The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Road Past Kennesaw: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864
    
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.

Title: The Road Past Kennesaw: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864

Author: Richard M. McMurry

Author of introduction, etc.: Bell Irvin Wiley

Release date: May 28, 2020 [eBook #62266]

Language: English

Credits: Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online Distributed
        Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ROAD PAST KENNESAW: THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN OF 1864 ***




Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net









                         THE ROAD PAST KENNESAW
                      THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN OF 1864


_RICHARD M. McMURRY_

_Foreword by Bell I. Wiley_

  Office of Publications
  National Park Service
  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
  Washington, D. C. 1972


 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
                                 Office
                   Washington, D.C. 20402—Price $1.70
            Stock No. 024-005-00288-O/Catalog No. I 29.2:K39

The author: _Richard M. McMurry, a long-time student of the Army of
Tennessee and the Atlanta Campaign, is associate professor of history at
Valdosta State College, Valdosta, Ga._




                  NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORY SERIES


Publication of this volume was made possible by a grant from the
Kennesaw Mountain Historical Association.


This publication is one of a series of booklets describing the
significance of historical and archeological areas in the National Park
System administered by the National Park Service, U.S. Department of the
Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing Office and can be
purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20402.
Price $1.70.

       Stock Number 024-005-00288-O    Catalog Number I 29.2:K 39




                                FOREWORD


The turning point of the Civil War is a perennial matter of dispute
among historians. Some specify the Henry-Donelson-Shiloh operation of
early 1862 as the pivotal campaign; others insist that Antietam was the
key event; still others are equally sure that Gettysburg and Vicksburg
marked the watershed of military activities. Regardless of when the tide
turned, there can be little doubt that the Federal drive on Atlanta,
launched in May 1864, was the beginning of the end for the Southern
Confederacy. And Sherman’s combination assault-flanking operation of
June 27 at Kennesaw Mountain may very well be considered the decisive
maneuver in the thrust toward Atlanta. For when Joseph E. Johnston found
it necessary to pull his forces back across the Chattahoochee, the fate
of the city was sealed.

The Atlanta Campaign had an importance reaching beyond the immediate
military and political consequences. It was conducted in a manner that
helped establish a new mode of warfare. From beginning to end, it was a
railroad campaign, in that a major transportation center was the prize
for which the contestants vied, and both sides used rail lines to
marshal, shift, and sustain their forces. Yanks and Rebs made some use
of repeating rifles, and Confederate references to shooting down “moving
bushes” indicate resort to camouflage by Sherman’s soldiers. The Union
commander maintained a command post under “signal tree” at Kennesaw
Mountain and directed the movement of his forces through a net of
telegraph lines running out to subordinate headquarters. Men of both
armies who early in the war had looked askance at the employment of pick
and shovel, now, as a matter of course, promptly scooped out protective
ditches at each change of position.

The campaign was also tremendously important as a human endeavor, and
one of the most impressive features of Richard McMurry’s account is the
insight—much of it gleaned from unpublished letters and diaries—into the
motivations, experiences, and reactions of the participants. The
officers and men who endured the heat and the mud of what must have been
one of the wettest seasons in the history of Georgia and who lived in
the shadow of death day after day for 4 months of as arduous campaigning
as occurred during the whole conflict, stand out as flesh and blood
human beings. This time of severe testing led to the undoing of some of
the generals, including Joseph E. Johnston and John Bell Hood. Others,
notably William Tecumseh Sherman, capitalized on the opportunities
afforded by the campaign to prove their worth and carve for themselves
lasting niches in the military hall of fame. Still others had their
careers cut short by hostile bullets, among them Leonidas Polk, a leader
whose Civil War experience makes inescapable the conclusion that he
should never have swapped his clerical robes for a general’s stars. In
marked contrast stood James B. McPherson, great both as a man and a
combat commander, whose premature passing elicited moving statements of
grief from leaders on both sides.

Human aspects of the campaign found most vivid and revealing expression
in the letters of the lesser officers and the men whom they led. Robert
M. Gill, a Mississippi lieutenant promoted from the ranks, poured out in
full and frequent letters to his wife his homesickness, his hopes, his
fears, and his spiritual concern; in so doing, he revealed his virtues
and his frailties and his ups and downs of morale until a Yankee
fusillade snuffed out his life at Jonesborough. On June 22, 1864, he
wrote from near Marietta: “I saw a canteen on which a heavy run was made
during and after the charge. I still like whiskey but do not want any
when going into a charge for I am or at least was drunk enough yesterday
without drinking a drop.” Lieutenant Gill tried very hard to live up to
his wife’s admonitions against “the sins of the camp,” but he had great
difficulty with profanity, especially in the excitement of battle. After
the action at Resaca, he wrote apologetically: “The men did not move out
to suit me, and I forgot everything and began to curse a cowardly scamp
who got behind.” Six weeks later he reported another lapse, and
following the Battle of Atlanta he wrote: “I done some heavy swearing, I
am told.... I try to do right but it seems impossible for me to keep
from cursing when I get under fire. I hope I will do better hereafter. I
do not wish to die with an oath on my lips.” Gill’s morale remained
relatively good until after the fall of Atlanta. Shortly after that
event, he wrote: “I think this cause a desperate one ... there is no
hope of defeating Lincoln.... I wish I could be sanguine of success.”

John W. Hagan, a stalwart sergeant of Johnston’s army, in poorly spelled
words and awkwardly constructed paragraphs addressed to his wife,
demonstrated the character and strength of the lowly men who were the
backbone of both armies. From near Marietta on June 17, 1864, Hagan
wrote: “the yankees charged us ... & we finelly drove them back we all
had as much to do as we could do. James & Ezekiel acted very brave the
boys Say Ezekiel went to shooting like he was spliting rails; in fact
all the Regt acted there parts.” The combat performance of Hagan and his
men contrasted markedly with that of one of the officers who was the
acting company commander, a Lieutenant Tomlinson. On June 21, Hagan
wrote his wife: “I have been in command of our company 3 days. Lieut.
Tomlinson stays along but pretends to be so sick he can not go in a
fight but so long as I Keepe the right side up Co. ‘K’ will be all
right.” Hagan’s morale remained high, despite the fact that he had not
received any pay for more than a year. On July 4, he wrote that “some of
our troops grow despondent but it is only thoes who are all ways
despondent,” and added: “all good soldiers will fight harder the harder
he is prest but a coward is allways ready to want an excuse to run or
say they or we are whiped. I never Knew there was so many cowards untill
Since we left Dalton. I do not Speak of our Regt but some troops have
behaved very badly.”

Sergeant Hagan and other Rebs who fought in the Atlanta Campaign had a
wholesome respect for the men in blue who opposed them; and rightfully
so, for the Union rank and file, mostly lads and young adults from the
farms of the Midwest, were admirable folk, deeply devoted to the cause
of Union. One of them, Pvt. John F. Brobst of the 25th Wisconsin
Regiment, wrote his sweetheart before the campaign was launched: “Home
is sweet and friends are dear, but what would they all be to let the
country go to ruin and be a slave. I am contented with my lot ... for I
know that I am doing my duty, and I know that it is my duty to do as I
am now a-doing. If I live to get back, I shall be proud of the freedom I
shall have, and know that I helped to gain that freedom. If I should not
get back, it will do them good who do get back.”

Despite the publication during the past century of many studies on the
subject, the Atlanta Campaign—overshadowed both during the war and later
by the engagements in Virginia—has not received anything like its due
share of attention. Now for the first time, thanks to Richard McMurry’s
thoroughness as a researcher and skill as a narrator, students of the
Civil War have a clear, succinct, balanced, authoritative, and
interesting account of the tremendously important Georgia operations of
May to September 1864. This excellent work should be as comprehensible
and appealing to those who read history and tour battle areas for fun as
it is to those who have achieved expertness in Civil War history.

                                                           Bell I. Wiley




                                CONTENTS


  Foreword by Bell I. Wiley                                            i
  Spring 1864                                                          1
  Resaca                                                               7
  To the Etowah                                                       14
  New Hope Church                                                     18
  Kennesaw Mountain                                                   23
  Across the Chattahoochee                                            29
  Johnston Removed From Command                                       32
  In the Ranks                                                        34
  Peachtree Creek                                                     42
  The Battle of Atlanta                                               46
  Ezra Church                                                         48
  The Month of August                                                 51
  Jonesborough                                                        54
  Epilogue                                                            57
  Sherman in Atlanta: A Photographic Portfolio                        59
  For Further Reading                                                 70
  Civil War Sites in Georgia                                          71

    [Illustration: {uncaptioned}]




                              SPRING 1864


One of the most important military campaigns of the American Civil War
was fought in northwestern Georgia during the spring and summer of 1864
between Northern forces under Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and
Confederates commanded first by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston and then by Gen.
John B. Hood. This campaign resulted in the capture of Atlanta by the
Unionists, prepared the way for Sherman’s “March to the Sea,” and, in
the opinion of many historians, made inevitable the reelection of
Abraham Lincoln and the consequent determination of the North to see the
war through to final victory rather than accept a compromise with
secession and slavery.

Spring 1864 marked the beginning of the war’s fourth year. In the
eastern theater, 3 years of fighting had led to a virtual stalemate,
with the opposing armies hovering between Washington and Richmond—about
where they had been when the war began in 1861. However, the situation
was quite different in the vast area between the Appalachian Mountains
and the Mississippi River, a region known in the 1860’s as “the West.”
There in 1862 Federal armies had driven the Southerners out of Kentucky
and much of Tennessee. In the following year the Northerners secured
control of the Mississippi River and captured the important city of
Chattanooga. By early 1864, Union armies were poised for what they hoped
would be a quick campaign to dismember the Confederacy and end the war.
This feeling was well illustrated by an Illinois soldier who wrote his
sister on April 22, “I think we can lick the Rebs like a book when we
start to do it & hope we will Clean Rebeldom out this summer so we will
be able to quit the business.”

To realize these hopes, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, commander of the
Northern armies, planned a simultaneous move on all fronts, with the
greatest efforts devoted to Virginia, where he would personally direct
operations, and to the region between the Tennessee and Chattahoochee
Rivers, where the Federals would be led by Sherman and Maj. Gen.
Nathaniel P. Banks. Grant hoped that Banks would move from New Orleans,
seize Mobile, and advance northward toward Montgomery, while Sherman’s
force struck southward from Chattanooga. Had these plans succeeded, the
Confederacy would have been reduced to a small area along the coast of
Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia. Confederate victories in
Louisiana, however, made Banks’ projected campaign infeasible, and
Sherman’s drive southward into Georgia, with Atlanta as the initial
goal, became the major Union effort in the West.

    [Illustration: _Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman_]

Leaders on both sides had long recognized the importance of Atlanta,
located a few miles south of the Chattahoochee and about 120 miles from
Chattanooga. In 1864, only Richmond was more important to the South.
Atlanta’s four railroads were not only the best means of communication
between the eastern and western parts of the Confederacy but they were
also the major lines of supply for the Southern armies in Virginia and
north Georgia. The city’s hospitals cared for the sick and wounded and
her factories produced many kinds of military goods. In the words of a
Northern editor, Atlanta was “the great military depot of Rebeldom.” In
addition, the city’s capture would give the Union armies a base from
which they could strike further into Georgia to reach such vital
manufacturing and administrative centers as Milledgeville, Macon,
Augusta, and Columbus. All of these things were clear to the men who led
the opposing armies.

William Tecumseh Sherman was a thin, nervous, active man, with a wild
shock of reddish or light-brown hair. A 44-year-old native of Ohio, he
had been graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1840 and, after
several years’ service in the Army, had resigned his commission to go
into banking and later into education. The outbreak of war had found him
serving as superintendent of a military college in Louisiana. He
resigned this position and returned to the North, where he entered
Federal service. Rising rapidly in the Army, he was chosen as supreme
commander in the West in early 1864. His soldiers liked him and
affectionately called him “Uncle Billy.” An officer who was with him in
1864 described the Federal commander as “tall and lank, not very erect,
with hair like a thatch, which he rubs up with his hands, a rusty beard
trimmed close, a wrinkled face, prominent red nose, small bright eyes,
coarse red hands ... he smokes constantly.” Sherman was also a dogged
fighter unawed by obstacles that would have broken lesser men, and Grant
knew he could be counted on to carry out his part of the grand
strategical plan for 1864.

Sherman’s assignment was to break up the Confederate army in north
Georgia and “to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as
you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.”
To accomplish this mission, he had almost 100,000 men organized into
three armies—the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Maj. Gen. George
H. Thomas; the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Maj. Gen. James B.
McPherson; and the Army of the Ohio, commanded by Maj. Gen. John M.
Schofield. By early May, Sherman had assembled these troops around
Chattanooga and was prepared to march with them into Georgia.

Opposed to Sherman’s host was the Confederate Army of Tennessee,
commanded by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston was a Virginian and, like
Sherman, a graduate of West Point (Class of 1829). He had served in the
U.S. Army until Virginia seceded in the spring of 1861, when he resigned
and entered Confederate service. In December 1863 he was named commander
of the major Confederate force in the West and given the mission of
defending the area against further Northern advance. Johnston had an
almost uncanny ability to win the loyal support of his subordinates. An
Arkansas officer who met the Southern commander in early 1864 noted in
his diary: “General Johnston is about 50 years of age—is quite gray—and
has a spare form, an intelligent face, and an expressive blue eye. He
was very polite, raising his cap to me after the introduction.”

Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Johnston was also secretive, stubborn
when dealing with his superiors, petulant, and too prone to see
difficulties rather than opportunities. He constantly worried about
defeat and retreat, and was hesitant to act. In sum, he was a man whose
personality prevented him from effectively utilizing his many abilities.

At the beginning of May, the 55,000 men of Johnston’s army were
concentrated around Dalton, Ga., 35 miles southeast of Chattanooga. The
Southern force consisted of two infantry corps commanded by Lt. Gens.
William J. Hardee and John Bell Hood, and a cavalry corps led by Maj.
Gen. Joseph Wheeler. What Johnston would do with these troops was still
very much in doubt. The Confederate government wanted him to march into
Tennessee and reestablish Southern authority over that crucial State.
Johnston, however, believed that conditions for such an offensive were
not favorable and that he should await Sherman’s advance, defeat it, and
then undertake to regain Tennessee. At the opening of the campaign in
early May, this issue had not been settled. The lack of understanding
and cooperation between the government in Richmond and the general in
Georgia, illustrated by this incident, was to hamper Confederate efforts
throughout the campaign.

    [Illustration: _Gen. Joseph E. Johnston_]

    [Illustration: ATLANTA CAMPAIGN
    1864]




                                 RESACA


Three major rivers—the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the
Chattahoochee—flow from northeast to southwest across northern Georgia,
dividing the area into four distinct geographical regions. Between
Chattanooga and the Oostanaula, several parallel mountain ridges slice
across the State in such a manner as to hamper military movements. The
most important of these was Rocky Face Ridge which ran from near the
Oostanaula to a point several miles north of Dalton. This ridge rose
high above the surrounding valleys and was the barrier between
Johnston’s army at Dalton and Sherman’s forces at Chattanooga. There
were three important gaps in this ridge: Mill Creek Gap west of Dalton,
Dug Gap a few miles to the south, and Snake Creek Gap west of the little
village of Resaca near the Oostanaula.

Dalton is on the eastern side of Rocky Face Ridge. The Western and
Atlantic Railroad, which connected Chattanooga and Atlanta and served as
the line of supply for both armies, crossed the Oostanaula near Resaca,
ran north for 15 miles to Dalton, then turned westward to pass through
Rocky Face Ridge at Mill Creek Gap, and continued on to Chattanooga.
During the winter, the Confederates had fortified the area around Dalton
to such an extent that they believed it to be secure against any attack.
Johnston hoped that the Federals would assault his lines on Rocky Face
Ridge, for he was confident that he could hurl the Northerners back with
heavy loss.

Sherman, however, had no intention of smashing his army against what one
of his soldiers called the “Georgian Gibraltar.” Northern scouts had
found Snake Creek Gap unguarded and the Federal commander decided to
send McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee through this gap to seize the
railroad near Resaca. Meanwhile, Thomas and Schofield would engage the
Confederates at Dalton to prevent their sending men to oppose McPherson.
Sherman hoped that when Johnston discovered his line of supply in
Federal hands, he would fall back in disorder and his army could be
routed by the Northerners. By May 6, the Federals were ready to begin
the campaign. Sherman moved Thomas and Schofield toward Dalton while
McPherson prepared to strike for Snake Creek Gap.

    [Illustration: _Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson_]

Johnston had not been idle. He had deployed his men in strong positions
to block the expected advance. He had also requested reinforcements, and
these were on the way. Some coastal garrisons had been withdrawn from
their posts and were being sent to join Johnston. More important,
though, was the large body of troops from Mississippi that was moving
across Alabama toward Dalton. These men, numbering about 15,000,
constituted the Army of Mississippi and were commanded by Lt. Gen.
Leonidas Polk. A West Point graduate (1827), Polk had resigned from the
Army to enter the Episcopal ministry. In 1861 he was Bishop of Louisiana
and entered the Confederate service where he was known as the
Bishop-General. When Polk joined Johnston the Confederate strength would
be raised to about 70,000.

Before Polk arrived, however, Sherman sent Thomas and Schofield against
Johnston’s position. On May 7 and 8, there was heavy fighting all along
the lines from the area north of Dalton south along Rocky Face Ridge to
Dug Gap. The Federals made no real headway, but the demonstration served
its purpose, for McPherson reached Snake Creek Gap on the evening of the
8th and found it open.

James Birdseye McPherson, who stood at Snake Creek Gap on the morning of
May 9 with an opportunity to strike Johnston a crippling blow, was one
of the Civil War’s most attractive leaders. Like Sherman, he was an
Ohioan and a West Pointer (1853). In 1864 he was only 35 years old. His
entire adult life had been spent in the Army, and in the Civil War his
abilities had carried him from captain to major general in slightly more
than a year’s time. Both Sherman and Grant looked upon him as an
outstanding leader—a belief shared by the Confederate editor who called
McPherson “the most dangerous man in the whole Yankee army.” He was
handsome, with flowing hair and whiskers, and he had a special reason
for wanting the war to end: when it was over he would be able to marry
the beautiful girl who was waiting for him in Baltimore. He was
courteous to men of all ranks, and his adoring soldiers remembered long
afterwards his habit of riding in the fields to leave the roads open for
them.

    [Illustration: OPENING BATTLES OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN]

    [Illustration: _For four long and bloody months, officers and men
    alike endured the heat and mud of what must have been one of the
    wettest seasons in the history of Georgia._]

On May 9, while skirmishing continued about Dalton, McPherson led his
army eastward, hoping to reach the railroad near Resaca and break
Johnston’s communications with Atlanta. Unknown to the Federals, there
were some 4,000 Confederates in Resaca. These included the advance
elements of Polk’s army, as well as infantry and cavalry units assigned
to guard the Oostanaula bridges and to protect the area.

The Northern advance met these Southerners near the town. McPherson,
surprised at finding so large a force in his front, moved with great
caution. Late in the afternoon, he became worried that Johnston might
rush troops southward and cut him off from Sherman. This fear, and the
fact that some of his men were without food, led him to break off the
engagement and fall back to a position at Snake Creek Gap which he
fortified that night.

In the following days, both armies shifted to the Resaca area. Sherman
began by sending a division of Thomas’ army to aid McPherson. Soon
orders followed for almost all of the Federals to march southward, with
only a small detachment left to watch Johnston. All day on the 11th the
roads west of Rocky Face were crowded with troops, wagons, and guns.
Although the march was slowed by a heavy rain, nightfall of the 12th
found the Northern army concentrated at Snake Creek Gap. Johnston
discovered the Federal move and during the night of May 12-13 ordered
his men to Resaca where Polk’s troops had been halted.

Skirmishing on the 13th developed the positions of the armies. Johnston
had posted his men on the high ground north and west of Resaca. Polk’s
Corps (as the Army of Mississippi was called) held the Confederate left,
Hardee’s men occupied the center, and Hood was on the right, with his
right flank curved back to the Conasauga River. The Federal advance,
McPherson’s army, had moved directly toward Resaca. When the advance was
slowed, Thomas moved to the north and formed his army on McPherson’s
left. Schofield moved into position on Thomas’ left.

The Battle of Resaca, fought May 13-15, was the first major engagement
of the campaign. The 13th was spent in skirmishing and establishing the
positions of the two armies. The 14th saw much heavy fighting. Sherman
delivered a major attack against the right center of Johnston’s line and
was hurled back with a heavy loss. One Northerner described the
Confederate fire as “_terrific and deadly_.” Later, Hood made a
determined assault on the Federal left and was prevented from winning a
great victory when Union reinforcements were hurried to the scene from
other sectors of the line. Late in the day, troops from McPherson’s army
made slight gains against the Confederate left. Fighting ceased at dark,
although firing continued throughout the night. There was no time for
the men to rest, however; both Johnston and Sherman kept their soldiers
busy digging fortifications, caring for the wounded, moving to new
positions, and preparing for the next day’s battle.

The heaviest fighting on the 15th occurred at the northern end of the
lines. There, both sides made attacks that achieved some local success
but were inconclusive. Meanwhile, a Federal detachment had been sent
down the Oostanaula to attempt a crossing. At Lay’s Ferry, a few miles
below Resaca, it got over the river and secured a position from which to
strike eastward against Johnston’s rail line. The Southern commander
believed that this left him no choice but to retreat. Accordingly,
during the night of May 15-16, the Confederates withdrew and crossed to
the southern bank of the Oostanaula, burning the bridges behind them.

As is the case with many Civil War battles, no accurate casualty figures
are available for the engagement at Resaca. Federal losses were probably
about 3,500; Confederate casualties were approximately 2,600.




                             TO THE ETOWAH


South of the Oostanaula, steep ridges and heavy woods give way to gently
rolling hills with only a light cover of vegetation. The area was almost
without defensible terrain and thus afforded a great advantage to
Sherman, whose larger forces would have more opportunities for maneuver
than they had found in the mountainous region to the north.

Once across the Oostanaula, Johnston sought to make a stand and draw the
Federals into a costly assault. He expected to find favorable terrain
near Calhoun, but in this he was disappointed and during the night of
May 16-17 he led the Confederates on southward toward Adairsville. The
Federals followed—Sherman dividing his forces into three columns and
advancing on a broad front. There were skirmishes all along the route
during the 16th and 17th, but the main bodies were not engaged.

At Adairsville Johnston again hoped to find a position in which he could
give battle, but there too the terrain was unsuitable for defense and
the Confederate commander was forced to continue his retreat. As he fell
back, however, Johnston devised a stratagem that he hoped would lead to
the destruction of a part of Sherman’s forces. There were two roads
leading south from Adairsville—one south to Kingston, the other
southeast to Cassville. It seemed likely that Sherman would divide his
armies so as to use both roads. This would give Johnston the opportunity
to attack one column before the other could come to its aid.

When the Southerners abandoned Adairsville during the night of May
17-18, Johnston sent Hardee’s Corps to Kingston while he fell back
toward Cassville with the rest of his army. He hoped that Sherman would
believe most of the Southerners to be in Kingston and concentrate the
bulk of his forces there. Hardee would then hold off the Northerners at
Kingston while Johnston, with Polk and Hood, destroyed the smaller
Federal column at Cassville.

Sherman reacted as Johnston hoped, ordering McPherson and the bulk of
Thomas’ army toward Kingston while sending only Schofield and one corps
of Thomas’ army along the road to Cassville. On the morning of May 19,
Johnston ordered Hood to march along a country road a mile or so east of
the Adairsville-Cassville Road and form his corps for battle facing
west. While Polk attacked the head of the Federal column, Hood was to
assail its left flank. As Hood was moving into position, he found
Northern soldiers to the east. This was a source of great danger, for
had Hood formed facing west, these Federals would have been in position
to attack the exposed flank and rear of his corps. After a brief
skirmish with the Northerners, Hood fell back to rejoin Polk. Johnston,
believing that the opportunity for a successful battle had passed,
ordered Hood and Polk to move to a new line east and south of Cassville,
where they were joined by Hardee who had been pushed out of Kingston.
Johnston formed his army on a ridge and hoped that Sherman would attack
him there on May 20. As usual, the Southern commander was confident of
repulsing the enemy.

    [Illustration: TO THE ETOWAH]

That night the Confederate leaders held a council of war. Exactly what
happened at the council is a matter of dispute. According to Johnston,
Polk and Hood reported that their lines could not be held and urged that
the army retreat. Believing that the fears of the corps commanders would
be communicated to their men and thus weaken the army’s confidence,
Johnston yielded to these demands, even though he thought the position
to be defensible. According to Hood, whose recollection of the council
differs markedly from Johnston’s, he and Polk told Johnston that the
line could not be held against an attack but that it was a good position
from which to move against the enemy. Johnston, however, was unwilling
to risk an offensive battle and decided to fall back across the Etowah.
No definite resolution of this dispute is possible, but most of the
available evidence supports Hood’s version of the conference. Certainly
Johnston was not obligated to allow the advice of subordinates to
overrule his own judgment. The responsibility for abandoning the
Cassville position rests on the Southern commander.

During the night, the Confederates withdrew across the Etowah. As they
fell back, their feelings were mixed. They had lost a very strong
position at Dalton, and had fallen back from Resaca, Calhoun, and
Adairsville. Now they were retreating again under cover of darkness.
That morning as they prepared for battle, their spirits had been high.
Now their disappointment was bitter. Although morale would revive in the
next few days, many Southern soldiers would never again place as much
confidence in Johnston’s abilities as they once had.

By contrast, morale in the Federal ranks soared. In a short time of
campaigning, the Northerners had “driven” their enemy from one position
after another. Sherman was satisfied with the progress his armies had
made and, after learning that the Confederates were south of the Etowah,
he decided to give his men a short rest. On May 20, one of the Northern
generals summarized the situation in a letter to his wife:

  Thus far our campaign has succeeded though it must be confessed the
  rebels have retreated in very good order and their army is still
  unbroken. Our hard work is still before us. We are still 53 miles from
  Atlanta and have to pass over a rugged Country. We will have some
  bloody work before we enter that place.

    [Illustration: _After a council with Hood and Polk, Johnston
    abandoned the Cassville position._]




                            NEW HOPE CHURCH


The region south of the Etowah was one of the wildest parts of north
Georgia. The area was sparsely settled, hilly, heavily wooded, and, in
1864, little known and poorly mapped. Sherman expected to push through
this region with little delay. On May 23 he wrote, “The Etowah is the
Rubicon of Georgia. We are now all in motion like a vast hive of bees,
and expect to swarm along the Chattahoochee in a few days.” His optimism
was ill-founded, for the rough terrain and heavy rains favored
Johnston’s smaller force and helped delay the Federal advance for 5
weeks.

Johnston posted his army around Allatoona Pass, a gap in the high hills
south of the Etowah through which the railroad ran on its way southward
to Marietta. He had again occupied a strong position hoping that Sherman
would attack it. The Federal commander, however, aware of the natural
strength of the terrain, was determined to avoid a direct assault and
crossed the river to the west where the country was more open. Dallas, a
small town about 14 miles south of the river and about the same distance
west of the railroad, was the first objective.

The Northerners began their advance on the 23d. McPherson swung far to
the west through Van Wert and then moved eastward toward Dallas. Thomas
was in the center moving via Stilesboro and Burnt Hickory. Schofield was
on the left, closest to the Etowah. The day was hot and the men suffered
greatly from thirst. Nevertheless, the Federals made progress toward
their objective and, on the 24th, were closing in on Dallas.

Confederate cavalry soon discovered Sherman’s movement and Johnston took
steps to meet it. By evening of the 24th, the Southerners held a line
east of Dallas which ran from southwest to northeast. The key to the
position was a crossroads at a Methodist church named New Hope. Hood’s
Corps held this part of the line. Polk and Hardee were to his left.

On May 25, some troops of Thomas’ army ran up against Hood’s line at New
Hope Church. In a late afternoon battle fought under dark skies and
rolling bursts of thunder, Thomas’ men made a series of gallant assaults
against the Southern line. The Federals met a withering hail of bullets
and shells that quickly halted each advance. In this short engagement,
Thomas lost about 1,500 men. The Confederates suffered little during the
battle and were elated at their success.

    [Illustration: BATTLES AROUND NEW HOPE CHURCH]

    [Illustration: {uncaptioned}]

Sunrise on the 26th found both commanders working to position their men
in the woods east of Dallas. Except for skirmishing, there was little
fighting during the day.

On the following day, Sherman attempted to defeat the right of the
Southern line by a surprise attack. In a battle known as Pickett’s Mill,
the Northerners were hurled back with about 1,500 casualties. For the
Federals, this engagement was one of the most desperate of the campaign.
One company of the 41st Ohio Regiment lost 20 of its 22 men. The 49th
Ohio carried slightly over 400 men into the battle and lost 203 of them.
The commander of another regiment wrote that he lost a third of his men
in the first few yards of the advance. “The rebel fire ... swept the
ground like a hailstorm,” wrote another Unionist, adding, “this is
surely not war it is butchery.” A third Northerner noted in his diary
that evening, “our men were slaughtered terribly 2 brigades of infantry
were almost cut to pieces.” The Southerners lost about 500 men.

Over the next few days fighting continued almost incessantly. Both sides
made assaults with strongly reinforced skirmish lines, seeking to hold
the enemy in position. This type of combat was very tiring on the men.
One soldier wrote after a night battle, “O God, what a night. They may
tell of hell and its awful fires, but the boys who went thru the fight
at Dallas ... are pretty well prepared for any event this side of
eternity.”

The days spent in the jungles near New Hope Church were among the most
arduous of the war for the soldiers of both armies. In addition to the
normal dangers of combat, the men had to undergo unusual physical
hardships. Rain, heat, constant alarms, continuous sharpshooting, the
stench of the dead, the screams of the wounded, and a serious shortage
of food all added to the normal discomforts of life in the field. One
Federal soldier described the time spent near Dallas as “Probably the
most wretched week” of the campaign. Another wrote of it as “a wearisome
waste of life and strength.” A third Northerner, referring to an
unsuccessful foray against the Confederate lines, wrote, “We have struck
a hornet nest at the business end.” So severe had the fighting been that
Sherman’s men would ever afterward refer to the struggle around New Hope
Church as the “Battle of the Hell Hole.”

When it became clear that no decisive battle would be fought at Dallas,
Sherman gradually sidled eastward to regain the railroad. On June 3,
advance elements of the Federal forces reached the little town of
Acworth, and within a few days, almost all the Northern troops were in
that general area. Sherman had outmaneuvered Johnston and bypassed the
strong Confederate position at Allatoona, but he had not seriously
weakened his opponent. Once again the Federal commander ordered a short
halt to rest his troops and allow time to repair the railroad and for
reinforcements to arrive.

    [Illustration: {uncaptioned}]




                           KENNESAW MOUNTAIN


By June 10, Sherman was ready to resume the advance. The Southerners had
taken up a line north of Marietta that ran from Brush Mountain on the
east to Pine Mountain in the center to Lost Mountain on the west.
McPherson moved against the right flank of this line, Thomas against the
center, and Schofield against the left. Rain fell almost every day and
hampered the Northern advance. For several days there was heavy
skirmishing in which the Federals captured Pine Mountain and made gains
at other points. Bishop-General Polk was killed on Pine Mountain by a
Union artillery shell on June 14, when he foolishly exposed himself to
enemy fire. Maj. Gen. William W. Loring commanded Polk’s Corps for
several weeks until a permanent replacement, Lt. Gen. Alexander P.
Stewart, took command.

By the 16th, Schofield’s advance had been so successful that the
Southerners were forced to give up Lost Mountain. For several days,
Johnston tried to hold a new line that ran west from Brush Mountain and
then turned southward. This line was enfiladed by the Federal artillery,
however, and during the night of June 18-19 the Confederates abandoned
it and took up a new position extending along the crest of Kennesaw
Mountain and off to the south. Hardee’s Corps held the left of this
line, Loring’s was in the center, and Hood’s was on the right.

When Sherman encountered this strong position, he extended his lines to
the south to try to outflank Johnston. He moved most of McPherson’s army
to the area directly in front of Kennesaw Mountain and placed Thomas’
army in line on McPherson’s right with orders to extend to the right. In
the days that followed, McPherson and Thomas were engaged in what
amounted to a siege of the Southern position. Little progress could be
made on the ground but the artillery on both sides was used in attempts
to batter and weaken the enemy. Day after day, the big Union guns
pounded the Southern line, their fire being answered by Confederate
cannon high on Kennesaw Mountain.

Meanwhile, Sherman drew Schofield’s army in from the Lost Mountain area
and ordered it to move south on the Sandtown Road, which ran west of the
Federal position toward the Chattahoochee. After a long and muddy march,
Schofield’s men reached Nose’s Creek at dark on June 19. On the
following day, they crossed the swollen stream and drove the Southerners
away. The bridge was rebuilt; on the 21st their advance was resumed.
That same day, the right of Thomas’ army established contact with
Schofield near Powder Springs Road.

Johnston had seen the Federal right being extended and was aware of the
dangers it presented to his line of communications. To meet this threat
the Confederate commander shifted Hood’s Corps from the right of his
line to the left during the night of June 21-22. By early afternoon of
the 22d, Hood’s men were in position on Hardee’s left.

Early on the 22d, the right of the Northern line resumed its advance.
The XX Corps of Thomas’ army moved east on Powder Springs Road,
supported by some of Schofield’s troops. By midafternoon, they reached
the vicinity of Valentine Kolb’s farm. The rest of Schofield’s army
continued down Sandtown Road to the Cheney farm, where it occupied a
position overlooking Olley’s Creek.

In the early part of the afternoon, the Federals captured several
Southerners from whom they learned that Hood had moved to the
Confederate left. From this they concluded that an attack upon the
Federal line was imminent. Quickly the Northern commanders closed up
their units and began to construct protecting works, using fence rails
or whatever material was at hand. Skirmishers were thrown out, and they
soon encountered an advancing line of Southerners. Just what brought
about this attack is not clear. Perhaps the activities of the Northern
skirmishers led the Confederates to think that the Federals were
attacking. Hood may have believed that when the skirmishers fell back he
had defeated an assault on his new position and decided to pursue the
beaten enemy. At any rate, the Southern advance precipitated a battle at
the Kolb farmhouse in which several Confederate attacks were hurled back
by the Federals. Hood lost about 1,000 men. Northern casualties were
about 300. After the battle, Hood fell back to his original position,
extending the Southern line southward to Olley’s Creek. For several
days, there was relative calm along the lines which now ran from the
railroad north of Marietta to Olley’s Creek southwest of the town.
Meanwhile, the rains ceased and the June sun began to dry the land.

Several days after the battle at Kolb’s farm, Sherman decided on a
change in tactics—he would make a direct assault on Johnston’s lines. It
was a bold decision that offered the possibility of a great victory. The
Southern line was thinly held and a successful attack could lead to the
isolation and destruction of a large part of Johnston’s army. The
Federal commander decided to strike the Confederates at three points:
McPherson would assault the southern end of Kennesaw Mountain, Thomas
would move against a salient known as the “Dead Angle” (on what is now
called Cheatham’s Hill) several miles to the south, and Schofield would
push south on Sandtown Road and attempt to cross Olley’s Creek. June 27
was set as the date for the assault, but Schofield was to begin
demonstrations on the 26th to draw Southerners away from other portions
of the line.

    [Illustration: KENNESAW MOUNTAIN]

Early on the 27th, the Federals began to probe at various points along
the Confederate trenches to distract the defenders. At 8 a.m. the
Northern artillery opened a brief but heavy fire to prepare the way for
the assaults. A few minutes later, the Federal infantry moved forward.
McPherson’s troops, advancing on both sides of Burnt Hickory Road, swept
over the Southern outposts and moved rapidly across the broken ground
toward the main Confederate trenches. Although their lines were
disordered, the blue-clad soldiers scrambled over rocks and fallen trees
until they were finally halted by the heavy fire from their entrenched
enemies. A few reached the Confederate line and were killed or captured
while fighting in their opponents’ works. Southerners on Little Kennesaw
added to the Northerners’ discomfort by rolling huge rocks down the
mountainside at them. When the Union troops realized that their attack
could not reach the Confederate lines, they broke off the engagement.
Some were able to find protection in the advanced Confederate rifle-pits
they had overrun and some managed to reach the positions from which they
had begun the assault. A few were forced to seek shelter among the trees
and large rocks on the slopes of the mountain where they remained until
darkness offered a chance to return to their own lines.

To the south, Thomas fared no better. Two columns were directed against
the Southern position—one at Cheatham’s Hill, the other a short distance
to the north. The Southerners expected no attack. Many of them were off
duty and others were relaxing in the lines. The Federal artillery,
however, alerted them to the danger and when Thomas’ infantry started
forward, the Confederates were ready.

As soon as the dense blue columns appeared in the cleared area between
the lines, the Confederates opened what one Northerner called a
“terrible” fire upon them. Men dropped rapidly but the columns continued
up the long slope toward the Southern position. “The air,” one Federal
remembered, “seemed filled with bullets, giving one the sensation
experienced when moving swiftly against a heavy rain or sleet storm.” As
the Union soldiers neared the crest of the ridge, they met the full fury
of the defenders’ fire. To one Federal it seemed as if the Confederate
trenches were “veritable volcanoes ... vomiting forth fire and smoke and
raining leaden hail in the face of the Union boys.”

Most of the attackers never reached the Confederate line. Those who did
were too few to overpower the defenders and were quickly killed or
captured. For a few brief seconds, two Northern battle flags waved on
the breastworks, but the bearers were soon shot down and within a short
time the attack had failed.

As Thomas’ left assaulting column struck that portion of the Southern
line held by the consolidated 1st and 15th Arkansas Regiments, the
gunfire ignited the underbrush and many wounded Federals faced the
terrifying prospect of being burned to death. In one of the notable acts
of the war, Lt. Col. William H. Martin, commanding the Arkansans, jumped
from his trenches waving a white handkerchief and shouting to the
Northerners to come and get the wounded men. For a few minutes, fighting
was suspended along that short stretch of the line and some of Martin’s
soldiers went to assist in moving their helpless enemies away from the
flames. When the wounded had been removed to safety, the two sides
resumed hostilities, but here too it was clear that the attack would not
be able to break Johnston’s lines.

At the Dead Angle, some of the attacking Northerners remained under the
crest of the ridge within a few yards of the Confederate trenches. There
they dug rifle pits of their own and started to burrow under the hill,
hoping to fill the tunnel with gunpowder and blow up the salient.
However, before this project had progressed very far, the Southerners
abandoned the position and thus rendered the subterranean attack
unnecessary.

While the attacks of McPherson and Thomas were being repulsed, Schofield
was gaining a clear success at the extreme right of the Union line. On
the 26th, one of his brigades crossed Olley’s Creek north of Sandtown
Road and, on the following day, cleared their opponents from the area,
securing a position several miles to the south which placed the right of
their line closer to the Chattahoochee than was the left of Johnston’s
army. From this position the Northerners could strike at the Confederate
line of supply and perhaps cut Johnston off from all sources of help by
breaking the railroad.

Exact casualty figures for the battles of June 27 are not available.
However, the best estimates place Northern losses at about 3,000 men.
The Southerners lost at least 750 killed, wounded, or captured.

Sherman has been criticized for ordering the frontal attack on
Johnston’s lines, but it now seems that his decision was not unwise. Had
the assault succeeded, he would have won a great victory. As it was, he
did not continue the attacks when it was clear that they would fail, and
he had managed to secure a position from which he could easily pry
Johnston out of the Kennesaw line.

    [Illustration: _Lt. Col. William H. Martin jumped from the trenches
    waving a white handkerchief and shouting to the Northerners to come
    and get the wounded men._]




                        ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE


The success won by Schofield at Olley’s Creek indicated the direction
for the next Federal movement. Sherman quickly decided to shift troops
to his right, knowing that such a move would force Johnston to choose
between giving up the Kennesaw line or being cut off from Atlanta.
Accordingly, he began to reinforce Schofield by moving McPherson from
the left to the right. By the afternoon of July 2, Federal troops were
pushing southward on Sandtown Road against only light opposition from
small Confederate detachments.

Johnston was aware of what was happening—in fact, he had expected such a
movement since the failure of the assault on the 27th. Believing that it
would be unwise to stretch his lines further and realizing that the
troops opposing the Federal advance could do no more than delay it,
Johnston decided to abandon his Kennesaw Mountain position and fall back
to a previously prepared line near Smyrna, 4 miles to the south.
Accordingly, during the night of July 2-3, the Confederates filed out of
their trenches around Marietta and marched southward.

When Sherman discovered that the Southerners were gone, he pushed
forward in pursuit, hoping to strike while the enemy was retreating. In
the late afternoon of the 3d, the Northerners reached the new
Confederate line. The 4th was spent in skirmishing, but before a serious
battle could develop, the Federal right secured a strategic position
from which it threatened to slice in between Johnston’s army and
Atlanta. Again, the threat to his left forced Johnston to retreat.
During the night of July 4-5, the Southerners fell back to a heavily
fortified position on the north bank of the Chattahoochee.

On the 5th, the Federals pushed forward until they reached the new
Southern line. Skirmishing that day convinced Sherman that the position
was too strong to be carried by a headlong assault. He dispatched a
cavalry force to seize Roswell, an important little manufacturing town
about 16 miles upriver from Johnston’s fortifications, and allowed his
men a few days’ rest while he planned the next move.

    [Illustration: ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER]

After carefully studying the situation, the Federal commander decided to
attempt a crossing near the mouth of Soap Creek, above Johnston’s right
flank. On July 8, he moved Schofield’s Army of the Ohio into position
for the crossing. In a brilliant movement, Schofield, utilizing pontoon
boats and the ruins of a submerged fish dam, got over the river and
drove away the small group of Southerners defending the area. Other
troops were rushed across, bridges were built, trenches were dug, and by
nightfall the Northerners held a secure bridgehead on the southern bank.
On the following day, the Federal cavalry got over the river at Roswell.
Sherman had successfully crossed the last major barrier between
Chattanooga and Atlanta and had carried the fighting into the open
country south of the Chattahoochee where the terrain would favor him.

During the night of July 9-10, Johnston retreated across the river and
took up a position on the southern bank of Peachtree Creek only a few
miles from Atlanta. The Confederate commander seems to have been
optimistic at this time. Once again he believed that he had reached a
position from which he could not be driven and he expected to fight the
decisive battle of the campaign along Peachtree Creek.

Sherman, meanwhile, had decided upon his next step. He would swing north
and east of Atlanta to cut Johnston off from Augusta and possible
reinforcements from Virginia. McPherson was to strike eastward from
Roswell to the Georgia Railroad at some point near Stone Mountain. As
this force advanced, the rest of the Federals would move closer to the
river. The line would thus become a great swinging movement, with
McPherson on the far left, Schofield in the center as the pivot, and
Thomas on the right along Peachtree Creek. This movement began on the
17th. The next day, McPherson reached the Georgia Railroad near Stone
Mountain.




                     JOHNSTON REMOVED FROM COMMAND


The Confederate government had been displeased by Johnston’s conduct of
the campaign. President Jefferson Davis and other civilian officials had
hoped that the Confederates would be able to regain Tennessee or at
least to draw Sherman into a situation in which a severe defeat would be
inflicted upon him. Instead, after 10 weeks of campaigning, Johnston was
backed up against Atlanta and there was no assurance that he would even
try to hold that important center. These circumstances led Davis to
remove Johnston from command of the army and to replace him with John B.
Hood, who was promoted to the temporary rank of full general.

Davis’ replacement of Johnston with Hood is one of the most
controversial acts of the war. Relations between the President and
Johnston had not been friendly since a dispute over the general’s rank
in 1861. Disagreements over strategy and tactics as well as the
personalities of the two men exacerbated matters in 1862 and 1863.
During Johnston’s tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee, the
situation became worse as communications between the two broke down
almost completely. Davis promoted officers in the army without
consulting Johnston, who maneuvered in the field without informing the
government of his plans and operations in any meaningful detail.

Davis saw that Johnston had yielded much valuable territory to the
enemy. Important officials in the government began to urge that the
general be removed from command. On July 9, Davis sent his military
adviser, Gen. Braxton Bragg, to report on the situation in Georgia.
Bragg visited Johnston, learned nothing of the general’s plans, and
reported that it appeared the city would be abandoned. Other evidence
brought to the President’s attention—such as Johnston’s suggestion that
prisoners held in south Georgia be sent to safer points—seemed to
confirm Bragg’s assessment that Atlanta would not be defended. On July
16, Davis telegraphed Johnston: “I wish to hear from you as to present
situation and your plan of operations so specifically as will enable me
to anticipate events.” The general’s reply of the same date read in
part:

  As the enemy has double our numbers, we must be on the defensive. My
  plan of operations must, therefore, depend upon that of the enemy.

  It is mainly to watch for an opportunity to fight to advantage. We are
  trying to put Atlanta in condition to be held for a day or two by the
  Georgia militia, that army movements may be freer and wider.

This vague reply did not satisfy Davis and on July 17 he issued the
order that removed Johnston from command. In great haste, Johnston wrote
out an order relinquishing his position and thanking the soldiers for
their courage and devotion. By the afternoon of the 18th he had left
Atlanta and the Army of Tennessee in the none-too-steady hands of John
Bell Hood.

Much debate has swirled around Davis’ decision. Johnston and his
partisans have argued that the general’s removal made inevitable the
loss of Atlanta, the reelection of Lincoln, and the defeat of the
Confederacy. They contend that had Johnston remained in command, the
city would have been held, or that if it were surrendered, the army at
least would not have been weakened and would have continued as an
effective unit.

Hood and Davis maintained that Johnston’s long retreat had demoralized
the army, that Johnston would not have held Atlanta, and that the
Confederacy’s only chance for success lay in replacing Johnston with a
bold commander who could strike Sherman a blow that would send the
Northerners reeling back to Chattanooga.

Most historians have tended to accept Johnston’s position. There can be
no definite answer, of course, but it does seem that Johnston would have
evacuated the city rather than lose a large portion of his army fighting
for it. This would have saved the army but, coming after the long
retreat from Dalton, might have so demoralized it that desertion and
disgust would have ended its career as an effective fighting force. If
the retention of Atlanta was essential to the life of the Confederacy,
President Davis seems justified in his decision to remove Johnston. It
was the Confederacy’s misfortune that no bold, intelligent, and lucky
general was available to take his place. But one thing was certain—with
Hood leading the Southerners, the pattern of the campaign would change.




                              IN THE RANKS


Historians have long been in the habit of dealing with the past as if it
were nothing more than the story of a small number of great men who
moved about shaping the world as they saw fit. In reality, leaders are
not long successful without followers—the great mass of the common
people who do the work, bear the burdens, and suffer the consequences of
their leaders’ policies. The Civil War offers a unique opportunity to
study the common people of America because during that conflict large
numbers of people were directly involved in the great events of the
times. For most of them, the war was the single most important event of
their lives. Consequently they wrote about it in great detail in their
letters and diaries and saved these documents after the conflict ended.
It is therefore possible to see the Civil War armies as groups of
humans, not masses of automata. The men who followed Sherman, Johnston,
and Hood in 1864 left behind information that adds much to an
understanding of the campaign.

Records kept by the Federal Government show that the typical Northern
soldier was 5 feet 8¼ inches tall and weighed 143½ pounds. Doubtless the
Southerners were of a similar stature. The same records also indicate
that before the war 48 percent of the men had been farmers. Among the
Confederates the percentage of farmers was more than half. Relatively
few immigrants served in either western army—perhaps one-fifth to
one-sixth of the men were of foreign birth. More than half the units in
Sherman’s armies were from Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Iowa, Kentucky,
Missouri, and Wisconsin also furnished large contingents. Such Eastern
States as New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania were
represented, but their contributions were small. More than two-thirds of
the units in the Southern army were from Tennessee, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Georgia. Other States with significant numbers of
troops in the Confederate ranks were Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana.
Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee were represented by units on
both sides. Most of the men in the armies that struggled for Atlanta had
volunteered for military service in 1861 or 1862. By 1864 they had
become veterans, inured to the hardships of military life. Nevertheless,
they found the Atlanta Campaign a severe trial.

Unlike many Civil War military operations in which fighting occurred at
infrequent intervals, the struggle for Atlanta was virtually a
continuous battle. Sometimes, as at Resaca, almost all of the opposing
forces were engaged; at other times, action was limited to the desultory
firing of skirmishers. But only on rare occasions were the soldiers able
to escape the sounds and dangers of combat.

The weather—whether a freak cold wave in mid-June, the unusually heavy
rains of late May and June, or the normal heat of July and
August—affected every man and often hampered troop movements as well.
Frequently units on the march lost men who could not stand the pace. The
soldiers would drop by the roadside until they had recovered their
strength, then move on to overtake their comrades. For example, the heat
on July 12 was so bad that only 50 of the men in an Illinois regiment
could keep up on a 3-mile march. When the armies were in fortified
positions, as they were at Kennesaw Mountain, the men often stretched
blankets or brush across the trenches to protect themselves from the
sun. On rainy days, fence rails or rocks in the trenches served to keep
soldiers out of the water.

Clothing was also a problem. As a rule, Sherman’s men were better
supplied than their opponents, but the wool uniforms they wore were
unsuited to the hot Georgia summer. The Confederates had almost no new
clothing after the campaign began and their uniforms deteriorated
rapidly. A Texan summed up their plight in early June when he wrote: “In
this army one hole in the seat of the breeches indicates a captain, two
holes a lieutenant, and the seat of the pants all out indicates that the
individual is a private.”

Rarely did the men of either army have a chance to wash and almost all
of them were affected by body lice and other vermin. A sense of humor
helped them to survive these trials—soldiers who were pinned down in a
water-filled trench by enemy fire consoled themselves with the thought
that they were at least drowning the lice. The Federals complained that
the retreating Southerners infested the country with lice that attacked
the advancing Northerners. Other pests included chiggers, ticks, snakes,
scorpions, flies, and ants.

    [Illustration: _By 1864 most of the men in the armies that struggled
    for Atlanta had become veterans, inured to the hardships of military
    life._]

    [Illustration: _Soldiers in both armies had no scruples about
    supplementing their rations with whatever could be taken from
    surrounding farms and homes._]

Soldiers in both armies suffered from a shortage of food and had no
scruples about supplementing their rations with whatever could be taken
from the surrounding farms and homes. Corn, pork, chickens, geese, hams,
potatoes, apples, and onions disappeared as the armies moved through a
neighborhood. Wild berries and fish were also eaten. Nevertheless, there
were many times when food was in short supply. One Federal wrote, “most
of the time we are on the move and cannot get such as is fit for a man
to eat.”

The Atlanta Campaign, like many of the later Civil War campaigns, saw
the development of trench warfare on a large scale. Protecting works
were built from loose rocks, fence rails, tombstones, or even the bodies
of dead comrades. By the third or fourth week of the campaign, both
sides had mastered the art of field fortification—a trench, with the
dirt piled on the side toward the enemy and surmounted by a headlog
under which were small openings for firing. Such works left “little but
the eyes ... exposed” to enemy fire. In front of the trenches the
underbrush would be cleared away and young trees cut so they fell toward
the foe. The trees were left partly attached to the stump so that they
could not be dragged aside. Telegraph wire was sometimes strung between
them to create further obstacles.

From behind their fortifications soldiers could pour out such a volume
of fire that there was no chance for a successful massed attack—unless
complete surprise could be achieved or overwhelming numbers brought
against a weak part of the enemy’s line. Much of the fighting was
therefore done by small patrols and snipers, especially in heavily
wooded country such as the area around New Hope Church and Kennesaw
Mountain.

The soldier who died in battle could expect no elaborate funeral.
Usually the armies were too busy to do more than bury the dead as
quickly as possible and they would probably be put in a mass grave near
the place where they had fallen. Later the bodies might be exhumed and
moved to a cemetery where they would be listed as “unidentified” and
reinterred in a numbered but nameless grave.

The soldier who was wounded or who was disabled by disease suffered
greatly. As a rule, the Northerner who was sent to an army hospital
fared better than his opponent because the Federals were better equipped
and provisioned than the Confederates. Field hospitals treated men whose
wounds were either very slight or too serious to permit further
movement. Others were sent by wagon and rail to hospitals in the
rear—Rome, Chattanooga, and Knoxville for the Federals; Atlanta and the
small towns along the railroads south of that city for the Southerners.

Transportation in crowded hospital wagons over rutted roads or in slow
hospital trains was an indescribable horror. The hospitals themselves
were better but, by modern standards, uncomfortable and dirty. For
painful operations, Northern soldiers often enjoyed the blessing of
chloroform. Many Southerners, however, especially those in the hospitals
in smaller towns, frequently endured major surgery without the benefit
of any opiate except, perhaps, whiskey. In such cases the hospitals
echoed with the screams of men undergoing amputations or such treatments
as that calling for the use of nitric acid to burn gangrene out of their
wounds.

    [Illustration: {uncaptioned}]

No precise figures as to the number of men who were killed, wounded, or
sick during the campaign are available. However, it is known that for
the war as a whole, disease killed about twice as many men as did the
weapons of the enemy. Sickness brought on by exposure and unsanitary
camps undoubtedly accounted for many lives among the soldiers in
Georgia. Diseases that were especially common were smallpox, scurvy,
dysentery, diarrhea (also known as “dierear” and the “Tennessee quick
step”), and various types of fevers.

Religion provided a great source of comfort for many soldiers. Chaplains
accompanied both armies but were too few to serve all the troops. Some
chaplains preferred to spend the campaign in the rear where they would
be safe, while others, of far more influence with the men, braved
hardships and dangers with the units they served. At least three of the
latter group were killed in battle during the campaign—either while
helping the wounded or fighting in the ranks. When chaplains were not
available the men sometimes organized and conducted their own religious
services. On the other hand, many soldiers ignored religion altogether
and continued such “sinful” practices as cursing, drinking, and
gambling. Nevertheless, what one soldier called “the missionary
influence of the enemy’s cannon” and the constant presence of death and
suffering led many to seek comfort in religion.

Throughout the campaign, when the armies were in a relatively stable
situation, the men sometimes agreed not to shoot at one another.
Instead, they would meet between the lines to talk, swim, drink, bathe,
enjoy the sun, pick blackberries, exchange newspapers, swap Northern
coffee for Southern tobacco, play cards, wrestle, eat, sing, rob the
dead, and argue politics. Officers on both sides tried to prohibit this
fraternization, but the men in the ranks had the good sense to ignore
their orders. These informal truces would usually be respected by all,
and when they were over, fighting would not resume until every man had
gotten back to his own trenches. Much of the tragedy of the war was
reflected in a letter written by a Wisconsin soldier on June 24:

  We made a bargain with them that we would not fire on them if they
  would not fire on us, and they were as good as their word. It seems
  too bad that we have to fight men that we like. Now these Southern
  soldiers seem just like our own boys, only they are on the other side.
  They talk about their people at home, their mothers and fathers and
  their sweethearts, just as we do among ourselves.

However, regardless of the soldiers’ feelings about each other during
those times of truce, the war was being run by the generals and the
generals said it must go on.




                            PEACHTREE CREEK


John Bell Hood, the new commander of the Confederate forces, found
himself in a difficult position on the morning of July 18, 1864. Hood
was young—only 33—and relatively inexperienced in handling large bodies
of troops. After graduation from West Point (in the same class with the
Federal generals McPherson and Schofield) he had served with the U.S.
Army until the spring of 1861, when he resigned and cast his lot with
the Confederacy. In the early years of the war Hood had risen rapidly in
rank—a rise more than justified by his outstanding leadership at the
brigade and division level.

Until the summer of 1863, Hood had been physically one of the most
magnificent men in the Confederate Army. A woman who knew him in 1861
described him as “six feet two inches in height, with a broad, full
chest, light hair and beard, blue eyes, with a peculiarly soft
expression, commanding in appearance, dignified in deportment,
gentlemanly and courteous to all.” By the time he took command of the
Army of Tennessee, Hood’s appearance had undergone some changes. His
left arm dangled uselessly at his side, smashed by a Federal bullet at
Gettysburg in July 1863. His right leg was gone, cut away at the hip
following a wound received at the Battle of Chickamauga in September
1863. Hood suffered great pain from these wounds, and no doubt he should
have been retired from field command; but he was not the kind of man who
could stay away from the army during a war.

After recovering from his second wound, he was sent to the Army of
Tennessee as a corps commander and had served in that capacity until
Davis selected him to succeed Johnston. He may have been taking a
derivative of laudanum to ease his pain and some students of the war
believe that this affected his judgment. Many soldiers in the army
distrusted Hood’s ability. Some officers resented his promotion over the
heads of generals who had served with the army since the beginning of
the war. Hood himself believed that the army had been demoralized by
Johnston’s long retreat and hence was unlikely to fight well.

Nor could the tactical situation have brought Hood any encouragement.
Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland was advancing southward directly toward
Atlanta, while the armies of McPherson and Schofield were east of the
city, advancing westward. Two of the four railroads that connected
Atlanta with the rest of the Confederacy were in Federal hands. Unless
Hood could keep the remaining lines open, the city was doomed.

    [Illustration: BATTLES AROUND ATLANTA]

  Battle of Peachtree Creek JULY 20
  Battle of Ezra Church, JULY 28
  Battle of Atlanta JULY 22

On July 19, the Army of the Cumberland crossed Peachtree Creek, but as
it advanced, it drifted toward the west. Thus by the afternoon a gap had
developed in the Northern line between Thomas on the right and Schofield
in the center. Hood decided to concentrate the corps of Hardee and
Stewart against Thomas. The Confederate commander hoped to overwhelm the
isolated Army of the Cumberland before help could arrive from McPherson
and Schofield. Hood relied upon his former corps, temporarily commanded
by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham, and the cavalry to defend the area
east of Atlanta. The attack on Thomas was set for 1 p.m., July 20.

Early in the morning of the 20th, while the Southerners were preparing
to assail the right of the Federal line, the Northerners east of Atlanta
moved west along the Georgia Railroad toward the city. Their progress
was so rapid that Hood felt it necessary to shift his army to the right
in an effort to strengthen the forces defending the eastern approaches
to Atlanta. This movement led to such confusion in the Confederate ranks
that the attack against Thomas was delayed for about 3 hours. When the
Southerners were finally ready to strike, Thomas’ men had had time to
establish and partly fortify a position on the south side of Peachtree
Creek.

What Hood had planned as a quick blow against an unprepared Northern
army thus developed into a headlong assault against a partially
fortified line. For several hours the Southerners threw themselves
against the Federals. Most of the attacks were halted before they
seriously threatened the Union position, but for a short while it
appeared that some of Hardee’s men would sweep around the left of
Thomas’ line and win a great victory. Hastily, Thomas assembled
artillery batteries and directed their fire against the Southerners.
Eventually the Confederates were driven back.

While fighting raged along Peachtree Creek, McPherson continued to push
toward Atlanta from the east. By 6 p.m., Hood was forced to call upon
Hardee for troops to reinforce the Southern lines east of the city. This
order drew from Hardee the reserve division that he was preparing to
throw into the assault against Thomas and forced him to abandon the
attack. The first of Hood’s efforts to cripple the Federal army had
failed, although at the time some Southerners saw it as a blow that
slowed Federal progress.

Northern casualties in the Battle of Peachtree Creek were reported at
1,600. Estimates of Southern losses (mostly from Federal sources) range
from 2,500 to 10,000. It seems now that 4,700 is a reliable estimate of
Confederate casualties.

    [Illustration: _Gen. John B. Hood_]

The battle later became a source of controversy between Hood and Hardee.
Hood, smarting under the criticism of Joseph E. Johnston and others,
blamed the failure to crush Thomas on Hardee. The corps commander, Hood
charged, had failed to attack at the proper time and had not driven home
the assault. Hardee, who had outranked Hood when they were both
lieutenant generals and who may have been disgruntled at serving under
his former junior, replied that the delay was caused by Hood’s decision
to shift the line to the right and that the assault had not been as
vigorously executed as it normally would have been because Hood’s
late-afternoon order to send reinforcements to the right had deprived
the attackers of the unit that was to deliver the final blow. Postwar
commentators mostly favor Hardee and a careful examination of the
evidence supports this view.




                         THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA


After the Battle of Peachtree Creek, attention shifted to the eastern
side of the city. Hood determined to strike McPherson who, on July 20
and 21, had moved past Decatur and entrenched a line running north and
south a few miles east of Atlanta. The Confederate commander realized
that he might march troops around the left of McPherson’s position and
attack him from the flank and rear. He chose Hardee’s Corps to be the
flanking column and planned to have Cheatham’s men attack the front of
McPherson’s army from the west while Hardee struck from the south and
east. With luck, this sensible plan could result in the defeat of a
large part of Sherman’s forces.

Late on the 21st, Hardee’s men withdrew from their advanced position
north of Atlanta and by midnight they were marching out of the city.
They were to move southward, then turn and swing eastward and northward.
Meanwhile, the other Southerners fell back to shorter lines where, it
was hoped, they would be able to hold off the Federals while Hardee
outflanked them.

On the morning of July 22, Sherman found the Southerners gone from his
immediate front and concluded that Atlanta had been abandoned. However,
as his armies pushed forward, they discovered that the defenders had
only fallen back to a new position. The Northern advance contracted the
Federal lines and the XVI Corps of McPherson’s army was crowded out of
place. McPherson ordered it to move to his extreme left. Thus at the
time Hardee was moving to that area, McPherson, by chance, was sending
in reinforcements.

Hardee’s march was long and hard. Poor roads, inept guides, and the July
heat combined to delay the Southerners. It was not until noon that
Hardee had his men in position, and at 1 p.m. he sent them forward. The
Confederates made their way through heavy underbrush and emerged facing
the Federal XVI Corps which had halted in a perfect position to meet the
charge which broke upon them.

Poor coordination also weakened the force of the Confederate offensive.
Cheatham’s men, who assailed the XVII Corps, did not join the assault
until about 3:30, by which time Hardee’s attack had lost much of its
force. Nevertheless, the fighting was severe. One Federal brigadier
wrote of the attackers:

  They burst forth from the woods in truly magnificent style in front of
  my right.... Hardly had the enemy made his appearance in my front when
  [the artillery] ... opened on them a deadly fire, which rather
  staggered their line, yet on came the advancing rebels, and hotter
  grew the fire of ... [our artillery]. At the same time the ...
  infantry ... opened on them with cool and deadly aim. Still on came
  the charging columns, more desperate than ever, those in front urged
  up by those in rear.

The first charge was driven back, but the Southerners returned to the
attack again and again throughout the long afternoon. Several times they
swarmed over the Federal positions, capturing men and cannon, but each
time they were driven back. In one of the early charges, McPherson was
killed by advancing Confederate skirmishers as he rode forward to rally
his men. Finally, about 7 p.m., the Southerners abandoned the attack and
fell back. Their losses have been estimated at about 8,000. Union
casualties were reported at 3,722.

For the second time Hood had lashed out at his opponent and had been
thrown back. Later he tried to shift the blame to Hardee whom he accused
of failing to be in the proper place at the proper time. In post-war
years, a bitter verbal battle raged over the question. Most present-day
authorities feel that Hardee did all that could reasonably have been
asked of him. His troops were worn from the battle on Peachtree Creek,
the bad roads slowed his march, and the fateful positioning of the XVI
Corps was a matter over which he had no control.

In the summer of 1864, however, many Confederates saw the battle as a
splendid victory. One artilleryman wrote on July 23:

  We gained a great victory yesterday of which I suppose you know [from
  newspapers] as much as I do. We left before much was accomplished but
  hear that our corps captured 3,500 prisoners and 22 pieces of
  artillery & the enemies killed & wounded amounted to twice our own.




                              EZRA CHURCH


For several days after the Battle of Atlanta, there was a lull in
military activities around the city. Both sides were reorganizing.
Sherman selected Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard to command the army that
McPherson had led. On the Confederate side, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee
replaced Cheatham as commander of the corps that had originally been
Hood’s.

By July 26, Sherman had decided upon his next maneuver. His goal was the
railroads south and west of Atlanta—the last links between that city and
the rest of the Confederacy—and to reach them he would swing Howard’s
Army of the Tennessee around from his extreme left to his extreme right.
The movement began that afternoon and by nightfall on the 27th, Howard’s
men were west of Atlanta. Early the following day the advance was
resumed. The only effective opposition came from a small body of
Confederate cavalry.

Hood was aware of Sherman’s new maneuver and determined to block it by
sending the corps of Lee and Stewart west along the road to the little
settlement of Lickskillet. By noon the opposing forces were in the area
of a meetinghouse known as Ezra Church, about 2½ miles west of Atlanta.
The Confederates had been ordered to attack and prevent the Northerners
from crossing the road, and Lee and Stewart sent their men forward in a
series of assaults against the XV Corps. The Federals had not had time
to entrench, but they had piled up barricades of logs and church
benches, and these afforded some protection.

“Our skirmishers, overpowered by numbers, were compelled to fall back to
the main line,” wrote a Union officer,

  followed at an interval of but a few paces by dense columns of the
  enemy, which, covered as they were by the undergrowth, advanced within
  forty or fifty paces of our lines, when a terrific and destructive
  fire was opened upon them, and was continued steadily until their
  advance was checked, at the distance of some twenty to thirty paces.
  Their lines were cut down, disordered, and driven back some distance,
  when they rallied and again came boldly forward to the charge, but
  under the murderous fire of our rifles were no more able to disorder
  or discompose our lines than before. They gained a little ground
  several times, only to lose it inch by inch, after the most terrible
  fighting on both sides.... After a very short interval, which did not
  amount to a cessation of the battle, new and largely augmented columns
  of the enemy came pouring in upon us, with the same results, however,
  as before, although their colors were planted within twenty paces.

For 4 or 5 hours the assaults continued, but the Confederates attacked
piecemeal—separate units rushing forward—rather than striking a unified
blow, and all their desperate courage was not enough to overcome this
handicap. The Southern army is estimated to have suffered about 5,000
casualties in this battle. Federal losses were reported at 600.

    [Illustration: {uncaptioned}]

    [Illustration: {uncaptioned}]




                          THE MONTH OF AUGUST


Although he had inflicted heavy losses on the Southerners, Sherman seems
to have become convinced that he would not be able to capture Atlanta by
his customary tactics. Hood had constructed a line of trenches that ran
from Atlanta southward to East Point, protecting the railroads. The
Confederate fortifications were too strong to be attacked and too long
to be encircled. Sherman brought up a battery of siege guns and shelled
the city. The Southern artillery in Atlanta replied and for several
weeks helpless citizens lived in their cellars and scurried about amid
bursting shells as the artillery duels started fires and smashed
buildings, killing soldiers and civilians indiscriminately.

The Federal commander also decided to try cavalry raids in the hope that
his horsemen could reach the railroads below Atlanta and, by cutting
them, force Hood to evacuate the city. Late in July, two expeditions
were launched. One under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman was to swing to the
east to McDonough, Lovejoy Station, and Macon, tearing up the railroad
and destroying supplies as it went. These cavalrymen were then to strike
southwest to Americus where they hoped to free the 30,000 Northerners
held in the prisoner of war camp at Andersonville. The other expedition,
under Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook, was to operate to the west and join
Stoneman in attacking the Confederate lines of communication south of
Atlanta.

From the start both raids were badly managed. Much of the blame must
rest upon Stoneman who chose to go directly to Macon rather than follow
orders. The scattered Federals were faced by a well-handled Confederate
force led by Wheeler. Except for Stoneman’s column, the Northern
horsemen were driven back to Sherman’s lines after destroying some
Confederate supplies. Stoneman reached the vicinity of Macon where on
July 31 he was attacked by the Southerners and captured along with 500
of his men.

Somehow during these busy weeks, Sherman found time to write a letter to
Miss Emily Hoffman of Baltimore, the fiancée of the dead McPherson. “I
owe you heartfelt sympathy,” he wrote, adding, “I yield to none of Earth
but yourself the right to excell me in lamentations for our Dead Hero.
Better the bride of McPherson dead than the wife of the richest Merchant
of Baltimore.” Sherman described the fallen leader of the Army of the
Tennessee who had been a close friend as well as a trusted subordinate
as “the impersonation of Knighthood” and added that “while Life lasts I
will delight in the Memory of that bright particular star.”

On August 10, Hood, perhaps thinking that the defeat of Stoneman and
McCook had weakened Sherman’s cavalry, struck out at his opponent’s line
of supply. He sent cavalry commander Wheeler with 4,000 men to destroy
the railroad north of Marietta and to disrupt Sherman’s communications
with the North. Although Wheeler was able to make some temporary breaks
in the line, he was unable to reduce substantially the flow of supplies
to Sherman’s armies. The Federal commander had built strong
fortifications at the most strategic points on the railroad and his
efficient repair crews quickly rebuilt those parts of the track that
Wheeler could reach and damage. Eventually, the Confederate cavalry
drifted into Tennessee and did not rejoin Hood until the campaign was
over. Many students of the war regard Wheeler’s mission as a mistake
because the absence of the cavalry deprived Hood of the best means of
keeping posted on Sherman’s activities and thus proved fatal to the army
at Atlanta.

Wheeler’s departure led Sherman to send out a third cavalry expedition,
commanded by Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick. The Northerners reached the
railroads below Atlanta and on August 18-20 succeeded in tearing up
sections of the track. On the 20th they were driven away. Kilpatrick
reported to Sherman that the railroad had been so thoroughly wrecked
that it would take at least 10 days to repair it. However, on the
following day, the Federals saw trains bringing supplies into the city
from the south. Clearly the Northern cavalry was not strong enough to
destroy Hood’s lines of supply. New plans would have to be tried if the
Unionists were to capture Atlanta.

Meanwhile, a curious kind of optimism was developing in the Southern
ranks. Many Confederates did not see the hard battles of late July as
defeats. Rather they viewed them as successful efforts to halt the
progress of flanking columns that had threatened the city’s lines of
supply. One officer wrote on August 4 about the battles of Atlanta and
Ezra Church: “General Hood watches his flanks closely and has twice
whipped the flanking columns.” When Sherman made no new efforts to flank
the city and when the Northern cavalry raids were beaten off one after
another, many men came to believe that Atlanta had been saved. In
mid-August a Texan informed his homefolk that “affairs are brightening
here. People and army seem more confident of success.” At about the same
time, a Mississippian wrote that “The enemy seems checked in his
flanking operations on our left, as he has made no progress in that
direction for the last four or five days.” On August 28, an Alabamian
wrote his wife that “It required hard fighting to check the enemy here
after having pursued us so far.”

At the very end of August there came exciting news for the Southerners.
Sherman had fallen back! The Northerners were gone from in front of
Atlanta! Many thought Wheeler’s cavalry had cut off Sherman’s supplies
and that this had forced the Federal commander to lift the siege. Joyous
Confederates swarmed out of the city to romp over the abandoned Northern
trenches. “The scales have turned in favor of the South,” wrote Capt.
Thomas J. Key of Arkansas, “and the Abolitionists are moving to the
rear.”

    [Illustration: CAVALRY OPERATIONS
    JULY-AUGUST 1864]




                              JONESBOROUGH


Some Southerners suspected in 1864 what we now know—Sherman had not
retreated. Rather, he had concluded that only his infantry could
effectively break Hood’s lines of supply and had resolved to move almost
all of his force to the southwest of the city. The movement began on
August 25. One corps was sent back to the Chattahoochee bridgehead to
guard the railroad that connected Sherman with the North. The remaining
Federal troops pulled out of their trenches and marched away to the west
and south. By noon on the 28th, Howard’s Army of the Tennessee had
reached Fairburn, a small station on the Atlanta and West Point
Railroad, 13 miles southwest of East Point. Later that afternoon,
Thomas’ troops occupied Red Oak, on the railroad 5 miles to the
northeast. The Northerners spent the rest of the 28th and the 29th
destroying the tracks. The rails were torn up, heated, and twisted so
that they were useless. Only one railroad, the Macon and Western,
running southeast from East Point to Macon, now remained in Confederate
hands. Sherman soon moved to cut it.

By August 29, Hood had learned of the activities of the Federals at
Fairburn. It was clear that the railroad to Macon would be Sherman’s
next objective and the Southern commander acted to defend that line.
However, he badly misjudged the situation and thought that only two
corps of Sherman’s army were to the southwest. Late on August 30, Hood
ordered Hardee to take two corps of the Southern army, move against the
raiding column, and drive it away. Both armies were soon closing in on
Jonesborough, 14 miles below East Point on the Macon railroad. By that
evening, advance elements of the Union forces had crossed the Flint
River and entrenched a position 1 mile west of Jonesborough. During the
night, Hardee’s Southerners moved into the town by rail; by morning they
were deploying in front of the Federal line.

Hardee had his own corps (temporarily led by Maj. Gen. Patrick R.
Cleburne) and Lee’s. It took until mid-afternoon to complete
preparations for an attack. The Confederates advanced about 3 p.m.,
their assault falling mostly on an entrenched salient on the east bank
of the Flint held by the Army of the Tennessee. The attack was fierce
but uncoordinated and failed to drive back the Northerners. When the
fighting ceased that night, the relative positions of the armies were
unchanged.

Meanwhile, Schofield’s Army of the Ohio had managed to break the Macon
railroad near Rough-and-Ready, a small station between Jonesborough and
East Point. This movement led Hood to conclude that Sherman’s main force
was attacking Atlanta from the south. The Confederate commander,
therefore, ordered Lee’s Corps to leave Hardee at Jonesborough and move
toward Atlanta to help defend the city. Lee began this movement at 2
a.m. the next morning.

At dawn on September 1, Sherman with almost all of his troops was south
of Atlanta. The Federals were concentrating at Jonesborough where they
had encountered the bulk of the Southern army on the preceding day and
where it seemed a decisive battle would be fought. The Confederates were
widely separated. Hood, with one corps, was in Atlanta; Hardee, with his
corps, was at Jonesborough; and Lee, with the remaining corps, was near
East Point.

At Jonesborough, Hardee had taken up a defensive position north and west
of the town. During the afternoon he was attacked by the overwhelming
force of Northerners concentrated there. Although suffering many
casualties, especially in prisoners, Hardee’s Corps fought well and held
its position until night offered a chance to fall back to Lovejoy’s
Station, 7 miles to the south.

By this time Hood had realized what was happening and knew that Atlanta
could not be held any longer. During the night of September 1-2, he
evacuated the city. Supplies that could not be carried away were burned.
Hood’s forces moved far to the east of the city to pass around
Jonesborough and join Hardee at Lovejoy’s Station. On September 2, Mayor
James M. Calhoun surrendered Atlanta to a party of Federal soldiers.

On the following day, Sherman sent a telegram to the authorities in
Washington announcing that “Atlanta is ours, and fairly won.” He added
that he would not pursue the Confederates, who were then fortified at
Lovejoy’s Station, but would return to Atlanta so that his men could
enjoy a brief respite from fighting. “Since May 5,” he wrote, “we have
been in one constant battle or skirmish, and need rest.”

A few days later another Federal wrote from his camp near Atlanta: “Here
we will rest until further orders.... The campaign that commenced May 2
is now over, and we will rest here to recruit and prepare for a new
campaign.”

Some writers have been critical of Sherman’s decision not to press after
Hood’s army. They maintain that the enemy force and not the city of
Atlanta was the true objective of the Unionists. It may have been that
Sherman’s action was determined by the question of supplies or it may
have been that his men were too exhausted for immediate operations south
of the city. At any rate, the capture of Atlanta delighted and heartened
Northerners. News of Sherman’s victory was greeted with ringing bells
and cannon fire all over the North.

    [Illustration: {uncaptioned}]




                                EPILOGUE


Sherman soon turned Atlanta into an armed camp. Houses were torn down
and the lumber used for fortifications or soldiers’ huts. Civilians
could not be fed by the army and were ordered out of the city with the
choice of going north or south. In mid-September a truce was declared
and the citizens who chose to remain in the Confederacy were transported
by the Northerners to Rough-and-Ready, where they were handed over to
Hood’s men who conveyed them farther south.

After completion of this unpleasant task, Hood determined to reverse
Sherman’s strategy and to move with his whole army around Atlanta to
draw Sherman after him into Alabama or Tennessee. In late September the
Confederates crossed the Chattahoochee and marched northward over many
of the summer’s battlefields. Sherman left a strong garrison in Atlanta
and followed Hood northward for several weeks. Unable to bring his
opponent to bay, Sherman detached a strong force to deal with the
Confederates and returned to Atlanta. Hood’s army was virtually
destroyed in several battles fought in Tennessee in November and
December. Sherman, meanwhile, reorganized his armies and on November 15
burned Atlanta and marched out of the city on his way to the sea.

The final importance of the Atlanta Campaign may lie more in its
psychological impact than in any military results. Essentially, in early
September, the Confederate military forces were in the same position
relative to the Northern armies that they had held early in the spring.
Psychologically, however, there had been a great shift. The news that
Atlanta had fallen meant that the average Northerner had at last a
tangible military victory that made it possible for him to see the end
of the war in the future. There would be more months of marching,
fighting, and dying, but Sherman’s capture of Atlanta convinced many
that the Confederacy was doomed.

    [Illustration: {uncaptioned}]




              SHERMAN IN ATLANTA: A Photographic Portfolio


On September 3, 1864, President Abraham Lincoln telegraphed the
commanding officer of the Federal Military Division of the Mississippi:
“The national thanks are rendered ... to Major-General W. T. Sherman and
the officers and soldiers of his command before Atlanta, for the
distinguished ability and perserverence displayed in the campaign in
Georgia which, under Divine favor, has resulted in the capture of
Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges and other military operations that
have signalized the campaign, must render it famous in the annals of
war, and have entitled those who have participated therein to the
applause and thanks of the nation.”

The Union soldiers had, in Sherman’s words, “completed the grand task
which has been assigned us by our Government.” Atlanta, chief rail hub
of the Confederacy and one of the South’s principal distributing,
industrial, commercial, and cultural centers, was in Federal hands at
last. It was a choice prize.

The city was founded in 1837 as Terminus, so-named because a rail line
ended there. It was incorporated as Marthasville in 1845; two years
later it was renamed Atlanta. Only a few dozen people lived there in the
1840’s, but by 1861, when the Civil War began, some 10,000 people called
it home. By 1864, when Sherman’s armies started south from Chattanooga,
Atlanta’s population was double that number. The city boasted factories,
foundries, stores, arsenals, government offices, and hospitals, which,
as the war progressed and drew closer, were hard pressed to handle the
mounting number of casualties needing treatment. So strategic was
Atlanta that Confederate President Jefferson Davis proclaimed that “Its
fall would open the way for the Federal armies to the Gulf on one hand,
and to Charleston on the other, and close up those granaries from which
Gen. Robert E. Lee’s armies are supplied. It would give them control of
our network of railroads and thus paralyze our efforts.” Now, with
Federal soldiers in Atlanta, Davis’ fears would be realized.

Sherman’s troops occupied Atlanta for more than 2 months. The
photographs and captions that follow highlight aspects of that
occupation.

    [Illustration:                                   _National Archives_
    _Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, conqueror of Atlanta._]

    [Illustration:                                 _Library of Congress_
    _Confederate palisades and cheveaux-de-frise around the Potter house
    northwest of Atlanta. Near here, Mayor James M. Calhoun surrendered
    the city to Sherman’s forces._]

    [Illustration:                                 _Library of Congress_
    _Union soldiers lounge inside one of the abandoned Confederate field
    forts defending Atlanta._]

    [Illustration:                                 _Library of Congress_
    _Atlanta, October 1864: “solid and business-like, wide streets and
    many fine houses.”_]

    [Illustration:                          _Atlanta Historical Society_
    _Federal officers commandeered many of Atlanta’s houses for staff
    headquarters. Col. Henry A. Barnum and his staff moved into General
    Hood’s former headquarters, described as the “finest wooden building
    in the city.”_]

    [Illustration:                                 _Library of Congress_
    _After Sherman turned Atlanta into an armed camp, wagon trains, like
    this one on Whitehall Street, rumbled through the city day and
    night._]

    [Illustration:                          _Atlanta Historical Society_
    _The 2d Massachusetts Infantry, the “best officered regiment in the
    Army,” set up camp in City Hall Square. When this photograph was
    taken, near the end of the occupation, the soldiers’ tents had been
    replaced by more substantial wooden huts built from demolished
    houses._]

    [Illustration:                                 _Library of Congress_
    _Atlanta residents, evicted from the city by General Sherman, await
    the departure of the baggage-laden train that will take them south
    beyond Union lines._]

    [Illustration:                                 _Library of Congress_
    _Federal soldiers pry up the city’s railroad tracks before leaving
    on their march to the sea._]

    [Illustration:                                 _Library of Congress_
    _The railroad depot after it was blown up by Federal demolition
    squads._]

    [Illustration:                                   _National Archives_
    _This desolate scene marks the site where retreating Confederate
    soldiers blew up their ordnance train early on the morning of
    September 1, 1864. Sherman’s soldiers left similar scenes of
    destruction in their wake as they marched across Georgia in the
    closing months of the war._]




                          FOR FURTHER READING


The only published book-length study of the Atlanta Campaign is Jacob D.
Cox’s _Atlanta_ (New York, 1882; new edition, 1963). More detailed
accounts may be found in two doctoral dissertations: Richard M. McMurry,
“The Atlanta Campaign, December 23, 1863, to July 18, 1864,” and Errol
MacGregor Clauss, “The Atlanta Campaign, 18 July-2 September 1864.” Both
were written at Emory University, the former in 1967 and the latter in
1965, and both are available on microfilm from University Microfilms,
Ann Arbor, Mich. In addition, the _Georgia Historical Quarterly_ and
_Civil War Times Illustrated_ have published numerous articles dealing
with specialized aspects of the campaign.

Good books by participants include Paul M. Angle, ed., _Three Years in
the Army of the Cumberland: The Letters and Diary of Major James A.
Connolly_ (Bloomington, 1959); John B. Hood, _Advance and Retreat:
Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies_ (New
Orleans, 1880; new edition, Bloomington, 1959); Joseph E. Johnston,
_Narrative of Military Operations During the Late War Between the
States_ (New York, 1874; new edition, Bloomington, 1959); Albert D.
Kirwan, ed., _Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade: The Journal of a
Confederate Soldier_ (Lexington, Ky., 1956); Milo M. Quaife, ed., _From
the Cannon’s Mouth: The Civil War Letters of General Alpheus S.
Williams_ (Detroit, 1959); John M. Schofield, _Forty-Six Years in the
Army_ (New York, 1897); William T. Sherman, _Memoirs of General William
T. Sherman, by Himself_ (2 vols., New York, 1875; new, 1-vol. edition,
Bloomington, 1957); U.S. War Department, comp., _War of the Rebellion:
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies_ (128 vols.,
Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), Series 1, vol. 38; Sam R. Watkins, “Co.
Aytch,” _Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment; or, A Side Show of the
Big Show_ (Chattanooga, 1900; new edition, Jackson, Tenn., 1952); and
Charles W. Wills, _Army Life of an Illinois Soldier ..._ (Washington,
D.C., 1906).




                       CIVIL WAR SITES IN GEORGIA


Listed below are several of the major Civil War sites in Georgia. A good
source on other areas is the booklet _Georgia Civil War Historical
Markers_, published by the Georgia Historical Commission.

ANDERSONVILLE: This is now a national historic site. It was the site of
the notorious Civil War prison where, in the summer of 1864, more than
30,000 captured Federals were held. On U.S. 49 at Andersonville, near
Americus.

ATLANTA: Goal of the 1864 campaign. Most of the area in which the
fighting occurred has been built over, but Grant Park contains the
trenches of Fort Walker, the Cyclorama of the Battle of Atlanta, and a
museum.

CHICKAMAUGA: On U.S. 278 near Rossville. A national military park where
the great battle of September 19-20, 1863, was fought.

COLUMBUS: Site of the raised Confederate gunboat _Muscogee_ and a naval
museum on Fourth Street, west of U.S. 27.

CRAWFORDSVILLE: On U.S. 278 west of Augusta. Liberty Hall, the home of
Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephens, has been restored and
is open to the public.

FORT PULASKI: A national monument on U.S. 80 east of Savannah. Site of
an engagement in 1862 when Northern forces attacked and captured the
fort.

IRWINVILLE: Off Ga. 107 in the south-central portion of the State.
Museum at the site where President Jefferson Davis was captured by
Federal forces in 1865.

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN: A national battlefield park on U.S. 41 north of
Marietta. This park preserves much of the area where fighting occurred
in 1864. Museum, slide show, and hiking trails.

MILLEDGEVILLE: On U.S. 441 in east-central Georgia. Capital of Georgia
during the war. Occupied by the Federals during the “March to the Sea.”
Many old buildings remain.

SAVANNAH: Terminus of the “March to the Sea.” Fort McAllister, east of
the city on U.S. 17, was a Confederate defense post. Factors Walk Museum
at 222 Factors Walk houses many wartime relics.


Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park is administered by the
National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. A
superintendent, whose address is Box 1167, Marietta, GA 30060, is in
immediate charge.

As the Nation’s principal conservation agency, the Department of the
Interior has basic responsibilities for water, fish, wildlife, mineral,
land, park, and recreational resources. Indian and Territorial affairs
are other major concerns of America’s “Department of Natural Resources.”
The Department works to assure the wisest choice in managing all our
resources so each will make its full contribution to a better United
States—now and in the future.

    [Illustration: Department of the Interior • March 1, 1849]

  United States Department of the Interior
  Thomas S. Kleppe, Secretary

  National Park Service
  George B. Hartzog, Jr., Director

                         ★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 224-506




                          Transcriber’s Notes


—Silently corrected a few typos.

—Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook
  is public-domain in the country of publication.

—In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by
  _underscores_.







End of Project Gutenberg's The Road Past Kennesaw, by Richard M. McMurry



*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ROAD PAST KENNESAW: THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN OF 1864 ***


    

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
be renamed.

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright
law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works,
so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United
States without permission and without paying copyright
royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part
of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™
concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark,
and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following
the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use
of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very
easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation
of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project
Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may
do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected
by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark
license, especially commercial redistribution.


START: FULL LICENSE

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE

PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK

To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full
Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or online at
www.gutenberg.org/license.

Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works

1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or
destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in your
possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a
Project Gutenberg™ electronic work and you do not agree to be bound
by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person
or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.

1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be
used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few
things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See
paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works if you follow the terms of this
agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™
electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.

1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection
of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the individual
works in the collection are in the public domain in the United
States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the
United States and you are located in the United States, we do not
claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing,
displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as
all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope
that you will support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting
free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg™
works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the
Project Gutenberg™ name associated with the work. You can easily
comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the
same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when
you share it without charge with others.

1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are
in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States,
check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this
agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing,
distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any
other Project Gutenberg™ work. The Foundation makes no
representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any
country other than the United States.

1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:

1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other
immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must appear
prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg™ work (any work
on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed,
performed, viewed, copied or distributed:

    This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
    other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
    whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
    of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
    at www.gutenberg.org. If you
    are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws
    of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
  
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is
derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in
the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are
redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply
either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or
obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg™
trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is posted
with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™ License for all works
posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the
beginning of this work.

1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg™
License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg™.

1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg™ License.

1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including
any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access
to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg™ work in a format
other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official
version posted on the official Project Gutenberg™ website
(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means
of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
full Project Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™ works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
provided that:

    • You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
        the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the method
        you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed
        to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, but he has
        agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project
        Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid
        within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are
        legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty
        payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project
        Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in
        Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg
        Literary Archive Foundation.”
    
    • You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
        you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
        does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
        License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
        copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue
        all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™
        works.
    
    • You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of
        any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
        electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
        receipt of the work.
    
    • You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
        distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.
    

1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than
are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing
from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of
the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set
forth in Section 3 below.

1.F.

1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project
Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may
contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate
or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or
other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.

1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right
of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.

1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you
received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium
with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you
with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in
lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person
or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If
the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing
without further opportunities to fix the problem.

1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement
violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the
agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or
limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or
unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the
remaining provisions.

1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in
accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the
production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses,
including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of
the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this
or any Project Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or
additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any
Defect you cause.

Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg™

Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It
exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations
from people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg™’s
goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™ collection will
remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
and permanent future for Project Gutenberg™ and future
generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see
Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.

Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation

The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification
number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by
U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.

The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500 West,
Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up
to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website
and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact

Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation

Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread
public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest
array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations
($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations
where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND
DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state
visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other
ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To
donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.

Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg™ electronic works

Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could be
freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose network of
volunteer support.

Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
edition.

Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.

This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™,
including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.