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Title: Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, Volume II., Part 3

Author: William T. Sherman

Release date: June 1, 2004 [eBook #5852]
                Most recently updated: December 29, 2020

Language: English

Credits: Produced by David Widger


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, VOLUME II., PART 3 ***




Produced by David Widger





MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN

By William T. Sherman




VOLUME II

Part 3



CHAPTER XVI.



ATLANTA CAMPAIGN-NASHVILLE AND CHATTANOOGA TO BENEBAW.


MARCH, APRIL, AND MAY, 1864.


On the 18th day of March, 1864, at Nashville, Tennessee, I relieved
Lieutenant-General Grant in command of the Military Division of the
Mississippi, embracing the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland,
Tennessee, and Arkansas, commanded respectively by Major-Generals
Schofield, Thomas, McPherson, and Steele.  General Grant was in the
act of starting East to assume command of all the armies of the
United States, but more particularly to give direction in person to
the Armies of the Potomac and James, operating against Richmond;
and I accompanied him as far as Cincinnati on his way, to avail
myself of the opportunity to discuss privately many little details
incident to the contemplated changes, and of preparation for the
great events then impending.  Among these was the intended
assignment to duty of many officers of note and influence, who had,
by the force of events, drifted into inactivity and discontent.
Among these stood prominent Generals McClellan, Burnside, and
Fremont, in, the East; and Generals Buell, McCook, Negley, and
Crittenden, at the West. My understanding was that General Grant
thought it wise and prudent to give all these officers appropriate
commands, that would enable them to regain the influence they had
lost; and, as a general reorganization of all the armies was then
necessary, he directed me to keep in mind especially the claims of
Generals Buell, McCook, and Crittenden, and endeavor to give them
commands that would be as near their rank and dates of commission
as possible; but I was to do nothing until I heard further from
him on the subject, as he explained that he would have to consult
the Secretary of War before making final orders.  General Buell and
his officers had been subjected to a long ordeal by a court of
inquiry, touching their conduct of the campaign in Tennessee and
Kentucky, that resulted in the battle of Perryville, or Chaplin's
Hills, October 8,1862, and they had been substantially acquitted;
and, as it was manifest that we were to have some hard fighting, we
were anxious to bring into harmony every man and every officer of
skill in the profession of arms.  Of these, Generals Buell and
McClellan were prominent in rank, and also by reason of their fame
acquired in Mexico, as well as in the earlier part of the civil
war.

After my return to Nashville I addressed myself to the task of
organization and preparation, which involved the general security
of the vast region of the South which had been already conquered,
more especially the several routes of supply and communication with
the active armies at the front, and to organize a large army to
move into Georgia, coincident with the advance of the Eastern
armies against Richmond.  I soon received from Colonel J. B. Fry
--now of the Adjutant-General's Department, but then at Washington in
charge of the Provost-Marshal-General's office--a letter asking me to
do something for General Buell.  I answered him frankly, telling him
of my understanding with General Grant, and that I was still awaiting
the expected order of the War Department, assigning General Buell to
my command.  Colonel Fry, as General Buell's special friend, replied
that he was very anxious that I should make specific application for
the services of General Buell by name, and inquired what I proposed
to offer him.  To this I answered that, after the agreement with
General Grant that he would notify me from Washington, I could not
with propriety press the matter, but if General Buell should be
assigned to me specifically I was prepared to assign him to command
all the troops on the Mississippi River from Cairo to Natchez,
comprising about three divisions, or the equivalent of a corps
d'armee.  General Grant never afterward communicated to me on the
subject at all; and I inferred that Mr. Stanton, who was notoriously
vindictive in his prejudices, would not consent to the employment of
these high officers.  General Buell, toward the close of the war,
published a bitter political letter, aimed at General Grant,
reflecting on his general management of the war, and stated that both
Generals Canby and Sherman had offered him a subordinate command,
which he had declined because he had once outranked us.  This was not
true as to me, or Canby either, I think, for both General Canby and I
ranked him at West Point and in the old army, and he (General Buell)
was only superior to us in the date of his commission as
major-general, for a short period in 1862.  This newspaper
communication, though aimed at General Grant, reacted on himself, for
it closed his military career.  General Crittenden afterward obtained
authority for service, and I offered him a division, but he declined
it for the reason, as I understood it, that he had at one time
commanded a corps.  He is now in the United States service,
commanding the Seventeenth Infantry.  General McCook obtained a
command under General Canby, in the Department of the Gulf, where he
rendered good service, and he is also in the regular service,
lieutenant-colonel Tenth Infantry.

I returned to Nashville from Cincinnati about the 25th of March,
and started at once, in a special car attached to the regular
train, to inspect my command at the front, going to Pulaski,
Tennessee, where I found General G. M. Dodge; thence to Huntsville,
Alabama, where I had left a part of my personal staff and the
records of the department during the time we had been absent at
Meridian; and there I found General McPherson, who had arrived from
Vicksburg, and had assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee.
General McPherson accompanied me, and we proceeded by the cars to
Stevenson, Bridgeport, etc., to Chattanooga, where we spent a day
or two with General George H.  Thomas, and then continued on to
Knoxville, where was General Schofield.  He returned with us to
Chattanooga, stopping by the way a few hours at Loudon, where were
the headquarters of the Fourth Corps (Major-General Gordon
Granger).  General Granger, as usual, was full of complaints at the
treatment of his corps since I had left him with General Burnside,
at Knoxville, the preceding November; and he stated to me
personally that he had a leave of absence in his pocket, of which
he intended to take advantage very soon.  About the end of March,
therefore, the three army commanders and myself were together at
Chattanooga.  We had nothing like a council of war, but conversed
freely and frankly on all matters of interest then in progress or
impending.  We all knew that, as soon as the spring was fairly
open, we should have to move directly against our antagonist,
General Jos. E. Johnston, then securely intrenched at Dalton,
thirty miles distant; and the purpose of our conference at the time
was to ascertain our own resources, and to distribute to each part
of the army its appropriate share of work.  We discussed every
possible contingency likely to arise, and I simply instructed each
army commander to make immediate preparations for a hard campaign,
regulating the distribution of supplies that were coming up by rail
from Nashville as equitably as possible.  We also agreed on some
subordinate changes in the organization of the three separate
armies which were destined to take the field; among which was the
consolidation of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps (Howard and Slocum)
into a single corps, to be commanded by General Jos. Hooker.
General Howard was to be transferred to the Fourth Corps, vice
Gordon Granger to avail himself of his leave of absence; and
General Slocum was to be ordered down the Mississippi River, to
command the District of Vicksburg.  These changes required the
consent of the President, and were all in due time approved.

The great question of the campaign was one of supplies.  Nashville,
our chief depot, was itself partially in a hostile country, and
even the routes of supply from Louisville to Nashville by rail, and
by way of the Cumberland River, had to be guarded.  Chattanooga
(our starting-point) was one hundred and thirty-six miles in front
of Nashville, and every foot of the way, especially the many
bridges, trestles, and culverts, had to be strongly guarded against
the acts of a local hostile population and of the enemy's cavalry.
Then, of course, as we advanced into Georgia, it was manifest that
we should have to repair the railroad, use it, and guard it
likewise: General Thomas's army was much the largest of the three,
was best provided, and contained the best corps of engineers,
railroad managers, and repair parties, as well as the best body of
spies and provost-marshals.  On him we were therefore compelled in a
great measure to rely for these most useful branches of service.  He
had so long exercised absolute command and control over the railroads
in his department, that the other armies were jealous, and these
thought the Army of the Cumberland got the lion's share of the
supplies and other advantages of the railroads.  I found a good deal
of feeling in the Army of the Tennessee on this score, and therefore
took supreme control of the roads myself, placed all the army
commanders on an equal footing, and gave to each the same control, so
far as orders of transportation for men and stores were concerned.
Thomas's spies brought him frequent and accurate reports of Jos. E.
Johnston's army at Dalton, giving its strength anywhere between forty
and fifty thousand men, and these were being reenforced by troops
from Mississippi, and by the Georgia militia, under General G. W.
Smith.  General Johnston seemed to be acting purely on the defensive,
so that we had time and leisure to take all our measures deliberately
and fully.  I fixed the date of May 1st, when all things should be in
readiness for the grand forward movement, and then returned to
Nashville; General Schofield going back to Knoxville, and McPherson
to Huntsville, Thomas remaining at Chattanooga.

On the 2d of April, at Nashville, I wrote to General Grant, then at
Washington, reporting to him the results of my visit to the several
armies, and asked his consent to the several changes proposed,
which was promptly given by telegraph.  I then addressed myself
specially to the troublesome question of transportation and
supplies.  I found the capacity of the railroads from Nashville
forward to Decatur, and to Chattanooga, so small, especially in the
number of locomotives and care, that it was clear that they were
barely able to supply the daily wants of the armies then dependent
on them, with no power of accumulating a surplus in advance.  The
cars were daily loaded down with men returning from furlough, with
cattle, horses, etc.; and, by reason of the previous desolation of
the country between Chattanooga and Knoxville, General Thomas had
authorized the issue of provisions to the suffering inhabitants.

We could not attempt an advance into Georgia without food,
ammunition, etc.; and ordinary prudence dictated that we should
have an accumulation at the front, in case of interruption to the
railway by the act of the enemy, or by common accident.
Accordingly, on the 6th of April, I issued a general order,
limiting the use of the railroad-cars to transporting only the
essential articles of food, ammunition, and supplies for the army
proper, forbidding any further issues to citizens, and cutting off
all civil traffic; requiring the commanders of posts within thirty
miles of Nashville to haul out their own stores in wagons;
requiring all troops destined for the front to march, and all
beef-cattle to be driven on their own legs.  This was a great help,
but of course it naturally raised a howl.  Some of the poor Union
people of East Tennessee appealed to President Lincoln, whose kind
heart responded promptly to their request. He telegraphed me to know
if I could not modify or repeal my orders; but I answered him that a
great campaign was impending, on which the fate of the nation hung;
that our railroads had but a limited capacity, and could not provide
for the necessities of the army and of the people too; that one or
the other must quit, and we could not until the army of Jos. Johnston
was conquered, etc., etc.  Mr. Lincoln seemed to acquiesce, and I
advised the people to obtain and drive out cattle from Kentucky, and
to haul out their supplies by the wagon-road from the same quarter,
by way of Cumberland Gap.  By these changes we nearly or quite
doubled our daily accumulation of stores at the front, and yet even
this was not found enough.

I accordingly called together in Nashville the master of
transportation, Colonel Anderson, the chief quartermaster, General
J. L. Donaldson, and the chief commissary, General Amos Beckwith,
for conference.  I assumed the strength of the army to move from
Chattanooga into Georgia at one hundred thousand men, and the
number of animals to be fed, both for cavalry and draught, at
thirty-five thousand; then, allowing for occasional wrecks of
trains, which were very common, and for the interruption of the
road itself by guerrillas and regular raids, we estimated it would
require one hundred and thirty cars, of ten tons each, to reach
Chattanooga daily, to be reasonably certain of an adequate supply.
Even with this calculation, we could not afford to bring forward
hay for the horses and mules, nor more than five pounds of oats or
corn per day for each animal.  I was willing to risk the question
of forage in part, because I expected to find wheat and corn
fields, and a good deal of grass, as we advanced into Georgia at
that season of the year.  The problem then was to deliver at
Chattanooga and beyond one hundred and thirty car-loads daily,
leaving the beef-cattle to be driven on the hoof, and all the
troops in excess of the usual train-guards to march by the ordinary
roads.  Colonel Anderson promptly explained that he did not possess
cars or locomotives enough to do this work.  I then instructed and
authorized him to hold on to all trains that arrived at Nashville
from Louisville, and to allow none to go back until he had secured
enough to fill the requirements of our problem.  At the time he
only had about sixty serviceable locomotives, and about six hundred
cars of all kinds, and he represented that to provide for all
contingencies he must have at least one hundred locomotives and one
thousand cars.  As soon as Mr. Guthrie, the President of the
Louisville & Nashville Railroad, detected that we were holding on
to all his locomotives and cars, he wrote me, earnestly
remonstrating against it, saying that he would not be able with
diminished stock to bring forward the necessary stores from
Louisville to Nashville.  I wrote to him, frankly telling him
exactly how we were placed, appealed to his patriotism to stand by
us, and advised him in like manner to hold on to all trains coming
into Jeffersonville, Indiana.  He and General Robert Allen, then
quartermaster-general at Louisville, arranged a ferry-boat so as to
transfer the trains over the Ohio River from Jeffersonville, and in
a short time we had cars and locomotives from almost every road at
the North; months afterward I was amused to see, away down in
Georgia, cars marked "Pittsburg & Fort Wayne," "Delaware &
Lackawanna," "Baltimore & Ohio," and indeed with the names of
almost every railroad north of the Ohio River.  How these railroad
companies ever recovered their property, or settled their
transportation accounts, I have never heard, but to this fact, as
much as to any other single fact, I attribute the perfect success
which afterward attended our campaigns; and I have always felt
grateful to Mr. Guthrie, of Louisville, who had sense enough and
patriotism enough to subordinate the interests of his railroad
company to the cause of his country.

About this time, viz., the early part of April, I was much
disturbed by a bold raid made by the rebel General Forrest up
between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers.  He reached the Ohio
River at Paducah, but was handsomely repulsed by Colonel Hicks.  He
then swung down toward Memphis, assaulted and carried Fort Pillow,
massacring a part of its garrison, composed wholly of negro troops.
At first I discredited the story of the massacre, because, in
preparing for the Meridian campaign, I had ordered Fort Pillow to
be evacuated, but it transpired afterward that General Hurlbut had
retained a small garrison at Fort Pillow to encourage the
enlistment of the blacks as soldiers, which was a favorite
political policy at that day.  The massacre at Fort Pillow occurred
April 12, 1864, and has been the subject of congressional inquiry.
No doubt Forrest's men acted like a set of barbarians, shooting
down the helpless negro garrison after the fort was in their
possession; but I am told that Forrest personally disclaims any
active participation in the assault, and that he stopped the firing
as soon as he could.  I also take it for granted that Forrest did
not lead the assault in person, and consequently that he was to the
rear, out of sight if not of hearing at the time, and I was told by
hundreds of our men, who were at various times prisoners in
Forrest's possession, that he was usually very kind to them.  He
had a desperate set of fellows under him, and at that very time
there is no doubt the feeling of the Southern people was fearfully
savage on this very point of our making soldiers out of their late
slaves, and Forrest may have shared the feeling.

I also had another serious cause of disturbance about that time.  I
wanted badly the two divisions of troops which had been loaned to
General Banks in the month of March previously, with the express
understanding that their absence was to endure only one month, and
that during April they were to come out of Red River, and be again
within the sphere of my command.  I accordingly instructed one of
my inspector-generals, John M.  Corse, to take a fleet steamboat at
Nashville, proceed via Cairo, Memphis, and Vicksburg, to General
Banks up the Red River, and to deliver the following letter of
April 3d, as also others, of like tenor, to Generals A. J. Smith
and Fred Steele, who were supposed to be with him:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 3, 1864

Major-General N. P. BANKS, commanding Department of the Gulf, Red
River.

GENERAL: The thirty days for which I loaned you the command of
General A. J. Smith will expire on the 10th instant.  I send with
this Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, to carry orders to General A.
J. Smith, and to give directions for a new movement, which is
preliminary to the general campaign.  General Corse may see you and
explain in full, but, lest he should not find you in person, I will
simply state that Forrest, availing himself of the absence of our
furloughed men and of the detachment with you, has pushed up
between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, even to the Ohio.  He
attacked Paducah, but got the worst of it, and he still lingers
about the place.  I hope that he will remain thereabouts till
General A. J. Smith can reach his destined point, but this I can
hardly expect; yet I want him to reach by the Yazoo a position near
Grenada, thence to operate against Forrest, after which to march
across to Decatur, Alabama.  You will see that he has a big job,
and therefore should start at once.  From all that I can learn, my
troops reached Alexandria, Louisiana, at the time agreed on, viz.,
March 17th, and I hear of them at Natchitoches, but cannot hear of
your troops being above Opelousas.

Steele is also moving.  I leave Steele's entire force to cooperate
with you and the navy, but, as I before stated, I must have A. T.
Smith's troops now as soon as possible.

I beg you will expedite their return to Vicksburg, if they have not
already started, and I want them if possible to remain in the same
boats they have used up Red River, as it will save the time
otherwise consumed in transfer to other boats.

All is well in this quarter, and I hope by the time you turn
against Mobile our forces will again act toward the same end,
though from distant points.  General Grant, now having lawful
control, will doubtless see that all minor objects are disregarded,
and that all the armies act on a common plan.

Hoping, when this reaches you, that you will be in possession of
Shreveport, I am, with great respect, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


Rumors were reaching us thick and fast of defeat and disaster in
that quarter; and I feared then, what afterward actually happened,
that neither General Banks nor Admiral Porter could or would spare
those two divisions.  On the 23d of April, General Corse returned,
bringing full answers to my letters, and I saw that we must go on
without them.  This was a serious loss to the Army of the
Tennessee, which was also short by two other divisions that were on
their veteran furlough, and were under orders to rendezvous at
Cairo, before embarking for Clifton, on the Tennessee River.

On the 10th of April, 1864, the headquarters of the three Armies of
the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, were at Chattanooga.,
Huntsville, and Knoxville, and the tables on page 16, et seq., give
their exact condition and strength.

The Department of the Arkansas was then subject to my command, but
General Fred Steele, its commander, was at Little Rock, remote from
me, acting in cooperation with General Banks, and had full
employment for every soldier of his command; so that I never
depended on him for any men, or for any participation in the
Georgia campaign.  Soon after, viz., May 8th, that department was
transferred to the Military Division of "the Gulf," or "Southwest,"
Major-General E.  R. S. Canby commanding, and General Steele served
with him in the subsequent movement against Mobile.

In Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, I had three generals
of education and experience, admirably qualified for the work
before us.  Each has made a history of his own, and I need not here
dwell on their respective merits as men, or as commanders of
armies, except that each possessed special qualities of mind and of
character which fitted them in the highest degree for the work then
in contemplation.

By the returns of April 10, 1864, it will be seen that the
Army of the Cumberland had on its muster-rolls--

                                       Men.
Present and absent...................171,450
Present for duty..................... 88,883


The Army of the Tennessee--
Present and absent....................134,763
Present for duty...................... 64,957

The Army of the Ohio--
Present and absent ................... 46,052
Present for duty ..................... 26,242


The department and army commanders had to maintain strong garrisons
in their respective departments, and also to guard their respective
lines of supply.  I therefore, in my mind, aimed to prepare out of
these three armies, by the 1st of May, 1864, a compact army for
active operations in Georgia, of about the following numbers:

Army of the Cumberland................ 50,000
Army of the Tennessee................. 35,000
Army of the Ohio ..................... 15,000

Total ............................... 100,000

and, to make these troops as mobile as possible, I made the
strictest possible orders in relation to wagons and all species of
incumbrances and impedimenta whatever.  Each officer and soldier
was required to carry on his horse or person food and clothing
enough for five days.  To each regiment was allowed but one wagon
and one ambulance, and to the officers of each company one pack
horse or mule.

Each division and brigade was provided a fair proportion of wagons
for a supply train, and these were limited in their loads to carry
food, ammunition, and clothing.  Tents were forbidden to all save
the sick and wounded, and one tent only was allowed to each
headquarters for use as an office.  These orders were not
absolutely enforced, though in person I set the example, and did
not have a tent, nor did any officer about me have one; but we had
wall tent-flies, without poles, and no tent-furniture of any kind.
We usually spread our flies over saplings, or on fence-rails or
posts improvised on the spot.  Most of the general officers, except
Thomas, followed my example strictly; but he had a regular
headquarters-camp.  I frequently called his attention to the orders
on this subject, rather jestingly than seriously.  He would break
out against his officers for having such luxuries, but, needing a
tent himself, and being good-natured and slow to act, he never
enforced my orders perfectly.  In addition to his regular
wagon-train, he had a big wagon which could be converted into an
office, and this we used to call "Thomas's circus." Several times
during the campaign I found quartermasters hid away in some
comfortable nook to the rear, with tents and mess-fixtures which
were the envy of the passing soldiers; and I frequently broke them
up, and distributed the tents to the surgeons of brigades.  Yet my
orders actually reduced the transportation, so that I doubt if any
army ever went forth to battle with fewer impedimenta, and where
the regular and necessary supplies of food, ammunition, and
clothing, were issued, as called for, so regularly and so well.

My personal staff was then composed of Captain J. C. McCoy,
aide-de-camp; Captain L. M. Dayton, aide-de-camp; Captain J. C.
Audenried, aide-de-camp; Brigadier-General J. D. Webster, chief of
staff; Major R. M. Sawyer, assistant adjutant-general; Captain
Montgomery Rochester, assistant adjutant-general.  These last three
were left at Nashville in charge of the office, and were empowered
to give orders in my name, communication being generally kept up by
telegraph.

Subsequently were added to my staff, and accompanied me in the
field, Brigadier-General W. F. Barry, chief of artillery; Colonel
O. M. Poe, chief of engineers; Colonel L. C. Easton, chief
quartermaster; Colonel Amos Beckwith, chief commissary; Captain
Thos. G. Baylor, chief of ordnance; Surgeon E. D.  Kittoe, medical
director; Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, inspector-general;
Lieutenant-Colonel C. Ewing, inspector-general; and Lieutenant-
Colonel Willard Warner, inspector-general.

These officers constituted my staff proper at the beginning of the
campaign, which remained substantially the same till the close of
the war, with very few exceptions; viz.: Surgeon John Moore, United
States Army, relieved Surgeon Kittoe of the volunteers (about
Atlanta) as medical director; Major Henry Hitchcock joined as
judge-advocate, and Captain G. Ward Nichols reported as an extra
aide-de-camp (after the fall of Atlanta) at Gaylesville, just
before we started for Savannah.

During the whole month of April the preparations for active war
were going on with extreme vigor, and my letter-book shows an
active correspondence with Generals Grant, Halleck, Thomas,
McPherson, and Schofield on thousands of matters of detail and
arrangement, most of which are embraced in my testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., Appendix.

When the time for action approached, viz., May 1,1864, the actual
armies prepared to move into Georgia resulted as follows, present
for battle:
                                   Men.
Army of the Cumberland, Major-General THOMAS.
Infantry ....................... 54,568
Artillery ......................  2,377
Cavalry.........................  3,828
        Aggregate............... 60,773
Number of field-guns, 130.

Army of the Tennessee, Major-General McPHERSON.

Infantry ....................... 22,437
Artillery ......................  1,404
Cavalry ........................    624
         Aggregate ............. 24,465
Guns, 96


Army of the Ohio, Major-General SCHOFIELD.

Infantry ....................... 11,183
Artillery.......................    679
Cavalry.........................  1,697
        Aggregate .............. 13,559
Guns, 28.

Grand aggregate, 98,797 men and 254 guns


These figures do not embrace the cavalry divisions which were still
incomplete, viz., of General Stoneman, at Lexington, Kentucky, and
of General Garrard, at Columbia, Tennessee, who were then rapidly
collecting horses, and joined us in the early stage of the
campaign.  General Stoneman, having a division of about four
thousand men and horses, was attached to Schofield's Army of the
Ohio.  General Garrard's division, of about four thousand five
hundred men and horses, was attached to General Thomas's command;
and he had another irregular division of cavalry, commanded by
Brigadier-General E.  McCook.  There was also a small brigade of
cavalry, belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, attached
temporarily to the Army of the Tennessee, which was commanded by
Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick.  These cavalry commands
changed constantly in strength and numbers, and were generally used
on the extreme flanks, or for some special detached service, as
will be herein-after related.  The Army of the Tennessee was still
short by the two divisions detached with General Banks, up Red
River, and two other divisions on furlough in Illinois, Indiana,
and Ohio, but which were rendezvousing at Cairo, under Generals
Leggett and Crocker, to form a part of the Seventeenth Corps, which
corps was to be commanded by Major-General Frank P. Blair, then a
member of Congress, in Washington.  On the 2d of April I notified
him by letter that I wanted him to join and to command these two
divisions, which ought to be ready by the 1st of May.  General
Blair, with these two divisions, constituting the Seventeenth Army
Corps, did not actually overtake us until we reached Acworth and
Big Shanty, in Georgia, about the 9th of June, 1864.

In my letter of April 4th to General John A. Rawains, chief of
staff to General Grant at Washington, I described at length all the
preparations that were in progress for the active campaign thus
contemplated, and therein estimated Schofield at twelve thousand,
Thomas at forty-five thousand, and McPherson at thirty thousand.
At first I intended to open the campaign about May 1st, by moving
Schofield on Dalton from Cleveland, Thomas on the same objective
from Chattanooga, and McPherson on Rome and Kingston from Gunter's
Landing.  My intention was merely to threaten Dalton in front, and
to direct McPherson to act vigorously against the railroad below
Resaca, far to the rear of the enemy.  But by reason of his being
short of his estimated strength by the four divisions before
referred to, and thus being reduced to about twenty-four thousand
men, I did not feel justified in placing him so far away from the
support of the main body of the army, and therefore subsequently
changed the plan of campaign, so far as to bring that army up to
Chattanooga, and to direct it thence through Ship's Gap against the
railroad to Johnston's rear, at or near Resaca, distant from Dalton
only eighteen miles, and in full communication with the other
armies by roads behind Rocky face Ridge, of about the same length.

On the 10th of April I received General Grant's letter of April 4th
from Washington, which formed the basis of all the campaigns of the
year 1864, and subsequently received another of April 19th, written
from Culpepper, Virginia, both of which are now in my possession,
in his own handwriting, and are here given entire.  These letters
embrace substantially all the orders he ever made on this
particular subject, and these, it will be seen, devolved on me the
details both as to the plan and execution of the campaign by the
armies under my immediate command.  These armies were to be
directed against the rebel army commanded by General Joseph E.
Johnston, then lying on the defensive, strongly intrenched at
Dalton, Georgia; and I was required to follow it up closely and
persistently, so that in no event could any part be detached to
assist General Lee in Virginia; General Grant undertaking in like
manner to keep Lee so busy that he could not respond to any calls
of help by Johnston.  Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta, nor Savannah,
was the objective, but the "army of Jos. Johnston," go where it
might.


[PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON D. C., April 4, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to
take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of
the army together, and somewhat toward a common centre.  For your
information I now write you my programme, as at present determined
upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his
present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn
over the defense of Red River to General Steels and the navy, and
to return your troops to you, and his own to New Orleans; to
abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with
not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on
the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to
collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men.
To this I will add five thousand from Missouri.  With this force he
is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can.  It
will be impossible for him to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate
against Richmond from the south aide of James River.  This will
give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W. F. Smith
commanding the right wing of his forces, and Gillmore the left
wing.  I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by
Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective
men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be
found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under
Ord and Averill, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other,
under Crook, to start from Charleston, on the Kanawha, to move
against the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about
Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord.  His force will be
all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of
all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and
to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can,
inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply
to lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you
free to execute it in your own way.  Submit to me, however, as
early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he
can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th
inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable.  Sigel is
concentrating now.  None will move from their places of rendezvous
until I direct, except Banks.  I want to be ready to move by the
25th inst., if possible; but all I can now direct is that you get
ready as soon as possible.  I know you will have difficulties to
encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are
abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not
calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can take
troops from there.  With the long line of railroad Sigel has to
protect, he can spare no troops, except to move directly to his
front.  In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on
the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large
force to prevent it.  In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself,
he can hold a leg while some one else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 10, 1864

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D.

DEAR GENERAL: Your two letters of April 4th are now before me, and
afford me infinite satisfaction.  That we are now all to act on a
common plan, converging on a common centre, looks like enlightened
war.

Like yourself, you take the biggest load, and from me you shall
have thorough and hearty cooperation.  I will not let side issues
draw me off from your main plans in which I am to knock Jos.
Johnston, and to do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as
possible.  I have heretofore written to General Rawlins and to
Colonel Comstock (of your staff) somewhat of the method in which I
propose to act.  I have seen all my army, corps, and division
commanders, and have signified only to the former, viz., Schofield,
Thomas, and McPherson, our general plans, which I inferred from the
purport of our conversation here and at Cincinnati.

First, I am pushing stores to the front with all possible dispatch,
and am completing the army organization according to the orders
from Washington, which are ample and perfectly satisfactory.

It will take us all of April to get in our furloughed veterans, to
bring up A. J. Smith's command, and to collect provisions and
cattle on the line of the Tennessee.  Each of the armies will
guard, by detachments of its own, its rear communications.

At the signal to be given by you, Schofield, leaving a select
garrison at Knoxville and London, with twelve thousand men will
drop down to the Hiawassee, and march against Johnston's right by
the old Federal road.  Stoneman, now in Kentucky, organizing the
cavalry forces of the Army of the Ohio, will operate with Schofield
on his left front--it may be, pushing a select body of about two
thousand cavalry by Ducktown or Elijah toward Athens, Georgia.

Thomas will aim to have forty-five thousand men of all arms, and
move straight against Johnston, wherever he may be, fighting him
cautiously, persistently, and to the best advantage.  He will have
two divisions of cavalry, to take advantage of any offering.

McPherson will have nine divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, if
A. J. Smith gets here, in which case he will have full thirty
thousand of the best men in America.  He will cross the Tennessee
at Decatur and Whitesburg, march toward Rome, and feel for Thomas.
If Johnston falls behind the Coosa, then McPherson will push for
Rome; and if Johnston falls behind the Chattahoochee, as I believe
he will, then McPherson will cross over and join Thomas.

McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas's
divisions, viz., Garrard's, six thousand strong, which is now at
Colombia, mounting, equipping, and preparing.  I design this
division to operate on McPherson's right, rear, or front, according
as the enemy appears.  But the moment I detect Johnston falling
behind the Chattahoochee, I propose to cast off the effective part
of this cavalry division, after crossing the Coosa, straight for
Opelika, West Point, Columbus, or Wetumpka, to break up the road
between Montgomery and Georgia.  If Garrard can do this work well,
he can return to the Union army; but should a superior force
interpose, then he will seek safety at Pensacola and join Banks,
or, after rest, will act against any force that he can find east of
Mobile, till such time as he can reach me.

Should Johnston fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will feign to the
right, but pass to the left and act against Atlanta or its eastern
communications, according to developed facts.

This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed, to look, but I will
ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy
that he cannot in any event send any part of his command against
you or Banks.

If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama
River, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my
problem, viz., "provisions." But in that I must venture.  Georgia
has a million of inhabitants.  If they can live, we should not
starve.  If the enemy interrupt our communications, I will be
absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, and
will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever we
can find. I will inspire my command, if successful, with the
feeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely necessary to
life, and that parched corn once fed General Jackson's army on that
very ground.
As ever, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.




HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CULPEPPER COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA, April 19, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: Since my letter to you of April 4th I have seen no reason
to change any portion of the general plan of campaign, if the enemy
remain still and allow us to take the initiative.  Rain has
continued so uninterruptedly until the last day or two that it will
be impossible to move, however, before the 27th, even if no more
should fall in the meantime.  I think Saturday, the 30th, will
probably be the day for our general move.

Colonel Comstock, who will take this, can spend a day with you, and
fill up many little gaps of information not given in any of my
letters.

What I now want more particularly to say is, that if the two main
attacks, yours and the one from here, should promise great success,
the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their
line of defense, and throw their whole strength upon the other,
believing a single defeat without any victory to sustain them
better than a defeat all along their line, and hoping too, at the
same time, that the army, meeting with no resistance, will rest
perfectly satisfied with their laurels, having penetrated to a
given point south, thereby enabling them to throw their force first
upon one and then on the other.

With the majority of military commanders they might do this.

But you have had too much experience in traveling light, and
subsisting upon the country, to be caught by any such ruse.  I hope
my experience has not been thrown away.  My directions, then, would
be, if the enemy in your front show signs of joining Lee, follow
him up to the full extent of your ability.  I will prevent the
concentration of Lee upon your front, if it is in the power of this
army to do it.

The Army of the Potomac looks well, and, so far as I can judge,
officers and men feel well.  Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 24, 1864

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief,
Culpepper, Virginia

GENERAL: I now have, at the hands of Colonel Comstock, of your
staff, the letter of April 19th, and am as far prepared to assume
the offensive as possible.  I only ask as much time as you think
proper, to enable me to get up McPherson's two divisions from
Cairo.  Their furloughs will expire about this time, and some of
them should now be in motion for Clifton, whence they will march to
Decatur, to join General Dodge.

McPherson is ordered to assemble the Fifteenth Corps near Larkin's,
and to get the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps (Dodge and Blair) at
Decatur at the earliest possible moment.  From these two points he
will direct his forces on Lebanon, Summerville, and Lafayette,
where he will act against Johnston, if he accept battle at Dalton;
or move in the direction of Rome, if the enemy give up Dalton, and
fall behind the Oostenaula or Etowah.  I see that there is some
risk in dividing our forces, but Thomas and Schofield will have
strength enough to cover all the valleys as far as Dalton; and,
should Johnston turn his whole force against McPherson, the latter
will have his bridge at Larkin's, and the route to Chattanooga via
Willa's Valley and the Chattanooga Creek, open for retreat; and if
Johnston attempt to leave Dalton, Thomas will have force enough to
push on through Dalton to Kingston, which will checkmate him.  My
own opinion is that Johnston will be compelled to hang to his
railroad, the only possible avenue of supply to his army, estimated
at from forty-five to sixty thousand men.

At Lafayette all our armies will be together, and if Johnston
stands at Dalton we must attack him in position.  Thomas feels
certain that he has no material increase of force, and that he has
not sent away Hardee, or any part of his army.  Supplies are the
great question.  I have materially increased the number of cars
daily.  When I got here, the average was from sixty-five to eighty
per day.  Yesterday the report was one hundred and ninety-three;
to-day, one hundred and thirty-four; and my estimate is that one
hundred and forty-five cars per day will give us a day's supply and
a day's accumulation.

McPherson is ordered to carry in wagons twenty day's rations, and
to rely on the depot at Ringgold for the renewal of his bread.
Beeves are now being driven on the hoof to the front; and the
commissary, Colonel Beckwith, seems fully alive to the importance
of the whole matter.

Our weakest point will be from the direction of Decatur, and I will
be forced to risk something from that quarter, depending on the
fact that the enemy has no force available with which to threaten
our communications from that direction.

Colonel Comstock will explain to you personally much that I cannot
commit to paper.  I am, with great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


On the 28th of April I removed my headquarters to Chattanooga, and
prepared for taking the field in person.  General Grant had first
indicated the 30th of April as the day for the simultaneous
advance, but subsequently changed the day to May 5th.  McPhersons
troops were brought forward rapidly to Chattanooga, partly by rail
and partly by marching.  Thomas's troops were already in position
(his advance being out as far as Ringgold-eighteen miles), and
Schofield was marching down by Cleveland to Red Clay and Catoosa
Springs.  On the 4th of May, Thomas was in person at Ringgold, his
left at Catoosa, and his right at Leet's Tan-yard.  Schofield was
at Red Clay, closing upon Thomas's left; and McPherson was moving
rapidly into Chattanooga, and out toward Gordon's Mill.

On the 5th I rode out to Ringgold, and on the very day appointed by
General Grant from his headquarters in Virginia the great campaign
was begun.  To give all the minute details will involve more than
is contemplated, and I will endeavor only to trace the principal
events, or rather to record such as weighed heaviest on my own mind
at the time, and which now remain best fixed in my memory.

My general headquarters and official records remained back at
Nashville, and I had near me only my personal staff and
inspectors-general, with about half a dozen wagons, and a single
company of Ohio sharp-shooters (commanded by Lieutenant McCrory) as
headquarters or camp guard.  I also had a small company of
irregular Alabama cavalry (commanded by Lieutenant Snelling), used
mostly as orderlies and couriers.  No wall-tents were allowed, only
the flies.  Our mess establishment was less in bulk than that of
any of the brigade commanders; nor was this from an indifference to
the ordinary comforts of life, but because I wanted to set the
example, and gradually to convert all parts of that army into a
mobile machine, willing and able to start at a minute's notice, and
to subsist on the scantiest food.  To reap absolute success might
involve the necessity even of dropping all wagons, and to subsist
on the chance food which the country was known to contain.  I had
obtained not only the United States census-tables of 1860, but a
compilation made by the Controller of the State of Georgia for the
purpose of taxation, containing in considerable detail the
"population and statistics" of every county in Georgia.  One of my
aides (Captain Dayton) acted as assistant adjutant general, with an
order-book, letter-book, and writing-paper, that filled a small
chest not much larger than an ordinary candle-boa.  The only
reports and returns called for were the ordinary tri-monthly
returns of "effective strength."  As these accumulated they were
sent back to Nashville, and afterward were embraced in the archives
of the Military Division of the Mississippi, changed in 1865 to the
Military Division of the Missouri, and I suppose they were burned
in the Chicago fire of 1870.  Still, duplicates remain of all
essential papers in the archives of the War Department.

The 6th of May was given to Schofield and McPherson to get into
position, and on the 7th General Thomas moved in force against
Tunnel Hill, driving off a mere picket-guard of the enemy, and I
was agreeably surprised to find that no damage had been done to the
tunnel or the railroad.  From Tunnel Hill I could look into the
gorge by which the railroad passed through a straight and
well-defined range of mountains, presenting sharp palisade faces,
and known as "Rocky Face."  The gorge itself was called the
"Buzzard Roost."  We could plainly see the enemy in this gorge and
behind it, and Mill Creek which formed the gorge, flowing toward
Dalton, had been dammed up, making a sort of irregular lake,
filling the road, thereby obstructing it, and the enemy's batteries
crowned the cliffs on either side.  The position was very strong,
and I knew that such a general as was my antagonist (Jos.
Johnston), who had been there six months, had fortified it to the
maximum.  Therefore I had no intention to attack the position
seriously in front, but depended on McPherson to capture and hold
the railroad to its rear, which would force Johnston to detach
largely against him, or rather, as I expected, to evacuate his
position at Dalton altogether.  My orders to Generals Thomas and
Schofield were merely to press strongly at all points in front,
ready to rush in on the first appearance of "let go," and, if
possible, to catch our enemy in the confusion of retreat.

All the movements of the 7th and 8th were made exactly as ordered,
and the enemy seemed quiescent, acting purely on the defensive.

I had constant communication with all parts of the army, and on the
9th McPherson's head of column entered and passed through Snake
Creek, perfectly undefended, and accomplished a complete surprise
to the enemy.  At its farther debouche he met a cavalry brigade,
easily driven, which retreated hastily north toward Dalton, and
doubtless carried to Johnston the first serious intimation that a
heavy force of infantry and artillery was to his rear and within a
few miles of his railroad.  I got a short note from McPherson that
day (written at 2 p.m., when he was within a mile and a half of the
railroad, above and near Resaca), and we all felt jubilant.  I
renewed orders to Thomas and Schofield to be ready for the instant
pursuit of what I expected to be a broken and disordered army,
forced to retreat by roads to the east of Resaca, which were known
to be very rough and impracticable.

That night I received further notice from McPherson that he had
found Resaca too strong for a surprise; that in consequence he had
fallen back three miles to the month of Snake Creek Gap, and was
there fortified.  I wrote him the next day the following letters,
copies of which are in my letter-book; but his to me were mere
notes in pencil, not retained



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, TUNNEL HILL, GEORGIA, May 11, 1864

Major-General McPHERSON, commanding army of the Tennessee,
Sugar Valley, Georgia.


GENERAL: I received by courier (in the night) yours of 5 and 8.30
P. M. of yesterday.

You now have your twenty-three thousand men, and General Hooker is
in close support, so that you can hold all of Jos. Johnston's army
in check should he abandon Dalton.  He cannot afford to abandon
Dalton, for he has fixed it up on purpose to receive us, and he
observes that we are close at hand, waiting for him to quit.  He
cannot afford a detachment strong enough to fight you, as his army
will not admit of it.

Strengthen your position; fight any thing that comes; and threaten
the safety of the railroad all the time.  But, to tell the truth, I
would rather the enemy would stay in Dalton two more days, when he
may find in his rear a larger party than he expects in an open
field.  At all events, we can then choose our own ground, and he
will be forced to move out of his works.  I do not intend to put a
column into Buzzard-Roost Gap at present.

See that you are in easy communication with me and with all
head-quarters.  After to-day the supplies will be at Ringgold.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, TUNNEL HILL, GEORGIA, May 11, 1864-Evening

Major-General McPHERSON, commanding army of the Tennessee,
Sugar Valley, Georgia

GENERAL: The indications are that Johnston is evacuating Dalton.
In that event, Howard's corps and the cavalry will pursue; all the
rest will follow your route.  I will be down early in the morning.

Try to strike him if possible about the forks of the road.

Hooker must be with you now, and you may send General Garrard by
Summerville to threaten Rome and that flank.  I will cause all the
lines to be felt at once.

W. T. SHERMAN, major-general commanding.



McPherson had startled Johnston in his fancied security, but had
not done the full measure of his work.  He had in hand twenty-three
thousand of the best men of the army, and could have walked into
Resaca (then held only by a small brigade), or he could have placed
his whole force astride the railroad above Resaca, and there have
easily withstood the attack of all of Johnston's army, with the
knowledge that Thomas and Schofield were on his heels.  Had he done
so, I am certain that Johnston would not have ventured to attack
him in position, but would have retreated eastward by Spring Place,
and we should have captured half his army and all his artillery and
wagons at the very beginning of the campaign.

Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life, but at
the critical moment McPherson seems to have been a little cautious.
Still, he was perfectly justified by his orders, and fell back and
assumed an unassailable defensive position in Sugar Valley, on the
Resaca side of Snake-Creek Gap.  As soon as informed of this, I
determined to pass the whole army through Snake-Creek Gap, and to
move on Resaca with the main army.

But during the 10th, the enemy showed no signs of evacuating
Dalton, and I was waiting for the arrival of Garrard's and
Stoneman's cavalry, known to be near at hand, so as to secure the
full advantages of victory, of which I felt certain.  Hooker's
Twentieth Corps was at once moved down to within easy supporting
distance of McPherson; and on the 11th, perceiving signs of
evacuation of Dalton, I gave all the orders for the general
movement, leaving the Fourth Corps (Howard) and Stoneman's cavalry
in observation in front of Buzzard-Roost Gap, and directing all the
rest of the army to march through Snake-Creek Gap, straight on
Resaca.  The roads were only such as the country afforded, mere
rough wagon-ways, and these converged to the single narrow track
through Snake-Creek Gap; but during the 12th and 13th the bulk of
Thomas's and Schofield's armies were got through, and deployed
against Resaca, McPherson on the right, Thomas in the centre, and
Schofield on the left.  Johnston, as I anticipated, had abandoned
all his well-prepared defenses at Dalton, and was found inside of
Resaca with the bulk of his army, holding his divisions well in
hand, acting purely on the defensive, and fighting well at all
points of conflict.  A complete line of intrenchments was found
covering the place, and this was strongly manned at all points.  On
the 14th we closed in, enveloping the town on its north and west,
and during the 15th we had a day of continual battle and skirmish.
At the same time I caused two pontoon-bridges to be laid across the
Oostenaula River at Lay's Ferry, about three miles below the town,
by which we could threaten Calhoun, a station on the railroad seven
miles below Resaca.  At the same time, May 14th, I dispatched
General Garrard, with his cavalry division, down the Oostenaula by
the Rome road, with orders to cross over, if possible, and to
attack or threaten the railroad at any point below Calhoun and
above Kingston.

During the 15th, without attempting to assault the fortified works,
we pressed at all points, and the sound of cannon and musketry rose
all day to the dignity of a battle.  Toward evening McPherson moved
his whole line of battle forward, till he had gained a ridge
overlooking the town, from which his field-artillery could reach
the railroad-bridge across the Oostenaula.  The enemy made several
attempts to drive him away, repeating the sallies several times,
and extending them into the night; but in every instance he was
repulsed with bloody loss.

Hooker's corps had also some heavy and handsome fighting that
afternoon and night on the left, where the Dalton roan entered the
intrenchments, capturing a four-gun intrenched battery, with its
men and guns; and generally all our men showed the finest fighting
qualities.

Howard's corps had followed Johnston down from Dalton, and was in
line; Stoneman's division of cavalry had also got up, and was on
the extreme left, beyond the Oostenaula.

On the night of May 15th Johnston got his army across the bridges,
set them on fire, and we entered Resaca at daylight.  Our loss up
to that time was about six hundred dead and thirty-three hundred
and seventy-five wounded--mostly light wounds that did not
necessitate sending the men to the rear for treatment.  That
Johnston had deliberately designed in advance to give up such
strong positions as Dalton and Resaca, for the purpose of drawing
us farther south, is simply absurd.  Had he remained in Dalton
another hour, it would have been his total defeat, and he only
evacuated Resaca because his safety demanded it.  The movement by
us through Snake-Creek Gap was a total surprise to him.  My army
about doubled his in size, but he had all the advantages of natural
positions, of artificial forts and roads, and of concentrated
action.  We were compelled to grope our way through forests, across
mountains, with a large army, necessarily more or less dispersed.
Of course, I was disappointed not to have crippled his, army more
at that particular stage of the game; but, as it resulted, these
rapid successes gave us the initiative, and the usual impulse of a
conquering army.

Johnston having retreated in the night of May 15th, immediate
pursuit was begun.  A division of infantry (Jeff. C. Davis's) was
at once dispatched down the valley toward Rome, to support
Garrard's cavalry, and the whole army was ordered to pursue,
McPherson by Lay's Ferry, on the right, Thomas directly by the
railroad, and Schofield by the left, by the old road that crossed
the Oostenaula above Echota or Newtown.

We hastily repaired the railroad bridge at Resaca, which had been
partially burned, and built a temporary floating bridge out of
timber and materials found on the spot; so that Thomas got his
advance corps over during the 16th, and marched as far as Calhoun,
where he came into communication with McPherson's troops, which had
crossed the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry by our pontoon-bridges,
previously laid.  Inasmuch as the bridge at Resaca was overtaxed,
Hooker's Twentieth Corps was also diverted to cross by the fords
and ferries above Resaca, in the neighborhood of Echota.

On the 17th, toward evening, the head of Thomas's column, Newton's
division, encountered the rear-guard of Johnston's army near
Adairsville.  I was near the head of column at the time, trying to
get a view of the position of the enemy from an elevation in an
open field.  My party attracted the fire of a battery; a shell
passed through the group of staff-officers and burst just beyond,
which scattered us promptly.  The next morning the enemy had
disappeared, and our pursuit was continued to Kingston, which we
reached during Sunday forenoon, the 19th.

From Resaca the railroad runs nearly due south, but at Kingston it
makes junction with another railroad from Rome, and changes
direction due east. At that time McPherson's head of column was
about four miles to the west of Kingston, at a country place called
"Woodlawn;" Schofield and Hooker were on the direct roads leading
from Newtown to Casaville, diagonal to the route followed by
Thomas.  Thomas's head of column, which had followed the country
roads alongside of the railroad, was about four miles east of
Kingston, toward Cassville, when about noon I got a message from
him that he had found the enemy, drawn up in line of battle, on
some extensive, open ground, about half-way between Kingston and
Cassville, and that appearances indicated a willingness and
preparation for battle.

Hurriedly sending orders to McPherson to resume the march, to
hasten forward by roads leading to the south of Kingston, so as to
leave for Thomas's troops and trains the use of the main road, and
to come up on his right, I rode forward rapidly, over some rough
gravel hills, and about six miles from Kingston found General
Thomas, with his troops deployed; but he reported that the enemy
had fallen back in echelon of divisions, steadily and in superb
order, into Cassville.  I knew that the roads by which Generals
Hooker and Schofield were approaching would lead them to a seminary
near Cassville, and that it was all-important to secure the point
of junction of these roads with the main road along which we were
marching.  Therefore I ordered General Thomas to push forward his
deployed lines as rapidly as possible; and, as night was
approaching, I ordered two field-batteries to close up at a gallop
on some woods which lay between us and the town of Cassville.  We
could not see the town by reason of these woods, but a high range
of hills just back of the town was visible over the tree-tops.  On
these hills could be seen fresh-made parapets, and the movements of
men, against whom I directed the artillery to fire at long range.
The stout resistance made by the enemy along our whole front of a
couple of miles indicated a purpose to fight at Cassville; and, as
the night was closing in, General Thomas and I were together, along
with our skirmish-lines near the seminary, on the edge of the town,
where musket-bullets from the enemy were cutting the leaves of the
trees pretty thickly about us.  Either Thomas or I remarked that
that was not the place for the two senior officers of a great army,
and we personally went back to the battery, where we passed the
night on the ground.  During the night I had reports from
McPherson, Hooker, and Schofield.  The former was about five miles
to my right rear, near the "nitre-caves;" Schofield was about six
miles north, and Hooker between us, within two miles.  All were
ordered to close down on Cassville at daylight, and to attack the
enemy wherever found.  Skirmishing was kept up all night, but when
day broke the next morning, May 20th, the enemy was gone, and our
cavalry was sent in pursuit.  These reported him beyond the Etowah
River.  We were then well in advance of our railroad-trains, on
which we depended for supplies; so I determined to pause a few days
to repair the railroad, which had been damaged but little, except
at the bridge at Resaca, and then to go on.

Nearly all the people of the country seemed to have fled with
Johnston's army; yet some few families remained, and from one of
them I procured the copy of an order which Johnston had made at
Adairsville, in which he recited that he had retreated as far as
strategy required, and that his army must be prepared for battle at
Cassville.  The newspapers of the South, many of which we found,
were also loud in denunciation of Johnston's falling back before us
without a serious battle, simply resisting by his skirmish-lines
and by his rear-guard.  But his friends proclaimed that it was all
strategic; that he was deliberately drawing us farther and farther
into the meshes, farther and farther away from our base of
supplies, and that in due season he would not only halt for battle,
but assume the bold offensive.  Of course it was to my interest to
bring him to battle as soon as possible, when our numerical
superiority was at the greatest; for he was picking up his
detachments as he fell back, whereas I was compelled to make
similar and stronger detachments to repair the railroads as we
advanced, and to guard them.  I found at Cassville many evidences
of preparation for a grand battle, among them a long line of fresh
intrenchments on the hill beyond the town, extending nearly three
miles to the south, embracing the railroad-crossing.  I was also
convinced that the whole of Polk's corps had joined Johnston from
Mississippi, and that he had in hand three full corps, viz.,
Hood's, Polk's, and Hardee's, numbering about sixty thousand men,
and could not then imagine why he had declined battle, and did not
learn the real reason till after the war was over, and then from
General Johnston himself.

In the autumn of 1865, when in command of the Military Division of
the Missouri, I went from St. Louis to Little Rock, Arkansas, and
afterward to Memphis.  Taking a steamer for Cairo, I found as
fellow-passengers Generals Johnston and Frank Blair.  We were, of
course, on the most friendly terms, and on our way up we talked
over our battles again, played cards, and questioned each other as
to particular parts of our mutual conduct in the game of war.  I
told Johnston that I had seen his order of preparation, in the
nature of an address to his army, announcing his purpose to retreat
no more, but to accept battle at Cassville.  He answered that such
was his purpose; that he had left Hardee's corps in the open fields
to check Thomas, and gain time for his formation on the ridge, just
behind Cassville; and it was this corps which General Thomas had
seen deployed, and whose handsome movement in retreat he had
reported in such complimentary terms.  Johnston described how he
had placed Hood's corps on the right, Polk's in the centre, and
Hardee's on the left.  He said he had ridden over the ground, given
to each corps commander his position, and orders to throw up
parapets during the night; that he was with Hardee on his extreme
left as the night closed in, and as Hardee's troops fell back to
the position assigned them for the intended battle of the next day;
and that, after giving Hardee some general instructions, he and his
staff rode back to Cassville.  As he entered the town, or village,
he met Generals Hood and Polk.  Hood inquired of him if he had had
any thing to eat, and he said no, that he was both hungry and
tired, when Hood invited him to go and share a supper which had
been prepared for him at a house close by.  At the supper they
discussed the chances of the impending battle, when Hood spoke of
the ground assigned him as being enfiladed by our (Union)
artillery, which Johnston disputed, when General Polk chimed in
with the remark that General Hood was right; that the cannon-shots
fired by us at nightfall had enfiladed their general line of
battle, and that for this reason he feared they could not hold
their men.  General Johnston was surprised at this, for he
understood General Hood to be one of those who professed to
criticise his strategy, contending that, instead of retreating, he
should have risked a battle.  General Johnston said he was
provoked, accused them of having been in conference, with being
beaten before battle, and added that he was unwilling to engage in
a critical battle with an army so superior to his own in numbers,
with two of his three corps commanders dissatisfied with the ground
and positions assigned them.  He then and there made up his mind to
retreat still farther south, to put the Etowah River and the
Allatoona range between us; and he at once gave orders to resume
the retrograde movement.

This was my recollection of the substance of the conversation, of
which I made no note at the time; but, at a meeting of the Society
of the Army of the Cumberland some years after, at Cleveland, Ohio,
about 1868, in a short after-dinner speech, I related this
conversation, and it got into print.  Subsequently, in the spring
of 1870, when I was at New Orleans, on route for Texas, General
Hood called to see me at the St. Charles Hotel, explained that he
had seen my speech reprinted in the newspapers and gave me his
version of the same event, describing the halt at Cassville, the
general orders for battle on that ground, and the meeting at supper
with Generals Johnston and Polk, when the chances of the battle to
be fought the next day were freely and fully discussed; and he
stated that he had argued against fighting the battle purely on the
defensive, but had asked General Johnston to permit him with his
own corps and part of Polk's to quit their lines, and to march
rapidly to attack and overwhelm Schofield, who was known to be
separated from Thomas by an interval of nearly five miles, claiming
that he could have defeated Schofield, and got back to his position
in time to meet General Thomas's attack in front.  He also stated
that he had then contended with Johnston for the "offensive-
defensive" game, instead of the "pure defensive," as proposed by
General Johnston; and he said that it was at this time that General
Johnston had taken offense, and that it was for this reason he had
ordered the retreat that night.  As subsequent events estranged
these two officers, it is very natural they should now differ on
this point; but it was sufficient for us that the rebel army did
retreat that night, leaving us masters of all the country above the
Etowah River.

For the purposes of rest, to give time for the repair of the
railroads, and to replenish supplies, we lay by some few days in
that quarter--Schofield with Stoneman's cavalry holding the ground
at Cassville Depot, Cartersville, and the Etowah Bridge; Thomas
holding his ground near Cassville, and McPherson that near
Kingston.  The officer intrusted with the repair of the railroads
was Colonel W. W. Wright, a railroad-engineer, who, with about two
thousand men, was so industrious and skillful that the bridge at
Resaca was rebuilt in three days, and cars loaded with stores came
forward to Kingston on the 24th.  The telegraph also brought us the
news of the bloody and desperate battles of the Wilderness, in
Virginia, and that General Grant was pushing his operations against
Lee with terrific energy.  I was therefore resolved to give my
enemy no rest.

In early days (1844), when a lieutenant of the Third Artillery, I
had been sent from Charleston, South Carolina, to Marietta,
Georgia, to assist Inspector-General Churchill to take testimony
concerning certain losses of horses and accoutrements by the
Georgia Volunteers during the Florida War; and after completing the
work at Marietta we transferred our party over to Bellefonte,
Alabama.  I had ridden the distance on horseback, and had noted
well the topography of the country, especially that about Kenesaw,
Allatoona, and the Etowah River.  On that occasion I had stopped
some days with a Colonel Tumlin, to see some remarkable Indian
mounds on the Etowah River, usually called the "Hightower:" I
therefore knew that the Allatoona Pass was very strong, would be
hard to force, and resolved not even to attempt it, but to turn the
position, by moving from Kingston to Marietta via. Dallas;
accordingly I made orders on the 20th to get ready for the march to
begin on the 23d.  The Army of the Cumberland was ordered to march
for Dallas, by Euharlee and Stilesboro; Davis's division, then in
Rome, by Van Wert; the Army of the Ohio to keep on the left of
Thomas, by a place called Burnt Hickory; and the Army of the
Tennessee to march for a position a little to the south, so as to
be on the right of the general army, when grouped about Dallas.

The movement contemplated leaving our railroad, and to depend for
twenty days on the contents of our wagons; and as the country was
very obscure, mostly in a state of nature, densely wooded, and with
few roads, our movements were necessarily slow.  We crossed the
Etowah by several bridges and fords, and took as many roads as
possible, keeping up communication by cross-roads, or by couriers
through the woods.  I personally joined General Thomas, who had the
centre, and was consequently the main column, or "column of
direction."  The several columns followed generally the valley of
the Euharlee, a tributary coming into the Etowah from the south,
and gradually crossed over a ridge of mountains, parts of which had
once been worked over for gold, and were consequently full of paths
and unused wagon-roads or tracks.  A cavalry picket of the enemy at
Burnt Hickory was captured, and had on his person an order from
General Johnston, dated at Allatoona, which showed that he had
detected my purpose of turning his position, and it accordingly
became necessary to use great caution, lest some of the minor
columns should fall into ambush, but, luckily the enemy was not
much more familiar with that part of the country than we were.  On
the other side of the Allatoona range, the Pumpkin-Vine Creek, also
a tributary of the Etowah, flowed north and west; Dallas, the point
aimed at, was a small town on the other or east side of this creek,
and was the point of concentration of a great many roads that led
in every direction.  Its possession would be a threat to Marietta
and Atlanta, but I could not then venture to attempt either, till I
had regained the use of the railroad, at least as far down as its
debouche from the Allatoona range of mountains.  Therefore, the
movement was chiefly designed to compel Johnston to give up
Allatoona.

On the 25th all the columns were moving steadily on Dallas
--McPherson and Davis away off to the right, near Van Wert; Thomas on
the main road in the centre, with Hooker's Twentieth Corps ahead,
toward Dallas; and Schofield to the left rear.  For the convenience
of march, Hooker had his three divisions on separate roads, all
leading toward Dallas, when, in the afternoon, as he approached a
bridge across Pumpkin-Vine Creek, he found it held by a cavalry
force, which was driven off, but the bridge was on fire.  This fire
was extinguished, and Hooker's leading division (Geary's) followed
the retreating cavalry on a road leading due east toward Marietta,
instead of Dallas.  This leading division, about four miles out from
the bridge, struck a heavy infantry force, which was moving down from
Allatoona toward Dallas, and a sharp battle ensued.  I came up in
person soon after, and as my map showed that we were near an
important cross-road called "New Hope," from a Methodist
meeting-house there of that name, I ordered General Hooker to secure
it if possible that night.  He asked for a short delay, till he could
bring up his other two divisions. viz., of Butterfield and Williams,
but before these divisions had got up and were deployed, the enemy
had also gained corresponding strength.  The woods were so dense, and
the resistance so spirited, that Hooker could not carry the position,
though the battle was noisy, and prolonged far into the night.  This
point, "New Hope," was the accidental intersection of the road
leading from Allatoona to Dallas with that from Van Wert to Marietta,
was four miles northeast of Dallas, and from the bloody fighting
there for the next week was called by the soldiers "Hell-Hole."

The night was pitch-dark, it rained hard, and the convergence of
our columns toward Dallas produced much confusion.  I am sure
similar confusion existed in the army opposed to us, for we were
all mixed up.  I slept on the ground, without cover, alongside of a
log, got little sleep, resolved at daylight to renew the battle,
and to make a lodgment on the Dallas and Allatoona road if
possible, but the morning revealed a strong line of intrenchments
facing us, with a heavy force of infantry and guns.  The battle was
renewed, and without success.  McPherson reached Dallas that
morning, viz., the 26th, and deployed his troops to the southeast
and east of the town, placing Davis's division of the Fourteenth
Corps, which had joined him on the road from Rome, on his left; but
this still left a gap of at least three miles between Davis and
Hooker.  Meantime, also, General Schofield was closing up on
Thomas's left.

Satisfied that Johnston in person was at New Hope with all his
army, and that it was so much nearer my "objective;" the railroad,
than Dallas, I concluded to draw McPherson from Dallas to Hooker's
right, and gave orders accordingly; but McPherson also was
confronted with a heavy force, and, as he began to withdraw
according to his orders, on the morning of the 28th he was fiercely
assailed on his right; a bloody battle ensued, in which he repulsed
the attack, inflicting heavy loss on his assailants, and it was not
until the 1st of June that he was enabled to withdraw from Dallas,
and to effect a close junction with Hooker in front of New Hope.
Meantime Thomas and Schofield were completing their deployments,
gradually overlapping Johnston on his right, and thus extending our
left nearer and nearer to the railroad, the nearest point of which
was Acworth, about eight miles distant.  All this time a continual
battle was in progress by strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage
of every species of cover, and both parties fortifying each night
by rifle-trenches, with head-logs, many of which grew to be as
formidable as first-class works of defense.  Occasionally one party
or the other would make a dash in the nature of a sally, but
usually it sustained a repulse with great loss of life.  I visited
personally all parts of our lines nearly every day, was constantly
within musket-range, and though the fire of musketry and cannon
resounded day and night along the whole line, varying from six to
ten miles, I rarely saw a dozen of the enemy at any one time; and
these were always skirmishers dodging from tree to tree, or behind
logs on the ground, or who occasionally showed their heads above
the hastily-constructed but remarkably strong rifle-trenches.  On
the occasion of my visit to McPherson on the 30th of May, while
standing with a group of officers, among whom were Generals
McPherson, Logan, Barry, and Colonel Taylor, my former chief of
artillery, a Minie-ball passed through Logan's coat-sleeve,
scratching the skin, and struck Colonel Taylor square in the
breast; luckily he had in his pocket a famous memorandum-book, in
which he kept a sort of diary, about which we used to joke him a
good deal; its thickness and size saved his life, breaking the
force of the ball, so that after traversing the book it only
penetrated the breast to the ribs, but it knocked him down and
disabled him for the rest of the campaign.  He was a most competent
and worthy officer, and now lives in poverty in Chicago, sustained
in part by his own labor, and in part by a pitiful pension recently
granted.

On the 1st of June General McPherson closed in upon the right, and,
without attempting further to carry the enemy's strong position at
New Hope Church, I held our general right in close contact with it,
gradually, carefully, and steadily working by the left, until our
strong infantry-lines had reached and secured possession of all the
wagon-roads between New Hope, Allatoona, and Acworth, when I
dispatched Generals Garrard's and Stoneman's divisions of cavalry
into Allatoona, the first around by the west end of the pass, and
the latter by the direct road.  Both reached their destination
without opposition, and orders were at once given to repair the
railroad forward from Kingston to Allatoona, embracing the bridge
across the Etowah River.  Thus the real object of my move on Dallas
was accomplished, and on the 4th of June I was preparing to draw
off from New Hope Church, and to take position on the railroad in
front of Allatoona, when, General Johnston himself having evacuated
his position, we effected the change without further battle, and
moved to the railroad, occupying it from Allatoona and Acworth
forward to Big Shanty, in sight of the famous Kenesaw Mountain.

Thus, substantially in the month of May, we had steadily driven our
antagonist from the strong positions of Dalton, Resaea, Cassville,
Allatoona, and Dallas; had advanced our lines in strong, compact
order from Chattanooga to Big Shanty, nearly a hundred miles of as
difficult country as was ever fought over by civilized armies; and
thus stood prepared to go on, anxious to fight, and confident of
success as soon as the railroad communications were complete to
bring forward the necessary supplies.  It is now impossible to
state accurately our loss of life and men in any one separate
battle; for the fighting was continuous, almost daily, among trees
and bushes, on ground where one could rarely see a hundred yards
ahead.

The aggregate loss in the several corps for the month of May is
reported-as follows in the usual monthly returns sent to the
Adjutant-General's office, which are, therefore, official:

Casualties during the Month of May, 1864
(Major-General SHERMAN commanding).

            Killed and Missing.      Wounded.       Total.
                1,863                 7,436         9,299



General Joseph E.  Johnston, in his "Narrative of his Military
Operations," just published (March 27, 1874), gives the effective
strength of his army at and about Dalton on the 1st of May, 1864
(page 302), as follows:

Infantry..................... 37,652
Artillery....................  2,812
Cavalry......................  2,392

    Total ................... 42,856



During May, and prior to reaching Cassville, he was further
reenforced (page 352)

Polk's corps of three divisions....... 12,000
Martin's division of cavalry..........  3,500
Jackson's division of cavalry.........  3,900

And at New Hope Church, May 26th

Brigade of Quarles....................  2,200

         Grand-total.................. 64,456


His losses during the month of May are stated by him, as taken from
the report of Surgeon Foard (page 325)


            Killed       Wounded       Total
             721          4,672        5,393


These figures include only the killed and wounded, whereas my
statement of losses embraces the "missing," which are usually
"prisoners," and of these we captured, during the whole campaign of
four and a half months, exactly 12,983, whose names, rank, and
regiments, were officially reported to the Commissary-General of
Prisoners; and assuming a due proportion for the month of May,
viz., one-fourth, makes 3,245 to be added to the killed and wounded
given above, making an aggregate loss in Johnston's army, from
Dalton to New Hope, inclusive, of 8,638, against ours of 9,299.

Therefore General Johnston is greatly in error, in his estimates on
page 357, in stating our loss, as compared with his, at six or ten
to one.

I always estimated my force at about double his, and could afford
to lose two to one without disturbing our relative proportion; but
I also reckoned that, in the natural strength of the country, in
the abundance of mountains, streams, and forests, he had a fair
offset to our numerical superiority, and therefore endeavored to
act with reasonable caution while moving on the vigorous
"offensive."

With the drawn battle of New Hope Church, and our occupation of the
natural fortress of Allatoona, terminated the month of May, and the
first stage of the campaign.




CHAPTER XVII.

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN--BATTLES ABOUT KENESAW MOUNTAIN.

JUNE, 1864.


On the 1st of June our three armies were well in hand, in the
broken and densely-wooded country fronting the enemy intrenched at
New Hope Church, about five miles north of Dallas.  General
Stoneman's division of cavalry had occupied Allatoona, on the
railroad, and General Garrard's division was at the western end of
the pass, about Stilesboro.  Colonel W. W. Wright, of the
Engineers, was busily employed in repairing the railroad and
rebuilding the bridge across the Etowah (or High tower) River,
which had been destroyed by the enemy on his retreat; and the
armies were engaged in a general and constant skirmish along a
front of about six miles--McPherson the right, Thomas the centre,
and Schofield on the left.  By gradually covering our front with
parapet, and extending to the left, we approached the railroad
toward Acworth and overlapped the enemy's right.  By the 4th of
June we had made such progress that Johnston evacuated his lines in
the night, leaving us masters of the situation, when I deliberately
shifted McPherson's army to the extreme left, at and in front of
Acworth, with Thomas's about two miles on his right, and
Schofield's on his right all facing east. Heavy rains set in about
the 1st of June, making the roads infamous; but our marches were
short, as we needed time for the repair of the railroad, so as to
bring supplies forward to Allatoona Station.  On the 6th I rode
back to Allatoona, seven miles, found it all that was expected, and
gave orders for its fortification and preparation as a "secondary
base."

General Blair arrived at Acworth on the 8th with his two divisions
of the Seventeenth Corps--the same which had been on veteran
furlough--had come up from Cairo by way of Clifton, on the
Tennessee River, and had followed our general route to Allatoona,
where he had left a garrison of about fifteen hundred men.  His
effective strength, as reported, was nine thousand.  These, with
new regiments and furloughed men who had joined early in the month
of May, equaled our losses from battle, sickness, and by
detachments; so that the three armies still aggregated about one
hundred thousand effective men.

On the 10th of June the whole combined army moved forward six
miles, to "Big Shanty," a station on the railroad, whence we had a
good view of the enemy's position, which embraced three prominent
hills known as Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain.  On each
of these hills the enemy had signal-stations and fresh lines of
parapets.  Heavy masses of infantry could be distinctly seen with
the naked eye, and it was manifest that Johnston had chosen his
ground well, and with deliberation had prepared for battle; but his
line was at least ten miles in extent--too long, in my judgment, to
be held successfully by his force, then estimated at sixty
thousand.  As his position, however, gave him a perfect view over
our field, we had to proceed with due caution.  McPherson had the
left, following the railroad, which curved around the north base of
Kenesaw; Thomas the centre, obliqued to the right, deploying below
Kenesaw and facing Pine Hill; and Schofield, somewhat refused, was
on the general right, looking south, toward Lost Mountain.

On the 11th the Etowah bridge was done; the railroad was repaired
up to our very skirmish line, close to the base of Kenesaw, and a
loaded train of cars came to Big Shanty.  The locomotive, detached,
was run forward to a water-tank within the range of the enemy's
guns on Kenesaw, whence the enemy opened fire on the locomotive;
but the engineer was not afraid, went on to the tank, got water,
and returned safely to his train, answering the guns with the
screams of his engine, heightened by the cheers and shouts of our
men.

The rains continued to pour, and made our developments slow and
dilatory, for there were no roads, and these had to be improvised
by each division for its own supply train from the depot in Big
Shanty to the camps.  Meantime each army was deploying carefully
before the enemy, intrenching every camp, ready as against a sally.
The enemy's cavalry was also busy in our rear, compelling us to
detach cavalry all the way  back as far as Resaca, and to
strengthen all the infantry posts  as far as Nashville.  Besides,
there was great danger, always in my mind, that Forrest would
collect a heavy cavalry command in Mississippi, cross the Tennessee
River, and break up our railroad below Nashville.  In anticipation
of this very danger, I had sent General Sturgis to Memphis to take
command of all the cavalry in that quarter, to go out toward
Pontotoc, engage Forrest and defeat him; but on the 14th of June I
learned that General Sturgis had himself been defeated on the 10th
of June, and had been driven by Forrest back into Memphis in
considerable confusion.  I expected that this would soon be
followed by a general raid on all our roads in Tennessee.  General
G. J. Smith, with the two divisions of the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Corps which had been with General Banks up Red River,
had returned from that ill-fated expedition, and had been ordered
to General Canby at New Orleans, who was making a diversion about
Mobile; but, on hearing of General Sturgis's defeat, I ordered
General Smith to go out from Memphis and renew the offensive, so as
to keep Forrest off our roads.  This he did finally, defeating
Forrest at Tupelo, on the 13th, 14th, and 15th  days of July; and
he so stirred up matters in North Mississippi that Forrest could
not leave for Tennessee.  This, for a time, left me only the task
of covering the roads against such minor detachments of cavalry as
Johnston could spare from his immediate army, and I proposed to
keep these too busy in their own defense to spare detachments.  By
the 14th the rain slackened, and we occupied a continuous line of
ten miles, intrenched, conforming to the irregular position of the
enemy, when I reconnoitred, with a view to make a break in their
line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain.  When abreast of Pine
Mountain I noticed a rebel battery on its crest, with a continuous
line of fresh rifle-trench about half-way down the hill.  Our
skirmishers were at the time engaged in the woods about the base of
this hill between the lines, and I estimated the distance to the
battery on the crest at about eight hundred yards.  Near it, in
plain view, stood a group of the enemy, evidently observing us with
glasses.  General Howard, commanding the Fourth Corps, was near by,
and I called his attention to this group, and ordered him to compel
it to keep behind its cover.  He replied that his orders from
General Thomas were to spare artillery-ammunition.  This was right,
according to the general policy, but I explained to him that we
must keep up the morale of a bold offensive, that he must use his
artillery, force the enemy to remain on the timid defensive, and
ordered him to cause a battery close by to fire three volleys.  I
continued to ride down our line, and soon heard, in quick
succession, the three volleys.  The next division in order was
Geary's, and I gave him similar orders.  General Polk, in my
opinion, was killed by the second volley fired from the first
battery referred to.

In a conversation with General Johnston, after the war, he
explained that on that day he had ridden in person from Marietta to
Pine Mountain, held by Bates's division, and was accompanied by
Generals Hardee and Polk.  When on Pine Mountain, reconnoitring,
quite a group of soldiers, belonging to the battery close by,
clustered about him.  He noticed the preparations of our battery to
fire, and cautioned these men to scatter.  They did so, and he
likewise hurried behind the parapet, from which he had an equally
good view of our position but General Polk, who was dignified and
corpulent, walked back slowly, not wishing to appear too hurried or
cautious in the presence of the men, and was struck across the
breast by an unexploded shell, which killed him instantly.  This is
my memory of the conversation, and it is confirmed by Johnston
himself in his "Narrative," page 337, except that he calculated the
distance of our battery at six hundred yards, and says that Polk
was killed by the third shot; I know that our guns fired by volley,
and believe that he was hit by a shot of the second volley.  It has
been asserted that I fired the gun which killed General Polk, and
that I knew it was directed against that general.  The fact is, at
that distance we could not even tell that the group were officers
at all; I was on horseback, a couple of hundred yards off, before
my orders to fire were executed, had no idea that our shot had
taken effect, and continued my ride down along the line to
Schofield's extreme flank, returning late in the evening to my
head-quarters at Big Shanty, where I occupied an abandoned house.
In a cotton-field back of that house was our signal-station, on the
roof of an old gin-house.  The signal-officer reported that by
studying the enemy's signals he had learned the key, and that he
could read their signals.  He explained to me that he had
translated a signal about noon, from Pine Mountain to Marietta,
"Send an ambulance for General Polk's body;" and later in the day
another, "Why don't you send an ambulance for General Polk?"  From
this we inferred that General Polk had been killed, but how or
where we knew not; and this inference was confirmed later in the
same day by the report of some prisoners who had been captured.

On the 15th we advanced our general lines, intending to attack at
any weak point discovered between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain; but
Pine Mountain was found to be abandoned, and Johnston had
contracted his front somewhat, on a direct line, connecting Kenesaw
with Lost Mountain.  Thomas and Schofield thereby gained about two
miles of most difficult, country, and McPherson's left lapped well
around the north end of Kenesaw.  We captured a good many
prisoners, among them a whole infantry regiment, the Fourteenth
Alabama, three hundred and twenty strong.

On the 16th the general movement was continued, when Lost Mountain
was abandoned by the enemy.  Our right naturally swung round, so as
to threaten the railroad below Marietta, but Johnston had still
further contracted and strengthened his lines, covering Marietta
and all the roads below.

On the 17th and 18th the rain again fell in torrents, making army
movements impossible, but we devoted the time to strengthening our
positions, more especially the left and centre, with a view
gradually to draw from the left to add to the right; and we had to
hold our lines on the left extremely strong, to guard against a
sally from Kenesaw against our depot at Big Shanty.  Garrard's
division of cavalry was kept busy on our left, McPherson had
gradually extended to his right, enabling Thomas to do the same
still farther; but the enemy's position was so very strong, and
everywhere it was covered by intrenchments, that we found it as
dangerous to assault as a permanent fort.  We in like manner
covered our lines of battle by similar works, and even our
skirmishers learned to cover their bodies by the simplest and best
forms of defensive works, such as rails or logs, piled in the form
of a simple lunette, covered on the outside with earth thrown up at
night.

The enemy and ourselves used the same form of rifle-trench, varied
according to the nature of the ground, viz.: the trees and bushes
were cut away for a hundred yards or more in front, serving as an
abatis or entanglement; the parapets varied from four to six feet
high, the dirt taken from a ditch outside and from a covered way
inside, and this parapet was surmounted by a "head-log," composed
of the trunk of a tree from twelve to twenty inches at the butt,
lying along the interior crest of the parapet and resting in
notches cut in other trunks which extended back, forming an
inclined plane, in case the head-log should be knocked inward by a
cannon-shot.  The men of both armies became extremely skillful in
the construction of these works, because each man realized their
value and importance to himself, so that it required no orders for
their construction.  As soon as a regiment or brigade gained a
position within easy distance for a sally, it would set to work
with a will, and would construct such a parapet in a single night;
but I endeavored to spare the soldiers this hard labor by
authorizing each division commander to organize out of the freedmen
who escaped to us a pioneer corps of two hundred men, who were fed
out of the regular army supplies, and I promised them ten dollars a
month, under an existing act of Congress.  These pioneer
detachments became very useful to us during the rest of the war,
for they could work at night while our men slept; they in turn were
not expected to fight, and could therefore sleep by day.  Our
enemies used their slaves for a similar purpose, but usually kept
them out of the range of fire by employing them to fortify and
strengthen the position to their rear next to be occupied in their
general retrograde.  During this campaign hundreds if not thousands
of miles of similar intrenchments were built by both armies, and,
as a rule, whichever party attacked got the worst of it.

On the 19th of June the rebel army again fell back on its flanks,
to such an extent that for a time I supposed it had retreated to
the Chattahoochee River, fifteen miles distant; but as we pressed
forward we were soon undeceived, for we found it still more
concentrated, covering Marietta and the railroad.  These successive
contractions of the enemy's line encouraged us and discouraged him,
but were doubtless justified by sound reasons.  On the 20th
Johnston's position was unusually strong.  Kenesaw Mountain was his
salient; his two flanks were refused and covered by parapets and by
Noonday and Nose's Creeks.  His left flank was his weak point, so
long as he acted on the "defensive," whereas, had he designed to
contract the extent of his line for the purpose of getting in
reserve a force with which to strike "offensively" from his right,
he would have done a wise act, and I was compelled to presume that
such was his object: We were also so far from Nashville and
Chattanooga that we were naturally sensitive for the safety of our
railroad and depots, so that the left (McPherson) was held very
strong.

About this time came reports that a large cavalry force of the
enemy had passed around our left flank, evidently to strike this
very railroad somewhere below Chattanooga.  I therefore reenforced
the cavalry stationed from Resaca to Casaville, and ordered forward
from Huntsville, Alabama, the infantry division of General John E.
Smith, to hold Kingston securely.

While we were thus engaged about Kenesaw, General Grant had his
hands full with Lee, in Virginia.  General Halleck was the chief of
staff at Washington, and to him I communicated almost daily.  I
find from my letter-book that on the 21st of June I reported to him
tersely and truly the condition of facts on that day: "This is the
nineteenth day of rain, and the prospect of fair weather is as far
off as ever.  The roads are impassable; the fields and woods become
quagmire's after a few wagons have crossed over.  Yet we are at
work all the time.  The left flank is across Noonday Creek, and the
right is across Nose's Creek.  The enemy still holds Kenesaw, a
conical mountain, with Marietta behind it, and has his flanks
retired, to cover that town and the railroad behind.  I am all
ready to attack the moment the weather and roads will permit troops
and artillery to move with any thing like life."

The weather has a wonderful effect on troops: in action and on the
march, rain is favorable; but in the woods, where all is blind and
uncertain, it seems almost impossible for an army covering ten
miles of front to act in concert during wet and stormy weather.
Still I pressed operations with the utmost earnestness, aiming
always to keep our fortified lines in absolute contact with the
enemy, while with the surplus force we felt forward, from one flank
or the other, for his line of communication and retreat.  On the
22d of June I rode the whole line, and ordered General Thomas in
person to advance his extreme right corps (Hooker's); and
instructed General Schofield, by letter, to keep his entire army,
viz., the Twenty-third Corps, as a strong right flank in close
support of Hooker's deployed line.  During this day the sun came
out, with some promise of clear weather, and I had got back to my
bivouac about dark, when a signal message was received, dated--

KULP HOUSE, 5.30 P.M.

General SHERMAN:
We have repulsed two heavy attacks, and feel confident, our only
apprehension being from our extreme right flank.  Three entire
corps are in front of us.

Major-General HOOKER.

Hooker's corps (the Twentieth) belonged to Thomas's army; Thomas's
headquarters were two miles nearer to Hooker than mine; and Hooker,
being an old army officer, knew that he should have reported this
fact to Thomas and not to me; I was, moreover, specially disturbed
by the assertion in his report that he was uneasy about his right
flank, when Schofield had been specially ordered to protect that.
I first inquired of my adjutant, Dayton, if he were certain that
General Schofield had received his orders, and he answered that the
envelope in which he had sent them was receipted by General
Schofield himself.  I knew, therefore, that General Schofield must
be near by, in close support of Hooker's right flank.  General
Thomas had before this occasion complained to me of General
Hooker's disposition to "switch off," leaving wide gaps in his
line, so as to be independent, and to make glory on his own
account.  I therefore resolved not to overlook this breach of
discipline and propriety.  The rebel army was only composed of
three corps; I had that very day ridden six miles of their lines,
found them everywhere strongly occupied, and therefore Hooker could
not have encountered "three entire corps."  Both McPherson and
Schofield had also complained to me of this same tendency of Hooker
to widen the gap between his own corps and his proper army
(Thomas's), so as to come into closer contact with one or other of
the wings, asserting that he was the senior by commission to both
McPherson and Schofield, and that in the event of battle he should
assume command over them, by virtue of his older commission.

They appealed to me to protect them.  I had heard during that day
some cannonading and heavy firing down toward the "Kulp House,"
which was about five miles southeast of where I was, but this was
nothing unusual, for at the same moment there was firing along our
lines full ten miles in extent.  Early the next day (23d) I rode
down to the "Kulp House," which was on a road leading from Powder
Springs to Marietta, about three miles distant from the latter.  On
the way I passed through General Butterfield's division of Hooker's
corps, which I learned had not been engaged at all in the battle of
the day before; then I rode along Geary's and Williams's divisions,
which occupied the field of battle, and the men were engaged in
burying the dead.  I found General Schofield's corps on the Powder
Springs road, its head of column abreast of Hooker's right,
therefore constituting "a strong right flank," and I met Generale
Schofield and Hooker together.  As rain was falling at the moment,
we passed into a little church standing by the road-side, and I
there showed General Schofield Hooker's signal-message of the day
before.  He was very angry, and pretty sharp words passed between
them, Schofield saying that his head of column (Hascall's division)
had been, at the time of the battle, actually in advance of
Hooker's line; that the attack or sally of the enemy struck his
troops before it did Hooker's; that General Hooker knew of it at
the time; and he offered to go out and show me that the dead men of
his advance division (Hascall's) were lying farther out than any of
Hooker's.  General Hooker pretended not to have known this fact.  I
then asked him why he had called on me for help, until he had used
all of his own troops; asserting that I had just seen Butterfield's
division, and had learned from him that he had not been engaged the
day before at all; and I asserted that the enemy's sally must have
been made by one corps (Hood's), in place of three, and that it had
fallen on Geary's and Williams's divisions, which had repulsed the
attack handsomely.  As we rode away from that church General Hooker
was by my side, and I told him that such a thing must not occur
again; in other words, I reproved him more gently than the occasion
demanded, and from that time he began to sulk.  General Hooker had
come from the East with great fame as a "fighter," and at
Chattanooga he was glorified by his "battle above the clouds,"
which I fear turned his head.  He seemed jealous of all the army
commanders, because in years, former rank, and experience, he
thought he was our superior.

On the 23d of June I telegraphed to General Halleck this summary,
which I cannot again better state:

We continue to press forward on the principle of an advance against
fortified positions.  The whole country is one vast fort, and
Johnston must have at least fifty miles of connected trenches, with
abatis and finished batteries.  We gain ground daily, fighting all
the time.  On the 21st General Stanley gained a position near the
south end of Kenesaw, from which the enemy attempted in vain to
drive him; and the same day General T. J. Wood's division took a
hill, which the enemy assaulted three times at night without
success, leaving more than a hundred dead on the ground.  Yesterday
the extreme right (Hooker and Schofield) advanced on the Powder
Springs road to within three miles of Marietta.  The enemy made a
strong effort to drive them away, but failed signally, leaving more
than two hundred dead on the field.  Our lines are now in close
contact, and the fighting is incessant, with a good deal of
artillery-fire.  As fast as we gain one position the enemy has
another all ready, but I think he will soon have to let go Kenesaw,
which is the key to the whole country.  The weather is now better,
and the roads are drying up fast. Our losses are light, and,
not-withstanding the repeated breaks of the road to our rear,
supplies are ample.

During the 24th and 25th of June General Schofield extended his
right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his
lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong
assaults at points where success would give us the greatest
advantage.  I had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson, and
Schofield, and we all agreed that we could not with prudence
stretch out any more, and therefore there was no alternative but to
attack "fortified lines," a thing carefully avoided up to that
time.  I reasoned, if we could make a breach anywhere near the
rebel centre, and thrust in a strong head of column, that with the
one moiety of our army we could hold in check the corresponding
wing of the enemy, and with the other sweep in flank and overwhelm
the other half.  The 27th of June was fixed as the day for the
attempt, and in order to oversee the whole, and to be in close
communication with all parts of the army, I had a place cleared on
the top of a hill to the rear of Thomas's centre, and had the
telegraph-wires laid to it.  The points of attack were chosen, and
the troops were all prepared with as little demonstration as
possible.  About 9 A.M.  Of the day appointed, the troops moved to
the assault, and all along our lines for ten miles a furious fire
of artillery and musketry was kept up.  At all points the enemy met
us with determined courage and in great force.  McPherson's
attacking column fought up the face of the lesser Kenesaw, but
could not reach the summit.  About a mile to the right (just below
the Dallas road) Thomas's assaulting column reached the parapet,
where Brigadier-General Barker was shot down mortally wounded, and
Brigadier-General Daniel McCook (my old law-partner) was
desperately wounded, from the effects of which he afterward died.
By 11.30 the assault was in fact over, and had failed.  We had not
broken the rebel line at either point, but our assaulting columns
held their ground within a few yards of the rebel trenches, and
there covered themselves with parapet.  McPherson lost about five
hundred men and several valuable officers, and Thomas lost nearly
two thousand men.  This was the hardest fight of the campaign up to
that date, and it is well described by Johnston in his "Narrative"
(pages 342, 343), where he admits his loss in killed and wounded
as

        Total ............. 808

This, no doubt, is a true and fair statement; but, as usual,
Johnston overestimates our loss, putting it at six thousand,
whereas our entire loss was about twenty-five hundred, killed and
wounded.

While the battle was in progress at the centre, Schofield crossed
Olley's Creek on the right, and gained a position threatening
Johnston's line of retreat; and, to increase the effect, I ordered
Stoneman's cavalry to proceed rapidly still farther to the right,
to Sweetwater.  Satisfied of the bloody cost of attacking
intrenched lines, I at once thought of moving the whole army to the
railroad at a point (Fulton) about ten miles below Marietta, or to
the Chattahoochee River itself, a movement similar to the one
afterward so successfully practised at Atlanta.  All the orders
were issued to bring forward supplies enough to fill our wagons,
intending to strip the railroad back to Allatoona, and leave that
place as our depot, to be covered as well as possible by Garrard's
cavalry.  General Thomas, as usual, shook his head, deeming it
risky to leave the railroad; but something had to be done, and I
had resolved on this move, as reported in my dispatch to General
Halleck on July 1st:

General Schofield is now south of Olley's Creek, and on the head of
Nickajack.  I have been hurrying down provisions and forage, and
tomorrow night propose to move McPherson from the left to the
extreme right, back of General Thomas.  This will bring my right
within three miles of the Chattahoochee River, and about five miles
from the railroad.  By this movement I think I can force Johnston
to move his whole army down from Kenesaw to defend his railroad and
the Chattahoochee, when I will (by the left flank) reach the
railroad below Marietta; but in this I must cut loose from the
railroad with ten days' supplies in wagons.  Johnston may come out
of his intrenchments to attack Thomas, which is exactly what I
want, for General Thomas is well intrenched on a line parallel with
the enemy south of Kenesaw.  I think that Allatoona and the line of
the Etowah are strong enough for me to venture on this move.  The
movement is substantially down the Sandtown road straight for
Atlanta.

McPherson drew out of his lines during the night of July 2d,
leaving Garrard's cavalry, dismounted, occupying his trenches, and
moved to the rear of the Army of the Cumberland, stretching down
the Nickajack; but Johnston detected the movement, and promptly
abandoned Marietta and Kenesaw.  I expected as much, for, by the
earliest dawn of the 3d of July, I was up at a large spy-glass
mounted on a tripod, which Colonel Poe, United States Engineers,
had at his bivouac close by our camp.  I directed the glass on
Kenesaw, and saw some of our pickets crawling up the hill
cautiously; soon they stood upon the very top, and I could plainly
see their movements as they ran along the crest just abandoned by
the enemy.  In a minute I roused my staff, and started them off
with orders in every direction for a pursuit by every possible
road, hoping to catch Johnston in the confusion of retreat,
especially at the crossing of the Chattahoochee River.

I must close this chapter here, so as to give the actual losses
during June, which are compiled from the official returns by
months.  These losses, from June 1st to July 3d, were all
substantially sustained about Kenesaw and Marietta, and it was
really a continuous battle, lasting from the 10th day of June till
the 3d of July, when the rebel army fell back from Marietta toward
the Chattahoochee River.  Our losses were:

                      Killed and Missing      Wounded     Total
Loss in June Aggregate      1,790              5,740      7,530


Johnston makes his statement of losses from the report of his
surgeon Foard, for pretty much the same period, viz., from June 4th
to July 4th (page 576):
                            Killed           Wounded     Total
         Total............   468               3,480      3,948


In the tabular statement the "missing" embraces the prisoners; and,
giving two thousand as a fair proportion of prisoners captured by
us for the month of June (twelve thousand nine hundred and
eighty-three in all the campaign), makes an aggregate loss in the
rebel army of fifty-nine hundred and forty-eight, to ours of
seventy-five hundred and thirty--a less proportion than in the
relative strength of our two armies, viz., as six to ten, thus
maintaining our relative superiority, which the desperate game
of war justified.




CHAPTER XVIII.

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN--BATTLES ABOUT ATLANTA

JULY, 1864.


As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving McPherson's
entire army from the extreme left, at the base of Kenesaw to the
right, below Olley's Creek, and stretching it down the Nickajack
toward Turner's Ferry of the Chattahoochee, we forced Johnston to
choose between a direct assault on Thomas's intrenched position, or
to permit us to make a lodgment on his railroad below Marietta, or
even to cross the Chattahoochee.  Of course, he chose to let go
Kenesaw and Marietta, and fall back on an intrenched camp prepared
by his orders in advance on the north and west bank of the
Chattahoochee, covering the railroad-crossing and his several
pontoon-bridges.  I confess I had not learned beforehand of the
existence of this strong place, in the nature of a tete-du-pont,
and had counted on striking him an effectual blow in the expected
confusion of his crossing the Chattahoochee, a broad and deep river
then to his rear.  Ordering every part of the army to pursue
vigorously on the morning of the 3d of July, I rode into Marietta,
just quitted by the rebel rear-guard, and was terribly angry at the
cautious pursuit by Garrard's cavalry, and even by the head of our
infantry columns.  But Johnston had in advance cleared and
multiplied his roads, whereas ours had to cross at right angles
from the direction of Powder Springs toward Marrietta, producing
delay and confusion.  By night Thomas's head of column ran up
against a strong rear-guard intrenched at Smyrna camp-ground, six
miles below Marietta, and there on the next day we celebrated our
Fourth of July, by a noisy but not a desperate battle, designed
chiefly to hold the enemy there till Generals McPherson and
Schofield could get well into position below him, near the
Chattahoochee crossings.

It was here that General Noyes, late Governor of Ohio, lost his
leg.  I came very near being shot myself while reconnoitring in the
second story of a house on our picket-line, which was struck
several times by cannon-shot, and perfectly riddled with
musket-balls.

During the night Johnston drew back all his army and trains inside
the tete-du-pont at the Chattahoochee, which proved one of the
strongest pieces of field-fortification I ever saw.  We closed up
against it, and were promptly met by a heavy and severe fire.
Thomas was on the main road in immediate pursuit; next on his right
was Schofield; and McPherson on the extreme right, reaching the
Chattahoochee River below Turner's Ferry.  Stoneman's cavalry was
still farther to the right, along down the Chattahoochee River as
far as opposite Sandtown; and on that day I ordered Garrard's
division of cavalry up the river eighteen miles, to secure
possession of the factories at Roswell, as well as to hold an
important bridge and ford at that place.

About three miles out from the Chattahoochee the main road forked,
the right branch following substantially the railroad, and the left
one leading straight for Atlanta, via Paice's Ferry and Buckhead.
We found the latter unoccupied and unguarded, and the Fourth Corps
(Howard's) reached the river at Paice's Ferry.  The right-hand road
was perfectly covered by the tete-du-pont before described, where
the resistance was very severe, and for some time deceived me, for
I was pushing Thomas with orders to fiercely assault his enemy,
supposing that he was merely opposing us to gain time to get his
trains and troops across the Chattahoochee; but, on personally
reconnoitring, I saw the abatis and the strong redoubts, which
satisfied me of the preparations that had been made by Johnston in
anticipation of this very event.  While I was with General Jeff. C.
Davis, a poor negro came out of the abatis, blanched with fright,
said he had been hidden under a log all day, with a perfect storm
of shot, shells, and musket-balls, passing over him, till a short
lull had enabled him to creep out and make himself known to our
skirmishers, who in turn had sent him back to where we were.  This
negro explained that he with about a thousand slaves had been at
work a month or more on these very lines, which, as he explained,
extended from the river about a mile above the railroad-bridge to
Turner's Ferry below,--being in extent from five to six miles.

Therefore, on the 5th of July we had driven our enemy to cover in
the valley of the Chattahoochee, and we held possession of the
river above for eighteen miles, as far as Roswell, and below ten
miles to the mouth of the Sweetwater.  Moreover, we held the high
ground and could overlook his movements, instead of his looking
down on us, as was the case at Kenesaw.

From a hill just back of Mining's Station I could see the houses in
Atlanta, nine miles distant, and the whole intervening valley of
the Chattahoochee; could observe the preparations for our reception
on the other side, the camps of men and large trains of covered
wagons; and supposed, as a matter of course, that Johnston had
passed the river with the bulk of his army, and that he had only
left on our side a corps to cover his bridges; but in fact he had
only sent across his cavalry and trains.  Between Howard's corps at
Paice's Ferry and the rest of Thomas's army pressing up against
this tete-du-pont, was a space concealed by dense woods, in
crossing which I came near riding into a detachment of the enemy's
cavalry; and later in the same day Colonel Frank Sherman, of
Chicago, then on General Howard's staff, did actually ride straight
into the enemy's camp, supposing that our lines were continuous.
He was carried to Atlanta, and for some time the enemy supposed
they were in possession of the commander-in-chief of the opposing
army.

I knew that Johnston would not remain long on the west bank of the
Chattahoochee, for I could easily practise on that ground to better
advantage our former tactics of intrenching a moiety in his front,
and with the rest of our army cross the river and threaten either
his rear or the city of Atlanta itself, which city was of vital
importance to the existence not only of his own army, but of the
Confederacy itself.  In my dispatch of July 6th to General Halleck,
at Washington, I state that:


Johnston (in his retreat from Kenesaw) has left two breaks in the
railroad--one above Marietta and one near Mining's Station.  The
former is already repaired, and Johnston's army has heard the sound
of our locomotives.  The telegraph is finished to Mining's Station,
and the field-wire has just reached my bivouac, and will be ready
to convey this message as soon as it is written and translated into
cipher.

I propose to study the crossings of the Chattahoochee, and, when
all is ready, to move quickly.  As a beginning, I will keep the
troops and wagons well back from the river, and only display to the
enemy our picket-line, with a few field-batteries along at random.
I have already shifted Schofield to a point in our left rear,
whence he can in a single move reach the Chattahoochee at a point
above the railroad-bridge, where there is a ford.  At present the
waters are turbid and swollen from recent rains; but if the present
hot weather lasts, the water will run down very fast. We have
pontoons enough for four bridges, but, as our crossing will be
resisted, we must manoeuvre some.  All the regular crossing-places
are covered by forts, apparently of long construction; but we shall
cross in due time, and, instead of attacking Atlanta direct, or any
of its forts, I propose to make a circuit, destroying all its
railroads.  This is a delicate movement, and must be done with
caution.  Our army is in good condition and full of confidence; but
the weather is intensely hot, and a good many men have fallen with
sunstroke.  The country is high and healthy, and the sanitary
condition of the army is good.

At this time Stoneman was very active on our extreme right,
pretending to be searching the river below Turner's Ferry for a
crossing, and was watched closely by the enemy's cavalry on the
other side, McPherson, on the right, was equally demonstrative at
and near Turner's Ferry.  Thomas faced substantially the intrenched
tete-du-pont, and had his left on the Chattahoochee River, at
Paice's Ferry.  Garrard's cavalry was up at Roswell, and McCook's
small division of cavalry was intermediate, above Soap's Creek.
Meantime, also, the railroad-construction party was hard at work,
repairing the railroad up to our camp at Vining's Station.

Of course, I expected every possible resistance in crossing the
Chattahoochee River, and had made up my mind to feign on the right,
but actually to cross over by the left.  We had already secured a
crossing place at Roswell, but one nearer was advisable; General
Schofield had examined the river well, found a place just below the
mouth of Soap's Creek which he deemed advantageous, and was
instructed to effect an early crossing there, and to intrench a
good position on the other side, viz., the east bank.  But,
preliminary thereto, I had ordered General Rousseau, at Nashville,
to collect, out of the scattered detachments of cavalry in
Tennessee, a force of a couple of thousand men, to rendezvous at
Decatur, Alabama, thence to make a rapid march for Opelika, to
break up the railroad links between Georgia and Alabama, and then
to make junction with me about Atlanta; or, if forced, to go on to
Pensacola, or even to swing across to some of our posts in
Mississippi.  General Rousseau asked leave to command this
expedition himself, to which I consented, and on the 6th of July he
reported that he was all ready at Decatur, and I gave him orders to
start.  He moved promptly on the 9th, crossed the Coosa below the
"Ten Islands" and the Tallapoosa below "Horseshoe Bend," having
passed through Talladega.  He struck the railroad west of Opelika,
tore it up for twenty miles, then turned north and came to Marietta
on the 22d of July, whence he reported to me.  This expedition was
in the nature of a raid, and must have disturbed the enemy
somewhat; but, as usual, the cavalry did not work hard, and their
destruction of the railroad was soon repaired.  Rousseau, when he
reported to me in person before Atlanta, on the 28d of July, stated
his entire loss to have been only twelve killed and thirty wounded.
He brought in four hundred captured mules and three hundred horses,
and also told me a good story.  He said he was far down in Alabama,
below Talladega, one hot, dusty day, when the blue clothing of his
men was gray with dust; he had halted his column along a road, and
he in person, with his staff, had gone to the house of a planter,
who met him kindly on the front-porch.  He asked for water, which
was brought, and as the party sat on the porch in conversation he
saw, in a stable-yard across the road, quite a number of good
mules. He remarked to the planter, "My good sir, I fear I must take
some of your mules."  The planter remonstrated, saying he had
already contributed liberally to the good cause; that it was only
last week he had given to General Roddy ten mules.  Rousseau
replied, "Well, in this war you should be at least neutral--that
is, you should be as liberal to us as to Roddy" (a rebel cavalry
general).  "Well, ain't you on our side?"  "No," said Rousseau; "I
am General Rousseau, and all these men you see are Yanks."  "Great
God! is it possible!  Are these Yanks!  Who ever supposed they
would come away down here in Alabama?"   Of course, Rousseau took
his ten mules.

Schofield effected his crossing at Soap's Creek very handsomely on
the 9th, capturing the small guard that was watching the crossing.
By night he was on the high ground beyond, strongly intrenched,
with two good pontoon-bridges finished, and was prepared, if
necessary, for an assault by the whole Confederate army.  The same
day Garrard's cavalry also crossed over at Roswell, drove away the
cavalry-pickets, and held its ground till relieved by Newton's
division of Howard's corps, which was sent up temporarily, till it
in turn was relieved by Dodge's corps (Sixteenth) of the Army of
the Tennessee, which was the advance of the whole of that army.

That night Johnston evacuated his trenches, crossed over the
Chattahoochee, burned the railroad bridge and his pontoon and
trestle bridges, and left us in full possession of the north or
west bank-besides which, we had already secured possession of the
two good crossings at Roswell and Soap's Creek.  I have always
thought Johnston neglected his opportunity there, for he had lain
comparatively idle while we got control of both banks of the river
above him.

On the 13th I ordered McPherson, with the Fifteenth Corps, to move
up to Roswell, to cross over, prepare good bridges, and to make a
strong tete-du-pont on the farther side.  Stoneman had been sent
down to Campbellton, with orders to cross over and to threaten the
railroad below Atlanta, if he could do so without too much risk;
and General Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, was to remain at
Turner's Ferry, demonstrating as much as possible, thus keeping up
the feint below while we were actually crossing above.  Thomas was
also ordered to prepare his bridges at Powers's and Paice's
Ferries.  By crossing the Chattahoochee above the railroad bridge,
we were better placed to  cover our railroad and depots than below,
though a movement across the river below the railroad, to the south
of Atlanta, might have been more decisive.  But we were already so
far from home, and would be compelled to accept battle whenever
offered, with the Chattahoochee to our rear, that it became
imperative for me to take all prudential measures the case admitted
of, and I therefore determined to pass the river above the
railroad-bridge-McPherson on the left, Schofield in the  centre,
and Thomas on the right. On the 13th I reported to General Halleck
as follows:


All is well.  I have now accumulated stores at Allatoona and
Marietta, both fortified and garrisoned points.  Have also three
places at which to cross the Chattahoochee in our possession, and
only await General Stoneman's return from a trip down the river, to
cross the army in force and move on Atlanta.

Stoneman is now out two days, and had orders to be back on the
fourth or fifth day at furthest.


From the 10th to the 15th we were all busy in strengthening the
several points for the proposed passage of the Chattahoochee, in
increasing the number and capacity of the bridges, rearranging the
garrisons to our rear, and in bringing forward supplies.  On the
15th General Stoneman got back to Powder Springs, and was ordered
to replace General Blair at Turner's Ferry, and Blair, with the
Seventeenth Corps, was ordered up to Roswell to join McPherson.  On
the 17th we began the general movement against Atlanta, Thomas
crossing the Chattahoochee at Powers's and Paice's, by pontoon-
bridges; Schofield moving out toward Cross Keys, and McPherson
toward Stone Mountain.  We encountered but little opposition except
by cavalry.  On the 18th all the armies moved on a general right
wheel, Thomas to Buckhead, forming line of  battle facing
Peach-Tree Creek; Schofield was on his left, and McPherson well
over toward the railroad between Stone Mountain and Decatur, which
he reached at 2 p.m.  of that day, about four miles from Stone
Mountain, and seven miles east of Decatur, and there he turned
toward Atlanta, breaking up the railroad as he progressed, his
advance-guard reaching Ecatur about night, where he came into
communication with Schofield's troops, which had also reached
Decatur.  About 10 A.M. of that day (July 18th), when the armies
were all in motion, one of General Thomas's staff-officers brought
me a citizen, one of our spies, who had just come out of Atlanta,
and had brought a newspaper of the same day, or of the day before,
containing Johnston's order relinquishing the command of the
Confederate forces in Atlanta, and Hood's order assuming the
command.  I immediately inquired of General Schofield, who was his
classmate at West Point, about Hood, as to his general character,
etc., and learned that he was bold even to rashness, and courageous
in the extreme; I inferred that the change of commanders meant
"fight."  Notice of this important change was at once sent to all
parts of the army, and every division commander was cautioned to be
always prepared for battle in any shape.  This was just what we
wanted, viz., to fight in open ground, on any thing like equal
terms, instead of being forced to run up against prepared
intrenchments; but, at the same time, the enemy having Atlanta
behind him, could choose the time and place of attack, and could at
pleasure mass a superior force on our weakest points.  Therefore,
we had to be constantly ready for sallies.

On the 19th the three armies were converging toward Atlanta,
meeting such feeble resistance that I really thought the enemy
intended to evacuate the place.  McPherson was moving astride of
the railroad, near Decatur; Schofield along a road leading toward
Atlanta, by Colonel Howard's house and the distillery; and Thomas
was crossing "Peach-Tree" in line of battle, building bridges for
nearly every division as deployed.  There was quite a gap between
Thomas and Schofield, which I endeavored to close by drawing two of
Howard's divisions nearer Schofield.  On the 20th I was with
General Schofield near the centre, and soon after noon heard heavy
firing in front of Thomas's right, which lasted an hour or so, and
then ceased.

I soon learned that the enemy had made a furious sally, the blow
falling on Hooker's corps (the Twentieth), and partially on
Johnson's division of the Fourteenth, and Newton's of the Fourth.
The troops had crossed Peach-Tree Creek, were deployed, but at the
time were resting for noon, when, without notice, the enemy came
pouring out of their trenches down upon them, they became
commingled, and fought in many places hand to hand.  General Thomas
happened to be near the rear of Newton's division, and got some
field-batteries in a good position, on the north side of Peach-Tree
Creek, from which he directed a furious fire on a mass of the
enemy, which was passing around Newton's left and exposed flank.
After a couple of hours of hard and close conflict, the enemy
retired slowly within his trenches, leaving his dead and many
wounded on the field. Johnson's and Newton's losses were light, for
they had partially covered their fronts with light parapet; but
Hooker's whole corps fought in open ground, and lost about fifteen
hundred men.  He reported four hundred rebel dead left on the
ground, and that the rebel wounded would number four thousand; but
this was conjectural, for most of them got back within their own
lines.  We had, however, met successfully a bold sally, had
repelled it handsomely, and were also put on our guard; and the
event illustrated the future tactics of our enemy.  This sally came
from the Peach-Tree line, which General Johnston had carefully
prepared in advance, from which to fight us outside of Atlanta.  We
then advanced our lines in compact order, close up to these
finished intrenchments, overlapping them on our left. From various
parts of our lines the houses inside of Atlanta were plainly
visible, though between us were the strong parapets, with ditch,
fraise, chevaux-de-frise, and abatis, prepared long in advance by
Colonel Jeremy F. Gilmer, formerly of the United States Engineers.
McPherson had the Fifteenth Corps astride the Augusta Railroad, and
the Seventeenth deployed on its left.  Schofield was next on his
right, then came Howard's, Hooker's, and Palmer's corps, on the
extreme right.  Each corps was deployed with strong reserves, and
their trains were parked to their rear.  McPherson's trains were in
Decatur, guarded by a brigade commanded by Colonel Sprague of the
Sixty-third Ohio.  The Sixteenth Corps (Dodge's) was crowded out of
position on the right of McPherson's line, by the contraction of
the circle of investment; and, during the previous afternoon, the
Seventeenth Corps (Blair's) had pushed its operations on the
farther side of the Augusta Railroad, so as to secure possession of
a hill, known as Leggett's Hill, which Leggett's and Force's
divisions had carried by assault.  Giles A. Smith's division was on
Leggett's left, deployed with a weak left flank "in air," in
military phraseology.  The evening before General Gresham, a great
favorite, was badly wounded; and there also Colonel Tom Reynolds,
now of Madison, Wisconsin, was shot through the leg.  When the
surgeons were debating the propriety of amputating it in his
hearing, he begged them to spare the leg, as it was very valuable,
being an "imported leg."  He was of Irish birth, and this
well-timed piece of wit saved his leg, for the surgeons thought, if
he could perpetrate a joke at such a time, they would trust to his
vitality to save his limb.

During the night, I had full reports from all parts of our line,
most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally, and
finding that McPherson was stretching out too much on his left
flank, I wrote him a note early in the morning not to extend so
much by his left; for we had not troops enough to completely invest
the place, and I intended to destroy utterly all parts of the
Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, then to withdraw from the
left flank and add to the right.  In that letter I ordered
McPherson not to extend any farther to the left, but to employ
General Dodge's corps (Sixteenth), then forced out of position, to
destroy every rail and tie of the railroad, from Decatur up to his
skirmish-line, and I wanted him (McPherson) to be ready, as soon as
General Garrard returned from Covington (whither I had sent him),
to move to the extreme right of Thomas, so as to reach if possible
the railroad below Atlanta, viz., the Macon road.  In the morning
we found the strong line of parapet, "Peach-Tree line," to the
front of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our lines were
advanced rapidly close up to Atlanta.  For some moments I supposed
the enemy intended to evacuate, and in person was on horseback at
the head of Schofield's troops, who had advanced in front of the
Howard House to some open ground, from which we could plainly see
the whole rebel line of parapets, and I saw their men dragging up
from the intervening valley, by the distillery, trees and saplings
for abatis.  Our skirmishers found the enemy down in this valley,
and we could see the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns in
position at intervals.  Schofield was dressing forward his lines,
and I could hear Thomas farther to the right engaged, when General
McPherson and his staff rode up.  We went back to the Howard House,
a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on the steps,
discussing the chances of battle, and of Hood's general character.
McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood,
Schofield, and Sheridan.  We agreed that we ought to be unusually
cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard
fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of
great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and
rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis
argued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the
cautious but prudent conduct of General Jos. Johnston.

McPherson was in excellent spirits, well pleased at the progress of
events so far, and had come over purposely to see me about the
order I had given him to use Dodge's corps to break up the
railroad, saying that the night before he had gained a position on
Leggett's Hill from which he could look over the rebel parapet, and
see the high smoke-stack of a large foundery in Atlanta; that
before receiving my order he had diverted Dodge's two divisions
(then in motion) from the main road, along a diagonal one that led
to his extreme left flank, then held by Giles A. Smith's division
(Seventeenth Corps), for the purpose of strengthening that flank;
and that he had sent some intrenching-tools there, to erect some
batteries from which he intended to knock down that foundery, and
otherwise to damage the buildings inside of Atlanta.  He said he
could put all his pioneers to work, and do with them in the time
indicated all I had proposed to do with General Dodge's two
divisions.  Of course I assented at once, and we walked down the
road a short distance, sat down by the foot of a tree where I had
my map, and on it pointed out to him Thomas's position and his own.
I then explained minutely that, after we had sufficiently broken up
the Augusta road, I wanted to shift his whole army around by the
rear to Thomas's extreme right, and hoped thus to reach the other
railroad at East Point.  While we sat there we could hear lively
skirmishing going on near us (down about the distillery), and
occasionally round-shot from twelve or twenty-four pound guns came
through the trees in reply to those of Schofield, and we could hear
similar sounds all along down the lines of Thomas to our right, and
his own to the left; but presently the firing appeared a little
more brisk (especially over about Giles G. Smith's division), and
then we heard an occasional gun back toward Decatur.  I asked him
what it meant.  We took my pocket-compass (which I always carried),
and by noting the direction of the sound, we became satisfied that
the firing was too far to our left rear to be explained by known
facts, and he hastily called for his horse, his staff, and his
orderlies.

McPherson was then in his prime (about thirty-four years old), over
six feet high, and a very handsome man in every way, was
universally liked, and had many noble qualities.  He had on his
boots outside his pantaloons, gauntlets on his hands, had on his
major-general's uniform, and wore a sword-belt, but no sword.  He
hastily gathered his papers (save one, which I now possess) into a
pocket-book, put it in his breast-pocket, and jumped on his horse,
saying he would hurry down his line and send me back word what
these sounds meant.  His adjutant-general, Clark, Inspector-General
Strong, and his aides, Captains Steele and Gile, were with him.
Although the sound of musketry on our left grew in volume, I was
not so much disturbed by it as by the sound of artillery back
toward Decatur.  I ordered Schofield at once to send a brigade back
to Decatur (some five miles) and was walking up and down the porch
of the Howard House, listening, when one of McPherson's staff, with
his horse covered with sweat, dashed up to the porch, and reported
that General McPherson was either "killed or a prisoner."  He
explained that when they had left me a few minutes before, they had
ridden rapidly across to the railroad, the sounds of battle
increasing as they neared the position occupied by General Giles A.
Smith's division, and that McPherson had sent first one, then
another of his staff to bring some of the reserve brigades of the
Fifteenth Corps over to the exposed left flank; that he had reached
the head of Dodge's corps (marching by the flank on the diagonal
road as described), and had ordered it to hurry forward to the same
point; that then, almost if not entirely alone, he had followed
this road leading across the wooded valley behind the Seventeenth
Corps, and had disappeared in these woods, doubtless with a sense
of absolute security.  The sound of musketry was there heard, and
McPherson's horse came back, bleeding, wounded, and riderless.  I
ordered the staff-officer who brought this message to return at
once, to find General Logan (the senior officer present with the
Army of the Tennessee), to report the same facts to him, and to
instruct him to drive back this supposed small force, which had
evidently got around the Seventeenth Corps through the blind woods
in rear of our left flank.  I soon dispatched one of my own staff
(McCoy, I think) to General Logan with similar orders, telling him
to refuse his left flank, and to fight the battle (holding fast to
Leggett's Hill) with the Army of the Tennessee; that I would
personally look to Decatur and to the safety of his rear, and would
reenforce him if he needed it.  I dispatched orders to General
Thomas on our right, telling him of this strong sally, and my
inference that the lines in his front had evidently been weakened
by reason thereof, and that he ought to take advantage of the
opportunity to make a lodgment in Atlanta, if possible.

Meantime the sounds of the battle rose on our extreme left more and
more furious, extending to the place where I stood, at the Howard
House.  Within an hour an ambulance came in (attended by Colonels
Clark and Strong, and Captains Steele and Gile), bearing
McPherson's body.  I had it carried inside of the Howard House, and
laid on a door wrenched from its hinges.  Dr. Hewitt, of the army,
was there, and I asked him to examine the wound.  He opened the
coat and shirt, saw where the ball had entered and where it came
out, or rather lodged under the skin, and he reported that
McPherson must have died in a few seconds after being hit; that the
ball had ranged upward across his body, and passed near the heart.
He was dressed just as he left me, with gauntlets and boots on, but
his pocket-book was gone.  On further inquiry I learned that his
body must have been in possession of the enemy some minutes, during
which time it was rifled of the pocket-book, and I was much
concerned lest the letter I had written him that morning should
have fallen into the hands of some one who could read and
understand its meaning.  Fortunately the spot in the woods where
McPherson was shot was regained by our troops in a few minutes, and
the pocket-book found in the haversack of a prisoner of war
captured at the time, and it and its contents were secured by one
of McPherson's staff.

While we were examining the body inside the house, the battle was
progressing outside, and many shots struck the building, which I
feared would take fire; so I ordered Captains Steele and Gile to
carry the body to Marietta.  They reached that place the same
night, and, on application, I ordered his personal staff to go on
and escort the body to his home, in Clyde, Ohio, where it was
received with great honor, and it is now buried in a small
cemetery, close by his mother's house, which cemetery is composed
in part of the family orchard, in which he used to play when a boy.
The foundation is ready laid for the equestrian monument now in
progress, under the auspices of the Society of the Army of the
Tennessee.

The reports that came to me from all parts of the field revealed
clearly what was the game of my antagonist, and the ground somewhat
favored him.  The railroad and wagon-road from Decatur to Atlanta
lie along the summit, from which the waters flow, by short, steep
valleys, into the "Peach-Tree" and Chattahoochee, to the west, and
by other valleys, of gentler declivity, toward the east (Ocmulgee).
The ridges and level ground were mostly cleared, and had been
cultivated as corn or cotton fields; but where the valleys were
broken, they were left in a state of nature--wooded, and full of
undergrowth.  McPherson's line of battle was across this railroad,
along a general ridge, with a gentle but cleared valley to his
front, between him and the defenses of Atlanta; and another valley,
behind him, was clear of timber in part, but to his left rear the
country was heavily wooded.  Hood, during the night of July 21st,
had withdrawn from his Peach-Tree line, had occupied the fortified
line of Atlanta, facing north and east, with Stewart's--formerly
Polk's--corps and part of Hardee's, and with G. W. Smith's division
of militia.  His own corps, and part of Hardee's, had marched out
to the road leading from McDonough to Decatur, and had turned so as
to strike the left and, rear of McPherson's line "in air."  At the
same time he had sent Wheeler's division of cavalry against the
trains parked in Decatur.  Unluckily for us, I had sent away the
whole of Garrard's division of cavalry during the night of the
20th, with orders to proceed to Covington, thirty miles east, to
burn two important bridges across the Ulcofauhatchee and Yellow
Rivers, to tear up the railroad, to damage it as much as possible
from Stone Mountain eastward, and to be gone four days; so that
McPherson had no cavalry in hand to guard that flank.

The enemy was therefore enabled, under cover or the forest, to
approach quite near before he was discovered; indeed, his
skirmish-line had worked through the timber and got into the field to
the rear of Giles A. Smith's division of the Seventeenth Corps
unseen, had captured Murray's battery of regular artillery, moving
through these woods entirely unguarded, and had got possession of
several of the hospital camps.  The right of this rebel line struck
Dodge's troops in motion; but, fortunately, this corps (Sixteenth)
had only to halt, face to the left, and was in line of battle; and
this corps not only held in check the enemy, but drove him back
through the woods.  About the same time this same force had struck
General Giles A. Smith's left flank, doubled it back, captured four
guns in position and the party engaged in building the very battery
which was the special object of McPherson's visit to me, and almost
enveloped the entire left flank.  The men, however, were skillful and
brave, and fought for a time with their backs to Atlanta.  They
gradually fell back, compressing their own line, and gaining strength
by making junction with Leggett's division of the Seventeenth Corps,
well and strongly posted on the hill.  One or two brigades of the
Fifteenth Corps, ordered by McPherson, came rapidly across the open
field to the rear, from the direction of the railroad, filled up the
gap from Blair's new left to the head of Dodge's column--now facing
to the general left--thus forming a strong left flank, at right
angles to the original line of battle. The enemy attacked, boldly and
repeatedly, the whole of this flank, but met an equally fierce
resistance; and on that ground a bloody battle raged from little
after noon till into the night.  A part of Hood's plan of action was
to sally from Atlanta at the same moment; but this sally was not, for
some reason, simultaneous, for the first attack on our extreme left
flank had been checked and repulsed before the sally came from the
direction of Atlanta. Meantime, Colonel Sprague, in Decatur, had got
his teams harnessed up, and safely conducted his train to the rear of
Schofield's position, holding in check Wheeler's cavalry till he had
got off all his trains, with the exception of three or four wagons.
I remained near the Howard House, receiving reports and sending
orders, urging Generals Thomas and Schofield to take advantage of the
absence from their front of so considerable a body as was evidently
engaged on our left, and, if possible, to make a lodgment in Atlanta
itself; but they reported that the lines to their front, at all
accessible points, were strong, by nature and by art, and were fully
manned.  About 4 p.m. the expected, sally came from Atlanta, directed
mainly against Leggett's Hill and along the Decatur road.  At
Leggett's Hill they were met and bloodily repulsed.  Along the
railroad they were more successful.  Sweeping over a small force with
two guns, they reached our main line, broke through it, and got
possession of De Gress's battery of four twenty-pound Parrotts,
killing every horse, and turning the guns against us.  General
Charles R. Wood's division of the Fifteenth Corps was on the extreme
right of the Army of the Tennessee, between the railroad and the
Howard House, where he connected with Schofield's troops.  He
reported to me in person that the line on his left had been swept
back, and that his connection with General Logan, on Leggett's Hill,
was broken.  I ordered him to wheel his brigades to the left, to
advance in echelon, and to catch the enemy in flank.  General
Schofield brought forward all his available batteries, to the number
of twenty guns, to a position to the left front of the Howard House,
whence we could overlook the field of action, and directed a heavy
fire over the heads of General Wood's men against the enemy; and we
saw Wood's troops advance and encounter the enemy, who had secured
possession of the old line of parapet which had been held by our men.
His right crossed this parapet, which he swept back, taking it in
flank; and, at the same time, the division which had been driven back
along the railroad was rallied by General Logan in person, and fought
for their former ground.  These combined forces drove the enemy into
Atlanta, recovering the twenty pound Parrott guns but one of them was
found "bursted" while in the possession of the enemy.  The two
six-pounders farther in advance were, however, lost, and had been
hauled back by the enemy into Atlanta.  Poor Captain de Gress came to
me in tears, lamenting the loss of his favorite guns; when they were
regained he had only a few men left, and not a single horse. He asked
an order for a reequipment, but I told him he must beg and borrow of
others till he could restore his battery, now reduced to three guns.
How he did so I do not know, but in a short time he did get horses,
men, and finally another gun, of the same special pattern, and served
them with splendid effect till the very close of the war.  This
battery had also been with me from Shiloh till that time.

The battle of July 22d is usually called the battle of Atlanta.  It
extended from the Howard House to General Giles A. Smith's
position, about a mile beyond the Augusta Railroad, and then back
toward Decatur, the whole extent of ground being fully seven miles.
In part the ground was clear and in part densely wooded.  I rode
over the whole of it the next day, and it bore the marks of a
bloody conflict.  The enemy had retired during the night inside of
Atlanta, and we remained masters of the situation outside.  I
purposely allowed the Army of the Tennessee to fight this battle
almost unaided, save by demonstrations on the part of General
Schofield and Thomas against the fortified lines to their immediate
fronts, and by detaching, as described, one of Schofield's brigades
to Decatur, because I knew that the attacking force could only be a
part of Hood's army, and that, if any assistance were rendered by
either of the other armies, the Army of the Tennessee would be
jealous.  Nobly did they do their work that day, and terrible was
the slaughter done to our enemy, though at sad cost to ourselves,
as shown by the following reports:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD NEAR ATLANTA, July 23,1864.

General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.

Yesterday morning the enemy fell back to the intrenchments proper
of the city of Atlanta, which are in a general circle, with a
radius of one and a half miles, and we closed in.  While we were
forming our lines, and selecting positions for our batteries, the
enemy appeared suddenly out of the dense woods in heavy masses on
our extreme left, and struck the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair)
in flank, and was forcing it back, when the Sixteenth Corps
(General Dodge) came up and checked the movement, but the enemy's
cavalry got well to our rear, and into Decatur, and for some hours
our left flank was completely enveloped.  The fight that resulted
was continuous until night, with heavy loss on both sides.  The
enemy took one of our batteries (Murray's, of the Regular Army)
that was marching in its place in column in the road, unconscious
of danger.  About 4 p.m. the enemy sallied against the division of
General Morgan L. Smith, of the Fifteenth Corps, which occupied an
abandoned line of rifle-trench near the railroad east of the city,
and forced it back some four hundred yards, leaving in his hands
for the time two batteries, but the ground and batteries were
immediately after recovered by the same troops reenforced.  I
cannot well approximate our loss, which fell heavily on the
Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, but count it as three thousand; I
know that, being on the defensive, we have inflicted equally heavy
loss on the enemy.

General McPherson, when arranging his troops about 11.00 A.M., and
passing from one column to another, incautiously rode upon an
ambuscade without apprehension, at some distance ahead of his staff
and orderlies, and was shot dead.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD NEAR ATLANTA, July 26,1864.

Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I find it difficult to make prompt report of results,
coupled with some data or information, without occasionally making
mistakes.  McPherson's sudden death, and Logan succeeding to the
command as it were in the midst of battle, made some confusion on
our extreme left; but it soon recovered and made sad havoc with the
enemy, who had practised one of his favorite games of attacking our
left when in motion, and before it had time to cover its weak
flank.  After riding over the ground and hearing the varying
statements of the actors, I directed General Logan to make an
official report of the actual result, and I herewith inclose it.

Though the number of dead rebels seems excessive, I am disposed to
give full credit to the report that our loss, though only
thirty-five hundred and twenty-one killed, wounded, and missing, the
enemy's dead alone on the field nearly equaled that number, viz.,
thirty-two hundred and twenty.  Happening at that point of the line
when a flag of truce was sent in to ask permission for each party to
bury its dead, I gave General Logan authority to permit a temporary
truce on that flank alone, while our labors and fighting proceeded at
all others.

I also send you a copy of General Garrard's report of the breaking
of the railroad toward Augusta.  I am now grouping my command to
attack the Macon road, and with that view will intrench a strong
line of circumvallation with flanks, so as to have as large an
infantry column as possible, with all the cavalry to swing round to
the south and east, to strike that road at or below East Point.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
BEFORE ATLANTA GEORGIA, July 24, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following general summary
of the result of the attack of the enemy on this army on the 22d
inst.

Total loss, killed, wounded, and missing, thirty-five hundred and
twenty-one, and ten pieces of artillery.

We have buried and delivered to the enemy, under a flag of truce
sent in by them, in front of the Third Division, Seventeenth Corps,
one thousand of their killed.

The number of their dead in front of the Fourth Division of the
same corps, including those on the ground not now occupied by our
troops, General Blair reports, will swell the number of their dead
on his front to two thousand.

The number of their dead buried in front of the Fifteenth Corps, up
to this hour, is three hundred and sixty, and the commanding
officer reports that at least as many more are yet unburied;
burying-parties being still at work.

The number of dead buried in front of the Sixteenth Corps is four
hundred and twenty-two.  We have over one thousand of their wounded
in our hands, the larger number of the wounded being carried off
during the night, after the engagement, by them.

We captured eighteen stands of colors, and have them now.  We also
captured five thousand stands of arms.

The attack was made on our lines seven times, and was seven times
repulsed.  Hood's and Hardee's corps and Wheeler's cavalry engaged
us.

We have sent to the rear one thousand prisoners, including
thirty-three commissioned officers of high rank.

We still occupy the field, and the troops are in fine spirits.  A
detailed and full report will be furnished as soon as completed.

Recapitulation.

Our total loss............................ 3,521
Enemy's dead, thus far reported, buried,
and delivered to them..................... 3,220
Total prisoners sent North................ 1,017
Total prisoners, wounded, in our hands.... 1,000
Estimated loss of the enemy, at least.... 10,000

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Joan A.  Logan, Major-General.


On the 22d of July General Rousseau reached Marietta, having
returned from his raid on the Alabama road at Opelika, and on the
next day General Garrard also returned from Covington, both having
been measurably successful.  The former was about twenty-five
hundred strong, the latter about four thousand, and both reported
that their horses were jaded and tired, needing shoes and rest.
But, about this time, I was advised by General Grant (then
investing Richmond) that the rebel Government had become aroused to
the critical condition of things about Atlanta, and that I must
look out for Hood being greatly reenforced.  I therefore was
resolved to push matters, and at once set about the original
purpose of transferring the whole of the Army of the Tennessee to
our right flank, leaving Schofield to stretch out so as to rest his
left on the Augusta road, then torn up for thirty miles eastward;
and, as auxiliary thereto, I ordered all the cavalry to be ready to
pass around Atlanta on both flanks, to break up the Macon road at
some point below, so as to cut off all supplies to the rebel army
inside, and thus to force it to evacuate, or come out and fight us
on equal terms.

But it first became necessary to settle the important question of
who should succeed General McPherson?  General Logan had taken
command of the Army of the Tennessee by virtue of his seniority,
and had done well; but I did not consider him equal to the command
of three corps.  Between him and General Blair there existed a
natural rivalry.  Both were men of great courage and talent, but
were politicians by nature and experience, and it may be that for
this reason they were mistrusted by regular officers like Generals
Schofield, Thomas, and myself.  It was all-important that there
should exist a perfect understanding among the army commanders, and
at a conference with General George H. Thomas at the headquarters
of General Thomas J. Woods, commanding a division in the Fourth
Corps, he (Thomas) remonstrated warmly against my recommending that
General Logan should be regularly assigned to the command of the
Army of the Tennessee by reason of his accidental seniority.  We
discussed fully the merits and qualities of every officer of high
rank in the army, and finally settled on Major-General O. O. Howard
as the best officer who was present and available for the purpose;
on the 24th of July I telegraphed to General Halleck this
preference, and it was promptly ratified by the President.  General
Howard's place in command of the Fourth Corps was filled by General
Stanley, one of his division commanders, on the recommendation of
General Thomas.  All these promotions happened to fall upon
West-Pointers, and doubtless Logan and Blair had some reason to
believe that we intended to monopolize the higher honors of the war
for the regular officers.  I remember well my own thoughts and
feelings at the time, and feel sure that I was not intentionally
partial to any class, I wanted to succeed in taking Atlanta, and
needed commanders who were purely and technically soldiers, men who
would obey orders and execute them promptly and on time; for I knew
that we would have to execute some most delicate manoeuvres,
requiring the utmost skill, nicety, and precision.  I believed that
General Howard would do all these faithfully and well, and I think
the result has justified my choice.  I regarded both Generals Logan
and Blair as "volunteers," that looked to personal fame and glory
as auxiliary and secondary to their political ambition, and not as
professional soldiers.

As soon as it was known that General Howard had been chosen to
command the Army of the Tennessee; General Hooker applied to
General Thomas to be relieved of the command of the Twentieth
Corps, and General Thomas forwarded his application to me approved
and heartily recommended.  I at once telegraphed to General
Halleck, recommending General Slocum (then at Vicksburg) to be his
successor, because Slocum had been displaced from the command of
his corps at the time when the Eleventh and Twelfth were united and
made the Twentieth.

General Hooker was offended because he was not chosen to succeed
McPherson; but his chances were not even considered; indeed, I had
never been satisfied with him since his affair at the Gulp House,
and had been more than once disposed to relieve him of his corps,
because of his repeated attempts to interfere with Generals
McPherson and Schofield.  I had known Hooker since 1836, and was
intimately associated with him in California, where we served
together on the staff of General Persifer F. Smith.  He had come to
us from the East with a high reputation as a "fighter," which he
had fully justified at Chattanooga and Peach-Tree Creek; at which
latter battle I complimented him on the field for special
gallantry, and afterward in official reports.  Still, I did feel a
sense of relief when he left us.  We were then two hundred and
fifty miles in advance of our base, dependent on a single line of
railroad for our daily food.  We had a bold, determined foe in our
immediate front, strongly intrenched, with communication open to
his rear for supplies and reenforcements, and every soldier
realized that we had plenty of hard fighting ahead, and that all
honors had to be fairly earned.

Until General Slocum joined (in the latter part of August), the
Twentieth Corps was commanded by General A. S. Williams, the senior
division commander present.  On the 25th of July the army,
therefore, stood thus: the Army of the Tennessee (General O. O.
Howard commanding) was on the left, pretty much on the same ground
it had occupied during the battle of the 22d, all ready to move
rapidly by the rear to the extreme right beyond Proctor's Creek;
the Army of the Ohio (General Schofield) was next in order, with
its left flank reaching the Augusta Railroad; next in order,
conforming closely with the rebel intrenchments of Atlanta, was
General Thomas's Army of the Cumberland, in the order of--the
Fourth Corps (Stanley's), the Twentieth Corps (Williams's), and the
Fourteenth Corps (Palmer's).  Palmer's right division (Jefferson C.
Davis's) was strongly refused along Proctor's Creek.  This line was
about five miles long, and was intrenched as against a sally about
as strong as was our enemy.  The cavalry was assembled in two
strong divisions; that of McCook (including the brigade of Harrison
which had been brought in from Opelika by General Rousseau)
numbered about thirty-five hundred effective cavalry, and was
posted to our right rear, at Turner's Ferry, where we had a good
pontoon-bridge; and to our left rear, at and about Decatur, were
the two cavalry divisions of Stoneman, twenty-five hundred, and
Garrard, four thousand, united for the time and occasion under the
command of Major-General George Stoneman, a cavalry-officer of high
repute.  My plan of action was to move the Army of the Tennessee to
the right rapidly and boldly against the railroad below Atlanta,
and at the same time to send all the cavalry around by the right
and left to make a lodgment on the Macon road about Jonesboro.

All the orders were given, and the morning of the 27th was fixed
for commencing the movement.  On the 26th I received from General
Stoneman a note asking permission (after having accomplished his
orders to break up the railroad at Jonesboro) to go on to Macon to
rescue our prisoners of war known to be held there, and then to
push on to Andersonville, where was the great depot of Union
prisoners, in which were penned at one time as many as twenty-three
thousand of our men, badly fed and harshly treated.  I wrote him an
answer consenting substantially to his proposition, only modifying
it by requiring him to send back General Garrard's division to its
position on our left flank after he had broken up the railroad at
Jonesboro.  Promptly, and on time, all got off, and General Dodge's
corps (the Sixteenth, of the Army of the Tennessee) reached its
position across Proctor's Creek the same evening, and early the
next morning (the 28th) Blair's corps (the Seventeenth) deployed on
his right, both corps covering their front with the usual parapet;
the Fifteenth Corps (General Logan's) came up that morning on the
right of Blair, strongly refused, and began to prepare the usual
cover.  As General Jeff. C. Davis's division was, as it were, left
out of line, I ordered it on the evening before to march down
toward Turner's Ferry, and then to take a road laid down on our
maps which led from there toward East Point, ready to engage any
enemy that might attack our general right flank, after the same
manner as had been done to the left flank on the 22d.

Personally on the morning of the 28th I followed the movement, and
rode to the extreme right, where we could hear some skirmishing and
an occasional cannon-shot.  As we approached the ground held by the
Fifteenth Corps, a cannon-ball passed over my shoulder and killed
the horse of an orderly behind; and seeing that this gun enfiladed
the road by which we were riding, we turned out of it and rode down
into a valley, where we left our horses and walked up to the hill
held by Morgan L. Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps.  Near a
house I met Generals Howard and Logan, who explained that there was
an intrenched battery to their front, with the appearance of a
strong infantry support.  I then walked up to the ridge, where I
found General Morgan L. Smith.  His men were deployed and engaged
in rolling logs and fence-rails, preparing a hasty cover.  From
this ridge we could overlook the open fields near a meeting-house
known as "Ezra Church," close by the Poor-House.  We could see the
fresh earth of a parapet covering some guns (that fired an
occasional shot), and there was also an appearance of activity
beyond.  General Smith was in the act of sending forward a regiment
from, his right flank to feel the position of the enemy, when I
explained to him and to Generals Logan and Howard that they must
look out for General Jeff. C. Davis's division, which was coming
up from the direction of Turner's Ferry.

As the skirmish-fire warmed up along the front of Blair's corps, as
well as along the Fifteenth Corps (Logan's), I became convinced
that Hood designed to attack this right flank, to prevent, if
possible, the extension of our line in that direction.  I regained
my horse, and rode rapidly back to see that Davis's division had
been dispatched as ordered.  I found General Davis in person, who
was unwell, and had sent his division that morning early, under the
command of his senior brigadier, Morgan; but, as I attached great
importance to the movement, he mounted his horse, and rode away to
overtake and to hurry forward the movement, so as to come up on the
left rear of the enemy, during the expected battle.

By this time the sound of cannon and musketry denoted a severe
battle as in progress, which began seriously at 11.30 a.m., and
ended substantially by 4 p.m.  It was a fierce attack by the enemy
on our extreme right flank, well posted and partially covered.  The
most authentic account of the battle is given by General Logan, who
commanded the Fifteenth Corps, in his official report to the
Adjutant-General of the Army of the Tennessee, thus:


HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS
BEFORE ATLANTA, GEORGIA, July 29, 1864

Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM T. CLARK, Assistant Adjutant-General,
Army of the Tennessee, present.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of orders, I
moved my command into position on the right of the Seventeenth
Corps, which was the extreme right of the army in the field, during
the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th; and, while advancing
in line of battle to a more favorable position, we were met by the
rebel infantry of Hardee's and Lee's corps, who made a determined
and desperate attack on us at 11 A.M. of the 28th (yesterday).

My lines were only protected by logs and rails, hastily thrown up
in front of them.

The first onset was received and checked, and the battle commenced
and lasted until about three o'clock in the evening.  During that
time six successive charges were made, which were six times
gallantly repulsed, each time with fearful loss to the enemy.

Later in the evening my lines were several times assaulted
vigorously, but each time with like result.  The worst of the
fighting occurred on General Harrow's and Morgan L. Smith's fronts,
which formed the centre and right of the corps.  The troops could
not have displayed greater courage, nor greater determination not
to give ground; had they shown less, they would have been driven
from their position.

Brigadier-Generals C. R. Woods, Harrow, and Morgan L. Smith,
division commanders, are entitled to equal credit for gallant
conduct and skill in repelling the assault.  My thanks are due to
Major-Generals Blair and Dodge for sending me reenforeements at a
time when they were much needed.  My losses were fifty killed, four
hundred and forty-nine wounded, and seventy-three missing:
aggregate, five hundred and seventy-two.

The division of General Harrow captured five battle-flags.  There
were about fifteen hundred or two thousand muskets left on the
ground. One hundred and six prisoners were captured, exclusive of
seventy-three wounded, who were sent to our hospital, and are being
cared for by our surgeons.  Five hundred and sixty-five rebels have
up to this time been buried, and about two hundred are supposed to
be yet unburied.  A large number of their wounded were undoubtedly
carried away in the night, as the enemy did not withdraw till near
daylight.  The enemy's loss could not have been less than six or
seven thousand men.  A more detailed report will hereafter be made.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

JOHN A.  LOGAN,
Major-General, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.


General Howard, in transmitting this report, added:

I wish to express my high gratification with the conduct of the
troops engaged.  I never saw better conduct in battle.  General
Logan, though ill and much worn out, was indefatigable, and the
success of the day is as much attributable to him as to any one
man.


This was, of coarse, the first fight in which General Howard had
commanded the Army of the Tennessee, and he evidently aimed to
reconcile General Logan in his disappointment, and to gain the
heart of his army, to which he was a stranger.  He very properly
left General Logan to fight his own corps, but exposed himself
freely; and, after the firing had ceased, in the afternoon he
walked the lines; the men, as reported to me, gathered about him in
the most affectionate way, and he at once gained their respect and
confidence.  To this fact I at the time attached much importance,
for it put me at ease as to the future conduct of that most
important army.

At no instant of time did I feel the least uneasiness about the
result on the 28th, but wanted to reap fuller results, hoping that
Davis's division would come up at the instant of defeat, and catch
the enemy in flank; but the woods were dense, the roads obscure,
and as usual this division got on the wrong road, and did not come
into position until about dark.  In like manner, I thought that
Hood had greatly weakened his main lines inside of Atlanta, and
accordingly sent repeated orders to Schofield and Thomas to make an
attempt to break in; but both reported that they found the parapets
very strong and full manned.

Our men were unusually encouraged by this day's work, for they
realized that we could compel Hood to come out from behind his
fortified lines to attack us at a disadvantage.  In conversation
with me, the soldiers of the Fifteenth Corps, with whom I was on
the most familiar terms, spoke of the affair of the 28th as the
easiest thing in the world; that, in fact, it was a common
slaughter of the enemy; they pointed out where the rebel lines had
been, and how they themselves had fired deliberately, had shot down
their antagonists, whose bodies still lay unburied, and marked
plainly their lines of battle, which must have halted within easy
musket-range of our men, who were partially protected by their
improvised line of logs and fence-rails.  All bore willing
testimony to the courage and spirit of the foe, who, though
repeatedly repulsed, came back with increased determination some
six or more times.

The next morning the Fifteenth Corps wheeled forward to the left
over the battle-field of the day before, and Davis's division still
farther prolonged the line, which reached nearly to the
ever-to-be-remembered "Sandtown road."

Then, by further thinning out Thomas's line, which was well
entrenched, I drew another division of Palmer's corps (Baird's)
around to the right, to further strengthen that flank.  I was
impatient to hear from the cavalry raid, then four days out, and
was watching for its effect, ready to make a bold push for the
possession of East Point.  General Garrard's division returned to
Decatur on the 31st, and reported that General Stoneman had posted
him at Flat Rock, while he (Stoneman) went on.  The month of July
therefore closed with our infantry line strongly entrenched, but
drawn out from the Augusta road on the left to the Sandtown road on
the right, a distance of full ten measured miles.

The enemy, though evidently somewhat intimidated by the results of
their defeats on the 22d and 28th, still presented a bold front at
all points, with fortified lines that defied a direct assault.  Our
railroad was done to the rear of our camps, Colonel W. P. Wright
having reconstructed the bridge across the Chattahoochee in six
days; and our garrisons and detachments to the rear had so
effectually guarded the railroad that the trains from Nashville
arrived daily, and our substantial wants were well supplied.

The month, though hot in the extreme, had been one of constant
conflict, without intermission, and on four several occasions
--viz., July 4th, 20th, 22d, and 28th--these affairs had amounted to
real battles, with casualty lists by the thousands.  Assuming the
correctness of the rebel surgeon Foard's report, on page 577 of
Johnston's "Narrative," commencing with July 4th and terminating
with July 31st, we have:

        Aggregate loss of the enemy......... 10,841

Our losses, as compiled from the official returns for July,
1864, are:
                     Killed and Missing.    Wounded.    Total.

Aggregate loss of July....... 3,804          5,915      9,719


In this table the column of "killed and missing" embraces the
prisoners that fell into the hands of the enemy, mostly lost in the
Seventeenth Corps, on the 22d of July, and does not embrace the
losses in the cavalry divisions of Garrard and McCook, which,
however, were small for July.  In all other respects the statement
is absolutely correct.  I am satisfied, however, that Surgeon Foard
could not have been in possession of data sufficiently accurate to
enable him to report the losses in actual battle of men who never
saw the hospital.  During the whole campaign I had rendered to me
tri-monthly statements of "effective strength," from which I
carefully eliminated the figures not essential for my conduct, so
that at all times I knew the exact fighting-strength of each corps,
division, and brigade, of the whole army, and also endeavored to
bear in mind our losses both on the several fields of battle and by
sickness, and well remember that I always estimated that during the
month of July we had inflicted heavier loss on the enemy than we
had sustained ourselves, and the above figures prove it
conclusively.  Before closing this chapter, I must record one or
two minor events that occurred about this time, that may prove of
interest.

On the 24th of July I received a dispatch from Inspector-General
James A. Hardie, then on duty at the War Department in Washington,
to the effect that Generals Osterhaus and Alvan P. Hovey had been
appointed major-generals.  Both of these had begun the campaign
with us in command of divisions, but had gone to the rear--the
former by reason of sickness, and the latter dissatisfied with
General Schofield and myself about the composition of his division
of the Twenty-third Corps.  Both were esteemed as first-class
officers, who had gained special distinction in the Vicksburg
campaign.  But up to that time, when the newspapers announced daily
promotions elsewhere, no prominent officers serving with me had
been advanced a peg, and I felt hurt.  I answered Hardie on the
25th, in a dispatch which has been made public, closing with this
language: "If the rear be the post of honor, then we had better all
change front on Washington."  To my amazement, in a few days I
received from President Lincoln himself an answer, in which he
caught me fairly.  I have not preserved a copy of that dispatch,
and suppose it was burned up in the Chicago fire; but it was
characteristic of Mr. Lincoln, and was dated the 26th or 27th day
of July, contained unequivocal expressions of respect for those who
were fighting hard and unselfishly, offering us a full share of the
honors and rewards of the war, and saying that, in the cases of
Hovey and Osterhaus, he was influenced mainly by the
recommendations of Generals Grant and Sherman.  On the 27th I
replied direct, apologizing somewhat for my message to General
Hardie, saying that I did not suppose such messages ever reached
him personally, explaining that General Grant's and Sherman's
recommendations for Hovey and Osterhaus had been made when the
events of the Vicksburg campaign were fresh with us, and that my
dispatch of the 25th to General Hardie had reflected chiefly the
feelings of the officers then present with me before Atlanta.  The
result of all this, however, was good, for another dispatch from
General Hardie, of the 28th, called on me to nominate eight
colonels for promotion as brigadier-generals.  I at once sent a
circular note to the army-commanders to nominate two colonels from
the Army of the Ohio and three from each of the others; and the
result was, that on the 29th of July I telegraphed the names of--

Colonel William Gross, Thirty-sixth Indiana; Colonel Charles C.
Walcutt, Forty-sixth Ohio; Colonel James W. Riley, One Hundred and
Fourth Ohio; Colonel L. P. Bradley, Fifty-first Illinois; Colonel
J. W. Sprague, Sixty-third Ohio; Colonel Joseph A. Cooper, Sixth
East Tennessee; Colonel John T. Croxton, Fourth Kentucky; Colonel
William W. Belknap, Fifteenth Iowa.  These were promptly appointed
brigadier-generals, were already in command of brigades or
divisions; and I doubt if eight promotions were ever made fairer,
or were more honestly earned, during the whole war.




CHAPTER XIX.

CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1864


The month of August opened hot and sultry, but our position before
Atlanta was healthy, with ample supply of wood, water, and
provisions.  The troops had become habituated to the slow and
steady progress of the siege; the skirmish-lines were held close up
to the enemy, were covered by rifle-trenches or logs, and kept up a
continuous clatter of musketry.  The mainlines were held farther
back, adapted to the shape of the ground, with muskets loaded and
stacked for instant use.  The field-batteries were in select
positions, covered by handsome parapets, and occasional shots from
them gave life and animation to the scene.  The men loitered about
the trenches carelessly, or busied themselves in constructing
ingenious huts out of the abundant timber, and seemed as snug,
comfortable, and happy, as though they were at home.  General
Schofield was still on the extreme left, Thomas in the centre, and
Howard on the right.  Two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps
(Baird's and Jeff.  C. Davis's) were detached to the right rear,
and held in reserve.

I thus awaited the effect of the cavalry movement against the
railroad about Jonesboro, and had heard from General Garrard that
Stoneman had gone on to Mason; during that day (August 1st) Colonel
Brownlow, of a Tennessee cavalry regiment, came in to Marietta from
General McCook, and reported that McCook's whole division had been
overwhelmed, defeated, and captured at Newnan.  Of course, I was
disturbed by this wild report, though I discredited it, but made
all possible preparations to strengthen our guards along the
railroad to the rear, on the theory that the force of cavalry which
had defeated McCook would at once be on the railroad about
Marietta.  At the same time Garrard was ordered to occupy the
trenches on our left, while Schofield's whole army moved to the
extreme right, and extended the line toward East Point.  Thomas was
also ordered still further to thin out his lines, so as to set free
the other division (Johnson's) of the Fourteenth Corps (Palmer's),
which was moved to the extreme right rear, and held in reserve
ready to make a bold push from that flank to secure a footing on
the Mason Railroad at or below East Point.

These changes were effected during the 2d and 3d days of August,
when General McCook came in and reported the actual results of his
cavalry expedition.  He had crossed the Chattahoochee River below
Campbellton, by his pontoon-bridge; had then marched rapidly across
to the Mason Railroad at Lovejoy's Station, where he had reason to
expect General Stoneman; but, not hearing of him, he set to work,
tore up two miles of track, burned two trains of cars, and cut away
five miles of telegraph-wire.  He also found the wagon-train
belonging to the rebel army in Atlanta, burned five hundred wagons,
killed eight hundred mules; and captured seventy-two officers and
three hundred and fifty men.  Finding his progress eastward, toward
McDonough, barred by a superior force, he turned back to Newnan,
where he found himself completely surrounded by infantry and
cavalry.  He had to drop his prisoners and fight his way out,
losing about six hundred men in killed and captured, and then
returned with the remainder to his position at Turner's Ferry.
This was bad enough, but not so bad as had been reported by Colonel
Brownlow.  Meantime, rumors came that General Stoneman was down
about Mason, on the east bank of the Ocmulgee.  On the 4th of
August Colonel Adams got to Marietta with his small brigade of nine
hundred men belonging to Stoneman's cavalry, reporting, as usual,
all the rest lost, and this was partially confirmed by a report
which came to me all the way round by General Grant's headquarters
before Richmond.  A few days afterward Colonel Capron also got in,
with another small brigade perfectly demoralized, and confirmed the
report that General Stoneman had covered the escape of these two
small brigades, himself standing with a reserve of seven hundred
men, with which he surrendered to a Colonel Iverson.  Thus another
of my cavalry divisions was badly damaged, and out of the fragments
we hastily reorganized three small divisions under
Brigadier-Generals Garrard, McCook, and Kilpatrick.

Stoneman had not obeyed his orders to attack the railroad first
before going to Macon and Andersonville, but had crossed the
Ocmulgee River high up near Covington, and had gone down that river
on the east bank.  He reached Clinton, and sent out detachments
which struck the railroad leading from Macon to Savannah at
Griswold Station, where they found and destroyed seventeen
locomotives and over a hundred cars; then went on and burned the
bridge across the Oconee, and reunited the division before Macon.
Stoneman shelled the town across the river, but could not cross
over by the bridge, and returned to Clinton, where he found his
retreat obstructed, as he supposed, by a superior force.  There he
became bewildered, and sacrificed himself for the safety of his
command.  He occupied the attention of his enemy by a small force
of seven hundred men, giving Colonels Adams and Capron leave, with
their brigades, to cut their way back to me at Atlanta.  The former
reached us entire, but the latter was struck and scattered at some
place farther north, and came in by detachments.  Stoneman
surrendered, and remained a prisoner until he was exchanged some
time after, late in September, at Rough and Ready.

I now became satisfied that cavalry could not, or would not, make a
sufficient lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, and that nothing
would suffice but for us to reach it with the main army.  Therefore
the most urgent efforts to that end were made, and to Schofield, on
the right, was committed the charge of this special object.  He had
his own corps (the Twenty-third), composed of eleven thousand and
seventy-five infantry and eight hundred and eighty-five artillery,
with McCook's broken division of cavalry, seventeen hundred and
fifty-four men and horses.  For this purpose I also placed the
Fourteenth Corps (Palmer) under his orders.  This corps numbered at
the time seventeen thousand two hundred and eighty-eight infantry
and eight hundred and twenty-six artillery; but General Palmer
claimed to rank General Schofield in the date of his commission as
major-general, and denied the latter's right to exercise command
over him.  General Palmer was a man of ability, but was not
enterprising.  His three divisions were compact and strong, well
commanded, admirable on the defensive, but slow to move or to act
on the offensive.  His corps (the Fourteenth) had sustained, up to
that time, fewer hard knocks than any other corps in the whole
army, and I was anxious to give it a chance.  I always expected to
have a desperate fight to get possession of the Macon road, which
was then the vital objective of the campaign.  Its possession by us
would, in my judgment, result in the capture of Atlanta, and give
us the fruits of victory, although the destruction of Hood's army
was the real object to be desired.  Yet Atlanta was known as the
"Gate-City of the South," was full of founderies, arsenals, and
machine-shops, and I knew that its capture would be the death-knell
of the Southern Confederacy.

On the 4th of August I ordered General Schofield to make a bold
attack on the railroad, anywhere about East Point, and ordered
General Palmer to report to him for duty.  He at once denied
General Schofield's right to command him; but, after examining the
dates of their respective commissions, and hearing their arguments,
I wrote to General Palmer.


August 4th.-10.45 p.m.

From the statements made by yourself and General Schofield to-day,
my decision is, that he ranks you as a major-general, being of the
same date of present commission, by reason of his previous superior
rank as brigadier-general.  The movements of to-morrow are so
important that the orders of the superior on that flank must be
regarded as military orders, and not in the nature of cooperation.
I did hope that there would be no necessity for my making this
decision; but it is better for all parties interested that no
question of rank should occur in actual battle.  The Sandtown road,
and the railroad, if possible, must be gained to-morrow, if it
costs half your command.  I regard the loss of time this afternoon
as equal to the loss of two thousand men.


I also communicated the substance of this to General Thomas, to
whose army Palmer's corps belonged, who replied on the 5th:


I regret to hear that Palmer has taken the course he has, and I
know that he intends to offer his resignation as soon as he can
properly do so.  I recommend that his application be granted.


And on the 5th I again wrote to General Palmer, arguing the point
with him, advising him, as a friend, not to resign at that crisis
lest his motives might be misconstrued, and because it might damage
his future career in civil life; but, at the same time, I felt it
my duty to say to him that the operations on that flank, during the
4th and 5th, had not been satisfactory--not imputing to him,
however, any want of energy or skill, but insisting that "the
events did not keep pace with my desires."  General Schofield had
reported to me that night:


I am compelled to acknowledge that I have totally failed to make
any aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps.  I have ordered
General Johnson's division to replace General Hascall's this
evening, and I propose to-morrow to take my own troops
(Twenty-third Corps) to the right, and try to recover what has been
lost by two days' delay.  The force may likely be too small.


I sanctioned the movement, and ordered two of Palmers divisions
--Davis's and Baird's--to follow en echelon in support of Schofield,
and summoned General Palmer to meet me in person: He came on the
6th to my headquarters, and insisted on his resignation being
accepted, for which formal act I referred him to General Thomas.
He then rode to General Thomas's camp, where he made a written
resignation of his office as commander of the Fourteenth Corps, and
was granted the usual leave of absence to go to his home in
Illinois, there to await further orders.  General Thomas
recommended that the resignation be accepted; that Johnson, the
senior division commander of the corps, should be ordered back to
Nashville as chief of cavalry, and that Brigadier-General Jefferson
C. Davis, the next in order, should be promoted major general, and
assigned to command the corps.  These changes had to be referred to
the President, in Washington, and were, in due time, approved and
executed; and thenceforward I had no reason to complain of the
slowness or inactivity of that splendid corps. It had been
originally formed by General George H. Thomas, had been commanded
by him in person, and had imbibed some what his personal character,
viz., steadiness, good order, and deliberation nothing hasty or
rash, but always safe, "slow, and sure."  On August 7th I
telegraphed to General Halleck:


Have received to-day the dispatches of the Secretary of War and of
General Grant, which are very satisfactory.  We keep hammering away
all the time, and there is no peace, inside or outside of Atlanta.
To-day General Schofield got round the line which was assaulted
yesterday by General Reilly's brigade, turned it and gained the
ground where the assault had been made, and got possession of all
our dead and wounded.  He continued to press on that flank, and
brought on a noisy but not a bloody battle.  He drove the enemy
behind his main breastworks, which cover the railroad from Atlanta
to East Point, and captured a good many of the skirmishers, who are
of his best troops--for the militia hug the breastworks close.  I
do not deem it prudent to extend any more to the right, but will
push forward daily by parallels, and make the inside of Atlanta too
hot to be endured.  I have sent back to Chattanooga for two
thirty-pound Parrotts, with which we can pick out almost any house in
town.  I am too impatient for a siege, and don't know but this is as
good a place to fight it out on, as farther inland.  One thing is
certain, whether we get inside of Atlanta or not, it will be a
used-up community when we are done with it.


In Schofield's extension on the 5th, General Reilly's brigade had
struck an outwork, which he promptly attacked, but, as usual, got
entangled in the trees and bushes which had been felled, and lost
about five hundred men, in killed and wounded; but, as above
reported, this outwork was found abandoned the next day, and we
could see from it that the rebels were extending their lines,
parallel with the railroad, about as fast as we could add to our
line of investment.  On the 10th of August the Parrott
thirty-pounders were received and placed in Position; for a couple
of days we kept up a sharp fire from all our batteries converging
on Atlanta, and at every available point we advanced our
infantry-lines, thereby shortening and strengthening the
investment; but I was not willing to order a direct assault, unless
some accident or positive neglect on the part of our antagonist
should reveal an opening.  However, it was manifest that no such
opening was intended by Hood, who felt secure behind his strong
defenses.  He had repelled our cavalry attacks on his railroad, and
had damaged us seriously thereby, so I expected that he would
attempt the same game against our rear.  Therefore I made
extraordinary exertions to recompose our cavalry divisions, which
were so essential, both for defense and offense.  Kilpatrick was
given that on our right rear, in support of Schofield's exposed
flank; Garrard retained that on our general left; and McCook's
division was held somewhat in reserve, about Marietta and the
railroad.  On the 10th, having occasion to telegraph to General
Grant, then in Washington, I used this language:


Since July 28th Hood has not attempted to meet us outside his
parapets.  In order to possess and destroy effectually his
communications, I may have to leave a corps at the railroad-bridge,
well intrenched, and cut loose with the balance to make a circle of
desolation around Atlanta.  I do not propose to assault the works,
which are too strong, nor to proceed by regular approaches.  I have
lost a good many regiments, and will lose more, by the expiration
of service; and this is the only reason why I want reenforcements.
We have killed, crippled, and captured more of the enemy than we
have lost by his acts.


On the 12th of August I heard of the success of Admiral Farragut in
entering Mobile Bay, which was regarded as a most valuable
auxiliary to our operations at Atlanta; and learned that I had been
commissioned a major-general in the regular army, which was
unexpected, and not desired until successful in the capture of
Atlanta.  These did not change the fact that we were held in check
by the stubborn defense of the place, and a conviction was forced
on my mind that our enemy would hold fast, even though every house
in the town should be battered down by our artillery.  It was
evident that we most decoy him out to fight us on something like
equal terms, or else, with the whole army, raise the siege and
attack his communications.  Accordingly, on the 13th of August, I
gave general orders for the Twentieth Corps to draw back to the
railroad-bridge at the Chattahoochee, to protect our trains,
hospitals, spare artillery, and the railroad-depot, while the rest
of the army should move bodily to some point on the Macon Railroad
below East Point.

Luckily, I learned just then that the enemy's cavalry, under
General Wheeler, had made a wide circuit around our left flank, and
had actually reached our railroad at Tilton Station, above Resaca,
captured a drove of one thousand of our beef-cattle, and was strong
enough to appear before Dalton, and demand of its commander,
Colonel Raum, the surrender of the place.  General John E. Smith,
who was at Kingston, collected together a couple of thousand men,
and proceeded in cars to the relief of Dalton when Wheeler
retreated northward toward Cleveland.  On the 16th another
detachment of the enemy's cavalry appeared in force about Allatoona
and the Etowah bridge, when I became fully convinced that Hood had
sent all of his cavalry to raid upon our railroads.  For some days
our communication with Nashville was interrupted by the destruction
of the telegraph-lines, as well as railroad.  I at once ordered
strong reconnoissances forward from our flanks on the left by
Garrard, and on the right by Kilpatrick.  The former moved with so
much caution that I was displeased; but Kilpatrick, on the
contrary, displayed so much zeal and activity that I was attracted
to him at once.  He reached Fairburn Station, on the West Point
road, and tore it up, returning safely to his position on our right
flank.  I summoned him to me, and was so pleased with his spirit
and confidence, that I concluded to suspend the general movement of
the main army, and to send him with his small division of cavalry
to break up the Macon road about Jonesboro, in the hopes that it
would force Hood to evacuate Atlanta, and that I should thereby not
only secure possession of the city itself, but probably could catch
Hood in the confusion of retreat; and, further to increase the
chances of success.

I ordered General Thomas to detach two brigades of Garrard's
division of cavalry from the left to the right rear, to act as a
reserve in support of General Kilpatrick.  Meantime, also, the
utmost activity was ordered along our whole front by the infantry
and artillery.  Kilpatrick got off during the night of the 18th,
and returned to us on the 22d, having made the complete circuit of
Atlanta.  He reported that he had destroyed three miles of the
railroad about Jonesboro, which he reckoned would take ten days to
repair; that he had encountered a division of infantry and a
brigade of cavalry (Ross's); that he had captured a battery and
destroyed three of its guns, bringing one in as a trophy, and he
also brought in three battle-flags and seventy prisoners.  On the
23d, however, we saw trains coming into Atlanta from the south,
when I became more than ever convinced that cavalry could not or
would not work hard enough to disable a railroad properly, and
therefore resolved at once to proceed to the execution of my
original plan.  Meantime, the damage done to our own railroad and
telegraph by Wheeler, about Resaca and Dalton, had been repaired,
and Wheeler himself was too far away to be of any service to his
own army, and where he could not do us much harm, viz., up about
the Hiawaesee.  On the 24th I rode down to the Chattahoochee
bridge, to see in person that it could be properly defended by the
single corps proposed to be left there for that purpose, and found
that the rebel works, which had been built by Johnston to resist
us, could be easily utilized against themselves; and on returning
to my camp, at   that same evening, I telegraphed to General
Halleck as follows:


Heavy fires in Atlanta all day, caused by our artillery.  I will be
all ready, and will commence the movement around Atlanta by the
south, tomorrow night, and for some time you will hear little of
us.  I will keep open a courier line back to the Chattahoochee
bridge, by way of Sandtown.  The Twentieth Corps will hold the
railroad-bridge, and I will move with the balance of the army,
provisioned for twenty days.


Meantime General Dodge (commanding the Sixteenth Corps) had been
wounded in the forehead, had gone to the rear, and his two
divisions were distributed to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps.
The real movement commenced on the 25th, at night.  The Twentieth
Corps drew back and took post at the railroad-bridge, and the
Fourth Corps (Stanley) moved to his right rear, closing up with the
Fourteenth Corps (Jeff. C. Davis) near Utoy Creek; at the same time
Garrard's cavalry, leaving their horses out of sight, occupied the
vacant trenches, so that the enemy did not detect the change at
all.  The next night (26th) the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps,
composing the Army of the Tennessee (Howard), drew out of their
trenches, made a wide circuit, and came up on the extreme right of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland
(Thomas) along Utoy Creek, facing south.  The enemy seemed to
suspect something that night, using his artillery pretty freely;
but I think he supposed we were going to retreat altogether.  An
artillery-shot, fired at random, killed one man and wounded
another, and the next morning some of his infantry came out of
Atlanta and found our camps abandoned.  It was afterward related
that there was great rejoicing in Atlanta "that the Yankees were
gone;" the fact was telegraphed all over the South, and several
trains of cars (with ladies) came up from Macon to assist in the
celebration of their grand victory.

On the 28th (making a general left-wheel, pivoting on Schofield)
both Thomas and Howard reached the West Point Railroad, extending
from East Point to Red-Oak Station and Fairburn, where we spent the
next day (29th) in breaking it up thoroughly.  The track was heaved
up in sections the length of a regiment, then separated rail by
rail; bonfires were made of the ties and of fence-rails on which
the rails were heated, carried to trees or telegraph-poles, wrapped
around and left to cool.  Such rails could not be used again; and,
to be still more certain, we filled up many deep cuts with trees,
brush, and earth, and commingled with them loaded shells, so
arranged that they would explode on an attempt to haul out the
bushes.  The explosion of one such shell would have demoralized a
gang of negroes, and thus would have prevented even the attempt to
clear the road.

Meantime Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, presented a bold
front toward East Point, daring and inviting the enemy to sally out
to attack him in position.  His first movement was on the 30th, to
Mount Gilead Church, then to Morrow's Mills, facing Rough and
Ready.  Thomas was on his right, within easy support, moving by
cross-roads from Red Oak to the Fayetteville road, extending from
Couch's to Renfrew's; and Howard was aiming for Jonesboro.

I was with General Thomas that day, which was hot but otherwise
very pleasant.  We stopped for a short noon-rest near a little
church (marked on our maps as Shoal-Creek Church), which stood back
about a hundred yards from the road, in a grove of native oaks.
The infantry column had halted in the road, stacked their arms, and
the men were scattered about--some lying in the shade of the trees,
and others were bringing corn-stalks from a large corn-field across
the road to feed our horses, while still others had arms full of
the roasting-ears, then in their prime.  Hundreds of fires were
soon started with the fence-rails, and the men were busy roasting
the ears.  Thomas and I were walking up and down the road which led
to the church, discussing the chances of the movement, which he
thought were extra-hazardous, and our path carried us by a fire at
which a soldier was roasting his corn.  The fire was built
artistically; the man was stripping the ears of their husks,
standing them in front of his fire, watching them carefully, and
turning each ear little by little, so as to roast it nicely.  He
was down on his knees intent on his business, paying little heed to
the stately and serious deliberations of his leaders.  Thomas's
mind was running on the fact that we had cut loose from our base of
supplies, and that seventy thousand men were then dependent for
their food on the chance supplies of the country (already
impoverished by the requisitions of the enemy), and on the contents
of our wagons.  Between Thomas and his men there existed a most
kindly relation, and he frequently talked with them in the most
familiar way.  Pausing awhile, and watching the operations of this
man roasting his corn, he said, "What are you doing?"  The man
looked up smilingly "Why, general, I am laying in a supply of
provisions."  "That is right, my man, but don't waste your
provisions."  As we resumed our walk, the man remarked, in a sort
of musing way, but loud enough for me to hear: "There he goes,
there goes the old man, economizing as usual."  "Economizing" with
corn, which cost only the labor of gathering and roasting!

As we walked, we could hear General Howard's guns at intervals,
away off to our right front, but an ominous silence continued
toward our left, where I was expecting at each moment to hear the
sound of battle.  That night we reached Renfrew's, and had reports
from left to right (from General Schofield, about Morrow's Mills,
to General Howard, within a couple of miles of Jonesboro).  The
next morning (August 31st) all moved straight for the railroad.
Schofield reached it near Rough and Ready, and Thomas at two points
between there and Jonesboro.  Howard found an intrenched foe
(Hardee's corps) covering Jonesboro, and his men began at once to
dig their accustomed rifle-pits.  Orders were sent to Generals
Thomas and Schofield to turn straight for Jonesboro, tearing up the
railroad-track as they advanced.  About 3.00 p.m.  the enemy
sallied from Jonesboro against the Fifteenth corps, but was easily
repulsed, and driven back within his lines.  All hands were kept
busy tearing up the railroad, and it was not until toward evening
of the 1st day of September that the Fourteenth Corps (Davis)
closed down on the north front of Jonesboro, connecting on his
right with Howard, and his left reaching the railroad, along which
General Stanley was moving, followed by Schofield.  General Davis
formed his divisions in line about 4 p.m., swept forward over some
old cotton-fields in full view, and went over the rebel parapet
handsomely, capturing the whole of Govan's brigade, with two
field-batteries of ten guns.  Being on the spot, I checked Davis's
movement, and ordered General Howard to send the two divisions of
the Seventeenth Corps (Blair) round by his right rear, to get below
Jonesboro, and to reach the railroad, so as to cut off retreat in
that direction.  I also dispatched orders after orders to hurry
forward Stanley, so as to lap around Jonesboro on the east, hoping
thus to capture the whole of Hardee's corps.  I sent first Captain
Audenried (aide-de-camp), then Colonel Poe, of the Engineers, and
lastly General Thomas himself (and that is the only time during the
campaign I can recall seeing General Thomas urge his horse into a
gallop).  Night was approaching, and the country on the farther
side of the railroad was densely wooded.  General Stanley had come
up on the left of Davis, and was deploying, though there could not
have been on his front more than a skirmish-line.  Had he moved
straight on by the flank, or by a slight circuit to his left, he
would have inclosed the whole ground occupied by Hardee's corps,
and that corps could not have escaped us; but night came on, and
Hardee did escape.

Meantime General Slocum had reached his corps (the Twentieth),
stationed at the Chattahoochee bridge, had relieved General A. S.
Williams in command, and orders had been sent back to him to feel
forward occasionally toward Atlanta, to observe the effect when we
had reached the railroad.  That night I was so restless and
impatient that I could not sleep, and about midnight there arose
toward Atlanta sounds of shells exploding, and other sound like
that of musketry.  I walked to the house of a farmer close by my
bivouac, called him out to listen to the reverberations which came
from the direction of Atlanta (twenty miles to the north of us),
and inquired of him if he had resided there long.  He said he had,
and that these sounds were just like those of a battle.  An
interval of quiet then ensued, when again, about 4 a.m., arose
other similar explosions, but I still remained in doubt whether the
enemy was engaged in blowing up his own magazines, or whether
General Slocum had not felt forward, and become engaged in a real
battle.

The next morning General Hardee was gone, and we all pushed forward
along the railroad south, in close pursuit, till we ran up against
his lines at a point just above Lovejoy's Station.  While bringing
forward troops and feeling the new position of our adversary,
rumors came from the rear that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, and
that General Slocum was in the city.  Later in the day I received a
note in Slocum's own handwriting, stating that he had heard during
the night the very sounds that I have referred to; that he had
moved rapidly up from the bridge about daylight, and had entered
Atlanta unopposed.  His letter was dated inside the city, so there
was no doubt of the fact.  General Thomas's bivouac was but a short
distance from mine, and, before giving notice to the army in
general orders, I sent one of my staff-officers to show him the
note.  In a few minutes the officer returned, soon followed by
Thomas himself, who again examined the note, so as to be perfectly
certain that it was genuine.  The news seemed to him too good to be
true.  He snapped his fingers, whistled, and almost danced, and, as
the news spread to the army, the shouts that arose from our men,
the wild hallooing and glorious laughter, were to us a full
recompense for the labor and toils and hardships through which we
had passed in the previous three months.

A courier-line was at once organized, messages were sent back and
forth from our camp at Lovejoy's to Atlanta, and to our
telegraph-station at the Chattahoochee bridge.  Of course, the glad
tidings flew on the wings of electricity to all parts of the North,
where the people had patiently awaited news of their husbands, sons,
and brothers, away down in "Dixie Land;" and congratulations came
pouring back full of good-will and patriotism.  This victory was most
opportune; Mr. Lincoln himself told me afterward that even he had
previously felt in doubt, for the summer was fast passing away; that
General Grant seemed to be checkmated about Richmond and Petersburg,
and my army seemed to have run up against an impassable barrier,
when, suddenly and unexpectedly, came the news that "Atlanta was
ours, and fairly won."  On this text many a fine speech was made, but
none more eloquent than that by Edward Everett, in Boston.  A
presidential election then agitated the North.  Mr. Lincoln
represented the national cause, and General McClellan had accepted
the nomination of the Democratic party, whose platform was that the
war was a failure, and that it was better to allow the South to go
free to establish a separate government, whose corner-stone should be
slavery.  Success to our arms at that instant was therefore a
political necessity; and it was all-important that something
startling in our interest should occur before the election in
November.  The brilliant success at Atlanta filled that requirement,
and made the election of Mr. Lincoln certain.  Among the many letters
of congratulation received, those of Mr. Lincoln and General Grant
seem most important:


EXECUTIVE MANSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. September 3, 1864.

The national thanks are rendered by the President to Major-General
W. T. Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of his command
before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability and perseverance
displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine favor,
has resulted in the capture of Atlanta.  The marches, battles,
sieges, and other military operations, that have signalized the
campaign, must render it famous in the annals of war, and have
entitled those who have participated therein to the applause and
thanks of the nation.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN
President of the United States


CITY POINT VIRGINIA, September 4, 1864-9 P.M.

Major-General SHERMAN:
I have just received your dispatch announcing the capture of
Atlanta.  In honor of your great victory, I have ordered a salute
to be fired with shotted guns from every battery bearing upon the
enemy.  The salute will be fired within an hour, amid great
rejoicing.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


These dispatches were communicated to the army in general orders,
and we all felt duly encouraged and elated by the praise of those
competent to bestow it.

The army still remained where the news of success had first found
us, viz., Lovejoy's; but, after due refection, I resolved not to
attempt at that time a further pursuit of Hood's army, but slowly
and deliberately to move back, occupy Atlanta, enjoy a short period
of rest, and to think well over the next step required in the
progress of events.  Orders for this movement were made on the 5th
September, and three days were given for each army to reach the
place assigned it, viz.: the Army of the Cumberland in and about
Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee at East Point; and the Army of
the Ohio at Decatur.

Personally I rode back to Jonesboro on the 6th, and there inspected
the rebel hospital, full of wounded officers and men left by Hardee
in his retreat.  The next night we stopped at Rough and Ready, and
on the 8th of September we rode into Atlanta, then occupied by the
Twentieth Corps (General Slocum).  In the Court-House Square was
encamped a brigade, embracing the Massachusetts Second and
Thirty-third Regiments, which had two of the finest bands of the
army, and their music was to us all a source of infinite pleasure
during our sojourn in that city.  I took up my headquarters in the
house of Judge Lyons, which stood opposite one corner of the
Court-House Square, and at once set about a measure already ordered,
of which I had thought much and long, viz., to remove the entire
civil population, and to deny to all civilians from the rear the
expected profits of civil trade.  Hundreds of sutlers and traders
were waiting at Nashville and Chattanooga, greedy to reach Atlanta
with their wares and goods, with, which to drive a profitable trade
with the inhabitants.  I gave positive orders that none of these
traders, except three (one for each separate army), should be
permitted to come nearer than Chattanooga; and, moreover, I
peremptorily required that all the citizens and families resident in
Atlanta should go away, giving to each the option to go south or
north, as their interests or feelings dictated.  I was resolved to
make Atlanta a pure military garrison or depot, with no civil
population to influence military measures.  I had seen Memphis,
Vicksburg, Natchez, and New Orleans, all captured from the enemy, and
each at once was garrisoned by a full division of troops, if not
more; so that success was actually crippling our armies in the field
by detachments to guard and protect the interests of a hostile
population.

I gave notice of this purpose, as early as the 4th of September, to
General Halleck, in a letter concluding with these words:

If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will
answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking.  If they want
peace, they and their relatives most stop the war.

I knew, of course, that such a measure would be strongly
criticised, but made up my mind to do it with the absolute
certainty of its justness, and that time would sanction its wisdom.
I knew that the people of the South would read in this measure two
important conclusions: one, that we were in earnest; and the other,
if they were sincere in their common and popular clamor "to die in
the last ditch," that the opportunity would soon come.

Soon after our reaching Atlanta, General Hood had sent in by a flag
of truce a proposition, offering a general exchange of prisoners,
saying that he was authorized to make such an exchange by the
Richmond authorities, out of the vast number of our men then held
captive at Andersonville, the same whom General Stoneman had hoped
to rescue at the time of his raid.  Some of these prisoners had
already escaped and got in, had described the pitiable condition of
the remainder, and, although I felt a sympathy for their hardships
and sufferings as deeply as any man could, yet as nearly all the
prisoners who had been captured by us during the campaign had been
sent, as fast as taken, to the usual depots North, they were then
beyond my control.  There were still about two thousand, mostly
captured at Jonesboro, who had been sent back by cars, but had not
passed Chattanooga.  These I ordered back, and offered General Hood
to exchange them for Stoneman, Buell, and such of my own army as
would make up the equivalent; but I would not exchange for his
prisoners generally, because I knew these would have to be sent to
their own regiments, away from my army, whereas all we could give
him could at once be put to duty in his immediate army.  Quite an
angry correspondence grew up between us, which was published at the
time in the newspapers, but it is not to be found in any book of
which I have present knowledge, and therefore is given here, as
illustrative of the events referred to, and of the feelings of the
actors in the game of war at that particular crisis, together with
certain other original letters of Generals Grant and Halleck, never
hitherto published.


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 12, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi

GENERAL: I send Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, of my staff, with
this.  Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of
affairs here, better than I can do in the limits of a letter.
Although I feel myself strong enough now for offensive operations,
I am holding on quietly, to get advantage of recruits and
convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly.  My lines are
necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom, north of the
James, across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James,
and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon road.  This line is very
strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men;
but, from its great length, necessarily takes many in the
aggregate.  I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to
control what is known as the Southside, or Lynchburg & Petersburg
road; then, if possible, to keep the Danville road out.  At the
same time this move is made, I want to send a force of from six to
ten thousand men against Wilmington.  The way I propose to do this
is to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point.  At
the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the
iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile.  This will
give us the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now
have of the harbor of Mobile.  What you are to do with the forces
at your command, I do not exactly see.  The difficulties of
supplying your army, except when they are constantly moving beyond
where you are, I plainly see.  If it had not been for Price's
movement, Canby could have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile.
From your command on the Mississippi, an equal number could have
been taken.  With these forces, my idea would have been to divide
them, sending one-half to Mobile, and the other half to Savannah.
You could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten
Macon and Augusta equally.  Whichever one should be abandoned by
the enemy, you could take and open up a new base of supplies.  My
object now in sending a staff-officer to you is not so much to
suggest operations for you as to get your views, and to have plans
matured by the time every thing can be got ready.  It would
probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans here
indicated will be executed.  If you have any promotions to
recommend, send the names forward, and I will approve them.

In conclusion, it is hardly necessary for me to say that I feel you
have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any
general in this war, and with a skill and ability that will be
acknowledged in history as unsurpassed, if not unequaled.  It gives
me as much pleasure to record this in your favor as it world in
favor of any living man, myself included.
Truly yours,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 20, 1864.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point,
Virgina

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge, at the hands of
Lieutenant  Colonel Porter, of your staff, your letter of September
12th, and accept with thanks the honorable and kindly mention
of the services of this army in the great cause in which we are all
engaged.

I send by Colonel Porter all official reports which are completed,
and will in a few days submit a list of names which are deemed
worthy of promotion.

I think we owe it to the President to save him the invidious task
of selection among the vast number of worthy applicants, and have
ordered my army commanders to prepare their lists with great care,
and to express their preferences, based upon claims of actual
capacity and services rendered.

These I will consolidate, and submit in such a form that, if
mistakes are made, they will at least be sanctioned by the best
contemporaneous evidence of merit, for I know that vacancies do not
exist equal in number to that of the officers who really deserve
promotion.

As to the future, I am pleased to know that your army is being
steadily reinforced by a good class of men, and I hope it will go
on until you have a force that is numerically double that of your
antagonist, so that with one part you can watch him, and with the
other push out boldly from your left flank, occupy the Southside
Railroad, compel him to attack you in position, or accept battle on
your own terms.

We ought to ask our country for the largest possible armies that
can be raised, as so important a thing as the self-existence of a
great nation should not be left to the fickle chances of war.

Now that Mobile is shut out to the commerce of our enemy, it calls
for no further effort on our part, unless the capture of the city
can be followed by the occupation of the Alabama River and the
railroad to Columbus, Georgia, when that place would be a
magnificent auxiliary to my further progress into Georgia; but,
until General Canby is much reinforced, and until he can more
thoroughly subdue the scattered armies west of the Mississippi, I
suppose that much cannot be attempted by him against the Alabama
River and Columbus, Georgia.

The utter destruction of Wilmington, North Carolina, is of
importance only in connection with the necessity of cutting off all
foreign trade to our enemy, and if Admiral Farragut can get across
the bar, and move quickly, I suppose he will succeed.  From my
knowledge of the mouth of Cape Fear River, I anticipate more
difficulty in getting the heavy ships across the bar than in
reaching the town of Wilmington; but, of course, the soundings of
the channel are well known at Washington, as well as the draught of
his iron-clads, so that it must be demonstrated to be feasible, or
else it would not be attempted.  If successful, I suppose that Fort
Caswell will be occupied, and the fleet at once sent to the
Savannah River.  Then the reduction of that city is the next
question.  It once in our possession, and the river open to us, I
would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with sixty
thousand men, hauling some stores, and depending on the country for
the balance.  Where a million of people find subsistence, my army
won't starve; but, as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few
roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force can so delay an
army and harass it, that it would not be a formidable object; but
if the enemy knew that we had our boats in the Savannah River I
could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of
corn and meat, and could so threaten Macon and Augusta that the
enemy world doubtless give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move
so as to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to
give us Augusta, with the only powder-mills and factories remaining
in the South, or let us have the use of the Savannah River.  Either
horn of the dilemma will be worth a battle.  I would prefer his
holding Augusta (as the probabilities are); for then, with the
Savannah River in our possession, the taking of Augusta would be a
mere matter of time.  This campaign can be made in the winter.

But the more I study the game, the more am I convinced that it
would be wrong for us to penetrate farther into Georgia without an
objective beyond.  It would not be productive of much good.  I can
start east and make a circuit south and back, doing vast damage to
the State, but resulting in no permanent good; and by mere
threatening to do so, I hold a rod over the Georgians, who are not
over-loyal to the South.  I will therefore give it as my opinion
that your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the maximum;
that, after you get Wilmington, you should strike for Savannah and
its river; that General Canby should hold the Mississippi River,
and send a force to take Columbus, Georgia, either by way of the
Alabama or Appalachicola River; that I should keep Hood employed
and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and
Charleston; and start as soon as Wilmington is sealed to commerce,
and the city of Savannah is in our possession.

I think it will be found that the movements of Price and Shelby,
west of the Mississippi, are mere diversions.  They cannot hope to
enter Missouri except as raiders; and the truth is, that General
Rosecrans should be ashamed to take my troops for such a purpose.
If you will secure Wilmington and the city of Savannah from your
centre, and let General Canby leave command over the Mississippi
River and country west of it, I will send a force to the Alabama
and Appalachicola, provided you give me one hundred thousand of the
drafted men to fill up my old regiments; and if you will fix a day
to be in Savannah, I will insure our possession of Macon and a
point on the river below Augusta.  The possession of the Savannah
River is more than fatal to the possibility of Southern
independence.  They may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all
Georgia.

I will have a long talk with Colonel Porter, and tell him every
thing that may occur to me of interest to you.

In the mean time, know that I admire your dogged perseverance and
pluck more than ever.  If you can whip Lee and I can march to the
Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave of
absence to see the young folks.

Yours as ever,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, September 16, 1864.

General W. T. SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

My DEAR GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 4th is just
received.  Its perusal has given me the greatest pleasure.  I have
not written before to congratulate you on the capture of Atlanta,
the objective point of your brilliant campaign, for the reason that
I have been suffering from my annual attack of "coryza," or
hay-cold.  It affects my eyes so much that I can scarcely see to
write.  As you suppose, I have watched your movements most
attentively and critically, and I do not hesitate to say that your
campaign has been the most brilliant of the war.  Its results are
less striking and less complete than those of General Grant at
Vicksburg, but then you have had greater difficulties to encounter,
a longer line of communications to keep up, and a longer and more
continuous strain upon yourself and upon your army.

You must have been very considerably annoyed by the State negro
recruiting-agents.  Your letter was a capital one, and did much
good.  The law was a ridiculous one; it was opposed by the War
Department, but passed through the influence of Eastern
manufacturers, who hoped to escape the draft in that way.  They
were making immense fortunes out of the war, and could well afford
to purchase negro recruits, and thus save their employees at home.

I fully agree with you in regard to the policy of a stringent
draft; but, unfortunately, political influences are against us, and
I fear it will not amount to much.  Mr. Seward's speech at Auburn,
again prophesying, for the twentieth time, that the rebellion would
be crushed in a few months, and saying that there would be no
draft, as we now had enough soldiers to end the war, etc., has done
much harm, in a military point of view.  I have seen enough of
politics here to last me for life.  You are right in avoiding them.
McClellan may possibly reach the White House, but he will lose the
respect of all honest, high-minded patriots, by his affiliation
with such traitors and Copperheads as B---, V---, W---, S---, & Co.
He would not stand upon the traitorous Chicago platform, but he had
not the manliness to oppose it.  A major-general in the United
States Army, and yet not one word to utter against rebels or the
rebellion!  I had much respect for McClellan before he became a
politician, but very little after reading his letter accepting the
nomination.

Hooker certainly made a mistake in leaving before the capture of
Atlanta.  I understand that, when here, he said that you would
fail; your army was discouraged and dissatisfied, etc., etc.  He is
most unmeasured in his abuse of me.  I inclose you a specimen of
what he publishes in Northern papers, wherever he goes.  They are
dictated by himself and written by W. B.  and such worthies.  The
funny part of the business is, that I had nothing whatever to do
with his being relieved on either occasion.  Moreover, I have never
said any thing to the President or Secretary of War to injure him
in the slightest degree, and he knows that perfectly well.  His
animosity arises from another source.  He is aware that I know some
things about his character and conduct in California, and, fearing
that I may use that information against him, he seeks to ward off
its effect by making it appear that I am his personal enemy, am
jealous of him, etc.  I know of no other reason for his hostility
to me.  He is welcome to abuse me as much as he pleases; I don't
think it will do him much good, or me much harm.  I know very
little of General Howard, but believe him to be a true, honorable
man.  Thomas is also a noble old war-horse.  It is true, as you
say, that he is slow, but he is always sure.

I have not seen General Grant since the fall of Atlanta, and do not
know what instructions he has sent you.  I fear that Canby has not
the means to do much by way of Mobile.  The military effects of
Banks's disaster are now showing themselves by the threatened
operations of Price & Co. toward Missouri, thus keeping in check
our armies west of the Mississippi.

With many thanks for your kind letter, and wishes for your future
success, yours truly,

H. W.  HALLECK.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 20, 1864.

Major General HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington D.C.

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to submit copies of a
correspondence between General Hood, of the Confederate Army, the
Mayor of Atlanta, and myself, touching the removal of the
inhabitants of Atlanta.

In explanation of the tone which marks some of these letters, I
will only call your attention to the fact that, after I had
announced my determination, General Hood took upon himself to
question my motives.  I could not tamely submit to such
impertinence; and I have also seen that, in violation of all
official usage, he has published in the Macon newspapers such parts
of the correspondence as suited his purpose.  This could have had
no other object than to create a feeling on the part of the people;
but if he expects to resort to such artifices, I think I can meet
him there too.

It is sufficient for my Government to know that the removal of the
inhabitants has been made with liberality and fairness, that it has
been attended with no force, and that no women or children have
suffered, unless for want of provisions by their natural protectors
and friends.

My real reasons for this step were:

We want all the houses of Atlanta for military storage and
occupation.

We want to contract the lines of defense, so as to diminish the
garrison to the limit necessary to defend its narrow and vital
parts, instead of embracing, as the lines now do, the vast suburbs.
This contraction of the lines, with the necessary citadels and
redoubts, will make it necessary to destroy the very houses used by
families as residences.

Atlanta is a fortified town, was stubbornly defended, and fairly
captured.  As captors, we have a right to it.

The residence here of a poor population would compel us, sooner or
later, to feed them or to see them starve under our eyes.

The residence here of the families of our enemies would be a
temptation and a means to keep up a correspondence dangerous and
hurtful to our cause; a civil population calls for provost-guards,
and absorbs the attention of officers in listening to everlasting
complaints and special grievances that are not military.

These are my reasons; and, if satisfactory to the Government of the
United States, it makes no difference whether it pleases General
Hood and his people or not.  I am, with respect, your obedient
servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 7, 1864.

General HOOD, commanding Confederate Army.

GENERAL: I have deemed it to the interest of the United States that
the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove, those who
prefer it to go south, and the rest north.  For the latter I can
provide food and transportation to points of their election in
Tennessee, Kentucky, or farther north.  For the former I can
provide transportation by cars as far as Rough and Ready, and also
wagons; but, that their removal may be made with as little
discomfort as possible, it will be necessary for you to help the
families from Rough and Ready to the care at Lovejoy's.  If you
consent, I will undertake to remove all the families in Atlanta who
prefer to go south to Rough and Ready, with all their movable
effects, viz., clothing, trunks, reasonable furniture, bedding,
etc., with their servants, white and black, with the proviso that
no force shall be used toward the blacks, one way or the other.  If
they want to go with their masters or mistresses, they may do so;
otherwise they will be sent away, unless they be men, when they may
be employed by our quartermaster.  Atlanta is no place for families
or non-combatants, and I have no desire to send them north if you
will assist in conveying them south.  If this proposition meets
your views, I will consent to a truce in the neighborhood of Rough
and Ready, stipulating that any wagons, horses, animals, or persons
sent there for the purposes herein stated, shall in no manner be
harmed or molested; you in your turn agreeing that any care,
wagons, or carriages, persons or animals sent to the same point,
shall not be interfered with.  Each of us might send a guard of,
say, one hundred men, to maintain order, and limit the truce to,
say, two days after a certain time appointed.

I have authorized the mayor to choose two citizens to convey to you
this letter, with such documents as the mayor may forward in
explanation, and shall await your reply.  I have the honor to be
your obedient servant.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


Major General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding United States Forces in
Georgia

GENERAL: Your letter of yesterday's date, borne by James M. Ball
and James R. Crew, citizens of Atlanta, is received.  You say
therein, "I deem it to be to the interest of the United States that
the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove," etc.  I do not
consider that I have any alternative in this matter.  I therefore
accept your proposition to declare a truce of two days, or such
time as may be necessary to accomplish the purpose mentioned, and
shall render all assistance in my power to expedite the
transportation of citizens in this direction.  I suggest that a
staff-officer be appointed by you to superintend the removal from
the city to Rough and Ready, while I appoint a like officer to
control their removal farther south; that a guard of one hundred
men be sent by either party as you propose, to maintain order at
that place, and that the removal begin on Monday next.

And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you
propose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever
before brought to my attention in the dark history of war.

In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you will
find that you are expelling from their homes and firesides the
wives and children of a brave people.  I am, general, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, General.


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 10, 1864.

General J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of Tennessee, Confederate Army.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
of this date, at the hands of Messrs.  Ball and Crew, consenting to
the arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the removal south of
the people of Atlanta, who prefer to go in that direction.  I
inclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied,
accomplish my purpose perfectly.

You style the measures proposed "unprecedented," and appeal to the
dark history of war for a parallel, as an act of "studied and
ingenious cruelty."  It is not unprecedented; for General Johnston
himself very wisely and properly removed the families all the way
from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should be
excepted.  Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark history of
war, when recent and modern examples are so handy.  You yourself
burned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-day
fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable because they
stood in the way of your forts and men.  You defended Atlanta on a
line so close to town that every cannon-shot and many musket-shots
from our line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into
the habitations of women and children.  General Hardee did the same
at Jonesboro, and General Johnston did the same, last summer, at
Jackson, Mississippi.  I have not accused you of heartless cruelty,
but merely instance these cases of very recent occurrence, and
could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any
fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the
families of a "brave people."

I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove
them now, at once, from scenes that women and children should not
be exposed to, and the "brave people" should scorn to commit their
wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say,
violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of its dark
history.

In the name of common-sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just God
in such a sacrilegious manner.  You who, in the midst of peace and
prosperity, have plunged a nation into war--dark and cruel war--who
dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our
arsenals and forts that were left in the honorable custody of
peaceful ordnance-sergeants, seized and made "prisoners of war" the
very garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes and
Indians, long before any overt act was committed by the (to you)
hated Lincoln Government; tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into
rebellion, spite of themselves; falsified the vote of Louisiana;
turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expelled
Union families by the thousands, burned their houses, and declared,
by an act of your Congress, the confiscation of all debts due
Northern men for goods had and received!  Talk thus to the marines,
but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this day
make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the
best-born Southerner among you! If we must be enemies, let us be
men, and fight it out as we propose to do, and not deal in arch
hypocritical appeals to God and humanity.  God will judge us in due
time, and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with
a town full of women and the families of a brave people at our back
or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own
friends and people.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
September 12, 1864

Major-General W. T, SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.


GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
of the 9th inst., with its inclosure in reference to the women,
children, and others, whom you have thought proper to expel from
their homes in the city of Atlanta.  Had you seen proper to let the
matter rest there, I would gladly have allowed your letter to close
this correspondence, and, without your expressing it in words,
would have been willing to believe that, while "the interests of
the United States," in your opinion, compelled you to an act of
barbarous cruelty, you regretted the necessity, and we would have
dropped the subject; but you have chosen to indulge in statements
which I feel compelled to notice, at least so far as to signify my
dissent, and not allow silence in regard to them to be construed as
acquiescence.

I see nothing in your communication which induces me to modify the
language of condemnation with which I characterized your order.  It
but strengthens me in the opinion that it stands "preeminent in the
dark history of war for studied and ingenious cruelty."  Your
original order was stripped of all pretenses; you announced the
edict for the sole reason that it was "to the interest of the
United States."  This alone you offered to us and the civilized
world as an all-sufficient reason for disregarding the laws of God
and man.  You say that "General Johnston himself very wisely and
properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down."  It is
due to that gallant soldier and gentleman to say that no act of his
distinguished career gives the least color to your unfounded
aspersions upon his conduct.  He depopulated no villages, nor
towns, nor cities, either friendly or hostile.  He offered and
extended friendly aid to his unfortunate fellow-citizens who
desired to flee from your fraternal embraces.  You are equally
unfortunate in your attempt to find a justification for this act of
cruelty, either in the defense of Jonesboro, by General Hardee, or
of Atlanta, by myself.  General Hardee defended his position in
front of Jonesboro at the expense of injury to the houses; an
ordinary, proper, and justifiable act of war.  I defended Atlanta
at the same risk and cost. If there was any fault in either case,
it was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case of
Atlanta, of your purpose to shell the town, which is usual in war
among civilized nations.  No inhabitant was expelled from his home
and fireside by the orders of General Hardee or myself, and
therefore your recent order can find no support from the conduct of
either of us.  I feel no other emotion other than pain in reading
that portion of your letter which attempts to justify your shelling
Atlanta without notice under pretense that I defended Atlanta upon
a line so close to town that every cannon-shot and many
musket-balls from your line of investment, that overshot their mark,
went into the habitations of women and children.  I made no complaint
of your firing into Atlanta in any way you thought proper.  I make
none now, but there are a hundred thousand witnesses that you fired
into the habitations of women and children for weeks, firing far
above and miles beyond my line of defense.  I have too good an
opinion, founded both upon observation and experience, of the skill
of your artillerists, to credit the insinuation that they for several
weeks unintentionally fired too high for my modest field-works, and
slaughtered women and children by accident and want of skill.

The residue of your letter is rather discussion.  It opens a wide
field for the discussion of questions which I do not feel are
committed to me.  I am only a general of one of the armies of the
Confederate States, charged with military operations in the field,
under the direction of my superior officers, and I am not called
upon to discuss with you the causes of the present war, or the
political questions which led to or resulted from it.  These grave
and important questions have been committed to far abler hands than
mine, and I shall only refer to them so far as to repel any unjust
conclusion which might be drawn from my silence.  You charge my
country with "daring and badgering you to battle."  The truth is,
we sent commissioners to you, respectfully offering a peaceful
separation, before the first gun was fired on either aide.  You say
we insulted your flag.  The truth is, we fired upon it, and those
who fought under it, when you came to our doors upon the mission of
subjugation.  You say we seized upon your forts and arsenals, and
made prisoners of the garrisons sent to protect us against negroes
and Indians.  The truth is, we, by force of arms, drove out
insolent intruders and took possession of our own forts and
arsenals, to resist your claims to dominion over masters, slaves,
and Indians, all of whom are to this day, with a unanimity
unexampled in the history of the world, warring against your
attempts to become their masters.  You say that we tried to force
Missouri and Kentucky into rebellion in spite of themselves.  The
truth is, my Government, from the beginning of this struggle to
this hour, has again and again offered, before the whole world, to
leave it to the unbiased will of these States, and all others, to
determine for themselves whether they will cast their destiny with
your Government or ours; and your Government has resisted this
fundamental principle of free institutions with the bayonet, and
labors daily, by force and fraud, to fasten its hateful tyranny
upon the unfortunate freemen of these States.  You say we falsified
the vote of Louisiana.  The truth is, Louisiana not only separated
herself from your Government by nearly a unanimous vote of her
people, but has vindicated the act upon every battle-field from
Gettysburg to the Sabine, and has exhibited an heroic devotion to
her decision which challenges the admiration and respect of every
man capable of feeling sympathy for the oppressed or admiration for
heroic valor.  You say that we turned loose pirates to plunder your
unarmed ships.  The truth is, when you robbed us of our part of the
navy, we built and bought a few vessels, hoisted the flag of our
country, and swept the seas, in defiance of your navy, around the
whole circumference of the globe.  You say we have expelled Union
families by thousands.  The truth is, not a single family has been
expelled from the Confederate States, that I am aware of; but, on
the contrary, the moderation of our Government toward traitors has
been a fruitful theme of denunciation by its enemies and
well-meaning friends of our cause.  You say my Government, by acts
of Congress, has confiscated "all debts due Northern men for goods
sold and delivered."  The truth is, our Congress gave due and ample
time to your merchants and traders to depart from our shores with
their ships, goods, and effects, and only sequestrated the property
of our enemies in retaliation for their acts--declaring us
traitors, and confiscating our property wherever their power
extended, either in their country or our own.  Such are your
accusations, and such are the facts known of all men to be true.

You order into exile the whole population of a city; drive men,
women and children from their homes at the point of the bayonet,
under the plea that it is to the interest of your Government, and
on the claim that it is "an act of kindness to these families of
Atlanta."  Butler only banished from New Orleans the registered
enemies of his Government, and acknowledged that he did it as a
punishment.  You issue a sweeping edict, covering all the
inhabitants of a city, and add insult to the injury heaped upon the
defenseless by assuming that you have done them a kindness.  This
you follow by the assertion that you will "make as much sacrifice
for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner."
And, because I characterize what you call as kindness as being real
cruelty, you presume to sit in judgment between me and my God; and
you decide that my earnest prayer to the Almighty Father to save
our women and children from what you call kindness, is a
"sacrilegious, hypocritical appeal."

You came into our country with your army, avowedly for the purpose
of subjugating free white men, women, and children, and not only
intend to rule over them, but you make negroes your allies, and
desire to place over us an inferior race, which we have raised from
barbarism to its present position, which is the highest ever
attained by that race, in any country, in all time.  I must,
therefore, decline to accept your statements in reference to your
kindness toward the people of Atlanta, and your willingness to
sacrifice every thing for the peace and honor of the South, and
refuse to be governed by your decision in regard to matters between
myself, my country, and my God.

You say, "Let us fight it out like men."  To this my reply is--for
myself, and I believe for all the free men, ay, and women and
children, in my country--we will fight you to the death!  Better
die a thousand deaths than submit to live under you or your
Government and your negro allies!

Having answered the points forced upon me by your letter of the 9th
of September, I close this correspondence with you; and,
notwithstanding your comments upon my appeal to God in the cause of
humanity, I again humbly and reverently invoke his almighty aid in
defense of justice and right. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, General.


ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 11, 1864
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN.

Sir: We the undersigned, Mayor and two of the Council for the city
of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people
of the said city, to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most
earnestly but respectfully to petition you to reconsider the order
requiring them to leave Atlanta.

At first view, it struck us that the measure world involve
extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the
practical execution of it so far as it has progressed, and the
individual condition of the people, and heard their statements as
to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attending it, we are
satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the aggregate
consequences appalling and heart-rending.

Many poor women are in advanced state of pregnancy, others now
having young children, and whose husbands for the greater part are
either in the army, prisoners, or dead.  Some say: "I have such a
one sick at my house; who will wait on them when I am gone?"
Others say: "What are we to do? We have no house to go to, and no
means to buy, build, or rent any; no parents, relatives, or
friends, to go to."  Another says: "I will try and take this or
that article of property, but such and such things I must leave
behind, though I need them much."  We reply to them: "General
Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready, and General
Hood will take it thence on."  And they will reply to that: "But I
want to leave the railroad at such a place, and cannot get
conveyance from there on."

We only refer to a few facts, to try to illustrate in part how this
measure will operate in practice.  As you advanced, the people
north of this fell back; and before your arrival here, a large
portion of the people had retired south, so that the country south
of this is already crowded, and without houses enough to
accommodate the people, and we are informed that many are now
staying in churches and other out-buildings.

This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly
women and children) to find any shelter?  And how can they live
through the winter in the woods--no shelter or subsistence, in the
midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to
assist them much, if they were willing to do so?

This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure.
You know the woe, the horrors, and the suffering, cannot be
described by words; imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask
you to take these things into consideration.

We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the duties
of your command, which almost deters us from asking your attention
to this matter, but thought it might be that you had not considered
this subject in all of its awful consequences, and that on more
reflection you, we hope, would not make this people an exception to
all mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred
--surely never in the United States--and what has this helpless
people done, that they should be driven from their homes, to wander
strangers and outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity?

We do not know as yet the number of people still here; of those who
are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed to
remain at home, could subsist for several months without
assistance, and a respectable number for a much longer time, and
who might not need assistance at any time.

In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to
reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate
people to remain at home, and enjoy what little means they have.
Respectfully submitted
JAMES M.  CALHOUN, Mayor.
E.  E.  RAWSON, Councilman.
S.  C.  Warns, Councilman.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 12, 1864.

JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor, E. E. RAWSON and S. C. Wares, representing
City Council of Atlanta.

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a
petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from
Atlanta.  I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your
statements of the distress that will be occasioned, and yet shall
not revoke my orders, because they were not designed to meet the
humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in
which millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep
interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all
America.  To secure this, we must stop the war that now desolates
our once happy and favored country.  To stop war, we must defeat
the rebel armies which are arrayed against the laws and
Constitution that all must respect and obey.  To defeat those
armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses,
provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to
accomplish our purpose.  Now, I know the vindictive nature of our
enemy, that we may have many years of military operations from this
quarter; and, therefore, deem it wise and prudent to prepare in
time.  The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with
its character as a home for families.  There will be no
manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here, for the maintenance of
families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to
go.  Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed for
the transfer,--instead of waiting till the plunging shot of
contending armies will renew the scenes of the past months.  Of
course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you
do not suppose this army will be here until the war is over.  I
cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot
impart to you what we propose to do, but I assert that our military
plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can
only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any
direction as easy and comfortable as possible.

You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will.  War is
cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into
our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can
pour out.  I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I
will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace.
But you cannot have peace and a division of our country.  If the
United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will
go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war.  The
United States does and must assert its authority, wherever it once
had power; for, if it relaxes one bit to pressure, it is gone, and
I believe that such is the national feeling.  This feeling assumes
various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union.  Once admit
the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the national
Government, and, instead of devoting your houses and streets and
roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army become at once your
protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come
from what quarter it may.  I know that a few individuals cannot
resist a torrent of error and passion, such as swept the South into
rebellion, but you can point out, so that we may know those who
desire a government, and those who insist on war and its
desolation.

You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these
terrible hardships of war.  They are inevitable, and the only way
the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet
at home, is to stop the war, which can only be done by admitting
that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride.

We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your
lands, or any thing you have, but we do want and will have a just
obedience to the laws of the United States.  That we will have,
and, if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot
help it.

You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that
live by falsehood and excitement; and the quicker you seek for
truth in other quarters, the better.  I repeat then that, by the
original compact of Government, the United States had certain
rights in Georgia, which have never been relinquished and never
will be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals,
mints, custom-houses, etc., etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was
installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of
provocation.  I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee,
and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children
fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding
feet.  In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands
upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands,
and whom we could not see starve.  Now that war comes home to you;
you feel very different.  You deprecate its horrors, but did not
feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and
moulded shells and shot, to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee,
to desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people who
only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the
Government of their inheritance.  But these comparisons are idle.
I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through union and
war, and I will ever conduct war with a view to perfect and early
success.

But, my dear sirs, when peace does come, you may call on me for any
thing.  Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with
you to shield your homes and families against danger from every
quarter.

Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed and
nurse them, and build for them, in more quiet places, proper
habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad
passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more
to settle over your old homes at Atlanta.  Yours in haste,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.



HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 14, 1864.

General J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of the Tennessee, Confederate
Army.

GENERAL: Yours of September 12th is received, and has been
carefully perused.  I agree with you that this discussion by two
soldiers is out of place, and profitless; but you must admit that
you began the controversy by characterizing an official act of mine
in unfair and improper terms.  I reiterate my former answer, and to
the only new matter contained in your rejoinder add: We have no
"negro allies" in this army; not a single negro soldier left
Chattanooga with this army, or is with it now.  There are a few
guarding Chattanooga, which General Steedman sent at one time to
drive Wheeler out of Dalton.

I was not bound by the laws of war to give notice of the shelling
of Atlanta, a "fortified town, with magazines, arsenals,
founderies, and public stores;" you were bound to take notice.  See
the books.

This is the conclusion of our correspondence, which I did not
begin, and terminate with satisfaction.  I am, with respect, your
obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, September 28, 1864,

Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

GENERAL: Your communications of the 20th in regard to the removal
of families from Atlanta, and the exchange of prisoners, and also
the official report of your campaign, are just received.  I have
not had time as yet to examine your report.  The course which you
have pursued in removing rebel families from Atlanta, and in the
exchange of prisoners, is fully approved by the War Department.
Not only are you justified by the laws and usages of war in
removing these people, but I think it was your duty to your own
army to do so.  Moreover, I am fully of opinion that the nature of
your position, the character of the war, the conduct of the enemy
(and especially of non-combatants and women of the territory which
we have heretofore conquered and occupied), will justify you in
gathering up all the forage and provisions which your army may
require, both for a siege of Atlanta and for your supply in your
march farther into the enemy's country.  Let the disloyal families
of the country, thus stripped, go to their husbands, fathers, and
natural protectors, in the rebel ranks; we have tried three years
of conciliation and kindness without any reciprocation; on the
contrary, those thus treated have acted as spies and guerrillas in
our rear and within our lines.  The safety of our armies, and a
proper regard for the lives of our soldiers, require that we apply
to our inexorable foes the severe rules of war.  We certainly are
not required to treat the so-called non-combatant rebels better
than they themselves treat each other.  Even herein Virginia,
within fifty miles of Washington, they strip their own families of
provisions, leaving them, as our army advances, to be fed by us, or
to starve within our lines.  We have fed this class of people long
enough.  Let them go with their husbands and fathers in the rebel
ranks; and if they won't go, we must send them to their friends and
natural protectors.  I would destroy every mill and factory within
reach which I did not want for my own use.  This the rebels have
done, not only in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but also in Virginia
and other rebel States, when compelled to fall back before our
armies.  In many sections of the country they have not left a mill
to grind grain for their own suffering families, lest we might use
them to supply our armies.  We most do the same.

I have endeavored to impress these views upon our commanders for
the last two years.  You are almost the only one who has properly
applied them.  I do not approve of General Hunter's course in
burning private homes or uselessly destroying private property.
That is barbarous.  But I approve of taking or destroying whatever
may serve as supplies to us or to the enemy's army.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief of Staff


In order to effect the exchange of prisoners, to facilitate the
exodus of the people of Atlanta, and to keep open communication
with the South, we established a neutral camp, at and about the
railroad-station next south of Atlanta, known as "Rough and Ready,"
to which point I dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Willard Warner, of
my staff, with a guard of one hundred men, and General Hood sent
Colonel Clare, of his staff, with a similar guard; these officers
and men harmonized perfectly, and parted good friends when their
work was done.  In the mean time I also had reconnoitred the entire
rebel lines about Atlanta, which were well built, but were entirely
too extensive to be held by a single corps or division of troops,
so I instructed Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, on my staff,
to lay off an inner and shorter line, susceptible of defense by a
smaller garrison.

By the middle of September all these matters were in progress, the
reports of the past campaign were written up and dispatched to
Washington, and our thoughts began to turn toward the future.
Admiral Farragut had boldly and successfully run the forts at the
entrance to Mobile Bay, which resulted in the capture of Fort
Morgan, so that General Canby was enabled to begin his regular
operations against Mobile City, with a view to open the Alabama
River to navigation.  My first thoughts were to concert operations
with him, either by way of Montgomery, Alabama, or by the
Appalachicula; but so long a line, to be used as a base for further
operations eastward, was not advisable, and I concluded to await
the initiative of the enemy, supposing that he would be forced to
resort to some desperate campaign by the clamor raised at the South
on account of the great loss to them of the city of Atlanta.

General Thomas occupied a house on Marietta Streets which had a
veranda with high pillars.  We were sitting there one evening,
talking about things generally, when General Thomas asked leave to
send his trains back to Chattanooga, for the convenience and
economy of forage.  I inquired of him if he supposed we would be
allowed much rest at Atlanta, and he said he thought we would, or
that at all events it would not be prudent for us to go much
farther into Georgia because of our already long line of
communication, viz., three hundred miles from Nashville.  This was
true; but there we were, and we could not afford to remain on the
defensive, simply holding Atlanta and fighting for the safety of
its railroad.  I insisted on his retaining all trains, and on
keeping all his divisions ready to move at a moment's warning.  All
the army, officers and men, seemed to relax more or less, and sink
into a condition of idleness.  General Schofield was permitted to
go to Knoxville, to look after matters in his Department of the
Ohio; and Generals Blair and Logan went home to look after
politics.  Many of the regiments were entitled to, and claimed,
their discharge, by reason of the expiration of their term of
service; so that with victory and success came also many causes of
disintegration.

The rebel General Wheeler was still in Middle Tennessee,
threatening our railroads, and rumors came that Forrest was on his
way from Mississippi to the same theatre, for the avowed purpose of
breaking up our railroads and compelling us to fall back from our
conquest. To prepare for this, or any other emergency, I ordered
Newton's division of the Fourth Corps back to Chattanooga, and
Corse's division of the Seventeenth Corps to Rome, and instructed
General Rousseau at Nashville, Granger at Decatur, and Steadman at
Chattanooga, to adopt the most active measures to protect and
insure the safety of our roads.

Hood still remained about Lovejoy's Station, and, up to the 15th of
September, had given no signs of his future plans; so that with
this date I close the campaign of Atlanta, with the following
review of our relative losses during the months of August and
September, with a summary of those for the whole campaign,
beginning May 6 and ending September 15, 1864.  The losses for
August and September are added together, so as to include those
about Jonesboro:


                       Killed and Missing    Wounded    Total
        Grand Aggregate..... 1,408             3,731    5,139



Hood's losses, as reported for the same period, page 577,
Johnston's "Narrative:"

                         Killed             Wounded     Total
                           482               3,223      3,705

To which should be added:

       Prisoners captured by us:............ 3,738

       Giving his total loss ............... 7,440


On recapitulating the entire losses of each army during the entire
campaign, from May to September, inclusive, we have, in the Union
army, as per table appended:

Killed ........................  4,423
Wounded ....................... 22,822
Missing........................  4,442
       Aggregate Loss ......... 31,627


In the Southern army, according to the reports of Surgeon Foard
(pp.  576, 577, Johnston's "Narrative ")

        Total killed ................  3,044
        Total killed and wounded..... 21,996
        Prisoners captured by us .... 12,983

        Aggregate loss to the
             Southern Army .......... 34,979


The foregoing figures are official, and are very nearly correct.  I
see no room for error save in the cavalry, which was very much
scattered, and whose reports are much less reliable than of the
infantry and artillery; but as Surgeon Foard's tables do not
embrace Wheeler's, Jackson's, and Martin's divisions of cavalry, I
infer that the comparison, as to cavalry losses, is a "stand-off."

I have no doubt that the Southern officers flattered themselves
that they had filled and crippled of us two and even six to one, as
stated by Johnston; but they were simply mistaken, and I herewith
submit official tabular statements made up from the archives of the
War Department, in proof thereof.


I have also had a careful tabular statement compiled from official
records in the adjutant-general's office, giving the "effective
strength" of the army under my command for each of the months of
May, June, July, August, and September, 1864, which enumerate every
man (infantry, artillery, and cavalry) for duty.  The
recapitulation clearly exhibits the actual truth.  We opened the
campaign with 98,797 (ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and
ninety-seven) men.  Blair's two divisions joined us early in June,
giving 112,819 (one hundred and twelve thousand eight hundred and
nineteen), which number gradually became reduced to 106,070 (one
hundred and six thousand and seventy men), 91,675 (ninety-one
thousand six hundred and seventy-five), and 81,758 (eighty-one
thousand seven hundred and fifty-eight) at the end of the campaign.
This gradual reduction was not altogether owing to death and
wounds, but to the expiration of service, or by detachments sent to
points at the rear.




CHAPTER XX

ATLANTA AND AFTER--PURSUIT OF HOOD.

SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1864.


By the middle of September, matters and things had settled down in
Atlanta, so that we felt perfectly at home.  The telegraph and
railroads were repaired, and we had uninterrupted communication to
the rear.  The trains arrived with regularity and dispatch, and
brought us ample supplies.  General Wheeler had been driven out of
Middle Tennessee, escaping south across the Tennessee River at
Bainbridge; and things looked as though we were to have a period of
repose.

One day, two citizens, Messrs. Hill and Foster, came into our lines
at Decatur, and were sent to my headquarters.  They represented
themselves as former members of Congress, and particular friends of
my brother John Sherman; that Mr. Hill had a son killed in the
rebel army as it fell back before us somewhere near Cassville, and
they wanted to obtain the body, having learned from a comrade where
it was buried.  I gave them permission to go by rail to the rear,
with a note to the commanding officer, General John E. Smith, at
Cartersville, requiring him to furnish them an escort and an
ambulance for the purpose.  I invited them to take dinner with our
mess, and we naturally ran into a general conversation about
politics and the devastation and ruin caused by the war.  They had
seen a part of the country over which the army had passed, and
could easily apply its measure of desolation to the remainder of
the State, if necessity should compel us to go ahead.

Mr. Hill resided at Madison, on the main road to Augusta, and
seemed to realize fully the danger; said that further resistance on
the part of the South was madness, that he hoped Governor Brown, of
Georgia, would so proclaim it, and withdraw his people from the
rebellion, in pursuance of what was known as the policy of
"separate State action."  I told him, if he saw Governor Brown, to
describe to him fully what he had seen, and to say that if he
remained inert, I would be compelled to go ahead, devastating the
State in its whole length and breadth; that there was no adequate
force to stop us, etc.; but if he would issue his proclamation
withdrawing his State troops from the armies of the Confederacy, I
would spare the State, and in our passage across it confine the
troops to the main roads, and would, moreover, pay for all the corn
and food we needed.  I also told Mr. Hill that he might, in my
name, invite Governor Brown to visit Atlanta; that I would give him
a safeguard, and that if he wanted to make a speech, I would
guarantee him as full and respectable an audience as any he had
ever spoken to.  I believe that Mr. Hill, after reaching his home
at Madison, went to Milledgeville, the capital of the State, and
delivered the message to Governor Brown.  I had also sent similar
messages by Judge Wright of Rome, Georgia, and by Mr. King, of
Marietta.  On the 15th of September I telegraphed to General
Halleck as follows:


My report is done, and will be forwarded as soon as I get in a few
more of the subordinate reports.  I am awaiting a courier from
General Grant.  All well; the troops are in good, healthy camps,
and supplies are coming forward finely.  Governor Brown has
disbanded his militia, to gather the corn and sorghum of the State.
I have reason to believe that he and Stephens want to visit me, and
have sent them hearty invitation.  I will exchange two thousand
prisoners with Hood, but no more.


Governor Brown's action at that time is fully explained by the
following letter, since made public, which was then only known to
us in part by hearsay:


EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA, September 10, 1864

General J. B. HOOD, commanding army of Tennessee.

GENERAL: As the militia of the State were called out for the
defense of Atlanta during the campaign against it, which has
terminated by the fall of the city into the hands of the enemy, and
as many of these left their homes without preparation (expecting to
be gone but a few weeks), who have remained in service over three
months (most of the time in the trenches), justice requires that
they be permitted, while the enemy are preparing for the winter
campaign, to return to their homes, and look for a time after
important interests, and prepare themselves for such service as may
be required when another campaign commences against other important
points in the State.  I therefore hereby withdraw said organization
from your command .  .  .  .

JOSEPH C. BROWN


This militia had composed a division under command of Major-General
Gustavus W.  Smith, and were thus dispersed to their homes, to
gather the corn and sorghum, then ripe and ready for the
harvesters.

On the 17th I received by telegraph from President Lincoln this
dispatch:


WASHINGTON, D.C., September 17, 1864

Major-General SHERMAN:

I feel great interest in the subjects of your dispatch, mentioning
corn and sorghum, and the contemplated visit to you.

A. LINCOLN, President of the United States.


I replied at once:


HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 17, 1864.

President LINCOLN, Washington., D. C.:

I will keep the department fully advised of all developments
connected with the subject in which you feel interested.


Mr. Wright, former member of Congress from Rome, Georgia, and Mr.
King, of Marietta, are now going between Governor Brown and myself.
I have said to them that some of the people of Georgia are engaged
in rebellion, began in error and perpetuated in pride, but that
Georgia can now save herself from the devastations of war preparing
for her, only by withdrawing her quota out of the Confederate Army,
and aiding me to expel Hood from the borders of the State; in which
event, instead of desolating the land as we progress, I will keep
our men to the high-roads and commons, and pay for the corn and
meat we need and take.

I am fully conscious of the delicate nature of such assertions, but
it would be a magnificent stroke of policy if we could, without
surrendering principle or a foot of ground, arouse the latent
enmity of Georgia against Davis.

The people do not hesitate to say that Mr. Stephens was and is a
Union man at heart; and they say that Davis will not trust him or
let him have a share in his Government.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


I have not the least doubt that Governor Brown, at that time,
seriously entertained the proposition; but he hardly felt ready to
act, and simply gave a furlough to the militia, and called a
special session of the Legislature, to meet at Milledgeville, to
take into consideration the critical condition of affairs in the
State.

On the 20th of September Colonel Horace Porter arrived from General
Grant, at City Point, bringing me the letter of September 12th,
asking my general views as to what should next be done.  He staid
several days at Atlanta, and on his return carried back to
Washington my full reports of the past campaign, and my letter of
September 20th to General Grant in answer to his of the 12th.

About this time we detected signs of activity on the part of the
enemy.  On the 21st Hood shifted his army across from the Mason
road, at Lovejoy's, to the West Point road, at Palmetto Station,
and his cavalry appeared on the west side of the Chattahoochee,
toward Powder Springs; thus, as it were, stepping aside, and
opening wide the door for us to enter Central Georgia.  I inferred,
however, that his real purpose was to assume the offensive against
our railroads, and on the 24th a heavy force of cavalry from
Mississippi, under General Forrest, made its appearance at Athena,
Alabama, and captured its garrison.

General Newton's division (of the Fourth Corps), and Corse's (of
the Seventeenth), were sent back by rail, the former to
Chattanooga, and the latter to Rome.  On the 25th I telegraphed to
General Halleck:

Hood seems to be moving, as it were, to the Alabama line, leaving
open the road to Mason, as also to Augusta; but his cavalry is busy
on all our roads.  A force, number estimated as high as eight
thousand, are reported to have captured Athena, Alabama; and a
regiment of three hundred and fifty men sent to its relief.  I have
sent Newton's division up to Chattanooga in cars, and will send
another division to Rome.  If I were sure that Savannah would soon
be in our possession, I should be tempted to march for
Milledgeville and Augusta; but I must first secure what I have.
Jeff. Davis is at Macon.

On the next day I telegraphed further that Jeff. Davis was with
Hood at Palmetto Station.  One of our spies was there at the time,
who came in the next night, and reported to me the substance of his
speech to the soldiers.  It was a repetition of those he had made
at Colombia, South Carolina, and Mason, Georgia, on his way out,
which I had seen in the newspapers.  Davis seemed to be perfectly
upset by the fall of Atlanta, and to have lost all sense and
reason.  He denounced General Jos. Johnston and Governor Brown as
little better than traitors; attributed to them personally the many
misfortunes which had befallen their cause, and informed the
soldiers that now the tables were to be turned; that General
Forrest was already on our roads in Middle Tennessee; and that
Hood's army would soon be there.  He asserted that the Yankee army
would have to retreat or starve, and that the retreat would prove
more disastrous than was that of Napoleon from Moscow.  He promised
his Tennessee and Kentucky soldiers that their feet should soon
tread their "native soil," etc., etc.  He made no concealment of
these vainglorious boasts, and thus gave us the full key to his
future designs.  To be forewarned was to be forearmed, and I think
we took full advantage of the occasion.

On the 26th I received this dispatch.


CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,September 26,1864-10 a.m.

Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta
It will be better to drive Forrest out of Middle Tennessee as a
first step, and do any thing else you may feel your force
sufficient for.  When a movement is made on any part of the
sea-coast, I will advise you.  If Hood goes to the Alabama line,
will it not be impossible for him to subsist his army?
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Answer:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 26, 1864.

GENERAL: I have your dispatch of to-day. I have already sent one
division (Newton's) to Chattanooga, and another (Corse's) to Rome.

Our armies are much reduced, and if I send back any more, I will
not be able to threaten Georgia much.  There are men enough to the
rear to whip Forrest, but they are necessarily scattered to defend
the roads.

Can you expedite the sending to Nashville of the recruits that are
in Indiana and Ohio? They could occupy the forts.

Hood is now on the West Point road, twenty-four miles south of
this, and draws his supplies by that road.  Jefferson Davis is
there to-day, and superhuman efforts will be made to break my road.

Forrest is now lieutenant-general, and commands all the enemy's
cavalry.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


General Grant first thought I was in error in supposing that Jeff.
Davis was at Macon and Palmetto, but on the 27th I received a
printed copy of his speech made at Macon on the 22d, which was so
significant that I ordered it to be telegraphed entire as far as
Louisville, to be sent thence by mail to Washington, and on the
same day received this dispatch:


WASHINGTON, D. C., September 27, 1864-9 a.m.
Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta:
You say Jeff Davis is on a visit to General Hood.  I judge that
Brown and Stephens are the objects of his visit.
A. LINCOLN, President of the United States.

To which I replied:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 28, 1864.

President LINCOLN, Washington, D. C.:

I have positive knowledge that Mr. Davis made a speech at Macon, on
the 22d, which I mailed to General Halleck yesterday.  It was
bitter against General Jos. Johnston and Governor Brown.  The
militia are on furlough.  Brown is at Milledgeville, trying to get
a Legislature to meet next month, but he is afraid to act unless in
concert with other Governors, Judge Wright, of Rome, has been here,
and Messrs. Hill and Nelson, former members of Congress, are here
now, and will go to meet Wright at Rome, and then go back to
Madison and Milledgeville.

Great efforts are being made to reenforce Hood's army, and to break
up my railroads, and I should have at once a good reserve force at
Nashville.  It would have a bad effect, if I were forced to send
back any considerable part of my army to guard roads, so as to
weaken me to an extent that I could not act offensively if the
occasion calls for it.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


All this time Hood and I were carrying on the foregoing
correspondence relating to the exchange of prisoners, the removal
of the people from Atlanta, and the relief of our prisoners of war
at Andersonville.  Notwithstanding the severity of their
imprisonment, some of these men escaped from Andersonville, and got
to me at Atlanta.  They described their sad condition: more than
twenty-five thousand prisoners confined in a stockade designed for
only ten thousand; debarred the privilege of gathering wood out of
which to make huts; deprived of sufficient healthy food, and the
little stream that ran through their prison pen poisoned and
polluted by the offal from their cooking and butchering houses
above.  On the 22d of September I wrote to General Hood, describing
the condition of our men at Andersonville, purposely refraining
from casting odium on him or his associates for the treatment of
these men, but asking his consent for me to procure from our
generous friends at the North the articles of clothing and comfort
which they wanted, viz., under-clothing, soap, combs, scissors,
etc.--all needed to keep them in health--and to send these stores
with a train, and an officer to issue them.  General Hood, on the
24th, promptly consented, and I telegraphed to my friend Mr. James
E. Yeatman, Vice-President of the Sanitary Commission at St. Louis,
to send us all the under-clothing and soap he could spare,
specifying twelve hundred fine-tooth combs, and four hundred pairs
of shears to cut hair.  These articles indicate the plague that
most afflicted our prisoners at Andersonville.

Mr. Yeatman promptly responded to my request, expressed the
articles, but they did not reach Andersonville in time, for the
prisoners were soon after removed; these supplies did, however,
finally overtake them at Jacksonville, Florida, just before the war
closed.

On the 28th I received from General Grant two dispatches


CITY POINT, VIRGINIA; September 27, 1864-8.30 a.m.
Major-General SHERMAN:
It is evident, from the tone of the Richmond press and from other
sources of information, that the enemy intend making a desperate
effort to drive you from where you are.  I have directed all new
troops from the West, and from the East too, if necessary, in case
none are ready in the West, to be sent to you.  If General
Burbridge is not too far on his way to Abingdon, I think he had
better be recalled and his surplus troops sent into Tennessee.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


CITY POINT, VIRGINIA; September 27, 1864-10.30 a.m.
Major-General SHERMAN:
I have directed all recruits and new troops from all the Western
States to be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders
from you.  I was mistaken about Jeff. Davis being in Richmond on
Thursday last.  He was then on his way to Macon.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


Forrest having already made his appearance in Middle Tennessee, and
Hood evidently edging off in that direction, satisfied me that the
general movement against our roads had begun.  I therefore
determined to send General Thomas back to Chattanooga, with another
division (Morgan's, of the Fourteenth Corps), to meet the danger in
Tennessee.  General Thomas went up on the 29th, and Morgan's
division followed the same day, also by rail.  And I telegraphed to
General Halleck

I take it for granted that Forrest will cut our road, but think we
can prevent him from making a serious lodgment.  His cavalry will
travel a hundred miles where ours will ten.  I have sent two
divisions up to Chattanooga and one to Rome, and General Thomas
started to-day to drive Forrest out of Tennessee.  Our roads should
be watched from the rear, and I am glad that General Grant has
ordered reserves to Nashville.  I prefer for the future to make the
movement on Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah.  Hood now rests
twenty-four miles south, on the Chattahoochee, with his right on
the West Point road.  He is removing the iron of the Macon road.  I
can whip his infantry, but his cavalry is to be feared.

There was great difficulty in obtaining correct information about
Hood's movements from Palmetto Station.  I could not get spies to
penetrate his camps, but on the 1st of October I was satisfied that
the bulk of his infantry was at and across the Chattahoochee River,
near Campbellton, and that his cavalry was on the west side, at
Powder Springs.  On that day I telegraphed to General Grant:

Hood is evidently across the Chattahoochee, below Sweetwater.  If
he tries to get on our road, this side of the Etowah, I shall
attack him; but if he goes to the Selma & Talladega road, why will
it not do to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has, and
the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy
Atlanta and march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston,
breaking roads and doing irreparable damage? We cannot remain on
the defensive.

The Selma & Talladega road herein referred to was an unfinished
railroad from Selma, Alabama, through Talladega, to Blue Mountain,
a terminus sixty-five miles southwest of Rome and about fifteen
miles southeast of Gadsden, where the rebel army could be supplied
from the direction of Montgomery and Mobile, and from which point
Hood could easily threaten Middle Tennessee.  My first impression
was, that Hood would make for that point; but by the 3d of October
the indications were that he would strike our railroad nearer us,
viz., about Kingston or Marietta.

Orders were at once made for the Twentieth Corps (Slocum's) to hold
Atlanta and the bridges of the Chattahoochee, and the other corps
were put in motion for Marietta.

The army had undergone many changes since the capture of Atlanta.
General Schofield had gone to the rear, leaving General J. D. Cog
in command of the Army of the Ohio (Twenty-third Corps).  General
Thomas, also, had been dispatched to Chattanooga, with Newton's
division of the Fourth Corps and Morgan's of the Fourteenth Corps,
leaving General D. S. Stanley, the senior major-general of the two
corps of his Army of the Cumberland, remaining and available for
this movement, viz., the Fourth and Fourteenth, commanded by
himself and Major-General Jeff. C. Davis; and after General Dodge
was wounded, his corps (the Sixteenth) had been broken up, and its
two divisions were added to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps,
constituting the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Major-General
O. O. Howard.  Generals Logan and Blair had gone home to assist in
the political canvass, leaving their corps, viz., the Fifteenth and
Seventeenth, under the command of Major-Generals Osterhaus and T.
E. G. Ransom.

These five corps were very much reduced in strength, by detachments
and by discharges, so that for the purpose of fighting Hood I had
only about sixty thousand infantry and artillery, with two small
divisions of cavalry (Kilpatrick's and Garrard's).  General Elliott
was the chief of cavalry to the Army of the Cumberland, and was the
senior officer of that arm of service present for duty with me.

We had strong railroad guards at Marietta and Kenesaw, Allatoona,
Etowah Bridge, Kingston, Rome, Resaca, Dalton, Ringgold, and
Chattanooga.  All the important bridges were likewise protected by
good block-houses, admirably constructed, and capable of a strong
defense against cavalry or infantry; and at nearly all the regular
railroad-stations we had smaller detachments intrenched.  I had
little fear of the enemy's cavalry damaging our roads seriously,
for they rarely made a break which could not be repaired in a few
days; but it was absolutely necessary to keep General Hood's
infantry off our main route of communication and supply.  Forrest
had with him in Middle Tennessee about eight thousand cavalry, and
Hood's army was estimated at from thirty-five to forty thousand
men, infantry and artillery, including Wheeler's cavalry, then
about three thousand strong.

We crossed the Chattahoochee River during the 3d and 4th of
October, rendezvoused at the old battle-field of Smyrna Camp, and
the next day reached Marietta and Kenesaw.  The telegraph-wires had
been cut above Marietta, and learning that heavy masses of
infantry, artillery, and cavalry, had been seen from Kenesaw
(marching north), I inferred that Allatoona was their objective
point; and on the 4th of October I signaled from Mining's Station
to Kenesaw, and from Kenesaw to Allatoona, over the heads of the
enemy, a message for General Corse, at Rome, to hurry back to the
assistance of the garrison at Allatoona.  Allatoona was held by, a
small brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tourtellotte, my
present aide-de-camp.  He had two small redoubts on either side of
the railroad, overlooking the village of Allatoona, and the
warehouses, in which were stored over a million rations of bread.

Reaching Kenesaw Mountain about 8 a.m. of October 5th (a beautiful
day), I had a superb view of the vast panorama to the north and
west.  To the southwest, about Dallas, could be seen the smoke of
camp-fires, indicating the presence of a large force of the enemy,
and the whole line of railroad from Big Shanty up to Allatoona
(full fifteen miles) was marked by the fires of the burning
railroad.  We could plainly see the smoke of battle about,
Allatoona, and hear the faint reverberation of the cannon.

From Kenesaw I ordered the Twenty-third Corps (General Cox) to
march due west on the Burnt Hickory road, and to burn houses or
piles of brush as it progressed, to indicate the head of column,
hoping to interpose this corps between Hood's main army at Dallas
and the detachment then assailing Allatoona.  The rest of the army
was directed straight for Allatoona, northwest, distant eighteen
miles.  The signal-officer on Kenesaw reported that since daylight
he had failed to obtain any answer to his call for Allatoona; but,
while I was with him, he caught a faint glimpse of the tell-tale
flag through an embrasure, and after much time he made out these
letters-" C.," "R.," "S.," "E.," "H.," "E.," "R.," and translated
the message--"Corse is here."  It was a source of great relief, for
it gave me the first assurance that General Corse had received his
orders, and that the place was adequately garrisoned.

I watched with painful suspense the indications of the battle
raging there, and was dreadfully impatient at the slow progress of
the relieving column, whose advance was marked by the smokes which
were made according to orders, but about 2 p.m.  I noticed with
satisfaction that the smoke of battle about Allatoona grew less and
less, and ceased altogether about 4 p.m.  For a time I attributed
this result to the effect of General Cog's march, but later in the
afternoon the signal-flag announced the welcome tidings that the
attack had been fairly repulsed, but that General Corse was
wounded.  The next day my aide, Colonel Dayton, received this
characteristic dispatch:

ALLATOONA, GEORGIA, October 6, 1884-2 P.M.
Captain L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp:
I am short a cheek-bone and an ear, but am able to whip all h--l
yet!  My losses are very heavy.  A force moving from Stilesboro' to
Kingston gives me some anxiety.  Tell me where Sherman is.
JOHN M. CORSE, Brigadier-General.

Inasmuch as the, enemy had retreated southwest, and would probably
next appear at Rome, I answered General Corse with orders to get
back to Rome with his troops as quickly as possible.

General Corse's report of this fight at Allatoona is very full and
graphic.  It is dated Rome, October 27, 1864; recites the fact that
he received his orders by signal to go to the assistance of
Allatoona on the 4th, when he telegraphed to Kingston for cars, and
a train of thirty empty cars was started for him, but about ten of
them got off the track and caused delay.  By 7 p.m. he had at Rome
a train of twenty cars, which he loaded up with Colonel Rowett's
brigade, and part of the Twelfth Illinois Infantry; started at 8
p.m., reached  Allatoona (distant thirty-five miles) at 1 a.m.  of
the 5th, and sent the train back for more men; but the road was in
bad order, and no more men came in time.  He found Colonel
Tourtellotte's garrison composed of eight hundred and ninety men;
his reenforcement was one thousand and fifty-four: total for the
defense, nineteen hundred and forty-four.  The outposts were
already engaged, and as soon as daylight came he drew back the men
from the village to the ridge on which the redoubts were built.

The enemy was composed of French's division of three brigades,
variously reported from four to five thousand strong.  This force
gradually surrounded the place by 8 a.m., when General French sent
in by flag of truce this note:


AROUND ALLATOONA, October 5, 1884.

Commanding Officer, United States Forces, Allatoona:

I have placed the forces under my command in such positions that
you are surrounded, and to avoid a needless effusion of blood I
call on you to surrender your forces at once, and unconditionally.

Five minutes will be allowed you to decide.  Should you accede to
this, you will be treated in the most honorable manner as prisoners
of war.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully yours,

S.  G.  FRENCH,
Major-General commanding forces Confederate States.


General Corse answered immediately:

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH CORPS
ALLATOONA, GEORGIA, October 5, 1864.

Major-General S. G. FRENCH, Confederate States, etc:

Your communication demanding surrender of my command I acknowledge
receipt of, and respectfully reply that we are prepared for the
"needless effusion of blood" whenever it is agreeable to you.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. CORSE,
Brigadier-General commanding forces United States.


Of course the attack began at once, coming from front, flank, and
rear.  There were two small redoubts, with slight parapets and
ditches, one on each side of the deep railroad-cut.  These redoubts
had been located by Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, at the
time of our advance on Kenesaw, the previous June.  Each redoubt
overlooked the storehouses close by the railroad, and each could
aid the other defensively by catching in flank the attacking force
of the other.  Our troops at first endeavored to hold some ground
outside the redoubts, but were soon driven inside, when the enemy
made repeated assaults, but were always driven back.  About 11 a.m.,
Colonel Redfield, of the Thirty-ninth Iowa, was killed, and Colonel
Rowett was wounded, but never ceased to fight and encourage his
men.  Colonel Tourtellotte was shot through the hips, but continued
to command.  General Corse was, at 1 p.m., shot across the face,
the ball cutting his ear, which stunned him, but he continued to
encourage his men and to give orders.  The enemy (about 1.30 p.m.)
made a last and desperate effort to carry one of the redoubts, but
was badly cut to pieces by the artillery and infantry fire from the
other, when he began to draw off, leaving his dead and wounded on
the ground.

Before finally withdrawing, General French converged a heavy fire
of his cannon on the block-house at Allatoona Creek, about two
miles from the depot, set it on fire, and captured its garrison,
consisting of four officers and eighty-five men.  By 4 p.m.  he was
in full retreat south, on the Dallas road, and got by before the
head of General Cox's column had reached it; still several
ambulances and stragglers were picked up by this command on that
road.  General Corse reported two hundred and thirty-one rebel
dead, four hundred and eleven prisoners, three regimental colors,
and eight hundred muskets captured.

Among the prisoners was a Brigadier-General Young, who thought that
French's aggregate loss would reach two thousand.  Colonel
Tourtellotte says that, for days after General Corse had returned
to Rome, his men found and buried at least a hundred more dead
rebels, who had doubtless been wounded, and died in the woods near
Allatoona.  I know that when I reached Allatoona, on the 9th, I saw
a good many dead men, which had been collected for burial.

Corse's entire loss, officially reported, was:

        Killed.    Wounded.    Missing.     Total.
         142         353         212         707


I esteemed this defense of Allatoona so handsome and important,
that I made it the subject of a general order, viz., No. 86, of
October 7, 1864:


The general commanding avails himself of the opportunity, in the
handsome defense made of Allatoona, to illustrate the most
important principle in war, that fortified posts should be defended
to the last, regardless of the relative numbers of the party
attacking and attacked .  .  .  .  The thanks of this army are due
and are hereby accorded to General Corse, Colonel Tourtellotte,
Colonel Rowett, officers, and men, for their determined and gallant
defense of Allatoona, and it is made an example to illustrate the
importance of preparing in time, and meeting the danger, when
present, boldly, manfully, and well.

Commanders and garrisons of the posts along our railroad are hereby
instructed that they must hold their posts to the last minute, sure
that the time gained is valuable and necessary to their comrades at
the front.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,
L.  M.  DAYTON, Aide-A-Camp.


The rebels had struck our railroad a heavy blow, burning every tie,
bending the rails for eight miles, from Big Shanty to above
Acworth, so that the estimate for repairs called for thirty-five
thousand new ties, and six miles of iron.  Ten thousand men were
distributed along the break to replace the ties, and to prepare the
road-bed, while the regular repair-party, under Colonel W. W.
Wright, came down from Chattanooga with iron, spikes, etc., and in
about seven days the road was all right again.  It was by such acts
of extraordinary energy that we discouraged our adversaries, for
the rebel soldiers felt that it was a waste of labor for them to
march hurriedly, on wide circuits, day and night, to burn a bridge
and tear up a mile or so of track, when they knew that we could lay
it back so quickly.  They supposed that we had men and money
without limit, and that we always kept on hand, distributed along
the road, duplicates of every bridge and culvert of any importance.

A good story is told of one who was on Kenesaw Mountain during our
advance in the previous June or July.  A group of rebels lay in the
shade of a tree, one hot day, overlooking our camps about Big
Shanty.  One soldier remarked to his fellows:

"Well, the Yanks will have to git up and git now, for I heard
General Johnston himself say that General Wheeler had blown up the
tunnel near Dalton, and that the Yanks would have to retreat,
because they could get no more rations."

"Oh, hell!" said a listener, "don't you know that old Sherman
carries a duplicate tunnel along?"

After the war was over, General Johnston inquired of me who was our
chief railroad-engineer.  When I told him that it was Colonel W. W.
Wright, a civilian, he was much surprised, said that our feats of
bridge-building and repairs of roads had excited his admiration;
and he instanced the occasion at Kenesaw in June, when an officer
from Wheeler's cavalry had reported to him in person that he had
come from General Wheeler, who had made a bad break in our road
about Triton Station, which he said would take at least a fortnight
to repair; and, while they were talking, a train was seen coming
down the road which had passed that very break, and had reached me
at Big Shanty as soon as the fleet horseman had reached him
(General Johnston) at Marietta

I doubt whether the history of war can furnish more examples of
skill and bravery than attended the defense of the railroad from
Nashville to Atlanta during the year 1864.

In person I reached Allatoona on the 9th of October, still in doubt
as to Hood's immediate intentions.  Our cavalry could do little
against his infantry in the rough and wooded country about Dallas,
which masked the enemy's movements; but General Corse, at Rome,
with Spencer's First Alabama Cavalry and a mounted regiment of
Illinois Infantry, could feel the country south of Rome about
Cedartown and Villa Rica; and reported the enemy to be in force at
both places.  On the 9th I telegraphed to General Thomas, at
Nashville, as follows:


I came up here to relieve our road.  The Twentieth Corps remains at
Atlanta.  Hood reached the road and broke it up between Big Shanty
and Acworth.  He attacked Allatoona, but was repulsed.  We have
plenty of bread and meat, but forage is scarce.  I want to destroy
all the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and to make for
the sea-coast. We cannot defend this long line of road.


And on the same day I telegraphed to General Grant, at City Point:


It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that
Hood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils, are turned
loose without home or habitation.  I think Hood's movements
indicate a diversion to the end of the Selma & Talladega road, at
Blue Mountain, about sixty miles southwest of Rome, from which he
will threaten Kingston, Bridgeport, and Decatur, Alabama.  I
propose that we break up the railroad from Ohattanooga forward, and
that we strike out with our wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and
Savannah.  Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless for us to
occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and
people, will cripple their military resources.  By attempting to
hold the roads, we will lose a thousand men each month, and will
gain no result.  I can make this march, and make Georgia howl!  We
have on hand over eight thousand head of cattle and three million
rations of bread, but no corn.  We can find plenty of forage in the
interior of the State.


Meantime the rebel General Forrest had made a bold circuit in
Middle Tennessee, avoiding all fortified points, and breaking up
the railroad at several places; but, as usual, he did his work so
hastily and carelessly that our engineers soon repaired the
damage--then, retreating before General Rousseau, he left the State
of Tennessee, crossing the river near Florence, Alabama, and got
off unharmed.

On the 10th of October the enemy appeared south of the Etowah River
at Rome, when I ordered all the armies to march to Kingston, rode
myself to Cartersville with the Twenty-third Corps (General Cox),
and telegraphed from there to General Thomas at Nashville:

It looks to me as though Hood was bound for Tuscumbia.  He is now
crossing the Coosa River below Rome, looking west. Let me know if
you can hold him with your forces now in Tennessee and the expected
reenforeements, as, in that event, you know what I propose to do.

I will be at Kingston to-morrow.  I think Rome is strong enough to
resist any attack, and the rivers are all high. If he turns up by
Summerville, I will get in behind him.


And on the same day to General Grant, at City Point:

Hood is now crossing the Coosa, twelve miles below Rome, bound
west. If he passes over to the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, had I not
better execute the plan of my letter sent you by Colonel Porter,
and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, to
defend the State? He will have an ample force when the
reenforcements ordered reach Nashville.


I found General John E.  Smith at Cartersville, and on the 11th
rode on to Kingston, where I had telegraphic communications in all
directions.

From General Corse, at Rome, I learned that Hood's army had
disappeared, but in what direction he was still in doubt; and I was
so strongly convinced of the wisdom of my proposition to change the
whole tactics of the campaign, to leave Hood to General Thomas, and
to march across Georgia for Savannah or Charleston, that I again
telegraphed to General Grant:

We cannot now remain on the defensive.  With twenty-five thousand
infantry and the bold cavalry he has, Hood can constantly break my
road.  I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of
the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city;
send back all my wounded and unserviceable men, and with my
effective army move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea.
Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be
forced to follow me.  Instead of being on the defensive, I will be
on the offensive.  Instead of my guessing at what he means to do,
he will have to guess at my plans.  The difference in war would be
fully twenty-five per pent.  I can make Savannah, Charleston, or
the month of the Chattahoochee (Appalachicola).  Answer quick, as I
know we will not have the telegraph long.


I received no answer to this at the time, and the next day went on
to Rome, where the news came that Hood had made his appearance at
Resaca, and had demanded the surrender of the place, which was
commanded by Colonel Weaver, reenforced by Brevet Brigadier-General
Raum.  General Hood had evidently marched with rapidity up the
Chattooga Valley, by Summerville, Lafayette, Ship's Gap, and
Snake-Creek Gap, and had with him his whole army, except a small
force left behind to watch Rome.  I ordered Resaca to be further
reenforced by rail from Kingston, and ordered General Cox to make a
bold reconnoissance down the Coosa Valley, which captured and
brought into Rome some cavalrymen and a couple of field-guns, with
their horses and men.  At first I thought of interposing my whole
army in the Chattooga Valley, so as to prevent Hood's escape south;
but I saw at a glance that he did not mean to fight, and in that
event, after damaging the road all he could, he would be likely to
retreat eastward by Spring Place, which I did not want him to do;
and, hearing from General Raum that he still held Resaca safe, and
that General Edward McCook had also got there with some cavalry
reenforcements, I turned all the heads of columns for Resaca, viz.,
General Cox's, from Rome; General Stanley's, from McGuire's; and
General Howard's, from Kingston.  We all reached Resaca during that
night, and the next morning (13th) learned that Hood's whole army
had passed up the valley toward Dalton, burning the railroad and
doing all the damage possible.

On the 12th he had demanded the surrender of Resaca in the
following letter:


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE
IN THE FIELD, October 12,1861.

To the officer commanding the United Stales Forces at Resaca,
Georgia.

SIR: I demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the post
and garrison under your command, and, should this be acceded to,
all white officers and soldiers will be parolled in a few days.  If
the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken.  Most
respectfully, your obedient servant,

J.  B.  HOOD, General.


To this Colonel Weaver, then in command, replied:

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION, FIFTEENTH CORPS
RESACA, GEORGIA,  October 12, 1884.

To General J. B. HOOD

Your communication of this date just received.  In reply, I have to
state that I am somewhat surprised at the concluding paragraph, to
the effect that, if the place is carried by assault, no prisoners
will be taken.  In my opinion I can hold this post. If you want it,
come and take it.

I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

CLARK R. WEAVER, Commanding Officer.


This brigade  was very small, and as Hood's investment extended
only from the Oostenaula, below the town, to the Connesauga above,
he left open the approach from the south, which enabled General
Raum and the cavalry of Generals McCook and Watkins to reenforce
from Kingston.  In fact, Hood, admonished by his losses at
Allatoona, did not attempt an assault at all, but limited his
attack to the above threat, and to some skirmishing, giving his
attention chiefly to the destruction of the railroad, which he
accomplished all the way up to Tunnel Hill, nearly twenty miles,
capturing en route the regiment of black troops at Dalton
(Johnson's Forty-fourth United States colored).  On the 14th, I
turned General Howard through Snake-Creek Gap, and sent General
Stanley around by Tilton, with orders to cross the mountain to the
west, so as to capture, if possible, the force left by the enemy in
Snake-Creek Gap.  We found this gap very badly obstructed by fallen
timber, but got through that night, and the next day the main army
was at Villanow.  On the morning of the 16th, the leading division
of General Howard's column, commanded by General Charles R. Woods,
carried Ship's Gap, taking prisoners part of the Twenty-fourth
South Carolina Regiment, which had been left there to hold us in
check.

The best information there obtained located Hood's army at
Lafayette, near which place I hoped to catch him and force him to
battle; but, by the time we had got enough troops across the
mountain at Ship's Gap, Hood had escaped down the valley of the
Chattooga, and all we could do was to follow him as closely as
possible.  From Ship's Gap I dispatched couriers to Chattanooga,
and received word back that General Schofield was there,
endeavoring to cooperate with me, but Hood had broken up the
telegraph, and thus had prevented quick communication.  General
Schofield did not reach me till the army had got down to
Gaylesville, about the 21st of October.

It was at Ship's Gap that a courier brought me the cipher message
from General Halleck which intimated that the authorities in
Washington were willing I should undertake the march across Georgia
to the sea.  The translated dispatch named "Horse-i-bar Sound" as
the point where the fleet would await my arrival.  After much time
I construed it to mean, "Ossabaw Sound," below Savannah, which was
correct.

On the 16th I telegraphed to General Thomas, at Nashville:

Send me Morgan's and Newton's old divisions.  Reestablish the road,
and I will follow Hood wherever he may go.  I think he will move to
Blue Mountain.  We can maintain our men and animals on the country.


General Thomas's reply was:

NASHVILLE, October 17, 1864--10.30 a.m.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch from Ship's Gap, 5 p.m. of the 16th, just received.
Schofield, whom I placed in command of the two divisions (Wagner's
and Morgan's), was to move up Lookout Valley this A.M., to
intercept Hood, should he be marching for Bridgeport.  I will order
him to join you with the two divisions, and will reconstruct the
road as soon as possible.  Will also reorganize the guards for
posts and block-houses ....  Mower and Wilson have arrived, and are
on their way to join you.  I hope you will adopt Grant's idea of
turning Wilson loose, rather than undertake the plan of a march
with the whole force through Georgia to the sea, inasmuch as
General Grant cannot cooperate with you as at first arranged.

GEORGE H.  THOMAS, Major-General.


So it is clear that at that date neither General Grant nor General
Thomas heartily favored my proposed plan of campaign.  On the same
day, I wrote to General Schofield at Chattanooga:

Hood is not at Dear Head Cove.  We occupy Ship's Gap and Lafayette.
Hood is moving south via Summerville, Alpine, and Gadsden.  If he
enters Tennessee, it will be to the west of Huntsville, but I think
he has given up all such idea.  I want the road repaired to
Atlanta; the sick and wounded men sent north of the Tennessee; my
army recomposed; and I will then make the interior of Georgia feel
the weight of war.  It is folly for us to be moving our armies on
the reports of scouts and citizens.  We must maintain the
offensive.  Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head was right
--the move to defend Caperton's Ferry is wrong.  Notify General
Thomas of these my views.  We must follow Hood till he is beyond
the reach of mischief, and then resume the offensive.


The correspondence between me and the authorities at Washington, as
well as with the several army commanders, given at length in the
report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, is full on all
these points.

After striking our road at Dalton, Hood was compelled to go on to
Chattanooga and Bridgeport, or to pass around by Decatur and
abandon altogether his attempt to make us let go our hold of
Atlanta by attacking our communications.  It was clear to me that
he had no intention to meet us in open battle, and the lightness
and celerity of his army convinced me that I could not possibly
catch him on a stern-chase.  We therefore quietly followed him down
the Chattooga Valley to the neighborhood of Gadsden, but halted the
main armies near the Coosa River, at the mouth of the Chattooga,
drawing our supplies of corn and meat from the farms of that
comparatively rich valley and of the neighborhood.

General Slocum, in Atlanta, had likewise sent out, under strong
escort, large trains of wagons to the east, and brought back corn,
bacon, and all kinds of provisions, so that Hood's efforts to cut
off our supplies only reacted on his own people.  So long as the
railroads were in good order, our supplies came full and regular
from the North; but when the enemy broke our railroads we were
perfectly justified in stripping the inhabitants of all they had.
I remember well the appeal of a very respectable farmer against our
men driving away his fine flock of sheep.  I explained to him that
General Hood had broken our railroad; that we were a strong, hungry
crowd, and needed plenty of food; that Uncle Sam was deeply
interested in our continued health and would soon repair these
roads, but meantime we must eat; we preferred Illinois beef, but
mutton would have to answer.  Poor fellow!  I don't believe he was
convinced of the wisdom or wit of my explanation.  Very soon after
reaching Lafayette we organized a line of supply from Chattanooga
to Ringgold by rail, and thence by wagons to our camps about
Gaylesville.  Meantime, also, Hood had reached the neighborhood of
Gadsden, and drew his supplies from the railroad at Blue Mountain.

On the 19th of October I telegraphed to General Halleck, at
Washington:

Hood has retreated rapidly by all the roads leading south.  Our
advance columns are now at Alpine and Melville Post-Office.  I
shall pursue him as far as Gaylesville.  The enemy will not venture
toward Tennessee except around by Decatur.  I propose to send the
Fourth Corps back to General Thomas, and leave him, with that
corps, the garrisons, and new troops, to defend the line of the
Tennessee River; and with the rest I will push into the heart of
Georgia and come out at Savannah, destroying all the railroads of
the State.  The break in our railroad at Big Shanty is almost
repaired, and that about Dalton should be done in ten days.  We
find abundance of forage in the country.


On the same day I telegraphed to General L. C. Easton,
chief-quartermaster, who had been absent on a visit to Missouri,
but had got back to Chattanooga:

Go in person to superintend the repairs of the railroad, and make
all orders in my name that will expedite its completion.  I want it
finished, to bring back from Atlanta to Chattanooga the sick and
wounded men and surplus stores.  On the 1st of November I want
nothing in front of Chattanooga except what we can use as food and
clothing and haul in our wagons.  There is plenty of corn in the
country, and we only want forage for the posts.  I allow ten days
for all this to be done, by which time I expect to be at or near
Atlanta.


I telegraphed also to General Amos Beckwith, chief-commissary in
Atlanta, who was acting as chief-quartermaster during the absence
of General Easton:

Hood will escape me.  I want to prepare for my big raid.  On the
1st of November I want nothing in Atlanta but what is necessary for
war.  Send all trash to the rear at once, and have on hand thirty
days' food and but little forage.  I propose to abandon Atlanta,
and the railroad back to Chattanooga, to sally forth to ruin
Georgia and bring up on the seashore.  Make all dispositions
accordingly.  I will go down the Coosa until I am sure that Hood
has gone to Blue Mountain.


On the 21st of October I reached Gaylesville, had my bivouac in an
open field back of the village, and remained there till the 28th.
During that time General Schofield arrived, with the two divisions
of Generals Wagner (formerly Newton's) and Morgan, which were
returned to their respective corps (the Fourth and Fourteenth), and
General Schofield resumed his own command of the Army of the Ohio,
then on the Coosa River, near Cedar Bluff.  General Joseph A. Mower
also arrived, and was assigned to command a division in the
Seventeenth Corps; and General J. H. Wilson came, having been sent
from Virginia by General Grant, for the purpose of commanding all
my cavalry.  I first intended to organize this cavalry into a corps
of three small divisions, to be commanded by General Wilson; but
the horses were well run down, and, at Wilson's instance, I
concluded to retain only one division of four thousand five hundred
men, with selected horses, under General Kilpatrick, and to send
General Wilson back with all the rest to Nashville, to be
reorganized and to act under General Thomas in the defense of
Tennessee.  Orders to this effect were made on the 24th of October.

General Grant, in designating General Wilson to command my cavalry,
predicted that he would, by his personal activity, increase the
effect of that arm "fifty per cent.," and he advised that he should
be sent south, to accomplish all that I had proposed to do with the
main army; but I had not so much faith in cavalry as he had, and
preferred to adhere to my original intention of going myself with a
competent force.

About this time I learned that General Beauregard had reached
Hood's army at Gadsden; that, without assuming direct command of
that army, he had authority from the Confederate Government to
direct all its movements, and to call to his assistance the whole
strength of the South.  His orders, on assuming command, were full
of alarm and desperation, dated:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST
October 17, 1864

In assuming command, at this critical juncture, of the Military
Division of the West, I appeal to my countrymen, of all classes and
sections, for their generous support.  In assigning me to this
responsible position, the President of the Confederate States has
extended to me the assurance of his earnest support.  The
Executives of your States meet me with similar expressions of their
devotion to our cause.  The noble army in the field, composed of
brave men and gallant officers, are strangers to me, but I know
they will do all that patriots can achieve.....

The army of Sherman still defiantly holds Atlanta.  He can and must
be driven from it.  It is only for the good people of Georgia and
surrounding states to speak the word, and the work is done, we have
abundant provisions.  There are men enough in the country, liable
to and able for service, to accomplish the result.....

My countrymen, respond to this call as you have done in days that
are past, and, with the blessing of a kind and overruling
Providence, the enemy shall be driven from your soil.  The security
of your wives and daughters from the insults and outrages of a
brutal foe shall be established soon, and be followed by a
permanent and honorable peace.  The claims of home and country,
wife and children, uniting with the demands of honor and
patriotism, summon us to the field.  We cannot, dare not, will not
fail to respond.  Full of hope and confidence, I come to join you
in your struggles, sharing your privations, and, with your brave
and true men, to strike the blow that shall bring success to our,
arms, triumph to our cause, and peace to our country!......

G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.


Notwithstanding this somewhat boastful order or appeal, General
Beauregard did not actually accompany General Hood on his
disastrous march to Nashville, but took post at Corinth,
Mississippi, to control the movement of his supplies and to watch
me.

At Gaylesville the pursuit of Hood by the army under my immediate
command may be said to have ceased.  During this pursuit, the
Fifteenth Corps was commanded by its senior major-general present,
P. J. Osterhaus, in the absence of General John A. Logan; and the
Seventeenth Corps was commanded by Brigadier-General T. E. G.
Ransom, the senior officer present, in the absence of General Frank
P.  Blair.

General Ransom was a young, most gallant, and promising officer,
son of the Colonel Ransom who was killed at Chapultepec, in the
Mexican War.  He had served with the Army of the Tennessee in 1862
and 1863, at Vicksburg, where he was severely wounded.  He was not
well at the time we started from Atlanta, but he insisted on going
along with his command.  His symptoms became more aggravated on the
march, and when we were encamped near Gaylesville, I visited him in
company with Surgeon John Moors, United States Army, who said that
the case was one of typhoid fever, which would likely prove fatal.
A few days after, viz., the 28th, he was being carried on a litter
toward Rome; and as I rode from Gaylesville to Rome, I passed him
by the way, stopped, and spoke with him, but did not then suppose
he was so near his end.  The next day, however, his escort reached
Rome, bearing his dead body.  The officer in charge reported that,
shortly after I had passed, his symptoms became so much worse that
they stopped at a farmhouse by the road-side, where he died that
evening.  His body was at once sent to Chicago for burial, and a
monument has been ordered by the Society of the Army of the
Tennessee to be erected in his memory.

On the 26th of October I learned that Hood's whole army had made
its appearance about Decatur, Alabama, and at once caused a strong
reconnoissance to be made down the Coosa to near Gadsden, which
revealed the truth that the enemy was gone except a small force of
cavalry, commanded by General Wheeler, which had been left to watch
us.  I then finally resolved on my future course, which was to
leave Hood to be encountered by General Thomas, while I should
carry into full effect the long-contemplated project of marching
for the sea-coast, and thence to operate toward Richmond.  But it
was all-important to me and to our cause that General Thomas should
have an ample force, equal to any and every emergency.

He then had at Nashville about eight or ten thousand new troops,
and as many more civil employs of the Quartermaster's Department,
which were not suited for the field, but would be most useful in
manning the excellent forts that already covered Nashville.  At
Chattanooga, he had General Steedman's division, about five
thousand men, besides garrisons for Chattanooga, Bridgeport, and
Stevenson; at Murfreesboro' he also had General Rousseau's
division, which was full five thousand strong, independent of the
necessary garrisons for the railroad.  At Decatur and Huntsville,
Alabama, was the infantry division of General R. S. Granger,
estimated at four thousand; and near Florence, Alabama, watching
the crossings of the Tennessee, were General Edward Hatch's
division of cavalry, four thousand; General Croxton's brigade,
twenty-five hundred; and Colonel Capron's brigade, twelve hundred;
besides which, General J.  H.  Wilson had collected in Nashville
about ten thousand dismounted cavalry, for which he was rapidly
collecting the necessary horses for a remount.  All these
aggregated about forty-five thousand men.  General A. J. Smith at
that time was in Missouri, with the two divisions of the Sixteenth
Corps which had been diverted to that quarter to assist General
Rosecrans in driving the rebel General Price out of Missouri.  This
object had been accomplished, and these troops, numbering from
eight to ten thousand, had been ordered to Nashville.  To these I
proposed at first to add only the Fourth Corps (General Stanley),
fifteen thousand; and that corps was ordered from Gaylesville to
march to Chattanooga, and thence report for orders to General
Thomas; but subsequently, on the 30th of October, at Rome, Georgia,
learning from General Thomas that the new troops promised by
General Grant were coming forward very slowly, I concluded to
further reenforce him by General Schofield's corps (Twenty-third),
twelve thousand, which corps accordingly marched for Resaca, and
there took the cars for Chattanooga.  I then knew that General
Thomas would have an ample force with which to encounter General
Hood anywhere in the open field, besides garrisons to secure the
railroad to his rear and as far forward as Chattanooga.  And,
moreover, I was more than convinced that he would have ample time
for preparation; for, on that very day, General R. S. Granger had
telegraphed me from Decatur, Alabama:

I omitted to mention another reason why Hood will go to Tusomnbia
before crossing the Tennessee River.  He was evidently out of
supplies.  His men were all grumbling; the first thing the
prisoners asked for was something to eat.  Hood could not get any
thing if he should cross this side of Rogersville.


I knew that the country about Decatur and Tuscumbia, Alabama, was
bare of provisions, and inferred that General Hood would have to
draw his supplies, not only of food, but of stores, clothing, and
ammunition, from Mobile, Montgomery, and Selma, Alabama, by the
railroad around by Meridian and Corinth, Mississippi, which we had
most effectually disabled the previous winter.

General Hood did not make a serious attack on Decatur, but hung
around it from October 26th to the 30th, when he drew off and
marched for a point on the south side of the Tennessee River,
opposite Florence, where he was compelled to remain nearly a month,
to collect the necessary supplies for his contemplated invasion of
Tennessee and Kentucky.

The Fourth Corps (Stanley) had already reached Chattanooga, and had
been transported by rail to Pulaski, Tennessee; and General Thomas
ordered General Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, to
Columbia, Tennessee, a place intermediate between Hood (then on the
Tennessee River, opposite Florence) and Forrest, opposite
Johnsonville.

On the 31st of October General Croxton, of the cavalry, reported
that the enemy had crossed the Tennessee River four miles above
Florence, and that he had endeavored to stop him, but without
success.  Still, I was convinced that Hood's army was in no
condition to march for Nashville, and that a good deal of further
delay might reasonably be counted on.  I also rested with much
confidence on the fact that the Tennessee River below Muscle Shoals
was strongly patrolled by gunboats, and that the reach of the river
above Muscle Shoals, from Decatur as high up as our railroad at
Bridgeport, was also guarded by gunboats, so that Hood, to cross
over, would be compelled to select a point inaccessible to these
gunboats.  He actually did choose such a place, at the old
railroad-piers, four miles above Florence, Alabama, which is below
Muscle Shoals and above Colbert Shoals.

On the 31st of October Forrest made his appearance on the Tennessee
River opposite Johnsonville (whence a new railroad led to
Nashville), and with his cavalry and field pieces actually crippled
and captured two gunboats with five of our transports, a feat of
arms which, I confess, excited my admiration.

There is no doubt that the month of October closed to us looking
decidedly squally; but, somehow, I was sustained in the belief that
in a very few days the tide would turn.

On the 1st of November I telegraphed very fully to General Grant,
at City Point, who must have been disturbed by the wild rumors that
filled the country, and on the 2d of November received (at Rome)
this dispatch:

CITY POINT,  November 1, 1864--6 P.M.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north,
to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign?
With Hood's army destroyed, you can go where you please with
impunity.  I believed and still believe, if you had started south
while Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have been
forced to go after you.  Now that he is far away he might look upon
the chase as useless, and he will go in one direction while you are
pushing in the other.  If you can see a chance of destroying Hood's
army, attend to that first, and make your other move secondary.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


My answer is dated

ROME, GEORGIA, November 2, 1864.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia:

Your dispatch is received.  If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I
would turn against him with my whole force; then he would retreat
to the south west, drawing me as a decoy away from Georgia, which
is his chief object. If he ventures north of the Tennessee River, I
may turn in that direction, and endeavor to get below him on his
line of retreat; but thus far he has not gone above the Tennessee
River.  General Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent
his reaching any country in which we have an interest; and he has
orders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma, Alabama.  No
single army can catch Hood, and I am convinced the best results
will follow from our defeating Jeff. Davis's cherished plea of
making me leave Georgia by manoeuvring.  Thus far I have confined
my efforts to thwart this plan, and have reduced baggage so that I
can pick up and start in any direction; but I regard the pursuit of
Hood as useless.  Still, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee,
I will hold Decatur, and be prepared to move in that direction;
but, unless I let go of Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


By this date, under the intelligent and energetic action of Colonel
W. W. Wright, and with the labor of fifteen hundred men, the
railroad break of fifteen miles about Dalton was repaired so far as
to admit of the passage of cars, and I transferred my headquarters
to Kingston as more central; and from that place, on the same day
(November 2d), again telegraphed to General Grant:

KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 2, 1884.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia:
If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By my
movements I have thrown Beauregard (Hood) well to the west, and
Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until
the reenforcements from Missouri reach him.  We have now ample
supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta, and can stand a month's
interruption to our communications.  I do not believe the
Confederate army can reach our railroad-lines except by
cavalry-raids, and Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate
them.  I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow my
contemplated movement through Georgia.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.


That same day I received, in answer to the Rome dispatch, the
following:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, November 2,1864--11.30 a.m.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch of 9 A.M. yesterday is just received.  I dispatched
you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had
worked so far north, ought to be looked upon now as the "object."
With the force, however, that you have left with General Thomas, he
must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him.

I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow
Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory.  I say,
then, go on as you propose.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General,


This was the first time that General Grant ordered the "march to
the sea," and, although many of his warm friends and admirers
insist that he was the author and projector of that march, and that
I simply executed his plans, General Grant has never, in my
opinion, thought so or said so.  The truth is fully given in an
original letter of President Lincoln, which I received at Savannah,
Georgia, and have at this instant before me, every word of which is
in his own familiar handwriting.  It is dated--


WASHINGTON, December 26, 1864.

When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was
anxious, if not fearful; but, feeling that you were the better
judge, and remembering "nothing risked, nothing gained," I did not
interfere.  Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all
yours; for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce;
and, taking the work of General Thomas into account, as it should
be taken, it is indeed a great success.  Not only does it afford
the obvious and immediate military advantages, but, in showing to
the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger
part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to
vanquish the old opposing force of the whole, Hood's army, it
brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light.  But what
next?  I suppose it will be safer if I leave General Grant and
yourself to decide.

A. LINCOLN


Of course, this judgment; made after the event, was extremely
flattering and was all I ever expected, a recognition of the truth
and of its importance.  I have often been asked, by well-meaning
friends, when the thought of that march first entered my mind.  I
knew that an army which had penetrated Georgia as far as Atlanta
could not turn back.  It must go ahead, but when, how, and where,
depended on many considerations.  As soon as Hood had shifted
across from Lovejoy's to Palmetto, I saw the move in my "mind's
eye;" and, after Jeff. Davis's speech at Palmetto, of September
26th, I was more positive in my conviction, but was in doubt as to
the time and manner.  When General Hood first struck our railroad
above Marietta, we were not ready, and I was forced to watch his
movements further, till he had "carromed" off to the west of
Decatur.  Then I was perfectly convinced, and had no longer a
shadow of doubt.  The only possible question was as to Thomas's
strength and ability to meet Hood in the open field.  I did not
suppose that General Hood, though rash, would venture to attack
fortified places like Allatoona, Resaca, Decatur, and Nashville;
but he did so, and in so doing he played into our hands perfectly.

On the 2d of November I was at Kingston, Georgia, and my four
corps--the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth--with
one division of cavalry, were strung from Rome to Atlanta.  Our
railroads and telegraph had been repaired, and I deliberately
prepared for the march to Savannah, distant three hundred miles
from Atlanta.  All the sick and wounded men had been sent back by
rail to Chattanooga; all our wagon-trains had been carefully
overhauled and loaded, so as to be ready to start on an hour's
notice, and there was no serious enemy in our front.

General Hood remained still at Florence, Alabama, occupying both
banks of the Tennessee River, busy in collecting shoes and clothing
for his men, and the necessary ammunition and stores with which to
invade Tennessee, most of which had to come from Mobile, Selma, and
Montgomery, Alabama, over railroads that were still broken.
Beauregard was at Corinth, hastening forward these necessary
preparations.

General Thomas was at Nashville, with Wilson's dismounted cavalry
and a mass of new troops and quartermaster's employs amply
sufficient to defend the place.  The Fourth and Twenty-third Corps,
under Generals Stanley and Schofield were posted at Pulaski,
Tennessee, and the cavalry of Hatch, Croxton, and Capron, were
about Florence, watching Hood.  Smith's (A. J.) two divisions of
the Sixteenth Corps were still in Missouri, but were reported as
ready to embark at Lexington for the Cumberland River and
Nashville.  Of course, General Thomas saw that on him would likely
fall the real blow, and was naturally anxious.  He still kept
Granger's division at Decatur, Rousseau's at Murfreesboro', and
Steedman's at Chattanooga, with strong railroad guards at all the
essential points intermediate, confident that by means of this very
railroad he could make his concentration sooner than Hood could
possibly march up from Florence.

Meantime, General F. P. Blair had rejoined his corps (Seventeenth),
and we were receiving at Kingston recruits and returned
furlough-men, distributing them to their proper companies.
Paymasters had come down to pay off our men before their departure to
a new sphere of action, and commissioners were also on hand from the
several States to take the vote of our men in the presidential
election then agitating the country.

On the 6th of November, at Kingston, I wrote and telegraphed to
General Grant, reviewing the whole situation, gave him my full plan
of action, stated that I was ready to march as soon as the election
was over, and appointed November 10th as the day for starting.  On
the 8th I received this dispatch:


CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, November 7, 1864-10.30 P.M.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch of this evening received.  I see no present reason
for changing your plan.  Should any arise, you will see it, or if I
do I will inform you.  I think everything here is favorable now.
Great good fortune attend you! I believe you will be eminently
successful, and, at worst, can only make a march less fruitful of
results than hoped for.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


Meantime trains of cars were whirling by, carrying to the rear an
immense amount of stores which had accumulated at Atlanta, and at
the other stations along the railroad; and General Steedman had
come down to Kingston, to take charge of the final evacuation and
withdrawal of the several garrisons below Chattanooga.

On the 10th of November the movement may be said to have fairly
begun.  All the troops designed for the campaign were ordered to
march for Atlanta, and General Corse, before evacuating his post at
Rome, was ordered to burn all the mills, factories, etc., etc.,
that could be useful to the enemy, should he undertake to pursue
us, or resume military possession of the country.  This was done on
the night of the 10th, and next day Corse reached Kingston.  On the
11th General Thomas and I interchanged full dispatches.  He had
heard of the arrival of General A. J. Smith's two divisions at
Paducah, which would surely reach Nashville much sooner than
General Hood could possibly do from Florence, so that he was
perfectly satisfied with his share of the army.

On the 12th, with a full staff, I started from Kingston for
Atlanta; and about noon of that day we reached Cartersville, and
sat on the edge of a porch to rest, when the telegraph operator,
Mr. Van Valkenburg, or Eddy, got the wire down from the poles to
his lap, in which he held a small pocket instrument.  Calling
"Chattanooga," he received this message from General Thomas,
dated--


NASHVILLE, November 12, 1884--8.80 A.M.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch of twelve o'clock last night is received.  I have no
fears that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and, if he attempts
to follow you, I will follow him as far as possible.  If he does
not follow you, I will then thoroughly organize my troops, and
believe I shall have men enough to ruin him unless he gets out of
the way very rapidly.

The country of Middle Alabama, I learn, is teeming with supplies
this year, which will be greatly to our advantage.  I have no
additional news to report from the direction of Florence.
I am now convinced that the greater part of Beauregard's army is
near Florence and Tuscumbia, and that you will have at least a
clear road before you for several days, and that your success will
fully equal your expectations.

George H.  THOMAS, Major-General.


I answered simply: "Dispatch received--all right."  About that
instant of time, some of our men burnt a bridge, which severed the
telegraph-wire, and all communication with the rear ceased
thenceforth.

As we rode on toward Atlanta that night, I remember the railroad-
trains going to the rear with a furious speed; the engineers and
the few men about the trains waving us an affectionate adieu.  It
surely was a strange event--two hostile armies marching in opposite
directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final
and conclusive result in a great war; and I was strongly inspired
with the feeling that the movement on our part was a direct attack
upon the rebel army and the rebel capital at Richmond, though a
full thousand miles of hostile country intervened, and that, for
better or worse, it would end the war.









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