Technique of Modern Tactics

A STUDY OF TROOP LEADING
METHODS IN THE OPERATIONS
OF DETACHMENTS OF ALL ARMS

BY
P. S. BOND
Major, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army,

AND
M. J. McDONOUGH
Major, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army.

THIRD EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED

The cordial reception that has been accorded this volume by the Army, the Marine Corps, the National Guard, Military Schools, Training Camps, etc., has made necessary a second and third editions. The present edition embodies the essential modifications contained in the 1914 F. S. R., and the act of June 3, 1916.

The chief reason leading to the publication of the volume in the first instance was the authors’ belief that the excellent instruction given at the Leavenworth Schools should be disseminated to the widest extent practicable among all those in the United States who are charged with preparation for the active physical defense of the nation. To assist in such an extension of military education, there seemed a need for a volume which would collect and make available within a small compass, the fruits of the study, observation, and experience of those officers who have unceasingly devoted themselves to the improvement of American tactical training.

It is well that the traditional indifference of the American people toward military preparedness is in this day being rudely disturbed. Fate has hitherto been lenient to the growing American nation. It has not demanded the full or the logical forfeit proportionate to the laxity displayed by us in meeting former crises. In the Revolution, fate was indeed kind to the Colonists. In the War of 1812 it awarded us greatly more than our efforts merited, and seemed to overlook the pitiful inefficiency of our land forces. At sea the brilliant series of naval exploits was made possible only by the unfaltering determination of the naval chieftains serving under a supine administration that desired to lock up the navy in home ports. In the Mexican War, in permitting us to conduct two campaigns without the loss of a single battle, and in spite of a woeful deficiency in men, in equipment, and in administrative support, fate was more than indulgent.

In the Civil War fate did not assess the full retribution of disruption of the Union, which it might logically have done, but it did exact for our neglect of preparation an immense payment in blood and treasure. This indulgence of fate may be not wholly a kindness. To the extent that it violates justice, it merely postpones the final reckoning and tends to lull its recipient into a false sense of national security, resulting from unearned success. The nation has not yet experienced the chastening discipline of defeat. In the future, therefore, we must not be surprised when full compensation is exacted if, as an adult people, we continue to misread the true import of history and persist in our traditional negligence.

A people may not logically assume great responsibilities without making timely provision for the discharge of those responsibilities. Sooner or later an exact accounting will be had. History shows many examples of nations which have paid the price of their neglect. Despite the hopes of Utopians history shows that human nature undergoes no progressive change, and it shows to the present day no substantial diminution in the frequency of wars.

That our people are beginning to manifest an intelligent interest in the condition of the National defense cannot fail to be gratifying to those whose lives are consecrated to such defense. Such interest is a vital support and an inspiration to the defenders. It is hoped that this volume may be of assistance in guiding to some extent the awakening interest.

In the first edition the subjects of air craft and motor vehicles were not treated, because although it was recognized from the outset that these machines would exert a very great influence upon the conduct of war, their tactics was at the time largely speculative. Such is not the case today.

[Pg 5]

The almost studied indifference of the American people toward reasonable preparation for the contingency of war makes more urgent the duty of all officers or those who hope to become officers, to do all in their power in advance to prepare themselves and those committed to their care for the immense responsibilities that will rest upon them when the storm bursts upon the nation.

The modern theory of war as exemplified in the practice of the so-called military nations, is that all the resources of the state—moral, physical and intellectual—should be at the disposal of the government for use in case of war. War is the most critical condition of the modern state with its highly developed and peculiarly sensitive and vulnerable industrial and commercial systems. For the successful prosecution of a conflict on which the very fate of the nation may depend, every ounce of its strength should be available. The aim is to strike immediately with all the force at the nation’s command. That state is best prepared which can most rapidly bring to bear its resources in men and materials. In this modern theory is involved the principle that every able-bodied male citizen owes to the state the obligation of service. This principle is not incompatible with democratic ideals and is recognized in theory by our own constitution. Personal service to be truly effective must be universal, compulsory and regular. It constitutes the true and only solution of the problem of adequate defense. All other solutions are makeshifts resulting from the attempt to get something without paying the cost. All have been tried again and again by the United States and other countries, and all have invariably been found wanting.

War today is one of the most highly developed of the arts—the field of the expert and the professional. This being the case there is more than ever before a need for adequate preparation in advance of the outbreak of war. The unprepared people or government who now-a-days find themselves on the brink of hostilities with a nation that is trained for the struggle, must expect inevitably to pay a severe national penalty.

The preparation of a nation for war is of two kinds; one of material things, the construction of forts, arsenals, fabrication of weapons, munitions, etc., the other the training of its people. While both are [Pg 6] essential, the latter is the more important, as well as the more difficult to provide. The American people, in fancied security, have steadfastly refused to pass laws or vote funds for adequate military preparation, either in materiel or personnel. It is evident that we regard the risk as insufficient to warrant the insurance, and we prefer to court war and pay its cost in blood and pensions, not to mention the risk of huge indemnities and the loss of valuable territory, national prestige and honor. We insure our own insignificant lives and pitiful possessions but refuse to insure the life of the nation.

The systematic and intelligent progress that has marked our industrial growth has been conspicuously lacking in our military affairs. “Whether we may be willing to admit it or not,” says General Upton, “in the conduct of war we have rejected the practice of European nations and, with little variation, have thus far pursued the policy of China.”

As to the amount of the risk involved in our policy of national defense or, as some would say, our lack of policy, it has increased by leaps and bounds with the constantly augmented military strength of the other great nations of the earth. This strength is hundreds of times as great as in the days of our thirteen colonies. The seas, which we have hitherto regarded as barriers for our protection, are today favorable avenues for the transport of troops and materials. As to the imminence of the risk we may gain an insight from contemplation of the present situation in Europe, and consideration of the effect of our vast undefended territory and wealth upon the envy and cupidity of other powerful states less fortunately situated than ourselves.

Preparedness for national defense, says Hudson Maxim, is simply a quarantine against the pestilence of war.

The best training for war is, of course, the actual experience of warfare; but for practical purposes this school is too limited to be of much assistance to the actors in person. If a reasonable period of peace intervenes between wars the actors of one war are to a very limited extent only, those having experience of the previous conflict. Even the general lessons of war are too quickly set aside. How little military knowledge has the present generation of Americans to show for the priceless expenditure of the Nation in the unsurpassed school of the Civil War. Wars are fought by the very young men of the country, and this is true not only of the rank and file but also of the majority [Pg 7] of the commanders. The hope of the nation lies therefore, in its youth, and how shall this youth be trained?

The duty devolves upon the older officers. There is no higher mission for older officers in time of peace than the systematic development of the talents of the younger officers entrusted to their care. These young officers will be the leaders in the next great war and the fate of the nation may indeed depend upon them. The nation, therefore, has every right to demand of the superiors that nothing will be left undone that may prepare these youths for the trial. Thus will the superiors be exerting their powerful influence upon the course of the coming war. The methods available are the study of history, working of map problems, and terrain exercises, tactical rides or walks, the war game—all in connection with field maneuvers with troops.

Correct training for service in campaign must aim to develop the sound characteristics of the individual, rather than to bind him to a system. The eternal fighting unit being the man, and no two men being created alike, anything which unduly hampers the initiative or self reliance of the officer, though intended as an aid, is in fact a restraint. Hence the caution cannot be too oft repeated that the officer must exert himself to keep aloof from rigid forms or models or precedents because, as in the military service there are no actual equals in rank, so there is no complete precedent for a military situation. Each situation is unique, as is also the man who meets it.

Nevertheless in the broad training of large numbers of young men the whims of the individual must not be confused with his sound characteristics, lest the results of his training be as a crop of weeds. The desire to develop the essential traits of each individual’s character is not a reason for haphazard instruction or lack of system. Those charged with the education of officers can accomplish broader results if their methods are based on systematic effort with the fundamental idea that the system is an aid to the individual, rather than that the individual is an agent of the system.

Outside of campaign the officer obtains his schooling from the experience of handling men and from individual study. These sources are complementary, neither is complete without the other. The commander receives his education not only in the saddle, but at his desk. It is [Pg 8] fortunate that this is so, because if outdoor maneuvers with troops were alone of value, the greater part of his time would have to be spent unprofitably. And no single effort expended in the peace training of officers will give greater results in the supreme test of war than the inculcation of habits of ceaseless industry.

On Von Moltke’s estimate of the value of tactical problems as a preparation for war we get an interesting side-light in an incident related of him by a French officer who, prior to the Franco-Prussian War, was on a mission to Berlin. Von Moltke was speaking of the decadence of French military training at that time, and he said to the officer: “Have you even the superficial smattering of the elements of the military art? I am tempted to doubt it. I wager that you do not know the most valuable piece of furniture of an officer in garrison. Come with me,” and so saying the old Prussian led his visitor into a small bed chamber suitable for a sub-lieutenant, containing a small bed without curtains, three straw chairs, shelves of books from floor to ceiling, and in the center a blackboard on an easel, the floor littered with pieces of chalk. “It is with this,” said Von Moltke, “that we beat our adversaries every morning, and as for art, here is all we want,” and he exhibited a series of topographic sketches.

The purpose then of this volume is to supply in compact form the help needed by the instructor,—or the student working alone—in the applicatory method of study. It is not intended as a text alone; its principal rôle is that of a guide to those engaged in the study of practical problems in tactics, either as instructor or student—for the preparation or solution of those problems. It is believed to be the only single work overlooking, from this point of view, the entire field of minor tactics. Nearly everything contained in this volume can be found elaborated in special treatises, but time is of value to the military student and this work gives in a single volume authoritatively the data that must otherwise be searched for through a small library. The organizations used in the text are those of the American service, but the tactical principles discussed are of general application. They pertain however, primarily to systematic organized warfare against a civilized foe, and have but a limited application to “bushwhacking,” guerrilla and savage warfare. Furthermore they are applicable especially to the warfare of the open field, with its rapid changes in situation, rather than the trench deadlocks so nearly akin to siege warfare which, under modern conditions, may often characterize the [Pg 9] operations of highly trained belligerents in large forces of nearly equal strength. Many minor details given in Field Service Regulations, Infantry Drill Regulations, and other manuals, are of necessity omitted. This volume is not intended to take the place of the authorized government publications.

The apparently deliberate evasion of definite or even approximate statements as to formations, strength, distances, intervals, etc., and the frequent repetition of the phrase, “this depends upon circumstances,” which characterize many writings on the subject of tactics, give rise to a desire, frequently expressed, for more specific information on these and similar matters. So far as seemed practicable the authors have endeavored herein to satisfy this desire. This is done with the full knowledge that warfare cannot be pursued as an exact science, and that the endeavor to be specific may in some instances elicit criticism.

Whatever one attempts he should be familiar with the methods which have characterized good practice in that particular line of endeavor. When confronted with a specific case the individual searches for the underlying principles which find application therein, and it is here that his resourcefulness and originality are called into play. The authors in each case discussed have endeavored to state clearly all the principles which may be applicable, giving at the same time some concrete illustrations in figures, distances, etc., of simple cases. These illustrations are not to be considered as models or patterns. Their purpose is solely that of illustrating the manner in which the stated principles are exemplified by a stated case.

For the officer charged with the conduct of garrison schools, militia instruction, field maneuvers, war games, the preparation of lectures and problems, etc., it is believed this volume will form a valuable ready reference. And of equal importance will it be to the officer of the army or militia, compelled for any reason to study alone. To such, the book is a silent instructor, a guide, a critic. To officers preparing for promotion examination, and to those at the Service Schools or in preparation therefor, it has special application.

If merit be found in the work, the credit is due to the large number of officers of the army, many of them recognized authorities, with whose assistance and under whose advice, inspiration, and guidance it has been produced. Criticisms or suggestions for improvement will be appreciated by the authors. [Pg 10]

ORGANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMY.

The following organization is a simple summary of that given in Field Service Regulations, 1914, (F. S. R.), as amended by the Act of June 3, 1916.

• A typical army corps consists of:
• Headquarters
• 2 or more infantry divisions
• 1 or more cavalry brigades or a cavalry division
• 1 field artillery brigade
• 1 telegraph battalion
• 1 field signal battalion

There will be included such ammunition, supply, engineer and sanitary trains as the President may deem necessary. A corps is the appropriate command of a Lieutenant General.

• A typical infantry division consists of:
• Headquarters
• 3 infantry brigades
• 1 regiment of cavalry
• 1 brigade of field artillery
• 1 regiment of engineers
• 1 field signal battalion
• 1 aero squadron
• 1 ammunition train
• 1 supply train
• 1 engineer train
• 1 sanitary train

A division is the appropriate command of a Major General.

A typical cavalry brigade consists of the headquarters and three cavalry regiments. When the brigade acts independently, horse artillery may be attached.

• A typical cavalry division consists of:
• Headquarters
• 3 cavalry brigades
• 1 regiment of field artillery (horse)
• 1 battalion of engineers (mounted)
• 1 field signal battalion (mounted)
• 1 aero squadron
• 1 ammunition train
• 1 supply train
• 1 engineer train
• 1 sanitary train
• A light bridge train and 1 or more pack trains
• are attached when necessary.

[Pg 11] A brigade consists of 3 regiments (inf. or cav.) When operating alone or independently it usually has auxiliary troops attached. A brigade is the appropriate command of a Brigadier General.

Line of communications. For each army corps or important expeditionary force about to take the field, a base is selected and equipped and a service of the line of communications established, both under the control of the commander of the army corps or expeditionary force.

The staffs of brigades and higher units shall be as prescribed by the President of the United States. Typical staffs are as follows:

• Brigade, including cavalry brigade
• 1 brigade adjutant, major (1 civilian clerk)
• 2 aides, lieutenants
•  
• Division, including cavalry division
• 1 chief of staff, colonel
• 2 assistant chiefs of staff, majors or captains
• 1 division adjutant, major
• 1 division inspector, major
• 1 judge advocate, major
• (for above, 6 civilian clerks)
• 1 chief quartermaster, lieut. colonel
• 1 chief surgeon, lieutenant colonel
• 3 aides, captains or lieutenants

When necessary the commanders of the engineers and signal troops may be directed, in addition to their other duties, to act, respectively, as chief engineer and chief signal officer. When a division acts independently, a chief engineer, (lieutenant colonel) may be detailed on the staff of the division commander.

• Corps.
• 1 chief of staff, brigadier general
• 1 adjutant general, colonel
• 1 inspector general, colonel
• 1 judge advocate, colonel or lieutenant colonel
• 1 chief quartermaster, colonel
• 1 chief surgeon, colonel
• 1 chief engineer, colonel
• 1 chief ordnance officer, colonel, or lieutenant colonel
• 1 chief signal officer, colonel or lieutenant colonel
• 3 aides, with the rank of lieutenant colonel
• (each of the above is assisted by one or more
• subordinates and the necessary clerical force)

[Pg 12]

Details of organization.

• Infantry.
• A company:
• 1 captain
• 1 1st lieutenant
• 1 2d lieutenant
• 100 enlisted men
• Provided: That the President may increase each company
• by 50 enlisted men
•  
• A machine gun company:
• 1 captain (mounted)
• 1 1st lieutenant (mounted)
• 2 2d lieutenants (mounted)
• 53 enlisted men
• 4 guns (2 platoons)
•  
• A battalion:
• 1 major (mounted)
• 1 adjutant (mounted)
• 4 companies
•  
• A regiment:
• 1 colonel (mounted)
• 1 lieutenant colonel (mounted)
• headquarters company, 1 captain, 58 enlisted men (8 mounted);
• includes part of the noncommissioned staff of regiment and
• battalions band, mounted orderlies, etc.
• supply company, 2 officers, 10 enlisted men, and one wagoner
• for each authorized wagon of field and combat trains
• 3 battalions
• 1 machine gun company

• Cavalry.
• A troop:
• 1 captain
• 2 lieutenants
• 70 enlisted men (4 platoons)
• Provided: That the President may increase each troop
• by 35 enlisted men
•  
• A machine gun troop:
• 4 officers
• 70 enlisted men
• 4 guns (2 platoons)
•  
• A squadron:
• 1 major
• 1 adjutant
• 4 troops [Pg 13]
•  
• A regiment:
• 1 colonel
• 1 lieutenant colonel
• 2 veterinarians
• headquarters troop, 1 captain, 54 enlisted men;
• includes part of the non-commissioned staff of regiment
• and squadrons, band, orderlies, etc.
• supply troop, 3 officers, 10 enlisted men and one wagoner for
• each authorized wagon of field and combat trains
• 3 squadrons
• 1 machine gun troop

• Field artillery.⁠[1]
• A battery:
• 1 captain
• 4 lieutenants
• 126 enlisted men
• 4 guns
• 12 caissons
• (A mountain battery includes also 1 packmaster,
• 1 assistant packmaster and 3 cargadores)
• Provided: That the President may increase each battery
• by 64 enlisted men
•  
• A battalion:
• 1 major
• 1 captain
• 3 batteries for light or mountain artillery,
• 2 batteries for horse or heavy field
•  
• A regiment of 2 battalions:
• 1 colonel
• 1 lieutenant colonel
• 1 captain
• 2 veterinarians
• headquarters company, 2 officers, 67 enlisted men;
• includes part of the non-commissioned staffs of
• regiment and battalions, band, orderlies, etc.
• supply company, 2 officers, 10 enlisted men and 1 wagoner for each
• authorized wagon of field and combat trains.
• 2 battalions. The number of battalions may be increased
• with corresponding changes in the headquarters and
• supply companies.

The organization of horse artillery is similar to that of light artillery. Most of the men are individually mounted. (See also “Artillery tactics,” Chapter VIII.) [Pg 14]

• Engineers.
• A company:
• 1 captain (mounted)
• 3 lieutenants (mounted)
• 109 enlisted men (24 mounted)
• Provided: That the President may increase each company
• by 55 enlisted men.
•  
• A mounted company:
• 1 captain
• 3 lieutenants
• 74 enlisted men
• Provided: That the President may increase each mounted
• company by 37 enlisted men
•  
• A battalion:
• 1 major (mounted)
• 1 captain (mounted)
• 1 battalion sergeant major
• 3 master engineers, junior grade
• 3 companies
•  
• A mounted battalion:
• 1 major
• 2 captains
• 1 1st lieutenant
• 1 veterinarian
• 1 master engineer, senior grade
• 3 master engineers, junior grade
• non-commissioned staff
• 3 mounted companies
•  
• A regiment:
• 1 colonel (mounted)
• 1 lieutenant colonel (mounted)
• non-commissioned staff
• 2 master engineers, senior grade
• 1 wagoner for each authorized wagon of field and combat trains
• 2 battalions
•  
• Note.—Mounted engineers have no regimental organization.

A company with bridge equipage usually has 3 divisions of bridge equipage. A battalion has therefore 9 divisions of bridge equipage, 3 light and 6 heavy. One division of the heavy equipage (225 ft. of bridge) has 16 wagons and 84 mules. One division of the light equipage (186 ft. of bridge) has 14 wagons and 56 mules. [Pg 15]

Signal Corps.

The President is authorized to organize such numbers of companies, battalions and aero squadrons of the Signal corps as the necessities of the service may demand. Typical organizations are as follows:

• Wire company: (all mounted)
• 1 captain
• 2 lieutenants
• 75 enlisted men
• 6 wire carts
• 1 instrument wagon
•  
• Radio company: (all mounted)
• 1 captain
• 2 lieutenants
• 75 enlisted men; 2 platoons of 2 radio sections each
• (2 wheel and 2 pack)
• 3 combat wagons (2 radio, 1 instrument)
• 6 pack mules
•  
• Field battalion:
• 1 major
• 1 adjutant
• n. c. staff
• 4 mounted orderlies
• 4 field wagons
• 1 shop wagon
• 2 companies, 1 wire and 1 radio

A wire company of signal troops has two platoons of two wire sections each. The wire section has 5 miles of wire (single conductor, ground return) and instruments (telegraph and telephone) for 4 stations. Each radio section can set up one station, having a radius of about 200 miles for wheel sections and 30 miles for pack sections. The distances are subject to great variations. (See also F. S. R. 1914.)

Transportation.

• Wagon company:
• 36 enlisted personnel
• 112 draft mules
• 6 saddle mules
• 27 wagons
•  
• Auto truck company:
• 37 enlisted personnel
• 27 auto trucks, freight
• 1 auto truck, supply [Pg 16]
•  
• Pack train:
• 14 enlisted personnel
• 50 pack mules
• 14 saddle mules

Note:—The tables of organization are subject to change from time to time. The latest tables of organization issued by the War Dept. should be consulted for details.

WAR STRENGTH, IN ROUND NUMBERS,
ROAD SPACE, AND DIMENSIONS OF CAMPS.
—(F. S. R., 1914.)

[Pg 18]

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE SOLUTION OF
TERRAIN EXERCISES, MAP MANEUVERS,
AND MAP PROBLEMS.

The solution of practical problems in tactics, either on the map or on the terrain, constitutes what is known as the applicatory method of instruction. It is the method followed by all modern armies, being properly regarded as the best substitute possible in time of peace for the actual experience of war. Indeed it is not to be regarded purely as a substitute for actual experience, inasmuch as it affords opportunity for the frequent and repeated application of principles to various concrete cases. Actual warfare will furnish to the majority of officers comparatively few opportunities of this kind.

Kinds of problems.—Tactical problems may be solved on the map or on the terrain. In the former class are included map problems, and one or two-sided war games. Problems on the terrain include tactical walks or rides, terrain exercises (without troops) and one and two-sided field maneuvers (with troops). These problems are prepared with a view to illustrating certain tactical principles. In some cases they call especially for decision, in other cases they are intended to give practice in the technique of carrying out a decision already made. Often the two functions are combined in a single problem. The former class are known as problems of decision. The latter are usually called troop leading problems.

Each class of problem has its particular field, and tactical instruction should not be limited to any one class. Problems involving a decision as to a course of action for a large force must necessarily be solved on a map, due to the inability of one man to see in person the terrain that would be covered by a division, for example. Thus, for the higher commanders, all problems of decision must of necessity be map problems even if, as in actual warfare or maneuvers, the decision is carried out on the terrain. Troop leading problems on the terrain should, for similar reasons, generally be limited to forces not exceeding a regiment in size. Problems involving the detailed location of defensive works can be solved satisfactorily only on the ground and should always take the form of terrain exercises. [Pg 20]

The two-sided war game is played by two individuals or two groups under the direction of an umpire. It is of peculiar value in that it calls for quick and frequent decision and, by its form—particularly the competition involved—it serves to stimulate interest.

The tactical walk or ride is an exercise on the terrain in which various situations, either independent or continuous, are presented by the instructor and discussed with the students. It has the defect of failing to place upon the shoulders of most of the students the responsibility of making a decision, and in this respect is inferior to the terrain exercise in which each student is required to write out his solution to every situation. The tactical ride, however, affords opportunity for bringing out, more or less forcibly, certain tactical principles which the instructor has in mind, and it may occasionally be employed to advantage.

Field maneuvers are problems in which the solution, instead of being written by the student, is actually executed on the terrain with troops.

The map problem will be the means of instruction most readily available to the largest number of officers, but this should whenever practicable, be supplemented by exercises on the terrain, both with and without troops.

Tactical problems vary greatly in substance, in fact no two are alike. In their general form, however, they are usually similar. The problem will ordinarily open with a statement of the general conditions in the theatre of war as a whole, the two combatants being usually designated by colors, such as Blue and Red. This statement is called the “general situation,” and is usually presumed to be known to both combatants, at least in a general way. It is, of course, always imaginary, even if the problem actually involves real troops. In small problems the “general situation” may be omitted. The problem next sets forth in some detail the circumstances of some particular body of troops on one side, under the heading “special situation—Blue,” (or “Red.”) Under this heading may be included a statement of the strength and position of the troops under consideration (of which the student is assumed to be the supreme or one of the subordinate commanders); information as to friendly troops in the vicinity with a statement of their movements and intentions (if necessary); the orders received from higher authority; [Pg 21] certain information concerning the enemy, more or less incomplete and often unreliable, usually in the form of advices from higher authority, messages and reports from subordinates, spies, deserters, prisoners or civilians, newspapers, etc.; information as to the hour and date at which the situation opens, weather, terrain, and such other local conditions as may have a bearing on the situation; etc., etc. The information set forth in the “special situation” in whole or in part, may, or may not be known to the enemy. As to this the student is generally required to judge for himself. The problem concludes with a statement of certain “requirements,” the fulfillment of which constitutes the “solution.” These requirements may include:

The “estimate of the situation” is a logical process of thought, terminating in a tactical “decision.” Such a process will be no innovation in the brain of any thinking man, since it is characteristic not only of tactics, but of all other serious affairs of life. It involves a careful consideration and analysis of all the evidence bearing upon the situation. The form given at the beginning of this Chapter sets forth in brief and comprehensive manner the principal points to be considered in making this estimate. It is intended to guide and assist the mental process, by insuring consideration of all matters of importance, but it should not be allowed to restrict independent thought. Not all of these considerations will exert an influence on the solution of any given problem. There is often some one preponderating condition, seldom more than two or three, which really influence the decision.

The most important consideration, which forms the basis of all subsequent thought and action, is the mission of the command. In a force which is an integral part of a larger force the mission will usually, although not always, be embodied in the orders of higher authority. For an independent command, however, the mission must generally be deduced from the commander’s knowledge of the wishes or intentions of superior authority, and of the existing situation and conditions. It is here that the judgment of the commander is called [Pg 22] into play, since the accomplishment of his true mission may require a course of action entirely at variance with the orders he has received. It is for this reason that orders too restrictive, and in too great detail, should not be given to subordinates who are expected to exercise to any considerable degree, independence of command. Their initiative must not be unduly hampered, as unexpected developments may entirely change the situation, and with it the mission. For example; an independent command, sent forward to seize a certain town finds it occupied by a superior force of the enemy, while another large force is approaching from a flank, and threatening to cut off retreat. It is now apparent that the original mission must be abandoned. The commander’s new mission has become that of saving his command by a prompt retreat. Gen. Von Verdy du Vernois says: “The officer who suddenly encounters the enemy while patrolling with his platoon must conduct his actions from a different point of view than if he commands his platoon as skirmishers in front of his company. A division in an army corps will generally be so situated that it must carry out an action, even though it be completely annihilated in so doing, and then it would still be promoting the general purpose; on the other hand, a division widely separated from an army would, as a rule, utterly fail to accomplish its mission if it allowed itself to be annihilated.” In such cases the commander must consider whether his division is not worth more than the accomplishment of his specific mission.

An estimate of the situation usually involves a careful consideration of times and distances. The information as to the enemy will be more or less incomplete, and often contradictory. Each item of information must be carefully weighed to determine the degree of credibility to be attached thereto, and from the preponderance of evidence the course of action must be determined. The only absolutely reliable information of the enemy is that obtained from the personal observation of trained officers, and even this may sometimes be at fault.

In order to secure some degree of uniformity in the solution of map problems and to avoid confusion of ideas, it is necessary to adopt certain systematic assumptions. Those which bear on any particular case will usually be stated in the problem, such as the condition of the [Pg 23] weather, fordability of streams, etc. The most usual of these assumptions, however, are not ordinarily stated, but are always to be understood. These are:

1. It is to be assumed that the (imaginary) troops under your command are, unless otherwise expressly stated, brave, well disciplined and experienced soldiers and that every subordinate is thoroughly instructed, and fully competent, each within his own sphere.

2. It is to be assumed that the enemy will probably act with good judgment, and make no mistakes. This usually means that he will take that course of action which you would least desire to have him take, or which would be, amongst the courses open to him, that most embarrassing to you.

It is apparent, of course, that neither of these assumptions will always hold in real life. We know that Gen. Lee’s plans for his campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, were based very largely on his knowledge of the personal characteristics of his opponents. Also, that after the death of Jackson, he never again attempted such a movement as that executed by Jackson’s corps at the battle of Chancellorsville. Some assumptions, however, are necessary as a basis for systematic study. Those adopted are the most natural and reasonable in the usual case.

In order to successfully solve tactical problems the commander must be able to read and interpret a map with rapidity and accuracy, and must have an eye for ground forms. He must be familiar with the organization of both his own and the opposing army, and acquainted with the powers and limitations, and with the tactics of each arm of the service. He must be familiar with the methods which constitute “good practice,” and acquainted with military precedents. In this manner he best fits himself to properly perform his high duty, for knowledge and experience as well as character and intellect are necessary as a basis for decision.

A good map, of course, affords a much quicker and better comprehension of the general situation than can possibly be obtained by any one individual on the terrain. In fact without good maps a large force would be seriously hampered in its operations. As it is impossible for any single individual to see in a limited time, or to comprehend as a whole if he had seen, the extent of ground surface that would be covered by a large force, terrain exercises should be limited to the [Pg 24] smaller units, or to portions only, of the larger forces, preferably not larger than a regiment. By this is not meant that field maneuvers should be limited to small bodies of troops. But for the higher commanders all problems, either in office or field, with or without troops, will be virtually map problems. The terrain exercises will be limited in effect to the commanders of the smaller units.

One form of problem, easy of solution on the ground, is more difficult on the map, i. e. visibility problems, the determination of whether a certain point or locality is visible from a certain other point or locality, a question often of grave importance in military operations. Methods of solving visibility problems on the map are given in various textbooks on mapping and topography. A little practice soon gives such facility that the less critical problems of this kind can be solved by inspection.

The tactical suggestions contained in this volume, are often referred to as the “rules” or “principles” of the Art of War. It may be said that they will apply to the majority of cases, otherwise they could hardly be dignified under the title of “principles.” They are, however, subject to frequent exception, and must always give way to judgment and common sense. It is for this reason that the Art of War is the most difficult branch of human endeavor. Experienced commanders will continue to violate the “rules” when their judgment dictates such a course, but unlike the tyro, they will do so with their eyes open, fully appreciating the necessity for their action, and the risks that are involved. They will, on occasion, throw aside the “rules,” not through ignorance, but with the keen insight and ripe judgment of trained intelligence, which will always be superior to rule and precedent. War is an art, rather than a science. Its ever varying problems cannot be solved by the application of rules of mathematical rigidity. Scientific progress has indeed a great influence upon warfare as upon other arts, but it can never replace the human element, and the victories of the future no less than those of the past, will be won by the talents and genius of the general, and the bravery, skill and devotion of his soldiers.

It is responsibility above all else that develops character, initiative and judgment. The knowledge of responsibility strengthens even the weak, and often calls into action powers they were not previously [Pg 25] suspected of possessing. It is for this reason that the most important object in the military training of officers is the development of responsibility. The supreme commander and each subordinate within his own sphere, should be required to exercise his own judgment, and be responsible for his own actions. Thus alone can he be qualified to meet the exigencies that are constantly arising in warfare. Military writings are accordingly filled with cautions such as “Do not interfere with your subordinates, nor usurp their prerogatives,” “Tell a subordinate what you want him to do, not how he is to do it,” “Avoid orders too much in detail,” etc., etc.

How then, in time of peace, may military responsibility, and the benefits resulting therefrom be attained? When an officer reads military history and textbooks on the Art of War, the responsibility for the facts alleged or the conclusions and deductions made rests entirely on the authors. The student gains from such works a certain amount of knowledge, but he certainly assumes no mental responsibility. When, however, he undertakes an independent solution of a tactical problem the entire responsibility for this solution rests on his shoulders alone. Capt. Buddecke of the German Army says:

“After we have gained in the above manner a correct insight into the details of the problem, we get to the main task, which is to think ourselves completely into the spirit of the problem and to arrive at an estimate and decision for our future course.

By repeatedly and quietly reading the problem, paying due regard to the map in front of us, we gain, just as in focussing a telescope, a clearer and clearer conception of the situation. The more we succeed in placing ourselves mentally in the given situation and recognizing all the details in their relation to the general problem, the more we succeed in thinking ourselves into the soul of the leader, in conceiving the magnitude of his task, and in sharing his responsibility, the more eager we shall become to take over his duties and play an active part in the operations.

The longer we pore over the map, the clearer will be our conception of the measures which the situation demands. And in this it is important to hold and consider carefully; that is, to follow out, to their furthest effects, all the thoughts and ideas which come to us, often passing like lightning through our brains, and suggesting various lines [Pg 26] of action. Often it is precisely these fleeting thoughts which lead us to the right path. But ideas which are not fully thought out and thoroughly weighed can not have a decisive influence on our judgment and decision. A head which has a hundred thoughts, but which can neither hold fast nor think out a single one, will always remain undecided and irresolute in tactics.

Only by intensive reflection is found in the confusion, the Ariadne thread which will lead us from the maze. However, although attention to details is to be recommended, yet the larger points of view which we have gained must not be lost in the consideration of minor details—a mistake often made and naturally often leading to false conclusions. It is rather our chief duty to find just these main points, and attention to minor details is but a means to this end.

Character and intuition unconsciously weave their thread into this labor of comprehension. To that which our brain devises is added, with good or bad effects, that which our intuition presents; and from the combined activity of both come as a product judgment and decision.

It is a delicate psychological process which takes place in the head and breast of the tactician, and without doubt this inner effort is one of the most stimulating and interesting of activities.

A tactical question awakens all our spiritual and mental powers. It demands keenness and understanding, common sense and imagination, firmness and patience, caution and daring, sense of locality and memory, judgment and the power of decision. The whole character, the whole disposition, the whole individuality of a man finds its expression here. Thus the solution of a tactical problem reflects the spirit of its author, since it is based on the peculiarities of his own individual character. A hesitating character will, in doubtful cases, prefer the defensive to the offensive. Kindred natures will follow similar trains of thought and in the majority of cases reach similar solutions.”

The independent solution of tactical problems affords a means of training to both the intellect and the character superior to that afforded by any other kind of tactical study save only the actual experiences of war. In war a commander’s mistakes are paid for in blood, and experience is dearly bought. In the solution of tactical problems in peace the student’s mistakes are paid for at most only in chagrin, the experience is cheap. [Pg 27]

There is always more than one, and there may be many satisfactory solutions to any problem. Hence the fact that two solutions differ radically by no means proves that one or the other is wrong. Each reflects the personality of its author, and either might accomplish the desired result. A simple plan, based on a sound decision and consistently carried out, will be better than the best plan executed in a dilatory and half-hearted fashion. Above all the plan must be simple, “Simplicity is the keynote of sane tactical procedure.” Complicated maneuvers offer little promise of success.

The plan should not be based wholly, nor in general even chiefly upon the known or probable movements of the enemy. The commander’s plan should be dictated chiefly by his own mission. In war it is best to lead, to retain the initiative, and to force the enemy to adapt his plans to yours. Hence if in doubt it is usually best to follow a bold and aggressive plan of action. Caution may avoid defeat, but boldness alone wins victories.

There is a certain manner in which tactical problems, particularly map problems, should be solved in order to gain the greatest possible benefit from this form of training. In brief this may be stated as follows: solve the problem yourself, make a thorough, honest and independent solution, and write it out. When you are fully satisfied with your solution, and not until then, read the “approved solution,” (if there be one) or submit your work to a reviewer for remark and criticism. For a beginner the solution of a map problem may require hours, even days. Becoming mentally wearied there is a strong tendency to “slur over” parts of the solution which may appear for the instant relatively unimportant; to be content with less than one’s best; to solve portions of the problem, and then read the corresponding portions of the approved solution, etc. Such tendencies are inimical to progress, and they are, moreover, an indication of a weakness of character which one should strive to overcome.

The statement of the problem should be read carefully, a number of times, localities being noted and marked on the map. Having become thoroughly impregnated with the situation, the student then proceeds to make his mental estimate, jotting down the points that occur to him, in pencil. For the beginner, at least, it is then best to write out the [Pg 28] estimate in full, using the form at the beginning of this chapter as a guide, in order to early acquire the habit of making a logical and complete estimate. If the problem calls for the estimate and orders, and is accompanied by an approved solution, it is usually well to complete the estimate to include the decision, and then read the approved solution to the same point and compare. Then assume the decision of the approved solution and write the orders necessary to carry out that decision, comparing these on completion with those of the approved solution. If the student writes orders based on his own decision they might differ so greatly from those of the approved solution that there would be no satisfactory basis for comparison.

Upon completing his independent solution the student should read the approved solution, if there is one, and submit his work to a critic for remark. The student’s mistakes and omissions in decision and detail will then be plainly apparent. These he should carefully consider, honestly acknowledge, and determine to avoid in future. They will thus be strongly impressed on his mind as practical experiences. As has been remarked, however, a difference or apparent difference in two solutions is by no means proof that one of them is in error. It is, of course, manifestly impossible that two solutions by different persons could ever be exactly alike. It is not of problems in arithmetic that we are speaking.

Take the problem as you find it, and do not waste time criticising and attempting to pick flaws in the “situation.” Nature cannot be “faked,” and it is difficult enough to create an imaginary situation which is even reasonably plausible, a fact which each will appreciate when he attempts to write a problem himself. To write a good problem is usually a task more difficult than to solve one.

In the solution of map problems considerable advantage may be derived from combined study with a congenial mate. Each man serves as a spur, a critic and a guide to the other. They should work in company, each independently, and then compare and discuss their results while these are fresh in their minds.

The apparatus required for the solution of map problems is very simple; including a “map measure” (wheel), scales, colored pins for marking the positions of troops, etc., small rectangles of cardboard or sheet lead, representing bodies of troops to the scale of the map, and colored according to the arms of the service, etc., etc. [Pg 29]

Diagrammatic analysis and synthesis. In both the solution and preparation of problems it is frequently a great aid to comprehension to lay out the situation (the combatant troops and critical features of the terrain) in a diagrammatic form. This clears away for the time, the mass of details which sometimes befog the main issues. Problems which at first reading appear complicated, are often seen to be quite simple when laid out in this manner, and the decision will often be plainly apparent. As has been said heretofore, questions of time and distance will usually be of great importance. Unless the troops are placed in their proper relative positions at the epoch considered, incorrect decisions are apt to result. A few examples will serve to illustrate this method. (See Fig. I.)

Fig. A. A Blue division, acting as right flank guard to a Blue field army, is marching east when it receives reports of a Red column of all arms, advancing from the southeast toward the Blue flank with the evident intention of attacking. The Blue division turns southeast and advances in two columns against the Red force. In the resulting encounter, it is evident, the Blues will be able to deploy and establish a line of battle much faster than the Reds, provided the latter continue to advance in one column. Should the Reds form two columns to the front their march will be delayed while waiting for the columns to form abreast.

Fig. B. A Blue army on the offensive, advancing east in two columns, approaches the line of an unfordable river, passable only at the bridges shown. A Red army also in two columns, is approaching the stream from the opposite direction, for the purpose of checking the Blue advance at the river. The Blue northern column reaches the northern bridge in advance of the Red northern column, and effects a crossing. The Blue southern column, on approaching the other bridge, learns that the advance of the Red southern column has already reached it, and that the Reds are making dispositions to dispute the passage.

The commander of the Blue northern column places his leading troops in a defensive position (A-B) so selected that the Red northern column can advance neither west nor south without first attacking the position. With the remainder of his column he turns south and marches to attack the right flank of the Red southern column in order to enable the Blue southern column to effect a crossing. [Pg 30]

Fig. I.

Fig. C. The advance guard of a large Blue force acting on the offensive is marching south. The main body has been somewhat delayed, and is several miles in rear. On approaching the screen, the Blue advance guard commander learns that a Red force is approaching in two columns. The aggregate strength of the two Red columns is considerably greater than that of the Blue advance guard, although less than that of the entire Blue force. To continue his advance and attack the superior Red force in its two column formation, favoring rapid deployment, while the Blue main body is still well to the rear, would be extremely apt to prove disastrous to the Blue advance guard commander. He therefore decides to seize the best defensive position available, one moreover [Pg 31] which he will have time to occupy in an orderly fashion, and there hold the Reds until the arrival of the Blue main body, which will take the tactical offensive upon its arrival.

Fig. D. A Blue army (A) and a Red army (B) are engaged in battle on an east and west line. A Blue division is approaching the battlefield from the southeast under orders to attack the left flank of the Red position at B. While passing the screen on his right the commander of the Blue division receives word from his patrols, which have been beyond the screen, that a Red force, estimated to consist of at least two divisions is approaching from the northeast, apparently with the intention of reaching the right rear of the Blue position at A. The Blue division commander at once decides to discontinue his advance northwest, to change direction to the right, and to seize a defensive position as far from the main battlefield as possible without risking a premature or rencontre engagement with the superior Red force now approaching. To facilitate the prompt occupation of the defensive position selected he advances toward it in two columns. Here he hopes to “contain” the Red force, keeping it out of the main battle until a decision is reached, or until the main Blue army can make arrangements to withdraw.

Preparation of problems. In the preparation of practical problems, either map problems, terrain exercises, one or two-sided war games or field maneuver problems, the following hints will be found useful:

1. Give the problem a semblance of reality, make the situations plausible, and introduce as few unnatural conditions as possible. For example, in a terrain exercise or field maneuver problem it is better not to state that a certain stream is impassable when in fact it is easily passable. Bridges which are assumed in the problem to have been destroyed should be conspicuously placarded. Otherwise they are very apt to be used. It is usually preferable, even in map problems, to make the problem fit the terrain as it actually exists, rather than to alter the terrain to fit the problem. In a map problem it is permissible to assume that corn shown on the map has been cut, that woods where underbrush is indicated are impassable for infantry, that streams are swollen and roads muddy from recent rains, etc. But do not assume that there is snow on the ground in July, or that corn is standing in [Pg 32] January. In maneuver problems it is always best to let the commanders take the terrain as they find it.

2. Make the problem simple and brief, and omit ordinarily all data which has no direct bearing upon the solution. Simple problems are best for purposes of instruction. It is however, occasionally desirable to introduce in the statement certain data which is really of no importance in order to give the student practice in analyzing and weighing information, and to teach him to base his decision on the best of the information, and to avoid being led astray by unimportant or conflicting reports. The commander must acquire by experience the power to see and cleave to the main issues amidst the fog of uncertainty, conflicting, erroneous and unimportant information, etc. The analysis of information is a most important part of his duty, as upon this his plan of action must be based.

3. The problem should be made instructive. Ordinarily it will be drawn with a view to illustrating certain tactical principles. It should, however, never be forced, but always allowed to develop naturally, especially in war games and field maneuvers. The officer who prepares the problem should not be disappointed if the solutions take a course quite different from his expectations. Authorship confers no special rights of interpretation.

4. Field maneuver problems should be made progressive and interesting to both officers and men. Unless their interest can be sustained they will get little benefit from the instruction. Unreality, unnecessary fatigue, delays and inaction should be avoided. Officers charged with the instruction of troops of the army or militia often lay out schedules which allow insufficient time for relaxation, and this results in dulling the interest of the troops thereby decreasing the benefits obtained from the course of instruction.

5. Field maneuver problems should be adapted to the kind and number of the troops which are to take part in them. Elaborate “general situations” are usually undesirable. Each commander should be given such information as he might reasonably be expected to have under real conditions.

6. Where the situation given in the problem includes both real and imaginary troops (as may be the case) great care should be taken to avoid a contact or mixing of real and imaginary troops. This complicates [Pg 33] the situation, and introduces the most objectionable element of unreality.

7. In field maneuver problems it is best to make the tasks of the opposing commanders nearly equal. Arrange the troops and the situation so that each has a chance to accomplish his mission. A commander cannot be expected to put his heart into the game if he knows that he is bound to fail in his mission, or certain to meet with defeat. On the other hand, the knowledge that they have a chance to succeed, even against superior numbers, stimulates the interest of both officers and men. In map problems, however, the student may occasionally be given a situation in which it is impossible for him to accomplish his mission.

8. In starting a field maneuver problem it is best to have the opposing sides out of contact. Do not state in the situation that a commander has a mounted patrol at such a point, unless the patrol is actually there. Do not manufacture messages for real patrols, but allow them to report what they actually learn. The commander should be allowed to send out his own patrols.

9. The commander (in a field maneuver problem) should be allowed ample latitude in making his decision, and should not be coerced into any particular plan of action. It is well, however, to arrange the situation so that a contact of the opposing sides will take place at some suitable locality. This adds greatly to the interest of the problem. It is desirable when practicable to have the problem end within a reasonable distance of the camping place, in order to avoid a long and fatiguing march thereafter.

10. Consider the distances that the troops must march during the day and do not exceed what is reasonable under the conditions. A long rest should be given at mid-day, and the troops should return to their camp at a reasonable hour in the afternoon. If this does not allow sufficient latitude temporary camps may be established at suitable localities. A problem once commenced should, of course, be carried to completion with the least possible interruption.

BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC.

The “Gettysburg-Antietam Map” referred to in this volume is a 3 inch map (3 in. to the mile) of the vicinity of Gettysburg, Pa., issued by [Pg 34] the Book Department, Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where it can be purchased for a nominal sum. It is the best map for its particular purpose with which the authors are acquainted.

Maps on a scale of 1:62,500 (commonly called 1 inch maps) of many portions of the United States, are now issued by the United States Geological Survey (Washington) at a nominal cost. They are excellent maps, and suitable for the solution of map problems, especially those involving the operations of divisions or larger forces.

Special maps of the vicinity of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and of various other maneuver grounds used by the Army and the Militia, may be obtained from the Book Department, Army Service Schools, or from the War Department.

The following is a short list of books which will be found useful for study and reference in connection with the subject of minor tactics. Most of them have been consulted in the preparation of this volume. Government publications may be obtained from the War Department, Washington, D. C., by issue or purchase. The other works can be obtained through the Book Department, Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

• Field Service Regulations, U. S. A., 1914. Government Publication.
• Drill Regulations of Inf., Cav., and Field Artillery.
• Government Publications, (separate volumes)
• Engineer Field Manual. Government Publication.
• Organization of the bridge equipage of the U. S. Army.
• Government Publication.
• Bulletin No. 4, War Dept.
• Notes on Field Fortification, Army Field Engineer School.
• How to feed an army. Government Publication.
• American Campaigns. Steele.
• Applied minor tactics. Morrison.
• Battle orders. Von Kiesling.
• Cavalry in future wars. Von Bernhardi.
• Cavalry in war and peace. Von Bernhardi.
• Cavalry tactics as illustrated by the War of the Rebellion. Gray.
• Conduct of war. Von der Goltz.
• Critical study of German tactics. De Pardieu.
• Criticisms on solutions of map problems. Boyd. [Pg 35]
• Duties of the General Staff. Von Schellendorff.
• Elements of strategy. Fiebeger.
• Essays, studies and letters of Col. Maude of the British Army. (5 volumes)
• Estimating tactical situations and composing field orders. Fitch.
• Examination and repair of simple highway bridges. Sherrill.
• Field fortification. Fiebeger.
• Fortification. Clark.
• Lectures on cavalry. Hayne.
• Letters on applied tactics. (with maps) Griepenkerl.
• Letters on strategy and tactics. (4 volumes) Hohenlohe.
• Map maneuvers and tactical rides. Sayre.
• Military policy of the U. S. Upton.
• Military topography. Sherrill.
• Napoleon’s maxims of war. Burnod.
• Nation in arms. Von der Goltz.
• Notes on bridges and bridging. Spalding.
• On war. Clausewitz.
• Organization and operation of the lines of communication in war. Furse.
• Patrols, advance guards and outposts. Morrison.
• Selected division problems. Gizycki and Litzmann.
• Service of security and information. Wagner.
• Some notes on the solution of tactical problems. Fiske.
• Studies in applied tactics. Von Alten.
• Studies in minor tactics. Army School of the Line.
• Studies in the leading of troops. Du Vernois.
• Supply of Sherman’s army in Atlanta campaign. Major and Fitch.
• Tactical decisions and orders. Buddecke.
• Tactical principles and problems. Hanna.
• Tactics. Infantry, Cavalry and Field Arty. Balck. Two volumes.
• Tactical ride. Du Vernois.
• The art of reconnaissance. Henderson.
• The principles of land defense. Thuillier.
• The provisioning of the modern army in the field. Sharpe.
• The regimental war game. Immanuel. [Pg 36]
• The rifle in war. Eames.
• Times of sunrise and sunset in U. S. Willson.
• (Published Harvard Co-operative Society)
• Transportation of troops and materiel. Baker.
• Troop leading and management of the sanitary service in war.
• Morrison and Munson.
• Von Moltke’s tactical problems.

General Remarks. The composition of field orders is so important a feature of nearly every problem that the student may well devote a considerable amount of study and practice to the acquisition of facility in writing orders.

The forms given in F. S. R. are excellent guides, and instructions as to what should be placed in orders and what should be omitted therefrom are given in F. S. R. and in a number of pamphlets on the subject of orders. But the closest study of these forms and instructions will still leave the student very poorly prepared to write a crisp, intelligible order. The ability to do this must be acquired by practice in writing orders to cover concrete cases. The Army Service Schools (at Fort Leavenworth) have developed a certain crisp, epigrammatic verbiage which is the result of long practice by many individuals, and it is of the utmost importance that this verbiage be early acquired by the student officer. This is done by solving a great number of problems and selecting therefrom the best forms of expression. To illustrate what is meant by this one example will suffice: In giving orders for the occupation of a defensive position while on the march the order (Par. 2) may state: “The duties of the advance guard as such will now cease.” This is plain enough for the advance guard, but how about the rear guard, the flank guard and the main body? What inferences are they to draw as to when their duties cease? Do the instructions to the advance guard apply also to them or are they purposely omitted, and if so what is to be done about it? Will the commander notify them later as to exactly when they are relieved of their former duties? The commander might have left the situation less in doubt by saying: “The duties heretofore performed by the advance guard, the rear guard, the flank guard, etc., as such, will now be discontinued.” But such an expression, while grammatically correct, is too rambling and verbose for an order. Instead he might say: “March conditions now cease.” This [Pg 38] sentence contains four words, as against 11 in the first case and 20 or more in the second. It covers the entire command and leaves no one in doubt for an instant. Many similar examples will be encountered in the study of problems. Clearness, of course, is even more important than brevity, but the two usually go hand in hand. A number of short sentences is usually preferable to one long one. The verbiage of orders should be brief, clear, concise, sententious and succinct. (See examples of orders in the text.)

It is often said that the forms given are suggestions only and not to be blindly followed. You will seldom be wrong, however, if you stick to the form, whereas if you attempt to show your originality and freedom from constraint by devising forms of your own you will usually find them more cumbersome than an order on the regular form. A tactical decision so complicated that it cannot be clearly and concisely expressed in a standard 5-paragraph order should be looked upon with distrust. In an assembly order Par. 1 (information of the enemy, etc.,) may be omitted, and of course if there are no trains or sanitary troops Par. 4 would also naturally be omitted, and the other paragraphs numbered accordingly. Administrative and routine details (supply, internal economy, etc.), should generally be omitted from field orders unless they bear directly upon the tactical situation. In this case they may be placed in a paragraph or paragraphs by themselves. Otherwise they will be the subject of orders as distinguished from field orders, which latter are understood to cover only the operations of the combatant troops or matters intimately connected therewith. The 5-paragraph form will always be an excellent model for all orders, both verbal and written, as its form is such as to insure consideration of all the essential tactical details. It will usually be well, then, to follow this form unless it is plainly apparent that it does not cover the case under consideration.

Considerable difficulty will be experienced in determining what to include in orders and what to omit. On this subject individuals will not always agree. Instructions in great detail are nearly always undesirable, but on the other hand nothing essential should be omitted. Individual and verbal orders will usually be somewhat more detailed than combined and written orders. The higher the commander the briefer [Pg 39] and less detailed will be his orders. Detailed instructions to subordinates may often properly be made the subject of a personal interview between the commander and the subordinate in question, and omitted from the formal written, combined order. In making written solutions of problems for his own instruction it is suggested that the student add to his order certain explanatory notes as to why certain details are included in or omitted from the order. Such notes constitute a useful criticism of the student’s own work and tend to develop his judgment as to what matter should properly be included in orders of various kinds and to subordinates of various rank. They should not of course, take the form of an “estimate of the situation.” Only doubtful points need be covered, and these briefly. A number of examples of orders with explanatory notes of the kind referred to will be found throughout this volume.

Kinds of Orders. Orders may be verbal, dictated or written, individual or combined. A combined order is usually understood to mean one covering the entire command.

The orders for a command less than a brigade are almost invariably verbal. The march orders of a brigade are usually dictated, its combat orders are usually verbal. All division orders are habitually written, when practicable.

Even when orders are actually issued verbally and individually it is the custom to subsequently prepare a written combined order for the organization records. It is the written form of orders that is usually called for in problems. But in order to afford practice in troop leading, problems in this subject often call for the orders exactly as they would be given at the time by the commander in the field.

Structure of Orders. The standard field order contains 5 paragraphs. It is fully explained and illustrated by examples in the F. S. R.

Par. 3 contains in detail the duties for the various fractions of the command each under a sub-heading, a, b, c. Instructions which refer collectively to two or more of the fractions mentioned in the a, b, c, paragraphs, or to a portion of a fraction mentioned in an a, b, c, paragraph, are lettered x, y, and z. [Pg 40]

The marginal distribution is habitually used for march and outpost orders but not for combat orders. Instead of the marginal distribution it is preferable in dictated orders (on account of the narrow pad on which they are written) and permissible in all orders, to place the distribution of troops in the center of the page between Pars. 2 and 3.

An order should show clearly the map or maps on which it is drawn or to which references are made in the order. These map references may be placed between the heading and Par. 1. (See examples of orders in the text.)

All operation orders should preferably be signed A, Colonel, or A, Brigadier General, only—not “By order of, etc.”

At the foot of the order should be a complete list of all persons to whom it is to be delivered. Thus “verbally to assembled officers” does not cover the case if the cavalry commander is ten miles to the front and the quartermaster with the trains ten miles to the rear. The written record of a verbal order should include a list of the individuals to whom delivered. Officers to whom written orders are delivered should generally be required to sign for them, often their initials opposite their names at the foot of the retained copy will be sufficient. This matter is one of extreme importance, as it is necessary to insure the delivery of an important order to every commander who is directly affected thereby and usually to others who are only indirectly affected. The best of orders will be useless unless they are promptly and surely communicated to all who are charged with their execution. Copies or synopses of important orders should be sent to superior commanders and, when necessary, to those who are co-operating with the officer who issues the order.

The nature of the orders to cover various different classes of operations must be learned by study and practice and there can be no hard and fast rules laid down. A few general precautions may, however, well be observed. Among these are the following:

Follow the forms given in the F. S. R. departing therefrom only when the application of the form results in a clumsy order, which will seldom or never be the case.

Use simple English and short, clear sentences. Omit arguments and discussions. Avoid the excessive use of participles and infinitives. Ambiguity is a fatal mistake. [Pg 41]

In referring to points, describe them so that they can be located on the ground as well as on the map. The description of a locality should, when practicable, be independent of any map. Do not use the expressions “in front of,” or “to the right of,” but “south of,” or “northeast of.” Do not order anything done at “dusk” or “sunrise,” but give standard times. “Dusk” is an indefinite time, and it is not possible by inspecting the sky to predict the time until sunrise, especially if it is cloudy. Do not assume that your subordinates can see on the ground all the points that you can see on the map.

The amount of information contained in an order should be sufficient to secure the intelligent co-operation of all subordinates and no more. It is not wise to tell them all your plans, but they must sufficiently understand the mission of the command to enable them to act intelligently in an emergency. Orders without knowledge of the commander’s desire may leave the subordinate totally at sea when facing a situation in which the orders must be modified or disregarded. Prominence should be given to good news, and bad news should be touched upon lightly or omitted entirely unless it is necessary to warn subordinates of impending danger. Thus, if the commander knows that reinforcements are on their way to the enemy he will take the necessary steps to provide against the danger, but it would not always be wise to dishearten his command by gratuitously giving them the bad news. Provisions for a possible retreat should be considered in advance by the commander, but should not be ordered until the necessity arises, and similarly for other contingencies of the future. In order to provide against the possibility of his being killed, seriously wounded or captured the [Pg 42] commander should communicate to the next in rank, or to a trusted staff officer, information of impending danger, etc., and so much of his plans for the future as may seem to be necessary.

An order should not trespass upon the province of a subordinate by entering into details which might safely be left to his judgment. Ordinarily tell him what you wish him to do but not how he is to do it, as methods will be largely dependent upon circumstances which cannot be foreseen. If detailed instructions seem to be necessary they might well be made the subject of a personal interview with the subordinate, but omitted from the written orders. The higher the rank of the subordinate the less detailed should be the instructions given him. A private soldier must do exactly as he is told without always knowing the reason why. A general commanding a division often exercises his own judgment as to how best to co-operate in the general plan.

On the other hand a commander should never divide responsibility with a subordinate. Tell him in unequivocal terms what he is to do and avoid such expressions as “if you think best,” or “as far as possible,” etc.

An order should not discuss contingencies nor attempt to provide for same, and it should not look too far ahead.

Circumstances often make it necessary to issue individual orders, even in cases where a combined order would be preferable. In such cases it is usually necessary for co-operation that each subordinate should know the general plan, and what other subordinates are to do. The combined order is therefore, generally to be preferred, as it saves time and assures co-operation. In a combined order every fraction of the command should be accounted for, and receive the necessary instructions. Where orders are issued individually the adjutant, or other staff officer, makes notes of the individual orders for the purpose of later consolidating them in a combined order.

In the case of dictated orders the officers who take the dictation should make a number of carbon copies in order to provide a supply for distribution and to save the time required in copying.

The time for issuing orders is a matter requiring careful consideration. If issued too far in advance there is the danger that later information or developments may make it necessary to modify or rescind the order, something which it is very desirable to avoid, as [Pg 43] besides the confusion thus created it tends to diminish the confidence of the troops in their commander. Also the information contained in the order may, either directly or indirectly, fall into the hands of unauthorized persons, and perhaps be communicated to the enemy. On the other hand the order should be issued sufficiently far in advance to allow time for its proper circulation, to allow subordinate commanders time to make their own estimates of the situation and issue their own orders, etc. Messing arrangements, supply, and other internal economies are also largely dependent upon the commander’s plans, and the troops can usually rest better if they know somewhat in advance when they must be ready to move. Accordingly it is sometimes advisable to issue preliminary orders in advance, the final order being reserved until later. An example of this would be the “assembly order” referred to in the chapter on “Advance Guards.” Another would be the “halt and outpost order” in which the troops for and general location of the outpost line would be designated, the detailed disposition of troops upon this line being arranged for later. Complicated orders should not, as a rule, be issued late at night, ordinarily not after 11 p. m. except in cases of emergency. On the other hand if late information which may affect the commander’s plans is expected it would not be wise for him to make his decision too far in advance, nor to communicate it to his command. Such a situation can often be met by the issue of a preliminary order.

Time must be allowed for making estimates, and for the issue and circulation of orders. To come to a decision after he is in possession of all available information the commander will require from 5 to 30 minutes, or even more if the situation be complicated. To issue a verbal or dictated order requires 5 to 15 minutes additional. A formal written order will usually require even more time. In a division action it will ordinarily require not less than 40 minutes for the commander to come to a decision and issue his written orders. (The time stated in an order is the instant of signature for a written order or the conclusion of a verbal or dictated order.)

It is necessary, in large commands, to make allowance for the time required for orders, subsequent to their issue, to reach all parts of the command. In a brigade, in some cases, as much as an hour may be [Pg 44] required, in a division as much as one and a half to two hours. It is to be remembered that each subordinate must make an estimate of the situation so far as it concerns his command, issue the necessary orders and circulate them amongst his subordinates, and so on, all after the receipt of the supreme commander’s order. In important cases it may be well to calculate the actual time required for orders to reach and take effect upon all parts of the command.

Motor cars and cycles by their speed facilitate the distribution of orders.

An order must be consonant with the decision it is supposed to embody. A disagreement between the two might be fatal. In solving a problem then, the student should check and cross check the decision and order, to make certain that they agree. It is ordinarily unnecessary to enter into minor details in the decision, which will usually cover the main points alone, giving such detail only as is required to enable a competent staff officer to write the necessary orders to carry the decision into effect.

The supreme commander will estimate the situation and make his decision. The duty of translating this decision into action through the medium of appropriate orders will devolve upon a staff officer. The preparation of military orders is in no essential respect different from the preparation of orders and correspondence in civil affairs. The successful business man should have little difficulty in acquiring skill in the preparation of military orders. Such skill is best acquired by practice in preparing orders to carry out the decisions of others. The military student, therefore, may profitably devote considerable time to such practice.

Classification. Patrols are classified according to their uses as tactical or strategical (discussed under “Cavalry Tactics”), security or information. Combat patrols are placed on the flanks of battle lines for the security thereof. Outposts and advance guards always send out patrols which ordinarily go but a short distance from the body which sent them out. The discussion under this heading pertains primarily to officer’s patrols sent out on independent missions. It is with such patrols that the special problems usually deal. Advance guard and outpost patrols are discussed under those headings, (Chapters IV and X.)

Composition and Strength. The men for a patrol should generally be selected for the purpose in view and not taken at random, or by roster. The same applies to their mounts.

For important duty on an independent mission the patrol should be commanded by an officer. However, do not get the habit of sending out officer’s patrols for all duty. All officers are available to command mounted patrols when necessary. Certain officers of an infantry regiment are mounted, and dismounted officers may be provided with mounts from the horses attached to the regiment.

A patrol should never be any larger than necessary for the purpose in view. Consider how many men may be required for messengers, and whether you will probably have to fight to accomplish your mission. A good rule is that less than 6 men are too few to send messages, and more than 10 too many to be readily concealed. In a hostile country you generally need two men for each message. In friendly country one is enough if distance is not too great, no enemy near, etc.

Mounted patrols are generally more efficient than foot patrols on account of their greater mobility, especially for information purposes. On an independent mission to a distance greater than two miles it is the rule to use mounted or auto patrols. But small mounted [Pg 46] patrols must proceed very cautiously if enemy is known to have bodies of infantry in the locality. If the enemy has cavalry about, there is also great risk for either mounted or dismounted patrols. The patrol leader should select men and horses when he can. Mounted and dismounted men should not be used in the same patrol.

The mounted orderlies which form part of an infantry regiment are intended to meet the constant need for the service of mounts while avoiding the disadvantages of detailing considerable numbers of cavalry for this purpose. The uses of these mounts will be many and will include the following:

The orderlies to whom the mounts are regularly assigned should be thoroughly trained as messengers and signalers and their usefulness may be greatly increased if they be trained also as scouts. While their prime function will be that of agents of communication the commander of a detached regiment, unaccompanied by a cavalry detail, who has need of mounted scouting will certainly use these mounts for such purpose. Such duty need not be performed by the orderlies regularly assigned, but their mounts may be used for officers and specially selected infantrymen assigned to scouting duty. Hostler duty will be required for the various mounts accompanying an infantry regiment, but hostlers need not be mounted. It is not to be supposed that the mounted men attached to an infantry regiment are to be considered primarily as hostlers, and the orderlies should not be regularly employed on such duty to an extent which would interfere with the performance of their more important functions.

The uses to which these mounted orderlies will be put will depend upon circumstances and upon the nature of their training. They will occupy space in the column and necessitate the transportation of a considerable amount of forage. They should not be utilized solely for the personal convenience and comfort of mounted officers. The skilled commander will train and utilize his mounted men in such manner as to obtain the largest possible return on the investment. [Pg 47]

In the operations of great masses of troops which are becoming more and more characteristic of modern warfare, especially in densely populated countries, the duty of reconnaissance will be performed by the cavalry and aeronautical services. Under such conditions detachment warfare will be reduced to a minimum and there will be little occasion to employ the mounted orderlies of the infantry, except for communication, etc. The general organization may well contemplate such conditions. Detachment warfare has, however, hitherto been frequent in the wars of the United States and is very apt to continue for some years to come in military operations on this continent. The detached brigade or regiment, even if accompanied by a cavalry command, will have frequent occasion to employ all available mounted men for the duty of reconnaissance.

Motor cars are often useful in the conduct of patrols. They are swift, and can travel almost anywhere that troops operate. They are present in great numbers with modern armies and in many cases are not as apt to attract hostile attention as bodies of mounted men.

Patrolling problems ordinarily require three things:

Instructions to patrol leader before starting. The officer sending out a patrol should give the leader very full instructions while being careful not to hamper him with details. Tell him fully what you want him to do but not how to do it. The information and instructions given him will include the following.

• 1. Information of the enemy and our supporting troops.
• 2. Plan of the commander.
• 3. Mission of the patrol—explain very carefully all that you
• want it to learn.
• 4. Size of the patrol and where obtained.
• 5. Furnish patrol leader with a map if he has not one already.
• 6. General route of patrol and hour of departure.
• 7. Limits of the country it is to observe, and location of other
• friendly patrols. [Pg 48]
• 8. Time patrol is to return, and if necessary latest hour by
• which first message should be back.
• 9. When and where messages are to be sent.
• 10. Location of Blue (friendly) outposts.
• 11. Contemplated movements of the command during patrol’s
• absence, if any.
• 12. Cause patrol leader to set his watch with yours.

Action of patrol leader before starting. 1. He confers with the officer from whom he is to obtain his men, asks about their qualifications, or if they are his own men selects those who are specially qualified. He makes the necessary arrangements for the start, such as the hour when the men are to be called, breakfast before starting, provides for a cooked meal to be carried if patrol is apt to be out over 6 hours, especially in hostile territory, etc.

2. He provides his own equipment, which besides his mount should include the following:

3. He studies his map and the route he is to take, notes distances, features of terrain, including prominent landmarks and lookout points, lays his plans, etc.

4. He assembles his detail and inspects the men and their equipment and the horses. He sees that all his men are physically fit, that they have everything that is necessary and nothing that is unnecessary. He inspects the backs, feet and mouths of the horses, has any white horses replaced by some of darker color, if practicable, and changes any horses that are said to have a habit of neighing excessively. He sees that each man has a canteen full of water or coffee, and one or two luncheons or cooked meals, as circumstances require, and that each has a feed of grain for his horse in his saddle bags. He sees that the accouterments of the men do not glisten or rattle, and that none has any maps, letters or newspapers which might be of value to the enemy in case of capture. He assures himself that both men and horses have been watered and fed before starting. [Pg 49]

5. He questions his men as to their qualifications. He explains in detail the mission of the patrol, and the instructions he has received. He shows them his map, and points out the route and important features of the terrain. He tells them where messages are to be sent. He instructs them as to their conduct, particularly as to the necessity for keeping concealed and avoiding a fight.

6. He rehearses with his men a simple code of signals.

7. He designates a second in command (unless such exists ex-officio).

Conduct of the Patrol. 1. The patrol, proceeds in column of twos at a trot until the outpost line is reached. At the outpost the patrol halts and the leader calls the attention of the men to the position of the outpost. He then points out the route and such landmarks as are of importance. He questions the outpost sentry as to any knowledge he has of the enemy, etc. He tells the sentry by what route he is going, by what route he will probably return, and how long he expects to be out.

2. On leaving the outpost the patrol takes up a more extended formation. This formation is essentially that of any body of troops on the march, consisting of advance guard, main body, flank guards (when required) and rear guard. A patrol should cover a road space of not less than 100 yards nor more than 250 under average conditions. 100 to 200 yards is about correct. A large patrol is not strung out much more than a small one. The formation should be such as to reduce vulnerability and to favor the escape of at least one man in case of attack. Distances much in excess of those given offer few advantages in these respects and make control by the leader very difficult. In very open country distances may be somewhat increased. In very close country or at night they may be reduced. A good formation for a mounted patrol of 8 men is as follows: In the lead Sergeant and one man at 20 yards distance, on opposite sides of road, Sergeant in lead, 60 yards back the Lieutenant and 4 men, at 10 yards distance, alternately on opposite sides of the road, 60 yards farther to the rear the remaining 2 men, at 15 yards distance, on opposite sides of road. Flank reconnaissance done by main body. The men should all be so close that they can promptly be assembled by low command or preferably by signal. Men reconnoitering to [Pg 50] flanks must necessarily at times be out of the leader’s sight, but they should never remain so long.

3. Remain on the road and proceed as rapidly as consistent with your mission and your safety. If you have a distant mission, and do not expect to encounter hostiles at once, and particularly if you are in a friendly country do not waste time by excessive reconnoitering at the start. You will of course grow more cautious as you approach the enemy.

4. The usual method of advance for a mounted patrol is by “successive bounds.” This means, in brief, from behind each crest look ahead to the next, and if the coast is clear ride rapidly ahead, repeating the process from the next crest. Of course the view may be limited also by turns of the road. Important cross roads should be reconnoitered as far as the next crest or turn. Shunt roads, if not too long, may be traversed by a couple of men. Woods may be reconnoitered in the judgment of the leader. It is well to see the country beyond them if practicable. Defiles should be approached with caution. In passing such send a couple of men through if defile is not too long or else reconnoiter it on a broad front. Men sent out from the patrol should be told where to go and when to rejoin. Sometimes they may be told to report direct to the commander any information they obtain. As a rule, however, avoid an actual splitting of the patrol, except for short distances and for local security. Men detached from a patrol for any purpose are very apt to become permanently separated.

5. From time to time the patrol leader designates a rendezvous in case patrol is scattered.

6. Houses and villages on the line of march should be approached with caution, especially in hostile country. Generally it is better to reconnoiter a village from a distance and then pass around it unless this would waste time, or unless there is some particular reason for entering the town. Ordinarily keep out of inclosures.

7. The patrol leader should verify his map and make essential military corrections to it as he proceeds. He should point out important landmarks to his men.

8. Water the horses in the morning after being out about an hour, and again in the afternoon.

9. Do not allow civilians to precede the patrol. [Pg 51]

10. Security or covering patrols will fight whenever necessary to their mission of guarding the main body from observation, and they will be made strong enough for this purpose. Information or reconnoitering patrols, however, should as a rule endeavor to avoid fighting and keep themselves concealed, as far as practicable, from observation. They will usually fail to accomplish their mission of gaining information if they allow themselves to be drawn into unnecessary combats with hostile patrols. Fighting, however, may be permissible or even necessary in some cases:

• (a) To gain important information, or escape with information gained.
• (b) To avoid capture.
• (c) In exceptional cases, to prevent an enemy from gaining important
• information or escaping with information gained. In general,
• however, reconnoitering patrols will not be expected to perform
• also the duty of covering and preventing hostile observation.
• (d) To prevent hostile patrols from getting in rear and thus
• endangering the transmission of important messages.
• (e) In exceptional cases, to capture prisoners if this may be
• done without great danger and there is a probability that
• important information may be gained from them.

In the above cases and such others as may arise, the patrol leader must consider his own mission, and whether his chances of success will be improved by fighting. The best patrolling is where the patrol accomplishes its mission without being seen by the enemy. As a rule the patrol should not fight for the sake of capturing prisoners. But if any be captured they should be closely questioned and a record made of any information gained from them. If this appears to be sufficiently important to warrant such a procedure the prisoners may be sent back to the outpost. Otherwise they may be deprived of their arms and mounts and turned loose, taken along with the patrol, or otherwise disposed of as circumstances may warrant, or instructions require.

11. Take advantage of all good lookout points for observation. The leader himself should take a look with his glasses, posting a couple of men near him to guard him from surprise.

12. Make your halts in concealed places, and generally utilize a halt for observation from some lookout. Put out “march outposts” during a halt. [Pg 52]

13. If a hostile patrol passes you it may be well to take his back trail—you are less liable to meet others than on a new road, and may also intercept important messages.

14. In concealing yourself make sure your retreat is not cut off.

15. If attacked by superior force scatter if necessary, and assemble later; if cut off make a detour; if checked on one line of advance take another.

16. Exchange information with any friendly (Blue) patrols you happen to meet, but generally keep out of the territory assigned to them.

17. Watch carefully for indications of the enemy—small points may often be important. In estimating strength of a hostile column try to gain a position from which you can see the entire column, rather than wait for it to pass a single point. The following table is useful for estimating strength of a column:

Troops passing a point in one minute:’

A thick cloud of dust indicates infantry.

A high, thin cloud indicates cavalry.

A broken cloud indicates artillery or trains.

18. A patrol should never desist until its mission is accomplished.

19. The main roads are best for travel. The enemy is more apt to be encountered there which may or may not be an advantage. It is sometimes advisable to return by a different route. Often it may be best to travel on a less frequented side road from which the main road can be observed.

20. A patrol’s mission is usually to locate the enemy’s main body, or at least a hostile force large enough to affect the plans of the commander who sent out the patrol. So keep on until you have done this. When you have located such a body hang to it as long as there is anything of value to be learned. Your commander will want to know the enemy’s location, strength, movements and intentions. [Pg 53]

21. Be cautious about interviewing the inhabitants in a hostile country—they may betray your presence to the enemy. But in a friendly country the inhabitants may give you valuable information, and will generally refrain from giving the enemy information about you—though not always. Take all hearsay evidence for what it is worth.

22. If a patrol remains out over night it is, of course, advisable to camp near the enemy in order to keep touch with him. Care should be exercised, however, in selecting a bivouac. In a friendly country the inhabitants may, with caution, be applied to for shelter. In a hostile country such a proceeding is dangerous. A patrol should usually avoid spending two successive nights in the same place in hostile territory.

23. If patrols go to a great distance and it is probable that there will be many important messages to be sent back, arrangements may be made to relay the messages. This is not usual, but is sometimes done, especially in a hostile country. Relay posts insure the safety and rapidity of transmission. These posts would ordinarily be placed at intervals of about 5 miles. They may be established by the patrol itself by dropping off a few men at intervals along the route, or they may be established by other bodies. To illustrate, suppose a company of infantry with some mounted men were holding a bridge 10 miles in front of the outpost line, and on the route of a patrol sent to the front. This company could establish 3 relay posts, one midway between the bridge and the outpost, one at the bridge and one 5 miles beyond. The two isolated relay posts should consist of two or more mounted men and 6 or 8 infantrymen for protection. In such a case the messengers coming in from the patrol might return to it from the outermost relay post, after a rest. The commander of each relay post should read and record all messages that arrive, and assure himself that they are safely transmitted to the next post.

24. Messages. The only strictly reliable information is that obtained by personal observation of a reliable officer. Do not report as a fact something that has been told you, but give the source of your information and your opinion as to its reliability if this seems advisable.

Generally send written messages by two men (giving each a copy). [Pg 54] Repeat the messages to them and have them repeat to you. Tell them the route to take, rate of speed, and caution them to destroy the messages rather than allow them to fall into the hands of the enemy. The rates of speed for a mounted messenger are, ordinary 5 miles per hour, rapid, 7 to 8, urgent, 10 to 12.

If you are in a friendly country, not too far out, with no enemy in your rear, one man may be enough to carry a message.

Messengers, as a rule, do not rejoin.

Intermediate commanders along the route, such as the outpost commander, may read messages.

In your messages, ordinarily give time and place of sending and state what you will do next. But if you have reason to fear that this will compromise your safety or lead to your capture and hence your failure, should message fall into hands of the enemy, this information may be omitted, especially if it is of no particular value to the commander. For similar reasons it may be advisable to omit the name, rank and organization, and even in some cases the location, of the superior to whom the message is sent, addressing it simply “Blue commander,” the messenger being given the necessary instructions as to its delivery. Arrangements are often made to have messages delivered at stations other than that occupied by the main command, preferably of course, a place connected by telegraph or telephone with the command. This may avoid danger of capture of messengers and insure more prompt delivery.

In each message usually give a rèsumé of important information in previous messages, in case these should not have been delivered, also any information obtained in the meantime, but which was not important or urgent enough for a special message. Keep a record of all you learn in your notebook and make a full report on your return.

The style of messages should be brief and clear, somewhat like telegrams. All cautions as to clearness and brevity in orders apply similarly to messages.

Messages should be numbered serially as a rule. Use your message pad in the solution of problems. Names of places should be PRINTED IN CAPITALS.

25. What to report. A patrol’s mission is not alone to gain certain information but to transmit it to the commander, and this last duty may be the more difficult. Information is of greatest value if [Pg 55] promptly transmitted. The first certain information of the enemy must be promptly reported. Thus, if you see two Red cavalrymen, report the fact at once, unless your commander was previously aware of the presence of small hostile parties in the locality. In such case the information is of no immediate value and need only be noted for final report. In reporting the presence of a hostile force always make sure that it is not immediately followed by other troops, and state this in your report. The next important information will usually be something concerning the enemy’s main force, or at least a considerable body. It is not necessary to report every patrol that you meet. Ordinarily do not send in negative messages, unless the commander desires negative information or has ordered you to send in a message by a certain hour. In some cases, however, negative information may be of the greatest importance. The patrol leader should always make use of the telegraph and telephone for transmitting messages when such facilities are available.

(For the use of Air Craft in reconnaissance see Chap. XVIII.)

Strength and Composition. The strength of an advance guard in actual campaign, is from 1-3 to 1-20 of command, usually nearer the former figure. In general, for a company, 1 platoon, for a battalion, 1 company, for a regiment, 1 battalion, for a brigade, 1 regiment, for a division, 1 brigade, reinforced. A company sends out a point or advance party, a battalion an advance party or support, a regiment a support. An advance guard smaller than a battalion usually has no reserve, but it is permissible for a battalion to have a reserve. Machine guns of leading regiment generally at tail of leading battalion. In an advance guard of 1 battalion machine guns are with the reserve usually at the tail. In a larger body with the support. It is a general rule to have at least a battalion in front of the machine guns.

There should always be some mounted men with an advance guard. If preceded by independent cavalry the advance guard does not need much cavalry. Otherwise it should have some. A number of mounted orderlies may be attached to the advance guard for patrol duty if no cavalry is available for the purpose.

Engineers are generally useful with an advance guard but seldom accompany one smaller than a regiment. The mounted section may accompany the advance cavalry.

Advance guard cavalry is the cavalry assigned to the advance guard commander. Advance cavalry is that portion of the advance guard cavalry which precedes the mounted point. Some or all of the cavalry, if the force is small, may be attached to the support for local reconnaissance. Mounted men are almost invariably assigned to the support. They may be sent out as flank patrols under officers, and used for mounted point and for nearby reconnaissance. In exceptional cases the advance guard commander may send out special patrols of mounted men to front or flanks, without attaching them to the support. In such cases their duties are somewhat similar to those of advance cavalry but usually more restricted.

Signal troops are seldom attached to an advance guard, unless it be at least a reinforced brigade. [Pg 57]

The sanitary troops properly belonging to an organization accompany it in advance guard. A brigade as advance guard usually has an ambulance company assigned to it, a regiment, 3 ambulances.

Artillery is not usually assigned to an advance guard of less than a brigade, but a battery might be assigned to two regiments in advance guard. Artillery is usually not safe with a small advance guard on account of its limited reconnaissance. Also a small infantry force with artillery becomes merely an escort for the artillery and neglects its more important duties. Artillery should have at least a regiment in front of it.

Advance guard artillery is generally with the reserve with at least a battalion and preferably a regiment immediately in front of it. Artillery is seldom placed in an advance guard in close country.

If there is much infantry patrolling to be done (usually in absence of mounted men) the advance party, whose special duty is patrolling, should be strong and commanded by an officer. But if there be plenty of mounted men, the advance party is relieved of this duty to a great extent and need not ordinarily be stronger than ¼the support.

The field trains of a small advance guard are usually with the main body during the march. This is also better with a large advance guard, unless the situation is such that a combat is not probable during the day and the trains could not reach the advance guard to supply it at night. On halting for the night the field trains of the advance guard troops (baggage section and one day’s rations) habitually join their organizations.

Avoid splitting organizations in forming an advance guard or any of its fractions. If you need more than 1 battalion better send the entire regiment.

“Leading troops” are not the same as an advance guard and should not be confused therewith. They are generally used where a regular advance guard is unnecessary, as for instance, ahead of the trains in a retreat or retrograde movement. If it is intended to delay the enemy or to prepare positions for delaying actions, engineers should generally be with “leading troops”—sometimes constituting their entire strength. They “prepare bridges for demolition,” and a mounted section of [Pg 58] engineers (with the rear guard) completes the demolition when last friendly troops have cleared, if necessary to delay the enemy.

The engineers, with either advance guard or leading troops are charged with the duty of removing obstacles to the march and repairing crossings, etc.

The Start. The supreme commander may order the advance guard to clear a certain point at a certain hour, or he may designate the hour of march and point of departure of the main body and the distance at which the advance guard will precede it. From these data the advance guard commander figures the time of departure of the different parts of his command. He usually designates for the start an initial point which all organizations can reach by one or preferably several convenient routes without countermarching, delay or confusion. The point, while well forward should generally be inside the outpost line. The hour of departure of the advance cavalry is designated in advance guard order as well as its route unless this is the same as that of advance guard and there is no danger of interference. In the advance guard order the hours at which the support will clear the initial point, and the head of the reserve reach it are also designated. The advance guard always marches by same route as main body. The outpost troops (if part of the advance guard) are usually assigned to the reserve. They remain in position until the support has passed the outpost line, and then close in time to take their places in the column.

Some convenient advanced point on the line of march beyond the initial point may be designated as the place at which the cavalry on outpost duty (day positions) may join the advance cavalry as it passes. The approximate time of junction should also be given in the order. Similar arrangements may be made for mounted orderlies on outpost duty to join their regiment, or head of reserve, etc., if they are out to the front.

The field trains with the advance guard should be assembled immediately after the departure of the advance guard (and in time to be out of the way of the main body) clear of the main road, preferably on a branch road on the less exposed flank. They will then usually join those of the main body. The trains with the outpost troops must move to the rear in time to be off the main road before any troops move. They are brought back the evening before the march, after supper, or else early next morning. [Pg 59]

A small command may be assembled in column of route on the road before starting, but with a large command this is neither desirable nor (ordinarily) practicable.

Do not allow anything for elongation at the beginning of a day’s march.

Assembly Order. In a large advance guard, in order to allow all the troops as much rest as possible, it is sometimes desirable to issue an “assembly order” (written or dictated) the night before the march, the “march order” being issued the next morning. The assembly order should not be issued later than 11 p. m., if this can be avoided, and the earlier the hour the better for the troops. The usual form of an assembly order will be a statement of the time at which the command will be in readiness to march in the morning. If the force be a large one different hours may be designated for different troops in order to give all as much rest as possible. To determine these times proceed as follows: Considering the position of the organization in the column calculate the time at which its head should reach the “initial point,” then subtract the time required to reach the initial point from the camp of the organization. This gives the time at which the organization should march from its camp. The organization should be “ready to march” from 3 to 10 minutes sooner—depending on size of entire advance guard. In writing an assembly order make sure that the marches of various organizations do not interfere. This would be a serious mistake. The assembly order should close with a statement of when and where the march order will be issued next morning. The assembly order may or may not contain information as to the enemy, the commander’s plan, etc., depending on the situation. If it is practicable to issue the complete march order the night before it is usually better to do so, as this gives subordinate commanders time to estimate the situation so far as it pertains to their commands, and to make all the necessary preliminary arrangements in ample time. This is usually practicable if there is not apt to be a change in the situation before morning, if spies are not feared, etc. The assembly order may sometimes include everything except the exact time of departure, objective of the march and route to be followed, this information being reserved until morning. Thus the commander avoids betraying prematurely his full plans. (See also “Field Orders,” Chap. II.) [Pg 60]

The order of the advance guard commander divides the advance guard into two main parties only (usually support and reserve). The subdivisions of the leading body and their distances are left to the commander thereof.

Distances. The distance at which the advance guard precedes the main body should be sufficient to secure the latter against surprise by rifle fire or, if a large command, by artillery fire, and in case the enemy is encountered, to permit of his being delayed long enough, and sufficiently far to the front to allow the main body ample time to make the dispositions necessary to meet him. Each fraction of the advance guard should be similarly disposed with regard to the fraction next in rear, it being remembered that small bodies are not likely to be made targets for artillery fire. Distances are greater in open country than in close country, greater if artillery fire is to be feared than if rifle fire only, greater if there is a possibility of attack in force by cavalry, than if foot troops alone are apt to be encountered, greater for a cavalry advance guard than for one of infantry or mixed troops. Distances are often reduced at night. The dispositions of a cavalry advance guard are similar to those of infantry, but usually with greater distances.

If any fraction of an advance guard consists of a battalion or more the fraction next in rear (including the main body) usually guides on it, following at a certain distance. If the fraction is smaller than a battalion it regulates its march on the fraction next in rear, preceding it at a certain distance. This should be covered in orders. This regulation of one body on another must be more or less reciprocal.

Reconnaissance. If there is a mission for the cavalry outside the sphere of the advance guard commander it should be used as independent cavalry. This will usually be the case if contact with the enemy has not been gained. But if approximate position of enemy is known and a combat is imminent it may be better to use cavalry as “advance cavalry.” This will allow it to go far enough out to gain contact with enemy in time, and yet does not allow it to get so far out of hand that it can not perform its proper functions during the combat. The cavalry should protect the advance guard from surprise by artillery fire. [Pg 61]

Patrolling is very fatiguing to foot soldiers, hence mounted men are used where practicable. Parallel roads adjacent to the line of march (not more than 1 to 2 miles distant) may be used for flank guards or patrols. A flank guard of an advance guard should usually be of mounted men. But if it is liable to encounter resistance or is expected to delay an enemy’s advance it must be supported by infantry. Usually observation alone is sufficient for flank protection.

A mounted point of a few men, ½ to 1 mile ahead of the infantry point is very desirable, especially if there is no advance cavalry.

Flank patrols should not march through the fields, especially as this would be of little use. If there are no suitable parallel roads available, flanking patrols (mounted or foot) are sent out to all good lookout points or country which it is desired to search, from the advance party when the latter is abreast of these points. These patrols occupy the lookout points until the advance guard has cleared them and then close in on the road and join the reserve. In a small force these lookouts remain in position until the main body has cleared, and then join the tail of the main column, rejoining their proper organization during a halt, or at the end of the day’s march. A large advance guard would always have mounted men, and so need not adopt to any great extent, this method of patrolling or lookout with dismounted men. Small patrols on parallel roads should occasionally rejoin, report, and be relieved by new patrols.

Connecting files must be maintained between all fractions of advance guard and between the reserve and the main body. It is the duty of each fraction to maintain communication with the one in front. Mounted orderlies are useful for this purpose. If these are not available, foot soldiers must be used, in which case they should be not over 200 yards apart.

A flank guard at a distance of two miles is far enough out to prevent surprise by artillery fire—the greatest danger to be anticipated on the flank (See “Flank guards” for further discussion of this subject.)

The support commander attends to details of nearby reconnaissance and makes the necessary divisions of his command.

If cavalry has been attached to advance guard it is, of course, not to be used as independent cavalry. It usually has the function of gaining [Pg 62] contact with the enemy to the front or exposed flank. After gaining touch it reconnoiters the enemy’s flanks, and may operate against his “flank and rear.” If there are friendly troops within its range, especially if it is marching to join them, the advance cavalry should maintain contact with them. The advance cavalry should not duplicate the work of the independent cavalry when there is such.

The advance cavalry should generally proceed in one body toward the place where the enemy is supposed to be. After contact is gained it will work around his flanks.

It is the duty of the cavalry or other mounted troops with the advance guard to establish contact and to keep in touch with the flank guard (if there is such), with the escort of the trains if these are marching by separate road, with the independent cavalry, with any friendly troops in the vicinity (especially if a junction with them is to be effected), and with the enemy. These duties should be specified in orders.

The important features of the terrain to be considered by the advance guard commander are: those affecting reconnaissance, such as branch and parallel roads, woods, hills, ridges, etc., those which may impede the march, such as road grades and surfaces, woods, bridges, streams and defiles; those bearing on attack and defense, including the foregoing, also towns, fences, etc., and exceptionally, artillery positions and camp sites.

The commander of the advance guard may be with the supreme commander at the head of the reserve. Otherwise he will be between the support and reserve or with the support. The support commander is usually with the advance party.

Miscellaneous duties of advance guards. On halting it is the duty of an advance guard to put out temporary or march outposts. This must never be neglected. (See also Chap. X.) On entering a hostile town the advance guard should seize the railroad, post, telephone and telegraph offices.

All possible methods by which the inhabitants might communicate with the enemy, whether wire, road or rail, should be controlled. If the local means of communication and transportation are not already under military control the supreme commander will issue the necessary orders for their regulation with a view to the service and safety of the armed [Pg 63] forces. Civilians, especially if mounted or in automobiles, should not be allowed to precede the advance guard or advance cavalry, either on the route of march or any parallel route. If overtaken on the march they are compelled to remain in rear. Neglect of this precaution, especially in hostile territory or near the frontier, may result in information of the numbers and movements of the troops being furnished to the enemy.

An advance guard must act aggressively in brushing aside small bodies of the enemy so that the march may not be delayed. Each part of an advance guard should try to handle any hostile force of less strength than itself without causing larger bodies in rear to deploy, thus delaying the march.

The conduct of an advance guard on encountering the enemy in force, must be governed by the circumstances and the mission of the command as a whole. If the latter be on the aggressive this will usually warrant aggressive action by the advance guard. Nevertheless the advance guard must be cautious about risking its own defeat and possibly that of the main body also, by becoming too deeply involved in a combat with a greatly superior force before the main body is up. If the strength of the enemy is unknown the advance guard may make a reconnaissance in force to develop him. It is not necessary to attempt to push home an attack if this appears too risky. If fire superiority can be gained the advance guard can then press the attack vigorously, being watchful, however, of its flanks. (See also Chaps. XI and XIII.)

Avoid intricate maneuvers and wide turning movements. Go straight at the enemy. The advance guard should not uncover the front of the main body.

If the support has been deployed in driving out the enemy, time may be saved by pushing out a new support from the undeployed reserve on resuming the march.

Do not deploy a large part of the force when fired on by a small body of the enemy. Otherwise the march may be unnecessarily delayed.

In passing a bridge or defile it is advisable to send strong infantry flank guards well out in order to drive out any hostiles on the flanks.

A cavalry advance guard, on account of its great flexibility of gaits may use the method of “successive bounds” for its advance. (See “Patrolling.”) [Pg 64]

OUTLINE OF SOLUTION OF
SMALL ADVANCE GUARD PROBLEM.

Advance Guard Order (verbal) for a Battalion.
(See Gettysburg-Antietam Map.)

Verbally to co. commanders, staff, and commander of m. g. company.

“The enemy is believed to have a bn. in NEW OXFORD guarding supplies in the village and the railroad bridge over the LITTLE CONEWAGO, three quarters of a mile northwest thereof, and to have several bns. in GETTYSBURG.

The remainder of our brigade should reach YORK SPRINGS by 10 a. m. today.

Our regiment advances today to break the railroad west of NEW OXFORD and to destroy the supplies in the town. Our mounted patrols have been sent early this morning to GRANITE HILL and towards NEW OXFORD.

The 1st Bn. reinforced by the machine gun company and seven mounted orderlies will constitute the advance guard under my command.

Cos. A and B with 7 mtd. orderlies will constitute the support, under command of Capt. A. Lieuts. X and Y will report to Capt. A to command patrols.

The support will clear the crossroads at BOWLDER at 5:58 a. m. preceding the reserve by 500 yds. and marching via ______ on NEW OXFORD.

The reserve, in order of march, Co. C, the machine gun company, Co. D, will start from the crossroads at BOWLDER at 6:04 a. m., preceding the main body by 600 yds.

The field trains will join those of the regiment in camp by 6:15 a. m.

Messages to head of support.”

Report of dispositions to regimental commander. [Pg 66]

Assembly Order.

Advance Guard, 1st Div., 1st Army Corps,
Farmhouse of ____ near ____
Field Orders		8 Aug., '12, 10:00 p. m.
No. ——
Geological Survey Map.

Dictated to officers detailed to receive. (Record names and organizations.)

Report of dispositions to division commander.

The march orders for an entire command are quite similar to those for an advance guard.

Following is an example of a reinforced brigade acting as advance guard to a division:

The foregoing indicates the approximate distances between elements of varying sizes in advance guards of any strength up to a brigade.

A Battalion with 10 mounted orderlies and a machine gun platoon, as advance guard:

ADVANCE GUARD ORDER FOR
A REINFORCED BRIGADE.

	Advance Guard, 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
	EMMITSBURG, MD.,
Field Orders,		20 Nov., '12—9:30 p. m.
No. ——
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" Map.

Dictated to staff and representatives of:

Copy to C. G., 1st Div., by mtd. messenger.

REAR GUARDS.

Strength and Composition. A rear guard is practically the inverse of an advance guard, its distribution and arrangements are quite similar. On a forward march (toward the enemy) it is unusual to detail a regular rear guard. The rear organization, without special orders, details a few men to cover the rear. If danger is to be apprehended from the rear as well as the front, a command might have both advance and rear guards. This would be exceptional.

It is in a retreat that a rear guard is of particular importance, especially in the retreat of a defeated force pursued by the enemy. In such a case the rear guard should be made as strong as or even stronger than the advance guard in a forward march. If enemy is pursuing closely, all the available troops still in hand may be used to oppose his advance. Thus a rear guard grades imperceptibly into a delaying force, and its orders may vary from those for a simple march to the occupation of a defensive position, for delaying action only. Ordinarily the strength of a rear guard in retreat is about the same as that of an advance guard in a forward march. But as a rear guard, unlike an advance guard, cannot ordinarily count on reinforcements, since the main body is marching away from it, be sure to make it strong enough in the beginning, so that it will not be necessary to detach additional troops to reinforce it.

The rear guard in retreat, usually includes the outpost of the previous night.

Infantry will ordinarily form part of a rear guard, but the proportion should preferably be less than with an advance guard. Infantry has more difficulty in withdrawing from action than mounted troops.

As much cavalry as possible should be assigned to the rear guard, both for reconnaissance and delaying actions. The cavalry should not be [Pg 71] independent of the rear guard commander unless the enemy is so far to the rear that touch with him might be lost if cavalry were restricted. A rear guard may well consist entirely of cavalry if there is enough of that arm available.

Motor cars are extremely useful in the pursuit of a defeated force and correspondingly useful in effecting a rapid retreat.

Artillery, especially horse artillery, is extremely useful for delaying the enemy. Hence a rear guard should as a usual thing have artillery. Even a battalion may have a battery or two with it. It is usually concentrated with the reserve.

The conduct of Engineers in a retreat is ordinarily as follows: The engineer company marches with the advance guard or leading troops and prepares bridges for destruction, constructs obstacles, and, if necessary, prepares delaying positions for defense. The mounted section of the engineers accompanies the rear guard and completes the demolitions after all friendly troops have passed. The destruction of bridges is a most efficacious means of delaying the enemy, but care should be exercised not to cut off the retreat of the rear guard cavalry. Also be careful about destroying bridges without the orders of the supreme commander if this might interfere with his plans. It is usually sufficient to merely disable the bridges by removing planking, if there is time. If no explosives are available a wooden bridge may be destroyed by fire. The engineers carry explosives. Each squadron of cavalry has also a “demolition squad.”

Machine guns are useful with a rear guard.

Signal troops seldom accompany a rear guard. If present they connect it with the main body.

The field trains of the rear guard usually march with those of the main body in front of all troops in the main column. If with the rear guard they should be sent on well in advance of the reserve—the farther the better—with orders to proceed to some definite point.

Sanitary troops if present with a rear guard should ordinarily be sent ahead of the reserve, but must remain within call in case of need. The artillery combat trains are usually with the sanitary troops, within call. They should not be separated entirely from the rear guard if a serious fight is anticipated.

The fractions of a rear guard are rear cavalry, rear point, rear party, [Pg 72] support and reserve. These are analogous to the corresponding fractions of an advance guard, and similarly constituted. Cavalry is employed tactically with a rear guard to a much greater extent than with an advance guard. Hence be cautious about letting it get too much out of hand.

Distances. The distances between fractions and from the main body are ordinarily greater than in the case of an advance guard. When the reserve of an advance guard would be 1,000 yards in front of the main body, that of a rear guard might be 1,500 to 2,000 yards in the rear. In the case of a convoy the rear guard usually remains closer (See “Convoys”). The distances of a rear guard cannot be maintained if it has to delay the enemy. It should not become too far separated from the main body, but it may be still more dangerous to be driven in too close.

As the distances are so variable it is not always advisable to prescribe them exactly. If enemy is not in immediate contact, the rear guard may be ordered to follow the main body at a certain distance. Otherwise it may be ordered to “follow delaying the enemy,” or to “march at such an hour,” or in the extreme case the supreme commander may merely inform the rear guard commander of the hour at which the main body will start, leaving the conduct of the rear guard entirely to its commander. It is, however, entirely proper to direct the rear guard commander in orders, to maintain touch with the enemy by means of patrols and to reconnoiter his flanks.

The rear guard commander should keep himself accurately informed as to the progress of the main body, so that he need not risk his safety any more than necessary. The supreme commander should, from time to time, advise the rear guard commander as to the progress of the main body, etc.

Conduct. As the column is usually withdrawing from the enemy the reconnaissance of a rear guard is different from that of an advance guard. It seeks to establish contact with the enemy, not only with his advance troops but with his main body, and to maintain it as long as possible. Its special duty in the way of reconnaissance is to cover the rear of the main body, not only on the road by which it is retreating, but on parallel roads, so that the enemy while engaging the rear guard with a portion of his force cannot slip by it on a parallel [Pg 73] road and strike the main body, or cut off the retreat of the rear guard. Thus it is important to keep in touch with enemy’s main body.

The rear guard should take the main road as soon as possible, and retreat as nearly as practicable straight to the rear, following the main body, and covering it at all times.

Its usual procedure if closely pressed by the enemy, is a series of delaying actions, one portion covering the retreat of another. The special duty of the rear guard commander, in addition to reconnaissance of the enemy, is the selection of suitable delaying positions. These should fulfill as many as possible of the requirements of a defensive position. But as they will usually not be held to a decision, it is both permissible and proper to occupy an extended front in order to deceive the enemy and force him to make a wide detour to turn the position. In case of an unexpected delay to the main body, such as a broken bridge, the rear guard might have to fight to a decision. In such case it might be reinforced, but ordinarily should not expect nor call for help from the main body.

If it is possible to delay the enemy with the artillery and cavalry it is well to put as little infantry as possible into action, since it is difficult to withdraw without loss and confusion.

The rear guard commander should consider several positions along the line of march from which the enemy may be delayed. It is well to make the first stand as far to the front as possible—at the outpost line if this is a good defensive position. Consequently the outpost should not be withdrawn prematurely, especially as this also gives the enemy notice of your intentions if he observes it. Another position must then be selected to cover the withdrawal of the outpost and so on. Each position should be such that its fire will not be masked by any retiring troops. As these will generally retire straight to the rear, positions squarely or obliquely on the flank of the line of retreat or line of enemy’s advance are often advantageous. If one flank is toward the enemy in such cases, it should be secure, and there should be a good getaway—the front edge of a woods, impenetrable for the most part, but having lanes through it is a good place for a flanking position. In retreating from such positions the troops may have temporarily to leave the main line of retreat. They should rejoin as soon as possible, since main body must not be uncovered. [Pg 74]

If the enemy can be sufficiently delayed by forcing him to deploy one or more times, this is the safest procedure. Accordingly look for high points along the line of retreat, hills and ridges, which may be utilized by the artillery or for position fire of machine guns, and long range rifle fire.

If it is necessary to make a stand, one determined stand in a good position is usually preferable to several half-hearted ones. You may not be able to deceive the enemy more than once as to your strength. If you have a good position do not leave it as long as it is safe to hang on.

A delaying position should preferably have a broad front, a good screen to conceal strength of troops occupying it, an obstacle in its front and a good getaway.

The instructions to an officer commanding a portion of the rear guard in a delaying position might be about as follows: “Major A, you will take up a position at ______ for the purpose of delaying the enemy’s advance (or to cover withdrawal of such troops from such place). When you are in danger of being cut off, break off the engagement and retire via ______ to ______, where further orders will be given you. Messages will reach me at ______.”

The rear guard should be kept as well in hand as conditions permit. All movements should be as simple as possible and as far as practicable, straight to the rear.

The commander of a rear guard should be allowed great latitude. His defensive measures should seldom be prescribed in advance by the supreme commander.

In his own orders the rear guard commander cannot in any case prescribe more than the first two delaying positions—the rear one to cover the retreat from the most advanced. Additional orders are given verbally as necessity arises, but other delaying positions should be considered in estimating the situation.

If the supreme commander has sent out any special patrols to the rear he should mention this in Par. 1 of his retreat order so that rear guard commander may take notice. He should also at all times keep the rear guard commander posted as to the situation, transmitting to him all information bearing upon his duty.

It is unusual for a rear guard to have a flank detachment. If special protection on the flank is required the supreme commander should generally give orders in regard to this, either detailing a special [Pg 75] flank guard, or directing the rear guard to do so. If this has not been done the rear guard commander must consider whether his mission requires a flank guard. Apply the rules given under “Flank Guards.” You will then usually find that a flank guard is not required. Moreover it is properly, as stated, the duty of the supreme commander to attend to this. If he had wanted a flank guard he would probably have said so.

In retreating upon the front of a defensive position a retiring force should draw off to a flank or retire into an interval in the line, so as to avoid masking the fire of the position, while at the same time drawing the enemy across the front of the position in such a manner as to subject him to its fire. Consider which flank it is better to approach.

A rear guard must not take the offensive without special orders from the supreme commander, unless necessary for the accomplishment of its mission. In this respect it differs from an advance guard. There will be occasions, however, when aggressive action will best serve to delay the enemy. If the pursuit be conducted too recklessly opportunity for an effective counter-stroke may be presented. In a critical case the supreme commander may himself remain with the rear guard. This would not be usual.

Rear guard orders, in general, are quite similar to those of an advance guard.

A RETREAT ORDER.

	Detch., 2nd Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
	TWO TAVERNS, PA.
Field Orders,		28 Nov., 1912—10:00 p. m.
No. ——
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" Map.

NOTE:—In this case the detachment is not required to delay the enemy’s advance but only to make good its own retreat. The enemy is not in contact with its outposts. If a serious rear or flank guard action were anticipated it might be better to place all the artillery with the rear and flank guards and the combat trains at the tail of the main body.

If, in a retreat, the enemy is pressing closely it may not be possible to conduct an uninterrupted march, and orders for same cannot be given in advance. In such a case it is often necessary to delay the enemy in successive positions, which duty may be assigned to the rear guard alone, or to the entire force. The rear guard commander, if charged with this duty, will then issue orders for a position in readiness prepared either to reinforce the outpost (which in such a case should have been placed under his command), cover its withdrawal, or take up the march in rear of the main body. Subsequent orders (for a delaying action, another position in readiness, or for taking up the march) may then be issued as the occasion demands. (See “Position in Readiness.”) [Pg 78]

FLANK GUARDS.

Strength and Composition. No rules can be given for the strength of a flank detachment, as this depends on circumstances to a greater extent than in cases of advance and rear guards. Its limiting strength is about ½ that of the body which sends it out, which amounts to a movement in two columns, and it varies from this maximum down to a mounted patrol, which of course would not be called a flank guard. A flank guard proper is a body which has some power of resistance.

A flank guard should generally have a large proportion of cavalry. It may well consist entirely of this arm if there is enough for the purpose, or if a determined resistance is not likely to be required. But if there is paucity of cavalry, not enough to have sufficient resisting power, then infantry should be sent to support the cavalry. As a rule a special flank guard is detailed only when resistance is necessary, hence it will ordinarily consist of infantry and cavalry.

Artillery as a rule does not accompany a flank guard, especially if the situation is such that the artillery from the main body can be thrown over to the flank in case of need. But if the flank guard has sufficient strength artillery may be attached if there appears to be an actual need of it. With a cavalry flank guard horse artillery if available should preferably be used.

Mounted men and machine guns are useful with a flank guard. Engineers, signal and sanitary troops are usually not required.

There should be no wagons with a flank guard, except the regular combat trains. In a flank march the trains should be closed upon the main body, or sent on another road (on unexposed flank) with an escort if required. The trains of the flank guard would be with those of the main body. Ordinarily the wounded or footsore infantrymen riding on the wagons (in addition to the personnel which regularly accompanies them) are sufficient escort for the trains. Do not send the wagon train over a bad road. It is slow enough at best, and on a bad road might, by its slow progress, defeat the very object for which it was separated from the main body. If engineers accompany the command they may be sent with the train to facilitate its progress by repairing bridges, etc. They, of course, also act as escort. In the U. S. field trains can seldom travel in double column, as the roads are not sufficiently capacious. [Pg 79]

In a flank march the advance guard (of the main body) need seldom be as strong as in a forward march.

When required. A flank guard is not a matter of course like an advance guard. It should be used only when the situation demands it. In deciding whether or not to use a flank guard and if yes what troops to assign thereto, ask and answer the following questions:

1. Is there a hostile force on the flank so strong and so close that it might strike the flank of the column during the march? Make careful calculations of times and distances and consider what enemy is able to do.

2. Will observation on the flank be sufficient, or is resistance very likely to be necessary?

3. Is a flank guard necessary for safety, does it promise a real advantage, or will it merely disperse the troops without any compensation?

4. Will a flank guard actually facilitate the march, or is it more apt to delay it?

5. Is there a suitable road for the flank guard at about 1½ miles distance, with several crossroads connecting it with line of march of main body?

6. Are there any impassable obstacles between the two routes?

7. Is the flank guard likely to have a serious fight? If yes generally send some infantry.

After answering these questions the decision will usually be that no flank guard is required. If you are in doubt do not send one. It is ordinarily better to keep your troops in hand especially in a small force, and protection on a flank can usually be provided by active mounted reconnaissance.

If the flank guard is very strong as compared to the main body the formation becomes virtually a movement in two columns. This may sometimes be an advantage. It shortens the distance from front to rear, and facilitates deployment to the front, so that it might be used to advantage where a combat is anticipated and position of enemy known. The distance between the two columns should be about equal to the depth of one column (combatant troops only) as this facilitates deployment to the front. The trains should be with the column on the less exposed [Pg 80] flank, or better still on a third road with an escort. An infantry flank guard not stronger than a regiment, should seldom be more than 1½ miles from the main body.

The ideal case for the use of a flank guard is where there is a certain point, such as a junction of several roads or a lone bridge over an unfordable stream, through which the enemy is certain or at least extremely likely to pass if he operates against the flank, or a strong position commanding the country through which he must pass even when he is not limited to a single route. In this case the flank guard, in sufficient strength, proceeds rapidly to the critical point and there delays the enemy until the main body including the rear guard if there is one, is clear of all danger. But even in this favorable case observation from some commanding point of the country through which the enemy must pass may be sufficient.

Another case in which a flank guard is often used is where a change in direction of march is executed, especially in the case of a convoy. In this case the whole (or a portion) of the former advance guard, reinforced if necessary, may be pushed out to the former front now become the flank, especially if the enemy is known to be in that direction. Here it may seize a strong position and hold it until the main body is out of danger or, according to circumstances, continue the march on a parallel road. A new advance guard is, of course, required, usually not as strong as the former one.

A convoy, being much more vulnerable to an attack than a body of troops, would usually have a flank guard if any danger was anticipated in the direction of its flank. (See “Convoys.”)

An auto convoy may be accompanied by cavalry, foot troops transported by auto, or by a number of armored cars, suitably disposed as advance and rear guards, and as flank guards on parallel roads. On a good road cavalry cannot always keep pace with an auto convoy of light trucks without retarding the speed of the convoy.

The smaller the force the less apt it is to need a flank guard. A large force is much more apt to need one as it requires more time to prepare to meet an attack. For the same reason the flank guard will generally be farther out. A distance of 1½ to 2 miles is sufficient to protect a [Pg 81] column against surprise by artillery fire, and this is ordinarily the limiting distance for a flank guard. A very large flank guard, being more independent and able to stand a longer time without reinforcement, might be farther out. Such a body, however, would be a detachment rather than a true flank guard.

If the flank guard consists entirely of cavalry its distance away, and the matters of communicating roads and obstacles between it and the main body (see ante) are of much less importance than where the bulk of the flank guard is infantry. A strong covering body of cavalry some distance out, however, is virtually independent cavalry and would generally be called such. Its movements would seldom be limited to any particular route.

Conduct. A flank guard marches like any other body, with advance guard, rear guard if necessary, and other security measures. This, of course, is not prescribed in the orders to the flank guard, but is left to its commander. A flank guard does not usually put out its own (another) flank guard. If of cavalry it should send officers’ patrols well to the exposed flank, and if of infantry it employs its cavalry or other mounted men to reconnoiter its exposed flank. It is, of course, extremely desirable to gain touch with the enemy.

Unless there is distinctly an independent mission for the cavalry on the flank it is advisable to place the cavalry with the flank guard and under the commander thereof. Otherwise the cavalry is very apt to get out of hand and fail to co-operate with the infantry. If, however, the cavalry commander is also the commander of the entire flank guard, the necessary freedom of action of the cavalry will not be restricted, while at the same time co-operation between the cavalry and the infantry is assured. Therefore if the cavalry with the flank guard is relatively strong (as compared to the infantry) and the relative rank of the officers concerned permits it, the entire flank guard may well be placed under the cavalry commander.

A flank guard should not bring on a decisive engagement unless it is empowered to do so, as this might involve the main body, contrary to the wishes of the supreme commander.

A flank guard usually marches abreast of the main body. The advance guard (of the main body) keeps touch with the flank guard, but the [Pg 82] latter should maintain communication with the rear guard (of the main body) and not fail to consider the safety of the latter, as it might be endangered if the flank guard advanced or retired too rapidly, allowing the enemy to cut in.

A flank guard usually will not be reinforced. But this may be necessary for the safety of the main column. Hence the obstacles between the two routes and the roads by which the flank guard may be reinforced in case of necessity, must be carefully considered.

The orders of the supreme commander should ordinarily prescribe the time of departure, route and special mission of the flank guard. After this considerable latitude should be allowed the flank guard commander as his actions will depend to a great extent on those of the enemy. The march of a flank guard will not always be continuous. It must, when necessary, halt in suitable places en route, assuming a defensive attitude if necessary, to delay the enemy until main body is clear. The flank guard commander must consider the enemy’s probable line or lines of advance, and the dispositions he will make to delay him. He will not hesitate to leave the prescribed route of march if his mission demands it. He will keep the supreme commander informed as to his actions, particularly if the enemy is encountered, and call for reinforcements when absolutely required.

MARCHES.

Arrangement of troops.

The different elements on a march are:

• (a) The independent cavalry.
• (b) The advance guard.
• (c) The main body.
• (d) The flank guard.
• (e) The rear guard.
• (f) The train (including field hospitals,
• ammunition, supply and pack trains).

In marches in peace time or at a distance from the enemy, cavalry and artillery may march in rear of the infantry or on a different road. Large bodies of cavalry and horse artillery should not, as a rule, be intermingled with foot troops, except so far as is necessary for their safety.

Auto truck trains may be routed on a separate road from wagons and troops where safe and practicable. A good road should be selected for their movement as they suffer greater proportionate delay on a poor road than either troops or wagons.

The combat trains ordinarily accompany their organizations, except that the artillery combat trains are usually in rear of the last infantry organization. The firing batteries should be as a rule near the head of the main body with a battalion or an entire regiment of infantry immediately in front of them. A column of artillery or wagons more than a mile in length should ordinarily have some infantry in the middle for protection against a sudden attack in flank.

Trains follow in advance, precede in retreat, the position of the trains thus usually indicates the direction for retreat. Sometimes trains are sent on a separate road, on unexposed flank. The field trains are usually combined under the command of an officer, who is designated only in the first order or when a change is made. [Pg 84]

There should generally be a small body of cavalry or other mounted men at the head of the main body especially in a flank march, and a few mounted men with the train, 6 to 12 men under an officer, designated in orders if train is separated from main body, and not sufficiently exposed to require a stronger escort.

Brigade trains in a forward march follow the main body at ½ to 2 miles. In a flank march they are usually closed up. In retreat they are sent well ahead. If separated from the main body they should have an escort if there is any risk. Often a few mounted men in addition to the slightly wounded and footsore infantrymen on the wagons (who are still able to fight) will be enough. Also the field trains are usually accompanied by a number of armed men in addition to the wagoners, including sergeants, cooks, mechanics, clerks, etc. Supply and ammunition trains are likewise habitually accompanied by a number of armed men. Engineers are very useful as an escort as they can facilitate the progress of the train. The escort, if any, should be mentioned in orders when train is separated from troops. It should always be under the command of an officer, preferably one senior to the Q. M.

Field trains may (a) Follow without distance (b) Follow at a certain distance (c) Remain behind (d) Follow to a certain locality and there remain (e) Precede at a certain distance or as rapidly as possible (f) Move by a different route to the same or another locality. In (a) and (b) no special escort is necessary. In the other cases circumstances decide. The arrangement of field trains in column should generally be the same as that of the troops to which they pertain. This is a matter of course, and need not be mentioned in orders, at least not after the first order. It is desirable to have the field trains join their organizations at the end of the march. But if tactical considerations demand, the troops can subsist for several days without their trains. Trains should never be taken through a defile or over a bridge if a combat is imminent, especially if retreat is possible. Keep them well to the rear, and off the main road when entering a fight. If it be necessary to separate the command from its trains for a considerable period an extra reserve ration or two may be issued to the troops before the separation. In a division action some or all of the ammunition train would usually accompany the troops into action, the remainder of the trains being left at or sent to a safe place in rear. (See Chap. XVII.) [Pg 85]

In passing a defile have a strong body of infantry at the head of the column. It is usually inadvisable to have a strong body of cavalry immediately ahead of the infantry in such a situation. A defile should be reconnoitered carefully, preferably on a broad front, before allowing any considerable number of troops to enter.

The companies in a battalion and the battalions in a regiment may alternate daily in position (this is not prescribed in orders of supreme commander). But beyond this, daily changes in the order of march are not advisable as they produce confusion and fatigue. The same troops may remain as advance guard for several days at a time, say for one series of marches—5 or 6 days—unless for some good reason, such as their having suffered severely in combat, it seems advisable to relieve them.

A rear guard is exceptional in a forward march—an advance guard in a retrograde movement. In the former case the rear infantry regiment, without orders, puts out a small rear guard (behind the trains), in the latter case “leading troops” (designated in orders) precede the trains. In a flank march both advance and rear guards as well as a flank guard may be necessary—all designated in march order.

Troops should be camped or quartered conveniently with reference to their position in column on arrival and on departure. It is well to camp in column of route along the road if command is not too large and conditions permit. It saves time and fatigue on both arrival and departure.

If there is an independent mission for the cavalry beyond the sphere of the advance guard and if the cavalry is relatively strong enough it should be made independent. Otherwise the bulk of it is attached to the advance guard. If a combat is imminent the tactical use of the cavalry to develop the enemy and operate against his flanks and rear may take precedence over other considerations, in which case the cavalry may better be kept in hand (assigned to advance guard).

The supreme commander may march (a) Between support and reserve of advance guard (b) At head of reserve (c) At head of main body. If he is with the advance guard a commander should be designated for the main body. The supreme commander may go wherever his presence is necessary. He generally designates a certain place (as “head of reserve”) to which [Pg 86] messages are to be sent, and if he is not there when they come in, an orderly takes them to him. When he is with the advance guard its commander will usually accompany him. The supreme commander should generally march with the advance guard if combat is at all probable. In retreat he may join the rear guard if the enemy is pressing the pursuit.

In a flank march the distances between elements should generally be less than in a forward march—the entire column is “closed up.”

Time of Starting. Infantry and other foot troops should have an hour of daylight prior to commencing the march. Hence the first troops to march should start about sunrise. Mounted troops should have two hours of daylight before starting. Hence they should march about an hour after sunrise. These are the proper hours for starting, and orders should be arranged accordingly. Circumstances may require an earlier start, at daybreak or, in exceptional cases, even a little earlier. But there should be cogent reasons for a very early start. It is well to avoid the habit of early starting. Both men and animals rest well in the hours just preceding dawn. To habitually interfere with this rest will rapidly lower the efficiency of the troops. If the number of mounted troops is small, and tactical considerations require it, their comfort may occasionally be disregarded, and they will start with the infantry at sunrise. As a rule the cavalry will not trot in starting a day’s march, they should walk at least a mile. In any case the gaits should be left to the judgment of the cavalry commander. The independent cavalry, if it moves by a separate road, may start later than the infantry, as it can make up for lost time by increase of gait. Ordinarily it should not be sent past foot troops on the same road (unless it be wide and paved) as this will cause confusion, delay and discomfort.

Trains may be started out considerably earlier than troops if necessary, as they are not subjected to such great fatigue. This, of course, will never be necessary when trains follow in rear of troops, but in retreat they should be sent on about 2 hours ahead of the troops, or even sooner if necessary for their safety and to get them out of the way. Hence they, with their escort, will frequently march before daybreak.

In considering the probable movements of the enemy, always make allowance for what might happen if he marches at daybreak or earlier [Pg 87] still, for he has this option. Are there any reasons why he might wish to start early? If he arrived late at his camping place (after 3:00 p. m.) this indicates the possibility of his making a start early the next morning.

A late arrival (after 3:00 p. m.) is even more objectionable than an early start, unless hours of march have been arranged with a long rest to avoid the heat of mid-day. It is better to break camp before daylight than to make it after dark.

Night marches of any considerable length should generally be avoided except in cases of extreme urgency. If indulged in to any great extent they will soon wear out both men and animals. Troops which have made a long night march will not be in good trim for active operations on the following day. Night marches are sometimes made in hot weather to avoid the heat of the day. They may also be made for the purpose of surprising the enemy, as to secure a favorable position from which he may be attacked at dawn, in the retreat or pursuit of a defeated force and in certain other special cases.

Under the conditions that obtain in modern warfare the movements of large bodies of troops during daylight will seldom escape detection by the enemy’s aerial scouts. Accordingly the cover of darkness will at times be used for the concentration of reserves at critical points on the field of battle. If the troops can be concealed at the end of such movements it will often be advisable to allow them to rest during a portion at least of the day following their night movement. This will restore their vigor and render them fresh for active operations. For night marches it is desirable that the troops be accompanied by guides. (See also Chaps. XI and XIII.)

Movements by rail are usually not practicable except for long distances (more than 40 miles) and when well protected from the enemy by distance or covering troops. They pertain to strategical concentrations, but seldom to tactical operations on a small scale.

Movements of troops in large or small numbers and over considerable distances are successfully accomplished by the use of motor cars. Motor transportation is adaptable to campaign, in that cars may start or end a journey almost anywhere in the theater without regard to a fixed rail right of way. They load, dispatch and unload without formality; they require no sidings nor elaborate terminals. [Pg 88]

In a large command the advance guard will be some distance in advance of the main body. Therefore the time of starting of the latter should not be set so early that advance guard must march before sunrise. Hence a large force cannot make an early start as readily as a small one, unless it camps in column of route.

Standard Times of Sunrise and Sunset
at Gettysburg, Pa.,
40° N lat.

(Authority—Prof. R. H. Willson, Harvard Univ.)
(Correct to within 5 minutes)

The Start. The start is arranged as described under “Advance Guards.” A large body cannot be assembled at one point. The initial point should preferably be at a crossroad, which organizations can reach by a number of different routes. If there is any danger of confusion or interference the routes of different organizations to the initial point should be prescribed. In a large command, where the advance guard and main body are separated by a considerable distance, an initial point should be designated for each. The order of the supreme commander will designate the hour at which the main body will start from its initial point and the hour at which the advance guard will clear its initial point, or preferably, the distance at which the advance guard will precede the main body (in starting). This latter arrangement allows the advance guard commander to select his initial point, which is usually desirable. During the march the main body will usually regulate its march on that of the advance guard if the latter be larger than a battalion. In a small command the same initial point is used for the advance guard and main body. The order of the supreme commander in this case will ordinarily designate the hour at which the advance guard is to clear the initial point and the hour at which the main body starts therefrom, or the distance at which it is [Pg 89] to follow the advance guard. Each subordinate commander is responsible that his command takes its proper place in column at the proper time without interference with other organizations. In an assembly order for a large command troops whose starting times do not differ by more than ten minutes would be grouped under one time heading. See also remarks under “The start,” and “Assembly order,” in the Chapter on advance guards.

It is not always possible to foresee the end of a day’s march. In such cases the order should direct the march “provisionally” on some intermediate point in the right direction, arrival at which without interruption is reasonably certain.

Length and speed of marches. Marches often cause greater losses than battles. A forced march may cost more than a fierce engagement. Hence avoid forced marches and all unnecessary hardships. A long march should not be undertaken with green troops. The early marches of a campaign should not be more than 8 or 9 miles per day for infantry or mixed troops. From this they can be gradually increased to a maximum of about 15 miles for a brigade or smaller force. Small bodies can make longer marches than large ones. Thus a battalion might march 16 miles, whereas 12 to 13 would be the usual limit for a division. Anything more than 15 miles for infantry or 25 for cavalry, is a forced march, except for small commands of seasoned troops.

The average speed of infantry without halts is 3 miles per hour (a mile in 20 minutes) or, including halts, 2½ miles per hour. There should be a halt of 10 minutes in each hour, and if the march extends into the afternoon a long halt of about an hour near noon. Troops should be informed of duration of halts.

Troops cannot march continually. After 5 or 6 days of steady marching (or less if combats also are included) even seasoned troops need a day of rest. Tactical requirements are paramount, but one must not forget that endurance of troops, even of cavalry, has a limit. Unnecessary hardships must be avoided. The fighting power of a command is considerably below the normal immediately after a forced march, and almost nil after a night march. Night marches may require half again as much time to cover the same distance as those executed during the day, in the case of a large command. [Pg 90]

It is not safe to assume a speed of more than 2 miles an hour for a wagon train. Field Artillery can keep pace with infantry, unless roads are very poor as in some mountainous sections of the U. S. On good roads and for moderate distances Light Field Arty. can keep pace with cavalry, but horse arty. is better for service with a cavalry command.

The following table shows the marching rates of various arms:

Note. Empty wagons on good roads can make longer marches. Small convoys of light auto trucks can average from 5 to 10 miles per hour, according to the nature of the road and other conditions. (See Chap. XVII.)

General Remarks. The elongation of a column (over road distances given in F. S. R.) may vary from nothing at the start to 20 per cent at the conclusion of a day’s march. 10 per cent is a fair average.

For a rapid current the limiting depths fordable are, for infantry 3 ft., for cavalry 4 ft., for artillery or wagons 2½ ft. If current is sluggish allow ⅓ more for infantry and cavalry.

Usually march on the main or best road. The distance may be somewhat greater, but the time required will usually be less. The best roads in the U. S. are none too good. During the march troops should remain on the road, but in taking position for combat both troops and artillery may move across country. Even in such a case it is best to remain on the road as long as possible.

The front is always in the direction of the enemy. Thus in a retreat the right flank guard would be on the left hand of the column. The head of a column is in the direction of march, which may be to the rear.

Do not use words “sunrise” or “daybreak” in orders, but give standard time. [Pg 91]

Troops usually march better and suffer less from fatigue in cold weather than in very warm weather.

It is not ordinarily practicable to march artillery or trains in double column on roads in the U. S. But trains or troops in rear of other trains may be brought to the front by halting the wagons ahead of them on one side of the road. It is very embarrassing for artillery to have to countermarch on U. S. roads. But it is possible. During a march one side of the road should be left clear for the passage of messengers.

In connection with subject of marches read also “Advance,” “Rear and Flank Guards,” and “Cavalry tactics.”

Change in direction of march. A change of direction of march usually results from a change in the situation causing a change of mission. An example of this would be a case in which the main body unexpectedly encountered the enemy in force. In such a case it would ordinarily be the duty of all detachments within reach to rejoin for the main battle—“march to the sound of the guns,”—abandoning for the time being their less important missions. Upon arrival such detachments should as a rule not attack the enemy independently, but should send word of the time and place of their arrival and place themselves under the orders of the supreme commander. While it is the rule that all detachments within reach should rejoin for the main conflict, yet there will be cases where a detachment is justified in staying out of a battle it might have joined. Of this the best example is where the detachment can “contain” a relatively larger force of the enemy, thus keeping it out of the main combat. If the enemy opposed to the detachment is of less strength than itself it may be contained by a portion of the detachment, while the rest marches to join the battle. A detachment should not allow itself to be contained by an inferior force.

In making the change of direction some suitable point to the former front should be selected and occupied by the advance guard to cover the change of direction. If there be any danger from the direction of the former front the advance guard continues its march as a flank guard, a new advance guard being pushed out from the main body. For such a movement two roads at suitable distance are required (see “Flank [Pg 92] Guards.”) In making a change of direction it is well to avoid countermarching troops, and especially artillery, if practicable.

In making a change of direction the safety of the trains must be carefully considered. If the detachment is joining the main body for battle, its trains (if with it) may well be sent by the shortest practicable route, escorted if necessary, to join those of the main body, or to some other safe place. If danger is to be anticipated from the former front now become a flank, the trains should preferably be moved on a parallel road on the unexposed flank.

ORDER—CHANGE IN DIRECTION OF MARCH.

	Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
	HUNTERSTOWN, PA.,
Field Orders		17 Nov., '12—11:20 a. m.
No. ——
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" Map.

Note: In this case the trains of the detachment are with those of the division. Hence all reference to trains is omitted from the order. This order as dictated will be written by the staff present and copies sent to officers not present.

CAMPS AND BIVOUACS.

Troops should not be bivouacked in the open except for very cogent reasons. A comfortable camp on a sanitary site is always desirable, provided tactical requirements permit the selection.

Troops should not be kept in column at the end of a day’s march but should be placed in camp immediately upon their arrival so as to give the men as much rest as possible. Hence the halt order should be issued well in advance, should be brief, and if practicable a staff officer accompanied by a surgeon should be sent ahead to make the necessary preliminary arrangements, and be ready with the aid of assistants to assign and lead organizations to their camps upon arrival, with a minimum of delay and confusion.

The important considerations in the selection of camps, aside from those of a tactical nature are:

1. A plentiful supply of water, streams or wells. It is usually assumed that any stream shown in blue on the map has water in it. The troops should be camped with reference to the water supply so that all may reach it as conveniently as possible. Along the banks of the same stream infantry or other foot troops should preferably be camped upstream, and cavalry, artillery and trains, downstream.

2. A camp should preferably be near a crossroad, as this gives a choice and multiplicity of routes for movements and facilitates communication generally. It is always desirable that a camp be near the main road, for the sake of convenience in arrival and departure, and if it be a large camp, roads through the camp and even a railroad for convenient supply are desirable. The camp should not be so close to an important road as to be disturbed by the noise and dust of traffic.

3. Fuel is an essential requisite, and forage desirable. [Pg 94]

4. The available area should be sufficient to accommodate the command. (See ante for table of camp areas.)

5. Especially in cold weather a southern exposure with a hill or wood to give protection from the prevailing winds is desirable. In summer, if the weather is very warm, an open wood which gives shade without interfering with the circulation of air, makes an excellent camp site.

6. Firm ground, such as good turf or gravel, with good drainage (ground water not too high), is very essential. These features may, of course, be artificially improved.

Troops should be assigned to camp conveniently with reference to their manner of arrival and departure. A camp in column of route facilitates placing the troops as well as resumption of the march. It is therefore, to be preferred for a short stay (over night) when tactical requirements allow it. The usual regimental camp is a column of battalion camps. (See also Chap. XVII.)

The health and efficiency of the troops are often best conserved by utilizing buildings for shelter, especially in cold or inclement weather. When tactical considerations permit troops may be billeted. Public buildings, warehouses, etc., if available, are to be preferred to private residences.

A convoy is a train of wagons or motor trucks, not regularly attached to any body of troops, with its escort. The term “convoy” is sometimes used for the wagons alone, not including the troops which accompany them.

Convoys, being peculiarly vulnerable, as well as liable to an attack, require more elaborate measures for their protection than would be usual for a body of troops in the same situation.

The vulnerability of a convoy increases rapidly with its length. As a rule then, a single column should contain not more than about one hundred wagons. Such a train would be (in single column) about a mile long. If allowed to straggle it might be very much longer. It is usually impracticable in the United States to march a convoy in double column, on account of the limited width of the roads. It is a wise measure when practicable.

No rigid rules can be laid down for the conduct of march of a convoy, as this will vary with the conditions.

In executing a flank march with a large convoy the mass of the troops would ordinarily be on the exposed flank, at some distance and would be called a “covering detachment.” The immediate guard of the convoy is called the “escort” and is of a strength sufficient only (in this case) to protect the wagons from attack by small parties of hostile cavalry, etc. The wagons with their immediate escort proceed as rapidly as possible to their destination by a separate route while the covering detachment keeps itself between the enemy and the convoy. The trains accompanying a body of troops during a flank march would similarly proceed on a separate road on the unexposed flank if a good road were available.

One rule of general if not universal application may be stated:—the mass of the troops should be between the wagons and the known or supposed position of the most threatening force of the enemy. It is a corollary of this rule that the trains of a combatant body of troops ordinarily “follow in advance, precede in retreat.” The distance between the wagons and the covering detachment is governed entirely by [Pg 96] circumstances. There should, however, be a small guard with the wagons.

A small convoy will not become the objective of a large body of hostile troops. Its escort will be called upon to repel the attacks of small parties only and will usually remain in close proximity to the wagons, the whole forming one detachment under one commander. The escort will, of course, employ advance, rear or flank guards as the situation requires. The “main body” will be the nucleus of troops remaining with the wagons after all detachments have been made. This arrangement will then be the usual case, and is the one to which particular reference is made in the following discussion.

Motor trucks are particularly advantageous for convoys. Their speed, by shortening the duration of the trip, reduces the risk of interference or capture. Moreover, the reserve motive power permits a burst of speed that assists in escape if the convoy be attacked. The vehicles cannot be stampeded and are less vulnerable than animals to injury from rifle, machine gun or shrapnel fire. Cars should be employed preferably in groups of the same type when practicable.

Arrangements for the March. The wagons are usually under the immediate charge of a Quartermaster, who will be mounted. Before starting, the train is divided into sections or provisional wagon companies of from twenty to thirty wagons each, twenty-seven being a convenient number, and a wagon master (or an old teamster) is assigned to the command of each section. The organization corresponds approximately to that of a regular train. Wagons may be army, hired or impressed, and their teamsters may be soldiers, regular civilian employees, hired or impressed citizens. Wagons and drivers of the same class should, as far as practicable, be placed in the same wagon sections. The slowest wagons are placed in the lead to reduce fatigue and elongation. The field train of the escort marches with the other wagons—usually at the head of the column. The impressed wagons should preferably be in rear, except when this causes excessive straggling, or when the rear is greatly exposed to attack.

A sufficient number of infantry for police guards are placed under orders of the Quartermaster, and a few mounted men assigned under his [Pg 97] orders as messengers, etc. A police guard of at least one squad is assigned to each wagon section. If the drivers are hired or impressed a stronger police guard is required. If the wagons are driven by enlisted men, police guards may be dispensed with if the escort is small. Police guards are usually permitted to ride on the wagons. Footsore or slightly wounded infantrymen, if any there be, may be assigned as police guards. These guards never leave the wagons even when attacked, but if the wagons have been parked a portion of the police guards may be released to join in the fight. Cavalry is more suitable for police guards than is infantry. But usually there will not be enough cavalry for this purpose, after allowing for more important duties.

The Quartermaster is charged with the duty of keeping the wagons closed up and moving in an orderly fashion. He removes broken down wagons from the road, shifting their loads to other wagons or destroying them as circumstances require.

The division of the wagons of convoy into sections or wagon companies and the assignment of wagonmasters may be covered in the first order, after which unless there is a change to be made, it is not again referred to. If the Quartermaster has made these arrangements in advance they need not be referred to in orders, but should be covered by a note after the order (in solution).

THE ESCORT.

Commander and Duties. The senior line officer with the escort commands the entire convoy and is responsible for all measures necessary for its safe and steady progress. It is of course desirable that he should be senior in rank to the Quartermaster in charge of the wagons.

The commander will generally be at the place where an attack is expected. Usually he is with the main body, but if he is with the advance or flank guard, the next in rank with the main body assumes charge of same during his absence, or a commander for the main body may be designated in orders.

The duty of the escort is to facilitate the progress of the wagons and protect them from rifle or artillery fire. It will make such dispositions as are best calculated to afford security. While active reconnaissance in the probable direction of the enemy is very essential, the bulk of the escort should be kept well in hand in order to strike a powerful blow if the enemy be encountered. The escort must [Pg 98] not assume the offensive unless absolutely essential for the safety of the convoy, no matter how tempting an opportunity may be presented. The main body moves promptly to any threatened point of the convoy.

Strength and Composition. No rule can be prescribed for the strength of an escort. It depends upon the size of the convoy, the nature of the country, the length of the march, the importance of the convoy and the risk. The risk, of course, involves a number of considerations, chief amongst which are the strength and proximity of the enemy.

For an average case one battalion of infantry and one troop of cavalry might be assigned as escort to one hundred wagons. For a large convoy the following rough rule as to the strength of the escort may serve as a guide.

• 2 infantry per wagon.
• 1 cavalry per 8 wagons.
• 1 gun per 100 wagons.

The escort will ordinarily be composed of infantry. There should usually be some cavalry. Machine guns are useful, but artillery is generally not employed. Engineers are always useful with a convoy as by repairing roads and bridges, and removing obstacles they can greatly facilitate its progress, being in addition equivalent to an equal number of infantry in fighting strength.

Motor cars are useful in the escort for the rapid transportation of the infantry and also for carrying machine guns or artillery in open or in armored cars. Cars containing guns are equally useful with an escort composed of cavalry. The invulnerability of the armored car to small arms fire and shrapnel, together with its speed, gives it great offensive power. Motor cars will be correspondingly useful in the pursuit and attack of a convoy. (See also Chap. XVIII.)

Distribution and Duties of Troops. The troops of the escort are distributed as follows:

• Advance guard.
• (Police guards)
• Main body.
• Flank guard.
• Rear guard.

[Pg 99] The relative strength of the different parts depends on the direction from which attack is most probable. The main body (including police guards) should generally comprise about one half of the infantry of the escort, and it will be the immediate guard of the convoy. The bulk of all the remaining troops should be placed in the direction from which the enemy’s attack is expected, either as advance, flank or in some cases rear guard. If the direction from which the enemy may attack is uncertain, the great bulk of the escort should remain with the convoy, and active reconnaissance be carried on in order to give ample warning of the enemy’s presence. Undue dispersion of the fighting forces must be carefully avoided.

The main body of the escort may march at the head of the column of wagons, or in the middle of same (or on another road—see ante). The first is the more comfortable place and should be preferred if tactical considerations allow. A small body of infantry and a few mounted men should be placed at the head of the wagons (when main body is in center) and a small body of infantry at the tail. If the wagon column is more than 1,200 yards long there should be some infantry at the middle of it, to protect its flanks. Some organization in the main body is directed in orders, to furnish the necessary police guards which are placed at the disposal of the Quartermaster.

The advance cavalry or advance scouting parties, need not ordinarily be very strong. They reconnoiter 3 to 5 miles to the front, and well to the flanks.

The infantry point of the advance guard should be about a mile in front of the wagons. A mounted point is desirable, especially if there be no cavalry with the advance guard. It reconnoiters up all side roads a distance of 1,000 yds. or more. It is the duty of the advance guard to establish contact with any friendly troops in the direction in which the convoy is marching, if they be not too distant, especially if they are awaiting its arrival. The advance guard commander examines the country with a view to selecting suitable places for sheltering or parking the convoy should the enemy be encountered. He selects suitable sites for camps.

The Engineers, if present, are usually with the advance guard.

A small convoy will usually have no regular flank guard. A flank guard, [Pg 100] if used at all would be put out because an attack is expected from that direction. Hence it should usually be strong, ⅓ to ½ the entire force. Its conduct is similar to that of the flank guard of a body of troops, except that it is of particular importance to hold the enemy beyond rifle or artillery range of the convoy, especially if it is carrying explosives. The flank guard should endeavor to accomplish this without calling for reinforcements, as it is desirable that the main body remain with the wagons. If there be sufficient cavalry with the escort to offer an effective resistance in case of a fight the bulk of it should be kept in hand and assigned to the flank guard, if the latter is strong. If the cavalry is too weak in numbers to be effective in combat even when concentrated, there is no objection to splitting it up into small detachments for reconnaissance, messenger and police duty. But a strong body of cavalry may be better employed tactically to assist in holding off the enemy. The flank guard marches opposite the convoy on a parallel road at least half a mile distant, or proceeds to some favorable locality from which it can cover the flank. It maintains communication with the main body during its march. A flank guard, instead of marching continuously on the flank can often obtain better results by successively occupying strong positions from which it can oppose the enemy, leaving each position and moving rapidly to the next as soon as the convoy is safely past. (See “Flank Guards.”)

The rear guard is usually small, unless danger is anticipated from the rear, and marches close up—at from 300 to 500 yds. behind the tail of the wagon column. In case of a fight it reinforces the main body.

The March. The available routes for the march should be carefully considered. Long distances, poor and dusty or muddy road surfaces, steep grades, many stream crossings, sharp turns, defiles and close country, are particularly objectionable features for the march of a convoy, as they may subject it to delay and danger. A few draft animals shot down by a handful of men in ambush would seriously delay the march. A road along an open ridge exposed to view from considerable distances is also objectionable, especially if it may be commanded by artillery or rifle fire from adjacent heights. A road through an open valley protected on the flank by impenetrable obstacles, beyond effective range, or covered by a parallel ridge from which the [Pg 101] approaches to the flank may be commanded, is excellent. The route should be selected with a view to avoiding the enemy, and a detour is justifiable if it is certain that the enemy may thus be avoided. Other things being equal the best road, which may often also be the most direct, is to be preferred. In a march of any length, facilities for watering the animals en route are desirable. A due consideration of all of the features of the various routes available which bear upon the safety and rapidity of the march, will enable the command to select that route which gives the greatest promise of a successful transit.

The wagons usually proceed without regular hourly halts, as their gait is so slow that continuous progress for two or more hours at a time will not result in excessive fatigue unless the road is a very poor one. Under favorable conditions a convoy might make an average progress of 2¼ to 2½ miles per hour for a day’s march. But in making calculations it is not safe to count on more than 2 miles per hour for a day’s march. Motor convoys of light trucks can average from 5 to 10 miles an hour depending on road and other conditions. They are capable of even higher speeds for short periods. (See table in “Marches”—Chap. VI.)

Consider the reported position of the enemy and calculate the times at which both the enemy and the convoy will probably reach the various critical points along the line of march (assuming that the enemy will direct his march on such points). Then consider the defensive measures that might be adopted at each critical point for the safety of the convoy, the lines of retreat from such points and the alternative routes by means of which they might be avoided. Do not overlook the fact that the enemy is dangerous whenever he gets within rifle range (or artillery range if he has artillery) of the convoy.

The best places to attack a convoy are at a defile, bridge, or sharp turn in the road, in the woods, or by artillery fire from a concealed position. Hence convoys should avoid such localities, or approach them with extreme caution.

A convoy should not hesitate to abandon its selected line of march and take a new one if necessary to avoid a hostile force stronger than the escort.

The far sides of adjacent ridges, clumps of wood, branch roads and the outlets of defiles must be carefully reconnoitered. The convoy must [Pg 102] never enter a defile until the advance guard has reconnoitered the sides and secured the outlet. The reconnaissance should be such that no considerable body of troops and especially no artillery, can get within range of the convoy unobserved.

A sharp change of direction is always fraught with danger, and measures should be taken for security to the former front. A portion or the whole of the former advance guard may be pushed out to a suitable position to cover the change of direction. When the convoy has completed the turn the troops so detached may rejoin or continue the march on a parallel road as a flank guard.

On reaching camp the wagons are parked for the night, the form of park depending on the terrain and on the risk. If there is little risk they may be parked in column of route, double column, two lines facing each other, etc. If there is danger of attack some form of closed park or corral should be used, with the animals inside (such as the “diamond corral”). The escort takes the usual measures for the security of the camp.

In moving back and forth with convoy or for the return of the escort it may be advisable to change route as the enemy might anticipate the return by the former route. The same precaution would apply to a small force going out to intercept a convoy.

Conduct on encountering the enemy. If the enemy is encountered in a position from which he can interfere with the march, the escort, if strong enough, will attack at once and drive him out, the wagons continuing the march, or halting temporarily if this be essential for their safety. If the enemy is too strong to be driven out the escort will hold him in position, while the wagons take another route, park or retreat.

The wagons should not be parked or even halted prematurely, as this in itself will cause a great loss of time. If the enemy is reported near, the wagons close up and continue the march in an orderly manner.

In case of a serious attack a suitable place is selected and the wagons are parked. The park should be as little exposed as possible. A most favorable locality is a basin or depression in the terrain, readily accessible from the road and surrounded by a ridge from which the escort may oppose the enemy. A good form of park is the “diamond corral” as it is easily formed and quickly broken in resuming the march. The park is formed under the supervision of the Quartermaster [Pg 103] and police guards. A portion of the latter remain to guard the park from surprise attacks by small parties of the enemy (especially cavalry), and such as can be spared are sent to take part in the combat. The rear guard closes up to assist in repelling the attack, or takes a suitable position to cover the rear. Mounted messengers, (usually 2 parties of 2 men each) are despatched to notify the nearest body of friendly troops, if there is any hope of their being able to render assistance in time, or any other reason why they should be apprised of the situation.

The enemy as a rule cannot afford to spend a great deal of time in capturing a small convoy. If he can be held off for 2 or 3 hours the convoy will usually be able to escape. As a last resort the escort retreats, taking with it a part of the convoy if possible, and endeavoring to destroy or at least seriously cripple all that is left.

Attack of a Convoy. As great mobility is desirable mounted troops, armored cars, or foot troops transported by automobile are the most suitable for the attack of a convoy.

A convoy may be delayed, with a view to attacking it, by destroying bridges or placing other obstacles in its path, or by shooting the animals, especially those of the leading wagons, from an ambush.

The usual method for a determined attack on a convoy is to check its head and tail with small bodies (preferably cavalry) and concentrate the main forces against a flank. A small force should be sent to overpower the police guard and cut loose or shoot down the animals (unless it is hoped to capture the trains intact and make off with them).

Hence if fired upon from front and rear by small bodies a convoy should be on the lookout for a determined attack on its flank.

If it is desired merely to damage the convoy or delay its march, or if the attacking troops are too weak to cope with the escort, they may select a concealed position along the route of the convoy (preferably near a town, bridge, defile, etc.) from which long range fire (artillery, infantry or machine gun) may be brought to bear upon the convoy. Serious damage may thus be inflicted without danger to the attacker. A convoy, as before mentioned, is far more vulnerable to such an attack than a body of troops, the wagons being, of course, utterly unable either to protect themselves or take cover from the fire. The [Pg 104] escort of a convoy should consequently carefully reconnoiter all localities from which long range fire is possible before allowing the wagons to come within range of same.

Convoys of prisoners. (See F. S. R.) In addition to an escort to repel attempts at rescue, a guard of about 10 infantry and several mounted men is required for each 100 prisoners. The captives are formed into companies and marched in column, their officers being separated from the troops. Prisoners should be given to understand that any attempt to escape will draw fire. If the convoy is attacked they are ordered to lie down. A convoy of prisoners protects the escort, as the enemy cannot fire or (in the case of cavalry), charge if the escort is close to the prisoners, especially on the opposite side. The prisoners thus form a shield. [Pg 105]

Fig. II.

TYPICAL ARRANGEMENTS
OF A
CONVOY ON THE MARCH

[Pg 106]

Fig. III.

TYPICAL ARRANGEMENTS
OF A
CONVOY ON THE MARCH

[Pg 107]

COMBINED ORDERS FOR CASE IV.
(See Fig. III.)

	1st Bn., 1st Inf.,
	LEAVENWORTH, KAN.
Field Orders,		10 Sept., 1912, 5:45 a. m.
No. ——
(Map Reference.)

(How and to whom communicated: See previous examples.)

(Report of dispositions to superior comdr.)

Note that this order has only 4 pars. instead of 5. Trains accounted for in par. 3. If the situation seems to render it advisable some or all of the cav. may be ordered to march in advance an hour before the rest of the troops, with instructions to “cover the movement” or if the commander is inexperienced to reconnoiter front and flanks and special localities. If a defile is to be passed the cav. comdr. may be told to report at near side of defile the results of his reconnaissance to the far side. Be careful about giving detailed instructions to the cav. unless the commander of it is inexperienced. If the situation is such as to render it possible, the convoy should establish communication with the troops at the place to which it is marching. If this is practicable (they being not too far away) the advance guard (or advance cav.) would be directed in the order to do this.

Materiel. A battery of light field artillery (3"), in the United States service, is sub-divided for action as follows:

• Firing battery—4 guns and 6 caissons. (5 sections).
• Combat train—6 caissons, 1 battery wagon, 1 store wagon.
• Field train—4 army wagons.

The firing battery includes the first five sections (4 gun and 1 caisson).

The combat train includes the 3 remaining caisson sections and the battery and store wagons. The 9th section comprises the battery and store wagons and 4 field wagons. In subdivision part of the 9th section (battery and store wagons) is with the combat train. The battery is also divided into 4 platoons, each includes 2 sections.

A battalion consists of 3 batteries, a regiment of 2 battalions. A battery has 3 telephones and 1 mile of double conductor buzzer wire. A battalion has 2 telephones and 3 miles of double conductor armored cable, on a reel cart. A regiment has same telephone equipment as a battalion with extra buzzer wire.

Each battery carries 358 rounds of ammunition per gun, a portion of which, varying with circumstances, is shell, the remainder being shrapnel. Remarkable results are claimed for the large capacity high explosive shell, against both personnel and materiel. The proper proportions of shell and shrapnel and the feasibility of the use of high explosive shell are still undecided. The weight behind the teams is: gun and limber about 4,300 lbs., caisson and limber about 4,600 lbs.

The gun elevates 15°, and depresses 5°, and these angles may be increased by depressing or elevating the trail. It traverses 4° each side of center. Height of axle 41 inches, tread of carriage, 60 inches.

In the panoramic sight the deflection is measured in mils (angle subtended by .001 times the range—hence approximately ¹/₆₄₀₀ of a circumference). The elevation (range) is measured in yards. The highest reading is 6,250 yards. [Pg 110]

The clinometer of the range quadrant is graduated in mils. The range disc of the quadrant is graduated from 0 to 6,500 yards. For greater ranges, with either sight or quadrant, an arbitrary index setting may be employed. The clinometer is used for indirect laying. Set off angle of site on clinometer and range on range disc.

The front covered by the fire of a battery of 4 guns without shifting trails is 60 yds. + 140 mils; this equals 200 yds. at 1,000 yds. range, 480 yds. at 3,000 yds. range, etc.

Dispositions of Artillery. On the march the firing batteries of light field artillery are usually near head of main body, a regiment (or battalion) of infantry being immediately in front of them. The combat trains usually march immediately in rear of the last foot troops in the main body. Exceptionally they may be with the firing batteries, especially in a small command, if there seems to be good reason for so placing them. Artillery in column with other troops should preferably occupy not more than about a mile of road space. If the artillery column be much longer than this its flanks will not be properly protected by the fire of the troops in front and rear in case of a sudden attack. In such a case then, a body of foot troops should be placed in the middle of the artillery. The field trains of the artillery on the march, are combined with those of the other troops, in rear.

For dispositions of artillery with advance, rear and flank guards see the Chapters on these subjects. (IV and V.)

In battery a gun and its caisson are placed side by side. Guns are at 20 yard intervals and the caissons of the 5th section are on the flanks of battery at 20 yard intervals. Hence the ordinary front of a battery is 100 yards. The limbers are placed under cover near the battery and to the flank. The combat train should be about 600 yards distant, in a secure position. These will be the usual dispositions, which may, however, be varied to suit the terrain or other conditions. To avoid detection of the location of the artillery by hostile air scouts exact alignments and uniform intervals should be avoided. Dust raised by the blast of discharge may betray the artillery’s location. This can be reduced by wetting or oiling the ground or covering with brush or paulins of inconspicuous color. When not actually firing, guns, limbers and caissons may be concealed by covering with brush or branches of [Pg 111] trees. If the ground permits, the guns may be placed in pits with parapets for protection, the works being concealed by trees and branches.

A division is the smallest body of troops having artillery permanently assigned to it.

Personnel.

Artillery Commander. Informs himself as to enemy. Examines terrain, selects general positions. Assigns units (usually large ones only) to general positions and targets in accord with plan of supreme commander. Takes general measures for communication, supply and reinforcement of artillery.

Regimental Commander. Informs himself as to location and disposition of enemy and friendly troops. Makes reconnaissance of area for artillery, and assigns battalions to general positions and targets. Takes measures for communication, supply and reinforcement.

Battalion Commander. Makes close reconnaissance with officers and scouts as to position of enemy and friendly troops, their disposition, terrain around his position, best method of approach. Selects positions for his batteries and assigns duties (targets, etc.) to each. Assigns direction point and sectors of observation. Gives orders about artificial cover, provides for auxiliary observing stations. Provides for local communications. Sees the position is secure or that there are supporting troops or scouts out. Selects routes for possible subsequent movements and provides for supply of ammunition, location of combat trains, etc.

The functions of the foregoing commanders are mainly tactical. They assign and employ the groups of artillery to meet the requirements of the initial and all succeeding phases of the combat. They keep in close touch with the higher commander under whose orders they are operating, and with the changing conditions on the battlefield.

Battery Commander. Examines target and ground near it, and general location assigned him. Picks out place for his battery and way to approach, under cover if possible, similarly for his limbers and combat train (if posted separately) with an eye to supply of ammunition under cover. If direct laying is to be used makes sure each gunner can see target, or if indirect that nothing interferes with fire, that guns [Pg 112] are defiladed, etc. and that gunners can see aiming point. Selects an aiming point, a battery commander’s station and auxiliary observing stations. Arranges for communications (telephone and signal), for ammunition supply. Secures firing data. Conducts his battery to position and posts it. Conducts the fire. The functions of the battery commander, especially in battalion, are thus mainly technical.

NOTE: If any of the higher commanders mentioned are not present or if the command is too small to have such, each officer must perform such of the duties of rank next above as the situation requires.

Lieutenants. In march or maneuver they command platoons. In subdivision for action the first two command the platoons of the firing battery, the 3d is reconnaissance officer and the junior commands the combat train.

Reconnaissance Officer. Determines firing data. Supervises work of scouts and auxiliary observing parties. Watches battlefield and notes tactical changes. Supervises communications. Prior to an action, while on the march, the reconnaissance officer may be sent with the advance guard to make such reconnaissance as may be of value to artillery. May conduct battery to position.

1st Sergeant. Assists captain. Posts limbers under cover. Keeps captain informed as to ammunition supply, supervises removal of empty caissons. Has charge of replacement of casualties, removal of wounded, etc.

Sergeants. (Q. M. Sgt. commands field train) Command sections. Supervise service of guns. Chief of 5th section sets up B. C. telescope and assists in using it.

Corporals. Act as gunners, caisson corporals, scouts, observers, etc.

Scouts and Signalers. In each battery 2 corporals trained as scouts, one corporal, 2 privates as signalers. Scouts may be used to guard flanks of battery. Scouts usually operate in pairs. The scouts are trained as ground scouts in selecting routes and guiding batteries along them. They act as auxiliary observers. In battalion the ground scouting is done by battalion scouts.

Agents. Agents are men who transmit information from one commander to another, and keep a commander in touch with the lower commanders. Each headquarters in an artillery organization has agents. [Pg 113]

Route Markers. These are men who are stationed at certain points to indicate the route to a position.

Artillery is so trained that if any of these positions are vacant they are readily filled by an alternate.

An artillery officer, preferably the senior present, should accompany the supreme commander during the advance to battle to learn the situation and the wishes of the commander. An artillery officer should accompany an advance guard. An artillery officer or other agent should accompany an attacking infantry line in order to communicate to the supporting artillery the needs of the infantry. He will generally keep in touch with the commander of the attacking force. The artillery commander is represented at supreme headquarters by a suitable agent from the artillery personnel.

Kinds of fire. Fire is classified in various ways:

• Masked fire (indirect laying is used)
• Unmasked fire (either direct or indirect laying may be used)

Masked fire is where guns are concealed from view and corresponds to indirect laying, where gunner does not see target but uses an aiming point.

If the target can be just seen through the sights (over the mask) the position has sight defilade, if by a mounted or dismounted man, mounted or dismounted defilade. If the mask conceals the flashes of the guns (in day time) the position has flash defilade, this requires 12 to 15 feet vertical cover. Even twigs will explode a shrapnel so make sure mask does not interfere with fire. To ascertain this allow height of muzzle 4 feet, angle of departure for range of 3,000 yards = 5° 40´, (Inverse tangent of 0.10). Thus, Distance from mask ÷ 10 > Height of mask - 4 (all figures in feet); or D > 10 (H - 4). To fire over a mask 20 feet high, the distance from the gun to the mask on level ground should be greater than 10 (20 - 4) = 160 feet.

Fire for adjustment. Fire for demolition.
Fire for registration. Fire for effect.

Fire for adjustment is to get on the target. It is adjusted for range, direction, distribution and height of burst (4). Fire for registration [Pg 114] is fire to determine ranges, to a position which may in future be occupied by enemy. (It should generally not be employed prematurely unless enemy already knows about your artillery as it would otherwise betray your presence and possibly your position.) Fire for effect is fire on the enemy, materiel or personnel. It is ordinarily directed to that portion of the enemy which is doing or may do most damage to the friendly infantry. Thus in the earlier stages of the action, and while the friendly infantry is in the zone of hostile artillery fire, but not yet within range of the infantry, the fire of the artillery will be directed against the hostile artillery. Later in the attack, during the struggle for fire superiority between the opposing infantries, the artillery will usually direct its fire upon the hostile infantry, that being at this stage, the most threatening element to the friendly infantry. Fire for demolition is fire against material objects, such as walls, houses, etc. For this purpose shell is invariably used.

Direct laying. Indirect laying.

In direct laying the gunner sees and aims on the target or a designated portion thereof. In indirect laying (whether the target is visible to the gunner or not) he aims on an auxiliary aiming point. Indirect laying is that generally employed, whether the guns are masked or not. It is usually simpler to use a clearly defined aiming point than to indicate to each gunner his allotted portion of a (possibly poorly defined) target. In case of a rapidly moving target, especially at close range, direct laying may be preferable to indirect, as the gunner can see his target, and often observe the effects of his fire. It may also be used in the last stages of an action, the guns being pushed forward to the crest, or for the defense of the guns themselves at close range. Direct laying has the disadvantage that it does not permit the proper concealment of the guns, and renders more difficult the conduct, control and direction of the fire by the captain and the higher artillery commanders. Its employment, therefore, will not be habitual. Indirect laying cannot as a rule be effectively employed against small, rapidly moving targets.

Salvo fire. Continuous fire.
Volley fire. Fire at will.

A salvo is a single discharge of successive pieces at stated intervals from one flank of the battery (or platoon) to the other. It is used [Pg 115] especially for ranging, (adjustment) as a series of bursts will give more information than a single burst. In continuous fire shots are fired singly at stated intervals. Volley fire is where each piece fires a stated number of rounds as fast as is consistent with proper laying, independent of the other pieces. Fire at will is used, generally for the defense of the guns themselves, at short ranges. The sights are set at 1,000 yards and the fuses of the shrapnel at zero, this setting being analagous to the “battle sight” of the infantry.

Time fire and percussion fire. Percussion fire is generally with shell and is directed against materiel. Time fire is always with shrapnel, and is usually directed against personnel. Shrapnel have a smoke producing matrix to produce a large, dense ball of smoke, at the point of burst, facilitating observation of fire. A shrapnel well burst (at a height of 3 mils) covers effectively a depth of 200 yards at ranges up to 3,000. Beyond this range the depth of the “beaten zone” falls off rapidly, being only 125 yards at 4,500. Due to dispersion along the range of the shots (longitudinal dispersion) the depth of the beaten zone at 3,000 yards is assumed at about 250 yards. It is 150 at 4,500. Width of beaten zone, 20 to 25 yards. Errors of fuse become serious as the range increases beyond 3,000.

Fire at single range. Searching fire (fire at successive ranges). Sweeping fire. Fire at a single range is employed in case accurate adjustment has been surely obtained by previous firing. As such accurate adjustment is very difficult to obtain it will generally be advisable to increase the dispersion by employing fire at successive ranges, gradually reducing the number of ranges as observation may warrant. Searching fire is also used to sweep ground known to be occupied by the enemy’s reserves or over which they must pass in reinforcing the firing line or making a counter-attack.

In absence of opportunity for observation of fire such practice will cause a great expenditure of ammunition often with little result. It may, however, be justified by circumstances. Sweeping fire is that which sweeps the front at same range. It is obtained by giving a full turn to the traversing wheel after each shot. This corresponds to a change of 8 mils of front. Ordinarily sweeping fire will be from right [Pg 116] to left. But note that when entire sheaf is moved along the front it is better to begin at the leeward side, so that the first shots fired will not obscure target for the remainder. At a range of about 2,500 yards sweeping will just about cover the front. If the range is greater there will be intervals unswept and if it is less the successive cones of dispersion will overlap. If the front of the target is not much over 35 mils it can be covered without sweeping. If more it can be swept, or the B. C. may shift the entire sheaf and attack first one part of the front and then another (see post).

Individual distribution.
Collective distribution.

In the former each gunner is assigned a definite part of the target to attack. Direct laying is used. In the latter the pieces have a common aiming point, and the B. C. distributes the fire over the target by varying the deflections of the different guns (deflection difference). Indirect laying is always employed. The B. C. can open or close the sheaf to fit the front of his target, and can shift the entire sheaf to the right or the left, the latter by varying the deflection, the former by varying the deflection difference. Or he may do both at once. To obtain or verify adjustment the sheaf may be converged until adjustment is secured and then properly distributed. Searching fire (at successive ranges) is used when the adjustment is imperfect, or to cover an area of some depth known or believed to be occupied by the enemy, or through which his supports or reserves must pass in reinforcing his firing line, making a counter-attack, etc. It usually implies a large expenditure of ammunition in proportion to the physical effect produced, but must, nevertheless be frequently employed, albeit with judgment and not at random.

The “firing data” obtained by the captain or reconnaissance officer are:

• 1. Deflection for directing gun.
• 2. Deflection difference for other guns.
• 3. Corrector for height of burst.
• 4. Angle of site.
• 5. Range.

In addition to this information the battery is also shown the aiming point and told the kind of fire to be used. [Pg 117]

Observation and control of fire. The officer conducting the fire should generally be posted near his battery so that he can watch it if possible or at least communicate readily, and to facilitate adjustment. In order to observe ground which cannot be seen from his station, as well as to assist in the control of the fire it may be desirable to have auxiliary observing stations. These should generally be on commanding sites.

Observing stations well to the front will give a closer view than possible to the B. C. and a station on the flank will afford better opportunity for observing errors in range and burst. A flank observer may be able to detect movements of troops, and also secure the battery against a flank or surprise attack. If there is no supporting detachment, observers to guard the exposed flank of the artillery should never be omitted. These auxiliary observing stations are usually established by the captain or reconnaissance officer, and usually occupied by battery scouts. Their number depends on circumstances. They communicate with B. C. by telephone, flag or helio. They should report promptly everything they see including movements of troops. There should also be communication between the B. C. and the advanced friendly troops. An agent may accompany the advance for this purpose. Trees and houses or other elevated points may be utilized for observing stations. Stations close to the guns like B. C. Sta. should generally be to windward, if practicable. Stations well out to the flanks are often favorable for observing the enemy’s interior lines, particularly the location of his artillery. If there are no natural observing stations artificial ones must be erected. The B. C. station should if possible be within 200 yards of the battery, preferably on a flank, in prolongation of the front of the battery and on a high point. It is desirable that it be within megaphone range if practicable. It would be quite rare for the B. C. station to be distant as much as 800 yards from the battery. It is very desirable that the captain should be able to observe the effect of the fire. It is very important that the B. C. station should not be too conspicuous. If it is it may draw enemy’s fire, and perhaps betray location of battery.

Aiming points should be considered as follows:

• 1. Are they surely visible from each gun?
• 2. Are they distinctive, easily described and identified?
• 3. Are they at a considerable distance from the guns?
• (Preferably over 2,000 yards).
• 4. Are they near the normal to the front?

[Pg 118] A point in front or rear is best if it is at least 1,000 yards distant. It should preferably be in rear in order that the guns may be defiladed from possible hostile observing stations. If not more than 1,000 yards away it had better be on a flank.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF
FIELD ARTILLERY.

The recent great improvements in materiel and methods of modern field artillery lend most of their advantages to the attack. The defender should cover the front of his position by a careful distribution of his batteries, permitting co-operation and mutual support. Batteries may be placed to cover areas which would otherwise be defiladed, on or near the military crest, or immediately in rear thereof, whence they can be run forward by hand to cover the defiladed area.

The positions of artillery in the attack will be governed by the following considerations:

The more detailed technical, tactical and topographical requirements of an artillery position will include the following:

A position in the interval between the frontal and enveloping attacks has the advantages that the artillery is well protected, and can support either attack with oblique or possibly flanking fire. A position on the flank, while usually requiring an escort, is very effective for oblique fire. It is also very useful in opposing an envelopment, as it may be able to cause it to make so great a detour as to defeat its purpose, or to delay it until the necessary dispositions can be made to oppose the movement. The conformation of the terrain will have a great influence on the decision as to where to place the artillery. The position in any case should be such as to best permit the artillery to accomplish its mission.

In the beginning of an action longer ranges may be permissible for the defense than for the attack. If the defense is relatively weak in artillery it is sometimes an advantage to have it out of range of the attacking artillery while still able to fire on advancing infantry. The attack must get within range of the defense artillery and may sometimes be forced to take an exposed position if defender’s artillery is well back.

Whatever the situation the mission of the field artillery is to support the infantry, particularly at the critical stages. While the infantry is deploying and during its advance through the zone of hostile artillery fire, the artillery of the attack engages that of the defense. When the infantry contest for fire superiority opens, the artillery of the attack, or a portion of it, will sweep the hostile infantry lines with the objects of causing the hostile infantry to keep their heads down, getting on their nerves, diminishing the effect of their fire, preventing supports from coming forward, etc. The actual physical effect of such fire may not be great, but if its moral influence is sufficient to diminish the efficacy of the hostile infantry fire, thereby permitting the steady advance of the friendly infantry, its purpose is accomplished. When the attacking infantry is so close to the hostile lines as to be in danger from the fire of its supporting artillery directed thereat, the latter should increase the range without cessation of fire. This will have a decided moral effect on the defenders in the fire trenches as the shrapnel will burst nearly over their heads. It also establishes a fire swept zone in rear of the [Pg 121] hostile firing line through which supports and reserves must pass in moving forward, or through which the firing line must retreat in case it breaks to the rear. It is desirable that the attacker’s artillery positions should be sufficiently close to permit effective fire upon retreating troops, known as “pursuing by fire.” The attacker’s artillery should move to advanced positions by echelon, in order that there be no cessation of artillery fire.

In defense the dispositions of the artillery will be very largely dependent upon the probable moves of the attacker. The principal consideration will be, is the combat to be to a decision, or is it a delaying action merely? In either case a long range fire is desirable in order to force the attacker to an early deployment, and to embarrass as much as possible his preliminary dispositions. In a decisive action the defender’s artillery should cover every portion of the front over which the attacker may pass. This may be done by taking a position near the crest, or by so distributing the artillery units that each will sweep the dead space in front of others (defensive relation). Or a combination of the two methods may be employed. Of these the second method is generally to be preferred, as it permits the occupation of covered positions difficult to detect, and at suitable ranges. If in this case there be dead space (defiladed from all the guns in the sheltered localities) this may be covered by “dagger batteries,” placed well forward in the defiladed area. The fronts of the dagger batteries should be covered by artillery fire, and they should also be supported by infantry and machine guns.

The artillery of the defense enjoys a certain advantage in that it frequently has opportunity to make preliminary arrangements, such as determining ranges, constructing shelter, providing for ammunition supply, etc., so that it is able to deliver an effective fire from the start. Some at least of the artillery of the defense may be held “in readiness,” or “in observation,” pending the development of the enemy’s attack, being placed in action according to the developments of the situation. Fire must be brought to bear upon the advancing infantry regardless of the attacker’s artillery. If overmatched by hostile artillery the defender’s artillery ceases fire temporarily but resumes again at the critical moment. Such a proceeding may often deceive the attacker. The defender’s artillery must prevent the attacking artillery [Pg 122] from advancing to the position if captured, must concentrate its fire on the hostile infantry which has penetrated, support a counter-attack, or cover the rallying of the defender’s infantry, sacrificing itself without hesitation if necessary. Unless it be necessary to reply to the attacking artillery because of the damage due to its unrestricted fire the artillery in defense (unless favorable targets are presented) may often remain silent and avoid disclosing its position until it is ready to fire on the hostile infantry. If it is perfectly concealed it may begin firing at any time, even if inferior to the attack.

Firing over the heads of friendly troops will be the rule in both attack and defense. In the attack this may be continued until the assaulting infantry is quite close to the enemy’s line, the exact distance depending on the accuracy of adjustment, terrain and other conditions. It is the duty of the artillery to support the infantry assault to the last practicable moment. Thereafter the attacking artillery increases the range to cover the ground in rear.

Positions are not occupied by formal maneuvers, but each battery proceeds under cover in most convenient manner. In moving in vicinity of a masked position it is advisable to go at a walk so as not to raise dust and betray location.

The artillery is safeguarded generally by the other troops. It should not have special supports unless these be required by its exposure or distance from the attacking or defending forces. Such a detachment if required weakens the other arms. Machine guns are especially useful as a support for artillery. The artillery must carefully watch its own flanks even when it has a support. It should be particularly watchful also of dead spaces.

The general positions of the artillery, its general duties, target, etc. are prescribed by the supreme commander. The exact positions and the control and direction of fire are under the artillery commander. Artillery should make necessary reconnaissance, take position with promptness, and at once obtain data, etc. The supreme commander will designate whether batteries will take position for immediate action, in observation, or in readiness. In the first case the artillery opens fire as soon as possible. The position may be masked or unmasked. In the second case (observation) the battery unlimbers and takes position, obtains data, and prepares to open fire on indicated targets when [Pg 123] directed. The position is generally masked. In the third case (readiness) the guns are not unlimbered, but are held near the selected approximate position ready to go into action or to move to another locality. Meantime the tactical situation is studied and the locality reconnoitered, preparation being made to go into action if directed. Before going into action a battery is sub-divided into firing battery, combat train and field train. As to when it is divided this depends on circumstances. If done too soon the other arms may get between battery and combat train and interfere with supply of ammunition. If not done soon enough the combat trains may interfere with movement to front of other arms. The field trains are usually held in rear with other trains. The order for subdivision is “form for action.”

The combat trains may be with the batteries or the battalions. If at the rear of the combatant troops they are usually assembled by battalion or regiment. Communication must always be maintained with the fighting batteries by agents from the combat trains. Battalions are rarely split to permit the employment of batteries singly, batteries are practically never split.

The artillery should be kept well in hand, not necessarily all in one group, but where it can be under one control. The desideratum is concentration or dispersion of fire, at will. If batteries are somewhat dispersed they will not be so readily silenced or overcome by hostile fire. Facilities for communication permit greater dispersion with better control. Artillery employs no “reserves” in the sense in which the term is used with reference to infantry. Its reserve consists in its reserve supply of ammunition and in its power to increase the rapidity of its fire to meet crises of the combat. Nevertheless, it will not always be advisable to place all the artillery in action at the outset. The mission of the force and the circumstances of the case must be considered. If it be desired to develop from the outset an overwhelming superiority of artillery fire all the guns may be posted for immediate action. An example of this would be a rencontre engagement of an advance guard, seeking to seize or hold an advantageous position pending the arrival of its main body. In the case, however, that the enemy’s strength and dispositions (including those of his artillery) are not accurately known, and when the nature and course of the engagement cannot be foreseen, it would be unwise to [Pg 124] commit all the guns to action prematurely, as it would then be difficult to meet rapid and unexpected developments in the situation. In such a case part of the artillery may be held “in observation” or “in readiness,” to be put into action as the developments of the situation may require. A few guns may develop a considerable volume of fire, for a limited period, by utilizing the rapid fire qualities of the weapon. The proper assignment of the artillery is not a matter of rule, but a question of judgment. Enough guns should be placed in action at any time to meet the existing situation and accomplish the mission of the artillery. The combat and ammunition trains should be kept together (in large groups) to facilitate proper control and ammunition supply. They should be in safe positions, but not too far to the rear. Ammunition trains are marked with red flags or lanterns so that they may be readily identified.

Different batteries may be assigned special tasks, but these may be subject to change, in fact usually are, one battery also fulfilling several different functions. The functions are: Counter batteries: To fire on hostile artillery. Infantry batteries: To prepare and support the infantry attack. They include batteries of preparation which fire on opposing infantry, and breaching batteries which open passages through the enemy’s line. Batteries of the counter-attack: Usually posted in observation to watch for and oppose a counter-attack if made. Accompanying batteries: To advance to the close support of the infantry. They usually support the close advance without themselves actually advancing. Reinforcing batteries: Held in observation to come to the support of other batteries when needed. Decoy batteries: To draw fire of hostile batteries not yet discovered. Usually posted with wide intervals, they employ rapid fire. These classifications and terms, while necessary for study and discussion, are seldom employed in the verbiage of field orders. They are not to be considered as fixed or rigid. A single battery may successively fulfill several functions at different stages of the action, and it will be rare that all would be required in a single engagement. When infantry batteries are directed to support certain organizations in the attack, the Commander of the organization to be supported would generally indicate the target [Pg 125] and exercise some supervision, but the artillery would not be under his command, but under that of the artillery commander of the entire force. The front of the position especially in defense, may be divided into areas to be assigned to the various groups. These groups should be so disposed as to permit the greatest possible concentration or dispersion of fire, in other words the best possible control. Where the terrain does not favor this, or the course of the action is uncertain, some artillery should be held “in observation” or “in readiness” to meet developments.

At the command “Prepare for Action” the instruments are taken out, breech and muzzle covers removed, guns examined and cleaned, shields set, etc. This command may be given before or after reaching position and before or after unlimbering.

At the command “March order,” battery being limbered or unlimbered, these operations are reversed and the gun and equipment secured for the march. When the commander rides forward, leaving command to follow he instructs officer in charge as to tactical situation, and gives him such other pertinent information as may appear desirable. He may also, in his judgment, instruct this officer as to time and place of subdivision for action (if not already made), time to prepare for action, route to be followed, gait, etc. An officer preceding a command to a position should determine the route to be followed and post the necessary markers.

It is desirable to secure at the outset a position suitable for all stages of the action. The terrain must be carefully examined for such positions. If batteries are well located and doing good service changes during an action should be made only when it is apparent that a distinct advantage can be thus gained. These changes take time, necessitate readjustment on the target and are often dangerous. They should be made under cover if possible. Sometimes they may advantageously be made at night, or the first position may be taken at night. Advantage should also be taken of lulls in the action. Changes may be necessitated by the artillery of the enemy having adjusted on a battery. In such a case a short move during a lull, may be all that is required. Movements must be anticipated and the necessary reconnaissance, clearing, repair of bridges, etc. and all other things necessary as preliminaries must be attended to. Changes of position are ordinarily made in echelon, the stationary part covering the change [Pg 126] with its fire. Batteries do not retire because they are out of ammunition, they wait for more. A disabled gun is not sent to rear to be repaired during action. A battery does not move in echelon, but all at once.

It is the province of the supreme commander to order changes of his artillery positions. But in emergency the artillery commander may order changes.

Before important change, have plenty of ammunition. Economy of ammunition at all times is a duty of all officers and non-commissioned officers.

There must always be the closest co-operation between the artillery and the other arms. The artillery commander should be kept advised of the tactical situation and of any changes therein, and of the requirements of the other arms. He should be in frequent conference and constant communication with the supreme commander.

“Dummy” emplacements are sometimes used, especially on defense, to draw fire and expose enemy’s artillery position.

Horse artillery usually accompanies a cavalry force of any size. Its tactical employment is similar to that of light artillery. It is particularly useful in a rear guard on account of its great mobility.

Do not get closer than 2,000 yards to hostile infantry of defense. Their artillery will likely be about 500 yards behind the infantry. Get within 3,000 to 3,500 yards of the defender’s artillery if practicable.

The best results against artillery will be obtained by the effect of shrapnel on the men and animals. After a battery has been immobilized by shrapnel fire high explosive shell may be used for the demolition of the materiel. With the 3 inch rifle it is generally a waste of ammunition to attempt the destruction of battery materiel except at ranges within 2,500 yards, and then only when the fire can be observed. With the high power ordnance, materiel may be destroyed at greater ranges (see post).

In firing on a rapidly moving target direct laying will usually be preferred. If direct fire is, for any reason, contemplated the artillery, while employing indirect fire should be near a crest to which the guns can be moved forward for direct fire. The movement of [Pg 127] the guns by hand, except for short distances and on smooth and gentle slopes, is a very laborious task. It will usually be better to limber up.

Opportunities for surprise fire at relatively close ranges will occasionally be practicable in defense, but seldom in attack.

Oblique and enfilade fire are ordinarily more effective than frontal fire, and are desirable when they can be obtained without too great dispersion or exposure of the artillery.

A support for the artillery is usually not needed except on the march. It can generally defend itself. If so isolated as to need a support, generally place it in rear on the exposed flank.

Do not travel too far over fields in getting to a position. Look for a position which can be reached without too much cross-country traveling.

Use shrapnel for ranging. Make the first bracket 400 yards. Do not waste time over a small bracket. Under favorable conditions a first bracket of 200 yds. may sometimes be obtained. In firing on cavalry a 600 yd. bracket is usual.

A battery should not halt to await orders if it can be avoided, but should come on promptly if possible, while a position is being reconnoitered. A good position promptly occupied may be better than the best position tardily taken.

Fig. IV.

BATTERY WITH A REGIMENT.

Artillery with Advance Guard. It should not occupy positions from which it cannot readily withdraw, and so risk bringing on a general action unless this has been authorized.

It should be so placed that it cannot be readily surprised in march formation by hostile fire, especially artillery fire.

Artillery is seldom assigned to the advance guard of a force not larger than a brigade. [Pg 128]

If there is artillery with the main body an artillery reconnaissance officer usually accompanies the advance guard.

Do not as a rule use artillery with an advance guard in wooded or mountainous country. It is generally useless, and especially vulnerable to attack at close range. In open country it is useful except at night.

Horse artillery may accompany a cavalry force. (See also Chap. IV.)

In a small force of artillery, there would be no objection to the combat train marching immediately in rear of the firing batteries, as the total continuous length of the artillery column would not be objectionably great.

With Rear Guard. Artillery, especially horse artillery is particularly useful for delaying the enemy. Hence the proportion with a rear guard is generally large. (See also Chap. V.)

With Outposts. The use of artillery with an outpost is not usual, as it is very trying duty and rapidly wears out the men and horses. If so used it is generally to command important roads, bridges and defiles, and is placed with the reserve.

PROBLEM INVOLVING A
BATTERY IN POSITION.

Mission. The mission is to take position promptly and support attack. Develop hostile artillery and later fire on hostile infantry.

Artillery commander accompanies supreme commander or latter will send for him. Artillery commander usually has with him the reconnaissance officer and scouts, the chief of 5th section with telescope, a musician, with tripod, two orderlies.

He considers the orders of the supreme commander, especially as to limits of his position (on this point he may give advice) and general plan of attack, disposition of enemy as learned from his reconnaissance officer, etc. He takes the terrain under observation at once.

He selects positions for battery, limbers, combat train, B. C. station, auxiliary observing stations, aiming point, routes for battery and combat train, etc.

He sends word to battery to form and prepare for action (it may already be formed) gives stations of fractions and routes thereto and directs them to proceed, telephone detail to report at B. C. station. [Pg 129] He sends word by orderlies who also guide battery, or the reconnaissance officer who is familiar with ground may be sent to do this. Or Captain himself may do it.

He has chief of 5th section set up B. C. telescope. Meantime, assisted by the scouts, he selects exact position for the battery and lays it out.

He next obtains the firing data.

Auxiliary observing stations may be established when desirable, by B. C. or reconnaissance officer. They are occupied by the reconnaissance officer, scouts, agents, or other available personnel.

The position of the battery should have a range near 3,000, indirect fire and flash defilade. It should be near a crest so that the guns may be moved forward later for direct fire, especially in defense. It should be concealed from view of observers on enemy’s flank.

The limbers should be under cover preferably on a flank near the battery.

The combat train should be under cover, about 600 yards away.

The field trains generally join those of main body.

The B. C. station should be within 200 yards of the battery, preferably in rear or on a flank. The battery should be visible and the location favorable for observation of fire by the Captain. Sta. should be to windward of battery.

The auxiliary observing stations should generally be well to the front, and at least one on a flank, to observe errors of range and burst. The one on the flank also protects the battery from surprise.

The aiming point should be a mile away preferably in rear, or else on a flank. If not more than 1,000 yards off, the flank is better.

The telephones, 3 in number, are placed at B. C. station, battery (if necessary) and at the observing station occupied by the reconnaissance officer.

The approaches to the positions should be under cover. Exposure for a brief moment may not incur danger of fire, but may indicate where battery is going. Covered approach more desirable for battery than for combat train. If necessary for concealment dismount drivers in moving to position.

Flank guards should be placed by the Captain unless provided for by an infantry support.

In addition to the Captain the following artillery personnel, some or all, must be accounted for: [Pg 130]

The reconnaissance officer: On the march usually with the advance guard, to select artillery positions and routes, learn enemy’s dispositions, etc. He has charge of the battery scouts. He may lead the battery over route to its position, or obtain firing data (usually not both). Establishes the auxiliary observing stations and may occupy one of them, supervises communications, watches battle for tactical developments, etc.

The senior lieutenant: Commands the battery up to the time it is unlimbered for action, and then commands one of the firing platoons.

Junior lieutenant, commands the combat train, (reserves) Q. M. Sergeant commands field train.

Chief of 5th Section on entering action, sets up B. C. telescope (which he brings forward) and assists in obtaining firing data.

Scouts. During march in advance guard with reconnaissance officer. Scout the ground and locate routes, seek information of enemy. May conduct battery to position. Assist Captain to lay out exact position of battery. Act as auxiliary observers. Guard flanks of battery.

Telephone detail set up and operate the 3 telephones. Usually report to Captain at B. C. Station.

An agent is usually with the supreme commander to transmit information to the artillery.

Route markers, placed to mark routes and guide battery along them.

Musicians, one carries tripod of B. C. telescope. With Captain to act as messengers.

REMARKS CONCERNING A BATTALION
OR LARGER UNIT IN ACTION.

The Major will usually be with the supreme commander during the march. Having received orders to place the artillery in position, he rides to the designated locality with his staff, etc., to reconnoiter, observe the terrain, and select positions for his batteries. When ready for the batteries to come forward he sends the battery agents (who are with him) to direct the Captains to join him. The battery agents may also take word as to the route or routes by which the batteries are to advance. Word is also sent back as to the disposition to be made of the [Pg 131] combat trains, the entire combat train of the battalion being usually consolidated at one place. The batteries form for action and are brought forward as directed by the senior officer of each, or all together by the senior officer present.

The battery commanders, on receiving word, ride forward to join the Major, usually taking with them their reconnaissance officers, scouts, musicians, chiefs of the 5th section (with B. C. telescopes), etc. The Major instructs the battery commanders as to the general situation, and the orders he has received. He then indicates the approximate stations of the different batteries, the exact positions being marked out by the battery commanders, or by their orders. If posted for immediate action the Major may now designate the target for each battery, and give instructions as to opening fire. Otherwise he may indicate the localities for which firing data are to be prepared, or give such other instructions as the situation may demand. He designates a direction point and sectors of observation. He informs the battery commanders where his own station will be, and where the battalion telephone line will be laid, so they may connect with same.

The Major instructs the Sergeant Major to bring up the reel cart, tells him where his station will be, and where the cable is to be laid.

If the position of the hostile artillery is not known the Major may send his adjutant, or one of the battery reconnaissance officers, with some scouts to try to locate same. Aero reconnaissance will be especially useful in locating hostile positions. Fire may be directed by aeroplane and visual or wireless signaling, unless the enemy be well provided with anti-aircraft guns and skillful in their use.

When practicable the artillery commander should be with the supreme commander during the engagement, the same station being ordinarily suitable for both. If not with the supreme commander the artillery commander should place an agent, preferably an officer with some orderlies, with the supreme commander, unless his station (artillery) is connected with that of the supreme commander by telephone. For this latter purpose the apparatus of the Signal Corps will generally be used.

If the batteries are close together, the Major may place a single auxiliary observing station (consisting of a couple of scouts, or one of [Pg 132] the battery reconnaissance officers and a scout) for all. Or each battery will be allowed to place its own observing station in the judgment of its commander.

Each battery places its own limbers, usually about 100 to 150 yds. from the battery, preferably on a flank. The combat trains are combined at a locality designated by the Major unless there be some special reason for keeping them separated. Ordinarily they should be some 600 yds. or so from the fighting batteries, if cover is available.

An ammunition company from the division train (if there be one) on taking station will send an agent to the artillery commander. The latter informs his subordinates as to the location of the ammunition company, when necessary.

The Major directs in a general way the fire of his battalion.

The duties of a Colonel commanding a regiment, or of a General commanding an Artillery Brigade, are quite similar to those of the Major commanding a battalion, but in less detail. The higher the commander the more general his duties and the less detailed his orders. The Brigade Commander outlines to his regimental commanders the general situation, designates the approximate positions of the regiments, and assigns general targets, etc.

The duties of a Major in the regiment are the same as when commanding a separate battalion, except that he receives his orders through the Colonel of his regiment instead of direct from the supreme commander. (See ante.)

HEAVY FIELD ARTILLERY.

Heavy field artillery includes all ordnance heavier than the 3" field gun, but still mobile enough to accompany an army in the field. It would be used (if present) in practically every battle.

The field artillery adopted for U. S. service is the following:

[Pg 133] All of these pieces fire both shell and shrapnel, and they will break up most of the field works that are likely to be constructed (it is ordinarily not practicable to construct in field a work which would resist their fire unless considerable time is available for preparation). The 3.8" howitzer having same weight as 3” gun is quite as mobile. The 4.7" howitzer is as mobile as the 3” gun when it has eight horses. With 6 horses it cannot move as rapidly. The 4.7" gun can move over roads and fields, maneuver and take positions exactly like 3” gun, but it cannot move as rapidly.

The organization, tactical uses and methods of fire control of this ordnance are similar to those of the 3" gun. Each battery has 4 pieces, but howitzer battalions have only 2 batteries.

This ordnance is to be regarded as intended for the same uses as the 3” gun and as supplementary thereto. It should not be used for tasks where the 3" gun would do as well, but should be used for targets beyond the range or destructive power of the 3” gun.

These pieces may be needed against troops who have had 24 hours or so to prepare a defensive position, as in this time they can throw up works which would protect them from the 3" gun fire.

These guns use indirect laying as a rule, but may also use direct laying, being in this respect like 3" gun. They should be placed back of the 3” gun and not assigned to living targets which can be reached by the 3" gun. They should generally be concealed, for this purpose they require a flash defilade of 20 ft. Behind a second ridge is a good place. A clearing in the woods is also good, provided an aiming point is available.

The position should afford good lines of approach and retreat and for ammunition supply. The limbers are usually posted farther to the rear than in the case of the 3" gun. There should always be an infantry escort for these pieces, and machine guns may also be so used.

Usually this heavy artillery will take only one position during an action, and it is therefore desirable that this position be carefully selected. Ample time must be allowed for reconnoitering a position and therefore a representative of the heavy artillery should be well forward during the march, for this purpose.

On account of the great ranges at which heavy artillery is usually employed, battalions are split up even less often than in the case of 3" guns. [Pg 134]

Fig. V.

TRAJECTORIES AND CONES OF DISPERSION
FOR SHELL AND SHRAPNEL

[Pg 135] The shell fire of these pieces will destroy the materiel of a battery. The 4.7" gun can destroy battery materiel with great accuracy at ranges up to 5,000 yds. Thus they can often prevent hostile light artillery from coming into action at all.

Whereas a reverse slope of about 15 degrees affords some protection against 3" artillery, only very steep slopes, 50 degrees or more, afford complete protection against the shrapnel of the field howitzer. (Fig V.)

If at the opening of the attack the howitzers cannot find the hostile artillery they may fire at the infantry. Later in the attack if the defender runs his artillery forward for direct fire, he may then be subject to the fire of the attacker’s heavy artillery.

Auxiliary observing stations from which target can be seen are of great importance, and as little can be seen from a range of 8,000 yds., it is necessary to have an observing station well to the front. Usually the artillery (bn.) commander himself will occupy a station from which the target can be seen. These stations are connected with the battery by the telephone equipment, which is ample. Sweeping fire is not used with these pieces, as it is too wasteful of the ammunition which is heavy and expensive. Fire only at what can be seen, or otherwise accurately located.

In defense these pieces are very useful in compelling the attacker to deploy early, or to make a very long detour to get out of their range if he turns the position.

Fig. VI.

[Pg 136] On the March. As the 3.8" howitzer and the 4.7" howitzer when provided with 8 horses, are very mobile there is no serious objection to having them well up at the head of the column except for the road space they occupy. Therefore if the tactical situation is such as to make it desirable to have these pieces well to the front they may be placed there. They would seldom, however, be attached to the advance guard. The 6" howitzer and 4.7” gun (and usually also the 3.8" and 4.7" howitzers) should be placed immediately in rear of the last infantry organization in the main body (just ahead of the artillery combat trains). The possible necessity of having to strengthen the bridges for this heavy ordnance is an argument in favor of leaving them in the rear, as this necessity would delay the march of the infantry if the guns were in front. Ordinarily there is not as much speed required in placing this ordnance in action as is usual with the lighter pieces. Positions are selected with more deliberation.

Motor cars are extensively used for the transportation of field and siege artillery of all types from the lightest to the heaviest. Machine guns and some of the lighter types of rapid fire guns, including anti-aircraft guns, are often mounted directly upon the truck. The heavier pieces are hauled as trailers by the motor trucks, which serve also to carry ammunition and supplies. The mobility of the automobile motive power is greater than that of animals and the machine is less vulnerable to fire. The possibilities of motor operated vehicles in conducting artillery off the roads have not yet been fully demonstrated, but the conduct of the “quads” or 4-wheel drive cars is very satisfactory.

MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY.

There are many instances in campaign where the lack of roads or trails prohibits or unduly restricts the employment of light artillery. To meet such conditions, the mountain gun transported on pack animals has been constructed. The gun should, in principle, be as effective a weapon as the field gun but transportation conditions limit its practicable size and power.

The various patterns of mountain guns are distributed in 3- 4- and 5-mule loads. The weight that can be borne by the best pack mules, for other than brief periods, is limited to about 250 lbs. in addition to [Pg 137] the weight of the saddle. As a gun of acceptable power can hardly be built within this weight, most mountain guns are made in two or more parts, each constituting the load of a mule. The piece is equipped with wheels and drag ropes for moving short distances without packing.

The weight of projectile fired from mountain artillery is approximately the same as that from 3" field guns but the muzzle velocity is considerably less and the range therefore shorter. The guns have a larger allowable angle of elevation than 3” guns (usually to 27° or 30°); they are in effect howitzers.

The general construction of the gun, carriage and ammunition is largely similar to those of light artillery. The gun is not permanently connected to the recoil mechanism on account of the division into mule loads but is dropped into recessed blocks on a sleigh when assembled for action; and there it is secured by a key. The sleigh forms the cover of the cradle and slides on the cradle guides in recoil. The trail is made folding and is adapted for firing in cramped positions. The guns fire fixed ammunition, shell and shrapnel. Mountain batteries have no limbers or wagons. The battery is provided with an ammunition train which may consist entirely of pack transportation or may include some carts or light wagons. The gun can be unpacked and ready to fire in one minute.

In the American service, a mountain battery consists of four guns and their accessories. It is divided into six sections and has in addition an ammunition train and a supply train. The first, second, third, and fourth sections are gun sections to each of which is attached a mule with pioneer tools. The gun section consists of a gun squad of 10 men together with a gun team of 4 mules with drivers and an ammunition team of the same strength. The 5th and 6th sections are ammunition sections with 6 mules in each team.

The ammunition train comprises ammunition mules and the mules carrying the forge, stores, tools, etc. The supply train carries kits, rations, forage, etc.

Though mountain artillery is the only form of artillery that can be used in country where wheel traffic is impossible, its use is by no means limited to such terrain. For assisting the attacking infantry throughout all stages of combat, it is very effective. The mule can go [Pg 138] practically anywhere that man can, except where the latter resorts to climbing; hence mountain batteries are peculiarly effective in country that restricts the scope of light artillery. These guns require virtually no more cover for concealment on the march than do infantry and they are thereby able to effect movements on the battlefield, without attracting hostile attention or fire, that would be impossible with light arty. They are very useful in the defense of woods, in temporary forward positions, in rear guard actions or in general where their mobility and easy concealment have special application.

On equal terms, they are no match for light artillery, but in terrain that hinders the use of that weapon, the mountain gun is capable of a usefulness that increases with the restrictions imposed on the former.

ANTI AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY.

The introduction of air craft into warfare has naturally resulted in the use of special means of protection against this new menace. Probably the most effective method is attack by a superior number of similar craft on the principle of the cavalry screen.

Anti aircraft weapons include small arms, machine guns, and field pieces having a range and power approximating that of the lighter types of field artillery. Small arms are regarded as of little use in the attack of air craft. The field gun type, using shrapnel and high explosive shell appears to be the most effective. One German type has a calibre of 104 mm. and throws a projectile weighing 34 lbs. It has a maximum rate of fire of 15 shots per minute and a range (in height) of 12,500 ft. For some types of gun hits are claimed at altitudes of 10,000 ft. or more. Such performances must be regarded as most exceptional and their probability will not be great enough to force aeroplanes to remain at such altitudes. A lower elevation is necessary for effective reconnaissance and the aeronauts must of necessity frequently take the risk involved. Swift aeroplanes will be practically immune from anti aircraft fire at altitudes of 10,000 ft. or more. They will have a fair chance of escape as low as 5,000 ft. As the altitude is reduced below this figure the risk will very rapidly increase. [Pg 139] Observation at heights of about a mile will, however, be frequently attempted, but efficient guns in sufficient numbers should be able to exact a heavy toll in the event of systematic efforts to observe at less elevations. Airships, because of their greater size, and slower and more regular movements, must remain at greater elevations to escape the effects of hostile fire.

The greatest difficulties encountered in anti aircraft firing are estimating the range and hitting a rapidly moving object. Results must be obtained by great rapidity of fire.

Thus, unless the burst happens to be directly in line with the target, it is impracticable to determine by observation from the firing point whether the shot is over or short.

Guns cannot fire vertically. Their elevation never exceeds 60° and in general 50° is the practicable limit. Beyond these angles accordingly the aircraft are immune.

New problems in exterior ballistics are introduced. The influence of air currents on the trajectory is considerable. Tracer shells which emit a smoke flame are occasionally used to verify the aim.

As the aeroplane may use any line of approach at will and moves at great speed, the need for a large number of very mobile, quick firing guns will be apparent. The guns are frequently mounted on motor trucks when used in the field.

Except for possible use in fortifications, special guns cannot evidently always be provided in sufficient numbers for this purpose. Arrangements must, therefore, be made for utilizing the standard field and siege guns and howitzers. This is usually accomplished by providing special types of mounts such as the split trail carriage, or by extemporizing means whereby the trail can be sunk in the ground to an extraordinary degree and the gun then prevented from overturning, by cables to holdfasts, etc.

The anti aircraft gun may be considered to have satisfactorily fulfilled its function if it prevents aircraft from flying at altitudes sufficiently low to permit effective reconnaissance.

REMARKS CONCERNING THE
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF
LIGHT FIELD ARTILLERY.

The following principles are of general (but not universal) application [Pg 140] in the tactics of field artillery. They may be considered as useful suggestions, to be varied, however, as circumstances may dictate.

A battalion of artillery should seldom be sub-divided. A battery of artillery has but one range finding equipment. Its subdivision would be justified only by most unusual conditions.

At the opening of an engagement some of the artillery may, according to circumstances, be held “in observation,” or “in readiness,” exceptionally in a small force, more frequently in a large one.

It having been decided to place the artillery in action it should be brought to its position promptly.

The artillery and combat trains should, when practicable, be conducted to their positions by concealed routes. Utilize the roads as far as practicable, avoiding long movements across country. Concealment in position and en route thereto and good observing stations are the principal technical requirements of an artillery position. The position should be concealed from the enemy’s observation from either front or flank. The position should be sufficiently roomy for the unit which occupies it. It is not desirable to crowd guns at less than their proper interval (20 yds.), but it often is necessary.

A good position for artillery in attack may often be found between the holding and enveloping attack. In either attack or defense a favorable position may be found on the flank. If the artillery is thus exposed it will usually require a guard or escort of other troops (to be designated by the supreme commander, often from the advance guard) both in position and en route thereto. The artillery in any case should have out the necessary details for protection and observation of fire.

If there be a choice between two crests it will generally be better, when other considerations are not paramount, to select the one farther from the enemy.

If direct fire is contemplated at any stage of the action the position should be selected with a view to this. Such a provision would be more usual in defense than in attack.

Flash defilade requires 12 to 15 ft. of vertical cover. In solving defilade and other visibility problems allowance should be made for the vegetation. [Pg 141]

It is ordinarily desirable to obtain a range between 2,500 and 3,500 yards from the probable target. Initial range in defense may be somewhat greater than in attack, since the hostile infantry will approach the position.

It is desirable to secure at the outset a position suitable for all stages of the action. Artillery once committed to action should not be moved during the course of the engagement unless it is apparent that a distinct advantage may thereby be gained, or unless such a movement is unavoidable.

The front may be covered and dead spaces eliminated by a subdivision and distribution of the artillery units.

Covered approach and concealment in position are desirable for the combat trains. Unless otherwise specially ordered the combat trains will be at the disposal of the artillery commander. In some cases they may take their stations under cover of the artillery fire.

The artillery prior to and during the action reconnoiters the terrain with a view to the selection of artillery positions. This is done without special orders. An artillery officer with the necessary reconnaissance detail should be with the advance guard during the march for this purpose.

The B. C. station should be close to the battery, and not in a conspicuous position, likely to draw the enemy’s fire.

Shrapnel should be used against living targets and for ranging. Shell is used against material objects. A hostile battery which has been immobilized by shrapnel fire may be destroyed by shell fire.

In ranging the first bracket should be of ample span, 400 yards is generally a good distance.

A duel between the opposing artilleries is not a necessary preliminary to every combat. It is the duty of the artillery in both attack and defense to support the infantry. It should therefore direct its fire as a rule, upon that element of the enemy which is at the time or may become the most threatening to the friendly infantry. Firing over the heads of the infantry will be the rule, in both attack and defense. The attacker’s artillery, having once opened fire upon the infantry firing line of the defense, should ordinarily continue this fire until the proximity of the assaulting infantry to the position makes it necessary to increase the range.

There should always be the closest co-operation between the artillery [Pg 142] and the other arms. The artillery commander during the engagement will often be with the supreme commander. If not he should be in close communication with him, generally through an artillery agent.

With rare exceptions the artillery in both attack and defense will be in rear of the general line of battle of the infantry. It may be stated as a very rough guide that the artillery of the defense will be, in the average case, approximately 500 yds. in rear of the infantry firing line, particularly when indirect fire is employed. The mission of the force, the nature of the terrain and the conditions of the case will determine the position of the artillery, which may also be subject to change during the action. In case of a counter-attack, pursuit, or occupation of a captured position, the artillery may often be pushed boldly to the front.

Instructions too much in detail should not be given to artillery in orders. It is usually unnecessary in the ordinary case for the supreme commander to encroach upon the province of the artillery commander by directing him to (a) Fire on any specified target, (b) Obtain firing data, (c) Reconnoiter advanced positions, (d) Take station at a definite point, (e) Open fire at any specified time. He should, according to circumstances, be directed ordinarily merely to take position (1) for immediate action, (2) in observation, or (3) in readiness. The information in the order as to the enemy and his own troops indicates to him what the probable targets will be and when and where they will probably appear. This information, together with the rule to fire on the hostile element most dangerous to the friendly infantry, enables the artillery to obtain the necessary firing data and fire on the proper target, (a) and (b). As to (c) the artillery commander will, without orders, consider the possibility of occupying a new position, according to developments, and he will conduct the necessary reconnaissance for this purpose, so as to be ready to move to a new position when later ordered to do so. As to (d) the supreme commander should, in his orders, direct the artillery to take position near such a place, leaving the selection of the exact location for the artillery to its commander. As to (e) if posted for immediate action the artillery will open fire as soon as the target appears. In the other two cases it will not open until it receives additional orders. Case (2) in observation, is used when the supreme commander does not wish fire opened prematurely, although he has decided where to [Pg 143] place the artillery. Case (3) in readiness, is characteristic of a position in readiness, where combat position of the artillery is not yet definitely decided upon. The supreme commander may, both prior to and during the engagement, consult the artillery commander, obtaining the latter’s views as to the positions for and handling of the artillery, and give him detailed instructions, but this should not appear in the orders. When using the expressions (1), (2) and (3) in orders, it is well (in solutions) to add after your order, an explanatory note as to why more definite instructions are not given to the artillery commander. In some cases it may be desirable to give the artillery more definite instructions in orders but such cases would not be usual, and could often be covered by a consultation, omitting detailed instructions from the orders. If detailed instructions, as to particular targets on which to fire, advanced positions, etc., are considered necessary in orders it is usually well to add (in your solution) a note explaining why such orders are considered necessary in this case. If firing data are to be obtained by “registration” (bracketing fire) the order may contain instructions to that effect. See also Chapters IV, V, VI, XI, XIII, XIV, XVII and XVIII.

The uses of cavalry in campaign are summarized as follows:

Cavalry being an expensive arm to equip and maintain should be used for the duty for which it is especially qualified, and not frittered away as messengers, orderlies, etc.

A division of the cavalry force while undesirable is frequently necessary. As little as possible should be assigned to the lesser tasks and the bulk to the principal duty. Many of the minor tasks for which cavalry has been often used may well be performed by mounted orderlies and the use of automobiles and motorcycles.

Cavalry should not ordinarily be used to perform duty which infantry could do as well (or better) when infantry is available. There will usually be many duties which the cavalry alone can perform.

The efficiency of cavalry depends very greatly on the condition of the horses, and they should be spared all unnecessary fatigue. Night work especially is very exhausting and so should be held to the minimum, although it cannot, of course, be entirely dispensed with. Always allow the cavalry to rest at night if practicable.

Cavalry operating alone, except for very short periods, should generally be accompanied by a sufficient train to provide reasonable [Pg 145] comfort for the men and horses and maintain their health and efficiency. The presence of the train restricts, to some extent, the movements of the cavalry, but the added comfort increases its efficiency and the range of its operations.

If the cavalry is out but a short distance its field trains would, as a rule, be in the rear with those of the other troops. They join the cavalry occasionally in order to replenish rations. When the cavalry is out for several days and mobility is of special importance it may be accompanied by a pack train in lieu of wagons. When combat is imminent all wagons and pack animals should be kept well to the rear. In such cases extra ammunition may be carried in the saddle bags.

Large bodies of cavalry would frequently be accompanied by artillery, preferably horse artillery if such is available. Artillery is always desirable with a large cavalry command.

Signal troops, especially radio sections pack (wireless) may be attached to cavalry operating independently, to maintain communication between separated portions, or with the foot troops which the cavalry is covering. The wireless sections are sent wherever there is a demand for their services. They would not habitually be attached to bodies smaller than a troop.

Mounted engineers frequently accompany advance cavalry and may, if there is special need for them, also accompany the independent cavalry. Cavalry commands have a limited number of tools of their own including demolition outfits (containing explosive). The men who handle the explosives are called the demolition squad—there being one to each squadron.

The cavalry commander, especially when he is acting independently, should be allowed great discretionary powers, and orders too much in detail should not be given him. He should be told what he is expected to do, but not how he is to do it. Otherwise the cavalry will be so hampered in its movements that its usefulness will be greatly impaired. “Success in reconnaissance depends greatly on the character of orders given. The hackneyed phrase that the cavalry is to advance and discover the strength and position of the enemy is useless, for this is only its natural duty. If, as is often the case, it is told to discover the intentions of the enemy, the commander really demands that it perform a duty incumbent on himself. Both cases betray a hesitancy on the part of the commander which results in a halting sort of action. [Pg 146] It is wisest to put to the cavalry simply the questions which it is desirable at the moment for the commander to have answered, viz: whether hostile encampments are met with in given localities, whether certain towns are occupied, whether the enemy’s advance guard or main body has reached a certain line, how far the enemy’s flanks extend, whether on a given road or railroad troops are moving. Such commissions, which cannot be misunderstood, will bring in clear reports from which the commander-in-chief can draw his own picture of the strength and position of the enemy, and divine his intentions.”

The cavalry will seek and destroy the enemy’s cavalry. Its important duties of screening, contact and reconnaissance will be rendered easier of accomplishment by the overthrow of the hostile mounted force. In the consummation of this important duty the best results will be obtained by concentrating the cavalry in large masses independent of all save the supreme commander in the theatre of operations. A relatively small part of the cavalry force should be assigned to divisions (or other units) and the great bulk of it concentrated under a single independent commander. The duty of cavalry may therefore be classified as follows:

• Major rôle: Army (independent) cavalry.
• Minor rôle: Divisional cavalry.

The divisional cavalry will be under the immediate orders of the division commander. It may be used independently, that is to say independent of all save the division commander, or as advance, rear, or outpost cavalry. In the latter cases it will be under the command of the advance guard, rear guard or outpost commanders. The divisional cavalry is charged with such duties (principally security and reconnaissance) as pertain especially to the operations of the division to which it is attached. While engaged in these duties it may be allowed a considerable degree of independence of action. It should not, however, encroach upon the sphere of activity of the army cavalry and should never be beyond recall by the division commander. When the division is operating independently the duties of the divisional cavalry will be similar to those of the independent cavalry of an army, although of course less in degree and scope. The following [Pg 147] paragraphs pertain primarily to the operations of the divisional cavalry. According to our present organization a regiment of cavalry will be attached to each division.

Advance, rear and outpost cavalry. Advance cavalry is that attached to and under the orders of the advance guard commander. Its function is the same as that of the whole advance guard, to insure the safe and uninterrupted advance of the main body. It would be exceptional to use an entire regiment of divisional cavalry in this manner, and in general, as in the case of army cavalry, better results will be obtained by keeping the divisional cavalry intact and independent. If, however, the cavalry with the division is too weak for independent action, or if there is no mission for it independent of that of the advance guard, it may be attached to the latter in a forward movement. The circumstances of each case will decide the best mode of employing the divisional cavalry.

Cavalry will be employed more frequently with the rear guard in retreat than with the advance guard in a forward movement. Cavalry is the arm par excellence for delaying actions, hence the entire divisional cavalry will frequently be assigned to the rear guard in retreat.

Divisional cavalry may also be assigned to flank guards and outposts in which duty it is very useful. If the situation demands, part of the divisional cavalry may be temporarily assigned to a detachment of the division operating independently. Such use of the cavalry must, however, be regarded as exceptional in systematic operations on a large scale, in common with all other “detachment warfare.” The independent “reinforced brigade,” of frequent occurrence in map problems and small maneuvers, will be not so often encountered in actual campaign against a civilized and organized foe. It will probably, however, continue for a time to find a field of usefulness in the operations of the American army.

For the use of cavalry with advance, rear and flank guards, outposts and detachments see Chaps. IV, V, VI, VII, X, XI, XIII, and XIV.

Independent Cavalry. Cavalry may and should be used independently:

The expression “independent cavalry,” means that the cavalry is independent of all but the supreme commander.

The duty of the independent cavalry is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, usually with the main force, thus securing information as to his movements and intentions, and screening the front of its own main body, so as to prevent the hostile cavalry from gaining similar information of the friendly forces; to operate against the enemy and his communications, etc.; to maintain communication between separated friendly forces; and to perform its other special functions, (see ante). The independent cavalry forages for itself to a greater or less degree and often aids in the collection of supplies for the entire command. It is also commonly employed in raiding, in attacking convoys, to destroy railroads, seize unprotected depots of supply, etc. In general the cavalry may be properly employed independently on any duty where great mobility and celerity of action are required.

The operations of independent cavalry have of necessity a very wide range. Depending on its strength and on other conditions the cavalry may be several days’ march from its supporting troops. It will nearly always be too far out to come in to the main camp every night.

The cavalry must at all times maintain touch with the enemy and communication with its own forces in rear. If there be advance cavalry between the main body and the independent cavalry, it will be charged with maintaining communication unless the independent cavalry is too far in advance.

All information of the enemy should be promptly transmitted. The presence of a hostile force should seldom be reported without information also as to its strength and composition. The presence of a hostile force having once been detected all its subsequent movements should be observed. In other words, the cavalry having once gained contact with the enemy should never thereafter lose it. [Pg 149]

In maintaining continuous contact aero reconnaissance is not entirely effective. It usually loses contact with the enemy temporarily during darkness and foul weather, and in this respect cavalry has an advantage. In the duty of reconnaissance the aeroplane and dirigible cannot fulfill all the functions of the cavalry. The two services are to be regarded as supplementary. In the usual case both will be needed.

In sending in reports the cavalry commander should state his plans or intentions for the future and, when necessary, the manner in which messages may be transmitted to him.

If the enemy has a strong and aggressive mounted force in the field the cavalry, while at no time neglecting its important duties of reconnaissance and screening, should keep a strong central mass well in hand to defeat the hostile cavalry as soon as it is encountered. Having defeated and thoroughly demoralized the enemy’s cavalry a much greater dispersion is permissible. The enemy’s cavalry having been overthrown he can no longer keep touch with the forces opposing him, nor screen himself from observation by their cavalry. His patrols and messengers, both going and returning, will have great difficulty in eluding the screen which will have been established.

Cavalry in the presence of infantry alone may be considerably dispersed with safety. But it should be kept well in hand so long as opposed to a strong and aggressive cavalry.

A large force of cavalry, in gaining contact advances toward the enemy in one or more columns, which should keep in close touch with each other. On reaching the vicinity of the enemy each column sends forward a “contact squadron” (from 1 to 4 troops, generally at least 2.) This contact squadron approaches still closer to enemy’s position and then sends out one or more strong strategic patrols, under command of officers. The sole function of these patrols, is to gain information of the enemy’s main body for strategic purposes. Their radius of action depends upon conditions. In a friendly country they may operate at considerable distances from their supporting troops. In hostile country, however, if the enemy’s cavalry is still active, the distances at which they can operate will be greatly diminished, and the difficulties of obtaining information correspondingly increased. Uniformed men in small bodies and in a hostile country overrun by the [Pg 150] enemy’s cavalry will have great difficulty in gathering and transmitting information sufficiently exact to be of strategic value. In such cases therefore, resort will often be had to the additional aid of spies. These patrols do not report minor information, and hence the number of their messages will be limited. Where practicable the commercial telegraph and telephone lines should be utilized in the transmission of messages. Motorcycles, light autos, air craft and wireless are all useful in maintaining communication. Important information which cannot be telegraphed should be sent to the rear over several routes, especially in hostile country. As the duty of these patrols is very arduous they should be relieved at suitable intervals, depending on conditions. They will usually subsist off the country. (See also “Patrolling.”)

The contact squadron supports the patrols and furnishes their reliefs. It arranges for the transmission of information from the patrols to the squadron, and from the squadron to designated stations in rear. For this purpose relay and collecting stations are established at suitable points and free use is made of the telegraph and telephone, motorcycles and any other available means of transmitting information. Signal troops (usually wireless sections pack) may be attached to bodies of cavalry engaged in reconnaissance. The maximum sending radius of the present field wireless sets (pack) in our service is about 30 miles, but they are not always dependable beyond 15 miles, and occasionally fail altogether in an emergency. They can seldom be relied upon as the sole means of communication. In the employment of wireless it may be advisable to use a code for important messages.

Cavalry in combat. Cavalry uses the following methods of offensive action:

Of the above the mounted charge in line will generally be the most effective although the opportunities for its successful employment will [Pg 151] probably be rare and fleeting. It is, therefore, to be preferred whenever it is practicable, even when the cavalry is in a generally defensive attitude, since cavalry has less power of resistance than infantry, and a successful charge is the most effective means of defense. If the ground is too rough or broken for a charge in line, if it is desired to extend the front for purposes of envelopment or in the rare case of a charge against a deployed line (either Infantry or Cavalry) a charge in line with extended intervals, usually accompanied by mounted fire action, may be employed, viz:

Charge as skirmishers, using the revolver, automatic pistol, or sabre.

Charge as foragers, the men in couples, using their revolvers, pistols or sabres.

A charge in column of fours should be used only when charge in line is, for some reason, impracticable, as when charging along a road, or when there is not time to form line.

Dismounted fire action is employed:

Even if intending eventually to fight on foot the cavalry should remain mounted as long as possible. It may often be better to remain mounted in concealment, awaiting a favorable opportunity to charge, rather than to hasten prematurely into a dismounted action. Cavalry which dismounts usually thereby surrenders the initiative, certainly when opposed to an enemy still mounted. In case of defeat by a superior mounted force there is usually no opportunity to retreat, and most of the dismounted men and all of the led horses will probably be lost. Therefore it is necessary, in dismounting to fight on foot, to hold a mounted reserve, especially when opposed to cavalry. One of the functions of this mounted reserve will be to check the enemy, if necessary, while the rest of the command is mounting. Even if it is contemplated to use a portion of the reserve eventually for dismounted action it is well to keep it mounted as long as practicable as it is thus more mobile. [Pg 152]

Cavalry should not start to dismount to fight on foot with a mounted enemy formed and ready to charge, within 1,000 yards, unless the terrain affords protection against a charge.

When opposed to infantry alone the risk in dismounting is not so great as when a hostile cavalry force is near, and cavalry will often dismount to fight infantry, especially in delaying actions. Even in this case, however, the cavalry should make its movements to position mounted as it has in this respect an advantage over infantry.

Even when dismounting to fight on foot cavalry should at all times keep up an active mounted reconnaissance, especially when opposed to cavalry.

When there is one horse holder to each four led horses they can be readily shifted from place to place, and are then said to be mobile. If the proportion of horseholders is less than this the horses are not readily shifted from place to place, and are then said to be immobile. If the horses are linked it is inadvisable to have less than one holder to eight horses, and even in this case it is not practicable to move them and they may be easily stampeded. To reduce to a minimum the number of horseholders (if the horses are not to be kept mobile) the animals may be linked in large circles. A better method is that of “coupling,” in which pairs of horses are linked each to the cantle of the other’s saddle thus facing in opposite directions. All troopers are then liberated for firing. The horses cannot move away or be stampeded, if the links hold.

To dismount to fight on foot, horses mobile, requires a minimum of ½ to 1 minute, not counting the time required to take position on the firing line. To mount requires about the same time. If the horses be immobilized more time is required both in mounting and dismounting.