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Title: The History of the Peloponnesian War

Author: Thucydides

Translator: Richard Crawley

Release date: December 1, 2004 [eBook #7142]
                Most recently updated: September 7, 2021

Language: English

Credits: Albert Imrie and David Widger


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ***




THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By Thucydides 431 BC

 Translated by Richard Crawley 


With Permission
to
CONNOP THIRLWALL
Historian of Greece
This Translation of the Work of His
Great Predecessor
is Respectfully Inscribed
by
—The Translator—


CONTENTS

 BOOK I
 CHAPTER I
 CHAPTER II
 CHAPTER III
 CHAPTER IV
 CHAPTER V
 
 BOOK II
 CHAPTER VI
 CHAPTER VII
 CHAPTER VIII
 
 BOOK III
 CHAPTER IX
 CHAPTER X
 CHAPTER XI
 
 BOOK IV
 CHAPTER XII
 CHAPTER XIII
 CHAPTER XIV
 
 BOOK V
 CHAPTER XV
 CHAPTER XVI
 CHAPTER XVII
 
 BOOK VI
 CHAPTER XVIII
 CHAPTER XIX
 CHAPTER XX
 
 BOOK VII
 CHAPTER XXI
 CHAPTER XXII
 CHAPTER XXIII
 
 BOOK VIII
 CHAPTER XXIV
 CHAPTER XXV
 CHAPTER XXVI





BOOK I




CHAPTER I


The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the Commencement of the
Peloponnesian War


Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the
Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the moment that it broke
out, and believing that it would be a great war and more worthy of
relation than any that had preceded it. This belief was not without its
grounds. The preparations of both the combatants were in every
department in the last state of perfection; and he could see the rest
of the Hellenic race taking sides in the quarrel; those who delayed
doing so at once having it in contemplation. Indeed this was the
greatest movement yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but
of a large part of the barbarian world—I had almost said of mankind.
For though the events of remote antiquity, and even those that more
immediately preceded the war, could not from lapse of time be clearly
ascertained, yet the evidences which an inquiry carried as far back as
was practicable leads me to trust, all point to the conclusion that
there was nothing on a great scale, either in war or in other matters.

For instance, it is evident that the country now called Hellas had in
ancient times no settled population; on the contrary, migrations were
of frequent occurrence, the several tribes readily abandoning their
homes under the pressure of superior numbers. Without commerce, without
freedom of communication either by land or sea, cultivating no more of
their territory than the exigencies of life required, destitute of
capital, never planting their land (for they could not tell when an
invader might not come and take it all away, and when he did come they
had no walls to stop him), thinking that the necessities of daily
sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as another, they
cared little for shifting their habitation, and consequently neither
built large cities nor attained to any other form of greatness. The
richest soils were always most subject to this change of masters; such
as the district now called Thessaly, Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese,
Arcadia excepted, and the most fertile parts of the rest of Hellas. The
goodness of the land favoured the aggrandizement of particular
individuals, and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of
ruin. It also invited invasion. Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of
its soil enjoying from a very remote period freedom from faction, never
changed its inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification
of my assertion that the migrations were the cause of there being no
correspondent growth in other parts. The most powerful victims of war
or faction from the rest of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a
safe retreat; and at an early period, becoming naturalized, swelled the
already large population of the city to such a height that Attica
became at last too small to hold them, and they had to send out
colonies to Ionia.

There is also another circumstance that contributes not a little to my
conviction of the weakness of ancient times. Before the Trojan war
there is no indication of any common action in Hellas, nor indeed of
the universal prevalence of the name; on the contrary, before the time
of Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such appellation existed, but the
country went by the names of the different tribes, in particular of the
Pelasgian. It was not till Hellen and his sons grew strong in
Phthiotis, and were invited as allies into the other cities, that one
by one they gradually acquired from the connection the name of
Hellenes; though a long time elapsed before that name could fasten
itself upon all. The best proof of this is furnished by Homer. Born
long after the Trojan War, he nowhere calls all of them by that name,
nor indeed any of them except the followers of Achilles from Phthiotis,
who were the original Hellenes: in his poems they are called Danaans,
Argives, and Achaeans. He does not even use the term barbarian,
probably because the Hellenes had not yet been marked off from the rest
of the world by one distinctive appellation. It appears therefore that
the several Hellenic communities, comprising not only those who first
acquired the name, city by city, as they came to understand each other,
but also those who assumed it afterwards as the name of the whole
people, were before the Trojan war prevented by their want of strength
and the absence of mutual intercourse from displaying any collective
action.

Indeed, they could not unite for this expedition till they had gained
increased familiarity with the sea. And the first person known to us by
tradition as having established a navy is Minos. He made himself master
of what is now called the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades,
into most of which he sent the first colonies, expelling the Carians
and appointing his own sons governors; and thus did his best to put
down piracy in those waters, a necessary step to secure the revenues
for his own use.

For in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of the coast and
islands, as communication by sea became more common, were tempted to
turn pirates, under the conduct of their most powerful men; the motives
being to serve their own cupidity and to support the needy. They would
fall upon a town unprotected by walls, and consisting of a mere
collection of villages, and would plunder it; indeed, this came to be
the main source of their livelihood, no disgrace being yet attached to
such an achievement, but even some glory. An illustration of this is
furnished by the honour with which some of the inhabitants of the
continent still regard a successful marauder, and by the question we
find the old poets everywhere representing the people as asking of
voyagers—“Are they pirates?”—as if those who are asked the question
would have no idea of disclaiming the imputation, or their
interrogators of reproaching them for it. The same rapine prevailed
also by land.

And even at the present day many of Hellas still follow the old
fashion, the Ozolian Locrians for instance, the Aetolians, the
Acarnanians, and that region of the continent; and the custom of
carrying arms is still kept up among these continentals, from the old
piratical habits. The whole of Hellas used once to carry arms, their
habitations being unprotected and their communication with each other
unsafe; indeed, to wear arms was as much a part of everyday life with
them as with the barbarians. And the fact that the people in these
parts of Hellas are still living in the old way points to a time when
the same mode of life was once equally common to all. The Athenians
were the first to lay aside their weapons, and to adopt an easier and
more luxurious mode of life; indeed, it is only lately that their rich
old men left off the luxury of wearing undergarments of linen, and
fastening a knot of their hair with a tie of golden grasshoppers, a
fashion which spread to their Ionian kindred and long prevailed among
the old men there. On the contrary, a modest style of dressing, more in
conformity with modern ideas, was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians,
the rich doing their best to assimilate their way of life to that of
the common people. They also set the example of contending naked,
publicly stripping and anointing themselves with oil in their gymnastic
exercises. Formerly, even in the Olympic contests, the athletes who
contended wore belts across their middles; and it is but a few years
since that the practice ceased. To this day among some of the
barbarians, especially in Asia, when prizes for boxing and wrestling
are offered, belts are worn by the combatants. And there are many other
points in which a likeness might be shown between the life of the
Hellenic world of old and the barbarian of to-day.

With respect to their towns, later on, at an era of increased
facilities of navigation and a greater supply of capital, we find the
shores becoming the site of walled towns, and the isthmuses being
occupied for the purposes of commerce and defence against a neighbour.
But the old towns, on account of the great prevalence of piracy, were
built away from the sea, whether on the islands or the continent, and
still remain in their old sites. For the pirates used to plunder one
another, and indeed all coast populations, whether seafaring or not.

The islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders were Carians
and Phoenicians, by whom most of the islands were colonized, as was
proved by the following fact. During the purification of Delos by
Athens in this war all the graves in the island were taken up, and it
was found that above half their inmates were Carians: they were
identified by the fashion of the arms buried with them, and by the
method of interment, which was the same as the Carians still follow.
But as soon as Minos had formed his navy, communication by sea became
easier, as he colonized most of the islands, and thus expelled the
malefactors. The coast population now began to apply themselves more
closely to the acquisition of wealth, and their life became more
settled; some even began to build themselves walls on the strength of
their newly acquired riches. For the love of gain would reconcile the
weaker to the dominion of the stronger, and the possession of capital
enabled the more powerful to reduce the smaller towns to subjection.
And it was at a somewhat later stage of this development that they went
on the expedition against Troy.

What enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was more, in my opinion,
his superiority in strength, than the oaths of Tyndareus, which bound
the suitors to follow him. Indeed, the account given by those
Peloponnesians who have been the recipients of the most credible
tradition is this. First of all Pelops, arriving among a needy
population from Asia with vast wealth, acquired such power that,
stranger though he was, the country was called after him; and this
power fortune saw fit materially to increase in the hands of his
descendants. Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids.
Atreus was his mother’s brother; and to the hands of his relation, who
had left his father on account of the death of Chrysippus, Eurystheus,
when he set out on his expedition, had committed Mycenæ and the
government. As time went on and Eurystheus did not return, Atreus
complied with the wishes of the Mycenæans, who were influenced by fear
of the Heraclids—besides, his power seemed considerable, and he had not
neglected to court the favour of the populace—and assumed the sceptre
of Mycenæ and the rest of the dominions of Eurystheus. And so the power
of the descendants of Pelops came to be greater than that of the
descendants of Perseus. To all this Agamemnon succeeded. He had also a
navy far stronger than his contemporaries, so that, in my opinion, fear
was quite as strong an element as love in the formation of the
confederate expedition. The strength of his navy is shown by the fact
that his own was the largest contingent, and that of the Arcadians was
furnished by him; this at least is what Homer says, if his testimony is
deemed sufficient. Besides, in his account of the transmission of the
sceptre, he calls him

Of many an isle, and of all Argos king.


Now Agamemnon’s was a continental power; and he could not have been
master of any except the adjacent islands (and these would not be
many), but through the possession of a fleet.

And from this expedition we may infer the character of earlier
enterprises. Now Mycenæ may have been a small place, and many of the
towns of that age may appear comparatively insignificant, but no exact
observer would therefore feel justified in rejecting the estimate given
by the poets and by tradition of the magnitude of the armament. For I
suppose if Lacedaemon were to become desolate, and the temples and the
foundations of the public buildings were left, that as time went on
there would be a strong disposition with posterity to refuse to accept
her fame as a true exponent of her power. And yet they occupy
two-fifths of Peloponnese and lead the whole, not to speak of their
numerous allies without. Still, as the city is neither built in a
compact form nor adorned with magnificent temples and public edifices,
but composed of villages after the old fashion of Hellas, there would
be an impression of inadequacy. Whereas, if Athens were to suffer the
same misfortune, I suppose that any inference from the appearance
presented to the eye would make her power to have been twice as great
as it is. We have therefore no right to be sceptical, nor to content
ourselves with an inspection of a town to the exclusion of a
consideration of its power; but we may safely conclude that the
armament in question surpassed all before it, as it fell short of
modern efforts; if we can here also accept the testimony of Homer’s
poems, in which, without allowing for the exaggeration which a poet
would feel himself licensed to employ, we can see that it was far from
equalling ours. He has represented it as consisting of twelve hundred
vessels; the Boeotian complement of each ship being a hundred and
twenty men, that of the ships of Philoctetes fifty. By this, I
conceive, he meant to convey the maximum and the minimum complement: at
any rate, he does not specify the amount of any others in his catalogue
of the ships. That they were all rowers as well as warriors we see from
his account of the ships of Philoctetes, in which all the men at the
oar are bowmen. Now it is improbable that many supernumeraries sailed,
if we except the kings and high officers; especially as they had to
cross the open sea with munitions of war, in ships, moreover, that had
no decks, but were equipped in the old piratical fashion. So that if we
strike the average of the largest and smallest ships, the number of
those who sailed will appear inconsiderable, representing, as they did,
the whole force of Hellas. And this was due not so much to scarcity of
men as of money. Difficulty of subsistence made the invaders reduce the
numbers of the army to a point at which it might live on the country
during the prosecution of the war. Even after the victory they obtained
on their arrival—and a victory there must have been, or the
fortifications of the naval camp could never have been built—there is
no indication of their whole force having been employed; on the
contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese and
to piracy from want of supplies. This was what really enabled the
Trojans to keep the field for ten years against them; the dispersion of
the enemy making them always a match for the detachment left behind. If
they had brought plenty of supplies with them, and had persevered in
the war without scattering for piracy and agriculture, they would have
easily defeated the Trojans in the field, since they could hold their
own against them with the division on service. In short, if they had
stuck to the siege, the capture of Troy would have cost them less time
and less trouble. But as want of money proved the weakness of earlier
expeditions, so from the same cause even the one in question, more
famous than its predecessors, may be pronounced on the evidence of what
it effected to have been inferior to its renown and to the current
opinion about it formed under the tuition of the poets.

Even after the Trojan War, Hellas was still engaged in removing and
settling, and thus could not attain to the quiet which must precede
growth. The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many
revolutions, and factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the
citizens thus driven into exile who founded the cities. Sixty years
after the capture of Ilium, the modern Boeotians were driven out of
Arne by the Thessalians, and settled in the present Boeotia, the former
Cadmeis; though there was a division of them there before, some of whom
joined the expedition to Ilium. Twenty years later, the Dorians and the
Heraclids became masters of Peloponnese; so that much had to be done
and many years had to elapse before Hellas could attain to a durable
tranquillity undisturbed by removals, and could begin to send out
colonies, as Athens did to Ionia and most of the islands, and the
Peloponnesians to most of Italy and Sicily and some places in the rest
of Hellas. All these places were founded subsequently to the war with
Troy.

But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth became
more an object, the revenues of the states increasing, tyrannies were
by their means established almost everywhere—the old form of government
being hereditary monarchy with definite prerogatives—and Hellas began
to fit out fleets and apply herself more closely to the sea. It is said
that the Corinthians were the first to approach the modern style of
naval architecture, and that Corinth was the first place in Hellas
where galleys were built; and we have Ameinocles, a Corinthian
shipwright, making four ships for the Samians. Dating from the end of
this war, it is nearly three hundred years ago that Ameinocles went to
Samos. Again, the earliest sea-fight in history was between the
Corinthians and Corcyraeans; this was about two hundred and sixty years
ago, dating from the same time. Planted on an isthmus, Corinth had from
time out of mind been a commercial emporium; as formerly almost all
communication between the Hellenes within and without Peloponnese was
carried on overland, and the Corinthian territory was the highway
through which it travelled. She had consequently great money resources,
as is shown by the epithet “wealthy” bestowed by the old poets on the
place, and this enabled her, when traffic by sea became more common, to
procure her navy and put down piracy; and as she could offer a mart for
both branches of the trade, she acquired for herself all the power
which a large revenue affords. Subsequently the Ionians attained to
great naval strength in the reign of Cyrus, the first king of the
Persians, and of his son Cambyses, and while they were at war with the
former commanded for a while the Ionian sea. Polycrates also, the
tyrant of Samos, had a powerful navy in the reign of Cambyses, with
which he reduced many of the islands, and among them Rhenea, which he
consecrated to the Delian Apollo. About this time also the Phocaeans,
while they were founding Marseilles, defeated the Carthaginians in a
sea-fight. These were the most powerful navies. And even these,
although so many generations had elapsed since the Trojan war, seem to
have been principally composed of the old fifty-oars and long-boats,
and to have counted few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was only
shortly the Persian war, and the death of Darius the successor of
Cambyses, that the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans acquired any
large number of galleys. For after these there were no navies of any
account in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes; Aegina, Athens, and
others may have possessed a few vessels, but they were principally
fifty-oars. It was quite at the end of this period that the war with
Aegina and the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles
to persuade the Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at
Salamis; and even these vessels had not complete decks.

The navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we have traversed
were what I have described. All their insignificance did not prevent
their being an element of the greatest power to those who cultivated
them, alike in revenue and in dominion. They were the means by which
the islands were reached and reduced, those of the smallest area
falling the easiest prey. Wars by land there were none, none at least
by which power was acquired; we have the usual border contests, but of
distant expeditions with conquest for object we hear nothing among the
Hellenes. There was no union of subject cities round a great state, no
spontaneous combination of equals for confederate expeditions; what
fighting there was consisted merely of local warfare between rival
neighbours. The nearest approach to a coalition took place in the old
war between Chalcis and Eretria; this was a quarrel in which the rest
of the Hellenic name did to some extent take sides.

Various, too, were the obstacles which the national growth encountered
in various localities. The power of the Ionians was advancing with
rapid strides, when it came into collision with Persia, under King
Cyrus, who, after having dethroned Croesus and overrun everything
between the Halys and the sea, stopped not till he had reduced the
cities of the coast; the islands being only left to be subdued by
Darius and the Phoenician navy.

Again, wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing simply for
themselves, of looking solely to their personal comfort and family
aggrandizement, made safety the great aim of their policy, and
prevented anything great proceeding from them; though they would each
have their affairs with their immediate neighbours. All this is only
true of the mother country, for in Sicily they attained to very great
power. Thus for a long time everywhere in Hellas do we find causes
which make the states alike incapable of combination for great and
national ends, or of any vigorous action of their own.

But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older
tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those in
Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though
after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it
suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at a
very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from
tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of
government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of
the late war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of
the other states. Not many years after the deposition of the tyrants,
the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and the Athenians.
Ten years afterwards, the barbarian returned with the armada for the
subjugation of Hellas. In the face of this great danger, the command of
the confederate Hellenes was assumed by the Lacedaemonians in virtue of
their superior power; and the Athenians, having made up their minds to
abandon their city, broke up their homes, threw themselves into their
ships, and became a naval people. This coalition, after repulsing the
barbarian, soon afterwards split into two sections, which included the
Hellenes who had revolted from the King, as well as those who had aided
him in the war. At the end of the one stood Athens, at the head of the
other Lacedaemon, one the first naval, the other the first military
power in Hellas. For a short time the league held together, till the
Lacedaemonians and Athenians quarrelled and made war upon each other
with their allies, a duel into which all the Hellenes sooner or later
were drawn, though some might at first remain neutral. So that the
whole period from the Median war to this, with some peaceful intervals,
was spent by each power in war, either with its rival, or with its own
revolted allies, and consequently afforded them constant practice in
military matters, and that experience which is learnt in the school of
danger.

The policy of Lacedaemon was not to exact tribute from her allies, but
merely to secure their subservience to her interests by establishing
oligarchies among them; Athens, on the contrary, had by degrees
deprived hers of their ships, and imposed instead contributions in
money on all except Chios and Lesbos. Both found their resources for
this war separately to exceed the sum of their strength when the
alliance flourished intact.

Having now given the result of my inquiries into early times, I grant
that there will be a difficulty in believing every particular detail.
The way that most men deal with traditions, even traditions of their
own country, is to receive them all alike as they are delivered,
without applying any critical test whatever. The general Athenian
public fancy that Hipparchus was tyrant when he fell by the hands of
Harmodius and Aristogiton, not knowing that Hippias, the eldest of the
sons of Pisistratus, was really supreme, and that Hipparchus and
Thessalus were his brothers; and that Harmodius and Aristogiton
suspecting, on the very day, nay at the very moment fixed on for the
deed, that information had been conveyed to Hippias by their
accomplices, concluded that he had been warned, and did not attack him,
yet, not liking to be apprehended and risk their lives for nothing,
fell upon Hipparchus near the temple of the daughters of Leos, and slew
him as he was arranging the Panathenaic procession.

There are many other unfounded ideas current among the rest of the
Hellenes, even on matters of contemporary history, which have not been
obscured by time. For instance, there is the notion that the
Lacedaemonian kings have two votes each, the fact being that they have
only one; and that there is a company of Pitane, there being simply no
such thing. So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of
truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand. On the
whole, however, the conclusions I have drawn from the proofs quoted
may, I believe, safely be relied on. Assuredly they will not be
disturbed either by the lays of a poet displaying the exaggeration of
his craft, or by the compositions of the chroniclers that are
attractive at truth’s expense; the subjects they treat of being out of
the reach of evidence, and time having robbed most of them of
historical value by enthroning them in the region of legend. Turning
from these, we can rest satisfied with having proceeded upon the
clearest data, and having arrived at conclusions as exact as can be
expected in matters of such antiquity. To come to this war: despite the
known disposition of the actors in a struggle to overrate its
importance, and when it is over to return to their admiration of
earlier events, yet an examination of the facts will show that it was
much greater than the wars which preceded it.

With reference to the speeches in this history, some were delivered
before the war began, others while it was going on; some I heard
myself, others I got from various quarters; it was in all cases
difficult to carry them word for word in one’s memory, so my habit has
been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them
by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to
the general sense of what they really said. And with reference to the
narrative of events, far from permitting myself to derive it from the
first source that came to hand, I did not even trust my own
impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what
others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the
most severe and detailed tests possible. My conclusions have cost me
some labour from the want of coincidence between accounts of the same
occurrences by different eye-witnesses, arising sometimes from
imperfect memory, sometimes from undue partiality for one side or the
other. The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract
somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those
inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the
interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must
resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have
written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the
moment, but as a possession for all time.

The Median War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a
speedy decision in two actions by sea and two by land. The
Peloponnesian War was prolonged to an immense length, and, long as it
was, it was short without parallel for the misfortunes that it brought
upon Hellas. Never had so many cities been taken and laid desolate,
here by the barbarians, here by the parties contending (the old
inhabitants being sometimes removed to make room for others); never was
there so much banishing and blood-shedding, now on the field of battle,
now in the strife of faction. Old stories of occurrences handed down by
tradition, but scantily confirmed by experience, suddenly ceased to be
incredible; there were earthquakes of unparalleled extent and violence;
eclipses of the sun occurred with a frequency unrecorded in previous
history; there were great droughts in sundry places and consequent
famines, and that most calamitous and awfully fatal visitation, the
plague. All this came upon them with the late war, which was begun by
the Athenians and Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty
years’ truce made after the conquest of Euboea. To the question why
they broke the treaty, I answer by placing first an account of their
grounds of complaint and points of difference, that no one may ever
have to ask the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war
of such magnitude. The real cause I consider to be the one which was
formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and
the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. Still
it is well to give the grounds alleged by either side which led to the
dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out of the war.




CHAPTER II


Causes of the War—The Affair of Epidamnus—The Affair of Potidæa


The city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the Ionic
Gulf. Its vicinity is inhabited by the Taulantians, an Illyrian people.
The place is a colony from Corcyra, founded by Phalius, son of
Eratocleides, of the family of the Heraclids, who had according to
ancient usage been summoned for the purpose from Corinth, the mother
country. The colonists were joined by some Corinthians, and others of
the Dorian race. Now, as time went on, the city of Epidamnus became
great and populous; but falling a prey to factions arising, it is said,
from a war with her neighbours the barbarians, she became much
enfeebled, and lost a considerable amount of her power. The last act
before the war was the expulsion of the nobles by the people. The
exiled party joined the barbarians, and proceeded to plunder those in
the city by sea and land; and the Epidamnians, finding themselves hard
pressed, sent ambassadors to Corcyra beseeching their mother country
not to allow them to perish, but to make up matters between them and
the exiles, and to rid them of the war with the barbarians. The
ambassadors seated themselves in the temple of Hera as suppliants, and
made the above requests to the Corcyraeans. But the Corcyraeans refused
to accept their supplication, and they were dismissed without having
effected anything.

When the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from Corcyra,
they were in a strait what to do next. So they sent to Delphi and
inquired of the God whether they should deliver their city to the
Corinthians and endeavour to obtain some assistance from their
founders. The answer he gave them was to deliver the city and place
themselves under Corinthian protection. So the Epidamnians went to
Corinth and delivered over the colony in obedience to the commands of
the oracle. They showed that their founder came from Corinth, and
revealed the answer of the god; and they begged them not to allow them
to perish, but to assist them. This the Corinthians consented to do.
Believing the colony to belong as much to themselves as to the
Corcyraeans, they felt it to be a kind of duty to undertake their
protection. Besides, they hated the Corcyraeans for their contempt of
the mother country. Instead of meeting with the usual honours accorded
to the parent city by every other colony at public assemblies, such as
precedence at sacrifices, Corinth found herself treated with contempt
by a power which in point of wealth could stand comparison with any
even of the richest communities in Hellas, which possessed great
military strength, and which sometimes could not repress a pride in the
high naval position of an island whose nautical renown dated from the
days of its old inhabitants, the Phaeacians. This was one reason of the
care that they lavished on their fleet, which became very efficient;
indeed they began the war with a force of a hundred and twenty galleys.

All these grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid to
Epidamnus. Advertisement was made for volunteer settlers, and a force
of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Corinthians was dispatched. They marched
by land to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, the route by sea being
avoided from fear of Corcyraean interruption. When the Corcyraeans
heard of the arrival of the settlers and troops in Epidamnus, and the
surrender of the colony to Corinth, they took fire. Instantly putting
to sea with five-and-twenty ships, which were quickly followed by
others, they insolently commanded the Epidamnians to receive back the
banished nobles—(it must be premised that the Epidamnian exiles had
come to Corcyra and, pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors, had
appealed to their kindred to restore them)—and to dismiss the
Corinthian garrison and settlers. But to all this the Epidamnians
turned a deaf ear. Upon this the Corcyraeans commenced operations
against them with a fleet of forty sail. They took with them the
exiles, with a view to their restoration, and also secured the services
of the Illyrians. Sitting down before the city, they issued a
proclamation to the effect that any of the natives that chose, and the
foreigners, might depart unharmed, with the alternative of being
treated as enemies. On their refusal the Corcyraeans proceeded to
besiege the city, which stands on an isthmus; and the Corinthians,
receiving intelligence of the investment of Epidamnus, got together an
armament and proclaimed a colony to Epidamnus, perfect political
equality being guaranteed to all who chose to go. Any who were not
prepared to sail at once might, by paying down the sum of fifty
Corinthian drachmae, have a share in the colony without leaving
Corinth. Great numbers took advantage of this proclamation, some being
ready to start directly, others paying the requisite forfeit. In case
of their passage being disputed by the Corcyraeans, several cities were
asked to lend them a convoy. Megara prepared to accompany them with
eight ships, Pale in Cephallonia with four; Epidaurus furnished five,
Hermione one, Troezen two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia eight. The Thebans
and Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans for hulls as well;
while Corinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand heavy
infantry.

When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to Corinth
with envoys from Lacedaemon and Sicyon, whom they persuaded to
accompany them, and bade her recall the garrison and settlers, as she
had nothing to do with Epidamnus. If, however, she had any claims to
make, they were willing to submit the matter to the arbitration of such
of the cities in Peloponnese as should be chosen by mutual agreement,
and that the colony should remain with the city to whom the arbitrators
might assign it. They were also willing to refer the matter to the
oracle at Delphi. If, in defiance of their protestations, war was
appealed to, they should be themselves compelled by this violence to
seek friends in quarters where they had no desire to seek them, and to
make even old ties give way to the necessity of assistance. The answer
they got from Corinth was that, if they would withdraw their fleet and
the barbarians from Epidamnus, negotiation might be possible; but,
while the town was still being besieged, going before arbitrators was
out of the question. The Corcyraeans retorted that if Corinth would
withdraw her troops from Epidamnus they would withdraw theirs, or they
were ready to let both parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being
concluded till judgment could be given.

Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their ships were manned
and their allies had come in, the Corinthians sent a herald before them
to declare war and, getting under way with seventy-five ships and two
thousand heavy infantry, sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the
Corcyraeans. The fleet was under the command of Aristeus, son of
Pellichas, Callicrates, son of Callias, and Timanor, son of Timanthes;
the troops under that of Archetimus, son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas,
son of Isarchus. When they had reached Actium in the territory of
Anactorium, at the mouth of the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, where
the temple of Apollo stands, the Corcyraeans sent on a herald in a
light boat to warn them not to sail against them. Meanwhile they
proceeded to man their ships, all of which had been equipped for
action, the old vessels being undergirded to make them seaworthy. On
the return of the herald without any peaceful answer from the
Corinthians, their ships being now manned, they put out to sea to meet
the enemy with a fleet of eighty sail (forty were engaged in the siege
of Epidamnus), formed line, and went into action, and gained a decisive
victory, and destroyed fifteen of the Corinthian vessels. The same day
had seen Epidamnus compelled by its besiegers to capitulate; the
conditions being that the foreigners should be sold, and the
Corinthians kept as prisoners of war, till their fate should be
otherwise decided.

After the engagement the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leukimme, a
headland of Corcyra, and slew all their captives except the
Corinthians, whom they kept as prisoners of war. Defeated at sea, the
Corinthians and their allies repaired home, and left the Corcyraeans
masters of all the sea about those parts. Sailing to Leucas, a
Corinthian colony, they ravaged their territory, and burnt Cyllene, the
harbour of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to
Corinth. For almost the whole of the period that followed the battle
they remained masters of the sea, and the allies of Corinth were
harassed by Corcyraean cruisers. At last Corinth, roused by the
sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the fall of the
summer, who formed an encampment at Actium and about Chimerium, in
Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and the rest of the friendly
cities. The Corcyraeans on their part formed a similar station on
Leukimme. Neither party made any movement, but they remained
confronting each other till the end of the summer, and winter was at
hand before either of them returned home.

Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corcyraeans, spent the whole
of the year after the engagement and that succeeding it in building
ships, and in straining every nerve to form an efficient fleet; rowers
being drawn from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas by the inducement
of large bounties. The Corcyraeans, alarmed at the news of their
preparations, being without a single ally in Hellas (for they had not
enrolled themselves either in the Athenian or in the Lacedaemonian
confederacy), decided to repair to Athens in order to enter into
alliance and to endeavour to procure support from her. Corinth also,
hearing of their intentions, sent an embassy to Athens to prevent the
Corcyraean navy being joined by the Athenian, and her prospect of
ordering the war according to her wishes being thus impeded. An
assembly was convoked, and the rival advocates appeared: the
Corcyraeans spoke as follows:

“Athenians! when a people that have not rendered any important service
or support to their neighbours in times past, for which they might
claim to be repaid, appear before them as we now appear before you to
solicit their assistance, they may fairly be required to satisfy
certain preliminary conditions. They should show, first, that it is
expedient or at least safe to grant their request; next, that they will
retain a lasting sense of the kindness. But if they cannot clearly
establish any of these points, they must not be annoyed if they meet
with a rebuff. Now the Corcyraeans believe that with their petition for
assistance they can also give you a satisfactory answer on these
points, and they have therefore dispatched us hither. It has so
happened that our policy as regards you with respect to this request,
turns out to be inconsistent, and as regards our interests, to be at
the present crisis inexpedient. We say inconsistent, because a power
which has never in the whole of her past history been willing to ally
herself with any of her neighbours, is now found asking them to ally
themselves with her. And we say inexpedient, because in our present war
with Corinth it has left us in a position of entire isolation, and what
once seemed the wise precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in
alliances with other powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in
risks of their choosing, has now proved to be folly and weakness. It is
true that in the late naval engagement we drove back the Corinthians
from our shores single-handed. But they have now got together a still
larger armament from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas; and we, seeing
our utter inability to cope with them without foreign aid, and the
magnitude of the danger which subjection to them implies, find it
necessary to ask help from you and from every other power. And we hope
to be excused if we forswear our old principle of complete political
isolation, a principle which was not adopted with any sinister
intention, but was rather the consequence of an error in judgment.

“Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance you
will congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to you.
First, because your assistance will be rendered to a power which,
herself inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Secondly,
because all that we most value is at stake in the present contest, and
your welcome of us under these circumstances will be a proof of
goodwill which will ever keep alive the gratitude you will lay up in
our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves excepted, we are the greatest naval
power in Hellas. Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good fortune
more rare in itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, than that
the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much material and
moral strength should present herself self-invited, should deliver
herself into your hands without danger and without expense, and should
lastly put you in the way of gaining a high character in the eyes of
the world, the gratitude of those whom you shall assist, and a great
accession of strength for yourselves? You may search all history
without finding many instances of a people gaining all these advantages
at once, or many instances of a power that comes in quest of assistance
being in a position to give to the people whose alliance she solicits
as much safety and honour as she will receive. But it will be urged
that it is only in the case of a war that we shall be found useful. To
this we answer that if any of you imagine that that war is far off, he
is grievously mistaken, and is blind to the fact that Lacedaemon
regards you with jealousy and desires war, and that Corinth is powerful
there—the same, remember, that is your enemy, and is even now trying to
subdue us as a preliminary to attacking you. And this she does to
prevent our becoming united by a common enmity, and her having us both
on her hands, and also to ensure getting the start of you in one of two
ways, either by crippling our power or by making its strength her own.
Now it is our policy to be beforehand with her—that is, for Corcyra to
make an offer of alliance and for you to accept it; in fact, we ought
to form plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans she
forms against us.

“If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into alliance
is not right, let her know that every colony that is well treated
honours its parent state, but becomes estranged from it by injustice.
For colonists are not sent forth on the understanding that they are to
be the slaves of those that remain behind, but that they are to be
their equals. And that Corinth was injuring us is clear. Invited to
refer the dispute about Epidamnus to arbitration, they chose to
prosecute their complaints war rather than by a fair trial. And let
their conduct towards us who are their kindred be a warning to you not
to be misled by their deceit, nor to yield to their direct requests;
concessions to adversaries only end in self-reproach, and the more
strictly they are avoided the greater will be the chance of security.

“If it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the
treaty existing between you and Lacedaemon, the answer is that we are a
neutral state, and that one of the express provisions of that treaty is
that it shall be competent for any Hellenic state that is neutral to
join whichever side it pleases. And it is intolerable for Corinth to be
allowed to obtain men for her navy not only from her allies, but also
from the rest of Hellas, no small number being furnished by your own
subjects; while we are to be excluded both from the alliance left open
to us by treaty, and from any assistance that we might get from other
quarters, and you are to be accused of political immorality if you
comply with our request. On the other hand, we shall have much greater
cause to complain of you, if you do not comply with it; if we, who are
in peril and are no enemies of yours, meet with a repulse at your
hands, while Corinth, who is the aggressor and your enemy, not only
meets with no hindrance from you, but is even allowed to draw material
for war from your dependencies. This ought not to be, but you should
either forbid her enlisting men in your dominions, or you should lend
us too what help you may think advisable.

“But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and support.
The advantages of this course, as we premised in the beginning of our
speech, are many. We mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there
be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than is offered by the fact
that the power which is at enmity with you is also at enmity with us,
and that that power is fully able to punish defection? And there is a
wide difference between declining the alliance of an inland and of a
maritime power. For your first endeavour should be to prevent, if
possible, the existence of any naval power except your own; failing
this, to secure the friendship of the strongest that does exist. And if
any of you believe that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon
this belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the treaty, you must
remember that on the one hand, whatever your fears, your strength will
be formidable to your antagonists; on the other, whatever the
confidence you derive from refusing to receive us, your weakness will
have no terrors for a strong enemy. You must also remember that your
decision is for Athens no less than Corcyra, and that you are not
making the best provision for her interests, if at a time when you are
anxiously scanning the horizon that you may be in readiness for the
breaking out of the war which is all but upon you, you hesitate to
attach to your side a place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike
pregnant with the most vital consequences. For it lies conveniently for
the coast-navigation in the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able
to bar the passage of naval reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese,
and from Peloponnese thither; and it is in other respects a most
desirable station. To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both
general and particular considerations, let this show you the folly of
sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable naval
powers in Hellas—Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth—and that if you allow two
of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, you
will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and
Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our ships to
reinforce you in the struggle.”

Such were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished, the
Corinthians spoke as follows:

“These Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine
themselves to the question of their reception into your alliance. They
also talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the victims
of an unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to touch upon both
these points before we proceed to the rest of what we have to say, that
you may have a more correct idea of the grounds of our claim, and have
good cause to reject their petition. According to them, their old
policy of refusing all offers of alliance was a policy of moderation.
It was in fact adopted for bad ends, not for good; indeed their conduct
is such as to make them by no means desirous of having allies present
to witness it, or of having the shame of asking their concurrence.
Besides, their geographical situation makes them independent of others,
and consequently the decision in cases where they injure any lies not
with judges appointed by mutual agreement, but with themselves,
because, while they seldom make voyages to their neighbours, they are
constantly being visited by foreign vessels which are compelled to put
in to Corcyra. In short, the object that they propose to themselves, in
their specious policy of complete isolation, is not to avoid sharing in
the crimes of others, but to secure monopoly of crime to themselves—the
licence of outrage wherever they can compel, of fraud wherever they can
elude, and the enjoyment of their gains without shame. And yet if they
were the honest men they pretend to be, the less hold that others had
upon them, the stronger would be the light in which they might have put
their honesty by giving and taking what was just.

“But such has not been their conduct either towards others or towards
us. The attitude of our colony towards us has always been one of
estrangement and is now one of hostility; for, say they: ‘We were not
sent out to be ill-treated.’ We rejoin that we did not found the colony
to be insulted by them, but to be their head and to be regarded with a
proper respect. At any rate our other colonies honour us, and we are
much beloved by our colonists; and clearly, if the majority are
satisfied with us, these can have no good reason for a dissatisfaction
in which they stand alone, and we are not acting improperly in making
war against them, nor are we making war against them without having
received signal provocation. Besides, if we were in the wrong, it would
be honourable in them to give way to our wishes, and disgraceful for us
to trample on their moderation; but in the pride and licence of wealth
they have sinned again and again against us, and never more deeply than
when Epidamnus, our dependency, which they took no steps to claim in
its distress upon our coming to relieve it, was by them seized, and is
now held by force of arms.

“As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first
submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from
the party who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the credit
due only to him who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well as
words, places himself on a level with his adversary. In their case, it
was not before they laid siege to the place, but after they at length
understood that we should not tamely suffer it, that they thought of
the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with their own
misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join with them
not in alliance but in crime, and to receive them in spite of their
being at enmity with us. But it was when they stood firmest that they
should have made overtures to you, and not at a time when we have been
wronged and they are in peril; nor yet at a time when you will be
admitting to a share in your protection those who never admitted you to
a share in their power, and will be incurring an equal amount of blame
from us with those in whose offences you had no hand. No, they should
have shared their power with you before they asked you to share your
fortunes with them.

“So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and the
violence and rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved. But that
you cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to learn. It may
be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is that it shall be
competent for any state, whose name was not down on the list, to join
whichever side it pleases. But this agreement is not meant for those
whose object in joining is the injury of other powers, but for those
whose need of support does not arise from the fact of defection, and
whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is mad enough to
receive them war instead of peace; which will be the case with you, if
you refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become their auxiliary and
remain our friend; if you join in their attack, you must share the
punishment which the defenders inflict on them. And yet you have the
best possible right to be neutral, or, failing this, you should on the
contrary join us against them. Corinth is at least in treaty with you;
with Corcyra you were never even in truce. But do not lay down the
principle that defection is to be patronized. Did we on the defection
of the Samians record our vote against you, when the rest of the
Peloponnesian powers were equally divided on the question whether they
should assist them? No, we told them to their face that every power has
a right to punish its own allies. Why, if you make it your policy to
receive and assist all offenders, you will find that just as many of
your dependencies will come over to us, and the principle that you
establish will press less heavily on us than on yourselves.

“This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right. But
we have also advice to offer and claims on your gratitude, which, since
there is no danger of our injuring you, as we are not enemies, and
since our friendship does not amount to very frequent intercourse, we
say ought to be liquidated at the present juncture. When you were in
want of ships of war for the war against the Aeginetans, before the
Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with twenty vessels. That good
turn, and the line we took on the Samian question, when we were the
cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to assist them, enabled you to
conquer Aegina and to punish Samos. And we acted thus at crises when,
if ever, men are wont in their efforts against their enemies to forget
everything for the sake of victory, regarding him who assists them then
as a friend, even if thus far he has been a foe, and him who opposes
them then as a foe, even if he has thus far been a friend; indeed they
allow their real interests to suffer from their absorbing preoccupation
in the struggle.

“Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they
are from their elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we have
done unto you. And let them not acknowledge the justice of what we say,
but dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only is the
straightest path generally speaking the wisest; but the coming of the
war, which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to persuade you to do
wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not worth while to be carried away
by it into gaining the instant and declared enmity of Corinth. It were,
rather, wise to try and counteract the unfavourable impression which
your conduct to Megara has created. For kindness opportunely shown has
a greater power of removing old grievances than the facts of the case
may warrant. And do not be seduced by the prospect of a great naval
alliance. Abstinence from all injustice to other first-rate powers is a
greater tower of strength than anything that can be gained by the
sacrifice of permanent tranquillity for an apparent temporary
advantage. It is now our turn to benefit by the principle that we laid
down at Lacedaemon, that every power has a right to punish her own
allies. We now claim to receive the same from you, and protest against
your rewarding us for benefiting you by our vote by injuring us by
yours. On the contrary, return us like for like, remembering that this
is that very crisis in which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he
who opposes is most a foe. And for these Corcyraeans—neither receive
them into alliance in our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So
do, and you will act as we have a right to expect of you, and at the
same time best consult your own interests.”

Such were the words of the Corinthians.

When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. In the
first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the representations
of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had changed and an alliance
with Corcyra was decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be a
defensive, not an offensive alliance. It did not involve a breach of
the treaty with Peloponnese: Athens could not be required to join
Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth. But each of the contracting parties
had a right to the other’s assistance against invasion, whether of his
own territory or that of an ally. For it began now to be felt that the
coming of the Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one
was willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra
sacrificed to Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other
by mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle
which Athens might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other
naval powers. At the same time the island seemed to lie conveniently on
the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens
received Corcyra into alliance and, on the departure of the Corinthians
not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance. They were
commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of
Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their instructions were
to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet except under certain
circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyra and threatened a landing on her
coast, or in any of her possessions, they were to do their utmost to
prevent it. These instructions were prompted by an anxiety to avoid a
breach of the treaty.

Meanwhile the Corinthians completed their preparations, and sailed for
Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. Of these Elis furnished ten,
Megara twelve, Leucas ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, Anactorium one, and
Corinth herself ninety. Each of these contingents had its own admiral,
the Corinthian being under the command of Xenoclides, son of Euthycles,
with four colleagues. Sailing from Leucas, they made land at the part
of the continent opposite Corcyra. They anchored in the harbour of
Chimerium, in the territory of Thesprotis, above which, at some
distance from the sea, lies the city of Ephyre, in the Elean district.
By this city the Acherusian lake pours its waters into the sea. It gets
its name from the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotis and
falls into the lake. There also the river Thyamis flows, forming the
boundary between Thesprotis and Kestrine; and between these rivers
rises the point of Chimerium. In this part of the continent the
Corinthians now came to anchor, and formed an encampment. When the
Corcyraeans saw them coming, they manned a hundred and ten ships,
commanded by Meikiades, Aisimides, and Eurybatus, and stationed
themselves at one of the Sybota isles; the ten Athenian ships being
present. On Point Leukimme they posted their land forces, and a
thousand heavy infantry who had come from Zacynthus to their
assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the mainland without their
allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers to their assistance,
the inhabitants of this part of the continent being old allies of
theirs.

When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three days’
provisions and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for action.
Sailing with the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out at sea and
coming towards them. When they perceived each other, both sides formed
in order of battle. On the Corcyraean right wing lay the Athenian
ships, the rest of the line being occupied by their own vessels formed
in three squadrons, each of which was commanded by one of the three
admirals. Such was the Corcyraean formation. The Corinthian was as
follows: on the right wing lay the Megarian and Ambraciot ships, in the
centre the rest of the allies in order. But the left was composed of
the best sailers in the Corinthian navy, to encounter the Athenians and
the right wing of the Corcyraeans. As soon as the signals were raised
on either side, they joined battle. Both sides had a large number of
heavy infantry on their decks, and a large number of archers and
darters, the old imperfect armament still prevailing. The sea-fight was
an obstinate one, though not remarkable for its science; indeed it was
more like a battle by land. Whenever they charged each other, the
multitude and crush of the vessels made it by no means easy to get
loose; besides, their hopes of victory lay principally in the heavy
infantry on the decks, who stood and fought in order, the ships
remaining stationary. The manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried;
in short, strength and pluck had more share in the fight than science.
Everywhere tumult reigned, the battle being one scene of confusion;
meanwhile the Athenian ships, by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever
they were pressed, served to alarm the enemy, though their commanders
could not join in the battle from fear of their instructions. The right
wing of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it, and
chased them in disorder to the continent with twenty ships, sailed up
to their camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and
plundered the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians and their
allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But where
the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided
success; the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being further weakened by
the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing the
Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them
more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they refrained from charging
any ships; but when the rout was becoming patent, and the Corinthians
were pressing on, the time at last came when every one set to, and all
distinction was laid aside, and it came to this point, that the
Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each other.

After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves in
lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels which they
had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom they butchered as
they sailed through, not caring so much to make prisoners. Some even of
their own friends were slain by them, by mistake, in their ignorance of
the defeat of the right wing For the number of the ships on both sides,
and the distance to which they covered the sea, made it difficult,
after they had once joined, to distinguish between the conquering and
the conquered; this battle proving far greater than any before it, any
at least between Hellenes, for the number of vessels engaged. After the
Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the
wrecks and their dead, most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of
and conveying to Sybota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by
their barbarian allies. Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbour
of Thesprotis. This task over, they mustered anew, and sailed against
the Corcyraeans, who on their part advanced to meet them with all their
ships that were fit for service and remaining to them, accompanied by
the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might attempt a landing in
their territory. It was by this time getting late, and the paean had
been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back
water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which had
been sent out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians,
who feared, as it turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyraeans and
the inability of their handful of ships to protect them. These ships
were thus seen by the Corinthians first. They suspected that they were
from Athens, and that those which they saw were not all, but that there
were more behind; they accordingly began to retire. The Corcyraeans
meanwhile had not sighted them, as they were advancing from a point
which they could not so well see, and were wondering why the
Corinthians were backing water, when some caught sight of them, and
cried out that there were ships in sight ahead. Upon this they also
retired; for it was now getting dark, and the retreat of the
Corinthians had suspended hostilities. Thus they parted from each
other, and the battle ceased with night. The Corcyraeans were in their
camp at Leukimme, when these twenty ships from Athens, under the
command of Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and Andocides, son of Leogoras,
bore on through the corpses and the wrecks, and sailed up to the camp,
not long after they were sighted. It was now night, and the Corcyraeans
feared that they might be hostile vessels; but they soon knew them, and
the ships came to anchor.

The next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to sea, accompanied by
all the Corcyraean ships that were seaworthy, and sailed to the harbour
at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay, to see if they would engage. The
Corinthians put out from the land and formed a line in the open sea,
but beyond this made no further movement, having no intention of
assuming the offensive. For they saw reinforcements arrived fresh from
Athens, and themselves confronted by numerous difficulties, such as the
necessity of guarding the prisoners whom they had on board and the want
of all means of refitting their ships in a desert place. What they were
thinking more about was how their voyage home was to be effected; they
feared that the Athenians might consider that the treaty was dissolved
by the collision which had occurred, and forbid their departure.

Accordingly they resolved to put some men on board a boat, and send
them without a herald’s wand to the Athenians, as an experiment. Having
done so, they spoke as follows: “You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war
and break the treaty. Engaged in chastising our enemies, we find you
placing yourselves in our path in arms against us. Now if your
intentions are to prevent us sailing to Corcyra, or anywhere else that
we may wish, and if you are for breaking the treaty, first take us that
are here and treat us as enemies.” Such was what they said, and all the
Corcyraean armament that were within hearing immediately called out to
take them and kill them. But the Athenians answered as follows:
“Neither are we beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor are we breaking the
treaty; but these Corcyraeans are our allies, and we are come to help
them. So if you want to sail anywhere else, we place no obstacle in
your way; but if you are going to sail against Corcyra, or any of her
possessions, we shall do our best to stop you.”

Receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians commenced
preparations for their voyage home, and set up a trophy in Sybota, on
the continent; while the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead that
had been carried out to them by the current, and by a wind which rose
in the night and scattered them in all directions, and set up their
trophy in Sybota, on the island, as victors. The reasons each side had
for claiming the victory were these. The Corinthians had been
victorious in the sea-fight until night; and having thus been enabled
to carry off most wrecks and dead, they were in possession of no fewer
than a thousand prisoners of war, and had sunk close upon seventy
vessels. The Corcyraeans had destroyed about thirty ships, and after
the arrival of the Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead on their
side; they had besides seen the Corinthians retire before them, backing
water on sight of the Athenian vessels, and upon the arrival of the
Athenians refuse to sail out against them from Sybota. Thus both sides
claimed the victory.

The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anactorium, which stands at the
mouth of the Ambracian gulf. The place was taken by treachery, being
common ground to the Corcyraeans and Corinthians. After establishing
Corinthian settlers there, they retired home. Eight hundred of the
Corcyraeans were slaves; these they sold; two hundred and fifty they
retained in captivity, and treated with great attention, in the hope
that they might bring over their country to Corinth on their return;
most of them being, as it happened, men of very high position in
Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her political existence in the
war with Corinth, and the Athenian vessels left the island. This was
the first cause of the war that Corinth had against the Athenians,
viz., that they had fought against them with the Corcyraeans in time of
treaty.

Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the
Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the war.
Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected her
hostility. The Potidæans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, being a
Corinthian colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were ordered to raze
the wall looking towards Pallene, to give hostages, to dismiss the
Corinthian magistrates, and in future not to receive the persons sent
from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was feared that they might be
persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, and might draw
the rest of the allies in the direction of Thrace to revolt with them.
These precautions against the Potidæans were taken by the Athenians
immediately after the battle at Corcyra. Not only was Corinth at length
openly hostile, but Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the
Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally been made an enemy. He had
been made an enemy by the Athenians entering into alliance with his
brother Philip and Derdas, who were in league against him. In his alarm
he had sent to Lacedaemon to try and involve the Athenians in a war
with the Peloponnesians, and was endeavouring to win over Corinth in
order to bring about the revolt of Potidæa. He also made overtures to
the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace, and to the Bottiaeans, to
persuade them to join in the revolt; for he thought that if these
places on the border could be made his allies, it would be easier to
carry on the war with their co-operation. Alive to all this, and
wishing to anticipate the revolt of the cities, the Athenians acted as
follows. They were just then sending off thirty ships and a thousand
heavy infantry for his country under the command of Archestratus, son
of Lycomedes, with four colleagues. They instructed the captains to
take hostages of the Potidæans, to raze the wall, and to be on their
guard against the revolt of the neighbouring cities.

Meanwhile the Potidæans sent envoys to Athens on the chance of
persuading them to take no new steps in their matters; they also went
to Lacedaemon with the Corinthians to secure support in case of need.
Failing after prolonged negotiation to obtain anything satisfactory
from the Athenians; being unable, for all they could say, to prevent
the vessels that were destined for Macedonia from also sailing against
them; and receiving from the Lacedaemonian government a promise to
invade Attica, if the Athenians should attack Potidæa, the Potidæans,
thus favoured by the moment, at last entered into league with the
Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and revolted. And Perdiccas induced the
Chalcidians to abandon and demolish their towns on the seaboard and,
settling inland at Olynthus, to make that one city a strong place:
meanwhile to those who followed his advice he gave a part of his
territory in Mygdonia round Lake Bolbe as a place of abode while the
war against the Athenians should last. They accordingly demolished
their towns, removed inland and prepared for war. The thirty ships of
the Athenians, arriving before the Thracian places, found Potidæa and
the rest in revolt. Their commanders, considering it to be quite
impossible with their present force to carry on war with Perdiccas and
with the confederate towns as well turned to Macedonia, their original
destination, and, having established themselves there, carried on war
in co-operation with Philip, and the brothers of Derdas, who had
invaded the country from the interior.

Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidæa in revolt and the Athenian
ships on the coast of Macedonia, alarmed for the safety of the place
and thinking its danger theirs, sent volunteers from Corinth, and
mercenaries from the rest of Peloponnese, to the number of sixteen
hundred heavy infantry in all, and four hundred light troops. Aristeus,
son of Adimantus, who was always a steady friend to the Potidæans, took
command of the expedition, and it was principally for love of him that
most of the men from Corinth volunteered. They arrived in Thrace forty
days after the revolt of Potidæa.

The Athenians also immediately received the news of the revolt of the
cities. On being informed that Aristeus and his reinforcements were on
their way, they sent two thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens
and forty ships against the places in revolt, under the command of
Callias, son of Calliades, and four colleagues. They arrived in
Macedonia first, and found the force of a thousand men that had been
first sent out, just become masters of Therme and besieging Pydna.
Accordingly they also joined in the investment, and besieged Pydna for
a while. Subsequently they came to terms and concluded a forced
alliance with Perdiccas, hastened by the calls of Potidæa and by the
arrival of Aristeus at that place. They withdrew from Macedonia, going
to Beroea and thence to Strepsa, and, after a futile attempt on the
latter place, they pursued by land their march to Potidæa with three
thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens, besides a number of
their allies, and six hundred Macedonian horsemen, the followers of
Philip and Pausanias. With these sailed seventy ships along the coast.
Advancing by short marches, on the third day they arrived at Gigonus,
where they encamped.

Meanwhile the Potidæans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus were
encamped on the side looking towards Olynthus on the isthmus, in
expectation of the Athenians, and had established their market outside
the city. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry;
while the command of the cavalry was given to Perdiccas, who had at
once left the alliance of the Athenians and gone back to that of the
Potidæans, having deputed Iolaus as his general: The plan of Aristeus
was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and await the attack of the
Athenians; leaving the Chalcidians and the allies outside the isthmus,
and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas in Olynthus to act upon the
Athenian rear, on the occasion of their advancing against him; and thus
to place the enemy between two fires. While Callias the Athenian
general and his colleagues dispatched the Macedonian horse and a few of
the allies to Olynthus, to prevent any movement being made from that
quarter, the Athenians themselves broke up their camp and marched
against Potidæa. After they had arrived at the isthmus, and saw the
enemy preparing for battle, they formed against him, and soon
afterwards engaged. The wing of Aristeus, with the Corinthians and
other picked troops round him, routed the wing opposed to it, and
followed for a considerable distance in pursuit. But the rest of the
army of the Potidæans and of the Peloponnesians was defeated by the
Athenians, and took refuge within the fortifications. Returning from
the pursuit, Aristeus perceived the defeat of the rest of the army.
Being at a loss which of the two risks to choose, whether to go to
Olynthus or to Potidæa, he at last determined to draw his men into as
small a space as possible, and force his way with a run into Potidæa.
Not without difficulty, through a storm of missiles, he passed along by
the breakwater through the sea, and brought off most of his men safe,
though a few were lost. Meanwhile the auxiliaries of the Potidæans from
Olynthus, which is about seven miles off and in sight of Potidæa, when
the battle began and the signals were raised, advanced a little way to
render assistance; and the Macedonian horse formed against them to
prevent it. But on victory speedily declaring for the Athenians and the
signals being taken down, they retired back within the wall; and the
Macedonians returned to the Athenians. Thus there were no cavalry
present on either side. After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy,
and gave back their dead to the Potidæans under truce. The Potidæans
and their allies had close upon three hundred killed; the Athenians a
hundred and fifty of their own citizens, and Callias their general.

The wall on the side of the isthmus had now works at once raised
against it, and manned by the Athenians. That on the side of Pallene
had no works raised against it. They did not think themselves strong
enough at once to keep a garrison in the isthmus and to cross over to
Pallene and raise works there; they were afraid that the Potidæans and
their allies might take advantage of their division to attack them.
Meanwhile the Athenians at home learning that there were no works at
Pallene, some time afterwards sent off sixteen hundred heavy infantry
of their own citizens under the command of Phormio, son of Asopius.
Arrived at Pallene, he fixed his headquarters at Aphytis, and led his
army against Potidæa by short marches, ravaging the country as he
advanced. No one venturing to meet him in the field, he raised works
against the wall on the side of Pallene. So at length Potidæa was
strongly invested on either side, and from the sea by the ships
co-operating in the blockade. Aristeus, seeing its investment complete,
and having no hope of its salvation, except in the event of some
movement from the Peloponnese, or of some other improbable contingency,
advised all except five hundred to watch for a wind and sail out of the
place, in order that their provisions might last the longer. He was
willing to be himself one of those who remained. Unable to persuade
them, and desirous of acting on the next alternative, and of having
things outside in the best posture possible, he eluded the guardships
of the Athenians and sailed out. Remaining among the Chalcidians, he
continued to carry on the war; in particular he laid an ambuscade near
the city of the Sermylians, and cut off many of them; he also
communicated with Peloponnese, and tried to contrive some method by
which help might be brought. Meanwhile, after the completion of the
investment of Potidæa, Phormio next employed his sixteen hundred men in
ravaging Chalcidice and Bottica: some of the towns also were taken by
him.




CHAPTER III


Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedaemon


The Athenians and Peloponnesians had these antecedent grounds of
complaint against each other: the complaint of Corinth was that her
colony of Potidæa, and Corinthian and Peloponnesian citizens within it,
were being besieged; that of Athens against the Peloponnesians that
they had incited a town of hers, a member of her alliance and a
contributor to her revenue, to revolt, and had come and were openly
fighting against her on the side of the Potidæans. For all this, war
had not yet broken out: there was still truce for a while; for this was
a private enterprise on the part of Corinth.

But the siege of Potidæa put an end to her inaction; she had men inside
it: besides, she feared for the place. Immediately summoning the allies
to Lacedaemon, she came and loudly accused Athens of breach of the
treaty and aggression on the rights of Peloponnese. With her, the
Aeginetans, formally unrepresented from fear of Athens, in secret
proved not the least urgent of the advocates for war, asserting that
they had not the independence guaranteed to them by the treaty. After
extending the summons to any of their allies and others who might have
complaints to make of Athenian aggression, the Lacedaemonians held
their ordinary assembly, and invited them to speak. There were many who
came forward and made their several accusations; among them the
Megarians, in a long list of grievances, called special attention to
the fact of their exclusion from the ports of the Athenian empire and
the market of Athens, in defiance of the treaty. Last of all the
Corinthians came forward, and having let those who preceded them
inflame the Lacedaemonians, now followed with a speech to this effect:

“Lacedaemonians! the confidence which you feel in your constitution and
social order, inclines you to receive any reflections of ours on other
powers with a certain scepticism. Hence springs your moderation, but
hence also the rather limited knowledge which you betray in dealing
with foreign politics. Time after time was our voice raised to warn you
of the blows about to be dealt us by Athens, and time after time,
instead of taking the trouble to ascertain the worth of our
communications, you contented yourselves with suspecting the speakers
of being inspired by private interest. And so, instead of calling these
allies together before the blow fell, you have delayed to do so till we
are smarting under it; allies among whom we have not the worst title to
speak, as having the greatest complaints to make, complaints of
Athenian outrage and Lacedaemonian neglect. Now if these assaults on
the rights of Hellas had been made in the dark, you might be
unacquainted with the facts, and it would be our duty to enlighten you.
As it is, long speeches are not needed where you see servitude
accomplished for some of us, meditated for others—in particular for our
allies—and prolonged preparations in the aggressor against the hour of
war. Or what, pray, is the meaning of their reception of Corcyra by
fraud, and their holding it against us by force? what of the siege of
Potidæa?—places one of which lies most conveniently for any action
against the Thracian towns; while the other would have contributed a
very large navy to the Peloponnesians?

“For all this you are responsible. You it was who first allowed them to
fortify their city after the Median war, and afterwards to erect the
long walls—you who, then and now, are always depriving of freedom not
only those whom they have enslaved, but also those who have as yet been
your allies. For the true author of the subjugation of a people is not
so much the immediate agent, as the power which permits it having the
means to prevent it; particularly if that power aspires to the glory of
being the liberator of Hellas. We are at last assembled. It has not
been easy to assemble, nor even now are our objects defined. We ought
not to be still inquiring into the fact of our wrongs, but into the
means of our defence. For the aggressors with matured plans to oppose
to our indecision have cast threats aside and betaken themselves to
action. And we know what are the paths by which Athenian aggression
travels, and how insidious is its progress. A degree of confidence she
may feel from the idea that your bluntness of perception prevents your
noticing her; but it is nothing to the impulse which her advance will
receive from the knowledge that you see, but do not care to interfere.
You, Lacedaemonians, of all the Hellenes are alone inactive, and defend
yourselves not by doing anything but by looking as if you would do
something; you alone wait till the power of an enemy is becoming twice
its original size, instead of crushing it in its infancy. And yet the
world used to say that you were to be depended upon; but in your case,
we fear, it said more than the truth. The Mede, we ourselves know, had
time to come from the ends of the earth to Peloponnese, without any
force of yours worthy of the name advancing to meet him. But this was a
distant enemy. Well, Athens at all events is a near neighbour, and yet
Athens you utterly disregard; against Athens you prefer to act on the
defensive instead of on the offensive, and to make it an affair of
chances by deferring the struggle till she has grown far stronger than
at first. And yet you know that on the whole the rock on which the
barbarian was wrecked was himself, and that if our present enemy Athens
has not again and again annihilated us, we owe it more to her blunders
than to your protection; Indeed, expectations from you have before now
been the ruin of some, whose faith induced them to omit preparation.

“We hope that none of you will consider these words of remonstrance to
be rather words of hostility; men remonstrate with friends who are in
error, accusations they reserve for enemies who have wronged them.
Besides, we consider that we have as good a right as any one to point
out a neighbour’s faults, particularly when we contemplate the great
contrast between the two national characters; a contrast of which, as
far as we can see, you have little perception, having never yet
considered what sort of antagonists you will encounter in the
Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different from yourselves. The
Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their designs are
characterized by swiftness alike in conception and execution; you have
a genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of
invention, and when forced to act you never go far enough. Again, they
are adventurous beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment,
and in danger they are sanguine; your wont is to attempt less than is
justified by your power, to mistrust even what is sanctioned by your
judgment, and to fancy that from danger there is no release. Further,
there is promptitude on their side against procrastination on yours;
they are never at home, you are never from it: for they hope by their
absence to extend their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to
endanger what you have left behind. They are swift to follow up a
success, and slow to recoil from a reverse. Their bodies they spend
ungrudgingly in their country’s cause; their intellect they jealously
husband to be employed in her service. A scheme unexecuted is with them
a positive loss, a successful enterprise a comparative failure. The
deficiency created by the miscarriage of an undertaking is soon filled
up by fresh hopes; for they alone are enabled to call a thing hoped for
a thing got, by the speed with which they act upon their resolutions.
Thus they toil on in trouble and danger all the days of their life,
with little opportunity for enjoying, being ever engaged in getting:
their only idea of a holiday is to do what the occasion demands, and to
them laborious occupation is less of a misfortune than the peace of a
quiet life. To describe their character in a word, one might truly say
that they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to
give none to others.

“Such is Athens, your antagonist. And yet, Lacedaemonians, you still
delay, and fail to see that peace stays longest with those, who are not
more careful to use their power justly than to show their determination
not to submit to injustice. On the contrary, your ideal of fair dealing
is based on the principle that, if you do not injure others, you need
not risk your own fortunes in preventing others from injuring you. Now
you could scarcely have succeeded in such a policy even with a
neighbour like yourselves; but in the present instance, as we have just
shown, your habits are old-fashioned as compared with theirs. It is the
law as in art, so in politics, that improvements ever prevail; and
though fixed usages may be best for undisturbed communities, constant
necessities of action must be accompanied by the constant improvement
of methods. Thus it happens that the vast experience of Athens has
carried her further than you on the path of innovation.

“Here, at least, let your procrastination end. For the present, assist
your allies and Potidæa in particular, as you promised, by a speedy
invasion of Attica, and do not sacrifice friends and kindred to their
bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some other
alliance. Such a step would not be condemned either by the Gods who
received our oaths, or by the men who witnessed them. The breach of a
treaty cannot be laid to the people whom desertion compels to seek new
relations, but to the power that fails to assist its confederate. But
if you will only act, we will stand by you; it would be unnatural for
us to change, and never should we meet with such a congenial ally. For
these reasons choose the right course, and endeavour not to let
Peloponnese under your supremacy degenerate from the prestige that it
enjoyed under that of your ancestors.”

Such were the words of the Corinthians. There happened to be Athenian
envoys present at Lacedaemon on other business. On hearing the speeches
they thought themselves called upon to come before the Lacedaemonians.
Their intention was not to offer a defence on any of the charges which
the cities brought against them, but to show on a comprehensive view
that it was not a matter to be hastily decided on, but one that
demanded further consideration. There was also a wish to call attention
to the great power of Athens, and to refresh the memory of the old and
enlighten the ignorance of the young, from a notion that their words
might have the effect of inducing them to prefer tranquillity to war.
So they came to the Lacedaemonians and said that they too, if there was
no objection, wished to speak to their assembly. They replied by
inviting them to come forward. The Athenians advanced, and spoke as
follows:

“The object of our mission here was not to argue with your allies, but
to attend to the matters on which our state dispatched us. However, the
vehemence of the outcry that we hear against us has prevailed on us to
come forward. It is not to combat the accusations of the cities (indeed
you are not the judges before whom either we or they can plead), but to
prevent your taking the wrong course on matters of great importance by
yielding too readily to the persuasions of your allies. We also wish to
show on a review of the whole indictment that we have a fair title to
our possessions, and that our country has claims to consideration. We
need not refer to remote antiquity: there we could appeal to the voice
of tradition, but not to the experience of our audience. But to the
Median War and contemporary history we must refer, although we are
rather tired of continually bringing this subject forward. In our
action during that war we ran great risk to obtain certain advantages:
you had your share in the solid results, do not try to rob us of all
share in the good that the glory may do us. However, the story shall be
told not so much to deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and
to show, if you are so ill advised as to enter into a struggle with
Athens, what sort of an antagonist she is likely to prove. We assert
that at Marathon we were at the front, and faced the barbarian
single-handed. That when he came the second time, unable to cope with
him by land we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined
in the action at Salamis. This prevented his taking the Peloponnesian
states in detail, and ravaging them with his fleet; when the multitude
of his vessels would have made any combination for self-defence
impossible. The best proof of this was furnished by the invader
himself. Defeated at sea, he considered his power to be no longer what
it had been, and retired as speedily as possible with the greater part
of his army.

“Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved
that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to
this result we contributed three very useful elements, viz., the
largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most
unhesitating patriotism. Our contingent of ships was little less than
two-thirds of the whole four hundred; the commander was Themistocles,
through whom chiefly it was that the battle took place in the straits,
the acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason of
your receiving him with honours such as had never been accorded to any
foreign visitor. While for daring patriotism we had no competitors.
Receiving no reinforcements from behind, seeing everything in front of
us already subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning our city,
after sacrificing our property (instead of deserting the remainder of
the league or depriving them of our services by dispersing), to throw
ourselves into our ships and meet the danger, without a thought of
resenting your neglect to assist us. We assert, therefore, that we
conferred on you quite as much as we received. For you had a stake to
fight for; the cities which you had left were still filled with your
homes, and you had the prospect of enjoying them again; and your coming
was prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all
events, you never appeared till we had nothing left to lose. But we
left behind us a city that was a city no longer, and staked our lives
for a city that had an existence only in desperate hope, and so bore
our full share in your deliverance and in ours. But if we had copied
others, and allowed fears for our territory to make us give in our
adhesion to the Mede before you came, or if we had suffered our ruin to
break our spirit and prevent us embarking in our ships, your naval
inferiority would have made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his objects
would have been peaceably attained.

“Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed at
that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our extreme
unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our
empire. That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you
were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war against the
barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to us and
spontaneously asked us to assume the command. And the nature of the
case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height;
fear being our principal motive, though honour and interest afterwards
came in. And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had already
revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends
that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it
appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who
left us would fall to you. And no one can quarrel with a people for
making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can
for its interest.

“You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle
the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And if at the period
of which we were speaking you had persevered to the end of the matter,
and had incurred hatred in your command, we are sure that you would
have made yourselves just as galling to the allies, and would have been
forced to choose between a strong government and danger to yourselves.
It follows that it was not a very wonderful action, or contrary to the
common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered
to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the
strongest motives, fear, honour, and interest. And it was not we who
set the example, for it has always been law that the weaker should be
subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be worthy of
our position, and so you thought us till now, when calculations of
interest have made you take up the cry of justice—a consideration which
no one ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had a
chance of gaining anything by might. And praise is due to all who, if
not so superior to human nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect
justice more than their position compels them to do.

“We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated by the
conduct of others who should be placed in our position; but even our
equity has very unreasonably subjected us to condemnation instead of
approval. Our abatement of our rights in the contract trials with our
allies, and our causing them to be decided by impartial laws at Athens,
have gained us the character of being litigious. And none care to
inquire why this reproach is not brought against other imperial powers,
who treat their subjects with less moderation than we do; the secret
being that where force can be used, law is not needed. But our subjects
are so habituated to associate with us as equals that any defeat
whatever that clashes with their notions of justice, whether it
proceeds from a legal judgment or from the power which our empire gives
us, makes them forget to be grateful for being allowed to retain most
of their possessions, and more vexed at a part being taken, than if we
had from the first cast law aside and openly gratified our
covetousness. If we had done so, not even would they have disputed that
the weaker must give way to the stronger. Men’s indignation, it seems,
is more excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks
like being cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled by a
superior. At all events they contrived to put up with much worse
treatment than this from the Mede, yet they think our rule severe, and
this is to be expected, for the present always weighs heavy on the
conquered. This at least is certain. If you were to succeed in
overthrowing us and in taking our place, you would speedily lose the
popularity with which fear of us has invested you, if your policy of
to-day is at all to tally with the sample that you gave of it during
the brief period of your command against the Mede. Not only is your
life at home regulated by rules and institutions incompatible with
those of others, but your citizens abroad act neither on these rules
nor on those which are recognized by the rest of Hellas.

“Take time then in forming your resolution, as the matter is of great
importance; and do not be persuaded by the opinions and complaints of
others to bring trouble on yourselves, but consider the vast influence
of accident in war, before you are engaged in it. As it continues, it
generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from which neither of
us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in the dark. It is a common
mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first, and
wait for disaster to discuss the matter. But we are not yet by any
means so misguided, nor, so far as we can see, are you; accordingly,
while it is still open to us both to choose aright, we bid you not to
dissolve the treaty, or to break your oaths, but to have our
differences settled by arbitration according to our agreement. Or else
we take the gods who heard the oaths to witness, and if you begin
hostilities, whatever line of action you choose, we will try not to be
behindhand in repelling you.”

Such were the words of the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had
heard the complaints of the allies against the Athenians, and the
observations of the latter, they made all withdraw, and consulted by
themselves on the question before them. The opinions of the majority
all led to the same conclusion; the Athenians were open aggressors, and
war must be declared at once. But Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king,
came forward, who had the reputation of being at once a wise and a
moderate man, and made the following speech:

“I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without having had the
experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age as
myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for war
from inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its safety.
This, the war on which you are now debating, would be one of the
greatest magnitude, on a sober consideration of the matter. In a
struggle with Peloponnesians and neighbours our strength is of the same
character, and it is possible to move swiftly on the different points.
But a struggle with a people who live in a distant land, who have also
an extraordinary familiarity with the sea, and who are in the highest
state of preparation in every other department; with wealth private and
public, with ships, and horses, and heavy infantry, and a population
such as no one other Hellenic place can equal, and lastly a number of
tributary allies—what can justify us in rashly beginning such a
struggle? wherein is our trust that we should rush on it unprepared? Is
it in our ships? There we are inferior; while if we are to practise and
become a match for them, time must intervene. Is it in our money? There
we have a far greater deficiency. We neither have it in our treasury,
nor are we ready to contribute it from our private funds. Confidence
might possibly be felt in our superiority in heavy infantry and
population, which will enable us to invade and devastate their lands.
But the Athenians have plenty of other land in their empire, and can
import what they want by sea. Again, if we are to attempt an
insurrection of their allies, these will have to be supported with a
fleet, most of them being islanders. What then is to be our war? For
unless we can either beat them at sea, or deprive them of the revenues
which feed their navy, we shall meet with little but disaster.
Meanwhile our honour will be pledged to keeping on, particularly if it
be the opinion that we began the quarrel. For let us never be elated by
the fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by the devastation of
their lands. I fear rather that we may leave it as a legacy to our
children; so improbable is it that the Athenian spirit will be the
slave of their land, or Athenian experience be cowed by war.

“Not that I would bid you be so unfeeling as to suffer them to injure
your allies, and to refrain from unmasking their intrigues; but I do
bid you not to take up arms at once, but to send and remonstrate with
them in a tone not too suggestive of war, nor again too suggestive of
submission, and to employ the interval in perfecting our own
preparations. The means will be, first, the acquisition of allies,
Hellenic or barbarian it matters not, so long as they are an accession
to our strength naval or pecuniary—I say Hellenic or barbarian, because
the odium of such an accession to all who like us are the objects of
the designs of the Athenians is taken away by the law of
self-preservation—and secondly the development of our home resources.
If they listen to our embassy, so much the better; but if not, after
the lapse of two or three years our position will have become
materially strengthened, and we can then attack them if we think
proper. Perhaps by that time the sight of our preparations, backed by
language equally significant, will have disposed them to submission,
while their land is still untouched, and while their counsels may be
directed to the retention of advantages as yet undestroyed. For the
only light in which you can view their land is that of a hostage in
your hands, a hostage the more valuable the better it is cultivated.
This you ought to spare as long as possible, and not make them
desperate, and so increase the difficulty of dealing with them. For if
while still unprepared, hurried away by the complaints of our allies,
we are induced to lay it waste, have a care that we do not bring deep
disgrace and deep perplexity upon Peloponnese. Complaints, whether of
communities or individuals, it is possible to adjust; but war
undertaken by a coalition for sectional interests, whose progress there
is no means of foreseeing, does not easily admit of creditable
settlement.

“And none need think it cowardice for a number of confederates to pause
before they attack a single city. The Athenians have allies as numerous
as our own, and allies that pay tribute, and war is a matter not so
much of arms as of money, which makes arms of use. And this is more
than ever true in a struggle between a continental and a maritime
power. First, then, let us provide money, and not allow ourselves to be
carried away by the talk of our allies before we have done so: as we
shall have the largest share of responsibility for the consequences be
they good or bad, we have also a right to a tranquil inquiry respecting
them.

“And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character that
are most assailed by their criticism, need not make you blush. If we
undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its
commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous
city has through all time been ours. The quality which they condemn is
really nothing but a wise moderation; thanks to its possession, we
alone do not become insolent in success and give way less than others
in misfortune; we are not carried away by the pleasure of hearing
ourselves cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns; nor, if
annoyed, are we any the more convinced by attempts to exasperate us by
accusation. We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order
that makes us so. We are warlike, because self-control contains honour
as a chief constituent, and honour bravery. And we are wise, because we
are educated with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too
severe a self-control to disobey them, and are brought up not to be too
knowing in useless matters—such as the knowledge which can give a
specious criticism of an enemy’s plans in theory, but fails to assail
them with equal success in practice—but are taught to consider that the
schemes of our enemies are not dissimilar to our own, and that the
freaks of chance are not determinable by calculation. In practice we
always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that
his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a
belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor
ought we to believe that there is much difference between man and man,
but to think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the
severest school. These practices, then, which our ancestors have
delivered to us, and by whose maintenance we have always profited, must
not be given up. And we must not be hurried into deciding in a day’s
brief space a question which concerns many lives and fortunes and many
cities, and in which honour is deeply involved—but we must decide
calmly. This our strength peculiarly enables us to do. As for the
Athenians, send to them on the matter of Potidæa, send on the matter of
the alleged wrongs of the allies, particularly as they are prepared
with legal satisfaction; and to proceed against one who offers
arbitration as against a wrongdoer, law forbids. Meanwhile do not omit
preparation for war. This decision will be the best for yourselves, the
most terrible to your opponents.”

Such were the words of Archidamus. Last came forward Sthenelaidas, one
of the ephors for that year, and spoke to the Lacedaemonians as
follows:

“The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand. They
said a good deal in praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that they
are injuring our allies and Peloponnese. And yet if they behaved well
against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they deserve double
punishment for having ceased to be good and for having become bad. We
meanwhile are the same then and now, and shall not, if we are wise,
disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put off till to-morrow the duty
of assisting those who must suffer to-day. Others have much money and
ships and horses, but we have good allies whom we must not give up to
the Athenians, nor by lawsuits and words decide the matter, as it is
anything but in word that we are harmed, but render instant and
powerful help. And let us not be told that it is fitting for us to
deliberate under injustice; long deliberation is rather fitting for
those who have injustice in contemplation. Vote therefore,
Lacedaemonians, for war, as the honour of Sparta demands, and neither
allow the further aggrandizement of Athens, nor betray our allies to
ruin, but with the gods let us advance against the aggressors.”

With these words he, as ephor, himself put the question to the assembly
of the Lacedaemonians. He said that he could not determine which was
the loudest acclamation (their mode of decision is by acclamation not
by voting); the fact being that he wished to make them declare their
opinion openly and thus to increase their ardour for war. Accordingly
he said: “All Lacedaemonians who are of opinion that the treaty has
been broken, and that Athens is guilty, leave your seats and go there,”
pointing out a certain place; “all who are of the opposite opinion,
there.” They accordingly stood up and divided; and those who held that
the treaty had been broken were in a decided majority. Summoning the
allies, they told them that their opinion was that Athens had been
guilty of injustice, but that they wished to convoke all the allies and
put it to the vote; in order that they might make war, if they decided
to do so, on a common resolution. Having thus gained their point, the
delegates returned home at once; the Athenian envoys a little later,
when they had dispatched the objects of their mission. This decision of
the assembly, judging that the treaty had been broken, was made in the
fourteenth year of the thirty years’ truce, which was entered into
after the affair of Euboea.

The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that the
war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the
arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power
of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them.




CHAPTER IV


From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the Peloponnesian
War—The Progress from Supremacy to Empire


The way in which Athens came to be placed in the circumstances under
which her power grew was this. After the Medes had returned from
Europe, defeated by sea and land by the Hellenes, and after those of
them who had fled with their ships to Mycale had been destroyed,
Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, the commander of the Hellenes
at Mycale, departed home with the allies from Peloponnese. But the
Athenians and the allies from Ionia and Hellespont, who had now
revolted from the King, remained and laid siege to Sestos, which was
still held by the Medes. After wintering before it, they became masters
of the place on its evacuation by the barbarians; and after this they
sailed away from Hellespont to their respective cities. Meanwhile the
Athenian people, after the departure of the barbarian from their
country, at once proceeded to carry over their children and wives, and
such property as they had left, from the places where they had
deposited them, and prepared to rebuild their city and their walls. For
only isolated portions of the circumference had been left standing, and
most of the houses were in ruins; though a few remained, in which the
Persian grandees had taken up their quarters.

Perceiving what they were going to do, the Lacedaemonians sent an
embassy to Athens. They would have themselves preferred to see neither
her nor any other city in possession of a wall; though here they acted
principally at the instigation of their allies, who were alarmed at the
strength of her newly acquired navy and the valour which she had
displayed in the war with the Medes. They begged her not only to
abstain from building walls for herself, but also to join them in
throwing down the walls that still held together of the
ultra-Peloponnesian cities. The real meaning of their advice, the
suspicion that it contained against the Athenians, was not proclaimed;
it was urged that so the barbarian, in the event of a third invasion,
would not have any strong place, such as he now had in Thebes, for his
base of operations; and that Peloponnese would suffice for all as a
base both for retreat and offence. After the Lacedaemonians had thus
spoken, they were, on the advice of Themistocles, immediately dismissed
by the Athenians, with the answer that ambassadors should be sent to
Sparta to discuss the question. Themistocles told the Athenians to send
him off with all speed to Lacedaemon, but not to dispatch his
colleagues as soon as they had selected them, but to wait until they
had raised their wall to the height from which defence was possible.
Meanwhile the whole population in the city was to labour at the wall,
the Athenians, their wives, and their children, sparing no edifice,
private or public, which might be of any use to the work, but throwing
all down. After giving these instructions, and adding that he would be
responsible for all other matters there, he departed. Arrived at
Lacedaemon he did not seek an audience with the authorities, but tried
to gain time and made excuses. When any of the government asked him why
he did not appear in the assembly, he would say that he was waiting for
his colleagues, who had been detained in Athens by some engagement;
however, that he expected their speedy arrival, and wondered that they
were not yet there. At first the Lacedaemonians trusted the words of
Themistocles, through their friendship for him; but when others
arrived, all distinctly declaring that the work was going on and
already attaining some elevation, they did not know how to disbelieve
it. Aware of this, he told them that rumours are deceptive, and should
not be trusted; they should send some reputable persons from Sparta to
inspect, whose report might be trusted. They dispatched them
accordingly. Concerning these Themistocles secretly sent word to the
Athenians to detain them as far as possible without putting them under
open constraint, and not to let them go until they had themselves
returned. For his colleagues had now joined him, Abronichus, son of
Lysicles, and Aristides, son of Lysimachus, with the news that the wall
was sufficiently advanced; and he feared that when the Lacedaemonians
heard the facts, they might refuse to let them go. So the Athenians
detained the envoys according to his message, and Themistocles had an
audience with the Lacedaemonians, and at last openly told them that
Athens was now fortified sufficiently to protect its inhabitants; that
any embassy which the Lacedaemonians or their allies might wish to send
to them should in future proceed on the assumption that the people to
whom they were going was able to distinguish both its own and the
general interests. That when the Athenians thought fit to abandon their
city and to embark in their ships, they ventured on that perilous step
without consulting them; and that on the other hand, wherever they had
deliberated with the Lacedaemonians, they had proved themselves to be
in judgment second to none. That they now thought it fit that their
city should have a wall, and that this would be more for the advantage
of both the citizens of Athens and the Hellenic confederacy; for
without equal military strength it was impossible to contribute equal
or fair counsel to the common interest. It followed, he observed,
either that all the members of the confederacy should be without walls,
or that the present step should be considered a right one.

The Lacedaemonians did not betray any open signs of anger against the
Athenians at what they heard. The embassy, it seems, was prompted not
by a desire to obstruct, but to guide the counsels of their government:
besides, Spartan feeling was at that time very friendly towards Athens
on account of the patriotism which she had displayed in the struggle
with the Mede. Still the defeat of their wishes could not but cause
them secret annoyance. The envoys of each state departed home without
complaint.

In this way the Athenians walled their city in a little while. To this
day the building shows signs of the haste of its execution; the
foundations are laid of stones of all kinds, and in some places not
wrought or fitted, but placed just in the order in which they were
brought by the different hands; and many columns, too, from tombs, and
sculptured stones were put in with the rest. For the bounds of the city
were extended at every point of the circumference; and so they laid
hands on everything without exception in their haste. Themistocles also
persuaded them to finish the walls of Piraeus, which had been begun
before, in his year of office as archon; being influenced alike by the
fineness of a locality that has three natural harbours, and by the
great start which the Athenians would gain in the acquisition of power
by becoming a naval people. For he first ventured to tell them to stick
to the sea and forthwith began to lay the foundations of the empire. It
was by his advice, too, that they built the walls of that thickness
which can still be discerned round Piraeus, the stones being brought up
by two wagons meeting each other. Between the walls thus formed there
was neither rubble nor mortar, but great stones hewn square and fitted
together, cramped to each other on the outside with iron and lead.
About half the height that he intended was finished. His idea was by
their size and thickness to keep off the attacks of an enemy; he
thought that they might be adequately defended by a small garrison of
invalids, and the rest be freed for service in the fleet. For the fleet
claimed most of his attention. He saw, as I think, that the approach by
sea was easier for the king’s army than that by land: he also thought
Piraeus more valuable than the upper city; indeed, he was always
advising the Athenians, if a day should come when they were hard
pressed by land, to go down into Piraeus, and defy the world with their
fleet. Thus, therefore, the Athenians completed their wall, and
commenced their other buildings immediately after the retreat of the
Mede.

Meanwhile Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from Lacedaemon
as commander-in-chief of the Hellenes, with twenty ships from
Peloponnese. With him sailed the Athenians with thirty ships, and a
number of the other allies. They made an expedition against Cyprus and
subdued most of the island, and afterwards against Byzantium, which was
in the hands of the Medes, and compelled it to surrender. This event
took place while the Spartans were still supreme. But the violence of
Pausanias had already begun to be disagreeable to the Hellenes,
particularly to the Ionians and the newly liberated populations. These
resorted to the Athenians and requested them as their kinsmen to become
their leaders, and to stop any attempt at violence on the part of
Pausanias. The Athenians accepted their overtures, and determined to
put down any attempt of the kind and to settle everything else as their
interests might seem to demand. In the meantime the Lacedaemonians
recalled Pausanias for an investigation of the reports which had
reached them. Manifold and grave accusations had been brought against
him by Hellenes arriving in Sparta; and, to all appearance, there had
been in him more of the mimicry of a despot than of the attitude of a
general. As it happened, his recall came just at the time when the
hatred which he had inspired had induced the allies to desert him, the
soldiers from Peloponnese excepted, and to range themselves by the side
of the Athenians. On his arrival at Lacedaemon, he was censured for his
private acts of oppression, but was acquitted on the heaviest counts
and pronounced not guilty; it must be known that the charge of Medism
formed one of the principal, and to all appearance one of the best
founded, articles against him. The Lacedaemonians did not, however,
restore him to his command, but sent out Dorkis and certain others with
a small force; who found the allies no longer inclined to concede to
them the supremacy. Perceiving this they departed, and the
Lacedaemonians did not send out any to succeed them. They feared for
those who went out a deterioration similar to that observable in
Pausanias; besides, they desired to be rid of the Median War, and were
satisfied of the competency of the Athenians for the position, and of
their friendship at the time towards themselves.

The Athenians, having thus succeeded to the supremacy by the voluntary
act of the allies through their hatred of Pausanias, fixed which cities
were to contribute money against the barbarian, which ships; their
professed object being to retaliate for their sufferings by ravaging
the King’s country. Now was the time that the office of “Treasurers for
Hellas” was first instituted by the Athenians. These officers received
the tribute, as the money contributed was called. The tribute was first
fixed at four hundred and sixty talents. The common treasury was at
Delos, and the congresses were held in the temple. Their supremacy
commenced with independent allies who acted on the resolutions of a
common congress. It was marked by the following undertakings in war and
in administration during the interval between the Median and the
present war, against the barbarian, against their own rebel allies, and
against the Peloponnesian powers which would come in contact with them
on various occasions. My excuse for relating these events, and for
venturing on this digression, is that this passage of history has been
omitted by all my predecessors, who have confined themselves either to
Hellenic history before the Median War, or the Median War itself.
Hellanicus, it is true, did touch on these events in his Athenian
history; but he is somewhat concise and not accurate in his dates.
Besides, the history of these events contains an explanation of the
growth of the Athenian empire.

First the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon from the
Medes, and made slaves of the inhabitants, being under the command of
Cimon, son of Miltiades. Next they enslaved Scyros, the island in the
Aegean, containing a Dolopian population, and colonized it themselves.
This was followed by a war against Carystus, in which the rest of
Euboea remained neutral, and which was ended by surrender on
conditions. After this Naxos left the confederacy, and a war ensued,
and she had to return after a siege; this was the first instance of the
engagement being broken by the subjugation of an allied city, a
precedent which was followed by that of the rest in the order which
circumstances prescribed. Of all the causes of defection, that
connected with arrears of tribute and vessels, and with failure of
service, was the chief; for the Athenians were very severe and
exacting, and made themselves offensive by applying the screw of
necessity to men who were not used to and in fact not disposed for any
continuous labour. In some other respects the Athenians were not the
old popular rulers they had been at first; and if they had more than
their fair share of service, it was correspondingly easy for them to
reduce any that tried to leave the confederacy. For this the allies had
themselves to blame; the wish to get off service making most of them
arrange to pay their share of the expense in money instead of in ships,
and so to avoid having to leave their homes. Thus while Athens was
increasing her navy with the funds which they contributed, a revolt
always found them without resources or experience for war.

Next we come to the actions by land and by sea at the river Eurymedon,
between the Athenians with their allies, and the Medes, when the
Athenians won both battles on the same day under the conduct of Cimon,
son of Miltiades, and captured and destroyed the whole Phoenician
fleet, consisting of two hundred vessels. Some time afterwards occurred
the defection of the Thasians, caused by disagreements about the marts
on the opposite coast of Thrace, and about the mine in their
possession. Sailing with a fleet to Thasos, the Athenians defeated them
at sea and effected a landing on the island. About the same time they
sent ten thousand settlers of their own citizens and the allies to
settle the place then called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways, now Amphipolis.
They succeeded in gaining possession of Ennea Hodoi from the Edonians,
but on advancing into the interior of Thrace were cut off in Drabescus,
a town of the Edonians, by the assembled Thracians, who regarded the
settlement of the place Ennea Hodoi as an act of hostility. Meanwhile
the Thasians being defeated in the field and suffering siege, appealed
to Lacedaemon, and desired her to assist them by an invasion of Attica.
Without informing Athens, she promised and intended to do so, but was
prevented by the occurrence of the earthquake, accompanied by the
secession of the Helots and the Thuriats and Aethaeans of the Perioeci
to Ithome. Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old
Messenians that were enslaved in the famous war; and so all of them
came to be called Messenians. So the Lacedaemonians being engaged in a
war with the rebels in Ithome, the Thasians in the third year of the
siege obtained terms from the Athenians by razing their walls,
delivering up their ships, and arranging to pay the moneys demanded at
once, and tribute in future; giving up their possessions on the
continent together with the mine.

The Lacedaemonians, meanwhile, finding the war against the rebels in
Ithome likely to last, invoked the aid of their allies, and especially
of the Athenians, who came in some force under the command of Cimon.
The reason for this pressing summons lay in their reputed skill in
siege operations; a long siege had taught the Lacedaemonians their own
deficiency in this art, else they would have taken the place by
assault. The first open quarrel between the Lacedaemonians and
Athenians arose out of this expedition. The Lacedaemonians, when
assault failed to take the place, apprehensive of the enterprising and
revolutionary character of the Athenians, and further looking upon them
as of alien extraction, began to fear that, if they remained, they
might be tempted by the besieged in Ithome to attempt some political
changes. They accordingly dismissed them alone of the allies, without
declaring their suspicions, but merely saying that they had now no need
of them. But the Athenians, aware that their dismissal did not proceed
from the more honourable reason of the two, but from suspicions which
had been conceived, went away deeply offended, and conscious of having
done nothing to merit such treatment from the Lacedaemonians; and the
instant that they returned home they broke off the alliance which had
been made against the Mede, and allied themselves with Sparta’s enemy
Argos; each of the contracting parties taking the same oaths and making
the same alliance with the Thessalians.

Meanwhile the rebels in Ithome, unable to prolong further a ten years’
resistance, surrendered to Lacedaemon; the conditions being that they
should depart from Peloponnese under safe conduct, and should never set
foot in it again: any one who might hereafter be found there was to be
the slave of his captor. It must be known that the Lacedaemonians had
an old oracle from Delphi, to the effect that they should let go the
suppliant of Zeus at Ithome. So they went forth with their children and
their wives, and being received by Athens from the hatred that she now
felt for the Lacedaemonians, were located at Naupactus, which she had
lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians. The Athenians received another
addition to their confederacy in the Megarians; who left the
Lacedaemonian alliance, annoyed by a war about boundaries forced on
them by Corinth. The Athenians occupied Megara and Pegae, and built the
Megarians their long walls from the city to Nisaea, in which they
placed an Athenian garrison. This was the principal cause of the
Corinthians conceiving such a deadly hatred against Athens.

Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan king of the Libyans on
the Egyptian border, having his headquarters at Marea, the town above
Pharos, caused a revolt of almost the whole of Egypt from King
Artaxerxes and, placing himself at its head, invited the Athenians to
his assistance. Abandoning a Cyprian expedition upon which they
happened to be engaged with two hundred ships of their own and their
allies, they arrived in Egypt and sailed from the sea into the Nile,
and making themselves masters of the river and two-thirds of Memphis,
addressed themselves to the attack of the remaining third, which is
called White Castle. Within it were Persians and Medes who had taken
refuge there, and Egyptians who had not joined the rebellion.

Meanwhile the Athenians, making a descent from their fleet upon Haliae,
were engaged by a force of Corinthians and Epidaurians; and the
Corinthians were victorious. Afterwards the Athenians engaged the
Peloponnesian fleet off Cecruphalia; and the Athenians were victorious.
Subsequently war broke out between Aegina and Athens, and there was a
great battle at sea off Aegina between the Athenians and Aeginetans,
each being aided by their allies; in which victory remained with the
Athenians, who took seventy of the enemy’s ships, and landed in the
country and commenced a siege under the command of Leocrates, son of
Stroebus. Upon this the Peloponnesians, desirous of aiding the
Aeginetans, threw into Aegina a force of three hundred heavy infantry,
who had before been serving with the Corinthians and Epidaurians.
Meanwhile the Corinthians and their allies occupied the heights of
Geraneia, and marched down into the Megarid, in the belief that, with a
large force absent in Aegina and Egypt, Athens would be unable to help
the Megarians without raising the siege of Aegina. But the Athenians,
instead of moving the army of Aegina, raised a force of the old and
young men that had been left in the city, and marched into the Megarid
under the command of Myronides. After a drawn battle with the
Corinthians, the rival hosts parted, each with the impression that they
had gained the victory. The Athenians, however, if anything, had rather
the advantage, and on the departure of the Corinthians set up a trophy.
Urged by the taunts of the elders in their city, the Corinthians made
their preparations, and about twelve days afterwards came and set up
their trophy as victors. Sallying out from Megara, the Athenians cut
off the party that was employed in erecting the trophy, and engaged and
defeated the rest. In the retreat of the vanquished army, a
considerable division, pressed by the pursuers and mistaking the road,
dashed into a field on some private property, with a deep trench all
round it, and no way out. Being acquainted with the place, the
Athenians hemmed their front with heavy infantry and, placing the light
troops round in a circle, stoned all who had gone in. Corinth here
suffered a severe blow. The bulk of her army continued its retreat
home.

About this time the Athenians began to build the long walls to the sea,
that towards Phalerum and that towards Piraeus. Meanwhile the Phocians
made an expedition against Doris, the old home of the Lacedaemonians,
containing the towns of Boeum, Kitinium, and Erineum. They had taken
one of these towns, when the Lacedaemonians under Nicomedes, son of
Cleombrotus, commanding for King Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was
still a minor, came to the aid of the Dorians with fifteen hundred
heavy infantry of their own, and ten thousand of their allies. After
compelling the Phocians to restore the town on conditions, they began
their retreat. The route by sea, across the Crissaean Gulf, exposed
them to the risk of being stopped by the Athenian fleet; that across
Geraneia seemed scarcely safe, the Athenians holding Megara and Pegae.
For the pass was a difficult one, and was always guarded by the
Athenians; and, in the present instance, the Lacedaemonians had
information that they meant to dispute their passage. So they resolved
to remain in Boeotia, and to consider which would be the safest line of
march. They had also another reason for this resolve. Secret
encouragement had been given them by a party in Athens, who hoped to
put an end to the reign of democracy and the building of the Long
Walls. Meanwhile the Athenians marched against them with their whole
levy and a thousand Argives and the respective contingents of the rest
of their allies. Altogether they were fourteen thousand strong. The
march was prompted by the notion that the Lacedaemonians were at a loss
how to effect their passage, and also by suspicions of an attempt to
overthrow the democracy. Some cavalry also joined the Athenians from
their Thessalian allies; but these went over to the Lacedaemonians
during the battle.

The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia. After heavy loss on both
sides, victory declared for the Lacedaemonians and their allies. After
entering the Megarid and cutting down the fruit trees, the
Lacedaemonians returned home across Geraneia and the isthmus. Sixty-two
days after the battle the Athenians marched into Boeotia under the
command of Myronides, defeated the Boeotians in battle at Oenophyta,
and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They dismantled the walls of
the Tanagraeans, took a hundred of the richest men of the Opuntian
Locrians as hostages, and finished their own long walls. This was
followed by the surrender of the Aeginetans to Athens on conditions;
they pulled down their walls, gave up their ships, and agreed to pay
tribute in future. The Athenians sailed round Peloponnese under
Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus, burnt the arsenal of Lacedaemon, took
Chalcis, a town of the Corinthians, and in a descent upon Sicyon
defeated the Sicyonians in battle.

Meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still there, and
encountered all the vicissitudes of war. First the Athenians were
masters of Egypt, and the King sent Megabazus a Persian to Lacedaemon
with money to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and so draw off
the Athenians from Egypt. Finding that the matter made no progress, and
that the money was only being wasted, he recalled Megabazus with the
remainder of the money, and sent Megabuzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian,
with a large army to Egypt. Arriving by land he defeated the Egyptians
and their allies in a battle, and drove the Hellenes out of Memphis,
and at length shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he
besieged them for a year and six months. At last, draining the canal of
its waters, which he diverted into another channel, he left their ships
high and dry and joined most of the island to the mainland, and then
marched over on foot and captured it. Thus the enterprise of the
Hellenes came to ruin after six years of war. Of all that large host a
few travelling through Libya reached Cyrene in safety, but most of them
perished. And thus Egypt returned to its subjection to the King, except
Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, whom they were unable to capture
from the extent of the marsh; the marshmen being also the most warlike
of the Egyptians. Inaros, the Libyan king, the sole author of the
Egyptian revolt, was betrayed, taken, and crucified. Meanwhile a
relieving squadron of fifty vessels had sailed from Athens and the rest
of the confederacy for Egypt. They put in to shore at the Mendesian
mouth of the Nile, in total ignorance of what had occurred. Attacked on
the land side by the troops, and from the sea by the Phoenician navy,
most of the ships were destroyed; the few remaining being saved by
retreat. Such was the end of the great expedition of the Athenians and
their allies to Egypt.

Meanwhile Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thessalian king, being an
exile from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Taking
with them the Boeotians and Phocians their allies, the Athenians
marched to Pharsalus in Thessaly. They became masters of the country,
though only in the immediate vicinity of the camp; beyond which they
could not go for fear of the Thessalian cavalry. But they failed to
take the city or to attain any of the other objects of their
expedition, and returned home with Orestes without having effected
anything. Not long after this a thousand of the Athenians embarked in
the vessels that were at Pegae (Pegae, it must be remembered, was now
theirs), and sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of
Pericles, son of Xanthippus. Landing in Sicyon and defeating the
Sicyonians who engaged them, they immediately took with them the
Achaeans and, sailing across, marched against and laid siege to
Oeniadae in Acarnania. Failing however to take it, they returned home.

Three years afterwards a truce was made between the Peloponnesians and
Athenians for five years. Released from Hellenic war, the Athenians
made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred vessels of their own and
their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these were detached
to Egypt at the instance of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes; the
rest laid siege to Kitium, from which, however, they were compelled to
retire by the death of Cimon and by scarcity of provisions. Sailing off
Salamis in Cyprus, they fought with the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and
Cilicians by land and sea, and, being victorious on both elements
departed home, and with them the returned squadron from Egypt. After
this the Lacedaemonians marched out on a sacred war, and, becoming
masters of the temple at Delphi, it in the hands of the Delphians.
Immediately after their retreat, the Athenians marched out, became
masters of the temple, and placed it in the hands of the Phocians.

Some time after this, Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other places in
Boeotia being in the hands of the Boeotian exiles, the Athenians
marched against the above-mentioned hostile places with a thousand
Athenian heavy infantry and the allied contingents, under the command
of Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus. They took Chaeronea, and made slaves of
the inhabitants, and, leaving a garrison, commenced their return. On
their road they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from
Orchomenus, with some Locrians and Euboean exiles, and others who were
of the same way of thinking, were defeated in battle, and some killed,
others taken captive. The Athenians evacuated all Boeotia by a treaty
providing for the recovery of the men; and the exiled Boeotians
returned, and with all the rest regained their independence.

This was soon afterwards followed by the revolt of Euboea from Athens.
Pericles had already crossed over with an army of Athenians to the
island, when news was brought to him that Megara had revolted, that the
Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica, and that the
Athenian garrison had been cut off by the Megarians, with the exception
of a few who had taken refuge in Nisaea. The Megarians had introduced
the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the town before they
revolted. Meanwhile Pericles brought his army back in all haste from
Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians marched into Attica as far as
Eleusis and Thrius, ravaging the country under the conduct of King
Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, and without advancing further
returned home. The Athenians then crossed over again to Euboea under
the command of Pericles, and subdued the whole of the island: all but
Histiaea was settled by convention; the Histiaeans they expelled from
their homes, and occupied their territory themselves.

Not long after their return from Euboea, they made a truce with the
Lacedaemonians and their allies for thirty years, giving up the posts
which they occupied in Peloponnese—Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia.
In the sixth year of the truce, war broke out between the Samians and
Milesians about Priene. Worsted in the war, the Milesians came to
Athens with loud complaints against the Samians. In this they were
joined by certain private persons from Samos itself, who wished to
revolutionize the government. Accordingly the Athenians sailed to Samos
with forty ships and set up a democracy; took hostages from the
Samians, fifty boys and as many men, lodged them in Lemnos, and after
leaving a garrison in the island returned home. But some of the Samians
had not remained in the island, but had fled to the continent. Making
an agreement with the most powerful of those in the city, and an
alliance with Pissuthnes, son of Hystaspes, the then satrap of Sardis,
they got together a force of seven hundred mercenaries, and under cover
of night crossed over to Samos. Their first step was to rise on the
commons, most of whom they secured; their next to steal their hostages
from Lemnos; after which they revolted, gave up the Athenian garrison
left with them and its commanders to Pissuthnes, and instantly prepared
for an expedition against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with
them.

As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they sailed with sixty ships
against Samos. Sixteen of these went to Caria to look out for the
Phoenician fleet, and to Chios and Lesbos carrying round orders for
reinforcements, and so never engaged; but forty-four ships under the
command of Pericles with nine colleagues gave battle, off the island of
Tragia, to seventy Samian vessels, of which twenty were transports, as
they were sailing from Miletus. Victory remained with the Athenians.
Reinforced afterwards by forty ships from Athens, and twenty-five Chian
and Lesbian vessels, the Athenians landed, and having the superiority
by land invested the city with three walls; it was also invested from
the sea. Meanwhile Pericles took sixty ships from the blockading
squadron, and departed in haste for Caunus and Caria, intelligence
having been brought in of the approach of the Phoenician fleet to the
aid of the Samians; indeed Stesagoras and others had left the island
with five ships to bring them. But in the meantime the Samians made a
sudden sally, and fell on the camp, which they found unfortified.
Destroying the look-out vessels, and engaging and defeating such as
were being launched to meet them, they remained masters of their own
seas for fourteen days, and carried in and carried out what they
pleased. But on the arrival of Pericles, they were once more shut up.
Fresh reinforcements afterwards arrived—forty ships from Athens with
Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio; twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles,
and thirty vessels from Chios and Lesbos. After a brief attempt at
fighting, the Samians, unable to hold out, were reduced after a nine
months’ siege and surrendered on conditions; they razed their walls,
gave hostages, delivered up their ships, and arranged to pay the
expenses of the war by instalments. The Byzantines also agreed to be
subject as before.




CHAPTER V


Second Congress at Lacedaemon—Preparations for War and Diplomatic
Skirmishes—Cylon—Pausanias—Themistocles


After this, though not many years later, we at length come to what has
been already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidæa, and the
events that served as a pretext for the present war. All these actions
of the Hellenes against each other and the barbarian occurred in the
fifty years’ interval between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning
of the present war. During this interval the Athenians succeeded in
placing their empire on a firmer basis, and advanced their own home
power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians, though fully aware of
it, opposed it only for a little while, but remained inactive during
most of the period, being of old slow to go to war except under the
pressure of necessity, and in the present instance being hampered by
wars at home; until the growth of the Athenian power could be no longer
ignored, and their own confederacy became the object of its
encroachments. They then felt that they could endure it no longer, but
that the time had come for them to throw themselves heart and soul upon
the hostile power, and break it, if they could, by commencing the
present war. And though the Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds
on the fact of the breach of the treaty and the guilt of the Athenians,
yet they sent to Delphi and inquired of the God whether it would be
well with them if they went to war; and, as it is reported, received
from him the answer that if they put their whole strength into the war,
victory would be theirs, and the promise that he himself would be with
them, whether invoked or uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their
allies again, and to take their vote on the propriety of making war.
After the ambassadors from the confederates had arrived and a congress
had been convened, they all spoke their minds, most of them denouncing
the Athenians and demanding that the war should begin. In particular
the Corinthians. They had before on their own account canvassed the
cities in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear that
it might come too late to save Potidæa; they were present also on this
occasion, and came forward the last, and made the following speech:

“Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having
failed in their duty: they have not only voted for war themselves, but
have assembled us here for that purpose. We say their duty, for
supremacy has its duties. Besides equitably administering private
interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the common
welfare in return for the special honours accorded to them by all in
other ways. For ourselves, all who have already had dealings with the
Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against them. The
states more inland and out of the highway of communication should
understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers, the result
will be to injure the transit of their produce for exportation and the
reception in exchange of their imports from the sea; and they must not
be careless judges of what is now said, as if it had nothing to do with
them, but must expect that the sacrifice of the powers on the coast
will one day be followed by the extension of the danger to the
interior, and must recognize that their own interests are deeply
involved in this discussion. For these reasons they should not hesitate
to exchange peace for war. If wise men remain quiet, while they are not
injured, brave men abandon peace for war when they are injured,
returning to an understanding on a favourable opportunity: in fact,
they are neither intoxicated by their success in war, nor disposed to
take an injury for the sake of the delightful tranquillity of peace.
Indeed, to falter for the sake of such delights is, if you remain
inactive, the quickest way of losing the sweets of repose to which you
cling; while to conceive extravagant pretensions from success in war is
to forget how hollow is the confidence by which you are elated. For if
many ill-conceived plans have succeeded through the still greater
fatuity of an opponent, many more, apparently well laid, have on the
contrary ended in disgrace. The confidence with which we form our
schemes is never completely justified in their execution; speculation
is carried on in safety, but, when it comes to action, fear causes
failure.

“To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is
under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint; and
after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We have
many reasons to expect success—first, superiority in numbers and in
military experience, and secondly our general and unvarying obedience
in the execution of orders. The naval strength which they possess shall
be raised by us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the
moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from these enables us to seduce
their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of
Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed
to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. A
single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their ruin: should they hold
out, in that case there will be the more time for us to exercise
ourselves in naval matters; and as soon as we have arrived at an
equality in science, we need scarcely ask whether we shall be their
superiors in courage. For the advantages that we have by nature they
cannot acquire by education; while their superiority in science must be
removed by our practice. The money required for these objects shall be
provided by our contributions: nothing indeed could be more monstrous
than the suggestion that, while their allies never tire of contributing
for their own servitude, we should refuse to spend for vengeance and
self-preservation the treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit
to Athenian rapacity and see employed for our own ruin.

“We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of
their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues,
which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified
positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be
foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon definite
rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances to meet an
emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the struggle and keeps
his temper best meets with most security, and he who loses his temper
about it with correspondent disaster. Let us also reflect that if it
was merely a number of disputes of territory between rival neighbours,
it might be borne; but here we have an enemy in Athens that is a match
for our whole coalition, and more than a match for any of its members;
so that unless as a body and as individual nationalities and individual
cities we make an unanimous stand against her, she will easily conquer
us divided and in detail. That conquest, terrible as it may sound,
would, it must be known, have no other end than slavery pure and
simple; a word which Peloponnese cannot even hear whispered without
disgrace, or without disgrace see so many states abused by one.
Meanwhile the opinion would be either that we were justly so used, or
that we put up with it from cowardice, and were proving degenerate sons
in not even securing for ourselves the freedom which our fathers gave
to Hellas; and in allowing the establishment in Hellas of a tyrant
state, though in individual states we think it our duty to put down
sole rulers. And we do not know how this conduct can be held free from
three of the gravest failings, want of sense, of courage, or of
vigilance. For we do not suppose that you have taken refuge in that
contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal in so many instances—a
feeling which from the numbers that it has ruined has come to be called
not contemptuous but contemptible.

“There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past further
than may be of service to the present. For the future we must provide
by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling our efforts; it
is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of labour, and you must
not change the habit, even though you should have a slight advantage in
wealth and resources; for it is not right that what was won in want
should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly advance to the war for
many reasons; the god has commanded it and promised to be with us, and
the rest of Hellas will all join in the struggle, part from fear, part
from interest. You will be the first to break a treaty which the god,
in advising us to go to war, judges to be violated already, but rather
to support a treaty that has been outraged: indeed, treaties are broken
not by resistance but by aggression.

“Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it, will
amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend in the
interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest is the
surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals. Delay not,
therefore, to assist Potidæa, a Dorian city besieged by Ionians, which
is quite a reversal of the order of things; nor to assert the freedom
of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait any longer when waiting
can only mean immediate disaster for some of us, and, if it comes to be
known that we have conferred but do not venture to protect ourselves,
like disaster in the near future for the rest. Delay not, fellow
allies, but, convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the wisdom of
this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its immediate terrors,
but looking beyond to the lasting peace by which it will be succeeded.
Out of war peace gains fresh stability, but to refuse to abandon repose
for war is not so sure a method of avoiding danger. We must believe
that the tyrant city that has been established in Hellas has been
established against all alike, with a programme of universal empire,
part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us then attack and reduce
it, and win future security for ourselves and freedom for the Hellenes
who are now enslaved.”

Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedaemonians, having now
heard all, give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied states
present in order, great and small alike; and the majority voted for
war. This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at
once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the
means requisite were to be procured by the different states, and that
there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time occupied
with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed before Attica
was invaded, and the war openly begun.

This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged with
complaints, in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as possible,
in the event of her paying no attention to them. The first
Lacedaemonian embassy was to order the Athenians to drive out the curse
of the goddess; the history of which is as follows. In former
generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at the
Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position, who had married a
daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of Megara. Now
this Cylon was inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by the god to
seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival of Zeus.
Accordingly, procuring a force from Theagenes and persuading his
friends to join him, when the Olympic festival in Peloponnese came, he
seized the Acropolis, with the intention of making himself tyrant,
thinking that this was the grand festival of Zeus, and also an occasion
appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games. Whether the grand
festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a question which
he never thought of, and which the oracle did not offer to solve. For
the Athenians also have a festival which is called the grand festival
of Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz., the Diasia. It is celebrated
outside the city, and the whole people sacrifice not real victims but a
number of bloodless offerings peculiar to the country. However,
fancying he had chosen the right time, he made the attempt. As soon as
the Athenians perceived it, they flocked in, one and all, from the
country, and sat down, and laid siege to the citadel. But as time went
on, weary of the labour of blockade, most of them departed; the
responsibility of keeping guard being left to the nine archons, with
plenary powers to arrange everything according to their good judgment.
It must be known that at that time most political functions were
discharged by the nine archons. Meanwhile Cylon and his besieged
companions were distressed for want of food and water. Accordingly
Cylon and his brother made their escape; but the rest being hard
pressed, and some even dying of famine, seated themselves as suppliants
at the altar in the Acropolis. The Athenians who were charged with the
duty of keeping guard, when they saw them at the point of death in the
temple, raised them up on the understanding that no harm should be done
to them, led them out, and slew them. Some who as they passed by took
refuge at the altars of the awful goddesses were dispatched on the
spot. From this deed the men who killed them were called accursed and
guilty against the goddess, they and their descendants. Accordingly
these cursed ones were driven out by the Athenians, driven out again by
Cleomenes of Lacedaemon and an Athenian faction; the living were driven
out, and the bones of the dead were taken up; thus they were cast out.
For all that, they came back afterwards, and their descendants are
still in the city.

This, then was the curse that the Lacedaemonians ordered them to drive
out. They were actuated primarily, as they pretended, by a care for the
honour of the gods; but they also know that Pericles, son of
Xanthippus, was connected with the curse on his mother’s side, and they
thought that his banishment would materially advance their designs on
Athens. Not that they really hoped to succeed in procuring this; they
rather thought to create a prejudice against him in the eyes of his
countrymen from the feeling that the war would be partly caused by his
misfortune. For being the most powerful man of his time, and the
leading Athenian statesman, he opposed the Lacedaemonians in
everything, and would have no concessions, but ever urged the Athenians
on to war.

The Athenians retorted by ordering the Lacedaemonians to drive out the
curse of Taenarus. The Lacedaemonians had once raised up some Helot
suppliants from the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, led them away and
slain them; for which they believe the great earthquake at Sparta to
have been a retribution. The Athenians also ordered them to drive out
the curse of the goddess of the Brazen House; the history of which is
as follows. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the
Spartans from his command in the Hellespont (this is his first recall),
and had been tried by them and acquitted, not being again sent out in a
public capacity, he took a galley of Hermione on his own
responsibility, without the authority of the Lacedaemonians, and
arrived as a private person in the Hellespont. He came ostensibly for
the Hellenic war, really to carry on his intrigues with the King, which
he had begun before his recall, being ambitious of reigning over
Hellas. The circumstance which first enabled him to lay the King under
an obligation, and to make a beginning of the whole design, was this.
Some connections and kinsmen of the King had been taken in Byzantium,
on its capture from the Medes, when he was first there, after the
return from Cyprus. These captives he sent off to the King without the
knowledge of the rest of the allies, the account being that they had
escaped from him. He managed this with the help of Gongylus, an
Eretrian, whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the prisoners.
He also gave Gongylus a letter for the King, the contents of which were
as follows, as was afterwards discovered: “Pausanias, the general of
Sparta, anxious to do you a favour, sends you these his prisoners of
war. I propose also, with your approval, to marry your daughter, and to
make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you. I may say that I
think I am able to do this, with your co-operation. Accordingly if any
of this please you, send a safe man to the sea through whom we may in
future conduct our correspondence.”

This was all that was revealed in the writing, and Xerxes was pleased
with the letter. He sent off Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, to the sea
with orders to supersede Megabates, the previous governor in the
satrapy of Daskylion, and to send over as quickly as possible to
Pausanias at Byzantium a letter which he entrusted to him; to show him
the royal signet, and to execute any commission which he might receive
from Pausanias on the King’s matters with all care and fidelity.
Artabazus on his arrival carried the King’s orders into effect, and
sent over the letter, which contained the following answer: “Thus saith
King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom you have saved for me across
sea from Byzantium, an obligation is laid up for you in our house,
recorded for ever; and with your proposals I am well pleased. Let
neither night nor day stop you from diligently performing any of your
promises to me; neither for cost of gold nor of silver let them be
hindered, nor yet for number of troops, wherever it may be that their
presence is needed; but with Artabazus, an honourable man whom I send
you, boldly advance my objects and yours, as may be most for the honour
and interest of us both.”

Before held in high honour by the Hellenes as the hero of Plataea,
Pausanias, after the receipt of this letter, became prouder than ever,
and could no longer live in the usual style, but went out of Byzantium
in a Median dress, was attended on his march through Thrace by a
bodyguard of Medes and Egyptians, kept a Persian table, and was quite
unable to contain his intentions, but betrayed by his conduct in
trifles what his ambition looked one day to enact on a grander scale.
He also made himself difficult of access, and displayed so violent a
temper to every one without exception that no one could come near him.
Indeed, this was the principal reason why the confederacy went over to
the Athenians.

The above-mentioned conduct, coming to the ears of the Lacedaemonians,
occasioned his first recall. And after his second voyage out in the
ship of Hermione, without their orders, he gave proofs of similar
behaviour. Besieged and expelled from Byzantium by the Athenians, he
did not return to Sparta; but news came that he had settled at Colonae
in the Troad, and was intriguing with the barbarians, and that his stay
there was for no good purpose; and the ephors, now no longer
hesitating, sent him a herald and a scytale with orders to accompany
the herald or be declared a public enemy. Anxious above everything to
avoid suspicion, and confident that he could quash the charge by means
of money, he returned a second time to Sparta. At first thrown into
prison by the ephors (whose powers enable them to do this to the King),
soon compromised the matter and came out again, and offered himself for
trial to any who wished to institute an inquiry concerning him.

Now the Spartans had no tangible proof against him—neither his enemies
nor the nation—of that indubitable kind required for the punishment of
a member of the royal family, and at that moment in high office; he
being regent for his first cousin King Pleistarchus, Leonidas’s son,
who was still a minor. But by his contempt of the laws and imitation of
the barbarians, he gave grounds for much suspicion of his being
discontented with things established; all the occasions on which he had
in any way departed from the regular customs were passed in review, and
it was remembered that he had taken upon himself to have inscribed on
the tripod at Delphi, which was dedicated by the Hellenes as the
first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the following couplet:

The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised
This monument, that Phœbus might be praised.


At the time the Lacedaemonians had at once erased the couplet, and
inscribed the names of the cities that had aided in the overthrow of
the barbarian and dedicated the offering. Yet it was considered that
Pausanias had here been guilty of a grave offence, which, interpreted
by the light of the attitude which he had since assumed, gained a new
significance, and seemed to be quite in keeping with his present
schemes. Besides, they were informed that he was even intriguing with
the Helots; and such indeed was the fact, for he promised them freedom
and citizenship if they would join him in insurrection and would help
him to carry out his plans to the end. Even now, mistrusting the
evidence even of the Helots themselves, the ephors would not consent to
take any decided step against him; in accordance with their regular
custom towards themselves, namely, to be slow in taking any irrevocable
resolve in the matter of a Spartan citizen without indisputable proof.
At last, it is said, the person who was going to carry to Artabazus the
last letter for the King, a man of Argilus, once the favourite and most
trusty servant of Pausanias, turned informer. Alarmed by the reflection
that none of the previous messengers had ever returned, having
counterfeited the seal, in order that, if he found himself mistaken in
his surmises, or if Pausanias should ask to make some correction, he
might not be discovered, he undid the letter, and found the postscript
that he had suspected, viz. an order to put him to death.

On being shown the letter, the ephors now felt more certain. Still,
they wished to hear Pausanias commit himself with their own ears.
Accordingly the man went by appointment to Taenarus as a suppliant, and
there built himself a hut divided into two by a partition; within which
he concealed some of the ephors and let them hear the whole matter
plainly. For Pausanias came to him and asked him the reason of his
suppliant position; and the man reproached him with the order that he
had written concerning him, and one by one declared all the rest of the
circumstances, how he who had never yet brought him into any danger,
while employed as agent between him and the King, was yet just like the
mass of his servants to be rewarded with death. Admitting all this, and
telling him not to be angry about the matter, Pausanias gave him the
pledge of raising him up from the temple, and begged him to set off as
quickly as possible, and not to hinder the business in hand.

The ephors listened carefully, and then departed, taking no action for
the moment, but, having at last attained to certainty, were preparing
to arrest him in the city. It is reported that, as he was about to be
arrested in the street, he saw from the face of one of the ephors what
he was coming for; another, too, made him a secret signal, and betrayed
it to him from kindness. Setting off with a run for the temple of the
goddess of the Brazen House, the enclosure of which was near at hand,
he succeeded in taking sanctuary before they took him, and entering
into a small chamber, which formed part of the temple, to avoid being
exposed to the weather, lay still there. The ephors, for the moment
distanced in the pursuit, afterwards took off the roof of the chamber,
and having made sure that he was inside, shut him in, barricaded the
doors, and staying before the place, reduced him by starvation. When
they found that he was on the point of expiring, just as he was, in the
chamber, they brought him out of the temple, while the breath was still
in him, and as soon as he was brought out he died. They were going to
throw him into the Kaiadas, where they cast criminals, but finally
decided to inter him somewhere near. But the god at Delphi afterwards
ordered the Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb to the place of his
death—where he now lies in the consecrated ground, as an inscription on
a monument declares—and, as what had been done was a curse to them, to
give back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen House.
So they had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a substitute
for Pausanias. The Athenians retorted by telling the Lacedaemonians to
drive out what the god himself had pronounced to be a curse.

To return to the Medism of Pausanias. Matter was found in the course of
the inquiry to implicate Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians
accordingly sent envoys to the Athenians and required them to punish
him as they had punished Pausanias. The Athenians consented to do so.
But he had, as it happened, been ostracized, and, with a residence at
Argos, was in the habit of visiting other parts of Peloponnese. So they
sent with the Lacedaemonians, who were ready to join in the pursuit,
persons with instructions to take him wherever they found him. But
Themistocles got scent of their intentions, and fled from Peloponnese
to Corcyra, which was under obligations towards him. But the
Corcyraeans alleged that they could not venture to shelter him at the
cost of offending Athens and Lacedaemon, and they conveyed him over to
the continent opposite. Pursued by the officers who hung on the report
of his movements, at a loss where to turn, he was compelled to stop at
the house of Admetus, the Molossian king, though they were not on
friendly terms. Admetus happened not to be indoors, but his wife, to
whom he made himself a suppliant, instructed him to take their child in
his arms and sit down by the hearth. Soon afterwards Admetus came in,
and Themistocles told him who he was, and begged him not to revenge on
Themistocles in exile any opposition which his requests might have
experienced from Themistocles at Athens. Indeed, he was now far too low
for his revenge; retaliation was only honourable between equals.
Besides, his opposition to the king had only affected the success of a
request, not the safety of his person; if the king were to give him up
to the pursuers that he mentioned, and the fate which they intended for
him, he would just be consigning him to certain death.

The King listened to him and raised him up with his son, as he was
sitting with him in his arms after the most effectual method of
supplication, and on the arrival of the Lacedaemonians not long
afterwards, refused to give him up for anything they could say, but
sent him off by land to the other sea to Pydna in Alexander’s
dominions, as he wished to go to the Persian king. There he met with a
merchantman on the point of starting for Ionia. Going on board, he was
carried by a storm to the Athenian squadron which was blockading Naxos.
In his alarm—he was luckily unknown to the people in the vessel—he told
the master who he was and what he was flying for, and said that, if he
refused to save him, he would declare that he was taking him for a
bribe. Meanwhile their safety consisted in letting no one leave the
ship until a favourable time for sailing should arise. If he complied
with his wishes, he promised him a proper recompense. The master acted
as he desired, and, after lying to for a day and a night out of reach
of the squadron, at length arrived at Ephesus.

After having rewarded him with a present of money, as soon as he
received some from his friends at Athens and from his secret hoards at
Argos, Themistocles started inland with one of the coast Persians, and
sent a letter to King Artaxerxes, Xerxes’s son, who had just come to
the throne. Its contents were as follows: “I, Themistocles, am come to
you, who did your house more harm than any of the Hellenes, when I was
compelled to defend myself against your father’s invasion—harm,
however, far surpassed by the good that I did him during his retreat,
which brought no danger for me but much for him. For the past, you are
a good turn in my debt”—here he mentioned the warning sent to Xerxes
from Salamis to retreat, as well as his finding the bridges unbroken,
which, as he falsely pretended, was due to him—“for the present, able
to do you great service, I am here, pursued by the Hellenes for my
friendship for you. However, I desire a year’s grace, when I shall be
able to declare in person the objects of my coming.”

It is said that the King approved his intention, and told him to do as
he said. He employed the interval in making what progress he could in
the study of the Persian tongue, and of the customs of the country.
Arrived at court at the end of the year, he attained to very high
consideration there, such as no Hellene has ever possessed before or
since; partly from his splendid antecedents, partly from the hopes
which he held out of effecting for him the subjugation of Hellas, but
principally by the proof which experience daily gave of his capacity.
For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs of
genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim on our admiration
quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity, alike
unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at once the best judge in
those sudden crises which admit of little or of no deliberation, and
the best prophet of the future, even to its most distant possibilities.
An able theoretical expositor of all that came within the sphere of his
practice, he was not without the power of passing an adequate judgment
in matters in which he had no experience. He could also excellently
divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen future. In fine,
whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness
of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have
surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an
emergency. Disease was the real cause of his death; though there is a
story of his having ended his life by poison, on finding himself unable
to fulfil his promises to the king. However this may be, there is a
monument to him in the marketplace of Asiatic Magnesia. He was governor
of the district, the King having given him Magnesia, which brought in
fifty talents a year, for bread, Lampsacus, which was considered to be
the richest wine country, for wine, and Myos for other provisions. His
bones, it is said, were conveyed home by his relatives in accordance
with his wishes, and interred in Attic ground. This was done without
the knowledge of the Athenians; as it is against the law to bury in
Attica an outlaw for treason. So ends the history of Pausanias and
Themistocles, the Lacedaemonian and the Athenian, the most famous men
of their time in Hellas.

To return to the Lacedaemonians. The history of their first embassy,
the injunctions which it conveyed, and the rejoinder which it provoked,
concerning the expulsion of the accursed persons, have been related
already. It was followed by a second, which ordered Athens to raise the
siege of Potidæa, and to respect the independence of Aegina. Above all,
it gave her most distinctly to understand that war might be prevented
by the revocation of the Megara decree, excluding the Megarians from
the use of Athenian harbours and of the market of Athens. But Athens
was not inclined either to revoke the decree, or to entertain their
other proposals; she accused the Megarians of pushing their cultivation
into the consecrated ground and the unenclosed land on the border, and
of harbouring her runaway slaves. At last an embassy arrived with the
Lacedaemonian ultimatum. The ambassadors were Ramphias, Melesippus, and
Agesander. Not a word was said on any of the old subjects; there was
simply this: “Lacedaemon wishes the peace to continue, and there is no
reason why it should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent.”
Upon this the Athenians held an assembly, and laid the matter before
their consideration. It was resolved to deliberate once for all on all
their demands, and to give them an answer. There were many speakers who
came forward and gave their support to one side or the other, urging
the necessity of war, or the revocation of the decree and the folly of
allowing it to stand in the way of peace. Among them came forward
Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens,
ablest alike in counsel and in action, and gave the following advice:

“There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through everything,
and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. I
know that the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded
to make war is not always retained in action; that as circumstances
change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as before the same,
almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me; and I put it to
those of you who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support
the national resolves even in the case of reverses, or to forfeit all
credit for their wisdom in the event of success. For sometimes the
course of things is as arbitrary as the plans of man; indeed this is
why we usually blame chance for whatever does not happen as we
expected. Now it was clear before that Lacedaemon entertained designs
against us; it is still more clear now. The treaty provides that we
shall mutually submit our differences to legal settlement, and that we
shall meanwhile each keep what we have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never
yet made us any such offer, never yet would accept from us any such
offer; on the contrary, they wish complaints to be settled by war
instead of by negotiation; and in the end we find them here dropping
the tone of expostulation and adopting that of command. They order us
to raise the siege of Potidæa, to let Aegina be independent, to revoke
the Megara decree; and they conclude with an ultimatum warning us to
leave the Hellenes independent. I hope that you will none of you think
that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the
Megara decree, which appears in front of their complaints, and the
revocation of which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of
self-reproach linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight
cause. Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your
resolution. If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some
greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first
instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that
they must treat you more as equals. Make your decision therefore at
once, either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to
war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the
ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making concessions
or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions. For all claims
from an equal, urged upon a neighbour as commands before any attempt at
legal settlement, be they great or be they small, have only one
meaning, and that is slavery.

“As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed comparison
will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally engaged in the
cultivation of their land, without funds either private or public, the
Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars across sea,
from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their attacks upon each
other. Powers of this description are quite incapable of often manning
a fleet or often sending out an army: they cannot afford the absence
from their homes, the expenditure from their own funds; and besides,
they have not command of the sea. Capital, it must be remembered,
maintains a war more than forced contributions. Farmers are a class of
men that are always more ready to serve in person than in purse.
Confident that the former will survive the dangers, they are by no
means so sure that the latter will not be prematurely exhausted,
especially if the war last longer than they expect, which it very
likely will. In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies may
be able to defy all Hellas, but they are incapacitated from carrying on
a war against a power different in character from their own, by the
want of the single council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous
action, and the substitution of a diet composed of various races, in
which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own
ends, a condition of things which generally results in no action at
all. The great wish of some is to avenge themselves on some particular
enemy, the great wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in
assembling, they devote a very small fraction of the time to the
consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of
their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his
neglect, that it is the business of somebody else to look after this or
that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all
separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays.

“But the principal point is the hindrance that they will experience
from want of money. The slowness with which it comes in will cause
delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man. Again, we need not
be alarmed either at the possibility of their raising fortifications in
Attica, or at their navy. It would be difficult for any system of
fortifications to establish a rival city, even in time of peace, much
more, surely, in an enemy’s country, with Athens just as much fortified
against it as it against Athens; while a mere post might be able to do
some harm to the country by incursions and by the facilities which it
would afford for desertion, but can never prevent our sailing into
their country and raising fortifications there, and making reprisals
with our powerful fleet. For our naval skill is of more use to us for
service on land, than their military skill for service at sea.
Familiarity with the sea they will not find an easy acquisition. If you
who have been practising at it ever since the Median invasion have not
yet brought it to perfection, is there any chance of anything
considerable being effected by an agricultural, unseafaring population,
who will besides be prevented from practising by the constant presence
of strong squadrons of observation from Athens? With a small squadron
they might hazard an engagement, encouraging their ignorance by
numbers; but the restraint of a strong force will prevent their moving,
and through want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and
consequently more timid. It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just
like anything else, is a matter of art, and will not admit of being
taken up occasionally as an occupation for times of leisure; on the
contrary, it is so exacting as to leave leisure for nothing else.

“Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try to
seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that would
only be a serious danger if we could not still be a match for them by
embarking our own citizens and the aliens resident among us. But in
fact by this means we are always a match for them; and, best of all, we
have a larger and higher class of native coxswains and sailors among
our own citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say nothing of the
danger of such a step, none of our foreign sailors would consent to
become an outlaw from his country, and to take service with them and
their hopes, for the sake of a few days’ high pay.

“This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the
Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have
criticized in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they can
show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will sail
against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation of the
whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of
Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except
by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and the
continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter. Consider for a
moment. Suppose that we were islanders; can you conceive a more
impregnable position? Well, this in future should, as far as possible,
be our conception of our position. Dismissing all thought of our land
and houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea and the city. No
irritation that we may feel for the former must provoke us to a battle
with the numerical superiority of the Peloponnesians. A victory would
only be succeeded by another battle against the same superiority: a
reverse involves the loss of our allies, the source of our strength,
who will not remain quiet a day after we become unable to march against
them. We must cry not over the loss of houses and land but of men’s
lives; since houses and land do not gain men, but men them. And if I
had thought that I could persuade you, I would have bid you go out and
lay them waste with your own hands, and show the Peloponnesians that
this at any rate will not make you submit.

“I have many other reasons to hope for a favourable issue, if you can
consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of
the war, and will abstain from wilfully involving yourselves in other
dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the
enemy’s devices. But these matters shall be explained in another
speech, as events require; for the present dismiss these men with the
answer that we will allow Megara the use of our market and harbours,
when the Lacedaemonians suspend their alien acts in favour of us and
our allies, there being nothing in the treaty to prevent either one or
the other: that we will leave the cities independent, if independent we
found them when we made the treaty, and when the Lacedaemonians grant
to their cities an independence not involving subservience to
Lacedaemonian interests, but such as each severally may desire: that we
are willing to give the legal satisfaction which our agreements
specify, and that we shall not commence hostilities, but shall resist
those who do commence them. This is an answer agreeable at once to the
rights and the dignity of Athens. It must be thoroughly understood that
war is a necessity; but that the more readily we accept it, the less
will be the ardour of our opponents, and that out of the greatest
dangers communities and individuals acquire the greatest glory. Did not
our fathers resist the Medes not only with resources far different from
ours, but even when those resources had been abandoned; and more by
wisdom than by fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they
beat off the barbarian and advance their affairs to their present
height? We must not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in
any way and in every way, and attempt to hand down our power to our
posterity unimpaired.”

Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, persuaded of the wisdom
of his advice, voted as he desired, and answered the Lacedaemonians as
he recommended, both on the separate points and in the general; they
would do nothing on dictation, but were ready to have the complaints
settled in a fair and impartial manner by the legal method, which the
terms of the truce prescribed. So the envoys departed home and did not
return again.

These were the charges and differences existing between the rival
powers before the war, arising immediately from the affair at Epidamnus
and Corcyra. Still intercourse continued in spite of them, and mutual
communication. It was carried on without heralds, but not without
suspicion, as events were occurring which were equivalent to a breach
of the treaty and matter for war.




BOOK II




CHAPTER VI


Beginning of the Peloponnesian War—First Invasion of Attica—Funeral
Oration of Pericles


The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies on
either side now really begins. For now all intercourse except through
the medium of heralds ceased, and hostilities were commenced and
prosecuted without intermission. The history follows the chronological
order of events by summers and winters.

The thirty years’ truce which was entered into after the conquest of
Euboea lasted fourteen years. In the fifteenth, in the forty-eighth
year of the priestess-ship of Chrysis at Argos, in the ephorate of
Aenesias at Sparta, in the last month but two of the archonship of
Pythodorus at Athens, and six months after the battle of Potidæa, just
at the beginning of spring, a Theban force a little over three hundred
strong, under the command of their Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, son of
Phyleides, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, about the first watch of
the night, made an armed entry into Plataea, a town of Boeotia in
alliance with Athens. The gates were opened to them by a Plataean
called Naucleides, who, with his party, had invited them in, meaning to
put to death the citizens of the opposite party, bring over the city to
Thebes, and thus obtain power for themselves. This was arranged through
Eurymachus, son of Leontiades, a person of great influence at Thebes.
For Plataea had always been at variance with Thebes; and the latter,
foreseeing that war was at hand, wished to surprise her old enemy in
time of peace, before hostilities had actually broken out. Indeed this
was how they got in so easily without being observed, as no guard had
been posted. After the soldiers had grounded arms in the market-place,
those who had invited them in wished them to set to work at once and go
to their enemies’ houses. This, however, the Thebans refused to do, but
determined to make a conciliatory proclamation, and if possible to come
to a friendly understanding with the citizens. Their herald accordingly
invited any who wished to resume their old place in the confederacy of
their countrymen to ground arms with them, for they thought that in
this way the city would readily join them.

On becoming aware of the presence of the Thebans within their gates,
and of the sudden occupation of the town, the Plataeans concluded in
their alarm that more had entered than was really the case, the night
preventing their seeing them. They accordingly came to terms and,
accepting the proposal, made no movement; especially as the Thebans
offered none of them any violence. But somehow or other, during the
negotiations, they discovered the scanty numbers of the Thebans, and
decided that they could easily attack and overpower them; the mass of
the Plataeans being averse to revolting from Athens. At all events they
resolved to attempt it. Digging through the party walls of the houses,
they thus managed to join each other without being seen going through
the streets, in which they placed wagons without the beasts in them, to
serve as a barricade, and arranged everything else as seemed convenient
for the occasion. When everything had been done that circumstances
permitted, they watched their opportunity and went out of their houses
against the enemy. It was still night, though daybreak was at hand: in
daylight it was thought that their attack would be met by men full of
courage and on equal terms with their assailants, while in darkness it
would fall upon panic-stricken troops, who would also be at a
disadvantage from their enemy’s knowledge of the locality. So they made
their assault at once, and came to close quarters as quickly as they
could.

The Thebans, finding themselves outwitted, immediately closed up to
repel all attacks made upon them. Twice or thrice they beat back their
assailants. But the men shouted and charged them, the women and slaves
screamed and yelled from the houses and pelted them with stones and
tiles; besides, it had been raining hard all night; and so at last
their courage gave way, and they turned and fled through the town. Most
of the fugitives were quite ignorant of the right ways out, and this,
with the mud, and the darkness caused by the moon being in her last
quarter, and the fact that their pursuers knew their way about and
could easily stop their escape, proved fatal to many. The only gate
open was the one by which they had entered, and this was shut by one of
the Plataeans driving the spike of a javelin into the bar instead of
the bolt; so that even here there was no longer any means of exit. They
were now chased all over the town. Some got on the wall and threw
themselves over, in most cases with a fatal result. One party managed
to find a deserted gate, and obtaining an axe from a woman, cut through
the bar; but as they were soon observed only a few succeeded in getting
out. Others were cut off in detail in different parts of the city. The
most numerous and compact body rushed into a large building next to the
city wall: the doors on the side of the street happened to be open, and
the Thebans fancied that they were the gates of the town, and that
there was a passage right through to the outside. The Plataeans, seeing
their enemies in a trap, now consulted whether they should set fire to
the building and burn them just as they were, or whether there was
anything else that they could do with them; until at length these and
the rest of the Theban survivors found wandering about the town agreed
to an unconditional surrender of themselves and their arms to the
Plataeans.

While such was the fate of the party in Plataea, the rest of the
Thebans who were to have joined them with all their forces before
daybreak, in case of anything miscarrying with the body that had
entered, received the news of the affair on the road, and pressed
forward to their succour. Now Plataea is nearly eight miles from
Thebes, and their march delayed by the rain that had fallen in the
night, for the river Asopus had risen and was not easy of passage; and
so, having to march in the rain, and being hindered in crossing the
river, they arrived too late, and found the whole party either slain or
captive. When they learned what had happened, they at once formed a
design against the Plataeans outside the city. As the attack had been
made in time of peace, and was perfectly unexpected, there were of
course men and stock in the fields; and the Thebans wished if possible
to have some prisoners to exchange against their countrymen in the
town, should any chance to have been taken alive. Such was their plan.
But the Plataeans suspected their intention almost before it was
formed, and becoming alarmed for their fellow citizens outside the
town, sent a herald to the Thebans, reproaching them for their
unscrupulous attempt to seize their city in time of peace, and warning
them against any outrage on those outside. Should the warning be
disregarded, they threatened to put to death the men they had in their
hands, but added that, on the Thebans retiring from their territory,
they would surrender the prisoners to their friends. This is the Theban
account of the matter, and they say that they had an oath given them.
The Plataeans, on the other hand, do not admit any promise of an
immediate surrender, but make it contingent upon subsequent
negotiation: the oath they deny altogether. Be this as it may, upon the
Thebans retiring from their territory without committing any injury,
the Plataeans hastily got in whatever they had in the country and
immediately put the men to death. The prisoners were a hundred and
eighty in number; Eurymachus, the person with whom the traitors had
negotiated, being one.

This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the dead
to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged things in the city as seemed
best to meet the present emergency. The Athenians meanwhile, having had
word of the affair sent them immediately after its occurrence, had
instantly seized all the Boeotians in Attica, and sent a herald to the
Plataeans to forbid their proceeding to extremities with their Theban
prisoners without instructions from Athens. The news of the men’s death
had of course not arrived; the first messenger having left Plataea just
when the Thebans entered it, the second just after their defeat and
capture; so there was no later news. Thus the Athenians sent orders in
ignorance of the facts; and the herald on his arrival found the men
slain. After this the Athenians marched to Plataea and brought in
provisions, and left a garrison in the place, also taking away the
women and children and such of the men as were least efficient.

After the affair at Plataea, the treaty had been broken by an overt
act, and Athens at once prepared for war, as did also Lacedaemon and
her allies. They resolved to send embassies to the King and to such
other of the barbarian powers as either party could look to for
assistance, and tried to ally themselves with the independent states at
home. Lacedaemon, in addition to the existing marine, gave orders to
the states that had declared for her in Italy and Sicily to build
vessels up to a grand total of five hundred, the quota of each city
being determined by its size, and also to provide a specified sum of
money. Till these were ready they were to remain neutral and to admit
single Athenian ships into their harbours. Athens on her part reviewed
her existing confederacy, and sent embassies to the places more
immediately round Peloponnese—Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and
Zacynthus—perceiving that if these could be relied on she could carry
the war all round Peloponnese.

And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their
utmost strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always at
its height at the commencement of an undertaking; and on this
particular occasion Peloponnese and Athens were both full of young men
whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the rest of
Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its leading
cities. Everywhere predictions were being recited and oracles being
chanted by such persons as collect them, and this not only in the
contending cities. Further, some while before this, there was an
earthquake at Delos, for the first time in the memory of the Hellenes.
This was said and thought to be ominous of the events impending;
indeed, nothing of the kind that happened was allowed to pass without
remark. The good wishes of men made greatly for the Lacedaemonians,
especially as they proclaimed themselves the liberators of Hellas. No
private or public effort that could help them in speech or action was
omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered wherever he could not
himself see to it. So general was the indignation felt against Athens,
whether by those who wished to escape from her empire, or were
apprehensive of being absorbed by it. Such were the preparations and
such the feelings with which the contest opened.

The allies of the two belligerents were the following. These were the
allies of Lacedaemon: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus except
the Argives and Achaeans, who were neutral; Pellene being the only
Achaean city that first joined in the war, though her example was
afterwards followed by the rest. Outside Peloponnese the Megarians,
Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians.
Of these, ships were furnished by the Corinthians, Megarians,
Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians; and cavalry
by the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The other states sent
infantry. This was the Lacedaemonian confederacy. That of Athens
comprised the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus,
most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, and some
tributary cities in the following countries, viz., Caria upon the sea
with her Dorian neighbours, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian towns,
the islands lying between Peloponnese and Crete towards the east, and
all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these, ships were furnished
by Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, infantry and money by the rest. Such
were the allies of either party and their resources for the war.

Immediately after the affair at Plataea, Lacedaemon sent round orders
to the cities in Peloponnese and the rest of her confederacy to prepare
troops and the provisions requisite for a foreign campaign, in order to
invade Attica. The several states were ready at the time appointed and
assembled at the Isthmus: the contingent of each city being two-thirds
of its whole force. After the whole army had mustered, the
Lacedaemonian king, Archidamus, the leader of the expedition, called
together the generals of all the states and the principal persons and
officers, and exhorted them as follows:

“Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both within
and without Peloponnese, and the elder men among us here are not
without experience in war. Yet we have never set out with a larger
force than the present; and if our numbers and efficiency are
remarkable, so also is the power of the state against which we march.
We ought not then to show ourselves inferior to our ancestors, or
unequal to our own reputation. For the hopes and attention of all
Hellas are bent upon the present effort, and its sympathy is with the
enemy of the hated Athens. Therefore, numerous as the invading army may
appear to be, and certain as some may think it that our adversary will
not meet us in the field, this is no sort of justification for the
least negligence upon the march; but the officers and men of each
particular city should always be prepared for the advent of danger in
their own quarters. The course of war cannot be foreseen, and its
attacks are generally dictated by the impulse of the moment; and where
overweening self-confidence has despised preparation, a wise
apprehension often been able to make head against superior numbers. Not
that confidence is out of place in an army of invasion, but in an
enemy’s country it should also be accompanied by the precautions of
apprehension: troops will by this combination be best inspired for
dealing a blow, and best secured against receiving one. In the present
instance, the city against which we are going, far from being so
impotent for defence, is on the contrary most excellently equipped at
all points; so that we have every reason to expect that they will take
the field against us, and that if they have not set out already before
we are there, they will certainly do so when they see us in their
territory wasting and destroying their property. For men are always
exasperated at suffering injuries to which they are not accustomed, and
on seeing them inflicted before their very eyes; and where least
inclined for reflection, rush with the greatest heat to action. The
Athenians are the very people of all others to do this, as they aspire
to rule the rest of the world, and are more in the habit of invading
and ravaging their neighbours’ territory, than of seeing their own
treated in the like fashion. Considering, therefore, the power of the
state against which we are marching, and the greatness of the
reputation which, according to the event, we shall win or lose for our
ancestors and ourselves, remember as you follow where you may be led to
regard discipline and vigilance as of the first importance, and to obey
with alacrity the orders transmitted to you; as nothing contributes so
much to the credit and safety of an army as the union of large bodies
by a single discipline.”

With this brief speech dismissing the assembly, Archidamus first sent
off Melesippus, son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in case she
should be more inclined to submit on seeing the Peloponnesians actually
on the march. But the Athenians did not admit into the city or to their
assembly, Pericles having already carried a motion against admitting
either herald or embassy from the Lacedaemonians after they had once
marched out.

The herald was accordingly sent away without an audience, and ordered
to be beyond the frontier that same day; in future, if those who sent
him had a proposition to make, they must retire to their own territory
before they dispatched embassies to Athens. An escort was sent with
Melesippus to prevent his holding communication with any one. When he
reached the frontier and was just going to be dismissed, he departed
with these words: “This day will be the beginning of great misfortunes
to the Hellenes.” As soon as he arrived at the camp, and Archidamus
learnt that the Athenians had still no thoughts of submitting, he at
length began his march, and advanced with his army into their
territory. Meanwhile the Boeotians, sending their contingent and
cavalry to join the Peloponnesian expedition, went to Plataea with the
remainder and laid waste the country.

While the Peloponnesians were still mustering at the Isthmus, or on the
march before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of Xanthippus, one of
the ten generals of the Athenians, finding that the invasion was to
take place, conceived the idea that Archidamus, who happened to be his
friend, might possibly pass by his estate without ravaging it. This he
might do, either from a personal wish to oblige him, or acting under
instructions from Lacedaemon for the purpose of creating a prejudice
against him, as had been before attempted in the demand for the
expulsion of the accursed family. He accordingly took the precaution of
announcing to the Athenians in the assembly that, although Archidamus
was his friend, yet this friendship should not extend to the detriment
of the state, and that in case the enemy should make his houses and
lands an exception to the rest and not pillage them, he at once gave
them up to be public property, so that they should not bring him into
suspicion. He also gave the citizens some advice on their present
affairs in the same strain as before. They were to prepare for the war,
and to carry in their property from the country. They were not to go
out to battle, but to come into the city and guard it, and get ready
their fleet, in which their real strength lay. They were also to keep a
tight rein on their allies—the strength of Athens being derived from
the money brought in by their payments, and success in war depending
principally upon conduct and capital, had no reason to despond. Apart
from other sources of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents
of silver was drawn from the tribute of the allies; and there were
still six thousand talents of coined silver in the Acropolis, out of
nine thousand seven hundred that had once been there, from which the
money had been taken for the porch of the Acropolis, the other public
buildings, and for Potidæa. This did not include the uncoined gold and
silver in public and private offerings, the sacred vessels for the
processions and games, the Median spoils, and similar resources to the
amount of five hundred talents. To this he added the treasures of the
other temples. These were by no means inconsiderable, and might fairly
be used. Nay, if they were ever absolutely driven to it, they might
take even the gold ornaments of Athene herself; for the statue
contained forty talents of pure gold and it was all removable. This
might be used for self-preservation, and must every penny of it be
restored. Such was their financial position—surely a satisfactory one.
Then they had an army of thirteen thousand heavy infantry, besides
sixteen thousand more in the garrisons and on home duty at Athens. This
was at first the number of men on guard in the event of an invasion: it
was composed of the oldest and youngest levies and the resident aliens
who had heavy armour. The Phaleric wall ran for four miles, before it
joined that round the city; and of this last nearly five had a guard,
although part of it was left without one, viz., that between the Long
Wall and the Phaleric. Then there were the Long Walls to Piraeus, a
distance of some four miles and a half, the outer of which was manned.
Lastly, the circumference of Piraeus with Munychia was nearly seven
miles and a half; only half of this, however, was guarded. Pericles
also showed them that they had twelve hundred horse including mounted
archers, with sixteen hundred archers unmounted, and three hundred
galleys fit for service. Such were the resources of Athens in the
different departments when the Peloponnesian invasion was impending and
hostilities were being commenced. Pericles also urged his usual
arguments for expecting a favourable issue to the war.

The Athenians listened to his advice, and began to carry in their wives
and children from the country, and all their household furniture, even
to the woodwork of their houses which they took down. Their sheep and
cattle they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent islands. But they
found it hard to move, as most of them had been always used to live in
the country.

From very early times this had been more the case with the Athenians
than with others. Under Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign
of Theseus, Attica had always consisted of a number of independent
townships, each with its own town hall and magistrates. Except in times
of danger the king at Athens was not consulted; in ordinary seasons
they carried on their government and settled their affairs without his
interference; sometimes even they waged war against him, as in the case
of the Eleusinians with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. In Theseus,
however, they had a king of equal intelligence and power; and one of
the chief features in his organization of the country was to abolish
the council-chambers and magistrates of the petty cities, and to merge
them in the single council-chamber and town hall of the present
capital. Individuals might still enjoy their private property just as
before, but they were henceforth compelled to have only one political
centre, viz., Athens; which thus counted all the inhabitants of Attica
among her citizens, so that when Theseus died he left a great state
behind him. Indeed, from him dates the Synoecia, or Feast of Union;
which is paid for by the state, and which the Athenians still keep in
honour of the goddess. Before this the city consisted of the present
citadel and the district beneath it looking rather towards the south.
This is shown by the fact that the temples of the other deities,
besides that of Athene, are in the citadel; and even those that are
outside it are mostly situated in this quarter of the city, as that of
the Olympian Zeus, of the Pythian Apollo, of Earth, and of Dionysus in
the Marshes, the same in whose honour the older Dionysia are to this
day celebrated in the month of Anthesterion not only by the Athenians
but also by their Ionian descendants. There are also other ancient
temples in this quarter. The fountain too, which, since the alteration
made by the tyrants, has been called Enneacrounos, or Nine Pipes, but
which, when the spring was open, went by the name of Callirhoe, or
Fairwater, was in those days, from being so near, used for the most
important offices. Indeed, the old fashion of using the water before
marriage and for other sacred purposes is still kept up. Again, from
their old residence in that quarter, the citadel is still known among
Athenians as the city.

The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent
townships. Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still
prevailed; and from the early times down to the present war most
Athenians still lived in the country with their families and
households, and were consequently not at all inclined to move now,
especially as they had only just restored their establishments after
the Median invasion. Deep was their trouble and discontent at
abandoning their houses and the hereditary temples of the ancient
constitution, and at having to change their habits of life and to bid
farewell to what each regarded as his native city.

When they arrived at Athens, though a few had houses of their own to go
to, or could find an asylum with friends or relatives, by far the
greater number had to take up their dwelling in the parts of the city
that were not built over and in the temples and chapels of the heroes,
except the Acropolis and the temple of the Eleusinian Demeter and such
other Places as were always kept closed. The occupation of the plot of
ground lying below the citadel called the Pelasgian had been forbidden
by a curse; and there was also an ominous fragment of a Pythian oracle
which said:

Leave the Pelasgian parcel desolate, Woe worth the day that men inhabit
it!

Yet this too was now built over in the necessity of the moment. And in
my opinion, if the oracle proved true, it was in the opposite sense to
what was expected. For the misfortunes of the state did not arise from
the unlawful occupation, but the necessity of the occupation from the
war; and though the god did not mention this, he foresaw that it would
be an evil day for Athens in which the plot came to be inhabited. Many
also took up their quarters in the towers of the walls or wherever else
they could. For when they were all come in, the city proved too small
to hold them; though afterwards they divided the Long Walls and a great
part of Piraeus into lots and settled there. All this while great
attention was being given to the war; the allies were being mustered,
and an armament of a hundred ships equipped for Peloponnese. Such was
the state of preparation at Athens.

Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing. The first town
they came to in Attica was Oenoe, where they to enter the country.
Sitting down before it, they prepared to assault the wall with engines
and otherwise. Oenoe, standing upon the Athenian and Boeotian border,
was of course a walled town, and was used as a fortress by the
Athenians in time of war. So the Peloponnesians prepared for their
assault, and wasted some valuable time before the place. This delay
brought the gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even during the levying of
the war he had credit for weakness and Athenian sympathies by the half
measures he had advocated; and after the army had assembled he had
further injured himself in public estimation by his loitering at the
Isthmus and the slowness with which the rest of the march had been
conducted. But all this was as nothing to the delay at Oenoe. During
this interval the Athenians were carrying in their property; and it was
the belief of the Peloponnesians that a quick advance would have found
everything still out, had it not been for his procrastination. Such was
the feeling of the army towards Archidamus during the siege. But he, it
is said, expected that the Athenians would shrink from letting their
land be wasted, and would make their submission while it was still
uninjured; and this was why he waited.

But after he had assaulted Oenoe, and every possible attempt to take it
had failed, as no herald came from Athens, he at last broke up his camp
and invaded Attica. This was about eighty days after the Theban attempt
upon Plataea, just in the middle of summer, when the corn was ripe, and
Archidamus, son of Zeuxis, king of Lacedaemon, was in command.
Encamping in Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they began their ravages,
and putting to flight some Athenian horse at a place called Rheiti, or
the Brooks, they then advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleus on their right,
through Cropia, until they reached Acharnae, the largest of the
Athenian demes or townships. Sitting down before it, they formed a camp
there, and continued their ravages for a long while.

The reason why Archidamus remained in order of battle at Acharnae
during this incursion, instead of descending into the plain, is said to
have been this. He hoped that the Athenians might possibly be tempted
by the multitude of their youth and the unprecedented efficiency of
their service to come out to battle and attempt to stop the devastation
of their lands. Accordingly, as they had met him at Eleusis or the
Thriasian plain, he tried if they could be provoked to a sally by the
spectacle of a camp at Acharnae. He thought the place itself a good
position for encamping; and it seemed likely that such an important
part of the state as the three thousand heavy infantry of the
Acharnians would refuse to submit to the ruin of their property, and
would force a battle on the rest of the citizens. On the other hand,
should the Athenians not take the field during this incursion, he could
then fearlessly ravage the plain in future invasions, and extend his
advance up to the very walls of Athens. After the Acharnians had lost
their own property they would be less willing to risk themselves for
that of their neighbours; and so there would be division in the
Athenian counsels. These were the motives of Archidamus for remaining
at Acharnae.

In the meanwhile, as long as the army was at Eleusis and the Thriasian
plain, hopes were still entertained of its not advancing any nearer. It
was remembered that Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon,
had invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army fourteen years before, but
had retreated without advancing farther than Eleusis and Thria, which
indeed proved the cause of his exile from Sparta, as it was thought he
had been bribed to retreat. But when they saw the army at Acharnae,
barely seven miles from Athens, they lost all patience. The territory
of Athens was being ravaged before the very eyes of the Athenians, a
sight which the young men had never seen before and the old only in the
Median wars; and it was naturally thought a grievous insult, and the
determination was universal, especially among the young men, to sally
forth and stop it. Knots were formed in the streets and engaged in hot
discussion; for if the proposed sally was warmly recommended, it was
also in some cases opposed. Oracles of the most various import were
recited by the collectors, and found eager listeners in one or other of
the disputants. Foremost in pressing for the sally were the Acharnians,
as constituting no small part of the army of the state, and as it was
their land that was being ravaged. In short, the whole city was in a
most excited state; Pericles was the object of general indignation; his
previous counsels were totally forgotten; he was abused for not leading
out the army which he commanded, and was made responsible for the whole
of the public suffering.

He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the ascendant,
and of his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call either assembly
or meeting of the people, fearing the fatal results of a debate
inspired by passion and not by prudence. Accordingly he addressed
himself to the defence of the city, and kept it as quiet as possible,
though he constantly sent out cavalry to prevent raids on the lands
near the city from flying parties of the enemy. There was a trifling
affair at Phrygia between a squadron of the Athenian horse with the
Thessalians and the Boeotian cavalry; in which the former had rather
the best of it, until the heavy infantry advanced to the support of the
Boeotians, when the Thessalians and Athenians were routed and lost a
few men, whose bodies, however, were recovered the same day without a
truce. The next day the Peloponnesians set up a trophy. Ancient
alliance brought the Thessalians to the aid of Athens; those who came
being the Larisaeans, Pharsalians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians,
and Pheraeans. The Larisaean commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus,
two party leaders in Larisa; the Pharsalian general was Menon; each of
the other cities had also its own commander.

In the meantime the Peloponnesians, as the Athenians did not come out
to engage them, broke up from Acharnae and ravaged some of the demes
between Mount Parnes and Brilessus. While they were in Attica the
Athenians sent off the hundred ships which they had been preparing
round Peloponnese, with a thousand heavy infantry and four hundred
archers on board, under the command of Carcinus, son of Xenotimus,
Proteas, son of Epicles, and Socrates, son of Antigenes. This armament
weighed anchor and started on its cruise, and the Peloponnesians, after
remaining in Attica as long as their provisions lasted, retired through
Boeotia by a different road to that by which they had entered. As they
passed Oropus they ravaged the territory of Graea, which is held by the
Oropians from Athens, and reaching Peloponnese broke up to their
respective cities.

After they had retired the Athenians set guards by land and sea at the
points at which they intended to have regular stations during the war.
They also resolved to set apart a special fund of a thousand talents
from the moneys in the Acropolis. This was not to be spent, but the
current expenses of the war were to be otherwise provided for. If any
one should move or put to the vote a proposition for using the money
for any purpose whatever except that of defending the city in the event
of the enemy bringing a fleet to make an attack by sea, it should be a
capital offence. With this sum of money they also set aside a special
fleet of one hundred galleys, the best ships of each year, with their
captains. None of these were to be used except with the money and
against the same peril, should such peril arise.

Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships round Peloponnese,
reinforced by a Corcyraean squadron of fifty vessels and some others of
the allies in those parts, cruised about the coasts and ravaged the
country. Among other places they landed in Laconia and made an assault
upon Methone; there being no garrison in the place, and the wall being
weak. But it so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, was
in command of a guard for the defence of the district. Hearing of the
attack, he hurried with a hundred heavy infantry to the assistance of
the besieged, and dashing through the army of the Athenians, which was
scattered over the country and had its attention turned to the wall,
threw himself into Methone. He lost a few men in making good his
entrance, but saved the place and won the thanks of Sparta by his
exploit, being thus the first officer who obtained this notice during
the war. The Athenians at once weighed anchor and continued their
cruise. Touching at Pheia in Elis, they ravaged the country for two
days and defeated a picked force of three hundred men that had come
from the vale of Elis and the immediate neighbourhood to the rescue.
But a stiff squall came down upon them, and, not liking to face it in a
place where there was no harbour, most of them got on board their
ships, and doubling Point Ichthys sailed into the port of Pheia. In the
meantime the Messenians, and some others who could not get on board,
marched over by land and took Pheia. The fleet afterwards sailed round
and picked them up and then put to sea; Pheia being evacuated, as the
main army of the Eleans had now come up. The Athenians continued their
cruise, and ravaged other places on the coast.

About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise round
Locris and also to guard Euboea; Cleopompus, son of Clinias, being in
command. Making descents from the fleet he ravaged certain places on
the sea-coast, and captured Thronium and took hostages from it. He also
defeated at Alope the Locrians that had assembled to resist him.

During the summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans with their
wives and children from Aegina, on the ground of their having been the
chief agents in bringing the war upon them. Besides, Aegina lies so
near Peloponnese that it seemed safer to send colonists of their own to
hold it, and shortly afterwards the settlers were sent out. The
banished Aeginetans found an asylum in Thyrea, which was given to them
by Lacedaemon, not only on account of her quarrel with Athens, but also
because the Aeginetans had laid her under obligations at the time of
the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea is
on the frontier of Argolis and Laconia, reaching down to the sea. Those
of the Aeginetans who did not settle here were scattered over the rest
of Hellas.

The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month, the only time
by the way at which it appears possible, the sun was eclipsed after
noon. After it had assumed the form of a crescent and some of the stars
had come out, it returned to its natural shape.

During the same summer Nymphodorus, son of Pythes, an Abderite, whose
sister Sitalces had married, was made their proxenus by the Athenians
and sent for to Athens. They had hitherto considered him their enemy;
but he had great influence with Sitalces, and they wished this prince
to become their ally. Sitalces was the son of Teres and King of the
Thracians. Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to establish
the great kingdom of the Odrysians on a scale quite unknown to the rest
of Thrace, a large portion of the Thracians being independent. This
Teres is in no way related to Tereus who married Pandion’s daughter
Procne from Athens; nor indeed did they belong to the same part of
Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulis, part of what is now called Phocis, but
which at that time was inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that
the women perpetrated the outrage upon Itys; and many of the poets when
they mention the nightingale call it the Daulian bird. Besides, Pandion
in contracting an alliance for his daughter would consider the
advantages of mutual assistance, and would naturally prefer a match at
the above moderate distance to the journey of many days which separates
Athens from the Odrysians. Again the names are different; and this
Teres was king of the Odrysians, the first by the way who attained to
any power. Sitalces, his son, was now sought as an ally by the
Athenians, who desired his aid in the reduction of the Thracian towns
and of Perdiccas. Coming to Athens, Nymphodorus concluded the alliance
with Sitalces and made his son Sadocus an Athenian citizen, and
promised to finish the war in Thrace by persuading Sitalces to send the
Athenians a force of Thracian horse and targeteers. He also reconciled
them with Perdiccas, and induced them to restore Therme to him; upon
which Perdiccas at once joined the Athenians and Phormio in an
expedition against the Chalcidians. Thus Sitalces, son of Teres, King
of the Thracians, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, King of the
Macedonians, became allies of Athens.

Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels were still cruising
round Peloponnese. After taking Sollium, a town belonging to Corinth,
and presenting the city and territory to the Acarnanians of Palaira,
they stormed Astacus, expelled its tyrant Evarchus, and gained the
place for their confederacy. Next they sailed to the island of
Cephallenia and brought it over without using force. Cephallenia lies
off Acarnania and Leucas, and consists of four states, the Paleans,
Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronaeans. Not long afterwards the fleet
returned to Athens. Towards the autumn of this year the Athenians
invaded the Megarid with their whole levy, resident aliens included,
under the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus. The Athenians in the
hundred ships round Peloponnese on their journey home had just reached
Aegina, and hearing that the citizens at home were in full force at
Megara, now sailed over and joined them. This was without doubt the
largest army of Athenians ever assembled, the state being still in the
flower of her strength and yet unvisited by the plague. Full ten
thousand heavy infantry were in the field, all Athenian citizens,
besides the three thousand before Potidæa. Then the resident aliens who
joined in the incursion were at least three thousand strong; besides
which there was a multitude of light troops. They ravaged the greater
part of the territory, and then retired. Other incursions into the
Megarid were afterwards made by the Athenians annually during the war,
sometimes only with cavalry, sometimes with all their forces. This went
on until the capture of Nisaea. Atalanta also, the desert island off
the Opuntian coast, was towards the end of this summer converted into a
fortified post by the Athenians, in order to prevent privateers issuing
from Opus and the rest of Locris and plundering Euboea. Such were the
events of this summer after the return of the Peloponnesians from
Attica.

In the ensuing winter the Acarnanian Evarchus, wishing to return to
Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail over with forty ships and
fifteen hundred heavy infantry and restore him; himself also hiring
some mercenaries. In command of the force were Euphamidas, son of
Aristonymus, Timoxenus, son of Timocrates, and Eumachus, son of
Chrysis, who sailed over and restored him and, after failing in an
attempt on some places on the Acarnanian coast which they were desirous
of gaining, began their voyage home. Coasting along shore they touched
at Cephallenia and made a descent on the Cranian territory, and losing
some men by the treachery of the Cranians, who fell suddenly upon them
after having agreed to treat, put to sea somewhat hurriedly and
returned home.

In the same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost to
those who had first fallen in this war. It was a custom of their
ancestors, and the manner of it is as follows. Three days before the
ceremony, the bones of the dead are laid out in a tent which has been
erected; and their friends bring to their relatives such offerings as
they please. In the funeral procession cypress coffins are borne in
cars, one for each tribe; the bones of the deceased being placed in the
coffin of their tribe. Among these is carried one empty bier decked for
the missing, that is, for those whose bodies could not be recovered.
Any citizen or stranger who pleases, joins in the procession: and the
female relatives are there to wail at the burial. The dead are laid in
the public sepulchre in the Beautiful suburb of the city, in which
those who fall in war are always buried; with the exception of those
slain at Marathon, who for their singular and extraordinary valour were
interred on the spot where they fell. After the bodies have been laid
in the earth, a man chosen by the state, of approved wisdom and eminent
reputation, pronounces over them an appropriate panegyric; after which
all retire. Such is the manner of the burying; and throughout the whole
of the war, whenever the occasion arose, the established custom was
observed. Meanwhile these were the first that had fallen, and Pericles,
son of Xanthippus, was chosen to pronounce their eulogium. When the
proper time arrived, he advanced from the sepulchre to an elevated
platform in order to be heard by as many of the crowd as possible, and
spoke as follows:

“Most of my predecessors in this place have commended him who made this
speech part of the law, telling us that it is well that it should be
delivered at the burial of those who fall in battle. For myself, I
should have thought that the worth which had displayed itself in deeds
would be sufficiently rewarded by honours also shown by deeds; such as
you now see in this funeral prepared at the people’s cost. And I could
have wished that the reputations of many brave men were not to be
imperilled in the mouth of a single individual, to stand or fall
according as he spoke well or ill. For it is hard to speak properly
upon a subject where it is even difficult to convince your hearers that
you are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the friend who is familiar
with every fact of the story may think that some point has not been set
forth with that fullness which he wishes and knows it to deserve; on
the other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be led by envy to
suspect exaggeration if he hears anything above his own nature. For men
can endure to hear others praised only so long as they can severally
persuade themselves of their own ability to equal the actions
recounted: when this point is passed, envy comes in and with it
incredulity. However, since our ancestors have stamped this custom with
their approval, it becomes my duty to obey the law and to try to
satisfy your several wishes and opinions as best I may.

“I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that they
should have the honour of the first mention on an occasion like the
present. They dwelt in the country without break in the succession from
generation to generation, and handed it down free to the present time
by their valour. And if our more remote ancestors deserve praise, much
more do our own fathers, who added to their inheritance the empire
which we now possess, and spared no pains to be able to leave their
acquisitions to us of the present generation. Lastly, there are few
parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by those of us
here, who are still more or less in the vigour of life; while the
mother country has been furnished by us with everything that can enable
her to depend on her own resources whether for war or for peace. That
part of our history which tells of the military achievements which gave
us our several possessions, or of the ready valour with which either we
or our fathers stemmed the tide of Hellenic or foreign aggression, is a
theme too familiar to my hearers for me to dilate on, and I shall
therefore pass it by. But what was the road by which we reached our
position, what the form of government under which our greatness grew,
what the national habits out of which it sprang; these are questions
which I may try to solve before I proceed to my panegyric upon these
men; since I think this to be a subject upon which on the present
occasion a speaker may properly dwell, and to which the whole
assemblage, whether citizens or foreigners, may listen with advantage.

“Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are
rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration
favours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a
democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in
their private differences; if no social standing, advancement in public
life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being
allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if
a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity
of his condition. The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends
also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous
surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry
with our neighbour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those
injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they
inflict no positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations
does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief
safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws,
particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they
are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which,
although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace.

“Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to refresh itself
from business. We celebrate games and sacrifices all the year round,
and the elegance of our private establishments forms a daily source of
pleasure and helps to banish the spleen; while the magnitude of our
city draws the produce of the world into our harbour, so that to the
Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury as
those of his own.

“If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our
antagonists. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien
acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing,
although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our
liberality; trusting less in system and policy than to the native
spirit of our citizens; while in education, where our rivals from their
very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we
live exactly as we please, and yet are just as ready to encounter every
legitimate danger. In proof of this it may be noticed that the
Lacedaemonians do not invade our country alone, but bring with them all
their confederates; while we Athenians advance unsupported into the
territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually
vanquish with ease men who are defending their homes. Our united force
was never yet encountered by any enemy, because we have at once to
attend to our marine and to dispatch our citizens by land upon a
hundred different services; so that, wherever they engage with some
such fraction of our strength, a success against a detachment is
magnified into a victory over the nation, and a defeat into a reverse
suffered at the hands of our entire people. And yet if with habits not
of labour but of ease, and courage not of art but of nature, we are
still willing to encounter danger, we have the double advantage of
escaping the experience of hardships in anticipation and of facing them
in the hour of need as fearlessly as those who are never free from
them.

“Nor are these the only points in which our city is worthy of
admiration. We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge
without effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show, and
place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in
declining the struggle against it. Our public men have, besides
politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary
citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair
judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding him
who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we
Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and,
instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of
action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at
all. Again, in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of
daring and deliberation, each carried to its highest point, and both
united in the same persons; although usually decision is the fruit of
ignorance, hesitation of reflection. But the palm of courage will
surely be adjudged most justly to those, who best know the difference
between hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from
danger. In generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by
conferring, not by receiving, favours. Yet, of course, the doer of the
favour is the firmer friend of the two, in order by continued kindness
to keep the recipient in his debt; while the debtor feels less keenly
from the very consciousness that the return he makes will be a payment,
not a free gift. And it is only the Athenians, who, fearless of
consequences, confer their benefits not from calculations of
expediency, but in the confidence of liberality.

“In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas, while I
doubt if the world can produce a man who, where he has only himself to
depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a
versatility, as the Athenian. And that this is no mere boast thrown out
for the occasion, but plain matter of fact, the power of the state
acquired by these habits proves. For Athens alone of her contemporaries
is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and alone gives
no occasion to her assailants to blush at the antagonist by whom they
have been worsted, or to her subjects to question her title by merit to
rule. Rather, the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be
ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have shown
it by mighty proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist,
or other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for
the impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have
forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and
everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable
monuments behind us. Such is the Athens for which these men, in the
assertion of their resolve not to lose her, nobly fought and died; and
well may every one of their survivors be ready to suffer in her cause.

“Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our
country, it has been to show that our stake in the struggle is not the
same as theirs who have no such blessings to lose, and also that the
panegyric of the men over whom I am now speaking might be by definite
proofs established. That panegyric is now in a great measure complete;
for the Athens that I have celebrated is only what the heroism of these
and their like have made her, men whose fame, unlike that of most
Hellenes, will be found to be only commensurate with their deserts. And
if a test of worth be wanted, it is to be found in their closing scene,
and this not only in cases in which it set the final seal upon their
merit, but also in those in which it gave the first intimation of their
having any. For there is justice in the claim that steadfastness in his
country’s battles should be as a cloak to cover a man’s other
imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad, and his
merit as a citizen more than outweighed his demerits as an individual.
But none of these allowed either wealth with its prospect of future
enjoyment to unnerve his spirit, or poverty with its hope of a day of
freedom and riches to tempt him to shrink from danger. No, holding that
vengeance upon their enemies was more to be desired than any personal
blessings, and reckoning this to be the most glorious of hazards, they
joyfully determined to accept the risk, to make sure of their
vengeance, and to let their wishes wait; and while committing to hope
the uncertainty of final success, in the business before them they
thought fit to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die
resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from
dishonour, but met danger face to face, and after one brief moment,
while at the summit of their fortune, escaped, not from their fear, but
from their glory.

“So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must
determine to have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you
may pray that it may have a happier issue. And not contented with ideas
derived only from words of the advantages which are bound up with the
defence of your country, though these would furnish a valuable text to
a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as the present, you
must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon
her from day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; and then, when
all her greatness shall break upon you, you must reflect that it was by
courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling of honour in action that men
were enabled to win all this, and that no personal failure in an
enterprise could make them consent to deprive their country of their
valour, but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious contribution
that they could offer. For this offering of their lives made in common
by them all they each of them individually received that renown which
never grows old, and for a sepulchre, not so much that in which their
bones have been deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their
glory is laid up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on
which deed or story shall call for its commemoration. For heroes have
the whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where
the column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every
breast a record unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that of
the heart. These take as your model and, judging happiness to be the
fruit of freedom and freedom of valour, never decline the dangers of
war. For it is not the miserable that would most justly be unsparing of
their lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is rather they to whom
continued life may bring reverses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall,
if it came, would be most tremendous in its consequences. And surely,
to a man of spirit, the degradation of cowardice must be immeasurably
more grievous than the unfelt death which strikes him in the midst of
his strength and patriotism!

“Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to offer to the
parents of the dead who may be here. Numberless are the chances to
which, as they know, the life of man is subject; but fortunate indeed
are they who draw for their lot a death so glorious as that which has
caused your mourning, and to whom life has been so exactly measured as
to terminate in the happiness in which it has been passed. Still I know
that this is a hard saying, especially when those are in question of
whom you will constantly be reminded by seeing in the homes of others
blessings of which once you also boasted: for grief is felt not so much
for the want of what we have never known, as for the loss of that to
which we have been long accustomed. Yet you who are still of an age to
beget children must bear up in the hope of having others in their
stead; not only will they help you to forget those whom you have lost,
but will be to the state at once a reinforcement and a security; for
never can a fair or just policy be expected of the citizen who does
not, like his fellows, bring to the decision the interests and
apprehensions of a father. While those of you who have passed your
prime must congratulate yourselves with the thought that the best part
of your life was fortunate, and that the brief span that remains will
be cheered by the fame of the departed. For it is only the love of
honour that never grows old; and honour it is, not gain, as some would
have it, that rejoices the heart of age and helplessness.

“Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an arduous struggle
before you. When a man is gone, all are wont to praise him, and should
your merit be ever so transcendent, you will still find it difficult
not merely to overtake, but even to approach their renown. The living
have envy to contend with, while those who are no longer in our path
are honoured with a goodwill into which rivalry does not enter. On the
other hand, if I must say anything on the subject of female excellence
to those of you who will now be in widowhood, it will be all comprised
in this brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in not falling
short of your natural character; and greatest will be hers who is least
talked of among the men, whether for good or for bad.

“My task is now finished. I have performed it to the best of my
ability, and in word, at least, the requirements of the law are now
satisfied. If deeds be in question, those who are here interred have
received part of their honours already, and for the rest, their
children will be brought up till manhood at the public expense: the
state thus offers a valuable prize, as the garland of victory in this
race of valour, for the reward both of those who have fallen and their
survivors. And where the rewards for merit are greatest, there are
found the best citizens.

“And now that you have brought to a close your lamentations for your
relatives, you may depart.”




CHAPTER VII


Second Year of the War—The Plague of Athens—Position and Policy of
Pericles—Fall of Potidæa


Such was the funeral that took place during this winter, with which the
first year of the war came to an end. In the first days of summer the
Lacedaemonians and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces as
before, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of
Zeuxidamus, King of Lacedaemon, and sat down and laid waste the
country. Not many days after their arrival in Attica the plague first
began to show itself among the Athenians. It was said that it had
broken out in many places previously in the neighbourhood of Lemnos and
elsewhere; but a pestilence of such extent and mortality was nowhere
remembered. Neither were the physicians at first of any service,
ignorant as they were of the proper way to treat it, but they died
themselves the most thickly, as they visited the sick most often; nor
did any human art succeed any better. Supplications in the temples,
divinations, and so forth were found equally futile, till the
overwhelming nature of the disaster at last put a stop to them
altogether.

It first began, it is said, in the parts of Ethiopia above Egypt, and
thence descended into Egypt and Libya and into most of the King’s
country. Suddenly falling upon Athens, it first attacked the population
in Piraeus—which was the occasion of their saying that the
Peloponnesians had poisoned the reservoirs, there being as yet no wells
there—and afterwards appeared in the upper city, when the deaths became
much more frequent. All speculation as to its origin and its causes, if
causes can be found adequate to produce so great a disturbance, I leave
to other writers, whether lay or professional; for myself, I shall
simply set down its nature, and explain the symptoms by which perhaps
it may be recognized by the student, if it should ever break out again.
This I can the better do, as I had the disease myself, and watched its
operation in the case of others.

That year then is admitted to have been otherwise unprecedentedly free
from sickness; and such few cases as occurred all determined in this.
As a rule, however, there was no ostensible cause; but people in good
health were all of a sudden attacked by violent heats in the head, and
redness and inflammation in the eyes, the inward parts, such as the
throat or tongue, becoming bloody and emitting an unnatural and fetid
breath. These symptoms were followed by sneezing and hoarseness, after
which the pain soon reached the chest, and produced a hard cough. When
it fixed in the stomach, it upset it; and discharges of bile of every
kind named by physicians ensued, accompanied by very great distress. In
most cases also an ineffectual retching followed, producing violent
spasms, which in some cases ceased soon after, in others much later.
Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor pale in its
appearance, but reddish, livid, and breaking out into small pustules
and ulcers. But internally it burned so that the patient could not bear
to have on him clothing or linen even of the very lightest description;
or indeed to be otherwise than stark naked. What they would have liked
best would have been to throw themselves into cold water; as indeed was
done by some of the neglected sick, who plunged into the rain-tanks in
their agonies of unquenchable thirst; though it made no difference
whether they drank little or much. Besides this, the miserable feeling
of not being able to rest or sleep never ceased to torment them. The
body meanwhile did not waste away so long as the distemper was at its
height, but held out to a marvel against its ravages; so that when they
succumbed, as in most cases, on the seventh or eighth day to the
internal inflammation, they had still some strength in them. But if
they passed this stage, and the disease descended further into the
bowels, inducing a violent ulceration there accompanied by severe
diarrhoea, this brought on a weakness which was generally fatal. For
the disorder first settled in the head, ran its course from thence
through the whole of the body, and, even where it did not prove mortal,
it still left its mark on the extremities; for it settled in the privy
parts, the fingers and the toes, and many escaped with the loss of
these, some too with that of their eyes. Others again were seized with
an entire loss of memory on their first recovery, and did not know
either themselves or their friends.

But while the nature of the distemper was such as to baffle all
description, and its attacks almost too grievous for human nature to
endure, it was still in the following circumstance that its difference
from all ordinary disorders was most clearly shown. All the birds and
beasts that prey upon human bodies, either abstained from touching them
(though there were many lying unburied), or died after tasting them. In
proof of this, it was noticed that birds of this kind actually
disappeared; they were not about the bodies, or indeed to be seen at
all. But of course the effects which I have mentioned could best be
studied in a domestic animal like the dog.

Such then, if we pass over the varieties of particular cases which were
many and peculiar, were the general features of the distemper.
Meanwhile the town enjoyed an immunity from all the ordinary disorders;
or if any case occurred, it ended in this. Some died in neglect, others
in the midst of every attention. No remedy was found that could be used
as a specific; for what did good in one case, did harm in another.
Strong and weak constitutions proved equally incapable of resistance,
all alike being swept away, although dieted with the utmost precaution.
By far the most terrible feature in the malady was the dejection which
ensued when any one felt himself sickening, for the despair into which
they instantly fell took away their power of resistance, and left them
a much easier prey to the disorder; besides which, there was the awful
spectacle of men dying like sheep, through having caught the infection
in nursing each other. This caused the greatest mortality. On the one
hand, if they were afraid to visit each other, they perished from
neglect; indeed many houses were emptied of their inmates for want of a
nurse: on the other, if they ventured to do so, death was the
consequence. This was especially the case with such as made any
pretensions to goodness: honour made them unsparing of themselves in
their attendance in their friends’ houses, where even the members of
the family were at last worn out by the moans of the dying, and
succumbed to the force of the disaster. Yet it was with those who had
recovered from the disease that the sick and the dying found most
compassion. These knew what it was from experience, and had now no fear
for themselves; for the same man was never attacked twice—never at
least fatally. And such persons not only received the congratulations
of others, but themselves also, in the elation of the moment, half
entertained the vain hope that they were for the future safe from any
disease whatsoever.

An aggravation of the existing calamity was the influx from the country
into the city, and this was especially felt by the new arrivals. As
there were no houses to receive them, they had to be lodged at the hot
season of the year in stifling cabins, where the mortality raged
without restraint. The bodies of dying men lay one upon another, and
half-dead creatures reeled about the streets and gathered round all the
fountains in their longing for water. The sacred places also in which
they had quartered themselves were full of corpses of persons that had
died there, just as they were; for as the disaster passed all bounds,
men, not knowing what was to become of them, became utterly careless of
everything, whether sacred or profane. All the burial rites before in
use were entirely upset, and they buried the bodies as best they could.
Many from want of the proper appliances, through so many of their
friends having died already, had recourse to the most shameless
sepultures: sometimes getting the start of those who had raised a pile,
they threw their own dead body upon the stranger’s pyre and ignited it;
sometimes they tossed the corpse which they were carrying on the top of
another that was burning, and so went off.

Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its
origin to the plague. Men now coolly ventured on what they had formerly
done in a corner, and not just as they pleased, seeing the rapid
transitions produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and those
who before had nothing succeeding to their property. So they resolved
to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their lives and riches
as alike things of a day. Perseverance in what men called honour was
popular with none, it was so uncertain whether they would be spared to
attain the object; but it was settled that present enjoyment, and all
that contributed to it, was both honourable and useful. Fear of gods or
law of man there was none to restrain them. As for the first, they
judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as
they saw all alike perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live
to be brought to trial for his offences, but each felt that a far
severer sentence had been already passed upon them all and hung ever
over their heads, and before this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy
life a little.

Such was the nature of the calamity, and heavily did it weigh on the
Athenians; death raging within the city and devastation without. Among
other things which they remembered in their distress was, very
naturally, the following verse which the old men said had long ago been
uttered:

A Dorian war shall come and with it death.


So a dispute arose as to whether dearth and not death had not been the
word in the verse; but at the present juncture, it was of course
decided in favour of the latter; for the people made their recollection
fit in with their sufferings. I fancy, however, that if another Dorian
war should ever afterwards come upon us, and a dearth should happen to
accompany it, the verse will probably be read accordingly. The oracle
also which had been given to the Lacedaemonians was now remembered by
those who knew of it. When the god was asked whether they should go to
war, he answered that if they put their might into it, victory would be
theirs, and that he would himself be with them. With this oracle events
were supposed to tally. For the plague broke out as soon as the
Peloponnesians invaded Attica, and never entering Peloponnese (not at
least to an extent worth noticing), committed its worst ravages at
Athens, and next to Athens, at the most populous of the other towns.
Such was the history of the plague.

After ravaging the plain, the Peloponnesians advanced into the Paralian
region as far as Laurium, where the Athenian silver mines are, and
first laid waste the side looking towards Peloponnese, next that which
faces Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was still general, held the
same opinion as in the former invasion, and would not let the Athenians
march out against them.

However, while they were still in the plain, and had not yet entered
the Paralian land, he had prepared an armament of a hundred ships for
Peloponnese, and when all was ready put out to sea. On board the ships
he took four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and three hundred
cavalry in horse transports, and then for the first time made out of
old galleys; fifty Chian and Lesbian vessels also joining in the
expedition. When this Athenian armament put out to sea, they left the
Peloponnesians in Attica in the Paralian region. Arriving at Epidaurus
in Peloponnese they ravaged most of the territory, and even had hopes
of taking the town by an assault: in this however they were not
successful. Putting out from Epidaurus, they laid waste the territory
of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, all towns on the coast of
Peloponnese, and thence sailing to Prasiai, a maritime town in Laconia,
ravaged part of its territory, and took and sacked the place itself;
after which they returned home, but found the Peloponnesians gone and
no longer in Attica.

During the whole time that the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the
Athenians on the expedition in their ships, men kept dying of the
plague both in the armament and in Athens. Indeed it was actually
asserted that the departure of the Peloponnesians was hastened by fear
of the disorder; as they heard from deserters that it was in the city,
and also could see the burials going on. Yet in this invasion they
remained longer than in any other, and ravaged the whole country, for
they were about forty days in Attica.

The same summer Hagnon, son of Nicias, and Cleopompus, son of Clinias,
the colleagues of Pericles, took the armament of which he had lately
made use, and went off upon an expedition against the Chalcidians in
the direction of Thrace and Potidæa, which was still under siege. As
soon as they arrived, they brought up their engines against Potidæa and
tried every means of taking it, but did not succeed either in capturing
the city or in doing anything else worthy of their preparations. For
the plague attacked them here also, and committed such havoc as to
cripple them completely, even the previously healthy soldiers of the
former expedition catching the infection from Hagnon’s troops; while
Phormio and the sixteen hundred men whom he commanded only escaped by
being no longer in the neighbourhood of the Chalcidians. The end of it
was that Hagnon returned with his ships to Athens, having lost one
thousand and fifty out of four thousand heavy infantry in about forty
days; though the soldiers stationed there before remained in the
country and carried on the siege of Potidæa.

After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians a change came over the
spirit of the Athenians. Their land had now been twice laid waste; and
war and pestilence at once pressed heavy upon them. They began to find
fault with Pericles, as the author of the war and the cause of all
their misfortunes, and became eager to come to terms with Lacedaemon,
and actually sent ambassadors thither, who did not however succeed in
their mission. Their despair was now complete and all vented itself
upon Pericles. When he saw them exasperated at the present turn of
affairs and acting exactly as he had anticipated, he called an
assembly, being (it must be remembered) still general, with the double
object of restoring confidence and of leading them from these angry
feelings to a calmer and more hopeful state of mind. He accordingly
came forward and spoke as follows:

“I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I have been the
object, as I know its causes; and I have called an assembly for the
purpose of reminding you upon certain points, and of protesting against
your being unreasonably irritated with me, or cowed by your sufferings.
I am of opinion that national greatness is more for the advantage of
private citizens, than any individual well-being coupled with public
humiliation. A man may be personally ever so well off, and yet if his
country be ruined he must be ruined with it; whereas a flourishing
commonwealth always affords chances of salvation to unfortunate
individuals. Since then a state can support the misfortunes of private
citizens, while they cannot support hers, it is surely the duty of
every one to be forward in her defence, and not like you to be so
confounded with your domestic afflictions as to give up all thoughts of
the common safety, and to blame me for having counselled war and
yourselves for having voted it. And yet if you are angry with me, it is
with one who, as I believe, is second to no man either in knowledge of
the proper policy, or in the ability to expound it, and who is moreover
not only a patriot but an honest one. A man possessing that knowledge
without that faculty of exposition might as well have no idea at all on
the matter: if he had both these gifts, but no love for his country, he
would be but a cold advocate for her interests; while were his
patriotism not proof against bribery, everything would go for a price.
So that if you thought that I was even moderately distinguished for
these qualities when you took my advice and went to war, there is
certainly no reason now why I should be charged with having done wrong.

“For those of course who have a free choice in the matter and whose
fortunes are not at stake, war is the greatest of follies. But if the
only choice was between submission with loss of independence, and
danger with the hope of preserving that independence, in such a case it
is he who will not accept the risk that deserves blame, not he who
will. I am the same man and do not alter, it is you who change, since
in fact you took my advice while unhurt, and waited for misfortune to
repent of it; and the apparent error of my policy lies in the infirmity
of your resolution, since the suffering that it entails is being felt
by every one among you, while its advantage is still remote and obscure
to all, and a great and sudden reverse having befallen you, your mind
is too much depressed to persevere in your resolves. For before what is
sudden, unexpected, and least within calculation, the spirit quails;
and putting all else aside, the plague has certainly been an emergency
of this kind. Born, however, as you are, citizens of a great state, and
brought up, as you have been, with habits equal to your birth, you
should be ready to face the greatest disasters and still to keep
unimpaired the lustre of your name. For the judgment of mankind is as
relentless to the weakness that falls short of a recognized renown, as
it is jealous of the arrogance that aspires higher than its due. Cease
then to grieve for your private afflictions, and address yourselves
instead to the safety of the commonwealth.

“If you shrink before the exertions which the war makes necessary, and
fear that after all they may not have a happy result, you know the
reasons by which I have often demonstrated to you the groundlessness of
your apprehensions. If those are not enough, I will now reveal an
advantage arising from the greatness of your dominion, which I think
has never yet suggested itself to you, which I never mentioned in my
previous speeches, and which has so bold a sound that I should scarce
adventure it now, were it not for the unnatural depression which I see
around me. You perhaps think that your empire extends only over your
allies; I will declare to you the truth. The visible field of action
has two parts, land and sea. In the whole of one of these you are
completely supreme, not merely as far as you use it at present, but
also to what further extent you may think fit: in fine, your naval
resources are such that your vessels may go where they please, without
the King or any other nation on earth being able to stop them. So that
although you may think it a great privation to lose the use of your
land and houses, still you must see that this power is something widely
different; and instead of fretting on their account, you should really
regard them in the light of the gardens and other accessories that
embellish a great fortune, and as, in comparison, of little moment. You
should know too that liberty preserved by your efforts will easily
recover for us what we have lost, while, the knee once bowed, even what
you have will pass from you. Your fathers receiving these possessions
not from others, but from themselves, did not let slip what their
labour had acquired, but delivered them safe to you; and in this
respect at least you must prove yourselves their equals, remembering
that to lose what one has got is more disgraceful than to be balked in
getting, and you must confront your enemies not merely with spirit but
with disdain. Confidence indeed a blissful ignorance can impart, ay,
even to a coward’s breast, but disdain is the privilege of those who,
like us, have been assured by reflection of their superiority to their
adversary. And where the chances are the same, knowledge fortifies
courage by the contempt which is its consequence, its trust being
placed, not in hope, which is the prop of the desperate, but in a
judgment grounded upon existing resources, whose anticipations are more
to be depended upon.

“Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining the
glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you all,
and you cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share
its honours. You should remember also that what you are fighting
against is not merely slavery as an exchange for independence, but also
loss of empire and danger from the animosities incurred in its
exercise. Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of
you in the alarm of the moment has become enamoured of the honesty of
such an unambitious part. For what you hold is, to speak somewhat
plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is
unsafe. And men of these retiring views, making converts of others,
would quickly ruin a state; indeed the result would be the same if they
could live independent by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious
are never secure without vigorous protectors at their side; in fine,
such qualities are useless to an imperial city, though they may help a
dependency to an unmolested servitude.

“But you must not be seduced by citizens like these or angry with
me—who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves—in spite of
the enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be
certain that he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands;
and although besides what we counted for, the plague has come upon
us—the only point indeed at which our calculation has been at fault. It
is this, I know, that has had a large share in making me more unpopular
than I should otherwise have been—quite undeservedly, unless you are
also prepared to give me the credit of any success with which chance
may present you. Besides, the hand of heaven must be borne with
resignation, that of the enemy with fortitude; this was the old way at
Athens, and do not you prevent it being so still. Remember, too, that
if your country has the greatest name in all the world, it is because
she never bent before disaster; because she has expended more life and
effort in war than any other city, and has won for herself a power
greater than any hitherto known, the memory of which will descend to
the latest posterity; even if now, in obedience to the general law of
decay, we should ever be forced to yield, still it will be remembered
that we held rule over more Hellenes than any other Hellenic state,
that we sustained the greatest wars against their united or separate
powers, and inhabited a city unrivalled by any other in resources or
magnitude. These glories may incur the censure of the slow and
unambitious; but in the breast of energy they will awake emulation, and
in those who must remain without them an envious regret. Hatred and
unpopularity at the moment have fallen to the lot of all who have
aspired to rule others; but where odium must be incurred, true wisdom
incurs it for the highest objects. Hatred also is short-lived; but that
which makes the splendour of the present and the glory of the future
remains for ever unforgotten. Make your decision, therefore, for glory
then and honour now, and attain both objects by instant and zealous
effort: do not send heralds to Lacedaemon, and do not betray any sign
of being oppressed by your present sufferings, since they whose minds
are least sensitive to calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet
it, are the greatest men and the greatest communities.”

Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the Athenians
of their anger against him and to divert their thoughts from their
immediate afflictions. As a community he succeeded in convincing them;
they not only gave up all idea of sending to Lacedaemon, but applied
themselves with increased energy to the war; still as private
individuals they could not help smarting under their sufferings, the
common people having been deprived of the little that they were
possessed, while the higher orders had lost fine properties with costly
establishments and buildings in the country, and, worst of all, had war
instead of peace. In fact, the public feeling against him did not
subside until he had been fined. Not long afterwards, however,
according to the way of the multitude, they again elected him general
and committed all their affairs to his hands, having now become less
sensitive to their private and domestic afflictions, and understanding
that he was the best man of all for the public necessities. For as long
as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he pursued a
moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness was at
its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly
gauged the power of his country. He outlived its commencement two years
and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it
became better known by his death. He told them to wait quietly, to pay
attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose
the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a
favourable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing
private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite
foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to
themselves and to their allies—projects whose success would only
conduce to the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose
failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war. The causes
of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and
known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over
the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for
as he never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled to
flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that
he could afford to anger them by contradiction. Whenever he saw them
unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word reduce them to
alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at
once restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a
democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen. With his
successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each
grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of
state affairs to the whims of the multitude. This, as might have been
expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders,
and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so
much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was
sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures
afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to
occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the
commons, by which they not only paralysed operations in the field, but
also first introduced civil discord at home. Yet after losing most of
their fleet besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction already
dominant in the city, they could still for three years make head
against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians,
but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the
King’s son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy.
Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own
intestine disorders. So superfluously abundant were the resources from
which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in the war over
the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians.

During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies made an
expedition with a hundred ships against Zacynthus, an island lying off
the coast of Elis, peopled by a colony of Achaeans from Peloponnese,
and in alliance with Athens. There were a thousand Lacedaemonian heavy
infantry on board, and Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral. They made a
descent from their ships, and ravaged most of the country; but as the
inhabitants would not submit, they sailed back home.

At the end of the same summer the Corinthian Aristeus, Aneristus,
Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, envoys from Lacedaemon, Timagoras, a Tegean,
and a private individual named Pollis from Argos, on their way to Asia
to persuade the King to supply funds and join in the war, came to
Sitalces, son of Teres in Thrace, with the idea of inducing him, if
possible, to forsake the alliance of Athens and to march on Potidæa
then besieged by an Athenian force, and also of getting conveyed by his
means to their destination across the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, who
was to send them up the country to the King. But there chanced to be
with Sitalces some Athenian ambassadors—Learchus, son of Callimachus,
and Ameiniades, son of Philemon—who persuaded Sitalces’ son, Sadocus,
the new Athenian citizen, to put the men into their hands and thus
prevent their crossing over to the King and doing their part to injure
the country of his choice. He accordingly had them seized, as they were
travelling through Thrace to the vessel in which they were to cross the
Hellespont, by a party whom he had sent on with Learchus and
Ameiniades, and gave orders for their delivery to the Athenian
ambassadors, by whom they were brought to Athens. On their arrival, the
Athenians, afraid that Aristeus, who had been notably the prime mover
in the previous affairs of Potidæa and their Thracian possessions,
might live to do them still more mischief if he escaped, slew them all
the same day, without giving them a trial or hearing the defence which
they wished to offer, and cast their bodies into a pit; thinking
themselves justified in using in retaliation the same mode of warfare
which the Lacedaemonians had begun, when they slew and cast into pits
all the Athenian and allied traders whom they caught on board the
merchantmen round Peloponnese. Indeed, at the outset of the war, the
Lacedaemonians butchered as enemies all whom they took on the sea,
whether allies of Athens or neutrals.

About the same time towards the close of the summer, the Ambraciot
forces, with a number of barbarians that they had raised, marched
against the Amphilochian Argos and the rest of that country. The origin
of their enmity against the Argives was this. This Argos and the rest
of Amphilochia were colonized by Amphilochus, son of Amphiaraus.
Dissatisfied with the state of affairs at home on his return thither
after the Trojan War, he built this city in the Ambracian Gulf, and
named it Argos after his own country. This was the largest town in
Amphilochia, and its inhabitants the most powerful. Under the pressure
of misfortune many generations afterwards, they called in the
Ambraciots, their neighbours on the Amphilochian border, to join their
colony; and it was by this union with the Ambraciots that they learnt
their present Hellenic speech, the rest of the Amphilochians being
barbarians. After a time the Ambraciots expelled the Argives and held
the city themselves. Upon this the Amphilochians gave themselves over
to the Acarnanians; and the two together called the Athenians, who sent
them Phormio as general and thirty ships; upon whose arrival they took
Argos by storm, and made slaves of the Ambraciots; and the
Amphilochians and Acarnanians inhabited the town in common. After this
began the alliance between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The enmity of
the Ambraciots against the Argives thus commenced with the enslavement
of their citizens; and afterwards during the war they collected this
armament among themselves and the Chaonians, and other of the
neighbouring barbarians. Arrived before Argos, they became masters of
the country; but not being successful in their attacks upon the town,
returned home and dispersed among their different peoples.

Such were the events of the summer. The ensuing winter the Athenians
sent twenty ships round Peloponnese, under the command of Phormio, who
stationed himself at Naupactus and kept watch against any one sailing
in or out of Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf. Six others went to Caria
and Lycia under Melesander, to collect tribute in those parts, and also
to prevent the Peloponnesian privateers from taking up their station in
those waters and molesting the passage of the merchantmen from Phaselis
and Phoenicia and the adjoining continent. However, Melesander, going
up the country into Lycia with a force of Athenians from the ships and
the allies, was defeated and killed in battle, with the loss of a
number of his troops.

The same winter the Potidæans at length found themselves no longer able
to hold out against their besiegers. The inroads of the Peloponnesians
into Attica had not had the desired effect of making the Athenians
raise the siege. Provisions there were none left; and so far had
distress for food gone in Potidæa that, besides a number of other
horrors, instances had even occurred of the people having eaten one
another. In this extremity they at last made proposals for capitulating
to the Athenian generals in command against them—Xenophon, son of
Euripides, Hestiodorus, son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus, son of
Callimachus. The generals accepted their proposals, seeing the
sufferings of the army in so exposed a position; besides which the
state had already spent two thousand talents upon the siege. The terms
of the capitulation were as follows: a free passage out for themselves,
their children, wives and auxiliaries, with one garment apiece, the
women with two, and a fixed sum of money for their journey. Under this
treaty they went out to Chalcidice and other places, according as was
their power. The Athenians, however, blamed the generals for granting
terms without instructions from home, being of opinion that the place
would have had to surrender at discretion. They afterwards sent
settlers of their own to Potidæa, and colonized it. Such were the
events of the winter, and so ended the second year of this war of which
Thucydides was the historian.




CHAPTER VIII


Third Year of the War—Investment of Plataea—Naval Victories of
Phormio—Thracian Irruption into Macedonia under Sitalces


The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, instead of
invading Attica, marched against Plataea, under the command of
Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. He had
encamped his army and was about to lay waste the country, when the
Plataeans hastened to send envoys to him, and spoke as follows:
“Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, in invading the Plataean territory, you
do what is wrong in itself, and worthy neither of yourselves nor of the
fathers who begot you. Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, your countryman,
after freeing Hellas from the Medes with the help of those Hellenes who
were willing to undertake the risk of the battle fought near our city,
offered sacrifice to Zeus the Liberator in the marketplace of Plataea,
and calling all the allies together restored to the Plataeans their
city and territory, and declared it independent and inviolate against
aggression or conquest. Should any such be attempted, the allies
present were to help according to their power. Your fathers rewarded us
thus for the courage and patriotism that we displayed at that perilous
epoch; but you do just the contrary, coming with our bitterest enemies,
the Thebans, to enslave us. We appeal, therefore, to the gods to whom
the oaths were then made, to the gods of your ancestors, and lastly to
those of our country, and call upon you to refrain from violating our
territory or transgressing the oaths, and to let us live independent,
as Pausanias decreed.”

The Plataeans had got thus far when they were cut short by Archidamus
saying: “There is justice, Plataeans, in what you say, if you act up to
your words. According, to the grant of Pausanias, continue to be
independent yourselves, and join in freeing those of your fellow
countrymen who, after sharing in the perils of that period, joined in
the oaths to you, and are now subject to the Athenians; for it is to
free them and the rest that all this provision and war has been made. I
could wish that you would share our labours and abide by the oaths
yourselves; if this is impossible, do what we have already required of
you—remain neutral, enjoying your own; join neither side, but receive
both as friends, neither as allies for the war. With this we shall be
satisfied.” Such were the words of Archidamus. The Plataeans, after
hearing what he had to say, went into the city and acquainted the
people with what had passed, and presently returned for answer that it
was impossible for them to do what he proposed without consulting the
Athenians, with whom their children and wives now were; besides which
they had their fears for the town. After his departure, what was to
prevent the Athenians from coming and taking it out of their hands, or
the Thebans, who would be included in the oaths, from taking advantage
of the proposed neutrality to make a second attempt to seize the city?
Upon these points he tried to reassure them by saying: “You have only
to deliver over the city and houses to us Lacedaemonians, to point out
the boundaries of your land, the number of your fruit-trees, and
whatever else can be numerically stated, and yourselves to withdraw
wherever you like as long as the war shall last. When it is over we
will restore to you whatever we received, and in the interim hold it in
trust and keep it in cultivation, paying you a sufficient allowance.”

When they had heard what he had to say, they re-entered the city, and
after consulting with the people said that they wished first to
acquaint the Athenians with this proposal, and in the event of their
approving to accede to it; in the meantime they asked him to grant them
a truce and not to lay waste their territory. He accordingly granted a
truce for the number of days requisite for the journey, and meanwhile
abstained from ravaging their territory. The Plataean envoys went to
Athens, and consulted with the Athenians, and returned with the
following message to those in the city: “The Athenians say, Plataeans,
that they never hitherto, since we became their allies, on any occasion
abandoned us to an enemy, nor will they now neglect us, but will help
us according to their ability; and they adjure you by the oaths which
your fathers swore, to keep the alliance unaltered.”

On the delivery of this message by the envoys, the Plataeans resolved
not to be unfaithful to the Athenians but to endure, if it must be,
seeing their lands laid waste and any other trials that might come to
them, and not to send out again, but to answer from the wall that it
was impossible for them to do as the Lacedaemonians proposed. As soon
as he had received this answer, King Archidamus proceeded first to make
a solemn appeal to the gods and heroes of the country in words
following: “Ye gods and heroes of the Plataean territory, be my
witnesses that not as aggressors originally, nor until these had first
departed from the common oath, did we invade this land, in which our
fathers offered you their prayers before defeating the Medes, and which
you made auspicious to the Hellenic arms; nor shall we be aggressors in
the measures to which we may now resort, since we have made many fair
proposals but have not been successful. Graciously accord that those
who were the first to offend may be punished for it, and that vengeance
may be attained by those who would righteously inflict it.”

After this appeal to the gods Archidamus put his army in motion. First
he enclosed the town with a palisade formed of the fruit-trees which
they cut down, to prevent further egress from Plataea; next they threw
up a mound against the city, hoping that the largeness of the force
employed would ensure the speedy reduction of the place. They
accordingly cut down timber from Cithaeron, and built it up on either
side, laying it like lattice-work to serve as a wall to keep the mound
from spreading abroad, and carried to it wood and stones and earth and
whatever other material might help to complete it. They continued to
work at the mound for seventy days and nights without intermission,
being divided into relief parties to allow of some being employed in
carrying while others took sleep and refreshment; the Lacedaemonian
officer attached to each contingent keeping the men to the work. But
the Plataeans, observing the progress of the mound, constructed a wall
of wood and fixed it upon that part of the city wall against which the
mound was being erected, and built up bricks inside it which they took
from the neighbouring houses. The timbers served to bind the building
together, and to prevent its becoming weak as it advanced in height; it
had also a covering of skins and hides, which protected the woodwork
against the attacks of burning missiles and allowed the men to work in
safety. Thus the wall was raised to a great height, and the mound
opposite made no less rapid progress. The Plataeans also thought of
another expedient; they pulled out part of the wall upon which the
mound abutted, and carried the earth into the city.

Discovering this the Peloponnesians twisted up clay in wattles of reed
and threw it into the breach formed in the mound, in order to give it
consistency and prevent its being carried away like the soil. Stopped
in this way the Plataeans changed their mode of operation, and digging
a mine from the town calculated their way under the mound, and began to
carry off its material as before. This went on for a long while without
the enemy outside finding it out, so that for all they threw on the top
their mound made no progress in proportion, being carried away from
beneath and constantly settling down in the vacuum. But the Plataeans,
fearing that even thus they might not be able to hold out against the
superior numbers of the enemy, had yet another invention. They stopped
working at the large building in front of the mound, and starting at
either end of it inside from the old low wall, built a new one in the
form of a crescent running in towards the town; in order that in the
event of the great wall being taken this might remain, and the enemy
have to throw up a fresh mound against it, and as they advanced within
might not only have their trouble over again, but also be exposed to
missiles on their flanks. While raising the mound the Peloponnesians
also brought up engines against the city, one of which was brought up
upon the mound against the great building and shook down a good piece
of it, to the no small alarm of the Plataeans. Others were advanced
against different parts of the wall but were lassoed and broken by the
Plataeans; who also hung up great beams by long iron chains from either
extremity of two poles laid on the wall and projecting over it, and
drew them up at an angle whenever any point was threatened by the
engine, and loosing their hold let the beam go with its chains slack,
so that it fell with a run and snapped off the nose of the battering
ram.

After this the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines effected
nothing, and that their mound was met by the counterwork, concluded
that their present means of offence were unequal to the taking of the
city, and prepared for its circumvallation. First, however, they
determined to try the effects of fire and see whether they could not,
with the help of a wind, burn the town, as it was not a large one;
indeed they thought of every possible expedient by which the place
might be reduced without the expense of a blockade. They accordingly
brought faggots of brushwood and threw them from the mound, first into
the space between it and the wall; and this soon becoming full from the
number of hands at work, they next heaped the faggots up as far into
the town as they could reach from the top, and then lighted the wood by
setting fire to it with sulphur and pitch. The consequence was a fire
greater than any one had ever yet seen produced by human agency, though
it could not of course be compared to the spontaneous conflagrations
sometimes known to occur through the wind rubbing the branches of a
mountain forest together. And this fire was not only remarkable for its
magnitude, but was also, at the end of so many perils, within an ace of
proving fatal to the Plataeans; a great part of the town became
entirely inaccessible, and had a wind blown upon it, in accordance with
the hopes of the enemy, nothing could have saved them. As it was, there
is also a story of heavy rain and thunder having come on by which the
fire was put out and the danger averted.

Failing in this last attempt the Peloponnesians left a portion of their
forces on the spot, dismissing the rest, and built a wall of
circumvallation round the town, dividing the ground among the various
cities present; a ditch being made within and without the lines, from
which they got their bricks. All being finished by about the rising of
Arcturus, they left men enough to man half the wall, the rest being
manned by the Boeotians, and drawing off their army dispersed to their
several cities. The Plataeans had before sent off their wives and
children and oldest men and the mass of the non-combatants to Athens;
so that the number of the besieged left in the place comprised four
hundred of their own citizens, eighty Athenians, and a hundred and ten
women to bake their bread. This was the sum total at the commencement
of the siege, and there was no one else within the walls, bond or free.
Such were the arrangements made for the blockade of Plataea.

The same summer and simultaneously with the expedition against Plataea,
the Athenians marched with two thousand heavy infantry and two hundred
horse against the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and the
Bottiaeans, just as the corn was getting ripe, under the command of
Xenophon, son of Euripides, with two colleagues. Arriving before
Spartolus in Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn and had some hopes of
the city coming over through the intrigues of a faction within. But
those of a different way of thinking had sent to Olynthus; and a
garrison of heavy infantry and other troops arrived accordingly. These
issuing from Spartolus were engaged by the Athenians in front of the
town: the Chalcidian heavy infantry, and some auxiliaries with them,
were beaten and retreated into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian horse and
light troops defeated the horse and light troops of the Athenians. The
Chalcidians had already a few targeteers from Crusis, and presently
after the battle were joined by some others from Olynthus; upon seeing
whom the light troops from Spartolus, emboldened by this accession and
by their previous success, with the help of the Chalcidian horse and
the reinforcement just arrived again attacked the Athenians, who
retired upon the two divisions which they had left with their baggage.
Whenever the Athenians advanced, their adversary gave way, pressing
them with missiles the instant they began to retire. The Chalcidian
horse also, riding up and charging them just as they pleased, at last
caused a panic amongst them and routed and pursued them to a great
distance. The Athenians took refuge in Potidæa, and afterwards
recovered their dead under truce, and returned to Athens with the
remnant of their army; four hundred and thirty men and all the generals
having fallen. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans set up a trophy, took up
their dead, and dispersed to their several cities.

The same summer, not long after this, the Ambraciots and Chaonians,
being desirous of reducing the whole of Acarnania and detaching it from
Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a fleet from their
confederacy and send a thousand heavy infantry to Acarnania,
representing that, if a combined movement were made by land and sea,
the coast Acarnanians would be unable to march, and the conquest of
Zacynthus and Cephallenia easily following on the possession of
Acarnania, the cruise round Peloponnese would be no longer so
convenient for the Athenians. Besides which there was a hope of taking
Naupactus. The Lacedaemonians accordingly at once sent off a few
vessels with Cnemus, who was still high admiral, and the heavy infantry
on board; and sent round orders for the fleet to equip as quickly as
possible and sail to Leucas. The Corinthians were the most forward in
the business; the Ambraciots being a colony of theirs. While the ships
from Corinth, Sicyon, and the neighbourhood were getting ready, and
those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, which had arrived before,
were waiting for them at Leucas, Cnemus and his thousand heavy infantry
had run into the gulf, giving the slip to Phormio, the commander of the
Athenian squadron stationed off Naupactus, and began at once to prepare
for the land expedition. The Hellenic troops with him consisted of the
Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians, and the thousand
Peloponnesians with whom he came; the barbarian of a thousand
Chaonians, who, belonging to a nation that has no king, were led by
Photys and Nicanor, the two members of the royal family to whom the
chieftainship for that year had been confided. With the Chaonians came
also some Thesprotians, like them without a king, some Molossians and
Atintanians led by Sabylinthus, the guardian of King Tharyps who was
still a minor, and some Paravaeans, under their king Oroedus,
accompanied by a thousand Orestians, subjects of King Antichus and
placed by him under the command of Oroedus. There were also a thousand
Macedonians sent by Perdiccas without the knowledge of the Athenians,
but they arrived too late. With this force Cnemus set out, without
waiting for the fleet from Corinth. Passing through the territory of
Amphilochian Argos, and sacking the open village of Limnaea, they
advanced to Stratus the Acarnanian capital; this once taken, the rest
of the country, they felt convinced, would speedily follow.

The Acarnanians, finding themselves invaded by a large army by land,
and from the sea threatened by a hostile fleet, made no combined
attempt at resistance, but remained to defend their homes, and sent for
help to Phormio, who replied that, when a fleet was on the point of
sailing from Corinth, it was impossible for him to leave Naupactus
unprotected. The Peloponnesians meanwhile and their allies advanced
upon Stratus in three divisions, with the intention of encamping near
it and attempting the wall by force if they failed to succeed by
negotiation. The order of march was as follows: the centre was occupied
by the Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians, with the Leucadians
and Anactorians and their followers on the right, and Cnemus with the
Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on the left; each division being a long
way off from, and sometimes even out of sight of, the others. The
Hellenes advanced in good order, keeping a look-out till they encamped
in a good position; but the Chaonians, filled with self-confidence, and
having the highest character for courage among the tribes of that part
of the continent, without waiting to occupy their camp, rushed on with
the rest of the barbarians, in the idea that they should take the town
by assault and obtain the sole glory of the enterprise. While they were
coming on, the Stratians, becoming aware how things stood, and thinking
that the defeat of this division would considerably dishearten the
Hellenes behind it, occupied the environs of the town with ambuscades,
and as soon as they approached engaged them at close quarters from the
city and the ambuscades. A panic seizing the Chaonians, great numbers
of them were slain; and as soon as they were seen to give way the rest
of the barbarians turned and fled. Owing to the distance by which their
allies had preceded them, neither of the Hellenic divisions knew
anything of the battle, but fancied they were hastening on to encamp.
However, when the flying barbarians broke in upon them, they opened
their ranks to receive them, brought their divisions together, and
stopped quiet where they were for the day; the Stratians not offering
to engage them, as the rest of the Acarnanians had not yet arrived, but
contenting themselves with slinging at them from a distance, which
distressed them greatly, as there was no stirring without their armour.
The Acarnanians would seem to excel in this mode of warfare.

As soon as night fell, Cnemus hastily drew off his army to the river
Anapus, about nine miles from Stratus, recovering his dead next day
under truce, and being there joined by the friendly Oeniadae, fell back
upon their city before the enemy’s reinforcements came up. From hence
each returned home; and the Stratians set up a trophy for the battle
with the barbarians.

Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates in
the Crissaean Gulf, which was to have co-operated with Cnemus and
prevented the coast Acarnanians from joining their countrymen in the
interior, was disabled from doing so by being compelled about the same
time as the battle at Stratus to fight with Phormio and the twenty
Athenian vessels stationed at Naupactus. For they were watched, as they
coasted along out of the gulf, by Phormio, who wished to attack in the
open sea. But the Corinthians and allies had started for Acarnania
without any idea of fighting at sea, and with vessels more like
transports for carrying soldiers; besides which, they never dreamed of
the twenty Athenian ships venturing to engage their forty-seven.
However, while they were coasting along their own shore, there were the
Athenians sailing along in line with them; and when they tried to cross
over from Patrae in Achaea to the mainland on the other side, on their
way to Acarnania, they saw them again coming out from Chalcis and the
river Evenus to meet them. They slipped from their moorings in the
night, but were observed, and were at length compelled to fight in mid
passage. Each state that contributed to the armament had its own
general; the Corinthian commanders were Machaon, Isocrates, and
Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians ranged their vessels in as large a
circle as possible without leaving an opening, with the prows outside
and the sterns in; and placed within all the small craft in company,
and their five best sailers to issue out at a moment’s notice and
strengthen any point threatened by the enemy.

The Athenians, formed in line, sailed round and round them, and forced
them to contract their circle, by continually brushing past and making
as though they would attack at once, having been previously cautioned
by Phormio not to do so till he gave the signal. His hope was that the
Peloponnesians would not retain their order like a force on shore, but
that the ships would fall foul of one another and the small craft cause
confusion; and if the wind should blow from the gulf (in expectation of
which he kept sailing round them, and which usually rose towards
morning), they would not, he felt sure, remain steady an instant. He
also thought that it rested with him to attack when he pleased, as his
ships were better sailers, and that an attack timed by the coming of
the wind would tell best. When the wind came down, the enemy’s ships
were now in a narrow space, and what with the wind and the small craft
dashing against them, at once fell into confusion: ship fell foul of
ship, while the crews were pushing them off with poles, and by their
shouting, swearing, and struggling with one another, made captains’
orders and boatswains’ cries alike inaudible, and through being unable
for want of practice to clear their oars in the rough water, prevented
the vessels from obeying their helmsmen properly. At this moment
Phormio gave the signal, and the Athenians attacked. Sinking first one
of the admirals, they then disabled all they came across, so that no
one thought of resistance for the confusion, but fled for Patrae and
Dyme in Achaea. The Athenians gave chase and captured twelve ships, and
taking most of the men out of them sailed to Molycrium, and after
setting up a trophy on the promontory of Rhium and dedicating a ship to
Poseidon, returned to Naupactus. As for the Peloponnesians, they at
once sailed with their remaining ships along the coast from Dyme and
Patrae to Cyllene, the Eleian arsenal; where Cnemus, and the ships from
Leucas that were to have joined them, also arrived after the battle at
Stratus.

The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet to Cnemus three
commissioners—Timocrates, Bradidas, and Lycophron—with orders to
prepare to engage again with better fortune, and not to be driven from
the sea by a few vessels; for they could not at all account for their
discomfiture, the less so as it was their first attempt at sea; and
they fancied that it was not that their marine was so inferior, but
that there had been misconduct somewhere, not considering the long
experience of the Athenians as compared with the little practice which
they had had themselves. The commissioners were accordingly sent in
anger. As soon as they arrived they set to work with Cnemus to order
ships from the different states, and to put those which they already
had in fighting order. Meanwhile Phormio sent word to Athens of their
preparations and his own victory, and desired as many ships as possible
to be speedily sent to him, as he stood in daily expectation of a
battle. Twenty were accordingly sent, but instructions were given to
their commander to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys,
who was proxenus of the Athenians, had persuaded them to sail against
Cydonia, promising to procure the reduction of that hostile town; his
real wish being to oblige the Polichnitans, neighbours of the
Cydonians. He accordingly went with the ships to Crete, and,
accompanied by the Polichnitans, laid waste the lands of the Cydonians;
and, what with adverse winds and stress of weather wasted no little
time there.

While the Athenians were thus detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians in
Cyllene got ready for battle, and coasted along to Panormus in Achaea,
where their land army had come to support them. Phormio also coasted
along to Molycrian Rhium, and anchored outside it with twenty ships,
the same as he had fought with before. This Rhium was friendly to the
Athenians. The other, in Peloponnese, lies opposite to it; the sea
between them is about three-quarters of a mile broad, and forms the
mouth of the Crissaean gulf. At this, the Achaean Rhium, not far off
Panormus, where their army lay, the Peloponnesians now cast anchor with
seventy-seven ships, when they saw the Athenians do so. For six or
seven days they remained opposite each other, practising and preparing
for the battle; the one resolved not to sail out of the Rhia into the
open sea, for fear of the disaster which had already happened to them,
the other not to sail into the straits, thinking it advantageous to the
enemy, to fight in the narrows. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the
rest of the Peloponnesian commanders, being desirous of bringing on a
battle as soon as possible, before reinforcements should arrive from
Athens, and noticing that the men were most of them cowed by the
previous defeat and out of heart for the business, first called them
together and encouraged them as follows:

“Peloponnesians, the late engagement, which may have made some of you
afraid of the one now in prospect, really gives no just ground for
apprehension. Preparation for it, as you know, there was little enough;
and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as an
expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of war were largely
against us; and perhaps also inexperience had something to do with our
failure in our first naval action. It was not, therefore, cowardice
that produced our defeat, nor ought the determination which force has
not quelled, but which still has a word to say with its adversary, to
lose its edge from the result of an accident; but admitting the
possibility of a chance miscarriage, we should know that brave hearts
must be always brave, and while they remain so can never put forward
inexperience as an excuse for misconduct. Nor are you so behind the
enemy in experience as you are ahead of him in courage; and although
the science of your opponents would, if valour accompanied it, have
also the presence of mind to carry out at in emergency the lesson it
has learnt, yet a faint heart will make all art powerless in the face
of danger. For fear takes away presence of mind, and without valour art
is useless. Against their superior experience set your superior daring,
and against the fear induced by defeat the fact of your having been
then unprepared; remember, too, that you have always the advantage of
superior numbers, and of engaging off your own coast, supported by your
heavy infantry; and as a rule, numbers and equipment give victory. At
no point, therefore, is defeat likely; and as for our previous
mistakes, the very fact of their occurrence will teach us better for
the future. Steersmen and sailors may, therefore, confidently attend to
their several duties, none quitting the station assigned to them: as
for ourselves, we promise to prepare for the engagement at least as
well as your previous commanders, and to give no excuse for any one
misconducting himself. Should any insist on doing so, he shall meet
with the punishment he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with
the appropriate rewards of valour.”

The Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men after this fashion.
Phormio, meanwhile, being himself not without fears for the courage of
his men, and noticing that they were forming in groups among themselves
and were alarmed at the odds against them, desired to call them
together and give them confidence and counsel in the present emergency.
He had before continually told them, and had accustomed their minds to
the idea, that there was no numerical superiority that they could not
face; and the men themselves had long been persuaded that Athenians
need never retire before any quantity of Peloponnesian vessels. At the
moment, however, he saw that they were dispirited by the sight before
them, and wishing to refresh their confidence, called them together and
spoke as follows:

“I see, my men, that you are frightened by the number of the enemy, and
I have accordingly called you together, not liking you to be afraid of
what is not really terrible. In the first place, the Peloponnesians,
already defeated, and not even themselves thinking that they are a
match for us, have not ventured to meet us on equal terms, but have
equipped this multitude of ships against us. Next, as to that upon
which they most rely, the courage which they suppose constitutional to
them, their confidence here only arises from the success which their
experience in land service usually gives them, and which they fancy
will do the same for them at sea. But this advantage will in all
justice belong to us on this element, if to them on that; as they are
not superior to us in courage, but we are each of us more confident,
according to our experience in our particular department. Besides, as
the Lacedaemonians use their supremacy over their allies to promote
their own glory, they are most of them being brought into danger
against their will, or they would never, after such a decided defeat,
have ventured upon a fresh engagement. You need not, therefore, be
afraid of their dash. You, on the contrary, inspire a much greater and
better founded alarm, both because of your late victory and also of
their belief that we should not face them unless about to do something
worthy of a success so signal. An adversary numerically superior, like
the one before us, comes into action trusting more to strength than to
resolution; while he who voluntarily confronts tremendous odds must
have very great internal resources to draw upon. For these reasons the
Peloponnesians fear our irrational audacity more than they would ever
have done a more commensurate preparation. Besides, many armaments have
before now succumbed to an inferior through want of skill or sometimes
of courage; neither of which defects certainly are ours. As to the
battle, it shall not be, if I can help it, in the strait, nor will I
sail in there at all; seeing that in a contest between a number of
clumsily managed vessels and a small, fast, well-handled squadron, want
of sea room is an undoubted disadvantage. One cannot run down an enemy
properly without having a sight of him a good way off, nor can one
retire at need when pressed; one can neither break the line nor return
upon his rear, the proper tactics for a fast sailer; but the naval
action necessarily becomes a land one, in which numbers must decide the
matter. For all this I will provide as far as can be. Do you stay at
your posts by your ships, and be sharp at catching the word of command,
the more so as we are observing one another from so short a distance;
and in action think order and silence all-important—qualities useful in
war generally, and in naval engagements in particular; and behave
before the enemy in a manner worthy of your past exploits. The issues
you will fight for are great—to destroy the naval hopes of the
Peloponnesians or to bring nearer to the Athenians their fears for the
sea. And I may once more remind you that you have defeated most of them
already; and beaten men do not face a danger twice with the same
determination.”

Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Peloponnesians finding that
the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows, in order to
lead them in whether they wished it or not, put out at dawn, and
forming four abreast, sailed inside the gulf in the direction of their
own country, the right wing leading as they had lain at anchor. In this
wing were placed twenty of their best sailers; so that in the event of
Phormio thinking that their object was Naupactus, and coasting along
thither to save the place, the Athenians might not be able to escape
their onset by getting outside their wing, but might be cut off by the
vessels in question. As they expected, Phormio, in alarm for the place
at that moment emptied of its garrison, as soon as he saw them put out,
reluctantly and hurriedly embarked and sailed along shore; the
Messenian land forces moving along also to support him. The
Peloponnesians seeing him coasting along with his ships in single file,
and by this inside the gulf and close inshore as they so much wished,
at one signal tacked suddenly and bore down in line at their best speed
on the Athenians, hoping to cut off the whole squadron. The eleven
leading vessels, however, escaped the Peloponnesian wing and its sudden
movement, and reached the more open water; but the rest were overtaken
as they tried to run through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the
crews being slain as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships the
Peloponnesians lashed to their own, and towed off empty; one they took
with the men in it; others were just being towed off, when they were
saved by the Messenians dashing into the sea with their armour and
fighting from the decks that they had boarded.

Thus far victory was with the Peloponnesians, and the Athenian fleet
destroyed; the twenty ships in the right wing being meanwhile in chase
of the eleven Athenian vessels that had escaped their sudden movement
and reached the more open water. These, with the exception of one ship,
all outsailed them and got safe into Naupactus, and forming close
inshore opposite the temple of Apollo, with their prows facing the
enemy, prepared to defend themselves in case the Peloponnesians should
sail inshore against them. After a while the Peloponnesians came up,
chanting the paean for their victory as they sailed on; the single
Athenian ship remaining being chased by a Leucadian far ahead of the
rest. But there happened to be a merchantman lying at anchor in the
roadstead, which the Athenian ship found time to sail round, and struck
the Leucadian in chase amidships and sank her. An exploit so sudden and
unexpected produced a panic among the Peloponnesians; and having fallen
out of order in the excitement of victory, some of them dropped their
oars and stopped their way in order to let the main body come up—an
unsafe thing to do considering how near they were to the enemy’s prows;
while others ran aground in the shallows, in their ignorance of the
localities.

Elated at this incident, the Athenians at one word gave a cheer, and
dashed at the enemy, who, embarrassed by his mistakes and the disorder
in which he found himself, only stood for an instant, and then fled for
Panormus, whence he had put out. The Athenians following on his heels
took the six vessels nearest them, and recovered those of their own
which had been disabled close inshore and taken in tow at the beginning
of the action; they killed some of the crews and took some prisoners.
On board the Leucadian which went down off the merchantman, was the
Lacedaemonian Timocrates, who killed himself when the ship was sunk,
and was cast up in the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians on their
return set up a trophy on the spot from which they had put out and
turned the day, and picking up the wrecks and dead that were on their
shore, gave back to the enemy their dead under truce. The
Peloponnesians also set up a trophy as victors for the defeat inflicted
upon the ships they had disabled in shore, and dedicated the vessel
which they had taken at Achaean Rhium, side by side with the trophy.
After this, apprehensive of the reinforcement expected from Athens, all
except the Leucadians sailed into the Crissaean Gulf for Corinth. Not
long after their retreat, the twenty Athenian ships, which were to have
joined Phormio before the battle, arrived at Naupactus.

Thus the summer ended. Winter was now at hand; but dispersing the
fleet, which had retired to Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf, Cnemus,
Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian captains allowed themselves to be
persuaded by the Megarians to make an attempt upon Piraeus, the port of
Athens, which from her decided superiority at sea had been naturally
left unguarded and open. Their plan was as follows: The men were each
to take their oar, cushion, and rowlock thong, and, going overland from
Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, to get to Megara as quickly as
they could, and launching forty vessels, which happened to be in the
docks at Nisaea, to sail at once to Piraeus. There was no fleet on the
look-out in the harbour, and no one had the least idea of the enemy
attempting a surprise; while an open attack would, it was thought,
never be deliberately ventured on, or, if in contemplation, would be
speedily known at Athens. Their plan formed, the next step was to put
it in execution. Arriving by night and launching the vessels from
Nisaea, they sailed, not to Piraeus as they had originally intended,
being afraid of the risk, besides which there was some talk of a wind
having stopped them, but to the point of Salamis that looks towards
Megara; where there was a fort and a squadron of three ships to prevent
anything sailing in or out of Megara. This fort they assaulted, and
towed off the galleys empty, and surprising the inhabitants began to
lay waste the rest of the island.

Meanwhile fire signals were raised to alarm Athens, and a panic ensued
there as serious as any that occurred during the war. The idea in the
city was that the enemy had already sailed into Piraeus: in Piraeus it
was thought that they had taken Salamis and might at any moment arrive
in the port; as indeed might easily have been done if their hearts had
been a little firmer: certainly no wind would have prevented them. As
soon as day broke, the Athenians assembled in full force, launched
their ships, and embarking in haste and uproar went with the fleet to
Salamis, while their soldiery mounted guard in Piraeus. The
Peloponnesians, on becoming aware of the coming relief, after they had
overrun most of Salamis, hastily sailed off with their plunder and
captives and the three ships from Fort Budorum to Nisaea; the state of
their ships also causing them some anxiety, as it was a long while
since they had been launched, and they were not water-tight. Arrived at
Megara, they returned back on foot to Corinth. The Athenians finding
them no longer at Salamis, sailed back themselves; and after this made
arrangements for guarding Piraeus more diligently in future, by closing
the harbours, and by other suitable precautions.

About the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces, son of
Teres, the Odrysian king of Thrace, made an expedition against
Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Chalcidians in
the neighbourhood of Thrace; his object being to enforce one promise
and fulfil another. On the one hand Perdiccas had made him a promise,
when hard pressed at the commencement of the war, upon condition that
Sitalces should reconcile the Athenians to him and not attempt to
restore his brother and enemy, the pretender Philip, but had not
offered to fulfil his engagement; on the other he, Sitalces, on
entering into alliance with the Athenians, had agreed to put an end to
the Chalcidian war in Thrace. These were the two objects of his
invasion. With him he brought Amyntas, the son of Philip, whom he
destined for the throne of Macedonia, and some Athenian envoys then at
his court on this business, and Hagnon as general; for the Athenians
were to join him against the Chalcidians with a fleet and as many
soldiers as they could get together.

Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the Thracian tribes
subject to him between Mounts Haemus and Rhodope and the Euxine and
Hellespont; next the Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes settled
south of the Danube in the neighbourhood of the Euxine, who, like the
Getae, border on the Scythians and are armed in the same manner, being
all mounted archers. Besides these he summoned many of the hill
Thracian independent swordsmen, called Dii and mostly inhabiting Mount
Rhodope, some of whom came as mercenaries, others as volunteers; also
the Agrianes and Laeaeans, and the rest of the Paeonian tribes in his
empire, at the confines of which these lay, extending up to the Laeaean
Paeonians and the river Strymon, which flows from Mount Scombrus
through the country of the Agrianes and Laeaeans; there the empire of
Sitalces ends and the territory of the independent Paeonians begins.
Bordering on the Triballi, also independent, were the Treres and
Tilataeans, who dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and extend towards
the setting sun as far as the river Oskius. This river rises in the
same mountains as the Nestus and Hebrus, a wild and extensive range
connected with Rhodope.

The empire of the Odrysians extended along the seaboard from Abdera to
the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine. The navigation of this coast by
the shortest route takes a merchantman four days and four nights with a
wind astern the whole way: by land an active man, travelling by the
shortest road, can get from Abdera to the Danube in eleven days. Such
was the length of its coast line. Inland from Byzantium to the Laeaeans
and the Strymon, the farthest limit of its extension into the interior,
it is a journey of thirteen days for an active man. The tribute from
all the barbarian districts and the Hellenic cities, taking what they
brought in under Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, who raised it to
its greatest height, amounted to about four hundred talents in gold and
silver. There were also presents in gold and silver to a no less
amount, besides stuff, plain and embroidered, and other articles, made
not only for the king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles. For
there was here established a custom opposite to that prevailing in the
Persian kingdom, namely, of taking rather than giving; more disgrace
being attached to not giving when asked than to asking and being
refused; and although this prevailed elsewhere in Thrace, it was
practised most extensively among the powerful Odrysians, it being
impossible to get anything done without a present. It was thus a very
powerful kingdom; in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in
Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and
military resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians, with whom
indeed no people in Europe can bear comparison, there not being even in
Asia any nation singly a match for them if unanimous, though of course
they are not on a level with other races in general intelligence and
the arts of civilized life.

It was the master of this empire that now prepared to take the field.
When everything was ready, he set out on his march for Macedonia, first
through his own dominions, next over the desolate range of Cercine that
divides the Sintians and Paeonians, crossing by a road which he had
made by felling the timber on a former campaign against the latter
people. Passing over these mountains, with the Paeonians on his right
and the Sintians and Maedians on the left, he finally arrived at
Doberus, in Paeonia, losing none of his army on the march, except
perhaps by sickness, but receiving some augmentations, many of the
independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope of plunder;
so that the whole is said to have formed a grand total of a hundred and
fifty thousand. Most of this was infantry, though there was about a
third cavalry, furnished principally by the Odrysians themselves and
next to them by the Getae. The most warlike of the infantry were the
independent swordsmen who came down from Rhodope; the rest of the mixed
multitude that followed him being chiefly formidable by their numbers.

Assembling in Doberus, they prepared for descending from the heights
upon Lower Macedonia, where the dominions of Perdiccas lay; for the
Lyncestae, Elimiots, and other tribes more inland, though Macedonians
by blood, and allies and dependants of their kindred, still have their
own separate governments. The country on the sea coast, now called
Macedonia, was first acquired by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas,
and his ancestors, originally Temenids from Argos. This was effected by
the expulsion from Pieria of the Pierians, who afterwards inhabited
Phagres and other places under Mount Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon
(indeed the country between Pangaeus and the sea is still called the
Pierian Gulf); of the Bottiaeans, at present neighbours of the
Chalcidians, from Bottia, and by the acquisition in Paeonia of a narrow
strip along the river Axius extending to Pella and the sea; the
district of Mygdonia, between the Axius and the Strymon, being also
added by the expulsion of the Edonians. From Eordia also were driven
the Eordians, most of whom perished, though a few of them still live
round Physca, and the Almopians from Almopia. These Macedonians also
conquered places belonging to the other tribes, which are still
theirs—Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia proper. The
whole is now called Macedonia, and at the time of the invasion of
Sitalces, Perdiccas, Alexander’s son, was the reigning king.

These Macedonians, unable to take the field against so numerous an
invader, shut themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as the
country possessed. Of these there was no great number, most of those
now found in the country having been erected subsequently by Archelaus,
the son of Perdiccas, on his accession, who also cut straight roads,
and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as regards horses,
heavy infantry, and other war material than had been done by all the
eight kings that preceded him. Advancing from Doberus, the Thracian
host first invaded what had been once Philip’s government, and took
Idomene by assault, Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places by
negotiation, these last coming over for love of Philip’s son, Amyntas,
then with Sitalces. Laying siege to Europus, and failing to take it, he
next advanced into the rest of Macedonia to the left of Pella and
Cyrrhus, not proceeding beyond this into Bottiaea and Pieria, but
staying to lay waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus.

The Macedonians never even thought of meeting him with infantry; but
the Thracian host was, as opportunity offered, attacked by handfuls of
their horse, which had been reinforced from their allies in the
interior. Armed with cuirasses, and excellent horsemen, wherever these
charged they overthrew all before them, but ran considerable risk in
entangling themselves in the masses of the enemy, and so finally
desisted from these efforts, deciding that they were not strong enough
to venture against numbers so superior.

Meanwhile Sitalces opened negotiations with Perdiccas on the objects of
his expedition; and finding that the Athenians, not believing that he
would come, did not appear with their fleet, though they sent presents
and envoys, dispatched a large part of his army against the Chalcidians
and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up inside their walls laid waste
their country. While he remained in these parts, the people farther
south, such as the Thessalians, Magnetes, and the other tribes subject
to the Thessalians, and the Hellenes as far as Thermopylae, all feared
that the army might advance against them, and prepared accordingly.
These fears were shared by the Thracians beyond the Strymon to the
north, who inhabited the plains, such as the Panaeans, the Odomanti,
the Droi, and the Dersaeans, all of whom are independent. It was even
matter of conversation among the Hellenes who were enemies of Athens
whether he might not be invited by his ally to advance also against
them. Meanwhile he held Chalcidice and Bottice and Macedonia, and was
ravaging them all; but finding that he was not succeeding in any of the
objects of his invasion, and that his army was without provisions and
was suffering from the severity of the season, he listened to the
advice of Seuthes, son of Spardacus, his nephew and highest officer,
and decided to retreat without delay. This Seuthes had been secretly
gained by Perdiccas by the promise of his sister in marriage with a
rich dowry. In accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty
days in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home
as quickly as he could; and Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister
Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such was the history of the
expedition of Sitalces.

In the course of this winter, after the dispersion of the Peloponnesian
fleet, the Athenians in Naupactus, under Phormio, coasted along to
Astacus and disembarked, and marched into the interior of Acarnania
with four hundred Athenian heavy infantry and four hundred Messenians.
After expelling some suspected persons from Stratus, Coronta, and other
places, and restoring Cynes, son of Theolytus, to Coronta, they
returned to their ships, deciding that it was impossible in the winter
season to march against Oeniadae, a place which, unlike the rest of
Acarnania, had been always hostile to them; for the river Achelous
flowing from Mount Pindus through Dolopia and the country of the
Agraeans and Amphilochians and the plain of Acarnania, past the town of
Stratus in the upper part of its course, forms lakes where it falls
into the sea round Oeniadae, and thus makes it impracticable for an
army in winter by reason of the water. Opposite to Oeniadae lie most of
the islands called Echinades, so close to the mouths of the Achelous
that that powerful stream is constantly forming deposits against them,
and has already joined some of the islands to the continent, and seems
likely in no long while to do the same with the rest. For the current
is strong, deep, and turbid, and the islands are so thick together that
they serve to imprison the alluvial deposit and prevent its dispersing,
lying, as they do, not in one line, but irregularly, so as to leave no
direct passage for the water into the open sea. The islands in question
are uninhabited and of no great size. There is also a story that
Alcmaeon, son of Amphiraus, during his wanderings after the murder of
his mother was bidden by Apollo to inhabit this spot, through an oracle
which intimated that he would have no release from his terrors until he
should find a country to dwell in which had not been seen by the sun,
or existed as land at the time he slew his mother; all else being to
him polluted ground. Perplexed at this, the story goes on to say, he at
last observed this deposit of the Achelous, and considered that a place
sufficient to support life upon, might have been thrown up during the
long interval that had elapsed since the death of his mother and the
beginning of his wanderings. Settling, therefore, in the district round
Oeniadae, he founded a dominion, and left the country its name from his
son Acarnan. Such is the story we have received concerning Alcmaeon.

The Athenians and Phormio putting back from Acarnania and arriving at
Naupactus, sailed home to Athens in the spring, taking with them the
ships that they had captured, and such of the prisoners made in the
late actions as were freemen; who were exchanged, man for man. And so
ended this winter, and the third year of this war, of which Thucydides
was the historian.




BOOK III




CHAPTER IX


Fourth and Fifth Years of the War—Revolt of Mitylene


The next summer, just as the corn was getting ripe, the Peloponnesians
and their allies invaded Attica under the command of Archidamus, son of
Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat down and ravaged the
land; the Athenian horse as usual attacking them, wherever it was
practicable, and preventing the mass of the light troops from advancing
from their camp and wasting the parts near the city. After staying the
time for which they had taken provisions, the invaders retired and
dispersed to their several cities.

Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians all Lesbos, except
Methymna, revolted from the Athenians. The Lesbians had wished to
revolt even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians would not receive
them; and yet now when they did revolt, they were compelled to do so
sooner than they had intended. While they were waiting until the moles
for their harbours and the ships and walls that they had in building
should be finished, and for the arrival of archers and corn and other
things that they were engaged in fetching from the Pontus, the
Tenedians, with whom they were at enmity, and the Methymnians, and some
factious persons in Mitylene itself, who were proxeni of Athens,
informed the Athenians that the Mitylenians were forcibly uniting the
island under their sovereignty, and that the preparations about which
they were so active, were all concerted with the Boeotians their
kindred and the Lacedaemonians with a view to a revolt, and that,
unless they were immediately prevented, Athens would lose Lesbos.

However, the Athenians, distressed by the plague, and by the war that
had recently broken out and was now raging, thought it a serious matter
to add Lesbos with its fleet and untouched resources to the list of
their enemies; and at first would not believe the charge, giving too
much weight to their wish that it might not be true. But when an
embassy which they sent had failed to persuade the Mitylenians to give
up the union and preparations complained of, they became alarmed, and
resolved to strike the first blow. They accordingly suddenly sent off
forty ships that had been got ready to sail round Peloponnese, under
the command of Cleippides, son of Deinias, and two others; word having
been brought them of a festival in honour of the Malean Apollo outside
the town, which is kept by the whole people of Mitylene, and at which,
if haste were made, they might hope to take them by surprise. If this
plan succeeded, well and good; if not, they were to order the
Mitylenians to deliver up their ships and to pull down their walls, and
if they did not obey, to declare war. The ships accordingly set out;
the ten galleys, forming the contingent of the Mitylenians present with
the fleet according to the terms of the alliance, being detained by the
Athenians, and their crews placed in custody. However, the Mitylenians
were informed of the expedition by a man who crossed from Athens to
Euboea, and going overland to Geraestus, sailed from thence by a
merchantman which he found on the point of putting to sea, and so
arrived at Mitylene the third day after leaving Athens. The Mitylenians
accordingly refrained from going out to the temple at Malea, and
moreover barricaded and kept guard round the half-finished parts of
their walls and harbours.

When the Athenians sailed in not long after and saw how things stood,
the generals delivered their orders, and upon the Mitylenians refusing
to obey, commenced hostilities. The Mitylenians, thus compelled to go
to war without notice and unprepared, at first sailed out with their
fleet and made some show of fighting, a little in front of the harbour;
but being driven back by the Athenian ships, immediately offered to
treat with the commanders, wishing, if possible, to get the ships away
for the present upon any tolerable terms. The Athenian commanders
accepted their offers, being themselves fearful that they might not be
able to cope with the whole of Lesbos; and an armistice having been
concluded, the Mitylenians sent to Athens one of the informers, already
repentant of his conduct, and others with him, to try to persuade the
Athenians of the innocence of their intentions and to get the fleet
recalled. In the meantime, having no great hope of a favourable answer
from Athens, they also sent off a galley with envoys to Lacedaemon,
unobserved by the Athenian fleet which was anchored at Malea to the
north of the town.

While these envoys, reaching Lacedaemon after a difficult journey
across the open sea, were negotiating for succours being sent them, the
ambassadors from Athens returned without having effected anything; and
hostilities were at once begun by the Mitylenians and the rest of
Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnians, who came to the aid of
the Athenians with the Imbrians and Lemnians and some few of the other
allies. The Mitylenians made a sortie with all their forces against the
Athenian camp; and a battle ensued, in which they gained some slight
advantage, but retired notwithstanding, not feeling sufficient
confidence in themselves to spend the night upon the field. After this
they kept quiet, wishing to wait for the chance of reinforcements
arriving from Peloponnese before making a second venture, being
encouraged by the arrival of Meleas, a Laconian, and Hermaeondas, a
Theban, who had been sent off before the insurrection but had been
unable to reach Lesbos before the Athenian expedition, and who now
stole in in a galley after the battle, and advised them to send another
galley and envoys back with them, which the Mitylenians accordingly
did.

Meanwhile the Athenians, greatly encouraged by the inaction of the
Mitylenians, summoned allies to their aid, who came in all the quicker
from seeing so little vigour displayed by the Lesbians, and bringing
round their ships to a new station to the south of the town, fortified
two camps, one on each side of the city, and instituted a blockade of
both the harbours. The sea was thus closed against the Mitylenians,
who, however, commanded the whole country, with the rest of the
Lesbians who had now joined them; the Athenians only holding a limited
area round their camps, and using Malea more as the station for their
ships and their market.

While the war went on in this way at Mitylene, the Athenians, about the
same time in this summer, also sent thirty ships to Peloponnese under
Asopius, son of Phormio; the Acarnanians insisting that the commander
sent should be some son or relative of Phormio. As the ships coasted
along shore they ravaged the seaboard of Laconia; after which Asopius
sent most of the fleet home, and himself went on with twelve vessels to
Naupactus, and afterwards raising the whole Acarnanian population made
an expedition against Oeniadae, the fleet sailing along the Achelous,
while the army laid waste the country. The inhabitants, however,
showing no signs of submitting, he dismissed the land forces and
himself sailed to Leucas, and making a descent upon Nericus was cut off
during his retreat, and most of his troops with him, by the people in
those parts aided by some coastguards; after which the Athenians sailed
away, recovering their dead from the Leucadians under truce.

Meanwhile the envoys of the Mitylenians sent out in the first ship were
told by the Lacedaemonians to come to Olympia, in order that the rest
of the allies might hear them and decide upon their matter, and so they
journeyed thither. It was the Olympiad in which the Rhodian Dorieus
gained his second victory, and the envoys having been introduced to
make their speech after the festival, spoke as follows:

“Lacedaemonians and allies, the rule established among the Hellenes is
not unknown to us. Those who revolt in war and forsake their former
confederacy are favourably regarded by those who receive them, in so
far as they are of use to them, but otherwise are thought less well of,
through being considered traitors to their former friends. Nor is this
an unfair way of judging, where the rebels and the power from whom they
secede are at one in policy and sympathy, and a match for each other in
resources and power, and where no reasonable ground exists for the
rebellion. But with us and the Athenians this was not the case; and no
one need think the worse of us for revolting from them in danger, after
having been honoured by them in time of peace.

“Justice and honesty will be the first topics of our speech, especially
as we are asking for alliance; because we know that there can never be
any solid friendship between individuals, or union between communities
that is worth the name, unless the parties be persuaded of each other’s
honesty, and be generally congenial the one to the other; since from
difference in feeling springs also difference in conduct. Between
ourselves and the Athenians alliance began, when you withdrew from the
Median War and they remained to finish the business. But we did not
become allies of the Athenians for the subjugation of the Hellenes, but
allies of the Hellenes for their liberation from the Mede; and as long
as the Athenians led us fairly we followed them loyally; but when we
saw them relax their hostility to the Mede, to try to compass the
subjection of the allies, then our apprehensions began. Unable,
however, to unite and defend themselves, on account of the number of
confederates that had votes, all the allies were enslaved, except
ourselves and the Chians, who continued to send our contingents as
independent and nominally free. Trust in Athens as a leader, however,
we could no longer feel, judging by the examples already given; it
being unlikely that she would reduce our fellow confederates, and not
do the same by us who were left, if ever she had the power.

“Had we all been still independent, we could have had more faith in
their not attempting any change; but the greater number being their
subjects, while they were treating us as equals, they would naturally
chafe under this solitary instance of independence as contrasted with
the submission of the majority; particularly as they daily grew more
powerful, and we more destitute. Now the only sure basis of an alliance
is for each party to be equally afraid of the other; he who would like
to encroach is then deterred by the reflection that he will not have
odds in his favour. Again, if we were left independent, it was only
because they thought they saw their way to empire more clearly by
specious language and by the paths of policy than by those of force.
Not only were we useful as evidence that powers who had votes, like
themselves, would not, surely, join them in their expeditions, against
their will, without the party attacked being in the wrong; but the same
system also enabled them to lead the stronger states against the weaker
first, and so to leave the former to the last, stripped of their
natural allies, and less capable of resistance. But if they had begun
with us, while all the states still had their resources under their own
control, and there was a centre to rally round, the work of subjugation
would have been found less easy. Besides this, our navy gave them some
apprehension: it was always possible that it might unite with you or
with some other power, and become dangerous to Athens. The court which
we paid to their commons and its leaders for the time being also helped
us to maintain our independence. However, we did not expect to be able
to do so much longer, if this war had not broken out, from the examples
that we had had of their conduct to the rest.

“How then could we put our trust in such friendship or freedom as we
had here? We accepted each other against our inclination; fear made
them court us in war, and us them in peace; sympathy, the ordinary
basis of confidence, had its place supplied by terror, fear having more
share than friendship in detaining us in the alliance; and the first
party that should be encouraged by the hope of impunity was certain to
break faith with the other. So that to condemn us for being the first
to break off, because they delay the blow that we dread, instead of
ourselves delaying to know for certain whether it will be dealt or not,
is to take a false view of the case. For if we were equally able with
them to meet their plots and imitate their delay, we should be their
equals and should be under no necessity of being their subjects; but
the liberty of offence being always theirs, that of defence ought
clearly to be ours.

“Such, Lacedaemonians and allies, are the grounds and the reasons of
our revolt; clear enough to convince our hearers of the fairness of our
conduct, and sufficient to alarm ourselves, and to make us turn to some
means of safety. This we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you on
the subject while the peace yet lasted, but were balked by your
refusing to receive us; and now, upon the Boeotians inviting us, we at
once responded to the call, and decided upon a twofold revolt, from the
Hellenes and from the Athenians, not to aid the latter in harming the
former, but to join in their liberation, and not to allow the Athenians
in the end to destroy us, but to act in time against them. Our revolt,
however, has taken place prematurely and without preparation—a fact
which makes it all the more incumbent on you to receive us into
alliance and to send us speedy relief, in order to show that you
support your friends, and at the same time do harm to your enemies. You
have an opportunity such as you never had before. Disease and
expenditure have wasted the Athenians: their ships are either cruising
round your coasts, or engaged in blockading us; and it is not probable
that they will have any to spare, if you invade them a second time this
summer by sea and land; but they will either offer no resistance to
your vessels, or withdraw from both our shores. Nor must it be thought
that this is a case of putting yourselves into danger for a country
which is not yours. Lesbos may appear far off, but when help is wanted
she will be found near enough. It is not in Attica that the war will be
decided, as some imagine, but in the countries by which Attica is
supported; and the Athenian revenue is drawn from the allies, and will
become still larger if they reduce us; as not only will no other state
revolt, but our resources will be added to theirs, and we shall be
treated worse than those that were enslaved before. But if you will
frankly support us, you will add to your side a state that has a large
navy, which is your great want; you will smooth the way to the
overthrow of the Athenians by depriving them of their allies, who will
be greatly encouraged to come over; and you will free yourselves from
the imputation made against you, of not supporting insurrection. In
short, only show yourselves as liberators, and you may count upon
having the advantage in the war.

“Respect, therefore, the hopes placed in you by the Hellenes, and that
Olympian Zeus, in whose temple we stand as very suppliants; become the
allies and defenders of the Mitylenians, and do not sacrifice us, who
put our lives upon the hazard, in a cause in which general good will
result to all from our success, and still more general harm if we fail
through your refusing to help us; but be the men that the Hellenes
think you, and our fears desire.”

Such were the words of the Mitylenians. After hearing them out, the
Lacedaemonians and confederates granted what they urged, and took the
Lesbians into alliance, and deciding in favour of the invasion of
Attica, told the allies present to march as quickly as possible to the
Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces; and arriving there first
themselves, got ready hauling machines to carry their ships across from
Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens, in order to make their attack
by sea and land at once. However, the zeal which they displayed was not
imitated by the rest of the confederates, who came in but slowly, being
engaged in harvesting their corn and sick of making expeditions.

Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations of the enemy were
due to his conviction of their weakness, and wishing to show him that
he was mistaken, and that they were able, without moving the Lesbian
fleet, to repel with ease that with which they were menaced from
Peloponnese, manned a hundred ships by embarking the citizens of
Athens, except the knights and Pentacosiomedimni, and the resident
aliens; and putting out to the Isthmus, displayed their power, and made
descents upon Peloponnese wherever they pleased. A disappointment so
signal made the Lacedaemonians think that the Lesbians had not spoken
the truth; and embarrassed by the non-appearance of the confederates,
coupled with the news that the thirty ships round Peloponnese were
ravaging the lands near Sparta, they went back home. Afterwards,
however, they got ready a fleet to send to Lesbos, and ordering a total
of forty ships from the different cities in the league, appointed
Alcidas to command the expedition in his capacity of high admiral.
Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships, upon seeing the
Lacedaemonians go home, went home likewise.

If, at the time that this fleet was at sea, Athens had almost the
largest number of first-rate ships in commission that she ever
possessed at any one moment, she had as many or even more when the war
began. At that time one hundred guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis; a
hundred more were cruising round Peloponnese, besides those employed at
Potidæa and in other places; making a grand total of two hundred and
fifty vessels employed on active service in a single summer. It was
this, with Potidæa, that most exhausted her revenues—Potidæa being
blockaded by a force of heavy infantry (each drawing two drachmae a
day, one for himself and another for his servant), which amounted to
three thousand at first, and was kept at this number down to the end of
the siege; besides sixteen hundred with Phormio who went away before it
was over; and the ships being all paid at the same rate. In this way
her money was wasted at first; and this was the largest number of ships
ever manned by her.

About the same time that the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the
Mitylenians marched by land with their mercenaries against Methymna,
which they thought to gain by treachery. After assaulting the town, and
not meeting with the success that they anticipated, they withdrew to
Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus; and taking measures for the better
security of these towns and strengthening their walls, hastily returned
home. After their departure the Methymnians marched against Antissa,
but were defeated in a sortie by the Antissians and their mercenaries,
and retreated in haste after losing many of their number. Word of this
reaching Athens, and the Athenians learning that the Mitylenians were
masters of the country and their own soldiers unable to hold them in
check, they sent out about the beginning of autumn Paches, son of
Epicurus, to take the command, and a thousand Athenian heavy infantry;
who worked their own passage and, arriving at Mitylene, built a single
wall all round it, forts being erected at some of the strongest points.
Mitylene was thus blockaded strictly on both sides, by land and by sea;
and winter now drew near.

The Athenians needing money for the siege, although they had for the
first time raised a contribution of two hundred talents from their own
citizens, now sent out twelve ships to levy subsidies from their
allies, with Lysicles and four others in command. After cruising to
different places and laying them under contribution, Lysicles went up
the country from Myus, in Caria, across the plain of the Meander, as
far as the hill of Sandius; and being attacked by the Carians and the
people of Anaia, was slain with many of his soldiers.

The same winter the Plataeans, who were still being besieged by the
Peloponnesians and Boeotians, distressed by the failure of their
provisions, and seeing no hope of relief from Athens, nor any other
means of safety, formed a scheme with the Athenians besieged with them
for escaping, if possible, by forcing their way over the enemy’s walls;
the attempt having been suggested by Theaenetus, son of Tolmides, a
soothsayer, and Eupompides, son of Daimachus, one of their generals. At
first all were to join: afterwards, half hung back, thinking the risk
great; about two hundred and twenty, however, voluntarily persevered in
the attempt, which was carried out in the following way. Ladders were
made to match the height of the enemy’s wall, which they measured by
the layers of bricks, the side turned towards them not being thoroughly
whitewashed. These were counted by many persons at once; and though
some might miss the right calculation, most would hit upon it,
particularly as they counted over and over again, and were no great way
from the wall, but could see it easily enough for their purpose. The
length required for the ladders was thus obtained, being calculated
from the breadth of the brick.

Now the wall of the Peloponnesians was constructed as follows. It
consisted of two lines drawn round the place, one against the
Plataeans, the other against any attack on the outside from Athens,
about sixteen feet apart. The intermediate space of sixteen feet was
occupied by huts portioned out among the soldiers on guard, and built
in one block, so as to give the appearance of a single thick wall with
battlements on either side. At intervals of every ten battlements were
towers of considerable size, and the same breadth as the wall, reaching
right across from its inner to its outer face, with no means of passing
except through the middle. Accordingly on stormy and wet nights the
battlements were deserted, and guard kept from the towers, which were
not far apart and roofed in above.

Such being the structure of the wall by which the Plataeans were
blockaded, when their preparations were completed, they waited for a
stormy night of wind and rain and without any moon, and then set out,
guided by the authors of the enterprise. Crossing first the ditch that
ran round the town, they next gained the wall of the enemy unperceived
by the sentinels, who did not see them in the darkness, or hear them,
as the wind drowned with its roar the noise of their approach; besides
which they kept a good way off from each other, that they might not be
betrayed by the clash of their weapons. They were also lightly
equipped, and had only the left foot shod to preserve them from
slipping in the mire. They came up to the battlements at one of the
intermediate spaces where they knew them to be unguarded: those who
carried the ladders went first and planted them; next twelve
light-armed soldiers with only a dagger and a breastplate mounted, led
by Ammias, son of Coroebus, who was the first on the wall; his
followers getting up after him and going six to each of the towers.
After these came another party of light troops armed with spears, whose
shields, that they might advance the easier, were carried by men
behind, who were to hand them to them when they found themselves in
presence of the enemy. After a good many had mounted they were
discovered by the sentinels in the towers, by the noise made by a tile
which was knocked down by one of the Plataeans as he was laying hold of
the battlements. The alarm was instantly given, and the troops rushed
to the wall, not knowing the nature of the danger, owing to the dark
night and stormy weather; the Plataeans in the town having also chosen
that moment to make a sortie against the wall of the Peloponnesians
upon the side opposite to that on which their men were getting over, in
order to divert the attention of the besiegers. Accordingly they
remained distracted at their several posts, without any venturing to
stir to give help from his own station, and at a loss to guess what was
going on. Meanwhile the three hundred set aside for service on
emergencies went outside the wall in the direction of the alarm.
Fire-signals of an attack were also raised towards Thebes; but the
Plataeans in the town at once displayed a number of others, prepared
beforehand for this very purpose, in order to render the enemy’s
signals unintelligible, and to prevent his friends getting a true idea
of what was passing and coming to his aid before their comrades who had
gone out should have made good their escape and be in safety.

Meanwhile the first of the scaling party that had got up, after
carrying both the towers and putting the sentinels to the sword, posted
themselves inside to prevent any one coming through against them; and
rearing ladders from the wall, sent several men up on the towers, and
from their summit and base kept in check all of the enemy that came up,
with their missiles, while their main body planted a number of ladders
against the wall, and knocking down the battlements, passed over
between the towers; each as soon as he had got over taking up his
station at the edge of the ditch, and plying from thence with arrows
and darts any who came along the wall to stop the passage of his
comrades. When all were over, the party on the towers came down, the
last of them not without difficulty, and proceeded to the ditch, just
as the three hundred came up carrying torches. The Plataeans, standing
on the edge of the ditch in the dark, had a good view of their
opponents, and discharged their arrows and darts upon the unarmed parts
of their bodies, while they themselves could not be so well seen in the
obscurity for the torches; and thus even the last of them got over the
ditch, though not without effort and difficulty; as ice had formed in
it, not strong enough to walk upon, but of that watery kind which
generally comes with a wind more east than north, and the snow which
this wind had caused to fall during the night had made the water in the
ditch rise, so that they could scarcely breast it as they crossed.
However, it was mainly the violence of the storm that enabled them to
effect their escape at all.

Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans went all together along the road
leading to Thebes, keeping the chapel of the hero Androcrates upon
their right; considering that the last road which the Peloponnesians
would suspect them of having taken would be that towards their enemies’
country. Indeed they could see them pursuing with torches upon the
Athens road towards Cithaeron and Druoskephalai or Oakheads. After
going for rather more than half a mile upon the road to Thebes, the
Plataeans turned off and took that leading to the mountain, to Erythrae
and Hysiae, and reaching the hills, made good their escape to Athens,
two hundred and twelve men in all; some of their number having turned
back into the town before getting over the wall, and one archer having
been taken prisoner at the outer ditch. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians
gave up the pursuit and returned to their posts; and the Plataeans in
the town, knowing nothing of what had passed, and informed by those who
had turned back that not a man had escaped, sent out a herald as soon
as it was day to make a truce for the recovery of the dead bodies, and
then, learning the truth, desisted. In this way the Plataean party got
over and were saved.

Towards the close of the same winter, Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, was
sent out in a galley from Lacedaemon to Mitylene. Going by sea to
Pyrrha, and from thence overland, he passed along the bed of a torrent,
where the line of circumvallation was passable, and thus entering
unperceived into Mitylene told the magistrates that Attica would
certainly be invaded, and the forty ships destined to relieve them
arrive, and that he had been sent on to announce this and to
superintend matters generally. The Mitylenians upon this took courage,
and laid aside the idea of treating with the Athenians; and now this
winter ended, and with it ended the fourth year of the war of which
Thucydides was the historian.

The next summer the Peloponnesians sent off the forty-two ships for
Mitylene, under Alcidas, their high admiral, and themselves and their
allies invaded Attica, their object being to distract the Athenians by
a double movement, and thus to make it less easy for them to act
against the fleet sailing to Mitylene. The commander in this invasion
was Cleomenes, in the place of King Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, his
nephew, who was still a minor. Not content with laying waste whatever
had shot up in the parts which they had before devastated, the invaders
now extended their ravages to lands passed over in their previous
incursions; so that this invasion was more severely felt by the
Athenians than any except the second; the enemy staying on and on until
they had overrun most of the country, in the expectation of hearing
from Lesbos of something having been achieved by their fleet, which
they thought must now have got over. However, as they did not obtain
any of the results expected, and their provisions began to run short,
they retreated and dispersed to their different cities.

In the meantime the Mitylenians, finding their provisions failing,
while the fleet from Peloponnese was loitering on the way instead of
appearing at Mitylene, were compelled to come to terms with the
Athenians in the following manner. Salaethus having himself ceased to
expect the fleet to arrive, now armed the commons with heavy armour,
which they had not before possessed, with the intention of making a
sortie against the Athenians. The commons, however, no sooner found
themselves possessed of arms than they refused any longer to obey their
officers; and forming in knots together, told the authorities to bring
out in public the provisions and divide them amongst them all, or they
would themselves come to terms with the Athenians and deliver up the
city.

The government, aware of their inability to prevent this, and of the
danger they would be in, if left out of the capitulation, publicly
agreed with Paches and the army to surrender Mitylene at discretion and
to admit the troops into the town; upon the understanding that the
Mitylenians should be allowed to send an embassy to Athens to plead
their cause, and that Paches should not imprison, make slaves of, or
put to death any of the citizens until its return. Such were the terms
of the capitulation; in spite of which the chief authors of the
negotiation with Lacedaemon were so completely overcome by terror when
the army entered that they went and seated themselves by the altars,
from which they were raised up by Paches under promise that he would do
them no wrong, and lodged by him in Tenedos, until he should learn the
pleasure of the Athenians concerning them. Paches also sent some
galleys and seized Antissa, and took such other military measures as he
thought advisable.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who ought to have made
all haste to relieve Mitylene, lost time in coming round Peloponnese
itself, and proceeding leisurely on the remainder of the voyage, made
Delos without having been seen by the Athenians at Athens, and from
thence arriving at Icarus and Myconus, there first heard of the fall of
Mitylene. Wishing to know the truth, they put into Embatum, in the
Erythraeid, about seven days after the capture of the town. Here they
learned the truth, and began to consider what they were to do; and
Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows:

“Alcidas and Peloponnesians who share with me the command of this
armament, my advice is to sail just as we are to Mitylene, before we
have been heard of. We may expect to find the Athenians as much off
their guard as men generally are who have just taken a city: this will
certainly be so by sea, where they have no idea of any enemy attacking
them, and where our strength, as it happens, mainly lies; while even
their land forces are probably scattered about the houses in the
carelessness of victory. If therefore we were to fall upon them
suddenly and in the night, I have hopes, with the help of the
well-wishers that we may have left inside the town, that we shall
become masters of the place. Let us not shrink from the risk, but let
us remember that this is just the occasion for one of the baseless
panics common in war: and that to be able to guard against these in
one’s own case, and to detect the moment when an attack will find an
enemy at this disadvantage, is what makes a successful general.”

These words of Teutiaplus failing to move Alcidas, some of the Ionian
exiles and the Lesbians with the expedition began to urge him, since
this seemed too dangerous, to seize one of the Ionian cities or the
Aeolic town of Cyme, to use as a base for effecting the revolt of
Ionia. This was by no means a hopeless enterprise, as their coming was
welcome everywhere; their object would be by this move to deprive
Athens of her chief source of revenue, and at the same time to saddle
her with expense, if she chose to blockade them; and they would
probably induce Pissuthnes to join them in the war. However, Alcidas
gave this proposal as bad a reception as the other, being eager, since
he had come too late for Mitylene, to find himself back in Peloponnese
as soon as possible.

Accordingly he put out from Embatum and proceeded along shore; and
touching at the Teian town, Myonnesus, there butchered most of the
prisoners that he had taken on his passage. Upon his coming to anchor
at Ephesus, envoys came to him from the Samians at Anaia, and told him
that he was not going the right way to free Hellas in massacring men
who had never raised a hand against him, and who were not enemies of
his, but allies of Athens against their will, and that if he did not
stop he would turn many more friends into enemies than enemies into
friends. Alcidas agreed to this, and let go all the Chians still in his
hands and some of the others that he had taken; the inhabitants,
instead of flying at the sight of his vessels, rather coming up to
them, taking them for Athenian, having no sort of expectation that
while the Athenians commanded the sea Peloponnesian ships would venture
over to Ionia.

From Ephesus Alcidas set sail in haste and fled. He had been seen by
the Salaminian and Paralian galleys, which happened to be sailing from
Athens, while still at anchor off Clarus; and fearing pursuit he now
made across the open sea, fully determined to touch nowhere, if he
could help it, until he got to Peloponnese. Meanwhile news of him had
come in to Paches from the Erythraeid, and indeed from all quarters. As
Ionia was unfortified, great fears were felt that the Peloponnesians
coasting along shore, even if they did not intend to stay, might make
descents in passing and plunder the towns; and now the Paralian and
Salaminian, having seen him at Clarus, themselves brought intelligence
of the fact. Paches accordingly gave hot chase, and continued the
pursuit as far as the isle of Patmos, and then finding that Alcidas had
got on too far to be overtaken, came back again. Meanwhile he thought
it fortunate that, as he had not fallen in with them out at sea, he had
not overtaken them anywhere where they would have been forced to
encamp, and so give him the trouble of blockading them.

On his return along shore he touched, among other places, at Notium,
the port of Colophon, where the Colophonians had settled after the
capture of the upper town by Itamenes and the barbarians, who had been
called in by certain individuals in a party quarrel. The capture of the
town took place about the time of the second Peloponnesian invasion of
Attica. However, the refugees, after settling at Notium, again split up
into factions, one of which called in Arcadian and barbarian
mercenaries from Pissuthnes and, entrenching these in a quarter apart,
formed a new community with the Median party of the Colophonians who
joined them from the upper town. Their opponents had retired into
exile, and now called in Paches, who invited Hippias, the commander of
the Arcadians in the fortified quarter, to a parley, upon condition
that, if they could not agree, he was to be put back safe and sound in
the fortification. However, upon his coming out to him, he put him into
custody, though not in chains, and attacked suddenly and took by
surprise the fortification, and putting the Arcadians and the
barbarians found in it to the sword, afterwards took Hippias into it as
he had promised, and, as soon as he was inside, seized him and shot him
down. Paches then gave up Notium to the Colophonians not of the Median
party; and settlers were afterwards sent out from Athens, and the place
colonized according to Athenian laws, after collecting all the
Colophonians found in any of the cities.

Arrived at Mitylene, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus; and finding the
Lacedaemonian, Salaethus, in hiding in the town, sent him off to
Athens, together with the Mitylenians that he had placed in Tenedos,
and any other persons that he thought concerned in the revolt. He also
sent back the greater part of his forces, remaining with the rest to
settle Mitylene and the rest of Lesbos as he thought best.

Upon the arrival of the prisoners with Salaethus, the Athenians at once
put the latter to death, although he offered, among other things, to
procure the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Plataea, which was
still under siege; and after deliberating as to what they should do
with the former, in the fury of the moment determined to put to death
not only the prisoners at Athens, but the whole adult male population
of Mitylene, and to make slaves of the women and children. It was
remarked that Mitylene had revolted without being, like the rest,
subjected to the empire; and what above all swelled the wrath of the
Athenians was the fact of the Peloponnesian fleet having ventured over
to Ionia to her support, a fact which was held to argue a long
meditated rebellion. They accordingly sent a galley to communicate the
decree to Paches, commanding him to lose no time in dispatching the
Mitylenians. The morrow brought repentance with it and reflection on
the horrid cruelty of a decree, which condemned a whole city to the
fate merited only by the guilty. This was no sooner perceived by the
Mitylenian ambassadors at Athens and their Athenian supporters, than
they moved the authorities to put the question again to the vote; which
they the more easily consented to do, as they themselves plainly saw
that most of the citizens wished some one to give them an opportunity
for reconsidering the matter. An assembly was therefore at once called,
and after much expression of opinion upon both sides, Cleon, son of
Cleaenetus, the same who had carried the former motion of putting the
Mitylenians to death, the most violent man at Athens, and at that time
by far the most powerful with the commons, came forward again and spoke
as follows:

“I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable
of empire, and never more so than by your present change of mind in the
matter of Mitylene. Fears or plots being unknown to you in your daily
relations with each other, you feel just the same with regard to your
allies, and never reflect that the mistakes into which you may be led
by listening to their appeals, or by giving way to your own compassion,
are full of danger to yourselves, and bring you no thanks for your
weakness from your allies; entirely forgetting that your empire is a
despotism and your subjects disaffected conspirators, whose obedience
is ensured not by your suicidal concessions, but by the superiority
given you by your own strength and not their loyalty. The most alarming
feature in the case is the constant change of measures with which we
appear to be threatened, and our seeming ignorance of the fact that bad
laws which are never changed are better for a city than good ones that
have no authority; that unlearned loyalty is more serviceable than
quick-witted insubordination; and that ordinary men usually manage
public affairs better than their more gifted fellows. The latter are
always wanting to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule every
proposition brought forward, thinking that they cannot show their wit
in more important matters, and by such behaviour too often ruin their
country; while those who mistrust their own cleverness are content to
be less learned than the laws, and less able to pick holes in the
speech of a good speaker; and being fair judges rather than rival
athletes, generally conduct affairs successfully. These we ought to
imitate, instead of being led on by cleverness and intellectual rivalry
to advise your people against our real opinions.

“For myself, I adhere to my former opinion, and wonder at those who
have proposed to reopen the case of the Mitylenians, and who are thus
causing a delay which is all in favour of the guilty, by making the
sufferer proceed against the offender with the edge of his anger
blunted; although where vengeance follows most closely upon the wrong,
it best equals it and most amply requites it. I wonder also who will be
the man who will maintain the contrary, and will pretend to show that
the crimes of the Mitylenians are of service to us, and our misfortunes
injurious to the allies. Such a man must plainly either have such
confidence in his rhetoric as to adventure to prove that what has been
once for all decided is still undetermined, or be bribed to try to
delude us by elaborate sophisms. In such contests the state gives the
rewards to others, and takes the dangers for herself. The persons to
blame are you who are so foolish as to institute these contests; who go
to see an oration as you would to see a sight, take your facts on
hearsay, judge of the practicability of a project by the wit of its
advocates, and trust for the truth as to past events not to the fact
which you saw more than to the clever strictures which you heard; the
easy victims of new-fangled arguments, unwilling to follow received
conclusions; slaves to every new paradox, despisers of the commonplace;
the first wish of every man being that he could speak himself, the next
to rival those who can speak by seeming to be quite up with their ideas
by applauding every hit almost before it is made, and by being as quick
in catching an argument as you are slow in foreseeing its consequences;
asking, if I may so say, for something different from the conditions
under which we live, and yet comprehending inadequately those very
conditions; very slaves to the pleasure of the ear, and more like the
audience of a rhetorician than the council of a city.

“In order to keep you from this, I proceed to show that no one state
has ever injured you as much as Mitylene. I can make allowance for
those who revolt because they cannot bear our empire, or who have been
forced to do so by the enemy. But for those who possessed an island
with fortifications; who could fear our enemies only by sea, and there
had their own force of galleys to protect them; who were independent
and held in the highest honour by you—to act as these have done, this
is not revolt—revolt implies oppression; it is deliberate and wanton
aggression; an attempt to ruin us by siding with our bitterest enemies;
a worse offence than a war undertaken on their own account in the
acquisition of power. The fate of those of their neighbours who had
already rebelled and had been subdued was no lesson to them; their own
prosperity could not dissuade them from affronting danger; but blindly
confident in the future, and full of hopes beyond their power though
not beyond their ambition, they declared war and made their decision to
prefer might to right, their attack being determined not by provocation
but by the moment which seemed propitious. The truth is that great good
fortune coming suddenly and unexpectedly tends to make a people
insolent; in most cases it is safer for mankind to have success in
reason than out of reason; and it is easier for them, one may say, to
stave off adversity than to preserve prosperity. Our mistake has been
to distinguish the Mitylenians as we have done: had they been long ago
treated like the rest, they never would have so far forgotten
themselves, human nature being as surely made arrogant by consideration
as it is awed by firmness. Let them now therefore be punished as their
crime requires, and do not, while you condemn the aristocracy, absolve
the people. This is certain, that all attacked you without distinction,
although they might have come over to us and been now again in
possession of their city. But no, they thought it safer to throw in
their lot with the aristocracy and so joined their rebellion! Consider
therefore: if you subject to the same punishment the ally who is forced
to rebel by the enemy, and him who does so by his own free choice,
which of them, think you, is there that will not rebel upon the
slightest pretext; when the reward of success is freedom, and the
penalty of failure nothing so very terrible? We meanwhile shall have to
risk our money and our lives against one state after another; and if
successful, shall receive a ruined town from which we can no longer
draw the revenue upon which our strength depends; while if
unsuccessful, we shall have an enemy the more upon our hands, and shall
spend the time that might be employed in combating our existing foes in
warring with our own allies.

“No hope, therefore, that rhetoric may instil or money purchase, of the
mercy due to human infirmity must be held out to the Mitylenians. Their
offence was not involuntary, but of malice and deliberate; and mercy is
only for unwilling offenders. I therefore, now as before, persist
against your reversing your first decision, or giving way to the three
failings most fatal to empire—pity, sentiment, and indulgence.
Compassion is due to those who can reciprocate the feeling, not to
those who will never pity us in return, but are our natural and
necessary foes: the orators who charm us with sentiment may find other
less important arenas for their talents, in the place of one where the
city pays a heavy penalty for a momentary pleasure, themselves
receiving fine acknowledgments for their fine phrases; while indulgence
should be shown towards those who will be our friends in future,
instead of towards men who will remain just what they were, and as much
our enemies as before. To sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my
advice you will do what is just towards the Mitylenians, and at the
same time expedient; while by a different decision you will not oblige
them so much as pass sentence upon yourselves. For if they were right
in rebelling, you must be wrong in ruling. However, if, right or wrong,
you determine to rule, you must carry out your principle and punish the
Mitylenians as your interest requires; or else you must give up your
empire and cultivate honesty without danger. Make up your minds,
therefore, to give them like for like; and do not let the victims who
escaped the plot be more insensible than the conspirators who hatched
it; but reflect what they would have done if victorious over you,
especially they were the aggressors. It is they who wrong their
neighbour without a cause, that pursue their victim to the death, on
account of the danger which they foresee in letting their enemy
survive; since the object of a wanton wrong is more dangerous, if he
escape, than an enemy who has not this to complain of. Do not,
therefore, be traitors to yourselves, but recall as nearly as possible
the moment of suffering and the supreme importance which you then
attached to their reduction; and now pay them back in their turn,
without yielding to present weakness or forgetting the peril that once
hung over you. Punish them as they deserve, and teach your other allies
by a striking example that the penalty of rebellion is death. Let them
once understand this and you will not have so often to neglect your
enemies while you are fighting with your own confederates.”

Such were the words of Cleon. After him Diodotus, son of Eucrates, who
had also in the previous assembly spoken most strongly against putting
the Mitylenians to death, came forward and spoke as follows:

“I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the
Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against
important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things
most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes
hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of
mind. As for the argument that speech ought not to be the exponent of
action, the man who uses it must be either senseless or interested:
senseless if he believes it possible to treat of the uncertain future
through any other medium; interested if, wishing to carry a disgraceful
measure and doubting his ability to speak well in a bad cause, he
thinks to frighten opponents and hearers by well-aimed calumny. What is
still more intolerable is to accuse a speaker of making a display in
order to be paid for it. If ignorance only were imputed, an
unsuccessful speaker might retire with a reputation for honesty, if not
for wisdom; while the charge of dishonesty makes him suspected, if
successful, and thought, if defeated, not only a fool but a rogue. The
city is no gainer by such a system, since fear deprives it of its
advisers; although in truth, if our speakers are to make such
assertions, it would be better for the country if they could not speak
at all, as we should then make fewer blunders. The good citizen ought
to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly
in argument; and a wise city, without over-distinguishing its best
advisers, will nevertheless not deprive them of their due, and, far
from punishing an unlucky counsellor, will not even regard him as
disgraced. In this way successful orators would be least tempted to
sacrifice their convictions to popularity, in the hope of still higher
honours, and unsuccessful speakers to resort to the same popular arts
in order to win over the multitude.

“This is not our way; and, besides, the moment that a man is suspected
of giving advice, however good, from corrupt motives, we feel such a
grudge against him for the gain which after all we are not certain he
will receive, that we deprive the city of its certain benefit. Plain
good advice has thus come to be no less suspected than bad; and the
advocate of the most monstrous measures is not more obliged to use
deceit to gain the people, than the best counsellor is to lie in order
to be believed. The city and the city only, owing to these refinements,
can never be served openly and without disguise; he who does serve it
openly being always suspected of serving himself in some secret way in
return. Still, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, and
the position of affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a
little farther than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your
advisers, are responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. For if
those who gave the advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you
would judge more calmly; as it is, you visit the disasters into which
the whim of the moment may have led you upon the single person of your
adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error.

“However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the
matter of Mitylene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is
not their guilt, but our interests. Though I prove them ever so guilty,
I shall not, therefore, advise their death, unless it be expedient; nor
though they should have claims to indulgence, shall I recommend it,
unless it be dearly for the good of the country. I consider that we are
deliberating for the future more than for the present; and where Cleon
is so positive as to the useful deterrent effects that will follow from
making rebellion capital, I, who consider the interests of the future
quite as much as he, as positively maintain the contrary. And I require
you not to reject my useful considerations for his specious ones: his
speech may have the attraction of seeming the more just in your present
temper against Mitylene; but we are not in a court of justice, but in a
political assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make
the Mitylenians useful to Athens.

“Now of course communities have enacted the penalty of death for many
offences far lighter than this: still hope leads men to venture, and no
one ever yet put himself in peril without the inward conviction that he
would succeed in his design. Again, was there ever city rebelling that
did not believe that it possessed either in itself or in its alliances
resources adequate to the enterprise? All, states and individuals, are
alike prone to err, and there is no law that will prevent them; or why
should men have exhausted the list of punishments in search of
enactments to protect them from evildoers? It is probable that in early
times the penalties for the greatest offences were less severe, and
that, as these were disregarded, the penalty of death has been by
degrees in most cases arrived at, which is itself disregarded in like
manner. Either then some means of terror more terrible than this must
be discovered, or it must be owned that this restraint is useless; and
that as long as poverty gives men the courage of necessity, or plenty
fills them with the ambition which belongs to insolence and pride, and
the other conditions of life remain each under the thraldom of some
fatal and master passion, so long will the impulse never be wanting to
drive men into danger. Hope also and cupidity, the one leading and the
other following, the one conceiving the attempt, the other suggesting
the facility of succeeding, cause the widest ruin, and, although
invisible agents, are far stronger than the dangers that are seen.
Fortune, too, powerfully helps the delusion and, by the unexpected aid
that she sometimes lends, tempts men to venture with inferior means;
and this is especially the case with communities, because the stakes
played for are the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting
together, each man irrationally magnifies his own capacity. In fine, it
is impossible to prevent, and only great simplicity can hope to
prevent, human nature doing what it has once set its mind upon, by
force of law or by any other deterrent force whatsoever.

“We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy through a
belief in the efficacy of the punishment of death, or exclude rebels
from the hope of repentance and an early atonement of their error.
Consider a moment. At present, if a city that has already revolted
perceive that it cannot succeed, it will come to terms while it is
still able to refund expenses, and pay tribute afterwards. In the other
case, what city, think you, would not prepare better than is now done,
and hold out to the last against its besiegers, if it is all one
whether it surrender late or soon? And how can it be otherwise than
hurtful to us to be put to the expense of a siege, because surrender is
out of the question; and if we take the city, to receive a ruined town
from which we can no longer draw the revenue which forms our real
strength against the enemy? We must not, therefore, sit as strict
judges of the offenders to our own prejudice, but rather see how by
moderate chastisements we may be enabled to benefit in future by the
revenue-producing powers of our dependencies; and we must make up our
minds to look for our protection not to legal terrors but to careful
administration. At present we do exactly the opposite. When a free
community, held in subjection by force, rises, as is only natural, and
asserts its independence, it is no sooner reduced than we fancy
ourselves obliged to punish it severely; although the right course with
freemen is not to chastise them rigorously when they do rise, but
rigorously to watch them before they rise, and to prevent their ever
entertaining the idea, and, the insurrection suppressed, to make as few
responsible for it as possible.

“Only consider what a blunder you would commit in doing as Cleon
recommends. As things are at present, in all the cities the people is
your friend, and either does not revolt with the oligarchy, or, if
forced to do so, becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so that
in the war with the hostile city you have the masses on your side. But
if you butcher the people of Mitylene, who had nothing to do with the
revolt, and who, as soon as they got arms, of their own motion
surrendered the town, first you will commit the crime of killing your
benefactors; and next you will play directly into the hands of the
higher classes, who when they induce their cities to rise, will
immediately have the people on their side, through your having
announced in advance the same punishment for those who are guilty and
for those who are not. On the contrary, even if they were guilty, you
ought to seem not to notice it, in order to avoid alienating the only
class still friendly to us. In short, I consider it far more useful for
the preservation of our empire voluntarily to put up with injustice,
than to put to death, however justly, those whom it is our interest to
keep alive. As for Cleon’s idea that in punishment the claims of
justice and expediency can both be satisfied, facts do not confirm the
possibility of such a combination.

“Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course, and without
conceding too much either to pity or to indulgence, by neither of which
motives do I any more than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon the
plain merits of the case before you, be persuaded by me to try calmly
those of the Mitylenians whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to leave
the rest undisturbed. This is at once best for the future, and most
terrible to your enemies at the present moment; inasmuch as good policy
against an adversary is superior to the blind attacks of brute force.”

Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed were
the ones that most directly contradicted each other; and the Athenians,
notwithstanding their change of feeling, now proceeded to a division,
in which the show of hands was almost equal, although the motion of
Diodotus carried the day. Another galley was at once sent off in haste,
for fear that the first might reach Lesbos in the interval, and the
city be found destroyed; the first ship having about a day and a
night’s start. Wine and barley-cakes were provided for the vessel by
the Mitylenian ambassadors, and great promises made if they arrived in
time; which caused the men to use such diligence upon the voyage that
they took their meals of barley-cakes kneaded with oil and wine as they
rowed, and only slept by turns while the others were at the oar.
Luckily they met with no contrary wind, and the first ship making no
haste upon so horrid an errand, while the second pressed on in the
manner described, the first arrived so little before them, that Paches
had only just had time to read the decree, and to prepare to execute
the sentence, when the second put into port and prevented the massacre.
The danger of Mitylene had indeed been great.

The other party whom Paches had sent off as the prime movers in the
rebellion, were upon Cleon’s motion put to death by the Athenians, the
number being rather more than a thousand. The Athenians also demolished
the walls of the Mitylenians, and took possession of their ships.
Afterwards tribute was not imposed upon the Lesbians; but all their
land, except that of the Methymnians, was divided into three thousand
allotments, three hundred of which were reserved as sacred for the
gods, and the rest assigned by lot to Athenian shareholders, who were
sent out to the island. With these the Lesbians agreed to pay a rent of
two minae a year for each allotment, and cultivated the land
themselves. The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the
continent belonging to the Mitylenians, which thus became for the
future subject to Athens. Such were the events that took place at
Lesbos.




CHAPTER X


Fifth Year of the War—Trial and Execution of the Plataeans— Corcyraean
Revolution


During the same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos, the Athenians
under Nicias, son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the island
of Minoa, which lies off Megara and was used as a fortified post by the
Megarians, who had built a tower upon it. Nicias wished to enable the
Athenians to maintain their blockade from this nearer station instead
of from Budorum and Salamis; to stop the Peloponnesian galleys and
privateers sailing out unobserved from the island, as they had been in
the habit of doing; and at the same time prevent anything from coming
into Megara. Accordingly, after taking two towers projecting on the
side of Nisaea, by engines from the sea, and clearing the entrance into
the channel between the island and the shore, he next proceeded to cut
off all communication by building a wall on the mainland at the point
where a bridge across a morass enabled succours to be thrown into the
island, which was not far off from the continent. A few days sufficing
to accomplish this, he afterwards raised some works in the island also,
and leaving a garrison there, departed with his forces.

About the same time in this summer, the Plataeans, being now without
provisions and unable to support the siege, surrendered to the
Peloponnesians in the following manner. An assault had been made upon
the wall, which the Plataeans were unable to repel. The Lacedaemonian
commander, perceiving their weakness, wished to avoid taking the place
by storm; his instructions from Lacedaemon having been so conceived, in
order that if at any future time peace should be made with Athens, and
they should agree each to restore the places that they had taken in the
war, Plataea might be held to have come over voluntarily, and not be
included in the list. He accordingly sent a herald to them to ask if
they were willing voluntarily to surrender the town to the
Lacedaemonians, and accept them as their judges, upon the understanding
that the guilty should be punished, but no one without form of law. The
Plataeans were now in the last state of weakness, and the herald had no
sooner delivered his message than they surrendered the town. The
Peloponnesians fed them for some days until the judges from Lacedaemon,
who were five in number, arrived. Upon their arrival no charge was
preferred; they simply called up the Plataeans, and asked them whether
they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the war then
raging. The Plataeans asked leave to speak at greater length, and
deputed two of their number to represent them: Astymachus, son of
Asopolaus, and Lacon, son of Aeimnestus, proxenus of the
Lacedaemonians, who came forward and spoke as follows:

“Lacedaemonians, when we surrendered our city we trusted in you, and
looked forward to a trial more agreeable to the forms of law than the
present, to which we had no idea of being subjected; the judges also in
whose hands we consented to place ourselves were you, and you only
(from whom we thought we were most likely to obtain justice), and not
other persons, as is now the case. As matters stand, we are afraid that
we have been doubly deceived. We have good reason to suspect, not only
that the issue to be tried is the most terrible of all, but that you
will not prove impartial; if we may argue from the fact that no
accusation was first brought forward for us to answer, but we had
ourselves to ask leave to speak, and from the question being put so
shortly, that a true answer to it tells against us, while a false one
can be contradicted. In this dilemma, our safest, and indeed our only
course, seems to be to say something at all risks: placed as we are, we
could scarcely be silent without being tormented by the damning thought
that speaking might have saved us. Another difficulty that we have to
encounter is the difficulty of convincing you. Were we unknown to each
other we might profit by bringing forward new matter with which you
were unacquainted: as it is, we can tell you nothing that you do not
know already, and we fear, not that you have condemned us in your own
minds of having failed in our duty towards you, and make this our
crime, but that to please a third party we have to submit to a trial
the result of which is already decided. Nevertheless, we will place
before you what we can justly urge, not only on the question of the
quarrel which the Thebans have against us, but also as addressing you
and the rest of the Hellenes; and we will remind you of our good
services, and endeavour to prevail with you.

“To your short question, whether we have done the Lacedaemonians and
allies any service in this war, we say, if you ask us as enemies, that
to refrain from serving you was not to do you injury; if as friends,
that you are more in fault for having marched against us. During the
peace, and against the Mede, we acted well: we have not now been the
first to break the peace, and we were the only Boeotians who then
joined in defending against the Mede the liberty of Hellas. Although an
inland people, we were present at the action at Artemisium; in the
battle that took place in our territory we fought by the side of
yourselves and Pausanias; and in all the other Hellenic exploits of the
time we took a part quite out of proportion to our strength. Besides,
you, as Lacedaemonians, ought not to forget that at the time of the
great panic at Sparta, after the earthquake, caused by the secession of
the Helots to Ithome, we sent the third part of our citizens to assist
you.

“On these great and historical occasions such was the part that we
chose, although afterwards we became your enemies. For this you were to
blame. When we asked for your alliance against our Theban oppressors,
you rejected our petition, and told us to go to the Athenians who were
our neighbours, as you lived too far off. In the war we never have done
to you, and never should have done to you, anything unreasonable. If we
refused to desert the Athenians when you asked us, we did no wrong;
they had helped us against the Thebans when you drew back, and we could
no longer give them up with honour; especially as we had obtained their
alliance and had been admitted to their citizenship at our own request,
and after receiving benefits at their hands; but it was plainly our
duty loyally to obey their orders. Besides, the faults that either of
you may commit in your supremacy must be laid, not upon the followers,
but on the chiefs that lead them astray.

“With regard to the Thebans, they have wronged us repeatedly, and their
last aggression, which has been the means of bringing us into our
present position, is within your own knowledge. In seizing our city in
time of peace, and what is more at a holy time in the month, they
justly encountered our vengeance, in accordance with the universal law
which sanctions resistance to an invader; and it cannot now be right
that we should suffer on their account. By taking your own immediate
interest and their animosity as the test of justice, you will prove
yourselves to be rather waiters on expediency than judges of right;
although if they seem useful to you now, we and the rest of the
Hellenes gave you much more valuable help at a time of greater need.
Now you are the assailants, and others fear you; but at the crisis to
which we allude, when the barbarian threatened all with slavery, the
Thebans were on his side. It is just, therefore, to put our patriotism
then against our error now, if error there has been; and you will find
the merit outweighing the fault, and displayed at a juncture when there
were few Hellenes who would set their valour against the strength of
Xerxes, and when greater praise was theirs who preferred the dangerous
path of honour to the safe course of consulting their own interest with
respect to the invasion. To these few we belonged, and highly were we
honoured for it; and yet we now fear to perish by having again acted on
the same principles, and chosen to act well with Athens sooner than
wisely with Sparta. Yet in justice the same cases should be decided in
the same way, and policy should not mean anything else than lasting
gratitude for the service of good ally combined with a proper attention
to one’s own immediate interest.

“Consider also that at present the Hellenes generally regard you as a
pattern of worth and honour; and if you pass an unjust sentence upon us
in this which is no obscure cause, but one in which you, the judges,
are as illustrious as we, the prisoners, are blameless, take care that
displeasure be not felt at an unworthy decision in the matter of
honourable men made by men yet more honourable than they, and at the
consecration in the national temples of spoils taken from the
Plataeans, the benefactors of Hellas. Shocking indeed will it seem for
Lacedaemonians to destroy Plataea, and for the city whose name your
fathers inscribed upon the tripod at Delphi for its good service, to be
by you blotted out from the map of Hellas, to please the Thebans. To
such a depth of misfortune have we fallen that, while the Medes’
success had been our ruin, Thebans now supplant us in your once fond
regards; and we have been subjected to two dangers, the greatest of
any—that of dying of starvation then, if we had not surrendered our
town, and now of being tried for our lives. So that we Plataeans, after
exertions beyond our power in the cause of the Hellenes, are rejected
by all, forsaken and unassisted; helped by none of our allies, and
reduced to doubt the stability of our only hope, yourselves.

“Still, in the name of the gods who once presided over our confederacy,
and of our own good service in the Hellenic cause, we adjure you to
relent; to recall the decision which we fear that the Thebans may have
obtained from you; to ask back the gift that you have given them, that
they disgrace not you by slaying us; to gain a pure instead of a guilty
gratitude, and not to gratify others to be yourselves rewarded with
shame. Our lives may be quickly taken, but it will be a heavy task to
wipe away the infamy of the deed; as we are no enemies whom you might
justly punish, but friends forced into taking arms against you. To
grant us our lives would be, therefore, a righteous judgment; if you
consider also that we are prisoners who surrendered of their own
accord, stretching out our hands for quarter, whose slaughter Hellenic
law forbids, and who besides were always your benefactors. Look at the
sepulchres of your fathers, slain by the Medes and buried in our
country, whom year by year we honoured with garments and all other
dues, and the first-fruits of all that our land produced in their
season, as friends from a friendly country and allies to our old
companions in arms. Should you not decide aright, your conduct would be
the very opposite to ours. Consider only: Pausanias buried them
thinking that he was laying them in friendly ground and among men as
friendly; but you, if you kill us and make the Plataean territory
Theban, will leave your fathers and kinsmen in a hostile soil and among
their murderers, deprived of the honours which they now enjoy. What is
more, you will enslave the land in which the freedom of the Hellenes
was won, make desolate the temples of the gods to whom they prayed
before they overcame the Medes, and take away your ancestral sacrifices
from those who founded and instituted them.

“It were not to your glory, Lacedaemonians, either to offend in this
way against the common law of the Hellenes and against your own
ancestors, or to kill us your benefactors to gratify another’s hatred
without having been wronged yourselves: it were more so to spare us and
to yield to the impressions of a reasonable compassion; reflecting not
merely on the awful fate in store for us, but also on the character of
the sufferers, and on the impossibility of predicting how soon
misfortune may fall even upon those who deserve it not. We, as we have
a right to do and as our need impels us, entreat you, calling aloud
upon the gods at whose common altar all the Hellenes worship, to hear
our request, to be not unmindful of the oaths which your fathers swore,
and which we now plead—we supplicate you by the tombs of your fathers,
and appeal to those that are gone to save us from falling into the
hands of the Thebans and their dearest friends from being given up to
their most detested foes. We also remind you of that day on which we
did the most glorious deeds, by your fathers’ sides, we who now on this
are like to suffer the most dreadful fate. Finally, to do what is
necessary and yet most difficult for men in our situation—that is, to
make an end of speaking, since with that ending the peril of our lives
draws near—in conclusion we say that we did not surrender our city to
the Thebans (to that we would have preferred inglorious starvation),
but trusted in and capitulated to you; and it would be just, if we fail
to persuade you, to put us back in the same position and let us take
the chance that falls to us. And at the same time we adjure you not to
give us up—your suppliants, Lacedaemonians, out of your hands and
faith, Plataeans foremost of the Hellenic patriots, to Thebans, our
most hated enemies—but to be our saviours, and not, while you free the
rest of the Hellenes, to bring us to destruction.”

Such were the words of the Plataeans. The Thebans, afraid that the
Lacedaemonians might be moved by what they had heard, came forward and
said that they too desired to address them, since the Plataeans had,
against their wish, been allowed to speak at length instead of being
confined to a simple answer to the question. Leave being granted, the
Thebans spoke as follows:

“We should never have asked to make this speech if the Plataeans on
their side had contented themselves with shortly answering the
question, and had not turned round and made charges against us, coupled
with a long defence of themselves upon matters outside the present
inquiry and not even the subject of accusation, and with praise of what
no one finds fault with. However, since they have done so, we must
answer their charges and refute their self-praise, in order that
neither our bad name nor their good may help them, but that you may
hear the real truth on both points, and so decide.

“The origin of our quarrel was this. We settled Plataea some time after
the rest of Boeotia, together with other places out of which we had
driven the mixed population. The Plataeans not choosing to recognize
our supremacy, as had been first arranged, but separating themselves
from the rest of the Boeotians, and proving traitors to their
nationality, we used compulsion; upon which they went over to the
Athenians, and with them did as much harm, for which we retaliated.

“Next, when the barbarian invaded Hellas, they say that they were the
only Boeotians who did not Medize; and this is where they most glorify
themselves and abuse us. We say that if they did not Medize, it was
because the Athenians did not do so either; just as afterwards when the
Athenians attacked the Hellenes they, the Plataeans, were again the
only Boeotians who Atticized. And yet consider the forms of our
respective governments when we so acted. Our city at that juncture had
neither an oligarchical constitution in which all the nobles enjoyed
equal rights, nor a democracy, but that which is most opposed to law
and good government and nearest a tyranny—the rule of a close cabal.
These, hoping to strengthen their individual power by the success of
the Mede, kept down by force the people, and brought him into the town.
The city as a whole was not its own mistress when it so acted, and
ought not to be reproached for the errors that it committed while
deprived of its constitution. Examine only how we acted after the
departure of the Mede and the recovery of the constitution; when the
Athenians attacked the rest of Hellas and endeavoured to subjugate our
country, of the greater part of which faction had already made them
masters. Did not we fight and conquer at Coronea and liberate Boeotia,
and do we not now actively contribute to the liberation of the rest,
providing horses to the cause and a force unequalled by that of any
other state in the confederacy?

“Let this suffice to excuse us for our Medism. We will now endeavour to
show that you have injured the Hellenes more than we, and are more
deserving of condign punishment. It was in defence against us, say you,
that you became allies and citizens of Athens. If so, you ought only to
have called in the Athenians against us, instead of joining them in
attacking others: it was open to you to do this if you ever felt that
they were leading you where you did not wish to follow, as Lacedaemon
was already your ally against the Mede, as you so much insist; and this
was surely sufficient to keep us off, and above all to allow you to
deliberate in security. Nevertheless, of your own choice and without
compulsion you chose to throw your lot in with Athens. And you say that
it had been base for you to betray your benefactors; but it was surely
far baser and more iniquitous to sacrifice the whole body of the
Hellenes, your fellow confederates, who were liberating Hellas, than
the Athenians only, who were enslaving it. The return that you made
them was therefore neither equal nor honourable, since you called them
in, as you say, because you were being oppressed yourselves, and then
became their accomplices in oppressing others; although baseness rather
consists in not returning like for like than in not returning what is
justly due but must be unjustly paid.

“Meanwhile, after thus plainly showing that it was not for the sake of
the Hellenes that you alone then did not Medize, but because the
Athenians did not do so either, and you wished to side with them and to
be against the rest; you now claim the benefit of good deeds done to
please your neighbours. This cannot be admitted: you chose the
Athenians, and with them you must stand or fall. Nor can you plead the
league then made and claim that it should now protect you. You
abandoned that league, and offended against it by helping instead of
hindering the subjugation of the Aeginetans and others of its members,
and that not under compulsion, but while in enjoyment of the same
institutions that you enjoy to the present hour, and no one forcing you
as in our case. Lastly, an invitation was addressed to you before you
were blockaded to be neutral and join neither party: this you did not
accept. Who then merit the detestation of the Hellenes more justly than
you, you who sought their ruin under the mask of honour? The former
virtues that you allege you now show not to be proper to your
character; the real bent of your nature has been at length damningly
proved: when the Athenians took the path of injustice you followed
them.

“Of our unwilling Medism and your wilful Atticizing this then is our
explanation. The last wrong wrong of which you complain consists in our
having, as you say, lawlessly invaded your town in time of peace and
festival. Here again we cannot think that we were more in fault than
yourselves. If of our own proper motion we made an armed attack upon
your city and ravaged your territory, we are guilty; but if the first
men among you in estate and family, wishing to put an end to the
foreign connection and to restore you to the common Boeotian country,
of their own free will invited us, wherein is our crime? Where wrong is
done, those who lead, as you say, are more to blame than those who
follow. Not that, in our judgment, wrong was done either by them or by
us. Citizens like yourselves, and with more at stake than you, they
opened their own walls and introduced us into their own city, not as
foes but as friends, to prevent the bad among you from becoming worse;
to give honest men their due; to reform principles without attacking
persons, since you were not to be banished from your city, but brought
home to your kindred, nor to be made enemies to any, but friends alike
to all.

“That our intention was not hostile is proved by our behaviour. We did
no harm to any one, but publicly invited those who wished to live under
a national, Boeotian government to come over to us; which as first you
gladly did, and made an agreement with us and remained tranquil, until
you became aware of the smallness of our numbers. Now it is possible
that there may have been something not quite fair in our entering
without the consent of your commons. At any rate you did not repay us
in kind. Instead of refraining, as we had done, from violence, and
inducing us to retire by negotiation, you fell upon us in violation of
your agreement, and slew some of us in fight, of which we do not so
much complain, for in that there was a certain justice; but others who
held out their hands and received quarter, and whose lives you
subsequently promised us, you lawlessly butchered. If this was not
abominable, what is? And after these three crimes committed one after
the other—the violation of your agreement, the murder of the men
afterwards, and the lying breach of your promise not to kill them, if
we refrained from injuring your property in the country—you still
affirm that we are the criminals and yourselves pretend to escape
justice. Not so, if these your judges decide aright, but you will be
punished for all together.

“Such, Lacedaemonians, are the facts. We have gone into them at some
length both on your account and on our own, that you may fed that you
will justly condemn the prisoners, and we, that we have given an
additional sanction to our vengeance. We would also prevent you from
being melted by hearing of their past virtues, if any such they had:
these may be fairly appealed to by the victims of injustice, but only
aggravate the guilt of criminals, since they offend against their
better nature. Nor let them gain anything by crying and wailing, by
calling upon your fathers’ tombs and their own desolate condition.
Against this we point to the far more dreadful fate of our youth,
butchered at their hands; the fathers of whom either fell at Coronea,
bringing Boeotia over to you, or seated, forlorn old men by desolate
hearths, with far more reason implore your justice upon the prisoners.
The pity which they appeal to is rather due to men who suffer
unworthily; those who suffer justly as they do are on the contrary
subjects for triumph. For their present desolate condition they have
themselves to blame, since they wilfully rejected the better alliance.
Their lawless act was not provoked by any action of ours: hate, not
justice, inspired their decision; and even now the satisfaction which
they afford us is not adequate; they will suffer by a legal sentence,
not as they pretend as suppliants asking for quarter in battle, but as
prisoners who have surrendered upon agreement to take their trial.
Vindicate, therefore, Lacedaemonians, the Hellenic law which they have
broken; and to us, the victims of its violation, grant the reward
merited by our zeal. Nor let us be supplanted in your favour by their
harangues, but offer an example to the Hellenes, that the contests to
which you invite them are of deeds, not words: good deeds can be
shortly stated, but where wrong is done a wealth of language is needed
to veil its deformity. However, if leading powers were to do what you
are now doing, and putting one short question to all alike were to
decide accordingly, men would be less tempted to seek fine phrases to
cover bad actions.”

Such were the words of the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges decided
that the question whether they had received any service from the
Plataeans in the war, was a fair one for them to put; as they had
always invited them to be neutral, agreeably to the original covenant
of Pausanias after the defeat of the Mede, and had again definitely
offered them the same conditions before the blockade. This offer having
been refused, they were now, they conceived, by the loyalty of their
intention released from their covenant; and having, as they considered,
suffered evil at the hands of the Plataeans, they brought them in again
one by one and asked each of them the same question, that is to say,
whether they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the
war; and upon their saying that they had not, took them out and slew
them, all without exception. The number of Plataeans thus massacred was
not less than two hundred, with twenty-five Athenians who had shared in
the siege. The women were taken as slaves. The city the Thebans gave
for about a year to some political emigrants from Megara and to the
surviving Plataeans of their own party to inhabit, and afterwards razed
it to the ground from the very foundations, and built on to the
precinct of Hera an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all round
above and below, making use for this purpose of the roofs and doors of
the Plataeans: of the rest of the materials in the wall, the brass and
the iron, they made couches which they dedicated to Hera, for whom they
also built a stone chapel of a hundred feet square. The land they
confiscated and let out on a ten years’ lease to Theban occupiers. The
adverse attitude of the Lacedaemonians in the whole Plataean affair was
mainly adopted to please the Thebans, who were thought to be useful in
the war at that moment raging. Such was the end of Plataea, in the
ninety-third year after she became the ally of Athens.

Meanwhile, the forty ships of the Peloponnesians that had gone to the
relief of the Lesbians, and which we left flying across the open sea,
pursued by the Athenians, were caught in a storm off Crete, and
scattering from thence made their way to Peloponnese, where they found
at Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot galleys, with Brasidas, son
of Tellis, lately arrived as counsellor to Alcidas; the Lacedaemonians,
upon the failure of the Lesbian expedition, having resolved to
strengthen their fleet and sail to Corcyra, where a revolution had
broken out, so as to arrive there before the twelve Athenian ships at
Naupactus could be reinforced from Athens. Brasidas and Alcidas began
to prepare accordingly.

The Corcyraean revolution began with the return of the prisoners taken
in the sea-fights off Epidamnus. These the Corinthians had released,
nominally upon the security of eight hundred talents given by their
proxeni, but in reality upon their engagement to bring over Corcyra to
Corinth. These men proceeded to canvass each of the citizens, and to
intrigue with the view of detaching the city from Athens. Upon the
arrival of an Athenian and a Corinthian vessel, with envoys on board, a
conference was held in which the Corcyraeans voted to remain allies of
the Athenians according to their agreement, but to be friends of the
Peloponnesians as they had been formerly. Meanwhile, the returned
prisoners brought Peithias, a volunteer proxenus of the Athenians and
leader of the commons, to trial, upon the charge of enslaving Corcyra
to Athens. He, being acquitted, retorted by accusing five of the
richest of their number of cutting stakes in the ground sacred to Zeus
and Alcinous; the legal penalty being a stater for each stake. Upon
their conviction, the amount of the penalty being very large, they
seated themselves as suppliants in the temples to be allowed to pay it
by instalments; but Peithias, who was one of the senate, prevailed upon
that body to enforce the law; upon which the accused, rendered
desperate by the law, and also learning that Peithias had the
intention, while still a member of the senate, to persuade the people
to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance with Athens, banded
together armed with daggers, and suddenly bursting into the senate
killed Peithias and sixty others, senators and private persons; some
few only of the party of Peithias taking refuge in the Athenian galley,
which had not yet departed.

After this outrage, the conspirators summoned the Corcyraeans to an
assembly, and said that this would turn out for the best, and would
save them from being enslaved by Athens: for the future, they moved to
receive neither party unless they came peacefully in a single ship,
treating any larger number as enemies. This motion made, they compelled
it to be adopted, and instantly sent off envoys to Athens to justify
what had been done and to dissuade the refugees there from any hostile
proceedings which might lead to a reaction.

Upon the arrival of the embassy, the Athenians arrested the envoys and
all who listened to them, as revolutionists, and lodged them in Aegina.
Meanwhile a Corinthian galley arriving in the island with Lacedaemonian
envoys, the dominant Corcyraean party attacked the commons and defeated
them in battle. Night coming on, the commons took refuge in the
Acropolis and the higher parts of the city, and concentrated themselves
there, having also possession of the Hyllaic harbour; their adversaries
occupying the market-place, where most of them lived, and the harbour
adjoining, looking towards the mainland.

The next day passed in skirmishes of little importance, each party
sending into the country to offer freedom to the slaves and to invite
them to join them. The mass of the slaves answered the appeal of the
commons; their antagonists being reinforced by eight hundred
mercenaries from the continent.

After a day’s interval hostilities recommenced, victory remaining with
the commons, who had the advantage in numbers and position, the women
also valiantly assisting them, pelting with tiles from the houses, and
supporting the melee with a fortitude beyond their sex. Towards dusk,
the oligarchs in full rout, fearing that the victorious commons might
assault and carry the arsenal and put them to the sword, fired the
houses round the marketplace and the lodging-houses, in order to bar
their advance; sparing neither their own, nor those of their
neighbours; by which much stuff of the merchants was consumed and the
city risked total destruction, if a wind had come to help the flame by
blowing on it. Hostilities now ceasing, both sides kept quiet, passing
the night on guard, while the Corinthian ship stole out to sea upon the
victory of the commons, and most of the mercenaries passed over
secretly to the continent.

The next day the Athenian general, Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, came
up from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian heavy
infantry. He at once endeavoured to bring about a settlement, and
persuaded the two parties to agree together to bring to trial ten of
the ringleaders, who presently fled, while the rest were to live in
peace, making terms with each other, and entering into a defensive and
offensive alliance with the Athenians. This arranged, he was about to
sail away, when the leaders of the commons induced him to leave them
five of his ships to make their adversaries less disposed to move,
while they manned and sent with him an equal number of their own. He
had no sooner consented, than they began to enroll their enemies for
the ships; and these, fearing that they might be sent off to Athens,
seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. An
attempt on the part of Nicostratus to reassure them and to persuade
them to rise proving unsuccessful, the commons armed upon this pretext,
alleging the refusal of their adversaries to sail with them as a proof
of the hollowness of their intentions, and took their arms out of their
houses, and would have dispatched some whom they fell in with, if
Nicostratus had not prevented it. The rest of the party, seeing what
was going on, seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of Hera,
being not less than four hundred in number; until the commons, fearing
that they might adopt some desperate resolution, induced them to rise,
and conveyed them over to the island in front of the temple, where
provisions were sent across to them.

At this stage in the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after the
removal of the men to the island, the Peloponnesian ships arrived from
Cyllene where they had been stationed since their return from Ionia,
fifty-three in number, still under the command of Alcidas, but with
Brasidas also on board as his adviser; and dropping anchor at Sybota, a
harbour on the mainland, at daybreak made sail for Corcyra.

The Corcyraeans in great confusion and alarm at the state of things in
the city and at the approach of the invader, at once proceeded to equip
sixty vessels, which they sent out, as fast as they were manned,
against the enemy, in spite of the Athenians recommending them to let
them sail out first, and to follow themselves afterwards with all their
ships together. Upon their vessels coming up to the enemy in this
straggling fashion, two immediately deserted: in others the crews were
fighting among themselves, and there was no order in anything that was
done; so that the Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, placed twenty
ships to oppose the Corcyraeans, and ranged the rest against the twelve
Athenian ships, amongst which were the two vessels Salaminia and
Paralus.

While the Corcyraeans, attacking without judgment and in small
detachments, were already crippled by their own misconduct, the
Athenians, afraid of the numbers of the enemy and of being surrounded,
did not venture to attack the main body or even the centre of the
division opposed to them, but fell upon its wing and sank one vessel;
after which the Peloponnesians formed in a circle, and the Athenians
rowed round them and tried to throw them into disorder. Perceiving
this, the division opposed to the Corcyraeans, fearing a repetition of
the disaster of Naupactus, came to support their friends, and the whole
fleet now bore down, united, upon the Athenians, who retired before it,
backing water, retiring as leisurely as possible in order to give the
Corcyraeans time to escape, while the enemy was thus kept occupied.
Such was the character of this sea-fight, which lasted until sunset.

The Corcyraeans now feared that the enemy would follow up their victory
and sail against the town and rescue the men in the island, or strike
some other blow equally decisive, and accordingly carried the men over
again to the temple of Hera, and kept guard over the city. The
Peloponnesians, however, although victorious in the sea-fight, did not
venture to attack the town, but took the thirteen Corcyraean vessels
which they had captured, and with them sailed back to the continent
from whence they had put out. The next day equally they refrained from
attacking the city, although the disorder and panic were at their
height, and though Brasidas, it is said, urged Alcidas, his superior
officer, to do so, but they landed upon the promontory of Leukimme and
laid waste the country.

Meanwhile the commons in Corcyra, being still in great fear of the
fleet attacking them, came to a parley with the suppliants and their
friends, in order to save the town; and prevailed upon some of them to
go on board the ships, of which they still manned thirty, against the
expected attack. But the Peloponnesians after ravaging the country
until midday sailed away, and towards nightfall were informed by beacon
signals of the approach of sixty Athenian vessels from Leucas, under
the command of Eurymedon, son of Thucles; which had been sent off by
the Athenians upon the news of the revolution and of the fleet with
Alcidas being about to sail for Corcyra.

The Peloponnesians accordingly at once set off in haste by night for
home, coasting along shore; and hauling their ships across the Isthmus
of Leucas, in order not to be seen doubling it, so departed. The
Corcyraeans, made aware of the approach of the Athenian fleet and of
the departure of the enemy, brought the Messenians from outside the
walls into the town, and ordered the fleet which they had manned to
sail round into the Hyllaic harbour; and while it was so doing, slew
such of their enemies as they laid hands on, dispatching afterwards, as
they landed them, those whom they had persuaded to go on board the
ships. Next they went to the sanctuary of Hera and persuaded about
fifty men to take their trial, and condemned them all to death. The
mass of the suppliants who had refused to do so, on seeing what was
taking place, slew each other there in the consecrated ground; while
some hanged themselves upon the trees, and others destroyed themselves
as they were severally able. During seven days that Eurymedon stayed
with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those
of their fellow citizens whom they regarded as their enemies: and
although the crime imputed was that of attempting to put down the
democracy, some were slain also for private hatred, others by their
debtors because of the moneys owed to them. Death thus raged in every
shape; and, as usually happens at such times, there was no length to
which violence did not go; sons were killed by their fathers, and
suppliants dragged from the altar or slain upon it; while some were
even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died there.

So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impression which it
made was the greater as it was one of the first to occur. Later on, one
may say, the whole Hellenic world was convulsed; struggles being every,
where made by the popular chiefs to bring in the Athenians, and by the
oligarchs to introduce the Lacedaemonians. In peace there would have
been neither the pretext nor the wish to make such an invitation; but
in war, with an alliance always at the command of either faction for
the hurt of their adversaries and their own corresponding advantage,
opportunities for bringing in the foreigner were never wanting to the
revolutionary parties. The sufferings which revolution entailed upon
the cities were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always
will occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the same; though
in a severer or milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according
to the variety of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity, states
and individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find
themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war
takes away the easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a rough
master, that brings most men’s characters to a level with their
fortunes. Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and the
places which it arrived at last, from having heard what had been done
before, carried to a still greater excess the refinement of their
inventions, as manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and the
atrocity of their reprisals. Words had to change their ordinary meaning
and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be
considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious
cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability
to see all sides of a question, inaptness to act on any. Frantic
violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a
justifiable means of self-defence. The advocate of extreme measures was
always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. To succeed in a
plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot a still shrewder; but
to try to provide against having to do either was to break up your
party and to be afraid of your adversaries. In fine, to forestall an
intending criminal, or to suggest the idea of a crime where it was
wanting, was equally commended until even blood became a weaker tie
than party, from the superior readiness of those united by the latter
to dare everything without reserve; for such associations had not in
view the blessings derivable from established institutions but were
formed by ambition for their overthrow; and the confidence of their
members in each other rested less on any religious sanction than upon
complicity in crime. The fair proposals of an adversary were met with
jealous precautions by the stronger of the two, and not with a generous
confidence. Revenge also was held of more account than
self-preservation. Oaths of reconciliation, being only proffered on
either side to meet an immediate difficulty, only held good so long as
no other weapon was at hand; but when opportunity offered, he who first
ventured to seize it and to take his enemy off his guard, thought this
perfidious vengeance sweeter than an open one, since, considerations of
safety apart, success by treachery won him the palm of superior
intelligence. Indeed it is generally the case that men are readier to
call rogues clever than simpletons honest, and are as ashamed of being
the second as they are proud of being the first. The cause of all these
evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from
these passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in
contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the fairest
professions, on the one side with the cry of political equality of the
people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for
themselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish,
and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for ascendancy engaged
in the direst excesses; in their acts of vengeance they went to even
greater lengths, not stopping at what justice or the good of the state
demanded, but making the party caprice of the moment their only
standard, and invoking with equal readiness the condemnation of an
unjust verdict or the authority of the strong arm to glut the
animosities of the hour. Thus religion was in honour with neither
party; but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high
reputation. Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished
between the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy
would not suffer them to escape.

Thus every form of iniquity took root in the Hellenic countries by
reason of the troubles. The ancient simplicity into which honour so
largely entered was laughed down and disappeared; and society became
divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow. To put an end to
this, there was neither promise to be depended upon, nor oath that
could command respect; but all parties dwelling rather in their
calculation upon the hopelessness of a permanent state of things, were
more intent upon self-defence than capable of confidence. In this
contest the blunter wits were most successful. Apprehensive of their
own deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they
feared to be worsted in debate and to be surprised by the combinations
of their more versatile opponents, and so at once boldly had recourse
to action: while their adversaries, arrogantly thinking that they
should know in time, and that it was unnecessary to secure by action
what policy afforded, often fell victims to their want of precaution.

Meanwhile Corcyra gave the first example of most of the crimes alluded
to; of the reprisals exacted by the governed who had never experienced
equitable treatment or indeed aught but insolence from their
rulers—when their hour came; of the iniquitous resolves of those who
desired to get rid of their accustomed poverty, and ardently coveted
their neighbours’ goods; and lastly, of the savage and pitiless
excesses into which men who had begun the struggle, not in a class but
in a party spirit, were hurried by their ungovernable passions. In the
confusion into which life was now thrown in the cities, human nature,
always rebelling against the law and now its master, gladly showed
itself ungoverned in passion, above respect for justice, and the enemy
of all superiority; since revenge would not have been set above
religion, and gain above justice, had it not been for the fatal power
of envy. Indeed men too often take upon themselves in the prosecution
of their revenge to set the example of doing away with those general
laws to which all alike can look for salvation in adversity, instead of
allowing them to subsist against the day of danger when their aid may
be required.

While the revolutionary passions thus for the first time displayed
themselves in the factions of Corcyra, Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet
sailed away; after which some five hundred Corcyraean exiles who had
succeeded in escaping, took some forts on the mainland, and becoming
masters of the Corcyraean territory over the water, made this their
base to Plunder their countrymen in the island, and did so much damage
as to cause a severe famine in the town. They also sent envoys to
Lacedaemon and Corinth to negotiate their restoration; but meeting with
no success, afterwards got together boats and mercenaries and crossed
over to the island, being about six hundred in all; and burning their
boats so as to have no hope except in becoming masters of the country,
went up to Mount Istone, and fortifying themselves there, began to
annoy those in the city and obtained command of the country.

At the close of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships under
the command of Laches, son of Melanopus, and Charoeades, son of
Euphiletus, to Sicily, where the Syracusans and Leontines were at war.
The Syracusans had for allies all the Dorian cities except
Camarina—these had been included in the Lacedaemonian confederacy from
the commencement of the war, though they had not taken any active part
in it—the Leontines had Camarina and the Chalcidian cities. In Italy
the Locrians were for the Syracusans, the Rhegians for their Leontine
kinsmen. The allies of the Leontines now sent to Athens and appealed to
their ancient alliance and to their Ionian origin, to persuade the
Athenians to send them a fleet, as the Syracusans were blockading them
by land and sea. The Athenians sent it upon the plea of their common
descent, but in reality to prevent the exportation of Sicilian corn to
Peloponnese and to test the possibility of bringing Sicily into
subjection. Accordingly they established themselves at Rhegium in
Italy, and from thence carried on the war in concert with their allies.




CHAPTER XI


Year of the War—Campaigns of Demosthenes in Western Greece—Ruin of
Ambracia


Summer was now over. The winter following, the plague a second time
attacked the Athenians; for although it had never entirely left them,
still there had been a notable abatement in its ravages. The second
visit lasted no less than a year, the first having lasted two; and
nothing distressed the Athenians and reduced their power more than
this. No less than four thousand four hundred heavy infantry in the
ranks died of it and three hundred cavalry, besides a number of the
multitude that was never ascertained. At the same time took place the
numerous earthquakes in Athens, Euboea, and Boeotia, particularly at
Orchomenus in the last-named country.

The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians, with thirty
ships, made an expedition against the islands of Aeolus; it being
impossible to invade them in summer, owing to the want of water. These
islands are occupied by the Liparaeans, a Cnidian colony, who live in
one of them of no great size called Lipara; and from this as their
headquarters cultivate the rest, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. In Hiera
the people in those parts believe that Hephaestus has his forge, from
the quantity of flame which they see it send out by night, and of smoke
by day. These islands lie off the coast of the Sicels and Messinese,
and were allies of the Syracusans. The Athenians laid waste their land,
and as the inhabitants did not submit, sailed back to Rhegium. Thus the
winter ended, and with it ended the fifth year of this war, of which
Thucydides was the historian.

The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies set out to invade
Attica under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, and went as far as
the Isthmus, but numerous earthquakes occurring, turned back again
without the invasion taking place. About the same time that these
earthquakes were so common, the sea at Orobiae, in Euboea, retiring
from the then line of coast, returned in a huge wave and invaded a
great part of the town, and retreated leaving some of it still under
water; so that what was once land is now sea; such of the inhabitants
perishing as could not run up to the higher ground in time. A similar
inundation also occurred at Atalanta, the island off the Opuntian
Locrian coast, carrying away part of the Athenian fort and wrecking one
of two ships which were drawn up on the beach. At Peparethus also the
sea retreated a little, without however any inundation following; and
an earthquake threw down part of the wall, the town hall, and a few
other buildings. The cause, in my opinion, of this phenomenon must be
sought in the earthquake. At the point where its shock has been the
most violent, the sea is driven back and, suddenly recoiling with
redoubled force, causes the inundation. Without an earthquake I do not
see how such an accident could happen.

During the same summer different operations were carried on by the
different belligerents in Sicily; by the Siceliots themselves against
each other, and by the Athenians and their allies: I shall however
confine myself to the actions in which the Athenians took part,
choosing the most important. The death of the Athenian general
Charoeades, killed by the Syracusans in battle, left Laches in the sole
command of the fleet, which he now directed in concert with the allies
against Mylae, a place belonging to the Messinese. Two Messinese
battalions in garrison at Mylae laid an ambush for the party landing
from the ships, but were routed with great slaughter by the Athenians
and their allies, who thereupon assaulted the fortification and
compelled them to surrender the Acropolis and to march with them upon
Messina. This town afterwards also submitted upon the approach of the
Athenians and their allies, and gave hostages and all other securities
required.

The same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round Peloponnese under
Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Procles, son of Theodorus, and
sixty others, with two thousand heavy infantry, against Melos, under
Nicias, son of Niceratus; wishing to reduce the Melians, who, although
islanders, refused to be subjects of Athens or even to join her
confederacy. The devastation of their land not procuring their
submission, the fleet, weighing from Melos, sailed to Oropus in the
territory of Graea, and landing at nightfall, the heavy infantry
started at once from the ships by land for Tanagra in Boeotia, where
they were met by the whole levy from Athens, agreeably to a concerted
signal, under the command of Hipponicus, son of Callias, and Eurymedon,
son of Thucles. They encamped, and passing that day in ravaging the
Tanagraean territory, remained there for the night; and next day, after
defeating those of the Tanagraeans who sailed out against them and some
Thebans who had come up to help the Tanagraeans, took some arms, set up
a trophy, and retired, the troops to the city and the others to the
ships. Nicias with his sixty ships coasted alongshore and ravaged the
Locrian seaboard, and so returned home.

About this time the Lacedaemonians founded their colony of Heraclea in
Trachis, their object being the following: the Malians form in all
three tribes, the Paralians, the Hiereans, and the Trachinians. The
last of these having suffered severely in a war with their neighbours
the Oetaeans, at first intended to give themselves up to Athens; but
afterwards fearing not to find in her the security that they sought,
sent to Lacedaemon, having chosen Tisamenus for their ambassador. In
this embassy joined also the Dorians from the mother country of the
Lacedaemonians, with the same request, as they themselves also suffered
from the same enemy. After hearing them, the Lacedaemonians determined
to send out the colony, wishing to assist the Trachinians and Dorians,
and also because they thought that the proposed town would lie
conveniently for the purposes of the war against the Athenians. A fleet
might be got ready there against Euboea, with the advantage of a short
passage to the island; and the town would also be useful as a station
on the road to Thrace. In short, everything made the Lacedaemonians
eager to found the place. After first consulting the god at Delphi and
receiving a favourable answer, they sent off the colonists, Spartans,
and Perioeci, inviting also any of the rest of the Hellenes who might
wish to accompany them, except Ionians, Achaeans, and certain other
nationalities; three Lacedaemonians leading as founders of the colony,
Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. The settlement effected, they fortified
anew the city, now called Heraclea, distant about four miles and a half
from Thermopylae and two miles and a quarter from the sea, and
commenced building docks, closing the side towards Thermopylae just by
the pass itself, in order that they might be easily defended.

The foundation of this town, evidently meant to annoy Euboea (the
passage across to Cenaeum in that island being a short one), at first
caused some alarm at Athens, which the event however did nothing to
justify, the town never giving them any trouble. The reason of this was
as follows. The Thessalians, who were sovereign in those parts, and
whose territory was menaced by its foundation, were afraid that it
might prove a very powerful neighbour, and accordingly continually
harassed and made war upon the new settlers, until they at last wore
them out in spite of their originally considerable numbers, people
flocking from all quarters to a place founded by the Lacedaemonians,
and thus thought secure of prosperity. On the other hand the
Lacedaemonians themselves, in the persons of their governors, did their
full share towards ruining its prosperity and reducing its population,
as they frightened away the greater part of the inhabitants by
governing harshly and in some cases not fairly, and thus made it easier
for their neighbours to prevail against them.

The same summer, about the same time that the Athenians were detained
at Melos, their fellow citizens in the thirty ships cruising round
Peloponnese, after cutting off some guards in an ambush at Ellomenus in
Leucadia, subsequently went against Leucas itself with a large
armament, having been reinforced by the whole levy of the Acarnanians
except Oeniadae, and by the Zacynthians and Cephallenians and fifteen
ships from Corcyra. While the Leucadians witnessed the devastation of
their land, without and within the isthmus upon which the town of
Leucas and the temple of Apollo stand, without making any movement on
account of the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, the Acarnanians urged
Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to build a wall so as to cut off the
town from the continent, a measure which they were convinced would
secure its capture and rid them once and for all of a most troublesome
enemy.

Demosthenes however had in the meanwhile been persuaded by the
Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, having so large an
army assembled, to attack the Aetolians, who were not only the enemies
of Naupactus, but whose reduction would further make it easy to gain
the rest of that part of the continent for the Athenians. The Aetolian
nation, although numerous and warlike, yet dwelt in unwalled villages
scattered far apart, and had nothing but light armour, and might,
according to the Messenians, be subdued without much difficulty before
succours could arrive. The plan which they recommended was to attack
first the Apodotians, next the Ophionians, and after these the
Eurytanians, who are the largest tribe in Aetolia, and speak, as is
said, a language exceedingly difficult to understand, and eat their
flesh raw. These once subdued, the rest would easily come in.

To this plan Demosthenes consented, not only to please the Messenians,
but also in the belief that by adding the Aetolians to his other
continental allies he would be able, without aid from home, to march
against the Boeotians by way of Ozolian Locris to Kytinium in Doris,
keeping Parnassus on his right until he descended to the Phocians, whom
he could force to join him if their ancient friendship for Athens did
not, as he anticipated, at once decide them to do so. Arrived in Phocis
he was already upon the frontier of Boeotia. He accordingly weighed
from Leucas, against the wish of the Acarnanians, and with his whole
armament sailed along the coast to Sollium, where he communicated to
them his intention; and upon their refusing to agree to it on account
of the non-investment of Leucas, himself with the rest of the forces,
the Cephallenians, the Messenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred
Athenian marines from his own ships (the fifteen Corcyraean vessels
having departed), started on his expedition against the Aetolians. His
base he established at Oeneon in Locris, as the Ozolian Locrians were
allies of Athens and were to meet him with all their forces in the
interior. Being neighbours of the Aetolians and armed in the same way,
it was thought that they would be of great service upon the expedition,
from their acquaintance with the localities and the warfare of the
inhabitants.

After bivouacking with the army in the precinct of Nemean Zeus, in
which the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the people of the
country, according to an oracle which had foretold that he should die
in Nemea, Demosthenes set out at daybreak to invade Aetolia. The first
day he took Potidania, the next Krokyle, and the third Tichium, where
he halted and sent back the booty to Eupalium in Locris, having
determined to pursue his conquests as far as the Ophionians, and, in
the event of their refusing to submit, to return to Naupactus and make
them the objects of a second expedition. Meanwhile the Aetolians had
been aware of his design from the moment of its formation, and as soon
as the army invaded their country came up in great force with all their
tribes; even the most remote Ophionians, the Bomiensians, and
Calliensians, who extend towards the Malian Gulf, being among the
number.

The Messenians, however, adhered to their original advice. Assuring
Demosthenes that the Aetolians were an easy conquest, they urged him to
push on as rapidly as possible, and to try to take the villages as fast
as he came up to them, without waiting until the whole nation should be
in arms against him. Led on by his advisers and trusting in his
fortune, as he had met with no opposition, without waiting for his
Locrian reinforcements, who were to have supplied him with the
light-armed darters in which he was most deficient, he advanced and
stormed Aegitium, the inhabitants flying before him and posting
themselves upon the hills above the town, which stood on high ground
about nine miles from the sea. Meanwhile the Aetolians had gathered to
the rescue, and now attacked the Athenians and their allies, running
down from the hills on every side and darting their javelins, falling
back when the Athenian army advanced, and coming on as it retired; and
for a long while the battle was of this character, alternate advance
and retreat, in both which operations the Athenians had the worst.

Still as long as their archers had arrows left and were able to use
them, they held out, the light-armed Aetolians retiring before the
arrows; but after the captain of the archers had been killed and his
men scattered, the soldiers, wearied out with the constant repetition
of the same exertions and hard pressed by the Aetolians with their
javelins, at last turned and fled, and falling into pathless gullies
and places that they were unacquainted with, thus perished, the
Messenian Chromon, their guide, having also unfortunately been killed.
A great many were overtaken in the pursuit by the swift-footed and
light-armed Aetolians, and fell beneath their javelins; the greater
number however missed their road and rushed into the wood, which had no
ways out, and which was soon fired and burnt round them by the enemy.
Indeed the Athenian army fell victims to death in every form, and
suffered all the vicissitudes of flight; the survivors escaped with
difficulty to the sea and Oeneon in Locris, whence they had set out.
Many of the allies were killed, and about one hundred and twenty
Athenian heavy infantry, not a man less, and all in the prime of life.
These were by far the best men in the city of Athens that fell during
this war. Among the slain was also Procles, the colleague of
Demosthenes. Meanwhile the Athenians took up their dead under truce
from the Aetolians, and retired to Naupactus, and from thence went in
their ships to Athens; Demosthenes staying behind in Naupactus and in
the neighbourhood, being afraid to face the Athenians after the
disaster.

About the same time the Athenians on the coast of Sicily sailed to
Locris, and in a descent which they made from the ships defeated the
Locrians who came against them, and took a fort upon the river Halex.

The same summer the Aetolians, who before the Athenian expedition had
sent an embassy to Corinth and Lacedaemon, composed of Tolophus, an
Ophionian, Boriades, an Eurytanian, and Tisander, an Apodotian,
obtained that an army should be sent them against Naupactus, which had
invited the Athenian invasion. The Lacedaemonians accordingly sent off
towards autumn three thousand heavy infantry of the allies, five
hundred of whom were from Heraclea, the newly founded city in Trachis,
under the command of Eurylochus, a Spartan, accompanied by Macarius and
Menedaius, also Spartans.

The army having assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the
Ozolian Locrians; the road to Naupactus lying through their territory,
and he having besides conceived the idea of detaching them from Athens.
His chief abettors in Locris were the Amphissians, who were alarmed at
the hostility of the Phocians. These first gave hostages themselves,
and induced the rest to do the same for fear of the invading army;
first, their neighbours the Myonians, who held the most difficult of
the passes, and after them the Ipnians, Messapians, Tritaeans,
Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeanthians, all of whom joined
in the expedition; the Olpaeans contenting themselves with giving
hostages, without accompanying the invasion; and the Hyaeans refusing
to do either, until the capture of Polis, one of their villages.

His preparations completed, Eurylochus lodged the hostages in Kytinium,
in Doris, and advanced upon Naupactus through the country of the
Locrians, taking upon his way Oeneon and Eupalium, two of their towns
that refused to join him. Arrived in the Naupactian territory, and
having been now joined by the Aetolians, the army laid waste the land
and took the suburb of the town, which was unfortified; and after this
Molycrium also, a Corinthian colony subject to Athens. Meanwhile the
Athenian Demosthenes, who since the affair in Aetolia had remained near
Naupactus, having had notice of the army and fearing for the town, went
and persuaded the Acarnanians, although not without difficulty because
of his departure from Leucas, to go to the relief of Naupactus. They
accordingly sent with him on board his ships a thousand heavy infantry,
who threw themselves into the place and saved it; the extent of its
wall and the small number of its defenders otherwise placing it in the
greatest danger. Meanwhile Eurylochus and his companions, finding that
this force had entered and that it was impossible to storm the town,
withdrew, not to Peloponnese, but to the country once called Aeolis,
and now Calydon and Pleuron, and to the places in that neighbourhood,
and Proschium in Aetolia; the Ambraciots having come and urged them to
combine with them in attacking Amphilochian Argos and the rest of
Amphilochia and Acarnania; affirming that the conquest of these
countries would bring all the continent into alliance with Lacedaemon.
To this Eurylochus consented, and dismissing the Aetolians, now
remained quiet with his army in those parts, until the time should come
for the Ambraciots to take the field, and for him to join them before
Argos.

Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the Athenians in Sicily with
their Hellenic allies, and such of the Sicel subjects or allies of
Syracuse as had revolted from her and joined their army, marched
against the Sicel town Inessa, the acropolis of which was held by the
Syracusans, and after attacking it without being able to take it,
retired. In the retreat, the allies retreating after the Athenians were
attacked by the Syracusans from the fort, and a large part of their
army routed with great slaughter. After this, Laches and the Athenians
from the ships made some descents in Locris, and defeating the
Locrians, who came against them with Proxenus, son of Capaton, upon the
river Caicinus, took some arms and departed.

The same winter the Athenians purified Delos, in compliance, it
appears, with a certain oracle. It had been purified before by
Pisistratus the tyrant; not indeed the whole island, but as much of it
as could be seen from the temple. All of it was, however, now purified
in the following way. All the sepulchres of those that had died in
Delos were taken up, and for the future it was commanded that no one
should be allowed either to die or to give birth to a child in the
island; but that they should be carried over to Rhenea, which is so
near to Delos that Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, having added Rhenea to
his other island conquests during his period of naval ascendancy,
dedicated it to the Delian Apollo by binding it to Delos with a chain.

The Athenians, after the purification, celebrated, for the first time,
the quinquennial festival of the Delian games. Once upon a time,
indeed, there was a great assemblage of the Ionians and the
neighbouring islanders at Delos, who used to come to the festival, as
the Ionians now do to that of Ephesus, and athletic and poetical
contests took place there, and the cities brought choirs of dancers.
Nothing can be clearer on this point than the following verses of
Homer, taken from a hymn to Apollo:

Phœbus, wherever thou strayest, far or near,
Delos was still of all thy haunts most dear.
Thither the robed Ionians take their way
With wife and child to keep thy holiday,
Invoke thy favour on each manly game,
And dance and sing in honour of thy name.


That there was also a poetical contest in which the Ionians went to
contend, again is shown by the following, taken from the same hymn.
After celebrating the Delian dance of the women, he ends his song of
praise with these verses, in which he also alludes to himself:

Well, may Apollo keep you all! and so,
Sweethearts, good-bye—yet tell me not I go
Out from your hearts; and if in after hours
Some other wanderer in this world of ours
Touch at your shores, and ask your maidens here
Who sings the songs the sweetest to your ear,
Think of me then, and answer with a smile,
‘A blind old man of Scio’s rocky isle.’


Homer thus attests that there was anciently a great assembly and
festival at Delos. In later times, although the islanders and the
Athenians continued to send the choirs of dancers with sacrifices, the
contests and most of the ceremonies were abolished, probably through
adversity, until the Athenians celebrated the games upon this occasion
with the novelty of horse-races.

The same winter the Ambraciots, as they had promised Eurylochus when
they retained his army, marched out against Amphilochian Argos with
three thousand heavy infantry, and invading the Argive territory
occupied Olpae, a stronghold on a hill near the sea, which had been
formerly fortified by the Acarnanians and used as the place of assizes
for their nation, and which is about two miles and three-quarters from
the city of Argos upon the sea-coast. Meanwhile the Acarnanians went
with a part of their forces to the relief of Argos, and with the rest
encamped in Amphilochia at the place called Crenae, or the Wells, to
watch for Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, and to prevent their
passing through and effecting their junction with the Ambraciots; while
they also sent for Demosthenes, the commander of the Aetolian
expedition, to be their leader, and for the twenty Athenian ships that
were cruising off Peloponnese under the command of Aristotle, son of
Timocrates, and Hierophon, son of Antimnestus. On their part, the
Ambraciots at Olpae sent a messenger to their own city, to beg them to
come with their whole levy to their assistance, fearing that the army
of Eurylochus might not be able to pass through the Acarnanians, and
that they might themselves be obliged to fight single-handed, or be
unable to retreat, if they wished it, without danger.

Meanwhile Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, learning that the
Ambraciots at Olpae had arrived, set out from Proschium with all haste
to join them, and crossing the Achelous advanced through Acarnania,
which they found deserted by its population, who had gone to the relief
of Argos; keeping on their right the city of the Stratians and its
garrison, and on their left the rest of Acarnania. Traversing the
territory of the Stratians, they advanced through Phytia, next,
skirting Medeon, through Limnaea; after which they left Acarnania
behind them and entered a friendly country, that of the Agraeans. From
thence they reached and crossed Mount Thymaus, which belongs to the
Agraeans, and descended into the Argive territory after nightfall, and
passing between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian posts at Crenae,
joined the Ambraciots at Olpae.

Uniting here at daybreak, they sat down at the place called Metropolis,
and encamped. Not long afterwards the Athenians in the twenty ships
came into the Ambracian Gulf to support the Argives, with Demosthenes
and two hundred Messenian heavy infantry, and sixty Athenian archers.
While the fleet off Olpae blockaded the hill from the sea, the
Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians, most of whom were kept back
by force by the Ambraciots, had already arrived at Argos, and were
preparing to give battle to the enemy, having chosen Demosthenes to
command the whole of the allied army in concert with their own
generals. Demosthenes led them near to Olpae and encamped, a great
ravine separating the two armies. During five days they remained
inactive; on the sixth both sides formed in order of battle. The army
of the Peloponnesians was the largest and outflanked their opponents;
and Demosthenes fearing that his right might be surrounded, placed in
ambush in a hollow way overgrown with bushes some four hundred heavy
infantry and light troops, who were to rise up at the moment of the
onset behind the projecting left wing of the enemy, and to take them in
the rear. When both sides were ready they joined battle; Demosthenes
being on the right wing with the Messenians and a few Athenians, while
the rest of the line was made up of the different divisions of the
Acarnanians, and of the Amphilochian carters. The Peloponnesians and
Ambraciots were drawn up pell-mell together, with the exception of the
Mantineans, who were massed on the left, without however reaching to
the extremity of the wing, where Eurylochus and his men confronted the
Messenians and Demosthenes.

The Peloponnesians were now well engaged and with their outflanking
wing were upon the point of turning their enemy’s right; when the
Acarnanians from the ambuscade set upon them from behind, and broke
them at the first attack, without their staying to resist; while the
panic into which they fell caused the flight of most of their army,
terrified beyond measure at seeing the division of Eurylochus and their
best troops cut to pieces. Most of the work was done by Demosthenes and
his Messenians, who were posted in this part of the field. Meanwhile
the Ambraciots (who are the best soldiers in those countries) and the
troops upon the right wing, defeated the division opposed to them and
pursued it to Argos. Returning from the pursuit, they found their main
body defeated; and hard pressed by the Acarnanians, with difficulty
made good their passage to Olpae, suffering heavy loss on the way, as
they dashed on without discipline or order, the Mantineans excepted,
who kept their ranks best of any in the army during the retreat.

The battle did not end until the evening. The next day Menedaius, who
on the death of Eurylochus and Macarius had succeeded to the sole
command, being at a loss after so signal a defeat how to stay and
sustain a siege, cut off as he was by land and by the Athenian fleet by
sea, and equally so how to retreat in safety, opened a parley with
Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals for a truce and permission to
retreat, and at the same time for the recovery of the dead. The dead
they gave back to him, and setting up a trophy took up their own also
to the number of about three hundred. The retreat demanded they refused
publicly to the army; but permission to depart without delay was
secretly granted to the Mantineans and to Menedaius and the other
commanders and principal men of the Peloponnesians by Demosthenes and
his Acarnanian colleagues; who desired to strip the Ambraciots and the
mercenary host of foreigners of their supporters; and, above all, to
discredit the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians with the Hellenes in
those parts, as traitors and self-seekers.

While the enemy was taking up his dead and hastily burying them as he
could, and those who obtained permission were secretly planning their
retreat, word was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the
Ambraciots from the city, in compliance with the first message from
Olpae, were on the march with their whole levy through Amphilochia to
join their countrymen at Olpae, knowing nothing of what had occurred.
Demosthenes prepared to march with his army against them, and meanwhile
sent on at once a strong division to beset the roads and occupy the
strong positions. In the meantime the Mantineans and others included in
the agreement went out under the pretence of gathering herbs and
firewood, and stole off by twos and threes, picking on the way the
things which they professed to have come out for, until they had gone
some distance from Olpae, when they quickened their pace. The
Ambraciots and such of the rest as had accompanied them in larger
parties, seeing them going on, pushed on in their turn, and began
running in order to catch them up. The Acarnanians at first thought
that all alike were departing without permission, and began to pursue
the Peloponnesians; and believing that they were being betrayed, even
threw a dart or two at some of their generals who tried to stop them
and told them that leave had been given. Eventually, however, they let
pass the Mantineans and Peloponnesians, and slew only the Ambraciots,
there being much dispute and difficulty in distinguishing whether a man
was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. The number thus slain was about
two hundred; the rest escaped into the bordering territory of Agraea,
and found refuge with Salynthius, the friendly king of the Agraeans.

Meanwhile the Ambraciots from the city arrived at Idomene. Idomene
consists of two lofty hills, the higher of which the troops sent on by
Demosthenes succeeded in occupying after nightfall, unobserved by the
Ambraciots, who had meanwhile ascended the smaller and bivouacked under
it. After supper Demosthenes set out with the rest of the army, as soon
as it was evening; himself with half his force making for the pass, and
the remainder going by the Amphilochian hills. At dawn he fell upon the
Ambraciots while they were still abed, ignorant of what had passed, and
fully thinking that it was their own countrymen—Demosthenes having
purposely put the Messenians in front with orders to address them in
the Doric dialect, and thus to inspire confidence in the sentinels, who
would not be able to see them as it was still night. In this way he
routed their army as soon as he attacked it, slaying most of them where
they were, the rest breaking away in flight over the hills. The roads,
however, were already occupied, and while the Amphilochians knew their
own country, the Ambraciots were ignorant of it and could not tell
which way to turn, and had also heavy armour as against a light-armed
enemy, and so fell into ravines and into the ambushes which had been
set for them, and perished there. In their manifold efforts to escape
some even turned to the sea, which was not far off, and seeing the
Athenian ships coasting alongshore just while the action was going on,
swam off to them, thinking it better in the panic they were in, to
perish, if perish they must, by the hands of the Athenians, than by
those of the barbarous and detested Amphilochians. Of the large
Ambraciot force destroyed in this manner, a few only reached the city
in safety; while the Acarnanians, after stripping the dead and setting
up a trophy, returned to Argos.

The next day arrived a herald from the Ambraciots who had fled from
Olpae to the Agraeans, to ask leave to take up the dead that had fallen
after the first engagement, when they left the camp with the Mantineans
and their companions, without, like them, having had permission to do
so. At the sight of the arms of the Ambraciots from the city, the
herald was astonished at their number, knowing nothing of the disaster
and fancying that they were those of their own party. Some one asked
him what he was so astonished at, and how many of them had been killed,
fancying in his turn that this was the herald from the troops at
Idomene. He replied: “About two hundred”; upon which his interrogator
took him up, saying: “Why, the arms you see here are of more than a
thousand.” The herald replied: “Then they are not the arms of those who
fought with us?” The other answered: “Yes, they are, if at least you
fought at Idomene yesterday.” “But we fought with no one yesterday; but
the day before in the retreat.” “However that may be, we fought
yesterday with those who came to reinforce you from the city of the
Ambraciots.” When the herald heard this and knew that the reinforcement
from the city had been destroyed, he broke into wailing and, stunned at
the magnitude of the present evils, went away at once without having
performed his errand, or again asking for the dead bodies. Indeed, this
was by far the greatest disaster that befell any one Hellenic city in
an equal number of days during this war; and I have not set down the
number of the dead, because the amount stated seems so out of
proportion to the size of the city as to be incredible. In any case I
know that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had wished to take
Ambracia as the Athenians and Demosthenes advised, they would have done
so without a blow; as it was, they feared that if the Athenians had it
they would be worse neighbours to them than the present.

After this the Acarnanians allotted a third of the spoils to the
Athenians, and divided the rest among their own different towns. The
share of the Athenians was captured on the voyage home; the arms now
deposited in the Attic temples are three hundred panoplies, which the
Acarnanians set apart for Demosthenes, and which he brought to Athens
in person, his return to his country after the Aetolian disaster being
rendered less hazardous by this exploit. The Athenians in the twenty
ships also went off to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians,
after the departure of Demosthenes and the Athenians, granted the
Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthius and
the Agraeans a free retreat from Oeniadae, to which place they had
removed from the country of Salynthius, and for the future concluded
with the Ambraciots a treaty and alliance for one hundred years, upon
the terms following. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive
alliance; the Ambraciots could not be required to march with the
Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the
Ambraciots against the Athenians; for the rest the Ambraciots were to
give up the places and hostages that they held of the Amphilochians,
and not to give help to Anactorium, which was at enmity with the
Acarnanians. With this arrangement they put an end to the war. After
this the Corinthians sent a garrison of their own citizens to Ambracia,
composed of three hundred heavy infantry, under the command of
Xenocleides, son of Euthycles, who reached their destination after a
difficult journey across the continent. Such was the history of the
affair of Ambracia.

The same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a descent from their ships
upon the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels, who had
invaded its borders from the interior, and also sailed to the islands
of Aeolus. Upon their return to Rhegium they found the Athenian
general, Pythodorus, son of Isolochus, come to supersede Laches in the
command of the fleet. The allies in Sicily had sailed to Athens and
induced the Athenians to send out more vessels to their assistance,
pointing out that the Syracusans who already commanded their land were
making efforts to get together a navy, to avoid being any longer
excluded from the sea by a few vessels. The Athenians proceeded to man
forty ships to send to them, thinking that the war in Sicily would thus
be the sooner ended, and also wishing to exercise their navy. One of
the generals, Pythodorus, was accordingly sent out with a few ships;
Sophocles, son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles, being
destined to follow with the main body. Meanwhile Pythodorus had taken
the command of Laches’ ships, and towards the end of winter sailed
against the Locrian fort, which Laches had formerly taken, and returned
after being defeated in battle by the Locrians.

In the first days of this spring, the stream of fire issued from Etna,
as on former occasions, and destroyed some land of the Catanians, who
live upon Mount Etna, which is the largest mountain in Sicily. Fifty
years, it is said, had elapsed since the last eruption, there having
been three in all since the Hellenes have inhabited Sicily. Such were
the events of this winter; and with it ended the sixth year of this
war, of which Thucydides was the historian.




BOOK IV




CHAPTER XII


Seventh Year of the War—Occupation of Pylos—Surrender of the Spartan
Army in Sphacteria


Next summer, about the time of the corn’s coming into ear, ten
Syracusan and as many Locrian vessels sailed to Messina, in Sicily, and
occupied the town upon the invitation of the inhabitants; and Messina
revolted from the Athenians. The Syracusans contrived this chiefly
because they saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, and
feared that the Athenians might hereafter use it as a base for
attacking them with a larger force; the Locrians because they wished to
carry on hostilities from both sides of the strait and to reduce their
enemies, the people of Rhegium. Meanwhile, the Locrians had invaded the
Rhegian territory with all their forces, to prevent their succouring
Messina, and also at the instance of some exiles from Rhegium who were
with them; the long factions by which that town had been torn rendering
it for the moment incapable of resistance, and thus furnishing an
additional temptation to the invaders. After devastating the country
the Locrian land forces retired, their ships remaining to guard
Messina, while others were being manned for the same destination to
carry on the war from thence.

About the same time in the spring, before the corn was ripe, the
Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica under Agis, the son of
Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat down and laid waste the
country. Meanwhile the Athenians sent off the forty ships which they
had been preparing to Sicily, with the remaining generals Eurymedon and
Sophocles; their colleague Pythodorus having already preceded them
thither. These had also instructions as they sailed by to look to the
Corcyraeans in the town, who were being plundered by the exiles in the
mountain. To support these exiles sixty Peloponnesian vessels had
lately sailed, it being thought that the famine raging in the city
would make it easy for them to reduce it. Demosthenes also, who had
remained without employment since his return from Acarnania, applied
and obtained permission to use the fleet, if he wished it, upon the
coast of Peloponnese.

Off Laconia they heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at
Corcyra, upon which Eurymedon and Sophocles wished to hasten to the
island, but Demosthenes required them first to touch at Pylos and do
what was wanted there, before continuing their voyage. While they were
making objections, a squall chanced to come on and carried the fleet
into Pylos. Demosthenes at once urged them to fortify the place, it
being for this that he had come on the voyage, and made them observe
there was plenty of stone and timber on the spot, and that the place
was strong by nature, and together with much of the country round
unoccupied; Pylos, or Coryphasium, as the Lacedaemonians call it, being
about forty-five miles distant from Sparta, and situated in the old
country of the Messenians. The commanders told him that there was no
lack of desert headlands in Peloponnese if he wished to put the city to
expense by occupying them. He, however, thought that this place was
distinguished from others of the kind by having a harbour close by;
while the Messenians, the old natives of the country, speaking the same
dialect as the Lacedaemonians, could do them the greatest mischief by
their incursions from it, and would at the same time be a trusty
garrison.

After speaking to the captains of companies on the subject, and failing
to persuade either the generals or the soldiers, he remained inactive
with the rest from stress of weather; until the soldiers themselves
wanting occupation were seized with a sudden impulse to go round and
fortify the place. Accordingly they set to work in earnest, and having
no iron tools, picked up stones, and put them together as they happened
to fit, and where mortar was needed, carried it on their backs for want
of hods, stooping down to make it stay on, and clasping their hands
together behind to prevent it falling off; sparing no effort to be able
to complete the most vulnerable points before the arrival of the
Lacedaemonians, most of the place being sufficiently strong by nature
without further fortifications.

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians were celebrating a festival, and also at
first made light of the news, in the idea that whenever they chose to
take the field the place would be immediately evacuated by the enemy or
easily taken by force; the absence of their army before Athens having
also something to do with their delay. The Athenians fortified the
place on the land side, and where it most required it, in six days, and
leaving Demosthenes with five ships to garrison it, with the main body
of the fleet hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

As soon as the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of
Pylos, they hurried back home; the Lacedaemonians and their king Agis
thinking that the matter touched them nearly. Besides having made their
invasion early in the season, and while the corn was still green, most
of their troops were short of provisions: the weather also was
unusually bad for the time of year, and greatly distressed their army.
Many reasons thus combined to hasten their departure and to make this
invasion a very short one; indeed they only stayed fifteen days in
Attica.

About the same time the Athenian general Simonides getting together a
few Athenians from the garrisons, and a number of the allies in those
parts, took Eion in Thrace, a Mendaean colony and hostile to Athens, by
treachery, but had no sooner done so than the Chalcidians and
Bottiaeans came up and beat him out of it, with the loss of many of his
soldiers.

On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans
themselves and the nearest of the Perioeci at once set out for Pylos,
the other Lacedaemonians following more slowly, as they had just come
in from another campaign. Word was also sent round Peloponnese to come
up as quickly as possible to Pylos; while the sixty Peloponnesian ships
were sent for from Corcyra, and being dragged by their crews across the
isthmus of Leucas, passed unperceived by the Athenian squadron at
Zacynthus, and reached Pylos, where the land forces had arrived before
them. Before the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in, Demosthenes found time
to send out unobserved two ships to inform Eurymedon and the Athenians
on board the fleet at Zacynthus of the danger of Pylos and to summon
them to his assistance. While the ships hastened on their voyage in
obedience to the orders of Demosthenes, the Lacedaemonians prepared to
assault the fort by land and sea, hoping to capture with ease a work
constructed in haste, and held by a feeble garrison. Meanwhile, as they
expected the Athenian ships to arrive from Zacynthus, they intended, if
they failed to take the place before, to block up the entrances of the
harbour to prevent their being able to anchor inside it. For the island
of Sphacteria, stretching along in a line close in front of the
harbour, at once makes it safe and narrows its entrances, leaving a
passage for two ships on the side nearest Pylos and the Athenian
fortifications, and for eight or nine on that next the rest of the
mainland: for the rest, the island was entirely covered with wood, and
without paths through not being inhabited, and about one mile and five
furlongs in length. The inlets the Lacedaemonians meant to close with a
line of ships placed close together, with their prows turned towards
the sea, and, meanwhile, fearing that the enemy might make use of the
island to operate against them, carried over some heavy infantry
thither, stationing others along the coast. By this means the island
and the continent would be alike hostile to the Athenians, as they
would be unable to land on either; and the shore of Pylos itself
outside the inlet towards the open sea having no harbour, and,
therefore, presenting no point which they could use as a base to
relieve their countrymen, they, the Lacedaemonians, without sea-fight
or risk would in all probability become masters of the place, occupied
as it had been on the spur of the moment, and unfurnished with
provisions. This being determined, they carried over to the island the
heavy infantry, drafted by lot from all the companies. Some others had
crossed over before in relief parties, but these last who were left
there were four hundred and twenty in number, with their Helot
attendants, commanded by Epitadas, son of Molobrus.

Meanwhile Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians about to attack him by
sea and land at once, himself was not idle. He drew up under the
fortification and enclosed in a stockade the galleys remaining to him
of those which had been left him, arming the sailors taken out of them
with poor shields made most of them of osier, it being impossible to
procure arms in such a desert place, and even these having been
obtained from a thirty-oared Messenian privateer and a boat belonging
to some Messenians who happened to have come to them. Among these
Messenians were forty heavy infantry, whom he made use of with the
rest. Posting most of his men, unarmed and armed, upon the best
fortified and strong points of the place towards the interior, with
orders to repel any attack of the land forces, he picked sixty heavy
infantry and a few archers from his whole force, and with these went
outside the wall down to the sea, where he thought that the enemy would
most likely attempt to land. Although the ground was difficult and
rocky, looking towards the open sea, the fact that this was the weakest
part of the wall would, he thought, encourage their ardour, as the
Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had here paid little
attention to their defences, and the enemy if he could force a landing
might feel secure of taking the place. At this point, accordingly,
going down to the water’s edge, he posted his heavy infantry to
prevent, if possible, a landing, and encouraged them in the following
terms:

“Soldiers and comrades in this adventure, I hope that none of you in
our present strait will think to show his wit by exactly calculating
all the perils that encompass us, but that you will rather hasten to
close with the enemy, without staying to count the odds, seeing in this
your best chance of safety. In emergencies like ours calculation is out
of place; the sooner the danger is faced the better. To my mind also
most of the chances are for us, if we will only stand fast and not
throw away our advantages, overawed by the numbers of the enemy. One of
the points in our favour is the awkwardness of the landing. This,
however, only helps us if we stand our ground. If we give way it will
be practicable enough, in spite of its natural difficulty, without a
defender; and the enemy will instantly become more formidable from the
difficulty he will have in retreating, supposing that we succeed in
repulsing him, which we shall find it easier to do, while he is on
board his ships, than after he has landed and meets us on equal terms.
As to his numbers, these need not too much alarm you. Large as they may
be he can only engage in small detachments, from the impossibility of
bringing to. Besides, the numerical superiority that we have to meet is
not that of an army on land with everything else equal, but of troops
on board ship, upon an element where many favourable accidents are
required to act with effect. I therefore consider that his difficulties
may be fairly set against our numerical deficiencies, and at the same
time I charge you, as Athenians who know by experience what landing
from ships on a hostile territory means, and how impossible it is to
drive back an enemy determined enough to stand his ground and not to be
frightened away by the surf and the terrors of the ships sailing in, to
stand fast in the present emergency, beat back the enemy at the water’s
edge, and save yourselves and the place.”

Thus encouraged by Demosthenes, the Athenians felt more confident, and
went down to meet the enemy, posting themselves along the edge of the
sea. The Lacedaemonians now put themselves in movement and
simultaneously assaulted the fortification with their land forces and
with their ships, forty-three in number, under their admiral,
Thrasymelidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spartan, who made his attack just
where Demosthenes expected. The Athenians had thus to defend themselves
on both sides, from the land and from the sea; the enemy rowing up in
small detachments, the one relieving the other—it being impossible for
many to bring to at once—and showing great ardour and cheering each
other on, in the endeavour to force a passage and to take the
fortification. He who most distinguished himself was Brasidas. Captain
of a galley, and seeing that the captains and steersmen, impressed by
the difficulty of the position, hung back even where a landing might
have seemed possible, for fear of wrecking their vessels, he shouted
out to them, that they must never allow the enemy to fortify himself in
their country for the sake of saving timber, but must shiver their
vessels and force a landing; and bade the allies, instead of hesitating
in such a moment to sacrifice their ships for Lacedaemon in return for
her many benefits, to run them boldly aground, land in one way or
another, and make themselves masters of the place and its garrison.

Not content with this exhortation, he forced his own steersman to run
his ship ashore, and stepping on to the gangway, was endeavouring to
land, when he was cut down by the Athenians, and after receiving many
wounds fainted away. Falling into the bows, his shield slipped off his
arm into the sea, and being thrown ashore was picked up by the
Athenians, and afterwards used for the trophy which they set up for
this attack. The rest also did their best, but were not able to land,
owing to the difficulty of the ground and the unflinching tenacity of
the Athenians. It was a strange reversal of the order of things for
Athenians to be fighting from the land, and from Laconian land too,
against Lacedaemonians coming from the sea; while Lacedaemonians were
trying to land from shipboard in their own country, now become hostile,
to attack Athenians, although the former were chiefly famous at the
time as an inland people and superior by land, the latter as a maritime
people with a navy that had no equal.

After continuing their attacks during that day and most of the next,
the Peloponnesians desisted, and the day after sent some of their ships
to Asine for timber to make engines, hoping to take by their aid, in
spite of its height, the wall opposite the harbour, where the landing
was easiest. At this moment the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus arrived,
now numbering fifty sail, having been reinforced by some of the ships
on guard at Naupactus and by four Chian vessels. Seeing the coast and
the island both crowded with heavy infantry, and the hostile ships in
harbour showing no signs of sailing out, at a loss where to anchor,
they sailed for the moment to the desert island of Prote, not far off,
where they passed the night. The next day they got under way in
readiness to engage in the open sea if the enemy chose to put out to
meet them, being determined in the event of his not doing so to sail in
and attack him. The Lacedaemonians did not put out to sea, and having
omitted to close the inlets as they had intended, remained quiet on
shore, engaged in manning their ships and getting ready, in the case of
any one sailing in, to fight in the harbour, which is a fairly large
one.

Perceiving this, the Athenians advanced against them by each inlet, and
falling on the enemy’s fleet, most of which was by this time afloat and
in line, at once put it to flight, and giving chase as far as the short
distance allowed, disabled a good many vessels and took five, one with
its crew on board; dashing in at the rest that had taken refuge on
shore, and battering some that were still being manned, before they
could put out, and lashing on to their own ships and towing off empty
others whose crews had fled. At this sight the Lacedaemonians, maddened
by a disaster which cut off their men on the island, rushed to the
rescue, and going into the sea with their heavy armour, laid hold of
the ships and tried to drag them back, each man thinking that success
depended on his individual exertions. Great was the melee, and quite in
contradiction to the naval tactics usual to the two combatants; the
Lacedaemonians in their excitement and dismay being actually engaged in
a sea-fight on land, while the victorious Athenians, in their eagerness
to push their success as far as possible, were carrying on a land-fight
from their ships. After great exertions and numerous wounds on both
sides they separated, the Lacedaemonians saving their empty ships,
except those first taken; and both parties returning to their camp, the
Athenians set up a trophy, gave back the dead, secured the wrecks, and
at once began to cruise round and jealously watch the island, with its
intercepted garrison, while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, whose
contingents had now all come up, stayed where they were before Pylos.

When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, the
disaster was thought so serious that the Lacedaemonians resolved that
the authorities should go down to the camp, and decide on the spot what
was best to be done. There, seeing that it was impossible to help their
men, and not wishing to risk their being reduced by hunger or
overpowered by numbers, they determined, with the consent of the
Athenian generals, to conclude an armistice at Pylos and send envoys to
Athens to obtain a convention, and to endeavour to get back their men
as quickly as possible.

The generals accepting their offers, an armistice was concluded upon
the terms following:

That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylos and deliver up to the
Athenians the ships that had fought in the late engagement, and all in
Laconia that were vessels of war, and should make no attack on the
fortification either by land or by sea.

That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to
send to the men in the island a certain fixed quantity of corn ready
kneaded, that is to say, two quarts of barley meal, one pint of wine,
and a piece of meat for each man, and half the same quantity for a
servant.

That this allowance should be sent in under the eyes of the Athenians,
and that no boat should sail to the island except openly.

That the Athenians should continue to the island same as before,
without however landing upon it, and should refrain from attacking the
Peloponnesian troops either by land or by sea.

That if either party should infringe any of these terms in the
slightest particular, the armistice should be at once void.

That the armistice should hold good until the return of the
Lacedaemonian envoys from Athens—the Athenians sending them thither in
a galley and bringing them back again—and upon the arrival of the
envoys should be at an end, and the ships be restored by the Athenians
in the same state as they received them.

Such were the terms of the armistice, and the ships were delivered over
to the number of sixty, and the envoys sent off accordingly. Arrived at
Athens they spoke as follows:

“Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to try to find some way of
settling the affair of our men on the island, that shall be at once
satisfactory to our interests, and as consistent with our dignity in
our misfortune as circumstances permit. We can venture to speak at some
length without any departure from the habit of our country. Men of few
words where many are not wanted, we can be less brief when there is a
matter of importance to be illustrated and an end to be served by its
illustration. Meanwhile we beg you to take what we may say, not in a
hostile spirit, nor as if we thought you ignorant and wished to lecture
you, but rather as a suggestion on the best course to be taken,
addressed to intelligent judges. You can now, if you choose, employ
your present success to advantage, so as to keep what you have got and
gain honour and reputation besides, and you can avoid the mistake of
those who meet with an extraordinary piece of good fortune, and are led
on by hope to grasp continually at something further, through having
already succeeded without expecting it. While those who have known most
vicissitudes of good and bad, have also justly least faith in their
prosperity; and to teach your city and ours this lesson experience has
not been wanting.

“To be convinced of this you have only to look at our present
misfortune. What power in Hellas stood higher than we did? and yet we
are come to you, although we formerly thought ourselves more able to
grant what we are now here to ask. Nevertheless, we have not been
brought to this by any decay in our power, or through having our heads
turned by aggrandizement; no, our resources are what they have always
been, and our error has been an error of judgment, to which all are
equally liable. Accordingly, the prosperity which your city now enjoys,
and the accession that it has lately received, must not make you fancy
that fortune will be always with you. Indeed sensible men are prudent
enough to treat their gains as precarious, just as they would also keep
a clear head in adversity, and think that war, so far from staying
within the limit to which a combatant may wish to confine it, will run
the course that its chances prescribe; and thus, not being puffed up by
confidence in military success, they are less likely to come to grief,
and most ready to make peace, if they can, while their fortune lasts.
This, Athenians, you have a good opportunity to do now with us, and
thus to escape the possible disasters which may follow upon your
refusal, and the consequent imputation of having owed to accident even
your present advantages, when you might have left behind you a
reputation for power and wisdom which nothing could endanger.

“The Lacedaemonians accordingly invite you to make a treaty and to end
the war, and offer peace and alliance and the most friendly and
intimate relations in every way and on every occasion between us; and
in return ask for the men on the island, thinking it better for both
parties not to stand out to the end, on the chance of some favourable
accident enabling the men to force their way out, or of their being
compelled to succumb under the pressure of blockade. Indeed if great
enmities are ever to be really settled, we think it will be, not by the
system of revenge and military success, and by forcing an opponent to
swear to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when the more fortunate
combatant waives these his privileges, to be guided by gentler feelings
conquers his rival in generosity, and accords peace on more moderate
conditions than he expected. From that moment, instead of the debt of
revenge which violence must entail, his adversary owes a debt of
generosity to be paid in kind, and is inclined by honour to stand to
his agreement. And men oftener act in this manner towards their
greatest enemies than where the quarrel is of less importance; they are
also by nature as glad to give way to those who first yield to them, as
they are apt to be provoked by arrogance to risks condemned by their
own judgment.

“To apply this to ourselves: if peace was ever desirable for both
parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything
irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally, personally
as well as politically, and you to miss the advantages that we now
offer you. While the issue is still in doubt, and you have reputation
and our friendship in prospect, and we the compromise of our misfortune
before anything fatal occur, let us be reconciled, and for ourselves
choose peace instead of war, and grant to the rest of the Hellenes a
remission from their sufferings, for which be sure they will think they
have chiefly you to thank. The war that they labour under they know not
which began, but the peace that concludes it, as it depends on your
decision, will by their gratitude be laid to your door. By such a
decision you can become firm friends with the Lacedaemonians at their
own invitation, which you do not force from them, but oblige them by
accepting. And from this friendship consider the advantages that are
likely to follow: when Attica and Sparta are at one, the rest of
Hellas, be sure, will remain in respectful inferiority before its
heads.”

Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians, their idea being that the
Athenians, already desirous of a truce and only kept back by their
opposition, would joyfully accept a peace freely offered, and give back
the men. The Athenians, however, having the men on the island, thought
that the treaty would be ready for them whenever they chose to make it,
and grasped at something further. Foremost to encourage them in this
policy was Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader of the time and
very powerful with the multitude, who persuaded them to answer as
follows: First, the men in the island must surrender themselves and
their arms and be brought to Athens. Next, the Lacedaemonians must
restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia, all places acquired not by
arms, but by the previous convention, under which they had been ceded
by Athens herself at a moment of disaster, when a truce was more
necessary to her than at present. This done they might take back their
men, and make a truce for as long as both parties might agree.

To this answer the envoys made no reply, but asked that commissioners
might be chosen with whom they might confer on each point, and quietly
talk the matter over and try to come to some agreement. Hereupon Cleon
violently assailed them, saying that he knew from the first that they
had no right intentions, and that it was clear enough now by their
refusing to speak before the people, and wanting to confer in secret
with a committee of two or three. No, if they meant anything honest let
them say it out before all. The Lacedaemonians, however, seeing that
whatever concessions they might be prepared to make in their
misfortune, it was impossible for them to speak before the multitude
and lose credit with their allies for a negotiation which might after
all miscarry, and on the other hand, that the Athenians would never
grant what they asked upon moderate terms, returned from Athens without
having effected anything.

Their arrival at once put an end to the armistice at Pylos, and the
Lacedaemonians asked back their ships according to the convention. The
Athenians, however, alleged an attack on the fort in contravention of
the truce, and other grievances seemingly not worth mentioning, and
refused to give them back, insisting upon the clause by which the
slightest infringement made the armistice void. The Lacedaemonians,
after denying the contravention and protesting against their bad faith
in the matter of the ships, went away and earnestly addressed
themselves to the war. Hostilities were now carried on at Pylos upon
both sides with vigour. The Athenians cruised round the island all day
with two ships going different ways; and by night, except on the
seaward side in windy weather, anchored round it with their whole
fleet, which, having been reinforced by twenty ships from Athens come
to aid in the blockade, now numbered seventy sail; while the
Peloponnesians remained encamped on the continent, making attacks on
the fort, and on the look-out for any opportunity which might offer
itself for the deliverance of their men.

Meanwhile the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily had brought up to
the squadron guarding Messina the reinforcement which we left them
preparing, and carried on the war from thence, incited chiefly by the
Locrians from hatred of the Rhegians, whose territory they had invaded
with all their forces. The Syracusans also wished to try their fortune
at sea, seeing that the Athenians had only a few ships actually at
Rhegium, and hearing that the main fleet destined to join them was
engaged in blockading the island. A naval victory, they thought, would
enable them to blockade Rhegium by sea and land, and easily to reduce
it; a success which would at once place their affairs upon a solid
basis, the promontory of Rhegium in Italy and Messina in Sicily being
so near each other that it would be impossible for the Athenians to
cruise against them and command the strait. The strait in question
consists of the sea between Rhegium and Messina, at the point where
Sicily approaches nearest to the continent, and is the Charybdis
through which the story makes Ulysses sail; and the narrowness of the
passage and the strength of the current that pours in from the vast
Tyrrhenian and Sicilian mains, have rightly given it a bad reputation.

In this strait the Syracusans and their allies were compelled to fight,
late in the day, about the passage of a boat, putting out with rather
more than thirty ships against sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian
vessels. Defeated by the Athenians they hastily set off, each for
himself, to their own stations at Messina and Rhegium, with the loss of
one ship; night coming on before the battle was finished. After this
the Locrians retired from the Rhegian territory, and the ships of the
Syracusans and their allies united and came to anchor at Cape Pelorus,
in the territory of Messina, where their land forces joined them. Here
the Athenians and Rhegians sailed up, and seeing the ships unmanned,
made an attack, in which they in their turn lost one vessel, which was
caught by a grappling iron, the crew saving themselves by swimming.
After this the Syracusans got on board their ships, and while they were
being towed alongshore to Messina, were again attacked by the
Athenians, but suddenly got out to sea and became the assailants, and
caused them to lose another vessel. After thus holding their own in the
voyage alongshore and in the engagement as above described, the
Syracusans sailed on into the harbour of Messina.

Meanwhile the Athenians, having received warning that Camarina was
about to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, sailed
thither; and the Messinese took this opportunity to attack by sea and
land with all their forces their Chalcidian neighbour, Naxos. The first
day they forced the Naxians to keep their walls, and laid waste their
country; the next they sailed round with their ships, and laid waste
their land on the river Akesines, while their land forces menaced the
city. Meanwhile the Sicels came down from the high country in great
numbers, to aid against the Messinese; and the Naxians, elated at the
sight, and animated by a belief that the Leontines and their other
Hellenic allies were coming to their support, suddenly sallied out from
the town, and attacked and routed the Messinese, killing more than a
thousand of them; while the remainder suffered severely in their
retreat home, being attacked by the barbarians on the road, and most of
them cut off. The ships put in to Messina, and afterwards dispersed for
their different homes. The Leontines and their allies, with the
Athenians, upon this at once turned their arms against the now weakened
Messina, and attacked, the Athenians with their ships on the side of
the harbour, and the land forces on that of the town. The Messinese,
however, sallying out with Demoteles and some Locrians who had been
left to garrison the city after the disaster, suddenly attacked and
routed most of the Leontine army, killing a great number; upon seeing
which the Athenians landed from their ships, and falling on the
Messinese in disorder chased them back into the town, and setting up a
trophy retired to Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily continued
to make war on each other by land, without the Athenians.

Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos were still besieging the
Lacedaemonians in the island, the Peloponnesian forces on the continent
remaining where they were. The blockade was very laborious for the
Athenians from want of food and water; there was no spring except one
in the citadel of Pylos itself, and that not a large one, and most of
them were obliged to grub up the shingle on the sea beach and drink
such water as they could find. They also suffered from want of room,
being encamped in a narrow space; and as there was no anchorage for the
ships, some took their meals on shore in their turn, while the others
were anchored out at sea. But their greatest discouragement arose from
the unexpectedly long time which it took to reduce a body of men shut
up in a desert island, with only brackish water to drink, a matter
which they had imagined would take them only a few days. The fact was
that the Lacedaemonians had made advertisement for volunteers to carry
into the island ground corn, wine, cheese, and any other food useful in
a siege; high prices being offered, and freedom promised to any of the
Helots who should succeed in doing so. The Helots accordingly were most
forward to engage in this risky traffic, putting off from this or that
part of Peloponnese, and running in by night on the seaward side of the
island. They were best pleased, however, when they could catch a wind
to carry them in. It was more easy to elude the look-out of the
galleys, when it blew from the seaward, as it became impossible for
them to anchor round the island; while the Helots had their boats rated
at their value in money, and ran them ashore, without caring how they
landed, being sure to find the soldiers waiting for them at the
landing-places. But all who risked it in fair weather were taken.
Divers also swam in under water from the harbour, dragging by a cord in
skins poppyseed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; these at first
escaped notice, but afterwards a look-out was kept for them. In short,
both sides tried every possible contrivance, the one to throw in
provisions, and the other to prevent their introduction.

At Athens, meanwhile, the news that the army was in great distress, and
that corn found its way in to the men in the island, caused no small
perplexity; and the Athenians began to fear that winter might come on
and find them still engaged in the blockade. They saw that the
convoying of provisions round Peloponnese would be then impossible. The
country offered no resources in itself, and even in summer they could
not send round enough. The blockade of a place without harbours could
no longer be kept up; and the men would either escape by the siege
being abandoned, or would watch for bad weather and sail out in the
boats that brought in their corn. What caused still more alarm was the
attitude of the Lacedaemonians, who must, it was thought by the
Athenians, feel themselves on strong ground not to send them any more
envoys; and they began to repent having rejected the treaty. Cleon,
perceiving the disfavour with which he was regarded for having stood in
the way of the convention, now said that their informants did not speak
the truth; and upon the messengers recommending them, if they did not
believe them, to send some commissioners to see, Cleon himself and
Theagenes were chosen by the Athenians as commissioners. Aware that he
would now be obliged either to say what had been already said by the
men whom he was slandering, or be proved a liar if he said the
contrary, he told the Athenians, whom he saw to be not altogether
disinclined for a fresh expedition, that instead of sending and wasting
their time and opportunities, if they believed what was told them, they
ought to sail against the men. And pointing at Nicias, son of
Niceratus, then general, whom he hated, he tauntingly said that it
would be easy, if they had men for generals, to sail with a force and
take those in the island, and that if he had himself been in command,
he would have done it.

Nicias, seeing the Athenians murmuring against Cleon for not sailing
now if it seemed to him so easy, and further seeing himself the object
of attack, told him that for all that the generals cared, he might take
what force he chose and make the attempt. At first Cleon fancied that
this resignation was merely a figure of speech, and was ready to go,
but finding that it was seriously meant, he drew back, and said that
Nicias, not he, was general, being now frightened, and having never
supposed that Nicias would go so far as to retire in his favour.
Nicias, however, repeated his offer, and resigned the command against
Pylos, and called the Athenians to witness that he did so. And as the
multitude is wont to do, the more Cleon shrank from the expedition and
tried to back out of what he had said, the more they encouraged Nicias
to hand over his command, and clamoured at Cleon to go. At last, not
knowing how to get out of his words, he undertook the expedition, and
came forward and said that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians, but
would sail without taking any one from the city with him, except the
Lemnians and Imbrians that were at Athens, with some targeteers that
had come up from Aenus, and four hundred archers from other quarters.
With these and the soldiers at Pylos, he would within twenty days
either bring the Lacedaemonians alive, or kill them on the spot. The
Athenians could not help laughing at his fatuity, while sensible men
comforted themselves with the reflection that they must gain in either
circumstance; either they would be rid of Cleon, which they rather
hoped, or if disappointed in this expectation, would reduce the
Lacedaemonians.

After he had settled everything in the assembly, and the Athenians had
voted him the command of the expedition, he chose as his colleague
Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, and pushed forward the
preparations for his voyage. His choice fell upon Demosthenes because
he heard that he was contemplating a descent on the island; the
soldiers distressed by the difficulties of the position, and rather
besieged than besiegers, being eager to fight it out, while the firing
of the island had increased the confidence of the general. He had been
at first afraid, because the island having never been inhabited was
almost entirely covered with wood and without paths, thinking this to
be in the enemy’s favour, as he might land with a large force, and yet
might suffer loss by an attack from an unseen position. The mistakes
and forces of the enemy the wood would in a great measure conceal from
him, while every blunder of his own troops would be at once detected,
and they would be thus able to fall upon him unexpectedly just where
they pleased, the attack being always in their power. If, on the other
hand, he should force them to engage in the thicket, the smaller number
who knew the country would, he thought, have the advantage over the
larger who were ignorant of it, while his own army might be cut off
imperceptibly, in spite of its numbers, as the men would not be able to
see where to succour each other.

The Aetolian disaster, which had been mainly caused by the wood, had
not a little to do with these reflections. Meanwhile, one of the
soldiers who were compelled by want of room to land on the extremities
of the island and take their dinners, with outposts fixed to prevent a
surprise, set fire to a little of the wood without meaning to do so;
and as it came on to blow soon afterwards, almost the whole was
consumed before they were aware of it. Demosthenes was now able for the
first time to see how numerous the Lacedaemonians really were, having
up to this moment been under the impression that they took in
provisions for a smaller number; he also saw that the Athenians thought
success important and were anxious about it, and that it was now easier
to land on the island, and accordingly got ready for the attempt, sent
for troops from the allies in the neighbourhood, and pushed forward his
other preparations. At this moment Cleon arrived at Pylos with the
troops which he had asked for, having sent on word to say that he was
coming. The first step taken by the two generals after their meeting
was to send a herald to the camp on the mainland, to ask if they were
disposed to avoid all risk and to order the men on the island to
surrender themselves and their arms, to be kept in gentle custody until
some general convention should be concluded.

On the rejection of this proposition the generals let one day pass, and
the next, embarking all their heavy infantry on board a few ships, put
out by night, and a little before dawn landed on both sides of the
island from the open sea and from the harbour, being about eight
hundred strong, and advanced with a run against the first post in the
island.

The enemy had distributed his force as follows: In this first post
there were about thirty heavy infantry; the centre and most level part,
where the water was, was held by the main body, and by Epitadas their
commander; while a small party guarded the very end of the island,
towards Pylos, which was precipitous on the sea-side and very difficult
to attack from the land, and where there was also a sort of old fort of
stones rudely put together, which they thought might be useful to them,
in case they should be forced to retreat. Such was their disposition.

The advanced post thus attacked by the Athenians was at once put to the
sword, the men being scarcely out of bed and still arming, the landing
having taken them by surprise, as they fancied the ships were only
sailing as usual to their stations for the night. As soon as day broke,
the rest of the army landed, that is to say, all the crews of rather
more than seventy ships, except the lowest rank of oars, with the arms
they carried, eight hundred archers, and as many targeteers, the
Messenian reinforcements, and all the other troops on duty round Pylos,
except the garrison on the fort. The tactics of Demosthenes had divided
them into companies of two hundred, more or less, and made them occupy
the highest points in order to paralyse the enemy by surrounding him on
every side and thus leaving him without any tangible adversary, exposed
to the cross-fire of their host; plied by those in his rear if he
attacked in front, and by those on one flank if he moved against those
on the other. In short, wherever he went he would have the assailants
behind him, and these light-armed assailants, the most awkward of all;
arrows, darts, stones, and slings making them formidable at a distance,
and there being no means of getting at them at close quarters, as they
could conquer flying, and the moment their pursuer turned they were
upon him. Such was the idea that inspired Demosthenes in his conception
of the descent, and presided over its execution.

Meanwhile the main body of the troops in the island (that under
Epitadas), seeing their outpost cut off and an army advancing against
them, serried their ranks and pressed forward to close with the
Athenian heavy infantry in front of them, the light troops being upon
their flanks and rear. However, they were not able to engage or to
profit by their superior skill, the light troops keeping them in check
on either side with their missiles, and the heavy infantry remaining
stationary instead of advancing to meet them; and although they routed
the light troops wherever they ran up and approached too closely, yet
they retreated fighting, being lightly equipped, and easily getting the
start in their flight, from the difficult and rugged nature of the
ground, in an island hitherto desert, over which the Lacedaemonians
could not pursue them with their heavy armour.

After this skirmishing had lasted some little while, the Lacedaemonians
became unable to dash out with the same rapidity as before upon the
points attacked, and the light troops finding that they now fought with
less vigour, became more confident. They could see with their own eyes
that they were many times more numerous than the enemy; they were now
more familiar with his aspect and found him less terrible, the result
not having justified the apprehensions which they had suffered, when
they first landed in slavish dismay at the idea of attacking
Lacedaemonians; and accordingly their fear changing to disdain, they
now rushed all together with loud shouts upon them, and pelted them
with stones, darts, and arrows, whichever came first to hand. The
shouting accompanying their onset confounded the Lacedaemonians,
unaccustomed to this mode of fighting; dust rose from the newly burnt
wood, and it was impossible to see in front of one with the arrows and
stones flying through clouds of dust from the hands of numerous
assailants. The Lacedaemonians had now to sustain a rude conflict;
their caps would not keep out the arrows, darts had broken off in the
armour of the wounded, while they themselves were helpless for offence,
being prevented from using their eyes to see what was before them, and
unable to hear the words of command for the hubbub raised by the enemy;
danger encompassed them on every side, and there was no hope of any
means of defence or safety.

At last, after many had been already wounded in the confined space in
which they were fighting, they formed in close order and retired on the
fort at the end of the island, which was not far off, and to their
friends who held it. The moment they gave way, the light troops became
bolder and pressed upon them, shouting louder than ever, and killed as
many as they came up with in their retreat, but most of the
Lacedaemonians made good their escape to the fort, and with the
garrison in it ranged themselves all along its whole extent to repulse
the enemy wherever it was assailable. The Athenians pursuing, unable to
surround and hem them in, owing to the strength of the ground, attacked
them in front and tried to storm the position. For a long time, indeed
for most of the day, both sides held out against all the torments of
the battle, thirst, and sun, the one endeavouring to drive the enemy
from the high ground, the other to maintain himself upon it, it being
now more easy for the Lacedaemonians to defend themselves than before,
as they could not be surrounded on the flanks.

The struggle began to seem endless, when the commander of the
Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were
losing their labour: but if they would give him some archers and light
troops to go round on the enemy’s rear by a way he would undertake to
find, he thought he could force the approach. Upon receiving what he
asked for, he started from a point out of sight in order not to be seen
by the enemy, and creeping on wherever the precipices of the island
permitted, and where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to the strength of
the ground, kept no guard, succeeded after the greatest difficulty in
getting round without their seeing him, and suddenly appeared on the
high ground in their rear, to the dismay of the surprised enemy and the
still greater joy of his expectant friends. The Lacedaemonians thus
placed between two fires, and in the same dilemma, to compare small
things with great, as at Thermopylae, where the defenders were cut off
through the Persians getting round by the path, being now attacked in
front and behind, began to give way, and overcome by the odds against
them and exhausted from want of food, retreated.

The Athenians were already masters of the approaches when Cleon and
Demosthenes perceiving that, if the enemy gave way a single step
further, they would be destroyed by their soldiery, put a stop to the
battle and held their men back; wishing to take the Lacedaemonians
alive to Athens, and hoping that their stubbornness might relax on
hearing the offer of terms, and that they might surrender and yield to
the present overwhelming danger. Proclamation was accordingly made, to
know if they would surrender themselves and their arms to the Athenians
to be dealt at their discretion.

The Lacedaemonians hearing this offer, most of them lowered their
shields and waved their hands to show that they accepted it.
Hostilities now ceased, and a parley was held between Cleon and
Demosthenes and Styphon, son of Pharax, on the other side; since
Epitadas, the first of the previous commanders, had been killed, and
Hippagretas, the next in command, left for dead among the slain, though
still alive, and thus the command had devolved upon Styphon according
to the law, in case of anything happening to his superiors. Styphon and
his companions said they wished to send a herald to the Lacedaemonians
on the mainland, to know what they were to do. The Athenians would not
let any of them go, but themselves called for heralds from the
mainland, and after questions had been carried backwards and forwards
two or three times, the last man that passed over from the
Lacedaemonians on the continent brought this message: “The
Lacedaemonians bid you to decide for yourselves so long as you do
nothing dishonourable”; upon which after consulting together they
surrendered themselves and their arms. The Athenians, after guarding
them that day and night, the next morning set up a trophy in the
island, and got ready to sail, giving their prisoners in batches to be
guarded by the captains of the galleys; and the Lacedaemonians sent a
herald and took up their dead. The number of the killed and prisoners
taken in the island was as follows: four hundred and twenty heavy
infantry had passed over; three hundred all but eight were taken alive
to Athens; the rest were killed. About a hundred and twenty of the
prisoners were Spartans. The Athenian loss was small, the battle not
having been fought at close quarters.

The blockade in all, counting from the fight at sea to the battle in
the island, had lasted seventy-two days. For twenty of these, during
the absence of the envoys sent to treat for peace, the men had
provisions given them, for the rest they were fed by the smugglers.
Corn and other victual was found in the island; the commander Epitadas
having kept the men upon half rations. The Athenians and Peloponnesians
now each withdrew their forces from Pylos, and went home, and crazy as
Cleon’s promise was, he fulfilled it, by bringing the men to Athens
within the twenty days as he had pledged himself to do.

Nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hellenes so much as
this. It was the opinion that no force or famine could make the
Lacedaemonians give up their arms, but that they would fight on as they
could, and die with them in their hands: indeed people could scarcely
believe that those who had surrendered were of the same stuff as the
fallen; and an Athenian ally, who some time after insultingly asked one
of the prisoners from the island if those that had fallen were men of
honour, received for answer that the atraktos—that is, the arrow—would
be worth a great deal if it could tell men of honour from the rest; in
allusion to the fact that the killed were those whom the stones and the
arrows happened to hit.

Upon the arrival of the men the Athenians determined to keep them in
prison until the peace, and if the Peloponnesians invaded their country
in the interval, to bring them out and put them to death. Meanwhile the
defence of Pylos was not forgotten; the Messenians from Naupactus sent
to their old country, to which Pylos formerly belonged, some of the
likeliest of their number, and began a series of incursions into
Laconia, which their common dialect rendered most destructive. The
Lacedaemonians, hitherto without experience of incursions or a warfare
of the kind, finding the Helots deserting, and fearing the march of
revolution in their country, began to be seriously uneasy, and in spite
of their unwillingness to betray this to the Athenians began to send
envoys to Athens, and tried to recover Pylos and the prisoners. The
Athenians, however, kept grasping at more, and dismissed envoy after
envoy without their having effected anything. Such was the history of
the affair of Pylos.




CHAPTER XIII


Seventh and Eighth Years of the War—End of Corcyraean Revolution— Peace
of Gela—Capture of Nisaea


The same summer, directly after these events, the Athenians made an
expedition against the territory of Corinth with eighty ships and two
thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and two hundred cavalry on board
horse transports, accompanied by the Milesians, Andrians, and
Carystians from the allies, under the command of Nicias, son of
Niceratus, with two colleagues. Putting out to sea they made land at
daybreak between Chersonese and Rheitus, at the beach of the country
underneath the Solygian hill, upon which the Dorians in old times
established themselves and carried on war against the Aeolian
inhabitants of Corinth, and where a village now stands called Solygia.
The beach where the fleet came to is about a mile and a half from the
village, seven miles from Corinth, and two and a quarter from the
Isthmus. The Corinthians had heard from Argos of the coming of the
Athenian armament, and had all come up to the Isthmus long before, with
the exception of those who lived beyond it, and also of five hundred
who were away in garrison in Ambracia and Leucadia; and they were there
in full force watching for the Athenians to land. These last, however,
gave them the slip by coming in the dark; and being informed by signals
of the fact the Corinthians left half their number at Cenchreae, in
case the Athenians should go against Crommyon, and marched in all haste
to the rescue.

Battus, one of the two generals present at the action, went with a
company to defend the village of Solygia, which was unfortified;
Lycophron remaining to give battle with the rest. The Corinthians first
attacked the right wing of the Athenians, which had just landed in
front of Chersonese, and afterwards the rest of the army. The battle
was an obstinate one, and fought throughout hand to hand. The right
wing of the Athenians and Carystians, who had been placed at the end of
the line, received and with some difficulty repulsed the Corinthians,
who thereupon retreated to a wall upon the rising ground behind, and
throwing down the stones upon them, came on again singing the paean,
and being received by the Athenians, were again engaged at close
quarters. At this moment a Corinthian company having come to the relief
of the left wing, routed and pursued the Athenian right to the sea,
whence they were in their turn driven back by the Athenians and
Carystians from the ships. Meanwhile the rest of the army on either
side fought on tenaciously, especially the right wing of the
Corinthians, where Lycophron sustained the attack of the Athenian left,
which it was feared might attempt the village of Solygia.

After holding on for a long while without either giving way, the
Athenians aided by their horse, of which the enemy had none, at length
routed the Corinthians, who retired to the hill and, halting, remained
quiet there, without coming down again. It was in this rout of the
right wing that they had the most killed, Lycophron their general being
among the number. The rest of the army, broken and put to flight in
this way without being seriously pursued or hurried, retired to the
high ground and there took up its position. The Athenians, finding that
the enemy no longer offered to engage them, stripped his dead and took
up their own and immediately set up a trophy. Meanwhile, the half of
the Corinthians left at Cenchreae to guard against the Athenians
sailing on Crommyon, although unable to see the battle for Mount
Oneion, found out what was going on by the dust, and hurried up to the
rescue; as did also the older Corinthians from the town, upon
discovering what had occurred. The Athenians seeing them all coming
against them, and thinking that they were reinforcements arriving from
the neighbouring Peloponnesians, withdrew in haste to their ships with
their spoils and their own dead, except two that they left behind, not
being able to find them, and going on board crossed over to the islands
opposite, and from thence sent a herald, and took up under truce the
bodies which they had left behind. Two hundred and twelve Corinthians
fell in the battle, and rather less than fifty Athenians.

Weighing from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to
Crommyon in the Corinthian territory, about thirteen miles from the
city, and coming to anchor laid waste the country, and passed the night
there. The next day, after first coasting along to the territory of
Epidaurus and making a descent there, they came to Methana between
Epidaurus and Troezen, and drew a wall across and fortified the isthmus
of the peninsula, and left a post there from which incursions were
henceforth made upon the country of Troezen, Haliae, and Epidaurus.
After walling off this spot, the fleet sailed off home.

While these events were going on, Eurymedon and Sophocles had put to
sea with the Athenian fleet from Pylos on their way to Sicily and,
arriving at Corcyra, joined the townsmen in an expedition against the
party established on Mount Istone, who had crossed over, as I have
mentioned, after the revolution and become masters of the country, to
the great hurt of the inhabitants. Their stronghold having been taken
by an attack, the garrison took refuge in a body upon some high ground
and there capitulated, agreeing to give up their mercenary auxiliaries,
lay down their arms, and commit themselves to the discretion of the
Athenian people. The generals carried them across under truce to the
island of Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they could be sent to
Athens, upon the understanding that, if any were caught running away,
all would lose the benefit of the treaty. Meanwhile the leaders of the
Corcyraean commons, afraid that the Athenians might spare the lives of
the prisoners, had recourse to the following stratagem. They gained
over some few men on the island by secretly sending friends with
instructions to provide them with a boat, and to tell them, as if for
their own sakes, that they had best escape as quickly as possible, as
the Athenian generals were going to give them up to the Corcyraean
people.

These representations succeeding, it was so arranged that the men were
caught sailing out in the boat that was provided, and the treaty became
void accordingly, and the whole body were given up to the Corcyraeans.
For this result the Athenian generals were in a great measure
responsible; their evident disinclination to sail for Sicily, and thus
to leave to others the honour of conducting the men to Athens,
encouraged the intriguers in their design and seemed to affirm the
truth of their representations. The prisoners thus handed over were
shut up by the Corcyraeans in a large building, and afterwards taken
out by twenties and led past two lines of heavy infantry, one on each
side, being bound together, and beaten and stabbed by the men in the
lines whenever any saw pass a personal enemy; while men carrying whips
went by their side and hastened on the road those that walked too
slowly.

As many as sixty men were taken out and killed in this way without the
knowledge of their friends in the building, who fancied they were
merely being moved from one prison to another. At last, however,
someone opened their eyes to the truth, upon which they called upon the
Athenians to kill them themselves, if such was their pleasure, and
refused any longer to go out of the building, and said they would do
all they could to prevent any one coming in. The Corcyraeans, not
liking themselves to force a passage by the doors, got up on the top of
the building, and breaking through the roof, threw down the tiles and
let fly arrows at them, from which the prisoners sheltered themselves
as well as they could. Most of their number, meanwhile, were engaged in
dispatching themselves by thrusting into their throats the arrows shot
by the enemy, and hanging themselves with the cords taken from some
beds that happened to be there, and with strips made from their
clothing; adopting, in short, every possible means of self-destruction,
and also falling victims to the missiles of their enemies on the roof.
Night came on while these horrors were enacting, and most of it had
passed before they were concluded. When it was day the Corcyraeans
threw them in layers upon wagons and carried them out of the city. All
the women taken in the stronghold were sold as slaves. In this way the
Corcyraeans of the mountain were destroyed by the commons; and so after
terrible excesses the party strife came to an end, at least as far as
the period of this war is concerned, for of one party there was
practically nothing left. Meanwhile the Athenians sailed off to Sicily,
their primary destination, and carried on the war with their allies
there.

At the close of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the
Acarnanians made an expedition against Anactorium, the Corinthian town
lying at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and took it by treachery; and
the Acarnanians themselves, sending settlers from all parts of
Acarnania, occupied the place.

Summer was now over. During the winter ensuing, Aristides, son of
Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian ships sent to collect
money from the allies, arrested at Eion, on the Strymon, Artaphernes, a
Persian, on his way from the King to Lacedaemon. He was conducted to
Athens, where the Athenians got his dispatches translated from the
Assyrian character and read them. With numerous references to other
subjects, they in substance told the Lacedaemonians that the King did
not know what they wanted, as of the many ambassadors they had sent him
no two ever told the same story; if however they were prepared to speak
plainly they might send him some envoys with this Persian. The
Athenians afterwards sent back Artaphernes in a galley to Ephesus, and
ambassadors with him, who heard there of the death of King Artaxerxes,
son of Xerxes, which took place about that time, and so returned home.

The same winter the Chians pulled down their new wall at the command of
the Athenians, who suspected them of meditating an insurrection, after
first however obtaining pledges from the Athenians, and security as far
as this was possible for their continuing to treat them as before. Thus
the winter ended, and with it ended the seventh year of this war of
which Thucydides is the historian.

In first days of the next summer there was an eclipse of the sun at the
time of new moon, and in the early part of the same month an
earthquake. Meanwhile, the Mitylenian and other Lesbian exiles set out,
for the most part from the continent, with mercenaries hired in
Peloponnese, and others levied on the spot, and took Rhoeteum, but
restored it without injury on the receipt of two thousand Phocaean
staters. After this they marched against Antandrus and took the town by
treachery, their plan being to free Antandrus and the rest of the
Actaean towns, formerly owned by Mitylene but now held by the
Athenians. Once fortified there, they would have every facility for
ship-building from the vicinity of Ida and the consequent abundance of
timber, and plenty of other supplies, and might from this base easily
ravage Lesbos, which was not far off, and make themselves masters of
the Aeolian towns on the continent.

While these were the schemes of the exiles, the Athenians in the same
summer made an expedition with sixty ships, two thousand heavy
infantry, a few cavalry, and some allied troops from Miletus and other
parts, against Cythera, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus,
Nicostratus, son of Diotrephes, and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. Cythera
is an island lying off Laconia, opposite Malea; the inhabitants are
Lacedaemonians of the class of the Perioeci; and an officer called the
judge of Cythera went over to the place annually from Sparta. A
garrison of heavy infantry was also regularly sent there, and great
attention paid to the island, as it was the landing-place for the
merchantmen from Egypt and Libya, and at the same time secured Laconia
from the attacks of privateers from the sea, at the only point where it
is assailable, as the whole coast rises abruptly towards the Sicilian
and Cretan seas.

Coming to land here with their armament, the Athenians with ten ships
and two thousand Milesian heavy infantry took the town of Scandea, on
the sea; and with the rest of their forces landing on the side of the
island looking towards Malea, went against the lower town of Cythera,
where they found all the inhabitants encamped. A battle ensuing, the
Cytherians held their ground for some little while, and then turned and
fled into the upper town, where they soon afterwards capitulated to
Nicias and his colleagues, agreeing to leave their fate to the decision
of the Athenians, their lives only being safe. A correspondence had
previously been going on between Nicias and certain of the inhabitants,
which caused the surrender to be effected more speedily, and upon terms
more advantageous, present and future, for the Cytherians; who would
otherwise have been expelled by the Athenians on account of their being
Lacedaemonians and their island being so near to Laconia. After the
capitulation, the Athenians occupied the town of Scandea near the
harbour, and appointing a garrison for Cythera, sailed to Asine, Helus,
and most of the places on the sea, and making descents and passing the
night on shore at such spots as were convenient, continued ravaging the
country for about seven days.

The Lacedaemonians seeing the Athenians masters of Cythera, and
expecting descents of the kind upon their coasts, nowhere opposed them
in force, but sent garrisons here and there through the country,
consisting of as many heavy infantry as the points menaced seemed to
require, and generally stood very much upon the defensive. After the
severe and unexpected blow that had befallen them in the island, the
occupation of Pylos and Cythera, and the apparition on every side of a
war whose rapidity defied precaution, they lived in constant fear of
internal revolution, and now took the unusual step of raising four
hundred horse and a force of archers, and became more timid than ever
in military matters, finding themselves involved in a maritime
struggle, which their organization had never contemplated, and that
against Athenians, with whom an enterprise unattempted was always
looked upon as a success sacrificed. Besides this, their late numerous
reverses of fortune, coming close one upon another without any reason,
had thoroughly unnerved them, and they were always afraid of a second
disaster like that on the island, and thus scarcely dared to take the
field, but fancied that they could not stir without a blunder, for
being new to the experience of adversity they had lost all confidence
in themselves.

Accordingly they now allowed the Athenians to ravage their seaboard,
without making any movement, the garrisons in whose neighbourhood the
descents were made always thinking their numbers insufficient, and
sharing the general feeling. A single garrison which ventured to
resist, near Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, struck terror by its charge into
the scattered mob of light troops, but retreated, upon being received
by the heavy infantry, with the loss of a few men and some arms, for
which the Athenians set up a trophy, and then sailed off to Cythera.
From thence they sailed round to Epidaurus Limera, ravaged part of the
country, and so came to Thyrea in the Cynurian territory, upon the
Argive and Laconian border. This district had been given by its
Lacedaemonian owners to the expelled Aeginetans to inhabit, in return
for their good offices at the time of the earthquake and the rising of
the Helots; and also because, although subjects of Athens, they had
always sided with Lacedaemon.

While the Athenians were still at sea, the Aeginetans evacuated a fort
which they were building upon the coast, and retreated into the upper
town where they lived, rather more than a mile from the sea. One of the
Lacedaemonian district garrisons which was helping them in the work,
refused to enter here with them at their entreaty, thinking it
dangerous to shut themselves up within the wall, and retiring to the
high ground remained quiet, not considering themselves a match for the
enemy. Meanwhile the Athenians landed, and instantly advanced with all
their forces and took Thyrea. The town they burnt, pillaging what was
in it; the Aeginetans who were not slain in action they took with them
to Athens, with Tantalus, son of Patrocles, their Lacedaemonian
commander, who had been wounded and taken prisoner. They also took with
them a few men from Cythera whom they thought it safest to remove.
These the Athenians determined to lodge in the islands: the rest of the
Cytherians were to retain their lands and pay four talents tribute; the
Aeginetans captured to be all put to death, on account of the old
inveterate feud; and Tantalus to share the imprisonment of the
Lacedaemonians taken on the island.

The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and Gela in Sicily first
made an armistice with each other, after which embassies from all the
other Sicilian cities assembled at Gela to try to bring about a
pacification. After many expressions of opinion on one side and the
other, according to the griefs and pretensions of the different parties
complaining, Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a Syracusan, the most
influential man among them, addressed the following words to the
assembly:

“If I now address you, Sicilians, it is not because my city is the
least in Sicily or the greatest sufferer by the war, but in order to
state publicly what appears to me to be the best policy for the whole
island. That war is an evil is a proposition so familiar to every one
that it would be tedious to develop it. No one is forced to engage in
it by ignorance, or kept out of it by fear, if he fancies there is
anything to be gained by it. To the former the gain appears greater
than the danger, while the latter would rather stand the risk than put
up with any immediate sacrifice. But if both should happen to have
chosen the wrong moment for acting in this way, advice to make peace
would not be unserviceable; and this, if we did but see it, is just
what we stand most in need of at the present juncture.

“I suppose that no one will dispute that we went to war at first in
order to serve our own several interests, that we are now, in view of
the same interests, debating how we can make peace; and that if we
separate without having as we think our rights, we shall go to war
again. And yet, as men of sense, we ought to see that our separate
interests are not alone at stake in the present congress: there is also
the question whether we have still time to save Sicily, the whole of
which in my opinion is menaced by Athenian ambition; and we ought to
find in the name of that people more imperious arguments for peace than
any which I can advance, when we see the first power in Hellas watching
our mistakes with the few ships that she has at present in our waters,
and under the fair name of alliance speciously seeking to turn to
account the natural hostility that exists between us. If we go to war,
and call in to help us a people that are ready enough to carry their
arms even where they are not invited; and if we injure ourselves at our
own expense, and at the same time serve as the pioneers of their
dominion, we may expect, when they see us worn out, that they will one
day come with a larger armament, and seek to bring all of us into
subjection.

“And yet as sensible men, if we call in allies and court danger, it
should be in order to enrich our different countries with new
acquisitions, and not to ruin what they possess already; and we should
understand that the intestine discords which are so fatal to
communities generally, will be equally so to Sicily, if we, its
inhabitants, absorbed in our local quarrels, neglect the common enemy.
These considerations should reconcile individual with individual, and
city with city, and unite us in a common effort to save the whole of
Sicily. Nor should any one imagine that the Dorians only are enemies of
Athens, while the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian blood; the
attack in question is not inspired by hatred of one of two
nationalities, but by a desire for the good things in Sicily, the
common property of us all. This is proved by the Athenian reception of
the Chalcidian invitation: an ally who has never given them any
assistance whatever, at once receives from them almost more than the
treaty entitles him to. That the Athenians should cherish this ambition
and practise this policy is very excusable; and I do not blame those
who wish to rule, but those who are over-ready to serve. It is just as
much in men’s nature to rule those who submit to them, as it is to
resist those who molest them; one is not less invariable than the
other. Meanwhile all who see these dangers and refuse to provide for
them properly, or who have come here without having made up their minds
that our first duty is to unite to get rid of the common peril, are
mistaken. The quickest way to be rid of it is to make peace with each
other; since the Athenians menace us not from their own country, but
from that of those who invited them here. In this way instead of war
issuing in war, peace quietly ends our quarrels; and the guests who
come hither under fair pretences for bad ends, will have good reason
for going away without having attained them.

“So far as regards the Athenians, such are the great advantages proved
inherent in a wise policy. Independently of this, in the face of the
universal consent, that peace is the first of blessings, how can we
refuse to make it amongst ourselves; or do you not think that the good
which you have, and the ills that you complain of, would be better
preserved and cured by quiet than by war; that peace has its honours
and splendours of a less perilous kind, not to mention the numerous
other blessings that one might dilate on, with the not less numerous
miseries of war? These considerations should teach you not to disregard
my words, but rather to look in them every one for his own safety. If
there be any here who feels certain either by right or might to effect
his object, let not this surprise be to him too severe a
disappointment. Let him remember that many before now have tried to
chastise a wrongdoer, and failing to punish their enemy have not even
saved themselves; while many who have trusted in force to gain an
advantage, instead of gaining anything more, have been doomed to lose
what they had. Vengeance is not necessarily successful because wrong
has been done, or strength sure because it is confident; but the
incalculable element in the future exercises the widest influence, and
is the most treacherous, and yet in fact the most useful of all things,
as it frightens us all equally, and thus makes us consider before
attacking each other.

“Let us therefore now allow the undefined fear of this unknown future,
and the immediate terror of the Athenians’ presence, to produce their
natural impression, and let us consider any failure to carry out the
programmes that we may each have sketched out for ourselves as
sufficiently accounted for by these obstacles, and send away the
intruder from the country; and if everlasting peace be impossible
between us, let us at all events make a treaty for as long a term as
possible, and put off our private differences to another day. In fine,
let us recognize that the adoption of my advice will leave us each
citizens of a free state, and as such arbiters of our own destiny, able
to return good or bad offices with equal effect; while its rejection
will make us dependent on others, and thus not only impotent to repel
an insult, but on the most favourable supposition, friends to our
direst enemies, and at feud with our natural friends.

“For myself, though, as I said at first, the representative of a great
city, and able to think less of defending myself than of attacking
others, I am prepared to concede something in prevision of these
dangers. I am not inclined to ruin myself for the sake of hurting my
enemies, or so blinded by animosity as to think myself equally master
of my own plans and of fortune which I cannot command; but I am ready
to give up anything in reason. I call upon the rest of you to imitate
my conduct of your own free will, without being forced to do so by the
enemy. There is no disgrace in connections giving way to one another, a
Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to his brethren; above and beyond
this we are neighbours, live in the same country, are girt by the same
sea, and go by the same name of Sicilians. We shall go to war again, I
suppose, when the time comes, and again make peace among ourselves by
means of future congresses; but the foreign invader, if we are wise,
will always find us united against him, since the hurt of one is the
danger of all; and we shall never, in future, invite into the island
either allies or mediators. By so acting we shall at the present moment
do for Sicily a double service, ridding her at once of the Athenians,
and of civil war, and in future shall live in freedom at home, and be
less menaced from abroad.”

Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians took his advice, and
came to an understanding among themselves to end the war, each keeping
what they had—the Camarinaeans taking Morgantina at a price fixed to be
paid to the Syracusans—and the allies of the Athenians called the
officers in command, and told them that they were going to make peace
and that they would be included in the treaty. The generals assenting,
the peace was concluded, and the Athenian fleet afterwards sailed away
from Sicily. Upon their arrival at Athens, the Athenians banished
Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon for having taken bribes
to depart when they might have subdued Sicily. So thoroughly had the
present prosperity persuaded the citizens that nothing could withstand
them, and that they could achieve what was possible and impracticable
alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The secret of
this was their general extraordinary success, which made them confuse
their strength with their hopes.

The same summer the Megarians in the city, pressed by the hostilities
of the Athenians, who invaded their country twice every year with all
their forces, and harassed by the incursions of their own exiles at
Pegae, who had been expelled in a revolution by the popular party,
began to ask each other whether it would not be better to receive back
their exiles, and free the town from one of its two scourges. The
friends of the emigrants, perceiving the agitation, now more openly
than before demanded the adoption of this proposition; and the leaders
of the commons, seeing that the sufferings of the times had tired out
the constancy of their supporters, entered in their alarm into
correspondence with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates, son of
Ariphron, and Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and resolved to betray
the town, thinking this less dangerous to themselves than the return of
the party which they had banished. It was accordingly arranged that the
Athenians should first take the long walls extending for nearly a mile
from the city to the port of Nisaea, to prevent the Peloponnesians
coming to the rescue from that place, where they formed the sole
garrison to secure the fidelity of Megara; and that after this the
attempt should be made to put into their hands the upper town, which it
was thought would then come over with less difficulty.

The Athenians, after plans had been arranged between themselves and
their correspondents both as to words and actions, sailed by night to
Minoa, the island off Megara, with six hundred heavy infantry under the
command of Hippocrates, and took post in a quarry not far off, out of
which bricks used to be taken for the walls; while Demosthenes, the
other commander, with a detachment of Plataean light troops and another
of Peripoli, placed himself in ambush in the precinct of Enyalius,
which was still nearer. No one knew of it, except those whose business
it was to know that night. A little before daybreak, the traitors in
Megara began to act. Every night for a long time back, under pretence
of marauding, in order to have a means of opening the gates, they had
been used, with the consent of the officer in command, to carry by
night a sculling boat upon a cart along the ditch to the sea, and so to
sail out, bringing it back again before day upon the cart, and taking
it within the wall through the gates, in order, as they pretended, to
baffle the Athenian blockade at Minoa, there being no boat to be seen
in the harbour. On the present occasion the cart was already at the
gates, which had been opened in the usual way for the boat, when the
Athenians, with whom this had been concerted, saw it, and ran at the
top of their speed from the ambush in order to reach the gates before
they were shut again, and while the cart was still there to prevent
their being closed; their Megarian accomplices at the same moment
killing the guard at the gates. The first to run in was Demosthenes
with his Plataeans and Peripoli, just where the trophy now stands; and
he was no sooner within the gates than the Plataeans engaged and
defeated the nearest party of Peloponnesians who had taken the alarm
and come to the rescue, and secured the gates for the approaching
Athenian heavy infantry.

After this, each of the Athenians as fast as they entered went against
the wall. A few of the Peloponnesian garrison stood their ground at
first, and tried to repel the assault, and some of them were killed;
but the main body took fright and fled; the night attack and the sight
of the Megarian traitors in arms against them making them think that
all Megara had gone over to the enemy. It so happened also that the
Athenian herald of his own idea called out and invited any of the
Megarians that wished, to join the Athenian ranks; and this was no
sooner heard by the garrison than they gave way, and, convinced that
they were the victims of a concerted attack, took refuge in Nisaea. By
daybreak, the walls being now taken and the Megarians in the city in
great agitation, the persons who had negotiated with the Athenians,
supported by the rest of the popular party which was privy to the plot,
said that they ought to open the gates and march out to battle. It had
been concerted between them that the Athenians should rush in, the
moment that the gates were opened, while the conspirators were to be
distinguished from the rest by being anointed with oil, and so to avoid
being hurt. They could open the gates with more security, as four
thousand Athenian heavy infantry from Eleusis, and six hundred horse,
had marched all night, according to agreement, and were now close at
hand. The conspirators were all ready anointed and at their posts by
the gates, when one of their accomplices denounced the plot to the
opposite party, who gathered together and came in a body, and roundly
said that they must not march out—a thing they had never yet ventured
on even when in greater force than at present—or wantonly compromise
the safety of the town, and that if what they said was not attended to,
the battle would have to be fought in Megara. For the rest, they gave
no signs of their knowledge of the intrigue, but stoutly maintained
that their advice was the best, and meanwhile kept close by and watched
the gates, making it impossible for the conspirators to effect their
purpose.

The Athenian generals seeing that some obstacle had arisen, and that
the capture of the town by force was no longer practicable, at once
proceeded to invest Nisaea, thinking that, if they could take it before
relief arrived, the surrender of Megara would soon follow. Iron,
stone-masons, and everything else required quickly coming up from
Athens, the Athenians started from the wall which they occupied, and
from this point built a cross wall looking towards Megara down to the
sea on either side of Nisaea; the ditch and the walls being divided
among the army, stones and bricks taken from the suburb, and the
fruit-trees and timber cut down to make a palisade wherever this seemed
necessary; the houses also in the suburb with the addition of
battlements sometimes entering into the fortification. The whole of
this day the work continued, and by the afternoon of the next the wall
was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisaea, alarmed by the
absolute want of provisions, which they used to take in for the day
from the upper town, not anticipating any speedy relief from the
Peloponnesians, and supposing Megara to be hostile, capitulated to the
Athenians on condition that they should give up their arms, and should
each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; their Lacedaemonian commander,
and any others of his countrymen in the place, being left to the
discretion of the Athenians. On these conditions they surrendered and
came out, and the Athenians broke down the long walls at their point of
junction with Megara, took possession of Nisaea, and went on with their
other preparations.

Just at this time the Lacedaemonian Brasidas, son of Tellis, happened
to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, getting ready an army
for Thrace. As soon as he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing
for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and the safety of Megara, he sent to
the Boeotians to meet him as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus, a
village so called of the Megarid, under Mount Geraneia, and went
himself, with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy infantry,
four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and such troops of his
own as he had already levied, expecting to find Nisaea not yet taken.
Hearing of its fall (he had marched out by night to Tripodiscus), he
took three hundred picked men from the army, without waiting till his
coming should be known, and came up to Megara unobserved by the
Athenians, who were down by the sea, ostensibly, and really if
possible, to attempt Nisaea, but above all to get into Megara and
secure the town. He accordingly invited the townspeople to admit his
party, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea.

However, one of the Megarian factions feared that he might expel them
and restore the exiles; the other that the commons, apprehensive of
this very danger, might set upon them, and the city be thus destroyed
by a battle within its gates under the eyes of the ambushed Athenians.
He was accordingly refused admittance, both parties electing to remain
quiet and await the event; each expecting a battle between the
Athenians and the relieving army, and thinking it safer to see their
friends victorious before declaring in their favour.

Unable to carry his point, Brasidas went back to the rest of the army.
At daybreak the Boeotians joined him. Having determined to relieve
Megara, whose danger they considered their own, even before hearing
from Brasidas, they were already in full force at Plataea, when his
messenger arrived to add spurs to their resolution; and they at once
sent on to him two thousand two hundred heavy infantry, and six hundred
horse, returning home with the main body. The whole army thus assembled
numbered six thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian heavy infantry were
drawn up by Nisaea and the sea; but the light troops being scattered
over the plain were attacked by the Boeotian horse and driven to the
sea, being taken entirely by surprise, as on previous occasions no
relief had ever come to the Megarians from any quarter. Here the
Boeotians were in their turn charged and engaged by the Athenian horse,
and a cavalry action ensued which lasted a long time, and in which both
parties claimed the victory. The Athenians killed and stripped the
leader of the Boeotian horse and some few of his comrades who had
charged right up to Nisaea, and remaining masters of the bodies gave
them back under truce, and set up a trophy; but regarding the action as
a whole the forces separated without either side having gained a
decisive advantage, the Boeotians returning to their army and the
Athenians to Nisaea.

After this Brasidas and the army came nearer to the sea and to Megara,
and taking up a convenient position, remained quiet in order of battle,
expecting to be attacked by the Athenians and knowing that the
Megarians were waiting to see which would be the victor. This attitude
seemed to present two advantages. Without taking the offensive or
willingly provoking the hazards of a battle, they openly showed their
readiness to fight, and thus without bearing the burden of the day
would fairly reap its honours; while at the same time they effectually
served their interests at Megara. For if they had failed to show
themselves they would not have had a chance, but would have certainly
been considered vanquished, and have lost the town. As it was, the
Athenians might possibly not be inclined to accept their challenge, and
their object would be attained without fighting. And so it turned out.
The Athenians formed outside the long walls and, the enemy not
attacking, there remained motionless; their generals having decided
that the risk was too unequal. In fact most of their objects had been
already attained; and they would have to begin a battle against
superior numbers, and if victorious could only gain Megara, while a
defeat would destroy the flower of their heavy soldiery. For the enemy
it was different; as even the states actually represented in his army
risked each only a part of its entire force, he might well be more
audacious. Accordingly, after waiting for some time without either side
attacking, the Athenians withdrew to Nisaea, and the Peloponnesians
after them to the point from which they had set out. The friends of the
Megarian exiles now threw aside their hesitation, and opened the gates
to Brasidas and the commanders from the different states—looking upon
him as the victor and upon the Athenians as having declined the
battle—and receiving them into the town proceeded to discuss matters
with them; the party in correspondence with the Athenians being
paralysed by the turn things had taken.

Afterwards Brasidas let the allies go home, and himself went back to
Corinth, to prepare for his expedition to Thrace, his original
destination. The Athenians also returning home, the Megarians in the
city most implicated in the Athenian negotiation, knowing that they had
been detected, presently disappeared; while the rest conferred with the
friends of the exiles, and restored the party at Pegae, after binding
them under solemn oaths to take no vengeance for the past, and only to
consult the real interests of the town. However, as soon as they were
in office, they held a review of the heavy infantry, and separating the
battalions, picked out about a hundred of their enemies, and of those
who were thought to be most involved in the correspondence with the
Athenians, brought them before the people, and compelling the vote to
be given openly, had them condemned and executed, and established a
close oligarchy in the town—a revolution which lasted a very long
while, although effected by a very few partisans.




CHAPTER XIV


Eighth and Ninth Years of the War—Invasion of Boeotia—Fall of
Amphipolis—Brilliant Successes of Brasidas


The same summer the Mitylenians were about to fortify Antandrus, as
they had intended, when Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders of the
Athenian squadron engaged in levying subsidies, heard on the Hellespont
of what was being done to the place (Lamachus their colleague having
sailed with ten ships into the Pontus) and conceived fears of its
becoming a second Anaia-the place in which the Samian exiles had
established themselves to annoy Samos, helping the Peloponnesians by
sending pilots to their navy, and keeping the city in agitation and
receiving all its outlaws. They accordingly got together a force from
the allies and set sail, defeated in battle the troops that met them
from Antandrus, and retook the place. Not long after, Lamachus, who had
sailed into the Pontus, lost his ships at anchor in the river Calex, in
the territory of Heraclea, rain having fallen in the interior and the
flood coming suddenly down upon them; and himself and his troops passed
by land through the Bithynian Thracians on the Asiatic side, and
arrived at Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

The same summer the Athenian general, Demosthenes, arrived at Naupactus
with forty ships immediately after the return from the Megarid.
Hippocrates and himself had had overtures made to them by certain men
in the cities in Boeotia, who wished to change the constitution and
introduce a democracy as at Athens; Ptoeodorus, a Theban exile, being
the chief mover in this intrigue. The seaport town of Siphae, in the
bay of Crisae, in the Thespian territory, was to be betrayed to them by
one party; Chaeronea (a dependency of what was formerly called the
Minyan, now the Boeotian, Orchomenus) to be put into their hands by
another from that town, whose exiles were very active in the business,
hiring men in Peloponnese. Some Phocians also were in the plot,
Chaeronea being the frontier town of Boeotia and close to Phanotis in
Phocia. Meanwhile the Athenians were to seize Delium, the sanctuary of
Apollo, in the territory of Tanagra looking towards Euboea; and all
these events were to take place simultaneously upon a day appointed, in
order that the Boeotians might be unable to unite to oppose them at
Delium, being everywhere detained by disturbances at home. Should the
enterprise succeed, and Delium be fortified, its authors confidently
expected that even if no revolution should immediately follow in
Boeotia, yet with these places in their hands, and the country being
harassed by incursions, and a refuge in each instance near for the
partisans engaged in them, things would not remain as they were, but
that the rebels being supported by the Athenians and the forces of the
oligarchs divided, it would be possible after a while to settle matters
according to their wishes.

Such was the plot in contemplation. Hippocrates with a force raised at
home awaited the proper moment to take the field against the Boeotians;
while he sent on Demosthenes with the forty ships above mentioned to
Naupactus, to raise in those parts an army of Acarnanians and of the
other allies, and sail and receive Siphae from the conspirators; a day
having been agreed on for the simultaneous execution of both these
operations. Demosthenes on his arrival found Oeniadae already compelled
by the united Acarnanians to join the Athenian confederacy, and himself
raising all the allies in those countries marched against and subdued
Salynthius and the Agraeans; after which he devoted himself to the
preparations necessary to enable him to be at Siphae by the time
appointed.

About the same time in the summer, Brasidas set out on his march for
the Thracian places with seventeen hundred heavy infantry, and arriving
at Heraclea in Trachis, from thence sent on a messenger to his friends
at Pharsalus, to ask them to conduct himself and his army through the
country. Accordingly there came to Melitia in Achaia Panaerus, Dorus,
Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, the Chalcidian proxenus, under
whose escort he resumed his march, being accompanied also by other
Thessalians, among whom was Niconidas from Larissa, a friend of
Perdiccas. It was never very easy to traverse Thessaly without an
escort; and throughout all Hellas for an armed force to pass without
leave through a neighbour’s country was a delicate step to take.
Besides this the Thessalian people had always sympathized with the
Athenians. Indeed if instead of the customary close oligarchy there had
been a constitutional government in Thessaly, he would never have been
able to proceed; since even as it was, he was met on his march at the
river Enipeus by certain of the opposite party who forbade his further
progress, and complained of his making the attempt without the consent
of the nation. To this his escort answered that they had no intention
of taking him through against their will; they were only friends in
attendance on an unexpected visitor. Brasidas himself added that he
came as a friend to Thessaly and its inhabitants, his arms not being
directed against them but against the Athenians, with whom he was at
war, and that although he knew of no quarrel between the Thessalians
and Lacedaemonians to prevent the two nations having access to each
other’s territory, he neither would nor could proceed against their
wishes; he could only beg them not to stop him. With this answer they
went away, and he took the advice of his escort, and pushed on without
halting, before a greater force might gather to prevent him. Thus in
the day that he set out from Melitia he performed the whole distance to
Pharsalus, and encamped on the river Apidanus; and so to Phacium and
from thence to Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort went back, and
the Perrhaebians, who are subjects of Thessaly, set him down at Dium in
the dominions of Perdiccas, a Macedonian town under Mount Olympus,
looking towards Thessaly.

In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before any one could be
got ready to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice. The
departure of the army from Peloponnese had been procured by the
Thracian towns in revolt against Athens and by Perdiccas, alarmed at
the successes of the Athenians. The Chalcidians thought that they would
be the first objects of an Athenian expedition, not that the
neighbouring towns which had not yet revolted did not also secretly
join in the invitation; and Perdiccas also had his apprehensions on
account of his old quarrels with the Athenians, although not openly at
war with them, and above all wished to reduce Arrhabaeus, king of the
Lyncestians. It had been less difficult for them to get an army to
leave Peloponnese, because of the ill fortune of the Lacedaemonians at
the present moment. The attacks of the Athenians upon Peloponnese, and
in particular upon Laconia, might, it was hoped, be diverted most
effectually by annoying them in return, and by sending an army to their
allies, especially as they were willing to maintain it and asked for it
to aid them in revolting. The Lacedaemonians were also glad to have an
excuse for sending some of the Helots out of the country, for fear that
the present aspect of affairs and the occupation of Pylos might
encourage them to move. Indeed fear of their numbers and obstinacy even
persuaded the Lacedaemonians to the action which I shall now relate,
their policy at all times having been governed by the necessity of
taking precautions against them. The Helots were invited by a
proclamation to pick out those of their number who claimed to have most
distinguished themselves against the enemy, in order that they might
receive their freedom; the object being to test them, as it was thought
that the first to claim their freedom would be the most high-spirited
and the most apt to rebel. As many as two thousand were selected
accordingly, who crowned themselves and went round the temples,
rejoicing in their new freedom. The Spartans, however, soon afterwards
did away with them, and no one ever knew how each of them perished. The
Spartans now therefore gladly sent seven hundred as heavy infantry with
Brasidas, who recruited the rest of his force by means of money in
Peloponnese.

Brasidas himself was sent out by the Lacedaemonians mainly at his own
desire, although the Chalcidians also were eager to have a man so
thorough as he had shown himself whenever there was anything to be done
at Sparta, and whose after-service abroad proved of the utmost use to
his country. At the present moment his just and moderate conduct
towards the towns generally succeeded in procuring their revolt,
besides the places which he managed to take by treachery; and thus when
the Lacedaemonians desired to treat, as they ultimately did, they had
places to offer in exchange, and the burden of war meanwhile shifted
from Peloponnese. Later on in the war, after the events in Sicily, the
present valour and conduct of Brasidas, known by experience to some, by
hearsay to others, was what mainly created in the allies of Athens a
feeling for the Lacedaemonians. He was the first who went out and
showed himself so good a man at all points as to leave behind him the
conviction that the rest were like him.

Meanwhile his arrival in the Thracian country no sooner became known to
the Athenians than they declared war against Perdiccas, whom they
regarded as the author of the expedition, and kept a closer watch on
their allies in that quarter.

Upon the arrival of Brasidas and his army, Perdiccas immediately
started with them and with his own forces against Arrhabaeus, son of
Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, his neighbour, with whom
he had a quarrel and whom he wished to subdue. However, when he arrived
with his army and Brasidas at the pass leading into Lyncus, Brasidas
told him that before commencing hostilities he wished to go and try to
persuade Arrhabaeus to become the ally of Lacedaemon, this latter
having already made overtures intimating his willingness to make
Brasidas arbitrator between them, and the Chalcidian envoys
accompanying him having warned him not to remove the apprehensions of
Perdiccas, in order to ensure his greater zeal in their cause. Besides,
the envoys of Perdiccas had talked at Lacedaemon about his bringing
many of the places round him into alliance with them; and thus Brasidas
thought he might take a larger view of the question of Arrhabaeus.
Perdiccas however retorted that he had not brought him with him to
arbitrate in their quarrel, but to put down the enemies whom he might
point out to him; and that while he, Perdiccas, maintained half his
army it was a breach of faith for Brasidas to parley with Arrhabaeus.
Nevertheless Brasidas disregarded the wishes of Perdiccas and held the
parley in spite of him, and suffered himself to be persuaded to lead
off the army without invading the country of Arrhabaeus; after which
Perdiccas, holding that faith had not been kept with him, contributed
only a third instead of half of the support of the army.

The same summer, without loss of time, Brasidas marched with the
Chalcidians against Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians, a little before
vintage. The inhabitants were divided into two parties on the question
of receiving him; those who had joined the Chalcidians in inviting him,
and the popular party. However, fear for their fruit, which was still
out, enabled Brasidas to persuade the multitude to admit him alone, and
to hear what he had to say before making a decision; and he was
admitted accordingly and appeared before the people, and not being a
bad speaker for a Lacedaemonian, addressed them as follows:

“Acanthians, the Lacedaemonians have sent out me and my army to make
good the reason that we gave for the war when we began it, viz., that
we were going to war with the Athenians in order to free Hellas. Our
delay in coming has been caused by mistaken expectations as to the war
at home, which led us to hope, by our own unassisted efforts and
without your risking anything, to effect the speedy downfall of the
Athenians; and you must not blame us for this, as we are now come the
moment that we were able, prepared with your aid to do our best to
subdue them. Meanwhile I am astonished at finding your gates shut
against me, and at not meeting with a better welcome. We Lacedaemonians
thought of you as allies eager to have us, to whom we should come in
spirit even before we were with you in body; and in this expectation
undertook all the risks of a march of many days through a strange
country, so far did our zeal carry us. It will be a terrible thing if
after this you have other intentions, and mean to stand in the way of
your own and Hellenic freedom. It is not merely that you oppose me
yourselves; but wherever I may go people will be less inclined to join
me, on the score that you, to whom I first came—an important town like
Acanthus, and prudent men like the Acanthians—refused to admit me. I
shall have nothing to prove that the reason which I advance is the true
one; it will be said either that there is something unfair in the
freedom which I offer, or that I am in insufficient force and unable to
protect you against an attack from Athens. Yet when I went with the
army which I now have to the relief of Nisaea, the Athenians did not
venture to engage me although in greater force than I; and it is not
likely they will ever send across sea against you an army as numerous
as they had at Nisaea. And for myself, I have come here not to hurt but
to free the Hellenes, witness the solemn oaths by which I have bound my
government that the allies that I may bring over shall be independent;
and besides my object in coming is not by force or fraud to obtain your
alliance, but to offer you mine to help you against your Athenian
masters. I protest, therefore, against any suspicions of my intentions
after the guarantees which I offer, and equally so against doubts of my
ability to protect you, and I invite you to join me without hesitation.

“Some of you may hang back because they have private enemies, and fear
that I may put the city into the hands of a party: none need be more
tranquil than they. I am not come here to help this party or that; and
I do not consider that I should be bringing you freedom in any real
sense, if I should disregard your constitution, and enslave the many to
the few or the few to the many. This would be heavier than a foreign
yoke; and we Lacedaemonians, instead of being thanked for our pains,
should get neither honour nor glory, but, contrariwise, reproaches. The
charges which strengthen our hands in the war against the Athenians
would on our own showing be merited by ourselves, and more hateful in
us than in those who make no pretensions to honesty; as it is more
disgraceful for persons of character to take what they covet by
fair-seeming fraud than by open force; the one aggression having for
its justification the might which fortune gives, the other being simply
a piece of clever roguery. A matter which concerns us thus nearly we
naturally look to most jealously; and over and above the oaths that I
have mentioned, what stronger assurance can you have, when you see that
our words, compared with the actual facts, produce the necessary
conviction that it is our interest to act as we say?

“If to these considerations of mine you put in the plea of inability,
and claim that your friendly feeling should save you from being hurt by
your refusal; if you say that freedom, in your opinion, is not without
its dangers, and that it is right to offer it to those who can accept
it, but not to force it on any against their will, then I shall take
the gods and heroes of your country to witness that I came for your
good and was rejected, and shall do my best to compel you by laying
waste your land. I shall do so without scruple, being justified by the
necessity which constrains me, first, to prevent the Lacedaemonians
from being damaged by you, their friends, in the event of your
nonadhesion, through the moneys that you pay to the Athenians; and
secondly, to prevent the Hellenes from being hindered by you in shaking
off their servitude. Otherwise indeed we should have no right to act as
we propose; except in the name of some public interest, what call
should we Lacedaemonians have to free those who do not wish it? Empire
we do not aspire to: it is what we are labouring to put down; and we
should wrong the greater number if we allowed you to stand in the way
of the independence that we offer to all. Endeavour, therefore, to
decide wisely, and strive to begin the work of liberation for the
Hellenes, and lay up for yourselves endless renown, while you escape
private loss, and cover your commonwealth with glory.”

Such were the words of Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been
said on both sides of the question, gave their votes in secret, and the
majority, influenced by the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by fear
for their fruit, decided to revolt from Athens; not however admitting
the army until they had taken his personal security for the oaths sworn
by his government before they sent him out, assuring the independence
of the allies whom he might bring over. Not long after, Stagirus, a
colony of the Andrians, followed their example and revolted.

Such were the events of this summer. It was in the first days of the
winter following that the places in Boeotia were to be put into the
hands of the Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the latter
of whom was to go with his ships to Siphae, the former to Delium. A
mistake, however, was made in the days on which they were each to
start; and Demosthenes, sailing first to Siphae, with the Acarnanians
and many of the allies from those parts on board, failed to effect
anything, through the plot having been betrayed by Nicomachus, a
Phocian from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the
Boeotians. Succours accordingly flocked in from all parts of Boeotia,
Hippocrates not being yet there to make his diversion, and Siphae and
Chaeronea were promptly secured, and the conspirators, informed of the
mistake, did not venture on any movement in the towns.

Meanwhile Hippocrates made a levy in mass of the citizens, resident
aliens, and foreigners in Athens, and arrived at his destination after
the Boeotians had already come back from Siphae, and encamping his army
began to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the following
manner. A trench was dug all round the temple and the consecrated
ground, and the earth thrown up from the excavation was made to do duty
as a wall, in which stakes were also planted, the vines round the
sanctuary being cut down and thrown in, together with stones and bricks
pulled down from the houses near; every means, in short, being used to
run up the rampart. Wooden towers were also erected where they were
wanted, and where there was no part of the temple buildings left
standing, as on the side where the gallery once existing had fallen in.
The work was begun on the third day after leaving home, and continued
during the fourth, and till dinnertime on the fifth, when most of it
being now finished the army removed from Delium about a mile and a
quarter on its way home. From this point most of the light troops went
straight on, while the heavy infantry halted and remained where they
were; Hippocrates having stayed behind at Delium to arrange the posts,
and to give directions for the completion of such part of the outworks
as had been left unfinished.

During the days thus employed the Boeotians were mustering at Tanagra,
and by the time that they had come in from all the towns, found the
Athenians already on their way home. The rest of the eleven Boeotarchs
were against giving battle, as the enemy was no longer in Boeotia, the
Athenians being just over the Oropian border, when they halted; but
Pagondas, son of Aeolidas, one of the Boeotarchs of Thebes
(Arianthides, son of Lysimachidas, being the other), and then
commander-in-chief, thought it best to hazard a battle. He accordingly
called the men to him, company after company, to prevent their all
leaving their arms at once, and urged them to attack the Athenians, and
stand the issue of a battle, speaking as follows:

“Boeotians, the idea that we ought not to give battle to the Athenians,
unless we came up with them in Boeotia, is one which should never have
entered into the head of any of us, your generals. It was to annoy
Boeotia that they crossed the frontier and built a fort in our country;
and they are therefore, I imagine, our enemies wherever we may come up
with them, and from wheresoever they may have come to act as enemies
do. And if any one has taken up with the idea in question for reasons
of safety, it is high time for him to change his mind. The party
attacked, whose own country is in danger, can scarcely discuss what is
prudent with the calmness of men who are in full enjoyment of what they
have got, and are thinking of attacking a neighbour in order to get
more. It is your national habit, in your country or out of it, to
oppose the same resistance to a foreign invader; and when that invader
is Athenian, and lives upon your frontier besides, it is doubly
imperative to do so. As between neighbours generally, freedom means
simply a determination to hold one’s own; and with neighbours like
these, who are trying to enslave near and far alike, there is nothing
for it but to fight it out to the last. Look at the condition of the
Euboeans and of most of the rest of Hellas, and be convinced that
others have to fight with their neighbours for this frontier or that,
but that for us conquest means one frontier for the whole country,
about which no dispute can be made, for they will simply come and take
by force what we have. So much more have we to fear from this neighbour
than from another. Besides, people who, like the Athenians in the
present instance, are tempted by pride of strength to attack their
neighbours, usually march most confidently against those who keep
still, and only defend themselves in their own country, but think twice
before they grapple with those who meet them outside their frontier and
strike the first blow if opportunity offers. The Athenians have shown
us this themselves; the defeat which we inflicted upon them at Coronea,
at the time when our quarrels had allowed them to occupy the country,
has given great security to Boeotia until the present day. Remembering
this, the old must equal their ancient exploits, and the young, the
sons of the heroes of that time, must endeavour not to disgrace their
native valour; and trusting in the help of the god whose temple has
been sacrilegiously fortified, and in the victims which in our
sacrifices have proved propitious, we must march against the enemy, and
teach him that he must go and get what he wants by attacking someone
who will not resist him, but that men whose glory it is to be always
ready to give battle for the liberty of their own country, and never
unjustly to enslave that of others, will not let him go without a
struggle.”

By these arguments Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to attack the
Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp led his army forward, it
being now late in the day. On nearing the enemy, he halted in a
position where a hill intervening prevented the two armies from seeing
each other, and then formed and prepared for action. Meanwhile
Hippocrates at Delium, informed of the approach of the Boeotians, sent
orders to his troops to throw themselves into line, and himself joined
them not long afterwards, leaving about three hundred horse behind him
at Delium, at once to guard the place in case of attack, and to watch
their opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians during the battle. The
Boeotians placed a detachment to deal with these, and when everything
was arranged to their satisfaction appeared over the hill, and halted
in the order which they had determined on, to the number of seven
thousand heavy infantry, more than ten thousand light troops, one
thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. On their right were the
Thebans and those of their province, in the centre the Haliartians,
Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the other people around the lake, and on the
left the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians, the cavalry and the
light troops being at the extremity of each wing. The Thebans formed
twenty-five shields deep, the rest as they pleased. Such was the
strength and disposition of the Boeotian army.

On the side of the Athenians, the heavy infantry throughout the whole
army formed eight deep, being in numbers equal to the enemy, with the
cavalry upon the two wings. Light troops regularly armed there were
none in the army, nor had there ever been any at Athens. Those who had
joined in the invasion, though many times more numerous than those of
the enemy, had mostly followed unarmed, as part of the levy in mass of
the citizens and foreigners at Athens, and having started first on
their way home were not present in any number. The armies being now in
line and upon the point of engaging, Hippocrates, the general, passed
along the Athenian ranks, and encouraged them as follows:

“Athenians, I shall only say a few words to you, but brave men require
no more, and they are addressed more to your understanding than to your
courage. None of you must fancy that we are going out of our way to run
this risk in the country of another. Fought in their territory the
battle will be for ours: if we conquer, the Peloponnesians will never
invade your country without the Boeotian horse, and in one battle you
will win Boeotia and in a manner free Attica. Advance to meet them then
like citizens of a country in which you all glory as the first in
Hellas, and like sons of the fathers who beat them at Oenophyta with
Myronides and thus gained possession of Boeotia.”

Hippocrates had got half through the army with his exhortation, when
the Boeotians, after a few more hasty words from Pagondas, struck up
the paean, and came against them from the hill; the Athenians advancing
to meet them, and closing at a run. The extreme wing of neither army
came into action, one like the other being stopped by the water-courses
in the way; the rest engaged with the utmost obstinacy, shield against
shield. The Boeotian left, as far as the centre, was worsted by the
Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field suffered most
severely. The troops alongside them having given way, they were
surrounded in a narrow space and cut down fighting hand to hand; some
of the Athenians also fell into confusion in surrounding the enemy and
mistook and so killed each other. In this part of the field the
Boeotians were beaten, and retreated upon the troops still fighting;
but the right, where the Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians
and shoved them further and further back, though gradually at first. It
so happened also that Pagondas, seeing the distress of his left, had
sent two squadrons of horse, where they could not be seen, round the
hill, and their sudden appearance struck a panic into the victorious
wing of the Athenians, who thought that it was another army coming
against them. At length in both parts of the field, disturbed by this
panic, and with their line broken by the advancing Thebans, the whole
Athenian army took to flight. Some made for Delium and the sea, some
for Oropus, others for Mount Parnes, or wherever they had hopes of
safety, pursued and cut down by the Boeotians, and in particular by the
cavalry, composed partly of Boeotians and partly of Locrians, who had
come up just as the rout began. Night however coming on to interrupt
the pursuit, the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily than they
would otherwise have done. The next day the troops at Oropus and Delium
returned home by sea, after leaving a garrison in the latter place,
which they continued to hold notwithstanding the defeat.

The Boeotians set up a trophy, took up their own dead, and stripped
those of the enemy, and leaving a guard over them retired to Tanagra,
there to take measures for attacking Delium. Meanwhile a herald came
from the Athenians to ask for the dead, but was met and turned back by
a Boeotian herald, who told him that he would effect nothing until the
return of himself the Boeotian herald, and who then went on to the
Athenians, and told them on the part of the Boeotians that they had
done wrong in transgressing the law of the Hellenes. Of what use was
the universal custom protecting the temples in an invaded country, if
the Athenians were to fortify Delium and live there, acting exactly as
if they were on unconsecrated ground, and drawing and using for their
purposes the water which they, the Boeotians, never touched except for
sacred uses? Accordingly for the god as well as for themselves, in the
name of the deities concerned, and of Apollo, the Boeotians invited
them first to evacuate the temple, if they wished to take up the dead
that belonged to them.

After these words from the herald, the Athenians sent their own herald
to the Boeotians to say that they had not done any wrong to the temple,
and for the future would do it no more harm than they could help; not
having occupied it originally in any such design, but to defend
themselves from it against those who were really wronging them. The law
of the Hellenes was that conquest of a country, whether more or less
extensive, carried with it possession of the temples in that country,
with the obligation to keep up the usual ceremonies, at least as far as
possible. The Boeotians and most other people who had turned out the
owners of a country, and put themselves in their places by force, now
held as of right the temples which they originally entered as usurpers.
If the Athenians could have conquered more of Boeotia this would have
been the case with them: as things stood, the piece of it which they
had got they should treat as their own, and not quit unless obliged.
The water they had disturbed under the impulsion of a necessity which
they had not wantonly incurred, having been forced to use it in
defending themselves against the Boeotians who first invaded Attica.
Besides, anything done under the pressure of war and danger might
reasonably claim indulgence even in the eye of the god; or why, pray,
were the altars the asylum for involuntary offences? Transgression also
was a term applied to presumptuous offenders, not to the victims of
adverse circumstances. In short, which were most impious—the Boeotians
who wished to barter dead bodies for holy places, or the Athenians who
refused to give up holy places to obtain what was theirs by right? The
condition of evacuating Boeotia must therefore be withdrawn. They were
no longer in Boeotia. They stood where they stood by the right of the
sword. All that the Boeotians had to do was to tell them to take up
their dead under a truce according to the national custom.

The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia, they must evacuate
that country before taking up their dead; if they were in their own
territory, they could do as they pleased: for they knew that, although
the Oropid where the bodies as it chanced were lying (the battle having
been fought on the borders) was subject to Athens, yet the Athenians
could not get them without their leave. Besides, why should they grant
a truce for Athenian ground? And what could be fairer than to tell them
to evacuate Boeotia if they wished to get what they asked? The Athenian
herald accordingly returned with this answer, without having
accomplished his object.

Meanwhile the Boeotians at once sent for darters and slingers from the
Malian Gulf, and with two thousand Corinthian heavy infantry who had
joined them after the battle, the Peloponnesian garrison which had
evacuated Nisaea, and some Megarians with them, marched against Delium,
and attacked the fort, and after divers efforts finally succeeded in
taking it by an engine of the following description. They sawed in two
and scooped out a great beam from end to end, and fitting it nicely
together again like a pipe, hung by chains a cauldron at one extremity,
with which communicated an iron tube projecting from the beam, which
was itself in great part plated with iron. This they brought up from a
distance upon carts to the part of the wall principally composed of
vines and timber, and when it was near, inserted huge bellows into
their end of the beam and blew with them. The blast passing closely
confined into the cauldron, which was filled with lighted coals,
sulphur and pitch, made a great blaze, and set fire to the wall, which
soon became untenable for its defenders, who left it and fled; and in
this way the fort was taken. Of the garrison some were killed and two
hundred made prisoners; most of the rest got on board their ships and
returned home.

Soon after the fall of Delium, which took place seventeen days after
the battle, the Athenian herald, without knowing what had happened,
came again for the dead, which were now restored by the Boeotians, who
no longer answered as at first. Not quite five hundred Boeotians fell
in the battle, and nearly one thousand Athenians, including Hippocrates
the general, besides a great number of light troops and camp followers.

Soon after this battle Demosthenes, after the failure of his voyage to
Siphae and of the plot on the town, availed himself of the Acarnanian
and Agraean troops and of the four hundred Athenian heavy infantry
which he had on board, to make a descent on the Sicyonian coast. Before
however all his ships had come to shore, the Sicyonians came up and
routed and chased to their ships those that had landed, killing some
and taking others prisoners; after which they set up a trophy, and gave
back the dead under truce.

About the same time with the affair of Delium took place the death of
Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, who was defeated in battle, in a
campaign against the Triballi; Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, his nephew,
succeeding to the kingdom of the Odrysians, and of the rest of Thrace
ruled by Sitalces.

The same winter Brasidas, with his allies in the Thracian places,
marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon. A
settlement upon the spot on which the city now stands was before
attempted by Aristagoras, the Milesian (when he fled from King Darius),
who was however dislodged by the Edonians; and thirty-two years later
by the Athenians, who sent thither ten thousand settlers of their own
citizens, and whoever else chose to go. These were cut off at Drabescus
by the Thracians. Twenty-nine years after, the Athenians returned
(Hagnon, son of Nicias, being sent out as leader of the colony) and
drove out the Edonians, and founded a town on the spot, formerly called
Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways. The base from which they started was Eion,
their commercial seaport at the mouth of the river, not more than three
miles from the present town, which Hagnon named Amphipolis, because the
Strymon flows round it on two sides, and he built it so as to be
conspicuous from the sea and land alike, running a long wall across
from river to river, to complete the circumference.

Brasidas now marched against this town, starting from Arne in
Chalcidice. Arriving about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake
of Bolbe runs into the sea, he supped there, and went on during the
night. The weather was stormy and it was snowing a little, which
encouraged him to hurry on, in order, if possible, to take every one at
Amphipolis by surprise, except the party who were to betray it. The
plot was carried on by some natives of Argilus, an Andrian colony,
residing in Amphipolis, where they had also other accomplices gained
over by Perdiccas or the Chalcidians. But the most active in the matter
were the inhabitants of Argilus itself, which is close by, who had
always been suspected by the Athenians, and had had designs on the
place. These men now saw their opportunity arrive with Brasidas, and
having for some time been in correspondence with their countrymen in
Amphipolis for the betrayal of the town, at once received him into
Argilus, and revolted from the Athenians, and that same night took him
on to the bridge over the river; where he found only a small guard to
oppose him, the town being at some distance from the passage, and the
walls not reaching down to it as at present. This guard he easily drove
in, partly through there being treason in their ranks, partly from the
stormy state of the weather and the suddenness of his attack, and so
got across the bridge, and immediately became master of all the
property outside; the Amphipolitans having houses all over the quarter.

The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise to the people in the
town; and the capture of many of those outside, and the flight of the
rest within the wall, combined to produce great confusion among the
citizens; especially as they did not trust one another. It is even said
that if Brasidas, instead of stopping to pillage, had advanced straight
against the town, he would probably have taken it. In fact, however, he
established himself where he was and overran the country outside, and
for the present remained inactive, vainly awaiting a demonstration on
the part of his friends within. Meanwhile the party opposed to the
traitors proved numerous enough to prevent the gates being immediately
thrown open, and in concert with Eucles, the general, who had come from
Athens to defend the place, sent to the other commander in Thrace,
Thucydides, son of Olorus, the author of this history, who was at the
isle of Thasos, a Parian colony, half a day’s sail from Amphipolis, to
tell him to come to their relief. On receipt of this message he at once
set sail with seven ships which he had with him, in order, if possible,
to reach Amphipolis in time to prevent its capitulation, or in any case
to save Eion.

Meanwhile Brasidas, afraid of succours arriving by sea from Thasos, and
learning that Thucydides possessed the right of working the gold mines
in that part of Thrace, and had thus great influence with the
inhabitants of the continent, hastened to gain the town, if possible,
before the people of Amphipolis should be encouraged by his arrival to
hope that he could save them by getting together a force of allies from
the sea and from Thrace, and so refuse to surrender. He accordingly
offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any of the Amphipolitans and
Athenians who chose, might continue to enjoy their property with full
rights of citizenship; while those who did not wish to stay had five
days to depart, taking their property with them.

The bulk of the inhabitants, upon hearing this, began to change their
minds, especially as only a small number of the citizens were
Athenians, the majority having come from different quarters, and many
of the prisoners outside had relations within the walls. They found the
proclamation a fair one in comparison of what their fear had suggested;
the Athenians being glad to go out, as they thought they ran more risk
than the rest, and further, did not expect any speedy relief, and the
multitude generally being content at being left in possession of their
civic rights, and at such an unexpected reprieve from danger. The
partisans of Brasidas now openly advocated this course, seeing that the
feeling of the people had changed, and that they no longer gave ear to
the Athenian general present; and thus the surrender was made and
Brasidas was admitted by them on the terms of his proclamation. In this
way they gave up the city, and late in the same day Thucydides and his
ships entered the harbour of Eion, Brasidas having just got hold of
Amphipolis, and having been within a night of taking Eion: had the
ships been less prompt in relieving it, in the morning it would have
been his.

After this Thucydides put all in order at Eion to secure it against any
present or future attack of Brasidas, and received such as had elected
to come there from the interior according to the terms agreed on.
Meanwhile Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of boats down the
river to Eion to see if he could not seize the point running out from
the wall, and so command the entrance; at the same time he attempted it
by land, but was beaten off on both sides and had to content himself
with arranging matters at Amphipolis and in the neighbourhood.
Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him; the Edonian king
Pittacus having been killed by the sons of Goaxis and his own wife
Brauro; and Galepsus and Oesime, which are Thasian colonies, not long
after followed its example. Perdiccas too came up immediately after the
capture and joined in these arrangements.

The news that Amphipolis was in the hands of the enemy caused great
alarm at Athens. Not only was the town valuable for the timber it
afforded for shipbuilding, and the money that it brought in; but also,
although the escort of the Thessalians gave the Lacedaemonians a means
of reaching the allies of Athens as far as the Strymon, yet as long as
they were not masters of the bridge but were watched on the side of
Eion by the Athenian galleys, and on the land side impeded by a large
and extensive lake formed by the waters of the river, it was impossible
for them to go any further. Now, on the contrary, the path seemed open.
There was also the fear of the allies revolting, owing to the
moderation displayed by Brasidas in all his conduct, and to the
declarations which he was everywhere making that he sent out to free
Hellas. The towns subject to the Athenians, hearing of the capture of
Amphipolis and of the terms accorded to it, and of the gentleness of
Brasidas, felt most strongly encouraged to change their condition, and
sent secret messages to him, begging him to come on to them; each
wishing to be the first to revolt. Indeed there seemed to be no danger
in so doing; their mistake in their estimate of the Athenian power was
as great as that power afterwards turned out to be, and their judgment
was based more upon blind wishing than upon any sound prevision; for it
is a habit of mankind to entrust to careless hope what they long for,
and to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what they do not fancy.
Besides the late severe blow which the Athenians had met with in
Boeotia, joined to the seductive, though untrue, statements of
Brasidas, about the Athenians not having ventured to engage his single
army at Nisaea, made the allies confident, and caused them to believe
that no Athenian force would be sent against them. Above all the wish
to do what was agreeable at the moment, and the likelihood that they
should find the Lacedaemonians full of zeal at starting, made them
eager to venture. Observing this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the
different towns, as far as was possible at such short notice and in
winter; while Brasidas sent dispatches to Lacedaemon asking for
reinforcements, and himself made preparations for building galleys in
the Strymon. The Lacedaemonians however did not send him any, partly
through envy on the part of their chief men, partly because they were
more bent on recovering the prisoners of the island and ending the war.

The same winter the Megarians took and razed to the foundations the
long walls which had been occupied by the Athenians; and Brasidas after
the capture of Amphipolis marched with his allies against Acte, a
promontory running out from the King’s dike with an inward curve, and
ending in Athos, a lofty mountain looking towards the Aegean Sea. In it
are various towns, Sane, an Andrian colony, close to the canal, and
facing the sea in the direction of Euboea; the others being Thyssus,
Cleone, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium, inhabited by mixed barbarian
races speaking the two languages. There is also a small Chalcidian
element; but the greater number are Tyrrheno-Pelasgians once settled in
Lemnos and Athens, and Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians; the towns
being all small ones. Most of these came over to Brasidas; but Sane and
Dium held out and saw their land ravaged by him and his army.

Upon their not submitting, he at once marched against Torone in
Chalcidice, which was held by an Athenian garrison, having been invited
by a few persons who were prepared to hand over the town. Arriving in
the dark a little before daybreak, he sat down with his army near the
temple of the Dioscuri, rather more than a quarter of a mile from the
city. The rest of the town of Torone and the Athenians in garrison did
not perceive his approach; but his partisans knowing that he was coming
(a few of them had secretly gone out to meet him) were on the watch for
his arrival, and were no sooner aware of it than they took it to them
seven light-armed men with daggers, who alone of twenty men ordered on
this service dared to enter, commanded by Lysistratus an Olynthian.
These passed through the sea wall, and without being seen went up and
put to the sword the garrison of the highest post in the town, which
stands on a hill, and broke open the postern on the side of
Canastraeum.

Brasidas meanwhile came a little nearer and then halted with his main
body, sending on one hundred targeteers to be ready to rush in first,
the moment that a gate should be thrown open and the beacon lighted as
agreed. After some time passed in waiting and wondering at the delay,
the targeteers by degrees got up close to the town. The Toronaeans
inside at work with the party that had entered had by this time broken
down the postern and opened the gates leading to the market-place by
cutting through the bar, and first brought some men round and let them
in by the postern, in order to strike a panic into the surprised
townsmen by suddenly attacking them from behind and on both sides at
once; after which they raised the fire-signal as had been agreed, and
took in by the market gates the rest of the targeteers.

Brasidas seeing the signal told the troops to rise, and dashed forward
amid the loud hurrahs of his men, which carried dismay among the
astonished townspeople. Some burst in straight by the gate, others over
some square pieces of timber placed against the wall (which has fallen
down and was being rebuilt) to draw up stones; Brasidas and the greater
number making straight uphill for the higher part of the town, in order
to take it from top to bottom, and once for all, while the rest of the
multitude spread in all directions.

The capture of the town was effected before the great body of the
Toronaeans had recovered from their surprise and confusion; but the
conspirators and the citizens of their party at once joined the
invaders. About fifty of the Athenian heavy infantry happened to be
sleeping in the market-place when the alarm reached them. A few of
these were killed fighting; the rest escaped, some by land, others to
the two ships on the station, and took refuge in Lecythus, a fort
garrisoned by their own men in the corner of the town running out into
the sea and cut off by a narrow isthmus; where they were joined by the
Toronaeans of their party.

Day now arrived, and the town being secured, Brasidas made a
proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians,
to come out, as many as chose, to their homes without fearing for their
rights or persons, and sent a herald to invite the Athenians to accept
a truce, and to evacuate Lecythus with their property, as being
Chalcidian ground. The Athenians refused this offer, but asked for a
truce for a day to take up their dead. Brasidas granted it for two
days, which he employed in fortifying the houses near, and the
Athenians in doing the same to their positions. Meanwhile he called a
meeting of the Toronaeans, and said very much what he had said at
Acanthus, namely, that they must not look upon those who had negotiated
with him for the capture of the town as bad men or as traitors, as they
had not acted as they had done from corrupt motives or in order to
enslave the city, but for the good and freedom of Torone; nor again
must those who had not shared in the enterprise fancy that they would
not equally reap its fruits, as he had not come to destroy either city
or individual. This was the reason of his proclamation to those that
had fled for refuge to the Athenians: he thought none the worse of them
for their friendship for the Athenians; he believed that they had only
to make trial of the Lacedaemonians to like them as well, or even much
better, as acting much more justly: it was for want of such a trial
that they were now afraid of them. Meanwhile he warned all of them to
prepare to be staunch allies, and for being held responsible for all
faults in future: for the past, they had not wronged the Lacedaemonians
but had been wronged by others who were too strong for them, and any
opposition that they might have offered him could be excused.

Having encouraged them with this address, as soon as the truce expired
he made his attack upon Lecythus; the Athenians defending themselves
from a poor wall and from some houses with parapets. One day they beat
him off; the next the enemy were preparing to bring up an engine
against them from which they meant to throw fire upon the wooden
defences, and the troops were already coming up to the point where they
fancied they could best bring up the engine, and where place was most
assailable; meanwhile the Athenians put a wooden tower upon a house
opposite, and carried up a quantity of jars and casks of water and big
stones, and a large number of men also climbed up. The house thus laden
too heavily suddenly broke down with a loud crash; at which the men who
were near and saw it were more vexed than frightened; but those not so
near, and still more those furthest off, thought that the place was
already taken at that point, and fled in haste to the sea and the
ships.

Brasidas, perceiving that they were deserting the parapet, and seeing
what was going on, dashed forward with his troops, and immediately took
the fort, and put to the sword all whom he found in it. In this way the
place was evacuated by the Athenians, who went across in their boats
and ships to Pallene. Now there is a temple of Athene in Lecythus, and
Brasidas had proclaimed in the moment of making the assault that he
would give thirty silver minae to the man first on the wall. Being now
of opinion that the capture was scarcely due to human means, he gave
the thirty minae to the goddess for her temple, and razed and cleared
Lecythus, and made the whole of it consecrated ground. The rest of the
winter he spent in settling the places in his hands, and in making
designs upon the rest; and with the expiration of the winter the eighth
year of this war ended.

In the spring of the summer following, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians
made an armistice for a year; the Athenians thinking that they would
thus have full leisure to take their precautions before Brasidas could
procure the revolt of any more of their towns, and might also, if it
suited them, conclude a general peace; the Lacedaemonians divining the
actual fears of the Athenians, and thinking that after once tasting a
respite from trouble and misery they would be more disposed to consent
to a reconciliation, and to give back the prisoners, and make a treaty
for the longer period. The great idea of the Lacedaemonians was to get
back their men while Brasidas’s good fortune lasted: further successes
might make the struggle a less unequal one in Chalcidice, but would
leave them still deprived of their men, and even in Chalcidice not more
than a match for the Athenians and by no means certain of victory. An
armistice was accordingly concluded by Lacedaemon and her allies upon
the terms following:

1. As to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we are agreed
that whosoever will shall have access to it, without fraud or fear,
according to the usages of his forefathers. The Lacedaemonians and the
allies present agree to this, and promise to send heralds to the
Boeotians and Phocians, and to do their best to persuade them to agree
likewise.

2. As to the treasure of the god, we agree to exert ourselves to detect
all malversators, truly and honestly following the customs of our
forefathers, we and you and all others willing to do so, all following
the customs of our forefathers. As to these points the Lacedaemonians
and the other allies are agreed as has been said.

3. As to what follows, the Lacedaemonians and the other allies agree,
if the Athenians conclude a treaty, to remain, each of us in our own
territory, retaining our respective acquisitions: the garrison in
Coryphasium keeping within Buphras and Tomeus: that in Cythera
attempting no communication with the Peloponnesian confederacy, neither
we with them, nor they with us: that in Nisaea and Minoa not crossing
the road leading from the gates of the temple of Nisus to that of
Poseidon and from thence straight to the bridge at Minoa: the Megarians
and the allies being equally bound not to cross this road, and the
Athenians retaining the island they have taken, without any
communication on either side: as to Troezen, each side retaining what
it has, and as was arranged with the Athenians.

4. As to the use of the sea, so far as refers to their own coast and to
that of their confederacy, that the Lacedaemonians and their allies may
voyage upon it in any vessel rowed by oars and of not more than five
hundred talents tonnage, not a vessel of war.

5. That all heralds and embassies, with as many attendants as they
please, for concluding the war and adjusting claims, shall have free
passage, going and coming, to Peloponnese or Athens by land and by sea.

6. That during the truce, deserters whether bond or free shall be
received neither by you, nor by us.

7. Further, that satisfaction shall be given by you to us and by us to
you according to the public law of our several countries, all disputes
being settled by law without recourse to hostilities.

The Lacedaemonians and allies agree to these articles; but if you have
anything fairer or juster to suggest, come to Lacedaemon and let us
know: whatever shall be just will meet with no objection either from
the Lacedaemonians or from the allies. Only let those who come come
with full powers, as you desire us. The truce shall be for one year.

Approved by the people.

The tribe of Acamantis had the prytany, Phoenippus was secretary,
Niciades chairman. Laches moved, in the name of the good luck of the
Athenians, that they should conclude the armistice upon the terms
agreed upon by the Lacedaemonians and the allies. It was agreed
accordingly in the popular assembly that the armistice should be for
one year, beginning that very day, the fourteenth of the month of
Elaphebolion; during which time ambassadors and heralds should go and
come between the two countries to discuss the bases of a pacification.
That the generals and prytanes should call an assembly of the people,
in which the Athenians should first consult on the peace, and on the
mode in which the embassy for putting an end to the war should be
admitted. That the embassy now present should at once take the
engagement before the people to keep well and truly this truce for one
year.

On these terms the Lacedaemonians concluded with the Athenians and
their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius; the
allies also taking the oaths. Those who concluded and poured the
libation were Taurus, son of Echetimides, Athenaeus, son of
Pericleidas, and Philocharidas, son of Eryxidaidas, Lacedaemonians;
Aeneas, son of Ocytus, and Euphamidas, son of Aristonymus, Corinthians;
Damotimus, son of Naucrates, and Onasimus, son of Megacles, Sicyonians;
Nicasus, son of Cecalus, and Menecrates, son of Amphidorus, Megarians;
and Amphias, son of Eupaidas, an Epidaurian; and the Athenian generals
Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Autocles,
son of Tolmaeus. Such was the armistice, and during the whole of it
conferences went on on the subject of a pacification.

In the days in which they were going backwards and forwards to these
conferences, Scione, a town in Pallene, revolted from Athens, and went
over to Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they are Pallenians from
Peloponnese, and that their first founders on their voyage from Troy
were carried in to this spot by the storm which the Achaeans were
caught in, and there settled. The Scionaeans had no sooner revolted
than Brasidas crossed over by night to Scione, with a friendly galley
ahead and himself in a small boat some way behind; his idea being that
if he fell in with a vessel larger than the boat he would have the
galley to defend him, while a ship that was a match for the galley
would probably neglect the small vessel to attack the large one, and
thus leave him time to escape. His passage effected, he called a
meeting of the Scionaeans and spoke to the same effect as at Acanthus
and Torone, adding that they merited the utmost commendation, in that,
in spite of Pallene within the isthmus being cut off by the Athenian
occupation of Potidæa and of their own practically insular position,
they had of their own free will gone forward to meet their liberty
instead of timorously waiting until they had been by force compelled to
their own manifest good. This was a sign that they would valiantly
undergo any trial, however great; and if he should order affairs as he
intended, he should count them among the truest and sincerest friends
of the Lacedaemonians, and would in every other way honour them.

The Scionaeans were elated by his language, and even those who had at
first disapproved of what was being done catching the general
confidence, they determined on a vigorous conduct of the war, and
welcomed Brasidas with all possible honours, publicly crowning him with
a crown of gold as the liberator of Hellas; while private persons
crowded round him and decked him with garlands as though he had been an
athlete. Meanwhile Brasidas left them a small garrison for the present
and crossed back again, and not long afterwards sent over a larger
force, intending with the help of the Scionaeans to attempt Mende and
Potidæa before the Athenians should arrive; Scione, he felt, being too
like an island for them not to relieve it. He had besides intelligence
in the above towns about their betrayal.

In the midst of his designs upon the towns in question, a galley
arrived with the commissioners carrying round the news of the
armistice, Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the
Lacedaemonians. The troops now crossed back to Torone, and the
commissioners gave Brasidas notice of the convention. All the
Lacedaemonian allies in Thrace accepted what had been done; and
Aristonymus made no difficulty about the rest, but finding, on counting
the days, that the Scionaeans had revolted after the date of the
convention, refused to include them in it. To this Brasidas earnestly
objected, asserting that the revolt took place before, and would not
give up the town. Upon Aristonymus reporting the case to Athens, the
people at once prepared to send an expedition to Scione. Upon this,
envoys arrived from Lacedaemon, alleging that this would be a breach of
the truce, and laying claim to the town upon the faith of the assertion
of Brasidas, and meanwhile offering to submit the question to
arbitration. Arbitration, however, was what the Athenians did not
choose to risk; being determined to send troops at once to the place,
and furious at the idea of even the islanders now daring to revolt, in
a vain reliance upon the power of the Lacedaemonians by land. Besides
the facts of the revolt were rather as the Athenians contended, the
Scionaeans having revolted two days after the convention. Cleon
accordingly succeeded in carrying a decree to reduce and put to death
the Scionaeans; and the Athenians employed the leisure which they now
enjoyed in preparing for the expedition.

Meanwhile Mende revolted, a town in Pallene and a colony of the
Eretrians, and was received without scruple by Brasidas, in spite of
its having evidently come over during the armistice, on account of
certain infringements of the truce alleged by him against the
Athenians. This audacity of Mende was partly caused by seeing Brasidas
forward in the matter and by the conclusions drawn from his refusal to
betray Scione; and besides, the conspirators in Mende were few, and, as
I have already intimated, had carried on their practices too long not
to fear detection for themselves, and not to wish to force the
inclination of the multitude. This news made the Athenians more furious
than ever, and they at once prepared against both towns. Brasidas,
expecting their arrival, conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice the
women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans, and sent over to
them five hundred Peloponnesian heavy infantry and three hundred
Chalcidian targeteers, all under the command of Polydamidas.

Leaving these two towns to prepare together against the speedy arrival
of the Athenians, Brasidas and Perdiccas started on a second joint
expedition into Lyncus against Arrhabaeus; the latter with the forces
of his Macedonian subjects, and a corps of heavy infantry composed of
Hellenes domiciled in the country; the former with the Peloponnesians
whom he still had with him and the Chalcidians, Acanthians, and the
rest in such force as they were able. In all there were about three
thousand Hellenic heavy infantry, accompanied by all the Macedonian
cavalry with the Chalcidians, near one thousand strong, besides an
immense crowd of barbarians. On entering the country of Arrhabaeus,
they found the Lyncestians encamped awaiting them, and themselves took
up a position opposite. The infantry on either side were upon a hill,
with a plain between them, into which the horse of both armies first
galloped down and engaged a cavalry action. After this the Lyncestian
heavy infantry advanced from their hill to join their cavalry and
offered battle; upon which Brasidas and Perdiccas also came down to
meet them, and engaged and routed them with heavy loss; the survivors
taking refuge upon the heights and there remaining inactive. The
victors now set up a trophy and waited two or three days for the
Illyrian mercenaries who were to join Perdiccas. Perdiccas then wished
to go on and attack the villages of Arrhabaeus, and to sit still no
longer; but Brasidas, afraid that the Athenians might sail up during
his absence, and of something happening to Mende, and seeing besides
that the Illyrians did not appear, far from seconding this wish was
anxious to return.

While they were thus disputing, the news arrived that the Illyrians had
actually betrayed Perdiccas and had joined Arrhabaeus; and the fear
inspired by their warlike character made both parties now think it best
to retreat. However, owing to the dispute, nothing had been settled as
to when they should start; and night coming on, the Macedonians and the
barbarian crowd took fright in a moment in one of those mysterious
panics to which great armies are liable; and persuaded that an army
many times more numerous than that which had really arrived was
advancing and all but upon them, suddenly broke and fled in the
direction of home, and thus compelled Perdiccas, who at first did not
perceive what had occurred, to depart without seeing Brasidas, the two
armies being encamped at a considerable distance from each other. At
daybreak Brasidas, perceiving that the Macedonians had gone on, and
that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were on the point of attacking him,
formed his heavy infantry into a square, with the light troops in the
centre, and himself also prepared to retreat. Posting his youngest
soldiers to dash out wherever the enemy should attack them, he himself
with three hundred picked men in the rear intended to face about during
the retreat and beat off the most forward of their assailants,
Meanwhile, before the enemy approached, he sought to sustain the
courage of his soldiers with the following hasty exhortation:

“Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect you of being dismayed at being
left alone to sustain the attack of a numerous and barbarian enemy, I
should just have said a few words to you as usual without further
explanation. As it is, in the face of the desertion of our friends and
the numbers of the enemy, I have some advice and information to offer,
which, brief as they must be, will, I hope, suffice for the more
important points. The bravery that you habitually display in war does
not depend on your having allies at your side in this or that
encounter, but on your native courage; nor have numbers any terrors for
citizens of states like yours, in which the many do not rule the few,
but rather the few the many, owing their position to nothing else than
to superiority in the field. Inexperience now makes you afraid of
barbarians; and yet the trial of strength which you had with the
Macedonians among them, and my own judgment, confirmed by what I hear
from others, should be enough to satisfy you that they will not prove
formidable. Where an enemy seems strong but is really weak, a true
knowledge of the facts makes his adversary the bolder, just as a
serious antagonist is encountered most confidently by those who do not
know him. Thus the present enemy might terrify an inexperienced
imagination; they are formidable in outward bulk, their loud yelling is
unbearable, and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a
threatening appearance. But when it comes to real fighting with an
opponent who stands his ground, they are not what they seemed; they
have no regular order that they should be ashamed of deserting their
positions when hard pressed; flight and attack are with them equally
honourable, and afford no test of courage; their independent mode of
fighting never leaving any one who wants to run away without a fair
excuse for so doing. In short, they think frightening you at a secure
distance a surer game than meeting you hand to hand; otherwise they
would have done the one and not the other. You can thus plainly see
that the terrors with which they were at first invested are in fact
trifling enough, though to the eye and ear very prominent. Stand your
ground therefore when they advance, and again wait your opportunity to
retire in good order, and you will reach a place of safety all the
sooner, and will know for ever afterwards that rabble such as these, to
those who sustain their first attack, do but show off their courage by
threats of the terrible things that they are going to do, at a
distance, but with those who give way to them are quick enough to
display their heroism in pursuit when they can do so without danger.”

With this brief address Brasidas began to lead off his army. Seeing
this, the barbarians came on with much shouting and hubbub, thinking
that he was flying and that they would overtake him and cut him off.
But wherever they charged they found the young men ready to dash out
against them, while Brasidas with his picked company sustained their
onset. Thus the Peloponnesians withstood the first attack, to the
surprise of the enemy, and afterwards received and repulsed them as
fast as they came on, retiring as soon as their opponents became quiet.
The main body of the barbarians ceased therefore to molest the Hellenes
with Brasidas in the open country, and leaving behind a certain number
to harass their march, the rest went on after the flying Macedonians,
slaying those with whom they came up, and so arrived in time to occupy
the narrow pass between two hills that leads into the country of
Arrhabaeus. They knew that this was the only way by which Brasidas
could retreat, and now proceeded to surround him just as he entered the
most impracticable part of the road, in order to cut him off.

Brasidas, perceiving their intention, told his three hundred to run on
without order, each as quickly as he could, to the hill which seemed
easiest to take, and to try to dislodge the barbarians already there,
before they should be joined by the main body closing round him. These
attacked and overpowered the party upon the hill, and the main army of
the Hellenes now advanced with less difficulty towards it—the
barbarians being terrified at seeing their men on that side driven from
the height and no longer following the main body, who, they considered,
had gained the frontier and made good their escape. The heights once
gained, Brasidas now proceeded more securely, and the same day arrived
at Arnisa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas. The soldiers,
enraged at the desertion of the Macedonians, vented their rage on all
their yokes of oxen which they found on the road, and on any baggage
which had tumbled off (as might easily happen in the panic of a night
retreat), by unyoking and cutting down the cattle and taking the
baggage for themselves. From this moment Perdiccas began to regard
Brasidas as an enemy and to feel against the Peloponnesians a hatred
which could not be congenial to the adversary of the Athenians.
However, he departed from his natural interests and made it his
endeavour to come to terms with the latter and to get rid of the
former.

On his return from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found the Athenians
already masters of Mende, and remained quiet where he was, thinking it
now out of his power to cross over into Pallene and assist the
Mendaeans, but he kept good watch over Torone. For about the same time
as the campaign in Lyncus, the Athenians sailed upon the expedition
which we left them preparing against Mende and Scione, with fifty
ships, ten of which were Chians, one thousand Athenian heavy infantry
and six hundred archers, one hundred Thracian mercenaries and some
targeteers drawn from their allies in the neighbourhood, under the
command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus, son of
Diitrephes. Weighing from Potidæa, the fleet came to land opposite the
temple of Poseidon, and proceeded against Mende; the men of which town,
reinforced by three hundred Scionaeans, with their Peloponnesian
auxiliaries, seven hundred heavy infantry in all, under Polydamidas,
they found encamped upon a strong hill outside the city. These Nicias,
with one hundred and twenty light-armed Methonaeans, sixty picked men
from the Athenian heavy infantry, and all the archers, tried to reach
by a path running up the hill, but received a wound and found himself
unable to force the position; while Nicostratus, with all the rest of
the army, advancing upon the hill, which was naturally difficult, by a
different approach further off, was thrown into utter disorder; and the
whole Athenian army narrowly escaped being defeated. For that day, as
the Mendaeans and their allies showed no signs of yielding, the
Athenians retreated and encamped, and the Mendaeans at nightfall
returned into the town.

The next day the Athenians sailed round to the Scione side, and took
the suburb, and all day plundered the country, without any one coming
out against them, partly because of intestine disturbances in the town;
and the following night the three hundred Scionaeans returned home. On
the morrow Nicias advanced with half the army to the frontier of Scione
and laid waste the country; while Nicostratus with the remainder sat
down before the town near the upper gate on the road to Potidæa. The
arms of the Mendaeans and of their Peloponnesian auxiliaries within the
wall happened to be piled in that quarter, where Polydamidas
accordingly began to draw them up for battle, encouraging the Mendaeans
to make a sortie. At this moment one of the popular party answered him
factiously that they would not go out and did not want a war, and for
thus answering was dragged by the arm and knocked about by Polydamidas.
Hereupon the infuriated commons at once seized their arms and rushed at
the Peloponnesians and at their allies of the opposite faction. The
troops thus assaulted were at once routed, partly from the suddenness
of the conflict and partly through fear of the gates being opened to
the Athenians, with whom they imagined that the attack had been
concerted. As many as were not killed on the spot took refuge in the
citadel, which they had held from the first; and the whole, Athenian
army, Nicias having by this time returned and being close to the city,
now burst into Mende, which had opened its gates without any
convention, and sacked it just as if they had taken it by storm, the
generals even finding some difficulty in restraining them from also
massacring the inhabitants. After this the Athenians told the Mendaeans
that they might retain their civil rights, and themselves judge the
supposed authors of the revolt; and cut off the party in the citadel by
a wall built down to the sea on either side, appointing troops to
maintain the blockade. Having thus secured Mende, they proceeded
against Scione.

The Scionaeans and Peloponnesians marched out against them, occupying a
strong hill in front of the town, which had to be captured by the enemy
before they could invest the place. The Athenians stormed the hill,
defeated and dislodged its occupants, and, having encamped and set up a
trophy, prepared for the work of circumvallation. Not long after they
had begun their operations, the auxiliaries besieged in the citadel of
Mende forced the guard by the sea-side and arrived by night at Scione,
into which most of them succeeded in entering, passing through the
besieging army.

While the investment of Scione was in progress, Perdiccas sent a herald
to the Athenian generals and made peace with the Athenians, through
spite against Brasidas for the retreat from Lyncus, from which moment
indeed he had begun to negotiate. The Lacedaemonian Ischagoras was just
then upon the point of starting with an army overland to join Brasidas;
and Perdiccas, being now required by Nicias to give some proof of the
sincerity of his reconciliation to the Athenians, and being himself no
longer disposed to let the Peloponnesians into his country, put in
motion his friends in Thessaly, with whose chief men he always took
care to have relations, and so effectually stopped the army and its
preparation that they did not even try the Thessalians. Ischagoras
himself, however, with Ameinias and Aristeus, succeeded in reaching
Brasidas; they had been commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to inspect
the state of affairs, and brought out from Sparta (in violation of all
precedent) some of their young men to put in command of the towns, to
guard against their being entrusted to the persons upon the spot.
Brasidas accordingly placed Clearidas, son of Cleonymus, in Amphipolis,
and Pasitelidas, son of Hegesander, in Torone.

The same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians on the
charge of Atticism, having always wished to do so, and now finding it
an easy matter, as the flower of the Thespian youth had perished in the
battle with the Athenians. The same summer also the temple of Hera at
Argos was burnt down, through Chrysis, the priestess, placing a lighted
torch near the garlands and then falling asleep, so that they all
caught fire and were in a blaze before she observed it. Chrysis that
very night fled to Phlius for fear of the Argives, who, agreeably to
the law in such a case, appointed another priestess named Phaeinis.
Chrysis at the time of her flight had been priestess for eight years of
the present war and half the ninth. At the close of the summer the
investment of Scione was completed, and the Athenians, leaving a
detachment to maintain the blockade, returned with the rest of their
army.

During the winter following, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were kept
quiet by the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, and their
respective allies, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the Oresthid. The
victory remained doubtful, as each side routed one of the wings opposed
to them, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi. After
heavy loss on both sides the battle was undecided, and night
interrupted the action; yet the Tegeans passed the night on the field
and set up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion
and set up theirs afterwards.

At the close of the same winter, in fact almost in spring, Brasidas
made an attempt upon Potidæa. He arrived by night, and succeeded in
planting a ladder against the wall without being discovered, the ladder
being planted just in the interval between the passing round of the
bell and the return of the man who brought it back. Upon the garrison,
however, taking the alarm immediately afterwards, before his men came
up, he quickly led off his troops, without waiting until it was day. So
ended the winter and the ninth year of this war of which Thucydides is
the historian.




BOOK V




CHAPTER XV


Tenth Year of the War—Death of Cleon and Brasidas—Peace of Nicias


The next summer the truce for a year ended, after lasting until the
Pythian games. During the armistice the Athenians expelled the Delians
from Delos, concluding that they must have been polluted by some old
offence at the time of their consecration, and that this had been the
omission in the previous purification of the island, which, as I have
related, had been thought to have been duly accomplished by the removal
of the graves of the dead. The Delians had Atramyttium in Asia given
them by Pharnaces, and settled there as they removed from Delos.

Meanwhile Cleon prevailed on the Athenians to let him set sail at the
expiration of the armistice for the towns in the direction of Thrace
with twelve hundred heavy infantry and three hundred horse from Athens,
a large force of the allies, and thirty ships. First touching at the
still besieged Scione, and taking some heavy infantry from the army
there, he next sailed into Cophos, a harbour in the territory of
Torone, which is not far from the town. From thence, having learnt from
deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone, and that its garrison was
not strong enough to give him battle, he advanced with his army against
the town, sending ten ships to sail round into the harbour. He first
came to the fortification lately thrown up in front of the town by
Brasidas in order to take in the suburb, to do which he had pulled down
part of the original wall and made it all one city. To this point
Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian commander, with such garrison as there
was in the place, hurried to repel the Athenian assault; but finding
himself hard pressed, and seeing the ships that had been sent round
sailing into the harbour, Pasitelidas began to be afraid that they
might get up to the city before its defenders were there and, the
fortification being also carried, he might be taken prisoner, and so
abandoned the outwork and ran into the town. But the Athenians from the
ships had already taken Torone, and their land forces following at his
heels burst in with him with a rush over the part of the old wall that
had been pulled down, killing some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans
in the melee, and making prisoners of the rest, and Pasitelidas their
commander amongst them. Brasidas meanwhile had advanced to relieve
Torone, and had only about four miles more to go when he heard of its
fall on the road, and turned back again. Cleon and the Athenians set up
two trophies, one by the harbour, the other by the fortification and,
making slaves of the wives and children of the Toronaeans, sent the men
with the Peloponnesians and any Chalcidians that were there, to the
number of seven hundred, to Athens; whence, however, they all came home
afterwards, the Peloponnesians on the conclusion of peace, and the rest
by being exchanged against other prisoners with the Olynthians. About
the same time Panactum, a fortress on the Athenian border, was taken by
treachery by the Boeotians. Meanwhile Cleon, after placing a garrison
in Torone, weighed anchor and sailed around Athos on his way to
Amphipolis.

About the same time Phaeax, son of Erasistratus, set sail with two
colleagues as ambassador from Athens to Italy and Sicily. The
Leontines, upon the departure of the Athenians from Sicily after the
pacification, had placed a number of new citizens upon the roll, and
the commons had a design for redividing the land; but the upper
classes, aware of their intention, called in the Syracusans and
expelled the commons. These last were scattered in various directions;
but the upper classes came to an agreement with the Syracusans,
abandoned and laid waste their city, and went and lived at Syracuse,
where they were made citizens. Afterwards some of them were
dissatisfied, and leaving Syracuse occupied Phocaeae, a quarter of the
town of Leontini, and Bricinniae, a strong place in the Leontine
country, and being there joined by most of the exiled commons carried
on war from the fortifications. The Athenians hearing this, sent Phaeax
to see if they could not by some means so convince their allies there
and the rest of the Sicilians of the ambitious designs of Syracuse as
to induce them to form a general coalition against her, and thus save
the commons of Leontini. Arrived in Sicily, Phaeax succeeded at
Camarina and Agrigentum, but meeting with a repulse at Gela did not go
on to the rest, as he saw that he should not succeed with them, but
returned through the country of the Sicels to Catana, and after
visiting Bricinniae as he passed, and encouraging its inhabitants,
sailed back to Athens.

During his voyage along the coast to and from Sicily, he treated with
some cities in Italy on the subject of friendship with Athens, and also
fell in with some Locrian settlers exiled from Messina, who had been
sent thither when the Locrians were called in by one of the factions
that divided Messina after the pacification of Sicily, and Messina came
for a time into the hands of the Locrians. These being met by Phaeax on
their return home received no injury at his hands, as the Locrians had
agreed with him for a treaty with Athens. They were the only people of
the allies who, when the reconciliation between the Sicilians took
place, had not made peace with her; nor indeed would they have done so
now, if they had not been pressed by a war with the Hipponians and
Medmaeans who lived on their border, and were colonists of theirs.
Phaeax meanwhile proceeded on his voyage, and at length arrived at
Athens.

Cleon, whom we left on his voyage from Torone to Amphipolis, made Eion
his base, and after an unsuccessful assault upon the Andrian colony of
Stagirus, took Galepsus, a colony of Thasos, by storm. He now sent
envoys to Perdiccas to command his attendance with an army, as provided
by the alliance; and others to Thrace, to Polles, king of the
Odomantians, who was to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as possible;
and himself remained inactive in Eion, awaiting their arrival. Informed
of this, Brasidas on his part took up a position of observation upon
Cerdylium, a place situated in the Argilian country on high ground
across the river, not far from Amphipolis, and commanding a view on all
sides, and thus made it impossible for Cleon’s army to move without his
seeing it; for he fully expected that Cleon, despising the scanty
numbers of his opponent, would march against Amphipolis with the force
that he had got with him. At the same time Brasidas made his
preparations, calling to his standard fifteen hundred Thracian
mercenaries and all the Edonians, horse and targeteers; he also had a
thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian targeteers, besides those in
Amphipolis, and a force of heavy infantry numbering altogether about
two thousand, and three hundred Hellenic horse. Fifteen hundred of
these he had with him upon Cerdylium; the rest were stationed with
Clearidas in Amphipolis.

After remaining quiet for some time, Cleon was at length obliged to do
as Brasidas expected. His soldiers, tired of their inactivity, began
also seriously to reflect on the weakness and incompetence of their
commander, and the skill and valour that would be opposed to him, and
on their own original unwillingness to accompany him. These murmurs
coming to the ears of Cleon, he resolved not to disgust the army by
keeping it in the same place, and broke up his camp and advanced. The
temper of the general was what it had been at Pylos, his success on
that occasion having given him confidence in his capacity. He never
dreamed of any one coming out to fight him, but said that he was rather
going up to view the place; and if he waited for his reinforcements, it
was not in order to make victory secure in case he should be compelled
to engage, but to be enabled to surround and storm the city. He
accordingly came and posted his army upon a strong hill in front of
Amphipolis, and proceeded to examine the lake formed by the Strymon,
and how the town lay on the side of Thrace. He thought to retire at
pleasure without fighting, as there was no one to be seen upon the wall
or coming out of the gates, all of which were shut. Indeed, it seemed a
mistake not to have brought down engines with him; he could then have
taken the town, there being no one to defend it.

As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion he descended himself
from Cerdylium and entered Amphipolis. He did not venture to go out in
regular order against the Athenians: he mistrusted his strength, and
thought it inadequate to the attempt; not in numbers—these were not so
unequal—but in quality, the flower of the Athenian army being in the
field, with the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians. He therefore
prepared to assail them by stratagem. By showing the enemy the number
of his troops, and the shifts which he had been put to to to arm them,
he thought that he should have less chance of beating him than by not
letting him have a sight of them, and thus learn how good a right he
had to despise them. He accordingly picked out a hundred and fifty
heavy infantry and, putting the rest under Clearidas, determined to
attack suddenly before the Athenians retired; thinking that he should
not have again such a chance of catching them alone, if their
reinforcements were once allowed to come up; and so calling all his
soldiers together in order to encourage them and explain his intention,
spoke as follows:

“Peloponnesians, the character of the country from which we have come,
one which has always owed its freedom to valour, and the fact that you
are Dorians and the enemy you are about to fight Ionians, whom you are
accustomed to beat, are things that do not need further comment. But
the plan of attack that I propose to pursue, this it is as well to
explain, in order that the fact of our adventuring with a part instead
of with the whole of our forces may not damp your courage by the
apparent disadvantage at which it places you. I imagine it is the poor
opinion that he has of us, and the fact that he has no idea of any one
coming out to engage him, that has made the enemy march up to the place
and carelessly look about him as he is doing, without noticing us. But
the most successful soldier will always be the man who most happily
detects a blunder like this, and who carefully consulting his own means
makes his attack not so much by open and regular approaches, as by
seizing the opportunity of the moment; and these stratagems, which do
the greatest service to our friends by most completely deceiving our
enemies, have the most brilliant name in war. Therefore, while their
careless confidence continues, and they are still thinking, as in my
judgment they are now doing, more of retreat than of maintaining their
position, while their spirit is slack and not high-strung with
expectation, I with the men under my command will, if possible, take
them by surprise and fall with a run upon their centre; and do you,
Clearidas, afterwards, when you see me already upon them, and, as is
likely, dealing terror among them, take with you the Amphipolitans, and
the rest of the allies, and suddenly open the gates and dash at them,
and hasten to engage as quickly as you can. That is our best chance of
establishing a panic among them, as a fresh assailant has always more
terrors for an enemy than the one he is immediately engaged with. Show
yourself a brave man, as a Spartan should; and do you, allies, follow
him like men, and remember that zeal, honour, and obedience mark the
good soldier, and that this day will make you either free men and
allies of Lacedaemon, or slaves of Athens; even if you escape without
personal loss of liberty or life, your bondage will be on harsher terms
than before, and you will also hinder the liberation of the rest of the
Hellenes. No cowardice then on your part, seeing the greatness of the
issues at stake, and I will show that what I preach to others I can
practise myself.”

After this brief speech Brasidas himself prepared for the sally, and
placed the rest with Clearidas at the Thracian gates to support him as
had been agreed. Meanwhile he had been seen coming down from Cerdylium
and then in the city, which is overlooked from the outside, sacrificing
near the temple of Athene; in short, all his movements had been
observed, and word was brought to Cleon, who had at the moment gone on
to look about him, that the whole of the enemy’s force could be seen in
the town, and that the feet of horses and men in great numbers were
visible under the gates, as if a sally were intended. Upon hearing this
he went up to look, and having done so, being unwilling to venture upon
the decisive step of a battle before his reinforcements came up, and
fancying that he would have time to retire, bid the retreat be sounded
and sent orders to the men to effect it by moving on the left wing in
the direction of Eion, which was indeed the only way practicable. This
however not being quick enough for him, he joined the retreat in person
and made the right wing wheel round, thus turning its unarmed side to
the enemy. It was then that Brasidas, seeing the Athenian force in
motion and his opportunity come, said to the men with him and the rest:
“Those fellows will never stand before us, one can see that by the way
their spears and heads are going. Troops which do as they do seldom
stand a charge. Quick, someone, and open the gates I spoke of, and let
us be out and at them with no fears for the result.” Accordingly
issuing out by the palisade gate and by the first in the long wall then
existing, he ran at the top of his speed along the straight road, where
the trophy now stands as you go by the steepest part of the hill, and
fell upon and routed the centre of the Athenians, panic-stricken by
their own disorder and astounded at his audacity. At the same moment
Clearidas in execution of his orders issued out from the Thracian gates
to support him, and also attacked the enemy. The result was that the
Athenians, suddenly and unexpectedly attacked on both sides, fell into
confusion; and their left towards Eion, which had already got on some
distance, at once broke and fled. Just as it was in full retreat and
Brasidas was passing on to attack the right, he received a wound; but
his fall was not perceived by the Athenians, as he was taken up by
those near him and carried off the field. The Athenian right made a
better stand, and though Cleon, who from the first had no thought of
fighting, at once fled and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian
targeteer, his infantry forming in close order upon the hill twice or
thrice repulsed the attacks of Clearidas, and did not finally give way
until they were surrounded and routed by the missiles of the Myrcinian
and Chalcidian horse and the targeteers. Thus the Athenian army was all
now in flight; and such as escaped being killed in the battle, or by
the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers, dispersed among the hills, and
with difficulty made their way to Eion. The men who had taken up and
rescued Brasidas, brought him into the town with the breath still in
him: he lived to hear of the victory of his troops, and not long after
expired. The rest of the army returning with Clearidas from the pursuit
stripped the dead and set up a trophy.

After this all the allies attended in arms and buried Brasidas at the
public expense in the city, in front of what is now the marketplace,
and the Amphipolitans, having enclosed his tomb, ever afterwards
sacrifice to him as a hero and have given to him the honour of games
and annual offerings. They constituted him the founder of their colony,
and pulled down the Hagnonic erections, and obliterated everything that
could be interpreted as a memorial of his having founded the place; for
they considered that Brasidas had been their preserver, and courting as
they did the alliance of Lacedaemon for fear of Athens, in their
present hostile relations with the latter they could no longer with the
same advantage or satisfaction pay Hagnon his honours. They also gave
the Athenians back their dead. About six hundred of the latter had
fallen and only seven of the enemy, owing to there having been no
regular engagement, but the affair of accident and panic that I have
described. After taking up their dead the Athenians sailed off home,
while Clearidas and his troops remained to arrange matters at
Amphipolis.

About the same time three Lacedaemonians—Ramphias, Autocharidas, and
Epicydidas—led a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy infantry to the
towns in the direction of Thrace, and arriving at Heraclea in Trachis
reformed matters there as seemed good to them. While they delayed
there, this battle took place and so the summer ended.

With the beginning of the winter following, Ramphias and his companions
penetrated as far as Pierium in Thessaly; but as the Thessalians
opposed their further advance, and Brasidas whom they came to reinforce
was dead, they turned back home, thinking that the moment had gone by,
the Athenians being defeated and gone, and themselves not equal to the
execution of Brasidas’s designs. The main cause however of their return
was because they knew that when they set out Lacedaemonian opinion was
really in favour of peace.

Indeed it so happened that directly after the battle of Amphipolis and
the retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly, both sides ceased to prosecute
the war and turned their attention to peace. Athens had suffered
severely at Delium, and again shortly afterwards at Amphipolis, and had
no longer that confidence in her strength which had made her before
refuse to treat, in the belief of ultimate victory which her success at
the moment had inspired; besides, she was afraid of her allies being
tempted by her reverses to rebel more generally, and repented having
let go the splendid opportunity for peace which the affair of Pylos had
offered. Lacedaemon, on the other hand, found the event of the war to
falsify her notion that a few years would suffice for the overthrow of
the power of the Athenians by the devastation of their land. She had
suffered on the island a disaster hitherto unknown at Sparta; she saw
her country plundered from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were
deserting, and she was in constant apprehension that those who remained
in Peloponnese would rely upon those outside and take advantage of the
situation to renew their old attempts at revolution. Besides this, as
chance would have it, her thirty years’ truce with the Argives was upon
the point of expiring; and they refused to renew it unless Cynuria were
restored to them; so that it seemed impossible to fight Argos and
Athens at once. She also suspected some of the cities in Peloponnese of
intending to go over to the enemy and that was indeed the case.

These considerations made both sides disposed for an accommodation; the
Lacedaemonians being probably the most eager, as they ardently desired
to recover the men taken upon the island, the Spartans among whom
belonged to the first families and were accordingly related to the
governing body in Lacedaemon. Negotiations had been begun directly
after their capture, but the Athenians in their hour of triumph would
not consent to any reasonable terms; though after their defeat at
Delium, Lacedaemon, knowing that they would be now more inclined to
listen, at once concluded the armistice for a year, during which they
were to confer together and see if a longer period could not be agreed
upon.

Now, however, after the Athenian defeat at Amphipolis, and the death of
Cleon and Brasidas, who had been the two principal opponents of peace
on either side—the latter from the success and honour which war gave
him, the former because he thought that, if tranquillity were restored,
his crimes would be more open to detection and his slanders less
credited—the foremost candidates for power in either city, Pleistoanax,
son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, and Nicias, son of Niceratus, the
most fortunate general of his time, each desired peace more ardently
than ever. Nicias, while still happy and honoured, wished to secure his
good fortune, to obtain a present release from trouble for himself and
his countrymen, and hand down to posterity a name as an ever-successful
statesman, and thought the way to do this was to keep out of danger and
commit himself as little as possible to fortune, and that peace alone
made this keeping out of danger possible. Pleistoanax, again, was
assailed by his enemies for his restoration, and regularly held up by
them to the prejudice of his countrymen, upon every reverse that befell
them, as though his unjust restoration were the cause; the accusation
being that he and his brother Aristocles had bribed the prophetess of
Delphi to tell the Lacedaemonian deputations which successively arrived
at the temple to bring home the seed of the demigod son of Zeus from
abroad, else they would have to plough with a silver share. In this
way, it was insisted, in time he had induced the Lacedaemonians in the
nineteenth year of his exile to Lycaeum (whither he had gone when
banished on suspicion of having been bribed to retreat from Attica, and
had built half his house within the consecrated precinct of Zeus for
fear of the Lacedaemonians), to restore him with the same dances and
sacrifices with which they had instituted their kings upon the first
settlement of Lacedaemon. The smart of this accusation, and the
reflection that in peace no disaster could occur, and that when
Lacedaemon had recovered her men there would be nothing for his enemies
to take hold of (whereas, while war lasted, the highest station must
always bear the scandal of everything that went wrong), made him
ardently desire a settlement. Accordingly this winter was employed in
conferences; and as spring rapidly approached, the Lacedaemonians sent
round orders to the cities to prepare for a fortified occupation of
Attica, and held this as a sword over the heads of the Athenians to
induce them to listen to their overtures; and at last, after many
claims had been urged on either side at the conferences a peace was
agreed on upon the following basis. Each party was to restore its
conquests, but Athens was to keep Nisaea; her demand for Plataea being
met by the Thebans asserting that they had acquired the place not by
force or treachery, but by the voluntary adhesion upon agreement of its
citizens; and the same, according to the Athenian account, being the
history of her acquisition of Nisaea. This arranged, the Lacedaemonians
summoned their allies, and all voting for peace except the Boeotians,
Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians, who did not approve of these
proceedings, they concluded the treaty and made peace, each of the
contracting parties swearing to the following articles:

The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their allies made a treaty, and
swore to it, city by city, as follows;

1. Touching the national temples, there shall be a free passage by land
and by sea to all who wish it, to sacrifice, travel, consult, and
attend the oracle or games, according to the customs of their
countries.

2. The temple and shrine of Apollo at Delphi and the Delphians shall be
governed by their own laws, taxed by their own state, and judged by
their own judges, the land and the people, according to the custom of
their country.

3. The treaty shall be binding for fifty years upon the Athenians and
the allies of the Athenians, and upon the Lacedaemonians and the allies
of the Lacedaemonians, without fraud or hurt by land or by sea.

4. It shall not be lawful to take up arms, with intent to do hurt,
either for the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians
and their allies, or for the Athenians and their allies against the
Lacedaemonians and their allies, in any way or means whatsoever. But
should any difference arise between them they are to have recourse to
law and oaths, according as may be agreed between the parties.

5. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall give back Amphipolis to
the Athenians. Nevertheless, in the case of cities given up by the
Lacedaemonians to the Athenians, the inhabitants shall be allowed to go
where they please and to take their property with them: and the cities
shall be independent, paying only the tribute of Aristides. And it
shall not be lawful for the Athenians or their allies to carry on war
against them after the treaty has been concluded, so long as the
tribute is paid. The cities referred to are Argilus, Stagirus,
Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. These cities shall be
neutral, allies neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians: but
if the cities consent, it shall be lawful for the Athenians to make
them their allies, provided always that the cities wish it. The
Mecybernaeans, Sanaeans, and Singaeans shall inhabit their own cities,
as also the Olynthians and Acanthians: but the Lacedaemonians and their
allies shall give back Panactum to the Athenians.

6. The Athenians shall give back Coryphasium, Cythera, Methana,
Lacedaemonians that are in the prison at Athens or elsewhere in the
Athenian dominions, and shall let go the Peloponnesians besieged in
Scione, and all others in Scione that are allies of the Lacedaemonians,
and all whom Brasidas sent in there, and any others of the allies of
the Lacedaemonians that may be in the prison at Athens or elsewhere in
the Athenian dominions.

7. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall in like manner give back
any of the Athenians or their allies that they may have in their hands.

8. In the case of Scione, Torone, and Sermylium, and any other cities
that the Athenians may have, the Athenians may adopt such measures as
they please.

9. The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedaemonians and their
allies, city by city. Every man shall swear by the most binding oath of
his country, seventeen from each city. The oath shall be as follows; “I
will abide by this agreement and treaty honestly and without deceit.”
In the same way an oath shall be taken by the Lacedaemonians and their
allies to the Athenians: and the oath shall be renewed annually by both
parties. Pillars shall be erected at Olympia, Pythia, the Isthmus, at
Athens in the Acropolis, and at Lacedaemon in the temple at Amyclae.

10. If anything be forgotten, whatever it be, and on whatever point, it
shall be consistent with their oath for both parties, the Athenians and
Lacedaemonians, to alter it, according to their discretion.

The treaty begins from the ephoralty of Pleistolas in Lacedaemon, on
the 27th day of the month of Artemisium, and from the archonship, of
Alcaeus at Athens, on the 25th day of the month of Elaphebolion. Those
who took the oath and poured the libations for the Lacedaemonians were
Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetis, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus,
Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis,
Alcinadas, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus: for the Athenians, Lampon,
Isthmonicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon,
Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates,
Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.

This treaty was made in the spring, just at the end of winter, directly
after the city festival of Dionysus, just ten years, with the
difference of a few days, from the first invasion of Attica and the
commencement of this war. This must be calculated by the seasons rather
than by trusting to the enumeration of the names of the several
magistrates or offices of honour that are used to mark past events.
Accuracy is impossible where an event may have occurred in the
beginning, or middle, or at any period in their tenure of office. But
by computing by summers and winters, the method adopted in this
history, it will be found that, each of these amounting to half a year,
there were ten summers and as many winters contained in this first war.

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, to whose lot it fell to begin the work of
restitution, immediately set free all the prisoners of war in their
possession, and sent Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas as envoys to
the towns in the direction of Thrace, to order Clearidas to hand over
Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the rest of their allies each to
accept the treaty as it affected them. They, however, did not like its
terms, and refused to accept it; Clearidas also, willing to oblige the
Chalcidians, would not hand over the town, averring his inability to do
so against their will. Meanwhile he hastened in person to Lacedaemon
with envoys from the place, to defend his disobedience against the
possible accusations of Ischagoras and his companions, and also to see
whether it was too late for the agreement to be altered; and on finding
the Lacedaemonians were bound, quickly set out back again with
instructions from them to hand over the place, if possible, or at all
events to bring out the Peloponnesians that were in it.

The allies happened to be present in person at Lacedaemon, and those
who had not accepted the treaty were now asked by the Lacedaemonians to
adopt it. This, however, they refused to do, for the same reasons as
before, unless a fairer one than the present were agreed upon; and
remaining firm in their determination were dismissed by the
Lacedaemonians, who now decided on forming an alliance with the
Athenians, thinking that Argos, who had refused the application of
Ampelidas and Lichas for a renewal of the treaty, would without Athens
be no longer formidable, and that the rest of the Peloponnese would be
most likely to keep quiet, if the coveted alliance of Athens were shut
against them. Accordingly, after conference with the Athenian
ambassadors, an alliance was agreed upon and oaths were exchanged, upon
the terms following:

1. The Lacedaemonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty years.

2. Should any enemy invade the territory of Lacedaemon and injure the
Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall help in such way as they most
effectively can, according to their power. But if the invader be gone
after plundering the country, that city shall be the enemy of
Lacedaemon and Athens, and shall be chastised by both, and one shall
not make peace without the other. This to be honestly, loyally, and
without fraud.

3. Should any enemy invade the territory of Athens and injure the
Athenians, the Lacedaemonians shall help them in such way as they most
effectively can, according to their power. But if the invader be gone
after plundering the country, that city shall be the enemy of
Lacedaemon and Athens, and shall be chastised by both, and one shall
not make peace without the other. This to be honestly, loyally, and
without fraud.

4. Should the slave population rise, the Athenians shall help the
Lacedaemonians with all their might, according to their power.

5. This treaty shall be sworn to by the same persons on either side
that swore to the other. It shall be renewed annually by the
Lacedaemonians going to Athens for the Dionysia, and the Athenians to
Lacedaemon for the Hyacinthia, and a pillar shall be set up by either
party: at Lacedaemon near the statue of Apollo at Amyclae, and at
Athens on the Acropolis near the statue of Athene. Should the
Lacedaemonians and Athenians see to add to or take away from the
alliance in any particular, it shall be consistent with their oaths for
both parties to do so, according to their discretion.

Those who took the oath for the Lacedaemonians were Pleistoanax, Agis,
Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus,
Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis,
Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus; for the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus,
Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus,
Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon,
Lamachus, and Demosthenes.

This alliance was made not long after the treaty; and the Athenians
gave back the men from the island to the Lacedaemonians, and the summer
of the eleventh year began. This completes the history of the first
war, which occupied the whole of the ten years previously.




CHAPTER XVI


Feeling against Sparta in Peloponnese—League of the Mantineans, Eleans,
Argives, and Athenians—Battle of Mantinea and breaking up of the League


After the treaty and the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and
Athenians, concluded after the ten years’ war, in the ephorate of
Pleistolas at Lacedaemon, and the archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, the
states which had accepted them were at peace; but the Corinthians and
some of the cities in Peloponnese trying to disturb the settlement, a
fresh agitation was instantly commenced by the allies against
Lacedaemon. Further, the Lacedaemonians, as time went on, became
suspected by the Athenians through their not performing some of the
provisions in the treaty; and though for six years and ten months they
abstained from invasion of each other’s territory, yet abroad an
unstable armistice did not prevent either party doing the other the
most effectual injury, until they were finally obliged to break the
treaty made after the ten years’ war and to have recourse to open
hostilities.

The history of this period has been also written by the same
Thucydides, an Athenian, in the chronological order of events by
summers and winters, to the time when the Lacedaemonians and their
allies put an end to the Athenian empire, and took the Long Walls and
Piraeus. The war had then lasted for twenty-seven years in all. Only a
mistaken judgment can object to including the interval of treaty in the
war. Looked at by the light of facts it cannot, it will be found, be
rationally considered a state of peace, where neither party either gave
or got back all that they had agreed, apart from the violations of it
which occurred on both sides in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and
other instances, and the fact that the allies in the direction of
Thrace were in as open hostility as ever, while the Boeotians had only
a truce renewed every ten days. So that the first ten years’ war, the
treacherous armistice that followed it, and the subsequent war will,
calculating by the seasons, be found to make up the number of years
which I have mentioned, with the difference of a few days, and to
afford an instance of faith in oracles being for once justified by the
event. I certainly all along remember from the beginning to the end of
the war its being commonly declared that it would last thrice nine
years. I lived through the whole of it, being of an age to comprehend
events, and giving my attention to them in order to know the exact
truth about them. It was also my fate to be an exile from my country
for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis; and being present with
both parties, and more especially with the Peloponnesians by reason of
my exile, I had leisure to observe affairs somewhat particularly. I
will accordingly now relate the differences that arose after the ten
years’ war, the breach of the treaty, and the hostilities that
followed.

After the conclusion of the fifty years’ truce and of the subsequent
alliance, the embassies from Peloponnese which had been summoned for
this business returned from Lacedaemon. The rest went straight home,
but the Corinthians first turned aside to Argos and opened negotiations
with some of the men in office there, pointing out that Lacedaemon
could have no good end in view, but only the subjugation of
Peloponnese, or she would never have entered into treaty and alliance
with the once detested Athenians, and that the duty of consulting for
the safety of Peloponnese had now fallen upon Argos, who should
immediately pass a decree inviting any Hellenic state that chose, such
state being independent and accustomed to meet fellow powers upon the
fair and equal ground of law and justice, to make a defensive alliance
with the Argives; appointing a few individuals with plenipotentiary
powers, instead of making the people the medium of negotiation, in
order that, in the case of an applicant being rejected, the fact of his
overtures might not be made public. They said that many would come over
from hatred of the Lacedaemonians. After this explanation of their
views, the Corinthians returned home.

The persons with whom they had communicated reported the proposal to
their government and people, and the Argives passed the decree and
chose twelve men to negotiate an alliance for any Hellenic state that
wished it, except Athens and Lacedaemon, neither of which should be
able to join without reference to the Argive people. Argos came into
the plan the more readily because she saw that war with Lacedaemon was
inevitable, the truce being on the point of expiring; and also because
she hoped to gain the supremacy of Peloponnese. For at this time
Lacedaemon had sunk very low in public estimation because of her
disasters, while the Argives were in a most flourishing condition,
having taken no part in the Attic war, but having on the contrary
profited largely by their neutrality. The Argives accordingly prepared
to receive into alliance any of the Hellenes that desired it.

The Mantineans and their allies were the first to come over through
fear of the Lacedaemonians. Having taken advantage of the war against
Athens to reduce a large part of Arcadia into subjection, they thought
that Lacedaemon would not leave them undisturbed in their conquests,
now that she had leisure to interfere, and consequently gladly turned
to a powerful city like Argos, the historical enemy of the
Lacedaemonians, and a sister democracy. Upon the defection of Mantinea,
the rest of Peloponnese at once began to agitate the propriety of
following her example, conceiving that the Mantineans not have changed
sides without good reason; besides which they were angry with
Lacedaemon among other reasons for having inserted in the treaty with
Athens that it should be consistent with their oaths for both parties,
Lacedaemonians and Athenians, to add to or take away from it according
to their discretion. It was this clause that was the real origin of the
panic in Peloponnese, by exciting suspicions of a Lacedaemonian and
Athenian combination against their liberties: any alteration should
properly have been made conditional upon the consent of the whole body
of the allies. With these apprehensions there was a very general desire
in each state to place itself in alliance with Argos.

In the meantime the Lacedaemonians perceiving the agitation going on in
Peloponnese, and that Corinth was the author of it and was herself
about to enter into alliance with the Argives, sent ambassadors thither
in the hope of preventing what was in contemplation. They accused her
of having brought it all about, and told her that she could not desert
Lacedaemon and become the ally of Argos, without adding violation of
her oaths to the crime which she had already committed in not accepting
the treaty with Athens, when it had been expressly agreed that the
decision of the majority of the allies should be binding, unless the
gods or heroes stood in the way. Corinth in her answer, delivered
before those of her allies who had like her refused to accept the
treaty, and whom she had previously invited to attend, refrained from
openly stating the injuries she complained of, such as the non-recovery
of Sollium or Anactorium from the Athenians, or any other point in
which she thought she had been prejudiced, but took shelter under the
pretext that she could not give up her Thracian allies, to whom her
separate individual security had been given, when they first rebelled
with Potidæa, as well as upon subsequent occasions. She denied,
therefore, that she committed any violation of her oaths to the allies
in not entering into the treaty with Athens; having sworn upon the
faith of the gods to her Thracian friends, she could not honestly give
them up. Besides, the expression was, “unless the gods or heroes stand
in the way.” Now here, as it appeared to her, the gods stood in the
way. This was what she said on the subject of her former oaths. As to
the Argive alliance, she would confer with her friends and do whatever
was right. The Lacedaemonian envoys returning home, some Argive
ambassadors who happened to be in Corinth pressed her to conclude the
alliance without further delay, but were told to attend at the next
congress to be held at Corinth.

Immediately afterwards an Elean embassy arrived, and first making an
alliance with Corinth went on from thence to Argos, according to their
instructions, and became allies of the Argives, their country being
just then at enmity with Lacedaemon and Lepreum. Some time back there
had been a war between the Lepreans and some of the Arcadians; and the
Eleans being called in by the former with the offer of half their
lands, had put an end to the war, and leaving the land in the hands of
its Leprean occupiers had imposed upon them the tribute of a talent to
the Olympian Zeus. Till the Attic war this tribute was paid by the
Lepreans, who then took the war as an excuse for no longer doing so,
and upon the Eleans using force appealed to Lacedaemon. The case was
thus submitted to her arbitrament; but the Eleans, suspecting the
fairness of the tribunal, renounced the reference and laid waste the
Leprean territory. The Lacedaemonians nevertheless decided that the
Lepreans were independent and the Eleans aggressors, and as the latter
did not abide by the arbitration, sent a garrison of heavy infantry
into Lepreum. Upon this the Eleans, holding that Lacedaemon had
received one of their rebel subjects, put forward the convention
providing that each confederate should come out of the Attic war in
possession of what he had when he went into it, and considering that
justice had not been done them went over to the Argives, and now made
the alliance through their ambassadors, who had been instructed for
that purpose. Immediately after them the Corinthians and the Thracian
Chalcidians became allies of Argos. Meanwhile the Boeotians and
Megarians, who acted together, remained quiet, being left to do as they
pleased by Lacedaemon, and thinking that the Argive democracy would not
suit so well with their aristocratic government as the Lacedaemonian
constitution.

About the same time in this summer Athens succeeded in reducing Scione,
put the adult males to death, and, making slaves of the women and
children, gave the land for the Plataeans to live in. She also brought
back the Delians to Delos, moved by her misfortunes in the field and by
the commands of the god at Delphi. Meanwhile the Phocians and Locrians
commenced hostilities. The Corinthians and Argives, being now in
alliance, went to Tegea to bring about its defection from Lacedaemon,
seeing that, if so considerable a state could be persuaded to join, all
Peloponnese would be with them. But when the Tegeans said that they
would do nothing against Lacedaemon, the hitherto zealous Corinthians
relaxed their activity, and began to fear that none of the rest would
now come over. Still they went to the Boeotians and tried to persuade
them to alliance and a common action generally with Argos and
themselves, and also begged them to go with them to Athens and obtain
for them a ten days’ truce similar to that made between the Athenians
and Boeotians not long after the fifty years’ treaty, and, in the event
of the Athenians refusing, to throw up the armistice, and not make any
truce in future without Corinth. These were the requests of the
Corinthians. The Boeotians stopped them on the subject of the Argive
alliance, but went with them to Athens, where however they failed to
obtain the ten days’ truce; the Athenian answer being that the
Corinthians had truce already, as being allies of Lacedaemon.
Nevertheless the Boeotians did not throw up their ten days’ truce, in
spite of the prayers and reproaches of the Corinthians for their breach
of faith; and these last had to content themselves with a de facto
armistice with Athens.

The same summer the Lacedaemonians marched into Arcadia with their
whole levy under Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon,
against the Parrhasians, who were subjects of Mantinea, and a faction
of whom had invited their aid. They also meant to demolish, if
possible, the fort of Cypsela which the Mantineans had built and
garrisoned in the Parrhasian territory, to annoy the district of
Sciritis in Laconia. The Lacedaemonians accordingly laid waste the
Parrhasian country, and the Mantineans, placing their town in the hands
of an Argive garrison, addressed themselves to the defence of their
confederacy, but being unable to save Cypsela or the Parrhasian towns
went back to Mantinea. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians made the
Parrhasians independent, razed the fortress, and returned home.

The same summer the soldiers from Thrace who had gone out with Brasidas
came back, having been brought from thence after the treaty by
Clearidas; and the Lacedaemonians decreed that the Helots who had
fought with Brasidas should be free and allowed to live where they
liked, and not long afterwards settled them with the Neodamodes at
Lepreum, which is situated on the Laconian and Elean border; Lacedaemon
being at this time at enmity with Elis. Those however of the Spartans
who had been taken prisoners on the island and had surrendered their
arms might, it was feared, suppose that they were to be subjected to
some degradation in consequence of their misfortune, and so make some
attempt at revolution, if left in possession of their franchise. These
were therefore at once disfranchised, although some of them were in
office at the time, and thus placed under a disability to take office,
or buy and sell anything. After some time, however, the franchise was
restored to them.

The same summer the Dians took Thyssus, a town on Acte by Athos in
alliance with Athens. During the whole of this summer intercourse
between the Athenians and Peloponnesians continued, although each party
began to suspect the other directly after the treaty, because of the
places specified in it not being restored. Lacedaemon, to whose lot it
had fallen to begin by restoring Amphipolis and the other towns, had
not done so. She had equally failed to get the treaty accepted by her
Thracian allies, or by the Boeotians or the Corinthians; although she
was continually promising to unite with Athens in compelling their
compliance, if it were longer refused. She also kept fixing a time at
which those who still refused to come in were to be declared enemies to
both parties, but took care not to bind herself by any written
agreement. Meanwhile the Athenians, seeing none of these professions
performed in fact, began to suspect the honesty of her intentions, and
consequently not only refused to comply with her demands for Pylos, but
also repented having given up the prisoners from the island, and kept
tight hold of the other places, until Lacedaemon’s part of the treaty
should be fulfilled. Lacedaemon, on the other hand, said she had done
what she could, having given up the Athenian prisoners of war in her
possession, evacuated Thrace, and performed everything else in her
power. Amphipolis it was out of her ability to restore; but she would
endeavour to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians into the treaty, to
recover Panactum, and send home all the Athenian prisoners of war in
Boeotia. Meanwhile she required that Pylos should be restored, or at
all events that the Messenians and Helots should be withdrawn, as her
troops had been from Thrace, and the place garrisoned, if necessary, by
the Athenians themselves. After a number of different conferences held
during the summer, she succeeded in persuading Athens to withdraw from
Pylos the Messenians and the rest of the Helots and deserters from
Laconia, who were accordingly settled by her at Cranii in Cephallenia.
Thus during this summer there was peace and intercourse between the two
peoples.

Next winter, however, the ephors under whom the treaty had been made
were no longer in office, and some of their successors were directly
opposed to it. Embassies now arrived from the Lacedaemonian
confederacy, and the Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians also
presented themselves at Lacedaemon, and after much discussion and no
agreement between them, separated for their several homes; when
Cleobulus and Xenares, the two ephors who were the most anxious to
break off the treaty, took advantage of this opportunity to communicate
privately with the Boeotians and Corinthians, and, advising them to act
as much as possible together, instructed the former first to enter into
alliance with Argos, and then try and bring themselves and the Argives
into alliance with Lacedaemon. The Boeotians would so be least likely
to be compelled to come into the Attic treaty; and the Lacedaemonians
would prefer gaining the friendship and alliance of Argos even at the
price of the hostility of Athens and the rupture of the treaty. The
Boeotians knew that an honourable friendship with Argos had been long
the desire of Lacedaemon; for the Lacedaemonians believed that this
would considerably facilitate the conduct of the war outside
Peloponnese. Meanwhile they begged the Boeotians to place Panactum in
her hands in order that she might, if possible, obtain Pylos in
exchange for it, and so be more in a position to resume hostilities
with Athens.

After receiving these instructions for their governments from Xenares
and Cleobulus and their friends at Lacedaemon, the Boeotians and
Corinthians departed. On their way home they were joined by two persons
high in office at Argos, who had waited for them on the road, and who
now sounded them upon the possibility of the Boeotians joining the
Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans in becoming the allies of Argos, in
the idea that if this could be effected they would be able, thus
united, to make peace or war as they pleased either against Lacedaemon
or any other power. The Boeotian envoys were were pleased at thus
hearing themselves accidentally asked to do what their friends at
Lacedaemon had told them; and the two Argives perceiving that their
proposal was agreeable, departed with a promise to send ambassadors to
the Boeotians. On their arrival the Boeotians reported to the
Boeotarchs what had been said to them at Lacedaemon and also by the
Argives who had met them, and the Boeotarchs, pleased with the idea,
embraced it with the more eagerness from the lucky coincidence of Argos
soliciting the very thing wanted by their friends at Lacedaemon.
Shortly afterwards ambassadors appeared from Argos with the proposals
indicated; and the Boeotarchs approved of the terms and dismissed the
ambassadors with a promise to send envoys to Argos to negotiate the
alliance.

In the meantime it was decided by the Boeotarchs, the Corinthians, the
Megarians, and the envoys from Thrace first to interchange oaths
together to give help to each other whenever it was required and not to
make war or peace except in common; after which the Boeotians and
Megarians, who acted together, should make the alliance with Argos. But
before the oaths were taken the Boeotarchs communicated these proposals
to the four councils of the Boeotians, in whom the supreme power
resides, and advised them to interchange oaths with all such cities as
should be willing to enter into a defensive league with the Boeotians.
But the members of the Boeotian councils refused their assent to the
proposal, being afraid of offending Lacedaemon by entering into a
league with the deserter Corinth; the Boeotarchs not having acquainted
them with what had passed at Lacedaemon and with the advice given by
Cleobulus and Xenares and the Boeotian partisans there, namely, that
they should become allies of Corinth and Argos as a preliminary to a
junction with Lacedaemon; fancying that, even if they should say
nothing about this, the councils would not vote against what had been
decided and advised by the Boeotarchs. This difficulty arising, the
Corinthians and the envoys from Thrace departed without anything having
been concluded; and the Boeotarchs, who had previously intended after
carrying this to try and effect the alliance with Argos, now omitted to
bring the Argive question before the councils, or to send to Argos the
envoys whom they had promised; and a general coldness and delay ensued
in the matter.

In this same winter Mecyberna was assaulted and taken by the
Olynthians, having an Athenian garrison inside it.

All this while negotiations had been going on between the Athenians and
Lacedaemonians about the conquests still retained by each, and
Lacedaemon, hoping that if Athens were to get back Panactum from the
Boeotians she might herself recover Pylos, now sent an embassy to the
Boeotians, and begged them to place Panactum and their Athenian
prisoners in her hands, in order that she might exchange them for
Pylos. This the Boeotians refused to do, unless Lacedaemon made a
separate alliance with them as she had done with Athens. Lacedaemon
knew that this would be a breach of faith to Athens, as it had been
agreed that neither of them should make peace or war without the other;
yet wishing to obtain Panactum which she hoped to exchange for Pylos,
and the party who pressed for the dissolution of the treaty strongly
affecting the Boeotian connection, she at length concluded the alliance
just as winter gave way to spring; and Panactum was instantly razed.
And so the eleventh year of the war ended.

In the first days of the summer following, the Argives, seeing that the
promised ambassadors from Boeotia did not arrive, and that Panactum was
being demolished, and that a separate alliance had been concluded
between the Boeotians and Lacedaemonians, began to be afraid that Argos
might be left alone, and all the confederacy go over to Lacedaemon.
They fancied that the Boeotians had been persuaded by the
Lacedaemonians to raze Panactum and to enter into the treaty with the
Athenians, and that Athens was privy to this arrangement, and even her
alliance, therefore, no longer open to them—a resource which they had
always counted upon, by reason of the dissensions existing, in the
event of the noncontinuance of their treaty with Lacedaemon. In this
strait the Argives, afraid that, as the result of refusing to renew the
treaty with Lacedaemon and of aspiring to the supremacy in Peloponnese,
they would have the Lacedaemonians, Tegeans, Boeotians, and Athenians
on their hands all at once, now hastily sent off Eustrophus and Aeson,
who seemed the persons most likely to be acceptable, as envoys to
Lacedaemon, with the view of making as good a treaty as they could with
the Lacedaemonians, upon such terms as could be got, and being left in
peace.

Having reached Lacedaemon, their ambassadors proceeded to negotiate the
terms of the proposed treaty. What the Argives first demanded was that
they might be allowed to refer to the arbitration of some state or
private person the question of the Cynurian land, a piece of frontier
territory about which they have always been disputing, and which
contains the towns of Thyrea and Anthene, and is occupied by the
Lacedaemonians. The Lacedaemonians at first said that they could not
allow this point to be discussed, but were ready to conclude upon the
old terms. Eventually, however, the Argive ambassadors succeeded in
obtaining from them this concession: For the present there was to be a
truce for fifty years, but it should be competent for either party,
there being neither plague nor war in Lacedaemon or Argos, to give a
formal challenge and decide the question of this territory by battle,
as on a former occasion, when both sides claimed the victory; pursuit
not being allowed beyond the frontier of Argos or Lacedaemon. The
Lacedaemonians at first thought this mere folly; but at last, anxious
at any cost to have the friendship of Argos they agreed to the terms
demanded, and reduced them to writing. However, before any of this
should become binding, the ambassadors were to return to Argos and
communicate with their people and, in the event of their approval, to
come at the feast of the Hyacinthia and take the oaths.

The envoys returned accordingly. In the meantime, while the Argives
were engaged in these negotiations, the Lacedaemonian
ambassadors—Andromedes, Phaedimus, and Antimenidas—who were to receive
the prisoners from the Boeotians and restore them and Panactum to the
Athenians, found that the Boeotians had themselves razed Panactum, upon
the plea that oaths had been anciently exchanged between their people
and the Athenians, after a dispute on the subject to the effect that
neither should inhabit the place, but that they should graze it in
common. As for the Athenian prisoners of war in the hands of the
Boeotians, these were delivered over to Andromedes and his colleagues,
and by them conveyed to Athens and given back. The envoys at the same
time announced the razing of Panactum, which to them seemed as good as
its restitution, as it would no longer lodge an enemy of Athens. This
announcement was received with great indignation by the Athenians, who
thought that the Lacedaemonians had played them false, both in the
matter of the demolition of Panactum, which ought to have been restored
to them standing, and in having, as they now heard, made a separate
alliance with the Boeotians, in spite of their previous promise to join
Athens in compelling the adhesion of those who refused to accede to the
treaty. The Athenians also considered the other points in which
Lacedaemon had failed in her compact, and thinking that they had been
overreached, gave an angry answer to the ambassadors and sent them
away.

The breach between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians having gone thus
far, the party at Athens, also, who wished to cancel the treaty,
immediately put themselves in motion. Foremost amongst these was
Alcibiades, son of Clinias, a man yet young in years for any other
Hellenic city, but distinguished by the splendour of his ancestry.
Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable, not that
personal pique had not also a great deal to do with his opposition; he
being offended with the Lacedaemonians for having negotiated the treaty
through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his
youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the ancient
connection of his family with them as their proxeni, which, renounced
by his grandfather, he had lately himself thought to renew by his
attentions to their prisoners taken in the island. Being thus, as he
thought, slighted on all hands, he had in the first instance spoken
against the treaty, saying that the Lacedaemonians were not to be
trusted, but that they only treated, in order to be enabled by this
means to crush Argos, and afterwards to attack Athens alone; and now,
immediately upon the above occurring, he sent privately to the Argives,
telling them to come as quickly as possible to Athens, accompanied by
the Mantineans and Eleans, with proposals of alliance; as the moment
was propitious and he himself would do all he could to help them.

Upon receiving this message and discovering that the Athenians, far
from being privy to the Boeotian alliance, were involved in a serious
quarrel with the Lacedaemonians, the Argives paid no further attention
to the embassy which they had just sent to Lacedaemon on the subject of
the treaty, and began to incline rather towards the Athenians,
reflecting that, in the event of war, they would thus have on their
side a city that was not only an ancient ally of Argos, but a sister
democracy and very powerful at sea. They accordingly at once sent
ambassadors to Athens to treat for an alliance, accompanied by others
from Elis and Mantinea.

At the same time arrived in haste from Lacedaemon an embassy consisting
of persons reputed well disposed towards the Athenians—Philocharidas,
Leon, and Endius—for fear that the Athenians in their irritation might
conclude alliance with the Argives, and also to ask back Pylos in
exchange for Panactum, and in defence of the alliance with the
Boeotians to plead that it had not been made to hurt the Athenians.
Upon the envoys speaking in the senate upon these points, and stating
that they had come with full powers to settle all others at issue
between them, Alcibiades became afraid that, if they were to repeat
these statements to the popular assembly, they might gain the
multitude, and the Argive alliance might be rejected, and accordingly
had recourse to the following stratagem. He persuaded the
Lacedaemonians by a solemn assurance that if they would say nothing of
their full powers in the assembly, he would give back Pylos to them
(himself, the present opponent of its restitution, engaging to obtain
this from the Athenians), and would settle the other points at issue.
His plan was to detach them from Nicias and to disgrace them before the
people, as being without sincerity in their intentions, or even common
consistency in their language, and so to get the Argives, Eleans, and
Mantineans taken into alliance. This plan proved successful. When the
envoys appeared before the people, and upon the question being put to
them, did not say as they had said in the senate, that they had come
with full powers, the Athenians lost all patience, and carried away by
Alcibiades, who thundered more loudly than ever against the
Lacedaemonians, were ready instantly to introduce the Argives and their
companions and to take them into alliance. An earthquake, however,
occurring, before anything definite had been done, this assembly was
adjourned.

In the assembly held the next day, Nicias, in spite of the
Lacedaemonians having been deceived themselves, and having allowed him
to be deceived also in not admitting that they had come with full
powers, still maintained that it was best to be friends with the
Lacedaemonians, and, letting the Argive proposals stand over, to send
once more to Lacedaemon and learn her intentions. The adjournment of
the war could only increase their own prestige and injure that of their
rivals; the excellent state of their affairs making it their interest
to preserve this prosperity as long as possible, while those of
Lacedaemon were so desperate that the sooner she could try her fortune
again the better. He succeeded accordingly in persuading them to send
ambassadors, himself being among the number, to invite the
Lacedaemonians, if they were really sincere, to restore Panactum intact
with Amphipolis, and to abandon their alliance with the Boeotians
(unless they consented to accede to the treaty), agreeably to the
stipulation which forbade either to treat without the other. The
ambassadors were also directed to say that the Athenians, had they
wished to play false, might already have made alliance with the
Argives, who were indeed come to Athens for that very purpose, and went
off furnished with instructions as to any other complaints that the
Athenians had to make. Having reached Lacedaemon, they communicated
their instructions, and concluded by telling the Lacedaemonians that
unless they gave up their alliance with the Boeotians, in the event of
their not acceding to the treaty, the Athenians for their part would
ally themselves with the Argives and their friends. The Lacedaemonians,
however, refused to give up the Boeotian alliance—the party of Xenares
the ephor, and such as shared their view, carrying the day upon this
point—but renewed the oaths at the request of Nicias, who feared to
return without having accomplished anything and to be disgraced; as was
indeed his fate, he being held the author of the treaty with
Lacedaemon. When he returned, and the Athenians heard that nothing had
been done at Lacedaemon, they flew into a passion, and deciding that
faith had not been kept with them, took advantage of the presence of
the Argives and their allies, who had been introduced by Alcibiades,
and made a treaty and alliance with them upon the terms following:

The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, acting for themselves
and the allies in their respective empires, made a treaty for a hundred
years, to be without fraud or hurt by land and by sea.

1. It shall not be lawful to carry on war, either for the Argives,
Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, against the Athenians, or the
allies in the Athenian empire: or for the Athenians and their allies
against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, or their allies, in any way or
means whatsoever.

The Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall be allies for a
hundred years upon the terms following:

2. If an enemy invade the country of the Athenians, the Argives,
Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to the relief of Athens, according as
the Athenians may require by message, in such way as they most
effectually can, to the best of their power. But if the invader be gone
after plundering the territory, the offending state shall be the enemy
of the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and war shall be
made against it by all these cities: and no one of the cities shall be
able to make peace with that state, except all the above cities agree
to do so.

3. Likewise the Athenians shall go to the relief of Argos, Mantinea,
and Elis, if an enemy invade the country of Elis, Mantinea, or Argos,
according as the above cities may require by message, in such way as
they most effectually can, to the best of their power. But if the
invader be gone after plundering the territory, the state offending
shall be the enemy of the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans,
and war shall be made against it by all these cities, and peace may not
be made with that state except all the above cities agree to it.

4. No armed force shall be allowed to pass for hostile purposes through
the country of the powers contracting, or of the allies in their
respective empires, or to go by sea, except all the cities—that is to
say, Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis—vote for such passage.

5. The relieving troops shall be maintained by the city sending them
for thirty days from their arrival in the city that has required them,
and upon their return in the same way: if their services be desired for
a longer period, the city that sent for them shall maintain them, at
the rate of three Aeginetan obols per day for a heavy-armed soldier,
archer, or light soldier, and an Aeginetan drachma for a trooper.

6. The city sending for the troops shall have the command when the war
is in its own country: but in case of the cities resolving upon a joint
expedition the command shall be equally divided among all the cities.

7. The treaty shall be sworn to by the Athenians for themselves and
their allies, by the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies, by
each state individually. Each shall swear the oath most binding in his
country over full-grown victims: the oath being as follows:

“I STAND BY THE ALLIANCE AND ITS ARTICLES, JUSTLY, INNOCENTLY, AND
SINCERELY, AND I WILL NOT TRANSGRESS THE SAME IN ANY WAY OR MEANS
WHATSOEVER.”

The oath shall be taken at Athens by the Senate and the magistrates,
the Prytanes administering it: at Argos by the Senate, the Eighty, and
the Artynae, the Eighty administering it: at Mantinea by the Demiurgi,
the Senate, and the other magistrates, the Theori and Polemarchs
administering it: at Elis by the Demiurgi, the magistrates, and the Six
Hundred, the Demiurgi and the Thesmophylaces administering it. The
oaths shall be renewed by the Athenians going to Elis, Mantinea, and
Argos thirty days before the Olympic games: by the Argives, Mantineans,
and Eleans going to Athens ten days before the great feast of the
Panathenaea. The articles of the treaty, the oaths, and the alliance
shall be inscribed on a stone pillar by the Athenians in the citadel,
by the Argives in the market-place, in the temple of Apollo: by the
Mantineans in the temple of Zeus, in the market-place: and a brazen
pillar shall be erected jointly by them at the Olympic games now at
hand. Should the above cities see good to make any addition in these
articles, whatever all the above cities shall agree upon, after
consulting together, shall be binding.

Although the treaty and alliances were thus concluded, still the treaty
between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians was not renounced by either
party. Meanwhile Corinth, although the ally of the Argives, did not
accede to the new treaty, any more than she had done to the alliance,
defensive and offensive, formed before this between the Eleans,
Argives, and Mantineans, when she declared herself content with the
first alliance, which was defensive only, and which bound them to help
each other, but not to join in attacking any. The Corinthians thus
stood aloof from their allies, and again turned their thoughts towards
Lacedaemon.

At the Olympic games which were held this summer, and in which the
Arcadian Androsthenes was victor the first time in the wrestling and
boxing, the Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple by the Eleans,
and thus prevented from sacrificing or contending, for having refused
to pay the fine specified in the Olympic law imposed upon them by the
Eleans, who alleged that they had attacked Fort Phyrcus, and sent heavy
infantry of theirs into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The amount of
the fine was two thousand minae, two for each heavy-armed soldier, as
the law prescribes. The Lacedaemonians sent envoys, and pleaded that
the imposition was unjust; saying that the truce had not yet been
proclaimed at Lacedaemon when the heavy infantry were sent off. But the
Eleans affirmed that the armistice with them had already begun (they
proclaim it first among themselves), and that the aggression of the
Lacedaemonians had taken them by surprise while they were living
quietly as in time of peace, and not expecting anything. Upon this the
Lacedaemonians submitted, that if the Eleans really believed that they
had committed an aggression, it was useless after that to proclaim the
truce at Lacedaemon; but they had proclaimed it notwithstanding, as
believing nothing of the kind, and from that moment the Lacedaemonians
had made no attack upon their country. Nevertheless the Eleans adhered
to what they had said, that nothing would persuade them that an
aggression had not been committed; if, however, the Lacedaemonians
would restore Lepreum, they would give up their own share of the money
and pay that of the god for them.

As this proposal was not accepted, the Eleans tried a second. Instead
of restoring Lepreum, if this was objected to, the Lacedaemonians
should ascend the altar of the Olympian Zeus, as they were so anxious
to have access to the temple, and swear before the Hellenes that they
would surely pay the fine at a later day. This being also refused, the
Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple, the sacrifice, and the
games, and sacrificed at home; the Lepreans being the only other
Hellenes who did not attend. Still the Eleans were afraid of the
Lacedaemonians sacrificing by force, and kept guard with a heavy-armed
company of their young men; being also joined by a thousand Argives,
the same number of Mantineans, and by some Athenian cavalry who stayed
at Harpina during the feast. Great fears were felt in the assembly of
the Lacedaemonians coming in arms, especially after Lichas, son of
Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, had been scourged on the course by the
umpires; because, upon his horses being the winners, and the Boeotian
people being proclaimed the victor on account of his having no right to
enter, he came forward on the course and crowned the charioteer, in
order to show that the chariot was his. After this incident all were
more afraid than ever, and firmly looked for a disturbance: the
Lacedaemonians, however, kept quiet, and let the feast pass by, as we
have seen. After the Olympic games, the Argives and the allies repaired
to Corinth to invite her to come over to them. There they found some
Lacedaemonian envoys; and a long discussion ensued, which after all
ended in nothing, as an earthquake occurred, and they dispersed to
their different homes.

Summer was now over. The winter following a battle took place between
the Heracleots in Trachinia and the Aenianians, Dolopians, Malians, and
certain of the Thessalians, all tribes bordering on and hostile to the
town, which directly menaced their country. Accordingly, after having
opposed and harassed it from its very foundation by every means in
their power, they now in this battle defeated the Heracleots, Xenares,
son of Cnidis, their Lacedaemonian commander, being among the slain.
Thus the winter ended and the twelfth year of this war ended also.
After the battle, Heraclea was so terribly reduced that in the first
days of the summer following the Boeotians occupied the place and sent
away the Lacedaemonian Agesippidas for misgovernment, fearing that the
town might be taken by the Athenians while the Lacedaemonians were
distracted with the affairs of Peloponnese. The Lacedaemonians,
nevertheless, were offended with them for what they had done.

The same summer Alcibiades, son of Clinias, now one of the generals at
Athens, in concert with the Argives and the allies, went into
Peloponnese with a few Athenian heavy infantry and archers and some of
the allies in those parts whom he took up as he passed, and with this
army marched here and there through Peloponnese, and settled various
matters connected with the alliance, and among other things induced the
Patrians to carry their walls down to the sea, intending himself also
to build a fort near the Achaean Rhium. However, the Corinthians and
Sicyonians, and all others who would have suffered by its being built,
came up and hindered him.

The same summer war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives. The
pretext was that the Epidaurians did not send an offering for their
pasture-land to Apollo Pythaeus, as they were bound to do, the Argives
having the chief management of the temple; but, apart from this
pretext, Alcibiades and the Argives were determined, if possible, to
gain possession of Epidaurus, and thus to ensure the neutrality of
Corinth and give the Athenians a shorter passage for their
reinforcements from Aegina than if they had to sail round Scyllaeum.
The Argives accordingly prepared to invade Epidaurus by themselves, to
exact the offering.

About the same time the Lacedaemonians marched out with all their
people to Leuctra upon their frontier, opposite to Mount Lycaeum, under
the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, without any one knowing their
destination, not even the cities that sent the contingents. The
sacrifices, however, for crossing the frontier not proving propitious,
the Lacedaemonians returned home themselves, and sent word to the
allies to be ready to march after the month ensuing, which happened to
be the month of Carneus, a holy time for the Dorians. Upon the retreat
of the Lacedaemonians the Argives marched out on the last day but three
of the month before Carneus, and keeping this as the day during the
whole time that they were out, invaded and plundered Epidaurus. The
Epidaurians summoned their allies to their aid, some of whom pleaded
the month as an excuse; others came as far as the frontier of Epidaurus
and there remained inactive.

While the Argives were in Epidaurus embassies from the cities assembled
at Mantinea, upon the invitation of the Athenians. The conference
having begun, the Corinthian Euphamidas said that their actions did not
agree with their words; while they were sitting deliberating about
peace, the Epidaurians and their allies and the Argives were arrayed
against each other in arms; deputies from each party should first go
and separate the armies, and then the talk about peace might be
resumed. In compliance with this suggestion, they went and brought back
the Argives from Epidaurus, and afterwards reassembled, but without
succeeding any better in coming to a conclusion; and the Argives a
second time invaded Epidaurus and plundered the country. The
Lacedaemonians also marched out to Caryae; but the frontier sacrifices
again proving unfavourable, they went back again, and the Argives,
after ravaging about a third of the Epidaurian territory, returned
home. Meanwhile a thousand Athenian heavy infantry had come to their
aid under the command of Alcibiades, but finding that the Lacedaemonian
expedition was at an end, and that they were no longer wanted, went
back again.

So passed the summer. The next winter the Lacedaemonians managed to
elude the vigilance of the Athenians, and sent in a garrison of three
hundred men to Epidaurus, under the command of Agesippidas. Upon this
the Argives went to the Athenians and complained of their having
allowed an enemy to pass by sea, in spite of the clause in the treaty
by which the allies were not to allow an enemy to pass through their
country. Unless, therefore, they now put the Messenians and Helots in
Pylos to annoy the Lacedaemonians, they, the Argives, should consider
that faith had not been kept with them. The Athenians were persuaded by
Alcibiades to inscribe at the bottom of the Laconian pillar that the
Lacedaemonians had not kept their oaths, and to convey the Helots at
Cranii to Pylos to plunder the country; but for the rest they remained
quiet as before. During this winter hostilities went on between the
Argives and Epidaurians, without any pitched battle taking place, but
only forays and ambuscades, in which the losses were small and fell now
on one side and now on the other. At the close of the winter, towards
the beginning of spring, the Argives went with scaling ladders to
Epidaurus, expecting to find it left unguarded on account of the war
and to be able to take it by assault, but returned unsuccessful. And
the winter ended, and with it the thirteenth year of the war ended
also.

In the middle of the next summer the Lacedaemonians, seeing the
Epidaurians, their allies, in distress, and the rest of Peloponnese
either in revolt or disaffected, concluded that it was high time for
them to interfere if they wished to stop the progress of the evil, and
accordingly with their full force, the Helots included, took the field
against Argos, under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of
the Lacedaemonians. The Tegeans and the other Arcadian allies of
Lacedaemon joined in the expedition. The allies from the rest of
Peloponnese and from outside mustered at Phlius; the Boeotians with
five thousand heavy infantry and as many light troops, and five hundred
horse and the same number of dismounted troopers; the Corinthians with
two thousand heavy infantry; the rest more or less as might happen; and
the Phliasians with all their forces, the army being in their country.

The preparations of the Lacedaemonians from the first had been known to
the Argives, who did not, however, take the field until the enemy was
on his road to join the rest at Phlius. Reinforced by the Mantineans
with their allies, and by three thousand Elean heavy infantry, they
advanced and fell in with the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium in Arcadia.
Each party took up its position upon a hill, and the Argives prepared
to engage the Lacedaemonians while they were alone; but Agis eluded
them by breaking up his camp in the night, and proceeded to join the
rest of the allies at Phlius. The Argives discovering this at daybreak,
marched first to Argos and then to the Nemean road, by which they
expected the Lacedaemonians and their allies would come down. However,
Agis, instead of taking this road as they expected, gave the
Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians their orders, and went along
another difficult road, and descended into the plain of Argos. The
Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians marched by another steep road;
while the Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians had instructions to come
down by the Nemean road where the Argives were posted, in order that,
if the enemy advanced into the plain against the troops of Agis, they
might fall upon his rear with their cavalry. These dispositions
concluded, Agis invaded the plain and began to ravage Saminthus and
other places.

Discovering this, the Argives came up from Nemea, day having now
dawned. On their way they fell in with the troops of the Phliasians and
Corinthians, and killed a few of the Phliasians and had perhaps a few
more of their own men killed by the Corinthians. Meanwhile the
Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians, advancing upon Nemea according to
their instructions, found the Argives no longer there, as they had gone
down on seeing their property ravaged, and were now forming for battle,
the Lacedaemonians imitating their example. The Argives were now
completely surrounded; from the plain the Lacedaemonians and their
allies shut them off from their city; above them were the Corinthians,
Phliasians, and Pellenians; and on the side of Nemea the Boeotians,
Sicyonians, and Megarians. Meanwhile their army was without cavalry,
the Athenians alone among the allies not having yet arrived. Now the
bulk of the Argives and their allies did not see the danger of their
position, but thought that they could not have a fairer field, having
intercepted the Lacedaemonians in their own country and close to the
city. Two men, however, in the Argive army, Thrasylus, one of the five
generals, and Alciphron, the Lacedaemonian proxenus, just as the armies
were upon the point of engaging, went and held a parley with Agis and
urged him not to bring on a battle, as the Argives were ready to refer
to fair and equal arbitration whatever complaints the Lacedaemonians
might have against them, and to make a treaty and live in peace in
future.

The Argives who made these statements did so upon their own authority,
not by order of the people, and Agis on his accepted their proposals,
and without himself either consulting the majority, simply communicated
the matter to a single individual, one of the high officers
accompanying the expedition, and granted the Argives a truce for four
months, in which to fulfil their promises; after which he immediately
led off the army without giving any explanation to any of the other
allies. The Lacedaemonians and allies followed their general out of
respect for the law, but amongst themselves loudly blamed Agis for
going away from so fair a field (the enemy being hemmed in on every
side by infantry and cavalry) without having done anything worthy of
their strength. Indeed this was by far the finest Hellenic army ever
yet brought together; and it should have been seen while it was still
united at Nemea, with the Lacedaemonians in full force, the Arcadians,
Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians and
Megarians, and all these the flower of their respective populations,
thinking themselves a match not merely for the Argive confederacy, but
for another such added to it. The army thus retired blaming Agis, and
returned every man to his home. The Argives however blamed still more
loudly the persons who had concluded the truce without consulting the
people, themselves thinking that they had let escape with the
Lacedaemonians an opportunity such as they should never see again; as
the struggle would have been under the walls of their city, and by the
side of many and brave allies. On their return accordingly they began
to stone Thrasylus in the bed of the Charadrus, where they try all
military causes before entering the city. Thrasylus fled to the altar,
and so saved his life; his property however they confiscated.

After this arrived a thousand Athenian heavy infantry and three hundred
horse, under the command of Laches and Nicostratus; whom the Argives,
being nevertheless loath to break the truce with the Lacedaemonians,
begged to depart, and refused to bring before the people, to whom they
had a communication to make, until compelled to do so by the entreaties
of the Mantineans and Eleans, who were still at Argos. The Athenians,
by the mouth of Alcibiades their ambassador there present, told the
Argives and the allies that they had no right to make a truce at all
without the consent of their fellow confederates, and now that the
Athenians had arrived so opportunely the war ought to be resumed. These
arguments proving successful with the allies, they immediately marched
upon Orchomenos, all except the Argives, who, although they had
consented like the rest, stayed behind at first, but eventually joined
the others. They now all sat down and besieged Orchomenos, and made
assaults upon it; one of their reasons for desiring to gain this place
being that hostages from Arcadia had been lodged there by the
Lacedaemonians. The Orchomenians, alarmed at the weakness of their wall
and the numbers of the enemy, and at the risk they ran of perishing
before relief arrived, capitulated upon condition of joining the
league, of giving hostages of their own to the Mantineans, and giving
up those lodged with them by the Lacedaemonians. Orchomenos thus
secured, the allies now consulted as to which of the remaining places
they should attack next. The Eleans were urgent for Lepreum; the
Mantineans for Tegea; and the Argives and Athenians giving their
support to the Mantineans, the Eleans went home in a rage at their not
having voted for Lepreum; while the rest of the allies made ready at
Mantinea for going against Tegea, which a party inside had arranged to
put into their hands.

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, upon their return from Argos after
concluding the four months’ truce, vehemently blamed Agis for not
having subdued Argos, after an opportunity such as they thought they
had never had before; for it was no easy matter to bring so many and so
good allies together. But when the news arrived of the capture of
Orchomenos, they became more angry than ever, and, departing from all
precedent, in the heat of the moment had almost decided to raze his
house, and to fine him ten thousand drachmae. Agis however entreated
them to do none of these things, promising to atone for his fault by
good service in the field, failing which they might then do to him
whatever they pleased; and they accordingly abstained from razing his
house or fining him as they had threatened to do, and now made a law,
hitherto unknown at Lacedaemon, attaching to him ten Spartans as
counsellors, without whose consent he should have no power to lead an
army out of the city.

At this juncture arrived word from their friends in Tegea that, unless
they speedily appeared, Tegea would go over from them to the Argives
and their allies, if it had not gone over already. Upon this news a
force marched out from Lacedaemon, of the Spartans and Helots and all
their people, and that instantly and upon a scale never before
witnessed. Advancing to Orestheum in Maenalia, they directed the
Arcadians in their league to follow close after them to Tegea, and,
going on themselves as far as Orestheum, from thence sent back the
sixth part of the Spartans, consisting of the oldest and youngest men,
to guard their homes, and with the rest of their army arrived at Tegea;
where their Arcadian allies soon after joined them. Meanwhile they sent
to Corinth, to the Boeotians, the Phocians, and Locrians, with orders
to come up as quickly as possible to Mantinea. These had but short
notice; and it was not easy except all together, and after waiting for
each other, to pass through the enemy’s country, which lay right across
and blocked up the line of communication. Nevertheless they made what
haste they could. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians with the Arcadian allies
that had joined them, entered the territory of Mantinea, and encamping
near the temple of Heracles began to plunder the country.

Here they were seen by the Argives and their allies, who immediately
took up a strong and difficult position, and formed in order of battle.
The Lacedaemonians at once advanced against them, and came on within a
stone’s throw or javelin’s cast, when one of the older men, seeing the
enemy’s position to be a strong one, hallooed to Agis that he was
minded to cure one evil with another; meaning that he wished to make
amends for his retreat, which had been so much blamed, from Argos, by
his present untimely precipitation. Meanwhile Agis, whether in
consequence of this halloo or of some sudden new idea of his own,
quickly led back his army without engaging, and entering the Tegean
territory, began to turn off into that of Mantinea the water about
which the Mantineans and Tegeans are always fighting, on account of the
extensive damage it does to whichever of the two countries it falls
into. His object in this was to make the Argives and their allies come
down from the hill, to resist the diversion of the water, as they would
be sure to do when they knew of it, and thus to fight the battle in the
plain. He accordingly stayed that day where he was, engaged in turning
off the water. The Argives and their allies were at first amazed at the
sudden retreat of the enemy after advancing so near, and did not know
what to make of it; but when he had gone away and disappeared, without
their having stirred to pursue him, they began anew to find fault with
their generals, who had not only let the Lacedaemonians get off before,
when they were so happily intercepted before Argos, but who now again
allowed them to run away, without any one pursuing them, and to escape
at their leisure while the Argive army was leisurely betrayed. The
generals, half-stunned for the moment, afterwards led them down from
the hill, and went forward and encamped in the plain, with the
intention of attacking the enemy.

The next day the Argives and their allies formed in the order in which
they meant to fight, if they chanced to encounter the enemy; and the
Lacedaemonians returning from the water to their old encampment by the
temple of Heracles, suddenly saw their adversaries close in front of
them, all in complete order, and advanced from the hill. A shock like
that of the present moment the Lacedaemonians do not ever remember to
have experienced: there was scant time for preparation, as they
instantly and hastily fell into their ranks, Agis, their king,
directing everything, agreeably to the law. For when a king is in the
field all commands proceed from him: he gives the word to the
Polemarchs; they to the Lochages; these to the Pentecostyes; these
again to the Enomotarchs, and these last to the Enomoties. In short all
orders required pass in the same way and quickly reach the troops; as
almost the whole Lacedaemonian army, save for a small part, consists of
officers under officers, and the care of what is to be done falls upon
many.

In this battle the left wing was composed of the Sciritae, who in a
Lacedaemonian army have always that post to themselves alone; next to
these were the soldiers of Brasidas from Thrace, and the Neodamodes
with them; then came the Lacedaemonians themselves, company after
company, with the Arcadians of Heraea at their side. After these were
the Maenalians, and on the right wing the Tegeans with a few of the
Lacedaemonians at the extremity; their cavalry being posted upon the
two wings. Such was the Lacedaemonian formation. That of their
opponents was as follows: On the right were the Mantineans, the action
taking place in their country; next to them the allies from Arcadia;
after whom came the thousand picked men of the Argives, to whom the
state had given a long course of military training at the public
expense; next to them the rest of the Argives, and after them their
allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneans, and lastly the Athenians on the
extreme left, and lastly the Athenians on the extreme left, and their
own cavalry with them.

Such were the order and the forces of the two combatants. The
Lacedaemonian army looked the largest; though as to putting down the
numbers of either host, or of the contingents composing it, I could not
do so with any accuracy. Owing to the secrecy of their government the
number of the Lacedaemonians was not known, and men are so apt to brag
about the forces of their country that the estimate of their opponents
was not trusted. The following calculation, however, makes it possible
to estimate the numbers of the Lacedaemonians present upon this
occasion. There were seven companies in the field without counting the
Sciritae, who numbered six hundred men: in each company there were four
Pentecostyes, and in the Pentecosty four Enomoties. The first rank of
the Enomoty was composed of four soldiers: as to the depth, although
they had not been all drawn up alike, but as each captain chose, they
were generally ranged eight deep; the first rank along the whole line,
exclusive of the Sciritae, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight
men.

The armies being now on the eve of engaging, each contingent received
some words of encouragement from its own commander. The Mantineans
were, reminded that they were going to fight for their country and to
avoid returning to the experience of servitude after having tasted that
of empire; the Argives, that they would contend for their ancient
supremacy, to regain their once equal share of Peloponnese of which
they had been so long deprived, and to punish an enemy and a neighbour
for a thousand wrongs; the Athenians, of the glory of gaining the
honours of the day with so many and brave allies in arms, and that a
victory over the Lacedaemonians in Peloponnese would cement and extend
their empire, and would besides preserve Attica from all invasions in
future. These were the incitements addressed to the Argives and their
allies. The Lacedaemonians meanwhile, man to man, and with their
war-songs in the ranks, exhorted each brave comrade to remember what he
had learnt before; well aware that the long training of action was of
more saving virtue than any brief verbal exhortation, though never so
well delivered.

After this they joined battle, the Argives and their allies advancing
with haste and fury, the Lacedaemonians slowly and to the music of many
flute-players—a standing institution in their army, that has nothing to
do with religion, but is meant to make them advance evenly, stepping in
time, without break their order, as large armies are apt to do in the
moment of engaging.

Just before the battle joined, King Agis resolved upon the following
manoeuvre. All armies are alike in this: on going into action they get
forced out rather on their right wing, and one and the other overlap
with this adversary’s left; because fear makes each man do his best to
shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next him on the
right, thinking that the closer the shields are locked together the
better will he be protected. The man primarily responsible for this is
the first upon the right wing, who is always striving to withdraw from
the enemy his unarmed side; and the same apprehension makes the rest
follow him. On the present occasion the Mantineans reached with their
wing far beyond the Sciritae, and the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans still
farther beyond the Athenians, as their army was the largest. Agis,
afraid of his left being surrounded, and thinking that the Mantineans
outflanked it too far, ordered the Sciritae and Brasideans to move out
from their place in the ranks and make the line even with the
Mantineans, and told the Polemarchs Hipponoidas and Aristocles to fill
up the gap thus formed, by throwing themselves into it with two
companies taken from the right wing; thinking that his right would
still be strong enough and to spare, and that the line fronting the
Mantineans would gain in solidity.

However, as he gave these orders in the moment of the onset, and at
short notice, it so happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not
move over, for which offence they were afterwards banished from Sparta,
as having been guilty of cowardice; and the enemy meanwhile closed
before the Sciritae (whom Agis on seeing that the two companies did not
move over ordered to return to their place) had time to fill up the
breach in question. Now it was, however, that the Lacedaemonians,
utterly worsted in respect of skill, showed themselves as superior in
point of courage. As soon as they came to close quarters with the
enemy, the Mantinean right broke their Sciritae and Brasideans, and,
bursting in with their allies and the thousand picked Argives into the
unclosed breach in their line, cut up and surrounded the
Lacedaemonians, and drove them in full rout to the wagons, slaying some
of the older men on guard there. But the Lacedaemonians, worsted in
this part of the field, with the rest of their army, and especially the
centre, where the three hundred knights, as they are called, fought
round King Agis, fell on the older men of the Argives and the five
companies so named, and on the Cleonaeans, the Orneans, and the
Athenians next them, and instantly routed them; the greater number not
even waiting to strike a blow, but giving way the moment that they came
on, some even being trodden under foot, in their fear of being
overtaken by their assailants.

The army of the Argives and their allies, having given way in this
quarter, was now completely cut in two, and the Lacedaemonian and
Tegean right simultaneously closing round the Athenians with the troops
that outflanked them, these last found themselves placed between two
fires, being surrounded on one side and already defeated on the other.
Indeed they would have suffered more severely than any other part of
the army, but for the services of the cavalry which they had with them.
Agis also on perceiving the distress of his left opposed to the
Mantineans and the thousand Argives, ordered all the army to advance to
the support of the defeated wing; and while this took place, as the
enemy moved past and slanted away from them, the Athenians escaped at
their leisure, and with them the beaten Argive division. Meanwhile the
Mantineans and their allies and the picked body of the Argives ceased
to press the enemy, and seeing their friends defeated and the
Lacedaemonians in full advance upon them, took to flight. Many of the
Mantineans perished; but the bulk of the picked body of the Argives
made good their escape. The flight and retreat, however, were neither
hurried nor long; the Lacedaemonians fighting long and stubbornly until
the rout of their enemy, but that once effected, pursuing for a short
time and not far.

Such was the battle, as nearly as possible as I have described it; the
greatest that had occurred for a very long while among the Hellenes,
and joined by the most considerable states. The Lacedaemonians took up
a position in front of the enemy’s dead, and immediately set up a
trophy and stripped the slain; they took up their own dead and carried
them back to Tegea, where they buried them, and restored those of the
enemy under truce. The Argives, Orneans, and Cleonaeans had seven
hundred killed; the Mantineans two hundred, and the Athenians and
Aeginetans also two hundred, with both their generals. On the side of
the Lacedaemonians, the allies did not suffer any loss worth speaking
of: as to the Lacedaemonians themselves it was difficult to learn the
truth; it is said, however, that there were slain about three hundred
of them.

While the battle was impending, Pleistoanax, the other king, set out
with a reinforcement composed of the oldest and youngest men, and got
as far as Tegea, where he heard of the victory and went back again. The
Lacedaemonians also sent and turned back the allies from Corinth and
from beyond the Isthmus, and returning themselves dismissed their
allies, and kept the Carnean holidays, which happened to be at that
time. The imputations cast upon them by the Hellenes at the time,
whether of cowardice on account of the disaster in the island, or of
mismanagement and slowness generally, were all wiped out by this single
action: fortune, it was thought, might have humbled them, but the men
themselves were the same as ever.

The day before this battle, the Epidaurians with all their forces
invaded the deserted Argive territory, and cut off many of the guards
left there in the absence of the Argive army. After the battle three
thousand Elean heavy infantry arriving to aid the Mantineans, and a
reinforcement of one thousand Athenians, all these allies marched at
once against Epidaurus, while the Lacedaemonians were keeping the
Carnea, and dividing the work among them began to build a wall round
the city. The rest left off; but the Athenians finished at once the
part assigned to them round Cape Heraeum; and having all joined in
leaving a garrison in the fortification in question, they returned to
their respective cities.

Summer now came to an end. In the first days of the next winter, when
the Carnean holidays were over, the Lacedaemonians took the field, and
arriving at Tegea sent on to Argos proposals of accommodation. They had
before had a party in the town desirous of overthrowing the democracy;
and after the battle that had been fought, these were now far more in a
position to persuade the people to listen to terms. Their plan was
first to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, to be followed by an
alliance, and after this to fall upon the commons. Lichas, son of
Arcesilaus, the Argive proxenus, accordingly arrived at Argos with two
proposals from Lacedaemon, to regulate the conditions of war or peace,
according as they preferred the one or the other. After much
discussion, Alcibiades happening to be in the town, the Lacedaemonian
party, who now ventured to act openly, persuaded the Argives to accept
the proposal for accommodation; which ran as follows:

The assembly of the Lacedaemonians agrees to treat with the Argives
upon the terms following:

1. The Argives shall restore to the Orchomenians their children, and to
the Maenalians their men, and shall restore the men they have in
Mantinea to the Lacedaemonians.

2. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fortification there. If
the Athenians refuse to withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be declared
enemies of the Argives and of the Lacedaemonians, and of the allies of
the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the Argives.

3. If the Lacedaemonians have any children in their custody, they shall
restore them every one to his city.

4. As to the offering to the god, the Argives, if they wish, shall
impose an oath upon the Epidaurians, but, if not, they shall swear it
themselves.

5. All the cities in Peloponnese, both small and great, shall be
independent according to the customs of their country.

6. If any of the powers outside Peloponnese invade Peloponnesian
territory, the parties contracting shall unite to repel them, on such
terms as they may agree upon, as being most fair for the
Peloponnesians.

7. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnese shall be on the
same footing as the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the Argives shall
be on the same footing as the Argives, being left in enjoyment of their
own possessions.

8. This treaty shall be shown to the allies, and shall be concluded, if
they approve; if the allies think fit, they may send the treaty to be
considered at home.

The Argives began by accepting this proposal, and the Lacedaemonian
army returned home from Tegea. After this intercourse was renewed
between them, and not long afterwards the same party contrived that the
Argives should give up the league with the Mantineans, Eleans, and
Athenians, and should make a treaty and alliance with the
Lacedaemonians; which was consequently done upon the terms following:

The Lacedaemonians and Argives agree to a treaty and alliance for fifty
years upon the terms following:

1. All disputes shall be decided by fair and impartial arbitration,
agreeably to the customs of the two countries.

2. The rest of the cities in Peloponnese may be included in this treaty
and alliance, as independent and sovereign, in full enjoyment of what
they possess, all disputes being decided by fair and impartial
arbitration, agreeably to the customs of the said cities.

3. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnese shall be upon
the same footing as the Lacedaemonians themselves, and the allies of
the Argives shall be upon the same footing as the Argives themselves,
continuing to enjoy what they possess.

4. If it shall be anywhere necessary to make an expedition in common,
the Lacedaemonians and Argives shall consult upon it and decide, as may
be most fair for the allies.

5. If any of the cities, whether inside or outside Peloponnese, have a
question whether of frontiers or otherwise, it must be settled, but if
one allied city should have a quarrel with another allied city, it must
be referred to some third city thought impartial by both parties.
Private citizens shall have their disputes decided according to the
laws of their several countries.

The treaty and above alliance concluded, each party at once released
everything whether acquired by war or otherwise, and thenceforth acting
in common voted to receive neither herald nor embassy from the
Athenians unless they evacuated their forts and withdrew from
Peloponnese, and also to make neither peace nor war with any, except
jointly. Zeal was not wanting: both parties sent envoys to the Thracian
places and to Perdiccas, and persuaded the latter to join their league.
Still he did not at once break off from Athens, although minded to do
so upon seeing the way shown him by Argos, the original home of his
family. They also renewed their old oaths with the Chalcidians and took
new ones: the Argives, besides, sent ambassadors to the Athenians,
bidding them evacuate the fort at Epidaurus. The Athenians, seeing
their own men outnumbered by the rest of the garrison, sent Demosthenes
to bring them out. This general, under colour of a gymnastic contest
which he arranged on his arrival, got the rest of the garrison out of
the place, and shut the gates behind them. Afterwards the Athenians
renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians, and by themselves gave up
the fortress.

After the defection of Argos from the league, the Mantineans, though
they held out at first, in the end finding themselves powerless without
the Argives, themselves too came to terms with Lacedaemon, and gave up
their sovereignty over the towns. The Lacedaemonians and Argives, each
a thousand strong, now took the field together, and the former first
went by themselves to Sicyon and made the government there more
oligarchical than before, and then both, uniting, put down the
democracy at Argos and set up an oligarchy favourable to Lacedaemon.
These events occurred at the close of the winter, just before spring;
and the fourteenth year of the war ended. The next summer the people of
Dium, in Athos, revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians, and the
Lacedaemonians settled affairs in Achaea in a way more agreeable to the
interests of their country. Meanwhile the popular party at Argos little
by little gathered new consistency and courage, and waited for the
moment of the Gymnopaedic festival at Lacedaemon, and then fell upon
the oligarchs. After a fight in the city, victory declared for the
commons, who slew some of their opponents and banished others. The
Lacedaemonians for a long while let the messages of their friends at
Argos remain without effect. At last they put off the Gymnopaediae and
marched to their succour, but learning at Tegea the defeat of the
oligarchs, refused to go any further in spite of the entreaties of
those who had escaped, and returned home and kept the festival. Later
on, envoys arrived with messages from the Argives in the town and from
the exiles, when the allies were also at Sparta; and after much had
been said on both sides, the Lacedaemonians decided that the party in
the town had done wrong, and resolved to march against Argos, but kept
delaying and putting off the matter. Meanwhile the commons at Argos, in
fear of the Lacedaemonians, began again to court the Athenian alliance,
which they were convinced would be of the greatest service to them; and
accordingly proceeded to build long walls to the sea, in order that in
case of a blockade by land; with the help of the Athenians they might
have the advantage of importing what they wanted by sea. Some of the
cities in Peloponnese were also privy to the building of these walls;
and the Argives with all their people, women and slaves not excepted,
addressed themselves to the work, while carpenters and masons came to
them from Athens.

Summer was now over. The winter following the Lacedaemonians, hearing
of the walls that were building, marched against Argos with their
allies, the Corinthians excepted, being also not without intelligence
in the city itself; Agis, son of Archidamus, their king, was in
command. The intelligence which they counted upon within the town came
to nothing; they however took and razed the walls which were being
built, and after capturing the Argive town Hysiae and killing all the
freemen that fell into their hands, went back and dispersed every man
to his city. After this the Argives marched into Phlius and plundered
it for harbouring their exiles, most of whom had settled there, and so
returned home. The same winter the Athenians blockaded Macedonia, on
the score of the league entered into by Perdiccas with the Argives and
Lacedaemonians, and also of his breach of his engagements on the
occasion of the expedition prepared by Athens against the Chalcidians
in the direction of Thrace and against Amphipolis, under the command of
Nicias, son of Niceratus, which had to be broken up mainly because of
his desertion. He was therefore proclaimed an enemy. And thus the
winter ended, and the fifteenth year of the war ended with it.




CHAPTER XVII


Sixteenth Year of the War—The Melian Conference—Fate of Melos


The next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized
the suspected persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction to the
number of three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the
neighbouring islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an
expedition against the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own,
six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry,
three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers from Athens, and
about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and the islanders.
The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the
Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained neutral and
took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using
violence and plundering their territory, assumed an attitude of open
hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son of Tisimachus,
the generals, encamping in their territory with the above armament,
before doing any harm to their land, sent envoys to negotiate. These
the Melians did not bring before the people, but bade them state the
object of their mission to the magistrates and the few; upon which the
Athenian envoys spoke as follows:

Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the people,
in order that we may not be able to speak straight on without
interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by seductive
arguments which would pass without refutation (for we know that this is
the meaning of our being brought before the few), what if you who sit
there were to pursue a method more cautious still? Make no set speech
yourselves, but take us up at whatever you do not like, and settle that
before going any farther. And first tell us if this proposition of ours
suits you.

The Melian commissioners answered:

Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you
propose there is nothing to object; but your military preparations are
too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to
be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from
this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and
refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery.

Athenians. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the future,
or for anything else than to consult for the safety of your state upon
the facts that you see before you, we will give over; otherwise we will
go on.

Melians. It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn
more ways than one both in thought and utterance. However, the question
in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and the
discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way which you propose.

Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious
pretences—either of how we have a right to our empire because we
overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you
have done us—and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in
return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying
that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or
that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding
in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do
that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in
power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they
must.

Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient—we speak as we are
obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of
interest—that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the
privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right,
and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got
to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your
fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for
the world to meditate upon.

Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten
us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real
antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by
themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk
that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we
are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what
we are now going to say, for the preservation of your country; as we
would fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and see you
preserved for the good of us both.

Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as
for you to rule?

Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before
suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.

Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends
instead of enemies, but allies of neither side.

Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your
friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and
your enmity of our power.

Melians. Is that your subjects’ idea of equity, to put those who have
nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most
of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels?

Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the
other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they
are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are
afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security
by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than
others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed
in baffling the masters of the sea.

Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy
which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about
justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours,
and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you
avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at case
from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this
but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force
others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?

Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but
little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their
taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves,
outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be
the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into
obvious danger.

Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your
subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice
in us who are still free not to try everything that can be tried,
before submitting to your yoke.

Athenians. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal
one, with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question
of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger
than you are.

Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more
impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose;
to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still
preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect.

Athenians. Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by those who
have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without
ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as
to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when
they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to
guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the case
with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be
like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still
afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible,
to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men
with hopes to their destruction.

Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the
difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the
terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good
as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what
we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians,
who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their
kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is not so utterly
irrational.

Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly
hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct
being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise
among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a
necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is
not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when
made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for
ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and
everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as
we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no
reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to
your notion about the Lacedaemonians, which leads you to believe that
shame will make them help you, here we bless your simplicity but do not
envy your folly. The Lacedaemonians, when their own interests or their
country’s laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their
conduct towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it
could be given than by shortly saying that of all the men we know they
are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable, and
what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much
for the safety which you now unreasonably count upon.

Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their
respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians,
their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in
Hellas and helping their enemies.

Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with
security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without danger;
and danger the Lacedaemonians generally court as little as possible.

Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face even
danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our
nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common
blood ensures our fidelity.

Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the
goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power
for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than others.
At least, such is their distrust of their home resources that it is
only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now is it
likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an
island?

Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide
one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to intercept
others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so safely. And
should the Lacedaemonians miscarry in this, they would fall upon your
land, and upon those left of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach;
and instead of places which are not yours, you will have to fight for
your own country and your own confederacy.

Athenians. Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day
experience, only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians
never once yet withdrew from a siege for fear of any. But we are struck
by the fact that, after saying you would consult for the safety of your
country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing which men
might trust in and think to be saved by. Your strongest arguments
depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too
scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to come out
victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of judgment,
unless, after allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more
prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by that idea of
disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time
too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many
cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they are
rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere influence of a
seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so
enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall wilfully into hopeless
disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of
error, than when it comes as the result of misfortune. This, if you are
well advised, you will guard against; and you will not think it
dishonourable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas, when it makes
you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing
to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the choice
given you between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose
the worse. And it is certain that those who do not yield to their
equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards
their inferiors, on the whole succeed best. Think over the matter,
therefore, after our withdrawal, and reflect once and again that it is
for your country that you are consulting, that you have not more than
one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or
ruin.

The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left
to themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had
maintained in the discussion, and answered: “Our resolution, Athenians,
is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of
freedom a city that has been inhabited these seven hundred years; but
we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it
until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and
so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us
to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our
country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both.”

Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from
the conference said: “Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from
these resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is
before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as
already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted
most in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you
be most completely deceived.”

The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and the Melians showing
no signs of yielding, the generals at once betook themselves to
hostilities, and drew a line of circumvallation round the Melians,
dividing the work among the different states. Subsequently the
Athenians returned with most of their army, leaving behind them a
certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard by
land and sea. The force thus left stayed on and besieged the place.

About the same time the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius and
lost eighty men cut off in an ambush by the Phliasians and Argive
exiles. Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the
Lacedaemonians that the latter, although they still refrained from
breaking off the treaty and going to war with Athens, yet proclaimed
that any of their people that chose might plunder the Athenians. The
Corinthians also commenced hostilities with the Athenians for private
quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed quiet.
Meanwhile the Melians attacked by night and took the part of the
Athenian lines over against the market, and killed some of the men, and
brought in corn and all else that they could find useful to them, and
so returned and kept quiet, while the Athenians took measures to keep
better guard in future.

Summer was now over. The next winter the Lacedaemonians intended to
invade the Argive territory, but arriving at the frontier found the
sacrifices for crossing unfavourable, and went back again. This
intention of theirs gave the Argives suspicions of certain of their
fellow citizens, some of whom they arrested; others, however, escaped
them. About the same time the Melians again took another part of the
Athenian lines which were but feebly garrisoned. Reinforcements
afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under the command of
Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed vigorously; and
some treachery taking place inside, the Melians surrendered at
discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom
they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently
sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves.




BOOK VI




CHAPTER XVIII


Seventeenth Year of the War—The Sicilian Campaign—Affair of the
Hermae—Departure of the Expedition


The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with a
greater armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if
possible, to conquer the island; most of them being ignorant of its
size and of the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and
of the fact that they were undertaking a war not much inferior to that
against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily in a
merchantman is not far short of eight days; and yet, large as the
island is, there are only two miles of sea to prevent its being
mainland.

It was settled originally as follows, and the peoples that occupied it
are these. The earliest inhabitants spoken of in any part of the
country are the Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I cannot tell of what
race they were, or whence they came or whither they went, and must
leave my readers to what the poets have said of them and to what may be
generally known concerning them. The Sicanians appear to have been the
next settlers, although they pretend to have been the first of all and
aborigines; but the facts show that they were Iberians, driven by the
Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. It was from them that the
island, before called Trinacria, took its name of Sicania, and to the
present day they inhabit the west of Sicily. On the fall of Ilium, some
of the Trojans escaped from the Achaeans, came in ships to Sicily, and
settled next to the Sicanians under the general name of Elymi; their
towns being called Eryx and Egesta. With them settled some of the
Phocians carried on their way from Troy by a storm, first to Libya, and
afterwards from thence to Sicily. The Sicels crossed over to Sicily
from their first home Italy, flying from the Opicans, as tradition says
and as seems not unlikely, upon rafts, having watched till the wind set
down the strait to effect the passage; although perhaps they may have
sailed over in some other way. Even at the present day there are still
Sicels in Italy; and the country got its name of Italy from Italus, a
king of the Sicels, so called. These went with a great host to Sicily,
defeated the Sicanians in battle and forced them to remove to the south
and west of the island, which thus came to be called Sicily instead of
Sicania, and after they crossed over continued to enjoy the richest
parts of the country for near three hundred years before any Hellenes
came to Sicily; indeed they still hold the centre and north of the
island. There were also Phoenicians living all round Sicily, who had
occupied promontories upon the sea coasts and the islets adjacent for
the purpose of trading with the Sicels. But when the Hellenes began to
arrive in considerable numbers by sea, the Phoenicians abandoned most
of their stations, and drawing together took up their abode in Motye,
Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymi, partly because they confided in
their alliance, and also because these are the nearest points for the
voyage between Carthage and Sicily.

These were the barbarians in Sicily, settled as I have said. Of the
Hellenes, the first to arrive were Chalcidians from Euboea with
Thucles, their founder. They founded Naxos and built the altar to
Apollo Archegetes, which now stands outside the town, and upon which
the deputies for the games sacrifice before sailing from Sicily.
Syracuse was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one of the
Heraclids from Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the
island upon which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer
surrounded by water: in process of time the outer town also was taken
within the walls and became populous. Meanwhile Thucles and the
Chalcidians set out from Naxos in the fifth year after the foundation
of Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by arms and founded Leontini and
afterwards Catana; the Catanians themselves choosing Evarchus as their
founder.

About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from Megara,
and after founding a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas,
and afterwards leaving it and for a short while joining the Chalcidians
at Leontini, was driven out by them and founded Thapsus. After his
death his companions were driven out of Thapsus, and founded a place
called the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given up the
place and inviting them thither. Here they lived two hundred and
forty-five years; after which they were expelled from the city and the
country by the Syracusan tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion, however,
a hundred years after they had settled there, they sent out Pamillus
and founded Selinus; he having come from their mother country Megara to
join them in its foundation. Gela was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes
and Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading a colony thither, in the
forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The town took its
name from the river Gelas, the place where the citadel now stands, and
which was first fortified, being called Lindii. The institutions which
they adopted were Dorian. Near one hundred and eight years after the
foundation of Gela, the Geloans founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so called
from the river of that name, and made Aristonous and Pystilus their
founders; giving their own institutions to the colony. Zancle was
originally founded by pirates from Cuma, the Chalcidian town in the
country of the Opicans: afterwards, however, large numbers came from
Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, and helped to people the place; the
founders being Perieres and Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis
respectively. It first had the name of Zancle given it by the Sicels,
because the place is shaped like a sickle, which the Sicels call
zanclon; but upon the original settlers being afterwards expelled by
some Samians and other Ionians who landed in Sicily flying from the
Medes, and the Samians in their turn not long afterwards by Anaxilas,
tyrant of Rhegium, the town was by him colonized with a mixed
population, and its name changed to Messina, after his old country.

Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most of
those who went to the colony being Chalcidians; though they were joined
by some exiles from Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called the
Myletidae. The language was a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric, but the
institutions which prevailed were the Chalcidian. Acrae and Casmenae
were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after Syracuse,
Casmenae nearly twenty after Acrae. Camarina was first founded by the
Syracusans, close upon a hundred and thirty-five years after the
building of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and Menecolus. But the
Camarinaeans being expelled by arms by the Syracusans for having
revolted, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time later receiving their
land in ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, resettled Camarina,
himself acting as its founder. Lastly, it was again depopulated by
Gelo, and settled once more for the third time by the Geloans.

Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting
Sicily, and such the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were
now bent upon invading; being ambitious in real truth of conquering the
whole, although they had also the specious design of succouring their
kindred and other allies in the island. But they were especially
incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens and invoked their
aid more urgently than ever. The Egestaeans had gone to war with their
neighbours the Selinuntines upon questions of marriage and disputed
territory, and the Selinuntines had procured the alliance of the
Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and sea. The Egestaeans now
reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches,
during the former Leontine war, and begged them to send a fleet to
their aid, and among a number of other considerations urged as a
capital argument that if the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished
for their depopulation of Leontini, to ruin the allies still left to
Athens in Sicily, and to get the whole power of the island into their
hands, there would be a danger of their one day coming with a large
force, as Dorians, to the aid of their Dorian brethren, and as
colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and
joining these in pulling down the Athenian empire. The Athenians would,
therefore, do well to unite with the allies still left to them, and to
make a stand against the Syracusans; especially as they, the
Egestaeans, were prepared to furnish money sufficient for the war. The
Athenians, hearing these arguments constantly repeated in their
assemblies by the Egestaeans and their supporters, voted first to send
envoys to Egesta, to see if there was really the money that they talked
of in the treasury and temples, and at the same time to ascertain in
what posture was the war with the Selinuntines.

The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly dispatched to Sicily. The
same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the Corinthians
excepted, marched into the Argive territory, and ravaged a small part
of the land, and took some yokes of oxen and carried off some corn.
They also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and left them a few
soldiers taken from the rest of the army; and after making a truce for
a certain while, according to which neither Orneatae nor Argives were
to injure each other’s territory, returned home with the army. Not long
afterwards the Athenians came with thirty ships and six hundred heavy
infantry, and the Argives joining them with all their forces, marched
out and besieged the men in Orneae for one day; but the garrison
escaped by night, the besiegers having bivouacked some way off. The
next day the Argives, discovering it, razed Orneae to the ground, and
went back again; after which the Athenians went home in their ships.
Meanwhile the Athenians took by sea to Methone on the Macedonian border
some cavalry of their own and the Macedonian exiles that were at
Athens, and plundered the country of Perdiccas. Upon this the
Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who had a truce with
Athens from one ten days to another, urging them to join Perdiccas in
the war, which they refused to do. And the winter ended, and with it
ended the sixteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is the
historian.

Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys arrived
from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty talents of
uncoined silver, as a month’s pay for sixty ships, which they were to
ask to have sent them. The Athenians held an assembly and, after
hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys a report, as
attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs generally, and
in particular as to the money, of which, it was said, there was
abundance in the temples and the treasury, voted to send sixty ships to
Sicily, under the command of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, son of
Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes, who were appointed with
full powers; they were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines,
to restore Leontini upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to order
all other matters in Sicily as they should deem best for the interests
of Athens. Five days after this a second assembly was held, to consider
the speediest means of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else
might be required by the generals for the expedition; and Nicias, who
had been chosen to the command against his will, and who thought that
the state was not well advised, but upon a slight aid specious pretext
was aspiring to the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter to
achieve, came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the
enterprise, and gave them the following counsel:

“Although this assembly was convened to consider the preparations to be
made for sailing to Sicily, I think, notwithstanding, that we have
still this question to examine, whether it be better to send out the
ships at all, and that we ought not to give so little consideration to
a matter of such moment, or let ourselves be persuaded by foreigners
into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do. And yet,
individually, I gain in honour by such a course, and fear as little as
other men for my person—not that I think a man need be any the worse
citizen for taking some thought for his person and estate; on the
contrary, such a man would for his own sake desire the prosperity of
his country more than others—nevertheless, as I have never spoken
against my convictions to gain honour, I shall not begin to do so now,
but shall say what I think best. Against your character any words of
mine would be weak enough, if I were to advise your keeping what you
have got and not risking what is actually yours for advantages which
are dubious in themselves, and which you may or may not attain. I will,
therefore, content myself with showing that your ardour is out of
season, and your ambition not easy of accomplishment.

“I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go
yonder and bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the
treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue
to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet—for nominal it has
become, owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta—but
which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not delay
our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention was
forced upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them than to
us; and secondly, because in this very convention there are many points
that are still disputed. Again, some of the most powerful states have
never yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some of these are at open
war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not yet move) are
restrained by truces renewed every ten days, and it is only too
probable that if they found our power divided, as we are hurrying to
divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the Siceliots, whose
alliance they would have in the past valued as they would that of few
others. A man ought, therefore, to consider these points, and not to
think of running risks with a country placed so critically, or of
grasping at another empire before we have secured the one we have
already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these years
in revolt from us without being yet subdued, and others on the
continents yield us but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the Egestaeans,
our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help them, while the
rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for punishment.

“And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while the
Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to be
ruled without difficulty. Now it is folly to go against men who could
not be kept under even if conquered, while failure would leave us in a
very different position from that which we occupied before the
enterprise. The Siceliots, again, to take them as they are at present,
in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite bugbear of the
Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less dangerous to us than
before. At present they might possibly come here as separate states for
love of Lacedaemon; in the other case one empire would scarcely attack
another; for after joining the Peloponnesians to overthrow ours, they
could only expect to see the same hands overthrow their own in the same
way. The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there
at all, and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away
again as soon as possible. We all know that that which is farthest off,
and the reputation of which can least be tested, is the object of
admiration; at the least reverse they would at once begin to look down
upon us, and would join our enemies here against us. You have
yourselves experienced this with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their
allies, whom your unexpected success, as compared with what you feared
at first, has made you suddenly despise, tempting you further to aspire
to the conquest of Sicily. Instead, however, of being puffed up by the
misfortunes of your adversaries, you ought to think of breaking their
spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence, and to understand
that the one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians by their disgrace
is how they may even now, if possible, overthrow us and repair their
dishonour; inasmuch as military reputation is their oldest and chiefest
study. Our struggle, therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the
barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily, but how to defend ourselves most
effectually against the oligarchical machinations of Lacedaemon.

“We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite from
a great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our estates
and persons, and that it is right to employ these at home on our own
behalf, instead of using them on behalf of these exiles whose interest
it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do nothing but talk themselves
and leave the danger to others, and who if they succeed will show no
proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down their friends with
them. And if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to
command, who urges you to make the expedition, merely for ends of his
own—specially if he be still too young to command—who seeks to be
admired for his stud of horses, but on account of its heavy expenses
hopes for some profit from his appointment, do not allow such a one to
maintain his private splendour at his country’s risk, but remember that
such persons injure the public fortune while they squander their own,
and that this is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to
decide or hastily to take in hand.

“When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same
individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn,
summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next
him not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a
coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely success
is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to them the mad
dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now threatened
by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on the other
side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing
between us, limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea for the
coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy their
own possessions and to settle their own quarrels; that the Egestaeans,
for their part, be told to end by themselves with the Selinuntines the
war which they began without consulting the Athenians; and that for the
future we do not enter into alliance, as we have been used to do, with
people whom we must help in their need, and who can never help us in
ours.

“And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the
commonwealth, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put the
question to the vote, and take a second time the opinions of the
Athenians. If you are afraid to move the question again, consider that
a violation of the law cannot carry any prejudice with so many
abettors, that you will be the physician of your misguided city, and
that the virtue of men in office is briefly this, to do their country
as much good as they can, or in any case no harm that they can avoid.”

Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians that came forward
spoke in favour of the expedition, and of not annulling what had been
voted, although some spoke on the other side. By far the warmest
advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias,
who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also
because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was,
besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce
Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by
means of his successes. For the position he held among the citizens led
him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both
in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on
had not a little to do with the ruin of the Athenian state. Alarmed at
the greatness of his licence in his own life and habits, and of the
ambition which he showed in all things soever that he undertook, the
mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and
became his enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war was as
good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to
every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus
before long to ruin the city. Meanwhile he now came forward and gave
the following advice to the Athenians:

“Athenians, I have a better right to command than others—I must begin
with this as Nicias has attacked me—and at the same time I believe
myself to be worthy of it. The things for which I am abused, bring fame
to my ancestors and to myself, and to the country profit besides. The
Hellenes, after expecting to see our city ruined by the war, concluded
it to be even greater than it really is, by reason of the magnificence
with which I represented it at the Olympic games, when I sent into the
lists seven chariots, a number never before entered by any private
person, and won the first prize, and was second and fourth, and took
care to have everything else in a style worthy of my victory. Custom
regards such displays as honourable, and they cannot be made without
leaving behind them an impression of power. Again, any splendour that I
may have exhibited at home in providing choruses or otherwise, is
naturally envied by my fellow citizens, but in the eyes of foreigners
has an air of strength as in the other instance. And this is no useless
folly, when a man at his own private cost benefits not himself only,
but his city: nor is it unfair that he who prides himself on his
position should refuse to be upon an equality with the rest. He who is
badly off has his misfortunes all to himself, and as we do not see men
courted in adversity, on the like principle a man ought to accept the
insolence of prosperity; or else, let him first mete out equal measure
to all, and then demand to have it meted out to him. What I know is
that persons of this kind and all others that have attained to any
distinction, although they may be unpopular in their lifetime in their
relations with their fellow-men and especially with their equals, leave
to posterity the desire of claiming connection with them even without
any ground, and are vaunted by the country to which they belonged, not
as strangers or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such
are my aspirations, and however I am abused for them in private, the
question is whether any one manages public affairs better than I do.
Having united the most powerful states of Peloponnese, without great
danger or expense to you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake their
all upon the issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although victorious
in the battle, they have never since fully recovered confidence.

“Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find fitting arguments
to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians, and by its ardour win
their confidence and prevail. And do not be afraid of my youth now, but
while I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears fortunate, avail
yourselves to the utmost of the services of us both. Neither rescind
your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground that you would be
going to attack a great power. The cities in Sicily are peopled by
motley rabbles, and easily change their institutions and adopt new ones
in their stead; and consequently the inhabitants, being without any
feeling of patriotism, are not provided with arms for their persons,
and have not regularly established themselves on the land; every man
thinks that either by fair words or by party strife he can obtain
something at the public expense, and then in the event of a catastrophe
settle in some other country, and makes his preparations accordingly.
From a mob like this you need not look for either unanimity in counsel
or concert in action; but they will probably one by one come in as they
get a fair offer, especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are
told. Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry as they
boast; just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous as each
state reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their numbers,
and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout this
war. The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will be
found as I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages, for we
shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred of the
Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will the powers at home
prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly. Our fathers with these very
adversaries, which it is said we shall now leave behind us when we
sail, and the Mede as their enemy as well, were able to win the empire,
depending solely on their superiority at sea. The Peloponnesians had
never so little hope against us as at present; and let them be ever so
sanguine, although strong enough to invade our country even if we stay
at home, they can never hurt us with their navy, as we leave one of our
own behind us that is a match for them.

“In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for
holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for
not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to assist
them, without objecting that they have not assisted us. We did not take
them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas, but that they
might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from coming
over here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has been won, both
by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant readiness to
support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite assistance;
since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom they ought
to assist, we should make but few new conquests, and should imperil
those we have already won. Men do not rest content with parrying the
attacks of a superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the
attack being made. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our
empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be
content with retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease
to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you
look at inaction from the same point of view as others, unless you are
prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs.

“Be convinced, then, that we shall augment our power at home by this
adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the
pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily, and letting them
see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and at
the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily may, of
the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian Hellenes, or
in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small advantage of ourselves
and our allies. The faculty of staying if successful, or of returning,
will be secured to us by our navy, as we shall be superior at sea to
all the Siceliots put together. And do not let the do-nothing policy
which Nicias advocates, or his setting of the young against the old,
turn you from your purpose, but in the good old fashion by which our
fathers, old and young together, by their united counsels brought our
affairs to their present height, do you endeavour still to advance
them; understanding that neither youth nor old age can do anything the
one without the other, but that levity, sobriety, and deliberate
judgment are strongest when united, and that, by sinking into inaction,
the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and its skill in
everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give it fresh
experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in word but in
deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature
could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting
such a policy, and that the safest rule of life is to take one’s
character and institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to
them as closely as one can.”

Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the Egestaeans
and some Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them of their
oaths and imploring their assistance, the Athenians became more eager
for the expedition than before. Nicias, perceiving that it would be now
useless to try to deter them by the old line of argument, but thinking
that he might perhaps alter their resolution by the extravagance of his
estimates, came forward a second time and spoke as follows:

“I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition,
and therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to
give you my opinion at the present juncture. From all that I hear we
are going against cities that are great and not subject to one another,
or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from enforced servitude
to an easier condition, or in the least likely to accept our rule in
exchange for freedom; and, to take only the Hellenic towns, they are
very numerous for one island. Besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect
to join us from their connection with Leontini, there are seven others
armed at all points just like our own power, particularly Selinus and
Syracuse, the chief objects of our expedition. These are full of heavy
infantry, archers, and darters, have galleys in abundance and crowds to
man them; they have also money, partly in the hands of private persons,
partly in the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from
some of the barbarians as well. But their chief advantage over us lies
in the number of their horses, and in the fact that they grow their
corn at home instead of importing it.

“Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak
naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail with
us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are not to be
shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry; especially if the
cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be left without
friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us with horse to defend
ourselves with. It would be disgraceful to have to retire under
compulsion, or to send back for reinforcements, owing to want of
reflection at first: we must therefore start from home with a competent
force, seeing that we are going to sail far from our country, and upon
an expedition not like any which you may undertaken undertaken the
quality of allies, among your subject states here in Hellas, where any
additional supplies needed were easily drawn from the friendly
territory; but we are cutting ourselves off, and going to a land
entirely strange, from which during four months in winter it is not
even easy for a messenger get to Athens.

“I think, therefore, that we ought to take great numbers of heavy
infantry, both from Athens and from our allies, and not merely from our
subjects, but also any we may be able to get for love or for money in
Peloponnese, and great numbers also of archers and slingers, to make
head against the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must have an overwhelming
superiority at sea, to enable us the more easily to carry in what we
want; and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels, that is to
say, wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the mills compelled to
serve for pay in the proper proportion; in order that in case of our
being weather-bound the armament may not want provisions, as it is not
every city that will be able to entertain numbers like ours. We must
also provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, so as not
to be dependent upon others; and above all we must take with us from
home as much money as possible, as the sums talked of as ready at
Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any other way.

“Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that of
the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry in the field, but even
at all points superior to him, we shall still find it difficult to
conquer Sicily or save ourselves. We must not disguise from ourselves
that we go to found a city among strangers and enemies, and that he who
undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared to become master of
the country the first day he lands, or failing in this to find
everything hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing that we shall have
need of much good counsel and more good fortune—a hard matter for
mortal man to aspire to—I wish as far as may be to make myself
independent of fortune before sailing, and when I do sail, to be as
safe as a strong force can make me. This I believe to be surest for the
country at large, and safest for us who are to go on the expedition. If
any one thinks differently I resign to him my command.”

With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust the
Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to sail
on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible. The
Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage taken
away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more eager for
it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what Nicias had
thought, as it was held that he had given good advice, and that the
expedition would be the safest in the world. All alike fell in love
with the enterprise. The older men thought that they would either
subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at all events,
with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of
life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt
that they should come safe home again; while the idea of the common
people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and make
conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for the future.
With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked it not, feared
to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept
quiet.

At last one of the Athenians came forward and called upon Nicias and
told him that he ought not to make excuses or put them off, but say at
once before them all what forces the Athenians should vote him. Upon
this he said, not without reluctance, that he would advise upon that
matter more at leisure with his colleagues; as far however as he could
see at present, they must sail with at least one hundred galleys—the
Athenians providing as many transports as they might determine, and
sending for others from the allies—not less than five thousand heavy
infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and if possible more; and the
rest of the armament in proportion; archers from home and from Crete,
and slingers, and whatever else might seem desirable, being got ready
by the generals and taken with them.

Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals should
have full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and of the
expedition generally, to do as they judged best for the interests of
Athens. After this the preparations began; messages being sent to the
allies and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city had just
recovered from the plague and the long war, and a number of young men
had grown up and capital had accumulated by reason of the truce,
everything was the more easily provided.

In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermae in the city of
Athens, that is to say the customary square figures, so common in the
doorways of private houses and temples, had in one night most of them
their fares mutilated. No one knew who had done it, but large public
rewards were offered to find the authors; and it was further voted that
any one who knew of any other act of impiety having been committed
should come and give information without fear of consequences, whether
he were citizen, alien, or slave. The matter was taken up the more
seriously, as it was thought to be ominous for the expedition, and part
of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and to upset the democracy.

Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body
servants, not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations of
other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic, and of mock
celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take place in private houses.
Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken hold of by
those who could least endure him, because he stood in the way of their
obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people, and who thought that
if he were once removed the first place would be theirs. These
accordingly magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed that the affair
of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were part and parcel
of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that nothing of all this
had been done without Alcibiades; the proofs alleged being the general
and undemocratic licence of his life and habits.

Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question, and also
before going on the expedition, the preparations for which were now
complete, offered to stand his trial, that it might be seen whether he
was guilty of the acts imputed to him; desiring to be punished if found
guilty, but, if acquitted, to take the command. Meanwhile he protested
against their receiving slanders against him in his absence, and begged
them rather to put him to death at once if he were guilty, and pointed
out the imprudence of sending him out at the head of so large an army,
with so serious a charge still undecided. But his enemies feared that
he would have the army for him if he were tried immediately, and that
the people might relent in favour of the man whom they already caressed
as the cause of the Argives and some of the Mantineans joining in the
expedition, and did their utmost to get this proposition rejected,
putting forward other orators who said that he ought at present to sail
and not delay the departure of the army, and be tried on his return
within a fixed number of days; their plan being to have him sent for
and brought home for trial upon some graver charge, which they would
the more easily get up in his absence. Accordingly it was decreed that
he should sail.

After this the departure for Sicily took place, it being now about
midsummer. Most of the allies, with the corn transports and the smaller
craft and the rest of the expedition, had already received orders to
muster at Corcyra, to cross the Ionian Sea from thence in a body to the
Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves, and such of their
allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piraeus upon a day
appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for putting out to
sea. With them also went down the whole population, one may say, of the
city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of the country each
escorting those that belonged to them, their friends, their relatives,
or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their way, as they
thought of the conquests which they hoped to make, or of the friends
whom they might never see again, considering the long voyage which they
were going to make from their country. Indeed, at this moment, when
they were now upon the point of parting from one another, the danger
came more home to them than when they voted for the expedition;
although the strength of the armament, and the profuse provision which
they remarked in every department, was a sight that could not but
comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of the crowd, they
simply went to see a sight worth looking at and passing all belief.

Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most costly
and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single
city up to that time. In mere number of ships and heavy infantry that
against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same when going against
Potidæa under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing as it did four
thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and one hundred
galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and many allies
besides. But these were sent upon a short voyage and with a scanty
equipment. The present expedition was formed in contemplation of a long
term of service by land and sea alike, and was furnished with ships and
troops so as to be ready for either as required. The fleet had been
elaborately equipped at great cost to the captains and the state; the
treasury giving a drachma a day to each seaman, and providing empty
ships, sixty men-of-war and forty transports, and manning these with
the best crews obtainable; while the captains gave a bounty in addition
to the pay from the treasury to the thranitae and crews generally,
besides spending lavishly upon figure-heads and equipments, and one and
all making the utmost exertions to enable their own ships to excel in
beauty and fast sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been picked from
the best muster-rolls, and vied with each other in paying great
attention to their arms and personal accoutrements. From this resulted
not only a rivalry among themselves in their different departments, but
an idea among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a display of
power and resources than an armament against an enemy. For if any one
had counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private
outlay of individuals—that is to say, the sums which the state had
already spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the hands of
the generals, and those which individuals had expended upon their
personal outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and were still
to lay out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey
money which each was likely to have provided himself with,
independently of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage of such
length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for the purpose
of exchange—it would have been found that many talents in all were
being taken out of the city. Indeed the expedition became not less
famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its
appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the
peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was
the longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most
ambitious in its objects considering the resources of those who
undertook it.

The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which they
meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers customary
before putting out to sea were offered, not in each ship by itself, but
by all together to the voice of a herald; and bowls of wine were mixed
through all the armament, and libations made by the soldiers and their
officers in gold and silver goblets. In their prayers joined also the
crowds on shore, the citizens and all others that wished them well. The
hymn sung and the libations finished, they put out to sea, and first
out in column then raced each other as far as Aegina, and so hastened
to reach Corcyra, where the rest of the allied forces were also
assembling.




CHAPTER XIX


Seventeenth Year of the War—Parties at Syracuse—Story of Harmodius and
Aristogiton—Disgrace of Alcibiades


Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the
expedition, but for a long while met with no credence whatever. Indeed,
an assembly was held in which speeches, as will be seen, were delivered
by different orators, believing or contradicting the report of the
Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates, son of Hermon, came
forward, being persuaded that he knew the truth of the matter, and gave
the following counsel:

“Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have been
when I speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I know
that those who either make or repeat statements thought not worthy of
belief not only gain no converts but are thought fools for their pains,
I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my tongue when the
state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can speak with more
authority on the matter than other persons. Much as you wonder at it,
the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us with a large force,
naval and military, professedly to help the Egestaeans and to restore
Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily, and above all our city, which
once gained, the rest, they think, will easily follow. Make up your
minds, therefore, to see them speedily here, and see how you can best
repel them with the means under your hand, and do be taken off your
guard through despising the news, or neglect the common weal through
disbelieving it. Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at
the force or daring of the enemy. They will not be able to do us more
hurt than we shall do them; nor is the greatness of their armament
altogether without advantage to us. Indeed, the greater it is the
better, with regard to the rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay will make
more ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away,
disappointed of the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a
moment that they will get what they want), it will be a most glorious
exploit for us, and in my judgment by no means an unlikely one. Few
indeed have been the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian,
that have gone far from home and been successful. They cannot be more
numerous than the people of the country and their neighbours, all of
whom fear leagues together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies
in a foreign land, to those against whom their plans were laid none the
less they leave renown, although they may themselves have been the main
cause of their own discomfort. Thus these very Athenians rose by the
defeat of the Mede, in a great measure due to accidental causes, from
the mere fact that Athens had been the object of his attack; and this
may very well be the case with us also.

“Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send
and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance
of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the
danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our allies,
or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also think that
it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by no means
there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear that the
Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps think
that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and
be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if not in
another. They are the best able to do so, if they will, of any of the
present day, as they possess most gold and silver, by which war, like
everything else, flourishes. Let us also send to Lacedaemon and
Corinth, and ask them to come here and help us as soon as possible, and
to keep alive the war in Hellas. But the true thing of all others, in
my opinion, to do at the present moment, is what you, with your
constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see, and what I must
nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together, or at least as
many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch the whole of our
actual navy with two months’ provisions, and meet the Athenians at
Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them that before
fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their passage across the
Ionian Sea, we should strike dismay into their army, and set them on
thinking that we have a base for our defensive—for Tarentum is ready to
receive us—while they have a wide sea to cross with all their armament,
which could with difficulty keep its order through so long a voyage,
and would be easy for us to attack as it came on slowly and in small
detachments. On the other hand, if they were to lighten their vessels,
and draw together their fast sailers and with these attack us, we could
either fall upon them when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did
not choose to do so, we could retire to Tarentum; while they, having
crossed with few provisions just to give battle, would be hard put to
it in desolate places, and would either have to remain and be
blockaded, or to try to sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of
their armament, and being further discouraged by not knowing for
certain whether the cities would receive them. In my opinion this
consideration alone would be sufficient to deter them from putting out
from Corcyra; and what with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers
and whereabouts, they would let the season go on until winter was upon
them, or, confounded by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up
the expedition, especially as their most experienced general has, as I
hear, taken the command against his will, and would grasp at the first
excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours. We should also be
reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really are, and men’s
minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first to attack,
or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack,
inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the
emergency. This would just be the case with the Athenians at present.
They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not resist,
having a right to judge us severely because we did not help the
Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if they were to see us showing a
courage for which they are not prepared, they would be more dismayed by
the surprise than they could ever be by our actual power. I could wish
to persuade you to show this courage; but if this cannot be, at all
events lose not a moment in preparing generally for the war; and
remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is best shown by
bravery in action, but that for the present the best course is to
accept the preparations which fear inspires as giving the surest
promise of safety, and to act as if the danger was real. That the
Athenians are coming to attack us, and are already upon the voyage, and
all but here—this is what I am sure of.”

Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were at
great strife among themselves; some contending that the Athenians had
no idea of coming and that there was no truth in what he said; some
asking if they did come what harm they could do that would not be
repaid them tenfold in return; while others made light of the whole
affair and turned it into ridicule. In short, there were few that
believed Hermocrates and feared for the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras,
the leader of the people and very powerful at that time with the
masses, came forward and spoke as follows:

“For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they may be as misguided
as they are supposed to be, and that they may come here to become our
subjects, is either a coward or a traitor to his country; while as for
those who carry such tidings and fill you with so much alarm, I wonder
less at their audacity than at their folly if they flatter themselves
that we do not see through them. The fact is that they have their
private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw the city into
consternation to have their own terrors cast into the shade by the
public alarm. In short, this is what these reports are worth; they do
not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who are always
causing agitation here in Sicily. However, if you are well advised, you
will not be guided in your calculation of probabilities by what these
persons tell you, but by what shrewd men and of large experience, as I
esteem the Athenians to be, would be likely to do. Now it is not likely
that they would leave the Peloponnesians behind them, and before they
have well ended the war in Hellas wantonly come in quest of a new war
quite as arduous in Sicily; indeed, in my judgment, they are only too
glad that we do not go and attack them, being so many and so great
cities as we are.

“However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily better
able to go through with the war than Peloponnese, as being at all
points better prepared, and our city by itself far more than a match
for this pretended army of invasion, even were it twice as large again.
I know that they will not have horses with them, or get any here,
except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring a force
of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which will
already have enough to do to come all this distance, however lightly
laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores required
against a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight quantity. In
fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I do not well see
how they could avoid annihilation if they brought with them another
city as large as Syracuse, and settled down and carried on war from our
frontier; much less can they hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile to
them, as all Sicily will be, and with only a camp pitched from the
ships, and composed of tents and bare necessaries, from which they
would not be able to stir far for fear of our cavalry.

“But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and as I have reason to know
are looking after their possessions at home, while persons here invent
stories that neither are true nor ever will be. Nor is this the first
time that I see these persons, when they cannot resort to deeds, trying
by such stories and by others even more abominable to frighten your
people and get into their hands the government: it is what I see
always. And I cannot help fearing that trying so often they may one day
succeed, and that we, as long as we do not feel the smart, may prove
too weak for the task of prevention, or, when the offenders are known,
of pursuit. The result is that our city is rarely at rest, but is
subject to constant troubles and to contests as frequent against
herself as against the enemy, not to speak of occasional tyrannies and
infamous cabals. However, I will try, if you will support me, to let
nothing of this happen in our time, by gaining you, the many, and by
chastising the authors of such machinations, not merely when they are
caught in the act—a difficult feat to accomplish—but also for what they
have the wish though not the power to do; as it is necessary to punish
an enemy not only for what he does, but also beforehand for what he
intends to do, if the first to relax precaution would not be also the
first to suffer. I shall also reprove, watch, and on occasion warn the
few—the most effectual way, in my opinion, of turning them from their
evil courses. And after all, as I have often asked, what would you
have, young men? Would you hold office at once? The law forbids it, a
law enacted rather because you are not competent than to disgrace you
when competent. Meanwhile you would not be on a legal equality with the
many! But how can it be right that citizens of the same state should be
held unworthy of the same privileges?

“It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor
equitable, but that the holders of property are also the best fitted to
rule. I say, on the contrary, first, that the word demos, or people,
includes the whole state, oligarchy only a part; next, that if the best
guardians of property are the rich, and the best counsellors the wise,
none can hear and decide so well as the many; and that all these
talents, severally and collectively, have their just place in a
democracy. But an oligarchy gives the many their share of the danger,
and not content with the largest part takes and keeps the whole of the
profit; and this is what the powerful and young among you aspire to,
but in a great city cannot possibly obtain.

“But even now, foolish men, most senseless of all the Hellenes that I
know, if you have no sense of the wickedness of your designs, or most
criminal if you have that sense and still dare to pursue them—even now,
if it is not a case for repentance, you may still learn wisdom, and
thus advance the interest of the country, the common interest of us
all. Reflect that in the country’s prosperity the men of merit in your
ranks will have a share and a larger share than the great mass of your
fellow countrymen, but that if you have other designs you run a risk of
being deprived of all; and desist from reports like these, as the
people know your object and will not put up with it. If the Athenians
arrive, this city will repulse them in a manner worthy of itself; we
have moreover, generals who will see to this matter. And if nothing of
this be true, as I incline to believe, the city will not be thrown into
a panic by your intelligence, or impose upon itself a self-chosen
servitude by choosing you for its rulers; the city itself will look
into the matter, and will judge your words as if they were acts, and,
instead of allowing itself to be deprived of its liberty by listening
to you, will strive to preserve that liberty, by taking care to have
always at hand the means of making itself respected.”

Such were the words of Athenagoras. One of the generals now stood up
and stopped any other speakers coming forward, adding these words of
his own with reference to the matter in hand: “It is not well for
speakers to utter calumnies against one another, or for their hearers
to entertain them; we ought rather to look to the intelligence that we
have received, and see how each man by himself and the city as a whole
may best prepare to repel the invaders. Even if there be no need, there
is no harm in the state being furnished with horses and arms and all
other insignia of war; and we will undertake to see to and order this,
and to send round to the cities to reconnoitre and do all else that may
appear desirable. Part of this we have seen to already, and whatever we
discover shall be laid before you.” After these words from the general,
the Syracusans departed from the assembly.

In the meantime the Athenians with all their allies had now arrived at
Corcyra. Here the generals began by again reviewing the armament, and
made arrangements as to the order in which they were to anchor and
encamp, and dividing the whole fleet into three divisions, allotted one
to each of their number, to avoid sailing all together and being thus
embarrassed for water, harbourage, or provisions at the stations which
they might touch at, and at the same time to be generally better
ordered and easier to handle, by each squadron having its own
commander. Next they sent on three ships to Italy and Sicily to find
out which of the cities would receive them, with instructions to meet
them on the way and let them know before they put in to land.

After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra, and proceeded to cross
to Sicily with an armament now consisting of one hundred and
thirty-four galleys in all (besides two Rhodian fifty-oars), of which
one hundred were Athenian vessels—sixty men-of-war, and forty
troopships—and the remainder from Chios and the other allies; five
thousand and one hundred heavy infantry in all, that is to say, fifteen
hundred Athenian citizens from the rolls at Athens and seven hundred
Thetes shipped as marines, and the rest allied troops, some of them
Athenian subjects, and besides these five hundred Argives, and two
hundred and fifty Mantineans serving for hire; four hundred and eighty
archers in all, eighty of whom were Cretans, seven hundred slingers
from Rhodes, one hundred and twenty light-armed exiles from Megara, and
one horse-transport carrying thirty horses.

Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the
war. The supplies for this force were carried by thirty ships of burden
laden with corn, which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons, and
carpenters, and the tools for raising fortifications, accompanied by
one hundred boats, like the former pressed into the service, besides
many other boats and ships of burden which followed the armament
voluntarily for purposes of trade; all of which now left Corcyra and
struck across the Ionian Sea together. The whole force making land at
the Iapygian promontory and Tarentum, with more or less good fortune,
coasted along the shores of Italy, the cities shutting their markets
and gates against them, and according them nothing but water and
liberty to anchor, and Tarentum and Locri not even that, until they
arrived at Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy. Here at length they
reunited, and not gaining admission within the walls pitched a camp
outside the city in the precinct of Artemis, where a market was also
provided for them, and drew their ships on shore and kept quiet.
Meanwhile they opened negotiations with the Rhegians, and called upon
them as Chalcidians to assist their Leontine kinsmen; to which the
Rhegians replied that they would not side with either party, but should
await the decision of the rest of the Italiots, and do as they did.
Upon this the Athenians now began to consider what would be the best
action to take in the affairs of Sicily, and meanwhile waited for the
ships sent on to come back from Egesta, in order to know whether there
was really there the money mentioned by the messengers at Athens.

In the meantime came in from all quarters to the Syracusans, as well as
from their own officers sent to reconnoitre, the positive tidings that
the fleet was at Rhegium; upon which they laid aside their incredulity
and threw themselves heart and soul into the work of preparation.
Guards or envoys, as the case might be, were sent round to the Sicels,
garrisons put into the posts of the Peripoli in the country, horses and
arms reviewed in the city to see that nothing was wanting, and all
other steps taken to prepare for a war which might be upon them at any
moment.

Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent on came from Egesta to the
Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that so far from there being the
sums promised, all that could be produced was thirty talents. The
generals were not a little disheartened at being thus disappointed at
the outset, and by the refusal to join in the expedition of the
Rhegians, the people they had first tried to gain and had had had most
reason to count upon, from their relationship to the Leontines and
constant friendship for Athens. If Nicias was prepared for the news
from Egesta, his two colleagues were taken completely by surprise. The
Egestaeans had had recourse to the following stratagem, when the first
envoys from Athens came to inspect their resources. They took the
envoys in question to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them
the treasures deposited there: bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a large
number of other pieces of plate, which from being in silver gave an
impression of wealth quite out of proportion to their really small
value. They also privately entertained the ships’ crews, and collected
all the cups of gold and silver that they could find in Egesta itself
or could borrow in the neighbouring Phoenician and Hellenic towns, and
each brought them to the banquets as their own; and as all used pretty
nearly the same, and everywhere a great quantity of plate was shown,
the effect was most dazzling upon the Athenian sailors, and made them
talk loudly of the riches they had seen when they got back to Athens.
The dupes in question—who had in their turn persuaded the rest—when the
news got abroad that there was not the money supposed at Egesta, were
much blamed by the soldiers.

Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The opinion
of Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the main object
of the expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide money for the
whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could not, to require
them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that they had asked for,
to stay and settle matters between them and the Selinuntines either by
force or by agreement, and then to coast past the other cities, and
after displaying the power of Athens and proving their zeal for their
friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they should have some
sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the Leontines, or of
bringing over some of the other cities), and not to endanger the state
by wasting its home resources.

Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not
disgrace itself by going away without having done anything; heralds
must be sent to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and efforts
be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans, and to
obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn and troops; and
first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the passage and
entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent harbour and base for
the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing who would be
their allies in the war, they might at length attack Syracuse and
Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with Egesta and the former
ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini.

Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight to
Syracuse, and fight their battle at once under the walls of the town
while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at its height.
Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed time to run on
without showing itself, men’s courage revived, and they saw it appear
at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly, while Syracuse
still trembled at their coming, they would have the best chance of
gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a complete panic into
the enemy by the aspect of their numbers—which would never appear so
considerable as at present—by the anticipation of coming disaster, and
above all by the immediate danger of the engagement. They might also
count upon surprising many in the fields outside, incredulous of their
coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his property
the army would not want for booty if it sat down in force before the
city. The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less disposed
to enter into alliance with the Syracusans, and would join the
Athenians, without waiting to see which were the strongest. They must
make Megara their naval station as a place to retreat to and a base
from which to attack: it was an uninhabited place at no great distance
from Syracuse either by land or by sea.

After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless gave his support
to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed in his own
vessel across to Messina with proposals of alliance, but met with no
success, the inhabitants answering that they could not receive him
within their walls, though they would provide him with a market
outside. Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium. Immediately upon his
return the generals manned and victualled sixty ships out of the whole
fleet and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament
behind them at Rhegium with one of their number. Received by the
Naxians, they then coasted on to Catana, and being refused admittance
by the inhabitants, there being a Syracusan party in the town, went on
to the river Terias. Here they bivouacked, and the next day sailed in
single file to Syracuse with all their ships except ten which they sent
on in front to sail into the great harbour and see if there was any
fleet launched, and to proclaim by herald from shipboard that the
Athenians were come to restore the Leontines to their country, as being
their allies and kinsmen, and that such of them, therefore, as were in
Syracuse should leave it without fear and join their friends and
benefactors the Athenians. After making this proclamation and
reconnoitring the city and the harbours, and the features of the
country which they would have to make their base of operations in the
war, they sailed back to Catana.

An assembly being held here, the inhabitants refused to receive the
armament, but invited the generals to come in and say what they
desired; and while Alcibiades was speaking and the citizens were intent
on the assembly, the soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up postern gate
without being observed, and getting inside the town, flocked into the
marketplace. The Syracusan party in the town no sooner saw the army
inside than they became frightened and withdrew, not being at all
numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians and
invited them to fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium. After this
the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and put off, this time with all the
armament, for Catana, and fell to work at their camp immediately upon
their arrival.

Meanwhile word was brought them from Camarina that if they went there
the town would go over to them, and also that the Syracusans were
manning a fleet. The Athenians accordingly sailed alongshore with all
their armament, first to Syracuse, where they found no fleet manning,
and so always along the coast to Camarina, where they brought to at the
beach, and sent a herald to the people, who, however, refused to
receive them, saying that their oaths bound them to receive the
Athenians only with a single vessel, unless they themselves sent for
more. Disappointed here, the Athenians now sailed back again, and after
landing and plundering on Syracusan territory and losing some
stragglers from their light infantry through the coming up of the
Syracusan horse, so got back to Catana.

There they found the Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades, with
orders for him to sail home to answer the charges which the state
brought against him, and for certain others of the soldiers who with
him were accused of sacrilege in the matter of the mysteries and of the
Hermae. For the Athenians, after the departure of the expedition, had
continued as active as ever in investigating the facts of the mysteries
and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing the informers, in their
suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently, arresting and imprisoning
the best citizens upon the evidence of rascals, and preferring to sift
the matter to the bottom sooner than to let an accused person of good
character pass unquestioned, owing to the rascality of the informer.
The commons had heard how oppressive the tyranny of Pisistratus and his
sons had become before it ended, and further that that had been put
down at last, not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the
Lacedaemonians, and so were always in fear and took everything
suspiciously.

Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and Harmodius was undertaken
in consequence of a love affair, which I shall relate at some length,
to show that the Athenians are not more accurate than the rest of the
world in their accounts of their own tyrants and of the facts of their
own history. Pisistratus dying at an advanced age in possession of the
tyranny, was succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias, and not Hipparchus,
as is vulgarly believed. Harmodius was then in the flower of youthful
beauty, and Aristogiton, a citizen in the middle rank of life, was his
lover and possessed him. Solicited without success by Hipparchus, son
of Pisistratus, Harmodius told Aristogiton, and the enraged lover,
afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might take Harmodius by force,
immediately formed a design, such as his condition in life permitted,
for overthrowing the tyranny. In the meantime Hipparchus, after a
second solicitation of Harmodius, attended with no better success,
unwilling to use violence, arranged to insult him in some covert way.
Indeed, generally their government was not grievous to the multitude,
or in any way odious in practice; and these tyrants cultivated wisdom
and virtue as much as any, and without exacting from the Athenians more
than a twentieth of their income, splendidly adorned their city, and
carried on their wars, and provided sacrifices for the temples. For the
rest, the city was left in full enjoyment of its existing laws, except
that care was always taken to have the offices in the hands of some one
of the family. Among those of them that held the yearly archonship at
Athens was Pisistratus, son of the tyrant Hippias, and named after his
grandfather, who dedicated during his term of office the altar to the
twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian
precinct. The Athenian people afterwards built on to and lengthened the
altar in the market-place, and obliterated the inscription; but that in
the Pythian precinct can still be seen, though in faded letters, and is
to the following effect:

Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, Sent up this record of his archonship
In precinct of Apollo Pythias.

That Hippias was the eldest son and succeeded to the government, is
what I positively assert as a fact upon which I have had more exact
accounts than others, and may be also ascertained by the following
circumstance. He is the only one of the legitimate brothers that
appears to have had children; as the altar shows, and the pillar placed
in the Athenian Acropolis, commemorating the crime of the tyrants,
which mentions no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but five of
Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, son of
Hyperechides; and naturally the eldest would have married first. Again,
his name comes first on the pillar after that of his father; and this
too is quite natural, as he was the eldest after him, and the reigning
tyrant. Nor can I ever believe that Hippias would have obtained the
tyranny so easily, if Hipparchus had been in power when he was killed,
and he, Hippias, had had to establish himself upon the same day; but he
had no doubt been long accustomed to overawe the citizens, and to be
obeyed by his mercenaries, and thus not only conquered, but conquered
with ease, without experiencing any of the embarrassment of a younger
brother unused to the exercise of authority. It was the sad fate which
made Hipparchus famous that got him also the credit with posterity of
having been tyrant.

To return to Harmodius; Hipparchus having been repulsed in his
solicitations insulted him as he had resolved, by first inviting a
sister of his, a young girl, to come and bear a basket in a certain
procession, and then rejecting her, on the plea that she had never been
invited at all owing to her unworthiness. If Harmodius was indignant at
this, Aristogiton for his sake now became more exasperated than ever;
and having arranged everything with those who were to join them in the
enterprise, they only waited for the great feast of the Panathenaea,
the sole day upon which the citizens forming part of the procession
could meet together in arms without suspicion. Aristogiton and
Harmodius were to begin, but were to be supported immediately by their
accomplices against the bodyguard. The conspirators were not many, for
better security, besides which they hoped that those not in the plot
would be carried away by the example of a few daring spirits, and use
the arms in their hands to recover their liberty.

At last the festival arrived; and Hippias with his bodyguard was
outside the city in the Ceramicus, arranging how the different parts of
the procession were to proceed. Harmodius and Aristogiton had already
their daggers and were getting ready to act, when seeing one of their
accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who was easy of access to
every one, they took fright, and concluded that they were discovered
and on the point of being taken; and eager if possible to be revenged
first upon the man who had wronged them and for whom they had
undertaken all this risk, they rushed, as they were, within the gates,
and meeting with Hipparchus by the Leocorium recklessly fell upon him
at once, infuriated, Aristogiton by love, and Harmodius by insult, and
smote him and slew him. Aristogiton escaped the guards at the moment,
through the crowd running up, but was afterwards taken and dispatched
in no merciful way: Harmodius was killed on the spot.

When the news was brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he at once
proceeded not to the scene of action, but to the armed men in the
procession, before they, being some distance away, knew anything of the
matter, and composing his features for the occasion, so as not to
betray himself, pointed to a certain spot, and bade them repair thither
without their arms. They withdrew accordingly, fancying he had
something to say; upon which he told the mercenaries to remove the
arms, and there and then picked out the men he thought guilty and all
found with daggers, the shield and spear being the usual weapons for a
procession.

In this way offended love first led Harmodius and Aristogiton to
conspire, and the alarm of the moment to commit the rash action
recounted. After this the tyranny pressed harder on the Athenians, and
Hippias, now grown more fearful, put to death many of the citizens, and
at the same time began to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge in case of
revolution. Thus, although an Athenian, he gave his daughter,
Archedice, to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus,
seeing that they had great influence with Darius. And there is her tomb
in Lampsacus with this inscription:

Archedice lies buried in this earth, Hippias her sire, and Athens gave
her birth; Unto her bosom pride was never known, Though daughter, wife,
and sister to the throne.

Hippias, after reigning three years longer over the Athenians, was
deposed in the fourth by the Lacedaemonians and the banished
Alcmaeonidae, and went with a safe conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides
at Lampsacus, and from thence to King Darius; from whose court he set
out twenty years after, in his old age, and came with the Medes to
Marathon.

With these events in their minds, and recalling everything they knew by
hearsay on the subject, the Athenian people grow difficult of humour
and suspicious of the persons charged in the affair of the mysteries,
and persuaded that all that had taken place was part of an oligarchical
and monarchical conspiracy. In the state of irritation thus produced,
many persons of consideration had been already thrown into prison, and
far from showing any signs of abating, public feeling grew daily more
savage, and more arrests were made; until at last one of those in
custody, thought to be the most guilty of all, was induced by a fellow
prisoner to make a revelation, whether true or not is a matter on which
there are two opinions, no one having been able, either then or since,
to say for certain who did the deed. However this may be, the other
found arguments to persuade him, that even if he had not done it, he
ought to save himself by gaining a promise of impunity, and free the
state of its present suspicions; as he would be surer of safety if he
confessed after promise of impunity than if he denied and were brought
to trial. He accordingly made a revelation, affecting himself and
others in the affair of the Hermae; and the Athenian people, glad at
last, as they supposed, to get at the truth, and furious until then at
not being able to discover those who had conspired against the commons,
at once let go the informer and all the rest whom he had not denounced,
and bringing the accused to trial executed as many as were apprehended,
and condemned to death such as had fled and set a price upon their
heads. In this it was, after all, not clear whether the sufferers had
been punished unjustly, while in any case the rest of the city received
immediate and manifest relief.

To return to Alcibiades: public feeling was very hostile to him, being
worked on by the same enemies who had attacked him before he went out;
and now that the Athenians fancied that they had got at the truth of
the matter of the Hermae, they believed more firmly than ever that the
affair of the mysteries also, in which he was implicated, had been
contrived by him in the same intention and was connected with the plot
against the democracy. Meanwhile it so happened that, just at the time
of this agitation, a small force of Lacedaemonians had advanced as far
as the Isthmus, in pursuance of some scheme with the Boeotians. It was
now thought that this had come by appointment, at his instigation, and
not on account of the Boeotians, and that, if the citizens had not
acted on the information received, and forestalled them by arresting
the prisoners, the city would have been betrayed. The citizens went so
far as to sleep one night armed in the temple of Theseus within the
walls. The friends also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at this time
suspected of a design to attack the commons; and the Argive hostages
deposited in the islands were given up by the Athenians to the Argive
people to be put to death upon that account: in short, everywhere
something was found to create suspicion against Alcibiades. It was
therefore decided to bring him to trial and execute him, and the
Salaminia was sent to Sicily for him and the others named in the
information, with instructions to order him to come and answer the
charges against him, but not to arrest him, because they wished to
avoid causing any agitation in the army or among the enemy in Sicily,
and above all to retain the services of the Mantineans and Argives,
who, it was thought, had been induced to join by his influence.
Alcibiades, with his own ship and his fellow accused, accordingly
sailed off with the Salaminia from Sicily, as though to return to
Athens, and went with her as far as Thurii, and there they left the
ship and disappeared, being afraid to go home for trial with such a
prejudice existing against them. The crew of the Salaminia stayed some
time looking for Alcibiades and his companions, and at length, as they
were nowhere to be found, set sail and departed. Alcibiades, now an
outlaw, crossed in a boat not long after from Thurii to Peloponnese;
and the Athenians passed sentence of death by default upon him and
those in his company.




CHAPTER XX


Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War—Inaction of the Athenian
Army—Alcibiades at Sparta—Investment of Syracuse


The Athenian generals left in Sicily now divided the armament into two
parts, and, each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole for Selinus
and Egesta, wishing to know whether the Egestaeans would give the
money, and to look into the question of Selinus and ascertain the state
of the quarrel between her and Egesta. Coasting along Sicily, with the
shore on their left, on the side towards the Tyrrhene Gulf they touched
at Himera, the only Hellenic city in that part of the island, and being
refused admission resumed their voyage. On their way they took Hyccara,
a petty Sicanian seaport, nevertheless at war with Egesta, and making
slaves of the inhabitants gave up the town to the Egestaeans, some of
whose horse had joined them; after which the army proceeded through the
territory of the Sicels until it reached Catana, while the fleet sailed
along the coast with the slaves on board. Meanwhile Nicias sailed
straight from Hyccara along the coast and went to Egesta and, after
transacting his other business and receiving thirty talents, rejoined
the forces. They now sold their slaves for the sum of one hundred and
twenty talents, and sailed round to their Sicel allies to urge them to
send troops; and meanwhile went with half their own force to the
hostile town of Hybla in the territory of Gela, but did not succeed in
taking it.

Summer was now over. The winter following, the Athenians at once began
to prepare for moving on Syracuse, and the Syracusans on their side for
marching against them. From the moment when the Athenians failed to
attack them instantly as they at first feared and expected, every day
that passed did something to revive their courage; and when they saw
them sailing far away from them on the other side of Sicily, and going
to Hybla only to fail in their attempts to storm it, they thought less
of them than ever, and called upon their generals, as the multitude is
apt to do in its moments of confidence, to lead them to Catana, since
the enemy would not come to them. Parties also of the Syracusan horse
employed in reconnoitring constantly rode up to the Athenian armament,
and among other insults asked them whether they had not really come to
settle with the Syracusans in a foreign country rather than to resettle
the Leontines in their own.

Aware of this, the Athenian generals determined to draw them out in
mass as far as possible from the city, and themselves in the meantime
to sail by night alongshore, and take up at their leisure a convenient
position. This they knew they could not so well do, if they had to
disembark from their ships in front of a force prepared for them, or to
go by land openly. The numerous cavalry of the Syracusans (a force
which they were themselves without) would then be able to do the
greatest mischief to their light troops and the crowd that followed
them; but this plan would enable them to take up a position in which
the horse could do them no hurt worth speaking of, some Syracusan
exiles with the army having told them of the spot near the Olympieum,
which they afterwards occupied. In pursuance of their idea, the
generals imagined the following stratagem. They sent to Syracuse a man
devoted to them, and by the Syracusan generals thought to be no less in
their interest; he was a native of Catana, and said he came from
persons in that place, whose names the Syracusan generals were
acquainted with, and whom they knew to be among the members of their
party still left in the city. He told them that the Athenians passed
the night in the town, at some distance from their arms, and that if
the Syracusans would name a day and come with all their people at
daybreak to attack the armament, they, their friends, would close the
gates upon the troops in the city, and set fire to the vessels, while
the Syracusans would easily take the camp by an attack upon the
stockade. In this they would be aided by many of the Catanians, who
were already prepared to act, and from whom he himself came.

The generals of the Syracusans, who did not want confidence, and who
had intended even without this to march on Catana, believed the man
without any sufficient inquiry, fixed at once a day upon which they
would be there, and dismissed him, and the Selinuntines and others of
their allies having now arrived, gave orders for all the Syracusans to
march out in mass. Their preparations completed, and the time fixed for
their arrival being at hand, they set out for Catana, and passed the
night upon the river Symaethus, in the Leontine territory. Meanwhile
the Athenians no sooner knew of their approach than they took all their
forces and such of the Sicels or others as had joined them, put them on
board their ships and boats, and sailed by night to Syracuse. Thus,
when morning broke the Athenians were landing opposite the Olympieum
ready to seize their camping ground, and the Syracusan horse having
ridden up first to Catana and found that all the armament had put to
sea, turned back and told the infantry, and then all turned back
together, and went to the relief of the city.

In the meantime, as the march before the Syracusans was a long one, the
Athenians quietly sat down their army in a convenient position, where
they could begin an engagement when they pleased, and where the
Syracusan cavalry would have least opportunity of annoying them, either
before or during the action, being fenced off on one side by walls,
houses, trees, and by a marsh, and on the other by cliffs. They also
felled the neighbouring trees and carried them down to the sea, and
formed a palisade alongside of their ships, and with stones which they
picked up and wood hastily raised a fort at Daskon, the most vulnerable
point of their position, and broke down the bridge over the Anapus.
These preparations were allowed to go on without any interruption from
the city, the first hostile force to appear being the Syracusan
cavalry, followed afterwards by all the foot together. At first they
came close up to the Athenian army, and then, finding that they did not
offer to engage, crossed the Helorine road and encamped for the night.

The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, their
dispositions being as follows: Their right wing was occupied by the
Argives and Mantineans, the centre by the Athenians, and the rest of
the field by the other allies. Half their army was drawn up eight deep
in advance, half close to their tents in a hollow square, formed also
eight deep, which had orders to look out and be ready to go to the
support of the troops hardest pressed. The camp followers were placed
inside this reserve. The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed their heavy
infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the mass levy of their own people,
and such allies as had joined them, the strongest contingent being that
of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of the Geloans, numbering
two hundred in all, with about twenty horse and fifty archers from
Camarina. The cavalry was posted on their right, full twelve hundred
strong, and next to it the darters. As the Athenians were about to
begin the attack, Nicias went along the lines, and addressed these
words of encouragement to the army and the nations composing it:

“Soldiers, a long exhortation is little needed by men like ourselves,
who are here to fight in the same battle, the force itself being, to my
thinking, more fit to inspire confidence than a fine speech with a weak
army. Where we have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the first of
the islanders in the ranks together, it were strange indeed, with so
many and so brave companions in arms, if we did not feel confident of
victory; especially when we have mass levies opposed to our picked
troops, and what is more, Siceliots, who may disdain us but will not
stand against us, their skill not being at all commensurate to their
rashness. You may also remember that we are far from home and have no
friendly land near, except what your own swords shall win you; and here
I put before you a motive just the reverse of that which the enemy are
appealing to; their cry being that they shall fight for their country,
mine that we shall fight for a country that is not ours, where we must
conquer or hardly get away, as we shall have their horse upon us in
great numbers. Remember, therefore, your renown, and go boldly against
the enemy, thinking the present strait and necessity more terrible than
they.”

After this address Nicias at once led on the army. The Syracusans were
not at that moment expecting an immediate engagement, and some had even
gone away to the town, which was close by; these now ran up as hard as
they could and, though behind time, took their places here or there in
the main body as fast as they joined it. Want of zeal or daring was
certainly not the fault of the Syracusans, either in this or the other
battles, but although not inferior in courage, so far as their military
science might carry them, when this failed them they were compelled to
give up their resolution also. On the present occasion, although they
had not supposed that the Athenians would begin the attack, and
although constrained to stand upon their defence at short notice, they
at once took up their arms and advanced to meet them. First, the
stone-throwers, slingers, and archers of either army began skirmishing,
and routed or were routed by one another, as might be expected between
light troops; next, soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and
trumpeters urged on the heavy infantry to the charge; and thus they
advanced, the Syracusans to fight for their country, and each
individual for his safety that day and liberty hereafter; in the
enemy’s army, the Athenians to make another’s country theirs and to
save their own from suffering by their defeat; the Argives and
independent allies to help them in getting what they came for, and to
earn by victory another sight of the country they had left behind;
while the subject allies owed most of their ardour to the desire of
self-preservation, which they could only hope for if victorious; next
to which, as a secondary motive, came the chance of serving on easier
terms, after helping the Athenians to a fresh conquest.

The armies now came to close quarters, and for a long while fought
without either giving ground. Meanwhile there occurred some claps of
thunder with lightning and heavy rain, which did not fail to add to the
fears of the party fighting for the first time, and very little
acquainted with war; while to their more experienced adversaries these
phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of year, and much more
alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. At last the
Argives drove in the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians
routed the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus cut
in two and betook itself to flight. The Athenians did not pursue far,
being held in check by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan horse, who
attacked and drove back any of their heavy infantry whom they saw
pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite of which the victors followed
so far as was safe in a body, and then went back and set up a trophy.
Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied at the Helorine road, where they
re-formed as well as they could under the circumstances, and even sent
a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieum, fearing that the
Athenians might lay hands on some of the treasures there. The rest
returned to the town.

The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but collected their
dead and laid them upon a pyre, and passed the night upon the field.
The next day they gave the enemy back their dead under truce, to the
number of about two hundred and sixty, Syracusans and allies, and
gathered together the bones of their own, some fifty, Athenians and
allies, and taking the spoils of the enemy, sailed back to Catana. It
was now winter; and it did not seem possible for the moment to carry on
the war before Syracuse, until horse should have been sent for from
Athens and levied among the allies in Sicily—to do away with their
utter inferiority in cavalry—and money should have been collected in
the country and received from Athens, and until some of the cities,
which they hoped would be now more disposed to listen to them after the
battle, should have been brought over, and corn and all other
necessaries provided, for a campaign in the spring against Syracuse.

With this intention they sailed off to Naxos and Catana for the winter.
Meanwhile the Syracusans burned their dead and then held an assembly,
in which Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a man who with a general ability
of the first order had given proofs of military capacity and brilliant
courage in the war, came forward and encouraged them, and told them not
to let what had occurred make them give way, since their spirit had not
been conquered, but their want of discipline had done the mischief.
Still they had not been beaten by so much as might have been expected,
especially as they were, one might say, novices in the art of war, an
army of artisans opposed to the most practised soldiers in Hellas. What
had also done great mischief was the number of the generals (there were
fifteen of them) and the quantity of orders given, combined with the
disorder and insubordination of the troops. But if they were to have a
few skilful generals, and used this winter in preparing their heavy
infantry, finding arms for such as had not got any, so as to make them
as numerous as possible, and forcing them to attend to their training
generally, they would have every chance of beating their adversaries,
courage being already theirs and discipline in the field having thus
been added to it. Indeed, both these qualities would improve, since
danger would exercise them in discipline, while their courage would be
led to surpass itself by the confidence which skill inspires. The
generals should be few and elected with full powers, and an oath should
be taken to leave them entire discretion in their command: if they
adopted this plan, their secrets would be better kept, all preparations
would be properly made, and there would be no room for excuses.

The Syracusans heard him, and voted everything as he advised, and
elected three generals, Hermocrates himself, Heraclides, son of
Lysimachus, and Sicanus, son of Execestes. They also sent envoys to
Corinth and Lacedaemon to procure a force of allies to join them, and
to induce the Lacedaemonians for their sakes openly to address
themselves in real earnest to the war against the Athenians, that they
might either have to leave Sicily or be less able to send
reinforcements to their army there.

The Athenian forces at Catana now at once sailed against Messina, in
the expectation of its being betrayed to them. The intrigue, however,
after all came to nothing: Alcibiades, who was in the secret, when he
left his command upon the summons from home, foreseeing that he would
be outlawed, gave information of the plot to the friends of the
Syracusans in Messina, who had at once put to death its authors, and
now rose in arms against the opposite faction with those of their way
of thinking, and succeeded in preventing the admission of the
Athenians. The latter waited for thirteen days, and then, as they were
exposed to the weather and without provisions, and met with no success,
went back to Naxos, where they made places for their ships to lie in,
erected a palisade round their camp, and retired into winter quarters;
meanwhile they sent a galley to Athens for money and cavalry to join
them in the spring. During the winter the Syracusans built a wall on to
the city, so as to take in the statue of Apollo Temenites, all along
the side looking towards Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation
longer and more difficult, in case of their being defeated, and also
erected a fort at Megara and another in the Olympieum, and stuck
palisades along the sea wherever there was a landing Place. Meanwhile,
as they knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched
with all their people to Catana, and ravaged the land and set fire to
the tents and encampment of the Athenians, and so returned home.
Learning also that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina,
on the strength of the alliance concluded in the time of Laches, to
gain, if possible, that city, they sent another from Syracuse to oppose
them. They had a shrewd suspicion that the Camarinaeans had not sent
what they did send for the first battle very willingly; and they now
feared that they would refuse to assist them at all in future, after
seeing the success of the Athenians in the action, and would join the
latter on the strength of their old friendship. Hermocrates, with some
others, accordingly arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus and
others from the Athenians; and an assembly of the Camarinaeans having
been convened, Hermocrates spoke as follows, in the hope of prejudicing
them against the Athenians:

“Camarinaeans, we did not come on this embassy because we were afraid
of your being frightened by the actual forces of the Athenians, but
rather of your being gained by what they would say to you before you
heard anything from us. They are come to Sicily with the pretext that
you know, and the intention which we all suspect, in my opinion less to
restore the Leontines to their homes than to oust us from ours; as it
is out of all reason that they should restore in Sicily the cities that
they lay waste in Hellas, or should cherish the Leontine Chalcidians
because of their Ionian blood and keep in servitude the Euboean
Chalcidians, of whom the Leontines are a colony. No; but the same
policy which has proved so successful in Hellas is now being tried in
Sicily. After being chosen as the leaders of the Ionians and of the
other allies of Athenian origin, to punish the Mede, the Athenians
accused some of failure in military service, some of fighting against
each other, and others, as the case might be, upon any colourable
pretext that could be found, until they thus subdued them all. In fine,
in the struggle against the Medes, the Athenians did not fight for the
liberty of the Hellenes, or the Hellenes for their own liberty, but the
former to make their countrymen serve them instead of him, the latter
to change one master for another, wiser indeed than the first, but
wiser for evil.

“But we are not now come to declare to an audience familiar with them
the misdeeds of a state so open to accusation as is the Athenian, but
much rather to blame ourselves, who, with the warnings we possess in
the Hellenes in those parts that have been enslaved through not
supporting each other, and seeing the same sophisms being now tried
upon ourselves—such as restorations of Leontine kinsfolk and support of
Egestaean allies—do not stand together and resolutely show them that
here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines, or islanders, who change
continually, but always serve a master, sometimes the Mede and
sometimes some other, but free Dorians from independent Peloponnese,
dwelling in Sicily. Or, are we waiting until we be taken in detail, one
city after another; knowing as we do that in no other way can we be
conquered, and seeing that they turn to this plan, so as to divide some
of us by words, to draw some by the bait of an alliance into open war
with each other, and to ruin others by such flattery as different
circumstances may render acceptable? And do we fancy when destruction
first overtakes a distant fellow countryman that the danger will not
come to each of us also, or that he who suffers before us will suffer
in himself alone?

“As for the Camarinaean who says that it is the Syracusan, not he, that
is the enemy of the Athenian, and who thinks it hard to have to
encounter risk in behalf of my country, I would have him bear in mind
that he will fight in my country, not more for mine than for his own,
and by so much the more safely in that he will enter on the struggle
not alone, after the way has been cleared by my ruin, but with me as
his ally, and that the object of the Athenian is not so much to punish
the enmity of the Syracusan as to use me as a blind to secure the
friendship of the Camarinaean. As for him who envies or even fears us
(and envied and feared great powers must always be), and who on this
account wishes Syracuse to be humbled to teach us a lesson, but would
still have her survive, in the interest of his own security the wish
that he indulges is not humanly possible. A man can control his own
desires, but he cannot likewise control circumstances; and in the event
of his calculations proving mistaken, he may live to bewail his own
misfortune, and wish to be again envying my prosperity. An idle wish,
if he now sacrifice us and refuse to take his share of perils which are
the same, in reality though not in name, for him as for us; what is
nominally the preservation of our power being really his own salvation.
It was to be expected that you, of all people in the world,
Camarinaeans, being our immediate neighbours and the next in danger,
would have foreseen this, and instead of supporting us in the lukewarm
way that you are now doing, would rather come to us of your own accord,
and be now offering at Syracuse the aid which you would have asked for
at Camarina, if to Camarina the Athenians had first come, to encourage
us to resist the invader. Neither you, however, nor the rest have as
yet bestirred yourselves in this direction.

“Fear perhaps will make you study to do right both by us and by the
invaders, and plead that you have an alliance with the Athenians. But
you made that alliance, not against your friends, but against the
enemies that might attack you, and to help the Athenians when they were
wronged by others, not when as now they are wronging their neighbours.
Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians though they be, refuse to help to
restore the Chalcidian Leontines; and it would be strange if, while
they suspect the gist of this fine pretence and are wise without
reason, you, with every reason on your side, should yet choose to
assist your natural enemies, and should join with their direst foes in
undoing those whom nature has made your own kinsfolk. This is not to do
right; but you should help us without fear of their armament, which has
no terrors if we hold together, but only if we let them succeed in
their endeavours to separate us; since even after attacking us by
ourselves and being victorious in battle, they had to go off without
effecting their purpose.

“United, therefore, we have no cause to despair, but rather new
encouragement to league together; especially as succour will come to us
from the Peloponnesians, in military matters the undoubted superiors of
the Athenians. And you need not think that your prudent policy of
taking sides with neither, because allies of both, is either safe for
you or fair to us. Practically it is not as fair as it pretends to be.
If the vanquished be defeated, and the victor conquer, through your
refusing to join, what is the effect of your abstention but to leave
the former to perish unaided, and to allow the latter to offend
unhindered? And yet it were more honourable to join those who are not
only the injured party, but your own kindred, and by so doing to defend
the common interests of Sicily and save your friends the Athenians from
doing wrong.

“In conclusion, we Syracusans say that it is useless for us to
demonstrate either to you or to the rest what you know already as well
as we do; but we entreat, and if our entreaty fail, we protest that we
are menaced by our eternal enemies the Ionians, and are betrayed by you
our fellow Dorians. If the Athenians reduce us, they will owe their
victory to your decision, but in their own name will reap the honour,
and will receive as the prize of their triumph the very men who enabled
them to gain it. On the other hand, if we are the conquerors, you will
have to pay for having been the cause of our danger. Consider,
therefore; and now make your choice between the security which present
servitude offers and the prospect of conquering with us and so escaping
disgraceful submission to an Athenian master and avoiding the lasting
enmity of Syracuse.”

Such were the words of Hermocrates; after whom Euphemus, the Athenian
ambassador, spoke as follows:

“Although we came here only to renew the former alliance, the attack of
the Syracusans compels us to speak of our empire and of the good right
we have to it. The best proof of this the speaker himself furnished,
when he called the Ionians eternal enemies of the Dorians. It is the
fact; and the Peloponnesian Dorians being our superiors in numbers and
next neighbours, we Ionians looked out for the best means of escaping
their domination. After the Median War we had a fleet, and so got rid
of the empire and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians, who had no right to
give orders to us more than we to them, except that of being the
strongest at that moment; and being appointed leaders of the King’s
former subjects, we continue to be so, thinking that we are least
likely to fall under the dominion of the Peloponnesians, if we have a
force to defend ourselves with, and in strict truth having done nothing
unfair in reducing to subjection the Ionians and islanders, the
kinsfolk whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved. They, our kinsfolk,
came against their mother country, that is to say against us, together
with the Mede, and, instead of having the courage to revolt and
sacrifice their property as we did when we abandoned our city, chose to
be slaves themselves, and to try to make us so.

“We, therefore, deserve to rule because we placed the largest fleet and
an unflinching patriotism at the service of the Hellenes, and because
these, our subjects, did us mischief by their ready subservience to the
Medes; and, desert apart, we seek to strengthen ourselves against the
Peloponnesians. We make no fine profession of having a right to rule
because we overthrew the barbarian single-handed, or because we risked
what we did risk for the freedom of the subjects in question any more
than for that of all, and for our own: no one can be quarrelled with
for providing for his proper safety. If we are now here in Sicily, it
is equally in the interest of our security, with which we perceive that
your interest also coincides. We prove this from the conduct which the
Syracusans cast against us and which you somewhat too timorously
suspect; knowing that those whom fear has made suspicious may be
carried away by the charm of eloquence for the moment, but when they
come to act follow their interests.

“Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas, and
fear makes us now come, with the help of our friends, to order safely
matters in Sicily, and not to enslave any but rather to prevent any
from being enslaved. Meanwhile, let no one imagine that we are
interesting ourselves in you without your having anything to do with
us, seeing that, if you are preserved and able to make head against the
Syracusans, they will be less likely to harm us by sending troops to
the Peloponnesians. In this way you have everything to do with us, and
on this account it is perfectly reasonable for us to restore the
Leontines, and to make them, not subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea,
but as powerful as possible, to help us by annoying the Syracusans from
their frontier. In Hellas we are alone a match for our enemies; and as
for the assertion that it is out of all reason that we should free the
Sicilian, while we enslave the Chalcidian, the fact is that the latter
is useful to us by being without arms and contributing money only;
while the former, the Leontines and our other friends, cannot be too
independent.

“Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is unreasonable if
expedient, no one a kinsman unless sure; but friendship or enmity is
everywhere an affair of time and circumstance. Here, in Sicily, our
interest is not to weaken our friends, but by means of their strength
to cripple our enemies. Why doubt this? In Hellas we treat our allies
as we find them useful. The Chians and Methymnians govern themselves
and furnish ships; most of the rest have harder terms and pay tribute
in money; while others, although islanders and easy for us to take, are
free altogether, because they occupy convenient positions round
Peloponnese. In our settlement of the states here in Sicily, we should
therefore; naturally be guided by our interest, and by fear, as we say,
of the Syracusans. Their ambition is to rule you, their object to use
the suspicions that we excite to unite you, and then, when we have gone
away without effecting anything, by force or through your isolation, to
become the masters of Sicily. And masters they must become, if you
unite with them; as a force of that magnitude would be no longer easy
for us to deal with united, and they would be more than a match for you
as soon as we were away.

“Any other view of the case is condemned by the facts. When you first
asked us over, the fear which you held out was that of danger to Athens
if we let you come under the dominion of Syracuse; and it is not right
now to mistrust the very same argument by which you claimed to convince
us, or to give way to suspicion because we are come with a larger force
against the power of that city. Those whom you should really distrust
are the Syracusans. We are not able to stay here without you, and if we
proved perfidious enough to bring you into subjection, we should be
unable to keep you in bondage, owing to the length of the voyage and
the difficulty of guarding large, and in a military sense continental,
towns: they, the Syracusans, live close to you, not in a camp, but in a
city greater than the force we have with us, plot always against you,
never let slip an opportunity once offered, as they have shown in the
case of the Leontines and others, and now have the face, just as if you
were fools, to invite you to aid them against the power that hinders
this, and that has thus far maintained Sicily independent. We, as
against them, invite you to a much more real safety, when we beg you
not to betray that common safety which we each have in the other, and
to reflect that they, even without allies, will, by their numbers, have
always the way open to you, while you will not often have the
opportunity of defending yourselves with such numerous auxiliaries; if,
through your suspicions, you once let these go away unsuccessful or
defeated, you will wish to see if only a handful of them back again,
when the day is past in which their presence could do anything for you.

“But we hope, Camarinaeans, that the calumnies of the Syracusans will
not be allowed to succeed either with you or with the rest: we have
told you the whole truth upon the things we are suspected of, and will
now briefly recapitulate, in the hope of convincing you. We assert that
we are rulers in Hellas in order not to be subjects; liberators in
Sicily that we may not be harmed by the Sicilians; that we are
compelled to interfere in many things, because we have many things to
guard against; and that now, as before, we are come as allies to those
of you who suffer wrong in this island, not without invitation but upon
invitation. Accordingly, instead of making yourselves judges or censors
of our conduct, and trying to turn us, which it were now difficult to
do, so far as there is anything in our interfering policy or in our
character that chimes in with your interest, this take and make use of;
and be sure that, far from being injurious to all alike, to most of the
Hellenes that policy is even beneficial. Thanks to it, all men in all
places, even where we are not, who either apprehend or meditate
aggression, from the near prospect before them, in the one case, of
obtaining our intervention in their favour, in the other, of our
arrival making the venture dangerous, find themselves constrained,
respectively, to be moderate against their will, and to be preserved
without trouble of their own. Do not you reject this security that is
open to all who desire it, and is now offered to you; but do like
others, and instead of being always on the defensive against the
Syracusans, unite with us, and in your turn at last threaten them.”

Such were the words of Euphemus. What the Camarinaeans felt was this.
Sympathizing with the Athenians, except in so far as they might be
afraid of their subjugating Sicily, they had always been at enmity with
their neighbour Syracuse. From the very fact, however, that they were
their neighbours, they feared the Syracusans most of the two, and being
apprehensive of their conquering even without them, both sent them in
the first instance the few horsemen mentioned, and for the future
determined to support them most in fact, although as sparingly as
possible; but for the moment in order not to seem to slight the
Athenians, especially as they had been successful in the engagement, to
answer both alike. Agreeably to this resolution they answered that as
both the contending parties happened to be allies of theirs, they
thought it most consistent with their oaths at present to side with
neither; with which answer the ambassadors of either party departed.

In the meantime, while Syracuse pursued her preparations for war, the
Athenians were encamped at Naxos, and tried by negotiation to gain as
many of the Sicels as possible. Those more in the low lands, and
subjects of Syracuse, mostly held aloof; but the peoples of the
interior who had never been otherwise than independent, with few
exceptions, at once joined the Athenians, and brought down corn to the
army, and in some cases even money. The Athenians marched against those
who refused to join, and forced some of them to do so; in the case of
others they were stopped by the Syracusans sending garrisons and
reinforcements. Meanwhile the Athenians moved their winter quarters
from Naxos to Catana, and reconstructed the camp burnt by the
Syracusans, and stayed there the rest of the winter. They also sent a
galley to Carthage, with proffers of friendship, on the chance of
obtaining assistance, and another to Tyrrhenia; some of the cities
there having spontaneously offered to join them in the war. They also
sent round to the Sicels and to Egesta, desiring them to send them as
many horses as possible, and meanwhile prepared bricks, iron, and all
other things necessary for the work of circumvallation, intending by
the spring to begin hostilities.

In the meantime the Syracusan envoys dispatched to Corinth and
Lacedaemon tried as they passed along the coast to persuade the
Italiots to interfere with the proceedings of the Athenians, which
threatened Italy quite as much as Syracuse, and having arrived at
Corinth made a speech calling on the Corinthians to assist them on the
ground of their common origin. The Corinthians voted at once to aid
them heart and soul themselves, and then sent on envoys with them to
Lacedaemon, to help them to persuade her also to prosecute the war with
the Athenians more openly at home and to send succours to Sicily. The
envoys from Corinth having reached Lacedaemon found there Alcibiades
with his fellow refugees, who had at once crossed over in a trading
vessel from Thurii, first to Cyllene in Elis, and afterwards from
thence to Lacedaemon; upon the Lacedaemonians’ own invitation, after
first obtaining a safe conduct, as he feared them for the part he had
taken in the affair of Mantinea. The result was that the Corinthians,
Syracusans, and Alcibiades, pressing all the same request in the
assembly of the Lacedaemonians, succeeded in persuading them; but as
the ephors and the authorities, although resolved to send envoys to
Syracuse to prevent their surrendering to the Athenians, showed no
disposition to send them any assistance, Alcibiades now came forward
and inflamed and stirred the Lacedaemonians by speaking as follows:

“I am forced first to speak to you of the prejudice with which I am
regarded, in order that suspicion may not make you disinclined to
listen to me upon public matters. The connection, with you as your
proxeni, which the ancestors of our family by reason of some discontent
renounced, I personally tried to renew by my good offices towards you,
in particular upon the occasion of the disaster at Pylos. But although
I maintained this friendly attitude, you yet chose to negotiate the
peace with the Athenians through my enemies, and thus to strengthen
them and to discredit me. You had therefore no right to complain if I
turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and seized other occasions of
thwarting and injuring you; and the time has now come when those among
you, who in the bitterness of the moment may have been then unfairly
angry with me, should look at the matter in its true light, and take a
different view. Those again who judged me unfavourably, because I
leaned rather to the side of the commons, must not think that their
dislike is any better founded. We have always been hostile to tyrants,
and all who oppose arbitrary power are called commons; hence we
continued to act as leaders of the multitude; besides which, as
democracy was the government of the city, it was necessary in most
things to conform to established conditions. However, we endeavoured to
be more moderate than the licentious temper of the times; and while
there were others, formerly as now, who tried to lead the multitude
astray—the same who banished me—our party was that of the whole people,
our creed being to do our part in preserving the form of government
under which the city enjoyed the utmost greatness and freedom, and
which we had found existing. As for democracy, the men of sense among
us knew what it was, and I perhaps as well as any, as I have the more
cause to complain of it; but there is nothing new to be said of a
patent absurdity; meanwhile we did not think it safe to alter it under
the pressure of your hostility.

“So much then for the prejudices with which I am regarded: I now can
call your attention to the questions you must consider, and upon which
superior knowledge perhaps permits me to speak. We sailed to Sicily
first to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and after them the
Italiots also, and finally to assail the empire and city of Carthage.
In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, we were then
to attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the entire force of the
Hellenes lately acquired in those parts, and taking a number of
barbarians into our pay, such as the Iberians and others in those
countries, confessedly the most warlike known, and building numerous
galleys in addition to those which we had already, timber being
plentiful in Italy; and with this fleet blockading Peloponnese from the
sea and assailing it with our armies by land, taking some of the cities
by storm, drawing works of circumvallation round others, we hoped
without difficulty to effect its reduction, and after this to rule the
whole of the Hellenic name. Money and corn meanwhile for the better
execution of these plans were to be supplied in sufficient quantities
by the newly acquired places in those countries, independently of our
revenues here at home.

“You have thus heard the history of the present expedition from the man
who most exactly knows what our objects were; and the remaining
generals will, if they can, carry these out just the same. But that the
states in Sicily must succumb if you do not help them, I will now show.
Although the Siceliots, with all their inexperience, might even now be
saved if their forces were united, the Syracusans alone, beaten already
in one battle with all their people and blockaded from the sea, will be
unable to withstand the Athenian armament that is now there. But if
Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls also, and Italy immediately
afterwards; and the danger which I just now spoke of from that quarter
will before long be upon you. None need therefore fancy that Sicily
only is in question; Peloponnese will be so also, unless you speedily
do as I tell you, and send on board ship to Syracuse troops that shall
able to row their ships themselves, and serve as heavy infantry the
moment that they land; and what I consider even more important than the
troops, a Spartan as commanding officer to discipline the forces
already on foot and to compel recusants to serve. The friends that you
have already will thus become more confident, and the waverers will be
encouraged to join you. Meanwhile you must carry on the war here more
openly, that the Syracusans, seeing that you do not forget them, may
put heart into their resistance, and that the Athenians may be less
able to reinforce their armament. You must fortify Decelea in Attica,
the blow of which the Athenians are always most afraid and the only one
that they think they have not experienced in the present war; the
surest method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears,
and to choose this means of attacking him, since every one naturally
knows best his own weak points and fears accordingly. The fortification
in question, while it benefits you, will create difficulties for your
adversaries, of which I shall pass over many, and shall only mention
the chief. Whatever property there is in the country will most of it
become yours, either by capture or surrender; and the Athenians will at
once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, of
their present gains from their land and from the law courts, and above
all of the revenue from their allies, which will be paid less
regularly, as they lose their awe of Athens and see you addressing
yourselves with vigour to the war. The zeal and speed with which all
this shall be done depends, Lacedaemonians, upon yourselves; as to its
possibility, I am quite confident, and I have little fear of being
mistaken.

“Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think any the worse of me if,
after having hitherto passed as a lover of my country, I now actively
join its worst enemies in attacking it, or will suspect what I say as
the fruit of an outlaw’s enthusiasm. I am an outlaw from the iniquity
of those who drove me forth, not, if you will be guided by me, from
your service; my worst enemies are not you who only harmed your foes,
but they who forced their friends to become enemies; and love of
country is what I do not feel when I am wronged, but what I felt when
secure in my rights as a citizen. Indeed I do not consider that I am
now attacking a country that is still mine; I am rather trying to
recover one that is mine no longer; and the true lover of his country
is not he who consents to lose it unjustly rather than attack it, but
he who longs for it so much that he will go all lengths to recover it.
For myself, therefore, Lacedaemonians, I beg you to use me without
scruple for danger and trouble of every kind, and to remember the
argument in every one’s mouth, that if I did you great harm as an
enemy, I could likewise do you good service as a friend, inasmuch as I
know the plans of the Athenians, while I only guessed yours. For
yourselves I entreat you to believe that your most capital interests
are now under deliberation; and I urge you to send without hesitation
the expeditions to Sicily and Attica; by the presence of a small part
of your forces you will save important cities in that island, and you
will destroy the power of Athens both present and prospective; after
this you will dwell in security and enjoy the supremacy over all
Hellas, resting not on force but upon consent and affection.”

Such were the words of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians, who had
themselves before intended to march against Athens, but were still
waiting and looking about them, at once became much more in earnest
when they received this particular information from Alcibiades, and
considered that they had heard it from the man who best knew the truth
of the matter. Accordingly they now turned their attention to the
fortifying of Decelea and sending immediate aid to the Sicilians; and
naming Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, to the command of the Syracusans,
bade him consult with that people and with the Corinthians and arrange
for succours reaching the island, in the best and speediest way
possible under the circumstances. Gylippus desired the Corinthians to
send him at once two ships to Asine, and to prepare the rest that they
intended to send, and to have them ready to sail at the proper time.
Having settled this, the envoys departed from Lacedaemon.

In the meantime arrived the Athenian galley from Sicily sent by the
generals for money and cavalry; and the Athenians, after hearing what
they wanted, voted to send the supplies for the armament and the
cavalry. And the winter ended, and with it ended the seventeenth year
of the present war of which Thucydides is the historian.

The next summer, at the very beginning of the season, the Athenians in
Sicily put out from Catana, and sailed along shore to Megara in Sicily,
from which, as I have mentioned above, the Syracusans expelled the
inhabitants in the time of their tyrant Gelo, themselves occupying the
territory. Here the Athenians landed and laid waste the country, and
after an unsuccessful attack upon a fort of the Syracusans, went on
with the fleet and army to the river Terias, and advancing inland laid
waste the plain and set fire to the corn; and after killing some of a
small Syracusan party which they encountered, and setting up a trophy,
went back again to their ships. They now sailed to Catana and took in
provisions there, and going with their whole force against Centoripa, a
town of the Sicels, acquired it by capitulation, and departed, after
also burning the corn of the Inessaeans and Hybleans. Upon their return
to Catana they found the horsemen arrived from Athens, to the number of
two hundred and fifty (with their equipments, but without their horses
which were to be procured upon the spot), and thirty mounted archers
and three hundred talents of silver.

The same spring the Lacedaemonians marched against Argos, and went as
far as Cleonae, when an earthquake occurred and caused them to return.
After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatid, which is on their border,
and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for no less
than twenty-five talents. The same summer, not long after, the Thespian
commons made an attack upon the party in office, which was not
successful, but succours arrived from Thebes, and some were caught,
while others took refuge at Athens.

The same summer the Syracusans learned that the Athenians had been
joined by their cavalry, and were on the point of marching against
them; and seeing that without becoming masters of Epipolae, a
precipitous spot situated exactly over the town, the Athenians could
not, even if victorious in battle, easily invest them, they determined
to guard its approaches, in order that the enemy might not ascend
unobserved by this, the sole way by which ascent was possible, as the
remainder is lofty ground, and falls right down to the city, and can
all be seen from inside; and as it lies above the rest the place is
called by the Syracusans Epipolae or Overtown. They accordingly went
out in mass at daybreak into the meadow along the river Anapus, their
new generals, Hermocrates and his colleagues, having just come into
office, and held a review of their heavy infantry, from whom they first
selected a picked body of six hundred, under the command of Diomilus,
an exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae, and to be ready to muster at a
moment’s notice to help wherever help should be required.

Meanwhile the Athenians, the very same morning, were holding a review,
having already made land unobserved with all the armament from Catana,
opposite a place called Leon, not much more than half a mile from
Epipolae, where they disembarked their army, bringing the fleet to
anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula running out into the sea, with a narrow
isthmus, and not far from the city of Syracuse either by land or water.
While the naval force of the Athenians threw a stockade across the
isthmus and remained quiet at Thapsus, the land army immediately went
on at a run to Epipolae, and succeeded in getting up by Euryelus before
the Syracusans perceived them, or could come up from the meadow and the
review. Diomilus with his six hundred and the rest advanced as quickly
as they could, but they had nearly three miles to go from the meadow
before reaching them. Attacking in this way in considerable disorder,
the Syracusans were defeated in battle at Epipolae and retired to the
town, with a loss of about three hundred killed, and Diomilus among the
number. After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the
Syracusans their dead under truce, and next day descended to Syracuse
itself; and no one coming out to meet them, reascended and built a fort
at Labdalum, upon the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae, looking towards
Megara, to serve as a magazine for their baggage and money, whenever
they advanced to battle or to work at the lines.

Not long afterwards three hundred cavalry came to them from Egesta, and
about a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and others; and thus, with
the two hundred and fifty from Athens, for whom they had got horses
from the Egestaeans and Catanians, besides others that they bought,
they now mustered six hundred and fifty cavalry in all. After posting a
garrison in Labdalum, they advanced to Syca, where they sat down and
quickly built the Circle or centre of their wall of circumvallation.
The Syracusans, appalled at the rapidity with which the work advanced,
determined to go out against them and give battle and interrupt it; and
the two armies were already in battle array, when the Syracusan
generals observed that their troops found such difficulty in getting
into line, and were in such disorder, that they led them back into the
town, except part of the cavalry. These remained and hindered the
Athenians from carrying stones or dispersing to any great distance,
until a tribe of the Athenian heavy infantry, with all the cavalry,
charged and routed the Syracusan horse with some loss; after which they
set up a trophy for the cavalry action.

The next day the Athenians began building the wall to the north of the
Circle, at the same time collecting stone and timber, which they kept
laying down towards Trogilus along the shortest line for their works
from the great harbour to the sea; while the Syracusans, guided by
their generals, and above all by Hermocrates, instead of risking any
more general engagements, determined to build a counterwork in the
direction in which the Athenians were going to carry their wall. If
this could be completed in time, the enemy’s lines would be cut; and
meanwhile, if he were to attempt to interrupt them by an attack, they
would send a part of their forces against him, and would secure the
approaches beforehand with their stockade, while the Athenians would
have to leave off working with their whole force in order to attend to
them. They accordingly sallied forth and began to build, starting from
their city, running a cross wall below the Athenian Circle, cutting
down the olives and erecting wooden towers. As the Athenian fleet had
not yet sailed round into the great harbour, the Syracusans still
commanded the seacoast, and the Athenians brought their provisions by
land from Thapsus.

The Syracusans now thought the stockades and stonework of their
counterwall sufficiently far advanced; and as the Athenians, afraid of
being divided and so fighting at a disadvantage, and intent upon their
own wall, did not come out to interrupt them, they left one tribe to
guard the new work and went back into the city. Meanwhile the Athenians
destroyed their pipes of drinking-water carried underground into the
city; and watching until the rest of the Syracusans were in their tents
at midday, and some even gone away into the city, and those in the
stockade keeping but indifferent guard, appointed three hundred picked
men of their own, and some men picked from the light troops and armed
for the purpose, to run suddenly as fast as they could to the
counterwork, while the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, the
one with one of the generals to the city in case of a sortie, the other
with the other general to the stockade by the postern gate. The three
hundred attacked and took the stockade, abandoned by its garrison, who
took refuge in the outworks round the statue of Apollo Temenites. Here
the pursuers burst in with them, and after getting in were beaten out
by the Syracusans, and some few of the Argives and Athenians slain;
after which the whole army retired, and having demolished the
counterwork and pulled up the stockade, carried away the stakes to
their own lines, and set up a trophy.

The next day the Athenians from the Circle proceeded to fortify the
cliff above the marsh which on this side of Epipolae looks towards the
great harbour; this being also the shortest line for their work to go
down across the plain and the marsh to the harbour. Meanwhile the
Syracusans marched out and began a second stockade, starting from the
city, across the middle of the marsh, digging a trench alongside to
make it impossible for the Athenians to carry their wall down to the
sea. As soon as the Athenians had finished their work at the cliff they
again attacked the stockade and ditch of the Syracusans. Ordering the
fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the great harbour of Syracuse,
they descended at about dawn from Epipolae into the plain, and laying
doors and planks over the marsh, where it was muddy and firmest,
crossed over on these, and by daybreak took the ditch and the stockade,
except a small portion which they captured afterwards. A battle now
ensued, in which the Athenians were victorious, the right wing of the
Syracusans flying to the town and the left to the river. The three
hundred picked Athenians, wishing to cut off their passage, pressed on
at a run to the bridge, when the alarmed Syracusans, who had with them
most of their cavalry, closed and routed them, hurling them back upon
the Athenian right wing, the first tribe of which was thrown into a
panic by the shock. Seeing this, Lamachus came to their aid from the
Athenian left with a few archers and with the Argives, and crossing a
ditch, was left alone with a few that had crossed with him, and was
killed with five or six of his men. These the Syracusans managed
immediately to snatch up in haste and get across the river into a place
of security, themselves retreating as the rest of the Athenian army now
came up.

Meanwhile those who had at first fled for refuge to the city, seeing
the turn affairs were taking, now rallied from the town and formed
against the Athenians in front of them, sending also a part of their
number to the Circle on Epipolae, which they hoped to take while
denuded of its defenders. These took and destroyed the Athenian outwork
of a thousand feet, the Circle itself being saved by Nicias, who
happened to have been left in it through illness, and who now ordered
the servants to set fire to the engines and timber thrown down before
the wall; want of men, as he was aware, rendering all other means of
escape impossible. This step was justified by the result, the
Syracusans not coming any further on account of the fire, but
retreating. Meanwhile succours were coming up from the Athenians below,
who had put to flight the troops opposed to them; and the fleet also,
according to orders, was sailing from Thapsus into the great harbour.
Seeing this, the troops on the heights retired in haste, and the whole
army of the Syracusans re-entered the city, thinking that with their
present force they would no longer be able to hinder the wall reaching
the sea.

After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans
their dead under truce, receiving in return Lamachus and those who had
fallen with him. The whole of their forces, naval and military, being
now with them, they began from Epipolae and the cliffs and enclosed the
Syracusans with a double wall down to the sea. Provisions were now
brought in for the armament from all parts of Italy; and many of the
Sicels, who had hitherto been looking to see how things went, came as
allies to the Athenians: there also arrived three ships of fifty oars
from Tyrrhenia. Meanwhile everything else progressed favourably for
their hopes. The Syracusans began to despair of finding safety in arms,
no relief having reached them from Peloponnese, and were now proposing
terms of capitulation among themselves and to Nicias, who after the
death of Lamachus was left sole commander. No decision was come to,
but, as was natural with men in difficulties and besieged more straitly
than before, there was much discussion with Nicias and still more in
the town. Their present misfortunes had also made them suspicious of
one another; and the blame of their disasters was thrown upon the
ill-fortune or treachery of the generals under whose command they had
happened; and these were deposed and others, Heraclides, Eucles, and
Tellias, elected in their stead.

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian, Gylippus, and the ships from Corinth were
now off Leucas, intent upon going with all haste to the relief of
Sicily. The reports that reached them being of an alarming kind, and
all agreeing in the falsehood that Syracuse was already completely
invested, Gylippus abandoned all hope of Sicily, and wishing to save
Italy, rapidly crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum with the Corinthian,
Pythen, two Laconian, and two Corinthian vessels, leaving the
Corinthians to follow him after manning, in addition to their own ten,
two Leucadian and two Ambraciot ships. From Tarentum Gylippus first
went on an embassy to Thurii, and claimed anew the rights of
citizenship which his father had enjoyed; failing to bring over the
townspeople, he weighed anchor and coasted along Italy. Opposite the
Terinaean Gulf he was caught by the wind which blows violently and
steadily from the north in that quarter, and was carried out to sea;
and after experiencing very rough weather, remade Tarentum, where he
hauled ashore and refitted such of his ships as had suffered most from
the tempest. Nicias heard of his approach, but, like the Thurians,
despised the scanty number of his ships, and set down piracy as the
only probable object of the voyage, and so took no precautions for the
present.

About the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians invaded Argos
with their allies, and laid waste most of the country. The Athenians
went with thirty ships to the relief of the Argives, thus breaking
their treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner. Up to
this time incursions from Pylos, descents on the coast of the rest of
Peloponnese, instead of on the Laconian, had been the extent of their
co-operation with the Argives and Mantineans; and although the Argives
had often begged them to land, if only for a moment, with their heavy
infantry in Laconia, lay waste ever so little of it with them, and
depart, they had always refused to do so. Now, however, under the
command of Phytodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus, they landed at
Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and plundered the country;
and thus furnished the Lacedaemonians with a better pretext for
hostilities against Athens. After the Athenians had retired from Argos
with their fleet, and the Lacedaemonians also, the Argives made an
incursion into the Phlisaid, and returned home after ravaging their
land and killing some of the inhabitants.




BOOK VII




CHAPTER XXI


Eighteenth and Nineteenth Years of the War—Arrival of Gylippus at
Syracuse—Fortification of Decelea—Successes of the Syracusans


After refitting their ships, Gylippus and Pythen coasted along from
Tarentum to Epizephyrian Locris. They now received the more correct
information that Syracuse was not yet completely invested, but that it
was still possible for an army arriving at Epipolae to effect an
entrance; and they consulted, accordingly, whether they should keep
Sicily on their right and risk sailing in by sea, or, leaving it on
their left, should first sail to Himera and, taking with them the
Himeraeans and any others that might agree to join them, go to Syracuse
by land. Finally they determined to sail for Himera, especially as the
four Athenian ships which Nicias had at length sent off, on hearing
that they were at Locris, had not yet arrived at Rhegium. Accordingly,
before these reached their post, the Peloponnesians crossed the strait
and, after touching at Rhegium and Messina, came to Himera. Arrived
there, they persuaded the Himeraeans to join in the war, and not only
to go with them themselves but to provide arms for the seamen from
their vessels which they had drawn ashore at Himera; and they sent and
appointed a place for the Selinuntines to meet them with all their
forces. A few troops were also promised by the Geloans and some of the
Sicels, who were now ready to join them with much greater alacrity,
owing to the recent death of Archonidas, a powerful Sicel king in that
neighbourhood and friendly to Athens, and owing also to the vigour
shown by Gylippus in coming from Lacedaemon. Gylippus now took with him
about seven hundred of his sailors and marines, that number only having
arms, a thousand heavy infantry and light troops from Himera with a
body of a hundred horse, some light troops and cavalry from Selinus, a
few Geloans, and Sicels numbering a thousand in all, and set out on his
march for Syracuse.

Meanwhile the Corinthian fleet from Leucas made all haste to arrive;
and one of their commanders, Gongylus, starting last with a single
ship, was the first to reach Syracuse, a little before Gylippus.
Gongylus found the Syracusans on the point of holding an assembly to
consider whether they should put an end to the war. This he prevented,
and reassured them by telling them that more vessels were still to
arrive, and that Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, had been dispatched by
the Lacedaemonians to take the command. Upon this the Syracusans took
courage, and immediately marched out with all their forces to meet
Gylippus, who they found was now close at hand. Meanwhile Gylippus,
after taking Ietae, a fort of the Sicels, on his way, formed his army
in order of battle, and so arrived at Epipolae, and ascending by
Euryelus, as the Athenians had done at first, now advanced with the
Syracusans against the Athenian lines. His arrival chanced at a
critical moment. The Athenians had already finished a double wall of
six or seven furlongs to the great harbour, with the exception of a
small portion next the sea, which they were still engaged upon; and in
the remainder of the circle towards Trogilus on the other sea, stones
had been laid ready for building for the greater part of the distance,
and some points had been left half finished, while others were entirely
completed. The danger of Syracuse had indeed been great.

Meanwhile the Athenians, recovering from the confusion into which they
had been first thrown by the sudden approach of Gylippus and the
Syracusans, formed in order of battle. Gylippus halted at a short
distance off and sent on a herald to tell them that, if they would
evacuate Sicily with bag and baggage within five days’ time, he was
willing to make a truce accordingly. The Athenians treated this
proposition with contempt, and dismissed the herald without an answer.
After this both sides began to prepare for action. Gylippus, observing
that the Syracusans were in disorder and did not easily fall into line,
drew off his troops more into the open ground, while Nicias did not
lead on the Athenians but lay still by his own wall. When Gylippus saw
that they did not come on, he led off his army to the citadel of the
quarter of Apollo Temenites, and passed the night there. On the
following day he led out the main body of his army, and, drawing them
up in order of battle before the walls of the Athenians to prevent
their going to the relief of any other quarter, dispatched a strong
force against Fort Labdalum, and took it, and put all whom he found in
it to the sword, the place not being within sight of the Athenians. On
the same day an Athenian galley that lay moored off the harbour was
captured by the Syracusans.

After this the Syracusans and their allies began to carry a single
wall, starting from the city, in a slanting direction up Epipolae, in
order that the Athenians, unless they could hinder the work, might be
no longer able to invest them. Meanwhile the Athenians, having now
finished their wall down to the sea, had come up to the heights; and
part of their wall being weak, Gylippus drew out his army by night and
attacked it. However, the Athenians who happened to be bivouacking
outside took the alarm and came out to meet him, upon seeing which he
quickly led his men back again. The Athenians now built their wall
higher, and in future kept guard at this point themselves, disposing
their confederates along the remainder of the works, at the stations
assigned to them. Nicias also determined to fortify Plemmyrium, a
promontory over against the city, which juts out and narrows the mouth
of the Great Harbour. He thought that the fortification of this place
would make it easier to bring in supplies, as they would be able to
carry on their blockade from a less distance, near to the port occupied
by the Syracusans; instead of being obliged, upon every movement of the
enemy’s navy, to put out against them from the bottom of the great
harbour. Besides this, he now began to pay more attention to the war by
sea, seeing that the coming of Gylippus had diminished their hopes by
land. Accordingly, he conveyed over his ships and some troops, and
built three forts in which he placed most of his baggage, and moored
there for the future the larger craft and men-of-war. This was the
first and chief occasion of the losses which the crews experienced. The
water which they used was scarce and had to be fetched from far, and
the sailors could not go out for firewood without being cut off by the
Syracusan horse, who were masters of the country; a third of the
enemy’s cavalry being stationed at the little town of Olympieum, to
prevent plundering incursions on the part of the Athenians at
Plemmyrium. Meanwhile Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian
fleet was approaching, and sent twenty ships to watch for them, with
orders to be on the look-out for them about Locris and Rhegium and the
approach to Sicily.

Gylippus, meanwhile, went on with the wall across Epipolae, using the
stones which the Athenians had laid down for their own wall, and at the
same time constantly led out the Syracusans and their allies, and
formed them in order of battle in front of the lines, the Athenians
forming against him. At last he thought that the moment was come, and
began the attack; and a hand-to-hand fight ensued between the lines,
where the Syracusan cavalry could be of no use; and the Syracusans and
their allies were defeated and took up their dead under truce, while
the Athenians erected a trophy. After this Gylippus called the soldiers
together, and said that the fault was not theirs but his; he had kept
their lines too much within the works, and had thus deprived them of
the services of their cavalry and darters. He would now, therefore,
lead them on a second time. He begged them to remember that in material
force they would be fully a match for their opponents, while, with
respect to moral advantages, it were intolerable if Peloponnesians and
Dorians should not feel confident of overcoming Ionians and islanders
with the motley rabble that accompanied them, and of driving them out
of the country.

After this he embraced the first opportunity that offered of again
leading them against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians held the
opinion that even if the Syracusans should not wish to offer battle, it
was necessary for them to prevent the building of the cross wall, as it
already almost overlapped the extreme point of their own, and if it
went any further it would from that moment make no difference whether
they fought ever so many successful actions, or never fought at all.
They accordingly came out to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus led out his
heavy infantry further from the fortifications than on the former
occasion, and so joined battle; posting his horse and darters upon the
flank of the Athenians in the open space, where the works of the two
walls terminated. During the engagement the cavalry attacked and routed
the left wing of the Athenians, which was opposed to them; and the rest
of the Athenian army was in consequence defeated by the Syracusans and
driven headlong within their lines. The night following the Syracusans
carried their wall up to the Athenian works and passed them, thus
putting it out of their power any longer to stop them, and depriving
them, even if victorious in the field, of all chance of investing the
city for the future.

After this the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians, Ambraciots,
and Leucadians sailed into the harbour under the command of Erasinides,
a Corinthian, having eluded the Athenian ships on guard, and helped the
Syracusans in completing the remainder of the cross wall. Meanwhile
Gylippus went into the rest of Sicily to raise land and naval forces,
and also to bring over any of the cities that either were lukewarm in
the cause or had hitherto kept out of the war altogether. Syracusan and
Corinthian envoys were also dispatched to Lacedaemon and Corinth to get
a fresh force sent over, in any way that might offer, either in
merchant vessels or transports, or in any other manner likely to prove
successful, as the Athenians too were sending for reinforcements; while
the Syracusans proceeded to man a fleet and to exercise, meaning to try
their fortune in this way also, and generally became exceedingly
confident.

Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his
own difficulties daily increasing, himself also sent to Athens. He had
before sent frequent reports of events as they occurred, and felt it
especially incumbent upon him to do so now, as he thought that they
were in a critical position, and that, unless speedily recalled or
strongly reinforced from home, they had no hope of safety. He feared,
however, that the messengers, either through inability to speak, or
through failure of memory, or from a wish to please the multitude,
might not report the truth, and so thought it best to write a letter,
to ensure that the Athenians should know his own opinion without its
being lost in transmission, and be able to decide upon the real facts
of the case.

His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the requisite
verbal instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the army, making
it his aim now to keep on the defensive and to avoid any unnecessary
danger.

At the close of the same summer the Athenian general Euetion marched in
concert with Perdiccas with a large body of Thracians against
Amphipolis, and failing to take it brought some galleys round into the
Strymon, and blockaded the town from the river, having his base at
Himeraeum.

Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the persons sent by Nicias,
reaching Athens, gave the verbal messages which had been entrusted to
them, and answered any questions that were asked them, and delivered
the letter. The clerk of the city now came forward and read out to the
Athenians the letter, which was as follows:

“Our past operations, Athenians, have been made known to you by many
other letters; it is now time for you to become equally familiar with
our present condition, and to take your measures accordingly. We had
defeated in most of our engagements with them the Syracusans, against
whom we were sent, and we had built the works which we now occupy, when
Gylippus arrived from Lacedaemon with an army obtained from Peloponnese
and from some of the cities in Sicily. In our first battle with him we
were victorious; in the battle on the following day we were overpowered
by a multitude of cavalry and darters, and compelled to retire within
our lines. We have now, therefore, been forced by the numbers of those
opposed to us to discontinue the work of circumvallation, and to remain
inactive; being unable to make use even of all the force we have, since
a large portion of our heavy infantry is absorbed in the defence of our
lines. Meanwhile the enemy have carried a single wall past our lines,
thus making it impossible for us to invest them in future, until this
cross wall be attacked by a strong force and captured. So that the
besieger in name has become, at least from the land side, the besieged
in reality; as we are prevented by their cavalry from even going for
any distance into the country.

“Besides this, an embassy has been dispatched to Peloponnese to procure
reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily, partly
in the hope of inducing those that are at present neutral to join him
in the war, partly of bringing from his allies additional contingents
for the land forces and material for the navy. For I understand that
they contemplate a combined attack, upon our lines with their land
forces and with their fleet by sea. You must none of you be surprised
that I say by sea also. They have discovered that the length of the
time we have now been in commission has rotted our ships and wasted our
crews, and that with the entireness of our crews and the soundness of
our ships the pristine efficiency of our navy has departed. For it is
impossible for us to haul our ships ashore and careen them, because,
the enemy’s vessels being as many or more than our own, we are
constantly anticipating an attack. Indeed, they may be seen exercising,
and it lies with them to take the initiative; and not having to
maintain a blockade, they have greater facilities for drying their
ships.

“This we should scarcely be able to do, even if we had plenty of ships
to spare, and were freed from our present necessity of exhausting all
our strength upon the blockade. For it is already difficult to carry in
supplies past Syracuse; and were we to relax our vigilance in the
slightest degree it would become impossible. The losses which our crews
have suffered and still continue to suffer arise from the following
causes. Expeditions for fuel and for forage, and the distance from
which water has to be fetched, cause our sailors to be cut off by the
Syracusan cavalry; the loss of our previous superiority emboldens our
slaves to desert; our foreign seamen are impressed by the unexpected
appearance of a navy against us, and the strength of the enemy’s
resistance; such of them as were pressed into the service take the
first opportunity of departing to their respective cities; such as were
originally seduced by the temptation of high pay, and expected little
fighting and large gains, leave us either by desertion to the enemy or
by availing themselves of one or other of the various facilities of
escape which the magnitude of Sicily affords them. Some even engage in
trade themselves and prevail upon the captains to take Hyccaric slaves
on board in their place; thus they have ruined the efficiency of our
navy.

“Now I need not remind you that the time during which a crew is in its
prime is short, and that the number of sailors who can start a ship on
her way and keep the rowing in time is small. But by far my greatest
trouble is, that holding the post which I do, I am prevented by the
natural indocility of the Athenian seaman from putting a stop to these
evils; and that meanwhile we have no source from which to recruit our
crews, which the enemy can do from many quarters, but are compelled to
depend both for supplying the crews in service and for making good our
losses upon the men whom we brought with us. For our present
confederates, Naxos and Catana, are incapable of supplying us. There is
only one thing more wanting to our opponents, I mean the defection of
our Italian markets. If they were to see you neglect to relieve us from
our present condition, and were to go over to the enemy, famine would
compel us to evacuate, and Syracuse would finish the war without a
blow.

“I might, it is true, have written to you something different and more
agreeable than this, but nothing certainly more useful, if it is
desirable for you to know the real state of things here before taking
your measures. Besides I know that it is your nature to love to be told
the best side of things, and then to blame the teller if the
expectations which he has raised in your minds are not answered by the
result; and I therefore thought it safest to declare to you the truth.

“Now you are not to think that either your generals or your soldiers
have ceased to be a match for the forces originally opposed to them.
But you are to reflect that a general Sicilian coalition is being
formed against us; that a fresh army is expected from Peloponnese,
while the force we have here is unable to cope even with our present
antagonists; and you must promptly decide either to recall us or to
send out to us another fleet and army as numerous again, with a large
sum of money, and someone to succeed me, as a disease in the kidneys
unfits me for retaining my post. I have, I think, some claim on your
indulgence, as while I was in my prime I did you much good service in
my commands. But whatever you mean to do, do it at the commencement of
spring and without delay, as the enemy will obtain his Sicilian
reinforcements shortly, those from Peloponnese after a longer interval;
and unless you attend to the matter the former will be here before you,
while the latter will elude you as they have done before.”

Such were the contents of Nicias’s letter. When the Athenians had heard
it they refused to accept his resignation, but chose him two
colleagues, naming Menander and Euthydemus, two of the officers at the
seat of war, to fill their places until their arrival, that Nicias
might not be left alone in his sickness to bear the whole weight of
affairs. They also voted to send out another army and navy, drawn
partly from the Athenians on the muster-roll, partly from the allies.
The colleagues chosen for Nicias were Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes,
and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. Eurymedon was sent off at once, about
the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships, a hundred and twenty
talents of silver, and instructions to tell the army that
reinforcements would arrive, and that care would be taken of them; but
Demosthenes stayed behind to organize the expedition, meaning to start
as soon as it was spring, and sent for troops to the allies, and
meanwhile got together money, ships, and heavy infantry at home.

The Athenians also sent twenty vessels round Peloponnese to prevent any
one crossing over to Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnese. For the
Corinthians, filled with confidence by the favourable alteration in
Sicilian affairs which had been reported by the envoys upon their
arrival, and convinced that the fleet which they had before sent out
had not been without its use, were now preparing to dispatch a force of
heavy infantry in merchant vessels to Sicily, while the Lacedaemonians
did the like for the rest of Peloponnese. The Corinthians also manned a
fleet of twenty-five vessels, intending to try the result of a battle
with the squadron on guard at Naupactus, and meanwhile to make it less
easy for the Athenians there to hinder the departure of their
merchantmen, by obliging them to keep an eye upon the galleys thus
arrayed against them.

In the meantime the Lacedaemonians prepared for their invasion of
Attica, in accordance with their own previous resolve, and at the
instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, who wished for an
invasion to arrest the reinforcements which they heard that Athens was
about to send to Sicily. Alcibiades also urgently advised the
fortification of Decelea, and a vigorous prosecution of the war. But
the Lacedaemonians derived most encouragement from the belief that
Athens, with two wars on her hands, against themselves and against the
Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction that
she had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former war, they
considered, the offence had been more on their own side, both on
account of the entrance of the Thebans into Plataea in time of peace,
and also of their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer of
arbitration, in spite of the clause in the former treaty that where
arbitration should be offered there should be no appeal to arms. For
this reason they thought that they deserved their misfortunes, and took
to heart seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever else had befallen
them. But when, besides the ravages from Pylos, which went on without
any intermission, the thirty Athenian ships came out from Argos and
wasted part of Epidaurus, Prasiae, and other places; when upon every
dispute that arose as to the interpretation of any doubtful point in
the treaty, their own offers of arbitration were always rejected by the
Athenians, the Lacedaemonians at length decided that Athens had now
committed the very same offence as they had before done, and had become
the guilty party; and they began to be full of ardour for the war. They
spent this winter in sending round to their allies for iron, and in
getting ready the other implements for building their fort; and
meanwhile began raising at home, and also by forced requisitions in the
rest of Peloponnese, a force to be sent out in the merchantmen to their
allies in Sicily. Winter thus ended, and with it the eighteenth year of
this war of which Thucydides is the historian.

In the first days of the spring following, at an earlier period than
usual, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the
command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. They
began by devastating the parts bordering upon the plain, and next
proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the different
cities. Decelea is about thirteen or fourteen miles from the city of
Athens, and the same distance or not much further from Boeotia; and the
fort was meant to annoy the plain and the richest parts of the country,
being in sight of Athens. While the Peloponnesians and their allies in
Attica were engaged in the work of fortification, their countrymen at
home sent off, at about the same time, the heavy infantry in the
merchant vessels to Sicily; the Lacedaemonians furnishing a picked
force of Helots and Neodamodes (or freedmen), six hundred heavy
infantry in all, under the command of Eccritus, a Spartan; and the
Boeotians three hundred heavy infantry, commanded by two Thebans, Xenon
and Nicon, and by Hegesander, a Thespian. These were among the first to
put out into the open sea, starting from Taenarus in Laconia. Not long
after their departure the Corinthians sent off a force of five hundred
heavy infantry, consisting partly of men from Corinth itself, and
partly of Arcadian mercenaries, placed under the command of Alexarchus,
a Corinthian. The Sicyonians also sent off two hundred heavy infantry
at same time as the Corinthians, under the command of Sargeus, a
Sicyonian. Meantime the five-and-twenty vessels manned by Corinth
during the winter lay confronting the twenty Athenian ships at
Naupactus until the heavy infantry in the merchantmen were fairly on
their way from Peloponnese; thus fulfilling the object for which they
had been manned originally, which was to divert the attention of the
Athenians from the merchantmen to the galleys.

During this time the Athenians were not idle. Simultaneously with the
fortification of Decelea, at the very beginning of spring, they sent
thirty ships round Peloponnese, under Charicles, son of Apollodorus,
with instructions to call at Argos and demand a force of their heavy
infantry for the fleet, agreeably to the alliance. At the same time
they dispatched Demosthenes to Sicily, as they had intended, with sixty
Athenian and five Chian vessels, twelve hundred Athenian heavy infantry
from the muster-roll, and as many of the islanders as could be raised
in the different quarters, drawing upon the other subject allies for
whatever they could supply that would be of use for the war.
Demosthenes was instructed first to sail round with Charicles and to
operate with him upon the coasts of Laconia, and accordingly sailed to
Aegina and there waited for the remainder of his armament, and for
Charicles to fetch the Argive troops.

In Sicily, about the same time in this spring, Gylippus came to
Syracuse with as many troops as he could bring from the cities which he
had persuaded to join. Calling the Syracusans together, he told them
that they must man as many ships as possible, and try their hand at a
sea-fight, by which he hoped to achieve an advantage in the war not
unworthy of the risk. With him Hermocrates actively joined in trying to
encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians at sea, saying that
the latter had not inherited their naval prowess nor would they retain
it for ever; they had been landsmen even to a greater degree than the
Syracusans, and had only become a maritime power when obliged by the
Mede. Besides, to daring spirits like the Athenians, a daring adversary
would seem the most formidable; and the Athenian plan of paralysing by
the boldness of their attack a neighbour often not their inferior in
strength could now be used against them with as good effect by the
Syracusans. He was convinced also that the unlooked-for spectacle of
Syracusans daring to face the Athenian navy would cause a terror to the
enemy, the advantages of which would far outweigh any loss that
Athenian science might inflict upon their inexperience. He accordingly
urged them to throw aside their fears and to try their fortune at sea;
and the Syracusans, under the influence of Gylippus and Hermocrates,
and perhaps some others, made up their minds for the sea-fight and
began to man their vessels.

When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out the whole army by night; his
plan being to assault in person the forts on Plemmyrium by land, while
thirty-five Syracusan galleys sailed according to appointment against
the enemy from the great harbour, and the forty-five remaining came
round from the lesser harbour, where they had their arsenal, in order
to effect a junction with those inside and simultaneously to attack
Plemmyrium, and thus to distract the Athenians by assaulting them on
two sides at once. The Athenians quickly manned sixty ships, and with
twenty-five of these engaged the thirty-five of the Syracusans in the
great harbour, sending the rest to meet those sailing round from the
arsenal; and an action now ensued directly in front of the mouth of the
great harbour, maintained with equal tenacity on both sides; the one
wishing to force the passage, the other to prevent them.

In the meantime, while the Athenians in Plemmyrium were down at the
sea, attending to the engagement, Gylippus made a sudden attack on the
forts in the early morning and took the largest first, and afterwards
the two smaller, whose garrisons did not wait for him, seeing the
largest so easily taken. At the fall of the first fort, the men from it
who succeeded in taking refuge in their boats and merchantmen, found
great difficulty in reaching the camp, as the Syracusans were having
the best of it in the engagement in the great harbour, and sent a
fast-sailing galley to pursue them. But when the two others fell, the
Syracusans were now being defeated; and the fugitives from these sailed
alongshore with more ease. The Syracusan ships fighting off the mouth
of the harbour forced their way through the Athenian vessels and
sailing in without any order fell foul of one another, and transferred
the victory to the Athenians; who not only routed the squadron in
question, but also that by which they were at first being defeated in
the harbour, sinking eleven of the Syracusan vessels and killing most
of the men, except the crews of three ships whom they made prisoners.
Their own loss was confined to three vessels; and after hauling ashore
the Syracusan wrecks and setting up a trophy upon the islet in front of
Plemmyrium, they retired to their own camp.

Unsuccessful at sea, the Syracusans had nevertheless the forts in
Plemmyrium, for which they set up three trophies. One of the two last
taken they razed, but put in order and garrisoned the two others. In
the capture of the forts a great many men were killed and made
prisoners, and a great quantity of property was taken in all. As the
Athenians had used them as a magazine, there was a large stock of goods
and corn of the merchants inside, and also a large stock belonging to
the captains; the masts and other furniture of forty galleys being
taken, besides three galleys which had been drawn up on shore. Indeed
the first and chiefest cause of the ruin of the Athenian army was the
capture of Plemmyrium; even the entrance of the harbour being now no
longer safe for carrying in provisions, as the Syracusan vessels were
stationed there to prevent it, and nothing could be brought in without
fighting; besides the general impression of dismay and discouragement
produced upon the army.

After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under the command of
Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these went to Peloponnese with
ambassadors to describe the hopeful state of their affairs, and to
incite the Peloponnesians to prosecute the war there even more actively
than they were now doing, while the eleven others sailed to Italy,
hearing that vessels laden with stores were on their way to the
Athenians. After falling in with and destroying most of the vessels in
question, and burning in the Caulonian territory a quantity of timber
for shipbuilding, which had been got ready for the Athenians, the
Syracusan squadron went to Locri, and one of the merchantmen from
Peloponnese coming in, while they were at anchor there, carrying
Thespian heavy infantry, took these on board and sailed alongshore
towards home. The Athenians were on the look-out for them with twenty
ships at Megara, but were only able to take one vessel with its crew;
the rest getting clear off to Syracuse. There was also some skirmishing
in the harbour about the piles which the Syracusans had driven in the
sea in front of the old docks, to allow their ships to lie at anchor
inside, without being hurt by the Athenians sailing up and running them
down. The Athenians brought up to them a ship of ten thousand talents
burden furnished with wooden turrets and screens, and fastened ropes
round the piles from their boats, wrenched them up and broke them, or
dived down and sawed them in two. Meanwhile the Syracusans plied them
with missiles from the docks, to which they replied from their large
vessel; until at last most of the piles were removed by the Athenians.
But the most awkward part of the stockade was the part out of sight:
some of the piles which had been driven in did not appear above water,
so that it was dangerous to sail up, for fear of running the ships upon
them, just as upon a reef, through not seeing them. However divers went
down and sawed off even these for reward; although the Syracusans drove
in others. Indeed there was no end to the contrivances to which they
resorted against each other, as might be expected between two hostile
armies confronting each other at such a short distance: and skirmishes
and all kinds of other attempts were of constant occurrence. Meanwhile
the Syracusans sent embassies to the cities, composed of Corinthians,
Ambraciots, and Lacedaemonians, to tell them of the capture of
Plemmyrium, and that their defeat in the sea-fight was due less to the
strength of the enemy than to their own disorder; and generally, to let
them know that they were full of hope, and to desire them to come to
their help with ships and troops, as the Athenians were expected with a
fresh army, and if the one already there could be destroyed before the
other arrived, the war would be at an end.

While the contending parties in Sicily were thus engaged, Demosthenes,
having now got together the armament with which he was to go to the
island, put out from Aegina, and making sail for Peloponnese, joined
Charicles and the thirty ships of the Athenians. Taking on board the
heavy infantry from Argos they sailed to Laconia, and, after first
plundering part of Epidaurus Limera, landed on the coast of Laconia,
opposite Cythera, where the temple of Apollo stands, and, laying waste
part of the country, fortified a sort of isthmus, to which the Helots
of the Lacedaemonians might desert, and from whence plundering
incursions might be made as from Pylos. Demosthenes helped to occupy
this place, and then immediately sailed on to Corcyra to take up some
of the allies in that island, and so to proceed without delay to
Sicily; while Charicles waited until he had completed the fortification
of the place and, leaving a garrison there, returned home subsequently
with his thirty ships and the Argives also.

This same summer arrived at Athens thirteen hundred targeteers,
Thracian swordsmen of the tribe of the Dii, who were to have sailed to
Sicily with Demosthenes. Since they had come too late, the Athenians
determined to send them back to Thrace, whence they had come; to keep
them for the Decelean war appearing too expensive, as the pay of each
man was a drachma a day. Indeed since Decelea had been first fortified
by the whole Peloponnesian army during this summer, and then occupied
for the annoyance of the country by the garrisons from the cities
relieving each other at stated intervals, it had been doing great
mischief to the Athenians; in fact this occupation, by the destruction
of property and loss of men which resulted from it, was one of the
principal causes of their ruin. Previously the invasions were short,
and did not prevent their enjoying their land during the rest of the
time: the enemy was now permanently fixed in Attica; at one time it was
an attack in force, at another it was the regular garrison overrunning
the country and making forays for its subsistence, and the
Lacedaemonian king, Agis, was in the field and diligently prosecuting
the war; great mischief was therefore done to the Athenians. They were
deprived of their whole country: more than twenty thousand slaves had
deserted, a great part of them artisans, and all their sheep and beasts
of burden were lost; and as the cavalry rode out daily upon excursions
to Decelea and to guard the country, their horses were either lamed by
being constantly worked upon rocky ground, or wounded by the enemy.

Besides, the transport of provisions from Euboea, which had before been
carried on so much more quickly overland by Decelea from Oropus, was
now effected at great cost by sea round Sunium; everything the city
required had to be imported from abroad, and instead of a city it
became a fortress. Summer and winter the Athenians were worn out by
having to keep guard on the fortifications, during the day by turns, by
night all together, the cavalry excepted, at the different military
posts or upon the wall. But what most oppressed them was that they had
two wars at once, and had thus reached a pitch of frenzy which no one
would have believed possible if he had heard of it before it had come
to pass. For could any one have imagined that even when besieged by the
Peloponnesians entrenched in Attica, they would still, instead of
withdrawing from Sicily, stay on there besieging in like manner
Syracuse, a town (taken as a town) in no way inferior to Athens, or
would so thoroughly upset the Hellenic estimate of their strength and
audacity, as to give the spectacle of a people which, at the beginning
of the war, some thought might hold out one year, some two, none more
than three, if the Peloponnesians invaded their country, now seventeen
years after the first invasion, after having already suffered from all
the evils of war, going to Sicily and undertaking a new war nothing
inferior to that which they already had with the Peloponnesians? These
causes, the great losses from Decelea, and the other heavy charges that
fell upon them, produced their financial embarrassment; and it was at
this time that they imposed upon their subjects, instead of the
tribute, the tax of a twentieth upon all imports and exports by sea,
which they thought would bring them in more money; their expenditure
being now not the same as at first, but having grown with the war while
their revenues decayed.

Accordingly, not wishing to incur expense in their present want of
money, they sent back at once the Thracians who came too late for
Demosthenes, under the conduct of Diitrephes, who was instructed, as
they were to pass through the Euripus, to make use of them if possible
in the voyage alongshore to injure the enemy. Diitrephes first landed
them at Tanagra and hastily snatched some booty; he then sailed across
the Euripus in the evening from Chalcis in Euboea and disembarking in
Boeotia led them against Mycalessus. The night he passed unobserved
near the temple of Hermes, not quite two miles from Mycalessus, and at
daybreak assaulted and took the town, which is not a large one; the
inhabitants being off their guard and not expecting that any one would
ever come up so far from the sea to molest them, the wall too being
weak, and in some places having tumbled down, while in others it had
not been built to any height, and the gates also being left open
through their feeling of security. The Thracians bursting into
Mycalessus sacked the houses and temples, and butchered the
inhabitants, sparing neither youth nor age, but killing all they fell
in with, one after the other, children and women, and even beasts of
burden, and whatever other living creatures they saw; the Thracian
race, like the bloodiest of the barbarians, being even more so when it
has nothing to fear. Everywhere confusion reigned and death in all its
shapes; and in particular they attacked a boys’ school, the largest
that there was in the place, into which the children had just gone, and
massacred them all. In short, the disaster falling upon the whole town
was unsurpassed in magnitude, and unapproached by any in suddenness and
in horror.

Meanwhile the Thebans heard of it and marched to the rescue, and
overtaking the Thracians before they had gone far, recovered the
plunder and drove them in panic to the Euripus and the sea, where the
vessels which brought them were lying. The greatest slaughter took
place while they were embarking, as they did not know how to swim, and
those in the vessels on seeing what was going on on on shore moored
them out of bowshot: in the rest of the retreat the Thracians made a
very respectable defence against the Theban horse, by which they were
first attacked, dashing out and closing their ranks according to the
tactics of their country, and lost only a few men in that part of the
affair. A good number who were after plunder were actually caught in
the town and put to death. Altogether the Thracians had two hundred and
fifty killed out of thirteen hundred, the Thebans and the rest who came
to the rescue about twenty, troopers and heavy infantry, with
Scirphondas, one of the Boeotarchs. The Mycalessians lost a large
proportion of their population.

While Mycalessus thus experienced a calamity for its extent as
lamentable as any that happened in the war, Demosthenes, whom we left
sailing to Corcyra, after the building of the fort in Laconia, found a
merchantman lying at Phea in Elis, in which the Corinthian heavy
infantry were to cross to Sicily. The ship he destroyed, but the men
escaped, and subsequently got another in which they pursued their
voyage. After this, arriving at Zacynthus and Cephallenia, he took a
body of heavy infantry on board, and sending for some of the Messenians
from Naupactus, crossed over to the opposite coast of Acarnania, to
Alyzia, and to Anactorium which was held by the Athenians. While he was
in these parts he was met by Eurymedon returning from Sicily, where he
had been sent, as has been mentioned, during the winter, with the money
for the army, who told him the news, and also that he had heard, while
at sea, that the Syracusans had taken Plemmyrium. Here, also, Conon
came to them, the commander at Naupactus, with news that the
twenty-five Corinthian ships stationed opposite to him, far from giving
over the war, were meditating an engagement; and he therefore begged
them to send him some ships, as his own eighteen were not a match for
the enemy’s twenty-five. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, accordingly, sent
ten of their best sailers with Conon to reinforce the squadron at
Naupactus, and meanwhile prepared for the muster of their forces;
Eurymedon, who was now the colleague of Demosthenes, and had turned
back in consequence of his appointment, sailing to Corcyra to tell them
to man fifteen ships and to enlist heavy infantry; while Demosthenes
raised slingers and darters from the parts about Acarnania.

Meanwhile the envoys, already mentioned, who had gone from Syracuse to
the cities after the capture of Plemmyrium, had succeeded in their
mission, and were about to bring the army that they had collected, when
Nicias got scent of it, and sent to the Centoripae and Alicyaeans and
other of the friendly Sicels, who held the passes, not to let the enemy
through, but to combine to prevent their passing, there being no other
way by which they could even attempt it, as the Agrigentines would not
give them a passage through their country. Agreeably to this request
the Sicels laid a triple ambuscade for the Siceliots upon their march,
and attacking them suddenly, while off their guard, killed about eight
hundred of them and all the envoys, the Corinthian only excepted, by
whom fifteen hundred who escaped were conducted to Syracuse.

About the same time the Camarinaeans also came to the assistance of
Syracuse with five hundred heavy infantry, three hundred darters, and
as many archers, while the Geloans sent crews for five ships, four
hundred darters, and two hundred horse. Indeed almost the whole of
Sicily, except the Agrigentines, who were neutral, now ceased merely to
watch events as it had hitherto done, and actively joined Syracuse
against the Athenians.

While the Syracusans after the Sicel disaster put off any immediate
attack upon the Athenians, Demosthenes and Eurymedon, whose forces from
Corcyra and the continent were now ready, crossed the Ionian Gulf with
all their armament to the Iapygian promontory, and starting from thence
touched at the Choerades Isles lying off Iapygia, where they took on
board a hundred and fifty Iapygian darters of the Messapian tribe, and
after renewing an old friendship with Artas the chief, who had
furnished them with the darters, arrived at Metapontium in Italy. Here
they persuaded their allies the Metapontines to send with them three
hundred darters and two galleys, and with this reinforcement coasted on
to Thurii, where they found the party hostile to Athens recently
expelled by a revolution, and accordingly remained there to muster and
review the whole army, to see if any had been left behind, and to
prevail upon the Thurians resolutely to join them in their expedition,
and in the circumstances in which they found themselves to conclude a
defensive and offensive alliance with the Athenians.

About the same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships
stationed opposite to the squadron at Naupactus to protect the passage
of the transports to Sicily had got ready for engaging, and manning
some additional vessels, so as to be numerically little inferior to the
Athenians, anchored off Erineus in Achaia in the Rhypic country. The
place off which they lay being in the form of a crescent, the land
forces furnished by the Corinthians and their allies on the spot came
up and ranged themselves upon the projecting headlands on either side,
while the fleet, under the command of Polyanthes, a Corinthian, held
the intervening space and blocked up the entrance. The Athenians under
Diphilus now sailed out against them with thirty-three ships from
Naupactus, and the Corinthians, at first not moving, at length thought
they saw their opportunity, raised the signal, and advanced and engaged
the Athenians. After an obstinate struggle, the Corinthians lost three
ships, and without sinking any altogether, disabled seven of the enemy,
which were struck prow to prow and had their foreships stove in by the
Corinthian vessels, whose cheeks had been strengthened for this very
purpose. After an action of this even character, in which either party
could claim the victory (although the Athenians became masters of the
wrecks through the wind driving them out to sea, the Corinthians not
putting out again to meet them), the two combatants parted. No pursuit
took place, and no prisoners were made on either side; the Corinthians
and Peloponnesians who were fighting near the shore escaping with ease,
and none of the Athenian vessels having been sunk. The Athenians now
sailed back to Naupactus, and the Corinthians immediately set up a
trophy as victors, because they had disabled a greater number of the
enemy’s ships. Moreover they held that they had not been worsted, for
the very same reason that their opponent held that he had not been
victorious; the Corinthians considering that they were conquerors, if
not decidedly conquered, and the Athenians thinking themselves
vanquished, because not decidedly victorious. However, when the
Peloponnesians sailed off and their land forces had dispersed, the
Athenians also set up a trophy as victors in Achaia, about two miles
and a quarter from Erineus, the Corinthian station.

This was the termination of the action at Naupactus. To return to
Demosthenes and Eurymedon: the Thurians having now got ready to join in
the expedition with seven hundred heavy infantry and three hundred
darters, the two generals ordered the ships to sail along the coast to
the Crotonian territory, and meanwhile held a review of all the land
forces upon the river Sybaris, and then led them through the Thurian
country. Arrived at the river Hylias, they here received a message from
the Crotonians, saying that they would not allow the army to pass
through their country; upon which the Athenians descended towards the
shore, and bivouacked near the sea and the mouth of the Hylias, where
the fleet also met them, and the next day embarked and sailed along the
coast touching at all the cities except Locri, until they came to Petra
in the Rhegian territory.

Meanwhile the Syracusans hearing of their approach resolved to make a
second attempt with their fleet and their other forces on shore, which
they had been collecting for this very purpose in order to do something
before their arrival. In addition to other improvements suggested by
the former sea-fight which they now adopted in the equipment of their
navy, they cut down their prows to a smaller compass to make them more
solid and made their cheeks stouter, and from these let stays into the
vessels’ sides for a length of six cubits within and without, in the
same way as the Corinthians had altered their prows before engaging the
squadron at Naupactus. The Syracusans thought that they would thus have
an advantage over the Athenian vessels, which were not constructed with
equal strength, but were slight in the bows, from their being more used
to sail round and charge the enemy’s side than to meet him prow to
prow, and that the battle being in the great harbour, with a great many
ships in not much room, was also a fact in their favour. Charging prow
to prow, they would stave in the enemy’s bows, by striking with solid
and stout beaks against hollow and weak ones; and secondly, the
Athenians for want of room would be unable to use their favourite
manoeuvre of breaking the line or of sailing round, as the Syracusans
would do their best not to let them do the one, and want of room would
prevent their doing the other. This charging prow to prow, which had
hitherto been thought want of skill in a helmsman, would be the
Syracusans’ chief manoeuvre, as being that which they should find most
useful, since the Athenians, if repulsed, would not be able to back
water in any direction except towards the shore, and that only for a
little way, and in the little space in front of their own camp. The
rest of the harbour would be commanded by the Syracusans; and the
Athenians, if hard pressed, by crowding together in a small space and
all to the same point, would run foul of one another and fall into
disorder, which was, in fact, the thing that did the Athenians most
harm in all the sea-fights, they not having, like the Syracusans, the
whole harbour to retreat over. As to their sailing round into the open
sea, this would be impossible, with the Syracusans in possession of the
way out and in, especially as Plemmyrium would be hostile to them, and
the mouth of the harbour was not large.

With these contrivances to suit their skill and ability, and now more
confident after the previous sea-fight, the Syracusans attacked by land
and sea at once. The town force Gylippus led out a little the first and
brought them up to the wall of the Athenians, where it looked towards
the city, while the force from the Olympieum, that is to say, the heavy
infantry that were there with the horse and the light troops of the
Syracusans, advanced against the wall from the opposite side; the ships
of the Syracusans and allies sailing out immediately afterwards. The
Athenians at first fancied that they were to be attacked by land only,
and it was not without alarm that they saw the fleet suddenly
approaching as well; and while some were forming upon the walls and in
front of them against the advancing enemy, and some marching out in
haste against the numbers of horse and darters coming from the
Olympieum and from outside, others manned the ships or rushed down to
the beach to oppose the enemy, and when the ships were manned put out
with seventy-five sail against about eighty of the Syracusans.

After spending a great part of the day in advancing and retreating and
skirmishing with each other, without either being able to gain any
advantage worth speaking of, except that the Syracusans sank one or two
of the Athenian vessels, they parted, the land force at the same time
retiring from the lines. The next day the Syracusans remained quiet,
and gave no signs of what they were going to do; but Nicias, seeing
that the battle had been a drawn one, and expecting that they would
attack again, compelled the captains to refit any of the ships that had
suffered, and moored merchant vessels before the stockade which they
had driven into the sea in front of their ships, to serve instead of an
enclosed harbour, at about two hundred feet from each other, in order
that any ship that was hard pressed might be able to retreat in safety
and sail out again at leisure. These preparations occupied the
Athenians all day until nightfall.

The next day the Syracusans began operations at an earlier hour, but
with the same plan of attack by land and sea. A great part of the day
the rivals spent as before, confronting and skirmishing with each
other; until at last Ariston, son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, the
ablest helmsman in the Syracusan service, persuaded their naval
commanders to send to the officials in the city, and tell them to move
the sale market as quickly as they could down to the sea, and oblige
every one to bring whatever eatables he had and sell them there, thus
enabling the commanders to land the crews and dine at once close to the
ships, and shortly afterwards, the selfsame day, to attack the
Athenians again when they were not expecting it.

In compliance with this advice a messenger was sent and the market got
ready, upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and withdrew to
the town, and at once landed and took their dinner upon the spot; while
the Athenians, supposing that they had returned to the town because
they felt they were beaten, disembarked at their leisure and set about
getting their dinners and about their other occupations, under the idea
that they done with fighting for that day. Suddenly the Syracusans had
manned their ships and again sailed against them; and the Athenians, in
great confusion and most of them fasting, got on board, and with great
difficulty put out to meet them. For some time both parties remained on
the defensive without engaging, until the Athenians at last resolved
not to let themselves be worn out by waiting where they were, but to
attack without delay, and giving a cheer, went into action. The
Syracusans received them, and charging prow to prow as they had
intended, stove in a great part of the Athenian foreships by the
strength of their beaks; the darters on the decks also did great damage
to the Athenians, but still greater damage was done by the Syracusans
who went about in small boats, ran in upon the oars of the Athenian
galleys, and sailed against their sides, and discharged from thence
their darts upon the sailors.

At last, fighting hard in this fashion, the Syracusans gained the
victory, and the Athenians turned and fled between the merchantmen to
their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued them as far as the
merchantmen, where they were stopped by the beams armed with dolphins
suspended from those vessels over the passage. Two of the Syracusan
vessels went too near in the excitement of victory and were destroyed,
one of them being taken with its crew. After sinking seven of the
Athenian vessels and disabling many, and taking most of the men
prisoners and killing others, the Syracusans retired and set up
trophies for both the engagements, being now confident of having a
decided superiority by sea, and by no means despairing of equal success
by land.




CHAPTER XXII


Nineteenth Year of the War—Arrival of Demosthenes—Defeat of the
Athenians at Epipolae—Folly and Obstinancy of Nicias


In the meantime, while the Syracusans were preparing for a second
attack upon both elements, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the
succours from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships,
including the foreigners; nearly five thousand heavy infantry, Athenian
and allied; a large number of darters, Hellenic and barbarian, and
slingers and archers and everything else upon a corresponding scale.
The Syracusans and their allies were for the moment not a little
dismayed at the idea that there was to be no term or ending to their
dangers, seeing, in spite of the fortification of Decelea, a new army
arrive nearly equal to the former, and the power of Athens proving so
great in every quarter. On the other hand, the first Athenian armament
regained a certain confidence in the midst of its misfortunes.
Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood, felt that he could not drag on
and fare as Nicias had done, who by wintering in Catana instead of at
once attacking Syracuse had allowed the terror of his first arrival to
evaporate in contempt, and had given time to Gylippus to arrive with a
force from Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would never have sent for
if he had attacked immediately; for they fancied that they were a match
for him by themselves, and would not have discovered their inferiority
until they were already invested, and even if they then sent for
succours, they would no longer have been equally able to profit by
their arrival. Recollecting this, and well aware that it was now on the
first day after his arrival that he like Nicias was most formidable to
the enemy, Demosthenes determined to lose no time in drawing the utmost
profit from the consternation at the moment inspired by his army; and
seeing that the counterwall of the Syracusans, which hindered the
Athenians from investing them, was a single one, and that he who should
become master of the way up to Epipolae, and afterwards of the camp
there, would find no difficulty in taking it, as no one would even wait
for his attack, made all haste to attempt the enterprise. This he took
to be the shortest way of ending the war, as he would either succeed
and take Syracuse, or would lead back the armament instead of
frittering away the lives of the Athenians engaged in the expedition
and the resources of the country at large.

First therefore the Athenians went out and laid waste the lands of the
Syracusans about the Anapus and carried all before them as at first by
land and by sea, the Syracusans not offering to oppose them upon either
element, unless it were with their cavalry and darters from the
Olympieum. Next Demosthenes resolved to attempt the counterwall first
by means of engines. As however the engines that he brought up were
burnt by the enemy fighting from the wall, and the rest of the forces
repulsed after attacking at many different points, he determined to
delay no longer, and having obtained the consent of Nicias and his
fellow commanders, proceeded to put in execution his plan of attacking
Epipolae. As by day it seemed impossible to approach and get up without
being observed, he ordered provisions for five days, took all the
masons and carpenters, and other things, such as arrows, and everything
else that they could want for the work of fortification if successful,
and, after the first watch, set out with Eurymedon and Menander and the
whole army for Epipolae, Nicias being left behind in the lines. Having
come up by the hill of Euryelus (where the former army had ascended at
first) unobserved by the enemy’s guards, they went up to the fort which
the Syracusans had there, and took it, and put to the sword part of the
garrison. The greater number, however, escaped at once and gave the
alarm to the camps, of which there were three upon Epipolae, defended
by outworks, one of the Syracusans, one of the other Siceliots, and one
of the allies; and also to the six hundred Syracusans forming the
original garrison for this part of Epipolae. These at once advanced
against the assailants and, falling in with Demosthenes and the
Athenians, were routed by them after a sharp resistance, the victors
immediately pushing on, eager to achieve the objects of the attack
without giving time for their ardour to cool; meanwhile others from the
very beginning were taking the counterwall of the Syracusans, which was
abandoned by its garrison, and pulling down the battlements. The
Syracusans and the allies, and Gylippus with the troops under his
command, advanced to the rescue from the outworks, but engaged in some
consternation (a night attack being a piece of audacity which they had
never expected), and were at first compelled to retreat. But while the
Athenians, flushed with their victory, now advanced with less order,
wishing to make their way as quickly as possible through the whole
force of the enemy not yet engaged, without relaxing their attack or
giving them time to rally, the Boeotians made the first stand against
them, attacked them, routed them, and put them to flight.

The Athenians now fell into great disorder and perplexity, so that it
was not easy to get from one side or the other any detailed account of
the affair. By day certainly the combatants have a clearer notion,
though even then by no means of all that takes place, no one knowing
much of anything that does not go on in his own immediate
neighbourhood; but in a night engagement (and this was the only one
that occurred between great armies during the war) how could any one
know anything for certain? Although there was a bright moon they saw
each other only as men do by moonlight, that is to say, they could
distinguish the form of the body, but could not tell for certain
whether it was a friend or an enemy. Both had great numbers of heavy
infantry moving about in a small space. Some of the Athenians were
already defeated, while others were coming up yet unconquered for their
first attack. A large part also of the rest of their forces either had
only just got up, or were still ascending, so that they did not know
which way to march. Owing to the rout that had taken place all in front
was now in confusion, and the noise made it difficult to distinguish
anything. The victorious Syracusans and allies were cheering each other
on with loud cries, by night the only possible means of communication,
and meanwhile receiving all who came against them; while the Athenians
were seeking for one another, taking all in front of them for enemies,
even although they might be some of their now flying friends; and by
constantly asking for the watchword, which was their only means of
recognition, not only caused great confusion among themselves by asking
all at once, but also made it known to the enemy, whose own they did
not so readily discover, as the Syracusans were victorious and not
scattered, and thus less easily mistaken. The result was that if the
Athenians fell in with a party of the enemy that was weaker than they,
it escaped them through knowing their watchword; while if they
themselves failed to answer they were put to the sword. But what hurt
them as much, or indeed more than anything else, was the singing of the
paean, from the perplexity which it caused by being nearly the same on
either side; the Argives and Corcyraeans and any other Dorian peoples
in the army, struck terror into the Athenians whenever they raised
their paean, no less than did the enemy. Thus, after being once thrown
into disorder, they ended by coming into collision with each other in
many parts of the field, friends with friends, and citizens with
citizens, and not only terrified one another, but even came to blows
and could only be parted with difficulty. In the pursuit many perished
by throwing themselves down the cliffs, the way down from Epipolae
being narrow; and of those who got down safely into the plain, although
many, especially those who belonged to the first armament, escaped
through their better acquaintance with the locality, some of the
newcomers lost their way and wandered over the country, and were cut
off in the morning by the Syracusan cavalry and killed.

The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies, one upon Epipolae
where the ascent had been made, and the other on the spot where the
first check was given by the Boeotians; and the Athenians took back
their dead under truce. A great many of the Athenians and allies were
killed, although still more arms were taken than could be accounted for
by the number of the dead, as some of those who were obliged to leap
down from the cliffs without their shields escaped with their lives and
did not perish like the rest.

After this the Syracusans, recovering their old confidence at such an
unexpected stroke of good fortune, dispatched Sicanus with fifteen
ships to Agrigentum where there was a revolution, to induce if possible
the city to join them; while Gylippus again went by land into the rest
of Sicily to bring up reinforcements, being now in hope of taking the
Athenian lines by storm, after the result of the affair on Epipolae.

In the meantime the Athenian generals consulted upon the disaster which
had happened, and upon the general weakness of the army. They saw
themselves unsuccessful in their enterprises, and the soldiers
disgusted with their stay; disease being rife among them owing to its
being the sickly season of the year, and to the marshy and unhealthy
nature of the spot in which they were encamped; and the state of their
affairs generally being thought desperate. Accordingly, Demosthenes was
of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer; but agreeably to his
original idea in risking the attempt upon Epipolae, now that this had
failed, he gave his vote for going away without further loss of time,
while the sea might yet be crossed, and their late reinforcement might
give them the superiority at all events on that element. He also said
that it would be more profitable for the state to carry on the war
against those who were building fortifications in Attica, than against
the Syracusans whom it was no longer easy to subdue; besides which it
was not right to squander large sums of money to no purpose by going on
with the siege.

This was the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias, without denying the bad
state of their affairs, was unwilling to avow their weakness, or to
have it reported to the enemy that the Athenians in full council were
openly voting for retreat; for in that case they would be much less
likely to effect it when they wanted without discovery. Moreover, his
own particular information still gave him reason to hope that the
affairs of the enemy would soon be in a worse state than their own, if
the Athenians persevered in the siege; as they would wear out the
Syracusans by want of money, especially with the more extensive command
of the sea now given them by their present navy. Besides this, there
was a party in Syracuse who wished to betray the city to the Athenians,
and kept sending him messages and telling him not to raise the siege.
Accordingly, knowing this and really waiting because he hesitated
between the two courses and wished to see his way more clearly, in his
public speech on this occasion he refused to lead off the army, saying
he was sure the Athenians would never approve of their returning
without a vote of theirs. Those who would vote upon their conduct,
instead of judging the facts as eye-witnesses like themselves and not
from what they might hear from hostile critics, would simply be guided
by the calumnies of the first clever speaker; while many, indeed most,
of the soldiers on the spot, who now so loudly proclaimed the danger of
their position, when they reached Athens would proclaim just as loudly
the opposite, and would say that their generals had been bribed to
betray them and return. For himself, therefore, who knew the Athenian
temper, sooner than perish under a dishonourable charge and by an
unjust sentence at the hands of the Athenians, he would rather take his
chance and die, if die he must, a soldier’s death at the hand of the
enemy. Besides, after all, the Syracusans were in a worse case than
themselves. What with paying mercenaries, spending upon fortified
posts, and now for a full year maintaining a large navy, they were
already at a loss and would soon be at a standstill: they had already
spent two thousand talents and incurred heavy debts besides, and could
not lose even ever so small a fraction of their present force through
not paying it, without ruin to their cause; depending as they did more
upon mercenaries than upon soldiers obliged to serve, like their own.
He therefore said that they ought to stay and carry on the siege, and
not depart defeated in point of money, in which they were much
superior.

Nicias spoke positively because he had exact information of the
financial distress at Syracuse, and also because of the strength of the
Athenian party there which kept sending him messages not to raise the
siege; besides which he had more confidence than before in his fleet,
and felt sure at least of its success. Demosthenes, however, would not
hear for a moment of continuing the siege, but said that if they could
not lead off the army without a decree from Athens, and if they were
obliged to stay on, they ought to remove to Thapsus or Catana; where
their land forces would have a wide extent of country to overrun, and
could live by plundering the enemy, and would thus do them damage;
while the fleet would have the open sea to fight in, that is to say,
instead of a narrow space which was all in the enemy’s favour, a wide
sea-room where their science would be of use, and where they could
retreat or advance without being confined or circumscribed either when
they put out or put in. In any case he was altogether opposed to their
staying on where they were, and insisted on removing at once, as
quickly and with as little delay as possible; and in this judgment
Eurymedon agreed. Nicias however still objecting, a certain diffidence
and hesitation came over them, with a suspicion that Nicias might have
some further information to make him so positive.




CHAPTER XXIII


Nineteenth Year of the War—Battles in the Great Harbour—Retreat and
Annihilation of the Athenian Army


While the Athenians lingered on in this way without moving from where
they were, Gylippus and Sicanus now arrived at Syracuse. Sicanus had
failed to gain Agrigentum, the party friendly to the Syracusans having
been driven out while he was still at Gela; but Gylippus was
accompanied not only by a large number of troops raised in Sicily, but
by the heavy infantry sent off in the spring from Peloponnese in the
merchantmen, who had arrived at Selinus from Libya. They had been
carried to Libya by a storm, and having obtained two galleys and pilots
from the Cyrenians, on their voyage alongshore had taken sides with the
Euesperitae and had defeated the Libyans who were besieging them, and
from thence coasting on to Neapolis, a Carthaginian mart, and the
nearest point to Sicily, from which it is only two days’ and a night’s
voyage, there crossed over and came to Selinus. Immediately upon their
arrival the Syracusans prepared to attack the Athenians again by land
and sea at once. The Athenian generals seeing a fresh army come to the
aid of the enemy, and that their own circumstances, far from improving,
were becoming daily worse, and above all distressed by the sickness of
the soldiers, now began to repent of not having removed before; and
Nicias no longer offering the same opposition, except by urging that
there should be no open voting, they gave orders as secretly as
possible for all to be prepared to sail out from the camp at a given
signal. All was at last ready, and they were on the point of sailing
away, when an eclipse of the moon, which was then at the full, took
place. Most of the Athenians, deeply impressed by this occurrence, now
urged the generals to wait; and Nicias, who was somewhat over-addicted
to divination and practices of that kind, refused from that moment even
to take the question of departure into consideration, until they had
waited the thrice nine days prescribed by the soothsayers.

The besiegers were thus condemned to stay in the country; and the
Syracusans, getting wind of what had happened, became more eager than
ever to press the Athenians, who had now themselves acknowledged that
they were no longer their superiors either by sea or by land, as
otherwise they would never have planned to sail away. Besides which the
Syracusans did not wish them to settle in any other part of Sicily,
where they would be more difficult to deal with, but desired to force
them to fight at sea as quickly as possible, in a position favourable
to themselves. Accordingly they manned their ships and practised for as
many days as they thought sufficient. When the moment arrived they
assaulted on the first day the Athenian lines, and upon a small force
of heavy infantry and horse sallying out against them by certain gates,
cut off some of the former and routed and pursued them to the lines,
where, as the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses
and some few of the heavy infantry.

Drawing off their troops for this day, on the next the Syracusans went
out with a fleet of seventy-six sail, and at the same time advanced
with their land forces against the lines. The Athenians put out to meet
them with eighty-six ships, came to close quarters, and engaged. The
Syracusans and their allies first defeated the Athenian centre, and
then caught Eurymedon, the commander of the right wing, who was sailing
out from the line more towards the land in order to surround the enemy,
in the hollow and recess of the harbour, and killed him and destroyed
the ships accompanying him; after which they now chased the whole
Athenian fleet before them and drove them ashore.

Gylippus seeing the enemy’s fleet defeated and carried ashore beyond
their stockades and camp, ran down to the breakwater with some of his
troops, in order to cut off the men as they landed and make it easier
for the Syracusans to tow off the vessels by the shore being friendly
ground. The Tyrrhenians who guarded this point for the Athenians,
seeing them come on in disorder, advanced out against them and attacked
and routed their van, hurling it into the marsh of Lysimeleia.
Afterwards the Syracusan and allied troops arrived in greater numbers,
and the Athenians fearing for their ships came up also to the rescue
and engaged them, and defeated and pursued them to some distance and
killed a few of their heavy infantry. They succeeded in rescuing most
of their ships and brought them down by their camp; eighteen however
were taken by the Syracusans and their allies, and all the men killed.
The rest the enemy tried to burn by means of an old merchantman which
they filled with faggots and pine-wood, set on fire, and let drift down
the wind which blew full on the Athenians. The Athenians, however,
alarmed for their ships, contrived means for stopping it and putting it
out, and checking the flames and the nearer approach of the
merchantman, thus escaped the danger.

After this the Syracusans set up a trophy for the sea-fight and for the
heavy infantry whom they had cut off up at the lines, where they took
the horses; and the Athenians for the rout of the foot driven by the
Tyrrhenians into the marsh, and for their own victory with the rest of
the army.

The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at sea, where until
now they had feared the reinforcement brought by Demosthenes, and deep,
in consequence, was the despondency of the Athenians, and great their
disappointment, and greater still their regret for having come on the
expedition. These were the only cities that they had yet encountered,
similar to their own in character, under democracies like themselves,
which had ships and horses, and were of considerable magnitude. They
had been unable to divide and bring them over by holding out the
prospect of changes in their governments, or to crush them by their
great superiority in force, but had failed in most of their attempts,
and being already in perplexity, had now been defeated at sea, where
defeat could never have been expected, and were thus plunged deeper in
embarrassment than ever.

Meanwhile the Syracusans immediately began to sail freely along the
harbour, and determined to close up its mouth, so that the Athenians
might not be able to steal out in future, even if they wished. Indeed,
the Syracusans no longer thought only of saving themselves, but also
how to hinder the escape of the enemy; thinking, and thinking rightly,
that they were now much the stronger, and that to conquer the Athenians
and their allies by land and sea would win them great glory in Hellas.
The rest of the Hellenes would thus immediately be either freed or
released from apprehension, as the remaining forces of Athens would be
henceforth unable to sustain the war that would be waged against her;
while they, the Syracusans, would be regarded as the authors of this
deliverance, and would be held in high admiration, not only with all
men now living but also with posterity. Nor were these the only
considerations that gave dignity to the struggle. They would thus
conquer not only the Athenians but also their numerous allies, and
conquer not alone, but with their companions in arms, commanding side
by side with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, having offered their
city to stand in the van of danger, and having been in a great measure
the pioneers of naval success.

Indeed, there were never so many peoples assembled before a single
city, if we except the grand total gathered together in this war under
Athens and Lacedaemon. The following were the states on either side who
came to Syracuse to fight for or against Sicily, to help to conquer or
defend the island. Right or community of blood was not the bond of
union between them, so much as interest or compulsion as the case might
be. The Athenians themselves being Ionians went against the Dorians of
Syracuse of their own free will; and the peoples still speaking Attic
and using the Athenian laws, the Lemnians, Imbrians, and Aeginetans,
that is to say the then occupants of Aegina, being their colonists,
went with them. To these must be also added the Hestiaeans dwelling at
Hestiaea in Euboea. Of the rest some joined in the expedition as
subjects of the Athenians, others as independent allies, others as
mercenaries. To the number of the subjects paying tribute belonged the
Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians, and Carystians from Euboea; the
Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians from the islands; and the Milesians,
Samians, and Chians from Ionia. The Chians, however, joined as
independent allies, paying no tribute, but furnishing ships. Most of
these were Ionians and descended from the Athenians, except the
Carystians, who are Dryopes, and although subjects and obliged to
serve, were still Ionians fighting against Dorians. Besides these there
were men of Aeolic race, the Methymnians, subjects who provided ships,
not tribute, and the Tenedians and Aenians who paid tribute. These
Aeolians fought against their Aeolian founders, the Boeotians in the
Syracusan army, because they were obliged, while the Plataeans, the
only native Boeotians opposed to Boeotians, did so upon a just quarrel.
Of the Rhodians and Cytherians, both Dorians, the latter, Lacedaemonian
colonists, fought in the Athenian ranks against their Lacedaemonian
countrymen with Gylippus; while the Rhodians, Argives by race, were
compelled to bear arms against the Dorian Syracusans and their own
colonists, the Geloans, serving with the Syracusans. Of the islanders
round Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians accompanied the
Athenians as independent allies, although their insular position really
left them little choice in the matter, owing to the maritime supremacy
of Athens, while the Corcyraeans, who were not only Dorians but
Corinthians, were openly serving against Corinthians and Syracusans,
although colonists of the former and of the same race as the latter,
under colour of compulsion, but really out of free will through hatred
of Corinth. The Messenians, as they are now called in Naupactus and
from Pylos, then held by the Athenians, were taken with them to the
war. There were also a few Megarian exiles, whose fate it was to be now
fighting against the Megarian Selinuntines.

The engagement of the rest was more of a voluntary nature. It was less
the league than hatred of the Lacedaemonians and the immediate private
advantage of each individual that persuaded the Dorian Argives to join
the Ionian Athenians in a war against Dorians; while the Mantineans and
other Arcadian mercenaries, accustomed to go against the enemy pointed
out to them at the moment, were led by interest to regard the Arcadians
serving with the Corinthians as just as much their enemies as any
others. The Cretans and Aetolians also served for hire, and the Cretans
who had joined the Rhodians in founding Gela, thus came to consent to
fight for pay against, instead of for, their colonists. There were also
some Acarnanians paid to serve, although they came chiefly for love of
Demosthenes and out of goodwill to the Athenians whose allies they
were. These all lived on the Hellenic side of the Ionian Gulf. Of the
Italiots, there were the Thurians and Metapontines, dragged into the
quarrel by the stern necessities of a time of revolution; of the
Siceliots, the Naxians and the Catanians; and of the barbarians, the
Egestaeans, who called in the Athenians, most of the Sicels, and
outside Sicily some Tyrrhenian enemies of Syracuse and Iapygian
mercenaries.

Such were the peoples serving with the Athenians. Against these the
Syracusans had the Camarinaeans their neighbours, the Geloans who live
next to them; then passing over the neutral Agrigentines, the
Selinuntines settled on the farther side of the island. These inhabit
the part of Sicily looking towards Libya; the Himeraeans came from the
side towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, being the only Hellenic inhabitants in
that quarter, and the only people that came from thence to the aid of
the Syracusans. Of the Hellenes in Sicily the above peoples joined in
the war, all Dorians and independent, and of the barbarians the Sicels
only, that is to say, such as did not go over to the Athenians. Of the
Hellenes outside Sicily there were the Lacedaemonians, who provided a
Spartan to take the command, and a force of Neodamodes or Freedmen, and
of Helots; the Corinthians, who alone joined with naval and land
forces, with their Leucadian and Ambraciot kinsmen; some mercenaries
sent by Corinth from Arcadia; some Sicyonians forced to serve, and from
outside Peloponnese the Boeotians. In comparison, however, with these
foreign auxiliaries, the great Siceliot cities furnished more in every
department—numbers of heavy infantry, ships, and horses, and an immense
multitude besides having been brought together; while in comparison,
again, one may say, with all the rest put together, more was provided
by the Syracusans themselves, both from the greatness of the city and
from the fact that they were in the greatest danger.

Such were the auxiliaries brought together on either side, all of which
had by this time joined, neither party experiencing any subsequent
accession. It was no wonder, therefore, if the Syracusans and their
allies thought that it would win them great glory if they could follow
up their recent victory in the sea-fight by the capture of the whole
Athenian armada, without letting it escape either by sea or by land.
They began at once to close up the Great Harbour by means of boats,
merchant vessels, and galleys moored broadside across its mouth, which
is nearly a mile wide, and made all their other arrangements for the
event of the Athenians again venturing to fight at sea. There was, in
fact, nothing little either in their plans or their ideas.

The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour and informed of their
further designs, called a council of war. The generals and colonels
assembled and discussed the difficulties of the situation; the point
which pressed most being that they no longer had provisions for
immediate use (having sent on to Catana to tell them not to send any,
in the belief that they were going away), and that they would not have
any in future unless they could command the sea. They therefore
determined to evacuate their upper lines, to enclose with a cross wall
and garrison a small space close to the ships, only just sufficient to
hold their stores and sick, and manning all the ships, seaworthy or
not, with every man that could be spared from the rest of their land
forces, to fight it out at sea, and, if victorious, to go to Catana, if
not, to burn their vessels, form in close order, and retreat by land
for the nearest friendly place they could reach, Hellenic or barbarian.
This was no sooner settled than carried into effect; they descended
gradually from the upper lines and manned all their vessels, compelling
all to go on board who were of age to be in any way of use. They thus
succeeded in manning about one hundred and ten ships in all, on board
of which they embarked a number of archers and darters taken from the
Acarnanians and from the other foreigners, making all other provisions
allowed by the nature of their plan and by the necessities which
imposed it. All was now nearly ready, and Nicias, seeing the soldiery
disheartened by their unprecedented and decided defeat at sea, and by
reason of the scarcity of provisions eager to fight it out as soon as
possible, called them all together, and first addressed them, speaking
as follows:

“Soldiers of the Athenians and of the allies, we have all an equal
interest in the coming struggle, in which life and country are at stake
for us quite as much as they can be for the enemy; since if our fleet
wins the day, each can see his native city again, wherever that city
may be. You must not lose heart, or be like men without any experience,
who fail in a first essay and ever afterwards fearfully forebode a
future as disastrous. But let the Athenians among you who have already
had experience of many wars, and the allies who have joined us in so
many expeditions, remember the surprises of war, and with the hope that
fortune will not be always against us, prepare to fight again in a
manner worthy of the number which you see yourselves to be.

“Now, whatever we thought would be of service against the crush of
vessels in such a narrow harbour, and against the force upon the decks
of the enemy, from which we suffered before, has all been considered
with the helmsmen, and, as far as our means allowed, provided. A number
of archers and darters will go on board, and a multitude that we should
not have employed in an action in the open sea, where our science would
be crippled by the weight of the vessels; but in the present land-fight
that we are forced to make from shipboard all this will be useful. We
have also discovered the changes in construction that we must make to
meet theirs; and against the thickness of their cheeks, which did us
the greatest mischief, we have provided grappling-irons, which will
prevent an assailant backing water after charging, if the soldiers on
deck here do their duty; since we are absolutely compelled to fight a
land battle from the fleet, and it seems to be our interest neither to
back water ourselves, nor to let the enemy do so, especially as the
shore, except so much of it as may be held by our troops, is hostile
ground.

“You must remember this and fight on as long as you can, and must not
let yourselves be driven ashore, but once alongside must make up your
minds not to part company until you have swept the heavy infantry from
the enemy’s deck. I say this more for the heavy infantry than for the
seamen, as it is more the business of the men on deck; and our land
forces are even now on the whole the strongest. The sailors I advise,
and at the same time implore, not to be too much daunted by their
misfortunes, now that we have our decks better armed and greater number
of vessels. Bear in mind how well worth preserving is the pleasure felt
by those of you who through your knowledge of our language and
imitation of our manners were always considered Athenians, even though
not so in reality, and as such were honoured throughout Hellas, and had
your full share of the advantages of our empire, and more than your
share in the respect of our subjects and in protection from ill
treatment. You, therefore, with whom alone we freely share our empire,
we now justly require not to betray that empire in its extremity, and
in scorn of Corinthians, whom you have often conquered, and of
Siceliots, none of whom so much as presumed to stand against us when
our navy was in its prime, we ask you to repel them, and to show that
even in sickness and disaster your skill is more than a match for the
fortune and vigour of any other.

“For the Athenians among you I add once more this reflection: You left
behind you no more such ships in your docks as these, no more heavy
infantry in their flower; if you do aught but conquer, our enemies here
will immediately sail thither, and those that are left of us at Athens
will become unable to repel their home assailants, reinforced by these
new allies. Here you will fall at once into the hands of the
Syracusans—I need not remind you of the intentions with which you
attacked them—and your countrymen at home will fall into those of the
Lacedaemonians. Since the fate of both thus hangs upon this single
battle, now, if ever, stand firm, and remember, each and all, that you
who are now going on board are the army and navy of the Athenians, and
all that is left of the state and the great name of Athens, in whose
defence if any man has any advantage in skill or courage, now is the
time for him to show it, and thus serve himself and save all.”

After this address Nicias at once gave orders to man the ships.
Meanwhile Gylippus and the Syracusans could perceive by the
preparations which they saw going on that the Athenians meant to fight
at sea. They had also notice of the grappling-irons, against which they
specially provided by stretching hides over the prows and much of the
upper part of their vessels, in order that the irons when thrown might
slip off without taking hold. All being now ready, the generals and
Gylippus addressed them in the following terms:

“Syracusans and allies, the glorious character of our past achievements
and the no less glorious results at issue in the coming battle are, we
think, understood by most of you, or you would never have thrown
yourselves with such ardour into the struggle; and if there be any one
not as fully aware of the facts as he ought to be, we will declare them
to him. The Athenians came to this country first to effect the conquest
of Sicily, and after that, if successful, of Peloponnese and the rest
of Hellas, possessing already the greatest empire yet known, of present
or former times, among the Hellenes. Here for the first time they found
in you men who faced their navy which made them masters everywhere; you
have already defeated them in the previous sea-fights, and will in all
likelihood defeat them again now. When men are once checked in what
they consider their special excellence, their whole opinion of
themselves suffers more than if they had not at first believed in their
superiority, the unexpected shock to their pride causing them to give
way more than their real strength warrants; and this is probably now
the case with the Athenians.

“With us it is different. The original estimate of ourselves which gave
us courage in the days of our unskilfulness has been strengthened,
while the conviction superadded to it that we must be the best seamen
of the time, if we have conquered the best, has given a double measure
of hope to every man among us; and, for the most part, where there is
the greatest hope, there is also the greatest ardour for action. The
means to combat us which they have tried to find in copying our
armament are familiar to our warfare, and will be met by proper
provisions; while they will never be able to have a number of heavy
infantry on their decks, contrary to their custom, and a number of
darters (born landsmen, one may say, Acarnanians and others, embarked
afloat, who will not know how to discharge their weapons when they have
to keep still), without hampering their vessels and falling all into
confusion among themselves through fighting not according to their own
tactics. For they will gain nothing by the number of their ships—I say
this to those of you who may be alarmed by having to fight against
odds—as a quantity of ships in a confined space will only be slower in
executing the movements required, and most exposed to injury from our
means of offence. Indeed, if you would know the plain truth, as we are
credibly informed, the excess of their sufferings and the necessities
of their present distress have made them desperate; they have no
confidence in their force, but wish to try their fortune in the only
way they can, and either to force their passage and sail out, or after
this to retreat by land, it being impossible for them to be worse off
than they are.

“The fortune of our greatest enemies having thus betrayed itself, and
their disorder being what I have described, let us engage in anger,
convinced that, as between adversaries, nothing is more legitimate than
to claim to sate the whole wrath of one’s soul in punishing the
aggressor, and nothing more sweet, as the proverb has it, than the
vengeance upon an enemy, which it will now be ours to take. That
enemies they are and mortal enemies you all know, since they came here
to enslave our country, and if successful had in reserve for our men
all that is most dreadful, and for our children and wives all that is
most dishonourable, and for the whole city the name which conveys the
greatest reproach. None should therefore relent or think it gain if
they go away without further danger to us. This they will do just the
same, even if they get the victory; while if we succeed, as we may
expect, in chastising them, and in handing down to all Sicily her
ancient freedom strengthened and confirmed, we shall have achieved no
mean triumph. And the rarest dangers are those in which failure brings
little loss and success the greatest advantage.”

After the above address to the soldiers on their side, the Syracusan
generals and Gylippus now perceived that the Athenians were manning
their ships, and immediately proceeded to man their own also. Meanwhile
Nicias, appalled by the position of affairs, realizing the greatness
and the nearness of the danger now that they were on the point of
putting out from shore, and thinking, as men are apt to think in great
crises, that when all has been done they have still something left to
do, and when all has been said that they have not yet said enough,
again called on the captains one by one, addressing each by his
father’s name and by his own, and by that of his tribe, and adjured
them not to belie their own personal renown, or to obscure the
hereditary virtues for which their ancestors were illustrious: he
reminded them of their country, the freest of the free, and of the
unfettered discretion allowed in it to all to live as they pleased; and
added other arguments such as men would use at such a crisis, and
which, with little alteration, are made to serve on all occasions
alike—appeals to wives, children, and national gods—without caring
whether they are thought commonplace, but loudly invoking them in the
belief that they will be of use in the consternation of the moment.
Having thus admonished them, not, he felt, as he would, but as he
could, Nicias withdrew and led the troops to the sea, and ranged them
in as long a line as he was able, in order to aid as far as possible in
sustaining the courage of the men afloat; while Demosthenes, Menander,
and Euthydemus, who took the command on board, put out from their own
camp and sailed straight to the barrier across the mouth of the harbour
and to the passage left open, to try to force their way out.

The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with about the same
number of ships as before, a part of which kept guard at the outlet,
and the remainder all round the rest of the harbour, in order to attack
the Athenians on all sides at once; while the land forces held
themselves in readiness at the points at which the vessels might put
into the shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus and
Agatharchus, who had each a wing of the whole force, with Pythen and
the Corinthians in the centre. When the rest of the Athenians came up
to the barrier, with the first shock of their charge they overpowered
the ships stationed there, and tried to undo the fastenings; after
this, as the Syracusans and allies bore down upon them from all
quarters, the action spread from the barrier over the whole harbour,
and was more obstinately disputed than any of the preceding ones. On
either side the rowers showed great zeal in bringing up their vessels
at the boatswains’ orders, and the helmsmen great skill in manoeuvring,
and great emulation one with another; while the ships once alongside,
the soldiers on board did their best not to let the service on deck be
outdone by the others; in short, every man strove to prove himself the
first in his particular department. And as many ships were engaged in a
small compass (for these were the largest fleets fighting in the
narrowest space ever known, being together little short of two
hundred), the regular attacks with the beak were few, there being no
opportunity of backing water or of breaking the line; while the
collisions caused by one ship chancing to run foul of another, either
in flying from or attacking a third, were more frequent. So long as a
vessel was coming up to the charge the men on the decks rained darts
and arrows and stones upon her; but once alongside, the heavy infantry
tried to board each other’s vessel, fighting hand to hand. In many
quarters it happened, by reason of the narrow room, that a vessel was
charging an enemy on one side and being charged herself on another, and
that two or sometimes more ships had perforce got entangled round one,
obliging the helmsmen to attend to defence here, offence there, not to
one thing at once, but to many on all sides; while the huge din caused
by the number of ships crashing together not only spread terror, but
made the orders of the boatswains inaudible. The boatswains on either
side in the discharge of their duty and in the heat of the conflict
shouted incessantly orders and appeals to their men; the Athenians they
urged to force the passage out, and now if ever to show their mettle
and lay hold of a safe return to their country; to the Syracusans and
their allies they cried that it would be glorious to prevent the escape
of the enemy, and, conquering, to exalt the countries that were theirs.
The generals, moreover, on either side, if they saw any in any part of
the battle backing ashore without being forced to do so, called out to
the captain by name and asked him—the Athenians, whether they were
retreating because they thought the thrice hostile shore more their own
than that sea which had cost them so much labour to win; the
Syracusans, whether they were flying from the flying Athenians, whom
they well knew to be eager to escape in whatever way they could.

Meanwhile the two armies on shore, while victory hung in the balance,
were a prey to the most agonizing and conflicting emotions; the natives
thirsting for more glory than they had already won, while the invaders
feared to find themselves in even worse plight than before. The all of
the Athenians being set upon their fleet, their fear for the event was
like nothing they had ever felt; while their view of the struggle was
necessarily as chequered as the battle itself. Close to the scene of
action and not all looking at the same point at once, some saw their
friends victorious and took courage and fell to calling upon heaven not
to deprive them of salvation, while others who had their eyes turned
upon the losers, wailed and cried aloud, and, although spectators, were
more overcome than the actual combatants. Others, again, were gazing at
some spot where the battle was evenly disputed; as the strife was
protracted without decision, their swaying bodies reflected the
agitation of their minds, and they suffered the worst agony of all,
ever just within reach of safety or just on the point of destruction.
In short, in that one Athenian army as long as the sea-fight remained
doubtful there was every sound to be heard at once, shrieks, cheers,
“We win,” “We lose,” and all the other manifold exclamations that a
great host would necessarily utter in great peril; and with the men in
the fleet it was nearly the same; until at last the Syracusans and
their allies, after the battle had lasted a long while, put the
Athenians to flight, and with much shouting and cheering chased them in
open rout to the shore. The naval force, one one way, one another, as
many as were not taken afloat now ran ashore and rushed from on board
their ships to their camp; while the army, no more divided, but carried
away by one impulse, all with shrieks and groans deplored the event,
and ran down, some to help the ships, others to guard what was left of
their wall, while the remaining and most numerous part already began to
consider how they should save themselves. Indeed, the panic of the
present moment had never been surpassed. They now suffered very nearly
what they had inflicted at Pylos; as then the Lacedaemonians with the
loss of their fleet lost also the men who had crossed over to the
island, so now the Athenians had no hope of escaping by land, without
the help of some extraordinary accident.

The sea-fight having been a severe one, and many ships and lives having
been lost on both sides, the victorious Syracusans and their allies now
picked up their wrecks and dead, and sailed off to the city and set up
a trophy. The Athenians, overwhelmed by their misfortune, never even
thought of asking leave to take up their dead or wrecks, but wished to
retreat that very night. Demosthenes, however, went to Nicias and gave
it as his opinion that they should man the ships they had left and make
another effort to force their passage out next morning; saying that
they had still left more ships fit for service than the enemy, the
Athenians having about sixty remaining as against less than fifty of
their opponents. Nicias was quite of his mind; but when they wished to
man the vessels, the sailors refused to go on board, being so utterly
overcome by their defeat as no longer to believe in the possibility of
success.

Accordingly they all now made up their minds to retreat by land.
Meanwhile the Syracusan Hermocrates—suspecting their intention, and
impressed by the danger of allowing a force of that magnitude to retire
by land, establish itself in some other part of Sicily, and from thence
renew the war—went and stated his views to the authorities, and pointed
out to them that they ought not to let the enemy get away by night, but
that all the Syracusans and their allies should at once march out and
block up the roads and seize and guard the passes. The authorities were
entirely of his opinion, and thought that it ought to be done, but on
the other hand felt sure that the people, who had given themselves over
to rejoicing, and were taking their ease after a great battle at sea,
would not be easily brought to obey; besides, they were celebrating a
festival, having on that day a sacrifice to Heracles, and most of them
in their rapture at the victory had fallen to drinking at the festival,
and would probably consent to anything sooner than to take up their
arms and march out at that moment. For these reasons the thing appeared
impracticable to the magistrates; and Hermocrates, finding himself
unable to do anything further with them, had now recourse to the
following stratagem of his own. What he feared was that the Athenians
might quietly get the start of them by passing the most difficult
places during the night; and he therefore sent, as soon as it was dusk,
some friends of his own to the camp with some horsemen who rode up
within earshot and called out to some of the men, as though they were
well-wishers of the Athenians, and told them to tell Nicias (who had in
fact some correspondents who informed him of what went on inside the
town) not to lead off the army by night as the Syracusans were guarding
the roads, but to make his preparations at his leisure and to retreat
by day. After saying this they departed; and their hearers informed the
Athenian generals, who put off going for that night on the strength of
this message, not doubting its sincerity.

Since after all they had not set out at once, they now determined to
stay also the following day to give time to the soldiers to pack up as
well as they could the most useful articles, and, leaving everything
else behind, to start only with what was strictly necessary for their
personal subsistence. Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus marched out
and blocked up the roads through the country by which the Athenians
were likely to pass, and kept guard at the fords of the streams and
rivers, posting themselves so as to receive them and stop the army
where they thought best; while their fleet sailed up to the beach and
towed off the ships of the Athenians. Some few were burned by the
Athenians themselves as they had intended; the rest the Syracusans
lashed on to their own at their leisure as they had been thrown up on
shore, without any one trying to stop them, and conveyed to the town.

After this, Nicias and Demosthenes now thinking that enough had been
done in the way of preparation, the removal of the army took place upon
the second day after the sea-fight. It was a lamentable scene, not
merely from the single circumstance that they were retreating after
having lost all their ships, their great hopes gone, and themselves and
the state in peril; but also in leaving the camp there were things most
grievous for every eye and heart to contemplate. The dead lay unburied,
and each man as he recognized a friend among them shuddered with grief
and horror; while the living whom they were leaving behind, wounded or
sick, were to the living far more shocking than the dead, and more to
be pitied than those who had perished. These fell to entreating and
bewailing until their friends knew not what to do, begging them to take
them and loudly calling to each individual comrade or relative whom
they could see, hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act
of departure, and following as far as they could, and, when their
bodily strength failed them, calling again and again upon heaven and
shrieking aloud as they were left behind. So that the whole army being
filled with tears and distracted after this fashion found it not easy
to go, even from an enemy’s land, where they had already suffered evils
too great for tears and in the unknown future before them feared to
suffer more. Dejection and self-condemnation were also rife among them.
Indeed they could only be compared to a starved-out town, and that no
small one, escaping; the whole multitude upon the march being not less
than forty thousand men. All carried anything they could which might be
of use, and the heavy infantry and troopers, contrary to their wont,
while under arms carried their own victuals, in some cases for want of
servants, in others through not trusting them; as they had long been
deserting and now did so in greater numbers than ever. Yet even thus
they did not carry enough, as there was no longer food in the camp.
Moreover their disgrace generally, and the universality of their
sufferings, however to a certain extent alleviated by being borne in
company, were still felt at the moment a heavy burden, especially when
they contrasted the splendour and glory of their setting out with the
humiliation in which it had ended. For this was by far the greatest
reverse that ever befell an Hellenic army. They had come to enslave
others, and were departing in fear of being enslaved themselves: they
had sailed out with prayer and paeans, and now started to go back with
omens directly contrary; travelling by land instead of by sea, and
trusting not in their fleet but in their heavy infantry. Nevertheless
the greatness of the danger still impending made all this appear
tolerable.

Nicias seeing the army dejected and greatly altered, passed along the
ranks and encouraged and comforted them as far as was possible under
the circumstances, raising his voice still higher and higher as he went
from one company to another in his earnestness, and in his anxiety that
the benefit of his words might reach as many as possible:

“Athenians and allies, even in our present position we must still hope
on, since men have ere now been saved from worse straits than this; and
you must not condemn yourselves too severely either because of your
disasters or because of your present unmerited sufferings. I myself who
am not superior to any of you in strength—indeed you see how I am in my
sickness—and who in the gifts of fortune am, I think, whether in
private life or otherwise, the equal of any, am now exposed to the same
danger as the meanest among you; and yet my life has been one of much
devotion toward the gods, and of much justice and without offence
toward men. I have, therefore, still a strong hope for the future, and
our misfortunes do not terrify me as much as they might. Indeed we may
hope that they will be lightened: our enemies have had good fortune
enough; and if any of the gods was offended at our expedition, we have
been already amply punished. Others before us have attacked their
neighbours and have done what men will do without suffering more than
they could bear; and we may now justly expect to find the gods more
kind, for we have become fitter objects for their pity than their
jealousy. And then look at yourselves, mark the numbers and efficiency
of the heavy infantry marching in your ranks, and do not give way too
much to despondency, but reflect that you are yourselves at once a city
wherever you sit down, and that there is no other in Sicily that could
easily resist your attack, or expel you when once established. The
safety and order of the march is for yourselves to look to; the one
thought of each man being that the spot on which he may be forced to
fight must be conquered and held as his country and stronghold.
Meanwhile we shall hasten on our way night and day alike, as our
provisions are scanty; and if we can reach some friendly place of the
Sicels, whom fear of the Syracusans still keeps true to us, you may
forthwith consider yourselves safe. A message has been sent on to them
with directions to meet us with supplies of food. To sum up, be
convinced, soldiers, that you must be brave, as there is no place near
for your cowardice to take refuge in, and that if you now escape from
the enemy, you may all see again what your hearts desire, while those
of you who are Athenians will raise up again the great power of the
state, fallen though it be. Men make the city and not walls or ships
without men in them.”

As he made this address, Nicias went along the ranks, and brought back
to their place any of the troops that he saw straggling out of the
line; while Demosthenes did as much for his part of the army,
addressing them in words very similar. The army marched in a hollow
square, the division under Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes
following, the heavy infantry being outside and the baggage-carriers
and the bulk of the army in the middle. When they arrived at the ford
of the river Anapus there they found drawn up a body of the Syracusans
and allies, and routing these, made good their passage and pushed on,
harassed by the charges of the Syracusan horse and by the missiles of
their light troops. On that day they advanced about four miles and a
half, halting for the night upon a certain hill. On the next they
started early and got on about two miles further, and descended into a
place in the plain and there encamped, in order to procure some
eatables from the houses, as the place was inhabited, and to carry on
with them water from thence, as for many furlongs in front, in the
direction in which they were going, it was not plentiful. The
Syracusans meanwhile went on and fortified the pass in front, where
there was a steep hill with a rocky ravine on each side of it, called
the Acraean cliff. The next day the Athenians advancing found
themselves impeded by the missiles and charges of the horse and
darters, both very numerous, of the Syracusans and allies; and after
fighting for a long while, at length retired to the same camp, where
they had no longer provisions as before, it being impossible to leave
their position by reason of the cavalry.

Early next morning they started afresh and forced their way to the
hill, which had been fortified, where they found before them the
enemy’s infantry drawn up many shields deep to defend the
fortification, the pass being narrow. The Athenians assaulted the work,
but were greeted by a storm of missiles from the hill, which told with
the greater effect through its being a steep one, and unable to force
the passage, retreated again and rested. Meanwhile occurred some claps
of thunder and rain, as often happens towards autumn, which still
further disheartened the Athenians, who thought all these things to be
omens of their approaching ruin. While they were resting, Gylippus and
the Syracusans sent a part of their army to throw up works in their
rear on the way by which they had advanced; however, the Athenians
immediately sent some of their men and prevented them; after which they
retreated more towards the plain and halted for the night. When they
advanced the next day the Syracusans surrounded and attacked them on
every side, and disabled many of them, falling back if the Athenians
advanced and coming on if they retired, and in particular assaulting
their rear, in the hope of routing them in detail, and thus striking a
panic into the whole army. For a long while the Athenians persevered in
this fashion, but after advancing for four or five furlongs halted to
rest in the plain, the Syracusans also withdrawing to their own camp.

During the night Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the wretched condition
of their troops, now in want of every kind of necessary, and numbers of
them disabled in the numerous attacks of the enemy, determined to light
as many fires as possible, and to lead off the army, no longer by the
same route as they had intended, but towards the sea in the opposite
direction to that guarded by the Syracusans. The whole of this route
was leading the army not to Catana but to the other side of Sicily,
towards Camarina, Gela, and the other Hellenic and barbarian towns in
that quarter. They accordingly lit a number of fires and set out by
night. Now all armies, and the greatest most of all, are liable to
fears and alarms, especially when they are marching by night through an
enemy’s country and with the enemy near; and the Athenians falling into
one of these panics, the leading division, that of Nicias, kept
together and got on a good way in front, while that of Demosthenes,
comprising rather more than half the army, got separated and marched on
in some disorder. By morning, however, they reached the sea, and
getting into the Helorine road, pushed on in order to reach the river
Cacyparis, and to follow the stream up through the interior, where they
hoped to be met by the Sicels whom they had sent for. Arrived at the
river, they found there also a Syracusan party engaged in barring the
passage of the ford with a wall and a palisade, and forcing this guard,
crossed the river and went on to another called the Erineus, according
to the advice of their guides.

Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and allies found that the
Athenians were gone, most of them accused Gylippus of having let them
escape on purpose, and hastily pursuing by the road which they had no
difficulty in finding that they had taken, overtook them about
dinner-time. They first came up with the troops under Demosthenes, who
were behind and marching somewhat slowly and in disorder, owing to the
night panic above referred to, and at once attacked and engaged them,
the Syracusan horse surrounding them with more ease now that they were
separated from the rest and hemming them in on one spot. The division
of Nicias was five or six miles on in front, as he led them more
rapidly, thinking that under the circumstances their safety lay not in
staying and fighting, unless obliged, but in retreating as fast as
possible, and only fighting when forced to do so. On the other hand,
Demosthenes was, generally speaking, harassed more incessantly, as his
post in the rear left him the first exposed to the attacks of the
enemy; and now, finding that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he omitted
to push on, in order to form his men for battle, and so lingered until
he was surrounded by his pursuers and himself and the Athenians with
him placed in the most distressing position, being huddled into an
enclosure with a wall all round it, a road on this side and on that,
and olive-trees in great number, where missiles were showered in upon
them from every quarter. This mode of attack the Syracusans had with
good reason adopted in preference to fighting at close quarters, as to
risk a struggle with desperate men was now more for the advantage of
the Athenians than for their own; besides, their success had now become
so certain that they began to spare themselves a little in order not to
be cut off in the moment of victory, thinking too that, as it was, they
would be able in this way to subdue and capture the enemy.

In fact, after plying the Athenians and allies all day long from every
side with missiles, they at length saw that they were worn out with
their wounds and other sufferings; and Gylippus and the Syracusans and
their allies made a proclamation, offering their liberty to any of the
islanders who chose to come over to them; and some few cities went
over. Afterwards a capitulation was agreed upon for all the rest with
Demosthenes, to lay down their arms on condition that no one was to be
put to death either by violence or imprisonment or want of the
necessaries of life. Upon this they surrendered to the number of six
thousand in all, laying down all the money in their possession, which
filled the hollows of four shields, and were immediately conveyed by
the Syracusans to the town.

Meanwhile Nicias with his division arrived that day at the river
Erineus, crossed over, and posted his army upon some high ground upon
the other side. The next day the Syracusans overtook him and told him
that the troops under Demosthenes had surrendered, and invited him to
follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, Nicias asked for a truce
to send a horseman to see, and upon the return of the messenger with
the tidings that they had surrendered, sent a herald to Gylippus and
the Syracusans, saying that he was ready to agree with them on behalf
of the Athenians to repay whatever money the Syracusans had spent upon
the war if they would let his army go; and offered until the money was
paid to give Athenians as hostages, one for every talent. The
Syracusans and Gylippus rejected this proposition, and attacked this
division as they had the other, standing all round and plying them with
missiles until the evening. Food and necessaries were as miserably
wanting to the troops of Nicias as they had been to their comrades;
nevertheless they watched for the quiet of the night to resume their
march. But as they were taking up their arms the Syracusans perceived
it and raised their paean, upon which the Athenians, finding that they
were discovered, laid them down again, except about three hundred men
who forced their way through the guards and went on during the night as
they were able.

As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as
before, by the Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side by
their missiles, and struck down by their javelins. The Athenians pushed
on for the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them from every
side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms, fancying that
they should breathe more freely if once across the river, and driven on
also by their exhaustion and craving for water. Once there they rushed
in, and all order was at an end, each man wanting to cross first, and
the attacks of the enemy making it difficult to cross at all; forced to
huddle together, they fell against and trod down one another, some
dying immediately upon the javelins, others getting entangled together
and stumbling over the articles of baggage, without being able to rise
again. Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the
Syracusans, who showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them
drinking greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of
the river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them,
especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but
which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it
was, most even fighting to have it.

At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the stream,
and part of the army had been destroyed at the river, and the few that
escaped from thence cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself
to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did the Syracusans, and told
him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they liked with him, but to stop
the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus, after this, immediately gave
orders to make prisoners; upon which the rest were brought together
alive, except a large number secreted by the soldiery, and a party was
sent in pursuit of the three hundred who had got through the guard
during the night, and who were now taken with the rest. The number of
the enemy collected as public property was not considerable; but that
secreted was very large, and all Sicily was filled with them, no
convention having been made in their case as for those taken with
Demosthenes. Besides this, a large portion were killed outright, the
carnage being very great, and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war.
In the numerous other encounters upon the march, not a few also had
fallen. Nevertheless many escaped, some at the moment, others served as
slaves, and then ran away subsequently. These found refuge at Catana.

The Syracusans and their allies now mustered and took up the spoils and
as many prisoners as they could, and went back to the city. The rest of
their Athenian and allied captives were deposited in the quarries, this
seeming the safest way of keeping them; but Nicias and Demosthenes were
butchered, against the will of Gylippus, who thought that it would be
the crown of his triumph if he could take the enemy’s generals to
Lacedaemon. One of them, as it happened, Demosthenes, was one of her
greatest enemies, on account of the affair of the island and of Pylos;
while the other, Nicias, was for the same reasons one of her greatest
friends, owing to his exertions to procure the release of the prisoners
by persuading the Athenians to make peace. For these reasons the
Lacedaemonians felt kindly towards him; and it was in this that Nicias
himself mainly confided when he surrendered to Gylippus. But some of
the Syracusans who had been in correspondence with him were afraid, it
was said, of his being put to the torture and troubling their success
by his revelations; others, especially the Corinthians, of his
escaping, as he was wealthy, by means of bribes, and living to do them
further mischief; and these persuaded the allies and put him to death.
This or the like was the cause of the death of a man who, of all the
Hellenes in my time, least deserved such a fate, seeing that the whole
course of his life had been regulated with strict attention to virtue.

The prisoners in the quarries were at first hardly treated by the
Syracusans. Crowded in a narrow hole, without any roof to cover them,
the heat of the sun and the stifling closeness of the air tormented
them during the day, and then the nights, which came on autumnal and
chilly, made them ill by the violence of the change; besides, as they
had to do everything in the same place for want of room, and the bodies
of those who died of their wounds or from the variation in the
temperature, or from similar causes, were left heaped together one upon
another, intolerable stenches arose; while hunger and thirst never
ceased to afflict them, each man during eight months having only half a
pint of water and a pint of corn given him daily. In short, no single
suffering to be apprehended by men thrust into such a place was spared
them. For some seventy days they thus lived all together, after which
all, except the Athenians and any Siceliots or Italiots who had joined
in the expedition, were sold. The total number of prisoners taken it
would be difficult to state exactly, but it could not have been less
than seven thousand.

This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in thig war, or, in
my opinion, in Hellenic history; at once most glorious to the victors,
and most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all points
and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were destroyed,
as the saying is, with a total destruction, their fleet, their army,
everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned home. Such were
the events in Sicily.




BOOK VIII




CHAPTER XXIV


Nineteenth and Twentieth Years of the War—Revolt of Ionia— Intervention
of Persia—The War in Ionia


When the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they disbelieved
even the most respectable of the soldiers who had themselves escaped
from the scene of action and clearly reported the matter, a destruction
so complete not being thought credible. When the conviction was forced
upon them, they were angry with the orators who had joined in promoting
the expedition, just as if they had not themselves voted it, and were
enraged also with the reciters of oracles and soothsayers, and all
other omen-mongers of the time who had encouraged them to hope that
they should conquer Sicily. Already distressed at all points and in all
quarters, after what had now happened, they were seized by a fear and
consternation quite without example. It was grievous enough for the
state and for every man in his proper person to lose so many heavy
infantry, cavalry, and able-bodied troops, and to see none left to
replace them; but when they saw, also, that they had not sufficient
ships in their docks, or money in the treasury, or crews for the ships,
they began to despair of salvation. They thought that their enemies in
Sicily would immediately sail with their fleet against Piraeus,
inflamed by so signal a victory; while their adversaries at home,
redoubling all their preparations, would vigorously attack them by sea
and land at once, aided by their own revolted confederates.
Nevertheless, with such means as they had, it was determined to resist
to the last, and to provide timber and money, and to equip a fleet as
they best could, to take steps to secure their confederates and above
all Euboea, to reform things in the city upon a more economical
footing, and to elect a board of elders to advise upon the state of
affairs as occasion should arise. In short, as is the way of a
democracy, in the panic of the moment they were ready to be as prudent
as possible.

These resolves were at once carried into effect. Summer was now over.
The winter ensuing saw all Hellas stirring under the impression of the
great Athenian disaster in Sicily. Neutrals now felt that even if
uninvited they ought no longer to stand aloof from the war, but should
volunteer to march against the Athenians, who, as they severally
reflected, would probably have come against them if the Sicilian
campaign had succeeded. Besides, they considered that the war would now
be short, and that it would be creditable for them to take part in it.
Meanwhile the allies of the Lacedaemonians felt all more anxious than
ever to see a speedy end to their heavy labours. But above all, the
subjects of the Athenians showed a readiness to revolt even beyond
their ability, judging the circumstances with passion, and refusing
even to hear of the Athenians being able to last out the coming summer.
Beyond all this, Lacedaemon was encouraged by the near prospect of
being joined in great force in the spring by her allies in Sicily,
lately forced by events to acquire their navy. With these reasons for
confidence in every quarter, the Lacedaemonians now resolved to throw
themselves without reserve into the war, considering that, once it was
happily terminated, they would be finally delivered from such dangers
as that which would have threatened them from Athens, if she had become
mistress of Sicily, and that the overthrow of the Athenians would leave
them in quiet enjoyment of the supremacy over all Hellas.

Their king, Agis, accordingly set out at once during this winter with
some troops from Decelea, and levied from the allies contributions for
the fleet, and turning towards the Malian Gulf exacted a sum of money
from the Oetaeans by carrying off most of their cattle in reprisal for
their old hostility, and, in spite of the protests and opposition of
the Thessalians, forced the Achaeans of Phthiotis and the other
subjects of the Thessalians in those parts to give him money and
hostages, and deposited the hostages at Corinth, and tried to bring
their countrymen into the confederacy. The Lacedaemonians now issued a
requisition to the cities for building a hundred ships, fixing their
own quota and that of the Boeotians at twenty-five each; that of the
Phocians and Locrians together at fifteen; that of the Corinthians at
fifteen; that of the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians together at
ten; and that of the Megarians, Troezenians, Epidaurians, and
Hermionians together at ten also; and meanwhile made every other
preparation for commencing hostilities by the spring.

In the meantime the Athenians were not idle. During this same winter,
as they had determined, they contributed timber and pushed on their
ship-building, and fortified Sunium to enable their corn-ships to round
it in safety, and evacuated the fort in Laconia which they had built on
their way to Sicily; while they also, for economy, cut down any other
expenses that seemed unnecessary, and above all kept a careful look-out
against the revolt of their confederates.

While both parties were thus engaged, and were as intent upon preparing
for the war as they had been at the outset, the Euboeans first of all
sent envoys during this winter to Agis to treat of their revolting from
Athens. Agis accepted their proposals, and sent for Alcamenes, son of
Sthenelaidas, and Melanthus from Lacedaemon, to take the command in
Euboea. These accordingly arrived with some three hundred Neodamodes,
and Agis began to arrange for their crossing over. But in the meanwhile
arrived some Lesbians, who also wished to revolt; and these being
supported by the Boeotians, Agis was persuaded to defer acting in the
matter of Euboea, and made arrangements for the revolt of the Lesbians,
giving them Alcamenes, who was to have sailed to Euboea, as governor,
and himself promising them ten ships, and the Boeotians the same
number. All this was done without instructions from home, as Agis while
at Decelea with the army that he commanded had power to send troops to
whatever quarter he pleased, and to levy men and money. During this
period, one might say, the allies obeyed him much more than they did
the Lacedaemonians in the city, as the force he had with him made him
feared at once wherever he went. While Agis was engaged with the
Lesbians, the Chians and Erythraeans, who were also ready to revolt,
applied, not to him but at Lacedaemon; where they arrived accompanied
by an ambassador from Tissaphernes, the commander of King Darius, son
of Artaxerxes, in the maritime districts, who invited the
Peloponnesians to come over, and promised to maintain their army. The
King had lately called upon him for the tribute from his government,
for which he was in arrears, being unable to raise it from the Hellenic
towns by reason of the Athenians; and he therefore calculated that by
weakening the Athenians he should get the tribute better paid, and
should also draw the Lacedaemonians into alliance with the King; and by
this means, as the King had commanded him, take alive or dead Amorges,
the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was in rebellion on the coast of
Caria.

While the Chians and Tissaphernes thus joined to effect the same
object, about the same time Calligeitus, son of Laophon, a Megarian,
and Timagoras, son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both of them exiles from
their country and living at the court of Pharnabazus, son of Pharnaces,
arrived at Lacedaemon upon a mission from Pharnabazus, to procure a
fleet for the Hellespont; by means of which, if possible, he might
himself effect the object of Tissaphernes’ ambition and cause the
cities in his government to revolt from the Athenians, and so get the
tribute, and by his own agency obtain for the King the alliance of the
Lacedaemonians.

The emissaries of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes treating apart, a keen
competition now ensued at Lacedaemon as to whether a fleet and army
should be sent first to Ionia and Chios, or to the Hellespont. The
Lacedaemonians, however, decidedly favoured the Chians and
Tissaphernes, who were seconded by Alcibiades, the family friend of
Endius, one of the ephors for that year. Indeed, this is how their
house got its Laconic name, Alcibiades being the family name of Endius.
Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians first sent to Chios Phrynis, one of the
Perioeci, to see whether they had as many ships as they said, and
whether their city generally was as great as was reported; and upon his
bringing word that they had been told the truth, immediately entered
into alliance with the Chians and Erythraeans, and voted to send them
forty ships, there being already, according to the statement of the
Chians, not less than sixty in the island. At first the Lacedaemonians
meant to send ten of these forty themselves, with Melanchridas their
admiral; but afterwards, an earthquake having occurred, they sent
Chalcideus instead of Melanchridas, and instead of the ten ships
equipped only five in Laconia. And the winter ended, and with it ended
also the nineteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is the
historian.

At the beginning of the next summer the Chians were urging that the
fleet should be sent off, being afraid that the Athenians, from whom
all these embassies were kept a secret, might find out what was going
on, and the Lacedaemonians at once sent three Spartans to Corinth to
haul the ships as quickly as possible across the Isthmus from the other
sea to that on the side of Athens, and to order them all to sail to
Chios, those which Agis was equipping for Lesbos not excepted. The
number of ships from the allied states was thirty-nine in all.

Meanwhile Calligeitus and Timagoras did not join on behalf of
Pharnabazus in the expedition to Chios or give the money—twenty-five
talents—which they had brought with them to help in dispatching a
force, but determined to sail afterwards with another force by
themselves. Agis, on the other hand, seeing the Lacedaemonians bent
upon going to Chios first, himself came in to their views; and the
allies assembled at Corinth and held a council, in which they decided
to sail first to Chios under the command of Chalcideus, who was
equipping the five vessels in Laconia, then to Lesbos, under the
command of Alcamenes, the same whom Agis had fixed upon, and lastly to
go to the Hellespont, where the command was given to Clearchus, son of
Ramphias. Meanwhile they would take only half the ships across the
Isthmus first, and let those sail off at once, in order that the
Athenians might attend less to the departing squadron than to those to
be taken across afterwards, as no care had been taken to keep this
voyage secret through contempt of the impotence of the Athenians, who
had as yet no fleet of any account upon the sea. Agreeably to this
determination, twenty-one vessels were at once conveyed across the
Isthmus.

They were now impatient to set sail, but the Corinthians were not
willing to accompany them until they had celebrated the Isthmian
festival, which fell at that time. Upon this Agis proposed to them to
save their scruples about breaking the Isthmian truce by taking the
expedition upon himself. The Corinthians not consenting to this, a
delay ensued, during which the Athenians conceived suspicions of what
was preparing at Chios, and sent Aristocrates, one of their generals,
and charged them with the fact, and, upon the denial of the Chians,
ordered them to send with them a contingent of ships, as faithful
confederates. Seven were sent accordingly. The reason of the dispatch
of the ships lay in the fact that the mass of the Chians were not privy
to the negotiations, while the few who were in the secret did not wish
to break with the multitude until they had something positive to lean
upon, and no longer expected the Peloponnesians to arrive by reason of
their delay.

In the meantime the Isthmian games took place, and the Athenians, who
had been also invited, went to attend them, and now seeing more clearly
into the designs of the Chians, as soon as they returned to Athens took
measures to prevent the fleet putting out from Cenchreae without their
knowledge. After the festival the Peloponnesians set sail with
twenty-one ships for Chios, under the command of Alcamenes. The
Athenians first sailed against them with an equal number, drawing off
towards the open sea. The enemy, however, turning back before he had
followed them far, the Athenians returned also, not trusting the seven
Chian ships which formed part of their number, and afterwards manned
thirty-seven vessels in all and chased him on his passage alongshore
into Spiraeum, a desert Corinthian port on the edge of the Epidaurian
frontier. After losing one ship out at sea, the Peloponnesians got the
rest together and brought them to anchor. The Athenians now attacked
not only from the sea with their fleet, but also disembarked upon the
coast; and a melee ensued of the most confused and violent kind, in
which the Athenians disabled most of the enemy’s vessels and killed
Alcamenes their commander, losing also a few of their own men.

After this they separated, and the Athenians, detaching a sufficient
number of ships to blockade those of the enemy, anchored with the rest
at the islet adjacent, upon which they proceeded to encamp, and sent to
Athens for reinforcements; the Peloponnesians having been joined on the
day after the battle by the Corinthians, who came to help the ships,
and by the other inhabitants in the vicinity not long afterwards. These
saw the difficulty of keeping guard in a desert place, and in their
perplexity at first thought of burning the ships, but finally resolved
to haul them up on shore and sit down and guard them with their land
forces until a convenient opportunity for escaping should present
itself. Agis also, on being informed of the disaster, sent them a
Spartan of the name of Thermon. The Lacedaemonians first received the
news of the fleet having put out from the Isthmus, Alcamenes having
been ordered by the ephors to send off a horseman when this took place,
and immediately resolved to dispatch their own five vessels under
Chalcideus, and Alcibiades with him. But while they were full of this
resolution came the second news of the fleet having taken refuge in
Spiraeum; and disheartened at their first step in the Ionian war
proving a failure, they laid aside the idea of sending the ships from
their own country, and even wished to recall some that had already
sailed.

Perceiving this, Alcibiades again persuaded Endius and the other ephors
to persevere in the expedition, saying that the voyage would be made
before the Chians heard of the fleet’s misfortune, and that as soon as
he set foot in Ionia, he should, by assuring them of the weakness of
the Athenians and the zeal of Lacedaemon, have no difficulty in
persuading the cities to revolt, as they would readily believe his
testimony. He also represented to Endius himself in private that it
would be glorious for him to be the means of making Ionia revolt and
the King become the ally of Lacedaemon, instead of that honour being
left to Agis (Agis, it must be remembered, was the enemy of
Alcibiades); and Endius and his colleagues thus persuaded, he put to
sea with the five ships and the Lacedaemonian Chalcideus, and made all
haste upon the voyage.

About this time the sixteen Peloponnesian ships from Sicily, which had
served through the war with Gylippus, were caught on their return off
Leucadia and roughly handled by the twenty-seven Athenian vessels under
Hippocles, son of Menippus, on the lookout for the ships from Sicily.
After losing one of their number, the rest escaped from the Athenians
and sailed into Corinth.

Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades seized all they met with on their
voyage, to prevent news of their coming, and let them go at Corycus,
the first point which they touched at in the continent. Here they were
visited by some of their Chian correspondents and, being urged by them
to sail up to the town without announcing their coming, arrived
suddenly before Chios. The many were amazed and confounded, while the
few had so arranged that the council should be sitting at the time; and
after speeches from Chalcideus and Alcibiades stating that many more
ships were sailing up, but saying nothing of the fleet being blockaded
in Spiraeum, the Chians revolted from the Athenians, and the
Erythraeans immediately afterwards. After this three vessels sailed
over to Clazomenae, and made that city revolt also; and the
Clazomenians immediately crossed over to the mainland and began to
fortify Polichna, in order to retreat there, in case of necessity, from
the island where they dwelt.

While the revolted places were all engaged in fortifying and preparing
for the war, news of Chios speedily reached Athens. The Athenians
thought the danger by which they were now menaced great and
unmistakable, and that the rest of their allies would not consent to
keep quiet after the secession of the greatest of their number. In the
consternation of the moment they at once took off the penalty attaching
to whoever proposed or put to the vote a proposal for using the
thousand talents which they had jealously avoided touching throughout
the whole war, and voted to employ them to man a large number of ships,
and to send off at once under Strombichides, son of Diotimus, the eight
vessels, forming part of the blockading fleet at Spiraeum, which had
left the blockade and had returned after pursuing and failing to
overtake the vessels with Chalcideus. These were to be followed shortly
afterwards by twelve more under Thrasycles, also taken from the
blockade. They also recalled the seven Chian vessels, forming part of
their squadron blockading the fleet in Spiraeum, and giving the slaves
on board their liberty, put the freemen in confinement, and speedily
manned and sent out ten fresh ships to blockade the Peloponnesians in
the place of all those that had departed, and decided to man thirty
more. Zeal was not wanting, and no effort was spared to send relief to
Chios.

In the meantime Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos,
and, taking one Samian vessel, sailed to Teos and required them to
remain quiet. Chalcideus also set sail with twenty-three ships for Teos
from Chios, the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans moving
alongshore to support him. Informed of this in time, Strombichides put
out from Teos before their arrival, and while out at sea, seeing the
number of the ships from Chios, fled towards Samos, chased by the
enemy. The Teians at first would not receive the land forces, but upon
the flight of the Athenians took them into the town. There they waited
for some time for Chalcideus to return from the pursuit, and as time
went on without his appearing, began themselves to demolish the wall
which the Athenians had built on the land side of the city of the
Teians, being assisted by a few of the barbarians who had come up under
the command of Stages, the lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after chasing Strombichides into
Samos, armed the crews of the ships from Peloponnese and left them at
Chios, and filling their places with substitutes from Chios and manning
twenty others, sailed off to effect the revolt of Miletus. The wish of
Alcibiades, who had friends among the leading men of the Milesians, was
to bring over the town before the arrival of the ships from
Peloponnese, and thus, by causing the revolt of as many cities as
possible with the help of the Chian power and of Chalcideus, to secure
the honour for the Chians and himself and Chalcideus, and, as he had
promised, for Endius who had sent them out. Not discovered until their
voyage was nearly completed, they arrived a little before Strombichides
and Thrasycles (who had just come with twelve ships from Athens, and
had joined Strombichides in pursuing them), and occasioned the revolt
of Miletus. The Athenians sailing up close on their heels with nineteen
ships found Miletus closed against them, and took up their station at
the adjacent island of Lade. The first alliance between the King and
the Lacedaemonians was now concluded immediately upon the revolt of the
Milesians, by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, and was as follows:

The Lacedaemonians and their allies made a treaty with the King and
Tissaphernes upon the terms following:

1. Whatever country or cities the King has, or the King’s ancestors
had, shall be the king’s: and whatever came in to the Athenians from
these cities, either money or any other thing, the King and the
Lacedaemonians and their allies shall jointly hinder the Athenians from
receiving either money or any other thing.

2. The war with the Athenians shall be carried on jointly by the King
and by the Lacedaemonians and their allies: and it shall not be lawful
to make peace with the Athenians except both agree, the King on his
side and the Lacedaemonians and their allies on theirs.

3. If any revolt from the King, they shall be the enemies of the
Lacedaemonians and their allies. And if any revolt from the
Lacedaemonians and their allies, they shall be the enemies of the King
in like manner.

This was the alliance. After this the Chians immediately manned ten
more vessels and sailed for Anaia, in order to gain intelligence of
those in Miletus, and also to make the cities revolt. A message,
however, reaching them from Chalcideus to tell them to go back again,
and that Amorges was at hand with an army by land, they sailed to the
temple of Zeus, and there sighting ten more ships sailing up with which
Diomedon had started from Athens after Thrasycles, fled, one ship to
Ephesus, the rest to Teos. The Athenians took four of their ships
empty, the men finding time to escape ashore; the rest took refuge in
the city of the Teians; after which the Athenians sailed off to Samos,
while the Chians put to sea with their remaining vessels, accompanied
by the land forces, and caused Lebedos to revolt, and after it Erae.
After this they both returned home, the fleet and the army.

About the same time the twenty ships of the Peloponnesians in Spiraeum,
which we left chased to land and blockaded by an equal number of
Athenians, suddenly sallied out and defeated the blockading squadron,
took four of their ships, and, sailing back to Cenchreae, prepared
again for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Here they were joined by
Astyochus as high admiral from Lacedaemon, henceforth invested with the
supreme command at sea. The land forces now withdrawing from Teos,
Tissaphernes repaired thither in person with an army and completed the
demolition of anything that was left of the wall, and so departed. Not
long after his departure Diomedon arrived with ten Athenian ships, and,
having made a convention by which the Teians admitted him as they had
the enemy, coasted along to Erae, and, failing in an attempt upon the
town, sailed back again.

About this time took place the rising of the commons at Samos against
the upper classes, in concert with some Athenians, who were there in
three vessels. The Samian commons put to death some two hundred in all
of the upper classes, and banished four hundred more, and themselves
took their land and houses; after which the Athenians decreed their
independence, being now sure of their fidelity, and the commons
henceforth governed the city, excluding the landholders from all share
in affairs, and forbidding any of the commons to give his daughter in
marriage to them or to take a wife from them in future.

After this, during the same summer, the Chians, whose zeal continued as
active as ever, and who even without the Peloponnesians found
themselves in sufficient force to effect the revolt of the cities and
also wished to have as many companions in peril as possible, made an
expedition with thirteen ships of their own to Lesbos; the instructions
from Lacedaemon being to go to that island next, and from thence to the
Hellespont. Meanwhile the land forces of the Peloponnesians who were
with the Chians and of the allies on the spot, moved alongshore for
Clazomenae and Cuma, under the command of Eualas, a Spartan; while the
fleet under Diniadas, one of the Perioeci, first sailed up to Methymna
and caused it to revolt, and, leaving four ships there, with the rest
procured the revolt of Mitylene.

In the meantime Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, set sail from
Cenchreae with four ships, as he had intended, and arrived at Chios. On
the third day after his arrival, the Athenian ships, twenty-five in
number, sailed to Lesbos under Diomedon and Leon, who had lately
arrived with a reinforcement of ten ships from Athens. Late in the same
day Astyochus put to sea, and taking one Chian vessel with him sailed
to Lesbos to render what assistance he could. Arrived at Pyrrha, and
from thence the next day at Eresus, he there learned that Mitylene had
been taken, almost without a blow, by the Athenians, who had sailed up
and unexpectedly put into the harbour, had beaten the Chian ships, and
landing and defeating the troops opposed to them had become masters of
the city. Informed of this by the Eresians and the Chian ships, which
had been left with Eubulus at Methymna, and had fled upon the capture
of Mitylene, and three of which he now fell in with, one having been
taken by the Athenians, Astyochus did not go on to Mitylene, but raised
and armed Eresus, and, sending the heavy infantry from his own ships by
land under Eteonicus to Antissa and Methymna, himself proceeded
alongshore thither with the ships which he had with him and with the
three Chians, in the hope that the Methymnians upon seeing them would
be encouraged to persevere in their revolt. As, however, everything
went against him in Lesbos, he took up his own force and sailed back to
Chios; the land forces on board, which were to have gone to the
Hellespont, being also conveyed back to their different cities. After
this six of the allied Peloponnesian ships at Cenchreae joined the
forces at Chios. The Athenians, after restoring matters to their old
state in Lesbos, set sail from thence and took Polichna, the place that
the Clazomenians were fortifying on the continent, and carried the
inhabitants back to their town upon the island, except the authors of
the revolt, who withdrew to Daphnus; and thus Clazomenae became once
more Athenian.

The same summer the Athenians in the twenty ships at Lade, blockading
Miletus, made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, and
killed Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian commander, who had come with a few
men against them, and the third day after sailed over and set up a
trophy, which, as they were not masters of the country, was however
pulled down by the Milesians. Meanwhile Leon and Diomedon with the
Athenian fleet from Lesbos issuing from the Oenussae, the isles off
Chios, and from their forts of Sidussa and Pteleum in the Erythraeid,
and from Lesbos, carried on the war against the Chians from the ships,
having on board heavy infantry from the rolls pressed to serve as
marines. Landing in Cardamyle and in Bolissus they defeated with heavy
loss the Chians that took the field against them and, laying desolate
the places in that neighbourhood, defeated the Chians again in another
battle at Phanae, and in a third at Leuconium. After this the Chians
ceased to meet them in the field, while the Athenians devastated the
country, which was beautifully stocked and had remained uninjured ever
since the Median wars. Indeed, after the Lacedaemonians, the Chians are
the only people that I have known who knew how to be wise in
prosperity, and who ordered their city the more securely the greater it
grew. Nor was this revolt, in which they might seem to have erred on
the side of rashness, ventured upon until they had numerous and gallant
allies to share the danger with them, and until they perceived the
Athenians after the Sicilian disaster themselves no longer denying the
thoroughly desperate state of their affairs. And if they were thrown
out by one of the surprises which upset human calculations, they found
out their mistake in company with many others who believed, like them,
in the speedy collapse of the Athenian power. While they were thus
blockaded from the sea and plundered by land, some of the citizens
undertook to bring the city over to the Athenians. Apprised of this the
authorities took no action themselves, but brought Astyochus, the
admiral, from Erythrae, with four ships that he had with him, and
considered how they could most quietly, either by taking hostages or by
some other means, put an end to the conspiracy.

While the Chians were thus engaged, a thousand Athenian heavy infantry
and fifteen hundred Argives (five hundred of whom were light troops
furnished with armour by the Athenians), and one thousand of the
allies, towards the close of the same summer sailed from Athens in
forty-eight ships, some of which were transports, under the command of
Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides, and putting into Samos crossed
over and encamped at Miletus. Upon this the Milesians came out to the
number of eight hundred heavy infantry, with the Peloponnesians who had
come with Chalcideus, and some foreign mercenaries of Tissaphernes,
Tissaphernes himself and his cavalry, and engaged the Athenians and
their allies. While the Argives rushed forward on their own wing with
the careless disdain of men advancing against Ionians who would never
stand their charge, and were defeated by the Milesians with a loss
little short of three hundred men, the Athenians first defeated the
Peloponnesians, and driving before them the barbarians and the ruck of
the army, without engaging the Milesians, who after the rout of the
Argives retreated into the town upon seeing their comrades worsted,
crowned their victory by grounding their arms under the very walls of
Miletus. Thus, in this battle, the Ionians on both sides overcame the
Dorians, the Athenians defeating the Peloponnesians opposed to them,
and the Milesians the Argives. After setting up a trophy, the Athenians
prepared to draw a wall round the place, which stood upon an isthmus;
thinking that, if they could gain Miletus, the other towns also would
easily come over to them.

Meanwhile about dusk tidings reached them that the fifty-five ships
from Peloponnese and Sicily might be instantly expected. Of these the
Siceliots, urged principally by the Syracusan Hermocrates to join in
giving the finishing blow to the power of Athens, furnished
twenty-two—twenty from Syracuse, and two from Silenus; and the ships
that we left preparing in Peloponnese being now ready, both squadrons
had been entrusted to Therimenes, a Lacedaemonian, to take to
Astyochus, the admiral. They now put in first at Leros the island off
Miletus, and from thence, discovering that the Athenians were before
the town, sailed into the Iasic Gulf, in order to learn how matters
stood at Miletus. Meanwhile Alcibiades came on horseback to Teichiussa
in the Milesian territory, the point of the gulf at which they had put
in for the night, and told them of the battle in which he had fought in
person by the side of the Milesians and Tissaphernes, and advised them,
if they did not wish to sacrifice Ionia and their cause, to fly to the
relief of Miletus and hinder its investment.

Accordingly they resolved to relieve it the next morning. Meanwhile
Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, had received precise intelligence
of the fleet from Leros, and when his colleagues expressed a wish to
keep the sea and fight it out, flatly refused either to stay himself or
to let them or any one else do so if he could help it. Where they could
hereafter contend, after full and undisturbed preparation, with an
exact knowledge of the number of the enemy’s fleet and of the force
which they could oppose to him, he would never allow the reproach of
disgrace to drive him into a risk that was unreasonable. It was no
disgrace for an Athenian fleet to retreat when it suited them: put it
as they would, it would be more disgraceful to be beaten, and to expose
the city not only to disgrace, but to the most serious danger. After
its late misfortunes it could hardly be justified in voluntarily taking
the offensive even with the strongest force, except in a case of
absolute necessity: much less then without compulsion could it rush
upon peril of its own seeking. He told them to take up their wounded as
quickly as they could and the troops and stores which they had brought
with them, and leaving behind what they had taken from the enemy’s
country, in order to lighten the ships, to sail off to Samos, and there
concentrating all their ships to attack as opportunity served. As he
spoke so he acted; and thus not now more than afterwards, nor in this
alone but in all that he had to do with, did Phrynichus show himself a
man of sense. In this way that very evening the Athenians broke up from
before Miletus, leaving their victory unfinished, and the Argives,
mortified at their disaster, promptly sailed off home from Samos.

As soon as it was morning the Peloponnesians weighed from Teichiussa
and put into Miletus after the departure of the Athenians; they stayed
one day, and on the next took with them the Chian vessels originally
chased into port with Chalcideus, and resolved to sail back for the
tackle which they had put on shore at Teichiussa. Upon their arrival
Tissaphernes came to them with his land forces and induced them to sail
to Iasus, which was held by his enemy Amorges. Accordingly they
suddenly attacked and took Iasus, whose inhabitants never imagined that
the ships could be other than Athenian. The Syracusans distinguished
themselves most in the action. Amorges, a bastard of Pissuthnes and a
rebel from the King, was taken alive and handed over to Tissaphernes,
to carry to the King, if he chose, according to his orders: Iasus was
sacked by the army, who found a very great booty there, the place being
wealthy from ancient date. The mercenaries serving with Amorges the
Peloponnesians received and enrolled in their army without doing them
any harm, since most of them came from Peloponnese, and handed over the
town to Tissaphernes with all the captives, bond or free, at the
stipulated price of one Doric stater a head; after which they returned
to Miletus. Pedaritus, son of Leon, who had been sent by the
Lacedaemonians to take the command at Chios, they dispatched by land as
far as Erythrae with the mercenaries taken from Amorges; appointing
Philip to remain as governor of Miletus.

Summer was now over. The winter following, Tissaphernes put Iasus in a
state of defence, and passing on to Miletus distributed a month’s pay
to all the ships as he had promised at Lacedaemon, at the rate of an
Attic drachma a day for each man. In future, however, he was resolved
not to give more than three obols, until he had consulted the King;
when if the King should so order he would give, he said, the full
drachma. However, upon the protest of the Syracusan general Hermocrates
(for as Therimenes was not admiral, but only accompanied them in order
to hand over the ships to Astyochus, he made little difficulty about
the pay), it was agreed that the amount of five ships’ pay should be
given over and above the three obols a day for each man; Tissaphernes
paying thirty talents a month for fifty-five ships, and to the rest,
for as many ships as they had beyond that number, at the same rate.

The same winter the Athenians in Samos, having been joined by
thirty-five more vessels from home under Charminus, Strombichides, and
Euctemon, called in their squadron at Chios and all the rest, intending
to blockade Miletus with their navy, and to send a fleet and an army
against Chios; drawing lots for the respective services. This intention
they carried into effect; Strombichides, Onamacles, and Euctemon
sailing against Chios, which fell to their lot, with thirty ships and a
part of the thousand heavy infantry, who had been to Miletus, in
transports; while the rest remained masters of the sea with
seventy-four ships at Samos, and advanced upon Miletus.

Meanwhile Astyochus, whom we left at Chios collecting the hostages
required in consequence of the conspiracy, stopped upon learning that
the fleet with Therimenes had arrived, and that the affairs of the
league were in a more flourishing condition, and putting out to sea
with ten Peloponnesian and as many Chian vessels, after a futile attack
upon Pteleum, coasted on to Clazomenae, and ordered the Athenian party
to remove inland to Daphnus, and to join the Peloponnesians, an order
in which also joined Tamos the king’s lieutenant in Ionia. This order
being disregarded, Astyochus made an attack upon the town, which was
unwalled, and having failed to take it was himself carried off by a
strong gale to Phocaea and Cuma, while the rest of the ships put in at
the islands adjacent to Clazomenae—Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa. Here
they were detained eight days by the winds, and, plundering and
consuming all the property of the Clazomenians there deposited, put the
rest on shipboard and sailed off to Phocaea and Cuma to join Astyochus.

While he was there, envoys arrived from the Lesbians who wished to
revolt again. With Astyochus they were successful; but the Corinthians
and the other allies being averse to it by reason of their former
failure, he weighed anchor and set sail for Chios, where they
eventually arrived from different quarters, the fleet having been
scattered by a storm. After this Pedaritus, whom we left marching along
the coast from Miletus, arrived at Erythrae, and thence crossed over
with his army to Chios, where he found also about five hundred soldiers
who had been left there by Chalcideus from the five ships with their
arms. Meanwhile some Lesbians making offers to revolt, Astyochus urged
upon Pedaritus and the Chians that they ought to go with their ships
and effect the revolt of Lesbos, and so increase the number of their
allies, or, if not successful, at all events harm the Athenians. The
Chians, however, turned a deaf ear to this, and Pedaritus flatly
refused to give up to him the Chian vessels.

Upon this Astyochus took five Corinthian and one Megarian vessel, with
another from Hermione, and the ships which had come with him from
Laconia, and set sail for Miletus to assume his command as admiral;
after telling the Chians with many threats that he would certainly not
come and help them if they should be in need. At Corycus in the
Erythraeid he brought to for the night; the Athenian armament sailing
from Samos against Chios being only separated from him by a hill, upon
the other side of which it brought to; so that neither perceived the
other. But a letter arriving in the night from Pedaritus to say that
some liberated Erythraean prisoners had come from Samos to betray
Erythrae, Astyochus at once put back to Erythrae, and so just escaped
falling in with the Athenians. Here Pedaritus sailed over to join him;
and after inquiry into the pretended treachery, finding that the whole
story had been made up to procure the escape of the men from Samos,
they acquitted them of the charge, and sailed away, Pedaritus to Chios
and Astyochus to Miletus as he had intended.

Meanwhile the Athenian armament sailing round Corycus fell in with
three Chian men-of-war off Arginus, and gave immediate chase. A great
storm coming on, the Chians with difficulty took refuge in the harbour;
the three Athenian vessels most forward in the pursuit being wrecked
and thrown up near the city of Chios, and the crews slain or taken
prisoners. The rest of the Athenian fleet took refuge in the harbour
called Phoenicus, under Mount Mimas, and from thence afterwards put
into Lesbos and prepared for the work of fortification.

The same winter the Lacedaemonian Hippocrates sailed out from
Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships under the command of Dorieus, son of
Diagoras, and two colleagues, one Laconian and one Syracusan vessel,
and arrived at Cnidus, which had already revolted at the instigation of
Tissaphernes. When their arrival was known at Miletus, orders came to
them to leave half their squadron to guard Cnidus, and with the rest to
cruise round Triopium and seize all the merchantmen arriving from
Egypt. Triopium is a promontory of Cnidus and sacred to Apollo. This
coming to the knowledge of the Athenians, they sailed from Samos and
captured the six ships on the watch at Triopium, the crews escaping out
of them. After this the Athenians sailed into Cnidus and made an
assault upon the town, which was unfortified, and all but took it; and
the next day assaulted it again, but with less effect, as the
inhabitants had improved their defences during the night, and had been
reinforced by the crews escaped from the ships at Triopium. The
Athenians now withdrew, and after plundering the Cnidian territory
sailed back to Samos.

About the same time Astyochus came to the fleet at Miletus. The
Peloponnesian camp was still plentifully supplied, being in receipt of
sufficient pay, and the soldiers having still in hand the large booty
taken at Iasus. The Milesians also showed great ardour for the war.
Nevertheless the Peloponnesians thought the first convention with
Tissaphernes, made with Chalcideus, defective, and more advantageous to
him than to them, and consequently while Therimenes was still there
concluded another, which was as follows:

The convention of the Lacedaemonians and the allies with King Darius
and the sons of the King, and with Tissaphernes for a treaty and
friendship, as follows:

1. Neither the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians
shall make war against or otherwise injure any country or cities that
belong to King Darius or did belong to his father or to his ancestors;
neither shall the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians
exact tribute from such cities. Neither shall King Darius nor any of
the subjects of the King make war against or otherwise injure the
Lacedaemonians or their allies.

2. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies should require any assistance
from the King, or the King from the Lacedaemonians or their allies,
whatever they both agree upon they shall be right in doing.

3. Both shall carry on jointly the war against the Athenians and their
allies: and if they make peace, both shall do so jointly.

4. The expense of all troops in the King’s country, sent for by the
King, shall be borne by the King.

5. If any of the states comprised in this convention with the King
attack the King’s country, the rest shall stop them and aid the King to
the best of their power. And if any in the King’s country or in the
countries under the King’s rule attack the country of the
Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall stop it and help them to
the best of his power.

After this convention Therimenes handed over the fleet to Astyochus,
sailed off in a small boat, and was lost. The Athenian armament had now
crossed over from Lesbos to Chios, and being master by sea and land
began to fortify Delphinium, a place naturally strong on the land side,
provided with more than one harbour, and also not far from the city of
Chios. Meanwhile the Chians remained inactive. Already defeated in so
many battles, they were now also at discord among themselves; the
execution of the party of Tydeus, son of Ion, by Pedaritus upon the
charge of Atticism, followed by the forcible imposition of an oligarchy
upon the rest of the city, having made them suspicious of one another;
and they therefore thought neither themselves not the mercenaries under
Pedaritus a match for the enemy. They sent, however, to Miletus to beg
Astyochus to assist them, which he refused to do, and was accordingly
denounced at Lacedaemon by Pedaritus as a traitor. Such was the state
of the Athenian affairs at Chios; while their fleet at Samos kept
sailing out against the enemy in Miletus, until they found that he
would not accept their challenge, and then retired again to Samos and
remained quiet.

In the same winter the twenty-seven ships equipped by the
Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus through the agency of the Megarian
Calligeitus, and the Cyzicene Timagoras, put out from Peloponnese and
sailed for Ionia about the time of the solstice, under the command of
Antisthenes, a Spartan. With them the Lacedaemonians also sent eleven
Spartans as advisers to Astyochus; Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, being
among the number. Arrived at Miletus, their orders were to aid in
generally superintending the good conduct of the war; to send off the
above ships or a greater or less number to the Hellespont to
Pharnabazus, if they thought proper, appointing Clearchus, son of
Ramphias, who sailed with them, to the command; and further, if they
thought proper, to make Antisthenes admiral, dismissing Astyochus, whom
the letters of Pedaritus had caused to be regarded with suspicion.
Sailing accordingly from Malea across the open sea, the squadron
touched at Melos and there fell in with ten Athenian ships, three of
which they took empty and burned. After this, being afraid that the
Athenian vessels escaped from Melos might, as they in fact did, give
information of their approach to the Athenians at Samos, they sailed to
Crete, and having lengthened their voyage by way of precaution made
land at Caunus in Asia, from whence considering themselves in safety
they sent a message to the fleet at Miletus for a convoy along the
coast.

Meanwhile the Chians and Pedaritus, undeterred by the backwardness of
Astyochus, went on sending messengers pressing him to come with all the
fleet to assist them against their besiegers, and not to leave the
greatest of the allied states in Ionia to be shut up by sea and overrun
and pillaged by land. There were more slaves at Chios than in any one
other city except Lacedaemon, and being also by reason of their numbers
punished more rigorously when they offended, most of them, when they
saw the Athenian armament firmly established in the island with a
fortified position, immediately deserted to the enemy, and through
their knowledge of the country did the greatest mischief. The Chians
therefore urged upon Astyochus that it was his duty to assist them,
while there was still a hope and a possibility of stopping the enemy’s
progress, while Delphinium was still in process of fortification and
unfinished, and before the completion of a higher rampart which was
being added to protect the camp and fleet of their besiegers. Astyochus
now saw that the allies also wished it and prepared to go, in spite of
his intention to the contrary owing to the threat already referred to.

In the meantime news came from Caunus of the arrival of the
twenty-seven ships with the Lacedaemonian commissioners; and Astyochus,
postponing everything to the duty of convoying a fleet of that
importance, in order to be more able to command the sea, and to the
safe conduct of the Lacedaemonians sent as spies over his behaviour, at
once gave up going to Chios and set sail for Caunus. As he coasted
along he landed at the Meropid Cos and sacked the city, which was
unfortified and had been lately laid in ruins by an earthquake, by far
the greatest in living memory, and, as the inhabitants had fled to the
mountains, overran the country and made booty of all it contained,
letting go, however, the free men. From Cos arriving in the night at
Cnidus he was constrained by the representations of the Cnidians not to
disembark the sailors, but to sail as he was straight against the
twenty Athenian vessels, which with Charminus, one of the commanders at
Samos, were on the watch for the very twenty-seven ships from
Peloponnese which Astyochus was himself sailing to join; the Athenians
in Samos having heard from Melos of their approach, and Charminus being
on the look-out off Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and Lycia, as he now heard
that they were at Caunus.

Astyochus accordingly sailed as he was to Syme, before he was heard of,
in the hope of catching the enemy somewhere out at sea. Rain, however,
and foggy weather encountered him, and caused his ships to straggle and
get into disorder in the dark. In the morning his fleet had parted
company and was most of it still straggling round the island, and the
left wing only in sight of Charminus and the Athenians, who took it for
the squadron which they were watching for from Caunus, and hastily put
out against it with part only of their twenty vessels, and attacking
immediately sank three ships and disabled others, and had the advantage
in the action until the main body of the fleet unexpectedly hove in
sight, when they were surrounded on every side. Upon this they took to
flight, and after losing six ships with the rest escaped to Teutlussa
or Beet Island, and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this the
Peloponnesians put into Cnidus and, being joined by the twenty-seven
ships from Caunus, sailed all together and set up a trophy in Syme, and
then returned to anchor at Cnidus.

As soon as the Athenians knew of the sea-fight, they sailed with all
the ships at Samos to Syme, and, without attacking or being attacked by
the fleet at Cnidus, took the ships’ tackle left at Syme, and touching
at Lorymi on the mainland sailed back to Samos. Meanwhile the
Peloponnesian ships, being now all at Cnidus, underwent such repairs as
were needed; while the eleven Lacedaemonian commissioners conferred
with Tissaphernes, who had come to meet them, upon the points which did
not satisfy them in the past transactions, and upon the best and
mutually most advantageous manner of conducting the war in future. The
severest critic of the present proceedings was Lichas, who said that
neither of the treaties could stand, neither that of Chalcideus, nor
that of Therimenes; it being monstrous that the King should at this
date pretend to the possession of all the country formerly ruled by
himself or by his ancestors—a pretension which implicitly put back
under the yoke all the islands—Thessaly, Locris, and everything as far
as Boeotia—and made the Lacedaemonians give to the Hellenes instead of
liberty a Median master. He therefore invited Tissaphernes to conclude
another and a better treaty, as they certainly would not recognize
those existing and did not want any of his pay upon such conditions.
This offended Tissaphernes so much that he went away in a rage without
settling anything.




CHAPTER XXV


Twentieth and Twenty-first Years of the War—Intrigues of
Alcibiades—Withdrawal of the Persian Subsidies—Oligarchical Coup d’Etat
at Athens—Patriotism of the Army at Samos


The Peloponnesians now determined to sail to Rhodes, upon the
invitation of some of the principal men there, hoping to gain an island
powerful by the number of its seamen and by its land forces, and also
thinking that they would be able to maintain their fleet from their own
confederacy, without having to ask for money from Tissaphernes. They
accordingly at once set sail that same winter from Cnidus, and first
put in with ninety-four ships at Camirus in the Rhodian country, to the
great alarm of the mass of the inhabitants, who were not privy to the
intrigue, and who consequently fled, especially as the town was
unfortified. They were afterwards, however, assembled by the
Lacedaemonians together with the inhabitants of the two other towns of
Lindus and Ialysus; and the Rhodians were persuaded to revolt from the
Athenians and the island went over to the Peloponnesians. Meanwhile the
Athenians had received the alarm and set sail with the fleet from Samos
to forestall them, and came within sight of the island, but being a
little too late sailed off for the moment to Chalce, and from thence to
Samos, and subsequently waged war against Rhodes, issuing from Chalce,
Cos, and Samos.

The Peloponnesians now levied a contribution of thirty-two talents from
the Rhodians, after which they hauled their ships ashore and for eighty
days remained inactive. During this time, and even earlier, before they
removed to Rhodes, the following intrigues took place. After the death
of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades began to be
suspected by the Peloponnesians; and Astyochus received from Lacedaemon
an order from them to put him to death, he being the personal enemy of
Agis, and in other respects thought unworthy of confidence. Alcibiades
in his alarm first withdrew to Tissaphernes, and immediately began to
do all he could with him to injure the Peloponnesian cause. Henceforth
becoming his adviser in everything, he cut down the pay from an Attic
drachma to three obols a day, and even this not paid too regularly; and
told Tissaphernes to say to the Peloponnesians that the Athenians,
whose maritime experience was of an older date than their own, only
gave their men three obols, not so much from poverty as to prevent
their seamen being corrupted by being too well off, and injuring their
condition by spending money upon enervating indulgences, and also paid
their crews irregularly in order to have a security against their
deserting in the arrears which they would leave behind them. He also
told Tissaphernes to bribe the captains and generals of the cities, and
so to obtain their connivance—an expedient which succeeded with all
except the Syracusans, Hermocrates alone opposing him on behalf of the
whole confederacy. Meanwhile the cities asking for money Alcibiades
sent off, by roundly telling them in the name of Tissaphernes that it
was great impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Hellas, not
content with being defended by a foreign force, to expect others to
risk not only their lives but their money as well in behalf of their
freedom; while the other cities, he said, had had to pay largely to
Athens before their rebellion, and could not justly refuse to
contribute as much or even more now for their own selves. He also
pointed out that Tissaphernes was at present carrying on the war at his
own charges, and had good cause for economy, but that as soon as he
received remittances from the king he would give them their pay in full
and do what was reasonable for the cities.

Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a hurry
to end the war, or to let himself be persuaded to bring up the
Phoenician fleet which he was equipping, or to provide pay for more
Hellenes, and thus put the power by land and sea into the same hands;
but to leave each of the contending parties in possession of one
element, thus enabling the king when he found one troublesome to call
in the other. For if the command of the sea and land were united in one
hand, he would not know where to turn for help to overthrow the
dominant power; unless he at last chose to stand up himself, and go
through with the struggle at great expense and hazard. The cheapest
plan was to let the Hellenes wear each other out, at a small share of
the expense and without risk to himself. Besides, he would find the
Athenians the most convenient partners in empire as they did not aim at
conquests on shore, and carried on the war upon principles and with a
practice most advantageous to the King; being prepared to combine to
conquer the sea for Athens, and for the King all the Hellenes
inhabiting his country, whom the Peloponnesians, on the contrary, had
come to liberate. Now it was not likely that the Lacedaemonians would
free the Hellenes from the Hellenic Athenians, without freeing them
also from the barbarian Mede, unless overthrown by him in the
meanwhile. Alcibiades therefore urged him to wear them both out at
first, and, after docking the Athenian power as much as he could,
forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians. In the main
Tissaphernes approved of this policy, so far at least as could be
conjectured from his behaviour; since he now gave his confidence to
Alcibiades in recognition of his good advice, and kept the
Peloponnesians short of money, and would not let them fight at sea, but
ruined their cause by pretending that the Phoenician fleet would
arrive, and that they would thus be enabled to contend with the odds in
their favour, and so made their navy lose its efficiency, which had
been very remarkable, and generally betrayed a coolness in the war that
was too plain to be mistaken.

Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, with whom he
then was, not merely because he thought it really the best, but because
he was studying means to effect his restoration to his country, well
knowing that if he did not destroy it he might one day hope to persuade
the Athenians to recall him, and thinking that his best chance of
persuading them lay in letting them see that he possessed the favour of
Tissaphernes. The event proved him to be right. When the Athenians at
Samos found that he had influence with Tissaphernes, principally of
their own motion (though partly also through Alcibiades himself sending
word to their chief men to tell the best men in the army that, if there
were only an oligarchy in the place of the rascally democracy that had
banished him, he would be glad to return to his country and to make
Tissaphernes their friend), the captains and chief men in the armament
at once embraced the idea of subverting the democracy.

The design was first mooted in the camp, and afterwards from thence
reached the city. Some persons crossed over from Samos and had an
interview with Alcibiades, who immediately offered to make first
Tissaphernes, and afterwards the King, their friend, if they would give
up the democracy and make it possible for the King to trust them. The
higher class, who also suffered most severely from the war, now
conceived great hopes of getting the government into their own hands,
and of triumphing over the enemy. Upon their return to Samos the
emissaries formed their partisans into a club, and openly told the mass
of the armament that the King would be their friend, and would provide
them with money, if Alcibiades were restored and the democracy
abolished. The multitude, if at first irritated by these intrigues,
were nevertheless kept quiet by the advantageous prospect of the pay
from the King; and the oligarchical conspirators, after making this
communication to the people, now re-examined the proposals of
Alcibiades among themselves, with most of their associates. Unlike the
rest, who thought them advantageous and trustworthy, Phrynichus, who
was still general, by no means approved of the proposals. Alcibiades,
he rightly thought, cared no more for an oligarchy than for a
democracy, and only sought to change the institutions of his country in
order to get himself recalled by his associates; while for themselves
their one object should be to avoid civil discord. It was not the
King’s interest, when the Peloponnesians were now their equals at sea,
and in possession of some of the chief cities in his empire, to go out
of his way to side with the Athenians whom he did not trust, when he
might make friends of the Peloponnesians who had never injured him. And
as for the allied states to whom oligarchy was now offered, because the
democracy was to be put down at Athens, he well knew that this would
not make the rebels come in any the sooner, or confirm the loyal in
their allegiance; as the allies would never prefer servitude with an
oligarchy or democracy to freedom with the constitution which they
actually enjoyed, to whichever type it belonged. Besides, the cities
thought that the so-called better classes would prove just as
oppressive as the commons, as being those who originated, proposed, and
for the most part benefited from the acts of the commons injurious to
the confederates. Indeed, if it depended on the better classes, the
confederates would be put to death without trial and with violence;
while the commons were their refuge and the chastiser of these men.
This he positively knew that the cities had learned by experience, and
that such was their opinion. The propositions of Alcibiades, and the
intrigues now in progress, could therefore never meet with his
approval.

However, the members of the club assembled, agreeably to their original
determination, accepted what was proposed, and prepared to send
Pisander and others on an embassy to Athens to treat for the
restoration of Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in the
city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians.

Phrynichus now saw that there would be a proposal to restore
Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would consent to it; and fearing
after what he had said against it that Alcibiades, if restored, would
revenge himself upon him for his opposition, had recourse to the
following expedient. He sent a secret letter to the Lacedaemonian
admiral Astyochus, who was still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, to
tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making Tissaphernes
the friend of the Athenians, and containing an express revelation of
the rest of the intrigue, desiring to be excused if he sought to harm
his enemy even at the expense of the interests of his country. However,
Astyochus, instead of thinking of punishing Alcibiades, who, besides,
no longer ventured within his reach as formerly, went up to him and
Tissaphernes at Magnesia, communicated to them the letter from Samos,
and turned informer, and, if report may be trusted, became the paid
creature of Tissaphernes, undertaking to inform him as to this and all
other matters; which was also the reason why he did not remonstrate
more strongly against the pay not being given in full. Upon this
Alcibiades instantly sent to the authorities at Samos a letter against
Phrynichus, stating what he had done, and requiring that he should be
put to death. Phrynichus distracted, and placed in the utmost peril by
the denunciation, sent again to Astyochus, reproaching him with having
so ill kept the secret of his previous letter, and saying that he was
now prepared to give them an opportunity of destroying the whole
Athenian armament at Samos; giving a detailed account of the means
which he should employ, Samos being unfortified, and pleading that,
being in danger of his life on their account, he could not now be
blamed for doing this or anything else to escape being destroyed by his
mortal enemies. This also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades.

Meanwhile Phrynichus having had timely notice that he was playing him
false, and that a letter on the subject was on the point of arriving
from Alcibiades, himself anticipated the news, and told the army that
the enemy, seeing that Samos was unfortified and the fleet not all
stationed within the harbour, meant to attack the camp, that he could
be certain of this intelligence, and that they must fortify Samos as
quickly as possible, and generally look to their defences. It will be
remembered that he was general, and had himself authority to carry out
these measures. Accordingly they addressed themselves to the work of
fortification, and Samos was thus fortified sooner than it would
otherwise have been. Not long afterwards came the letter from
Alcibiades, saying that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and the
enemy about to attack it. Alcibiades, however, gained no credit, it
being thought that he was in the secret of the enemy’s designs, and had
tried to fasten them upon Phrynichus, and to make out that he was their
accomplice, out of hatred; and consequently far from hurting him he
rather bore witness to what he had said by this intelligence.

After this Alcibiades set to work to persuade Tissaphernes to become
the friend of the Athenians. Tissaphernes, although afraid of the
Peloponnesians because they had more ships in Asia than the Athenians,
was yet disposed to be persuaded if he could, especially after his
quarrel with the Peloponnesians at Cnidus about the treaty of
Therimenes. The quarrel had already taken place, as the Peloponnesians
were by this time actually at Rhodes; and in it the original argument
of Alcibiades touching the liberation of all the towns by the
Lacedaemonians had been verified by the declaration of Lichas that it
was impossible to submit to a convention which made the King master of
all the states at any former time ruled by himself or by his fathers.

While Alcibiades was besieging the favour of Tissaphernes with an
earnestness proportioned to the greatness of the issue, the Athenian
envoys who had been dispatched from Samos with Pisander arrived at
Athens, and made a speech before the people, giving a brief summary of
their views, and particularly insisting that, if Alcibiades were
recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they could have the
King as their ally, and would be able to overcome the Peloponnesians. A
number of speakers opposed them on the question of the democracy, the
enemies of Alcibiades cried out against the scandal of a restoration to
be effected by a violation of the constitution, and the Eumolpidae and
Ceryces protested in behalf of the mysteries, the cause of his
banishment, and called upon the gods to avert his recall; when
Pisander, in the midst of much opposition and abuse, came forward, and
taking each of his opponents aside asked him the following question: In
the face of the fact that the Peloponnesians had as many ships as their
own confronting them at sea, more cities in alliance with them, and the
King and Tissaphernes to supply them with money, of which the Athenians
had none left, had he any hope of saving the state, unless someone
could induce the King to come over to their side? Upon their replying
that they had not, he then plainly said to them: “This we cannot have
unless we have a more moderate form of government, and put the offices
into fewer hands, and so gain the King’s confidence, and forthwith
restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living that can bring this
about. The safety of the state, not the form of its government, is for
the moment the most pressing question, as we can always change
afterwards whatever we do not like.”

The people were at first highly irritated at the mention of an
oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly from Pisander that this was
the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears, and promised
themselves some day to change the government again, and gave way. They
accordingly voted that Pisander should sail with ten others and make
the best arrangement that they could with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.
At the same time the people, upon a false accusation of Pisander,
dismissed Phrynichus from his post together with his colleague
Scironides, sending Diomedon and Leon to replace them in the command of
the fleet. The accusation was that Phrynichus had betrayed Iasus and
Amorges; and Pisander brought it because he thought him a man unfit for
the business now in hand with Alcibiades. Pisander also went the round
of all the clubs already existing in the city for help in lawsuits and
elections, and urged them to draw together and to unite their efforts
for the overthrow of the democracy; and after taking all other measures
required by the circumstances, so that no time might be lost, set off
with his ten companions on his voyage to Tissaphernes.

In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by this time joined the
fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians they
found hauled up on shore, and, after making a descent upon the coast
and defeating the Rhodians who appeared in the field against them,
withdrew to Chalce and made that place their base of operations instead
of Cos, as they could better observe from thence if the Peloponnesian
fleet put out to sea. Meanwhile Xenophantes, a Laconian, came to Rhodes
from Pedaritus at Chios, with the news that the fortification of the
Athenians was now finished, and that, unless the whole Peloponnesian
fleet came to the rescue, the cause in Chios must be lost. Upon this
they resolved to go to his relief. In the meantime Pedaritus, with the
mercenaries that he had with him and the whole force of the Chians,
made an assault upon the work round the Athenian ships and took a
portion of it, and got possession of some vessels that were hauled up
on shore, when the Athenians sallied out to the rescue, and first
routing the Chians, next defeated the remainder of the force round
Pedaritus, who was himself killed, with many of the Chians, a great
number of arms being also taken.

After this the Chians were besieged even more straitly than before by
land and sea, and the famine in the place was great. Meanwhile the
Athenian envoys with Pisander arrived at the court of Tissaphernes, and
conferred with him about the proposed agreement. However, Alcibiades,
not being altogether sure of Tissaphernes (who feared the
Peloponnesians more than the Athenians, and besides wished to wear out
both parties, as Alcibiades himself had recommended), had recourse to
the following stratagem to make the treaty between the Athenians and
Tissaphernes miscarry by reason of the magnitude of his demands. In my
opinion Tissaphernes desired this result, fear being his motive; while
Alcibiades, who now saw that Tissaphernes was determined not to treat
on any terms, wished the Athenians to think, not that he was unable to
persuade Tissaphernes, but that after the latter had been persuaded and
was willing to join them, they had not conceded enough to him. For the
demands of Alcibiades, speaking for Tissaphernes, who was present, were
so extravagant that the Athenians, although for a long while they
agreed to whatever he asked, yet had to bear the blame of failure: he
required the cession of the whole of Ionia, next of the islands
adjacent, besides other concessions, and these passed without
opposition; at last, in the third interview, Alcibiades, who now feared
a complete discovery of his inability, required them to allow the King
to build ships and sail along his own coast wherever and with as many
as he pleased. Upon this the Athenians would yield no further, and
concluding that there was nothing to be done, but that they had been
deceived by Alcibiades, went away in a passion and proceeded to Samos.

Tissaphernes immediately after this, in the same winter, proceeded
along shore to Caunus, desiring to bring the Peloponnesian fleet back
to Miletus, and to supply them with pay, making a fresh convention upon
such terms as he could get, in order not to bring matters to an
absolute breach between them. He was afraid that if many of their ships
were left without pay they would be compelled to engage and be
defeated, or that their vessels being left without hands the Athenians
would attain their objects without his assistance. Still more he feared
that the Peloponnesians might ravage the continent in search of
supplies. Having calculated and considered all this, agreeably to his
plan of keeping the two sides equal, he now sent for the Peloponnesians
and gave them pay, and concluded with them a third treaty in words
following:

In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas was
ephor at Lacedaemon, a convention was concluded in the plain of the
Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes,
Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, concerning the affairs of the
King and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies.

1. The country of the King in Asia shall be the King’s, and the King
shall treat his own country as he pleases.

2. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not invade or injure the
King’s country: neither shall the King invade or injure that of the
Lacedaemonians or of their allies. If any of the Lacedaemonians or of
their allies invade or injure the King’s country, the Lacedaemonians
and their allies shall prevent it: and if any from the King’s country
invade or injure the country of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies,
the King shall prevent it.

3. Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present, according
to the agreement, until the arrival of the King’s vessels: but after
the arrival of the King’s vessels the Lacedaemonians and their allies
may pay their own ships if they wish it. If, however, they choose to
receive the pay from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall furnish it: and
the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall repay him at the end of the
war such moneys as they shall have received.

4. After the vessels have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and
of their allies and those of the King shall carry on the war jointly,
according as Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall
think best. If they wish to make peace with the Athenians, they shall
make peace also jointly.

This was the treaty. After this Tissaphernes prepared to bring up the
Phoenician fleet according to agreement, and to make good his other
promises, or at all events wished to make it appear that he was so
preparing.

Winter was now drawing towards its close, when the Boeotians took
Oropus by treachery, though held by an Athenian garrison. Their
accomplices in this were some of the Eretrians and of the Oropians
themselves, who were plotting the revolt of Euboea, as the place was
exactly opposite Eretria, and while in Athenian hands was necessarily a
source of great annoyance to Eretria and the rest of Euboea. Oropus
being in their hands, the Eretrians now came to Rhodes to invite the
Peloponnesians into Euboea. The latter, however, were rather bent on
the relief of the distressed Chians, and accordingly put out to sea and
sailed with all their ships from Rhodes. Off Triopium they sighted the
Athenian fleet out at sea sailing from Chalce, and, neither attacking
the other, arrived, the latter at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus,
seeing that it was no longer possible to relieve Chios without a
battle. And this winter ended, and with it ended the twentieth year of
this war of which Thucydides is the historian.

Early in the spring of the summer following, Dercyllidas, a Spartan,
was sent with a small force by land to the Hellespont to effect the
revolt of Abydos, which is a Milesian colony; and the Chians, while
Astyochus was at a loss how to help them, were compelled to fight at
sea by the pressure of the siege. While Astyochus was still at Rhodes
they had received from Miletus, as their commander after the death of
Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out with Antisthenes, and
twelve vessels which had been on guard at Miletus, five of which were
Thurian, four Syracusans, one from Anaia, one Milesian, and one Leon’s
own. Accordingly the Chians marched out in mass and took up a strong
position, while thirty-six of their ships put out and engaged
thirty-two of the Athenians; and after a tough fight, in which the
Chians and their allies had rather the best of it, as it was now late,
retired to their city.

Immediately after this Dercyllidas arrived by land from Miletus; and
Abydos in the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus, and Lampsacus
two days later. Upon receipt of this news Strombichides hastily sailed
from Chios with twenty-four Athenian ships, some transports carrying
heavy infantry being of the number, and defeating the Lampsacenes who
came out against him, took Lampsacus, which was unfortified, at the
first assault, and making prize of the slaves and goods restored the
freemen to their homes, and went on to Abydos. The inhabitants,
however, refusing to capitulate, and his assaults failing to take the
place, he sailed over to the coast opposite, and appointed Sestos, the
town in the Chersonese held by the Medes at a former period in this
history, as the centre for the defence of the whole Hellespont.

In the meantime the Chians commanded the sea more than before; and the
Peloponnesians at Miletus and Astyochus, hearing of the sea-fight and
of the departure of the squadron with Strombichides, took fresh
courage. Coasting along with two vessels to Chios, Astyochus took the
ships from that place, and now moved with the whole fleet upon Samos,
from whence, however, he sailed back to Miletus, as the Athenians did
not put out against him, owing to their suspicions of one another. For
it was about this time, or even before, that the democracy was put down
at Athens. When Pisander and the envoys returned from Tissaphernes to
Samos they at once strengthened still further their interest in the
army itself, and instigated the upper class in Samos to join them in
establishing an oligarchy, the very form of government which a party of
them had lately risen to avoid. At the same time the Athenians at
Samos, after a consultation among themselves, determined to let
Alcibiades alone, since he refused to join them, and besides was not
the man for an oligarchy; and now that they were once embarked, to see
for themselves how they could best prevent the ruin of their cause, and
meanwhile to sustain the war, and to contribute without stint money and
all else that might be required from their own private estates, as they
would henceforth labour for themselves alone.

After encouraging each other in these resolutions, they now at once
sent off half the envoys and Pisander to do what was necessary at
Athens (with instructions to establish oligarchies on their way in all
the subject cities which they might touch at), and dispatched the other
half in different directions to the other dependencies. Diitrephes
also, who was in the neighbourhood of Chios, and had been elected to
the command of the Thracian towns, was sent off to his government, and
arriving at Thasos abolished the democracy there. Two months, however,
had not elapsed after his departure before the Thasians began to
fortify their town, being already tired of an aristocracy with Athens,
and in daily expectation of freedom from Lacedaemon. Indeed there was a
party of them (whom the Athenians had banished), with the
Peloponnesians, who with their friends in the town were already making
every exertion to bring a squadron, and to effect the revolt of Thasos;
and this party thus saw exactly what they most wanted done, that is to
say, the reformation of the government without risk, and the abolition
of the democracy which would have opposed them. Things at Thasos thus
turned out just the contrary to what the oligarchical conspirators at
Athens expected; and the same in my opinion was the case in many of the
other dependencies; as the cities no sooner got a moderate government
and liberty of action, than they went on to absolute freedom without
being at all seduced by the show of reform offered by the Athenians.

Pisander and his colleagues on their voyage alongshore abolished, as
had been determined, the democracies in the cities, and also took some
heavy infantry from certain places as their allies, and so came to
Athens. Here they found most of the work already done by their
associates. Some of the younger men had banded together, and secretly
assassinated one Androcles, the chief leader of the commons, and mainly
responsible for the banishment of Alcibiades; Androcles being singled
out both because he was a popular leader and because they sought by his
death to recommend themselves to Alcibiades, who was, as they supposed,
to be recalled, and to make Tissaphernes their friend. There were also
some other obnoxious persons whom they secretly did away with in the
same manner. Meanwhile their cry in public was that no pay should be
given except to persons serving in the war, and that not more than five
thousand should share in the government, and those such as were most
able to serve the state in person and in purse.

But this was a mere catchword for the multitude, as the authors of the
revolution were really to govern. However, the Assembly and the Council
of the Bean still met notwithstanding, although they discussed nothing
that was not approved of by the conspirators, who both supplied the
speakers and reviewed in advance what they were to say. Fear, and the
sight of the numbers of the conspirators, closed the mouths of the
rest; or if any ventured to rise in opposition, he was presently put to
death in some convenient way, and there was neither search for the
murderers nor justice to be had against them if suspected; but the
people remained motionless, being so thoroughly cowed that men thought
themselves lucky to escape violence, even when they held their tongues.
An exaggerated belief in the numbers of the conspirators also
demoralized the people, rendered helpless by the magnitude of the city,
and by their want of intelligence with each other, and being without
means of finding out what those numbers really were. For the same
reason it was impossible for any one to open his grief to a neighbour
and to concert measures to defend himself, as he would have had to
speak either to one whom he did not know, or whom he knew but did not
trust. Indeed all the popular party approached each other with
suspicion, each thinking his neighbour concerned in what was going on,
the conspirators having in their ranks persons whom no one could ever
have believed capable of joining an oligarchy; and these it was who
made the many so suspicious, and so helped to procure impunity for the
few, by confirming the commons in their mistrust of one another.

At this juncture arrived Pisander and his colleagues, who lost no time
in doing the rest. First they assembled the people, and moved to elect
ten commissioners with full powers to frame a constitution, and that
when this was done they should on an appointed day lay before the
people their opinion as to the best mode of governing the city.
Afterwards, when the day arrived, the conspirators enclosed the
assembly in Colonus, a temple of Poseidon, a little more than a mile
outside the city; when the commissioners simply brought forward this
single motion, that any Athenian might propose with impunity whatever
measure he pleased, heavy penalties being imposed upon any who should
indict for illegality, or otherwise molest him for so doing. The way
thus cleared, it was now plainly declared that all tenure of office and
receipt of pay under the existing institutions were at an end, and that
five men must be elected as presidents, who should in their turn elect
one hundred, and each of the hundred three apiece; and that this body
thus made up to four hundred should enter the council chamber with full
powers and govern as they judged best, and should convene the five
thousand whenever they pleased.

The man who moved this resolution was Pisander, who was throughout the
chief ostensible agent in putting down the democracy. But he who
concerted the whole affair, and prepared the way for the catastrophe,
and who had given the greatest thought to the matter, was Antiphon, one
of the best men of his day in Athens; who, with a head to contrive
measures and a tongue to recommend them, did not willingly come forward
in the assembly or upon any public scene, being ill looked upon by the
multitude owing to his reputation for talent; and who yet was the one
man best able to aid in the courts, or before the assembly, the suitors
who required his opinion. Indeed, when he was afterwards himself tried
for his life on the charge of having been concerned in setting up this
very government, when the Four Hundred were overthrown and hardly dealt
with by the commons, he made what would seem to be the best defence of
any known up to my time. Phrynichus also went beyond all others in his
zeal for the oligarchy. Afraid of Alcibiades, and assured that he was
no stranger to his intrigues with Astyochus at Samos, he held that no
oligarchy was ever likely to restore him, and once embarked in the
enterprise, proved, where danger was to be faced, by far the staunchest
of them all. Theramenes, son of Hagnon, was also one of the foremost of
the subverters of the democracy—a man as able in council as in debate.
Conducted by so many and by such sagacious heads, the enterprise, great
as it was, not unnaturally went forward; although it was no light
matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom, almost a hundred
years after the deposition of the tyrants, when it had been not only
not subject to any during the whole of that period, but accustomed
during more than half of it to rule over subjects of its own.

The assembly ratified the proposed constitution, without a single
opposing voice, and was then dissolved; after which the Four Hundred
were brought into the council chamber in the following way. On account
of the enemy at Decelea, all the Athenians were constantly on the wall
or in the ranks at the various military posts. On that day the persons
not in the secret were allowed to go home as usual, while orders were
given to the accomplices of the conspirators to hang about, without
making any demonstration, at some little distance from the posts, and
in case of any opposition to what was being done, to seize the arms and
put it down. There were also some Andrians and Tenians, three hundred
Carystians, and some of the settlers in Aegina come with their own arms
for this very purpose, who had received similar instructions. These
dispositions completed, the Four Hundred went, each with a dagger
concealed about his person, accompanied by one hundred and twenty
Hellenic youths, whom they employed wherever violence was needed, and
appeared before the Councillors of the Bean in the council chamber, and
told them to take their pay and be gone; themselves bringing it for the
whole of the residue of their term of office, and giving it to them as
they went out.

Upon the Council withdrawing in this way without venturing any
objection, and the rest of the citizens making no movement, the Four
Hundred entered the council chamber, and for the present contented
themselves with drawing lots for their Prytanes, and making their
prayers and sacrifices to the gods upon entering office, but afterwards
departed widely from the democratic system of government, and except
that on account of Alcibiades they did not recall the exiles, ruled the
city by force; putting to death some men, though not many, whom they
thought it convenient to remove, and imprisoning and banishing others.
They also sent to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, at Decelea, to say that
they desired to make peace, and that he might reasonably be more
disposed to treat now that he had them to deal with instead of the
inconstant commons.

Agis, however, did not believe in the tranquillity of the city, or that
the commons would thus in a moment give up their ancient liberty, but
thought that the sight of a large Lacedaemonian force would be
sufficient to excite them if they were not already in commotion, of
which he was by no means certain. He accordingly gave to the envoys of
the Four Hundred an answer which held out no hopes of an accommodation,
and sending for large reinforcements from Peloponnese, not long
afterwards, with these and his garrison from Decelea, descended to the
very walls of Athens; hoping either that civil disturbances might help
to subdue them to his terms, or that, in the confusion to be expected
within and without the city, they might even surrender without a blow
being struck; at all events he thought he would succeed in seizing the
Long Walls, bared of their defenders. However, the Athenians saw him
come close up, without making the least disturbance within the city;
and sending out their cavalry, and a number of their heavy infantry,
light troops, and archers, shot down some of his soldiers who
approached too near, and got possession of some arms and dead. Upon
this Agis, at last convinced, led his army back again and, remaining
with his own troops in the old position at Decelea, sent the
reinforcement back home, after a few days’ stay in Attica. After this
the Four Hundred persevering sent another embassy to Agis, and now
meeting with a better reception, at his suggestion dispatched envoys to
Lacedaemon to negotiate a treaty, being desirous of making peace.

They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army, and to explain
that the oligarchy was not established for the hurt of the city or the
citizens, but for the salvation of the country at large; and that there
were five thousand, not four hundred only, concerned; although, what
with their expeditions and employments abroad, the Athenians had never
yet assembled to discuss a question important enough to bring five
thousand of them together. The emissaries were also told what to say
upon all other points, and were so sent off immediately after the
establishment of the new government, which feared, as it turned out
justly, that the mass of seamen would not be willing to remain under
the oligarchical constitution, and, the evil beginning there, might be
the means of their overthrow.

Indeed at Samos the question of the oligarchy had already entered upon
a new phase, the following events having taken place just at the time
that the Four Hundred were conspiring. That part of the Samian
population which has been mentioned as rising against the upper class,
and as being the democratic party, had now turned round, and yielding
to the solicitations of Pisander during his visit, and of the Athenians
in the conspiracy at Samos, had bound themselves by oaths to the number
of three hundred, and were about to fall upon the rest of their fellow
citizens, whom they now in their turn regarded as the democratic party.
Meanwhile they put to death one Hyperbolus, an Athenian, a pestilent
fellow that had been ostracized, not from fear of his influence or
position, but because he was a rascal and a disgrace to the city; being
aided in this by Charminus, one of the generals, and by some of the
Athenians with them, to whom they had sworn friendship, and with whom
they perpetrated other acts of the kind, and now determined to attack
the people. The latter got wind of what was coming, and told two of the
generals, Leon and Diomedon, who, on account of the credit which they
enjoyed with the commons, were unwilling supporters of the oligarchy;
and also Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former a captain of a galley,
the latter serving with the heavy infantry, besides certain others who
had ever been thought most opposed to the conspirators, entreating them
not to look on and see them destroyed, and Samos, the sole remaining
stay of their empire, lost to the Athenians. Upon hearing this, the
persons whom they addressed now went round the soldiers one by one, and
urged them to resist, especially the crew of the Paralus, which was
made up entirely of Athenians and freemen, and had from time out of
mind been enemies of oligarchy, even when there was no such thing
existing; and Leon and Diomedon left behind some ships for their
protection in case of their sailing away anywhere themselves.
Accordingly, when the Three Hundred attacked the people, all these came
to the rescue, and foremost of all the crew of the Paralus; and the
Samian commons gained the victory, and putting to death some thirty of
the Three Hundred, and banishing three others of the ringleaders,
accorded an amnesty to the rest, and lived together under a democratic
government for the future.

The ship Paralus, with Chaereas, son of Archestratus, on board, an
Athenian who had taken an active part in the revolution, was now
without loss of time sent off by the Samians and the army to Athens to
report what had occurred; the fact that the Four Hundred were in power
not being yet known. When they sailed into harbour the Four Hundred
immediately arrested two or three of the Parali and, taking the vessel
from the rest, shifted them into a troopship and set them to keep guard
round Euboea. Chaereas, however, managed to secrete himself as soon as
he saw how things stood, and returning to Samos, drew a picture to the
soldiers of the horrors enacting at Athens, in which everything was
exaggerated; saying that all were punished with stripes, that no one
could say a word against the holders of power, that the soldiers’ wives
and children were outraged, and that it was intended to seize and shut
up the relatives of all in the army at Samos who were not of the
government’s way of thinking, to be put to death in case of their
disobedience; besides a host of other injurious inventions.

On hearing this the first thought of the army was to fall upon the
chief authors of the oligarchy and upon all the rest concerned.
Eventually, however, they desisted from this idea upon the men of
moderate views opposing it and warning them against ruining their
cause, with the enemy close at hand and ready for battle. After this,
Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the chief leaders in the
revolution, now wishing in the most public manner to change the
government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most
tremendous oaths, and those of the oligarchical party more than any, to
accept a democratic government, to be united, to prosecute actively the
war with the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four Hundred, and
to hold no communication with them. The same oath was also taken by all
the Samians of full age; and the soldiers associated the Samians in all
their affairs and in the fruits of their dangers, having the conviction
that there was no way of escape for themselves or for them, but that
the success of the Four Hundred or of the enemy at Miletus must be
their ruin.

The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy upon
the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp. Meanwhile
the soldiers forthwith held an assembly, in which they deposed the
former generals and any of the captains whom they suspected, and chose
new captains and generals to replace them, besides Thrasybulus and
Thrasyllus, whom they had already. They also stood up and encouraged
one another, and among other things urged that they ought not to lose
heart because the city had revolted from them, as the party seceding
was smaller and in every way poorer in resources than themselves. They
had the whole fleet with which to compel the other cities in their
empire to give them money just as if they had their base in the
capital, having a city in Samos which, so far from wanting strength,
had when at war been within an ace of depriving the Athenians of the
command of the sea, while as far as the enemy was concerned they had
the same base of operations as before. Indeed, with the fleet in their
hands, they were better able to provide themselves with supplies than
the government at home. It was their advanced position at Samos which
had throughout enabled the home authorities to command the entrance
into Piraeus; and if they refused to give them back the constitution,
they would now find that the army was more in a position to exclude
them from the sea than they were to exclude the army. Besides, the city
was of little or no use towards enabling them to overcome the enemy;
and they had lost nothing in losing those who had no longer either
money to send them (the soldiers having to find this for themselves),
or good counsel, which entitles cities to direct armies. On the
contrary, even in this the home government had done wrong in abolishing
the institutions of their ancestors, while the army maintained the said
institutions, and would try to force the home government to do so
likewise. So that even in point of good counsel the camp had as good
counsellors as the city. Moreover, they had but to grant him security
for his person and his recall, and Alcibiades would be only too glad to
procure them the alliance of the King. And above all if they failed
altogether, with the navy which they possessed, they had numbers of
places to retire to in which they would find cities and lands.

Debating together and comforting themselves after this manner, they
pushed on their war measures as actively as ever; and the ten envoys
sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood while
they were still at Delos, stayed quiet there.

About this time a cry arose a Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus that
Astyochus and Tissaphernes were ruining their cause. Astyochus had not
been willing to fight at sea—either before, while they were still in
full vigour and the fleet of the Athenians small, or now, when the
enemy was, as they were informed, in a state of sedition and his ships
not yet united—but kept them waiting for the Phoenician fleet from
Tissaphernes, which had only a nominal existence, at the risk of
wasting away in inactivity. While Tissaphernes not only did not bring
up the fleet in question, but was ruining their navy by payments made
irregularly, and even then not made in full. They must therefore, they
insisted, delay no longer, but fight a decisive naval engagement. The
Syracusans were the most urgent of any.

The confederates and Astyochus, aware of these murmurs, had already
decided in council to fight a decisive battle; and when the news
reached them of the disturbance at Samos, they put to sea with all
their ships, one hundred and ten in number, and, ordering the Milesians
to move by land upon Mycale, set sail thither. The Athenians with the
eighty-two ships from Samos were at the moment lying at Glauce in
Mycale, a point where Samos approaches near to the continent; and,
seeing the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them, retired into
Samos, not thinking themselves numerically strong enough to stake their
all upon a battle. Besides, they had notice from Miletus of the wish of
the enemy to engage, and were expecting to be joined from the
Hellespont by Strombichides, to whom a messenger had been already
dispatched, with the ships that had gone from Chios to Abydos. The
Athenians accordingly withdrew to Samos, and the Peloponnesians put in
at Mycale, and encamped with the land forces of the Milesians and the
people of the neighbourhood. The next day they were about to sail
against Samos, when tidings reached them of the arrival of
Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont, upon which they
immediately sailed back to Miletus. The Athenians, thus reinforced, now
in their turn sailed against Miletus with a hundred and eight ships,
wishing to fight a decisive battle, but, as no one put out to meet
them, sailed back to Samos.




CHAPTER XXVI


Twenty-first Year of the War—Recall of Alcibiades to Samos—Revolt of
Euboea and Downfall of the Four Hundred—Battle of Cynossema


In the same summer, immediately after this, the Peloponnesians having
refused to fight with their fleet united, through not thinking
themselves a match for the enemy, and being at a loss where to look for
money for such a number of ships, especially as Tissaphernes proved so
bad a paymaster, sent off Clearchus, son of Ramphias, with forty ships
to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the original instructions from
Peloponnese; Pharnabazus inviting them and being prepared to furnish
pay, and Byzantium besides sending offers to revolt to them. These
Peloponnesian ships accordingly put out into the open sea, in order to
escape the observation of the Athenians, and being overtaken by a
storm, the majority with Clearchus got into Delos, and afterwards
returned to Miletus, whence Clearchus proceeded by land to the
Hellespont to take the command: ten, however, of their number, under
the Megarian Helixus, made good their passage to the Hellespont, and
effected the revolt of Byzantium. After this, the commanders at Samos
were informed of it, and sent a squadron against them to guard the
Hellespont; and an encounter took place before Byzantium between eight
vessels on either side.

Meanwhile the chiefs at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who from the
moment that he had changed the government had remained firmly resolved
to recall Alcibiades, at last in an assembly brought over the mass of
the soldiery, and upon their voting for his recall and amnesty, sailed
over to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades to Samos, being convinced
that their only chance of salvation lay in his bringing over
Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to themselves. An assembly was
then held in which Alcibiades complained of and deplored his private
misfortune in having been banished, and speaking at great length upon
public affairs, highly incited their hopes for the future, and
extravagantly magnified his own influence with Tissaphernes. His object
in this was to make the oligarchical government at Athens afraid of
him, to hasten the dissolution of the clubs, to increase his credit
with the army at Samos and heighten their own confidence, and lastly to
prejudice the enemy as strongly as possible against Tissaphernes, and
blast the hopes which they entertained. Alcibiades accordingly held out
to the army such extravagant promises as the following: that
Tissaphernes had solemnly assured him that if he could only trust the
Athenians they should never want for supplies while he had anything
left, no, not even if he should have to coin his own silver couch, and
that he would bring the Phoenician fleet now at Aspendus to the
Athenians instead of to the Peloponnesians; but that he could only
trust the Athenians if Alcibiades were recalled to be his security for
them.

Upon hearing this and much more besides, the Athenians at once elected
him general together with the former ones, and put all their affairs
into his hands. There was now not a man in the army who would have
exchanged his present hopes of safety and vengeance upon the Four
Hundred for any consideration whatever; and after what they had been
told they were now inclined to disdain the enemy before them, and to
sail at once for Piraeus. To the plan of sailing for Piraeus, leaving
their more immediate enemies behind them, Alcibiades opposed the most
positive refusal, in spite of the numbers that insisted upon it, saying
that now that he had been elected general he would first sail to
Tissaphernes and concert with him measures for carrying on the war.
Accordingly, upon leaving this assembly, he immediately took his
departure in order to have it thought that there was an entire
confidence between them, and also wishing to increase his consideration
with Tissaphernes, and to show that he had now been elected general and
was in a position to do him good or evil as he chose; thus managing to
frighten the Athenians with Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes with the
Athenians.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of
Alcibiades and, already distrustful of Tissaphernes, now became far
more disgusted with him than ever. Indeed after their refusal to go out
and give battle to the Athenians when they appeared before Miletus,
Tissaphernes had grown slacker than ever in his payments; and even
before this, on account of Alcibiades, his unpopularity had been on the
increase. Gathering together, just as before, the soldiers and some
persons of consideration besides the soldiery began to reckon up how
they had never yet received their pay in full; that what they did
receive was small in quantity, and even that paid irregularly, and that
unless they fought a decisive battle or removed to some station where
they could get supplies, the ships’ crews would desert; and that it was
all the fault of Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his own
private advantage.

The army was engaged in these reflections, when the following
disturbance took place about the person of Astyochus. Most of the
Syracusan and Thurian sailors were freemen, and these the freest crews
in the armament were likewise the boldest in setting upon Astyochus and
demanding their pay. The latter answered somewhat stiffly and
threatened them, and when Dorieus spoke up for his own sailors even
went so far as to lift his baton against him; upon seeing which the
mass of men, in sailor fashion, rushed in a fury to strike Astyochus.
He, however, saw them in time and fled for refuge to an altar; and they
were thus parted without his being struck. Meanwhile the fort built by
Tissaphernes in Miletus was surprised and taken by the Milesians, and
the garrison in it turned out—an act which met with the approval of the
rest of the allies, and in particular of the Syracusans, but which
found no favour with Lichas, who said moreover that the Milesians and
the rest in the King’s country ought to show a reasonable submission to
Tissaphernes and to pay him court, until the war should be happily
settled. The Milesians were angry with him for this and for other
things of the kind, and upon his afterwards dying of sickness, would
not allow him to be buried where the Lacedaemonians with the army
desired.

The discontent of the army with Astyochus and Tissaphernes had reached
this pitch, when Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon to succeed Astyochus
as admiral, and assumed the command. Astyochus now set sail for home;
and Tissaphernes sent with him one of his confidants, Gaulites, a
Carian, who spoke the two languages, to complain of the Milesians for
the affair of the fort, and at the same time to defend himself against
the Milesians, who were, as he was aware, on their way to Sparta
chiefly to denounce his conduct, and had with them Hermocrates, who was
to accuse Tissaphernes of joining with Alcibiades to ruin the
Peloponnesian cause and of playing a double game. Indeed Hermocrates
had always been at enmity with him about the pay not being restored in
full; and eventually when he was banished from Syracuse, and new
commanders—Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus—had come out to Miletus to
the ships of the Syracusans, Tissaphernes, pressed harder than ever
upon him in his exile, and among other charges against him accused him
of having once asked him for money, and then given himself out as his
enemy because he failed to obtain it.

While Astyochus and the Milesians and Hermocrates made sail for
Lacedaemon, Alcibiades had now crossed back from Tissaphernes to Samos.
After his return the envoys of the Four Hundred sent, as has been
mentioned above, to pacify and explain matters to the forces at Samos,
arrived from Delos; and an assembly was held in which they attempted to
speak. The soldiers at first would not hear them, and cried out to put
to death the subverters of the democracy, but at last, after some
difficulty, calmed down and gave them a hearing. Upon this the envoys
proceeded to inform them that the recent change had been made to save
the city, and not to ruin it or to deliver it over to the enemy, for
they had already had an opportunity of doing this when he invaded the
country during their government; that all the Five Thousand would have
their proper share in the government; and that their hearers’ relatives
had neither outrage, as Chaereas had slanderously reported, nor other
ill treatment to complain of, but were all in undisturbed enjoyment of
their property just as they had left them. Besides these they made a
number of other statements which had no better success with their angry
auditors; and amid a host of different opinions the one which found
most favour was that of sailing to Piraeus. Now it was that Alcibiades
for the first time did the state a service, and one of the most signal
kind. For when the Athenians at Samos were bent upon sailing against
their countrymen, in which case Ionia and the Hellespont would most
certainly at once have passed into possession of the enemy, Alcibiades
it was who prevented them. At that moment, when no other man would have
been able to hold back the multitude, he put a stop to the intended
expedition, and rebuked and turned aside the resentment felt, on
personal grounds, against the envoys; he dismissed them with an answer
from himself, to the effect that he did not object to the government of
the Five Thousand, but insisted that the Four Hundred should be deposed
and the Council of Five Hundred reinstated in power: meanwhile any
retrenchments for economy, by which pay might be better found for the
armament, met with his entire approval. Generally, he bade them hold
out and show a bold face to the enemy, since if the city were saved
there was good hope that the two parties might some day be reconciled,
whereas if either were once destroyed, that at Samos, or that at
Athens, there would no longer be any one to be reconciled to. Meanwhile
arrived envoys from the Argives, with offers of support to the Athenian
commons at Samos: these were thanked by Alcibiades, and dismissed with
a request to come when called upon. The Argives were accompanied by the
crew of the Paralus, whom we left placed in a troopship by the Four
Hundred with orders to cruise round Euboea, and who being employed to
carry to Lacedaemon some Athenian envoys sent by the Four
Hundred—Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias—as they sailed by Argos
laid hands upon the envoys, and delivering them over to the Argives as
the chief subverters of the democracy, themselves, instead of returning
to Athens, took the Argive envoys on board, and came to Samos in the
galley which had been confided to them.

The same summer at the time that the return of Alcibiades coupled with
the general conduct of Tissaphernes had carried to its height the
discontent of the Peloponnesians, who no longer entertained any doubt
of his having joined the Athenians, Tissaphernes wishing, it would
seem, to clear himself to them of these charges, prepared to go after
the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus, and invited Lichas to go with him;
saying that he would appoint Tamos as his lieutenant to provide pay for
the armament during his own absence. Accounts differ, and it is not
easy to ascertain with what intention he went to Aspendus, and did not
bring the fleet after all. That one hundred and forty-seven Phoenician
ships came as far as Aspendus is certain; but why they did not come on
has been variously accounted for. Some think that he went away in
pursuance of his plan of wasting the Peloponnesian resources, since at
any rate Tamos, his lieutenant, far from being any better, proved a
worse paymaster than himself: others that he brought the Phoenicians to
Aspendus to exact money from them for their discharge, having never
intended to employ them: others again that it was in view of the outcry
against him at Lacedaemon, in order that it might be said that he was
not in fault, but that the ships were really manned and that he had
certainly gone to fetch them. To myself it seems only too evident that
he did not bring up the fleet because he wished to wear out and
paralyse the Hellenic forces, that is, to waste their strength by the
time lost during his journey to Aspendus, and to keep them evenly
balanced by not throwing his weight into either scale. Had he wished to
finish the war, he could have done so, assuming of course that he made
his appearance in a way which left no room for doubt; as by bringing up
the fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to the
Lacedaemonians, whose navy, even as it was, faced the Athenian more as
an equal than as an inferior. But what convicts him most clearly, is
the excuse which he put forward for not bringing the ships. He said
that the number assembled was less than the King had ordered; but
surely it would only have enhanced his credit if he spent little of the
King’s money and effected the same end at less cost. In any case,
whatever was his intention, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and saw the
Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians at his desire sent a Lacedaemonian
called Philip with two galleys to fetch the fleet.

Alcibiades finding that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, himself
sailed thither with thirteen ships, promising to do a great and certain
service to the Athenians at Samos, as he would either bring the
Phoenician fleet to the Athenians, or at all events prevent its joining
the Peloponnesians. In all probability he had long known that
Tissaphernes never meant to bring the fleet at all, and wished to
compromise him as much as possible in the eyes of the Peloponnesians
through his apparent friendship for himself and the Athenians, and thus
in a manner to oblige him to join their side.

While Alcibiades weighed anchor and sailed eastward straight for
Phaselis and Caunus, the envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Samos
arrived at Athens. Upon their delivering the message from Alcibiades,
telling them to hold out and to show a firm front to the enemy, and
saying that he had great hopes of reconciling them with the army and of
overcoming the Peloponnesians, the majority of the members of the
oligarchy, who were already discontented and only too much inclined to
be quit of the business in any safe way that they could, were at once
greatly strengthened in their resolve. These now banded together and
strongly criticized the administration, their leaders being some of the
principal generals and men in office under the oligarchy, such as
Theramenes, son of Hagnon, Aristocrates, son of Scellias, and others;
who, although among the most prominent members of the government (being
afraid, as they said, of the army at Samos, and most especially of
Alcibiades, and also lest the envoys whom they had sent to Lacedaemon
might do the state some harm without the authority of the people),
without insisting on objections to the excessive concentration of power
in a few hands, yet urged that the Five Thousand must be shown to exist
not merely in name but in reality, and the constitution placed upon a
fairer basis. But this was merely their political cry; most of them
being driven by private ambition into the line of conduct so surely
fatal to oligarchies that arise out of democracies. For all at once
pretend to be not only equals but each the chief and master of his
fellows; while under a democracy a disappointed candidate accepts his
defeat more easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten
by his equals. But what most clearly encouraged the malcontents was the
power of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own disbelief in the stability
of the oligarchy; and it was now a race between them as to which should
first become the leader of the commons.

Meanwhile the leaders and members of the Four Hundred most opposed to a
democratic form of government—Phrynichus who had had the quarrel with
Alcibiades during his command at Samos, Aristarchus the bitter and
inveterate enemy of the commons, and Pisander and Antiphon and others
of the chiefs who already as soon as they entered upon power, and again
when the army at Samos seceded from them and declared for a democracy,
had sent envoys from their own body to Lacedaemon and made every effort
for peace, and had built the wall in Eetionia—now redoubled their
exertions when their envoys returned from Samos, and they saw not only
the people but their own most trusted associates turning against them.
Alarmed at the state of things at Athens as at Samos, they now sent off
in haste Antiphon and Phrynichus and ten others with injunctions to
make peace with Lacedaemon upon any terms, no matter what, that should
be at all tolerable. Meanwhile they pushed on more actively than ever
with the wall in Eetionia. Now the meaning of this wall, according to
Theramenes and his supporters, was not so much to keep out the army of
Samos, in case of its trying to force its way into Piraeus, as to be
able to let in, at pleasure, the fleet and army of the enemy. For
Eetionia is a mole of Piraeus, close alongside of the entrance of the
harbour, and was now fortified in connection with the wall already
existing on the land side, so that a few men placed in it might be able
to command the entrance; the old wall on the land side and the new one
now being built within on the side of the sea, both ending in one of
the two towers standing at the narrow mouth of the harbour. They also
walled off the largest porch in Piraeus which was in immediate
connection with this wall, and kept it in their own hands, compelling
all to unload there the corn that came into the harbour, and what they
had in stock, and to take it out from thence when they sold it.

These measures had long provoked the murmurs of Theramenes, and when
the envoys returned from Lacedaemon without having effected any general
pacification, he affirmed that this wall was like to prove the ruin of
the state. At this moment forty-two ships from Peloponnese, including
some Siceliot and Italiot vessels from Locri and Tarentum, had been
invited over by the Euboeans and were already riding off Las in Laconia
preparing for the voyage to Euboea, under the command of Agesandridas,
son of Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes now affirmed that this squadron
was destined not so much to aid Euboea as the party fortifying
Eetionia, and that unless precautions were speedily taken the city
would be surprised and lost. This was no mere calumny, there being
really some such plan entertained by the accused. Their first wish was
to have the oligarchy without giving up the empire; failing this to
keep their ships and walls and be independent; while, if this also were
denied them, sooner than be the first victims of the restored
democracy, they were resolved to call in the enemy and make peace, give
up their walls and ships, and at all costs retain possession of the
government, if their lives were only assured to them.

For this reason they pushed forward the construction of their work with
posterns and entrances and means of introducing the enemy, being eager
to have it finished in time. Meanwhile the murmurs against them were at
first confined to a few persons and went on in secret, until
Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon, was laid
wait for and stabbed in full market by one of the Peripoli, falling
down dead before he had gone far from the council chamber. The assassin
escaped; but his accomplice, an Argive, was taken and put to the
torture by the Four Hundred, without their being able to extract from
him the name of his employer, or anything further than that he knew of
many men who used to assemble at the house of the commander of the
Peripoli and at other houses. Here the matter was allowed to drop. This
so emboldened Theramenes and Aristocrates and the rest of their
partisans in the Four Hundred and out of doors, that they now resolved
to act. For by this time the ships had sailed round from Las, and
anchoring at Epidaurus had overrun Aegina; and Theramenes asserted
that, being bound for Euboea, they would never have sailed in to Aegina
and come back to anchor at Epidaurus, unless they had been invited to
come to aid in the designs of which he had always accused the
government. Further inaction had therefore now become impossible. In
the end, after a great many seditious harangues and suspicions, they
set to work in real earnest. The heavy infantry in Piraeus building the
wall in Eetionia, among whom was Aristocrates, a colonel, with his own
tribe, laid hands upon Alexicles, a general under the oligarchy and the
devoted adherent of the cabal, and took him into a house and confined
him there. In this they were assisted by one Hermon, commander of the
Peripoli in Munychia, and others, and above all had with them the great
bulk of the heavy infantry. As soon as the news reached the Four
Hundred, who happened to be sitting in the council chamber, all except
the disaffected wished at once to go to the posts where the arms were,
and menaced Theramenes and his party. Theramenes defended himself, and
said that he was ready immediately to go and help to rescue Alexicles;
and taking with him one of the generals belonging to his party, went
down to Piraeus, followed by Aristarchus and some young men of the
cavalry. All was now panic and confusion. Those in the city imagined
that Piraeus was already taken and the prisoner put to death, while
those in Piraeus expected every moment to be attacked by the party in
the city. The older men, however, stopped the persons running up and
down the town and making for the stands of arms; and Thucydides the
Pharsalian, proxenus of the city, came forward and threw himself in the
way of the rival factions, and appealed to them not to ruin the state,
while the enemy was still at hand waiting for his opportunity, and so
at length succeeded in quieting them and in keeping their hands off
each other. Meanwhile Theramenes came down to Piraeus, being himself
one of the generals, and raged and stormed against the heavy infantry,
while Aristarchus and the adversaries of the people were angry in right
earnest. Most of the heavy infantry, however, went on with the business
without faltering, and asked Theramenes if he thought the wall had been
constructed for any good purpose, and whether it would not be better
that it should be pulled down. To this he answered that if they thought
it best to pull it down, he for his part agreed with them. Upon this
the heavy infantry and a number of the people in Piraeus immediately
got up on the fortification and began to demolish it. Now their cry to
the multitude was that all should join in the work who wished the Five
Thousand to govern instead of the Four Hundred. For instead of saying
in so many words “all who wished the commons to govern,” they still
disguised themselves under the name of the Five Thousand; being afraid
that these might really exist, and that they might be speaking to one
of their number and get into trouble through ignorance. Indeed this was
why the Four Hundred neither wished the Five Thousand to exist, nor to
have it known that they did not exist; being of opinion that to give
themselves so many partners in empire would be downright democracy,
while the mystery in question would make the people afraid of one
another.

The next day the Four Hundred, although alarmed, nevertheless assembled
in the council chamber, while the heavy infantry in Piraeus, after
having released their prisoner Alexicles and pulled down the
fortification, went with their arms to the theatre of Dionysus, close
to Munychia, and there held an assembly in which they decided to march
into the city, and setting forth accordingly halted in the Anaceum.
Here they were joined by some delegates from the Four Hundred, who
reasoned with them one by one, and persuaded those whom they saw to be
the most moderate to remain quiet themselves, and to keep in the rest;
saying that they would make known the Five Thousand, and have the Four
Hundred chosen from them in rotation, as should be decided by the Five
Thousand, and meanwhile entreated them not to ruin the state or drive
it into the arms of the enemy. After a great many had spoken and had
been spoken to, the whole body of heavy infantry became calmer than
before, absorbed by their fears for the country at large, and now
agreed to hold upon an appointed day an assembly in the theatre of
Dionysus for the restoration of concord.

When the day came for the assembly in the theatre, and they were upon
the point of assembling, news arrived that the forty-two ships under
Agesandridas were sailing from Megara along the coast of Salamis. The
people to a man now thought that it was just what Theramenes and his
party had so often said, that the ships were sailing to the
fortification, and concluded that they had done well to demolish it.
But though it may possibly have been by appointment that Agesandridas
hovered about Epidaurus and the neighbourhood, he would also naturally
be kept there by the hope of an opportunity arising out of the troubles
in the town. In any case the Athenians, on receipt of the news
immediately ran down in mass to Piraeus, seeing themselves threatened
by the enemy with a worse war than their war among themselves, not at a
distance, but close to the harbour of Athens. Some went on board the
ships already afloat, while others launched fresh vessels, or ran to
defend the walls and the mouth of the harbour.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesian vessels sailed by, and rounding Sunium
anchored between Thoricus and Prasiae, and afterwards arrived at
Oropus. The Athenians, with revolution in the city, and unwilling to
lose a moment in going to the relief of their most important possession
(for Euboea was everything to them now that they were shut out from
Attica), were compelled to put to sea in haste and with untrained
crews, and sent Thymochares with some vessels to Eretria. These upon
their arrival, with the ships already in Euboea, made up a total of
thirty-six vessels, and were immediately forced to engage. For
Agesandridas, after his crews had dined, put out from Oropus, which is
about seven miles from Eretria by sea; and the Athenians, seeing him
sailing up, immediately began to man their vessels. The sailors,
however, instead of being by their ships, as they supposed, were gone
away to purchase provisions for their dinner in the houses in the
outskirts of the town; the Eretrians having so arranged that there
should be nothing on sale in the marketplace, in order that the
Athenians might be a long time in manning their ships, and, the enemy’s
attack taking them by surprise, might be compelled to put to sea just
as they were. A signal also was raised in Eretria to give them notice
in Oropus when to put to sea. The Athenians, forced to put out so
poorly prepared, engaged off the harbour of Eretria, and after holding
their own for some little while notwithstanding, were at length put to
flight and chased to the shore. Such of their number as took refuge in
Eretria, which they presumed to be friendly to them, found their fate
in that city, being butchered by the inhabitants; while those who fled
to the Athenian fort in the Eretrian territory, and the vessels which
got to Chalcis, were saved. The Peloponnesians, after taking twenty-two
Athenian ships, and killing or making prisoners of the crews, set up a
trophy, and not long afterwards effected the revolt of the whole of
Euboea (except Oreus, which was held by the Athenians themselves), and
made a general settlement of the affairs of the island.

When the news of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens, a panic
ensued such as they had never before known. Neither the disaster in
Sicily, great as it seemed at the time, nor any other had ever so much
alarmed them. The camp at Samos was in revolt; they had no more ships
or men to man them; they were at discord among themselves and might at
any moment come to blows; and a disaster of this magnitude coming on
the top of all, by which they lost their fleet, and worst of all
Euboea, which was of more value to them than Attica, could not occur
without throwing them into the deepest despondency. Meanwhile their
greatest and most immediate trouble was the possibility that the enemy,
emboldened by his victory, might make straight for them and sail
against Piraeus, which they had no longer ships to defend; and every
moment they expected him to arrive. This, with a little more courage,
he might easily have done, in which case he would either have increased
the dissensions of the city by his presence, or, if he had stayed to
besiege it, have compelled the fleet from Ionia, although the enemy of
the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their country and of their
relatives, and in the meantime would have become master of the
Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and of everything as far as Euboea, or,
to speak roundly, of the whole Athenian empire. But here, as on so many
other occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people
in the world for the Athenians to be at war with. The wide difference
between the two characters, the slowness and want of energy of the
Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and enterprise of their
opponents, proved of the greatest service, especially to a maritime
empire like Athens. Indeed this was shown by the Syracusans, who were
most like the Athenians in character, and also most successful in
combating them.

Nevertheless, upon receipt of the news, the Athenians manned twenty
ships and called immediately a first assembly in the Pnyx, where they
had been used to meet formerly, and deposed the Four Hundred and voted
to hand over the government to the Five Thousand, of which body all who
furnished a suit of armour were to be members, decreeing also that no
one should receive pay for the discharge of any office, or if he did
should be held accursed. Many other assemblies were held afterwards, in
which law-makers were elected and all other measures taken to form a
constitution. It was during the first period of this constitution that
the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government that they ever
did, at least in my time. For the fusion of the high and the low was
effected with judgment, and this was what first enabled the state to
raise up her head after her manifold disasters. They also voted for the
recall of Alcibiades and of other exiles, and sent to him and to the
camp at Samos, and urged them to devote themselves vigorously to the
war.

Upon this revolution taking place, the party of Pisander and Alexicles
and the chiefs of the oligarchs immediately withdrew to Decelea, with
the single exception of Aristarchus, one of the generals, who hastily
took some of the most barbarian of the archers and marched to Oenoe.
This was a fort of the Athenians upon the Boeotian border, at that
moment besieged by the Corinthians, irritated by the loss of a party
returning from Decelea, who had been cut off by the garrison. The
Corinthians had volunteered for this service, and had called upon the
Boeotians to assist them. After communicating with them, Aristarchus
deceived the garrison in Oenoe by telling them that their countrymen in
the city had compounded with the Lacedaemonians, and that one of the
terms of the capitulation was that they must surrender the place to the
Boeotians. The garrison believed him as he was general, and besides
knew nothing of what had occurred owing to the siege, and so evacuated
the fort under truce. In this way the Boeotians gained possession of
Oenoe, and the oligarchy and the troubles at Athens ended.

To return to the Peloponnesians in Miletus. No pay was forthcoming from
any of the agents deputed by Tissaphernes for that purpose upon his
departure for Aspendus; neither the Phoenician fleet nor Tissaphernes
showed any signs of appearing, and Philip, who had been sent with him,
and another Spartan, Hippocrates, who was at Phaselis, wrote word to
Mindarus, the admiral, that the ships were not coming at all, and that
they were being grossly abused by Tissaphernes. Meanwhile Pharnabazus
was inviting them to come, and making every effort to get the fleet
and, like Tissaphernes, to cause the revolt of the cities in his
government still subject to Athens, founding great hopes on his
success; until at length, at about the period of the summer which we
have now reached, Mindarus yielded to his importunities, and, with
great order and at a moment’s notice, in order to elude the enemy at
Samos, weighed anchor with seventy-three ships from Miletus and set
sail for the Hellespont. Thither sixteen vessels had already preceded
him in the same summer, and had overrun part of the Chersonese. Being
caught in a storm, Mindarus was compelled to run in to Icarus and,
after being detained five or six days there by stress of weather,
arrived at Chios.

Meanwhile Thrasyllus had heard of his having put out from Miletus, and
immediately set sail with fifty-five ships from Samos, in haste to
arrive before him in the Hellespont. But learning that he was at Chios,
and expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts in Lesbos and
on the continent opposite to prevent the fleet moving without his
knowing it, and himself coasted along to Methymna, and gave orders to
prepare meal and other necessaries, in order to attack them from Lesbos
in the event of their remaining for any length of time at Chios.
Meanwhile he resolved to sail against Eresus, a town in Lesbos which
had revolted, and, if he could, to take it. For some of the principal
Methymnian exiles had carried over about fifty heavy infantry, their
sworn associates, from Cuma, and hiring others from the continent, so
as to make up three hundred in all, chose Anaxander, a Theban, to
command them, on account of the community of blood existing between the
Thebans and the Lesbians, and first attacked Methymna. Balked in this
attempt by the advance of the Athenian guards from Mitylene, and
repulsed a second time in a battle outside the city, they then crossed
the mountain and effected the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus accordingly
determined to go there with all his ships and to attack the place.
Meanwhile Thrasybulus had preceded him thither with five ships from
Samos, as soon as he heard that the exiles had crossed over, and coming
too late to save Eresus, went on and anchored before the town. Here
they were joined also by two vessels on their way home from the
Hellespont, and by the ships of the Methymnians, making a grand total
of sixty-seven vessels; and the forces on board now made ready with
engines and every other means available to do their utmost to storm
Eresus.

In the meantime Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after
taking provisions for two days and receiving three Chian pieces of
money for each man from the Chians, on the third day put out in haste
from the island; in order to avoid falling in with the ships at Eresus,
they did not make for the open sea, but keeping Lesbos on their left,
sailed for the continent. After touching at the port of Carteria, in
the Phocaeid, and dining, they went on along the Cumaean coast and
supped at Arginusae, on the continent over against Mitylene. From
thence they continued their voyage along the coast, although it was
late in the night, and arriving at Harmatus on the continent opposite
Methymna, dined there; and swiftly passing Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus,
and the neighbouring towns, arrived a little before midnight at
Rhoeteum. Here they were now in the Hellespont. Some of the ships also
put in at Sigeum and at other places in the neighbourhood.

Meanwhile the warnings of the fire signals and the sudden increase in
the number of fires on the enemy’s shore informed the eighteen Athenian
ships at Sestos of the approach of the Peloponnesian fleet. That very
night they set sail in haste just as they were, and, hugging the shore
of the Chersonese, coasted along to Elaeus, in order to sail out into
the open sea away from the fleet of the enemy.

After passing unobserved the sixteen ships at Abydos, which had
nevertheless been warned by their approaching friends to be on the
alert to prevent their sailing out, at dawn they sighted the fleet of
Mindarus, which immediately gave chase. All had not time to get away;
the greater number however escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, while four of
the hindmost were overtaken off Elaeus. One of these was stranded
opposite to the temple of Protesilaus and taken with its crew, two
others without their crews; the fourth was abandoned on the shore of
Imbros and burned by the enemy.

After this the Peloponnesians were joined by the squadron from Abydos,
which made up their fleet to a grand total of eighty-six vessels; they
spent the day in unsuccessfully besieging Elaeus, and then sailed back
to Abydos. Meanwhile the Athenians, deceived by their scouts, and never
dreaming of the enemy’s fleet getting by undetected, were tranquilly
besieging Eresus. As soon as they heard the news they instantly
abandoned Eresus, and made with all speed for the Hellespont, and after
taking two of the Peloponnesian ships which had been carried out too
far into the open sea in the ardour of the pursuit and now fell in
their way, the next day dropped anchor at Elaeus, and, bringing back
the ships that had taken refuge at Imbros, during five days prepared
for the coming engagement.

After this they engaged in the following way. The Athenians formed in
column and sailed close alongshore to Sestos; upon perceiving which the
Peloponnesians put out from Abydos to meet them. Realizing that a
battle was now imminent, both combatants extended their flank; the
Athenians along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani with seventy-six
ships; the Peloponnesians from Abydos to Dardanus with eighty-six. The
Peloponnesian right wing was occupied by the Syracusans, their left by
Mindarus in person with the best sailers in the navy; the Athenian left
by Thrasyllus, their right by Thrasybulus, the other commanders being
in different parts of the fleet. The Peloponnesians hastened to engage
first, and outflanking with their left the Athenian right sought to cut
them off, if possible, from sailing out of the straits, and to drive
their centre upon the shore, which was not far off. The Athenians
perceiving their intention extended their own wing and outsailed them,
while their left had by this time passed the point of Cynossema. This,
however, obliged them to thin and weaken their centre, especially as
they had fewer ships than the enemy, and as the coast round Point
Cynossema formed a sharp angle which prevented their seeing what was
going on on the other side of it.

The Peloponnesians now attacked their centre and drove ashore the ships
of the Athenians, and disembarked to follow up their victory. No help
could be given to the centre either by the squadron of Thrasybulus on
the right, on account of the number of ships attacking him, or by that
of Thrasyllus on the left, from whom the point of Cynossema hid what
was going on, and who was also hindered by his Syracusan and other
opponents, whose numbers were fully equal to his own. At length,
however, the Peloponnesians in the confidence of victory began to
scatter in pursuit of the ships of the enemy, and allowed a
considerable part of their fleet to get into disorder. On seeing this
the squadron of Thrasybulus discontinued their lateral movement and,
facing about, attacked and routed the ships opposed to them, and next
fell roughly upon the scattered vessels of the victorious Peloponnesian
division, and put most of them to flight without a blow. The Syracusans
also had by this time given way before the squadron of Thrasyllus, and
now openly took to flight upon seeing the flight of their comrades.

The rout was now complete. Most of the Peloponnesians fled for refuge
first to the river Midius, and afterwards to Abydos. Only a few ships
were taken by the Athenians; as owing to the narrowness of the
Hellespont the enemy had not far to go to be in safety. Nevertheless
nothing could have been more opportune for them than this victory. Up
to this time they had feared the Peloponnesian fleet, owing to a number
of petty losses and to the disaster in Sicily; but they now ceased to
mistrust themselves or any longer to think their enemies good for
anything at sea. Meanwhile they took from the enemy eight Chian
vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian, one Leucadian,
Lacedaemonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, losing fifteen of their own.
After setting up a trophy upon Point Cynossema, securing the wrecks,
and restoring to the enemy his dead under truce, they sent off a galley
to Athens with the news of their victory. The arrival of this vessel
with its unhoped-for good news, after the recent disasters of Euboea,
and in the revolution at Athens, gave fresh courage to the Athenians,
and caused them to believe that if they put their shoulders to the
wheel their cause might yet prevail.

On the fourth day after the sea-fight the Athenians in Sestos having
hastily refitted their ships sailed against Cyzicus, which had
revolted. Off Harpagium and Priapus they sighted at anchor the eight
vessels from Byzantium, and, sailing up and routing the troops on
shore, took the ships, and then went on and recovered the town of
Cyzicus, which was unfortified, and levied money from the citizens. In
the meantime the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus, and
recovered such of their captured galleys as were still uninjured, the
rest having been burned by the Elaeusians, and sent Hippocrates and
Epicles to Euboea to fetch the squadron from that island.

About the same time Alcibiades returned with his thirteen ships from
Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, bringing word that he had prevented the
Phoenician fleet from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made
Tissaphernes more friendly to the Athenians than before. Alcibiades now
manned nine more ships, and levied large sums of money from the
Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After doing this and placing a
governor in Cos, he sailed back to Samos, autumn being now at hand.
Meanwhile Tissaphernes, upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet had
sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, set off again back from
Aspendus, and made all sail for Ionia. While the Peloponnesians were in
the Hellespont, the Antandrians, a people of Aeolic extraction,
conveyed by land across Mount Ida some heavy infantry from Abydos, and
introduced them into the town; having been ill-treated by Arsaces, the
Persian lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This same Arsaces had, upon
pretence of a secret quarrel, invited the chief men of the Delians to
undertake military service (these were Delians who had settled at
Atramyttium after having been driven from their homes by the Athenians
for the sake of purifying Delos); and after drawing them out from their
town as his friends and allies, had laid wait for them at dinner, and
surrounded them and caused them to be shot down by his soldiers. This
deed made the Antandrians fear that he might some day do them some
mischief; and as he also laid upon them burdens too heavy for them to
bear, they expelled his garrison from their citadel.

Tissaphernes, upon hearing of this act of the Peloponnesians in
addition to what had occurred at Miletus and Cnidus, where his
garrisons had been also expelled, now saw that the breach between them
was serious; and fearing further injury from them, and being also vexed
to think that Pharnabazus should receive them, and in less time and at
less cost perhaps succeed better against Athens than he had done,
determined to rejoin them in the Hellespont, in order to complain of
the events at Antandros and excuse himself as best he could in the
matter of the Phoenician fleet and of the other charges against him.
Accordingly he went first to Ephesus and offered sacrifice to
Artemis....

[When the winter after this summer is over the twenty-first year of
this war will be completed. ]

THE END






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