But innumerable
    difficulties confronted it. Whilst pursuing a
    strictly pacific policy, ministers could not afford to
    disregard the national susceptibilities which the events
    of the past few months had aroused. Guizot, accordingly,
    before leaving London, and after his return to
    France, declared constantly that the fate of the new
    ministry was in the hands of the British government.
    If only he could be enabled to state that the Powers
    were prepared to make concessions to M. Thiers’ successors,
    which they would not have made to M. Thiers
    himself, he was confident that he could defeat his
    opponents. But, if it were resolved rigorously to
    execute the treaty against Mehemet Ali, he and his
    colleagues would surely be overwhelmed and the King
    would be forced to call the war party into his counsels.
    Without doubt, his friends Reeve and Greville proved
    most useful in propagating this opinion.[662] Palmerston,
    however, was quite unmoved. He scouted the notion
    that France would resort to extreme measures in
    defence of the Pasha, and he was determined that the [Pg 313]British interests, involved in the expulsion of Mehemet
    Ali from Syria, should not be sacrificed in order to
    strengthen the parliamentary position of a foreign
    government.


At the time of M. Thiers’ resignation, his despatch
    of October 8 was still unanswered. But, before M.
    Guizot had been long installed at the Foreign Office,
    he received Lord Palmerston’s reply to it. The contents
    of this document caused him the greatest irritation.
    After exposing with remorseless logic the
    fallacies of M. Thiers’ arguments, Palmerston laid
    down the principle that the future government of
    Egypt concerned the Porte alone. He has generally
    been blamed for not employing a more conciliatory
    tone in this, his first important communication with
    M. Guizot, who was not responsible for the opinions
    of his predecessor in office. Palmerston, however, had
    two distinct objects in view, and it is open to question
    whether he would have attained his ends, had he
    employed less uncompromising language. His despatches,
    both of November 2 and November 20, were
    clearly written with the purpose of convincing M. Guizot
    of the necessity of regarding Syria as altogether
    lost to Mehemet Ali, and of thus putting an end to
    the efforts which were being made to preserve for him
    the southern portion of Palestine. Secondly, by intimating
    that the Pasha’s reinstatement in the government
    of Egypt would depend upon his prompt compliance
    with the Sultan’s demands, Palmerston evidently
    intended to force M. Guizot to exert all his influence
    over Mehemet Ali in favour of a complete surrender.[663]


Events, meanwhile, had been moving rapidly in
    Syria. Before the middle of October the Turkish flag
    waved once more over Beyrout and Saïda, the ancient
    Sidon, whilst Napier, at the head of a Turkish division [Pg 314]and some detachments of British and Austrian marines,
    completely defeated and put to flight the redoubtable
    Ibrahim. As early as October 5, Palmerston had
    desired the Lords of the Admiralty to advise Sir Robert
    Stopford of the importance of promptly restoring the
    fortress of Acre to the Sultan.[664] The allied commanders
    appear to have been somewhat undecided as to the
    propriety of attacking this famous stronghold, the key
    of Syria. In view of the lateness of the season, Stopford
    himself was very reluctant to embark upon operations
    against it.[665] But Palmerston’s despatch overcame
    his irresolution and induced him to listen to the bolder
    counsels of Napier, Walker, and Jochmus. Acre, which
    had successfully resisted Bonaparte and which had
    held Ibrahim in check for six months, surrendered, on
    November 3, to the British admiral after an engagement
    of a few hours’ duration. The moment the news
    reached London, Stopford was directed to send “a competent
    officer” to Mehemet Ali to signify to him that,
    provided he would restore the Turkish fleet and give
    an undertaking in writing to evacuate Syria, Adana,
    Arabia, the Holy Cities and Crete, the Powers would
    recommend the Porte to reappoint him to the governorship
    of Egypt.[666] But, before these instructions could
    take effect, Napier, who had arrived off Alexandria with
    his squadron, had seen fit to conclude, upon his own
    responsibility, an agreement with Mehemet Ali. In
    this unauthorized convention, which was signed on
    November 27, it was stipulated that the Pasha should
    surrender the Turkish fleet and evacuate Syria, on the
    understanding that the four Powers in return would [Pg 315]guarantee to him the hereditary tenure of the Pashalic
    of Egypt.[667]


Napier, who was a strong Radical, appears to have
    been privately urged by certain members of the
    Cabinet to seize the first opportunity of concluding a
    peace with Mehemet Ali.[668] But, whatever his reasons
    may have been for acting in so irregular a manner, the
    main provisions of his treaty, unquestionably, accorded
    with the instructions sent to Stopford on November 14.
    Palmerston, in consequence, decided to signify his
    approval of the arrangement, with one important
    reservation.[669] Under no circumstances “could Great
    Britain singly, or the four Powers jointly, guarantee
    to a subject a grant of administrative authority made
    to him by his Sovereign, within the dominions of that
    Sovereign.” But at Constantinople Napier’s proceedings
    aroused the greatest indignation, and the Sublime
    Porte, with the full concurrence of the ambassadors
    of the Powers, pronounced the convention null and
    void.[670] The same course was adopted by Stopford, who
    sent Captain Fanshawe, his flag captain, to Alexandria
    to declare that the convention of November 27 could
    not be ratified, and that Mehemet Ali must submit
    unconditionally to the terms which the Powers were
    prepared to offer to him.[671]


Mehemet Ali could not do otherwise than yield.
    The fall of Acre had decided the fate of Syria. Fanshawe’s
    task was thus easy of execution, and, on
    December 16, he arrived at Constantinople bringing [Pg 316]with him a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand
    Vizier, in which the Pasha conceded every demand and,
    with regard to Egypt, threw himself upon the generosity
    of the Sultan.[672] The Turkish ministers, however,
    were little disposed to show mercy to a fallen enemy
    who, in the days of his strength, had caused them so
    much anxiety. Nor were the British ambassador and
    the Austrian internuncio in favour of treating Mehemet
    Ali leniently. But Metternich had been terribly
    alarmed by the French armaments, and had sent strict
    instructions to his agent at Constantinople to terminate
    the eastern question with as little delay as possible.
    Baron Stürmer was, in consequence, reluctantly obliged
    to counsel the Porte to confer upon the Pasha the
    hereditary tenure of Egypt. Ponsonby, however, was
    more tenacious of his opinions, and, although Palmerston,
    after the Cabinet Council of October 10, had
    directed him to advise the Turkish government to grant
    the heredity to Mehemet Ali,[673] he declined to join with
    his colleagues in pressing the Porte to adopt
    this measure. He was doubtful, he declared, whether
    the Pasha’s letter to the Grand Vizier should be
    regarded as an act of complete submission. Before
    pronouncing a decided opinion upon that point, he
    must wait in order to see whether the Pasha by his
    actions intended to prove the sincerity of his promises.[674] But, on January 10, 1841, he received Palmerston’s
    despatch on the subject of Napier’s convention, wherein
    it was distinctly laid down that Great Britain approved
    of the principle of conferring the heredity upon
    Mehemet Ali.[675] This second intimation of the views
    of his government was too clear for even Ponsonby [Pg 317]to venture upon disregarding it. He was, in consequence,
    obliged to advise the Porte to make the
    required concession. The Turkish ministers no sooner
    perceived that the Powers were unanimously in favour
    of it, than they promised to take the necessary steps
    for investing Mehemet Ali with the hereditary government
    of Egypt.[676]


Two days before this concession was extorted from
    the Porte, Mehemet Ali surrendered the Ottoman fleet
    to the commissioners sent to receive it. Furthermore,
    he gave the necessary orders for the evacuation of
    Crete and the other territories which he had promised
    to restore to the Sultan. His son Ibrahim, with the
    remnants of the army of Syria, had by this time
    arrived at Gaza, on the Egyptian frontier. He had
    himself been attacked by jaundice, and his troops had
    suffered cruelly in their retreat.[677] But their losses
    would have been far heavier, had it not been for the
    Napier Convention. The British officers employed in
    Syria had considered themselves in honour bound to
    observe the armistice, which was one of the conditions
    of that irregular agreement.[678]


Mehemet Ali having thus made his submission, it
    remained only to determine the conditions under
    which the hereditary governorship of Egypt should be
    conferred upon him. The Porte was very naturally
    desirous to circumscribe in every possible way, the
    powers which it had reluctantly consented to delegate.
    Some weeks, accordingly, were spent in discussing the
    affair with the ambassadors. But, at last, on February
    13, 1841, the Porte issued a firman of investiture, [Pg 318]and sent off a special envoy to Egypt to present it to
    Mehemet Ali.[679]


The French government, meanwhile, rigidly
    abstained from any kind of interference, M. Guizot
    from the tribune of the Chamber declared his
    intention of preserving the peace, whilst at the same
    time maintaining the armaments which, by reason of
    her isolation, France could not afford to reduce. The
    Opposition inveighed fiercely against the attitude
    which the government proposed to adopt. M. Thiers
    gave his version of the negotiations and protested
    that, had he been able to remain in office, he would
    have armed upon a gigantic scale, not only in order to
    prevent the execution of the Treaty of July, but in
    order to obtain a revision of the territorial settlement
    of 1815. To support their statements, he and his
    former colleagues recklessly divulged the contents
    of confidential documents, and disclosed military
    secrets.[680] Nevertheless, ministers obtained a majority
    in both Chambers on the question of their foreign
    policy. The attention of the assembly, during the
    remainder of the session, was chiefly directed to
    matters connected with the fortification of Paris.
    The enormous expenditure entailed by that measure,
    and by the other military preparations of M. Thiers
    had a very sobering effect upon the popular Chamber.
    The crisis, it was computed, would cost the country
    not less than one hundred and fifty millions of
    francs.[681]


No sooner had M. Guizot emerged successfully
    from the initial stages of the parliamentary struggle,
    than he applied himself diligently to the task of
    bringing back France into the Concert of the Powers. [Pg 319]The German Courts, he was well aware, were most
    anxious to terminate a situation pregnant with
    dangerous possibilities. In the eyes of Metternich
    and of Baron Werther, the Prussian minister,
    the isolation of France threatened the peace of
    Europe, and, in order to put an end to it, they were
    prepared to settle “tant bien que mal,”[682] the eastern
    question. Under ordinary circumstances the Tsar
    Nicholas might have been expected to oppose the
    resumption by France of her place in the Concert of
    the Powers. But he had now strong reasons of his
    own for desiring that her isolation should cease. He
    had instructed Brunnow to undertake that the Treaty
    of Unkiar-Skelessi should not be renewed, because
    experience had proved that it was of no practical
    value.[683] The Cabinet of St. Petersburg had arrived at
    the conclusion that, for the better protection of the
    southern provinces of Russia, the question of the
    Dardanelles should be regulated by some European
    agreement. But no compact of that nature would be
    likely to endure, unless France were to be made a
    party to it.[684]


Although it suited Nicholas that France should
    re-enter the European Concert, his dislike of Louis
    Philippe, and of the régime of July was as strong as
    ever. Whilst proposing to close the eastern question
    with some “final transaction to which France might
    be invited to adhere,”[685] he also suggested that the
    treaty for the pacification of the Levant should be
    converted into a quadruple alliance, “providing
    against the contingency of an attack by France
    upon the liberties of Europe.” His main reason, he
    informed Lord Clanricarde, for making this proposal, [Pg 320]was to establish a close understanding with Great
    Britain.[686] Metternich had not “the spirit of a
    gentleman,” and neither England nor Russia ought to
    place any confidence in him.[687] The British government,
    however, was unable to entertain the suggestion.
    “All formal engagements of the Crown,” Lord
    Clanricarde was instructed to explain, “must be
    submitted to Parliament, and Parliament might not
    approve of an engagement which should bind England
    prospectively.” Nor was there any way in which this
    difficulty could be overcome. It would not be
    removed by the verbal agreement into which the
    Imperial Cabinet had declared its readiness to enter,
    should the constitutional obstacles to the conclusion
    of a more formal compact prove insuperable. “A
    verbal engagement would bind the ministers who
    made it, but might be disavowed by their successors,
    and thus the Russian government might be led
    to count upon a system of policy which might
    not eventually be pursued. . . . Under these circumstances,”concluded Lord Palmerston, “it seems to
    Her Majesty’s government that the Cabinet of St.
    Petersburg should be satisfied to trust to the general
    tendency of the policy of Great Britain, which leads
    her to watch over the maintenance of the balance of
    power.”[688]


Whether or not M. Guizot obtained any inkling of
    the Tsar’s proposals, he appears to have ascertained
    quickly that the three absolute Courts wished to close
    the eastern question in order that France should resume
    her place in the Concert. But he was very far from
    certain whether Lord Palmerston’s views coincided
    with those of his continental allies. He was not without
    fear that it might be the secret intention of Great [Pg 321]Britain to drive Mehemet Ali out of Egypt. From the
    moment he had taken office, he had declared that the
    fate of Syria must be left to the chances of war, but
    that no French government could acquiesce in the
    expulsion of the Pasha from his Egyptian governorship.
    So long, however, as France maintained her armaments
    Metternich would be most unlikely to consent to any
    further measures of hostility against Mehemet Ali.
    Thus by playing upon the fears of the German Courts,
    he could bring considerable pressure to bear upon
    Palmerston. Nor was it only in this way that he
    proposed to counteract the schemes which he suspected
    the British minister of harbouring. Lord Holland was
    dead, and the French party was greatly discredited,
    but he could still depend upon the assistance of
    “Bear” Ellice,[689] Greville and his other English friends,
    whenever an opportunity of thwarting Palmerston
    should arise. For the purpose of organizing as much
    opposition as possible to the Foreign Secretary, he had,
    in the month of November, 1840, despatched Baron
    Mounier upon a special mission to London.[690] At the
    same time Baron Bourqueney, the French chargé
    d’affaires, was instructed confidentially to discuss the
    situation with his colleagues, but, under no circumstances,
    was he to make any direct proposals to Lord
    Palmerston. He was constantly to declare that the
    isolation of France must continue, so long as the treaty
    of July should be in existence.


M. Guizot had made no mistake in supposing that
    Palmerston would rather have seen Mehemet Ali deposed [Pg 322]than invested with the hereditary tenure of Egypt.
    But, as he pointed out to the Ottoman ambassador, it
    was his rule in all affairs “to be content with what
    was practical,”[691] and Lord Beauvale’s despatches from
    Vienna made it clear that Metternich would never
    consent to take part in expelling the Pasha from
    Egypt.[692] Palmerston, therefore, accepted the situation
    and was prepared to be satisfied with an arrangement
    which restricted the authority of Mehemet Ali to his
    Egyptian Pashalic. He was opposed to the plan,
    which had been proposed at one time, of inviting
    France to participate in the final settling between the
    Sultan and the Pasha. As the avowed protector of
    Mehemet Ali she could not, he contended, fail to bring
    a dangerous element of discord into the conference.[693] Nevertheless, at the beginning of January, 1841, Baron
    Bourqueney, after having been his guest for a few days
    at Broadlands, felt convinced that “he was really
    anxious to discover some way of bringing back France
    into the concert, although he was still undecided as to
    the manner in which it should be effected.”[694] The
    correctness of this surmise was before long confirmed
    by the event. After the decision of the four Powers
    to press the Porte to confer the heredity upon Mehemet
    Ali had been embodied in the collective note of January
    30, 1841, Palmerston himself took the initiative and
    invited Baron Bourqueney to call upon him at the
    Foreign Office, in order to discuss future arrangements.


The conferences which were thus begun on February
    18 continued until March 5, and resulted in the framing
    of two diplomatic instruments. The first, termed [Pg 323]the protocol, was only to be signed by the representatives
    of the Powers which were parties to the Treaty
    of July 15, 1840. The difficulties which had induced
    the Porte to invoke the assistance of the four Courts
    being now at an end, the wish was recorded “of expressing
    in the most formal manner the respect due to
    the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of
    which it has, at all times, been prohibited for ships of
    war of foreign Powers to enter the straits of the
    Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.” With this principle,
    which was of general and permanent application,
    France was to be formally invited to concur. The
    second document consisted of a treaty, known as
    The Convention of the Straits, according to which
    the Sultan undertook to close the Dardanelles and the
    Bosphorus to the warships of all foreign nations, and
    the Sovereigns of Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria
    and Russia pledged themselves to uphold this ancient
    rule of the Ottoman Empire.[695]


M. Guizot, after the plenipotentiaries had agreed to
    certain small verbal alterations, pronounced himself
    satisfied with both documents. Nevertheless, the full
    powers to sign, which Baron Bourqueney was expecting
    to receive, were not transmitted. For the present, he
    was merely authorized to initial the convention.[696] The
    news had reached Paris that Mehemet Ali was greatly
    displeased with the conditions attached to his firman of investiture, and that he had, in consequence, refused
    to accept it. The decree in question had never been
    submitted to the approval of the ambassadors at
    Constantinople, and it now appeared that the heredity,
    which it professed to confer, was of an entirely fictitious
    nature. At the death of Mehemet Ali, it was provided
    that his successor was to be chosen by the Sultan from
    among any of his descendants. Furthermore, the [Pg 324]appointment of all officers of the Egyptian army, above
    the rank of captain, was to be regulated by the Porte.
    Lastly, the Pasha complained that the amount of the
    tribute imposed upon him was far too heavy. Rather
    than submit to conditions so humiliating he would once
    more appeal to arms.[697]


Three months elapsed before the points in dispute
    could be settled. Meanwhile, the French government
    resumed its attitude of complete aloofness, and M.
    Guizot declared that no powers to sign could be sent
    to London, so long as the possibility existed that
    coercion might once more be applied to the Pasha
    under the terms of the Treaty of July. To the great
    annoyance of the German Courts, Palmerston was
    resolutely opposed to any declaration that the objects
    of that treaty had been attained. A premature dissolution
    of the alliance, he maintained, would only encourage
    Mehemet Ali to adopt a more defiant attitude,
    and must increase the difficulties of adjusting his
    relations with the Sultan.[698] “A question,” he insisted,
    “could not be really finished merely by saying that it
    was so.”[699] Metternich was compelled reluctantly to
    admit the force of this argument.[700] But, whilst he
    acknowledged the necessity of maintaining the alliance,
    his agents insinuated freely that Palmerston desired to
    embarrass the negotiations, in order to drive Mehemet
    Ali to commit some act of violence.


The conduct of Lord Ponsonby, it must be
    admitted, suggested that his chief had no great wish
    to discover a peaceful solution of the Egyptian
    question. When the news arrived at Constantinople
    that Mehemet Ali had refused to accept the firman, he at [Pg 325]once advised the Porte to hold no further communication
    with him. The Sublime Porte, he declared, need no
    longer fear the military power of Mehemet Ali. “His
    destruction might be the consequence[701] of his again
    venturing to defy the Sultan.” The patience with
    which Lord Palmerston submitted to Ponsonby’s deviations
    from his instructions is undeniably suspicious.
    It is practically certain, however, that no secret understanding
    existed between them. Palmerston’s personal
    views with regard to Mehemet Ali accorded so completely
    with those of his agent, that he was induced to
    regard with a lenient eye his reluctance to carry out a
    distasteful task. But, whilst treating him with great
    forbearance, he never allowed Lord Ponsonby to
    impose his opinions upon him. On January 26, 1841,
    in a despatch endorsed by Queen Victoria with the
    significant words “highly approved,”[702] he told him
    plainly that his counsels to the Porte were not in
    harmony with his instructions. Again, on March 16,
    he prescribed the necessity of overcoming the obstacles
    to a settlement so emphatically, that Ponsonby wrote
    in reply, that he perceived that “the end which he
    was expected to attain was the arrangement of this
    affair with Mehemet Ali at any rate” (sic).[703] Nor can
    it reasonably be contended that his tone changed after
    the Pasha’s refusal to accept the conditions of the firman of investiture. On the contrary, in his
    instructions of April 10, he laid stress upon the
    necessity of adjusting the points in dispute with
    as little delay as possible, and absolutely dissented
    from Ponsonby’s view that the Sultan should hold no
    direct communication with Mehemet Ali.[704]


Ponsonby was, therefore, obliged to join with his [Pg 326]colleagues in advising the Porte to modify the firman of February 13. Their representations, combined with
    an intimation from Baron Stürmer that Austria[705] would
    withdraw from the alliance if her counsels were disregarded,
    soon produced the desired effect. On April
    14, Ponsonby was able to report that the Divan had
    decided that the succession of Mehemet Ali should
    be regulated in accordance with the principle of
    primogeniture, that he should have the power of
    dealing with the promotion of all officers below the
    rank of brigadier-general, and that the amount of his
    tribute should be reduced.[706] Nevertheless, some weeks
    elapsed before the Porte could be induced to embody
    these concessions in a new firman. For this delay
    Ponsonby was in no way responsible. On the
    contrary, he appears to have entered a vigorous
    protest against the procrastinating policy of the
    Turkish ministers.[707] Greatly to Metternich’s annoyance,
    however, Palmerston persisted in refusing to
    declare that the objects of the Treaty of July had
    been fully achieved. The French government, therefore,
    continued to withhold from Baron Bourqueney
    the authority to sign the Convention of the Straits.
    But M. Guizot was consumed with anxiety to conclude
    the affair, and in consequence of Palmerston’s attitude
    he was now compelled to instruct his agents in Egypt
    to urge Mehemet Ali to accept the amended firman,
    which they were to declare was no longer open to any
    reasonable objections.[708]


Mehemet Ali was too astute to offer any further
    resistance. On July 8, 1841, Ponsonby’s singularly
    laconic despatch reached London, announcing “the
    satisfactory intelligence”[709] that the Pasha had accepted [Pg 327]the new firman, and had made a complete submission
    to the Sultan. The representatives of the Powers
    which were parties to the Treaty of July, thereupon,
    affixed their signatures to the protocol, which they
    had initialed four months before, announcing that the
    objects of their alliance had been fully attained.
    Three days later the isolation of France was formally
    terminated. On July 13, the plenipotentiaries of
    Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and France
    signed the Convention of the Straits by which their
    respective Sovereigns pledged themselves to uphold
    the principle of the closure of the Dardanelles and the
    Bosphorus to the warships of the Powers.


The conclusion of the Convention of the Straits
    was the last important act of the Melbourne government.
    After sustaining a defeat on the sugar question,
    on May 18, ministers, in the subsequent motion of
    want of confidence brought forward by Sir Robert
    Peel, found themselves in a minority of one. At the
    general elections which followed, the Conservatives
    obtained a decisive victory. The Whigs, in consequence,
    retired from office, and Lord Palmerston was
    replaced at the Foreign Office by Lord Aberdeen.


Palmerston’s conduct of the Turco-Egyptian affair
    has been the subject of much adverse criticism. M.
    Thureau-Dangin and other French writers have asserted
    that his eastern policy, in 1840, was based upon the
    desire deliberately to injure France. The Treaty of
    July, they contend, was simply a retaliation upon
    Louis Philippe, because he had declined to interfere
    more actively in the civil war in Spain. Nor does
    Palmerston escape censure at the hands of the chief
    English historian of this period. Sir Spencer Walpole,[710] re-echoing the views of Lord Holland and the French
    party, charges him with having sacrificed the greater
    to the lesser object. The good understanding with [Pg 328]France, which Palmerston compromised so recklessly,
    was a matter, he argues, of far more importance to
    England than any question connected with the rule of
    the Sultan or of the Pasha over Syria and Arabia.
    Furthermore, he accuses him of inconsistency. His
    alliance with the absolute Courts, in 1840, was a complete
    negation of the policy which, in 1834, had led
    him to conclude the Quadruple Treaty with Liberal
    France for the maintenance of constitutionalism in
    Spain and Portugal.


To these different charges there are certain obvious
    answers. It has been shown that Palmerston, far
    from maliciously desiring to exclude France from the
    treaty for the pacification of the Levant, honestly
    endeavoured to persuade her to combine with Great
    Britain, and the other Powers in the affair. It was
    only when he perceived that M. Thiers was secretly
    working to establish conditions in the Mediterranean,
    which could not fail to have a prejudicial effect upon
    his country’s highest interests, that he decided to act
    without her. He by no means undervalued the
    importance of good relations with France, but, in
    order to preserve them, he was not prepared to shut
    his eyes to proceedings which might some day imperil
    the safety of British India. The public statements of
    M. Thiers and of certain of his colleagues are alone
    sufficient to justify Lord Palmerston’s policy in 1840.
    Under the question as to whether Syria and Arabia
    should be restored to the direct rule of the Sultan,
    which Sir Spencer Walpole dismisses as a secondary
    consideration, lay the question as to whether a great
    naval Power should gain a footing upon the shores of
    the Persian Gulf.


The reasoning by which the same writer seeks to
    justify his accusation of inconsistency is still more
    unconvincing. The Treaty of July was concluded
    for a definite purpose which involved no repudiation [Pg 329]of the principles underlying the Quadruple Treaty of
    1834. Yet Sir Spencer Walpole, apparently, regards
    it as a betrayal of Liberalism that England, in a
    question of eastern policy, should have separated herself
    from a constitutional Power and have allied
    herself with the absolute Courts of Russia, Austria and
    Prussia. Under any circumstances such a contention
    would be difficult to uphold, but when applied to
    France, in 1840, it becomes altogether inadmissible.
    Neither Louis Philippe nor his principal ministers
    were Liberals in the proper sense of the word.
    Treaty engagements notwithstanding, their attitude
    towards the cause of liberty in Spain, although not
    so openly proclaimed, was almost as unsympathetic as
    that of the Cabinets of the autocratic monarchies.
    Louis Philippe, Molé, Guizot and even Thiers, when
    they did not actively oppose it, did nothing to assist
    the development of popular government in Europe.


But whatever verdict may be passed upon
    Palmerston’s Egyptian policy, his rare skill and
    determination in carrying it out must command
    universal admiration. Although ruin, disgrace and
    perhaps impeachment must have been the penalty of
    failure, he never wavered in his resolution to execute
    his treaty in all its details. His indomitable spirit
    stimulated the courage of his allies abroad and
    triumphed over the opposition of his fellow-ministers
    at home. When he quitted the Foreign Office British
    prestige stood at a height which it had not reached
    since the Battle of Waterloo. His most persistent
    detractors had been forced to admit the correctness
    of his military judgment and his prescience in treating
    as of no account the warlike threats of Louis Philippe
    and of M. Thiers.


“Palmerston,” wrote Reeve regretfully, “has
    bowled out every one.”[711] Charles Greville was [Pg 330]moved to enthusiasm. “The elder Pitt,” he records,
    “could not have manifested more decision and resource.
    Success is much more attributable to Palmerston than
    to our naval and military commanders, and, probably,
    solely to him.”[712]




 [Pg 331]


 CHAPTER IX


THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING


Lord Aberdeen, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs
    in Sir Robert Peel’s Cabinet, had held the same office
    in the government of the Duke of Wellington. He
    had had to deal, as will be remembered, with the
    question of the recognition of Louis Philippe and with
    the attitude which England was to observe towards
    the revolution in Belgium. His first experience of
    diplomacy had been gained in the days of the great
    war. In 1813, as quite a young man, he had been
    sent upon a special mission to Vienna, and had been
    concerned in the negotiations which had resulted in
    the entry of Austria into the coalition. During the
    campaign in Germany he had accompanied the headquarters
    of the allied armies and had been profoundly
    impressed by the scenes of which he had been a
    witness. Whether justified or not, the belief prevailed
    widely that, should complications arise, the spectacle of
    Leipsic after “the battle of the nations” would be ever
    present before the eyes of England’s Foreign Secretary.[713]


With regard to the more important questions
    which the Foreign Office had in hand, or with which
    it had recently been called upon to deal, Aberdeen
    was in substantial agreement with Palmerston. He
    approved of his policy in the Egyptian affair and
    endorsed his views as to the necessity of encouraging
    Spain to shake off the influence of France. But he
    was at the same time intensely desirous of replacing [Pg 332]Franco-British relations upon their former intimate
    footing, and of allaying the irritation which the
    Treaty of July had aroused. To attain this end he
    was prepared to make far greater concessions than
    any to which Palmerston would have consented. No
    one was so convinced as he of the truth of the
    saying, ascribed to the Duke of Wellington, that the
    peace of Europe would remain unbroken, so long as
    France and England were united. It was not in
    their policies, but in their personal characters, that lay
    the real difference between Aberdeen and Palmerston.
    Aberdeen was by nature conciliatory. Palmerston was
    instinctively combative, and would rarely deny himself
    the pleasure of relentlessly exposing the fallacies of
    an opponent’s arguments. Aberdeen, although in
    some respects more of a Liberal than his predecessor,
    had a scholar’s abhorrence, which had been intensified
    by his former relations with Metternich and other
    continental statesmen, of all movements of a revolutionary
    character. Palmerston was a man of
    coarser fibre, but of wider sympathies, than his grave
    and studious successor.


Notwithstanding the earnest desire of both Lord
    Aberdeen and of M. Guizot to bring matters to a
    successful conclusion, the first important transaction
    between the new British government and the French
    Foreign Office led to no satisfactory result. In 1831,
    and again in 1833, France and England had contracted
    certain engagements towards each other for
    the purpose of suppressing the slave trade. They
    had agreed that their cruisers should stop and overhaul
    any suspected vessel, whether flying the French
    or the British flag. Palmerston, however, had not
    been content with an arrangement, which limited the
    right of search to ships purporting to be of French or
    English nationality. He, accordingly, in combination
    with France, made representations on the subject to [Pg 333]the other Powers and succeeded in inducing them to
    agree to the principle which the French and English
    governments had adopted. The new convention, to
    which all the chief European Powers were to be
    parties, was ready for signature at the time when it
    became evident that a change of government in
    England was about to take place. Palmerston, who
    had always been keenly interested in suppressing the
    slave trade, was particularly anxious that his name
    should be affixed to an international agreement which,
    he hoped, would prove the means of abolishing a
    traffic which he abhorred. M. Guizot, however, saw
    fit purposely to delay matters in order to deprive him
    of this satisfaction. Nor did he make any secret of
    his reasons for acting in this manner. Palmerston’s
    attitude towards him, he complained to Henry Bulwer,
    had been unfriendly. In his dispatch of November 2,
    1840,[714] he had shown a total lack of consideration for
    the difficulties of his position, and in a recent speech
    to his constituents at Tiverton he had made some
    highly offensive remarks about the manner in which
    the French military authorities in Algeria were carrying
    on their war with the Arab tribes.[715]


But, once Lord Aberdeen was installed in Downing
    Street, M. Guizot’s objections to proceeding with the
    slave trade convention disappeared. The necessary
    powers were sent to Sainte-Aulaire, the French
    ambassador, and, on December 20, 1841, the treaty,
    regulating the right of search, was signed in London.
    It was soon clear, however, that M. Guizot had been [Pg 334]mistaken in supposing that the Chamber would agree
    to ratify the agreement into which he had entered.
    The opposition to slavery had never been so pronounced
    in France as in England, and the Treaty
    of July had greatly stimulated the old feeling of
    jealousy of British maritime supremacy. By reason
    of England’s naval preponderance, the duty of
    stopping suspected vessels must necessarily devolve
    chiefly upon her officers. Both in the French
    Chambers and in the press it was hotly contended
    that the new treaty was but a device, by means of
    which England purposed to arrogate to herself the
    right of policing the sea. So keen was this feeling
    that M. Guizot was forced to inform the British
    government that France would be unable to ratify.
    Popular opposition, it was thought, would diminish
    with time, and the protocol was accordingly kept open,
    in the hope that France might still become a party to
    the treaty. But this expectation was not fulfilled,
    and on November 9, 1842, the definite withdrawal
    of France was officially communicated to Lord
    Aberdeen. The affair caused no little resentment and
    disappointment in England. Three years later, however,
    M. Guizot was enabled to re-open the question.
    By that time the relations of the two countries were
    upon a more friendly footing, and the Duc de Broglie
    and Dr. Lushington, the commissioners of their
    respective governments, succeeded, in consequence, in
    arriving at an agreement. The new treaty, signed on
    May 29, 1845, fulfilled all the essential conditions of
    previous conventions, but provided that, in future, the
    right of search in African waters should be exercised
    by a joint Franco-British squadron.[716]


Spanish affairs, however, were destined to be the
    question which was to occupy the chief attention of
    the two governments. It has been related how, in the [Pg 335]autumn of 1840, Christina had been forced to quit
    Spain, and how, in the spring of the following year,
    the Cortes had elected Espartero sole Regent of the
    kingdom. This solution of the difficulty was by no
    means acquiesced in as satisfactory by all parties.
    The elevation of the popular general to the head of
    the government was necessarily regarded as a victory
    for the Progressistas and, consequently, as a triumph
    for English diplomacy. Indeed, since the abdication of
    the Queen-Mother, the Moderados, as a parliamentary
    party, had almost ceased to exist. But their leaders
    still continued to correspond with Christina, whose
    house in the Rue de Courcelles in Paris soon became
    the centre of a vast conspiracy against the new
    Regent.


Whilst it was thus a matter of common notoriety
    that the Moderado chiefs, together with General
    Narvaez and other military rivals of Espartero, were
    plotting in Paris[717] to overthrow the new order of
    affairs in Spain, the question of the young Queen’s
    marriage suddenly sprang into prominence. Isabella
    was not yet twelve years of age, but already the
    selection of her husband was the subject of grave
    deliberations in Paris and in London. Christina had
    always considered it to be vitally important that her
    daughter should marry a member of one of the
    great reigning families. As far back as the year
    1838, at a most critical period of the civil war, when
    it was evident that no assistance was to be expected
    from Louis Philippe, she had suggested to the British
    minister that Isabella might be affianced to an
    English prince. If the difficulties arising from the
    difference of religion should prove insurmountable, she
    would be satisfied with the betrothal of her daughter
    to a member of the House of Coburg, “on account of
    the excellent education which the princes of that [Pg 336]family had received, and on account of their near
    connection with Her Britannic Majesty.”[718] Villiers
    was without instructions upon the point, but he took
    upon himself to declare unhesitatingly that the
    English match could never be effected. Christina,
    thereupon, announced her intention of marrying her
    daughter to a son of the Archduke Charles of
    Austria. It was a combination which, “she was now
    convinced, afforded the best means of pacifying the
    country.” The negotiations at Vienna, she informed
    him, would be entrusted to M. de Cea Bermúdez and
    their success would largely depend upon the amount
    of support given them by the British government.[719]


Palmerston, upon receiving Villiers’ despatch,
    immediately conveyed to him “Her Majesty’s gracious
    approbation of the course which he had pursued.”[720] At
    the same time, he informed him that the British
    government could not possibly take part in M. de
    Cea’s negotiations at Vienna, “without in the first
    instance communicating thereupon with the government
    of France and, as the King of the French
    would be extremely averse to such a marriage, it was
    not probable that such a communication would contribute
    much to the accomplishment of the object.”
    Nor was there any likelihood, he predicted, that the
    Austrian Cabinet would entertain the offer. This
    view of the case was soon borne out by the event.
    Metternich at once disclaimed any intention of
    listening to Christina’s proposals, whilst M. Molé, who,
    notwithstanding the secrecy which had been observed,
    was aware of the reasons of M. de Cea’s presence at
    Vienna, declared to Lord Granville that “the armed
    intervention of France would, undoubtedly, be the [Pg 337]consequence of any attempt to place an Austrian
    prince upon the throne of Spain.”[721]


The triumph of the constitutionalists and the
    termination of the civil war necessarily invested
    Isabella with an importance which she had not
    possessed, whilst the issue of the struggle was
    uncertain. Once the stability of her throne seemed
    assured, she appeared to Louis Philippe in the light of
    a most eligible daughter-in-law. In the month of
    November, 1839, Christina’s former minister, Count
    Toreno, was understood to be engaged in negotiating
    a marriage between a son of the King of the French
    and the young Queen of Spain. The scheme, reported
    the British chargé d’affaires, had numerous supporters.
    But the Queen Regent had informed him privately
    that “she was hostile to the match and had other
    views for her daughter.”[722] It is probable that
    Christina was perfectly sincere in thus declaring her
    intentions to Mr. Southern. Nor is there any reason
    to suppose that, after her abdication, her objections to
    the French marriage diminished. But, inasmuch as
    she was residing in Paris and hoped to obtain the
    assistance of Louis Philippe to her schemes for overturning
    Espartero, she was necessarily compelled to
    conceal her real sentiments. The re-establishment of
    French ascendancy at the Court of Madrid occupied a
    foremost place in the policy both of the King and of
    M. Guizot. So long, however, as Espartero and the Progressistas were in power there was little prospect
    that they would be enabled to bring their plans to
    a successful conclusion. Under the circumstances,
    therefore, they were disposed to regard with a friendly
    eye the proceedings of the military and Moderado malcontents in Paris. Bulwer strongly suspected that [Pg 338]some kind of a compact existed, whereby Louis Philippe
    promised indirectly to assist the conspirators, and
    Christina, in return, undertook to employ her parental
    influence over Isabella in favour of her marriage with
    the Prince de Joinville or the Duc d’Aumale.[723]


The insurrection against Espartero broke out early
    in October, 1841. The standard of rebellion was
    raised by O’Donnell at Pampeluna and by the generals
    commanding the garrisons of Vittoria and Saragossa.
    But their plans, which had been so carefully matured
    in Paris, miscarried, and the loyal troops experienced
    little difficulty in dispersing their followers and in
    restoring tranquillity. Madrid, in the meanwhile, had
    been the scene of one of the most dramatic episodes in
    recent history. On the night of October 7, Generals
    Concha and Diego Leon, at the head of a band of
    military conspirators, penetrated into the palace with
    the object of carrying off the young Queen. But
    when they attempted to ascend the grand staircase
    they encountered a determined party of halberdiers.
    A furious struggle then ensued. The crash of musketry
    reverberated through the palace, and bullets struck the
    walls of the room in which the terrified Isabella had
    sought refuge with her attendants. But help was
    soon forthcoming. The resistance of the halberdiers
    had enabled the national militia, which was animated
    by strong Liberal and Progressista sentiments, to
    assemble. At the appearance of the citizen soldiers
    the conspirators either fled or laid down their arms.
    Some of their leaders escaped to France, but Leon was
    captured and, a few days later, paid the penalty of his
    treason, his youth, his good looks and his former distinguished
    services earning for him a sympathy which
    the circumstances of his case in no way justified.


 [Pg 339]


“With respect to the share of the French government
    in organizing and promoting this enterprise,”wrote Lord Aberdeen, “I do not think it necessary to
    enter into an enquiry at present. We have received
    the most positive assurances that they have been
    entirely strangers to the undertaking. Whatever may
    be the value of these assurances, the attempt having
    happily failed, there appears to be no advantage in
    testifying suspicion and distrust.”[724] He, accordingly,
    directed Bulwer to do all in his power to persuade
    Olozaga, the Spanish minister, to adopt as moderate a
    tone as possible in his communications with M. Guizot.
    The Spanish government was naturally deeply incensed
    at the encouragement which the conspirators
    had received in Paris, and their representations on the
    subject included a demand for the expulsion of Christina
    from France. This was peremptorily refused and the
    relations of the two countries began to assume a very
    disquieting appearance. In Bulwer’s opinion, were
    Louis Philippe to receive any encouragement from
    Austria or Prussia, he might not improbably embark
    upon a war with Spain. “Should hostilities break
    out,” he warned Lord Aberdeen, “Barcelona would be
    the French objective, on account of the effect which its
    capture would have on those Courts which are fearful
    of the democratic opinions prevailing there.”[725]


Aberdeen’s instructions to Mr. Aston, the British
    minister at Madrid, were of the same nature as those
    transmitted to Bulwer in Paris. He was to warn the
    Spanish ministers of the folly of provoking a rupture
    with France. But, at the same time, he was to assure
    Espartero that “the policy of Great Britain would
    continue to be directed towards the maintenance of
    the real independence of Spain and to her protection [Pg 340]from whatever quarter she might be threatened.”[726] Meanwhile, the British government would make every
    effort to induce the Northern Courts formally to acknowledge
    the sovereignty of Isabella.[727] Whether
    designedly or not, however, the endeavours of Lord
    Aberdeen in this direction were frustrated by France.
    Owing in a great measure to his good offices, the
    Spanish government withdrew its demand for
    Christina’s expulsion.[728] Louis Philippe, thereupon,
    directed M. de Salvandy, who some weeks earlier had
    been appointed ambassador at Madrid, to proceed to
    his post. But this measure, which seemed to foreshadow
    the establishment of more harmonious relations
    between the two countries, led to a most unfortunate
    complication. Salvandy, upon his arrival at Madrid,
    insisted upon being allowed to place his credentials in
    the hands of Isabella herself and absolutely declined to
    present them to Espartero, the Regent. Both sides
    invoked precedents in support of their attitude and
    pressed their arguments with the greatest warmth.
    Finally, Salvandy withdrew from Madrid taking with
    him all the members of his embassy, with the exception
    of his second secretary, the Duc de Glücksberg, a son
    of Louis XVIII.’s favourite minister, the Duc Décazes.


It is unnecessary to discuss the various questions
    of diplomatic etiquette raised in this controversy.
    Whilst, upon the whole, inclining to the French point
    of view, Lord Aberdeen was of opinion that the dispute
    could have been amicably adjusted without great
    difficulty. The attitude of Mr. Aston, he considered,
    had not been altogether satisfactory, and he was
    disposed to impute blame to him for not having
    discovered some basis for a compromise. Not content [Pg 341]with censuring him, he allowed M. Guizot to be
    furnished with a copy of the letter in which his disapproval
    was expressed.[729] When Salvandy was
    appointed to the Court of Madrid Bulwer had described
    him as “a man of letters, but pompous and
    ridiculous in manner and unlikely to acquire an
    influence over the young Queen of Spain.”[730] But, if
    it was the secret desire of Louis Philippe to provoke
    a quarrel with Espartero, he was perhaps the most
    suitable person he could have selected for the purpose.
    The dispute involving, as it was supposed to have done,
    the monarchical principle had effectually dispelled all
    hope that the absolute Powers would agree to renew
    diplomatic relations with the Court of Madrid—a circumstance
    which Louis Philippe, in conversation with
    the British ambassador, affected “to deplore most
    deeply.”[731] So far as France was concerned, however,
    the Duc de Glücksberg was left at Madrid without
    official title, in order merely to carry on the ordinary
    business between the two countries.


But in all matters relating to Spanish affairs the
    question of Isabella’s marriage occupied the foremost
    place. Louis Philippe now protested that he had
    never for a moment entertained the idea of putting
    forward one of his sons as a candidate for her hand.
    But, after making this assertion, he invariably added
    that he should object to her marrying any prince who
    did not belong to either the Spanish or Neapolitan
    branch of the House of Bourbon.[732] Accordingly, in
    February, 1842, he sent M. Pageot, who had been for
    several years first secretary of the French embassy at [Pg 342]Madrid, to London, for the purpose of obtaining the
    accession of the British government to the principle
    that the husband of the Queen of Spain must be a
    descendant of Philip V. After leaving London Pageot
    was to proceed to Vienna, where he was to hold the
    same language to Prince Metternich.


Neither in London nor at Vienna, however, was
    M. Pageot able to bring his mission to a successful
    conclusion. Lord Aberdeen declared emphatically
    that England could not recognize the right of France
    to dispose of the hand of Isabella. The British
    government looked upon the matter “as an exclusively
    Spanish affair, which ought to be regulated solely by
    considerations affecting the happiness of the Queen
    and the welfare of her people.” At these words
    M. Pageot, at once, interposed with the remark that
    he presumed that he was now at liberty to inform his
    government that England would not object to her
    marriage with a French prince. But Aberdeen, with
    equal promptitude, added an important amendment to
    his first statement. The marriage of the Queen of
    Spain with a son of Louis Philippe would, he asserted,
    upset the balance of power, and England would
    always oppose any combination calculated to produce
    political consequences of that nature.[733] Metternich
    was no less emphatic in protesting against the pretensions
    of the King of the French to dictate on such
    a subject to an independent State. Nor was he less
    decided in declaring that the general interests of
    Europe would be endangered by Isabella’s marriage
    with a son of Louis Philippe. In his opinion the
    whole Spanish question might be amicably settled by
    the betrothal of the Queen to a son of Don Carlos,
    without any sacrifice of their respective rights, as in
    the case of Ferdinand and Isabella in the fifteenth [Pg 343]century. This was a view of the case, however, with
    which the British government was unable to concur.
    “Prince Metternich,” wrote Aberdeen,[734] “has been
    misled by a fancied historical analogy. The solution,
    he suggests, might have been productive of good
    whilst the civil war was in progress and whilst Don
    Carlos was in possession of the northern provinces.
    But, now that he and his adherents have been driven
    from Spain as fugitives, it would be regarded with the
    utmost repugnance by the majority of Spaniards.
    A marriage of the Queen with a son of Don Carlos,
    although it might reconcile the personal claims of
    each, would inevitably bring into fierce and hostile
    contact the passions and opinions of their adherents.”


Pageot’s mission, therefore, had done little to
    advance the question of Isabella’s marriage. Meanwhile,
    Count Toreno, Christina’s confidential adviser
    in Paris, had, on several occasions, sought out Lord
    Cowley, the British ambassador, for the express purpose
    of informing him that the Queen-Mother would
    prefer to see her daughter married to a Coburg rather
    than to a Bourbon prince.[735] At the same time
    Espartero was known to be engaged in attempting to
    negotiate her marriage with the third son of the King
    of Bavaria. Louis Philippe, for his part, was more
    than ever determined to restrict her choice of a
    husband to the Bourbon candidates, and, in Lord
    Cowley’s opinion, had serious thoughts “of supporting
    his pretensions by an armament.”[736] It was, however,
    by more indirect methods that he proposed to attain
    his ends. All through the spring and summer of 1842
    the Spanish malcontents, both in Paris and upon the
    frontiers, displayed renewed activity. The Carlists and [Pg 344]the Christinos, having concluded an alliance based
    upon the marriage of Isabella with a son of the
    Pretender, openly prepared for united action against
    their common enemy, the Regent Espartero.[737] This
    compact was, doubtless, the reason of the seeming
    approval, given by Louis Philippe, to Metternich’s
    utterly impracticable plan for settling the Spanish
    difficulty.[738] Neither the representations of the Spanish
    government nor a strong protest from Lord Aberdeen[739] had any effect in inducing the French authorities to place
    any check upon the proceedings of the conspirators.


In November, 1842, a formidable insurrection
    broke out at Barcelona. The rising assumed from the
    outset a republican character, and, in their first conflicts
    with the troops, the insurgents were uniformly
    successful. The arrival of reinforcements, however,
    soon altered the aspect of affairs and enabled General
    Van Halen to re-establish the authority of the Regent.
    Once more Louis Philippe and Christina were loudly
    accused of having promoted the outbreak. The
    Queen-Mother, reported Lord Cowley, undoubtedly
    supplied the revolutionists with money, and General
    Atthalin, a close personal friend of the King and an
    officer of his household, had been in secret communication
    with the organizers of the movement.
    “The Spanish government,” wrote Mr. Aston, “considers
    that the insurrection at Barcelona has been
    promoted by France with the twofold object of preventing
    the conclusion of a commercial treaty with
    Great Britain and of causing the downfall of the
    Regent.[740] The complaints, which the Spanish chargé [Pg 345]d’affaires was instructed to make in Paris, bore
    especially upon the proceedings of M. Ferdinand de
    Lesseps,[741] the French consul at Barcelona, who was
    accused of having actively assisted the insurgents.
    M. Guizot, however, who, according to Lord Cowley,
    had taken no part in these intrigues, defended the
    conduct of Lesseps and directed the Duc de Glücksberg
    to obtain a retractation of the charges brought against
    him from the Cabinet of Madrid.[742] The situation
    thus assumed a very dangerous appearance, and Lord
    Aberdeen intervened once more in the interests of
    peace. Let the Spanish government, he urged, institute
    a calm and dispassionate inquiry into all the
    facts alleged against the French consul and let no
    reparation be demanded of the French government,
    unless there be evidence of his culpability sufficient to
    satisfy all impartial persons.[743] This advice was
    accepted, and, after a thorough examination of all the
    circumstances of the case, a disavowal of certain of
    the more serious charges was inserted in the Gazette at Madrid. Nevertheless, as Lord Aberdeen pointed
    out, “few people could read with impartial attention
    the various documents without coming to the conclusion
    that M. de Lesseps did very considerably
    exceed the limits of his consular duties,” and he,
    therefore, ventured to express the hope that the
    French government “would no longer retain him in
    the place where his undue activity had been displayed.[744]


 [Pg 346]


Under ordinary circumstances, Louis Philippe
    would not have hesitated to dispense with the services
    of a consul, who had shown sympathy with a republican
    insurrection. But it being his secret policy
    to create every kind of embarrassment for Espartero
    he declined to recall M. de Lesseps.[745] The refusal of the
    French government aroused great indignation in Spain
    and materially contributed to increase the difficulties
    which were threatening to overwhelm the Regent.[746] The popular general, the idol of the nation, was now
    an object of execration with all parties. His stern
    repression of anarchy had gained for him the hatred of
    the extreme democrats, whilst his ignorance of the
    principles of representative government had involved
    him in innumerable disputes with the Cortes. The only
    remedy which he could apply to the situation was to
    prorogue the Chambers and assume the powers of a
    military dictator. But the army was no longer his willing
    instrument. The senior officers, with few exceptions,
    held Moderado opinions, and, for the past two years,
    General Narvaez and other agents of Christina had been
    busily engaged in undermining their loyalty. In the
    month of June, 1843, Brigadier Prim raised the cry of
    “Down with Espartero,” to which his troops responded
    eagerly. The revolution spread rapidly. Whilst regiment
    after regiment deserted the cause of the Regent,
    Narvaez appeared before Madrid at the head of a
    division. After a feeble resistance on the part of
    the national militia the capital opened its gates. In
    the south meanwhile, on July 29, Espartero, having
    been abandoned by his troops, embarked at Cadiz on a
    British ship, and sought refuge in England, where he
    was feasted by the City of London and acclaimed by
    the populace.


For some weeks prior to these events the threatening [Pg 347]aspect of affairs had been a frequent subject of discussion
    between Louis Philippe, M. Guizot, and Lord
    Cowley. Both the King and his minister had but one
    remedy to suggest for the many ills from which Spain
    was suffering. Espartero, they declared, would speedily
    find that all his difficulties would disappear, were
    he to devote his whole attention to effecting the
    marriage of Isabella with a Bourbon. If England
    desired to see the dangers now threatening the Regent
    averted, let her join with France in urging him to
    adopt this policy.[747] Aberdeen, however, declined to
    entertain this request. The matter, he maintained,
    was one in which no Foreign Power had a right to
    interfere, whilst, “as to whether the proposed marriage
    would be likely to answer the expectations of those
    who counselled it, Her Majesty’s government did not
    feel called upon to express an opinion.”[748] But as the
    situation in Spain daily increased in gravity, Lord
    Cowley became persuaded that a fresh complication
    was to be apprehended. Should Espartero be overthrown,
    he warned his chief, it was greatly to be feared
    that the victorious party would demand the marriage
    of Isabella with a son of Louis Philippe. If such an
    alliance were to be proposed, the French nation would
    be flattered and might not improbably insist upon the
    offer being accepted, “even at the risk of war.”[749]


The downfall of Espartero and the new danger to
    which Cowley had drawn his attention caused Lord
    Aberdeen’s resolution to waver. He now proposed
    that France and England should unite their efforts for
    the purpose of restoring order in Spain. Under the
    circumstances this was practically an intimation that [Pg 348]he was prepared to reconsider his often-repeated declaration
    that the marriage of Isabella was an exclusively
    Spanish affair. It was certainly interpreted in this
    sense by Louis Philippe and M. Guizot, who accepted
    the offer with the utmost alacrity. It was their policy
    to affect the greatest confidence that, in their hour of
    triumph, Christina and her friends would defer to the
    advice of France in all matters. But in their hearts
    they had doubtless grave misgivings upon the subject,
    and they were, consequently, only too delighted to
    obtain the support of England to their schemes.
    Marshal Sébastiani was at once despatched to London
    to confer upon the situation.[750] He was to assure Lord
    Aberdeen that Louis Philippe would never allow one of
    his sons to marry the Queen of Spain. Personally the
    King would prefer that she should marry a son of Don
    Carlos, but he would not oppose her union with any
    member of either the Spanish or Neapolitan branch of
    the House of Bourbon. Scarcely, however, had the
    marshal arrived in England than it was announced that
    Queen Victoria purposed to pay the king of the French
    a visit at the Château d’Eu, near le Tréport. Her
    Majesty was to be accompanied by her Foreign Secretary,
    who would thus be enabled personally to discuss
    matters with M. Guizot.


The Queen duly arrived at Eu, on September 2,
    and prolonged her stay until the 7th, as the guest of
    the King. In every respect the visit proved an
    immense success.[751] Her Majesty’s affectionate regard
    for Louis Philippe was destined, before long, to
    diminish greatly, but she appears always to have
    looked back with pleasure upon the days spent in
    company with his family at Eu.[752] Although social [Pg 349]amenities were the feature of the visit, Lord Aberdeen
    and M. Guizot were enabled to discuss grave matters
    of State. Both appear to have been equally satisfied
    with the result of their informal conferences,[753] and their
    agreement upon Spanish affairs was afterwards confirmed
    by Aberdeen in an official despatch. “All that
    can at present be done,” he wrote, “is that both governments
    should act cordially and unreservedly together,
    taking for the principle of their conduct the real good
    of Spain, without reference to the supposed separate
    interests of either. . . . Her Majesty’s government are
    still of opinion that to the Queen and the nation
    should be left the selection of the Royal Consort. But
    they will not be found unwilling to offer such friendly
    counsel to the Spanish government as may aid them in
    coming to a sound decision. With this view, although
    Her Majesty’s government cannot admit that the
    preferable claims of any prince or family are such as
    to control the free choice of the Spanish government,
    they would be fully disposed to concur in the proposition
    of the Cabinet of the Tuileries and to recommend
    that the selection of the Queen’s Consort should
    be made from the descendants of Philip V. . . .”[754]


Shortly after the conclusion of the Queen’s visit to
    Eu, M. de Jarnac,[755] the French chargé d’affaires in
    London, was the guest of Lord Aberdeen at Haddo.
    On one occasion his host placed in his hands a letter
    in which he referred to the “cordial understanding,”which he now believed had been established between
    France and England.[756] This designation struck M.
    Guizot as singularly happy, and both he and Louis [Pg 350]Philippe henceforward constantly employed it to
    describe the complete accord existing between the
    French and British governments.


An occasion quickly arose which enabled England
    to show that “the cordial understanding” was, so far
    as she was concerned, no diplomatic fiction. The Duc
    de Bordeaux, more commonly known by the title of
    Comte de Chambord which he shortly afterwards
    assumed, arrived in London, towards the end of
    November. The prince was the posthumous son of
    the Duc de Berri and the sole surviving male representative
    of the elder branch of the Bourbons. No sooner
    was he installed in the house, which had been taken
    for him in Belgrave Square, than hundreds of French
    legitimists flocked to London. They were for the
    most part members of the old noble families, but
    among the pilgrims was M. Berryer, the distinguished
    advocate and parliamentary orator. Even old Chateaubriand,
    who since the Revolution of July had taken no
    part in politics, journeyed to London to testify his
    devotion to the prince, whom he and his party acclaimed
    as Henri V. King of France and Navarre.[757] These
    proceedings aroused considerable excitement in France
    and caused Louis Philippe and his ministers some
    uneasiness. The French ambassador had already been
    instructed to urge that Queen Victoria should refuse to
    receive the young prince, on the ground that it was
    the evident intention of his adherents to give to his
    visit the character of a political demonstration against
    the House of Orleans. The Queen[758] had promptly
    signified  her readiness to comply with this demand.
    It was not possible, however, to accede to a further
    request, made after the arrival of the Duc de Bordeaux
    in London, that the proceedings in Belgrave Square [Pg 351]should be forcibly put a stop to, seeing that they in
    no way infringed the law of England. An intimation
    was, nevertheless, conveyed to His Royal Highness
    that Her Majesty greatly disliked these demonstrations
    and would, in consequence, be pleased to hear that he
    had decided to curtail his stay in London. This
    message produced the required effect. The Duc de
    Bordeaux, a few days later, departed from Belgrave
    Square, and, during the remainder of the time which
    he spent in England, his conduct was irreproachable.[759]


The promptitude with which the Queen and her
    government had responded to his wishes was very
    gratifying to Louis Philippe. In their Speeches from
    the Throne, both Sovereigns, at the opening of their
    respective Parliaments, alluded to “the cordial understanding”
    which had been established between their
    governments. Nevertheless, before the close of the
    session of 1844, the two countries were once more
    upon the brink of war. In the year 1839, a company
    had been formed at Nantes for the purpose of founding
    a French colony in New Zealand. The undertaking
    was supported by the government, which proposed
    annexing both islands. But, before the arrival of the
    French expedition, Captain Hobson proclaimed the
    sovereignty of Her Britannic Majesty over New
    Zealand, and its acquisition was duly notified in the London Gazette of October 2, 1840. The French
    government bowed before the accomplished fact, but
    prepared to seek another outlet in the Pacific. The
    following year, accordingly, a squadron, under the
    command of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, was dispatched
    to take possession of the Marquesas Islands, where
    it was proposed to establish a penal colony. Not
    content, however, with carrying out his instructions [Pg 352]the admiral, upon his own responsibility, proceeded
    to declare a French protectorate over Tahiti, the most
    important of the islands of the Society group. More
    than fifty years before, Tahiti had been visited by the
    first English missionaries. Owing to their unremitting
    efforts, the islanders had gradually been converted
    to the Protestant religion and had acquired civilized
    habits. On two occasions the Sovereign, Queen Pomare,
    had offered to place herself under the protection of the
    British flag, but both Canning and Palmerston had
    declined to accede to her proposal. In August, 1842,
    Admiral Dupetit-Thouars anchored off the island. He
    came to exact reparation for the alleged ill-treatment
    of two French priests. He demanded a large indemnity
    and threatened a bombardment, unless payment were
    made within twenty-four hours. It was altogether
    out of the power of Queen Pomare to comply with
    these conditions. Resistance was, however, out of the
    question. By the advice of the French consul, M.
    Meerenhout, she begged to be allowed to place herself
    under the protection of France. It was M. Meerenhout
    who was supposed to have counselled the French
    admiral to make his descent upon the island.[760]


The admiral’s report of his proceedings at Tahiti
    afforded little satisfaction either to the King or to M.
    Guizot.[761] But to have disavowed him would have exposed
    them to the charge of truckling to England—an
    accusation which would probably have proved fatal to
    the existence of the government. The establishment
    of a French protectorate over the islands was, accordingly,
    published in the Moniteur of March 20, 1843.
    The announcement was much resented in England. It
    was not possible, however, for England to object to
    France assuming a responsibility which she herself
    had twice declined to undertake. Lord Aberdeen’s [Pg 353]communications with M. Guizot on the subject were,
    consequently, confined to the expression of a hope that
    the British missionaries would not be interfered with,
    and that the sovereign rights of Queen Pomare would
    be respected. With both these requests the French
    government readily promised to comply.[762] But, in the
    meantime, affairs at Tahiti had not been progressing
    smoothly.


When the Queen was induced to invoke the protection
    of France, Mr. Pritchard, the British consul,
    was absent from the island on a visit to Australia.
    Pritchard had, for a long time past, been engaged in
    missionary work and in trading in the South Seas.
    According to his own statement, however, upon his
    appointment to the post of consul at Tahiti, he had
    severed his connection with the Methodist missionary
    society of which he had been a member.[763] Meerenhout,
    the French consul, on the other hand, was an ardent
    Roman Catholic, but, like his British colleague, he too
    combined the business of trading with his official
    duties.[764] Racial prejudice, sectarian zeal and trade
    rivalry account sufficiently for the bitter enmity which
    existed between the two men. The news of Admiral
    Dupetit-Thouars’ proceedings reached Pritchard at
    Sidney, and his own correspondence shows that he
    started upon his return journey with the intention of
    doing everything in his power to induce the British
    government “to interfere” and with the expectation
    of finding “many difficulties to encounter.”[765] His first
    act upon his arrival at Tahiti was to instigate Queen
    Pomare, over whom he appears to have had great [Pg 354]influence, to write to Her Britannic Majesty. In this
    curious document Queen Pomare, after inviting her
    “sister friend” to commiserate with her in the difficulties
    in which she was involved with the French, begged
    her “to send a large ship of war” to her assistance.
    The circumstances under which the demand for French
    protection had been extorted from her were narrated,
    much space being devoted to the part played in the
    transaction by M. Meerenhout, “a very bad and
    troublesome man.”[766]


It was evident to Lord Aberdeen that the attitude
    adopted by Mr. Pritchard might at any moment
    produce some disagreeable incident, the danger of a
    chance collision being enhanced by the ill-feeling which
    prevailed between the French and British naval
    officers. He decided, therefore, to appoint Major-General
    Miller, upon whose prudence and judgment he
    could depend, consul-general of the Pacific Islands,
    and to place under his orders all the British consuls
    in the South Seas. At the same time, he sent off
    instructions to Mr. Pritchard enjoining him to recommend
    a prudent line of conduct to Queen Pomare and
    carefully “to avoid any expression calculated to encourage
    her or her chiefs to expect assistance from
    England.” Her Majesty’s government, whilst strongly
    disapproving the action of the French authorities at
    Tahiti and deploring the humiliations inflicted upon
    the Queen, “was precluded from interfering authoritatively
    on her behalf.”[767] But, before this despatch
    could reach its destination, Admiral Dupetit-Thouars
    reappeared at Tahiti. On this occasion he had returned
    to complain of some incident connected with
    the hoisting of a flag. After a few days spent in
    investigating the matter, he pronounced the islanders [Pg 355]to be animated by a thoroughly bad spirit. On
    November 6, 1843, Queen Pomare was declared
    deposed, and Tahiti a French possession. Having
    issued this proclamation the admiral proceeded to land
    troops and to occupy the island. In his despatch to
    his government, explaining the reasons which had
    induced him to take this step, he imputed the chief
    blame for the unrest of the natives to Mr. Pritchard.[768]


The news of these events reached Europe in the
    month of February, 1844, and evoked a great outburst
    of indignation in England. Louis Philippe and M.
    Guizot were again placed in a most embarrassing situation.
    Should they refuse to uphold the action of the
    admiral, their conduct would be assailed on all sides as
    a cowardly betrayal of French interests at the bidding
    of England. On  the other hand, the ratification of
    his act, if it should not entail war, must certainly put
    an end to “the cordial understanding,” the maintenance
    of which, for the present, was essential to the successful
    execution of their Spanish policy. Of these two
    alternatives, the second unquestionably presented the
    greatest disadvantages. At a Cabinet Council, on
    February 25, it was decided to adhere to the protectorate,
    but to disavow the last proceedings of Admiral
    Thouars and to reinstate Queen Pomare in the sovereignty
    of which she had been deprived.[769] A few
    weeks later, on April 10, Lord Aberdeen informed
    Mr. Pritchard that he would be transferred to the
    Navigator Islands. In deciding to remove him from
    Tahiti, the government in no way desired to express
    disapprobation of his past conduct, but, for the sake
    both of his own comfort and of the maintenance of
    good relations with France, it was felt to be advisable
    to replace him by some person who had not been [Pg 356]connected with the transactions of the past two years.[770] This measure of precaution was, however, of no avail.
    A month before the despatch of these instructions Mr.
    Pritchard had departed from Tahiti, but under very
    different circumstances from those contemplated by
    Lord Aberdeen. The disavowal of Admiral Thouars
    was made the subject of a fierce attack in the Chamber
    upon the Soult-Guizot Cabinet. In the course of the
    debates, certain deputies displayed great hostility to
    England and indulged in much intemperate language.
    This ebullition of temper was not treated very seriously
    in England. But it was a different matter when the
    Prince de Joinville, who was a strong supporter of
    Admiral Thouars, saw fit to publish a pamphlet, in
    which the question of a war with Great Britain was
    discussed in all its bearings. Only the year before
    His Royal Highness had been the guest of Queen
    Victoria at Windsor, and the appearance of his work,
    entitled Note sur l’état des forces navales de la France,
    created a most disagreeable impression at Court, upon
    the government and upon all classes of the people.
    Louis Philippe, who had never authorized the publication
    of his son’s imprudent pamphlet, was genuinely
    distressed and did all in his power to suppress it.[771]


Public attention, however, was speedily diverted
    from the Prince de Joinville to the Tsar. Suddenly,
    on May 31, 1844, the Court was informed that
    Nicholas would arrive on a visit to England within
    the next twenty-four hours. At Ascot races and at
    the various festivities which were hastily arranged in
    his honour, his appearance excited universal curiosity.
    On every occasion it was plainly his intention to impress,
    not only the Court and high society, but all [Pg 357]classes of the people with the sincerity of his desire to
    establish the most friendly relations between his empire
    and Great Britain.[772] To Peel, Aberdeen and Wellington,
    with whom he had some confidential conversations, he
    was at pains to contrast his respect and affection for
    England with the dislike and the contempt with which
    he regarded Louis Philippe, M. Guizot, and the French
    nation generally. Sir Robert Peel, however, appears
    to have told him plainly that he and his colleagues
    were most desirous that, at the death of Louis
    Philippe, his crown should pass to his next heir in the
    Orleans line without disturbance or opposition. But
    having given emphatic expression to his hatred of the
    July Monarchy, Nicholas put forward a distinct proposal.
    Turkey was sick, very sick, upon the point of
    death. It would be a critical moment when the
    Ottoman empire should break up completely. Nevertheless,
    he apprehended danger only from the ambitious
    and aggressive spirit of the French. Let, therefore,
    England, Austria and Russia agree to act in concert,
    without reference to France, and all would be well.[773] The British ministers would not appear altogether to
    have rejected this proposition. But it is difficult to
    believe the story[774] that distinct pledges on the subject
    were given, and that Nicholas, in consequence, was
    tempted to embark upon those measures which were to
    result in the Crimean war. It is unnecessary, however,
    to discuss here whether the conferences of 1844 were
    in any degree responsible for the war ten years later.
    The Tsar’s visit had no immediate effect upon the
    European situation in general, or upon Franco-British
    relations in particular. Nothing that he had said or
    done during his nine days’ stay in England had in any [Pg 358]way impaired “the cordial understanding.” He had
    probably a shrewd idea, however, that complications in
    more than one direction would, before long, greatly
    endanger its existence. An instinctive perception of
    coming trouble may have been the secret of his sudden
    determination to visit England.


On June 6, three days before the departure of the
    Tsar, Aberdeen was informed officially that French
    troops might not improbably be ordered to enter the
    territory of the Emperor of Morocco.[775] The famous
    Arab chieftain, Abd-el-Kader, with whom the French
    had been at war for a long time past, had recently
    sought refuge within the frontiers of the Moorish
    empire. On former occasions, when hard pressed, he
    had eluded capture in this manner. Representations
    had frequently been made at Fez, on the subject of the
    facilities which were alleged to have been afforded him
    for renewing the struggle. These complaints, however,
    had hitherto produced little or no effect, and Marshal
    Bugeaud, the governor of Algiers, consequently urged
    the adoption of stronger measures. Neither Louis
    Philippe nor his ministers desired to begin hostilities,
    but, on May 30, 1844, a French force, under General
    de Lamoricière, was attacked by a body of Moroccan
    cavalry upon the Algerian side of the frontier. The
    situation at once assumed a very grave character.
    The French consul at Tangier was instructed to proceed
    to Fez to demand the punishment of the Moorish
    commander, the expulsion of Abd-el-Kader, and the
    withdrawal of the troops assembled close to the French
    frontier. At the same time, a squadron under the
    Prince de Joinville was despatched to Moroccan waters[776] and preparations were made for reinforcing Marshal
    Bugeaud.


 [Pg 359]


The news that hostilities were impending caused
    great dissatisfaction in England. Ministers were
    questioned upon the subject in both Houses and the
    press commented upon the affair with much acrimony.
    Under pretext of obtaining redress for some more or
    less imaginary grievance, Morocco, it was predicted,
    would be invaded and, without doubt, permanently
    occupied. The fate which had befallen the Dey of
    Algiers was assuredly reserved for the Emperor of
    Morocco. This general feeling of uneasiness and suspicion
    was increased by the selection of the Prince de
    Joinville, the author of the recent pamphlet, for the
    command of the squadron sent to cruise off Tangier.[777] The two governments, nevertheless, maintained their
    friendly communications. M. Guizot gave the most
    positive assurances that every effort would be made to
    settle the affair peacefully, and undertook that, should
    hostilities break out, Tangier[778] would not be bombarded
    nor would any portion of Morocco be appropriated.
    Aberdeen was not prepared to deny that
    the French government had grave cause for complaint.
    Although it had been considered necessary for the
    protection of British interests that a squadron should
    be sent to the Moroccan coast, the British fleet in
    those waters, he promised the French ambassador,
    would be numerically inferior to that of the Prince de
    Joinville.[779] Had he regarded it as in the smallest
    degree probable that his proposal would be accepted,
    he would, doubtless, have suggested that England
    should act as mediator in the quarrel. But, in spite
    of the fact that “the cordial understanding” had
    been loudly proclaimed, the idea of allowing England [Pg 360]to interfere would have been so unpopular in France
    that no government could have ventured to entertain
    it. Under these circumstances Aberdeen could only
    direct Mr. Drummond Hay, the British consul at Tangier,
    to proceed to Fez and to endeavour to prevail
    upon the Emperor to acquiesce in the French demands.
    Notwithstanding that the Moors had a second time
    attacked the column of General de Lamoricière, strong
    hopes were entertained, at the end of July, that actual
    war might still be averted.


On July 30, 1844, The Times announced the startling
    news that Mr. Pritchard, the British consul at
    Tahiti, had arrived in England, after having been
    arrested, cast into a dungeon and finally expelled from
    the island by the French military authorities. In
    answer to a question put to him, the following night,
    by Sir Charles Napier in the House of Commons, Sir
    Robert Peel declared that, if the reports which the
    government had received were true, “a gross outrage”
    had undoubtedly been perpetrated. But, when the
    next day M. de Jarnac spoke to Lord Aberdeen on
    the subject, he was authorized to inform M. Guizot
    that the Prime Minister could not admit that his
    words had been correctly reported in the morning
    papers.[780] The first accounts of Mr. Pritchard’s case
    would seem to have been somewhat inaccurate. When
    all the circumstances were brought to light, it was evident
    that the British government had just cause to
    complain of the treatment which he had experienced,
    but it was, at the same time, no less clear that his
    own conduct had been most injudicious. Immediately
    upon the proclamation of French sovereignty over
    Tahiti, Mr. Pritchard struck his flag and sent a protest
    to Admiral Thouars. From this moment he assumed so
    anomalous a position that it is not surprising that the
    French governor, Admiral Bruat, should have refused [Pg 361]to recognize it. According to Pritchard’s own statement,
    he “continued to perform his functions as consul, except
    in corresponding with the French authorities, and continued
    to act as the accredited agent of Great Britain
    to Queen Pomare.” Furthermore, he appears to have
    invited the deposed Queen to take up her abode in his
    house, where she stayed until, “considering it not safe
    to remain on shore,” she decided to go on board H.M.S. Dublin, which was lying in the harbour of Papeete.[781]


The natives meanwhile were growing restless and
    evincing a determination to resist the imposition of
    foreign rule. Their hostility, in the opinion of the
    French officers, was to be ascribed mainly to the pernicious
    example set them by Mr. Pritchard. No event
    of importance, however, occurred until March 2, 1844,
    on which date, during the absence of the governor from
    Papeete, a French sentry was alleged to have been
    assaulted by a native. M. d’Aubigny, the senior officer
    on the spot, thereupon proclaimed martial law throughout
    the island and decreed the arrest of Mr. Pritchard,
    who was forthwith imprisoned in an underground chamber
    beneath the guard room of a block house. After he
    had been in captivity for four days and had endured
    much discomfort, Admiral Bruat returned to Papeete.
    The governor, perceiving at once that his subordinate
    had acted with undue precipitation, ordered the release
    of Mr. Pritchard and his removal to a British vessel, The Cormorant, which, on March 13, quitted the island
    and carried him to Valparaiso.[782]


“Never since I have been in this country,” wrote
    M. de Jarnac, “have I seen anything to equal the
    excitement which the news from Tahiti has aroused.
    The religious party took up the case at once. Meetings
    of the ‘Saints’ have been convened, violent [Pg 362]speeches have been delivered all over the country, and
    pictures representing certain of the events connected
    with the affair have been exhibited. The papers are
    very violent. Lord Aberdeen appears to be growing
    more apprehensive daily. He is convinced that some
    form of satisfaction must be given. He wishes, however,
    to leave the initiative of proposing it to Your
    Excellency: but I happen to know that the plan of
    sending Mr. Pritchard straight back to Tahiti has
    been under discussion by the Cabinet.”[783] In
    France the excitement was scarcely less intense.
    The newspapers, with one accord, called loudly
    upon the government to stand by its officers,
    and to deny Great Britain any kind of reparation,
    even at the risk of war. The production of Charles IV. at the Opera House evoked a furious manifestation
    of hostility to England. Fortunately, however,
    the session was brought to a close on August 5,
    and, in the meantime, M. Guizot resolutely refused
    to make any statement about the affair in the
    Chambers.[784]


But although the prorogation afforded him some
    relief, M. Guizot was, nevertheless, in a position of
    extreme difficulty. His friends unceasingly warned
    him that he must resist the demands of England, or
    be prepared to succumb to the outburst of popular
    indignation which any concessions would provoke.[785] Under these circumstances he decided that complete
    inaction was, for the present, the safest course to adopt.
    “The greater the excitement,” he instructed Jarnac,
    “the more necessary it becomes to allow it time to
    cool down. For the moment we must abstain from all
    discussion of the subject.” Nevertheless, when interviewing [Pg 363]Aberdeen, he would do well to bring forward
    those arguments which he himself was employing in
    his conversations with Lord Cowley. Stress should
    be laid upon the fact that Pritchard had ceased to
    act as consul. As a private individual whose presence
    was regarded as prejudicial to good order, the colonial
    authorities had a universally acknowledged right to
    expel him. At the same time, however, it could not
    be denied that “some of the proceedings which had
    attended his removal had been irregular. . . .”[786]


Hitherto Lord Aberdeen had studiously refrained
    from formulating any precise demand. But, on
    August 13, after a meeting of the Cabinet, he directed
    Cowley to give M. Guizot clearly to understand that,
    unless satisfaction in some shape were voluntarily
    offered, he must transmit “a formal and detailed
    statement of the grounds upon which Her Majesty’s
    government founded its expectations of redress.”[787] In
    England anger at the continued silence of the French
    government was rising to a dangerous pitch. On
    August 14, at a meeting at Exeter Hall, at which Mr.
    Pritchard himself was present, men, who in most
    international disputes would have advocated peace at
    any price, gave utterance to the most warlike sentiments.
    Two days later came the news that the
    answer of the Emperor of Morocco to the French ultimatum having been considered unsatisfactory,
    Tangier had been bombarded. “War,” wrote M. de
    Jarnac, “is now generally regarded as inevitable.”[788] Lord Cowley was instructed to represent that “the
    attack upon Tangier, after the repeated assurance of
    M. Guizot that it would be respected under all circumstances,
    had greatly surprised the British government [Pg 364]. . . any occupation of the coast of Morocco could not
    fail to be viewed in a very serious light by Great
    Britain, and must lead to evils of great magnitude.[789]”


M. Guizot, however, adhered resolutely to his plan
    “of allowing time for the excitement to cool down”
    in England, and he still forbore to offer any satisfaction
    for the treatment to which Mr. Pritchard had
    been subjected. Both he and the King appear to
    have strangely underestimated the intensity of the
    resentment to which the Tahiti affair had given rise.
    “The two governments,” he informed Jarnac, “were
    not yet agreed in their appreciation of the facts
    imputed to Mr. Pritchard,” and it was, consequently,
    impossible for the present to discuss the nature of the
    reparation which might be due to him. Again, a few
    days later, he directed him to inform Lord Aberdeen
    that his despatch of the 13th would have to be
    deliberated upon by the Council, “many of the
    members of which were absent from Paris.”[790] Meanwhile,
    the press of both countries was busily engaged
    in embittering the quarrel. Some highly offensive
    attacks upon the private life of Mr. Pritchard appeared
    in the French papers, whilst The Times published
    letters, purporting to have been written by naval
    officers who had witnessed the bombardment of
    Tangier, in which the most insulting doubts were
    cast upon the seamanship of the Prince de Joinville
    and upon the fighting qualities of the French sailors.[791] M. Guizot, however, continued to display a lofty
    indifference to the popular excitement on both sides
    of the Channel. He was content to enjoin M. de
    Jarnac to impress upon Lord Aberdeen that it “would
    be a disgrace, were the peace of the world to be [Pg 365]disturbed on account of Pritchard, Pomare and
    d’Aubigny.”[792]


But the young diplomatist in charge of the French
    embassy in London was, fortunately, alive to the
    dangers of the situation. Ever since the first arrival
    of the news from Tahiti, M. de Jarnac had sought to
    convince his government that the affair was highly
    serious. Nor was it only to M. Guizot that he
    addressed his warnings. Having been charged to
    deliver a letter from the King to Prince Albert, he
    took the opportunity, thus afforded him, of communicating
    his fears to Louis Philippe himself. He
    begged him to believe that at a recent Cabinet Council
    Lord Aberdeen had been the only minister to oppose a
    large increase of the navy. “Were it not for the
    confidence reposed in the wisdom of Your Majesty,
    the situation would resemble in many unfortunate
    particulars that of 1840.”[793] He daily adjured M.
    Guizot to reflect most seriously upon the danger of
    deferring any longer his reply to the British government.
    “People in England are discussing alliances
    and talk of nothing but war. M. de Nesselrode is staying
    at Brighton. He affects to be unconcerned with
    politics. But it is said that he remains here in order
    that he may be upon the spot, should a serious disagreement
    arise between France and England. If that
    be his object, fortune may have favoured his designs
    in a remarkable manner.”[794]


The British Parliament was to be prorogued on
    September 5, and, unless an announcement could be
    made in the Queen’s Speech that a settlement had
    been arrived at, war, it was generally felt, could
    scarcely be avoided. Even M. Guizot began to realize [Pg 366]that, if the peace was to be preserved, he must propose
    some form of reparation. On several occasions Jarnac
    had hinted that the British government might very
    possibly be satisfied, were a pecuniary indemnity to be
    offered to Mr. Pritchard.[795] Unquestionably, the payment
    of a sum of money would be regarded in France
    as less objectionable than most other forms of reparation.
    But, having proposed to the King and the
    Cabinet that the affair should be settled on those lines,
    and having obtained their assent, M. Guizot still
    deferred transmitting an offer of pecuniary compensation
    to London. In a despatch, dated August 29, a
    copy of which was to be given to Lord Aberdeen, he
    stoutly maintained the right of the authorities at
    Tahiti to expel Mr. Pritchard from the island. His
    imprisonment, however, and certain other acts of
    which M. d’Aubigny had been guilty, could not be
    defended, and that officer would, in consequence,
    receive in due course a notification of the censure
    which the government had passed upon his conduct.
    He could concede no more, he told Lord Cowley, and
    he fully intended to retire from office, if further redress
    were to be demanded.[796] Nevertheless, he appears
    privately to have informed M. de Jarnac that he was
    transmitting a second despatch, containing an offer of
    a money payment to Mr. Pritchard, which he was to
    communicate to Lord Aberdeen, should the British
    government regard the reprimand, administered to
    M. d’Aubigny, as an inadequate reparation. This, as he
    doubtless expected, was the view taken of his first
    despatch by the Cabinet in London. Jarnac, in consequence,
    lost no time in assuring Lord Aberdeen that
    an offer of a pecuniary indemnity would be made. [Pg 367]Had he not taken this responsibility upon himself, he
    was convinced that the customary announcement that
    “friendly relations existed with other countries”
    would have been omitted from the Queen’s Speech, and
    “the whole of Europe would have been thrown into
    a state of perturbation.” On the following day,
    September 4, he placed in the hands of Lord Aberdeen
    the official offer of the French government to indemnify
    Mr. Pritchard by the payment of a sum of
    money, the amount of which was to be determined by
    the admirals commanding the French and British fleets
    in the Pacific. Aberdeen pronounced the proposed
    satisfaction “rather slender,” but assured him that he
    might now consider the matter as settled.[797] Twenty-four
    hours later Parliament was prorogued, and the
    happy termination of the Pritchard affair was announced
    in the Speech from the Throne. “The
    danger,” wrote Queen Victoria to the King of the
    Belgians, had been “imminent.”[798]


The settlement of the Tahiti dispute was quickly
    followed by the welcome news that France had concluded
    peace with the Emperor of Morocco. Marshal
    Bugeaud, on August 14, had won a decisive victory
    over the Moors on the river Isly, whilst at sea the
    Prince de Joinville, after silencing the forts of Tangier,
    had, on August 15, destroyed the defences of Mogador.
    Neither the King nor M. Guizot desired to prosecute
    the campaign any further. They had obtained all the
    advantages which they could hope to derive from
    active hostilities. They had proved that they were
    not to be deterred, by the irritation which their action
    had called forth in England, from inflicting a severe
    punishment upon the Moors. The national thirst for [Pg 368]military glory had been sufficiently appeased by the
    successes which had already been achieved. Under
    these circumstances, they were not disposed to be
    exacting in their conditions. Provided the Emperor
    would submit to the terms set forth in their original ultimatum, they would not insist upon an indemnity,
    but would recall their troops and forthwith suspend
    hostilities. The Court of Fez promptly acceded to
    these moderate demands, and, on September 10, 1844,
    a treaty of peace was signed at Tangier.


The cessation of hostilities between France and
    Morocco removed much of the resentment which recent
    events in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific had
    aroused in England. Notwithstanding that, at the end
    of August, 1844, the two countries had been upon the
    brink of war, Louis Philippe, early in October, was
    enabled to return the visit which Queen Victoria, the
    year before, had paid him at the Château d’Eu. During
    his stay in England the King was installed with
    much magnificence as a Knight of the Garter at
    Windsor, and, on every occasion on which he was seen
    in public, was accorded a hearty welcome by the
    people. Isabella’s marriage still occupied the foremost
    place in his thoughts. That question, however, had
    made but little progress, in spite of the overthrow of
    Espartero and of the triumph of Christina and the Moderados.


After the flight of the Regent Spain had passed
    under the rule of Ramon Maria Narvaez, the Captain-General
    of Castile, an able and unscrupulous adventurer.
    The Liberals, who had joined with the Moderados in encompassing the downfall of Espartero, were quickly
    forced to realize the magnitude of their folly. Parliamentary
    government was practically abolished, and
    any attempts to resist the authority of the dictator
    were mercilessly repressed. Over two hundred executions
    for political offences, during the space of one [Pg 369]year, broke the spirit of the democratic party, and
    gave the country an outward appearance of tranquillity.
    The difficulty of selecting a Regent in the place of
    Espartero had, in the meantime, been overcome by
    the unconstitutional declaration of the Cortes, on
    November 8, 1843, that the Queen was of full age,
    although she had only entered upon her fourteenth
    year. The question having thus been settled, Christina,
    in the spring of 1844, left Paris and returned to
    Madrid, accompanied by her husband, Nuñoz, henceforward
    to be known as the Duke of Rianzarez.


In 1844 the eldest son of Don Carlos, the two sons
    of Don Francisco de Paula, and Count Trapani, the
    brother of the King of Naples, and of Christina herself,
    were, for all practical purposes, the only unmarried
    male descendants of Philip V. If, therefore, the principle
    proclaimed by Louis Philippe were to be adhered
    to, Isabella’s choice of a husband must be restricted to
    these four princes. To each one, however, there were
    serious objections. Although a suitable candidate in
    other respects, the son of Don Carlos was ineligible on
    political grounds.[799] The idea of her daughter’s marriage
    with either of the sons of Don Francisco de
    Paula was most distasteful to Christina. Notwithstanding
    that their mother, the Infanta Carlotta, was
    her sister, she had for a long time past looked upon
    her as her worst enemy. Nor had the death of this
    princess, early in 1844,[800] greatly diminished the animosity
    with which she regarded this branch of the
    family. But in addition to the feud which had existed
    for so many years between Christina and their mother,
    both young men for different reasons were objectionable
    in themselves. The appearance of the elder, Don [Pg 370]Francisco de Asis, Duke of Cadiz, was ridiculous and
    effeminate, and he, moreover, was generally believed
    to be impotent. Christina, however, appears to have
    regarded the loudly professed Liberalism of Don
    Enrique, Duke of Seville, as a more serious objection
    to his marriage with her daughter than the physical
    unfitness of his elder brother. The fourth candidate,
    Count Trapani, was an unattractive, backward youth
    of sixteen, whose life had hitherto been spent within
    the walls of a Jesuit College at Rome. The difficulties,
    however, in the way of his marriage with Isabella
    were mainly political. Metternich greatly disliked
    the notion of a closer connection between the absolute
    Court of Naples and the constitutional monarchy of
    Spain.[801] Furthermore, the Spanish people despised
    the Neapolitans, and could not fail to resent the idea
    of selecting the Royal Consort from the Neapolitan
    branch of the Bourbons.[802]


Count Trapani, nevertheless, was chosen by Louis
    Philippe and M. Guizot as the most suitable husband
    for Isabella. In the summer of 1844, the French
    agents, both at Naples and at Madrid, were instructed
    to further his candidature by all means in their
    power.[803] Christina’s feelings on the subject cannot
    be precisely determined. There can be little doubt,
    however, that she never gave the project her hearty
    support. Probably she realized that it was impracticable
    by reason of the dislike with which it was
    certain to be regarded by Spaniards of all classes.
    It is significant that one of her first acts, after her
    return to Madrid, was to assure Mr. Bulwer that she
    had no intention of submitting to the dictation
    of Louis Philippe, and that she still hoped to arrange [Pg 371]the marriage of Isabella with Leopold, the son of
    Prince Ferdinand of Coburg.[804] Henry Bulwer had been
    appointed British minister at Madrid, soon after the
    downfall of the Regent. Aberdeen appears to have
    been anxious that a man, less wedded than Aston
    to Palmerstonian traditions, should carry out the
    new policy of cordially co-operating with France
    for the general welfare of Spain. The French
    government, once Espartero had been expelled, had
    hastened to resume normal diplomatic relations with
    the Court of Isabella. Accordingly, almost at the
    same time as Bulwer was sent to Madrid, the Comte
    Bresson, whose proceedings at Brussels in 1831 have
    been related, was transferred from Berlin to the
    Spanish capital as French ambassador. Far from
    acting harmoniously together, however, they appear
    to have cordially disliked each other. Bresson is
    described by Bulwer,[805] in his Life of Palmerston, as
    a person sprung from the middle classes, and “consequently
    vulgarly pre-occupied with his position as
    ambassador.” Bresson,[806] for his part, considered his
    English colleague as “pas élevé,” and as a man
    against whom he must constantly be on his guard,
    lest he should take some liberty with him.


At the close of the year of 1844, a further
    complication was added to the many difficulties which
    surrounded the question of the Queen’s marriage.
    “I believe,” wrote Lord Cowley,[807] “that Louis Philippe
    is thinking of the marriage of Montpensier[808] with the
    sister of Isabella.” The supposition was perfectly
    correct. It is impossible, however, to say with [Pg 372]certainty when the King first decided to put forward
    his son as a candidate for the hand of the Infanta
    Fernanda. According to Guizot,[809] the suggestion
    was not made until the autumn of 1844, and it was
    then propounded, he alleges, for the purpose of
    reconciling Christina and the Spanish people to the
    insignificance of the Neapolitan alliance. But it was
    always, he asserts, made perfectly clear that the
    Montpensier marriage could not take place until the
    Queen had married and borne a child. Be that as
    it may, it was not considered advisable to inform
    Lord Aberdeen of this project. During the next few
    months, however, the new matrimonial scheme was
    the subject of many rumours, and, in the month of
    July, 1845, a visit of the Duke of Rianzarez to Paris
    was so generally believed to be connected with this
    affair, that it was felt that some explanation must
    be given to the British government.[810] M. Guizot,
    accordingly, informed Mr. Bulwer, who happened to be
    in Paris on his way to London, that he wished Lord
    Aberdeen to know that “King Louis Philippe and
    Queen Christina were desirous to settle the marriage
    for private and personal reasons into which the
    Infanta’s fortune entered.” It would not take place
    for some time, he assured him, and in any case not
    until Isabella had had children.[811]


On September 8, 1845, Queen Victoria paid a
    second visit to Louis Philippe at the Château d’Eu.
    Her Majesty, Prince Albert, Aberdeen and Peel had
    been considerably disturbed by the news brought
    by Bulwer from Paris. But on the very day of the
    arrival of the Royal party at Eu, both the King
    and M. Guizot declared to Lord Aberdeen, “in the [Pg 373]most positive and explicit manner, that until the
    Queen was married and had children, they should
    consider the Infanta precisely as her sister, and that
    any marriage with a French prince would be entirely
    out of the question. . . . I distinctly understood,”wrote Aberdeen to Peel a few hours after he had
    received these assurances, “that it was not only
    a marriage and a child, but children that were
    necessary to secure the succession. I thought this
    was as much as we could desire at present, and that
    the question of a marriage with a French prince might
    safely be left to be considered, whenever the contingency
    contemplated should arrive. Many things
    may happen in the course of a few years.”[812]


On the very day that Queen Victoria arrived at
    Eu, the Duc and the Duchesse de Nemours and the
    Duke d’Aumale left Pampeluna, where they had been
    the guests of the Spanish Royal family. The real
    object of their visit would never appear to have
    transpired.[813] Bulwer, for reasons which in due course
    he explained to Aberdeen, was not present at Pampeluna,
    and delayed returning to Spain until the French
    princes had recrossed the frontier. The interview, he
    understood, had been arranged for the purpose of
    “pushing on the marriage with Count Trapani, a
    marriage most unpopular in the country.” He had,
    therefore, decided to stay away. By absenting himself,
    his government would not incur “the odium
    which must stigmatize all those by whom the
    Neapolitan match may be conceived to have been
    brought about.” On the other hand, should the visit
    of the French princes not achieve the desired result, [Pg 374]they would be unable to impute its failure “to the
    intrigues of the British minister.” Upon his return
    to Madrid, Bulwer experienced great difficulty in
    obtaining any information about the state of affairs.
    Bresson assured him that Isabella’s health “was
    declared to be such as to render her marriage for
    the present inopportune.”[814] Christina gave him to
    understand that matters were still undecided. “But
    her language was not that of entire confidence, and
    she seemed divided between the wish to say nothing
    and the desire to say enough to prevent any
    subsequent charge of want of frankness.” Upon the
    whole, he was inclined to think that some plan was
    contemplated, “which it was not yet judged expedient
    to avow.”[815] From divers sources he learnt that the
    Queen-Mother, Bresson and Carini, the Neapolitan
    ambassador, were suspected of an intention “privately
    to betroth Isabella to Trapani, and to force his
    acceptance upon the Cortes.” Narvaez had been
    induced to support their unconstitutional designs,
    “in the belief that he would be more necessary with
    an unpopular, than with a popular prince.”[816]


Meanwhile, M. Bresson at Madrid and M. Guizot
    in Paris were greatly dissatisfied with the aspect of
    affairs. The King of Naples had always been reluctant
    to allow his brother to be put forward as a suitor for
    the hand of the Queen of Spain. He distrusted Louis
    Philippe exceedingly, he was fearful of offending the
    Court of Vienna, he was on bad terms with his sister
    Christina, and, in point of fact, had not officially
    acknowledged the sovereignty of Isabella. Nevertheless,
    under the vigorous pressure brought to bear
    upon him from Paris, he agreed to renew diplomatic
    relations with the Court of Madrid, and to empower [Pg 375]his ambassador to discuss his brother’s marriage. But,
    having surmounted the difficulties at Naples, Louis
    Philippe and M. Guizot were confronted by more
    serious obstacles at Madrid. As time went on, the
    unpopularity of the Neapolitan match tended rather to
    increase than to diminish. So universal was the dislike
    to this connection that Guizot judged it prudent to
    warn Bresson to maintain friendly relations with Don
    Francisco de Paula,[817] seeing that it might be necessary
    before long to insist upon Isabella’s marriage with one
    of his sons. As the prospects of the Bourbon candidates
    grew less favourable the Coburg marriage,
    greatly to the annoyance of Louis Philippe, began to
    be discussed as a necessary alternative. The impending
    visit of Prince Leopold to his brother the King of
    Portugal gave rise to many rumours. There was an
    intrigue on foot, reported Bresson, to promote the
    chances of that prince, and Bulwer, he was convinced,
    was more or less concerned in it.[818]


Under these circumstances M. Guizot decided to
    direct M. de Jarnac to confer upon the situation with
    Lord Aberdeen. He was to intimate to him that, in
    fulfilment of the compact at Eu, he should now bestir
    himself actively on behalf of the Bourbon candidates,
    and make it perfectly clear to the Coburgs that no
    member of their family could be allowed to marry
    Isabella. This was more than Aberdeen was prepared
    to undertake. He, however, assured M. de Jarnac
    upon his honour that the Coburgs should receive no
    encouragement either from the Court or from the
    government, and promised him that they would be
    advised to abandon their supposed intention of visiting
    Madrid.[819] Aberdeen was at this time in receipt of
    Bulwer’s despatch of October 30, 1845, informing him [Pg 376]of his suspicion that Christina and Narvaez were purposing
    to accomplish the Trapani marriage, in violation
    of the article of the constitution which prescribed
    that the sovereign must communicate his intention of
    contracting a matrimonial alliance to the Cortes.
    He at once replied by charging him to express to the
    general the sincere hope of the British government that
    no such plan was under consideration. “Say to him,”he wrote in conclusion, “that you are instructed to
    offer no opposition to the marriage of the Queen to
    Trapani, provided it be openly accomplished according
    to legal forms, still less are you authorized to espouse
    the cause of any other candidate.”[820]


Mere friendly neutrality, however, could be of
    little service to Louis Philippe and M. Guizot. A
    further disappointment, moreover, was in store for
    them. At the end of January, 1846, General Narvaez,
    who, as a supporter of the Neapolitan alliance, had
    been growing very unpopular, resigned office after a
    violent quarrel with his fellow-ministers.[821] When the
    news reached Paris that the one man who might have
    effected the Trapani marriage was no longer at the head
    of affairs, it was decided to make another, and a more
    direct, attempt to force the British government to take
    action on behalf of the Bourbon candidate. Jarnac
    was, accordingly, supplied with a document, which he
    was to read to Lord Aberdeen. This extraordinary
    paper, known as the Memorandum of February 27,
    1846, set forth the following conclusions: “The Count
    Trapani is greatly compromised: 1. By the demonstration
    which has been made against him; 2. By the fall
    of General Narvaez. The sons of Don Francisco de
    Paula are greatly compromised: 1. By their mistaken
    conduct; 2. By their intimacy with the Radical [Pg 377]party; 3. By the dislike of the Queen-Mother and of
    the young Queen herself to them. The sons of Don
    Carlos are for the time out of the question. The
    actual situation of the descendants of Philip V. is
    consequently bad. Efforts are being made to marry
    Prince Leopold of Coburg either to the Queen Isabella
    or to the Infanta Fernanda. Lisbon is the chief seat
    of these machinations. It is said that Prince Leopold,
    who is to leave Lisbon on February 24, intends to
    visit Madrid. Many circumstances appear to confirm
    the truth of this rumour. If the present state of
    affairs be prolonged we may find ourselves compelled,
    in order that our policy in Spain may not receive a
    check which we are determined not to suffer, to declare
    ourselves liberated from all engagements with regard
    to either marriage. Such a situation would arise, were
    the marriage of the Queen or the Infanta with Prince
    Leopold of Coburg or with any other prince, not a
    descendant of Philip V., to appear probable or imminent.
    In that case we should take immediate steps to
    ward off the blow by demanding the hand of either the
    Queen or the Infanta for the Duc de Montpensier.
    We are sincerely desirous of averting the necessity of
    resorting to so extreme a measure. We see only one
    way in which the crisis can be avoided. The English
    Cabinet must co-operate actively with us in promoting
    the claims of one of the descendants of Philip V., no
    matter which, and in arranging his marriage with
    Queen Isabella, and in preventing, in the meanwhile,
    the marriage of the Infanta either with Prince
    Leopold or with any other prince, not a descendant of
    Philip V.”[822]


Aberdeen appears to have listened in silence and
    to have made no protest against the unwarrantable
    assumptions contained in this document. No copy of
    it was given to him, nor would he seem to have asked [Pg 378]for one.[823] Meanwhile, strange events were taking place
    in Spain. The Miraflores Cabinet was quickly overthrown
    and, on March 17, 1846, Narvaez was once
    more at the head of the government. His return to
    power was quickly followed by the promulgation of
    decrees restricting the liberty of the press and suspending
    the sittings of the Cortes.[824] Bulwer was
    convinced that it was decided forthwith to betroth
    Isabella to Trapani, regardless of public opinion and of
    legal forms.[825] But, if Narvaez ever contemplated a coup d’état of this nature, he soon relinquished the
    idea. His tenure of office was of very brief duration.
    On April 5 he was dismissed and ordered to quit
    Madrid immediately. The mystery which surrounds
    these sudden changes of government has never been
    satisfactorily unravelled. It is certain that they were
    connected, more or less directly, with Isabella’s
    marriage. At first sight it would seem as though
    Christina had resolved to discard Narvaez, because she
    perceived that he was powerless to effect the Trapani
    marriage. Nevertheless, this apparently obvious explanation
    is probably erroneous. The Queen-Mother
    was never really desirous that her daughter should
    marry her uncle, Trapani. But she wished to ruin
    Narvaez, whose secret aim it was to diminish the
    influence of the Court and of the Church.[826] It is
    possible, therefore, that she may have insisted upon
    his supporting the Neapolitan alliance in order simply
    to discredit him. In this crafty fashion she may have
    hoped to rid herself of the man who, she had once
    declared, “was more arrogant than Espartero.”[827]


 [Pg 379]


On April 8, 1846, the following message[828] was
    received in Paris from M. Bresson, who, doubtless, had
    some person in his employ in close attendance upon
    Isabella. “La reine est nubile depuis deux heures.”[829] Whether or not this news was communicated to Lord
    Cowley by M. Guizot, it was certainly known at once
    at the British embassy. Christina could no longer
    invoke physical reasons for delaying her daughter’s
    marriage. But, meanwhile, the number of Bourbon
    candidates was rapidly diminishing. Trapani was too
    unpopular, and Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, the
    younger son of Don Francisco de Paula, had recently
    been concerned in an insurrection in Gallicia, and had
    been ordered to leave Spain. The only available
    husband for Isabella among the descendants of Philip
    V. was, therefore, Don Enrique’s elder brother, Don
    Francisco, Duke of Cadiz, whom both she and her
    mother disliked and despised. Christina, under these
    circumstances, resolved to revert to the matrimonial
    combination which she had constantly regarded as the
    best. The moment was not unfavourable for openly
    defying Louis Philippe. Narvaez, the minister who
    had always been looked upon as the chief tool of the
    French Court, was in disgrace, and Isturiz, his successor,
    was her devoted servant. She accordingly determined
    to propose to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg that Isabella
    should marry his son, Prince Leopold. After informing
    him of its contents, she gave the letter containing
    this offer to Mr. Bulwer, asking that it might be conveyed
    to Lisbon by his messenger. The British
    minister complied with her request and reported the
    affair to his chief.


Lord Aberdeen was seriously annoyed, and at once [Pg 380]informed M. de Sainte-Aulaire of what had passed,
    assuring him that he should administer a severe rebuke
    to Mr. Bulwer. Bulwer, he considered, had violated
    his instructions, both in undertaking to transmit the
    offer to Lisbon and in concealing Christina’s proceedings
    from M. Bresson. In consequence of the strictures
    passed upon his conduct, Bulwer offered to resign.
    Aberdeen, however, in a friendly letter insisted upon
    his remaining at his post.[830] A few days later, on June
    29, 1846, Sir Robert Peel announced that he and his
    colleagues had retired from office, and that Lord John
    Russell had undertaken to form a government. On
    June 25, on the very day on which their Corn Bill had
    been carried through the House of Lords, ministers
    had been defeated in the Commons by a Radical and
    Protectionist coalition. In the new administration the
    seals of the Foreign Office passed into the keeping of
    Lord Palmerston.




 [Pg 381]


 CHAPTER X


THE SPANISH MARRIAGES[831]


At the close of the year 1845, when Peel had resigned
    office on account of the dissensions in his Cabinet on
    the question of the Corn Laws, Lord John Russell had
    in vain attempted to form a government. His failure
    had been due to the objections urged by Lord Grey to
    Palmerston’s return to the Foreign Office.[832] Peel had,
    in consequence, agreed to withdraw his resignation and
    to carry on the government. But it was soon clear
    that the Protectionists, if they could not prevent the
    passage of his Corn Bill, would certainly encompass
    his downfall at the first opportunity. Palmerston,
    under these circumstances, judged it advisable to take
    steps to remove the impression that his nomination as
    Foreign Secretary would create alarm in France and
    imperil “the cordial understanding.” He, accordingly,
    decided to visit Paris with the object of dispelling this [Pg 382]idea. His intimate knowledge of the French language
    and his considerable powers of conversation, combined
    with the personal charm of Lady Palmerston, soon
    achieved the desired result. In the previous month
    of December, the prospect that “ce terrible Lord
    Palmerston” would be once again at the Foreign Office
    had spread dismay in ministerial circles. But, in the
    following spring, when he returned to England, after
    a few weeks’ stay in Paris, the amiable qualities and
    the friendly dispositions of “ce cher Lord Palmerston”
    were the chief topic of conversation in the political salons.[833]


Louis Philippe and his Foreign Minister had been
    most disagreeably surprised by the disclosure of the
    proposal made by Christina to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg.
    Lord Aberdeen’s straightforward conduct in
    the affair could not undo the fact that the Queen-Mother
    had deliberately, and without the knowledge
    of the French ambassador, opened a negotiation for
    the marriage of Isabella to a prince, who was not a
    descendant of Philip V. In pursuance of this policy
    the Duke of Sotomayor, the Spanish ambassador in
    London, had been instructed to inquire officially in
    what light the British government would regard the
    selection of a prince, who was not a Bourbon, as the
    future husband of the Queen. To this question Lord
    Aberdeen had replied that, “should it be found that
    no descendant of Philip V. could safely be chosen,
    consistently with the happiness of the Queen or with
    a due regard to the tranquillity of the country, it could
    be no cause of displeasure to Great Britain were a
    prince from some other family to be selected.” He
    could not believe that in such a case “the enlightened
    Court of the Tuileries” would  interfere. “But, if
    contrary to all reason and probability, an attempt [Pg 383]were made to control the wishes and feelings of the
    Queen and the clearly understood will of her people,
    Spain would not only receive the warmest sympathy
    of Great Britain but of all Europe.”[834]


M. Guizot appears to have been even more
    annoyed than Louis Philippe at Christina’s proposal
    to the Coburgs. He is said, indeed, to have attempted
    to persuade the King to counteract it, by demanding
    the hand of Isabella for his son Montpensier. But
    neither Louis Philippe nor the young Duke himself
    were prepared to resort to so extreme a measure. The
    King, for the present, was content to address acrimonious
    complaints to Christina,[835] and to instruct
    M. Bresson to make a strong representation to the
    Spanish ministers.[836] At the same time, both he and
    M. Guizot decided to take steps to effect a reconciliation
    between the Queen-Mother and General Narvaez,
    whose return to power they regarded as essential to
    the success of their plans. Meanwhile, Jarnac spoke
    of Palmerston, with whom he had had his first interview
    on July 14, as “fairly well intentioned and
    rather timid.” This description of his attitude,
    M. Guizot admitted, was most satisfactory. “Nevertheless,
    between him and me,” he pointed out to his
    royal master, “there can be nothing more than a
    marriage of reason.” He purposed, therefore, so to
    arrange matters that he might be enabled to communicate
    his views directly to Lord John Russell.
    “It will require nice handling to speak to one about
    foreign affairs without offending the other. But, on
    occasions, we may have to do so.”[837]


Bresson appears to have expressed himself strongly [Pg 384]in favour of abandoning the Trapani marriage. In
    his opinion the matter resolved itself simply into
    choosing one of the sons of Don Francisco. Jarnac
    was, accordingly, instructed to propose to Lord
    Palmerston that these two princes should be the
    objects of the joint support of France and England.
    “London,” wrote M. Guizot to Louis Philippe, “will
    certainly favour Don Enrique, on account of his
    intimate connection with the Progressistas. . . .
    Evidently Cadiz would be the best selection for
    the Queen, Spain, and ourselves. Nevertheless, I do
    not think it advisable to propose him directly.”[838] Although Christina’s overture to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg
    at Lisbon had been made early in June, no
    answer had yet been returned to it. The prudent
    Coburgs would seem to have regarded it as inexpedient
    to incur the lasting enmity of Louis
    Philippe, for the sake of seeing a member of their
    family raised to the position of King-Consort of
    Spain. Upon his arrival in England, at the end of
    June, the Duke was strongly advised in this sense
    both by King Leopold and by Prince Albert. He,
    accordingly, resolved to reject Christina’s offer, on the
    ground of the injury which must result to Spain
    from a marriage contracted in opposition to the wishes
    of France.[839] This decision, however, would not appear
    to have been communicated directly to Louis Philippe.
    Nevertheless, the private letters, during the months of
    July and August, both of Bresson and Guizot, show
    plainly that they were aware that the Coburgs had no
    intention of entertaining the Queen-Mother’s proposal.[840]


 [Pg 385]


Palmerston, whilst in opposition, appears to have
    known nothing of the details of the Spanish marriage
    question. Until informed of it by Aberdeen, with
    whom he had a long conversation in the first days of
    July, he was completely ignorant of Christina’s proposal
    to the Coburgs.[841] From 1834 to 1841, however,
    he had constantly been engaged in combating the Moderados, and, upon his return to office in 1846, he
    at once reverted to his former policy of favouring the Progressistas. Under these circumstances, the candidature
    of Don Enrique, whose connection with the extreme
    wing of the Liberal party had been the cause of his exile
    and disgrace, would naturally enlist his approval and
    support. Nevertheless, in his first communication to
    Mr. Bulwer, he expressed no preference for any particular
    candidate. Spanish affairs, he wrote in his
    famous despatch of July 19, appeared to be divided
    into two questions—the marriage of the Queen and
    the condition of the country. In respect to the first,
    he had nothing to add to those instructions with
    which Bulwer had been supplied by his predecessor in
    office. There were three candidates in the field—Prince
    Leopold of Coburg and the two sons of Don
    Francisco de Paula—and “Her Majesty’s government
    could only hope that the choice might fall upon the
    one most likely to secure the happiness of the Queen
    and promote the welfare of the Spanish nation.” The
    greater part of the despatch, however, was concerned
    with the second question—the political condition of
    the country. On that point, although Lord Palmerston
    had no particular instructions to give, he had
    some very severe criticisms to offer. “After a
    struggle of now thirty-four years’ duration for constitutional
    freedom, Spain,” he declared, “finds herself
    under a system of government almost as arbitrary in
    practice, whatever it may be in theory, as any which [Pg 386]has existed in any former period of her history. She
    has indeed a Parliament, but all freedom for discussion
    has been overborne by force. . . . There is,
    indeed, by law liberty of the press, but that liberty
    has, by the arbitrary acts of the government, been
    reduced to the liberty of publishing what may be
    agreeable to the executive. . . . This system of
    violence seems, in some degree, to have survived the
    fall of its author[842] and not to have been as yet entirely
    abandoned by the more moderate men who have succeeded
    him in the government. . . . It was certainly
    not for the purpose of subjecting the Spanish nation
    to a grinding tyranny that Great Britain entered into
    the Quadruple Alliance and gave that active assistance,
    which contributed so materially to the expulsion of
    Don Carlos from Spain. . . .”[843]


This despatch was not to be communicated to the
    Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, but was intended
    to enable Mr. Bulwer to express, “to those persons
    who might have the power of remedying the existing
    evils,” the opinions of his government upon the state of
    the country. But, having sent it to Madrid, Palmerston,
    on July 20, confidentially informed M. de Jarnac of
    its contents and allowed him to be supplied with a
    copy of it. It is plain that he must have had some
    reason for thus communicating to the French chargé
    d’affaires a despatch, replete with sentiments which
    could not but be otherwise than very distasteful to his
    government. Without doubt, he must have known
    that Bulwer’s instructions would be at once passed on
    from Paris to Madrid, and it can only, therefore, be
    supposed that he wished the Spanish ministers to
    learn in this manner exactly what he thought about
    them. Perhaps, also, he was not sorry that M. Guizot [Pg 387]should have an opportunity of realizing the very low
    estimation in which he held his political friends, the Moderados. To the marriage question he obviously
    attached little importance, and his remarks upon that
    subject were, doubtless, drawn up far less carefully
    than those which had reference to the actual condition
    of Spain.


Louis Philippe, at this time, was somewhat disturbed
    by a letter from M. Bresson to M. Guizot, dated
    July 12, in which the ambassador gave a lengthy
    account of his recent proceedings at Madrid. The
    Queen-Mother, he reported, urged various objections
    to the Duke of Cadiz. “Isabella,” she declared,
    “had an insurmountable aversion to him and she
    herself had grave doubts about his virility. This last
    statement,” wrote M. Bresson, “took us upon very
    delicate ground. She adverted to his voice, his hips,
    and his general bodily conformation, and I replied by
    insisting that his rigid morality was to be ascribed
    solely to his consuming passion for the Queen, her
    daughter. Furthermore, I pointed out, that his desire
    to marry was inconsistent with the idea that he was
    incapable of fulfilling the conditions of matrimony.”
    Christina’s opinion upon that point was probably little
    influenced by arguments such as these. But, when
    M. Bresson took upon himself to assure her that, “in
    any Bourbon combination” the marriage of the Duc de
    Montpensier with the Infanta could be announced
    simultaneously with that of the Queen, she received
    the information with “every appearance of sincere
    pleasure.” Rianzarez also expressed to him his satisfaction
    with this arrangement, which would remove the
    great political objection to the Queen’s marriage with
    Cadiz or, even, with Trapani. Bresson, however, was
    of opinion that her union with the former could be
    effected more easily and expeditiously than with the
    latter, and he, accordingly, suggested that his regiment [Pg 388]should be brought to Madrid, in order that, “by
    constantly seeing him, Isabella might grow accustomed
    to his voice and hips.”[844]


The Queens, Louis Philippe declared at once, must
    be given to understand clearly that Bresson had no
    right to promise that the two marriages would be
    concluded simultaneously. He was not to be moved
    from this decision by Guizot’s insinuation that possibly
    the ambassador had not gone quite so far as His
    Majesty imagined. On the contrary, he replied, he
    had very little doubt that he had committed himself
    even more deeply than he admitted. It was while
    he was in this mood that Jarnac’s copy of Palmerston’s
    despatch of July 19 reached Paris. A perusal of its
    contents caused the King a considerable amount of
    annoyance,[845] yet it would not appear to have weakened
    his determination to insist upon the disavowal of
    M. Bresson.[846] But the question, as to how far the
    despatch of July 19 was responsible for the final
    decision of Louis Philippe, will be discussed later on.


Although in his official instructions he had expressed
    no preference for any particular candidate,
    Palmerston soon informed Bulwer, privately, that
    Don Enrique was the British candidate.[847] The selection
    of that prince called forth no objections from M. de
    Jarnac. On the contrary, as late as August 16, he
    gave Palmerston definitely to understand that, provided
    he would adhere to that arrangement, France
    would join with him in pressing it upon the Court of
    Madrid.[848] Bulwer, however, was filled with dismay on
    learning that he was expected to support the suit of [Pg 389]Don Enrique. He had little fault to find with him
    personally. He considered him manly, enterprising
    and ambitious, and described him as resembling in
    many respects Prince Louis Napoleon.[849] There was
    one objection to him, however, and that was an
    insuperable one—nothing short of a successful revolution
    would induce Christina to accept him. “Let me
    caution your Lordship again and again,” he wrote on
    August 4, “against appearing to listen to the counsels
    of the Progressistas and Don Enrique, if you wish to
    retain the confidence of the palace.”[850]


No sooner was Palmerston installed at the Foreign
    Office, than Bulwer, reverting to his former scheme,
    began to plead earnestly in favour of the Coburg
    marriage. France, he maintained, in order to carry
    out successfully her plans of aggrandisement in
    Algeria, Morocco, Tunis and Egypt must exercise
    a paramount influence at Madrid. It followed,
    therefore, that all her ambitious designs would be
    checkmated by the Queen’s marriage outside the
    Bourbon line. “The policy of maintaining good
    relations with France,” he was not disposed to dispute
    it, “was a great and wise policy. But what would
    happen,” he asked, “were Louis Philippe to die?
    In that event would not the power of a great military
    nation fall into the hands of three or four enterprising
    young men, burning for glory in their several careers?
    The policy of good relations with France depended,”he much feared, “upon the life of a man of seventy-four
    and upon the well or the ill-directed aim of an
    assassin.”[851] The Coburg marriage, Christina assured
    him, could still be arranged. Let the management of
    the affair be entrusted to him and he would undertake [Pg 390]to bring it to a successful conclusion. France would
    oppose it vigorously, and it must, therefore, be prepared
    in secrecy. Indeed, he acknowledged that his
    plan must needs “wear the aspect of an intrigue, in
    order to avoid the effects of an intrigue.”[852]


Palmerston, however, was not to be diverted from
    his intention by these arguments. The Court, the
    government, and the Coburgs themselves were alike
    agreed that Louis Philippe’s hostility to it had
    rendered the Spanish proposal unacceptable. On
    August 22, therefore, he addressed a lengthy despatch
    to Bulwer, in which he laid it down as the deliberate
    opinion of the British government that Don Enrique
    was the most suitable candidate.[853] But, before this
    communication could reach Madrid, the affair to which
    it referred had been definitely settled. The French
    government had not failed to turn its knowledge
    of Palmerston’s dispatch of July 19 to account.
    M. Bresson, in pursuance of M. Guizot’s[854] instructions,
    had been busily engaged in representing it as a declaration
    of hostility against the Moderado government in
    Madrid. Nuñoz, the brother of the Duke of Rianzarez,
    informed Mr. Bulwer that all hope of arranging the
    Coburg marriage had been abandoned, that Palmerston
    “would listen to no other alliance but that of
    Don Enrique, who is looked upon by the Court as an
    open adversary and a disguised rebel,” and that a Progressista insurrection was being prepared in London.[855] Only a week after he had transmitted this news, the
    British minister, on August 29, reported that the
    Queen, the night before at 12 o’clock, had made up [Pg 391]her mind in favour of Don Francisco de Asis, Duke of
    Cadiz. Furthermore, he had to inform Lord Palmerston
    that the marriage of the Duc de Montpensier
    would take place at the same time. “I learn,” he
    wrote in conclusion, “that directly the Queen had
    signified her intention of marrying her cousin, Count
    Bresson formally asked the hand of the Infanta for
    the Duke of Montpensier, stating that he had powers
    to enter upon and conclude that affair.”[856]


M. Guizot, on September 1, communicated this
    news to Lord Normanby, the new British ambassador
    in Paris.[857] Palmerston, who was yachting with Her
    Majesty on the south coast of England, received the
    information of the conclusion of the double marriage in
    a letter from the Comte de Jarnac. Louis Philippe
    eluded the disagreeable task of apprising Queen Victoria
    that he had broken his compact, by allowing his own
    Queen, Marie Amélie, to convey the intelligence to her.
    The reply which she received was short and cold.
    “You will remember,” wrote Queen Victoria, “what
    passed between the King and myself at Eu. . . .
    You will, doubtless, have heard that, in order to be
    agreeable to your King, we declined to arrange the
    marriage of our cousin, Prince Leopold, with the
    Queen of Spain. . . . You will, therefore, easily
    understand that the sudden announcement of this
    double marriage could only cause us surprise and the
    keenest regret. . .”[858]


M. Guizot explained his conduct by referring to
    the Memorandum of February 27, 1846, of the existence
    of which Palmerston was now for the first time [Pg 392]informed. In that document France had reserved to
    herself the right of departing from the agreement at
    Eu, should at any time a Coburg marriage appear
    “imminent or probable.” Palmerston’s inclusion of
    Prince Leopold among the available candidates in
    his despatch of July 19, combined with Christina’s
    overture at Lisbon, in the previous month of May,
    had created a situation, M. Guizot insisted, which
    released France from all her engagements. But,
    although he firmly maintained this contention and
    instructed M. de Jarnac to hold the same language in
    London, his conduct was not that of a man confident
    in the justice of his cause. Besides attempting to
    induce Lord Aberdeen to declare that, under the
    circumstances, a departure from the compact at Eu
    was permissible, he drew up a bitter attack upon Lord
    Palmerston and sent it to Jarnac with instructions to
    forward it to Lord John Russell. But in both cases he
    met with disappointment. Aberdeen told him frankly
    that he could not adopt his view of the case, and that
    he had no fault to find with the language or the
    conduct of his successor in office.[859] John Russell
    showed his letter to Palmerston, and informed M.
    de Jarnac that his colleague had his hearty
    approval and support.[860] Louis Philippe, meanwhile,
    had compiled a lengthy statement of his case and had
    sent it to his daughter, the Queen of the Belgians, in
    order that it might be placed before Queen Victoria.
    But neither his laboured attempts to extenuate his
    own conduct nor his insinuations about Lord Palmerston
    produced the desired effect. After a careful consideration
    of his letter, replied the Queen on September
    27, she had failed to discover any reasons which could
    justify him in breaking his promise. She had arrived
    at this conclusion, she begged him to believe, “by the [Pg 393]help of her own eyes,” not, as he had suggested, by
    the aid of those of Lord Palmerston.[861]


The protests of the Queen, however, were as
    ineffectual as the official remonstrances of Bulwer at
    Madrid and of Normanby in Paris. On October 10,
    1846, the double marriage was duly solemnized at the
    palace, in the hall called “de Embajadores.” The
    British minister was not present at the ceremony,
    which was witnessed by a great crowd of persons.
    “One viva only was heard, and that not very loud,
    when the Infante Don Francisco descended from his
    carriage.”[862] Louis Philippe and M. Guizot had attained
    their object, but they had sacrificed “the cordial
    understanding.” In England, the authors of the
    Spanish marriages stood condemned by the Court, by
    the Cabinet, and by public opinion. There was no
    thought of an appeal to arms, but it was felt that in
    the future the relations of the two governments could
    no longer be carried on in the same spirit of close and
    friendly intimacy. Palmerston, founding his case
    upon the renunciation made at the Peace of Utrecht[863] by the Duc d’Orléans of that day, sought to induce
    the Powers to declare that any children, which might
    be born to the Duc de Montpensier and the Infanta,
    would be excluded from succeeding to the Spanish
    throne. Throughout Europe, however, there were
    ominous signs of a recrudescence of the revolutionary
    spirit, and Metternich, in consequence, had strong
    reasons for desiring to propitiate Louis Philippe and
    M. Guizot. He, therefore, refused to pronounce himself
    and simply adopted an attitude of neutrality,
    taking care to point out that the trouble could never
    have arisen, had the legitimist principle been upheld [Pg 394]and had Don Carlos been enthroned. Russia and
    Prussia, which like Austria had never acknowledged the
    sovereignty of Isabella, followed the example of the
    Court of Vienna and declined to be drawn into the
    controversy.


Palmerston’s conduct was, unquestionably, ill-advised
    in thus attempting to apply to Spain, in the
    middle of the nineteenth century, the stipulations of
    diplomatic instruments framed when the conditions of
    Europe were very different. But, if his objections to
    the Infanta’s marriage, founded upon the Treaty of
    Utrecht, were unsuccessful, he was afforded the satisfaction
    of completely refuting the pleas set up by M.
    Guizot in justification of his actions. The argument
    which forms the main contention of his despatches,
    both of October 31, 1846 and of January 8, 1847, is
    unanswerable. The Memorandum of February 27,
    1846, to which the French government attached so
    much importance was, he pointed out, unofficial and
    verbal. No record of it was to be found at the
    Foreign Office. M. de Jarnac had never mentioned
    it to him, “until after the event had happened for
    which it was now quoted as a justification.” But,
    “even admitting for the sake of argument that Her
    Majesty’s present government were to be held bound
    by it, how could it justify a departure from the
    engagement of Eu? The imminent danger, specified
    in that memorandum, was the likelihood that either
    the Queen or the Infanta should be about immediately
    to marry a foreign Prince, not being a descendant of
    Philip V. But if that likelihood had ever existed, it
    had at all events ceased to exist, when M. Bresson
    demanded the hand of the Infanta for the Duc de
    Montpensier. Not only had it then ceased to exist,
    but with respect to the Queen, whose marriage was
    then the immediate and only subject of discussion, it
    had been succeeded by an impossibility; because when [Pg 395]Count Bresson demanded the hand of the Infanta the
    marriage of the Queen to the Infant Don Francisco
    had actually been resolved upon and settled.”[864]


Both in the French Chambers and in the British
    Parliament the Spanish marriages were the subject of
    debate, at the opening of the session of 1847. The
    publication of the English blue-book created a profound
    sensation in France.[865] After reading the correspondence,
    no one could any longer maintain that England
    had encouraged the candidature of Prince Leopold of
    Coburg, or that Louis Philippe had been justified in
    breaking the agreement of Eu. Nevertheless, in spite
    of the light which was thus thrown upon the proceedings
    which led up to the marriages, the true history of
    the case was only imperfectly revealed. Even to-day,
    the real motives which actuated some of the principal
    actors in the affair are still largely a matter of conjecture.
    Palmerston[866] himself believed, and his opinion
    has been adopted by the majority of English writers,
    that a secret understanding existed between Christina
    and Louis Philippe. The Queen-Mother’s overture to
    the Duke of Saxe-Coburg has been represented as a
    trap craftily laid for the British government. England,
    it was calculated, would never resist the temptation of
    actively supporting the candidature of Prince Leopold,
    and Louis Philippe would, in consequence, be furnished
    with a pretext for repudiating his promises.[867] But, plausible as this explanation of Christina’s conduct
    may sound, it cannot stand the test of a close
    examination.


Had the Queen-Mother never manifested any [Pg 396]anxiety to marry her daughter to a Coburg, until she
    requested Bulwer to transmit her proposal to Lisbon,
    her proceedings, it must be admitted, would be open
    to grave suspicion. But  the facts of the case are
    very different. On at least three previous occasions,
    when she cannot possibly have been acting in collusion
    with Louis Philippe, she had declared her predilection
    for the Coburg match. In 1838, during the civil war,
    she mentioned the matter to Lord  Clarendon.[868] In
    1841, after her abdication, when she was living in
    Paris, she sent Count Toreno to Lord Cowley to inform
    him that she regarded a Coburg Prince as the most
    suitable husband for Isabella.[869] No sooner was she
    back at Madrid, in 1844, than she expressed herself in
    the same spirit to Mr. Bulwer.[870] To the very last she
    appears to have struggled against the dictation of the
    King of the French. Finding that the Coburgs were
    fearful of incurring the wrath of the Court of the
    Tuileries, she did all in her power to persuade Louis
    Philippe not to insist upon her daughter’s marriage
    with a Bourbon, “who had none of the qualities calculated
    to make her happy.” As late as the middle of
    July, 1846, she sent the Marquis of Miraflores to Paris
    to plead her cause with him. But the “Citizen King”
    was inflexible. “Royal marriages,” he reminded her,
    “were not like of those of private individuals.”[871] Nevertheless, she still refused to yield, and when she
    at last gave way and compelled the unfortunate
    Isabella to marry the Duke of Cadiz, it was the ill-judged
    intervention of Lord Palmerston which was the
    cause of her surrender, not the expostulations and
    threats of Louis Philippe.


In Spain, in 1846, the victory of one party over [Pg 397]another meant something more than that a particular
    set of politicians had been temporarily replaced in
    office by their opponents. Disgrace, exile and even
    loss of liberty were the fate which generally awaited
    the leaders of a defeated party. Christina herself,
    after the triumph of the Progressistas in 1836, had
    had to submit to the insolent dictation of a band
    of mutinous sergeants and had seen her Moderado ministers forced to fly from the country. Four years
    later the same party, in its hour of victory, had humiliated
    her as a woman and as a Queen and had driven
    her to resign the regency. She was not by nature
    vindictive, but she, doubtless, regarded a Progressista with feelings very similar to those which her father or
    her brother entertained for a Carbonaro. It may be
    imagined, therefore, with what dismay she read Palmerston’s
    despatch of July 19. In every line of it the
    intention of befriending her enemies was apparent.
    Palmerston, it was clear to her, was declaring that
    Don Enrique was the only suitable husband for
    Isabella, simply in order to promote the fortunes of
    the Progressistas.


Once convinced that the Moderado régime was
    endangered by the hostility of Lord Palmerston,
    Christina determined to comply with Louis Philippe’s
    demands and thus obtain his protection. The Duke
    of Cadiz was hastily summoned to Madrid and Isabella
    was compelled to accept him for a husband. It is not
    absolutely certain whether the Queen-Mother insisted
    upon the simultaneous announcement of Montpensier’s
    marriage with her second daughter, or whether the
    proposal came from M. Bresson. It is highly probable,
    however, that she made it an indispensable condition
    to her acceptation of Cadiz. The fact that the Infanta
    was betrothed to a son of Louis Philippe would conciliate
    the French party and would be looked upon by
    people, generally, as some compensation for the [Pg 398]extreme insignificance of the King Consort. Moreover,
    from her point of view there was another, and a far
    stronger reason, in favour of the simultaneous conclusion
    of the two marriages. Once the elder brother
    was the husband of the Queen, it would be very difficult
    to prevent the marriage of the younger, Don
    Enrique, with the Infanta.[872] That danger could be
    averted only by the announcement that she was
    betrothed to, and was shortly to marry, Montpensier.


Notwithstanding that he owed his crown to a
    popular revolution, Louis Philippe attached the
    highest importance to the natural alliances of the
    Bourbons. The maintenance of relations with Spain
    on the footing of consanguinity was, in consequence,
    the constant aim of his policy. In the pursuit of this
    object he found a ready instrument in his Foreign
    Minister. By upholding the principle that Isabella’s
    husband must be a descendant of Philip V., M. Guizot
    purposed to disprove the reproach of his opponents
    that this foreign policy was weak and subservient to
    England.[873] His motives are perfectly comprehensible.
    But the reasons which induced the King to break the
    compact of Eu, by consenting to allow his son’s
    marriage to take place at the same time as that of the
    Queen, have never been satisfactorily explained. Louis
    Philippe was very angry upon learning, on July 20,
    1846, that M. Bresson, in order to overcome Christina’s
    repugnance to the Duke of Cadiz, had held out to her
    the inducement that Montpensier’s marriage with the
    Infanta might be concluded simultaneously. Turning
    a deaf ear to the timid remonstrances of M. Guizot, he
    insisted upon the necessity of acquainting the Queen-Mother
    that his ambassador had greatly exceeded his
    instructions. His private correspondence, discovered [Pg 399]at the Tuileries after the Revolution of ’48, makes his
    sentiments upon that point absolutely clear.[874] Nevertheless,
    in the course of the next three weeks all his
    scruples vanished, and he allowed M. Bresson to be
    furnished with the powers necessary for the conclusion
    of the double marriage.


According to the official French version of the
    affair, it was the despatch of July 19 which caused the
    King to change his mind. Seeing that Palmerston had
    placed Coburg at the head of the list of candidates, he,
    rightly or wrongly, conceived that the danger, specified
    in the Memorandum of February 27, 1846, had become
    “probable and imminent,” and that he was, in consequence,
    released from all his engagements to England.
    But his secret correspondence with M. Guizot completely
    disproves this assertion. In forwarding, on
    July 24, the despatch to the King, Guizot himself
    made no suggestion of that nature. On the contrary,
    he expressed the extremely judicious opinion that
    Palmerston was very indifferent about Coburg and
    was rather trying to regain his influence over the Progressistas. Louis Philippe took the same view of
    the case. He was greatly annoyed at the strictures
    passed upon his friends, the Moderados, predicted that
    Palmerston’s proceedings would lead to the bouleversement of Spain, but “all that,” he wrote, “makes it
    the more necessary that our disavowal of the simultaneous
    marriage plan should reach Christina at once.
    The more we suspect bad faith in others the more
    must we be careful to keep our own hands clean.”[875] The letters published in the Revue retrospective show
    that he adhered to these admirable sentiments for
    some ten days longer. There is no document, however,
    or trustworthy evidence to explain why, probably
    about August 13 or 14, he suddenly decided to
    adopt a totally different view of the matter. Under [Pg 400]these circumstances it is only possible to suggest the
    following explanation.


Louis Philippe in the question of the Spanish
    marriages had a twofold object in view. To his
    Bourbon policy was subjoined the bourgeois policy of
    the père de famille, who was desirous of obtaining for
    his son the large fortune which was supposed to be the
    portion of the Infanta. Palmerston, however, was
    determined to prevent the accomplishment of this plan.
    To the well-known instructions transmitted to Bulwer,
    on August 22, was appended a despatch, marked separate and confidential, in which he laid down the
    principle that Montpensier’s marriage with the Infanta
    “would be as objectionable, and in some respects more
    so, than his marriage with the Queen.”[876] It is true that
    the contents of this despatch were unknown to Louis
    Philippe and his agents, and moreover, that before it
    reached Bulwer’s hands the affair had been concluded.
    But Guizot was, undoubtedly, aware of Palmerston’s
    opinions on the subject. Indeed, in a letter to the
    King, on August 8, he expressed the fear that, although
    Coburg might be abandoned so far as Isabella was
    concerned, Palmerston would probably attempt to
    marry him to the Infanta. “After our first battle,”he wrote, “we shall have to fight another, and a very
    sharp one.”[877] Louis Philippe himself, a few days later,
    appears to have been disturbed by a letter which his
    Queen had received from Christina. The tone of it he
    considered unpleasant, “and it contained no mention
    of Montpensier’s marriage.” . . . “Our situation,” he
    informed Guizot, “has, in consequence, much changed
    for the worse.”[878]


It is evident, therefore, that on August 12, Louis
    Philippe was aware that danger threatened his project [Pg 401]of marrying his son to the Infanta from two quarters.
    Palmerston was resolved to oppose it, and the Queen-Mother,
    if not actually hostile to it, was showing some
    reluctance to support it. But in the course of the next
    day or two, news would probably be received from
    Madrid of the effect which the despatch of July 19 had
    had upon Christina and her ministers. Under these
    circumstances, a great effort was, doubtless, made to
    persuade the King to give Bresson a free hand. Guizot,
    Madame Adelaïde,[879] and other members of his family
    assuredly represented to him that the present opportunity
    must not be allowed to escape. Christina was
    thoroughly frightened, and would be prepared to accept
    both Cadiz and Montpensier, provided only that the two
    marriages could take place simultaneously. Should
    there be either hesitation or delay, however, Palmerston
    would have time to mature his plans, and the
    Infanta and her fortune would be lost to them.


If the theory, here put forward, be correct, that it
    was Palmerston’s hostility to Montpensier’s projected
    marriage which caused Louis Philippe to break his
    promise to England, the question arises, whether, under
    the circumstances, he was not justified in regarding
    himself as released from his engagements. M. Thureau-Dangin[880] contends that the King, having undertaken at
    Eu to postpone his son’s marriage with the Infanta
    until the Queen should have children, had a right to
    expect that, in the interval, England should do nothing
    to facilitate her marriage with any other prince.
    Aberdeen, unquestionably, did not regard the matter
    in that light. He simply looked upon Montpensier’s
    marriage with the Infanta as delayed for several years,
    until, by the birth of heirs to Isabella, it should
    have lost its political significance. Even then, when
    it should be less objectionable, he did not consider that [Pg 402]England was bound to consent to it, and, in the meantime,
    as he pointed out to Peel, “many things might
    happen.”[881] Palmerston most certainly would have
    repudiated the notion that the compact of Eu debarred
    him from recommending the alliance of the Infanta
    with Leopold of Coburg. “We can admit of no
    parity of position,” he told Jarnac, “between a son
    of the King of the French and the third son of a
    German nobleman as closely related to the French, as
    to the British, Royal Family.”[882] M. Guizot, in the Memorandum of February 27, undoubtedly declared
    that the Bourbon principle applied equally to the Queen
    and the Infanta, but he clearly had not much faith in
    his ability to make good that contention. He was
    perfectly aware of Palmerston’s sentiments with respect
    to Montpensier’s marriage, but he never attempted to
    argue that, because of them, the King was released
    from his promise. Throughout the controversy he confined
    himself to asserting, what he knew to be untrue,
    that Palmerston’s proceedings had rendered “probable
    and imminent” the alliance of a Coburg prince with
    Queen Isabella.


In most English accounts it is taken for granted
    that Louis Philippe selected the Duke of Cadiz as a
    husband for Isabella, in order to make certain that the
    succession to the Spanish throne should pass to the
    descendants of Montpensier. But the circumstances
    do not warrant this assumption. Count Trapani,
    whose physical fitness was never called into question,
    was always his favourite candidate. It was only in
    the last resort, when, owing to the unpopularity of
    the Neapolitan connection, he was forced to bring
    forward another Bourbon, that he fell back upon [Pg 403]Cadiz. The suspicions which existed about the virility
    of this young prince did not deter the King
    from seeking to impose him upon Isabella. He
    cannot, however, be fairly charged with having
    expressly chosen him, because he believed him to be
    impotent. Don Enrique and the sons of Don Carlos
    being for different political reasons out of the question,
    he had no option but to renounce his Bourbon principle,
    or to insist upon the Queen’s marriage with the
    Duke of Cadiz.


The experience of England during the eighteenth
    century had taught her to look with dread upon the
    prospect of having to struggle single-handed against
    the two Bourbon Powers. The lesson of 1783 was
    never forgotten by her statesmen. Under the Restoration,
    when the absolute rule of Ferdinand VII. was
    re-established by French bayonets, Mr. Canning, to
    avert the dangers of a close alliance between the
    Courts of Madrid and of the Tuileries, acknowledged
    the revolted Spanish colonies and “called in the new
    world to redress the balance of the old.” Palmerston
    was confronted by a different situation. Spain was
    weaker, but France had acquired Algiers and was upon
    terms of suspicious friendliness with Mehemet Ali.
    In alliance with the Pasha of Egypt in the east and
    with Spain in the west, she might, it was to be feared,
    obtain a complete control of the Mediterranean. It
    was, therefore, Palmerston conceived, a matter of the
    first importance that her influence over the Cabinet of
    Madrid should be destroyed. This object, in his
    opinion, could never be successfully attained until
    Spain should be endowed with Liberal institutions,
    and should adopt a national, not a dynastic, policy.
    It was with this end in view that he entered into the
    Quadruple Treaty, by which England engaged to
    assist the Christinos to expel Don Carlos from the
    Peninsula. Without doubt, the idea upon which his [Pg 404]policy was based was statesmanlike; nevertheless, the
    methods by which he hoped to accomplish his purpose
    were deplorably unsound. The treaty of 1834 involved
    interference in the domestic affairs of Spain,
    and that in combination with the very Power the
    ascendancy of which over the Spanish government it
    was his secret object to diminish.


Any military advantages which the Christinos may
    have derived from the Quadruple Treaty were more
    than counterbalanced by the harm, which the jealous
    interference of France and Great Britain in her
    internal affairs, inflicted upon Spain. Long after the
    Pretender had fled and outward peace had been
    restored, the political settlement of the country was
    retarded by the rivalry and intrigues of the ambassadors
    and ministers of the two Powers. The
    marriages of 1846, and all the evils which they
    brought in their train, were an outcome of the policy
    which Palmerston had inaugurated twelve years before.
    But he had not been in power during the whole of this
    period, and, when he returned to the Foreign Office,
    the marriage question was already far advanced.
    Aberdeen was not responsible for the Quadruple
    Treaty, and he was sincerely desirous of putting an
    end to the practice of meddling with internal politics,
    which both the French and British agents at Madrid
    had adopted. Nevertheless, his weakness and irresolution
    in dealing with M. Guizot were the cause of
    much mischief. Had he adhered to his first pronouncement
    that England would object to any
    alliance which threatened to disturb the balance of
    power, but that, with that exception, she looked upon
    the Royal marriages as an exclusively Spanish affair,
    none of the subsequent complications could have
    arisen. Unfortunately, however, after the downfall
    of Espartero, he undertook to observe a kind of
    benevolent neutrality towards the principle of the [Pg 405]French government—that Isabella’s husband must be
    a Bourbon. The compact of Eu and the different
    interpretations which were placed upon it, the pretensions
    set up in the Memorandum of February 27,
    1846, were the consequences of the modifications
    introduced into his original declaration.




 [Pg 406]


 CHAPTER XI


PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF ’48.


Whilst France and England had been quarrelling
    over the Spanish marriages, events of greater importance
    had been taking place in Central Europe.
    The Polish nationalists had planned an insurrection
    which was to break out simultaneously in Prussian
    and Austrian Poland. At Posen, the authorities
    obtained early intelligence of the projected rising, and
    were enabled to suppress it without difficulty. But
    in Gallicia, in February, 1846, the Austrian military
    commander was suddenly called upon to deal with a
    formidable rebellion. Colonel Benedek,[883] however, by
    allowing the Polish peasants to wreak their hatred
    upon their landlords, succeeded in dividing the forces
    opposed to him and in subduing one revolution by
    another. The free town of Cracow was the scene of
    severe fighting, and, after the defeat of the insurgents,
    was occupied by Russian troops. The measure was to
    be merely temporary, and the town, it was announced,
    would be evacuated, directly order should be restored.
    But, when it was evident that the Spanish marriage
    question had hopelessly divided France and England,
    the Northern Courts adopted a different attitude. On
    November 15, 1846, the Austrian, the Prussian and
    the Russian ministers in London informed Palmerston [Pg 407]that the independent existence of Cracow was incompatible
    with the public tranquillity of Europe, and
    that, in consequence, it had been decided that the
    Republic should, in the future, form part of the
    Austrian Empire.[884] A similar communication was, at
    the same time, made to the French government. The
    Republic of Cracow having been constituted by a
    treaty between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, on May 3,
    1815, these three Powers maintained that they had a
    right to undo what they had done, without consultation
    with the other Powers which were parties to the
    general settlement of 1815.[885] Both France and England
    at once entered a formal protest. M. Guizot, having
    attained his object in Spain, was now bent upon re-establishing
    “the cordial understanding,” and would
    gladly have made a joint representation to the three
    Powers with great Britain.[886] But his hope that the
    annexation of Cracow would prove the means of reuniting
    France and England was not realized. Palmerston
    contented himself with directing Normanby to
    furnish the French government with a copy of the
    remonstrance which he addressed to the Court of
    Vienna.[887]


Metternich was not disturbed by these representations.
    It was out of the power of England to enforce
    her views, and Louis Philippe and M. Guizot were
    careful at once to reassure him about their veritable
    intentions. Public indignation had been aroused in
    France by the extinction of the little republic and,
    under the circumstances, it had been necessary to
    protest officially. But let the Chancellor understand,
    Louis Philippe informed the Austrian ambassador,
    that the remonstrance which M. de Flahaut had been [Pg 408]instructed to make at Vienna was “merely talk which
    could hurt no one.”[888] Metternich, however, although
    he was thus speedily relieved from all anxiety as to
    the attitude which the western Powers purposed to
    adopt towards his proceedings in Gallicia, had much
    cause for uneasiness in other directions. Germany was
    seething with discontent, and the King of Prussia, by
    deciding to summon the combined Estates, was evincing
    a regrettable disposition to acquiesce in the popular
    demand for a greater measure of political rights. In
    Italy affairs presented a yet more alarming appearance.
    For the past fourteen years the Peninsula had been
    outwardly at peace. But Metternich’s vigilance had
    not been lulled to sleep by this seeming acquiescence
    in existing conditions. A movement, he was well
    aware, was in progress infinitely more dangerous than
    the local insurrections planned in the secrecy of the Carbonari lodges. Mazzini, by means of his society of Young Italy, and Gioberti, d’Azeglio and Balbo, by
    their writings, were teaching the people to dream of
    independence and of national unity. Hitherto Metternich,
    in his policy of repression, had always been able
    to count upon the whole-hearted support of the different
    Italian governments. But now the Sovereign of the
    most important State in the Peninsula was strongly
    suspected of encouraging the propagation of these new
    doctrines.


Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, had, as the Prince
    of Carignano, displayed Liberal tendencies. In the
    Piedmontese rebellion of 1821 his conduct had been
    equivocal, but, since his accession, in 1831, he had
    shown a firm determination to uphold the absolutist
    traditions of his House. Nevertheless, he now permitted
    both d’Azeglio and Balbo to reside unmolested
    within his dominions and, in spite of Metternich’s
    remonstrances, his police scarcely interfered with the [Pg 409]free circulation of their subversive writings. In the
    summer of 1846, it was already apparent that the relations
    between the Courts of Turin and of Vienna were
    no longer upon their former friendly footing. Ostensibly
    a question of tariff was the only cause of dispute.
    In reality, however, it was Charles Albert’s increasing
    sympathy with the Italian national movement which
    was the reason of the prohibitive duty, placed by
    Metternich, upon the wines of Piedmont.[889] Matters
    were in this state when, on June 1, 1846, the Pope,
    Gregory XVI., died. Fifteen days later, Cardinal
    Mastai-Ferretti, Archbishop of Imola, was elected to
    succeed him, and assumed the title of Pius IX.


The condition of the Papal States was deplorable.
    The finances were in disorder, and the government
    depended for its existence upon the protection of
    Austria and upon the presence of its Swiss auxiliary
    troops. The new Pope, it was hoped, would consent
    to the introduction of certain necessary measures of
    reform. The expectation that Pius IX. would not
    pursue the reactionary policy of his predecessor proved
    well founded.[890] On July 16, 1846, a month after his
    election, His Holiness proclaimed a general amnesty
    for political offences. The educated classes had eagerly
    absorbed the doctrines of Balbo, d’Azeglio, and Gioberti,
    and the Liberal tendencies manifested by the new Pope
    aroused an immense enthusiasm. Nor was his popularity
    confined to his own dominions. The quiet and
    unpretending priest suddenly found himself magnified
    into a national hero. Patriots, who had begun to look
    to Charles Albert as the future liberator of Italy, now
    placed all their hopes in Pius IX. It was not possible
    for him to withstand the enthusiasm which his [Pg 410]concessions had called forth. In the spring of 1847, a
    modified liberty was granted to the press, and the formation
    of a Council of State, to be chosen by the Pope
    from elected provincial delegates, was decreed. Lastly,
    on July 5, the establishment of a civic guard was
    announced. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, fearful that
    invidious comparisons would be drawn between his
    methods of government and those of His Holiness,
    made haste to initiate similar reforms at Florence.[891]


In the opinion of Louis Philippe, the death of
    Gregory XVI. amounted to a public misfortune. A
    Liberal Pope could not but add materially to the
    political unrest which had suddenly affected the whole
    of Europe.[892] Nevertheless, neither he nor M. Guizot
    were as yet prepared to join with Austria in counselling
    the Papal government to resist the popular demand
    for reforms. France was at the time represented at
    Rome by a man of considerable ability and learning,
    Count Rossi, an Italian political exile and a naturalized
    Frenchman. In the first instance he was instructed
    to counsel the adoption of a strictly juste milieu policy.[893] The new Papal government should be based upon the
    principles of an enlightened conservatism. His Holiness
    would be well advised promptly to introduce certain
    much-needed reforms into his system of administration.
    Let him beware, however, of listening to those who
    would propose violent and ill-considered changes.
    Above all, let him avoid giving unnecessary offence to
    Austria.[894] But, after his quarrel with England over
    the Spanish marriages, M. Guizot decided to revise his
    Italian policy.


In every part of the world France and England [Pg 411]were opposed to each other. M. Guizot’s own relations
    with Lord Normanby were very far from friendly.
    The public denial of the French minister that he had
    used certain words, imputed to him by the British
    ambassador, had been followed by a personal quarrel,
    which had only been arranged by the intervention of
    Count Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador.[895] At Madrid,
    the consequences of the distasteful marriage forced
    upon the young Queen were already apparent. Isabella
    was practically separated from her husband, and her
    relations with General Serrano were a cause of scandal.
    French and British rivalry was actively maintained by
    Bresson and by Bulwer, who, with the full knowledge
    of Palmerston, was deeply involved in all the intrigues
    of the palace.[896] At Athens, where King Otho had
    been compelled to grant a constitution, Lyons and
    Piscatory, the British and French ministers, were
    closely identified with different political parties. In
    South America, a dispute between Lord Howden and
    Comte Walewski threatened to put an end to the
    mediation of France and England in the war, which
    for some time past had been in progress between
    Buenos Ayres and Monte Video.[897]


M. Guizot, under these circumstances, resolved to
    make approaches to Austria. The British government
    alone was disposed to sympathize sincerely with the
    Liberal movement which was causing so much anxiety
    to the absolute Courts. If only he could arrive at an
    agreement with Metternich as to the policy to be
    adopted towards German, Swiss and Italian affairs,
    England would be isolated completely. But the
    negotiation of such an understanding was a delicate
    matter. An alliance between the government of the [Pg 412]“Citizen King” and the Cabinet of Vienna, for the
    maintenance of despotism and of the settlement of
    1815, was an unnatural combination which might
    prove fatal to its promotor. Public opinion in France
    was on the side of the peoples struggling for political
    freedom. M. Thiers, the leader of the Opposition, had
    loudly declared that this was only the principle upon
    which French policy could be based. M. Guizot,
    therefore, considered it advisable, in his intercourse
    with Metternich, not to make use of the ordinary
    channels of communication, but to employ a secret
    agent. In the spring of 1847, accordingly, he sent to
    Vienna, a certain Klindworth,[898] who on several former
    occasions appears to have been entrusted with
    confidential missions by the French Foreign Office.
    He was to assure Prince Metternich that the French
    government was determined to uphold the territorial status quo, and was prepared to co-operate with
    Austria in opposing the introduction of any fundamental
    changes in the system of government of the
    different Italian States.[899]


M. Guizot, furthermore, entered into a direct
    correspondence with Prince Metternich. But no
    precise agreement as to their respective policies was
    concluded.[900] Guizot appears to have been mainly
    concerned to assure the Austrian Chancellor of the
    high esteem which he entertained for his perspicacity
    and judgment. Nor did he, on occasions, disdain to
    employ language which can only be described as that
    of fulsome adulation.[901] Metternich could not be [Pg 413]otherwise than pleased and flattered by the advances
    thus made to him. He was not, however, disposed to
    set an undue value upon the protestations of M.
    Guizot. He had little doubt that, were Austria to
    invade the Papal States, France would at once
    dispatch an army to Italy, proclaiming that she had
    taken His Holiness under her protection. But,
    although no formal compact resulted from M. Guizot’s
    overtures at Vienna, his desire to propitiate Prince
    Metternich was reflected in his instructions to his
    agents at the different Italian Courts. By the spring
    of 1847, it was evident that the Italian Liberal movement
    was regarded with nearly as much disapproval
    by the government of Louis Philippe as by the
    Cabinet of Vienna.


Metternich was under no illusions as to the true
    meaning of the events which were taking place in
    Italy. Above the popular expressions of joy at the
    reforms, conceded by the Pope or by the Grand Duke
    of Tuscany, rose the threatening cry for the expulsion
    of the foreigner. Unless the Liberal movement
    could be crushed, the Emperor, he perceived clearly,
    would have to fight to retain his Italian possessions.
    “Nationality,” he bade Buol warn Charles Albert,
    “was the new device which the revolutionists had
    inscribed upon their banners.”[902] Resolutely he prepared
    for the struggle which he saw was impending.
    Troops were poured into Lombardy and the Austrian
    garrison at Ferrara was strengthened. Moreover, he
    was strongly suspected of fomenting a counter-revolutionary
    plot at Rome, with the object of forcibly
    displacing the Liberal advisers of His Holiness, and
    of surrounding him with members of the reactionary
    party. The discovery of this conspiracy, in which the
    governor of Rome was involved, caused an immense [Pg 414]excitement. No certain evidence could be procured
    of the participation of Austrian agents in the affair.
    It was significant, however, that the garrison of
    Ferrara received a substantial accession of strength on
    the very day fixed upon by the conspirators for the
    execution of their plans.[903] But, if Metternich’s connection
    with the Roman plot of July 1847 may be held
    to be not proven, his intention to provoke the Liberal
    and national party into some ill-considered act of
    violence, which should furnish him with a pretext for
    armed intervention, admits of no doubt. Hitherto,
    as specified by the treaty, the garrison at Ferrara[904] had been confined to the citadel. But now the
    Austrians proceeded to occupy the whole town, the
    troops adopting a most insulting attitude towards the
    population, and especially towards the civic guard.
    But this clumsy device for bringing on a collision
    failed in its object. In the words of the British
    minister at Florence, the newly enrolled citizen
    soldiers “observed the most extraordinary moderation
    under the most contumelious treatment.”[905] The
    Austrian proceedings at Ferrara called forth a strong
    protest from His Holiness, who, at the same time
    requested Charles Albert to send a frigate to Civita
    Vecchia for his personal protection. His Sardinian
    Majesty promptly complied with this demand, whereupon,
    the French ambassador tendered an offer of
    assistance on the part of his government. This
    proposal, however, was declined, no doubt being
    entertained at Rome, that France and Austria were [Pg 415]acting together in Italian affairs.[906] Thus Metternich,
    by his aggressive attitude, had only succeeded in
    creating a bond of union between the Papal government
    and the Court of Turin.[907]


At the end of July, 1847, Metternich resolved to
    inquire of the different Powers, which were parties to
    the treaties of 1815, whether they, as “the principal
    guardians of the political peace,”[908] intended to maintain
    the territorial divisions of the Italian peninsula as
    settled by the Congress of Vienna. The revolution,
    he told Lord Ponsonby, must now be considered as
    complete in the Roman States and in Tuscany. A
    revolution, he explained, was accomplished, once a
    government had been deprived of all power. But the
    real object of the party which had triumphed at Rome
    was to create a united Italy. The Emperor, however,
    while studiously respecting the independence of the
    sovereign States of the Peninsula, was determined to
    preserve his own Italian kingdom.[909] The British
    government, wrote Palmerston in reply, holds that the
    stipulations of treaties must everywhere be observed,
    and that no changes in an agreement can properly be
    effected, except with the concurrence of all the Powers
    which are parties to it. But Her Majesty’s government,
    at the same time, is no less strongly of opinion that
    the right to carry out internal reforms is a right inherent
    to independent sovereignty.[910] A month later,
    on September 11, when the threatening communications
    made by Count Buol to the Court of Turin, and
    the proceedings of the military commander at Ferrara
    suggested that Austria might be contemplating some [Pg 416]act of aggression against the Kingdom of Sardinia and
    the Papal dominions, Palmerston reverted to this subject.
    “The crowns of Great Britain and of Sardinia,” he
    warned Metternich, “had long been bound together by
    the ties of an intimate and faithful alliance, and Great
    Britain could neither forget nor repudiate claims
    founded upon such honourable grounds.” The Papal
    States were an essential element in the political independence
    of the Italian Peninsula, and no invasion of
    them could take place “without leading to consequences
    of great gravity and importance.”[911]


At the time when Palmerston was holding this
    language, the British government had decided upon a
    measure, which was afterwards the subject of much
    criticism. In the month of April, the Papal nuncio in Paris had expressed to Lord Normanby a fear that
    His Holiness would experience great difficulty in carrying
    out his projected reforms. It was plain that no
    assistance would be forthcoming from the French
    government, and it was, in consequence, very necessary
    that the cause of social improvement in Italy
    should receive “a more active moral support from
    England.” If there were constitutional objections to
    the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with
    the Holy See,[912] might not some one, he suggested, in
    the confidence of Her Majesty’s government, be sent to
    Rome for the purpose of communicating with the Pope
    and his ministers?[913] The Russell Cabinet was strongly
    in favour of acceding to this request, but the manner
    in which the British government should extend its
    “moral support” was somewhat difficult to determine. [Pg 417]Palmerston advocated that Lord Minto, the Lord
    Privy Seal, should be sent upon a special mission to
    Turin, Florence and Borne. The Queen, however,
    raised certain objections to this plan. In an able memorandum Prince Albert pointed out that to
    despatch a member of the government to Italy, to
    encourage the rulers of the different States to adopt
    measures, which Austria regarded as highly dangerous
    to her existence as an Italian power, was “a most
    hostile step towards our old and natural ally.” It
    would be more friendly, he contended, and certainly
    more honest, to let it be clearly understood at Vienna
    that an attack upon any Italian Sovereign, who was
    desirous of effecting administrative reforms, would be
    looked upon as a violation of treaties to which England
    was a party. But His Royal Highness was ready to
    admit that, by adopting such a policy, England would
    be morally bound to uphold the independence of the
    Italian States, whereas the projected mission of Lord
    Minto would not commit her actively to interfere on
    their behalf.[914] After some further discussion and correspondence
    Palmerston carried his point. On September
    11, his already quoted despatch was sent off to
    Vienna, and, a week later, Lord Minto was supplied
    with his instructions and started upon his journey.


Moderate as was the language which Lord Minto
    was directed to hold at the different Italian Courts,
    his mission was necessarily regarded with extreme
    disapproval at Vienna. Yet Minto had no mandate to
    encourage the movement in favour of Italian unity,
    nor was he instructed to counsel the adoption of any
    measures which could be regarded as even an indirect
    attempt to deprive the Emperor of his Italian possessions.
    On the contrary, he was to insist upon the
    necessity of maintaining the peace. At Turin, he was [Pg 418]to warn Charles Albert of the danger of allowing his
    natural irritation at the interference of Austria in his
    affairs to betray him into some act, which might
    furnish the Court of Vienna with a pretext for attacking
    him. But Metternich, being determined to place
    an absolute check upon the development of Liberal
    ideas, was naturally greatly annoyed that a British
    minister should visit Florence, Rome and Turin for
    the purpose of congratulating the Sovereigns upon the
    reforms which they had already carried out, and of
    urging them to persevere in the same course in the
    future.[915]


Another task, however, had been confided to Lord
    Minto, besides that of counselling the Italian rulers to
    advance with prudence and circumspection along the
    path of reform. On his way to Turin he was instructed
    to visit Switzerland, where a very grave condition of
    affairs had arisen. By the Federal Pact of 1815
    Switzerland consisted of twenty-two sovereign and
    independent Cantons, each of which possessed one vote
    in the Federal Diet. The repercussion of the revolution
    of 1830, in France, was acutely felt in Switzerland,
    and, about that time, the cantonal constitutions
    were revised in a democratic spirit. Some nine years
    later, however, the Conservatives, by raising the cry
    that religion was in danger, succeeded in many of the
    Cantons in regaining their lost power. The victorious
    party made no attempt, even in those Cantons where
    their ascendency was the most complete, to repeal the
    Liberal legislation of the past few years. On the contrary,
    in the very Catholic cantons of Lucerne and of
    the Valais, the popular veto and the referendum were
    introduced. It was plainly the opinion of the clergy
    that their influence over the people would enable them
    to obtain, by means of these democratic institutions, [Pg 419]the rejection of any measure of which they disapproved.
    In the Canton of Aargau, however, of which
    the population was half Protestant and half Catholic,
    the clerical party failed to establish its ascendency by
    peaceful means. An attempt was, accordingly, made
    to overturn the existing government by force. But
    the insurrection proved unsuccessful and the eight
    monasteries, the inmates of which were proved to have
    been actively concerned in the plot, were suppressed.
    The existence of these establishments had been guaranteed
    by an article of the Federal Pact, and the
    action of the Grand Council of Aargau, in decreeing
    their abolition, was, in consequence, brought before the
    Federal Diet. The matter was not settled until the
    year 1843, when the Canton of Aargau agreed to
    restore four suppressed female convents; a compromise
    which was accepted as satisfactory by the
    majority of the Diet. But scarcely had this controversy,
    which had evoked intense bitterness of feeling,
    been settled, then disturbances broke out in the Valais.
    The clerical party in that Canton contrived, after
    severe fighting, to overturn the Radical government.
    The success of this revolution, it was clear, was largely
    due to the secret assistance which the reactionaries had
    received from the Grand Council of Lucerne. Such
    conduct was the more inexcusable seeing that, at the
    time, Lucerne was the directing Canton and, therefore,
    the more bound to observe an attitude of impartiality.
    The Jesuits were generally regarded as the chief
    instigators of the affair, and throughout the greater
    part of Switzerland a feeling of extreme hostility arose
    against them. But the men in power at Lucerne were
    indifferent to the dislike with which the Order was
    regarded by the majority of their countrymen, and
    they, forthwith, proceeded to call in the Jesuits and to
    give them the complete control of all the educational
    establishments in their Canton. Meanwhile, with the [Pg 420]admitted connivance of the Radical governments of
    Berne, Aargau and Soleure, volunteers were being
    enrolled and, at the end of the year 1844, and again
    in April, 1845, armed bands, known as the corps
    francs, deliberately attacked Lucerne. But, having
    concluded an alliance with Uri, Zug, and Unterwalden,
    Lucerne successfully repelled these invaders. In this
    same year the expulsion of the Jesuits from the whole
    of Switzerland was moved in the Federal Diet.


As far back as the year 1832, the Cantons of Uri,
    Schwyz and Unterwalden, had entered into a combination,
    known as the League of Sarnen, with the
    object of resisting the democratic tendencies of the
    age. The association was, subsequently, strengthened
    by the accession of Fribourg, Zug, Lucerne, and, in
    1844, of the Valais. Early in the year 1846, the
    character of the league was transformed completely.
    From a peaceful association it was converted into a
    military alliance, for the purpose of upholding the
    right of every independent Canton to live under such
    laws as its legislature might enact. The Sonderbund,
    as this alliance of the seven Catholic Cantons was
    called, was at once denounced as an infraction of
    Article VI. of the Federal Pact, prescribing that
    “no alliance, prejudicial either to the general confederacy
    or to the rights of other Cantons, could be
    formed by separate Cantons among themselves.” A
    motion to that effect was, accordingly, brought forward
    in the Federal Diet, but no decision in its favour
    was obtained. Before the next year, however, in some
    cases by constitutional means, in others, as at Geneva,
    by force and violence, the composition of the governments
    in several Cantons was changed and Radical
    Grand Councils were installed in power. Under these
    circumstances, a majority was easily obtained in favour
    both of the expulsion of the Jesuits and of declaring
    the illegality of the Sonderbund. The allied Catholic [Pg 421]Cantons, however, refused to submit to this decision of
    the Federal Diet and proclaimed their intention of
    resisting, by arms if necessary, any attempt to interfere
    with their independence. Thus, at the time
    when Lord Minto departed for the continent, all the
    signs pointed to the probability that Switzerland
    would, before long, be the scene of a bloody civil war.


The rapid advance of democracy in Switzerland
    had necessarily excited the alarm of the absolute
    Courts. Moreover, between the years 1830 and 1840,
    not only the Cabinet of Vienna but the French
    government had had, on several occasions, good cause
    to complain that, unchecked by the authorities,
    political refugees were allowed to concert their
    measures for disturbing the peace of neighbouring
    States. After 1840, the internal disputes and the
    increasing lawlessness of the country began to attract
    the serious attention of all the Powers responsible for
    the settlement of 1815. Both Lord Aberdeen and
    M. Guizot were agreed that, could the question of the
    Jesuits be arranged, the chief element of danger
    in the situation would be removed. The French
    minister consented readily to exert his influence to
    induce the Pope to recall them. Let it be well understood
    at Rome, he wrote to Rossi, on June 6, 1845,
    that, should a Radical government be established at
    Geneva, there would be a majority in favour of the
    expulsion of the Order in the Federal Diet. Make it
    perfectly clear to His Holiness that “the fate of the
    disciples of Loyola is in the hands of the followers of
    Calvin.”[916] Prince Metternich was at this time instructing
    the Austrian ambassador at Rome to employ
    similar arguments. But Gregory XVI. showed no
    disposition to interfere, and all hope had soon to be
    abandoned of obtaining his co-operation in the affair.[917] [Pg 422]In the following year, the overthrow of the Conservative
    governments at Geneva and in the Canton of
    Vaud, and the prospect that, in the ensuing session,
    the Radicals would be in a majority in the Federal
    Diet, increased Metternich’s uneasiness. Hitherto,
    France had set her face resolutely against intervention
    in any shape or form. But, in the autumn of
    1846, Louis Philippe, being anxious to assure himself
    of the neutrality of the Northern Courts in the question
    of the Spanish marriages, the Austrian Chancellor took
    the opportunity of proposing that the Powers should
    seriously take in hand the affairs of Switzerland.
    M. Guizot was rather disposed to accede to this suggestion,
    but the King, being still hopeful of re-establishing
    “the cordial understanding,” refused to
    sanction any participation in measures which might
    lead eventually to armed intervention.[918] In the spring
    of 1847, however, when it was clear that England had
    no intention of forgetting the affront which she had
    received in the matter of the Spanish marriages, and
    when, in consequence, M. Guizot was desirous of
    effecting a close understanding with Austria, French
    policy towards Switzerland was altered to suit the
    exigencies of the situation.


The sympathies of Metternich and of all the
    absolute Courts were necessarily on the side of the Sonderbund.[919] The continental Cabinets were agreed
    that it would be highly dangerous, in the unsettled
    state of Europe, to allow the league of the Catholic
    and Conservative Cantons to be dissolved by their
    Radical neighbours. Federal unity, Metternich maintained,
    was clearly the object for which the democrats
    were striving, and it was on that account that they [Pg 423]desired to undermine cantonal independence. But
    any revision of the Federal Pact would, he argued,
    release from their engagements the Powers which had
    guaranteed the neutrality and independence of Switzerland,
    and would justify them in intervening. Louis
    Philippe and M. Guizot, although fully disposed to
    endorse his views, dared not venture to employ French
    troops to fight the battle of the Jesuits. They, accordingly,
    insinuated that, if Austria were to take the first
    step, public opinion in France might be reconciled to
    the notion of a French intervention. This ingenuous
    proposal was promptly declined. Metternich had no
    idea of incurring the odium of invading Switzerland
    and of allowing France to declare that similar action
    on her part had been rendered necessary by the aggressiveness
    of Austria.[920] Thus in Swiss, as in Italian
    affairs, M. Guizot and Prince Metternich, notwithstanding
    the harmony of their sentiments, found it
    impossible to devise any practical plan for concerted
    action.


England, as a party to the settlement of 1815, had
    an unquestionable right to be consulted in any arrangement
    tending to alter the political position of Switzerland
    in the European system. But, owing to her
    geographical situation, she was less directly concerned
    than France, Austria or Prussia in the internal condition
    of the Confederation. The British government was,
    consequently, in a position to regard the question from
    a more detached and impartial standpoint. Moreover,
    the letters of Mr. Grote,[921] the historian of Greece,
    to the Spectator, supplied the English public with far
    better information about Swiss politics than was to
    be obtained in the official press of continental States. [Pg 424]Palmerston had no intention of discussing the questions
    as to whether the alliance of the Catholic Cantons
    should be looked upon as an infraction of the Federal
    Pact, and as to whether the action of the Radical
    majority in the Diet, in decreeing the expulsion of
    the Jesuits, constituted a violation of cantonal sovereignty
    and independence. It is clear that, from an
    early date, he adopted the view, propounded by Mr.
    Grote, that, whereas the so-called Radical Cantons represented
    the wealth, the intelligence, the industry, the
    population and the progressive elements of Switzerland,
    the Cantons of the Sonderbund were, in every respect,
    the stationary and backward portions of the Republic.
    From these premises it followed logically that, although
    it might be possible for the allied Catholic Cantons to
    break up the Confederation, it was not in their power
    to guide it or to hold it together.[922] He, therefore,
    proposed both to Prince Metternich and M. Guizot,
    that they should endeavour to persuade the Catholic
    leaders to dissolve their alliance.[923] This solution of
    the difficulty, as may be supposed, was not adopted
    by either of the statesmen to whom it was made.
    On the contrary, Metternich at this time was arranging
    to furnish the Sonderbund with arms, and was seriously
    considering whether he should place the services of an
    Austrian general at its disposal, while M. Guizot was
    giving secret instructions for the despatch of warlike
    stores to Lucerne from the arsenal at Besançon.[924]


Lord Minto, in his conversations with M. Ochsenbein,
    the President of the Federal Diet, was charged
    to counsel forbearance and moderation. “Her Majesty’s [Pg 425]government,” wrote Palmerston, “as the sincere and
    disinterested friend of Switzerland, could not but
    exhort all parties to abate pretensions, however just
    they may be thought, and to yield somewhat of rights,
    however valid they may be considered, rather than
    begin an appeal to arms, the consequences of which
    it would be easier to lament than to foresee.” He was
    not prepared to deny that the Federal Pact might
    stand in need of revision. It was alleged, however,
    that the Diet proposed “to sweep away the separate
    sovereignty of the several Cantons in order to blend
    the whole of Switzerland into one single Republic.”
    He must, therefore, remind the Swiss government that
    “the fundamental principle upon which the arrangements
    of the Treaty of Vienna, in regard to Switzerland,
    repose, is the separate sovereignty of the several
    Cantons.” Any attempt to alter the basis of the
    political organization of the Republic would inevitably
    entail civil war and foreign intervention.[925]


Yet, notwithstanding the pacific spirit in which
    Lord Minto’s instructions were drawn up, Palmerston
    has been freely accused of inciting the Radical Cantons
    to begin hostilities. Animosity to Louis Philippe and
    his principal minister, assert his detractors, was at
    this period the mainspring of his policy. Thus, when
    the French government evinced a disposition to favour
    the cause of the Sonderbund, Palmerston, having satisfied
    himself of the military superiority of the Radical
    Cantons, secretly urged them to attack their weaker
    neighbours, in the hope that the forcible dissolution
    of the Catholic alliance would entail the downfall of
    M. Guizot. This charge has been reiterated in the
    recently published letters of Sir Robert Morier. Mr.
    David Morier, Sir Robert’s father, had been for many
    years British minister in Switzerland. In the summer [Pg 426]of 1847, however, being in England on leave, he was
    not allowed to return to his post, because, says his son,
    he was instinctively a peacemaker and, therefore, no
    longer a suitable instrument to execute the policy
    upon which Lord Palmerston had decided to embark.[926] But a perusal of Mr. Morier’s despatches suggests
    another, and an infinitely more probable, explanation of
    his recall. When affairs in Switzerland were beginning
    to assume a dangerous aspect, he is to be found
    expressing views with which Lord Palmerston would
    have heartily agreed. Writing to Lord Aberdeen, in
    June, 1844, on the subject of the Jesuits, Mr. Morier
    points out that this intrusion of a powerful foreign
    agency into all the concerns of the Confederation
    raises the question whether, “self-preservation being
    the first law of States, the claim of cantonal sovereignty
    should not be made to yield to the exigencies of the
    general welfare.” Again, some months later, speaking
    of the introduction of the Jesuits into Lucerne, he
    warns his chief that Lucerne “must be inscribed upon
    the list of Cantons with Fribourg, Schwyz and the Valais,
    subjected, henceforward, through their Jesuit institutions,
    to the influence of a foreign and anti-national
    power of the most dangerous tendency to the peace of
    the Confederation.”[927] But, during the winter of 1846,
    an unprovoked assault was committed upon one of
    his sons, Burnet Morier, by an excited Radical of
    Berne. The young man with commendable promptitude
    felled his assailant to the ground,[928] and, under these
    circumstances, Palmerston probably considered that
    the affair need not be made the subject of an official
    demand for reparation. Mr. Morier, however, thought [Pg 427]otherwise, and his indignation appears to have transformed
    him into a strong supporter of the Sonderbund.
    The contrast between the sentiments, contained in his memorandum on Swiss affairs, submitted to the Foreign
    Office in February, 1847,[929] and those expressed in his
    earlier despatches, must have given Lord Palmerston
    food for serious reflection. Without doubt, he must
    have come to the conclusion that a man burning with
    resentment against the Radical leaders was hardly as
    qualified, as his son seems to have supposed, to
    exercise a moderating influence upon the passions of
    contending parties.


Lord Minto, having arrived in Switzerland, lost no
    time in placing himself in communication with M.
    Ochsenbein. The election of this person, who two
    years before had commanded the corps francs in
    their raid upon Lucerne, to the post of President of
    the Federal Diet, had greatly exasperated the Catholics.
    Lord Minto, however, reported that he found him
    most reasonable, and, to all appearances, sincerely
    desirous of discovering some means of averting an
    outbreak of hostilities. The Jesuits, he assured the
    English minister, constituted the chief obstacle to a
    peaceful settlement, and, could they be removed, all
    danger of war would disappear. Palmerston, on receiving
    this information, at once instructed Minto, who by
    that time had passed on to Italy, to use every endeavour,
    while at Rome, to persuade His Holiness to
    intervene.[930] But, meanwhile, in Switzerland the
    chances of maintaining the peace were hourly diminishing.
    Both sides were now openly preparing for war,
    and, on October 29, the deputies of the Catholic
    Cantons formally quitted the Federal Diet. On that [Pg 428]same day Lord Palmerston made a last effort to avert
    a rupture. He enjoined the British chargé d’affaires at Berne to seek out M. Ochsenbein and to endeavour
    to prevail upon him to postpone the execution of any
    irrevocable measure, until the result of Lord Minto’s
    mission to Rome should be known. M. Ochsenbein’s
    only reply to this communication was hastily to
    convene the Diet, which forthwith decreed the dissolution
    of the Sonderbund by the armed forces of the
    Federal executive.[931]


Two days later, on November 6, the Duc de Broglie,
    who had recently succeeded Sainte-Aulaire, as ambassador
    in London, submitted a project of intervention
    to Lord Palmerston. Let the Powers, proposed M.
    Guizot, offer to mediate on the basis that the question
    of the Jesuits should be settled by the Pope, and that
    the other points in dispute should form the subject of
    a conference, at which each of the Cantons should be
    represented. In the meantime, the contending parties
    would be invited to suspend hostilities—a refusal to
    comply releasing the Powers from their engagements
    to the Confederation and entitling them to enforce
    their demands by whatever measures they might
    subsequently agree to adopt.[932] Palmerston’s official
    answer was not sent off to Paris until November 16.
    It was in the form of a counter-proposition. The
    British government, he declared, “could not go the
    length of thinking” that the outbreak of civil war
    could release the Powers from those pledges into which
    they had entered to maintain the neutrality of Switzerland.
    Furthermore, it considered that the presence of
    the Jesuits upon the territory of the Confederation, in
    opposition to the wishes of the majority of the Cantons,
    constituted a real grievance. Her Majesty’s government, [Pg 429]under the circumstances, before consenting to
    join with France and the other Power in offering to
    mediate, must make two conditions. In the first
    place, the removal of the Jesuits, whether by a decision
    to be obtained from the Pope, or by an act of sovereign
    authority on the part of the Cantons in which the
    Order was established, must be the basis of any arrangement
    proposed by the Powers to the contending parties.
    Secondly, it was to be distinctly understood that a
    refusal by either side to accept mediation must not be
    made the ground for armed interference in the internal
    affairs of Switzerland.[933]


In Paris, at Berlin, and at Vienna, it had been intended
    to hold very different language to M. Ochsenbein
    and his colleagues. Nevertheless, M. Guizot, although
    stipulating for certain trifling modifications, accepted
    the British proposal. The assent of Prussia and of
    Austria was obtained, but it was given with the utmost
    reluctance.[934] Palmerston was, in point of fact, completely
    master of the situation. The condition of
    Germany was so unsettled, the appearance of affairs
    in Italy was so alarming, that Metternich could not
    attack the Radicals of Berne except in combination
    with France and, in the Swiss question, Louis Philippe
    and M. Guizot dared not act with the absolute Courts
    in opposition to the constitutional government of
    England.[935] Nicholas, having no direct interest in the
    matter, was content to adopt whatever course might
    commend itself to the Cabinet of Vienna. The five [Pg 430]governments being thus agreed, an identic note was, on
    November 26, drawn up in London for presentation
    to the President of the Diet, and to the official organ of
    the Sonderbund by the representatives of the Powers
    in Switzerland. But, while ministers and diplomatists
    had been talking and writing, the Federal executive
    had acted. No sooner had the Diet, on November 4,
    decreed the forcible suppression of the Sonderbund than the Genevese general, Dufour, who had at his
    disposal an army of 100,000 men and 260 guns, was
    ordered to begin operations. The isolated canton of
    Fribourg having been easily overwhelmed, the Federal
    commander advanced with his whole force against
    Lucerne. Salis-Soglio, a Protestant of the Grisons,
    whose army amounted to some 80,000 troops with
    74 guns, awaited him in a selected position between
    the Reuss and the Lake of Zug. The decisive battle
    was fought on November 23, Dufour’s victory was
    complete. On the following day, the Jesuits and the
    executive council having fled, Lucerne surrendered.
    The Valais, the last of the seven Cantons to abandon
    the struggle, capitulated on the 29th. Twenty-five
    days after the Diet had formally resolved upon its
    suppression, the Sonderbund ceased to exist.


In almost all accounts of these events Palmerston’s
    proceedings have been misrepresented. According to
    his detractors, he cunningly inveigled the Powers into
    an exchange of views with the pretended object of
    averting civil war in Switzerland, while in reality he
    was secretly urging the Federal executive to open the
    campaign against the Sonderbund.[936] Even Liberals, in
    sympathy with his policy, describe him as having
    deliberately protracted the negotiations in London, in
    order that the Radicals should be able to crush the
    Catholic Cantons without fear of foreign interference.[937] [Pg 431]Palmerston, it is perfectly clear, was strongly opposed
    to direct intervention and, moreover, was disposed to
    think that an unsolicited offer on the part of the
    Powers to assist the Swiss to settle their internal disputes
    would inflame their national pride, and rather
    tend to aggravate, than to diminish, the gravity of the
    situation. It is possible, therefore, that he may to
    some extent have delayed the negotiations. But the
    alleged waste of time cannot at the most have exceeded
    a very few days, seeing that the French note was only
    submitted to him on November 9, and that his counter-proposal
    had been agreed to by the Powers and was
    ready for transmission to Switzerland on the 26th. To
    contend that Palmerston supposed that, by delaying
    the negotiations for two or three days, he would enable
    the Radicals to achieve their purpose, is to credit him
    with a knowledge of the military weakness of the Sonderbund which he most certainly did not possess.
    If he in any way retarded the final drafting of the
    proposed offer of mediation, it is infinitely more probable
    that he so acted in the hope that Minto’s efforts at
    Rome to induce the Pope to recall the Jesuits from
    Lucerne might prove successful and that, in consequence,
    the two parties might be able to settle their quarrel
    without an appeal to arms and without foreign
    interference.


Sir Robert Morier, however, asserts most positively
    that Palmerston “instigated Peel to perform his
    celebrated feat of precipitating the war of the Sonderbund.”[938] In his Mémoires M. Guizot has reproduced a
    letter from M. de Bois-le-Comte, the French ambassador
    to the Confederation, in which it is stated that, upon
    receipt of the news from London that the Powers
    intended to propose mediation, Mr. Peel sent the
    chaplain of the British legation to the headquarters of [Pg 432]General Dufour to apprise him of the state of affairs
    and to urge him immediately to march upon Lucerne
    and try conclusions with the army of the Sonderbund.[939] It is evident that, if there be any foundation of truth
    in these stories, neither the instructions with which
    Lord Minto, a member of the government, was
    supplied, nor the official despatch of October 29, which
    was to be communicated to M. Ochsenbein, can have
    been the expression of Lord Palmerston’s real policy.
    His veritable intentions must have been conveyed in
    private letters[940] to the British chargé d’affaires at Berne,
    it never having been suggested that he employed any
    secret agent in the affair. The question as to who
    acted as British minister to the Confederation, at this
    period, is, therefore, of extreme importance. It is inconceivable
    that Palmerston, if he really were engaged
    in prosecuting the Machiavellian designs imputed to
    him, should not have replaced Mr. Morier by an
    Arthur Aston, a Henry Bulwer, or some other tried
    and trusted agent. But in point of fact the business
    of the legation, during the whole of this critical time,
    was left in charge of a young secretary, Mr. Peel.
    Now Peel was the eldest son of Sir Robert, who, to the
    day of his death, never forgave Palmerston for his
    desertion of the Tory party in 1828.[941] Is it credible
    that Palmerston can have entrusted the conduct of an
    affair of the kind, suggested by M. Guizot and Sir
    Robert Morier, to a comparative stranger, a young man [Pg 433]of twenty-five, the son of his political opponent and
    personal enemy?


Nevertheless, it is highly probable that Palmerston’s
    despatch of October 29, although written with a very
    different object, did, in effect, precipitate the conflict
    between the Radical Cantons and the Sonderbund.
    As Mr. Peel, without doubt, rightly divined, M.
    Ochsenbein, notwithstanding the pacific language which
    he had held to Lord Minto, had no real desire to see
    the dispute amicably settled.[942] Federal unity was the
    end which he and his friends had set themselves to
    attain, and they were convinced that nothing but
    physical force would induce the Catholic and Conservative
    Cantons to renounce their sovereign rights.
    By “blood and iron” alone could the success of their
    policy be achieved. Hence the prospect that England
    intended to exert herself at Rome, in favour of Papal
    intervention, may have driven the Radicals of Berne to
    immediate action. They may have argued that, should
    His Holiness consent to recall the Jesuits and should
    the Sonderbund, in consequence, be peacefully dissolved,
    an excellent opportunity would be lost of
    reducing the Conservative Cantons to submission.


The identic note of November 26, 1847, was to
    have been communicated to the contending parties,
    on behalf of Great Britain, by Sir Stratford Canning.
    His instructions, however, provided that he should
    not present it if, upon his arrival in Switzerland, he
    should find that the Sonderbund had capitulated and
    that the war was at an end.[943] Canning, in consequence,
    made no offer of mediation, but remained about three
    weeks in Switzerland for the purpose of impressing
    upon M. Ochsenbein and his colleagues the expediency
    of treating the defeated Cantons with consideration, [Pg 434]and of refraining from any measures which might
    furnish other Powers with a pretext for intervention.
    France, Austria, and Prussia, however, adopted a
    different procedure. M. de Bois-le-Comte received
    the identic note on November 29, and, forthwith,
    despatched a copy of it both to the Federal Diet and
    to the leaders of the Sonderbund, notwithstanding that
    Lucerne had already surrendered and that it was
    evident that the Valais could not hold out much
    longer.[944] His example was followed by the ministers
    of Austria and Prussia. To these communications the
    executive at Berne, the members of which had
    expressed to Sir Stratford Canning their gratification
    at the attitude adopted by Great Britain, sent an
    answer couched in very decided language. The offer
    of mediation was rejected, not only because hostilities
    had ceased, but because it was impossible to recognize
    the principle upon which the proposal was based. If
    the Confederation were at war with another State, it
    might, or might not, entertain an offer of mediation,
    but it could not admit, under any circumstances, the
    claim of the Powers to treat as belligerents the
    Cantons of the Sonderbund. The treaties by which
    the Confederation had been constituted provided only
    for one Diet and for one Federal executive. The
    alliance of the seven Cantons was simply an act of
    rebellion which the central government had been
    strong enough to deal with effectually.[945]


The overthrow of the Sonderbund and the haughty
    reply returned by the Diet to the French, the Austrian,
    and the Prussian notes caused a profound sensation.
    The inability of the absolute Courts and of the government
    of M. Guizot to render assistance to the Cantons, [Pg 435]which had sought to resist the decrees of the majority
    in the Swiss Diet, was made manifest to the world.
    Italian nationalists, German Liberals, French reformers,
    acclaimed the victory of the Radical executive
    as a triumph for their cause. In governmental circles,
    at Vienna and at Berlin, there was no disposition to
    under-rate the gravity of the situation. Largely
    owing to the restraining influence of Lord Minto,
    central Italy still presented a certain outward appearance
    of tranquillity.[946] But Sicily and Naples were
    in open revolution, and King “Bomba,” who had,
    hitherto, set his face sternly against all reforms, was,
    in January, 1848, compelled to concede a constitution.
    Meanwhile, throughout the Peninsula the feeling of
    hostility to Austria was growing in intensity. Encouraged
    by Lord Minto, Sardinia, Tuscany, and the
    Papal States agreed to abolish all internal lines of
    customs and to form a commercial league, after the
    manner of the German Zollverein.[947] The significance
    of this measure was clearly perceived by Metternich.
    On December 14, he directed Diedrichstein to acquaint
    Palmerston that the condition of Italy would necessitate
    a large increase of the Austrian army in Lombardy.[948] “You and I,” he confided to his old friend,
    Radetzky, “are not destined to end our days in peace.
    . . . It has been reserved for the present age to
    witness the spectacle of a Liberal Pope.”[949]


The forcible dissolution of the alliance of the
    Catholic Cantons made it the more necessary, the
    German Cabinets declared, for the Powers vigilantly
    to watch over the proceedings of the Federal Diet.
    The conference, which it had been proposed to hold
    upon Swiss affairs, must, they insisted, still take [Pg 436]place.[950] The British government, however, altogether
    dissented from this view. The Sonderbund no longer
    existed, the Jesuits had fled, and Palmerston, therefore,
    could see no occasion for any deliberations upon
    the domestic affairs of the Confederation. England,
    in any case, he announced, must now decline to take
    part in a conference. M. Guizot adopted a different
    attitude. If Palmerston were resolved to pose as the
    patron of Radicals and revolutionists, why should not
    he come forward as the champion of order and
    stability? The Austrian, Count Coloredo, and the
    Prussian, General von Radowitz, who had been
    despatched to Paris by their respective governments,
    found him most favourably disposed. It was very
    flattering to his vanity that at this crisis the Courts of
    Vienna and of Berlin should be prepared to defer to
    his opinions and should send their emissaries to Paris
    to consult him. But from London he received a word
    of warning which made a considerable impression upon
    him. It would evoke, wrote his friend the Duc de
    Broglie, recollections of the Holy Alliance and savour
    overmuch of the deliberations at Laybach and Verona,[951] were France to take part in a conference which England
    had declined to attend.[952]


In his conversations with Coloredo and Radowitz,
    M. Guizot, consequently, deprecated the notion of
    assembling a conference. Let them for the moment,
    he urged, be content with formally declaring to the
    Diet that the Powers were resolved not to suffer the
    violation of the principle of cantonal sovereignty
    and independence. Should their representations be [Pg 437]unheeded, the question of active intervention could be
    more conveniently discussed at a later date. He had,
    they must not forget, his parliamentary position to
    consider. In the coming session, M. Thiers was preparing
    to assail his foreign policy with the utmost
    virulence. Metternich consented readily to adopt
    these suggestions. Far from desiring to aggravate the
    difficulties of M. Guizot, he considered it of supreme
    importance that he should remain in office.[953] A joint
    note, dated January 18, 1848, was, accordingly, drawn
    up and presented to the Federal executive. Coloredo
    and Radowitz, thereupon, quitted Paris. It  was
    clearly inexpedient that these agents of the absolute
    Courts should be present in the French capital, during
    the heated debates to which the reply to the Address
    was expected to give rise. But their deliberations
    were to be regarded as merely suspended, not as
    definitely concluded. In the spring they were to
    return and resume their discussions. But this plan
    was not destined to be realized. Before the time
    appointed for their second meeting with M. Guizot,
    the storm burst and swept away the Orleans Monarchy.
    The revolutionary contagion spread rapidly to Berlin
    and to Vienna. Metternich, compelled to fly, sought
    refuge in England, in company with Prince Wittgenstein,
    M. Guizot, and other ultra-conservative statesmen.
    At the news of the downfall of the redoubtable Chancellor
    the Milanese flew to arms. After a memorable
    conflict of five days’ duration, Radetzky retired upon
    the Quadrilateral, to prepare for the struggle with
    Charles Albert, who had thrown down the gauntlet to
    Austria and marched to the assistance of the Lombards.


A history of Franco-British relations, during the
    reign of Louis Philippe, is not concerned with the
    internal reasons which contributed to his downfall. It [Pg 438]is sufficient to point out that the existence of the
    Orleans Monarchy was necessarily precarious, seeing
    that it was in the nature of a compromise which had
    only been grudgingly acquiesced in by the nation.
    The revolution by which it was overwhelmed was, in
    the words of Lamartine, “une revolution de mépris.”
    All classes were thoroughly disgusted with the policy of
    M. Guizot and indignant at the numerous public and
    private scandals[954] brought to light, during the year
    1847. In a constitutional State a change of government
    is the remedy provided for such a condition of
    affairs. Louis Philippe, however, was too attached to
    his system of personal government willingly to part
    with a minister, who never attempted to restrict him
    to the rôle of a constitutional sovereign.[955] His last
    Cabinet, he protested, to the day of his death, had the
    support of the majority of the Chamber. But the
    servile body of placemen, which formed the ministerial
    party, in no way represented the opinion of the nation.
    The people with one accord condemned the proceedings
    of the government and identified the King with the
    unpopular actions of his principal minister. On
    February 23, 1848, a demonstration in favour of parliamentary
    reform, followed by a tumult in the streets,
    sufficed to destroy the discredited régime.


The rupture of “the cordial understanding” with
    England was followed so closely by the downfall of the
    monarchy, as to suggest that there must have been a
    connection between the two events. That the quarrel
    with England was one of the contributory causes of
    the revolution is almost universally admitted. [Pg 439]English writers have generally referred to the events of
    ’48 with some complacency, as the just retribution
    which promptly overtook Louis Philippe. So shrewd
    an observer as Baron Stockmar appears to have been
    convinced that the revelations in connection with the
    Spanish marriages did the “Citizen King” an incalculable
    amount of harm in the eyes of the French people
    and precipitated his overthrow.[956] Now, it is clear that
    the Spanish marriages had one effect which took those
    who were responsible for them completely by surprise.
    M. Guizot had confidently anticipated that, whatever
    other consequences might flow from them, they would
    be acclaimed as a great diplomatic triumph achieved at
    the expense of England. But the event completely
    falsified his expectations. The men, who in the question
    of the right of search, in the Pritchard affair, and
    in many other matters, had constantly accused him of
    truckling to England, were the first to denounce him
    for having sacrificed “the cordial understanding” to a
    purely dynastic object. It is more than probable that
    the indignation professed by M. Thiers and his friends
    was not very sincere and was, to a large extent, assumed
    for purposes of party politics. But their words, none
    the less, made a deep impression upon the middle-classes
    which had hitherto steadfastly supported the régime of July. These people, says Lord Normanby,
    were convinced that their material interests had
    suffered owing to the rupture of the English alliance.
    The construction of railways in France had led, as in
    England, to a wild outburst of speculation. The
    undue inflation of prices was followed by the inevitable
    reaction. This unexpected depreciation in the
    value of the shares of the new companies was not, however,
    ascribed to its true causes. Disappointed speculators
    persuaded themselves that their losses were due
    to the disinclination of the British public to invest in [Pg 440]French railways, owing to the change which the
    Spanish marriages had wrought in the political relations
    of the two countries.[957]


But in so far as the revolution of ’48 is concerned,
    the true importance of the break-up of “the cordial
    understanding” consists in the policy which M. Guizot,
    in consequence, saw fit to adopt. It is undeniable that
    his attitude towards the Italian national movement and
    in the Swiss question was severely condemned by the
    majority of his countrymen, and proved most injurious
    to the monarchy. Men perceived clearly that the only
    result of his unnatural alliance with the Cabinet of
    Vienna had been enormously to diminish French
    influence at Rome and at Turin. In Switzerland his
    policy was seen to have been even more ineffectual.[958] All
    his efforts had been directed to the preservation of the Sonderbund. Nevertheless, the alliance of the reactionary
    cantons had been promptly and ignominiously
    dissolved, whilst his proffered mediation had
    been rejected with a haughty intimation that the
    victorious party intended to settle its affairs without
    his interference. It has been urged, however, in his
    defence that his difficulties were greatly aggravated by
    Lord Palmerston, whose deliberate purpose it was to
    thwart him on every occasion. A secret alliance, it has
    been said, existed between the British Foreign Minister
    and M. Thiers. Gossip on this subject had been rife ever
    since the close of the year 1844. It would seem that
    about that time some friendly messages from Palmerston
    were conveyed to M. Thiers by Sir John Easthope,[959] the proprietor of the Morning Chronicle, which was
    generally regarded as Palmerston’s especial organ. In [Pg 441]the following year, when M. Thiers visited London, Sir
    Anthony Panizzi, an Italian political exile, and the
    chief librarian of the British Museum, took great credit
    to himself for having cemented a good understanding
    between the two statesmen.[960] Palmerston afterwards
    denied absolutely that their interviews were in any
    way connected with a “conspiracy against M. Guizot.”[961] Greville, however, accuses him of having, during the
    controversy on the subject of the Spanish marriages,
    permitted Lord Normanby to supply M. Thiers with
    the diplomatic documents bearing upon the question.
    Greville was so ready to believe anything discreditable
    about Palmerston that he cannot, as a rule, be looked
    upon as an altogether trustworthy witness. But, at
    the time referred to, he was in a position to speak of
    his own knowledge of what was taking place, inasmuch
    as he was in Paris for the express purpose of trying to
    re-establish “the cordial understanding” and was,
    moreover, the guest of Lord Normanby at the British
    embassy.[962] His testimony, therefore, coupled with the
    corroborative evidence to be found in the published
    letters of Panizzi, does suggest that certain of Thiers’
    very damaging criticisms of M. Guizot may have been
    inspired by Lord Palmerston.[963] But, had the policy of
    M. Guizot been supported by public opinion, the
    intrigues of a foreign minister with his chief political
    opponent would have tended to strengthen, rather than
    to weaken, his position. The whole affair, indeed, is
    not of much importance. Some of Thiers’ newspaper
    articles may have been based upon information improperly
    supplied to him by the agents of Lord
    Palmerston, but his great speech on the Spanish [Pg 442]marriages was not delivered until February 4, 1847,[964] when the British blue book was at the disposal of any
    one who might desire to purchase it.


But the more serious charge has been made that
    Palmerston’s whole policy, at this period, was subordinated
    to his desire to avenge the defeat he had
    sustained in the Spanish marriages.[965] His attitude in
    the Swiss and Italian questions has been fully explained.
    It is difficult to see how any British minister could
    have acted differently. Had Aberdeen been in office,
    it may safely be surmised that, out of consideration
    for Austria, he would not have advocated the despatch
    of one of his colleagues upon such a mission, as was
    confided to a member of Lord John Russell’s government.
    But, without doubt, he would have furnished
    his agents at the Italian Courts with instructions substantially
    the same as those drawn up for the guidance
    of Lord Minto. In the Swiss affair both Aberdeen and
    Palmerston sought to avert civil war and foreign intervention
    by inducing the Pope to recall the Jesuits
    from Lucerne. There is, in short, a continuity in the
    British policy, whether conducted by Aberdeen or by
    Palmerston, not to be found in that of M. Guizot.
    His rapprochement with the Cabinet of Vienna obliged
    him to adopt towards the Liberal and national movements
    in progress throughout Europe the views of
    Prince Metternich. The precise reasons which induced
    him to make overtures to Austria can only be conjectured.
    Having shattered “the cordial understanding,”he may have thought that he must be able to
    show that he had substituted for the English, the
    Austrian, alliance. Perhaps he may have had some
    idea of isolating England, by means of the close
    relations which he proposed to establish between the
    government of the “Citizen King” and the absolute [Pg 443]Courts. But, be his motives what they may, his dealings
    with Metternich, in 1847, were unquestionably one
    of the chief reasons of the revolution of ’48.[966]


For the first time, between the years 1830 and
    1848, the attempt was seriously made by the French
    and English governments to establish, as a primary
    principle of policy, the necessity of maintaining close
    and intimate relations between the two countries. The
    result, on the whole, disappointed expectations. The
    great work of Talleyrand’s old age, the cementing of a
    good understanding between the Whigs and the Orleans’
    Monarchy, without doubt, deterred the absolute Courts
    from intervening in French affairs after the Revolution
    of July. Unquestionably, also, it averted a great war
    in the question of the separation of Belgium from Holland.
    But, on subsequent occasions, it did not prevent
    grave differences of opinion from arising between the
    two governments. The time had not yet come when
    “the cordial understanding” could be placed upon a
    firm and durable basis. The maintenance of the settlement,
    agreed to after the great war, was still the foundation
    of British policy in Europe. France, on the other
    hand, chafed bitterly at the conditions imposed upon
    her by the Congress of Vienna. Even among the peace-loving
    middle-classes the hope was fondly entertained
    that the man would arise who, “à grands coups de
    sabre,” should destroy the treaties of 1815 and give
    back to France her “natural frontiers.” Bonapartism
    was a living force by reason of the existence of this
    feeling. Louis Philippe and his ministers sought to
    allay the restlessness which it engendered by an active
    policy in the Mediterranean and in more distant waters.
    Suspicions and jealousies, the consequences of more
    than a hundred years of war and rivalry, were thus
    kept alive. French and British officials, whether of high
    rank or of low degree, continued to regard each other [Pg 444]with instinctive hostility. Bulwer was no less anxious
    to outwit his colleague, Bresson, than was Pritchard to
    thwart his fellow-consul, Meerenhout. Nevertheless,
    the policy which finally broke up the alliance was not
    a policy which commended itself to the French people.
    Palmerston’s views upon European affairs, between
    1846 and 1848, accorded far more with the sentiments
    of the majority of Frenchmen than did those of M.
    Guizot; and his quarrel was not with the French
    nation, but with the government of Louis Philippe.




 [Pg 445]


 INDEX


 Abd-el-Kader, Algerian chief, 358



    Abdullah Pasha, 150



    Abd-ul-Mejid, Sultan of Turkey, 242



    Aberdeen, Earl of, 34, 37, 38, 116, 222, 281, 327, 331, 332, 333, 334, 339, 340, 342, 343, 344, 345, 347, 348, 349, 352, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376, 377, 379, 380, 382, 385, 392, 401, 404, 421, 426, 442



    Adair, Sir Robert, 76, 79, 82, 83, 84, 100, 101, 127



    Adelaïde, Madame, sister of Louis Philippe, 9, 401



    Ahmed Pasha, 165



    Akiff-Effendi, 246



    Albani, Cardinal, 104



    Albert, Prince Consort of Queen Victoria, 287, 365, 372, 384, 417



    Alexander I., Tsar of Russia, 19, 44



    Alexander, Tsarewitch, afterwards Alexander II., 236



    Ali Pasha, 146



    Alison, Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, 289



    Althorp, Viscount. See Spencer, Earl



    Alvanley, Lord, 86



    Ancillon, Johann Peter, 111, 112, 136, 141



    Apponyi, Count, 66, 68, 273, 292, 295, 411



    Argüelles, Agustín, 218



    Aston, Arthur, 217, 226, 307, 339, 340, 344, 371, 432



    Atthalin, General, Baron, 27, 36, 344



    Aubigny, Captain de, 361, 365, 366



    Auckland, Earl of, 235



    Aumale, Duc d', son of Louis Philippe, 338, 373



    Avedick, Armenian dragoman, 244



    Azeglio, Marquis de, 408, 409





    Bagot, Sir Charles, 76, 113



    Balbo, Count Cesare, 408, 409



    Balmaceda, Carlist chief, 215



    Bandiera, Admiral, 290



    Barante, Baron de, 130



    Baudrand, General, 15, 81



    Beauharnais, Eugène de, 48



Beauvale, Lord, 17, 107, 108, 111, 112, 114, 169, 247, 250, 322



    Becker, Nikolaus, German poet, 312



    Bedford, Duke of, 297



    Belliard, General Augustin-Daniel, 21, 61, 83, 100, 101



    Benedek, Colonel Ludwig von, 406



    Berri, Duc de, 62, 350



    Bern, Duchesse de, 51, 120, 134, 197



    Bernetti, Cardinal, 104, 106, 107



    Bernstorff, Count, 24



    Berryer, Pierre-Antoine, 350



    Beshir, Emir, 152



    Bligh, British chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg, 166, 168, 221



    Boghos Bey, 227



    Boigne, Comtesse de, 259



    Bois-le-Comte, French Ambassador to the Swiss Confederation, 431, 434



    Bordeaux, Duc de, 9, 62, 120, 350, 351



    Bourqueney, Baron, 241, 286, 321, 322, 323, 326



    Boutenieff, Russian Minister at Constantinople, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 161, 162, 223, 247



    Bravo, Gonzalez, 217



    Bresson, Comte, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 371, 374, 375, 379, 380, 383, 384, 387, 388, 390, 391, 394, 395, 397, 398, 399, 401, 411, 444



    Broglie, Duc de, 35, 39, 130, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138, 156, 160, 165, 167, 169, 177, 178, 181, 184, 188, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 219, 221, 222, 225, 226, 334, 428, 436



    Bruat, Admiral, 360, 361



    Brunnow, Baron, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 261, 267, 300, 319



    Bubna, Field-Marshal, 19



    Bugeaud, Marshal, Duc d'Isly, 358, 367



    Bülow, Baron, 114, 141, 263, 266, 274, 275, 276, 283



    Bulwer, Henry, Lytton, afterwards Lord Dalling, 232, 249, 250, 257, 279, 280, 295, 296, 298, 307, 333, 337, 339, 341, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 378, 379, 380, 385, 386, 388, 390, 393, 396, 400, 411, 432, 444



    Buol, Count, 413, 415



    Burnes, Sir Alexander, 235, 236





    Cabrera, Ramon, 202, 210, 214, 215, 216



    Caillier, Captain, 242



    Calatrava, Josè Maria, 203, 205, 207



    Calomarde, Spanish statesman, 173, 174



    Campbell, Colonel, 156, 162, 226, 227, 230, 232, 233, 234, 251, 257



    Canning, George, 20, 50, 63, 144, 146, 147, 352, 403



    Canning, Sir Stratford, afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 151, 153, 155, 174, 175, 177, 221, 433, 434



    Carini, Neapolitan Ambassador at Madrid, 374



    Carlos, Don, Pretender to the Spanish throne, 173, 174, 176, 178, 179, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 214, 342, 343, 344, 348, 369, 377, 386, 394, 403



    Carlotta, Infanta, 369



    Cartwright, Thomas, 49, 50



    Castlereagh, Viscount, afterwards Second Marquis of Londonderry, 16, 20



    Cea, Bermúdez, Spanish statesman, 174, 175, 177, 178, 336



    Chad, British minister at Berlin, 110, 112



    Charles X., King of France, 1, 4, 6, 8, 16, 20, 21, 30, 39, 43, 45



    Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, 408, 409, 413, 414, 418, 437



    Charles, Archduke of Austria, 49, 336



    Charles Frederick, Archduke of Austria, 290



    Charles, of Naples, Prince, 51, 55, 57, 59, 69



    Charlotte, Princess, daughter of George IV., 69



    Chassé, General, Baron, 76, 140, 142



    Chateaubriand, Vicomte de, 26, 64, 350



    Chekib-Effendi, 263, 267, 271



    Chesney, Colonel Francis, 237



    Chlopicki, General, 44



    Chrzanowski, General Adalbert, 229, 251, 252



    Clanricarde, Marquis of, 236, 252, 319, 320



Clarendon, Earl of, 177, 184, 186, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 203, 207, 208, 210, 216, 217, 265, 266, 275, 297, 336, 396



    Cochelet, Adrien-Louis, 241, 242, 269, 272, 273



    Codrington, Admiral, Sir Edward, 146



    Coloredo, Count, 436, 437



    Concha, General, 338



    Constantine, Paulovitch, Grand Duke, 144



    Cor, dragoman to French Embassy at Constantinople, 291, 292



    Cordoba, General, 201



    Cortazar, Modesto, 216



    Coste, Jacques, 270, 310



    Cousin, Victor, 41



    Cowley, Earl, 185, 343, 345, 347, 363, 366, 371, 379, 396



    Cubières, General de, 302



    Cunningham, Marchioness of, 50





    Daine, General, 76, 83



    Darmès, regicide, 306



    Décazes, Duc, 39, 340



    Dedel, Dutch Envoy in London, 266



    Deutz, Agent of Duchesse de Bern, 197



    Diebitsch, Marshal, Count, 26, 42, 64



    Diedrichstein, Baron von, 435



    Dino, Duchesse de, 32, 199, 266



    Dost Mohammad, Amir of Kabul, 235



    Drummond-Hay, British Consul at Tangier, 360



    Duckworth, Admiral, 164



    Dufour, General, 430, 432



    Duhamel, Colonel, 157



    Dupetit-Thouars, Admiral, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 360



    Dupin, André Marie Jean Jacques, 31, 129



    Dupont, Jacques, 31, 39



    Durham, Earl of, 123, 124, 135, 224





    Easthope, Sir John, 440



    Eliot, Lord, afterwards Earl of St. Germans, 184, 185



    Ellice, Edward, 265, 297, 321



    Elphinstone, Miss Mercer, 53



    Emin Bey, 148



    Enrique, Don, Duke of Seville, 370, 379, 384, 385, 388, 389, 390, 397, 398, 403



    Escalera, General, 207



    España, Count of, 214



    Espartero, General Baldomero, 206, 207, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 307, 335, 338, 339, 340, 341, 343, 344, 346, 347, 368, 369, 371, 378, 404



    Etterhazy, Prince, 43



    Evans, Sir George de Lacy, 187, 202, 211



    Excelmans, General, afterwards Marshal, 52





    Fabvier, General, Baron, 52



    Fanshawe, Captain, 315



    Faucher, Léon, 302



    Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, 20, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 190, 191, 192, 403



    Ferdinand I. (IV.), King of the Two Sicilies, 19



    Ferdinand II. ("Bomba,") King of the Two Sicilies, 264, 374, 435



    Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, King Consort of Maria II., Queen of Portugal, 190



    Ferdinand, Duke of Saxe-Coburg, 371, 379, 382, 384, 395



    Fernanda, Infanta, 372, 377, 391, 394, 395, 397, 398, 400, 401



    Fethi Ahmed Pasha, 270, 273



    Fezensac, Duc de, 209



    Flahaut, General, Comte de, 53, 54, 265, 407



    Forbes, British chargé d'affaires at Vienna, 101



    Francis II., Emperor of Austria, 17, 21, 26, 68, 166



    Francis IV., Duke of Modena, 64



    Francisco de Paula, Infante, 369, 375, 385, 393



    Francisco de Asis, Don, Duke of Cadiz, afterwards king Consort of Isabella II., Queen of Spain, 370, 379, 384, 387, 391, 395, 396, 397, 398, 401, 402, 403



    Frederick William III., King of Prussia, 17, 22, 23, 24, 26, 31, 32, 68, 167, 274



Frederick William IV., King of Prussia, 166, 408



    Frederick William, Crown Prince of Prussia. See  Frederick William IV.





    Gallois, Captain, 105, 107



    Gendebien, Alexandra, Joseph, 48, 52



    George IV., King of Great Britain, 14, 50, 69



    Gérard, Marshal, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 139, 140, 141, 142



    Gioberti, Vincenzo, 408, 409



    Glücksberg, Duc de, 340, 341, 345



    Goblet, General, 84, 100, 101, 128



    Granville, Earl of, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 67, 69, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 85, 95, 99, 103, 129, 131, 132, 134, 137, 160, 181, 185, 188, 193, 194, 196, 202, 205, 208, 209, 228, 234, 244, 279, 280, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 336



    Granville, Countess of, 63



    Gregory XVI., Pope, 409, 410, 421



    Greville, Charles, 64, 70, 265, 283, 297, 299, 302, 312, 321, 329, 441



    Grey, 2nd Earl, 39, 40, 46, 49, 51, 57, 74, 79, 80, 81, 83, 89, 92, 96, 98, 102, 116, 118, 119, 123, 134, 137, 140, 172, 183, 199, 222, 265



    Grey, 3rd Earl, 381



    Grote, George, 423, 424



    Guizot, François, 31, 35, 39, 47, 130, 132, 191, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 288, 292, 296, 297, 304, 305, 309, 312, 313, 318, 320, 321, 323, 324, 326, 329, 332, 333, 334, 337, 339, 341, 345, 347, 348, 349, 352, 353, 355, 356, 357, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 370, 372, 374, 375, 376, 379, 383, 384, 386, 387, 388, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 404, 407, 410, 411, 412, 413, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 428, 429, 431, 432, 434, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 444





    Haines, Captain, 232.



    Hafiz Pasha, 228, 240, 242, 243, 251, 252



    Halen, General Van, 344



    Halil Pasha, 155, 158, 159, 243, 269



    Hay, Admiral, Lord John, 201, 207, 213



    Heine, Heinrich, 63, 120, 302



    Heytesbury, Lord, 26, 27, 28, 42, 68, 87, 88, 89, 90, 110, 123, 125



    Hinüber, General, 72



    Hobson, Captain William, 351



    Hodges, Colonel, 269, 272



    Holland, Lord, 255, 266, 275, 298, 302, 321, 327



    Holland, Lady, 298



    Hosrew Pasha, 150, 243, 247, 268, 269, 272, 273



    Howard de Walden, Lord, 189, 190



    Howden, Lord, 411



    Hugon, Admiral, 226, 306



    Humann, Jean-Georges, 132



    Hume, Joseph, 281



    Hussein Pasha, 151





    Ibell, Charles, 24



    Ibrahim Pasha, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 219, 220, 232, 234, 240, 241, 242, 245, 247, 251, 252, 253, 268, 269, 271, 280, 283, 287, 291, 294, 295, 296, 301, 310, 311, 314, 317



    Isabella II., Queen of Spain, 174, 176, 180, 186, 204, 206, 208, 211, 213, 216, 335, 337, 338, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 347, 348, 368, 369, 370, 371, 374, 375, 377, 378, 379, 382, 383, 387, 388, 391, 394, 396, 397, 400, 401, 402, 403, 405, 411



    Isturiz, Francisco, Javier de, 202, 379





    Jarnac, Philippe de Bohan-Chabot, Comte de, 349, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 375, 376, 383, 384, 386, 388, 391, 392, 394, 402



    Jochmus, General, 252, 314



    Joinville, Prince de, son of Louis Philippe, 189, 244, 338, 356, 358, 359, 364, 367





    Klindworth, secret diplomatic agent, 412



    Kotchuby, Russian minister, 156



    Kotzebue, Augustus, 24





    La Fayette, Marquis de, 5, 9, 11, 35, 46



    Laffitte, Jacques, 4, 9, 39, 62, 63



    Lalande, Admiral, 243, 244, 245



    Lallemand, General, Baron, 52



    Lamarque, General, Comte, 46, 120



    Lamartine, Alphonse de, 438



    Lamb, Sir Frederick. See Beauvale, Lord



    Lamoricière, General Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de, 358, 360



    Lansdowne, Marquis of, 181, 266, 275, 302



    La Tour-Maubourg, Marie-Charles-César de Faÿ, General, Marquis de, 82, 84, 95, 98, 99, 100, 127, 139



    Lawoëstine, Colonel, Marquis de, 54, 55, 56



    Leon, General Diego, 338



    Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, afterwards Leopold I., King of the Belgians, 49, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 82, 84, 85, 91, 92, 93, 99, 100, 101, 126, 127, 139, 143, 285, 287, 300, 307, 367, 384



    Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, Prince, 371, 375, 377, 379, 385, 391, 392, 395, 402



    Lesseps, Viscomte Ferdinand de, 227, 345, 346



    Leuchtenberg, Duc Auguste de, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 189



    Lieven, Prince, 42, 90, 115, 221



    Lieven, Princess, 222, 259, 265, 274



    Lobau, Marshal Mouton de, 46



    Londonderry, 3rd Marquis of, 74, 85, 223



    Louis XVIII., King of France, 6, 7, 30, 39, 62, 340



Louis Philippe, King of the French, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 30, 34, 35, 40, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 69, 81, 92, 97, 100, 121, 124, 129, 130, 131, 134, 137, 144, 173, 177, 182, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207, 209, 212, 214, 220, 239, 250, 258, 264, 265, 279, 285, 287, 292, 293, 300, 305, 307, 308, 309, 311, 319, 327, 329, 331, 335, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 347, 348, 350, 351, 355, 356, 357, 358, 365, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 374, 375, 376, 379, 382, 383, 384, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 407, 410, 413, 422, 423, 425, 429, 437, 438, 439, 443, 444



    Louise, Princesse, daughter of Louis Philippe, consort of Leopold I., King of the Belgians, 126, 392



    Loulé, Marquise de, 189



    Lushington, Doctor, 334



    Lützow, Count, 67



    Lyndhurst, Lord, 118, 119



    Lyons, Sir Edmund, 411





    Maanen, Cornelius van, 29



    Macneil, British minister at Teheran, 235



    Mahmud II., Sultan of Turkey, 145, 146, 147, 150, 152, 153, 157, 159, 161, 163, 165, 169, 219, 220, 227, 228, 229, 232, 237, 238, 239, 240, 242, 246



    Maison, Marshal, Marquis, 41, 64, 66, 67, 108



    Malcolm, Sir Pulteney, 164



    Mandeville, British chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, 154, 155, 157, 158, 160



    Maria II., Queen of Portugal, 171, 173, 174, 176, 189, 190



    Maria Amalia of Saxony, 3rd wife of Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, 172



    Maria Christina, 4th wife of Ferdinand VII. and Queen Regent of Spain, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 186, 192, 194, 195, 202, 203, 206, 207, 209, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 307, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 343, 344, 346, 348, 368, 369, 370, 372, 374, 376, 378, 379, 382, 383, 384, 385, 387, 389, 392, 395, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401



    Marie Amélie, Queen of the French, Consort of Louis Philippe, 9, 51, 391



    Mareuil, French chargé d'affaires in London, 132



    Maroto, General Rafael, 211, 212, 213, 214



    Martínez de la Rosa, Francisco, 178, 180, 184, 187, 190, 192



    Matuszewic, Count, 111, 115, 169



    Mauguin, François, 49



    Maurojeni, Turkish chargé d'affaires at Vienna, 153



    Mazzini, Giuseppe, 408



    Medem, Count, 252



    Meerenhout, French consul at Tahiti, 352, 353, 354, 444



    Mehemet Ali, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 164, 168, 169, 170, 171, 219, 220, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 255, 256, 260, 261, 262, 263, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 284, 285, 290, 291, 294, 295, 296, 297, 299, 300, 301, 303, 305, 308, 309, 310, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 403



    Melbourne, Viscount, 183, 186, 205, 266, 275, 282, 283, 286, 287, 297, 298, 299, 303, 307, 309, 326



    Mendizabal, Juan Alvarez, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 201, 202



    Mérode, Comte Félix de, 55



    Metternich, Clement Wenceslas, Prince, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 42, 43, 49, 65, 67, 68, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 112, 114, 121, 135, 144, 166, 167, 168, 169, 198, 204, 225, 245, 247, 254, 266, 269, 293, 300, 310, 312, 316, 319, 320, 321, 322, 324, 326, 332, 336, 342, 343, 344, 370, 393, 407, 408, 409, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 418, 421, 422, 423, 424, 429, 435, 437, 442, 443



    Meulinäer, Dutch statesman, 82, 84, 126, 128



    Miguel, Dom, usurping King of Portugal, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179



    Miller, Major-General, 354



    Mimaut, French consul-general at Alexandria, 227, 272



    Minto, Earl of, 417, 418, 421, 424, 425, 427, 428, 431, 432, 433, 435, 442



    Miraflores, Marquis of, 378, 396



    Mohammad, Shah of Persia, 235, 236



    Molé, Louis, Comte, 31, 35, 36, 38, 39, 48, 196, 204, 205, 207, 212, 234, 329, 336



    Moltke, Major Helmuth von, afterwards Field-Marshal, 230, 238, 251



    Montalivet, Comte de, 45



    Montpensier, Duc de, son of Louis Philippe, 371, 372, 377, 383, 387, 391, 393, 394, 397, 398, 400, 401, 402



    Montrond, Comte Casimir de, 32, 58



    Morier, Burnet, 426



    Morier, David, 425, 426, 432



    Morny, Duc de, 53



    Mortemart, Duc de, 87



    Mounier, Baron, 321



    Muñagorri, Basque lawyer, 210, 212



    Muravieff, General, 154, 155, 156, 158



    Mustafa-Effendi, 153





    Namic Pasha, 153



    Napier, Commodore, Sir Charles, 175, 290, 295, 301, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 360



    Napoleon, Prince Charles, 66



    Napoleon, Prince Louis, afterwards Napoleon III., 53, 66, 121, 285, 286



    Narvaez, General Ramon Maria, 211, 335, 346, 368, 374, 376, 378, 379, 383



    Nemours, Duc de, son of Louis Philippe, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 139, 189, 373



    Nesselrode, Charles Robert Count, 20, 22, 87, 88, 90, 110, 125, 156, 165, 166, 167, 168, 220, 221, 236, 252, 269, 365



    Neumann, Baron, 258, 263, 266, 273, 283



    Nicholas I., Tsar of Russia, 20, 26, 27, 28, 36, 44, 68, 73, 88, 90, 101, 105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 116, 123, 124, 135, 140, 146, 147, 154, 156, 157, 160, 163, 166, 168, 220, 223, 224, 239, 241, 246, 253, 257, 319, 356, 357, 429



    Normanby, Marquis of, 391, 393, 407, 411, 416, 439, 441



    Nourri-Effendi, 242, 262, 263



    Nuñoz. See Rianzarez, Duke of



    Nuñoz, brother of Duke of Rianzarez, 390





    Ochsenbein, Ulrich, 424, 427, 428, 429, 432, 433



    O'Donnell, General, 216, 338



    Olozaga, Salustiano de, 339



    Orange, Prince Frederick of, 29



    Orange, William, Prince of, 29, 36, 47, 48, 50, 52, 57, 70, 76, 83



    Orléans, Duc de. See Louis Philippe, King of the French 



    Orleans, Duc de, eldest son of Louis Philippe, 139, 198, 204, 225, 293



    Orloff, General, Count Alexis, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 162, 163, 170, 254



    Osman Bey, 243



    Otho, King of Greece, 311, 411



    Otrante, Comte Athanase de, 65





    Pageot, French diplomatist, 341, 342, 343



    Palmella, Duke of, 189



    Palmerston, Viscount, 41, 42, 46, 49, 53, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 70, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98, 99, 102, 105, 106, 107, 109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 125, 128, 134, 136, 139, 141, 143, 144, 153, 156, 166, 169, 173, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 186, 187, 189, 192, 194, 195, 196, 199, 201, 202, 204, 208, 209, 213, 217, 219, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 251, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 270, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 281, 282, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 292, 296, 297, 298, 299, 302, 303, 304, 305, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 320, 321, 322, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 330, 331, 332, 333, 336, 352, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 406, 407, 411, 415, 416, 417, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 435, 436, 440, 441, 442, 444



    Palmerston, Lady, 382



    Panizzi, Sir Anthony, 441



    Parnell, Sir Henry, 39



    Pedro I., Emperor of Brazil, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 178, 189



    Peel, Sir Robert, 183, 186, 222, 281, 327, 331, 357, 360, 372, 373, 380, 381, 401, 432



    Peel, Robert, son of Sir Robert, 431, 432, 433



    Périer, Casimir, 39, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 72, 75, 78, 79, 81, 86, 100, 102, 103, 105, 108, 112, 118, 120, 121, 129, 130



    Périgord, Comte Edmond de, 32



    Piscatory, French minister at Athens, 411



    Pius IX., Pope, 409, 414



    Polignac, Prince Jules de, 3, 14, 15, 26, 45, 155



    Pomare, Queen of Tahiti, 352, 353, 354, 361, 365



    Ponsonby, Viscount, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 71, 72, 156, 162, 223, 224, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 239, 240, 243, 244, 247, 248, 269, 270, 273, 291, 303, 305, 316, 324, 325, 326, 415



    Pontois, French ambassador at Constantinople, 269, 291, 292



    Pottinger, Eldred, 235



    Pozzo di Borgo, Charles, Count, 160



    Prim, Brigadier-General, afterwards Marshal, 346



    Pritchard, George, 353, 354, 355, 356, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 444





    Quesada, General, 203





    Radetzky, Field-Marshal, Count, 104, 435, 437



    Radowitz, General von, 436, 437



    Ranjit Singh, Maharajah of Lahore, 235



    Rayneval, Alphonse Gérard de, 187, 195, 197



    Reeve, Henry, 281, 302, 312, 329



    Reichstadt, Duc de, son of Napoleon I., 67, 121



    Rémusat, Comte Charles de, 5, 47



    Reshid Bey, 159



    Reshid, Mustafa, Pasha, 229, 239, 240, 244, 269, 273, 291, 292



Rianzarez, Duke of, 369, 372, 387



    Riego, Rafael del, 179



    Rifat Bey, 288, 290, 294, 301



    Rigny, Admiral, Comte de, 178, 179



    Rives, American minister in Paris, 5



    Rodil, General, 179



    Rossi, Comte Pellegrino, 410, 421



    Roussin, Albin Reine, Admiral, Baron, 75, 158, 159, 160, 162, 168, 172, 228, 234, 241, 247, 248, 257, 272, 302



    Royer-Collard, Pierre Paul, 130



    Russell, Lord John, 282, 297, 299, 303, 380, 381, 383, 392, 416, 442





    Sainte-Aulaire, Louis-Clair de Beaupoil, Marquis de, 66, 104, 193, 247, 333, 380, 428



    Saldanha, Marshal, Duke of, 189



    Salis-Soglio, Ulrich von, 430



    Salvandy, Comte de, 340, 341



    Sami Bey, 272, 273



    Samos, Prince of, 272



    Sand, Karl Ludwig, 24



    Sarim-Effendi, 227, 228, 272



    Sarsfield, General Pedro, 207



    Sartorius, Sir George, 172, 175



    Sébastiani, General, afterwards Marshal, 41, 51, 52, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 77, 79, 80, 82, 85, 86, 87, 89, 94, 98, 99, 100, 132, 256, 257, 258, 259, 348



    Sébastiani, General Tiburce, 100



    Serrano, General, 411



    Sèves, Colonel. See Soliman Pasha



    Seymour, George, 106, 107



    Simonitch, Count, 235, 236



Soliman Pasha, 149,  291, 301



    Sotomayor, Duke of, 382



    Soult, Marshal, Duc de Dalmatie, 79, 85, 131, 132, 142, 197, 212, 240, 241, 242, 243, 246, 248, 249, 250, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259, 260, 309, 356



    Southern, secretary to British legation and chargé d'affaires at Madrid, 194, 215, 337



Spencer, Earl, 183, 297



    Stockmar, Baron, 77, 84, 91, 92, 93, 98, 101, 115, 116, 125, 126, 127, 439



    Stopford, Admiral, Sir Robert, 249, 251, 264, 278, 289, 290, 301, 311, 314, 315



    Stuart de Rothesay, Lord, 34, 35, 38, 45, 48, 53



    Stürmer, Baron, 247, 316, 326



    Soliman Pasha, 149, 291, 301





    Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince de, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 51, 54, 57, 58, 59, 61, 66, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 86, 87, 88, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 102, 105, 115, 116, 137, 141, 144, 178, 179, 180, 198, 259, 443



    Taylor, Sir Brooke, 66



    Temple, Sir William, 264



    Terceira, Duke of, 176



    Thiers, Louis-Adolphe, 4, 8, 132, 197, 198, 201, 203, 204, 225, 226, 227, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 288, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 302, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 318, 328, 329, 412, 437, 439, 440, 441



    Toreno, Count, 192, 337, 343, 396



    Trapani, Count, 369, 370, 373, 374, 376, 378, 379, 384, 387, 402



    Turner, Lieutenant, 208, 210, 212





    Varennes, French chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, 154, 155, 157, 160



    Véron, Doctor Louis-Désiré, 248



    Verstolk van Soelen, Johan Gijsbert, Dutch statesman, 71, 113



    Victoria, Queen of Great Britain, 212, 285, 299, 303, 325, 348, 350, 356, 367, 368, 372, 373, 391, 392, 417



    Villèle, Jean-Baptiste de, 146



    Villiers, George. See Clarendon, Earl of



    Vogoride, Prince Nicolae, 272





    Walewski, Comte, 284, 294, 411



    Walker, Captain, 245, 301, 314



    Wellington, Duke of, 14, 15, 28, 32, 34, 37, 41, 81, 86, 96, 116, 119, 147, 183, 185, 222, 223, 224, 281, 287, 331, 332, 357



    Werther, Baron, 31, 136, 295, 319



    Weyer, Silvain van de, 52, 91, 100, 116, 117, 128



    William I., King of the Netherlands, 29, 43, 47, 55, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 91, 93, 101, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 122, 123, 125, 127, 133, 135, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143



    William IV., King of Great Britain, 15, 32, 39, 40, 106, 118, 134, 137, 153, 183



    Witkewitch, Captain, 235, 236



    Wittgenstein, Prince, 22, 24, 437



    Wylde, Colonel, 187, 200, 201, 210, 213





    Zumalacárregui, General, 183, 200



    Zuylen, Baron van, 125, 128






FOOTNOTES:




[1] H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), I. pp. 62, 63,
        66, 67, 68, and 354.






[2] The “pré carré,” the sea, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees.






[3] N. Senior, Conversations with Thiers, Guizot, etc., I. pp. 288, 323,
        and 334.






[4] L. Blanc, Histoire de dix ans., I. p. 383.






[5] F. Daudet, Revue des Deux Mondes. 1er décembre, 1909. “La
        police politique sous la Restauration.”






[6] Guizot, Mémoires, II. pp. 12-16.






[7] The son of the Duchesse de Berri. The Duc de Berri had been
        murdered at the Opera House on February 13, 1820, and his son had
        been born in the following September. The Duc de Bordeaux was
        therefore the grandson of Charles X. and the nephew of the Duc
        d’Angoulême, the Dauphin. He is better known by the title of the
        Comte de Chambord.






[8] L. Vitet, “La monarchie de” 1830, Revue des Deux Mondes. 1er décembre, 1860.






[9] L. Blanc, Histoire de dix ans., I. pp. 384-388.






[10] H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leyland), I. pp.
        141, 142.






[11] Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 26-28.






[12] Affaires étrangères 631, Angleterre, Baudrand à Molé, août 28,
        1830. H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, I. p. 330. Edinburgh Review,
        October, 1830. Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 131-134. C. Greville, Journals, II. pp. 94, 95. Correspondence of Princess Lieven with Earl
        Grey, II. Grey to Princess Lieven, July 29, 1830.






[13] Despatches and Correspondence of Wellington, VII. Wellington
        to Aberdeen, August 12th, 1830, pp. 162-169, Memorandum upon
        Relations with France. C. Greville, Journal, II. p. 21.






[14] Affaires étrangères 631, Angleterre: Baudrand à Molé, 23 août,
        1830; Vaudreuil à Molé, 28 août, 1830.






[15] F.O. Austria 243, Lamb to Palmerston, September 3, 1833.






[16] Bolton King, History of Italian Unity, I. pp. 51-61.






[17] Metternich, Memoires, IV. p. 222: Metternich à Esterhazy, 7 août,
        1825.






[18] Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 10-17.






[19] Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 17-30.






[20] E. Quinet, De l’Allemagne. Revue des Deux Mondes, V. Premier
        semestre.






[21] William A’Court, first Baron Heytesbury (1779-1860).






[22] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, August 17, 18, 19, 1830.






[23] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen (most secret and
        confidential), August 20, 1830.






[24] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, September 8, 14, 1830.






[25] Guizot, Mémoires, II. pp. 86-87.






[26] Broglie, Souvenirs, IV. pp. 41-42.






[27] Affaires étrangères, 631 Angleterre. Talleyrand à Molé, 25
        septembre, 1830. Barante, Souvenirs, IV. p. 9.






[28] C. Greville, Journals, II. p. 57.






[29] La Jeune Captive.






[30] There is an interesting article on the subject of Montrond, by H.
        Welschinger, in the Revue de Paris of the 1er février, 1895, entitled “Un
        ami de Talleyrand.” His name figures constantly in T. Raikes’ Journal, Chroniques de Madame de Dino, C. Greville’s Journals, H. Greville’s Diary, Gronow’s Recollections, etc.






[31] T. Raikes, Journal, I. p. 268, and III. pp. 153-154. Among the
        papers discovered at the Tuileries, after the Revolution of 1848, and
        published in the Revue Retrospective, p. 37, Montrond’s name appears
        opposite a sum of 36,000 francs in the accounts of the secret service
        funds of the Foreign Office for the year 1842.






[32] Affaires étrangères, 631 Angleterre, Vaudreuil à Molé 31 août,
        1830. Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 144-147.






[33] F.O. France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 3, 1830.






[34] Affaires étrangères, 681 (bis) Angleterre Talleyrand a Molé, 3, 6,
        8 octobre, 1830.






[35] F.O. France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 12, 1830. F.O.
        France 414, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 1, 8, 11, 1830, Guizot, Mémoires, II. pp. 95-98. Broglie, Souvenirs, IV. pp. 28-29. L. Blanc, Histoire de dix ans., II. pp. 103-114.






[36] Affaires étrangères, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand à Molé,
        11 octobre, 1830.






[37] Affaires étrangères, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Molé à Talleyrand,
        13 octobre, 1830. F.O. France 414 & 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, 12, 15
        October, 1830.






[38] Affaires étrangères, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Molé à Talleyrand, 9, 20
        octobre, 1830; Talleyrand à Molé, 15, 23, 25 octobre, 1830; 1 novembre,
        1830.






[39] F.O. France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 22, 1830. F.O.
        France 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 18, 22, 25, 31, 1830.






[40] Broglie, Souvenirs, IV. pp. 87-91. Guizot, Mémoires, II. pp. 128-135.






[41] Affaires étrangères, 681 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        novembre 27, 1830.






[42] N. Senior, Conversations with Thiers, Guizot, etc., II. p. 280.
        C. Greville, Journals, III. p. 210.






[43] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, I. pp. 315-316, 322; II. p. 8






[44] F.O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, September 4, 1830.






[45] Affaires étrangères, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Maison à Talleyrand, 13,
        15, 22 novembre, 1830. F.O. France 416, Stuart to Aberdeen and
        Palmerston, November 22, 26, 29, 1830.






[46] F.O. Russia 187, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, October 12, 1830.






[47] Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 43-48 and 51-57; Metternich à
        Esterhazy, 21 octobre, 1830. Memoire pour Orloff, 6 octobre, 1830.






[48] Affairs étrangères, 601 (bis) et 632, Angleterre, Talleyrand à Molé,
        29 octobre, 1830; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 20 novembre, 1830,
        10, 21 novembre, 1831.






[49] Schools upon the system advocated by Joseph Lancaster (1778-1838), i.e. upon the monitorial system. (Dictionary of National
        Biography.)






[50] Affaires étrangères, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        28 décembre, 1830. Metternich, Memoires, V. p. 79, Metternich à
        Ficquelmont, 31 décembre, 1830.






[51] F.O. France 417, Stuart to Palmerston, December 10, 1830.






[52] Barante, Souvenirs, IV. pp. 174 and 187, Rémusat à Barante, 2
        avril, 1831; Guizot à Barante, 8 avril, 1831. Cf. also N. Senior, Conversations with Thiers, Guizot, etc., Conversation with Victor
        Cousin, May 20, 1856.






[53] State Papers, XVIII. pp. 728, 729.






[54] State Papers, XVIII. pp. 749, 750. Affaires étrangères, 631 (bis)
        Angleterre, Talleyrand, à Sébastiani, 20 décembre, 1830.






[55] State Papers, XVIII. pp. 759-773.






[56] F.O. France 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 19, 1830.






[57] Affaires étrangères, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand à Maison, 7
        novembre, 1830.






[58] State Papers, XVII. p. 1242.






[59] Affaires étrangères, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        27 novembre, 1830; Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 25 décembre, 1830.
        Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 25 déc, 1830.






[60] Affaires étrangères, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand,
        2 décembre, 1830; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 30 décembre, 1830.






[61] F.O. France 416, Stuart to Palmerston, December 31, 1830;
        January 3, 1831.






[62] Lord Lamington, In the Days of the Dandies, pp. 127, 128. Dictionary of National Biography, Ponsonby, John, Viscount (1770-1855).






[63] Affaires étrangères, 187 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 19 décembre
        1830; 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 8, 14, 18 janvier, 1831
        (particulière et confidentielle).






[64] Affaires étrangères, 631 (bis) and 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à
        Talleyrand, 3, 10, 19 janvier, 1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 7 janvier,
        1831.






[65] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 19 janvier,
        1831.






[66] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 17
        janvier, 1831.






[67] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 6 janvier,
        1831.






[68] Affaires étrangères, 187 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 6 décembre,
        1830.






[69] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 6 janvier,
        1831.






[70] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 17
        janvier, 1831 (particulière); 18 janvier, 1831 (particulière et confidentielle).






[71] F.O. France 426, Granville to Palmerston, January 21, 1831.






[72] T. Raikes’ Journal, III. p. 182.






[73] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 37-40; Palmerston to
        Granville, February 8, 1831.






[74] F.O. France 426, Granville to Palmerston, January 14, 21, 22,
        1831.






[75] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 25
        janvier, 1831.






[76] T. Juste, Sylvain Van de Weyer, pp. 135-137 and notes.






[77] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 19 janvier,
        1831.






[78] The leader of the Catholic party in Belgium.






[79] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 21 janvier,
        1831.






[80] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 22, 24
        janvier, 1831.






[81] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 29 janvier,
        1831.






[82] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Lawoëstine à Sébastiani, 29
        janvier, 1831.






[83] F.O. Belgium 4, Ponsonby to Palmerston, February 4, 1831.






[84] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 2, 4,
        5 février, 1831.






[85] State Papers, XVIII. pp. 774-775.






[86] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 7, 9,
        10 février, 1831.






[87] F.O. France 426, Granville to Palmerston, February 4, 9, 1831.






[88] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand,
        8 février 1831.






[89] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, February 8, 1831.






[90] F.O. France 426 and 427, Granville to Palmerston, February 11,
        12, 1831.






[91] F.O. Belgium 4, Ponsonby to Palmerston. February 11, 1831.






[92] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, February 25, 1831.






[93] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, February 28, 1831.






[94] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 12 février,
        1831.






[95] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Bresson à Sébastiani, 9 février,
        1831.






[96] Affaires étrangères, 190 Belgique, Sébastiani à Bresson, 12 février,
        1831.






[97] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        13 février, 1831.






[98] The Comte de Chambord, the posthumous son of the Duc de Berri,
        in whose favour Charles X. and the Duc d’Angoulême had abdicated.






[99] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 27
        février, 1831.






[100] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 14, 1831.






[101] Metternich, Mémoires, V. pp. 128-130; Metternich à Apponyi,
        21 mars, 1831. H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 51-53,
        Palmerston to Granville, March 15, 1831.






[102] H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by C. Leland), I. pp. 114,
        115, 118.






[103] Letters of Harriet, Countess Granville, II. p. 93, Lady Granville
        to Lady Carlisle, March 14, 1841.






[104] Chateaubriand, Mémoires, IV. p. 451.






[105] C. Greville, Journal, I. pp. 310-311.






[106] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, February 21, 24, 1831.






[107] Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 157-161; Metternich à Apponyi,
        16, 19 février, 1831.






[108] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, Ier mars, 1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 8, 24 mars, 1831. F.O. France
        427 and 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 7, 21, 1831.






[109] The Austrian ambassador at Rome.






[110] Metternich, Memoires, V. p. 125, Metternich à Apponyi, 12 mars,
        1831.






[111] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 18, 1831.






[112] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 28, 1831.






[113] Louis Philippe evidently considered that the large majority of his
        subjects had no religion at all.






[114] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1831.






[115] F.O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 14, 1831.






[116] F.O. Russia 191, Heytesbury to Palmerston, March 21, 1831.






[117] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 4, 1831.






[118] Affaires étrangères, 682 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand,
        24 mars, 1831. F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 25,
        1831.






[119] F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1831.






[120] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 80-127.






[121] C. Greville, Journals (I), II. p. 133. Affaires étrangères, 632
        Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 4 avril, 1831.






[122] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        28 mars, 1831.






[123] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, March 18, April 1, 1831.
        F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1831.






[124] State Papers, XVIII. pp. 798-796. Affaires étrangères, 132
        Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 17 avril, 1831. F.O. France 424,
        Palmerston to Granville, April 17, 1831. F.O. France 428, Granville
        to Palmerston, April 22, 1831.






[125] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand,
        12 août 1831. F.O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 8, 11,
        1831.






[126] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 3 mai,
        1831.






[127] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, May 17, 1831.






[128] F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, June 7, 1831.






[129] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 9 juin,
        1831.






[130] F.O. France 429, Granville to Palmerston, June 10, 1831.






[131] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 13, 15,
        and 22 juin, 1831; Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 25 juin, 1831.






[132] State Papers, XVIII. pp. 802-806.






[133] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 161-172.






[134] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 4 mars,
        1831, 16 avril, 1831, 13 juin, 1831. Talleyrand à Sébastiani, June 16,
        1831.






[135] C. Greville, Journals, (I) II. p. 178.






[136] State Papers, XVIII. pp. 807-817.






[137] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 96-98, Palmerston to
        Granville, August 5, 1831. F.O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston,
        August 8, 1831.






[138] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        15 août, 1831.






[139] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 177-179. F.O. Belgium 6, Adair to
        Palmerston, August 22, 1831.






[140] Affaires étrangères, 134 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand 4 août,
        1831. F.O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston, August 4, 1831.






[141] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        7, 9 août, 1831.






[142] C. Greville, Journals (I) II, pp. 178-179.






[143] State Papers, XVIII. pp. 824-825.






[144] F.O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston, August 5, 7, 13, 14, 15,
        1831. F.O. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 21, 1831.






[145] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        11, 12, 15 août, 1831; Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 14, 15 août, 1831.






[146] F.O. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 17, 1831.






[147] State Papers, XVIII. pp. 830-831.






[148] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Louis Philippe à Talleyrand,
        Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 27 août, 1841.






[149] F.O. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 31, September
        5, 1831. Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Baudrand à Sébastiani,
        31 août, 1831.






[150] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        27 août, 1 septembre, 1831.






[151] F.O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston, August 22, 1831.
        F.O. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 31, 1831. Affaires
        étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 19 août, 1831;
        Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 22 août, 1831. Affaires étrangères, 192 Belgique,
        Sébastiani à La Tour-Maubourg, 15 août, 1831.






[152] F.O. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 21, 1831. Affaires
        étrangères, 192 Belgique, La Tour-Maubourg à Sébastiani, 20 août,
        1831.






[153] Affaires étrangères, 192 Belgique, Belliard à Sébastiani, 7, 9 août,
        1831.






[154] F.O. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 11, 14, 1831.






[155] F.O. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 19, 22, 1831.
        Affaires étrangères, 192 Belgique, Belliard à Sébastiani, 19, 21 août;
        Meulinäer à Gérard, 22 août, 1831. Leopold à Gérard (undated)
        undertaking that troops left in Belgium will be the object of his minute
        attention and will be retained no longer than necessary.






[156] F.O. Belgium 6, Palmerston to Adair, August 27, 1831; Adair to
        Palmerston, August 30, and September 6, 1831. Affaires étrangères, 192
        Belgique, Belliard à Sébastiani, 1, 3, 8 septembre, 1831.






[157] F.O. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, September 5, 1831.






[158] F.O. Belgium 7, Adair to Palmerston, September 11, 1831.






[159] F.O. France 431, Granville to Palmerston, September 10, 16, 1831.






[160] The Times, September 30, 1831.






[161] T. Raikes’ Journal, I. p. 137.






[162] F.O. France 431, Granville to Palmerston, September 19, 21, 1831.






[163] Affaires étrangères, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        21 décembre, 1830; Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 25 décembre, 1830;
        3 janvier 1831.






[164] Affaires étrangères, 632 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 9 mars,
        1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 13, 25 mars, 1831.






[165] F.O. Russia 191, Heytesbury to Palmerston, April 13, 30, 1831.






[166] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand,
        7 juillet, 1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 14, 20, 22 juillet, 4 septembre,
        1831.






[167] F.O. Russia 193, Heytesbury to Palmerston, October 8, 10,
        1831; November 12, 18.






[168] F.O. Russia 190, Palmerston to Heytesbury, November 23, 1831.






[169] F.O. Russia 198 & 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, December 18,
        1831, January 2, 1832. Affaires étrangères, 635 Angleterre, Talleyrand
        à Sébastiani, 19 novembre, 1831.






[170] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 179-209.






[171] As the system of the barrier fortresses was to be abandoned.






[172] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand,
        13 septembre, 1831; Talleyrand à Sébastiani, septembre 29, 1831;
        635 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, 4 octobre, 1831; Talleyrand à
        Sébastiani, 10, 12, 15, 17, 20 octobre, 1831; Sébastiani à Talleyrand
        22 octobre, 1831, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 16 novembre, 1831.






[173] F.O. France 426, Palmerston to Granville, October 28, 1831; 431,
        Granville to Palmerston, September 26, 30, 1831.






[174] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 216-218, 225, 230. H. Bulwer, Life of
        Palmerston, II. pp. 116-120; Palmerston to Granville, August 25, 1831.






[175] F.O. Belgium 7, Palmerston to Adair (secret), November 16, 1831. Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV., I. p. 338, Grey
        to Taylor, August 26, 1831.






[176] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 212, 219-221. Correspondence of Earl
        Grey with King William IV., I. pp. 341-342, Taylor to Grey, August
        27, 1831.






[177] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 222-225, and 231-232.






[178] Affaires étrangères, 635 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 15
        décembre, 1831. Affaires étrangères, 635 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand
        16, 19 décembre, 1831.






[179] F.O. France 431, Granville to Palmerston, December 16, 1831.






[180] Affaires étrangères, 635 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 22, 24,
        25, 27, 30 décembre, 1831.






[181] F.O. France 442, Granville to Palmerston, December 19, 1831.






[182] F.O. France 432, Granville to Palmerston, December 23, 30, 1831.
        Affaires étrangères, 635 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Talleyrand, C. Périer à
        Talleyrand, 31 décembre, 1831.






[183] F.O. Belgium 7, Adair to Palmerston, December 16, 1831. Affaires
        étrangères, 194 Belgique, Tiburce Sébastiani à Sébastiani, 12 décembre,
        1831; Belliard à Sébastiani, 13 décembre, 1831.






[184] Affaires étrangères, 194 Belgique, Belliard à Sébastiani, 23 décembre,
        1831.






[185] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. p. 234.






[186] Affaires étrangères, 194 Belgique, Belliard à Sébastiani, 13, 18, 19
        décembre, 1831. F.O. Belgium 7, Adair to Palmerston, December 20,
        1831. Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 225-230.






[187] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 226-229. Metternich, Memoires, V. pp.
        217-224, Metternich à Apponyi, Metternich à Ficquelmont, 27 décembre,
        1831. F.O. Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, January 7 and 20, 1832.
        Affaires étrangères, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand à C. Périer, 25 janvier,
        1832.






[188] Despatches and Memoranda of Duke of Wellington, VIII. pp.
        277-279 (State of parties in the French Chamber). Heinrich Heine, Letters from Paris, translated by C. Leland, I. p. 125. “And should
        Lord Grey fall with him will fall Casimir Périer. Both keep themselves
        upright by their mutual tendency to tumble down, like two drunkards
        who remain standing by leaning one against the other.”






[189] Affaires étrangères, 635 and 636 Angleterre, C. Périer à Talleyrand,
        9, 11 janvier, 1832; Talleyrand à Périer, 23 janvier, 1832. Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 231-233. F.O. France 444, Granville to Palmerston,
        January 27, 1832.






[190] State Papers, XIX. pp. 92-93.






[191] F.O. France 444, Granville to Palmerston, January 30, February
        1, 13, March 2, 1832.






[192] F.O. Rome 25, Freeborn to Bidwell, January 29, 1832.






[193] F.O. France 445, Freeborn (British consul at Rome) to Granville,
        February 1, 1832; Granville to Palmerston, February 13, 1832. F.O.
        Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, February 6, 1832.






[194] F.O. France 445, Granville to Palmerston, March 5, 1832. F.O.
        Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, February 14, 1832. F.O. Rome
        25, Freeborn to Bidwell, February 1, 1832; Freeborn to Palmerston,
        February 18, 1832.






[195] F.O. Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, February 11, 1832.






[196] F.O. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, March 14, 1832.






[197] Affaires étrangères, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        22, 23 mars, 1832.






[198] Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV., II. pp. 351-355.
        The King to Grey, April 16, 1832, II. pp. 358-368. Grey to the
        King, April 17, 1832; Grey to Sir H. Taylor, April 17, 1832.






[199] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, April 25, 1832.






[200] F.O. Tuscany 62, Palmerston to Seymour, February 20, 1832.






[201] F.O. Tuscany 62, Palmerston to Seymour, March 7, 1832.
        F.O. France 445, Granville to Palmerston, March 14, 1832.






[202] Affaires étrangères, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand à C. Périer, 6 mars,
        1832.






[203] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 1, 2, and 12, 1832.
        Affaires étrangères, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani, 27 mars,
        1832.






[204] F.O. Russia 190 & 199, Palmerston to Heytesbury, November 23,
        1831; Heytesbury to Palmerston, January 3, 1832. Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 268-270. State Papers, XVIII. pp. 928-931.






[205] F.O. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, February 4, 1832. Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV., II. p. 215; Grey
        to Taylor, February 13, 1832.






[206] F.O. Prussia 181, Chad to Palmerston, February 12, 13, 1832.






[207] Russian plenipotentiary at the conference which was settling the
        affairs of Greece.






[208] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, February 25, 1832.






[209] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 12, 1832.






[210] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 1, 1832.






[211] F.O. Prussia, 180, Palmerston to Chad, February 3, 1832.






[212] F.O. France, 445, Granville to Palmerston, March 2, 1832.






[213] F.O. Prussia 181, Chad to Palmerston, February 12, 1832.






[214] F.O. Prussia 181, Chad to Palmerston, March 4, 1832.






[215] F.O. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, February 11, 19, 27,
        1832.






[216] F.O. Netherlands 180, Palmerston to Bagot, March 16, 1832.






[217] F.O. Prussia 180, Chad to Palmerston, March 25, 1832.






[218] F.O. Netherlands 181, Bagot to Palmerston, March 23, 1832.






[219] F.O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 12, 1832.






[220] Affaires étrangères, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Sébastiani,
        20 avril, 1832.






[221] State Papers, XIX. pp. 95-97.






[222] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 252-257.






[223] F.O. France 442, Palmerston to Hamilton, May 8, 1832. State
        Papers, XIX. pp. 98-99.






[224] F.O. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, April 15, May 18, 1832.






[225] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 258-259.






[226] Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV., II.
        pp. 394-395.






[227] Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV., II.
        pp. 351-355; the King to Grey, April 16, 1832.






[228] Annual Register, 1832, p. 187.






[229] H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by C. Leland), I. p. 2.






[230] Metternich, Mémoires, V. p. 288; Metternich à Apponyi, 21 juin,
        1832.






[231] H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by C. Leland), I. p. 355.






[232] State Papers, XIX. pp. 102-105. Stockmar, Memoirs, I. p. 262.






[233] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. p. 243.






[234] F.O. Russia 200, Palmerston to Durham, July 3, 1832.






[235] F.O. Russia 200, Durham to Palmerston, July 18, 1832.






[236] Ibid., July 18, 27, August 2, September 8, 12, 1832.






[237] F.O. Russia 200, Durham to Palmerston, August 22, 1832.






[238] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 277-278.






[239] F.O. France 448, Granville to Palmerston, August 3, 6, 1832.






[240] F.O. Belgium 13, Adair to Palmerston, September 7, 1832. F.O.
        France 448 & 449, Granville to Palmerston, August 27, 29, September 3,
        1832.






[241] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, September 18, 1832.






[242] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 278-285.






[243] State Papers, XIX. pp. 150-190.






[244] F.O. France 447, Granville to Palmerston, June 29, 1832; D. de
        Dino Chronique, I. pp. 73-74.






[245] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, September 28, 1832.






[246] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 4, 1832.






[247] Ibid., October 5, 1832.






[248] Affaires étrangères, 639 Angleterre, Mareuil à Sébastiani, 8 octobre,
        1832.






[249] The Times, January 31, 1834. Leading article explaining its
        changed attitude in the Dutch-Belgian question and why it had supported
        the King of the Netherlands in 1830 and 1831.






[250] C. Greville, Journals, III. p. 33.






[251] Stockmar, Memoirs, I. p. 273.






[252] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 19, 1832.






[253] F.O. Austria 236, Lamb to Palmerston, November 24, 1832.






[254] Metternich, Mémoires, V. pp. 397-406; Metternich à Schwartzenberg,
        13 novembre, 1832; Metternich à Trauttmansdorff, 13 novembre,
        1832.






[255] Metternich, Mémoires, V. pp. 411-413; Metternich à Clam, 13
        novembre, 1832.






[256] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 8, 1832.
        F.O. Prussia 184, Minto to Palmerston, September 29, October 7, 13,
        1832. Affaires étrangères, 639 Angleterre, Mareuil à Sébastiani,
        11 octobre, 1832.






[257] Affaires étrangères, 639 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Broglie,
        18 octobre, 1832.






[258] F.O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 21, 22, 24,
        1832.






[259] State Papers, XIX. pp. 258-263.






[260] F.O. Belgium 13, Adair to Palmerston, October 30, 1832.






[261] F.O. France 443 and 450, Palmerston to Granville, November 20,
        30, 1832; Granville to Palmerston, November 9, 22, December 7, 1832.






[262] T. Raikes, Journal, I. pp. 88, 92, 93, 102, and 112. C. Greville, Journals, II. p. 329.






[263] F.O. Prussia 184, Minto to Palmerston, October 18, 1832. F.O.
        France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 29, 1832.






[264] F.O. Prussia 184, Minto to Palmerston, November 5, 7, 21, 24,
        28, 29, December 22, 1832.






[265] Affaires étrangères, 639 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Broglie, 1 décembre,
        1832.






[266] F.O. France 465, Aston to Palmerston, May 3, 11, 1833. F.O.
        Netherlands 186, Jerningham to Palmerston, February 15, April 18,
        May 24, 1833.






[267] State Papers, XX. pp. 282-286.






[268] Metternich, Mémoires, V. pp. 406-411; Metternich à Trauttmansdorff,
        13 novembre, 1832.






[269] Minister to Louis XVIII. and Charles X.






[270] C. A. Murray, Memoir of Mohammed Ali, pp. 31-35.






[271] N. Senior, Conversations and Journals in Egypt and Malta, I.
        p. 27.






[272] F.O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, January 26, 1832.






[273] Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War.






[274] High Admiral.






[275] F.O. Turkey 210, S. Canning to Palmerston, March 7, 1832.






[276] F.O. Turkey 211, S. Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 1832.






[277] F.O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, October 27, 1832
        (Report of Captain Maunsell, R.N., of H.M.S. Alfred).






[278] F.O. Turkey 223 & 224, Mandeville to Palmerston, March 11, 1833
        (Report of Mr. A. Pisani); Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 24, 1833
        (Memorandum of Mr. Kennedy).






[279] F.O. Turkey 211, S. Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 1832.






[280] F.O. Turkey 212, S. Canning to Palmerston, August 7, 1832.






[281] Minister for Foreign Affairs.






[282] F.O. Turkey 212, S. Canning to Palmerston (cipher, separate and
        secret), August 9, 1832.






[283] F.O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, October 18, 1832.






[284] F.O. Turkey 213, Palmerston to Mandeville, December 5, 1832.






[285] F.O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, December 28, 1832.






[286] F.O. Turkey 212, Mandeville to Palmerston, December 31, 1832.
        S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 30-31. F.O. Turkey
        222, Mandeville to Palmerston (cipher), January 8, 1833. F.O. France
        463, Granville to Palmerston, January 21, 28, 1833.






[287] F.O. Turkey 211 and 212, S. Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 22,
        1832. F.O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, September 26,
        October 26, 1832 (cipher).






[288] F.O. France 463, Granville to Palmerston, January 21, 28,
        February 7, 1833. F.O. Turkey 227, Palmerston to Campbell,
        February 4, 1833.






[289] S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. ix. 27, 48, 49,
        50.






[290] S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 29-30.






[291] On the Sea of Marmora.






[292] F.O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, January 13, 26, 1833.






[293] F.O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, January 28, February
        3, 4, 1833. S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, p. 31.






[294] F.O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, February 15, 1833.






[295] About 150 miles beyond Konieh, and 80 miles from Brusa.






[296] F.O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, February 11, 23, 1833.






[297] S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, p. 32.






[298] F.O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, February 23, 1833.






[299] F.O. Turkey 228, Campbell to Palmerston, March 31, 1833.






[300] F.O. Turkey 223 Mandeville to Palmerston, March 26, 27, 1833.






[301] F.O. Turkey 223, Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833.






[302] Ibid., April 14, 1833.






[303] F.O. France 464, Granville to Palmerston, March 18, 22, 29, 1833.






[304] F.O. Turkey 223, Mandeville to Palmerston, April 11, 1833.






[305] Ibid., April 23, 1833.






[306] Ibid., May 4, 1833.






[307] F.O. Turkey 228, Campbell to Palmerston, May 2, 3, 7, 9, 13, 15,
        1833.






[308] S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 33-37. F.O.
        Turkey, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 22, June 7, July 7, 1833.






[309] F.O. France 466, Granville to Palmerston, July 12, 1833. F.O.
        Turkey 224, Pisani to Ponsonby (secret and confidential), June 17,
        1833; Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 22, 1833.






[310] “Au besoin et d’après le principe de reciprocité.”






[311] S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, p. 41.






[312] S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 42-44.






[313] F.O. France 466, Aston to Palmerston, August 2, 1833.






[314] F.O. Turkey 221, Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 27, 1833.






[315] F.O. Russia 208, Bligh to Palmerston, October 24, 1833.






[316] Ibid., December 28, 1833.






[317] F.O. Russia 207, Bligh to Palmerston, August 24, 1833. F.O.
        France 466, Aston to Palmerston, August 30, 1833.






[318] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 165-166.






[319] S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 51-52.






[320] F.O. Russia 208, Bligh to Palmerston, December 21, 1833 (confidential).






[321] Matuszewic figures in the well-known picture, “The Melton Breakfast.”






[322] F.O. Austria 243, Lamb to Palmerston, September 3, October 1,
        December 26, 1833.






[323] F.O. France 481, Granville to Palmerston, February 3, 1834.






[324] F.O. Turkey 221, Palmerston to Ponsonby, December 6, 1833.






[325] Vide p. 75.






[326] F.O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston, July 28, 1831. F.O.
        France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 10, 1831.






[327] F.O. Spain 403, Canning to Palmerston, January 22, 1833.






[328] Ibid., March 20, 29, 1833.






[329] Ibid., February 7, 1833 (most secret).






[330] C. Napier, War in Portugal, I. pp. 160-161 and 176-206.






[331] F.O. Portugal 398, Palmerston to Russell, August 7, 1833.






[332] F.O. France 469, Granville to Palmerston, October 10, 1833.






[333] F.O. Spain 412, Villiers to Palmerston, October 7, 15, 19, 24, 31,
        November 8, 23, December 8, 1833.






[334] Ibid., October 27, 1833 (cypher). F.O. France 465, Granville to
        Palmerston, November 1, 15, 29, 1833.






[335] F.O. France 468 & 480, Granville to Palmerston, December 16,
        1833, January 17, March 14, 1834. Affaires étrangères, 643 Angleterre,
        Talleyrand à Broglie, 10 mars, 1834.






[336] Affaires étrangères, 643 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Rigny, 13,
        14 avril, 1834. Guizot, Mémoires, IV. pp. 86-92.






[337] Affaires étrangères, 643 Angleterre, Rigny à Talleyrand, 17 avril,
        1834.






[338] About £1500 per annum.






[339] T. Raikes, Journal, I. p. 106.






[340] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 166-174 and 180-185.






[341] F.O. Spain 694, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 22, 1846
        (confidential).






[342] F.O. France 467, Granville to Palmerston, September 13, 1833.
        Guizot, Mémoires, IV. pp. 57-74.






[343] F.O. France 468, Granville to Palmerston, November 1, 1833.






[344] F.O. Netherlands 206, Disbrowe to Palmerston, December 8, 1837
        (most secret). Report of a conversation repeated to the British
        minister by the Carlist agent, Saint-Sylvain (Baron de Los Valles), in
        which Louis Philippe is supposed to have said, “Je préfère toujours les
        capuchons aux bonnets rouges.”






[345] The Fueros of Biscay and Navarre overrode the general laws of
        Spain. So long as the system remained in force in these provinces the
        right of taxation, the levy of military forces, and all matters connected
        with land tenure, were vested in local legislative bodies.






[346] F.O. Spain 439 and 440, Villiers to Wellington, February 11, 1835;
        Wellington to Villiers, February 17, 1835.






[347] F.O. Spain 439, Wellington to Villiers, March 27, 1835. F.O.
        Spain 446, Wellington to Eliot, March 26, 1835 (secret).






[348] F.O. France 501, Cowley to Wellington, April 3 (secret and
        confidential), 17, 20, 24 (separate and confidential), 1835. F.O. France
        497, Wellington to Cowley, April 2, 1836. F.O. Spain 446, Eliot to
        Wellington, March 30, 1835 (private).






[349] F.O. Spain 446, Eliot to Wellington, April 20, 28, 1835; Eliot to
        Palmerston, May 6, 1835.






[350] F.O. Spain 439, Palmerston to Villiers, May 22, 1835.






[351] F.O. France 502, Granville to Palmerston, June 8, 1835.






[352] F.O. Spain 447, Palmerston to Wylde, July 13, 1835.






[353] F.O. Spain 447, Wylde to Palmerston, August 2, 1835.






[354] F.O. France 504, Granville to Palmerston, August 17, 1835.






[355] F.O. France 503, Granville to Palmerston, July 17, August 10,
        1835.






[356] F.O. Portugal 436 & 439, Howard de W. to Palmerston, June 13,
        November 12, 21 (secret), December 13, 1835.






[357] Revue Retrospective, p. 41. Marquise de Loulé, Subvention
        Accidentelle, 6000 francs.






[358] F.O. Portugal 436, Howard de W. to Palmerston, June 23, 1835
        (confidential), contains following enclosure:— 


 “Lisbon, June 22, 1835. 


 “My dear Lord, 


 “You may give Lord Palmerston the most positive assurance
        that I should resign my position as a minister to the crown the moment
        it is out of my power to prevent the marriage of the queen with any
        prince that would put an end to the relations existing between France
        and England. 


 “(Signed), Saldanha.” 






[359] F.O. France 501, Cowley to Palmerston, May 8, 1835 (separate
        and confidential).






[360] F.O. Portugal 438, Howard de W. to Palmerston, October 23, 1835
        (secret).






[361] Guizot, Mémoires, IV. p. 146.






[362] F.O. Spain 444, Villiers to Palmerston, September 15, 1835.






[363] F.O. France 504, 505 and 517, Granville to Palmerston, August 21,
        October 5, 9, 19, 1835; Palmerston to Aston, August 30, 1836.






[364] F.O. Spain 444, Villiers to Palmerston, September 15, 1835
        (secret and confidential).






[365] Secretary to the British Legation at Madrid.






[366] F.O. Spain 445, Villiers to Palmerston, November 28, 1835,
        (most secret and confidential).






[367] F.O. France 506, Granville to Palmerston, December 4, 1835
        (private letter).






[368] Guizot, Mémoires, IV. pp. 147-149 and 421-425; Broglie à Rayneval,
        12, 19 décembre, 1835.






[369] F.O. Spain 439, Palmerston to  Villiers, December 21, 1835
        (secret).






[370] F.O. Spain 457, Villiers to Palmerston, January 2, 1836.






[371] F.O. France 518 and 527, Granville to Palmerston, December 5,
        1836; Palmerston to Granville, December 27, 1836.






[372] Thureau Dangin, Monarchie de Juillet, II. p. 178 (note).






[373] Metternich, Mémoires, VI. pp. 31-53 and 270.






[374] Thureau Dangin, La Monarchie de Juillet, III. pp. 74-75.






[375] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 221-223. Correspondence
        of Princess Lieven with Earl Grey, II., Princess Lieven to Grey, August
        26, 1835. T. Raikes’ Journal, III. pp. 265-266. C. Greville, Journals (1),
        III. pp. 20, 314, 385, 386.






[376] Affaires étrangères, 644 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Rigny, 16, 26
        juin, 1834.






[377] Affaires étrangères, 644 Angleterre, Talleyrand à Louis Philippe,
        22 novembre, 1834. In this letter occurs the following sentence,
        “possibly the honour may be reserved for Wellington of arresting
        England on the path of decadence.”






[378] F.O. Spain 447. Extract of a private letter from Colonel Wylde,
        dated Puente de la Reyna, August 8, 1835.






[379] F.O. Spain 464, Wylde to Palmerston, February 12, 18, 1836
        (confidential).






[380] F.O. France 516, Palmerston to Granville, March 14, 1836.






[381] F.O. France 520, Granville to Palmerston, March 18, 1836.






[382] F.O. Spain 456, Palmerston to Villiers, June 1 (No. 44), August
        22, 1836. F.O. France 59 and 525, Palmerston to Ashton, August
        30, 1836; Granville to Palmerston, October 7, 1836.






[383] F.O. Spain 464, Wylde to Palmerston, July 13, 16, 1836.






[384] F.O. Spain 460, Villiers to Palmerston, July 24, 1836.






[385] F.O. Spain 460, Villiers to Palmerston, August 6, 9, 13, 14, 16,
        17, 1836.






[386] The Duc d’Orléans married on May 30, 1837, the Princess Helena of
        Mecklenburg-Schwerin.






[387] F.O. France 524, Aston to Palmerston, August 26, 1836.






[388] F.O. France 525, Granville to Palmerston, September 23, 1836.






[389] F.O. France 518, Palmerston to Granville, September 29, 1836.






[390] F.O. France 564, Granville to Palmerston, October 26, 1836.






[391] F.O. France 539, Granville to Palmerston, February 3, 1837
        (confidential). H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 243. H. Greville, Diary, I. p. 113. Malmesbury, Memoirs of an ex-Minister, I. p. 272.
        C. Greville, Journals (1), III. pp. 385-386.






[392] F.O. France 542, Granville to Palmerston, July 3, 1837
        (confidential).






[393] F.O. Netherlands 206, Disbrowe to Palmerston, October 6,
        December 8, 1837 (most secret and confidential).






[394] F.O. Netherlands. Disbrowe to Palmerston, December 8, 1837
        (most secret).






[395] A. S. Hume, Modern Spain, pp. 345-346.






[396] Hubbard, Histoire de l’Espagne, IV. pp. 92-93.






[397] F.O. Spain 485, Villiers to Palmerston, December 30, 1837. F.O.
        France 544, Granville to Palmerston, October 27, 30, 1837 (secret and
        confidential).






[398] F.O. Spain 486, Wylde to Palmerston, December 10, 1837. F.O.
        Spain 485, Villiers to Palmerston, December 24, 1837.






[399] F.O. Spain 503, Villiers to Palmerston, April 21, 1838 (secret).






[400] F.O. Spain 499, Palmerston to Villiers, May 7, 1838.






[401] F.O. France 356, Palmerston to Granville, May 7, 1838.






[402] F.O. Spain 526 and 527, Clarendon to Palmerston, February 2,
        1839; Southern to Palmerston, March 30, June 1, 1839.






[403] F.O. France 561, Granville to Palmerston, May 14, 1838 (secret
        and confidential).






[404] F.O. Spain 530, Southern to Palmerston, June 22, 1839.






[405] F.O. Spain 504, Villiers to Palmerston, May 26, 1838 (cypher).






[406] F.O. Spain 505, Villiers to Palmerston, June 16, 23, 30, July 7,
        1838.






[407] F.O. Spain 505 and 506, Villiers to Palmerston, June 9, 1838;
        Hervey to Palmerston, July 14, 1838.






[408] Hubbard, Histoire de l’Espagne, IV. pp. 111-118.






[409] C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 65.






[410] F.O. Spain 526, Clarendon to Palmerston, February 27, March 7,
        1839. Hubbard, Histoire de l’Espagne, IV. pp. 141-148.






[411] Hubbard, Histoire de l’Espagne, IV. p. 151.






[412] C. Greville, Journals (2), I. pp. 104-108.






[413] F.O. France 583, Granville to Palmerston, June 10, 1839. F.O.
        Spain 530, Southern to Palmerston, June 15, 1839.






[414] F.O. Spain 579 (supplementary), Palmerston to Wylde, August 10,
        1839.






[415] F.O. Spain 579 (supplementary), Wylde to Palmerston, August 26,
        29, September 1, 1839.






[416] F.O. Spain 534 and 535, Southern to Palmerston, October 19,
        1839; Jerningham to Palmerston, November 25, 1839.






[417] F.O. Spain 531, Southern to Palmerston, July 27, 1839.






[418] F.O. Spain 535, Jerningham to Palmerston, December 7, 1839,
        January 4, 1840.






[419] F.O. Spain 552, Aston to Palmerston, May 23, 30, June 8, 1840.






[420] F.O. Spain 553, Aston to Palmerston, July 21, August 22,
        September 3, 1840. Hubbard, Histoire de l’Espagne, IV. pp. 228-229.






[421] F.O. Spain 547, Palmerston to Aston, September 3, 1840 (confidential).






[422] F.O. Spain 554 and 555, Aston to Palmerston, September 22, 1840;
        Scott to Palmerston, October 1, 1840; Aston to Palmerston, October
        11, 1840.






[423] Hubbard, Histoire de l’Espagne, IV. pp. 233-235.






[424] F.O. Turkey 283, Campbell to Palmerston, August 23, 1836.






[425] F.O. France 485 and 487, Granville to Palmerston, June 23, 1834;
        Aston to Palmerston, August 13, 1834, September 15, 1834. F.O.
        Turkey 234, Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 23, 1834.






[426] F.O. Turkey 246, Campbell to Palmerston, September 4, 5, 1834
        (secret and confidential).






[427] F.O. Turkey 244, Palmerston to Campbell, October 26, 1834.
        F.O. France 488, Granville to Palmerston, October 27, 1834.






[428] F.O. France 480 and 483, Granville to Palmerston, January 24,
        March 14, April 18, 1834.






[429] Sir Stratford Canning, who had been created Lord Stratford de
        Redcliffe, was ambassador to the Porte at the time of the Crimean War.
        The negotiations are said to have been influenced by Nicholas’ dislike of
        him.






[430] F.O. Russia 201 and 207, Palmerston to Bligh, October 27, 1832;
        Bligh to Palmerston, November 17, 1832; Palmerston to Bligh,
        December 14, 1832; Bligh to Palmerston, January 9, May 29, June
        19, 1833 (the whole of this correspondence is in the form of private
        letters).






[431] The following article appeared in The Times of May 28, 1834:
        “The recall of Prince Lieven, or rather of Madame la Princesse, is an
        event. We cannot say of Her Serene Highness that the petit nez
        retroussé has occasioned much mischief, whatever her organs of speech
        or her implements of writing may have done. . . . There never figured
        on the courtly stage a female intriguer more restless, more arrogant,
        more (politically and therefore we mean it not offensively) odious and
        insufferable than this supercilious ambassadress. She fancied herself a
        ‘power,’ she was, however, more frequently a dupe,” etc., etc.






[432] E. Daudet, Une Vie d’Ambassadrice, pp. 170, 180-183.






[433] F.O. Turkey 234, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 10, 1834
        (secret).






[434] F.O. France 497, Wellington to Aston, March 17, 1835.






[435] C. Greville, Journals (1), III. pp. 225-229.






[436] F.O. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby, June 20, 1836.






[437] F.O. Turkey 274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 15, 1836.






[438] F.O. Turkey 273, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 14, 1836.






[439] F.O. Russia 223, Durham to Palmerston, February 6, 1836,
        March 3, 1836 (confidential); cf. Barante, Souvenirs, V. pp. 277-278,
        299-300, 346.






[440] Vide p. 168.






[441] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 360, Palmerston to
        Melbourne, July 5, 1840.






[442] F.O. France 520, Granville to Palmerston, February 26, 1836.






[443] F.O. France 489, Granville to Wellington, December 12, 1834.






[444] British chargé d’affaires in Paris.






[445] F.O. France 523, Aston to Palmerston, July 25, 29, 1836 (private
        letter).






[446] Lesseps, Ferdinand, Vicomte de, conceived in 1854 the great
        scheme of cutting the Suez Canal.






[447] F.O. Turkey 284, Campbell to Palmerston, October 30,
        November 18, 1836.






[448] F.O. Turkey 284 and 319, Campbell to Palmerston, December 20,
        1836, January 21, 24, April 7, 11, 1837.






[449] F.O. France 562, Granville to Palmerston, June 25, 1838.






[450] F.O. Turkey 271 and 274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 8, 1836
        (secret); Palmerston to Ponsonby, May 7, 1836 (secret). “His Majesty’s
        government do not expect that any communication which he (the
        Sultan’s agent) is to make will induce them to consider an attack upon
        Mehemet Ali, in the present relative strength of the two parties, as
        anything but an act of the most extreme impolicy.”






[451] F.O. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 7, 1836 (private
        and confidential).






[452] The Turkish Commander in Asia Minor.






[453] F.O. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 29, 1836
        (secret and confidential).






[454] F.O. Turkey 342, Campbell to Palmerston, January 22, 1838.






[455] The name given to the immunities and privileges granted in the
        sixteenth century to France, and gradually extended to other Powers.






[456] F.O. Turkey 328, Palmerston to Ponsonby, February 6, 1838.






[457] F.O. Turkey 332, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 19, 1838.






[458] On the subject of the alleged ill-treatment of the crew of a ship-wrecked
        vessel sailing under British colours.






[459] F.O. Turkey 342, Campbell to Palmerston, January 16, 1838.






[460] Ibid., March 27, 1838.






[461] F.O. Turkey 343, Palmerston to Campbell, June 8, 1838; Campbell
        to Palmerston, June 9, September 1, 1838.






[462] F.O. Turkey 342, Palmerston to Campbell, February 6, March 16,
        1838; Campbell to Palmerston, April 3, 5, May 19, 21, 1838.






[463] F.O. Turkey 342, Campbell to Palmerston, May 25, 1838.






[464] F.O. France 557, Palmerston to Granville, July 3, 1838.






[465] F.O. Turkey 343, Campbell to Palmerston, August 16, 24, September
        5, 8, 1838.






[466] F.O. Turkey 343, Campbell to Palmerston, September 28, 1838.






[467] F.O. France 564, Granville to Palmerston, September 21, 28,
        October 5, 1838. F.O. Turkey 332, Ponsonby to Palmerston, October
        29, 1838.






[468] H. Rawlinson, Russia and England in the East, pp. 139-151.






[469] Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan, Palmerston
        to Clanricarde,  October 26, 1838; Nesselrode à Pozzo, 20 octobre,
        1838; Palmerston to Pozzo, December 20, 1838; Nesselrode à Pozzo,
        20 janvier, 1839.






[470] F.O. Russia 252, Clanricarde to Palmerston, May 25, 1839.






[471] F.O. Turkey 274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 7, 1836.






[472] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 291-294.






[473] Lettres du Maréchal Moltke sur l’Orient, II. pp. 310-311.






[474] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 12, 1839.
        F.O. Turkey 355, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 20, 23, 1839
        (confidential).






[475] F.O. Turkey 332, Ponsonby to Palmerston, September 5 (secret),
        October 3, 13, November 9, December 31, 1838.






[476] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 267-269; Palmerston to
        Granville, June 8, 1838.






[477] Levant correspondence, Reshid à Palmerston, 26 avril, 1839;
        Palmerston to Reshid, May 6, 1839; Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 6,
        1839. F.O. Turkey 355, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 22, 1839.






[478] Thureau Dangin, Monarchie de Juillet, IV. p. 48.






[479] Guizot, Mémoires, IV. Pièces Historiques, Bourqueney à Soult,
        20 juin, 1839.






[480] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 18, 1839;
        Palmerston to Beauvale, July 23, 1839.






[481] Levant correspondence, Campbell to Palmerston, May 19, 1839.






[482] Ibid., June 14, 1839.






[483] Ibid., June 16, 1839.






[484] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 3, 1839.






[485] Ibid., July 8, 1839.






[486] F.O. France 584, Granville to Palmerston, July 29, 1839.






[487] Vice-Admiral.






[488] F.O. Turkey 360, Ponsonby to Palmerston, November 27, 28, 30,
        December 3, 1839.






[489] Revue des Deux Mondes, 1er août, 1852, L’Escadre de la Méditerranée.
        See also curious remarks of M. Thureau-Dangin, Monarchie de
        Juillet, IV. pp. 53-56.






[490] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, July 30, 1839;
        Palmerston to Beauvale, August 1, 1839; Guizot, Mémoires, Pièces
        historiques, Bourqueney à Soult, 23 juillet, 1839.






[491] F.O. Russia 243, Palmerston to Clanricarde, October 10, 1838.






[492] Levant correspondence, Dalmatie à Bourqueney, 17 juin, 1839;
        Beauvale to Palmerston, June 14, 1839; Palmerston to Beauvale,
        June 28, 1839; Palmerston to Granville, June 29, 1839; Beauvale to
        Palmerston, June 30, 1839; W. Russell to Palmerston, July 6, 1839;
        Beauvale to Palmerston, July 10, 1839.






[493] Ibid., Clanricarde to Palmerston, July 27, 1839; Nesselrode à
        Kisseleff, 15-27 juillet, 1839.






[494] Ibid., Granville to Palmerston, July 30, 1839; Soult à Bourqueney,
        26 juillet, 1839.






[495] Ibid., Palmerston to Granville, July 30, 1839.






[496] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 21, 22, 1839.






[497] Ibid., July 26, 1839.






[498] Ibid., July 29, 1839.






[499] Sir Frederick Lamb, created Baron Beauvale in 1839.






[500] Thureau-Dangin, Monarchie de Juillet, IV. p. 58 (note).






[501] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 29, 1839.






[502] L. Véron, Mémoires d’un Bourgeois de Paris, V. pp. 17, 19.






[503] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Beauvale, June 28, 1839.






[504] Guizot, Mémoires, Pièces historiques, Soult à Bourqueney, 17 juin,
        1839.






[505] Levant correspondence, Granville to Palmerston, August 8, 9, 19,
        1839.






[506] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 20, 1839;
        Palmerston to Admiralty, August 24, 1839; Palmerston to Beauvale,
        August 25, 1839.






[507] Ibid., Bulwer to Palmerston, August 26, 1839.






[508] Ibid., August 30, 1839.






[509] F.O. France 586, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 16, 1839
        (secret and confidential).






[510] F.O. Turkey 358, Stopford to Ponsonby, August 21, 1839.






[511] F.O. Turkey 372, Palmerston to Campbell, August 13, and September
        11, 1839 (separate).






[512] F.O. Turkey 358, Ponsonby to Palmerston, September 10, 1839
        (report of General Chrzanowski on battle of Nezib); also Ponsonby
        to Palmerston, July 29, 1839.






[513] Lettres du Maréchal de Moltke sur l’Orient, p. 340.






[514] F.O. Turkey 358, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 12, 1839
        (report of General Jochmus on battle of Nezib).






[515] F.O. Turkey 357, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 7, 1839
        (enclosing Chrzanowski’s plan for bringing Mehemet Ali to reason).






[516] Levant correspondence, Clanricarde to Palmerston, August 27, 28,
        1839.






[517] Ibid., Palmerston to Clanricarde, October 25, 1839.






[518] S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 52-82.






[519] Levant correspondence, Dalmatie à Sébastiani, 26 septembre, 1839.






[520] Ibid., Palmerston to Bulwer, September 28, 1839.






[521] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 348.






[522] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Clanricarde, October 25,
        1839.






[523] Guizot, Mémoires, IV. pp. 365-367.






[524] F.O. France 586, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 13, 1839.






[525] F.O. Turkey 372, Palmerston to Campbell, September 11, 1839
        (separate).






[526] F.O. France 587, Bulwer to Palmerston, October 4, 1839.






[527] Guizot, Mémoires, IV. pp. 367-370.






[528] Affaires étrangères, 654 Angleterre, Sébastiani à Soult, 5 janvier,
        1840.






[529] Ibid., 27 janvier, 1840.






[530] Guizot, Mémoires, IV. pp. 369-375.






[531] Vide p. 221.






[532] F. Daudet, Une Vie d’Ambassadrice, pp. 236-239. The liaison of
        Princess Lieven with Guizot is the origin of Balzac’s story, Les Secrets
        de la Princesse de Cadignan. Guizot figures in the character of
        d’Arthez.






[533] Guizot, Mémoires, V. p. 63.






[534] Ibid., V. p. 64.






[535] Guizot, Mémoires, V. Pièces historiques, Soult à Guizot, 19
        février, 1840.






[536] Affaires étrangères, 634 Angleterre, Thiers à Guizot, 12 mars,
        1840.






[537] Guizot, Mémoires, V. p, 207.






[538] Guizot, Mémoires, V. p. 65.






[539] Affaires étrangères, 654 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 12, 16 mars,
        1840.






[540] Affaires étrangères, 654, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 13, 16
        avril, 1840; Thiers à Guizot, 14, 20 avril, 1840.






[541] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 10 mai, 1840.






[542] Guizot, Mémoires, V. pp. 61, 62.






[543] Ellice, Edward (1781-1863) had been a member of Lord Grey’s
        government from 1830 to 1834.






[544] Correspondence of Princess Lieven with Earl Grey, III.; P. Lieven
        to Grey, April 13, 1836; Grey to P. Lieven, May 6, and October 22,
        1836.






[545] Creevey Papers, II. p. 309.






[546] Vide p. 53.






[547] F.O. France 600, Palmerston to Granville, October, 1840
        (private letter, part of which is given in Bulwer’s Life of Palmerston).






[548] Duchesse de Dino, Chronique, III. p. 228.






[549] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 1 juin, 1840.






[550] Metternich, Mémoires, VI. pp. 430-432, and 454-464.






[551] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 8 mai, 1, 9, 13
        juin, 1840; Thiers à Guizot, 16 juin, 1840.






[552] Levant correspondence, Campbell to Palmerston, August 7, 1839.






[553] Levant correspondence, Campbell to Palmerston, September 2,
        26, 1839; Campbell to Ponsonby, October 19, 1839; Young to Palmerston,
        October 16, 1839; Hodges to Palmerston, January 4, 13, 14, 16, 23,
        February 12, 1840.






[554] Levant correspondence, Wagner to Koenigsmark, November 26,
        1839.






[555] F.O. Turkey 392, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 3, 1840 (secret).






[556] F.O. Russia 260, Clanricarde to Palmerston, February  24,
        May 23, 1840.






[557] The despatches of the French consuls at this period are not
        available for inspection.






[558] F.O. Turkey 359, 360, Ponsonby to Palmerston, October 30,
        November 24, December 18, 1839; F.O. Turkey 392, Ponsonby to
        Palmerston, January 28, 29, 1840. Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to
        Palmerston, November 13, 1839.






[559] Coste (Jacques), 1798-1859, founder and manager of the Temps,
        the organ of the tiers parti. This venture proved a disastrous failure,
        and M. Coste in 1840 was in pecuniary difficulties. There are frequent
        allusions to his embarrassments in his correspondence with Fethi
        Ahmed Pasha.






[560] F.O. Turkey 394, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 29, 1840 (separate
        and confidential)—“Your Lordship knows the intimacy which
        exists between M. Coste and M. Thiers, and he (Coste) undoubtedly
        does speak (as he asserts) the sentiments of the President of the French
        ministry.” Lord Ponsonby goes on to state that the original letters
        have been in his hands. The copies transmitted contain many notes in
        Palmerston’s handwriting.






[561] F.O. Turkey 395, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 13, 1840 (separate
        and confidential).






[562] F.O. Turkey 395, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 30, 1840
        (separate and confidential).






[563] Vide p. 227.






[564] F.O. Turkey 405, Hodges to Palmerston, June 17, 19, 1840.






[565] Guizot, Mémoires, V. pp. 205, 206.






[566] Levant correspondence, Hodges to Palmerston, June 16, 1840.






[567] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 11 juillet,
        1840.






[568] F.O. Turkey 394, Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 23, 1840.






[569] Guizot, Mémoires, V. pp. 218-220.






[570] Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchie de Juillet, IV. p. 221. H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. p. 432; Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27,
        1843.






[571] C. Greville, Journals (2), I. pp. 308-309.






[572] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 356-363; Palmerston to
        Melbourne, July 5, 6, 1840.






[573] To the Cabinet minute submitting to the Queen the expediency of
        making the treaty, the dissent of Holland and Clarendon was appended.
        C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 304.






[574] Levant correspondence, Part I. pp. 689-700.






[575] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 426-433; Palmerston to
        Hobhouse, July 27, 1843.






[576] Metternich, Mémoires, IV. p. 436; Metternich à Apponyi, 4 août,
        1840.






[577] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 17 juillet, 1840.
        Guizot, Mémoires, V. pp. 220-228.






[578] He had been transferred from Constantinople to Paris as secretary
        of embassy in 1839.






[579] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 315. Levant correspondence,
        Bulwer to Palmerston, July 20, 1840.






[580] F.O. France 604, Bulwer to Palmerston, July 27, 1840 (most
        confidential).






[581] Ibid., Granville to Palmerston, August 3, 1840 (confidential).






[582] The Times, July 27, August 1, 3, 1840.






[583] Ibid., August 7, 1840.






[584] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Thiers à Guizot (undated,
        probably, 21 juillet, 1840). Guizot, Mémoires, V. pp. 230-235.






[585] C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 329.






[586] Guizot, Mémoires, V. p. 271-272.






[587] Affaires étrangères, 665 Angleterre, Louis Philippe au Roi des
        Belges, 13 août, 1840.






[588] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Bourqueney à Thiers, 8 août,
        1840.






[589] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers,  21,  22
        août, 1840. Guizot, Mémoires, V. 278-290.






[590] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 31, 1840.






[591] The Times, October 7, 1840.






[592] Guizot, Mémoires, V. pp. 290-296.






[593] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 5, 8,
        1840.






[594] Admiralty (in letters) 5503 Syria, Palmerston to Admiralty, July
        16, 17, 23, 1840 (secret).






[595] C. Napier, War in Syria, I. p. 10.






[596] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, December 10, 13,
        1839, January 3, February 14, March 5, 17, 1840.






[597] Admiralty (in letters), 5503 Syria, Palmerston to Admiralty, July
        25, 1840 (secret).






[598] Levant correspondence, Hodges to Palmerston, July 23, 1840.






[599] Colonel Sèves.






[600] C. Napier, War in Syria, I. pp. 29-49. Admiralty (in letters),
        5503 Syria, Napier to Stopford, August 21, 1840.






[601] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 17,
        1840.






[602] F.O. Turkey 396, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 19, 1840.






[603] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 22,
        1840.






[604] F.O. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 7, 1840.






[605] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Guizot, September 9,
        1840.






[606] H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), II. p. 160.






[607] T. Raikes’ Journal, IV. p. 43.






[608] H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), II. p. 160.






[609] F.O. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, August 31, 1840.
        Thureau Dangin, Monarchie de Juillet, IV. pp. 242-243. The Times,
        September 1, 1840.






[610] H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), II. p. 39. Letters of Queen Victoria, October 2, 1840 (I. K. Leopold to Queen
        Victoria).






[611] H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), II. p. 141.






[612] Levant correspondence, Hodges to Palmerston, August 24, 1840.






[613] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 324-327.






[614] F.O. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 18, 1840
        (private and confidential).






[615] Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Guizot à Thiers, 20 septembre,
        1840. Guizot, Mémoires, V. pp. 317-323.






[616] S. Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, I. pp. 347-348. C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 304.






[617] Vide p. 265.






[618] C. Greville, Journals (2), II. p. 106.






[619] Melbourne Papers, pp. 472-473.






[620] C. Greville, Journals (2), I. pp. 310-311, in particular, and Chapters
        VIII. and IX. in general.






[621] The Times, December 1, 1840.






[622] The Times, December 7, 1840.






[623] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 343-344.






[624] Melbourne Papers, II. p. 479.






[625] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 348.






[626] Melbourne Papers, pp. 467-480. C. Greville, Journals (2), I.
        pp. 312-318.






[627] C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 331.






[628] The Princess Royal was born November 21, 1840.






[629] S. Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, I. pp, 352-353.






[630] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, October 6, 1840.






[631] C. Greville, Journals (2), I. pp. 324-327. S. Walpole, Life of Lord
        John Russell, p. 354. Melbourne Papers, pp. 483-484.






[632] Levant correspondence, Schlemnitz to Palmerston, October 9,
        1840; Brunnow to Palmerston, October 12, 1840; Neumann to
        Palmerston, October 12, 1840.






[633] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, September 10,
        14, 1840; Hodges to Palmerston, September 22, 1840.






[634] C. Napier, War in Syria, I. pp. 47-68.






[635] H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), II. p. 49.






[636] Memoirs of H. Reeve, I. p. 130.






[637] Ibid., pp. 122-129.






[638] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 333-334.






[639] Letters of Queen Victoria, Palmerston to the Queen, October 11,
        1840.






[640] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, October 2, 1840.






[641] S. Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, I. pp. 354-357.






[642] Letters of Queen Victoria, Melbourne to the Queen, October 9,
        1840.






[643] Levant correspondence, Thiers à Guizot, 3 octobre, 1840.






[644] Ibid., 8 octobre, 1840.






[645] L. Vérnon, Mémoires d’un Bourgeois de Paris, V. p. 27.






[646] C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 337. Letters of Queen Victoria,
        Melbourne to the Queen, October 11, 1840.






[647] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Ponsonby, October 15, 1840;
        Palmerston to Granville, October 17, 1840.






[648] Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchie de Juillet, IV. p. 343.






[649] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, October 8, 1840.






[650] F.O. France 606, Granville to Palmerston, October 12, 1840. Levant correspondence, Granville to Palmerston, October 12, 1840.






[651] Admiralty (in letters) 5495, Martin to Stopford, April 26, 1840.






[652] F.O. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 14, 1840 (confidential).






[653] Vide p. 217.






[654] F.O. Spain 555, Scott to Palmerston, October 23, 1840 (secret);
        Aston to Palmerston, November 7, 1840. Levant correspondence,
        Palmerston to Aston, October 15, 1840. H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston,
        II. pp. 341-343.






[655] Melbourne Papers, p. 487.






[656] Guizot, Mémoires, IV. pp. 400-402. Thureau-Dangin, La
        Monarchie de Juillet, IV. pp. 344-346.






[657] Vide pp. 269-273.






[658] F.O. Sardinia 112, Abercromby to Palmerston, November 28,
        December 30, 1840. F.O. Sicily 169, Temple to Palmerston, September 16,
        1840. Thureau-Dangin, Monarchie et Juillet, IV. pp. 274-275.






[659] F.O. Austria 208, Beauvale to Palmerston, February 2, 5, 1841.
        F.O. Russia 271, Clanricarde to Palmerston, February 3, 1841.






[660] “Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den frien deutschen Rhein.”






[661] Metternich, Mémoires, VI. p. 447.






[662] Memoirs of H. Reeve, pp. 134-135. Melbourne Papers, p. 492.
        C. Greville, Journals (2), I. pp. 347-349.






[663] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, November 2, 20,
        1840; Granville to Palmerston, November 5, 1840.






[664] Admiralty (in letters) 5503, Syria, Palmerston to Admiralty,
        October 5, 1840 (secret).






[665] F.O. Turkey 397, Ponsonby to Palmerston, October 7, 1840 (confidential).






[666] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Admiralty, November 14,
        1840.






[667] Levant correspondence, Barrow to Leverson, December 15, 1840.






[668] Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 16, 1840 (enclosure I.);
        Napier to Ponsonby, December 14, 1840, “I was led to believe by letters
        which I had received from different members of the Government that
        they were most anxious to settle the Eastern question speedily.”






[669] Ibid., Palmerston to Admiralty, December 15, 1840; Palmerston
        to Ponsonby, December 17, 1840.






[670] Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 8, 1840.






[671] Admiralty (in letters) 5504, Syria, II., Stopford to Admiralty,
        December 10, 1840.






[672] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 16,
        23, 1840.






[673] Ibid., Palmerston to Ponsonby, October 15, 1840.






[674] Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 23, 1840.






[675] Ibid., Palmerston to Ponsonby, December 17, 1840.






[676] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, January 10, 13,
        1841.






[677] Ibid., Barrow to Backhouse, February 1, 28, 1841.






[678] F.O. Turkey 399, Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 13, 1840.
        F.O. Austria 208, Beauvale to Palmerston, March 5, 1841. Levant
        correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, February 21, 1841. Admiralty
        (in letters) 5504, Syria, II., Backhouse to Admiralty, April 17, 1841.






[679] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, February 14, 15,
        1841; Chekib Effendi to Palmerston, March 11, 1841.






[680] Ibid., Granville to Palmerston, December 4, 1840.






[681] F.O. France 607, Granville to Palmerston, November 27, 1840.






[682] Guizot, Mémoires, VI. p. 78.






[683] Vide p. 253.






[684] S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, p. 83.






[685] Levant correspondence, Nesselrode to Brunnow, December 10,
        22, 1840.






[686] F.O. Russia 271, Clanricarde to Palmerston, January 18, 1841
        (confidential).






[687] Ibid., March 9, 1841 (confidential).






[688] F.O. Russia 269, Palmerston to Clanricarde, January 11, 1841.






[689] Among the despatches in vol. 653 Angleterre, is an extract from a
        letter from M. —— to M. Guizot, dated November 28, 1840; the writer
        gives the views of Melbourne, Russell and Lansdowne. He also speaks
        of a conversation with Esterhazy, and talks of an interview of two hours’
        duration with Palmerston. The author of this communication was
        perhaps Ellice. The evidence of Greville’s Journal seems to make it
        very improbable that he was responsible for it. Nor can the authorship
        of it be imputed to Reeve.






[690] Guizot, Mémoires, VI. pp. 49-50.






[691] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Ponsonby, January 29,
        1841.






[692] F.O. Austria 208, Beauvale to Palmerston, January 17, 1841.






[693] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Bloomfield, December 2,
        1840.






[694] Affaires étrangères, 657 Angleterre, Bourqueney à Guizot, 7 janvier,
        1841 (confidentielle et réservée).






[695] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 16, 1841.






[696] Ibid., Granville to Palmerston, March 12, 15, 1841.






[697] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 6, 9, 17,
        27, 1841. Guizot, Mémoires, VI. pp. 95-98.






[698] Ibid., Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 10, 1841.






[699] Ibid., Palmerston to W. Russell, April 21, 1841.






[700] Ibid., Beauvale to Ponsonby, April 19, 1841; Beauvale to Palmerston,
        April 22, 1841.






[701] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 27, 1841
        (enclosures).






[702] F.O. Turkey 427, Palmerston to Ponsonby, January 26, 1841.






[703] Ibid., 433, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 6, 1841 (confidential).






[704] Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 10, 1841.






[705] Levant correspondence, Beauvale to Palmerston, April 9, 14, 1841.






[706] Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 14, 1841.






[707] Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 12, 26, 1841.






[708] Guizot, Mémoires, VI. pp. 111-112.






[709] Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 21, 1841.






[710] S. Walpole, History of England from 1815, IV. pp. 334-338.






[711] Memoirs of Henry Reeve, p. 141.






[712] C. Greville’s Journals (2), I, p. 356.






[713] Jarnac, Lord Aberdeen, Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 juillet, 1860.






[714] Vide p. 313.






[715] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 376-383. Guizot, Mémoires,
        VI. pp. 130-145 and 412-417. In the speech complained of,
        Palmerston, besides denouncing the alleged cruelties committed by the
        French army, was so ill-advised as to draw a comparison between the
        tranquil condition of Afghanistan under a British military occupation
        and the disturbed state of Algeria. How spurious was the peace of
        which he boasted was proved, six months later, by the overwhelming
        disaster which overtook Elphinstone’s army.






[716] Guizot, Mémoires, VI. pp. 220-241.






[717] F.O. France 623, Bulwer to Palmerston, April 26, 1841.






[718] F.O. Spain 509, Villiers to Palmerston, November 17, 1838
        (secret).






[719] Ibid., 510, Villiers to Palmerston, December 1, 1838 (secret).






[720] Ibid., 500, Palmerston to Villiers, November 30, 1838 (secret).






[721] F.O. France 580, Granville to Palmerston, March 1, 1839.






[722] F.O. Spain 534, Southern to Palmerston, November 9, 1839
        (cypher).






[723] F.O. France 623, Bulwer to Palmerston, April 23 (private
        and confidential), 26, 1841. F.O. France 629, Bulwer to Aberdeen,
        October 18, 25, 1841 (confidential).






[724] F.O. France 621, Aberdeen to Bulwer, October 22, 1841.






[725] Ibid., 630, Bulwer to Aberdeen, November 8, 9, 1841 (private
        and confidential).






[726] F.O. Spain 571, Aberdeen to Aston, November 18, 1841.






[727] F.O. Austria 297, Aberdeen to Gordon, December 4, 1841.






[728] F.O. France 630, Bulwer to Aberdeen, November 19, 1841;
        Cowley to Aberdeen, November 26, 1841.






[729] Guizot, Mémoires, pp. 316, 334. C. Greville, Journals (2), II.
        pp. 73-75.






[730] F.O. France 628, Bulwer to Aberdeen, September 17, 1841.






[731] Ibid., 631 and 647, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 29, 1841,
        January 21, 1842 (secret and confidential).






[732] Ibid., 630 and 631, Bulwer to Aberdeen, November 8, 1841
        (private and confidential); Cowley to Aberdeen, December 3, 1841
        (secret and confidential), December 6 and 24 (confidential).






[733] F.O. Austria 304, Aberdeen to Gordon, March 16, 1842. Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 115-116.






[734] F.O. Austria 304, Aberdeen to Gordon, April 26, 1842. Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 118-122.






[735] F.O. France 631 and 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 6, 1841
        (confidential); May 6, 1842 (confidential).






[736] Ibid., 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 4, May 6, 1842 (confidential).






[737] F.O. France 648 and 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, February 4,
        February 14, March 4, April 15, 1842.






[738] Ibid., 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 13, 1842.






[739] Ibid., 645, Aberdeen to Cowley, February 18, 1842.






[740] Ibid., 653, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 2, 1842  (secret and
        confidential). General Atthalin’s intimacy with Mdme. Adelaïde,
        Louis Philippe’s sister and political confidant, was notorious. Madame
        Atthalin was one of the least offensive of the names applied to her by
        the legitimists. The story that she was secretly married to General
        Atthalin appears to be unfounded. F.O. Spain 604, Aston to Aberdeen,
        November 21, 1842.






[741] Vide p. 227.






[742] F.O. France 653 and 665, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 2
        (secret and confidential), December 13 and 19, 1842 (secret and confidential),
        January 20 and 22 (secret and confidential), January 2
        and 6 (confidential), January 30, 1843.






[743] F.O. Spain 597, Aberdeen to Aston, December 27, 1842.






[744] F.O. France 663, Aberdeen to Cowley, February 14, 1843.






[745] F.O. France 666, Cowley to Aberdeen, March 6, 13, 31, 1843.






[746] F.O. Spain 624, Aston to Aberdeen, March 6, 1843.






[747] F.O. France 667, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 29 (secret and
        confidential), June 2, 1843 (confidential).






[748] F.O. Spain 622, Aberdeen to Aston, June 7, 1843 (confidential).






[749] F.O. France 668, Cowley to Aberdeen, July 3, 1843 (secret and
        confidential).






[750] F.O. France 669, Cowley to Aberdeen, August 14, 1843 (secret and
        confidential).






[751] Ibid., 670, Cowley to Aberdeen, September 11, 1843 (confidential).
        C. Greville, Journals (2), II. p. 200.






[752] Letters of Queen Victoria, Vols. I. and II.






[753] Guizot, Mémoires, VI. pp. 188-195.






[754] F.O. France 664, Aberdeen to Cowley, December 15, 1843. Correspondence relating to the marriage of the Queen and Infanta of
        Spain presented to Parliament, 1847.






[755] Philippe de Rohan-Chabot, Comte de Jarnac, First Secretary of the
        French embassy in London.






[756] Jarnac, Lord Aberdeen, Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 juillet, 1860.






[757] Letters of Queen Victoria, Aberdeen to Queen Victoria, December 1,
        1843.






[758] Ibid., Prince Albert to Peel, October 21, 1843.






[759] Letters of Queen Victoria, Queen Victoria to King of the Belgians,
        December 12, 1843. Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 53-66. C. Greville, Journals (2), pp. 211-214.






[760] F.O. Pacific Islands 26, Miller to Bidwell, September 17, 1844.






[761] Guizot, Mémoires, VII. p. 56.






[762] F.O. France 666 and 669, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 7, August 30,
        1843. F.O. France 664, Aberdeen to Cowley, August 25, October 3,
        1843.






[763] F.O. Pacific Islands 27, Pritchard to Aberdeen, August 17, 1844.






[764] Ibid., 26, Miller to Bidwell, September 17, 1844.






[765] Ibid., 20, extract from a letter from Consul Pritchard, dated
        Sidney, January 3, 1843.






[766] F.O. France 664, Aberdeen to Cowley, October 3, 1843 (enclosures).






[767] F.O. Pacific Islands 20, Aberdeen to Pritchard, September 25,
        1840.






[768] F.O. France 695, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 14, 1844. Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 64-69.






[769] F.O. France 693, Cowley to Aberdeen, February 19, 25, 1844.






[770] F.O. Pacific Islands 27, Aberdeen to Pritchard, April 10, 1844.






[771] F.O. France 696, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 20, 31, 1844 (secret
        and confidential). Letters of Queen Victoria, Queen Victoria to King
        of the Belgians, May 24, October 17, 1844.






[772] Letters of Queen Victoria, Queen Victoria to King of the Belgians,
        June 4, 11, 1844. C. Greville, Journals (2), II. pp. 243-246.






[773] Stockmar, Memoirs, II. pp. 106-110. T. Martin, Life of Prince
        Consort, I. pp. 215-219.






[774] Malmesbury, Memoirs of an ex-Minister, I. p. 402.






[775] F.O. France 697, Cowley to Aberdeen, June 3, 1844. Affaires
        étrangères, 663 Angleterre, Guizot à Sainte-Aulaire, 6 juin, 1844.






[776] Affaires étrangères, 663 Angleterre, Guizot à Sainte-Aulaire, 13 juin,
        1844. F.O. France 697, Cowley to Aberdeen, June 14, 1844.






[777] Guizot, Mémoires, VII. pp. 52-59.






[778] England asked that Tangier should be respected on the ground
        that all the European consuls resided there.






[779] F.O. France 697, Cowley to Aberdeen, June 10, July 12, 15, 1844.
        Affaires étrangères, 663 Angleterre, Guizot à Sainte Aulaire, 13 juin,
        1844; Jarnac à Guizot, 6 juillet, 1844.






[780] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac à Guizot, 1 août, 1844.






[781] F.O. Pacific Islands 20 and 27, Pritchard to Aberdeen, November
        10, 23, 1843, January 26, 1844.






[782] Guizot, Mémoires, VII. pp. 74-82.






[783] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac à Guizot, 4 août, 1844.






[784] F.O. France 699, Cowley to Aberdeen, August 2, 5, 1844 (secret
        and confidential).






[785] Ibid., August 9, 1844 (secret and confidential).






[786] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Guizot à Jarnac, 8 août, 1844.






[787] F.O. France 691, Aberdeen to Cowley, August 13, 1844.






[788] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac à Guizot, 22 août,
        1844.






[789] F.O. France 691, Aberdeen to Cowley, August 23, 1844.






[790] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Guizot à Jarnac, 15, 18 août,
        1844.






[791] The Times, August 21, 1844.






[792] Guizot, Mémoires, VII. p. 97.






[793] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac à Louis Philippe,
        14 août, 1844.






[794] Ibid., 664 Angleterre, Guizot à Jarnac, 28 août, 1844.






[795] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac à Guizot, 10, 27 août,
        1844.






[796] F.O. France 691, Cowley to Aberdeen, August 28, 30, 1844 (secret
        and confidential).






[797] Affaires étrangères, 664 Angleterre, Guizot à Jarnac, 29 août,
        2 septembre, 1844; Jarnac à Guizot, 4 septembre, 1844. Guizot, Mémoires, VII. pp. 98-104.






[798] Letters of Queen Victoria, Queen Victoria to King of the Belgians,
        September 15, 1844.






[799] F.O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, November 15, 1844 (confidential).
        Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 197-198.






[800] Ibid., 724, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 2, 1845 (secret and confidential).






[801] F.O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, November 22 (confidential),
        December 13, 1844 (secret and confidential).






[802] T. Martin, Life of the Prince Consort, I. pp. 349-350.






[803] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. p. 199.






[804] F.O. Spain 651 and 652, Bulwer to Aberdeen, April 1, May 15,
        1844 (private and confidential).






[805] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. p. 213.






[806] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 160-161.






[807] F.O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 16, 1844 (secret
        and confidential).






[808] Youngest son of Louis Philippe.






[809] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 211, 223, 224.






[810] F.O. France 726, Cowley to Aberdeen, July 25, 1845 (confidential).






[811] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. p. 215.






[812] Letters of Queen Victoria, Aberdeen to Peel, September 8, 1845.
        T. Martin, Life of Prince Consort, I. p. 305. Guizot, Mémoires, VIII.
        pp. 225-227. F.O. France 728, Cowley to Aberdeen, October 6, 1845
        (secret and confidential).






[813] Guizot, in his detailed account of the Spanish marriages, makes no
        mention of the visit.






[814] F.O. Spain 678, Bulwer to Aberdeen, October 9, 1845.






[815] Ibid., October 30, 1845.






[816] Ibid., October 10, 30, 1845 (cipher, confidential).






[817] Revue retrospective, pp. 295, 296.






[818] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 227-234.






[819] Ibid., pp. 228-235.






[820] Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
        Infanta of Spain, Aberdeen to Bulwer, November 17, 1845.






[821] F.O. Spain 696, Bulwer to Aberdeen, February 28, 1846.






[822] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 251-255.






[823] C. Greville, Journal (2), III. pp. 9 and 54. T. Martin, Life of
        Prince Consort, I. pp. 355-356.






[824] F.O. Spain 696, Bulwer to Aberdeen, March 19, 1846.






[825] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. p. 217.






[826] F.O. Spain 698, Bulwer to Aberdeen, July 8, 1846.






[827] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 248-249.






[828] It would be conveyed from the Spanish frontier by Chaptal’s
        system of telegraphy.






[829] F.O. France 751, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 8, 1846 (private and
        confidential).






[830] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. pp. 219-226.  T. Martin, Life
        of Prince Consort, I. pp. 350-352. Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 261-264.






[831] Practically the whole of the correspondence relating to this affair
        has been removed from the archives des affaires étrangères in Paris.
        But in the volume marked “828 Espagne” the following unsigned
        and undated note is to be found:—“In the question of the Spanish
        marriages there was a private correspondence between the King and
        M. Bresson, and also between the latter and M. Guizot. After the death
        of the ambassador the minutes of his letters and the original answers of
        the King and of the minister (Guizot) were handed over to M. Guizot by
        his widow, and were carried off by him in February, 1848. But it is
        certain that Madame Bresson retained improperly a copy of this correspondence
        which her husband had made, and which it was her duty to
        return to the Foreign Office.” (M. Bresson committed suicide at
        Naples in November, 1847.)






[832] Letters of Queen Victoria, Memorandum by the Prince Albert,
        December 20, 1845.






[833] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. pp. 192-193. C. Greville, Journals (2), II. p. 388. Guizot, Mémoires, VIII., pp. 279-282.






[834] Correspondence relating to the Queen and Infanta of Spain,
        Aberdeen to Sotomayor, June 22, 1846.






[835] Revue retrospective, pp. 52-53.






[836] F.O. France 753, Cowley to Aberdeen, July 13, 1846 (private and
        confidential); Revue retrospective, p. 171.






[837] Revue retrospective, p. 171.






[838] Revue retrospective, pp. 170 and 181-182.






[839] T. Martin, Life of Prince Consort, I. p. 352.






[840] Revue retrospective, pp. 180-181, 196, 197; Guizot à Louis
        Philippe, 8 août, 1846:—“You can be quite happy about Coburg. No
        Coburg possible. Palmerston has had a long confidential talk on the
        subject with the Queen, Prince Albert and King Leopold. This news
        reaches me from an excellent quarter.”






[841] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 180-181.






[842] General Narvaez.






[843] Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and
        Infanta of Spain, Palmerston to Bulwer, July 19, 1846.






[844] Revue retrospective, pp. 180-181.






[845] F.O. France 753, Cowley to Palmerston, July 27, 1846 (private and
        confidential).






[846] Revue retrospective, pp. 182-185, 402-403.






[847] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. pp. 264-276.






[848] Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
        Infanta of Spain, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 16, 1846.






[849] F.O. Spain 698, Bulwer to Palmerston, July 19, 1846 (secret and
        confidential).






[850] Ibid., August 4, 1846 (secret and confidential).






[851] Ibid.






[852] F.O. Spain 698, Bulwer to Palmerston, July 19, 1846 (secret and
        confidential).






[853] Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
        Infanta of Spain, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 22, 1846.






[854] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. p. 301.






[855] F.O. Spain 698, Bulwer to Palmerston, August 22, 1846 (secret and
        confidential).






[856] Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
        Infanta of Spain, Bulwer to Palmerston, August 29, 1846.






[857] Ibid., Normanby to Palmerston, September 1, 1846.






[858] Letters of Queen Victoria, Queen of the French to Queen Victoria,
        September 8, 1846; Queen Victoria to Queen of the French, September
        10, 1846.






[859] Revue retrospective, pp. 324-326.






[860] C. Greville, Journals (2), III. p. 10.






[861] T. Martin, Life of Prince Consort, I. pp. 503-516.






[862] Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
        Infanta of Spain, Bulwer to Palmerston, October 11, 1846.






[863] Ibid., Palmerston to Normanby, September 22, 1846; Palmerston
        to Bulwer, September 28, 1846.






[864] Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
        Infanta of Spain, Palmerston to Normanby, October 31, 1846, January
        8, 1847.






[865] C. Greville, Journals (2), III. p. 48.






[866] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. p. 320.






[867] T. Martin, Life of Prince Consort, I. p. 351. Stockmar, Memoirs,
        II. p. 156.






[868] Vide p. 335.






[869] Vide p. 343.






[870] Vide p. 370.






[871] Revue retrospective, pp. 52-53. Correspondence relating to the
        marriages of the Queen and Infanta of Spain, Palmerston to Bulwer,
        October 31, 1846, January 8, 1847.






[872] This, in M. Thiers’ opinion, was Christina’s motive, vide L. Fagan, Life of Sir A. Panizzi, I. p. 228, Thiers to Panizzi, January 17, 1847.






[873] Stockmar, Memoirs, II. pp. 134 and 197.






[874] Revue retrospective, pp. 182-184.






[875] Ibid., pp. 184-185.






[876] F.O. Spain 694, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 22, 1846 (separate
        and confidential).






[877] Revue retrospective, p. 197.






[878] Ibid., p. 198.






[879] R. Arnaud, Adelaïde d’Orléans, p. 348.






[880] Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchie de Juillet, VI. pp. 220-221.






[881] Letters of Queen Victoria, Aberdeen to Peel, September 8, 1845.






[882] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. pp. 268-276. Correspondence
        relating to the marriages of the Queen and Infanta of Spain,
        Palmerston to Normanby, September 22, 1846.






[883] Afterwards Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army in Bohemia
        in the war with Prussia in 1866.






[884] State Papers, XXXV. pp. 1069-1071.






[885] Metternich, Mémoires, VII. p. 282.






[886] F.O. France 757, Normanby to Palmerston, November 20, 1846.






[887] State Papers, XXXV. pp. 1082-1095.






[888] Thureau-Dangin, Monarchie de Juillet, VII. p. 276.






[889] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Abercromby to
        Palmerston, January 12, 1847. Metternich, Mémoires, VII. pp. 228-245.






[890] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Scarlett to Aberdeen,
        June 18, 1846; Hamilton to Aberdeen, June 30, 1846.






[891] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Scarlett to Palmerston,
        April 17, 1847.






[892] Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchie de Juillet, VII. pp. 230-231.






[893] Correspondence relating to affairs of Italy, Cowley to Palmerston,
        July 17, 31, 1846.






[894] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 342-356.






[895] F.O. France 778, Normanby to Palmerston, February 26, 1847
        (private and confidential).






[896] The despatches contained in F.O. Spain 720-727 afford abundant
        evidence of this.






[897] H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. pp. 199-200.






[898] Revue Retrospective. His name frequently occurs among those in
        receipt of secret service money. For his mission to Vienna, he appears
        to have received 10,000 francs.






[899] Metternich, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 395-404; Thureau-Dangin, La
        Monarchie de Juillet, VII. pp. 239-240.






[900] Ibid., pp. 388-404.






[901] Ibid., pp. 404-405 (note), Guizot à Metternich, 7 novembre, 1847,
        “J’ai appris avec grand plaisir que la santé de Votre Altesse était
        excellente; J’en fais mon compliment a l’Europe.”






[902] Metternich, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 228-229, Metternich à Buol,
        29 mai, 1846.






[903] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Abercromby to
        Palmerston, June 10, 1847; Hamilton to Palmerston July 20, 1847;
        Clinton Dawkins to Palmerston, July 17, 1847, Hamilton to Palmerston,
        July 25, 1847; Palmerston to Ponsonby, September 27, 1847.






[904] Ferrara was in the Papal States, but Austria had the right of
        garrisoning la place de Ferrare.






[905] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Hamilton to Palmerston,
        August 14, 1847.






[906] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Abercromby to
        Palmerston, August 19, 1847.






[907] Ibid., Abercromby to Palmerston, August 24, 1847.






[908] Ibid., Metternich to Diedrichstein, August 2, 1847. In this despatch
        occurs the famous sentence, “Italy is a geographical expression.”






[909] Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 30, 1847.






[910] Ibid., Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 12, 1847.






[911] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Palmerston to
        Ponsonby, September 11, 1847.






[912] A secretary of the British legation at Florence resided at Rome,
        and directed his reports to the minister at Florence.






[913] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Normanby to
        Palmerston, April 19, 1847; Palmerston to Normanby, April 27, 1847;
        Normanby to Palmerston, April 30, 1847.






[914] T. Martin, Life of the Prince Consort, I. pp. 428-434. Prince
        Albert’s Memorandum is dated, Ardverikie, August 29, 1847.






[915] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Palmerston to
        Minto, September 18, 1847.






[916] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 434-435.






[917] Correspondence relating to affairs of Switzerland, Cowley to
        Aberdeen, February 3, 21, 1845; Gordon to Aberdeen, February 19,
        1845.






[918] F.O. France 756, Normanby to Palmerston, October 23, 1846
        (secret and confidential). Metternich, Mémoires, VII. pp. 178-180.






[919] Metternich, Mémoires, VII. pp. 451-466.






[920] Metternich, Mémoires, VII. pp. 335-336; Metternich à Apponyi,
        20 juin, 1847.






[921] G. Grote, Seven letters on the recent politics of Switzerland (originally published in Spectator), London, 1847.






[922] G. Grote, Seven letters on the recent politics of Switzerland, pp.
        173 and 181.






[923] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Palmerston
        to Ponsonby, August 9, 17, 1847; Palmerston to Normanby,
        August 17, 1847.






[924] Ibid., Minto to Palmerston, October 4, 1847; Peel to Palmerston,
        October 14, 1847.






[925] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Palmerston
        to Minto, September 18, 1847.






[926] Mrs. Rosslynn Wemyss, Memoirs and letters of Sir R. Morier, I.
        p. 38.






[927] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Morier to
        Aberdeen, June 4, November 25, 1844.






[928] Mrs. Rosslynn Wemyss, Memoirs and letters of Sir R. Morier,
        p. 53.






[929] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Morier to
        Palmerston, February 18, 1847 (enclosure).






[930] Ibid., Minto to Palmerston, October 4, 1847; Palmerston to
        Minto, October 22, 1847.






[931] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Palmerston
        to Peel, October 29, 1847; Peel to Palmerston, November 4, 6, 1847.






[932] Ibid., Guizot à Broglie, 4 novembre, 1847.






[933] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Palmerston
        to Normanby, November 16, 1847.






[934] Ibid., Normanby to Palmerston, November 18, 1847; Palmerston
        to Normanby, November 19, 1847; Broglie à Guizot, 20 novembre,
        1847; Guizot à Broglie, 19 novembre, 1847; Howard to Palmerston,
        November 21, 1847; Palmerston to Broglie, November 26, 1847; Howard
        to Palmerston, November 22, 1847; Metternich, Mémoires, VII. pp.
        493-502.






[935] F.O. France 783, Normanby to Palmerston, November 6 (cypher),
        8, 1847 (private and confidential). Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 468-502.






[936] Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchie de Juillet, VII. pp. 186-198.






[937] Cambridge Modern History, XI. p. 250.






[938] Mrs. Rosslynn Wemyss, Memoirs and letters of Sir R. Morier, I.
        p. 38.






[939] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 506-508.






[940] One private letter was certainly written by Palmerston to Peel. It
        is dated November 17, 1847, marked private, and begins—“My dear
        Sir.” Peel is asked to ascertain privately, “throwing out the idea as
        his own,” in what light the Diet would regard the proposal of mediation
        which Palmerston informs him, in confidence, he has just sent to Paris.
        He then proceeds to warn him to be on his guard against M. de Bois-le-Comte.
        “Keep well with him,” he says, “but it is well that you should
        know he is one of the most artful, cunning and intriguing of the French
        diplomatists.” (F.O. Switzerland 92).






[941] C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 364 (note).






[942] F.O. Switzerland 94, Peel to Palmerston, November 6, 1847.






[943] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Palmerston
        to S. Canning, November 27, December 1, 1847.






[944] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Hervey to
        Palmerston, December 3, 1847.






[945] Ibid., Peel to Palmerston, December 7, 1847; Canning to Palmerston,
        December 8, 11, 1847.






[946] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Minto to Palmerston,
        October 29, 1847






[947] Ibid., Minto to Palmerston, October 5, November 9, 1847.






[948] Ibid., Metternich to Diedrichstein, December 14, 1847.






[949] Metternich, Mémoires, VII. p. 476.






[950] Metternich, Mémoires, VII. pp. 513-530.






[951] As a result of the conference at Laybach in 1821 Austria received
        a mandate to intervene at Naples and to abolish the constitution wrung
        from Ferdinand. The congress of Verona in 1822 preceded a French
        intervention in Spain for the purpose of restoring the absolute rule of
        Ferdinand VII.






[952] Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchie de Juillet, VII. p. 210.






[953] Guizot, Mémoires, VIII. pp. 513-515. Metternich, Mémoires, VII.
        pp. 563, 564.






[954] Notably the trial and conviction of MM. Teste and de Cubières,
        ex-ministers, for fraud in connection with a mining concession and the
        murder of the Duchesse de Choiseuil-Praslin by her husband. The
        Duke, a peer of France, took poison in prison. The Duchess was the
        daughter of Marshal Sébastiani.






[955] F.O. France 781 Normanby to Palmerston, July 30, 1847 (private
        and confidential).






[956] Stockmar, Memoirs, II. p. 203.






[957] F.O. France 781, Normanby to Palmerston, July 30, 1847 (private
        and confidential).






[958] E. Regnault, Histoire de huit ans, III. pp. 308-309. Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchie de Juillet, VII. pp. 232-294.






[959] F.O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 23, 1844 (private
        and confidential). C. Greville, Journals (2), II. p. 267.






[960] L. Fagan, Life of Sir A. Panizzi, I. pp. 253-254.






[961] Letters of Queen Victoria, Palmerston to Melbourne, December
        26, 1845.






[962] C. Greville, Journals (2), III. p. 40, also pp. 16-49.






[963] L. Fagan, Life of Sir A. Panizzi, I. pp. 208-248.






[964] E. Regnault, Histoire de huit ans, III. pp. 190-198.






[965] Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchie de Juillet, VII. pp. 115-148.






[966] E. Regnault, Histoire de huit ans, III. p. 304.






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