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Title: Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism

Author: Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki

Release date: February 3, 2025 [eBook #75283]

Language: English

Original publication: Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1908

Credits: an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OUTLINES OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM ***





 OUTLINES
 OF
 MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

 BY
 DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI




 CHICAGO
 THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY
 1908




 PREFACE.

{v}

The object of this book is twofold: (1) To refute the many wrong
opinions which are entertained by Western critics concerning the
fundamental teachings of Mahâyâna Buddhism; (2) To awake interest
among scholars of comparative religion in the development of the
religious sentiment and faith as exemplified by the growth of one of
the most powerful spiritual forces in the world. The book is therefore
at once popular and scholarly. It is popular in the sense that it
tries to expose the fallacy of the general attitude assumed by other
religionists towards Mahâyânism. It aims to be scholarly, on the
other hand, when it endeavors to expound some of the most salient
features of the doctrine, historically and systematically.

In attempting the accomplishment of this latter object, however, the
author makes no great claim, because it is impossible to present
within this prescribed space all the data that are available for a
comprehensive and systematic elucidation of the Mahâyâna Buddhism,
whose history began in the sixth century before the Christian era and
ran through a period of more than two thousand years before it assumed
the form in which it is at present taught in the Orient. During this
long period, the Mahâyâna {vi} doctrine was elaborated by the best
minds that India, Tibet, China, and Japan ever produced. It is no
wonder then that so many diverse and apparently contradictory
teachings are all comprised under the general name of Mahâyâna
Buddhism. To expound all these theories even tentatively would be
altogether outside the scope of such a work as this. All that I could
or hoped to do was to discuss a few of the most general and most
essential topics of Mahâyânism, making this a sort of introduction
to a more detailed exposition of the system as a whole as well as in
particular.

To attain the first object, I have gone occasionally outside the
sphere within which I had properly to confine the work. But this
deviation seemed imperative for the reason that some critics are so
prejudiced that even seemingly self-evident truths are not comprehended
by them. I may be prejudiced in my own way, but very frequently I have
wondered how completely and how wretchedly some people can be made the
prey of self-delusion.

The doctrinal history of Mahâyâna Buddhism is very little known to
Occidental scholars. This is mainly due to the inaccessibility of
material which is largely written in the Chinese tongue, one of the
most difficult of languages for foreigners to master. In this age of
liberal culture, it is a great pity that so few of the precious stones
contained in the religion of Buddha are obtainable by Western people.
Human nature is essentially the same the world over, and {vii}
whenever and wherever conditions mature we see the same spiritual
phenomena; and this fact ever strengthens our faith in the universality
of truth and in the ultimate reign of lovingkindness. It is my sincere
desire that in so far as my intellectual attainment permits I shall be
allowed to pursue my study and to share my findings with my
fellow-beings.

In concluding this prelude, the author wishes to say that this little
book is presented to the public with a full knowledge of its many
defects, to revise which he will not fail to make use of every
opportunity offered him.

                                        /Daisetz T. Suzuki/.

{viii}




 CONTENTS.

{ix}

Preface

Introduction

(1) _The Mahâyâna and Hînayâna Buddhism._ Why the Two Doctrines?--The
Original Meaning of Mahâyâna.--An Older Classification of
Buddhists.--Mahâyâna Buddhism defined.

(2) _Is the Mahâyâna Buddhism the genuine teaching of Buddha?_ No Life
Without Growth.--Mahâyânism a Living Religion.

(3) _Some Misstatements about the Mahâyânism._ Why Injustice Done to
Buddhism.--Examples of Injustice.--Monier
Monier-Williams.--Beal.--Waddell.

(4) _The Significance of Religion._ No Revealed Religion.--The
Mystery.--Intellect and Imagination.--The Contents of Faith vary.

Chapter I. A General Characterisation of Buddhism.

No God and No Soul.--Karma.--Avidyâ.--Non-âtman.--The Non-âtmanness of
Things.--Dharmakâya.--Nirvâna.--Intellectual Tendency of Buddhism.

Chapter II. Historical Characterisation of Mahâyânism.

Sthiramati’s Conception of Mahâyânism.--Seven Principal Features of
Mahâyânism.--Ten Essential Features of Mahâyânism.

{x}

Speculative Mahâyânism.

Chapter III. Practice and Speculation.

Relation of Feeling and Intellect.--Buddhism and Speculation.--Religion
and Metaphysics.

Chapter IV. Classification of Knowledge.

Three Forms of Knowledge.--Illusion.--Relative Knowledge.--Absolute
Knowledge.--World-Views founded on the three Forms of
Knowledge.--Two Forms of Knowledge.--Transcendental Truth and Relative
Understanding.

Chapter V. Bhûtatathâtâ (Suchness).

Indefinability.--The “Thundrous Silence.”--Suchness
Conditioned.--Questions Defying Solution.--The Theory of
Ignorance.--Dualism and Moral Evil.

Chapter VI. The Tathâgata-Garbha and the Âlaya-vijnâna.

The Garbha and Ignorance.--The Âlaya-vijñâna and its Evolution.--The
Manas.--The Sâmkhya Philosophy and Mahâyânism.

Chapter VII. The Theory of Non-âtman or Non-ego.

Âtman.--Buddha’s First Line of Inquiry.--The Skandha.--King Milinda
and Nâgasena.--Ananda’s Attempts to Locate the Soul.--Âtman and the
“Old Man.”--The Vedântic Conception.--Nâgârjuna on the
Soul.--Non-âtman-ness of Things.--Svabhâva.--The Real Significance of
Emptiness.

Chapter VIII. Karma.

Definition.--The Working of Karma.--Karma and Social injustice.--An
Individualistic View of Karma.--Karma and Determinism.--The Maturing
of Good Stock and the Accumulation of Good Merits.--Immortality.

{xi}

Practical Mahâyânism.

Chapter IX. The Dharmakâya.

God.--Dharmakâya.--Dharmakâya as Religious Object.--More Detailed
Characterisation.--The Dharmakâya and Individual Beings.--The
Dharmakâya as Love.--Later Mahâyânists’ View of the Dharmakâya.--The
Freedom of the Dharmakâya.--The Will of the Dharmakâya.

Chapter X. The Doctrine of Trikâya.

The Human and the Super-human Buddha.--An Historical View.--Who was
Buddha?--The Trikâya as Explained in the _Suvarna-Prabhâ_.--Revelation
in All Stages of Culture.--The Sambhogakâya.--A Mere Subjective
Existence.--Attitude of Modern Mahâyânists.--Recapitulation.

Chapter XI. The Bodhisattva.

The Three Yânas.--Strict Individualism.--The Doctrine of
Parivarta.--Bodhisattva in “Primitive” Buddhism.--We are all
Bodhisattvas.--The Buddha’s Life.--The Bodhisattva and Love.--The
Meaning of Bodhi and Bodhicitta.--Love and Karunâ.--Nâgârjuna and
Sthiramati on Bodhicitta.--The Awakening of the Bodhicitta.--The
Bodhisattva’s Pranidhâna.

Chapter XII. Ten Stages of Bodhisattvahood.

Gradation in our Spiritual Life.--Pramuditâ.--Vimalâ.--Prabhâkarî.
--Arcismatî.--Sudurjanâ.--Abhimukhî.--Dûrangamâ.--Acalâ.--Sâdhumatî.
--Dharmameghâ.

{xii}

Chapter XIII. Nirvâna.

Nihilistic Nirvâna not the First Object.--Nirvâna is Positive.--The
Mahâyânistic Conception of Nirvâna.--Nirvâna as the
Dharmakâya.--Nirvâna in its Fourth Sense.--Nirvâna and Samsâra are
One.--The Middle Course.--How to Realise Nirvâna.--Love Awakens
Intelligence.--Conclusion.

Appendix, Hymns of Mahâyâna Faith.

Index.

Endnotes.




 INTRODUCTION.

{1}


 1. THE MAHÂYÂNA AND THE HÎNAYÂNA
 BUDDHISM.

/The/ terms “Mahâyâna” and “Hînayâna” may sound unfamiliar to most of
our readers, perhaps even to those who have devoted some time to the
study of Buddhism. They have hitherto been induced to believe that
there is but one form of Buddhism, and that there exists no such
distinction as Mahâyânism and Hînayânism. But, as a matter of fact,
there are diverse schools in Buddhism just as in other religious
systems. It is said that, within a few hundred years after the demise
of Buddha, there were more than twenty different schools,[1] all
claiming {2} to be the orthodox teaching of their master. These,
however, seem to have vanished into insignificance one after another,
when there arose a new school quite different in its general
constitution from its predecessors, but far more important in its
significance as a religious movement. This new school or rather system
made itself so prominent in the meantime as to stand distinctly alone
from all the other schools, which later became a class by itself.
Essentially, it taught everything that was considered to be Buddhistic,
but it was very comprehensive in its principle and method and scope.
And, by reason of this, Buddhism was now split into two great systems,
Mahâyânism and Hînayânism, the latter indiscriminately including all
the minor schools which preceded Mahâyânism in their formal
establishment.

Broadly speaking, the difference between Mahâyânism and Hînayânism is
this: Mahâyânism is more liberal and progressive, but in many respects
too metaphysical and full of speculative thoughts that frequently reach
a dazzling eminence: Hînayânism, on the other hand, is somewhat
conservative and may be considered in many points to be a rationalistic
ethical system simply.

Mahâyâna literally means “great vehicle” and Hînayâna “small or
inferior vehicle,” that is, of salvation. This distinction is
recognised only by the followers of Mahâyânism, because it was by
them that the unwelcome title of Hînayânism was given to their rival
brethren,--thinking that they were more progressive {3} and had a more
assimilating energy than the latter. The adherents of Hînayânism, as
a matter of course, refused to sanction the Mahâyânist doctrine as
the genuine teaching of Buddha, and insisted that there could not be
any other Buddhism than their own, to them naturally the Mahâyâna
system was a sort of heresy.

Geographically, the progressive school of Buddhism found its
supporters in Nepal, Tibet, China, Corea, and Japan, while the
conservative school established itself in Ceylon,[2] Siam, and Burma.
Hence the Mahâyâna and the Hînayâna are also known respectively
Northern and Southern Buddhism.

_En passant_, let me remark that this distinction, however, is not
quite correct, for we have some {4} schools in China and Japan, whose
equivalent or counterpart cannot be found in the so-called Northern
Buddhism, that is, Buddhism flourishing in Northern India. For
instance, we do not have in Nepal or in Tibet anything like the
Sukhâvatî sects of Japan or China. Of course, the general essential
ideas of the Sukhâvatî philosophy are found in the sûtra literature
as well as in the writings of such authors as Açvaghoṣa, Asanga, and
Nâgârjuna. But those ideas were not developed and made into a new sect
as they were in the East. Therefore, it may be more proper to divide
Buddhism into three, instead of two, geographical sections: Southern,
Northern, and Eastern.


 _Why the two Doctrines?_

In spite of this distinction, the two schools, Hînayânism and
Mahâyânism, are no more than two main issues of one original source,
which was first discovered by Çâkyamuni; and, as a matter of course,
we find many common traits which are essential to both of them. The
spirit that animated the innermost heart of Buddha is perceptible in
Southern as well as in Northern Buddhism. The difference between them
is not radical or qualitative as imagined by some. It is due, on the
one hand, to a general unfolding of the religious consciousness and a
constant broadening of the intellectual horizon, and, on the other
hand, to the conservative efforts to literally preserve the monastic
rules and traditions. Both schools started with the same spirit,
pursuing the {5} same course. But after a while one did not feel any
necessity for broadening the spirit of the master and adhered to his
words as literally as possible; whilst the other, actuated by a liberal
and comprehensive spirit, has drawn nourishments from all available
sources, in order to unfold the germs in the original system that were
vigorous and generative. These diverse inclinations among primitive
Buddhists naturally led to the dissension of Mahâyânism and Hînayânism.

We cannot here enter into any detailed accounts as to what external
and internal forces were acting in the body of Buddhism to produce the
Mahâyâna system, or as to how gradually it unfolded itself so as to
absorb and assimilate all the discordant thoughts that came in contact
with it. Suffice it to state and answer in general terms the question
which is frequently asked by the uninitiated: “Why did one Buddhism
ever allow itself to be differentiated into two systems, which are
apparently in contradiction in more than one point with each other?”
In other words, “How can there be two Buddhisms equally representing
the true doctrine of the founder?”

The reason is plain enough. The teachings of a great religious founder
are as a rule very general, comprehensive, and many-sided: and,
therefore, there are great possibilities in them to allow various
liberal interpretations by his disciples. And it is on this very
account of comprehensiveness that enables followers of diverse needs,
characters, and trainings to {6} satisfy their spiritual appetite
universally and severally with the teachings of their master. This
comprehensiveness, however, is not due to the intentional use by the
leader of ambiguous terms, nor is it due to the obscurity and
confusion of his own conceptions. The initiator of a movement,
spiritual as well as intellectual, has no time to think out all its
possible details and consequences. When the principle of the movement
is understood by the contemporaries and the foundation of it is
solidly laid down, his own part as initiator is accomplished; and the
remainder can safely be left over to his successors. The latter will
take up the work and carry it out in all its particulars, while making
all necessary alterations and ameliorations according to circumstances.
Therefore, the rôle to be played by the originator is necessarily
indefinite and comprehensive.

Kant, for instance, as promoter of German philosophy, has become the
father of such diverse philosophical systems as Jacobi’s, Fichte’s,
Hegel’s, Schopenhauer’s, etc., while each of them endeavored to
develop some points indefinitely or covertly or indirectly stated by
Kant himself. Jesus of Nazareth, as instigator of a revolutionary
movement against Judaism, did not have any stereotyped theological
doctrines, such as were established later by Christian doctors. The
indefiniteness of his views was so apparent that it caused even among
his personal disciples a sort of dissension, while a majority of his
disciples cherished a visionary hope for the advent {7} of a divine
kingdom on earth. But those externalities which are doomed to pass, do
not prevent the spirit of the movement once awakened by a great leader
from growing more powerful and noble.

The same thing can be said of the teachings of the Buddha. What he
inspired in his followers was the spirit of that religious system
which is now known as Buddhism. Guided by this spirit, his followers
severally developed his teachings as required by their special needs
and circumstances, finally giving birth to the distinction of
Mahâyânism and Hînayânism.


 _The Original Meaning of Mahâyâna._

The term Mahâyâna was first used to designate the highest principle,
or being, or knowledge, of which the universe with all its sentient
and non-sentient beings is a manifestation, and through which only
they can attain final salvation (_mokṣa_ or _nirvâna_). Mahâyâna was
not the name given to any religious doctrine, nor had it anything to
do with doctrinal controversy, though later it was so utilised by the
progressive party.

Açvaghoṣa, the first Mahâyâna expounder known to us,--living about the
time of Christ,--used the term in his religio-philosophical book
called _Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahâyâna_[3] as
synonymous with Bhûtatathâtâ, or Dharmakâyâ,[4] the {8} highest
principle of Mahâyânism. He likened the recognition of, and faith in,
this highest being and principle into a conveyance which will carry us
safely across the tempestuous ocean of birth and death (_samsâra_) to
the eternal shore of Nirvâna.

Soon after him, however, the controversy between the two schools of
Buddhism, conservatives and progressionists as we might call them,
became more and more pronounced; and when it reached its climax which
was most probably in the times of Nâgârjuna and Âryadeva, i.e., a
few centuries after Açvaghoṣa, the progressive party ingeniously
invented the term Hînayâna in contrast to Mahâyâna, the latter
having been adopted by them as the watchword of their own school. The
Hînayânists and the Tîrthakas[5] then were sweepingly condemned by
the Mahâyânists as inadequate to achieve a universal salvation of
sentient beings.


 _An Older Classification of Buddhists._

Before the distinction of Mahâyânists and Hînayânists became definite,
that is to say, at the time of Nâgârjuna or even before it, those
Buddhists who held a more progressive and broader view tried to
distinguish three yânas among the followers of the Buddha, viz.,
Bodhisattva-yâna, Pratyekabuddha-yâna, and Çrâvaka-yâna; yâna being
another name for class.

{9}

The Bodhisattva is that class of Buddhists who, believing in the Bodhi
(intelligence or wisdom), which is a reflection of the Dharmakâya in
the human soul, direct all their spiritual energy toward realising and
developing it for the sake of their fellow-creatures.

The Pratyekabuddha is a “solitary thinker” or a philosopher, who,
retiring into solitude and calmly contemplating on the evanescence of
worldly pleasures, endeavors to attain his own salvation, but remains
unconcerned with the sufferings of his fellow-beings. Religiously
considered, a Pratyekabuddha is cold, impassive, egotistic, and lacks
love for all mankind.

The Çrâvaka which means “hearer” is inferior in the estimate of
Mahâyânists even to the Pratyekabuddha, for he does not possess any
intellect that enables him to think independently and to find out by
himself the way to final salvation. Being endowed, however, with a
pious heart, he is willing to listen to the instructions of the Buddha,
to believe in him, to observe faithfully all the moral precepts given
by him, and rests fully contented within the narrow horizon of his
mediocre intellect.

To a further elucidation of Bodhisattvahood and its important bearings
in the Mahâyâna Buddhism, we devote a special chapter below. For
Mahâyânism is no more than the Buddhism of Bodhisattvas, while the
Pratyekabuddhas and the Çrâvakas are considered by Mahâyânists to be
adherents of Hînayânism.

{10}


 _The Mahâyâna Buddhism Defined._

We can now form a somewhat definite notion as to what the Mahâyâna
Buddhism is. It is the Buddhism which, inspired by a progressive
spirit, broadened its original scope, so far as it did not contradict
the inner significance of the teachings of the Buddha, and which
assimilated other religio-philosophical beliefs within itself,
whenever it felt that, by so doing, people of more widely different
characters and intellectual endowments could be saved. Let us be
satisfied at present with this statement, until we enter into a more
detailed exposition of its doctrinal peculiarities in the pages that
follow.

It may not be out of place, while passing, to remark that the term
Mahâyânism is used in this work merely in contradistinction to that
form of Buddhism, which is flourishing in Ceylon and Burma and other
central Asiatic nations, and whose literature is principally written
in the language called Pâli, which comes from the same stock as
Sanskrit. The term “Mahâyâna” does not imply, as it is used here, any
sense of superiority over the Hînayâna. When the historical aspect of
Mahâyânism is treated, it may naturally develop that its over-zealous
and one-sided devotees unnecessarily emphasised its controversial and
dogmatical phase at the sacrifice of its true spirit; but the reader
must not think that this work has anything to do with those
complications. In fact, Mahâyânism professes to be a boundless ocean
in which all form {11} of thought and faith can find its congenial and
welcome home; why then should we make it militate against its own
fellow-doctrine, Hînayânism?




 2. IS THE MAHÂYÂNA BUDDHISM THE GENUINE
 TEACHING OF THE BUDDHA?

What is generally known to the Western nations by the name of Buddhism
is Hînayânism, whose scriptures as above stated are written in Pâli
and studied mostly in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam. It was through this
language that the first knowledge of Buddhism was acquired by
Orientalists; and naturally they came to regard Hînayânism or Southern
Buddhism as the only genuine teachings of the Buddha. They insisted,
and some of them still insist, that to have an adequate and thorough
knowledge of Buddhism, they must confine themselves solely to the
study of the Pâli, that whatever may be learned from other sources,
i.e., from the Sanskrit, Tibetan, or Chinese documents should be
considered as throwing only a side-light on the reliable information
obtained from the Pâli, and further that the knowledge derived from
the former should in certain cases be discarded as accounts of a
degenerated form of Buddhism. Owing to these unfortunate hypotheses,
the significance of Mahâyânism as a living religion has been entirely
ignored; and even those who are regarded as best authorities on the
subject appear greatly misinformed and, what is worse, altogether
prejudiced.

{12}


 _No Life Without Growth._

This is very unfair on the part of the critics, because what religion
is there in the whole history of mankind that has not made any
development whatever, that has remained the same, like the granite,
throughout its entire course? Let us ask whether there is any religion
which has shown some signs of vitality and yet retained its primitive
form intact and unmodified in every respect. Is not changeableness,
that is, susceptibility to irritation the most essential sign of
vitality? Every organism grows, which means a change in some way or
other. There is no form of life to be found anywhere on earth, that
does not grow or change, or that has not any inherent power of
adjusting itself to the surrounding conditions.

Take, for example, Christianity. Is Protestantism the genuine teaching
of Jesus of Nazareth? or does Catholicism represent his true spirit?
Jesus himself did not have any definite notion of Trinity doctrine,
nor did he propose any suggestion for ritualism. According to the
Synoptics, he appears to have cherished a rather immature conception
of the kingdom of God than a purely ideal one as conceived by Paul,
and his personal disciples who were just as illiterate philosophically
as the master himself were anxiously waiting in all probability for
its mundane realisation. But what Christians, Catholics or Protestants,
in these days of enlightenment, would dare {13} give a literal
explanation to this material conception of the coming kingdom?

Again, think of Jesus’s view on marriage and social life. Is it not an
established fact that he highly advocated celibacy and in the case of
married people strict continence, and also that he greatly favored
pious poverty and asceticism in general? In these respects, the monks
of the Medieval Ages and the Catholic priests of the present day
(though I cannot say they are ascetic and poor in their living) must
be said to be in more accord with the teaching of the master than
their Protestant brethren. But what Protestants would seriously
venture to defend all those views of Jesus, in spite of their avowed
declaration that they are sincerely following in the steps of their
Lord? Taking all in all, these contradictions do not prevent them,
Protestants as well as Catholics, from calling themselves Christians
and even good, pious, devoted Christians, as long as they are
consciously or unconsciously animated by the same spirit, that was
burning in the son of the carpenter of Nazareth, an obscure village of
Galilee, about two thousand years ago.

The same mode of reasoning holds good in the case of Mahâyânism, and
it would be absurd to insist on the genuineness of Hînayânism at the
expense of the former. Take for granted that the Mahâyâna school of
Buddhism contains some elements absorbed from other Indian
religio-philosophical systems; but what of it? Is not Christianity
also an amalgamation, {14} so to speak, of Jewish, Greek, Roman,
Babylonian, Egyptian, and other pagan thoughts? In fact every healthy
and energetic religion is historical, in the sense that, in the course
of its development, it has adapted itself to the ever-changing
environment, and has assimilated within itself various elements which
appeared at first even threatening its own existence. In Christianity,
this process of assimilation, adaptation, and modification has been
going on from its very beginning. As the result, we see in the
Christianity of to-day its original type so metamorphosed, so far as
its outward appearance is concerned, that nobody would now take it for
a faithful copy of the prototype.


 _Mahâyânism a Living Faith._

So with Mahâyânism. Whatever changes it has made during its historical
evolution, its spirit and central ideas are all those of its founder.
The question whether or not it is genuine, entirely depends on our
interpretation of the term “genuine.” If we take it to mean the
lifeless preservation of the original, we should say that Mahâyânism
is not the genuine teaching of the Buddha, and we may add that
Mahâyânists would be proud of the fact, because being a living
religious force it would never condescend to be the corpse of a
by-gone faith. The fossils, however faithfully preserved, are nothing
but rigid inorganic substances from which life is forever departed.
{15} Mahâyânism is far from this; it is an ever-growing faith and
ready in all times to cast off its old garments as soon as they are
worn out. But its spirit originally inspired by the “Teacher of Men
and Gods” (_çâstadevamanuṣyânam_) is most jealously guarded against
pollution and degeneration. Therefore, as far as its spirit is
concerned, there is no room left to doubt its genuineness; and those
who desire to have a complete survey of Buddhism cannot ignore the
significance of Mahâyânism.

It is naught but an idle talk to question the historical value of an
organism, which is now full of vitality and active in all its
functions, and to treat it like an archeological object, dug out from
the depths of the earth, or like a piece of bric-à-brac, discovered
in the ruins of an ancient royal palace. Mahâyânism is not an object
of historical curiosity. Its vitality and activity concern us in our
daily life. It is a great spiritual organism; its moral and religious
forces are still exercising an enormous power over millions of souls;
and its further development is sure to be a very valuable contribution
to the world-progress of the religious consciousness. What does it
matter, then, whether or not Mahâyânism is the genuine teaching of the
Buddha?

Here is an instance of most flagrant contradictions present in our
minds, but of which we are not conscious on account of our preconceived
ideas. Christian critics vigorously insist on the genuineness of their
own religion, which is no more than a {16} hybrid, at least outwardly;
but they want to condemn their rival religion as degenerated, because
it went through various stages of development like theirs. It is of no
practical use to trouble with this nonsensical question,--the question
of the genuineness of Mahâyânism, which by the way is frequently
raised by outsiders as well as by some unenlightened Buddhists
themselves.




 3. SOME MISSTATEMENTS ABOUT THE
 MAHÂYÂNA DOCTRINES.

Before entering fully into the subject proper of this work, let us
glance over some erroneous opinions about the Mahâyâna doctrines,
which are held by some Western scholars, and naturally by all
uninitiated readers, who are like the blind led by the blind. It may
not be altogether a superfluous work to give them a passing review in
this chapter and to show broadly what Mahâyânism is not.


 _Why Injustice is done to Buddhism._

The people who have had their thoughts and sentiments habitually
trained by one particular set of religious dogmas, frequently misjudge
the value of those thoughts that are strange and unfamiliar to them.
We may call this class of people bigots or religious enthusiasts. They
may have fine religious and moral sentiments as far as their own
religious training goes; but, when examined from a broader point of
view, they are to a great extent vitiated {17} with prejudices,
superstitions, and fanatical beliefs, which, since childhood, have
been pumped into their receptive minds, before they were sufficiently
developed and could form independent judgments. This fact so miserably
spoils their purity of sentiment and obscures their transparency of
intellect, that they are disqualified to perceive and appreciate
whatever is good and true and beautiful in the so-called heathen
religions. This is the main reason why those Christian missionaries
are incapable of rightly understanding the spirit of religion
generally--I mean, those missionaries who come to the East to
substitute one set of superstitions for another.

This strong general indictment against the Christian missionaries,
however, is by no means prompted by any partisan spirit. My desire, on
the contrary, is to do justice to those thoughts and sentiments that
have been working consciously or unconsciously in the human mind from
time immemorial and shall work on till the day of the last judgment,
if there ever be such a day. To see what these thoughts and sentiments
are, which, by the way, constitute the kernel of every religion, we
must without any reluctance throw off all the prejudices we are liable
to cherish, though quite unknowingly; and keeping always in view what
is most essential in the religious consciousness, we must not confound
it with its accessories, which are doomed to die in the course of
time.

{18}


 _Examples of Injustice._

As specimen of injustice done to the Mahâyâna Buddhism by Christian
critics, we quote the following passages from Monier-William’s
_Buddhism_, Waddell’s _Buddhism in Tibet_, and Samuel Beal’s _Buddhism
in China_, all of which are representative works each in its own field.


 _Monier Monier-Williams._

Monier Monier-Williams is a well-known authority on Sanskrit
literature, and his works in this department will long remain as a
valuable contribution to human knowledge. But, unfortunately, as soon
as he attempts to enter the domain of religious controversy, his
intellect becomes piteously obscured by his preconceived ideas. He
thinks, for instance, that the principal feature of Mahâyânism consists
merely in amplifying the number of Bodhisattvas, who are contented,
according to his view, with their “perpetual residence in the heavens,
and quite willing to put off all desires for Buddhahood and
Parinirvana.” (P. 190.)

This remark is so absurd that it will at once be rejected by any one
who has a first-hand knowledge of the Mahâyâna system, as even unworthy
of refutation, but Monier-Williams takes special pains to give to his
characterisation of the Mahâyâna doctrine a show of rational
explanation. “Of course,” says he, “men instinctively recoiled from
utter self-annihilation, {19} and so the Buddha’s followers ended in
changing the true idea of Nirvana and converting it from a condition
of non-existence into a state of lazy beatitude in celestial regions
(!), while they encouraged all men--whether monks or laymen--to make a
sense of dreamy bliss in Heaven (!), and not total extinction of life,
the end of all their efforts.” (P. 156.)

This view of the Buddhist heaven as interpreted by Monier-Williams is
nothing but the conception of the Christian heaven colored with
paganism. Nothing is more foreign to Buddhists than this distinguished
Sankritist’s interpretation of celestial existence. The life of devas
(celestial beings) is just as much subject to the law of birth and
death as that of men on earth. What consolation would there be for the
Mahâyânists striving after the highest principle of existence, only
to find themselves transmigrated to a celestial abode, that is also
full of sorrows and sufferings? Always working for the welfare of
their fellow-creatures, the Bodhisattvas never desire any earthly or
heavenly happiness for themselves. Whatever merits, according to the
law of karma, there be stored up for their good work, they do not have
any wish to enjoy them by themselves, but they will have all these
merits turned over (_parivarta_) to the interests of their
fellow-beings. This is the ideal of Bodhisattvas, i.e., of the
followers of Mahâyânism.

{20}


 _Beal._

Samuel Beal who is considered by Western scholars to be an authority
on Chinese Buddhism, referring to the Mahâyâna conception of
Dharmakâya,[6] says in his _Buddhism in China_ (p. 156): “We can
have little doubt, then, that from early days worship was offered by
Buddhists at several spots, consecrated by the presence of the Teacher,
to an invisible presence. This presence was formulated by the later
Buddhists under the phrase, ‘the Body of the Law’, Dharmakâya.”

Then, alluding to Buddha’s instruction that says after his Parinirvana
the Law given by him should be regarded as himself, Beal proceeds to
say: “Here was the germ from which proceeded the idea or formula of an
invisible presence: teaching and power of the Law (_Dharma_)
represented the Dharmakâya or Law-Body of Buddha, present with the
order, and fit for reverence.”

To interpret Dharmakâya as the Body of the Law is quite inadequate
and misleading. To the Hînayânists, there is nothing beside the
Tripitaka as the object of reverence, and, therefore, the notion of
the Body of the Law has no meaning to them. The idea {21} is distinctly
Mahâyânistic, but Beal is not well informed about its real significance
as understood by the Buddhists. The chief reason of his
misinterpretation, as I judge, lies in his rendering _dharma_ by “law”,
while _dharma_ here means “that which subsists,” or “that which
maintains itself even when all the transient modes disappear,” in
short, “being,” or “substance.” Dharmakâya, therefore, would be a sort
of the Absolute, or Essence-Body of all things. This notion plays such
an important rôle in Mahâyânism that an adequate knowledge of it is
indispensable to understand the constitution of Mahâyânism as a
religious system.


 _Waddell._

Let us state one more case of misrepresentation by Western scholars of
the Mahâyâna Buddhism. Waddell, author of _Buddhism in Tibet_,
referring to the point of divergence between the so-called Northern
Buddhism and the Southern, says (pp. 10-11): “It was the theistic
Mahâyâna doctrine which substituted, for the agnostic idealism and
simple morality of Buddha, a speculative theistic system with a
mysticism of sophistic nihilism in the background.”

And again: “This Mahâyâna [meaning Nâgârjuna’s Mâdhyamika school] was
essentially a sophistic nihilism, or rather Parinirvana, while ceasing
to be extinction of life, was converted a mystic state which admitted
of no definition.”

{22}

It may not be wrong to call Mahâyânism a speculative theistic system
in a wide sense, but it must be asked on what ground Waddell thinks
that it has in its background “a mysticism of sophistic nihilism”.
Could a religious system be called sophistry when it makes a close
inquiry into the science of dialectics, in order to show how futile it
is to seek salvation through the intellect alone? Could a religious
system be called a nihilism when it endeavors to reach the highest
reality which transcends the phenomenality of concrete individual
existences? Could a doctrine be called nihilistic when it defines the
absolute as neither void (_çûnya_) nor not-void (_açûnya_)?

I could cull some more passages from other Buddhist scholars of the
West and show how far Mahâyânism has been made by them a subject of
misrepresentation. But since this work is not a polemic, but devoted
to a positive exposition of its basic doctrines, I refrain from so
doing. Suffice it to state that one of the main causes of the injustice
done to Buddhism by the Christian critics comes from their
preconceptions, of which they may not be aware, but which all the more
vitiate their “impartial” judgments.




 4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION.

Those misconceptions about Buddhism as above stated induce me to
digress in this introductory part and to say a few words concerning
the distinction {23} between the form and the spirit of religion. A
clear knowledge of this distinction will greatly facilitate the
formation of a correct notion about Mahâyânism and will also help us
duly to appreciate its significance as a living religious faith.

By the spirit of religion I mean that element in religion which remains
unchanged throughout its successive stages of development and
transformation: while the form of it is the external shell which is
subject to any modification required by circumstances.


 _No Revealed Religion._

It admits of no doubt that religion, as everything else under the sun,
is subject to the laws of evolution, and that, therefore, there is no
such thing as a revealed religion, whose teachings are supposed to
have been delivered to us direct from the hands of an anthropomorphic
or anthropopsychic supernatural being, and which, like an inorganic
substance, remains forever the same, without changing, without growing,
without modifying itself in accord with the surrounding conditions.
Unless people are so blinded by a belief in this kind of religion as
to insist that its dogmas have suffered absolutely no change whatever
since its “revelation,” they must recognise like every clear-headed
person the fact that there are some ephemeral elements in every
religion, which must carefully be distinguished from its quintessence
which remains eternally the same.

When this discrimination is not observed, prejudice {24} will at once
assert itself, inducing them to imagine that the religion in which
they were brought up with all its truths and superstitions is the only
orthodox religion in the world, and all the other religions are
nothing else than heathenism, idolatry, atheism, apostasy, and the
like. This attitude of such religionists, however, serves only to
betray their own narrowness of mind and dimness of spiritual insight.
No one who desires to penetrate into the innermost recesses of the
human heart and who longs to feel the fullest meaning of life, should
foster in himself in the least degree a disposition of bigotry.


 _The Mystery._

Religion is the inmost voice of the human heart that under the yoke of
a seemingly finite existence groans and travails in pain. Mankind,
from their first appearance on earth, have never been satisfied with
the finiteness and impermanency of life. They have always been
yearning after something that will liberate them from the slavery of
this mortal coil, or from the cursed bondage of metempsychosis, as
Hindu thinkers express it. This something, however, on account of its
transcending all the principles of separation and individuation, which
characterise the phenomena of this mundane existence, has always
remained as something indefinite, inadequate, chaotic, and full of
mystery. And, according to different degrees of intellectual
development in different ages and nations, people have endeavored to
invest this {25} mysterious something with all sorts of human feelings
and intelligence. Most of modern scientists are now content with the
hypothesis that the mystery is unfathomable by the human mind, which
is conditioned by the law of relativity, and that our business here,
moral as well as intellectual, can be executed without troubling
ourselves with this ever-haunting problem of mystery;--this doctrine
is called agnosticism.

But this hypothesis can in no wise be considered the final sentence
passed on the mystery. From the scientific point of view, the maxim of
agnosticism is excellent, as science does not pretend to venture into
the realm of non-relativity. Dissatisfaction, however, presents itself,
when we attempt to silence by this hypothesis the last demand of the
human heart.


 _Intellect and Imagination._

The human heart is not an intellectual crystal. When the intellect
displays itself in its full glory, the heart still aches and struggles
to get hold of something beyond. The intellect may sometimes declare
that it has at last laid its hand on what is demanded by the heart.
Time passes on, and the mystery is examined from the other points that
escaped consideration before, and, to the great disappointment of the
heart, the supposed solution is found to be wanting. The intellect is
baffled. But the human heart never gets tired of its yearnings and
demands a satisfaction ever more pressingly. Should they be considered
a mere nightmare of imagination? Surely {26} not, for herein lies the
field where religion claims supreme authority, and its claim is
perfectly right.

But religion cannot fabricate whatever it pleases; it must work in
perfect accord with the intellect. As the essential nature of man does
not consist solely in intellect, or will, or feeling, but in the
coördination of these psychical elements, religion must guard herself
against the unrestrained flight of imagination. Most of the
superstitions fondly cherished by a pious heart are due to the
disregard of the intellectual element in religion.

The imagination creates: the intellect discriminates. Creation without
discrimination is wild: discrimination without creation is barren.
Religion and science, when they do not work with mutual understanding,
are sure to be one-sided. The soul makes an abnormal growth at one
point, loses its balance, and is finally given up to a collapse of the
entire system. Those pious religious enthusiasts who see a natural
enemy in science and denounce it with all their energy, are, in my
opinion, as purblind and distorted in their view, as those men of
science who think that science alone must claim the whole field of
soul-activities as well as those of nature. I am not in sympathy with
either of them: for one is just as arrogant in its claim as the other.
Without a careful examination of both sides of a shield, we are not
competent to give a correct opinion upon it.

But the imagination is not the exclusive possession of religion, nor
is discrimination or ratiocination the {27} monopoly of science. They
are reciprocal and complementary: one cannot do anything without the
other. The difference between science and religion is not that between
certitude and probability. The difference is rather in their respective
fields of activity. Science is solely concerned with things
conditional, relative, and finite. When it explains a given phenomenon
by some fixed laws which are in turn nothing but a generalisation of
particular facts, the task of science is done, and any further attempt
to go beyond this, i.e., to make an inquiry into the whence, whither,
and why of things, is beyond its realm. But the human soul does not
remain satisfied here, it asks for the ultimate principle underlying
all so-called scientific laws and hypotheses. Science is indifferent
to the teleology of things: a mechanical explanation of them appeases
its intellectual curiosity. But in religion teleology is of paramount
importance, it is one of the most fundamental problems, and a system
which does not give any definite conception on this point is no
religion. Science, again, does not care if there is something beyond
or outside its manifold laws and theories; but a religion which does
not possess a God or anything corresponding to it, ceases to be so,
for it fails to give consolation to the human heart.


 _The Contents of Faith vary._

The solution of religious problems, as far as they fall within the
sphere of relative experience, is largely {28} a matter of personal
conviction, determined by one’s intellectual development, external
circumstances, education, disposition, etc. The conceptions of faith
thus formulated are naturally infinitely diversified; even among the
followers of a certain definite set of dogmas, each will understand
them in his own way, owing to individual peculiarities. If we could
subject their conceptions of faith to a strict analysis as a chemist
does his materials, we should detect in them all the possible forms of
differentiation. But all these things belong to the exterior of
religion and have nothing to do with the essentials which underlie
them.

The abiding elements of religion come from within, and consist mainly
in the mysterious sentiment that lies hidden in the deepest depths of
the human heart, and that, when awakened, shakes the whole structure
of personality and brings about a great spiritual revolution, which
results in a complete change of one’s world-conception. When this
mysterious sentiment finds expression and formulates its conceptions
in the terms of intellect, it becomes a definite system of beliefs,
which is popularly called religion, but which should properly be
termed dogmatism, that is, an intellectualised form of religion. On
the other hand, the outward forms of religion consist of those
changing elements that are mainly determined by the intellectual and
moral development of the times as well as by individual esthetical
feelings.

True Christians and enlightened Buddhists may, therefore, find their
point of agreement in the recognition {29} of the inmost religious
sentiment that constitutes the basis of our being, though this
agreement does by no means prevent them from retaining their
individuality in the conceptions and expressions of faith. My
conviction is: If the Buddha and the Christ changed their accidental
places of birth, Gautama might have been a Christ rising against the
Jewish traditionalism, and Jesus a Buddha, perhaps propounding the
doctrine of non-ego and Nirvâna and Dharmakâya.

However great a man may be, he cannot but be an echo of the spirit of
the times. He never stands, as is supposed by some, so aloof and
towering above the masses as to be practically by himself. On the
contrary, “he,” as Emerson says, “finds himself in the river of the
thoughts and events, forced onward by the ideas and necessities of his
contemporaries.” So it was with the Buddha, and so with the Christ.
They were nothing but the concrete representatives of the ideas and
feelings that were struggling in those times against the established
institutions, which were degenerating fast and menaced the progress of
humanity. But at the same time those ideas and sentiments were the
outburst of the Eternal Soul, which occasionally makes a solemn
announcement of its will, through great historical figures or through
great world-events.

 * * *

Believing that a bit of religio-philosophical exposition as above
indulged will prepare the minds of {30} my Christian readers sincerely
to take up the study of a religious system other than their own, I now
proceed to a systematical elucidation of the Mahâyâna Buddhism, as it
is believed at present in the Far East.




 CHAPTER I.
 A GENERAL CHARACTERISATION OF BUDDHISM.

{31}


 _No God and no Soul._

/Buddhism/ is considered by some to be a religion without a God and
without a soul. The statement is true and untrue according to what
meaning we give to those terms.

Buddhism does not recognise the existence of a being, who stands aloof
from his “creations,” and who meddles occasionally with human affairs
when his capricious will pleases him. This conception of a supreme
being is very offensive to Buddhists. They are unable to perceive any
truth in the hypotheses, that a being like ourselves created the
universe out of nothing and first peopled it with a pair of sentient
beings; that, owing to a crime committed by them, which, however,
could have been avoided if the creator so desired, they were condemned
by him to eternal damnation; that the creator in the meantime feeling
pity for the cursed, or suffering the bite of remorse for his somewhat
rash deed, despatched his only beloved son to the earth for the
purpose of rescuing mankind from universal misery, etc., etc. If
Buddhism is called atheism on account of its {32} refusal to take
poetry for actual fact, its followers would have no objection to the
designation.

Next, if we understand by soul âtman, which, secretly hiding itself
behind all mental activities, direct them after the fashion of an
organist striking different notes as he pleases, Buddhists outspokenly
deny the existence of such a fabulous being. To postulate an
independent âtman outside a combination of the five Skandhas[7], of
which an individual being is supposed by Buddhists to consist, is to
unreservedly welcome egoism with all its pernicious corollaries. And
what distinguishes Buddhism most characteristically and emphatically
from all other religions is the doctrine of non-âtman or non-ego,
exactly opposite to the postulate of a soul-substance which is
cherished by most of religious enthusiasts. In this sense, Buddhism is
undoubtedly a religion without the soul.

To make these points clearer in a general way, let us briefly treat in
this chapter of such principal tenets of Buddhism as Karma, Âtman,
Avidyâ, Nirvâna, Dharmakâya, etc. Some of these doctrines being the
common property of the two schools of Buddhism, Hînayânism and
Mahâyânism, their brief, comprehensive exposition here will furnish
our readers with a general notion about the constitution of Buddhism,
and will also prepare them to pursue a further specific exposition of
the Mahâyâna doctrine which follows.

{33}


 _Karma._

One of the most fundamental doctrines established by Buddha is that
nothing in this world comes from a single cause, that the existence of
a universe is the result of a combination of several causes (_hetu_)
and conditions (_pratyaya_), and is at the same time an active force
contributing to the production of an effect in the future. As far as
phenomenal existences are concerned, this law of cause and effect
holds universally valid. Nothing, even God, can interfere with the
course of things thus regulated, materially as well as morally. If a
God really exists and has some concern about our worldly affairs, he
must first conform himself to the law of causation. Because the
principle of karma, which is the Buddhist term for causation morally
conceived, holds supreme everywhere and all the time.

The conception of karma plays the most important rôle in Buddhist
ethics. Karma is the formative principle of the universe. It determines
the course of events and the destiny of our existence. The reason why
we cannot change our present state of things as we may will, is that
it has already been determined by the karma that was performed in our
previous lives, not only individually but collectively. But, for this
same reason, we shall be able to work out our destiny in the future,
which is nothing but the resultant of several factors that are working
and that are being worked by ourselves in this life.

{34}

Therefore, says Buddha:


 “By self alone is evil done,
 By self is one disgraced;
 By self is evil left undone,
 By self alone is he purified;
 Purity and impurity belong to self:
 No one can purify another.”[8]


Again,


 “Not in the sky
 Nor in the midst of the sea,
 Nor entering a cleft of the mountains,
 Is found that realm on earth
 Where one may stand and be
 From an evil deed absolved.”[9]


This doctrine of karma may be regarded as an application in our
ethical realm of the theory of the conservation of energy. Everything
done is done once for all; its footprints on the sand of our moral and
social evolution are forever left; nay, more than left, they are
generative, good or evil, and waiting for further development under
favorable conditions. In the physical world, even the slightest
possible movement of our limbs cannot but affect the general cosmic
motion of the earth, however infinitesimal it be; and if we had a
proper instrument, we could surely measure its precise extent of
effect. So is it even with our deeds. A deed once performed, together
with its subjective motives, can never vanish without leaving some
impressions either on the individual {35} consciousness or on the
supra-individual, i.e., social consciousness.

We need not further state that the conception of karma in its general
aspect is scientifically verified. In our moral and material life,
where the law of relativity rules supreme, the doctrine of karma must
be considered thoroughly valid. And as long as its validity is
admitted in this field, we can live our phenomenal life without
resorting to the hypothesis of a personal God, as declared by Lamarck
when his significant work on evolution was presented to Emperor
Napoleon.

But it will do injustice to Buddhism if we designate it agnosticism or
naturalism, denying or ignoring the existence of the ultimate,
unifying principle, in which all contradictions are obliterated.
Dharmakâya is the name given by Buddhists to this highest principle,
viewed not only from the philosophical but also from the religious
standpoint. In the Dharmakâya, Buddhists find the ultimate
significance of life, which, when seen from its phenomenal aspect,
cannot escape the bondage of karma and its irrefragable laws.


 _Avidyâ._

What claims our attention next, is the problem of nescience, which is
one of the most essential features of Buddhism. Buddhists think,
nescience (in Sanskrit _avidyâ_) is the subjective aspect of karma,
involving us in a series of rebirths. Rebirth, considered by itself,
is no moral evil, but rather a necessary {36} condition of progress
toward perfection, if perfection ever be attainable here. It is an
evil only when it is the outcome of ignorance,--ignorance as to the
true meaning of our earthly existence.

Ignorant are they who do not recognise the evanescence of worldly
things and who tenaciously cleave to them as final realities; who
madly struggle to shun the misery brought about by their own folly;
who savagely cling to the self against the will of God, as Christians
would say; who take particulars as final existences and ignore One
pervading reality which underlies them all; who build up an adamantine
wall between the mine and thine: in a word, ignorant are those who do
not understand that there is no such thing as an ego-soul, and that
all individual existences are unified in the system of Dharmakâya.
Buddhism, therefore, most emphatically maintains that to attain the
bliss of Nirvana we must radically dispel this illusion, this
ignorance, this root of all evil and suffering in this life.

The doctrine of nescience or ignorance is technically expressed in the
following formula, which is commonly called the Twelve Nidânas or
Pratyayasamutpada, that is to say Chains of Dependence:

(1) There is Ignorance (_avidyâ_) in the beginning; (2) from Ignorance
Action (_sanskâra_) comes forth; (3) from Action Consciousness
(_vijñâna_) comes forth; (4) from Consciousness Name-and-Form
(_nâmarûpa_) comes forth; (5) from Name-and-Form the Six Organs
(_ṣadâyâtana_) come forth; (6) from the Six Organs {37} Touch
(_sparça_) comes forth; (7) from Touch Sensation (_vedanâ_) comes
forth; (8) from Sensation Desire (_tṛṣnâ_) comes forth; (9) from Desire
Clinging (_upâdâna_) comes forth; (10) from Clinging Being (_bhâva_)
comes forth; (11) from Being Birth (_jati_) comes forth; and (12) from
Birth Pain (_duḥkha_) comes forth.

According to Vasubandhu’s _Abhidharmakoça_, the formula is explained
as follows: Being ignorant in our previous life as to the significance
of our existence, we let loose our desires and act wantonly. Owing to
this karma, we are destined in the present life to be endowed with
consciousness (_vijñâna_), name-and-form (_nâmarûpa_), the six organs
of sense (_ṣadâyâtana_), and sensation (_vedanâ_). By the exercise of
these faculties, we now desire for, hanker after, cling to, these
illusive existences which have no ultimate reality whatever. In
consequence of this “Will to Live” we potentially accumulate or make
up the karma that will lead us to further metempsychosis of birth and
death.

The formula is by no means logical, nor is it exhaustive, but the
fundamental notion that life started in ignorance or blind will
remains veritable.


 _Non-Atman._

The problem of nescience naturally leads to the doctrine usually known
as that of non-Atman, i.e., non-ego, to which allusion was made at the
beginning {38} of this chapter. This doctrine of Buddhism is one of
the subjects that have caused much criticism by Christian scholars.
Its thesis runs: There is no such thing as ego-soul, which, according
to the vulgar interpretation, is the agent of our mental activities.
And this is the reason why Buddhism is sometimes called a religion
without the soul, as aforesaid.

This Buddhist negation of the ego-soul is perhaps startling to the
people, who, having no speculative power, blindly accept the
traditional, materialistic view of the soul. They think, they are very
spiritual in endorsing the dualism of soul and flesh, and in making
the soul something like a corporeal entity, though far more ethereal
than an ordinary object of the senses. They think of the soul as being
more in the form of an angel, when they teach that it ascends to
heaven immediately after its release from the material imprisonment.

They further imagine that the soul, because of its imprisonment in the
body, groans in pain for its liberty, not being able to bear its
mundane limitations. The immortality of the soul is a continuation
after the dismemberment of material elements of this ethereal, astral,
ghost-like entity,--very much resembling the Samkhyan _Lingham_ or the
Vedantic _sûkṣama-çârîra_. Self-consciousness will not a whit suffer
in its continued activity, as it is the essential function of the
soul. Brothers and sisters, parents and sons and daughters, wives and
husbands, all transfigured and sublimated, will meet again in the {39}
celestial abode, and perpetuate their home life much after the manner
of their earthly one. People who take this view of the soul and its
immortality must feel a great disappointment or even resentment, when
they are asked to recognise the Buddhist theory of non-âtman.

The absurdity of ascribing to the soul a sort of astral existence
taught by some theosophists is due to the confusion of the name and
the object corresponding to it. The soul, or what is tantamount
according to the vulgar notion, the ego, is a name given to a certain
coördination of mental activities. Abstract names are invented by us
to economise our intellectual labors, and of course have no
corresponding realities as particular presences in the concrete
objective world. Vulgar minds have forgotten the history of the
formation of abstract names. Being accustomed always to find certain
objective realities or concrete individuals answering to certain
names, they--those naïve realists--imagine that all names, irrespective
of their nature, must have their concrete individual equivalents in
the sensual world. Their idealism or spiritualism, so called, is in
fact a gross form of materialism, in spite of their unfounded fear for
the latter as atheistic and even immoral;--curse of ignorance!

The non-âtman theory does not deny that there is a coördination or
unification of various mental operations. Buddhism calls this system
of coördination vijñâna, not âtman. Vijñâna is consciousness, while
{40} âtman is the ego conceived as a concrete entity,--a hypostatic
agent which, abiding in the deepest recess of the mind, directs all
subjective activities according to its own discretion. This view is
radically rejected by Buddhism.

A familiar analogy illustrating the doctrine of non-âtman is the
notion of a wheel or that of a house. Wheel is the name given to a
combination in a fixed form of the spokes, axle, tire, hub, rim, etc.;
house is that given to a combination of roofs, pillars, windows,
floors, walls, etc., after a certain model and for a certain purpose.
Now, take all these parts independently, and where is the house or the
wheel to be found? House or wheel is merely the name designating a
certain form in which parts are systematically and definitely disposed.
What an absurdity, then, it must be to insist on the independent
existence of the wheel or of the house as an agent behind the
combination of certain parts thus definitely arranged!

It is wonderful that Buddhism clearly anticipated the outcome of
modern psychological researches at the time when all other religious
and philosophical systems were eagerly cherishing dogmatic
superstitions concerning the nature of the ego. The refusal of modern
psychology to have soul mean anything more than the sum-total of all
mental experiences, such as sensations, ideas, feelings, decisions,
etc., is precisely a rehearsal of the Buddhist doctrine of non-âtman.
It does not deny that there is a unity of consciousness, {41} for to
deny this is to doubt our everyday experiences, but it refuses to
assert that this unity is absolute, unconditioned, and independent.
Everything in this phenomenal phase of existence, is a combination of
certain causes (_hetu_) and conditions (_pratyaya_) brought together
according to the principle of karma; and everything that is compound
is finite and subject to dissolution, and, therefore, always limited
by something else. Even the soul-life, as far as its phenomenality
goes, is no exception to this universal law. To maintain the existence
of a soul-substance which is supposed to lie hidden behind the
phenomena of consciousness, is not only misleading, but harmful and
productive of some morally dangerous conclusions. The supposition that
there is something where there is really nothing, makes us cling to
this chimerical form, with no other result than subjecting ourselves
to an eternal series of sufferings. So we read in the _Lankâvatâra
Sûtra_, III:


 “A flower in the air, or a hare with horns,
 Or a pregnant maid of stone:
 To take what is not for what is,
 ’Tis called a judgment false.

 “In a combination of causes,
 The vulgar seek the reality of self.
 As truth they understand not,
 From birth to birth they transmigrate.”



 _The Non-Atman-ness of Things._

Mahâyânism has gone a step further than Hînayânism in the development
of the doctrine of non-âtman, for it expressly disavows, besides the
denial {42} of the existence of the ego-substance, a noumenal
conception of things, i.e., the conception of particulars as having
something absolute in them. Hînayânism, indeed, also disfavors this
conception of thinginess, but it does so only implicitly. It is
Mahâyânism that definitely insists on the non-existence of a personal
(_pudgala_) as well as a thingish (_dharma_) ego.

According to the vulgar view, particular existences are real, they
have permanent substantial entities, remaining forever as such. They
think, therefore, that organic matter remains forever organic just as
much as inorganic matter remains inorganic; that, as they are
essentially different, there is no mutual transformation between them.
The human soul is different from that of the lower animals and sentient
beings from non-sentient beings; the difference being well-defined and
permanent, there is no bridge over which one can cross to the other.
We may call this view naturalistic egoism.

Mahâyânism, against this egoistic conception of the world, extends
its theory of non-âtman to the realm lying outside us. It maintains
that there is no irreducible reality in particular existences, so long
as they are combinations of several causes and conditions brought
together by the principle of karma. Things are here because they are
sustained by karma. As soon as its force is exhausted, the conditions
that made their existence possible lose efficience and dissolve, and
in their places will follow other conditions and existences. Therefore,
what is organic {43} to-day, may be inorganic to-morrow, and _vice
versa_. Carbon, for instance, which is stored within the earth appears
in the form of coal or graphite or diamond; but that which exists on
its surface is found sometimes combined with other elements in the
form of an animal or a vegetable, sometimes in its free elementary
state. It is the same carbon everywhere; it becomes inorganic or
organic, according to its karma, it has no âtman in itself which
directs its transformation by its own self-determining will. Mutual
transformation is everywhere observable; there is a constant shifting
of forces, an eternal transmigration of the elements,--all of which
tend to show the transitoriness and non-âtman-ness of individual
existences. The universe is moving like a whirl-wind, nothing in it
proving to be stationary, nothing in it rigidly adhering to its own
form of existence.

Suppose, on the other hand, there were an âtman behind every
particular being; suppose, too, it were absolute and permanent and
self-acting; and this phenomenal world would then come to a
standstill, and life be forever gone. For is not changeability the
most essential feature and condition of life, and also the strongest
evidence for the non-existence of individual things as realities? The
physical sciences recognise this universal fact of mutual
transformation in its positive aspect and call it the law of the
conservation of energy and of matter. Mahâyânism, recognising its
negative side, proposes the doctrine of the non-âtman-ness of things,
that is to say, the {44} impermanency of all particular existences.
Therefore, it is said, “_Sarvam anityam, sarvam çûnyam, sarvam
anâtman_.” (All is transitory, all is void, all is without ego.)

Mahâyânists condemn the vulgar view that denies the consubstantiality
and reciprocal transformation of all beings, not only because it is
scientifically untenable, but mainly because, ethically and religiously
considered, it is fraught with extremely dangerous ideas,--ideas which
finally may lead a “brother to deliver up the brother to death and the
father the child,” and, again, it may constrain “the children to rise
up against their parents and cause them to be put to death.” Why?
Because this view, born of egoism, would dry up the well of human love
and sympathy, and transform us into creatures of bestial selfishness;
because this view is not capable of inspiring us with the sense of
mutuality and commiseration and of making us disinterestedly feel for
our fellow-beings. Then, all fine religious and humane sentiments
would depart from our hearts, and we should be nothing less than rigid,
lifeless corpses, no pulse beating, no blood running. And how many
victims are offered every day on this altar of egoism! They are not
necessarily immoral by nature, but blindly led by the false conception
of life and the world, they have been rendered incapable of seeing
their own spiritual doubles in their neighbors. Being ever controlled
by their sensual impulses, they sin against humanity, against nature,
and against themselves.

{45}

We read in the _Mahâyâna-abhisamaya Sûtra_ (Nanjo, no. 196):


 “Empty and calm and devoid of ego
 Is the nature of all things:
 There is no individual being
 That in reality exists.

 “Nor end nor beginning having
 Nor any middle course,
 All is a sham, here’s no reality whatever:
 It is like unto a vision and a dream.

 “It is like unto clouds and lightning,
 It is like unto gossamer or bubbles floating
 It is like unto fiery revolving wheel,
 It is like unto water-splashing.

 “Because of causes and conditions things are here:
 In them there’s no self-nature [i.e., âtman]:
 All things that move and work,
 Know them as such.

 “Ignorance and thirsty desire,
 The source of birth and death they are:
 Right contemplation and discipline by heart,
 Desire and ignorance obliterate.

 “All beings in the world,
 Beyond words they are and expressions:
 Their ultimate nature, pure and true,
 Is like unto vacuity of space.”[10]


 _The Dharmakâya._

The Dharmakâya, which literally means “body or system of being,” is,
according to the Mahâyânists, {46} the ultimate reality that underlies
all particular phenomena; it is that which makes the existence of
individuals possible; it is the _raison d’être_ of the universe; it is
the norm of being, which regulates the course of events and thoughts.
The conception of Dharmakâya is peculiarly Mahâyânistic, for the
Hînayâna school did not go so far as to formulate the ultimate
principle of the universe; its adherents stopped short at a
positivistic interpretation of Buddhism. The Dharmakâya remained for
them to be the Body of the Law, or the Buddha’s personality as embodied
in the truth taught by him.

The Dharmakâya may be compared in one sense to the God of Christianity
and in another sense to the Brahman or Paramâtman of Vedantism. It is
different, however, from the former in that it does not stand
transcendentally above the universe, which, according to the Christian
view, was created by God, but which is, according to Mahâyânism, a
manifestation of the Dharmakâya himself. It is also different from
Brahman in that it is not absolutely impersonal, nor is it a mere
being. The Dharmakâya, on the contrary, is capable of willing and
reflecting, or, to use Buddhist phraseology, it is _Karunâ_ (love) and
_Bodhi_ (intelligence), and not the mere state of being.

This pantheistic and at the same time entheistic Dharmakâya is working
in every sentient being, for sentient beings are nothing but a
self-manifestation of the Dharmakâya. Individuals are not isolated
existences, as imagined by most people. If isolated, {47} they are
nothing, they are so many soap-bubbles which vanish one after another
in the vacuity of space. All particular existences acquire their
meaning only when they are thought of in their oneness in the
Dharmakâya. The veil of Mâya, i.e., subjective ignorance may temporally
throw an obstacle to our perceiving the universal light of Dharmakâya,
in which we are all one. But when our Bodhi or intellect, which is by
the way a reflection of the Dharmakâya in the human mind, is so fully
enlightened, we no more build the artificial barrier of egoism before
our spiritual eye; the distinction between the _meum_ and _teum_ is
obliterated, no dualism throws the nets of entanglement over us; I
recognise myself in you and you recognise yourself in me; _tat tvam
asi_. Or,


 “What is here, that is there;
 What is there, that is here:
 Who sees duality here,
 From death to death goes he.”[11]


This state of enlightenment may be called the spiritual expansion of
the ego, or, negatively, the ideal annihilation of the ego. A
never-drying stream of sympathy and love which is the life of religion
will now spontaneously flow out of the fountainhead of Dharmakâya.

The doctrine of non-ego teaches us that there is no reality in
individual existences, that we do not have any transcendental entity
called ego-substance. {48} The doctrine of Dharmakâya, to supplement
this, teaches us that we all are one in the System of Being and only
as such are immortal. The one shows us the folly of clinging to
individual existences and of coveting the immortality of the ego-soul;
the other convinces us of the truth that we are saved by living into
the unity of Dharmakâya. The doctrine of non-âtman liberates us from
the shackle of unfounded egoism; but as mere liberation does not mean
anything positive and may perchance lead us to asceticism, we apply
the energy thus released to the execution of the will of Dharmakâya.

The questions: “Why have we to love our neighbors as ourselves? Why
have we to do to others all things whatsoever we would that they
should do to us?” are answered thus by Buddhists: “It is because we
are all one in the Dharmakâya, because when the clouds of ignorance
and egoism are totally dispersed, the light of universal love and
intelligence cannot help but shine in all its glory. And, enveloped in
this glory, we do not see any enemy, nor neighbor, we are not even
conscious of whether we are one in the Dharmakâya. There is no ‘my
will’ here, but only ‘thy will,’ the will of Dharmakâya, in which we
live and move and have our being.”

The Apostle Paul says: “For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ
shall all be made alive.” Why? Buddhists would answer, “because Adam
asserted his egoism in giving himself up to ignorance, (the tree of
knowledge is in truth the tree of ignorance, {49} for from it comes
the duality of me and thee); while Christ on the contrary surrendered
his egoistic assertion to the intelligence of the universal Dharmakâya.
That is why we die in the former and are made alive in the latter.”


 _Nirvâna._

The meaning of Nirvâna has been variously interpreted by non-Buddhist
students from the philological and the historical standpoint; but it
matters little what conclusions they have reached, as we are not going
to recapitulate them here; nor do they at all affect our presentation
of the Buddhists’ own view as below. For it is the latter that concerns
us here most and constitutes the all-important part of the problem. We
have had too much of non-Buddhist speculation on the question at issue.
The majority of the critics, while claiming to be fair and impartial,
have, by some preconceived ideas, been led to a conclusion, which is
not at all acceptable to intelligent Buddhists. Further, the fact has
escaped their notice that Pâli literature from which they chiefly
derive their information on the subject represents the views of one of
the many sects that arose soon after the demise of the Master and were
constantly branching off at and after the time of King Açoka. The
probability is, that Buddha himself did not have any stereotyped
conception of Nirvana, and, as most great minds do, expressed his ideas
outright as formed under various circumstances; though of course they
could not be {50} in contradiction with his central beliefs, which must
have remained the same throughout the course of his religious life.
Therefore, to understand a problem in all its apparently contradictory
aspects, it is very necessary to grasp at the start the spirit of the
author of the problem, and when this is done the rest will be
understood comparatively much easier. Non-Buddhist critics lack in
this most important qualification; therefore, it is no wonder that
Buddhists themselves are always reluctant to accede to their
interpretations.

Enough for apology. Nirvâna, according to Buddhists, does not signify
an annihilation of consciousness nor a temporal or permanent
suppression of mentation[12], as imagined by some; but it is the {51}
annihilation of the notion of ego-substance and of all the desires
that arise from this erroneous conception. But this represents the
negative side of the doctrine, and its positive side consists in
universal love or sympathy (_karunâ_) for all beings.

These two aspects of Nirvâna, i.e., negatively, the destruction of
evil passions, and, positively, the practice of sympathy, are
complementary to each other; and when we have one we have the other.
Because, as soon as the heart is freed from the cangue of egoism, the
same heart, hitherto so cold and hard, undergoes a complete change,
shows animation, and, joyously escaping from self-imprisonment, finds
its freedom in the bosom of Dharmakâya. In this latter sense, Nirvâna
is the “humanisation” of Dharmakâya, that is to say, “God’s will done
in earth as it is in heaven.” If we make use of the {52} terms,
subjective and objective. Nirvâna is the former, and the Dharmakâya is
the latter, phase of one and the same principle. Again,
psychologically, Nirvâna is enlightenment, the actualisation of the
Bodhicitta[13] (Heart of Intelligence).

The gospel of love and the doctrine of Nirvâna may appear to some to
contradict each other, for they think that the former is the source of
energy and activity, while the latter is a lifeless, inhuman, ascetic
quietism. But the truth is, love is the emotional aspect and Nirvâna
the intellectual aspect of the inmost religious consciousness which
constitutes the essence of the Buddhist life.

That Nirvâna is the destruction of selfish desires is plainly shown in
this stanza:


 “To the giver merit is increased;
 When the senses are controlled anger arises not,
 The wise forsake evil,
 By the destruction of desire, sin, and infatuation,
 A man attains to Nirvâna.”[14]


The following which was breathed forth by Buddha against a certain
class of monks, testifies that when Nirvâna is understood in the sense
of quietism or pessimism, he vigorously repudiated it:


 “Fearing an endless chain of birth and death,
 And the misery of transmigration,
 Their heart is filled with worry,
 But they desire their safety only.

{53}

 “Quietly sitting and reckoning the breaths,
 They’re bent on the Anâpânam.[15]
 They contemplate on the filthiness of the body,--
 Thinking how impure it is!

 “They shun the dust of the triple world,
 And in ascetic practise their safety they seek:
 Incapable of love and sympathy are they,
 For on Nirvâna abides their thought.”[16]


Against this ascetic practise of some monks, the Buddha sets forth
what might be called the ideal of the Buddhist life:


 “Arouse thy will, supreme and great,
 Practise love and sympathy, give joy and protection;
 Thy love like unto space,
 Be it without discrimination, without limitation.

 “Merits establish, not for thy own sake,
 But for charity universal;
 Save and deliver all beings,
 Let them attain the wisdom of the Great Way.”


It is apparent that the ethical application of the doctrine of Nirvâna
is naught else than the Golden {54} Rule,[17] so called. The Golden
Rule, however, does not give any reason why we should so act, it is a
mere command whose authority is ascribed to a certain superhuman being.
This does not satisfy an intellectually disposed mind, which refuses
to accept anything on mere authority, for it wants to go to the bottom
of things and see on what ground they are standing. Buddhism has solved
this problem by finding the oneness of things in Dharmakâya, from which
flows the eternal stream of love and sympathy. As we have seen before,
when the cursed barrier of egoism is broken down, there remains nothing
that can prevent us from loving others as ourselves.

Those who wish to see nothing but an utter barrenness of heart after
the annihilation of egoism, are much mistaken in their estimation of
human nature. For they think its animation comes from selfishness, and
that all forms of activity in our life are propelled simply by the
desire to preserve self and the race. They, therefore, naturally
shrink from the doctrine that teaches that all things worldly are
empty, and that there is no such thing as ego-substance whose {55}
immortality is so much coveted by most people. But the truth is, the
spring of love does not lie in the idea of self, but in its removal.
For the human heart, being a reflection of the Dharmakâya which is
love and intelligence, recovers its intrinsic power and goodness, only
when the veil of ignorance and egoism is cast aside. The animation,
energy, strenuousness, which were shown by a self-centered will, and
which therefore were utterly despicable, will not surely die out with
the removal of their odious atmosphere in which egoism had enveloped
them. But they will gain an ever nobler interpretation, ever more
elevating and satisfying significance; for they have gone through a
baptism of fire, by which the last trace of egoism has been thoroughly
consumed. The old evil master is eternally buried, but the willing
servants are still here and ever ready to do their service, now more
efficiently, for their new legitimate and more authoritative lord.

Destruction is in common parlance closely associated with nothingness,
hence Nirvâna, the destruction of egoism, is ordinarily understood as
a synonym of nihilism. But the removal of darkness does not bring
desolation, but means enlightenment and order and peace. It is the
same chamber, all the furniture is left there as it was before. In
darkness chaos reigned, goblins walked wild; in enlightenment
everything is in its proper place. And did we not state plainly that
Nirvâna was enlightenment?

{56}


 _The Intellectual Tendency of Buddhism._

One thing which in this connection I wish to refer to, is what makes
Buddhism appear somehow cold and impassive. By this I mean its
intellectuality.

The fact is that anything coming from India greatly savors of
philosophy. In ancient India everybody of the higher castes seems to
have indulged in intellectual and speculative exercises. Being rich in
natural resources and thus the struggle for existence being reduced to
a minimum, the Brahmans and the Kṣatriyas gathered themselves under
most luxuriously growing trees, or retired to the mountain-grottoes
undisturbed by the hurly-burly of the world, and there they devoted
all their leisure hours to metaphysical speculations and discussions.
Buddhism, as a product of these people, is naturally deeply imbued
with intellectualism.

Further, in India there was no distinction between religion and
philosophy. Every philosophical system was at the same time a religion,
and _vice versa_. Philosophy with the Hindus was not an idle display
of logical subtlety which generally ends in entangling itself in the
meshes of sophistry. Their aim of philosophising was to have an
intellectual insight into the significance of existence and the
destiny of humanity. They did not believe in anything blindly nor
accept anything on mere tradition. Buddha most characteristically
echoes this sentiment when he says, “Follow my teachings not as taught
by a Buddha, but as {57} being in accord with truth.” This spirit of
self-reliance and self-salvation later became singularly Buddhistic.
Even when Buddha was still merely an enthusiastic aspirant for Nirvâna,
he seems to have been strongly possessed of this spirit, for he most
emphatically declared the following famous passage, in response to the
pathetic persuasion of his father’s ministers, who wanted him to come
home with them: “The doubt whether there exists anything or not, is
not to be settled for me by another’s words. Arriving at the truth
either by mortification or by tranquilisation, I will grasp myself
whatever is ascertainable about it. It is not mine to receive a view
which is full of conflicts, uncertainties, and contradictions. What
enlightened men would go by other’s faith? The multitudes are like the
blind led in the darkness by the blind.”[18]

To say simply, “Love your enemy,” was not satisfactory to the Hindu
mind, it wanted to see the reason why. And as soon as the people were
convinced intellectually, they went even so far as to defend the faith
with their lives. It was not an uncommon event that before a party of
Hindu philosophers entered into a discussion they made an agreement
that the penalty of defeats should be the sacrifice of the life. They
were, above all, a people of intellect, though of course not lacking
in religious sentiment.

It is no wonder, then, that Buddha did not make the first proclamation
of his message by “Repent, for {58} the kingdom of heaven is at hand,”
but by the establishment of the Four Noble Truths.[19] One appeals to
the feeling, and the other to the intellect. That which appeals to the
intellect naturally seems to be less passionate, but the truth is,
feeling without the support of intellect leads to fanaticism and is
always ready to yield itself to bigotry and superstition.

The doctrine of Nirvâna is doubtless more intellectual than the
Christian gospel of love. It first recognises the wretchedness of
human life as is proved by our daily experiences; it then finds its
cause in our subjective ignorance as to the true meaning of existence,
and in our egocentric desires which, obscuring our spiritual insight,
make us tenaciously cling to things chimerical; it then proposes the
complete annihilation of egoism, the root of all evil, by which,
subjectively, tranquillity of heart is restored, and, objectively, the
realisation of universal love becomes possible. Buddhism, thus,
proceeds most logically in the development of its doctrine of Nirvâna
and universal love.

Says Victor Hugo (_Les Misérables_, vol. II): “The reduction of the
universe to a single being, the expansion of a single being even to
God, this is love.” When a man clings to the self and does not want
{59} to identify himself with other fellow-selves, he cannot expand
his being to God. When he shuts himself in the narrow shell of ego and
keeps all the world outside, he cannot reduce the universe to his
innermost self. To love, therefore, one must first enter Nirvâna.

The truth is everywhere the same and is attained through the removal
of ignorance. But as individual disposition differs according to the
previous karma, some are more prone to intellectualism, while the
others to sentimentality (in its psychological sense). Let us then
follow our own inclination conscientiously and not speak evil of
others. This is called the Doctrine of Middle Path.




 CHAPTER II.
 HISTORICAL CHARACTERISATION OF
 MAHÂYÂNISM.

{60}

/We/ are now in a position to enter into a specific exposition of the
Mahâyâna doctrine. But, before doing so, it will be well for us first
to consider the views that were held by the Hindu Buddhist thinkers
concerning its characteristic features; in other words, to make an
historical survey of its peculiarities.

As stated in the Introduction, the term Mahâyâna was invented in the
times of Nâgârjuna and Âryadeva (about the third or fourth century
after Christ), when doctrinal struggles between the Çrâvaka and the
Bodhisattva classes reached a climax. The progressive Hindu Buddhists,
desiring to announce the essential features of their doctrine, did so
naturally at the expense of their rival and by pointing out why theirs
was greater than, or superior to, Hînayânism. Their views were thus
necessarily vitiated by a partisan spirit, and instead of impartially
and critically enumerating the principal characteristics of Mahâyânism,
they placed rather too much stress upon those points that do not in
these latter days appear to be very essential, but that were then
considered by them to be of paramount importance. These points,
nevertheless, {61} throw some light on the nature of Mahâyâna Buddhism
as historically distinguished from its consanguineous rival and
fellow-doctrine.


 _Sthiramati’s Conception of Mahâyânism._

Sthiramati[20] in his _Introduction to Mahâyânism_ states that
Mahâyânism is a special doctrine for the Bodhisattvas, who are to be
distinguished from the other two classes, viz, the Çrâvakas and the
Pratyekabuddhas. The essential difference of the doctrine consists in
the belief that objects of the senses are merely phenomenal and have
no absolute reality, that the indestructible Dharmakâya which is
all-pervading constitutes the norm of existence, that all
Bodhisattvas[21] are incarnations of the Dharmakâya, who not by
their evil karma previously accumulated, but by their boundless love
for all mankind, assume {62} corporeal existences, and that persons
who thus appear in the flesh, as avatars of the Buddha supreme,
associate themselves with the masses in all possible social relations,
in order that they might thus lead them to a state of enlightenment.

While this is a very summary statement of the Mahâyâna doctrine, a
more elaborate and extended enumeration of its peculiar features in
contradistinction to those of Hînayânism, is made in the _Miscellanea
on Mahâyâna Metaphysics_,[22] _The Spiritual Stages of the
Yogâcâra_,[23] _An Exposition of the Holy Doctrine_,[24] _A
Comprehensive Treatise on Mahâyânism_,[25] and others. Let us first
explain the “Seven General Characteristics” as described in the first
three works here mentioned.


 _Seven Principal Features of Mahâyânism._

According to Asanga, who lived a little later than Nâgârjuna, that
is, at the time when Mahâyânism was further divided into the Yogâcârya
and the Mâdhyamika school, the seven features peculiar to Mahâyânism
as distinguished from Hînayânism, are as follows:

(1) _Its Comprehensiveness._ Mahâyânism does not confine itself to
the teachings of one Buddha alone; {63} but wherever and whenever
truth is found, even under the disguise of most absurd superstitions,
it makes no hesitation to winnow the grain from the husk and
assimilate it in its own system. Innumerable good laws taught by
Buddhas[26] of all ages and localities are all taken up in the
coherent body of Mahâyânism.

(2) _Universal love for All Sentient Beings._ Hînayânism confines
itself to the salvation of individuals only; it does not extend its
bliss universally, as each person must achieve his own deliverance.
Mahâyânism, on the other hand, aims at general salvation; it
endeavors to save us not only individually, but universally. All the
motives, efforts, and actions of the Bodhisattvas pivot on the
furtherance of universal welfare.

(3) _Its Greatness in Intellectual Comprehension._ Mahâyânism
maintains the theory of non-âtman not only in regard to sentient
beings but in regard to things in general. While it denies the
hypothesis of a metaphysical agent directing our mental operations, it
also rejects the view that insists on the noumenal or thingish reality
of existences as they appear to our senses.

(4) _Its Marvelous Spiritual Energy._ The Bodhisattvas never become
tired of working for universal salvation, {64} nor do they despair
because of the long time required to accomplish this momentous object.
To try to attain enlightenment in the shortest possible period and to
be self-sufficient without paying any attention to the welfare of the
masses, is not the teaching of Mahâyânism.

(5) _Its Greatness in the Exercise of the Upâya._ The term _upâya_
literally means expediency. The great fatherly sympathetic heart of
the Bodhisattva has inexhaustible resources at his command in order
that he might lead the masses to final enlightenment, each according
to his disposition and environment. Mahâyânism does not ask its
followers to escape the metempsychosis of birth and death for the sake
of entering into the lethargic tranquillity of Nirvâna; for
metempsychosis in itself is no evil, and Nirvâna in its coma is not
productive of any good. And as long as there are souls groaning in
pain, the Bodhisattva cannot rest in Nirvâna; there is no rest for
his unselfish heart, so full of love and sympathy, until he leads all
his fellow-beings to the eternal bliss of Buddhahood. To reach this
end he employs innumerable means (_upâya_) suggested by his
disinterested lovingkindness.

(6) _Its Higher Spiritual Attainment._ In Hînayânism the highest bliss
attainable does not go beyond Arhatship which is ascetic saintliness.
But the followers of Mahâyânism attain even to Buddhahood with all its
spiritual powers.

(7) _Its Greater Activity._ When the Bodhisattva {65} reaches the
stage of Buddhahood, he is able to manifest himself everywhere in the
ten quarters of the universe[27] and to minister to the spiritual
needs of all sentient beings.

These seven peculiarities are enumerated to be the reasons why the
doctrine defended by the progressive Buddhists is to be called
Mahâyânism, or the doctrine of great vehicle, in contradistinction to
Hînayânism, the doctrine of small vehicle. In each case, therefore,
Asanga takes pains to draw the line of demarcation distinctly between
the two schools of Buddhism and not between Buddhism and all other
religious doctrines which existed at his time.


 _The Ten Essential Features of Buddhism._

The following statement of the ten essential features of Mahâyânism as
presented in the _Comprehensive Treatise on Mahâyânism_, is made from
a different standpoint from the preceding one, for it is the
pronunciamento of the Yogâcâra school of Asanga {66} and Vasubandhu
rather than that of Mahâyânism generally. This school together with
the Mâdhyamika school of Nâgârjuna constitute the two divisions of
Hindu Mahâyânism.[28]

The points enumerated by Asanga and Vasubandhu as most essential in
their system are ten.

(1) It teaches an immanent existence of all things in the
_Âlayavijñâna_ or All-Conserving Soul. The conception of an
All-Conserving Soul, it is claimed, was suggested by Buddha in the
so-called Hînayâna sûtras; but on account of its deep meaning and
of the liability of its being confounded with the ego-soul conception,
he did not disclose its full significance in their sûtras; but made
it known only in the Mahâyâna sûtras.

According to the Yogâcâra school, the Âlaya is not an universal, but
an individual mind or soul, whatever we may term it, in which the
“germs” of all things exist in their ideality.[29] The objective
world in reality does not exist, but by dint of subjective {67}
illusion that is created by ignorance, we project all these “germs” in
the Âlayavijñâna to the outside world, and imagine that they are
there really as they are; while the Manovijñâna (ego-consciousness)
which is too a product of illusion, tenaciously clinging to the
Âlayavijñâna as the real self, never abandons its egoism. The
Âlayavijñâna, however, is indifferent to, and irresponsible for, all
these errors on the part of the Manovijñâna.[30]

(2) The Yogâcâra school distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: 1.
Illusion (_parikalpita_), 2. Discriminative or Relative Knowledge
(_paratantra_), and 3. Perfect Knowledge (_pariniṣpanna_).

The distinction may best be illustrated by the well-known analogy of a
rope and a snake. Deceived by a similarity in appearance, men
frequently take a rope lying on the ground for a poisonous snake and
{68} are terribly shocked on that account. But when they approach and
carefully examine it, they become at once convinced of the
groundlessness of this apprehension, which was the natural sequence of
illusion. This may be considered to correspond to what Kant calls
_Schein_.

Most people, however, do not go any further in their inquiry. They are
contented with the sensual, empirical knowledge of an object with
which they come in contact. When they understand that the thing they
mistook for a snake was really nothing but a yard of innocent rope,
they think their knowledge of the object is complete, and do not
trouble themselves with a philosophical investigation as to whether
the rope which to them is just what it appears to be, has any real
existence in itself. They do not stop a moment to reflect that their
knowledge is merely relative, for it does not go beyond the phenomenal
significance of the things they perceive.

But is an object in reality such as it appears to be to our senses?
Are particular phenomena as such really actual? What is the value of
our knowledge concerning those so-called realities? When we make an
investigation into such problems as these, the Yogâcâra school says,
we find that their existence is only relative and has no absolute
value whatever independent of the perceiving subject. They are the
“ejection” of our ideas into the outside world, which are centred and
conserved in our Âlayavijñâna and which are awakened into activity by
subjective {69} ignorance. This clear insight into the nature of
things, i.e., into their non-realness as âtman, constitutes perfect
knowledge.

(3) When we attain to the perfect knowledge, we recognise the ideality
of the universe. There is no such thing as an objective world, which
is really an illusive manifestation of the mind called Âlayavijñâna.
But even this supposedly real existence of the Âlayavijñâna is a
product of particularisation called forth by the ignorant Manovijñâna.
The Manovijñâna, or empirical ego, as it might be called, having no
adequate knowledge as to the true nature of the Âlaya, takes the latter
for a metaphysical agent, that like the master of a puppet-show manages
all mental operations according to its humour. As the silkworm
imprisons itself in the cocoon created by itself, the Manovijñâna,
entangling itself in ignorance and confusion, takes its own illusory
creations for real realities.

(4) For the regulation of moral life, the Yogâcâra with the other
Mahâyâna schools, proposes the practising of the six Pâramitâs (virtues
of perfection), which are: 1. _Dana_ (giving), 2. _Çîla_ (moral
precept), 3. _Kṣânti_ (meekness), 4. _Vîrya_ (energy), 5. _Dhyâna_
(meditation), 6. _Prajñâ_ (knowledge or wisdom). In way of explanation,
says Asanga: “By not clinging to wealth or pleasures (1), by not
cherishing any thoughts to violate the precepts (2), by not feeling
dejected in the face of evils (3), by not awakening any thought of
indolence while practising goodness (4), {70} by maintaining serenity
of mind in the midst of disturbance and confusion of this world (5),
and finally by always practising _ekacitta_[31] and by truthfully
comprehending the nature of things (6), the Bodhisattvas recognise the
truth of _vijñânamâtra_,--the truth that there is nothing that is not
of ideal or subjective creation.”

(5) Mahâyânism teaches that there are ten spiritual stages of
Bodhisattvahood, viz., 1. Pramuditâ, 2. Vimalâ, 3 Prabhâkarî, 4.
Arcismatî, 5. Sudurjayâ, 6. Abhimukhî, 7. Dûrangamâ, 8. Acalâ, 9.
Sâdhumatî, 10. Dharmameghâ[32]. By passing through all these stages
one after another, we are believed to reach the oneness of Dharmakâya.

(6) The Yogâcârists claim that the precepts that are practised by the
followers of Mahâyânism are far superior to those of Hînayânists. The
latter tend to externalism and formalism, and do not go deep into our
spiritual, subjective motives. Now, there are physical, verbal, and
spiritual precepts observed by the Buddha. The Hînayânists observe the
first two neglecting the last which is by far more important than the
rest. For instance, the Çrâvaka’s interpretation of the ten Çikṣas[33]
is literal and not spiritual; {71} further, they follow these precepts
because they wish to attain Nirvâna for their own sake, and not for
others’. The Bodhisattva, on the other hand, does not wish to be bound
within the narrow circle of moral restriction. Aiming at an universal
emancipation of mankind, he ventures even violating the ten çikṣas, if
necessary. The first çikṣa, for instance, forbids the killing of any
living being; but the Bodhisattva does not hesitate to go to war, in
case the cause he espouses is right and beneficient to humanity at
large.

(7) As Mahâyânism insists on the purification of the inner life, its
teaching applies not to things outward, its principles are not of the
ascetic and exclusive kind. The Mahâyânists do not shun to commingle
themselves with the “dust of worldliness”; they aim at the realisation
of the Bodhi; they are not afraid of being thrown into the whirlpool
of metempsychosis; they endeavor to impart spiritual benefits to all
sentient beings without regard to their attitude, whether hostile or
friendly, towards themselves; having immovable faith in the Mahâyâna,
they never become contaminated by vanity and worldly pleasures with
which they may constantly be in touch; they have a clear insight into
the doctrine of non-âtman; being free from all spiritual faults, they
live in perfect accord with the laws of Suchness and discharge their
duties without the {72} least conceit or self-assertion: in a word,
their inner life is a realisation of the Dharmakâya.

(8) The intellectual superiority of the Bodhisattva is shown by his
possession of knowledge of non-particularisation (_anânârtha_).[34]
This knowledge, philosophically considered, is the knowledge of the
absolute, or the knowledge of the universal. The Bodhisattva’s mind is
free from the dualism of samsâra (birth-and-death) and nirvâna, of
positivism and negativism, of being and non-being, of object and
subject, of ego and non-ego. His knowledge, in short, transcends the
limits of final realities, soaring high to the realm of the absolute
and the abode of non-particularity.

(9) In consequence of this intellectual elevation, the Bodhisattva
perceives the working of birth and death in nirvâna, and nirvâna in
the transmigration of birth and death. He sees the “ever-changing
many” in the “never-changing one,” and the “never-changing {73} one”
in the “ever-changing many.” His inward life is in accord at once with
the laws of transitory phenomena and with those of transcendental
Suchness. According to the former, he does not recoil as ascetics do
when he comes in contact with the world of the senses; he is not
afraid of suffering the ills that the flesh is heir to; but, according
to the latter, he never clings to things evanescent, his inmost
consciousness forever dwells in the serenity of eternal Suchness.

(10) The final characteristic to be mentioned as distinctly
Mahâyânistic is the doctrine of Trikâya. There is, it is asserted,
the highest being which is the ultimate cause of the universe and in
which all existences find their essential origin and significance.
This is called by the Mahâyânists Dharmakâya. The Dharmakâya, however,
does not remain in its absoluteness, it reveals itself in the realm of
cause and effect. It then takes a particular form. It becomes a devil,
or a god, or a deva, or a human being, or an animal of lower grade,
adapting itself to the degrees of the intellectual development of the
people. For it is the people’s inner needs which necessitate the
special forms of manifestation. This is called Nirmânakâya, that is,
the body of transformation. The Buddha who manifested himself in the
person of Gautama, the son of King of Çuddhodâna about two thousand
five hundred years ago on the Ganges, is a form of Nirmânakâya. The
third one is called Sambhogakâya, or body of bliss. This is the
spiritual {74} body of a Buddha, invested with all possible grandeur
in form and in possession of all imaginable psychic powers. The
conception of Sambhogakâya is full of wild imaginations which are not
easy of comprehension by modern minds.[35]

These characteristics enumerated at seven or ten as peculiarly
Mahâyânistic are what the Hindu Buddhist philosophers of the first
century down to the fifth or sixth century of the Christian era
thought to be the most essential points of their faith and what they
thought entitled it to be called the “Great Vehicle” (_Mahâyâna_) of
salvation, in contradistinction to the faith embraced by their
conservative brethren. But, as we view them now, the points here
specified are to a great extent saturated with a partisan spirit, and
besides they are more or less scattered and unconnected statements of
the so-called salient features of Mahâyânism. Nor do they furnish much
information concerning the nature of Mahâyânism as a coherent system
of religious teachings. They give but a general and somewhat obscure
delineation of it, and that in opposition to Hînayânism. In point of
fact, Mahâyânism is a school of Buddhism and has many characteristics
in common with Hînayânism. Indeed, the spirit of the former is also
that of the latter, and as far as the general trend of Buddhism is
concerned there is no need of emphasising {75} the significance of one
school over the other. On the following pages I shall try to present a
more comprehensive and impartial exposition of the Buddhism, which has
been persistently designated by its followers as Mahâyânism.




 SPECULATIVE MAHÂYÂNISM.

{76}

 CHAPTER III.
 PRACTISE AND SPECULATION.

/Mahâyânism/ perhaps can best be treated in two main divisions, as it
has distinctly two principal features in its doctrinal development. I
may call one the speculative phase of Mahâyânism and the other
practical. The first part is essentially a sort of Buddhist
metaphysics, where the mind is engaged solely in ratiocination and
abstraction. Here the intellect plays a very prominent part, and some
of the most abstruse problems of philosophy are freely discussed.
Speculative followers of Buddhism have taken great interest in the
discussion of them and have written many volumes on various
subjects.[36] {77} The second or practical phase of Mahâyânism
deals with such religious beliefs that constitute the life and essence
of the system. Mahâyânists might have reasoned wrongfully to explain
their practical faith, but the faith itself is the outburst of the
religious sentiment which is inherent in human nature. This practical
part, therefore, is by far more important, and in fact it can be said
that the speculative part is merely a preparatory step toward it.
Inasmuch as Mahâyânism is a religion and not a philosophical system,
it must be practical, that is, it must directly appeal to the inmost
life of the human heart.


 _Relation of Feeling and Intellect in Religion._

So much has been said about the relation between philosophy and
religion; and there are many scholars who so firmly believe in the
identity of religion either with superstitions or with supernatural
revelation, that the denial of this assertion is considered by them
practically to be the disavowal of all religions. For, according to
them, there is no midway in religion. A religion which is rational and
yet practical is no religion. Now, Buddhism is neither a vagary of
imagination nor a revelation from above, and on this account it has
been declared by some to be a philosophy. The title “Speculative
Mahâyânism” thus, is apt to {78} be taken as a confirmation of such
opinion. To remove all the misconceptions, therefore, which might be
entertained concerning the religious nature of Mahâyânism and its
attitude toward intellectualism, I have deemed it wise here to say a
few words about the relation between feeling and intellect in religion.

There is no doubt that religion is essentially practical; it does not
necessarily require theorisation. The latter, properly speaking, is
the business of philosophy. If religion was a product of the intellect
solely, it could not give satisfaction to the needs of man’s whole
being. Reason constitutes but a part of the organised totality of an
individual being. Abstraction however high, and speculation however
deep, do not as such satisfy the inmost yearnings of the human heart.
But this they can do when they enter into one’s inner life and
constitution; that is, when abstraction becomes a concrete fact and
speculation a living principle in one’s existence; in short, when
philosophy becomes religion.

Philosophy as such, therefore, is generally distinguished from
religion. But we must not suppose that religion as the deepest
expression of a human being can eliminate altogether from it the
intellectual element. The most predominant rôle in religion may be
played by the imagination and feeling, but ratiocination must not fail
to assert its legitimate right in the co-ordination of beliefs. When
this right is denied, religion becomes fanaticism, superstition, fata
morgana, and even a menace to the progress of humanity.

{79}

The intellect is critical, objective, and always tries to stand apart
from the things that are taken up for examination. This alienation or
keeping itself aloof from concrete facts on the part of the intellect,
constantly tends to disregard the real significance of life, of which
it is also a manifestation. Therefore, the conflict between feeling
and reason, religion and science, instinct and knowledge, has been
going on since the awakening of consciousness.

Seeing this fact, intellectual people are generally prone to condemn
religion as barring the freedom and obstructing the progress of
scientific investigations. It is true that religion went frequently to
the other extreme and tried to suppress the just claim of reason; it
is true that this was especially the case with Christianity, whose
history abounds with regretable incidents resulting from its violent
encroachments upon the domain of reason. It is also true that the
feeling and the intellect are sometimes at variance, that what the
feeling esteems as the most valuable treasure is at times relentlessly
crushed by the reason, while the feeling looks with utmost contempt at
the results that have been reached by the intellect after much
lucubration. But this fatal conflict is no better than the fight which
takes place between the head and the tail of a hydra when it is cut in
twain; it always results in self-destruction.

We cannot live under such a miserable condition forever; when we know
that it is altogether due to a myopia on the part of our understanding.
The {80} truth is that feeling and reason “cannot do without one
another, and must work together inseparably in the process of human
development, since reason without feeling could have nothing to act
for and would be impotent to act, while feeling without reason would
act tyrannically and blindly--that is to say, if either could exist
and act at all without the other; for in the end it is not feeling nor
reason, which acts, but it is the man who acts according as he feels
and reasons”. (H. Maudsley’s _Natural Causes and Supernatural
Seemings_, p. vii). If it is thus admitted that feeling and reason
must co-ordinate and co-operate in the realisation of human ideals,
religion, though essentially a phenomenon of the emotional life,
cannot be indifferent to the significance of the intellect. Indeed,
religion, as much as philosophy, has ever been speculating on the
problems that are of the most vital importance to human life. In
Christianity speculation has been carried on under the name of
theology, though it claims to be fundamentally a religion of faith. In
India, however, as mentioned elsewhere, there was no dividing line
between philosophy and religion; and every teaching, every system, and
every doctrine, however abstract and speculative it might appear to
the Western mind, was at bottom religious and always aimed at the
deliverance of the soul. There was no philosophical system that did
not have some practical purpose.

Indian thinkers could not separate religion from {81} philosophy,
practice from theory. Their philosophy flowed out of the very spring
of the human heart and was not a mere display of fine intellectuation.
If their thinking were not in the right direction and led to a fallacy
which made life more miserable, they were ever ready to surrender
themselves to a superior doctrine as soon as it was discovered. But
when they thought they were in the right track, they did not hesitate
to sacrifice their life for it. Their philosophy had as much fire as
religion.


 _Buddhism and Speculation._

Owing to this fact, Buddhism as much as Hinduism is full of abstract
speculations and philosophical reflections so much so that some
Christian critics are inclined to deny the religiosity of Buddhism.
But no student of the science of comparative religion would indorse
such a view nowadays. Buddhism, in spite of its predominant
intellectualism, is really a religious system. There is no doubt that
it emphasises the rational element of religion more than any other
religious teachings, but on that account we cannot say that it
altogether disregards the importance of the part to be played by the
feeling. Its speculative, philosophical phase is really a preparation
for fully appreciating the subjective significance of religion, for
religion is ultimately subjective, that is to say, the essence of
religion is love and faith, or, to use Buddhist phraseology, it is the
expression of the Bodhi which {82} consists in _prajñâ_[37]
(intelligence or wisdom) and _karunâ_ (love or compassion). Mere
knowledge (not _prajñâ_) has very little value in human life. When
not guided by love and faith, it readily turns out to be the most
obedient servant of egoism and sensualism. What Tennyson says in the
following verses is perfectly true with Buddhism:


 “Who loves not knowledge? Who shall rail
  Against her beauty? May she mix
  With men and prosper! Who shall fix
 Her pillars? Let her work prevail.

 “But on her forehead sits a fire;
  She sets her forward countenance
  And leaps into the future chance,
 Submitting all things to desire.

 “Half grown as yet, a child, and vain--
  She cannot fight the fear of death.
  What is she, cut from love and faith,
 But some wild Pallas from the brain

 “Of demons? fiery-hot to burst
  All barriers in her onward race
  For power. Let her know her place;
 She is the second, not the first.

 “A higher hand must make her mild,
  If all be not in vain, and guide
  Her footsteps, moving side by side
 With Wisdom, like the younger child.”


{83}

But it must be remembered that Buddhism never ignores the part which
is played by the intellect in the purification of faith. For it is by
the judicious exercise of the intellect, that all religious
superstitions and prejudices are finally destroyed.

The intellect is so far of great consequence, and we must respect it
as the thunderbolt of Vajrapani, which crushes everything that is mere
sham and false. But at the same time we must also remember that the
quintessence of religion like the house built on the solid rock never
suffers on account of this destruction. Its foundation lies too deeply
buried in human {84} heart to be damaged by knowledge or science. So
long as there is a human heart warm with blood and burning with the
fire of life, the intellect however powerful will never be able to
trample it under foot. Indeed, the more severely the religious
sentiment is tested in the crucible of the intellect, the more
glorious and illuminating becomes its intrinsic virtue. The true
religion is, therefore, never reluctant to appear before the tribunal
of scientific investigation. In fact by ignoring the ultimate
significance of the religious consciousness, science is digging its
own grave. For what purpose has science other than the unravelling of
the mysteries of nature and reading into the meaning of existence? And
is this not what constitutes the foundation of religion? Science
cannot be final, it must find its reason in religion; as a mere
intellectual exercise it is not worthy of our serious consideration.


 _Religion and Metaphysics._

The French sociologist, M. Guyau, says in his _Irreligion of the
Future_ (English translation p. 10):

“Every positive and historical religion presents three distinctive and
essential elements: (1) An attempt at a mythical and non-scientific
explanation of natural phenomena (divine intervention, miracles,
efficacious prayers, etc.), or of historical facts (incarnation of
Jesus Christ or of Buddha, revelation, and so forth); (2) A system of
dogmas, that is to say, of symbolic ideas, of imaginative beliefs,
forcibly {85} imposed upon one’s faith as absolute verities, even
though they are susceptible of no scientific demonstration or
philosophical justification; (3) A cult and a system of rites, that is
to say, of more or less immutable practices regarded as possessing a
marvelous efficacy upon the course of things, a propitiatory virtue. A
religion without myth, without dogma, without cult, without rite, is
no more than that somewhat bastard product, ‘natural religion,’ which
is resolvable to a system of metaphysical hypotheses.”

M. Guyau seems to think that what will be left in religion, when
severed from its superstitions and imaginary beliefs and mysterious
rites, is a system of metaphysical speculations, and that, therefore,
it is not a religion. But in my opinion the French sociologist shares
the error that is very prevalent among the scientific men of to-day.
He is perfectly right in trying to strip religion of all its ephemeral
elements and external integuments, but he is entirely wrong when he
does this at the expense of its very essence, which consists of the
inmost yearnings of the human heart. And this essence has no affinity
with the superstitions which grow round it like excrescences as the
results of insufficient or abnormal nourishment. Nor does it concern
itself with mere philosophising and constructing hypotheses about
metaphysical problems. Far from it. Religion is a cry from the abysmal
depths of the human heart, that can never be silenced, until it finds
that something and identifies itself with it, which reveals the
teleological {86} significance of life and the universe. But this
something has a subjective value only, as Goethe makes Faust exclaim,
“Feeling is all in all, name for it I have none.” Why? Because it
cannot objectively or intellectually be demonstrated, as in the case
with those laws which govern phenomenal existences,--the proper
objects of the discursive human understanding. And this subjectivity
of religion is what makes “all righteousnesses as filthy garments.” If
religion deprived of its dogmas and cults is to be considered, as M.
Guyau thinks, nothing but a system of metaphysics, we utterly lose
sight of its subjective significance or its emotional element, which
indeed constitutes its _raison d’être_.

 * * *

Having this in view we proceed to see first on what metaphysical
hypothesis speculative Mahâyâna Buddhism is built up; but the reader
must remember that this phase of Mahâyânism is merely a preliminary
to its more essential part, which we expound later under the heading
of “Practical Mahâyânism,” in contradistinction to “Speculative
Mahâyânism.”




 CHAPTER IV.
 CLASSIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.

{87}


 _Three Forms of Knowledge._

/Mahâyânism/ generally distinguishes two or three forms of knowledge.
This classification is a sort of epistemology, inasmuch as it proposes
to ascertain the extent and nature of human knowledge, from a
religious point of view. Its object is to see what kind of human
knowledge is most reliable and valuable for the annihilation of
ignorance and the attainment of enlightenment. The Mahâyâna school
which has given most attention to this division of Buddhist philosophy
is the Yogâcâra of Asanga and Vasubandhu. The _Lankâvatarâ_ and the
_Sandhinirmocana_ and some other Sûtras, on which the school claims to
have its doctrinal foundation, teach three forms of knowledge. The
sûtra literature, however, as a rule does not enter into any detailed
exposition of the subject; it merely classifies knowledge and points
out what form of knowledge is most desirable by the Buddhists. To
obtain a fuller and more discursive elucidation, we must come to the
Abhidharma Pitaka of that school. Of the text books most generally
studied of the {88} Yogâcâra, we may mention Vasubandhu’s
_Vijñânamâtra_ with its commentaries and Asanga’s _Comprehensive
Treatise on Mahâyânism_. The following statements are abstracted
mainly from these documents.

The three forms of knowledge as classified by the Yogâcâra are: (1)
Illusion (_parikalpita_), (2) Relative Knowledge (_paratantra_), and
(3) Absolute Knowledge (_pariniṣpanna_).


 _Illusion._

Illusion (_parikalpita_), to use Kantian phraseology, is a
sense-perception not co-ordinated by the categories of the
understanding; that is to say, it is a purely subjective elaboration,
not verified by objective reality and critical judgment. So long as we
make no practical application of it, it will harbor no danger; there
is no evil in it, at least religiously. Perceptual illusion is a
psychical fact, and as such it is justified. A straight rod in water
appears crooked on account of the refraction of light; a sensation is
often felt in the limb after it has been amputated, for the nervous
system has not yet adjusted itself to the new condition. They are all
illusions, however. They are doubtless the correct interpretation of
the sense-impressions in question, but they are not confirmed by other
sense-impressions whose coördination is necessary to establish an
objective reality. The moral involved in this is: all sound inferences
and correct behavior must be based on critical knowledge and not on
illusory premises.

{89}

Reasoning in this wise, the Mahâyânists declare that the egoism
fostered by vulgar minds belongs to this class of knowledge, though of
a different order, and that those who tenaciously cling to egoism as
their final stronghold are believers in an intellectual fata morgana,
and are like the thirsty deer that madly after the visionary water in
the desert, or like the crafty monkey that tries to catch the lunar
reflection in the water. Because the belief in the existence of a
metaphysical agent behind our mental phenomena is not confirmed by
experience and sound judgment, it being merely a product of
unenlightened subjectivity.

Besides this ethical and philosophical egoism, all forms of
world-conception which is founded on the sandy basis of subjective
illusion, such as fetichism, idolatry, anthropomorphism,
anthropopsychism, and the like, must be classed under the
_parikalpita-lakṣana_ as doctrines having illusionary premises.


 _Relative Knowledge._

Next comes the _paratantra-lakṣana_, a _welt-anschauung_ based upon
relative knowledge, or better, upon the knowledge of the law of
relativity. According to this view, everything in the world has a
relative and conditional existence, and nothing can claim an absolute
reality free from all limitations. This closely corresponds to the
theory advanced by most of modern scientists, whose agnosticism denies
our intellectual capability of transcending the law of relativity.

{90}

The _paratantra-lakṣana_, therefore, consists in the knowledge
derived from our daily intercourse with the outward world. It deals
with the highest abstractions we can make out of our sensuous
experiences. It is positivistic in its strictest sense. It says: The
universe has only a relative existence, and our knowledge is
necessarily limited. Even the highest generalisation cannot go beyond
the law of relativity. It is impossible for us to know the first cause
and the ultimate end of existence; nor have we any need to go thus
beyond the sphere of existence, which would inevitably involve us in
the maze of mystic imagination.

The _paratantra-lakṣana_, therefore, is a positivism, agnosticism, or
empiricism in its spirit. Though the Yogâcâra Buddhists do not use all
these modern philosophical terms, the interpretation here given is
really what they intended to mean by the second form of knowledge. A
world-conception based on this view, it is declared by the
Mahâyânists, is sound as far as our perceptual knowledge is concerned;
but it does not exhaust the entire field of human experience, for it
does not take into account our spiritual life and our inmost
consciousness. There is something in the human heart that refuses to
be satisfied with merely systematising under the so-called laws of
nature those multitudinous impressions which we receive from the
outside world. There is a singular feeling, or sentiment, or yearning,
whatever we may call it, in our inmost heart, which defies any plainer
{91} description than a mere suggestion or an indirect statement. This
somewhat mystic consciousness seems despite its obscureness to contain
the meaning of our existence as well as that of the universe. The
intellect may try to persuade us with all its subtle reasonings to
subdue this disquieting feeling and to remain contented with the
systematising of natural laws, so called. But it is deceiving itself
by so doing; because the intellect is but a servant to the heart, and
so far as it is not forced to self-contradiction, it must accommodate
itself to the needs of the heart. That is to say, we must transcend
the narrow limits of conditionality and see what indispensable
postulates are underlying our life and experiences. The recognition
of these indispensable postulates of life constitutes the Yogâcâra’s
third form of knowledge called _pariniṣpanna-lakṣana_.


 _Absolute Knowledge._

_Pariniṣpanna-lakṣana_ literally means the world-view founded on the
most perfect knowledge. According to this view, the universe is a
monistico-pantheistic system. While phenomenal existences are
regulated by natural laws characterised by conditionality and
individuation, they by no means exhaust all our experiences which are
stored in our inmost consciousness. There must be something,--this is
the absolute demand of humanity, the ultimate postulate of
experience,--be it Will, or Intelligence, which, underlying and
animating all existences, forms {92} the basis of cosmic, ethical, and
religious life. This highest Will, or Intelligence, or both may be
termed God, but the Mahâyânists call it religiously Dharmakâya,
ontologically Bhûtatathâtâ, and psychologically Bodhi or Sambodhi.
And they think it must be immanent in the universe manifesting itself
in all places and times; it must be the cause of perpetual creation;
it must be the principle of morality. This being so, how do we come to
the recognition of its presence? The Buddhists say that when our minds
are clear of illusions, prejudices, and egotistic assumptions, they
become transparent and reflect the truth like a dust-free mirror. The
illumination thus gained in our consciousness constitutes the
so-called _pariniṣpanna_, the most perfect knowledge, that leads to
Nirvâna, final salvation, and eternal bliss.


 _World-views Founded on the Three
 Forms of Knowledge._

The reason will be obvious to the reader why the Yogâcâra school
distinguishes three classes of world-conception founded on the three
kinds of knowledge. The _parikalpita-lakṣana_ is most primitive and
most puerile. However, in these days of enlightenment, what is
believed by the masses is naught else than a _parikalpita_ conception
of the world. The material existence as it appears to our senses is to
them all in all. They seem to be unable to shake off the yoke of
egoistic illusion and naïve realism. Their God must be transcendent
and anthropopathic, {93} and always willing to meddle with worldly
affairs as his whim pleases. How different the world is, in which the
multitudes of unreflecting minds are living, from that which is
conceived by Buddhas and Bodhisattvas! Hartmann, a German thinker, is
right, when he says that the masses are at least a century behind in
their intellectual culture. But the most strange thing in the world is
that, in spite of all their ignorance and superstitious beliefs, the
waves of universal transformation are ever carrying them onward to a
destination, of which, perhaps, they have not the slightest suspicion.

The _paratantra-lakṣana_ advances a step further, but the fundamental
error involved in it is its persistent self-contradictory disregard
for what our inmost consciousness is constantly revealing to us. The
intellect alone can by no means unravel the mystery of our entire
existence. In order to reach the highest truth, we must boldly plunge
with our whole being into a region where absolute darkness defying the
light of intellect is supposed to prevail. This region which is no
more nor less than the field of religious consciousness is shunned by
most of the intellectual people on the plea that the intellect by its
very nature is unable to fathom it. But the only way that leads us to
the final pacification of the heart-yearnings is to go beyond the
horizons of limiting reason and to resort to the faith that has been
planted in the heart as the _sine qua non_ of its own existence and
vitality. And by faith I mean _Prajñâ_ (wisdom), transcendental {94}
knowledge, that comes direct from the intelligence-essence of the
Dharmakâya. A mind, so tired in vainly searching after truth and bliss
in the verbiage of philosophy and the nonsense of ritualism, finds
itself here completely rested bathing in the rays of divine
effulgence,--whence this is, it does not question, being so filled
with supramundane blessings which alone are felt. Buddhism calls this
exalted spiritual state Nirvâna or Mokṣa; and _pariniṣpanna-lakṣana_
is a world-conception which naturally follows from this subjective,
ideal enlightenment.[38]


 _Two Forms of Knowledge._

The other Hindu Mahâyânism, the Mâdhyamika school of Nâgârjuna,
distinguishes two, instead of three, orders of knowledge, but
practically the Yogâcâra and the Mâdhyamika come to the same
conclusion.[39]

{95}

The two kinds of knowledge or truth distinguished by the Mâdhyamika
philosophy are _Samvṛtti-satya_ and _Paramârtha-satya_, that is,
conditional truth and transcendental truth. We read in Nâgârjuna’s
_Mâdhyamika Çâstra_ (Buddhist Text Society edition, pp. 180, 181):


 “On two truths is founded
 The holy doctrine of Buddhas:
 Truth conditional,
 And truth transcendental.

 “Those who verily know not
 The distinction of the two truths.
 Know not the essence
 Of Buddhism which is meaningful.”[40]


The conditional truth includes illusion and relative knowledge of the
Yogâcâra school, while the transcendental truth corresponds to the
absolute knowledge.

In explaining these two truths, the Mâdhyamika philosophers have made
a constant use of the terms, _çûnya_ and _açûnya_, void and not-void,
which unfortunately became a cause of the misunderstanding by Christian
scholars of Nâgârjuna’s transcendental philosophy. Absolute truth is
void in its ultimate nature, for it contains nothing concrete or real
or individual that makes it an object of particularisation. But this
must not be understood, as is done by some superficial critics, in the
sense of absolute {96} nothingness. The Mâdhyamika philosophers make
the _satya_ (transcendental truth) empty when contrasted with the
realness of phenomenal existences. Because it is not real in the sense
a particular being is real; but it is empty since it transcends the
principle of individuation. When considered absolutely, it can neither
be empty nor not-empty, neither _çûnya_ nor _açûnya_, neither _asti_
nor _nâsti_, neither _abhâva_ nor _bhâva_, neither real nor unreal.
All these terms imply relation and contrast, while the _Paramârtha_
Satya is above them, or better, it unifies all contrasts and antitheses
in its absolute oneness. Therefore, even to designate it at all may
lead to the misunderstanding of the true nature of the _Satya_, for
naming is particularising. It is not, as such, an object of
intellectuation or of demonstrative knowledge. It underlies everything
conditional and phenomenal, and does not permit itself to be a
particular object of discrimination.


 _Transcendental Truth and Relative
 Understanding._

One may say: If transcendental truth is of such an abstract nature,
beyond the reach of the understanding, how can we ever hope to attain
it and enjoy its blessings? But Nâgârjuna says that it is not
absolutely out of the ken of the understanding; it is, on the
contrary, through the understanding that we become acquainted with the
quarter towards which our spiritual efforts should be directed, only
{97} let us not cling to the means by which we grasp the final
reality. A finger is needed to point at the moon, but when we have
recognised the moon, let us no more trouble ourselves with the finger.
The fisherman carries a basket to take the fish home, but what need
has he to worry about the basket when the contents are safely on the
table? Only so long as we are not yet aware of the way to
enlightenment, let us not ignore the value of relative knowledge or
conditional truth or _lokasamvṛttisatya_ as Nâgârjuna terms it.


 “If not by worldly knowledge,
 The truth is not understood;
 When the truth is not approached,
 Nirvâna is not attained.”[41]


From this, it is to be inferred that Buddhism never discourages the
scientific, critical investigation of religious beliefs. For it is one
of the functions of science that it should purify the contents of a
belief and that it should point out in which direction our final
spiritual truth and consolation have to be sought. Science alone which
is built on relative knowledge is not able to satisfy all our religious
cravings, but it is certainly able to direct us to the path of
enlightenment. When this path is at last revealed, we shall know how
to avail ourselves of the discovery, as then Prajñâ (or Sambodhi, or
Wisdom) becomes the {98} guide of life. Here we enter into the region
of the unknowable. The spiritual facts we experience are not
demonstrable, for they are so direct and immediate that the uninitiated
are altogether at a loss to get a glimpse of them.




 CHAPTER V.
 BHÛTATATHÂTÂ (SUCHNESS).

{99}

/From/ the ontological point of view, Paramârtha-satya or Pariniṣpanna
(transcendental truth) is called Bhûtatathâtâ, which literally means
“suchness of existence.” As Buddhism does not separate being from
thought nor thought from being, what is suchness in the objective
world, is transcendental truth in the subjective world, and _vice
versa_ Bhûtatathâtâ, then, is the Godhead of Buddhism, and it marks
the consummation of all our mental efforts to reach the highest
principle, which unifies all possible contradictions and spontaneously
directs the course of world-events. In short, it is the ultimate
postulate of existence. Like Paramârtha-satya, as above stated, it
does not belong to the domain of demonstrative knowledge or sensuous
experience; it is unknowable by the ordinary processes of
intellectuation, which the natural sciences use in the formulation of
general laws; and it is grasped, declare the Buddhists, only by the
minds that are capable of exercising what might be called religious
intuition.

Açvaghoṣa argues, in his _Awakening of Faith_ for the indefinability
of this first principle. When we say it is çûnya or empty, on account
of its being independent {100} of all the thinkable qualities, which
we attribute to things relative and conditional, people would take it
for the nothingness of absolute void. But when we define it as a real
reality, as it stands above the evanescence of phenomena, they would
imagine that there is something individual and existing outside the
pale of this universe, which, though as concrete as we ourselves are,
lives an eternal life. It is like describing to the blind what an
elephant looks like; each one of them gets but a very indistinct and
imperfect conception of the huge creature, yet every one of them
thinks he has a true and most comprehensive idea of it.[42]
Açvaghoṣa, thus, wishes to eschew all definite statements concerning
the ultimate nature of being, but as language is the only mode with
which we mortals can express our ideas and communicate them to others,
he thinks the best expression that can be given to it is Bhûtatathâtâ,
i.e., “suchness of existence,” or simply, “suchness.”

Bhûtatathâtâ (suchness), thus absolutely viewed, does not fall under
the category of being and non-being; and minds which are kept within
the narrow circle of contrasts, must be said to be incapable of
grasping it as it truly is. Says Nâgârjuna in his Çâstra (Ch. XV.):


 “Between thisness (_svabhâva_) and thatness (_parabhâva_),
 Between being and non-being,
 Who discriminates,
 The truth of Buddhism he perceives not.”[43]


{101}

Or,


 “To think ‘it is’, is eternalism,
 To think ‘it is not’, is nihilism:
 Being and non-being,
 The wise cling not to either.”[44]


Again,


 “The dualism of ‘to be’ and ‘not to be,’
 The dualism of pure and not-pure:
 Such dualism having abandoned,
 The wise stand not even in the middle.”[45]


To quote, again, from the _Awakening of Faith_ (pp. 58-59): “In its
metaphysical origin, Bhûtatathâtâ has nothing to do with things
defiled, i.e., conditional: it is free from all signs of
individualisation, such as exist in phenomenal objects: it is
independent of an unreal, particularising consciousness.”


 _Indefinability._

Absolute Suchness from its very nature thus defies all definitions. We
cannot even say that it is, for everything that is presupposes that
which is not: existence and non-existence are relative terms as much
as subject and object, mind and matter, this and that, one and other:
one cannot be conceived {102} without the other. “It is not so (_na
iti_)[46],” therefore, may be the only way our imperfect human tongue
can express it. So the Mahâyânists generally designate absolute
Suchness as Çûnyatâ or void.

But when this most significant word, çûnyatâ, is to be more fully
interpreted, we would say with Açvaghoṣa that “Suchness is neither
that which is existence nor that which is non-existence; neither that
which is at once existence and non-existence, nor that which is not at
once existence and non-existence; it is neither that which is unity
nor that which is plurality; neither that which is at once unity and
plurality, nor that which is not at once unity and plurality.”[47]

{103}

Nâgârjuna’s famous doctrine of “The Middle Path of Eight No’s”
breathes the same spirit, which declares:


 “There is no death, no birth, no destruction, no persistence,
 No oneness, no manyness, no coming, no departing,”[48]


Elsewhere, he expresses the same idea in a somewhat paradoxical
manner, making the historical Buddha a real concrete manifestation of
Suchness:


 “After his passing, deem not thus:
 ‘The Buddha still is here,’
 He is above all contrasts,
 To be and not to be.

 “While living, deem not thus:
 ‘The Buddha is now here.’
 He is above all contrasts,
 To be and not to be.”[49]


This view of Suchness as no-ness abounds in the literature of the
Dhyâna school of Mahâyânism. To cite one instance: When
Bodhi-Dharma[50], the founder {104} of the Dhyâna sect, saw Emperor
Wu of Liang dynasty (A.D. 502-556), he was asked what the first
principle of the Holy Doctrine was, he did not give any lengthy,
periphrastic statement after the manner of a philosopher, but
laconically replied, “Vast emptiness and nothing holy.” The Emperor
was bewildered and did not know how to take the words of his holy
adviser. Naturally, he did not expect such an abrupt answer, and,
being greatly disappointed, ventured another question: “Who is he,
then, that stands before me?” By this he meant to repudiate the
doctrine of absolute Suchness. His line of argument being this: If
there is nothing in the ultimate nature of things that distinguishes
between holiness and sinfulness, why this world of contrasts, where
some are revered as holy, for instance, Bodhi-Dharma who is at this
very moment standing in front of him with the mission of propagating
the holy teachings of Buddha? Bodhi-Dharma, however, was a mystic and
was fully convinced of the insufficiency of the human tongue to
express the highest truth which is revealed only {105} intuitively to
the religious consciousness. His conclusive answer was, “I do not
know”.[51]

This “I do not know” is not to be understood in the spirit of
agnosticism, but in the sense of “God when understood is no God,” for
_in se est et per se conceptur_. This way of describing Suchness by
negative terms only, excluding all differences of name and form
(_nâmarûpa_) to reach a higher kind of affirmation, seems to be the
most appropriate one, inasmuch as the human understanding is limited
in so many respects; but, nevertheless, it has caused much
misinterpretation even among Buddhists themselves, not to mention
those Christian Buddhist scholars of to-day, who sometimes appear
almost wilfully to misconstrue the significance of the çûnyatâ
philosophy. It was to avoid these unfortunate misinterpretations that
the Mahâyânists frequently made the paradoxical assertion that
absolute Suchness is empty and not empty, çûnya and açunya, being
and non-being, sat and asat, one and many, this and that.


 _The “Thundrous Silence.”_

There yet remains another mode of explaining absolute Suchness, which
though most practical and most effective for the religiously disposed
minds, may prove very inadequate to a sceptical intellect. {106} It is
the “thundrous silence” of Vimalakîrti in response to an inquiry
concerning the nature of Suchness or the “Dharma of Non-duality,” as
it is termed in the Sûtra.[52]

Bodhisattva Vimalakîrti once asked a host of Bodhisattvas led by
Mañjuçri, who came to visit him, to express their views as to how to
enter into the Dharma of Non-duality. Some replied, “Birth and death
are two, but the Dharma itself was never born and will never die.
Those who understand this are said to enter into the Dharma of
Non-duality.” Some said, “‘I’ and ‘mine’ are two. Because I think ‘I
am’ there are things called ‘mine.’ But as there is no ‘I am’ where
shall we look for things ‘mine’? By thus reflecting we enter into the
Dharma of Non-duality.” Some replied, “Samsâra and Nirvâna are two.
But when we understand the ultimate nature of Samsâra, Samsâra
vanishes from our consciousness, and there is neither bondage nor
release, neither birth nor death. By thus reflecting we enter into the
Dharma of Non-duality”. Others said, “Ignorance and enlightenment are
two. No ignorance, no enlightenment, and there is no dualism. Why?
Because those who have entered a meditation in which there is no
sense-impression, no cogitation, are free from ignorance as well as
from enlightenment. This holds true with all the other dualistic
categories. Those who enter thus into the thought of sameness are
{107} said to enter into the Dharma of Non-duality.” Still others
answered, “To long for Nirvâna and to shun worldliness are of dualism.
Long not for Nirvâna, shun not worldliness, and we are free from
dualism. Why? Because bondage and release are relative terms, and when
there is no bondage from the beginning, who wishes to be released? No
bondage, no release, and therefore no longing, no shunning: this is
called the entering into the Dharma of Non-duality.”

Many more answers of similar nature came forth from all the
Bodhisattvas in the assembly except the leader Mañjuçri. Vimalakîrti
now requested him to give his own view, and to this Mañjuçri
responded, “What I think may be stated thus: That which is in all
beings wordless, speechless, shows no signs, is not possible of
cognisance, and is above all questionings and answerings,--to know
this is said to enter into the Dharma of Non-duality.”

Finally, the host Vimalakîrti himself was demanded by Mañjuçri to
express his idea of Non-duality, but he kept completely silent and
uttered not a word. Thereupon, Mañjuçri admiringly exclaimed, “Well
done, well done! The Dharma of Non-duality is truly above letters and
words!”[53]

{108}

Now, of this Suchness, the Mahâyânists distinguish two aspects, as
it is comprehended by our consciousness, which are conditional and
non-conditional, or the phenomenal world of causality and the
transcendental realm of absolute freedom. This distinction corresponds
to that, in the field of knowledge, of relative truth and
transcendental truth.[54]

{109}


 _Suchness Conditioned._

Absolute transcendental Suchness defying all means of characterisation
does not, as long as it so remains, have any direct significance in
the phenomenal world and human life. When it does, it must become
conditional Suchness as _Gesetzmässigkeit_ in nature and as ethical
order in our practical life. Suchness as absolute is too remote, too
abstract, and may have only a metaphysical value. Its existence or
non-existence seems not to affect us in our daily social life,
inasmuch as it is transcendental. In order to enter into our limited
consciousness, to become the norm of our conscious activities, to
regulate the course of the evolutionary tide in nature, Suchness must
surrender its “splendid isolation,” must abandon its absoluteness.

When Suchness thus comes down from its sovereign-seat in the realm of
unthinkability, we have this universe unfolded before our eyes in all
its diversity and magnificence. Twinkling stars inlaid in the vaulted
sky; the planet elaborately decorated with verdant meadows, towering
mountains, and rolling waves; the birds cheerfully singing in the
woods; the beasts wildly running through the thickets; the summer
heavens ornamented with white fleecy clouds and on {110} earth all
branches and leaves growing in abundant luxury; the winter prairie
destitute of all animation, only with naked trees here and there
trembling in the dreary north winds; all these manifestations, not
varying a hair’s breadth of deviation from their mathematical,
astronomical, physical, chemical, and biological laws, are naught else
than the work of conditional Suchness in nature.

When we turn to human life and history, we have the work of
conditional Suchness manifested in all forms of activity as passions,
aspirations, imaginations, intellectual efforts, etc. It makes us
desire to eat when hungry, and to drink when thirsty; it makes the man
long for the woman, and the woman for the man; it keeps children in
merriment and frolic; it braces men and women bravely to carry the
burden of life. When we are oppressed, it causes us to cry, “Let us
have liberty or die”; when we are treated with injustice, it leads us
even to murder and fire and revolution; when our noble sentiments are
aroused to the highest pitch, it makes us ready to sacrifice all that
is most dear to us. In brief, all the kaleidoscopic changes of this
phenomenal world, subjective as well as objective, come from the
playing hands of conditional Suchness It not only constitutes the
goodness and blessings of life, but the sins, crimes, and misery which
the flesh is heir to.[55]

{111}

Açvaghoṣa in his _Awakening of Faith_ speaks of the Heart (_hṛdaya_)
of Suchness and of the Heart of Birth-and-Death. By the Heart of
Suchness he means the absolute and by the Heart of Birth-and-Death a
manifestation of the absolute in this world of particulars. “They are
not separate,” however, says he, but they are one, for the Heart of
{112} Suchness is the Heart of Birth-and-Death. It is on account of
our limited senses and finite mind that we have a world of particulars,
which, as it is, is no more than a fragment of the absolute
Bhûtatathâtâ. And yet it is through this fragmentary manifestation
that we are finally enabled to reach the fundamental nature of being
in its entirety. Says Açvaghoṣa, “Depending on the Tathâgata-garbha,
there evolves the Heart of Birth-and-Death. What is immortal and what
is mortal are harmoniously blended, for they are not one, nor are they
separate..... Herein all things are organised. Hereby all things are
created.”

The above is from the ontological standpoint. When viewed
psychologically, the Heart of Suchness is enlightenment, for Buddhism
makes no distinction between being and thought, world and mind. The
ultimate nature of the two is considered to be absolutely one. Now,
speaking of the nature of enlightenment, Açvaghoṣa says: “It is like
the emptiness of space and the brightness of the mirror in that it is
true, and real, and great. It completes and perfects all things. It is
free from the condition of destructibility. In it is reflected every
phase of life and activity in the world. Nothing goes out of it,
nothing enters into it, nothing is annihilated, nothing is destroyed.
It is one eternal soul, no forms of defilement can defile it. It is
the essence of intelligence. By reason of its numerous immaculate
virtues which inhere in it, it perfumes the hearts of all beings.”
Thus, the Heart of Suchness, which is enlightenment and {113} the
essence of intelligence, constantly works in and through the hearts of
all human beings, that is, in and through our finite minds. In this
sense, Buddhism declares that truth is not to be sought in highly
abstract philosophical formulæ, but in the phenomena of our everyday
life such as eating, dressing, walking, sleeping, etc. The Heart of
Suchness acts and does not abstract; it synthesises and does not
“dissect to murder.”


 _Questions Defying Solution._

Speaking of the world as a manifestation of Suchness, we are here
beset with the most puzzling questions that have baffled the best
minds ever since the dawn of intellect. They are: Why did Suchness
ever leave its abode in the mysterious realm of transcendentality and
descend on earth where every form of misery greets us on all sides?
What inherent necessity was there for it to mingle in the dust of
worldliness while it could enjoy the unspeakable bliss of its own
absoluteness? In other words, why did absolute Suchness ever become
conditional Suchness? To dispose of these questions as not concerning
human interests is the creed of agnosticism and positivism; but the
fact is, they are not questions whimsically framed by the human mind
when it was in the mood of playing with itself. They are queries of
the most vital importance ever put to us, and the significance of life
entirely hangs on our interpretation of them.

{114}

Buddhism confesses that the mystery is unsolvable purely by the human
mind, for it is absolutely beyond the region of finite intellect and
the power of a logical demonstrability. The mystery can only be solved
in a practical way when we attain the highest spiritual enlightenment
of Buddhahood, in which the Bodhi with its unimpeded supernatural
light directly looks into the very abyss of Suchness. The Bodhi or
Intelligence which constitutes the kernel of our being, is a partial
realisation in us of Suchness. When this intelligence is merged and
expands in the Body of Suchness, as the water in a vessel poured into
the waters of the boundless ocean, it at once perceives and realises
its nature, its destiny, and its significance in life.

Buddhism is a religion and leaves many topics of metaphysics unsolved,
at least logically. Though it is more intellectual and philosophical
than any other religion, it does not pretend to build a complete
system of speculation. As far as theorisation is concerned, Buddhism
is dogmatic and assumes many propositions without revealing their
dialectical processes. But they are all necessary and fundamental
hypotheses of the religious consciousness; they are the ultimate
demands of the human soul. Religion has no positive obligation to
prove its propositions after the fashion of the natural sciences. It
is enough for religion to state the facts as they are, and the
intellect, though hampered by limitations inherent in it, has to try
her best to put them together in a coherent system.

{115}

The solution, then, by Buddhism of those queries stated above cannot
be said to be very logical and free from serious difficulties, but
practically it serves all required purposes and is conducive to
religious discipline. By this I mean the Buddhist theory of Nescience
or Ignorance (_avidyâ_).


 _Theory of Ignorance._

The theory of nescience or ignorance (_avidyâ_) is an attempt by
Buddhists to solve the relation between the one and the many, between
absolute Suchness and conditional Suchness, between Dharmakâya and
Sarvasattva, between wisdom (_bodhi_) and sin (_kleça_), between
Nirvâna and Samsâra. But Buddhism does not give us any systematic
exposition of the doctrine. What it says is categorical and dogmatic.
“This universe is really the Dharmadhâtu;[56] it is characterised by
sameness (_samatâ_); there is no differentiation (_visama_) in it; it
is even emptiness itself (_çûnyatâ_); all things have no _pudgala_
(self). But, because of nescience, there are four or six _mahâbhûta_
(elements), five _skandha_ (aggregates), six (or eight) _vijñâna_
(senses), and twelve _nidâna_ (chains of causation). All these names
and forms (_nâmarûpa_) are of nescience or ignorance.” Or, according
to Açvaghoṣa, “The Heart of Suchness is the vast All of one
Dharmadhâtu; it is the essence of all doctrines. The ultimate nature
does not perish, nor does it {116} decay. All particular objects exist
because of confused subjectivity (_smṛti_).[57] Independent of
confused subjectivity, there is no outside world to be perceived and
discriminated.” “Everything that is subject to the law of birth and
death exists only because of ignorance and karma.” Such statements as
these are found almost everywhere in the Buddhist literature; but as
to the question how and why this negative principle of ignorance came
to assert itself in the body of Suchness, we are at a loss where to
find an authoritative and definite answer to it.

One thing, however, is certain, which is this: Ignorance (_avidyâ_)
is principium individium, that creates the multitudinousness of
phenomena in the absolute oneness of being, that tosses up the roaring
billows of existence in the eternal ocean of Suchness, that breaks the
silence of Nirvâna and starts the wheel of metempsychosis perpetually
rolling, that, veiling the transpicuous mirror of Bodhi, affects the
reflection of Suchness therein, that transforms the sameness (_samatâ_)
of Suchness to the duality of thisness and thatness and leads many
confused minds to egoism with all its pernicious corollaries.

Perhaps, the best way to attack the problem of ignorance is to
understand that Buddhism is a thoroughly idealistic doctrine as every
true religion should be, and that psychologically, and not
ontologically, {117} should Suchness be conceived, and further, that
nescience is inherent in Suchness, though only hypothetically,
illusively, apparently, and not really in any sense.

According to Brahmanism, there was in the beginning only one being;
and this being willed to be two; which naturally resulted in the
differentiation of subject and object, mind and nature. In Buddhism,
however, Suchness is not explicitly stated as having had any desire to
be other than itself, at least when it is purely metaphysically
conceived. But as Buddhism interprets this world of particularisation
as a manifestation of Suchness conditioned by the principle of
ignorance, ignorance must be considered, however illusory in its
ultimate nature, to have potentially or rather negatively existed in
the being of Suchness; and when Suchness, by its transcendental
freedom of will, affirmed itself, it did so by negating itself, that
is, by permitting itself to be conditioned by the principle of
ignorance or individuation. The latter, as is expressly stated
everywhere in Buddhist sûtras and çâstras, is no more than an illusion
and a negative quantity, it is merely the veil of Mâya. This chimerical
nature of ignorance preserves the essential absoluteness of the first
principle and makes the monism of the Mahâyâna doctrine thoroughly
consistent. What is to be noted here, however, is this: Buddhism does
not necessarily regard this world of particulars as altogether
evanescent and dream-like. When ignorance alone is taken notice {118}
of and the presence of Suchness in all this multitudinousness of
things is denied, this existence is positively declared to be void.
But when an enlightened mind perceives Suchness even in the midst of
the utter darkness of ignorance, this life assumes an entirely new
aspect, and we come to realise the illusiveness of all evils.

To return to the subject, ignorance or nescience is defined by
Açvaghoṣa as a spark of consciousness[58] that spontaneously flashes
from the unfathomable depths of Suchness. According to this, ignorance
and consciousness are interchangeable terms, though with different
shades of meaning. Ignorance is, so to speak, the _raison d’être_ of
consciousness, is that which makes the appearance of the latter
possible, while ignorance itself is in turn an illusive emanation of
Suchness. It is then evident that the awakening of consciousness marks
the first step toward the rising of this universe from the abyss of
the self-identity of Suchness. For the unfolding of consciousness
implies the separation of the perceiving and the perceived, the
_viṣayin_ and the _viṣaya_, of subject and object, mind and nature.

The eternal abyss of Suchness, so called, is the point where
subjectivity and objectivity are merged in absolute oneness. It is the
time, though strictly {119} speaking chronology does not apply here,
when all “the ten thousand things” of the world have not yet been
differentiated and even when the God who “created the heaven and
earth” has not yet made his debut. To use psychological terms, it is
a state of transcendental or transmarginal consciousness, where all
sense-perceptions and conceptual images vanish, and where we are in a
state of absolute unconsciousness. This sounds mystical; but it is an
established fact that in the field of our mental activities there is
an abyss where consciousness sometimes suddenly disappears. This
region beyond the threshold of awaredness, though often a trysting
place for psychical abnormalities, has a great religious significance,
which cannot be ignored by superficial scientific arguments. Here is
the region where the consciousness of subject and object is completely
annihilated, but here we do not have the silence and darkness of a
grave, nor is it a state of absolute nothingness. The self is here
lost in the presence of something indescribable, or better, it expands
so as to embrace the world-all within itself, and is not conscious of
any egoistic elation or arrogance; but it merely feels the fulness of
reality and a touch of celestial joy that cannot be imparted to others
by anything human. The most convincing spiritual insight into the
nature of being comes from this source. Enlightenment is the name
given by Buddhists to the actual gaining of this insight. Bodhi or
Prajñâ or intelligence is the term for the {120} spiritual power that
brings about this enlightenment.

When the mind emerges from this state of sameness, consciousness
spontaneously comes back as it vanished before, retaining the memory
of the experience so unique and now confronting the world of contrasts
and mutual dependence, in which our empirical ego moves. The transition
from one state to the other is like a flash of lightning scintilating
from behind the clouds; though the two, the subliminal and the
superficial consciousness, seem to be one continuous form of activity,
permitting no hiatus between them. At any rate, this awakening of
subjectivity and the leaving behind of transmarginal consciousness
marks the start of ignorance. Therefore, psychologically speaking,
ignorance must be considered synonymous with the awakening of
consciousness in a sentient being.

Here we have the most mysterious fact that baffles all our
intellectual efforts to unravel, which is: How and why has ignorance,
or what is tantamount, consciousness, ever been awakened from the
absolute calmness (_çānti_) of being? How and why have the waves of
mentation ever been stirred up in the ocean of eternal tranquillity?
Açvaghoṣa simply says, “spontaneously.” This by no means explains
anything, or at least it is not in the line with our so-called
scientific interpretations, nor does it give us any reason why.
Nevertheless, religiously and practically viewed, “spontaneous” is the
most graphic and vigorous term there is for describing the actual
state of things {121} as they pass before our mental eye. In fact,
there is always something vague and indefinite in all our psychological
experiences. With whatever scientific accuracy, with whatever
objective precision we may describe the phenomena that take place in
the mind, there is always something that eludes our scrutiny, is too
slippery, as it were, to take hold of; so that after all our strenuous
intellectual efforts to be exact and perspicuous in our expositions,
we are still compelled to leave much to the imagination of the reader.
In case he happens to be lacking in the experience which we have
endeavored to describe we shall vainly hope to awaken in him the said
impression with the same degree of intensity and realness.

It is for this reason that Açvaghoṣa and other Mahâyânists declare
that the rising of consciousness out of the abysmal depths of Suchness
is _felt_ by Buddhas and other enlightened minds only that have
actually gone through the experience. The why of ignorance nobody can
explain as much as the why of Suchness. But when we personally
experience this spiritual fact, we no more feel the need of harboring
any doubt about how or why. Everything becomes transparent, and the
rays of supernatural enlightenment shine like a halo round our
spiritual personality. We move as dictated by the behest of Suchness,
i.e., by the Dharmakâya, and in which we feel infinite bliss and
satisfaction. This religious experience is the most unique phenomenon
in the life of a sentient being.

{122}


 _Dualism and Moral Evil._

As we cannot think that the essence of the external world to be other
than that of our own mind, that is to say, as we cannot think subject
and object to be different in their ultimate nature, our conclusion
naturally is that the same principle of Ignorance which gathers the
clouds of subjectivity, calls up the multitudinousness of phenomena in
the world-mind of Suchness. The universe in its entirety is an
infinite mind, and our limited mind with its transmarginal
consciousness is a microcosm. What the finite mind feels in its inmost
self, must also be what the cosmic mind feels; nay, we can go one step
further, and say that when the human mind enters the region lying
beyond the border of subjectivity and objectivity, it is in communion
with the heart of the universe, whose secrets are revealed here
without reserve. Therefore, Buddhism does not make any distinction
between knowing and being, enlightenment and Suchness. When the mind
is free from ignorance and no more clings to things particular, it is
said to be in harmony and even one with Suchness.

We must, however, remember that ignorance as the principle of
individuation and a spontaneous expression of Suchness, is no moral
evil. The awakening of subjectivity or the dawn of consciousness forms
part of the necessary cosmic process. The separation of subject and
object, or the appearance of a phenomenal world, is nothing but a
realisation {123} of the cosmic mind (Dharmakâya). As such Ignorance
performs an essential function in the evolution of the world-totality.
Ignorance is inherent in Buddhas as well as in all sentient beings.
Every one of us cannot help perceiving an external world (_viṣaya_)
and forming conceptions and reasoning and feeling and willing. We do
not see any moral fault here. If there is really anything morally
wrong, then we cannot do anything with it, we are utterly helpless
before it, for it is not our fault, but that of the cosmic soul from
which and in which we have our being.

Ignorance has produced everywhere a state of relativity and reciprocal
dependence. Birth is inseparably linked with death, congregation with
segregation, evolution with involution, attraction with repulsion, the
centripetal with the centrifugal force, the spring with the fall, the
tide with the ebb, joy with sorrow, God with Satan, Adam with Eve,
Buddha with Devadatta, etc., etc., _ad infinitum_. These are necessary
conditions of existence; and if existence is an evil, they must be
abolished, and with their abolition the very reason of existence is
abolished, which means absolute nothingness, an impossibility as long
as we exist. The work of ignorance in the world of conditional
Suchness is quite innocent, and Buddhists do not recognise any fault
in its existence, if not contaminated by confused subjectivity. Those
who speak of the curse of existence, or those who conceive Nirvâna to
be the abode of non-existence {124} and the happiness of absolute
annihilation, are considered by Buddhists to be unable to understand
the significance of Ignorance.

Is there then no fault to be found with Ignorance? Not in Ignorance
itself, but in our defiled attachment to it, that is, when we are
ignorant of Ignorance. It is wrong to cling to the dualism of subject
and object as final and act accordingly. It is wrong to take the work
of ignorance as ultimate and to forget the foundation on which it
stands. It is wrong, thinking that the awakening of consciousness
reveals the whole world, to ignore the existence of unseen realities.
In short, evils quickly follow our steps when we try to realise the
conclusions of ignorance without knowing its true relation to Suchness.
Egoism is the most fundamental of all errors and evils.

When we speak of ignorance as hindering the light of intelligence from
penetrating to the bottom of reality, we usually understand the term
ignorance not in the philosophical sense of principium individuum, but
in the sense of confused subjectivity, which conceives the work of
Ignorance as the final reality culminating in egoism. So, we might say
that while the principle of Ignorance is philosophically justified,
its unenlightened actualisation in our practical life is altogether
unwarranted and brings on us a series of dire calamities.




 CHAPTER VI.
 THE TATHÂGATA-GARBHA AND THE
 ÂLAYA-VIJÑÂNA.

{125}

/Suchness/ (_Bhûtatathâtâ_), the ultimate principle of existence, is
known by so many different names, as it is viewed in so many different
phases of its manifestation. Suchness is the Essence of Buddhas, as it
constitutes the reason of Buddhahood; it is the Dharma, when it is
considered the norm of existence; it is the Bodhi when it is the
source of intelligence; Nirvana, when it brings eternal peace to a
heart troubled with egoism and its vile passions; Prajñâ (wisdom),
when it intelligently directs the course of nature; the Dharmakâya,
when it is religiously considered as the fountain-head of love and
wisdom; the Bodhicitta (intelligence-heart), when it is the awakener
of religious consciousness; Çûnyatâ (vacuity), when viewed as
transcending all particular forms; the summum bonum (_kuçalam_), when
its ethical phase is emphasised; the Highest Truth (_paramârtha_),
when its epistemological feature is put forward; the Middle Path
(_mâdhyamârga_), when it is considered above the onesidedness and
limitation of individual existences; the Essence of Being
(_bhûtakoti_), when its ontological aspect is taken into {126}
account; the Tathâgata-garbha (the Womb of Tathâgata), when it is
thought of in analogy to mother earth, where all the germs of life are
stored, and where all precious stones and metals are concealed under
the cover of filth. And it is of this last aspect of Suchness that I
here propose to consider at some length.


 _The Tathâgata-Garbha and Ignorance._

Tathâgata-Garbha literally means Tathâgata’s womb[59] or treasure or
store, in which the essence of Tathâgatahood remains concealed under
the veil of Ignorance. It may rightly be called the womb of universe,
from which issues forth the multitudinousness of things, mental as
well as physical.

The Tathâgata-Garbha, therefore, may be explained ontologically as a
state of Suchness quickened by Ignorance and ready to be realised in
the world of particulars, that is, when it is about to transform
itself to the duality of subject and object, though there is yet no
perceptible manifestation of motility in any form. Psychologically, it
is the transcendental soul of man just coming under the bondage of the
law of karmaic causation. Though pure and free in its nature as the
expression of Suchness in man, the transcendental {127} soul or pure
intelligence is now influenced by the principle of birth-and-death and
subjects itself to organic determinations. As it is, it is yet devoid
of differentiation and limitation, save that there is a bare
possibility of them. It will, however, as soon as it is actualised in
a special form, unfold all its particularities subject to their own
laws; it will hunger, desire, strive, and even be annoyed by its
material bonds, and then, beginning to long for liberation, will
struggle inwardly. Here is then no more of the absolute freedom of
Suchness, as long as its phenomenal phase alone is considered, since
the Garbha works under the constraint of particularisation. The
essence of Tathâgatahood, however, is here preserved intact, and,
whenever it is possible, our finite minds are able to feel its
presence and power. Hypothetically, therefore, the Garbha is always in
association with passions and desires that are of Ignorance.

We read in the _Çrimâlâ-Sûtra_: “With the storage of passions attached
we find the Tathâgata-Garbha,” or, “The Dharmakâya of the Tathâgata
not detached from the storage of passions is called Tathâgata-Garbha.”
In Buddhism, passion or desire or sin (_kleça_) is generally used in
contrast to intelligence or Bodhi or Nirvâna. As the latter,
religiously considered, represents a particular manifestation in the
human mind of the Dharmakâya or Bhûtatathâtâ, so the former is a
reflection of universal Ignorance in the microcosm. Therefore, the
human soul in which, according to Buddhism, intelligence and desire
are merged, should {128} be regarded as an individuation of the
Tathâgata-Garbha. And it is in this capacity that the Garbha is called
_Âlayavijñâna_.


 _The Âlayavijñâna and its Evolution._

As we have seen, the Âlayavijñâna or All-Conserving Soul is a
particularised expression in the human mind of the Tathâgata-Garbha.
It is an individual, ideal reflex of the cosmic Garbha. It is this
“psychic germ,” as the Âlaya is often designated, that stores all the
mental possibilities, which are set in motion by the impetus of an
external world, which works on the Âlaya through the six senses
(_vijñâna_).

Mahâyânism is essentially idealistic and does not make a radical,
qualitative distinction between subject and object, thought and being,
mind and nature, consciousness and energy. Therefore, the being and
activity of the Âlaya are essentially those of the Garbha; and again,
as the Garbha is the joint creation of universal Ignorance and
Suchness, so is the Âlaya the product of desire (_kleça_) and wisdom
(_bodhi_). The Garbha and the Âlaya, however, are each in itself
innocent and absolutely irresponsible for the existing state of
affairs. And let it be remarked here that Buddhism does not condemn
this life and universe for their wickedness as was done by some
religious teachers and philosophers. The so-called wickedness is not
radical in nature and life. It is merely superficial. It is the work
of ignorance and desire, and when they are converted to do service for
the {129} Bodhi, they cease to be wicked or sinful or evil. Buddhists,
therefore, strongly insist on the innate and intrinsic goodness of the
Âlaya and the Garbha.

Says Açvaghoṣa in his _Awakening of Faith_ (p. 75): “In the
All-Conserving Soul (_Âlaya_) Ignorance obtains, and from
non-enlightenment [thus produced] starts that which sees, that which
represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which
constantly particularises.” Here we have the evolution of the Garbha
in its psychological manifestation; in other words, we have here the
evolution of the Âlayavijñâna. When the Garbha or Âlaya comes under
the influence of birth-and-death (_samsâra_), it no longer retains its
primeval indifference or sameness (_samatâ_); but there come to exist
that which sees (_viṣayin_) and that which is seen (_viṣaya_), a mind
and an objective world. From the interaction of these two forms of
existence, we have now before our eyes the entire panorama of the
universe swiftly and noiselessly moving with its never-tiring steps.
A most favorite simile with Buddhists to illustrate these incessant
activities of the phenomenal world, is to compare them to the waves
that are seen forever rolling in a boundless ocean, while the body of
waters which make up the ocean is compared to Suchness, and the wind
that stirs up the waves to the principle of birth-and-death or
ignorance which is the same thing. So we read in the _Lankâvatâra
Sûtra_:

{130}


 “Like unto the ocean-waves,
 Which by a raging storm maddened
 Against the rugged precipice strike
 Without interruption;
 Even so in the Alaya-sea
 Stirred by the objectivity-wind
 All kinds of mentation-waves
 Arise a-dancing, a-rolling.”[60]


But all the psychical activities thus brought into full view, should
not be conceived as different from the Mind (_citta_) itself. It is
merely in the nature of our understanding that we think of attributes
apart from their substance, the latter being imagined to be in
possession and control of the former. There is, however, in fact no
substance _per se_, independent of its attributes, and no attributes
detached from that which unites them. And this is one of the
fundamental conceptions of Buddhism, that there is no soul-in-itself
considered apart from its various manifestations such as imagination,
sensation, intellectuation, etc. The innumerable ripples and waves and
billows of mentation that are stirred in the depths of the
Tathâgata-Garbha, are not things foreign or external to it, but they
are all particular expressions of the same essence, they are working
out its immanent destiny. So continues the _Lankâvatâra Sûtra_:

{131}


 “The saline crystal and its red-bluishness,
 The milky sap and its sweetness,
 Various flowers and their fruits,
 The sun and the moon and their luminosity:
 These are neither separable nor inseparable.
 As waves are stirred in the water,
 Even so the seven modes of mentation
 Are awakened in the Mind and united with it.
 When the waters are troubled in the ocean,
 We have waves that roll each in its own way:
 So with the Mind All-Conserving.
 When stirred, therein diverse mentations arise:
 Citta, Manas, and Manovijñâna.
 These we distinguish as attributes,
 In substance they differ not from each other;
 For they are neither attributing nor attributed.
 The sea-water and the waves,
 One varies not from the other:
 It is even so with the Mind and its activities;
 Between them difference nowhere obtains.
 Citta is karma-accumulating,
 Manas reflects an objective world,
 Manovijñâna is the faculty of judgment,
 The five Vijñânas are the differentiating senses.”[61]


{132}


 _The Manas._

The Âlayavijñâna which is sometimes, as in the preceding quotations,
simply called _citta_ (mind), is, as such, no more than a state of
Suchness, allowing itself to be influenced by the principle of
birth-and-death, i.e., by Ignorance; and there has in it taken place
as yet no “awakening” or “stirring up” (_vṛtti_), from which results a
consciousness. When the Manas is evolved, however, we have a sign of
mentality thereby set in motion, for the Manas, according to the
Mahâyânists, marks the dawn of consciousness in the universe.

The Manas, deriving its reason of consciousness from the Citta or
Âlaya, reflects on it as well as on an external world, and becomes
conscious of the distinction between me and not-me. But since this
not-I or external world is nothing but an unfoldment of the Âlaya
itself, the Manas must be said really to be self-reflecting, when it
discriminates between subject and object. If the Âlaya is not yet
conscious of itself, the Manas is, as the latter comes to realise the
state of self-awareness. The Âlaya is perhaps to be compared in a
sense to the Kantian “ego of transcendental apperception”; while the
Manas is the actual center of self-consciousness. But the Manas and
the Âlaya (or Citta) are not two different things in the sense that
one emanates from the other or that one is created by the other. It is
better to understand {133} the Manas as a state or condition of the
Citta in its evolution.

Now, the Manas is not only contemplative, but capable of volition. It
awakens the desire to cling to the state of individuation, it harbors
egoism, passion, and prejudice; it wills and creates: for Ignorance,
the principle of birth-and-death, is there in its full force, and the
absolute identity of Suchness is here forever departed. Therefore, the
Manas really marks the beginning of concrete, particularising
consciousness-waves in the eternal ocean of the All-Conserving Mind.
The mind which was hitherto indifferent and neutral here acquires a
full consciousness; discriminates between ego and non-ego; feels pain
and pleasure; clings to that which is agreeable and shrinks from that
which is disagreeable; urges activities according to judgments, false
or truthful; memorises what has been experienced, and stores it
all:--in short, all the modes of mentation come into play with the
awakening of the Manas.

According to Açvaghoṣa, with the evolution of the Manas there arise
five important psychical activities which characterise the human mind.
They are: (1) motility, that is the capability of creating karma; (2)
the power to perceive; (3) the power to respond; (4) the power to
discriminate; and (5) individuality. Through the exercise of these
five functions, the Manas is able to create according to its will, to
be a perceiving subject, to respond to the stimuli of an external
world, to deliver judgments {134} over what it likes and what it
dislikes, and finally to retain all its own “karma-seeds” in the past
and to mature them for the future, according to circumstances.

With the advent of the Manas, the evolution of the Citta is complete.
Practically, it is the consummation of mentality, for
self-consciousness is ripe now. The will can affirm its ego-centric,
dualistic activities, and the intellect can exercise its
discriminating, reasoning, and image-retaining faculties. The Manas
now becomes the center of psychic coördination. It receives messages
from the six senses and pronounces over the impressions whatever
judgments, intellectual or volitional, which are needed at the time
for its own conservation. It also reflects on its own sanctum, and,
perceiving there the presence of the Âlaya, wrongfully jumps to the
conclusion that herein lies the real, ultimate ego-soul, from which it
derives the notions of authority, unity, and permanency.

As is evident, the Manas is a double-edged sword. It may destroy
itself by clinging to the error of ego-conception, or it may, by a
judicious exercise of its reasoning faculty, destroy all the
misconceptions that arise from a wrong interpretation of the principle
of Ignorance. The Manas destroys itself by being overwhelmed by the
dualism of _ego_ and _alter_, by taking them for final, irreducible
realities, and by thus fostering absolute ego-centric thoughts and
desires, and by making itself a willing prey of an indomitable egoism,
religiously and morally. On the other hand, when it {135} sees an
error in the conception of the absolute reality of individuals, when
it perceives a play of Ignorance in the dualism of me and not-me, when
it recognises the _raison d’être_ of existence in the essence of
Tathâgatahood, i.e., in Suchness, when it realises that the Âlaya
which is mistaken for the ego is no more than an innocent and
irreproachable reflection of the cosmic Garbha, it at once transcends
the sphere of particularity and becomes the very harbinger of eternal
enlightenment.

Buddhists, therefore, do not see any error or evil in the evolution of
the Mind (_âlaya_). There is nothing faulty in the awakening of
consciousness, in the dualism of subject and object, in the
individualising operation of birth-and-death (_samsâra_), only so
long as our Manas keeps aloof from the contamination of false egoism.
The gravest error, however, permeates every fiber of our mind with all
its wickedness and irrationality, as soon as the nature of the
evolution of the Âlaya is wrongfully interpreted by the abuse of the
functions of the Manas.[62]

{136}

Though Mahâyânism most emphatically denies the existence of a personal
ego which is imagined to be lodging within the body and to be the
spiritual master of it, it does not necessarily follow that it denies
the unity of consciousness or personality or individuality. In fact,
the assumption of Manovijñâna by Buddhists most conclusively proves
that they have an ego in a sense, the denial of whose empirical
existence is tantamount to the denial of the most concrete facts of
our daily experiences. What is most persistently negated by them is
not the existence of ego, but its final, ultimate reality. But to
discuss this subject more fully we have a special chapter below
devoted to “Âtman.”


 _The Sâmkhya Philosophy and Mahâyânism._

If we draw a comparison between the Sâmkhya philosophy and Mahâyânism,
the Âlayavijñâna may {137} be considered an unification of Soul
(_puruṣa_) and Nature (_prakṛtî_), and the Manovijñâna a combination
of Buddhi (intellect) or Mahat (great element) with Ahankâra (ego).
According to the _Sâmkhyakârika_ (11), the essential nature of Prakṛtî
is the power of creation, or, to use Buddhist phraseology, it is blind
activity; while that of Puruṣa is witnessing (_sakṣitvâ_) and
perceiving (_drastṛtvâ_). (_The Kârika_, 19.) A modern philosopher
would say, Puruṣa is intelligence and Prakṛtî the will; and when they
are combined and blended in one, they make Hartmann’s _Unbewusste
Geist_ (unconscious spirit). The All-Conserving Mind (_Âlaya_) in a
certain sense resembles the Unconscious, as it is the manifestation of
Suchness, the principle of enlightenment, in its evolutionary aspect
as conditioned by Ignorance; and Ignorance apparently {138} corresponds
to the will as the principle of blind activity. The Sâmkhya philosophy
is an avowed dualism and permits the existence of two principles
independent of each other. Mahâyânism is fundamentally monistic and
makes Ignorance merely a condition necessary to the unfolding of
Suchness.[63] Therefore, what the Sâmkhya splits into two, Mahâyânism
puts together in one.

So is the parallelism between the Manovijñâna, and Buddhi and Ahankâra.
Buddhi, intellect, is defined as _adhyavasâya_ (_Kârika_, 23), while
Ahankâra is interpreted as _abhimanas_ (_Kârika_, 24), which is
evidently self-consciousness. As to the exact meaning of _adhyavasâya_,
there is a divergence of opinion: “ascertainment,” “judgment,”
“determination,” “apprehension” are some of the English equivalents
chosen for it. But the inner signification of Buddhi is clear enough;
it indicates the awakening of knowledge, the dawn of rationality, the
first shedding of light on the dark recesses of unconsciousness; so
the commentators give as the synonyms _mati_ (understanding), _khyâti_
(cognition), _jñânam_, _prajñâ_, etc., the last two of these, which
mean knowledge or intelligence, being also technical terms of
Mahâyânism. And, as we have seen above, these senses are what the
Buddhists give to their Manovijñâna, save that the {139} latter in
addition has the faculty of discriminating between _teum_ and _meum_,
while in the Sâmkhya this is reserved for Ahankâra. Thus, here, too,
in place of the Sâmkhya dualism, we have the Buddhist unity.

Another point we have to take notice here in comparing the two great
Hindu religio-philosophical systems, is that the Sâmkhya philosophy
pluralises the Soul (_puruṣa_, _Kârika_, 18), while Buddhism
postulates one universal Citta or Âlaya. According to the followers
of Kapila, therefore, there must be as many souls as there are
individuals, and at every departure or advent of an individual there
must be assumed a corresponding soul passing away or coming into
existence, though we do not know its whence and whither. Buddhism, on
the other hand, denies the existence of any individual mind apart from
the All-Conserving Mind (_Âlaya_) which is universal. Individuality
first appears at the awakening of the Manovijñâna. The quintessence
of the Mind is Suchness and is not subject to the limitations of time
and space as well as the law of causation. But as soon as it asserts
itself in the world of particularisation, it negates itself thereby,
and, becoming specialised, gives rise to individual souls.[64]




 CHAPTER VII.
 THE THEORY OF NON-ATMAN OR NON-EGO.

{140}

/If/ I am requested to formulate the ground-principles of the
philosophy of Mahâyâna Buddhism, and, indeed, of all the schools of
Buddhism, I would suggest the following:


(1) All is momentary (_sarvam kṣanikam_).

(2) All is empty (_sarvam çûnyam_).

(3) All is without self (_sarvam anâtmam_).

(4) All is such as it is (_sarvam tathâtvam_).


These four tenets, as it were, are so closely interrelated that, stand
or fall, they all inevitably share one and the same fate together.
Whatever different views the various schools of Buddhism may hold on
points of minor importance, they all concur at least on these four
principal propositions.

Of these four propositions, the first, the second, and the fourth have
been elucidated above, more or less explicitly. If the existence of a
relative world is the work of ignorance and as such has no final
reality, it must be considered illusory and empty; though it does not
necessarily follow that on this account our life is not worth living.
We must not {141} confuse the moral value of existence with the
ontological problem of its phenomenality. It all depends on our
subjective attitude whether or not our world and life become full of
significance. When the illusiveness or phenomenality of individual
existences is granted and we use the world accordingly, that is, “as
not abusing it,” we escape the error and curse of egoism and take
things as they are presented to us, as reflecting the Dharma of
Suchness. We no more cling to forms of particularity as something
ultimate and absolutely real and as that in which lies the essence of
our life. We take them for such as they are, and recognise their
reality only in so far as they are considered a partial realisation of
Suchness, and do not go any further. Suchness, indeed, lies not hidden
_behind_ them, but exists immanently _in_ them. Things are empty and
illusory so long as they are particular things and are not thought of
in reference to the All that is Suchness and Reality.

From this, it logically follows that in this world of relativity all
is momentary, that nothing is permanent, so far as isolated, particular
existences are concerned. Even independently of the statement made
above, the doctrine of universal impermanency is an almost self-evident
truth experienced everywhere, and does not require any special
demonstration to prove its validity. The desire for immortality which
is so conspicuous and persistent in all the stages of development of
the religious consciousness that the very desire has been thought to
be the essence of all {142} religious systems, is the most conclusive
proof that things on this earth are in a constant flux of becoming,
and that there is nothing permanent or stationary in our individual
existences; if otherwise, people would never have sought for
immortality.

If this be granted as a fact of our everyday experience, we naturally
ask: “Why are things so changeable? Why is life so fleeting? What is
it that makes things so mutable and transitory?” To this, the
Buddhist’s answer is: Because the universe is a resultant product of
many efficient forces that are acting according to different
karmas;--the destiny of those forces being that no one force or no one
set of forces can constantly be predominant over all the others, but
that when one has exhausted its potential karma, it is replaced by
another that has been steadily coming forward in the meantime. Hence
the universal cadence of birth and death, of the spring and the fall,
of the tide and the ebb, of integration and disintegration. Where
there is attraction, there is repulsion; where there is the
centripetal force, there is the centrifugal force. Because it is the
law of karma that at the very moment of birth the arms of death are
around the neck of life. The universe is nothing but a grand rhythmic
manifestation of certain forces working in conformity to their
predetermined laws; or, to use Buddhist terminology, this _lokadhâtu_
(material world) consists in a concatenation of _hetus_ (causes) and
_pratyayas_ (conditions) regulated by their karma. {143} If this were
not so, there would be either a certain fixed state of things in which
perfect equilibrium would be maintained, or an inexpressible confusion
of things of which no knowledge or experience would be possible. In
the former case, we should have universal stagnation and eternal
death; in the latter case, there would be no universe, no life,
nothing but absolute chaos. Therefore, so long as we have the world
before us, in which all the possible varieties of particularisation
are manifested it cannot be otherwise than in a state of constant
vicissitudes and therefore of universal transitoriness.

Now, the Buddhist argument for the theory of non-ego is this: If
individual existences are due to relations obtaining between diverse
forces, which act sometimes in unison with and sometimes in opposition
to one another as predetermined by their karma, they cannot be said to
have any transcendental agency behind them, which is a permanent unity
and absolute dictator. In other words, there is no âtman or ego-soul
behind our mental activities, and no thing-in-itself (_svabhâva_), so
to speak, behind each particular form of existence. This is called the
Buddhist theory of non-âtman or non-ego.


 _Âtman._

Buddhists use the term “âtman” in two senses: first, in the sense of
personal ego,[65] and secondly, in {144} that of thing-in-itself,
perhaps, with a slight modification of its commonly accepted meaning.
Let us use the term “âtman” here in its first sense as equivalent to
_bhûtâtman_, for we are going first to treat of the doctrine of
non-ego, and later of that of no-thing-in-itself.

Âtman is usually translated “life,” “ego,” or “soul,”[66] and is a
technical term used both by Vedanta philosophers and Buddhists. But we
have to note at the beginning that they do not use the term in the
same sense. When the Vedanta philosophy, especially the later one,
speaks of âtman as our inmost self which is identical with the
universal Brahma, it is used in its most abstract metaphysical sense
and does not mean the soul whatever, as the latter is {145} commonly
understood by vulgar minds. On the other hand, Buddhists understand by
âtman this vulgar, materialistic conception of the soul (_bhûtâtman_)
and positively denies its existence as such. If we, for convenience’
sake, distinguish between phenomenal and noumenal in our notion of ego
or soul, the âtman of Buddhism is the phenomenal ego, namely, a
concrete agent that is supposed to do the acting, thinking, and
feeling; while the âtman of Vedantists is the noumenal ego as the
_raison d’être_ of our psychical life. The one is in fact material,
however ethereal it might be conceived. The other is a highly
metaphysical conception transcending the reach of human discursive
knowledge. The latter may be identified with Paramâtman and the former
with Jîvâtman. Paramâtman is a universal soul from which, according to
Vedantism, emanates this world of phenomena, and in a certain sense it
may be said to correspond to the Tathâgata-garbha of Buddhism.
Jîvâtman is the ego-soul as it is conceived by ignorant people as an
independent entity directing all the mental activities. It is this
latter âtman that was found to be void by Buddha when he arose from
his long meditation, declaring:


 “Many a life to transmigrate,
 Long quest, no rest, hath been my fate,
 Tent-designer[67] inquisitive for:
 Painful birth from state to state.

{146}

 “Tent-designer! I know thee now;
 Never again to build art thou:
 Quite out are all thy joyful fires,
 Rafter broken and roof-tree gone,
 Gain eternity--dead desires.”[68]


 _Buddha’s First Line of Inquiry._

Buddhism finds the source of all evils and sufferings in the vulgar
material conception of the ego-soul, and concentrates its entire
ethical force upon the destruction of the ego-centric notions and
desires. The Buddha seems, since the beginning of his wandering life,
to have conceived the idea that the way of salvation must lie somehow
in the removal of this egoistic prejudice, for so long as we are not
liberated from its curse we are liable to become the prey of the three
venomous passions: covetousness, infatuation, and anger, and to suffer
the misery of birth and death and disease and old age. Thus, when he
received his first instructions from the Sâmkhya philosopher, Arada,
he was not satisfied, because he did not teach how to abandon this
ego-soul itself. The Buddha argued: “I consider that the embodied
ego-soul, though freed from the evolvent-evolutes,[69] {147} is still
subject to the condition of birth and has the condition of a seed. The
seed may remain dormant so long as it is deprived of the opportunity
of coming into contact with the requisite conditions of quickening and
being quickened, but since its germinating power has not been
destroyed, it will surely develop all its potentialities as soon as it
is brought into that necessary contact. Even though the ego-soul free
from entanglement [i.e. from the bondage of Prakṛti] is declared to
be liberated, yet, so long as the ego-soul remains, there can be no
absolute abandonment of it, there can be no real abandonment of
egoism.”[70]

The Buddha then proceeds to indicate the path through which he reached
his final conclusion and declares: “There is no real separation of the
qualities and their subject; for fire cannot be conceived apart from
its heat and form.” When this argument is logically carried out, it
leads nowhere but to the Buddhist doctrine of non-âtman, that says:
The existence of an ego-soul cannot be conceived apart from sensation,
perception, imagination, intelligence, volition, etc., and, therefore,
it is absurd to think that there is an independent individual
soul-agent which makes our consciousness its workshop.

To imagine that an object can be abstracted from its qualities, not
only logically but in reality, that there is some unknown quantity
that is in {148} possession of such and such characteristic marks
(_lakṣana_) whereby it makes itself perceivable by our senses, says
Buddhism, is wrong and unwarranted by reason. Fire cannot be conceived
apart from its form and heat; waves cannot be conceived apart from the
water and its commotion; the wheel cannot exist outside of its rim,
spokes, axle, etc. All things, thus, are made of _hetus_ and
_pratyayas_, of causes and conditions, of qualities and attributes;
and it is impossible for our pudgala or âtman or ego or soul to be
any exception to this universal condition of things.

Let me in this connection state an interesting incident in the history
of Chinese Buddhism. Hui-K’e, the second patriarch of the Dhyâna sect
in China, was troubled with this ego-problem before his conversion. He
was at first a faithful Confucian, but Confucianism did not satisfy
all his spiritual wants. His soul was wavering between agnosticism and
scepticism, and consequently he felt an unspeakable anguish in his
inmost heart. When he learned of the arrival of Bodhidharma in his
country, he hastened to his monastery and implored him to give him
some spiritual advice. But Bodhidharma did not utter a word, being
seemingly absorbed in his deep meditation. Hui-K’e, however, was
determined to obtain from him some religious instructions at all
hazards. So it is reported that he was standing at the same spot seven
days and nights, when he at last cut off his left arm with the sword
he was carrying (being {149} a military officer) and placed it before
Dharma, saying: “This arm is a token of my sincere desire to be
instructed in the Holy Doctrine. My soul is troubled and annoyed; pray
let your grace show me the way to pacify it.” Dharma quietly arose
from his meditation and said: “Where is your soul? Bring it here and I
will have it pacified.” Hui-K’e replied: “I have been searching for it
all these years, but I have never succeeded in laying a hand on it.”
Dharma then exclaimed: “There, I have your soul pacified!” At this, it
is said, a flash of spiritual enlightenment went across the mind of
Hui-K’e, and his “soul” was pacified once for all.


 _The Skandhas._

When the five skandhas are combined according to their previous karma
and present a temporal existence in the form of a sentient being,
vulgar minds imagine that they have here an individual entity
sustained by an immortal ego-substratum. In fact, the material body
(_rûpakâya_) alone is not what makes the ego-soul, nor the sensation
(_vedanâ_), nor the deeds (_sanskâra_), nor the consciousness
(_vijñâna_), nor the conception (_samjñâ_); but only when they are
all combined in a certain form they make a sentient being. Yet this
combination is not the work of a certain independent entity, which,
according to its own will, combines the five skandhas in one form and
then hides itself in it. The combination of the constituent {150}
elements, Buddhism declares, is achieved by themselves after their
karma. When a certain number of atoms of hydrogen and of oxygen are
brought together, they attract each other on their own accord or owing
to their own karma, and the result is water. The ego of water, so to
speak, did not will to bring the two elements and make itself out of
them. Even so is it with the existence of a sentient being, and there
is no need of hypostasising a fabulous ego-monster behind the
combination of the five skandhas.

Skandha (_khanda_ in Pâli) literally means “aggregate” or
“agglomeration”, and, according to the Chinese exegetists, it is
called so, because our personal existence is an aggregate of the five
constituent elements of being, because it comes to take a definite
individual form when the skandhas are brought together according to
their previous karma. The first of the five aggregates is matter
(_rûpa_), whose essential quality is thought to consist in resistance.
The material part of our existence in the five sense-organs called
_indryas_: eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and the body. The second skandha
is called sensation or sense-impression (_vedanâ_), which results from
the contact of the six vijñânas (senses) with the viṣaya (external
world). The third is called _samjñâ_ which corresponds to our
conception. It is the psychic power by which we are enabled to form
the abstract images of particular objects. The fourth is _sanskâra_
which may be rendered action or deed. Our intelligent consciousness,
{151} responding to impressions received which are either agreeable or
disagreeable or indifferent, acts accordingly; and these acts bear
fruit in the coming generations.

Sanskâra, the fourth constituent of being, comprises two categories,
mental (_caitta_) and non-mental (_cittaviprayukta_). And the mental
is subdivided into six: fundamental (_mahâbhûmi_), good (_kuçala_),
tormenting (_kleça_), evil (_akuçala_), tormenting minor (_upakleça_),
and indefinite (_aniyata_). It may be interesting to enumerate what
all these sankâras are, as they shed light on the practical ethics of
Buddhism.

There are ten fundamental sanskâras belonging to the category of
mental or psychic activities: 1. cetanâ (mentation), 2. sparça
(contact), 3. chanda (desire), 4. mati (understanding), 5. smṛti
(recollection), 6. manaskara (concentration), 7. adhimokṣa (unfettered
intelligence), 8. samâdhi (meditation). The ten good sanskâras are: 1.
çraddhâ (faith), 2. vîrya (energy), 3. upekṣa (complacency), 4. hrî
(modesty), 5. apatrapâ (shame), 6 alobha (non-covetousness), 7. adveṣa
(freedom from hatred), 8. ahimsa (gentleness of heart), 9. praçradbhi
(mental repose), 10. apramâda (attentiveness).

The six tormenting sanskâras are as follows: 1. moha (folly), 2.
pramâda (wantonness), 3. kâusidya (indolence), 4. açrâddhya
(scepticism), 5. styāna (slothfulness), 6. âuddhatpa (unsteadiness).

The two minor evil sanskâras are: 1. ahrîkatâ, state of not being
modest, or arrogance, or self-assertiveness, {152} and 2. anapatrapa,
being lost to shame, or to be without conscience.

The ten minor tormenting sanskâras are: 1. krodha (anger), 2. mrakṣa
(secretiveness), 3. mâtsarya (niggardliness), 4. îrṣya (envy). 5.
pradâça (uneasiness), 6. vihimsâ (noxiousness), 7. upanâha (malignity),
8. mâyâ (trickiness), 9. çâthya (dishonesty), 10. mada (arrogance).

The eight indefinite sanskâras are: 1. kâukṛtya (repentance), 2.
middha (sleep), 3. vitarka (inquiry), 4. vicâra (investigation), 5.
râga (excitement), 6. pratigha (wrath), 7. mâna (self-reliance), 8.
vicikitsâ (doubting).

The second grand category of sanskâra which is not included under
“mental” or “psychic,” comprises fourteen items as follows: 1. prâpti
(attainment), 2. aprâpti (non-attainment), 3. sabhâgatâ (grouping),
4 asanjñika (unconsciousness), 5. asanjñisamâpatti (unconscious
absorption in religious meditation), 6. nirodhasamâpatti
(annihilation-trance of a heretic), 7. jîvita (vitality), 8. jâti
(birth), 9. sthiti (existing), 10. jarâ (decadence), 11. anityatâ
(transitoriness), 12. nâmakâya (name), 13. padakâya (phrase), 14.
vyañjanakâya (sentence).

Now, to return to the main problem. The fifth skandha is called
_vijñâna_, commonly rendered consciousness, which, however, is not
quite correct. The vijñâna is intelligence or mentality, it is the
psychic power of discrimination, and in many cases it can be
translated by sense. There are, according to Hînayânists, six
vijñânas or senses: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual,
and cogitative; according {153} to Mahâyânism there are eight
vijñânas: the manovijñâna and the âlayavijñâna, being added to the
above six. This psychological phase of Mahâyâna philosophy is
principally worked out by the Yogâcâra school, whose leading thinkers
are Asanga and Vasubandhu.


 _King Milinda and Nâgasena._

Buddhist literature, Northern as well as Southern, abounds with
expositions of the doctrine of non-ego, as it is one of the most
important foundation-stones on which the magnificent temple of
Buddhism is built. The dialogue[71] between King Milinda and
Nâgasena, among many others, is very interesting for various reasons
and full of suggestive thoughts, and we have the following discussion
of theirs concerning the problem of ego abstracted from the Dialogue.

At their first meeting the King asks Nâgasena, “How is your Reverence
known, and what is your name?”

To this the monk-philosopher replies: “I am known as Nâgasena, and it
is by that name that my brethren in the faith address me. But although
parents give such a name as Nâgasena, or Sûrasena, Vîrasena, or
Sîhasena, yet this Nâgasena and so on--is only a generally understood
term, a designation in common use. For there is no permanent self
involved in the matter.”

Being greatly surprised by this answer, the King {154} volleys upon
Nâgasena a series of questions as follows:

“If there be no permanent self involved in the matter, who is it, pray,
who gives to you members of the Order your robes and food and lodging
and necessaries for the sick? Who is it who enjoys such things when
given? Who is it who lives a life of righteousness? Who is it who
devotes himself to meditation? Who is it who attains to the goal of
the Excellent Way, to the Nirvâna of Arhatship? And who is it who
destroys living creatures? who is it who takes what is not his own?
who is it who lives an evil life of worldly lusts, who speaks lies,
who drinks strong drink, who in a word commits any one of the five
sins which work out their bitter fruit even in this life? If that be
so, there is neither merit nor demerit; there is neither doer nor
cause of good or evil deeds; there is neither fruit nor result of good
or evil karma. If we are to think that were a man to kill you there
would be no murder,[72] then it follows that there are no real
masters or teachers in your Order, that your ordinations are void. You
tell me that your brethren in the Order are in the habit of addressing
you as Nâgasena. Now, what is that Nâgasena? Do you mean to say that
the hair is Nâgasena?”

This last query being denied by the Buddhist sage, the King asks: “Or
is it the nails, the skin, the flesh, the nerves, the bones, the
marrow, the kidneys, {155} the heart, the liver, the abdomen, the
spleen, the lungs, the larger intestines, the smaller intestines, the
faeces, the bile, the phlegm, the pus, the blood, the sweat, the fat,
the tears, the serum, the saliva, the mucus, the oil that lubricates
the joints, the urine, or the brain or any or all of these, that is
Nâgasena?

“Is it the material form that is Nâgasena, or the sensations, or the
ideas, or the confections (deeds), or the consciousness, that is
Nâgasena?”

To all these questions, the King, having received a uniform denial,
exclaims in excitement: “Then, thus, ask as I may, I can discover no
Nâgasena. Nâgasena is a mere empty sound. Who then is the Nâgasena
that we see before us?[73] It is a falsehood that your Reverence has
spoken, an untruth?”

Nâgasena does not give any direct answer, but quietly proposes some
counter-questions to the King. Ascertaining that he came in a carriage
to the Buddhist philosopher, he asks: “Is it the wheel, or the
framework, or the ropes, or the spokes of the wheels, or the goad,
that are the chariot?”

To this, the king says, “No,” and continues: “It is on account of its
having all these things that it {156} comes under the generally
understood term, the designation in common use, of ‘chariot.’”

“Very good,” says Nâgasena, “Your Majesty has rightly grasped the
meaning of ‘chariot.’ And just even so it is on account of all these
things you questioned me about the thirty-two kinds of organic matter
in a human body, and the five skandhas (constituent elements of being)
that I come under the generally-understood term, the designation in
common use, of ‘Nâgasena.’”

Then, the sage quotes in way of confirmation a passage from the
_Samyutta Nikâya_: “Just as it is by the condition precedent of the
co-existence of its various parts that the word ‘chariot’ is used,
just so it is that when the skandhas are there we talk of a ‘being.’”

 * * *

To further illustrate the theory of non-âtman from earlier Buddhist
literature, let me quote the following from the _Jâtaka Tales_ (No.
244):

The Bodhisattva said to a pilgrim. “Will you have a drink of
Ganges-water fragrant with the scent of the forest?”

The pilgrim tried to catch him in his words: “What is the Ganges? Is
the sand the Ganges? Is the water the Ganges? Is the hither bank the
Ganges? Is the further bank the Ganges?”

But the Bodhisattva retorted, “If you except the {157} water, the
sand, the hither bank, and the further bank, where can you find any
Ganges?”

Following this argument we might say, “Where is the ego-soul, except
imagination, volition, intellection, desire, aspiration, etc.?”


 _Ananda’s Attempts to Locate the Soul._

In the _Surangama Sutra_[74], Buddha exposes the absurdity of the
hypothesis of an individual concrete soul-substance by subverting
Ândanda’s seven successive attempts to determine its whereabouts.
Most people who firmly believe in personal immortality, will see how
vague and chimerical and logically untenable is their notion of the
soul, when it is critically examined as in the following case. Ânanda’s
conception of the soul is somewhat puerile, but I doubt whether even
in our enlightened age the belief {158} entertained by the multitude
is any better than his.

When questioned by the Buddha as to the locality of the soul, Ânanda
asserts that it resides within the body. Thereupon, the Buddha says:
“If your intelligent soul resides within your corporeal body, how is
it that it does not see your inside first? To illustrate, what we see
first in this lecture hall is the interior and it is only when the
windows are thrown open that we are able to see the outside garden and
woods. It is impossible for us who are sitting in the hall to see the
outside only and not to see the inside. Reasoning in a similar way,
why does not the soul that is considered to be within the body see the
internal organs first such as the stomach, heart, veins etc.? If
however it does not see the inside, surely it cannot be said to reside
within the body.”

Ânanda now proposes to solve the problem by locating the soul outside
the body. He says that the soul is like a candle-light placed without
this hall. Where the light shines everything is visible, but within
the room there are no candles burning, and therefore here prevails
nothing but darkness. This explains the incapacity of the soul to see
the inside of the body. But the Buddha argues that “it is impossible
for the soul to be outside. If so, what the soul feels may not be felt
by the body, and what the body feels may not be felt by the soul, as
there is no relationship between the two. The fact, however, is that
when you, Ânanda, see my hand thus stretched, you are conscious that
you have the perception of {159} it. As far as there is a
correspondence between the soul and the body, the soul cannot be said
to be residing outside the body.”

The third hypothesis assumed by Ânanda is that the soul hides itself
just behind the sense-organs. Suppose a man put a pair of lenses over
his eyes. Cannot he see the outside world through them? The reason why
it cannot see the inside is that it resides within the sense-organs.

But says the Buddha: “When we have a lens over an eye, we perceive
this lens as well as the outside world. If the soul is hidden behind
the sense-organ, why does it not see the sense-organ itself? As it
does not in fact, it cannot be residing in the place you mention.”

Ananda proposes another theory. “Within, we have the stomach, liver,
heart, etc.: without, we have so many orifices. Where the internal
organs are, there is darkness; but where we have openings, there is
light. Close the eyes and the soul sees the darkness inside. Open the
eyes and it sees the brightness outside. What do you say to this
theory?”

The Buddha says: “If you take the darkness you see when the eyes are
closed for your inside, do you consider this darkness as something
confronting your soul, or not? In the first case, wherever there
prevails a darkness, that must be thought to be your interior organs.
In the latter case, seeing is impossible, for seeing presupposes the
existence of subject and object. Besides this, there is another
difficulty. Granting {160} your supposition that the eye could turn
itself inward or outward and see the darkness of the interior or the
brightness of the external world, it could also see your own face when
the eye is opened. If it could not do so, it must be said to be
incapable of turning the sight inward.”

The fifth assumption as made by Ânanda is that the soul is the essence
of understanding or intelligence, which is not within, nor without,
nor in the middle, but which comes into actual existence as soon as it
confronts the objective world, for it is taught by the Buddha that the
world exists on account of the mind and the mind on account of the
world.

To this the Buddha replies: “According to your argument, the soul must
be said to exist before it comes in contact with the world; otherwise,
the contact cannot have any sense. The soul, then, exists as an
individual presence, not after nor at the time of a contact with the
external world, but assuredly before the contact. Granting this, we
come back again to the old difficulties: Does the soul come out of
your inside, or does it come in from the outside? In case of the first
alternative, the soul must be able to see its own face.”

Ânanda interrupts: “Seeing is done by the eyes, and the soul has
nothing to do with it.”

The Buddha objects: “If so, a dead man has eyes just as perfect as a
living man.[75] He must be able {161} to see things, but if he sees
at all, he cannot be dead. Well, if your intelligent soul has a
concrete existence, should it be thought simple or compound? Should it
be thought of as filling the body or being present only in a particular
spot? If it is a simple unit, when one of your limbs is touched, all
the four will at once be conscious of the touch, which really means no
touch. If the soul is a compound body, how can it distinguish itself
from another soul? If it is filling the body all over, there will be
no localisation of sensation, as must be the case according to the
first supposition of a simple soul-unit. Finally, if it occupies only
a particular part of the body, you may experience certain feelings on
that spot only, and all the other parts will remain perfectly
anesthetic. All these hypotheses are against the actual facts of our
experience and cannot be logically maintained.”

For the sixth time, Ânanda ventures to untie the Gordian knot of the
soul-problem. “As the soul cannot be located neither within nor
without, it must be somewhere in the middle.” But the Buddha again
refutes this, saying: “This ‘middle’ is extremely indefinite. Should
it be located as a point in space or somewhere on the body? If it is
on the surface of the body, {162} it is not the middle; if it is in
the body, it is then within. If it is said to occupy a point in space,
how should that point be indicated? Without an indication, a point is
no point; and if an indication is needed, it can be fixed anywhere
arbitrarily, and then there will be no end of confusion.”

Ânanda interposes and says that he does not mean this kind of “middle.”
The eye and the color conditioning each other, there comes to exist
visual perception. The eye has the faculty to discriminate, and the
color-world has no sensibility; but the perception takes place in
their “middle,” that is, in their interaction; and then it is said that
there exists a soul.

Says the Buddha: “If the soul, as you say, exists in the relation
between the sense-organs (_indṛya_) and their respective sense-objects
(_viṣaya_), should we consider the soul as uniting and partaking the
natures of these two incongruous things, viṣaya and indṛya? If the
soul partakes something of each, it has no characteristics of its own.
If it unites the two natures, the distinction between subject and
object exists no more. ‘In the middle’ is an empty word; that is to
say, to conceive the soul as the relation between the indryas and the
viṣayas is to make it an airy nothing.”

The seventh and final hypothesis offered by Ânanda is that the soul
is the state of non-attachment, and that, therefore, it has no
particular locality in which it abides. But this is also mercilessly
attacked by the Buddha who declares: “Attachment presupposes the
existence of beings to which a mind-may be attached. {163} Now, should
we consider these things (_dharmas_) such as the world, space, land,
water, birds, beasts, etc. as existing or not existing? If the
external world does not exist, we cannot speak about non-attachment,
as there is nothing to attach from the first. If the external world
really is, how can we manage not to come in contact with it? When we
say that things are devoid of all characteristic marks, it amounts to
the declaration that they are non-existent. But they are not
non-existent, they must have certain characteristics that distinguish
themselves. Now, the external world has certainly some marks
(_lakṣana_) and it must by all means be considered as existing. There
then is no room for your theory of non-attachment.”

At this, Ânanda surrenders and the Buddha discloses his theory of
Dharmakâya, which we shall expound at some length in the chapter
specially devoted to it.

 * * *

By way of a summary of the above, let me remark that the Buddhists do
not deny the existence of the so-called empirical ego in
contradistinction to the noumenal ego, which latter can be considered
to correspond to the Buddhist âtman. Vasubandhu in his treatise on
the Yogâcâra’s idealistic philosophy declares that the existence of
âtman and dharma is only hypothetical, provisional, apparent, and not
in any sense real and ultimate. To express this in modern terms, the
soul and the world, or subject and object, have only relative
existence, and no absolute reality can {164} be ascribed to them.
Psychologically speaking, every one of us has an ego or soul which
means the unity of consciousness; and physically, this world of
phenomena is real either as a manifestation of one energy or as a
composite of atoms or electrons, as is considered by physicists.

To confine ourselves to the psychological question, what Buddhism most
emphatically insists on is the non-existence of a concrete,
individual, irreducible soul-substance, whose immortality is so much
coveted by most unenlightened people. Individuation is only relative
and not absolute. Buddhism knows how far the principle could safely
and consistently be carried out, and its followers will not forget
where to stop and destroy the wall, almost adamantine to some
religionists, of individualism. Absolute individualism, as the
Buddhists understand it, incapacitates us to follow the natural flow
of sympathy; to bathe in the eternal sunshine of divinity which not
only surrounds but penetrates us; to escape the curse of individual
immortality which is strangely so much sought after by some people; to
trace this mundane life to its fountainhead of which it drinks so
freely, yet quite unknowingly; to rise rejuvenated from the consuming
fire of Kâla (Chronos). To think that there is a mysterious something
behind the empirical ego and that this something comes out triumphantly
after the fashion of the immortal phœnix from the funeral pyre of
corporeality, is not Buddhistic.

What I would remark here in connection with this {165} problem of the
soul, is its relation to that of Âlayavijñâna, of which it is said
that the Buddha was very reluctant to talk, on account of its being
easily confounded with the notion of the ego. The Âlaya, as was
explained, is a sort of universal soul from which our individual
empirical souls are considered to have evolved. The Manas which is the
first offspring of the Âlaya is endowed with the faculty of
discrimination, and from the wrongful use of this faculty there arises
in the Manas the conception of the Âlaya as the ego,--the real
concrete soul-substratum.

The Âlaya, however, is not a particular phenomenon, for it is a state
of Suchness in its evolutionary disposition and has nothing in it yet
to suggest its concrete individuality. When the Manas finds out its
error and lifts the veil of Ignorance from the body of the Âlaya, it
soon becomes convinced of the ultimate nature of the soul, so called.
For the soul is not individual, but supra-individual.


 _Âtman and the “Old Man.”_

When the Buddhists exclaim: “Put away your egoism, for the ego is an
empty notion, a mere word without reality,” some of our Christian
readers may think that if there is no ego, what will become of our
personality or individuality? Though this point will become clearer as
we proceed, let us remark here that what Buddhism understands by ego
or âtman may be considered to correspond in many respects to the
Christian notion of “flesh” or the {166} “old man,” which is the
source of all our sinful acts. Says Paul: “I am crucified with Christ;
nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life
which I live now in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God,
who loved me and gave himself for me.” (Gal. ii, 20.) When this
passage is interpreted by the Buddhists, the “I” that was annihilated
through crucifixion, is our false notion of an ego-soul (_âtman_);
and the “I” that is living through the grace of God is the Bodhi, a
reflex in us of the Dharmakâya.

When Christians put the spirit and the flesh in contrast and advise us
to “walk in the spirit” and not to “fulfil the lust of the flesh,” it
must be said that they understand by the flesh our concrete, material
existence whose characteristic is predominantly individual, and by the
spirit, that which transcends particularity and egoism; for “love,
joy, peace, long-suffering, faith, meekness, temperance,” and suchlike
virtues are possible only when our egocentric, âtman-made desires are
utterly abnegated. Buddhism is more intellectual than Christianity or
Judaism and prefers philosophical terms which are better understood
than popular language which leads often to confusion. Compared with
the Buddhists’ conception of âtman, the “flesh” lacks in perspicuity
and exactitude, not to speak of its dualistic tendency which is
extremely offensive to the Buddhists.

{167}


 _The Vedantic Conception._

Though the doctrine of non-âtman is pre-eminently Buddhistic, other
Hindu philosophers did not neglect to acknowledge its importance in
our religious life. Having grown in the same soil under similar
circumstances, the following passage which is taken from the
_Yogavâsistha_ (which is supposed to be a Vedantic work, Upaçama P.,
ch. LII, 31, 44) sounds almost like Buddhistic:

“I am absolute, I am the light of intelligence, I am free from the
defilement of egoism. O thou that art unreal! I am not bound by thee,
the seed of egoism.”[76]

The author then argues: Where shall we consider the ego-soul, so
called, to be residing in this body of flesh and bones? and what does
it look like? We move our limbs, but the movement is due to the vital
airs (_vâta_). We think, but consciousness is a manifestation of the
great mind (_mahâcitta_). We cease to exist, but extinction belongs
to the body (_kâya_). Now, take apart what we imagine to constitute
our personal existence. The flesh is one thing, the blood is another,
and so on with mentation (_bodha_) and vitality (_spanda_). The ear
hears, the tongue tastes, the eye sees, the mind {168} thinks, but
what and where is that which we call “ego”?

Then comes the conclusion: “In reality, there is no such thing as the
ego-soul, nor is there any mine and thine, nor imagination. All this
is nothing but the manifestation of the universal soul which is the
light of pure intelligence.”[77]


 _Nâgârjuna on the Soul._

In conclusion, let me quote some passage bearing on the subject from
Nâgârjuna’s _Discourse on the Middle Path_ (chapter 9):[78] “Some
say that there are seeing, hearing, feeling, etc., because there is
something which exists even prior to those [manifestations]. For how
could seeing, etc. come from that which does not exist? Therefore, it
must be admitted that that being [i.e. soul] existed prior to those
[manifestations].

“But [this hypothesis of the prior (_pûrva_) or independent existence
of the soul is wrong, because] how could that being be known if it
existed prior to seeing, feeling, etc.? If that being could exist
without seeing, etc., the latter too could surely exist without that
being. But how could a thing which could not be known by any sign
exist before it is known? How could _this_ exist without _that_, and
how could {169} _that_ exist without _this_? [Are not all things
relative and conditioning one another?]

“If that being called soul could not exist prior to all manifestations
such as seeing, etc., how could it exist prior to each of them taken
individually?

“If it is the same soul that sees, hears, feels, etc., it must be
assumed that the soul exists prior to each of these manifestations.
This, however, is not warranted by facts. [Because in that case one
must be able to hear with the eyes, see with the ears, as one soul is
considered to direct all these diverse faculties at its will.]

“If, on the other hand, the hearer is one, and the seer is another,
the feeler must be still another. Then, there will be hearing, seeing,
etc. simultaneously,--which leads to the assumption of a plurality of
souls.[79] [This too is against experience.]

“Further, the soul does not exist in the element (_bhûta_) on which
seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. depend. [To use modern expression, the
soul does not exist in the nerves which respond to the external
stimuli.]

“If seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. have no soul that exists prior to
them, they too have no existence as such. For how could _that_ exist
without _this_, and _this_ without _that_? Subject and object are
mutually conditioned. The soul as it is has no independent, individual
reality whatever. Therefore, the hypothesis that contends for the
existence of an ego-soul prior {170} to simultaneous with, or posterior
to, seeing, etc., is to be abandoned as fruitless, for the ego-soul
existeth not.”


 _Non-âtman-ness of Things._

The word “âtman” is used by the Buddhists not only psychologically in
the sense of soul, self, or ego, but also ontologically in the sense
of substance or thing-in-itself or thinginess; and its existence in
this capacity is also strongly denied by them. For the same reason
that the existence of an individual ego-soul is untenable, they reject
the hypothesis of the permanent existence of an individual object as
such. As there is no transcendent agent in our soul-life, so there is
no real, eternal existence of individuals as individuals, but a system
of different attributes, which, when the force of karma is exhausted,
ceases to subsist. Individual existences cannot be real by their
inherent nature, but they are illusory, and will never remain permanent
as such; for they are constantly becoming, and have no selfhood though
they may so appear to our particularising senses on account of our
subjective ignorance. They are in reality cûnya and anâtman, they are
empty and void of âtman.


 _Svabhâva._

The term “svabhâva” (self-essence or noumenon) is sometimes used by
the Mahâyânists in place of âtman, and they would say that all dharmas
have no self-essence, {171} _sarvam dharmam niḥsvabhâvam_, which is to
say, that all things in their phenomenal aspect are devoid of
individual selves, that it is only due to our ignorance that we believe
in the thinginess of things, whereas there is no such thing as svabhâva
or âtman or noumenon which resides in them. Svabhâva and âtman are thus
habitually used by Buddhists as quite synonymous.

What do they exactly understand by “svabhâva” whose existence is
denied in a particular object as perceived by our senses? This has
never been explicitly defined by the Mahâyânists, but they seem to
understand by svabhâva something concrete, individual, yet independent,
unconditional, and not subject to the law of causation
(_pratyayasamutpâda_). It, therefore, stands in opposition to
çûnyatâ, emptiness, as well as to conditionality. Inasmuch as all
beings are transient and empty in their inherent being, they cannot
logically be said to be in possession of self-essence which defies the
law of causation. All things are mutually conditioning and limiting,
and apart from their relativity they are non-existent and cannot be
known by us. Therefore, says Nâgârjuna, “If substance be different
from attribute, it is then beyond comprehension.”[80] For “a jag is
not to be known independent of matter et cetera, and matter in turn is
not to be known independent of ether et cetera.”[81] {172} As there
is no subject without object, so there is no substance without
attribute; for one is the condition for the other. Does self-essence
then exist in causation? No, “whatever is subject to conditionality,
is by its very nature tranquil and empty.” (_Pratîtya yad yad bhavati,
tat tac çântam svabhâvataḥ._) Whatever owes its existence to a
combination of causes and conditions is without self-essence, and
therefore it is tranquil (_çânta_), it is empty, it is unreal (_asat_),
and the ultimate nature of this universal emptiness is not within the
sphere of intellectual demonstrability, for the human understanding is
not capable of transcending its inherent limitations.

Says Pingalaka, a commentator of Nâgârjuna: “The cloth exists on
account of the thread; the matting is possible on account of the
rattan. If the thread had its own fixed, unchangeable self-essence, it
could not be made out of the flax. If the cloth had its own fixed,
unchangeable self-essence, it could not be made from the thread. But
as in point of fact the cloth comes from the thread and the thread
from the flax, it must be said that the thread as well as the cloth
had no fixed, unchangeable self-essence. It is just like the relation
that obtains between the burning and the burned. They are brought
together under certain conditions, and thus there takes place a
phenomenon called burning. The burning and the burned, each has no
reality of its own. For when one is absent the other is put out of
existence. It is so with all things in this world, they are all empty,
{173} without self, without absolute existence, they are like the
will-o’-the-wisp.”[82]


 _The Real Significance of Emptiness._

From these statements it will be apparent that the emptiness of things
(_çûnyatâ_) does not mean nothingness, as is sometimes interpreted
by some critics, but it simply means conditionality or transitoriness
of all phenomenal existences, it is a synonym for aniyata or pratîtya.
Therefore, emptiness, according to the Buddhists, signifies,
negatively, the absence of particularity, the non-existence of
individuals as such, and positively, the ever-changing state of the
phenomenal world, a constant flux of becoming, an eternal series of
causes and effects. It must never be understood in the sense of
annihilation or absolute nothingness, for nihilism is as much
condemned by Buddhism as naïve realism. “The Buddha proclaimed
emptiness as a remedy for all doctrinal controversies, but those who
in turn cling to emptiness are beyond treatment.” A medicine is
indispensable as long as there is a disease to heal, but it turns
poisonous when applied after the restoration of perfect health. To
make this point completely clear, let me quote the following from
Nâgârjuna’s _Mâdhyamika Çâstra_ (Chap. XXIV). “[Some one may object to
the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness, declaring:] If all is void
(_çûnya_) and {174} there is neither creation nor destruction, then it
must be concluded that even the Fourfold Noble Truth does not exist.
If the Fourfold Noble Truth does not exist, the recognition of
Suffering, the stoppage of Accumulation, the attainment of Cessation,
and the advancement of Discipline,--all must be said to be
unrealisable. If they are altogether unrealisable, there cannot be any
of the four states of saintliness; and without these states there
cannot be anybody who will aspire for them. If there are no wise men,
the Sangha is then impossible. Further, as there is no Fourfold Noble
Truth, there is no Good Law (_saddharma_); and as there is neither
Good Law nor Sangha, the existence of Buddha himself must be an
impossibility. Those who talk of emptiness, therefore, must be said to
negate the Triple Treasure (_triratna_) altogether. Emptiness not only
destroys the law of causation and the general principle of retribution
(_phalasadbhâvam_), but utterly annihilates the possibility of a
phenomenal world.”

“[To this it is to be remarked that]

“Only he is annoyed over such scepticism who understands not the true
significance and interpretation of emptiness (_çûnyatâ_).

“The Buddha’s teaching rests on the discrimination of two kinds of
truth (_satya_): absolute and relative. Those who do not have any
adequate knowledge of them are unable to grasp the deep and subtle
meaning of Buddhism. [The essence of being, dharmata, is beyond verbal
definition or intellectual comprehension, {175} for there is neither
birth nor death in it, and it is even like unto Nirvâna. The nature
of Suchness, tattva, is fundamentally free from conditionality, it is
tranquil, it distances all phenomenal frivolities, it discriminates
not, nor is it particularised].[83]

“But if not for relative truth, absolute truth is unattainable, and
when absolute truth is not attained, Nirvâna is not to be gained.

“The dull-headed who do not perceive the truth rightfully go to
self-destruction, for they are like an awkward magician whose trick
entangles himself, or like an unskilled snake-catcher who gets himself
hurt. The World-honored One knew well the abstruseness of the Doctrine
which is beyond the mental capacity of the multitudes and was inclined
not to disclose it before them.

“The objection that Buddhism onesidedly adheres to emptiness and
thereby exposes itself to grave errors, entirely misses the mark; for
there are no errors in emptiness. Why? Because it is on account of
emptiness that all things are at all possible, and without emptiness
all things will come to naught. Those who deny emptiness and find
fault with it, are like a horseman who forgets that he is on
horseback.

“If they think that things exist because of their self-essence
(_svabhâva_), [and not because of their emptiness,] they thereby make
things come out of causelessness (_ahetupratyaya_), they destroy those
{176} relations that exist between the acting and the act and the
acted; and they also destroy the conditions that make up the law of
birth and death.

“All is declared empty because there is nothing that is not a product
of universal causation (_pratyayasamutpâda_). This law of causation,
however, is merely provisional, though herein lies the middle path.

“As thus there is not an object (_dharma_) which is not conditioned
(_pratîtya_), so there is nothing that is not empty.

“If all is not empty, then there is no death nor birth, and withal
disappears the Fourfold Noble Truth.

“How could there be Suffering, if not for the law of causation?
Impermanence is suffering. But with self-essence there will be no
impermanence. [So long as impermanence is the condition of life,
self-essence which is a causeless existence, is out of question.]
Suppose Suffering is self-existent, then it could not come from
Accumulation, which in turn becomes impossible when emptiness is not
admitted. Again, when Suffering is self-existent, then there could be
no Cessation, for with the hypothesis of self-essence Cessation
becomes a meaningless term. Again, when Suffering is self-existent,
then there will be no Path. But as we can actually walk on the Path,
the hypothesis of self-essence is to be abandoned.

“If there is neither Suffering nor Cessation, it must be said that the
Path leading to the Cessation of Suffering is also non-existent.

“If there is really self-essence, Suffering could not {177} be
recognised now, as it had not been recognised, for self-essence as
such must remain forever the same. [That is to say, enlightened minds,
through the teaching of Buddha, now recognise the existence of
Suffering, though they did not recognise it when they were still
uninitiated. If things were all in a fixed, self-determining state on
account of their self-essence, it would be impossible for those
enlightened men to discover what they had never observed before. The
recognition of the Fourfold Noble Truth is only possible when this
phenomenal world is in a state of constant becoming, that is, when it
is empty as it really is.]

“As it is with the recognition of Suffering, so it is with the
stoppage of Accumulation, the attainment of Cessation, the realisation
of Path as well as with the four states of saintliness.

“If, on account of self-essence, the four states of saintliness were
unattainable before, how could they be realised now, still upholding
the hypothesis of self-essence? [But we can attain to saintliness as a
matter of fact, for there are many holy men who through their
spiritual discipline have emerged from their former life of ignorance
and darkness. If everything had its own self-essence which makes it
impossible to transform from one state to another, how could a person
desire to ascend, if he ever so desire, higher and higher on the scale
of existence?]

“If there were no four states of saintliness (_catvâri phalâni_), then
there would be no aspirants for it. {178} And if there were no eight
wise men (_puruṣapuñgala_), there could exist no Sangha.

“Again, when there could not be the Fourfold Noble Truth, the Law
would be impossible, and without the Sangha and the Law how could the
Buddha exist? You might say: ‘A Buddha does not exist on account of
wisdom (_Bodhi_), nor does wisdom exist on account of the Buddha.’ But
if a man did not have Buddha-essence [that is, Bodhi] he could not
hope to attain to Buddhahood, however strenuously he might exert
himself in the ways of Bodhisattva.

“Further, if all is not empty but has self-essence, [i.e. if all is in
a fixed, unchangeable state of sameness], how could there be any
doing? How could there be good and evil? If you maintain that there is
an effect (_phala_) which does not come from a cause good or evil,
[which is the practical conclusion of the hypothesis of self-essence],
then it means that retribution is independent of our deed, good or
evil. [But is this justified by our experience?]

“If it must then be admitted that our deed good or evil becomes the
cause of retribution, retribution must be said to come from our deed,
good or evil; then how could we say there is no emptiness?

“When you negate the doctrine of emptiness, the law of universal
causation, you negate the possibility of this phenomenal world. When
the doctrine of emptiness is negated, there remains nothing that ought
to be done; and a thing is called done which is not yet accomplished;
and he is said to be a doer who has {179} not done anything whatever.
If there were such a thing as self-essence, the multitudinousness of
things must be regarded as uncreated and imperishable and eternally
existing which is tantamount to eternal nothingness.

“If there were no emptiness there would be no attainment of what has
not yet been attained, nor would there be the annihilation of pain,
nor the extinction of all the passions (_sarvakleça_).

“Therefore, it is taught by the Buddha that those who recognise the
law of universal causation, recognise the Buddha as well as Suffering,
Accumulation, Cessation, and the Path.”

 * * *

The Mahâyânistic doctrines thus formulated and transmitted down to
the present days are: There is no such thing as the ego; mentation is
produced by the co-ordination of various vijñânas or senses.

Individual existences have no selfhood or self-essence or reality, for
they are but an aggregate of certain qualities sustained by efficient
karma. The world of particulars is the work of Ignorance as declared
by Buddha in his Formula of Dependence (Twelve Nidânas). When this
veil of Mâya is uplifted, the universal light of Dharmakâya shines in
all its magnificence. Individual existences then as such lose their
significance and become sublimated and ennobled in the oneness of
Dharmakâya. Egoistic prejudices are forever vanquished, and the aim of
our lives is no more the {180} gratification of selfish cravings, but
the glorification of Dharma as it works its own way through the
multitudinousness of things. The self does not stand any more in a
state of isolation (which is an illusion), it is absorbed in the
universal body of Dharma, it recognises itself in other selves animate
as well as inanimate, and all things are in Nirvâna. When we reach
this state of ideal enlightenment, we are said to have realised the
Buddhist life.




 CHAPTER VIII.
 KARMA.

{181}


 _Definition._

/Karma/, or Sanskâra which is sometimes used as its synonym,--though
the latter gives a slightly different shade of meaning,--comes from
the Sanskrit root _kṛ_, “to do,” “to make,” “to perform,” “to effect,”
“to produce,” etc. Both terms mean activity in its concrete as well as
in its abstract sense, and form an antithesis to intelligence,
contemplation, or ideation in general. When karma is used in its most
abstract sense, it becomes an equivalent to “beginningless ignorance,”
which is universally inherent in nature, and corresponds to the Will
or blind activity of Schopenhauer; for ignorance as we have seen above
is a negative manifestation of Suchness (_Bhûtatathâtâ_) and marks the
beginning or unfolding of a phenomenal world, whose existence is
characterised by incessant activities actuated by the principle of
karma. When Goethe says in Faust, “In Anfang war die That,” he uses
the term “That” in the sense of karma as it is here understood.

When karma is used in its concrete sense, it is the {182} principle of
activity in the world of particulars or nâmarûpas: it becomes in the
physical world the principle of conservation of energy, in the
biological realm that of evolution and heredity etc., and in the moral
world that of immortality of deeds. Sanskara, when used as an
equivalent of karma, corresponds to this concrete signification of it,
as it is the case in the Twelve Chains of Dependence (_Nidânas_, or
_Pratyâyasamutpâda_).[84] Here it follows ignorance (_avidyâ_) and
precedes consciousness (_vijñâna_). Ignorance in this case means
simply privation of enlightenment, and does not imply any sense of
activity which is expressed in Sanskâra. It is only when it is coupled
with the latter that it becomes the principle of activity, and creates
as its first offspring consciousness or mentality. In fact, ignorance
and blind activity are one, their logical difference being this: the
former emphasises the epistemological phase and the latter the
ethical; or, we might say, one is statical and the other dynamical. If
we are to draw a comparison between the first four of the Twelve
Nidânas and the several processes of evolution that takes place in the
Tathâgata-garbha as described above, we can take Ignorance and the
principle of blind activity, sanskâra, {183} in the Twelve Chains as
corresponding to the All-conserving Soul (_âlayavijñâna_), and the
Vijñâna, consciousness of the Twelve Chains, to the Manovijñâna, and
the Nâmârûpa to this visible world, _viṣaya_, in which the principle
of karma works in its concrete form.

As we have a special chapter devoted to “Ignorance” as an equivalent
of karma in its abstract sense, let us here treat of the Buddhist
conception of karma in the realm of names and forms, i.e. of karma in
its concrete sense. But we shall restrict ourselves to the activity of
karmaic causation in the moral world, as we are not concerned with
physics or biology.


 _The Working of Karma._

The Buddhist conception of karma briefly stated is this: Any act, good
or evil, once committed and conceived, never vanishes like a bubble in
water, but lives, potentially or actively as the case may be, in the
world of minds and deeds. This mysterious moral energy, so to speak,
is embodied in and emanates from every act and thought, for it does
not matter whether it is actually performed, or merely conceived in
the mind. When the time comes, it is sure to germinate and grow with
all its vitality. Says Buddha:


 “Karma even after the lapse of a hundred kalpas,
 Will not be lost nor destroyed;
 As soon as all the necessary conditions are ready,
 Its fruit is sure to ripe.”[85]

{184}

Again,


 “Whatever a man does, the same he in himself will find,
 The good man, good: and evil he that evil has designed;
 And so our deeds are all like seeds, and bring forth fruit in kind.”[86]


A grain of wheat, it is said, which was accidentally preserved in good
condition in a tomb more than a thousand years old, did not lose its
germinating energy, and, when planted with proper care, it actually
started to sprout. So with karma, it is endowed with an enormous
vitality, nay, it is even immortal. However remote the time of their
commission might have been, the karma of our deeds never dies; it must
work out its own destiny at whatever cost, if not overcome by some
counteracting force. The law of karma is irrefragable.

The irrefragability of karma means that the law of causation is
supreme in our moral sphere just as much as in the physical, that life
consists in a concatenation of causes and effects regulated by the
principle of karma, that nothing in the life of an individual or a
nation or a race happens without due cause and sufficient reason, that
is, without previous karma. The Buddhists, therefore, do not believe
in any special act of grace or revelation in our religious realm and
moral life. The idea of deus ex machina is banned in Buddhism. Whatever
is suffered or enjoyed morally in our present life is due to the karma,
accumulated {185} since the beginning of life on earth. Nothing sown,
nothing reaped.

Whatever has been done leaves an ineffable mark in the individual’s
life and even in that of the universe; and this mark will never be
erased save by sheer exhaustion of the karma or by the interruption of
an overwhelming counter-karma. In case the karma of an act is not
actualised during one’s own life-time, it will in that of one’s
successors, who may be physical or spiritual. Not only “the evil that
men do lives after them,” but also the good, for it will not be
“interred with their bones,” as vulgar minds imagine. We read in the
_Samyukta Nikâya_, III, 1-4:


 “Assailed by death, in life’s last throes,
 At quitting of this human state,
 What is it one can call his own?
 What with him take as he goes hence?
 What is it follows after him,
 And like a shadow ne’er departs?

 “His good deeds and his wickedness,
 Whate’er a mortal does while here;
 ’Tis this that he can call his own,
 This with him take as he goes hence.
 This is what follows after him,
 And like a shadow ne’er departs.

 “Let all, then, noble deeds perform,
 A treasure-store for future weal;
 For merit gained this life within,
 Will yield a blessing in the next.”[87]


{186}

In accordance with this karmaic preservation, Buddhists do not expect
to have their sins expatiated by other innocent people so long as
their own hearts remain unsoftened as ever. But when the all-embracing
love of Buddhas for all sentient beings kindles even the smallest
spark of repentance and enlightenment in the heart of a sinner, and
when this ever-vacillating light grows to its full magnitude under
propitious conditions, the sinner gets fully awakened from the evil
karma of eons, and enters, free from all curses, into the eternity of
Nirvâna.


 _Karma and Social Injustice._

The doctrine of karma is very frequently utilised by some Buddhists to
explain a state of things which must be considered cases of social
injustice.

There are some people who are born rich and noble and destined to
enjoy all forms of earthly happiness and all the advantages of social
life, though they have done nothing that justifies them in luxuriating
in such a fashion any more than their poor neighbors. These people,
however, are declared by some pseudo-Buddhists to be merely harvesting
the crops of good karma they had prepared in their former lives. On
the other hand, the poor, needy, and low that are struggling to eke
out a mere existence in spite of their moral rectitude and honest
industry, are considered to be suffering the evil karma which had been
accumulated during their previous lives. The law of moral retribution
is never {187} suspended, as they reason, on account of the changes
which may take place in a mortal being. An act, good or evil, once
performed, will not be lost in the eternal succession and interaction
of incidents, but will certainly find the sufferer of its due
consequence, and it does not matter whether the actor has gone through
the vicissitudes of birth and death. For the Buddhist conception of
individual identity is not that of personal continuity, but of karmaic
conservation. Whatever deeds we may commit, they invariably bear their
legitimate fruit and follow us even after death. Therefore, if the
rich and noble neglect to do their duties or abandon themselves to the
enjoyment of sensual pleasures, then they are sure in their future
births, if not in their present life, to gather the crops they have
thus unwittingly prepared for themselves. The poor, however hard their
lot in this life, can claim their rightful rewards, if they do not get
despaired of their present sufferings and give themselves up to
temptations, but dutifully continue to do things good and meritorious.
Because as their present fate is the result of their former deeds, so
will be their future fortune the fruit of their present deeds.

This view as held by some pseudo-Buddhists gives us a wrong impression
about the practical working of the principle of karma in this world of
nâmarûpas, for it tries to explain by karmaic theory the phenomena
which lie outside of the sphere of its applicability. As I understand,
what the theory of karma {188} proposes to explain is not cases of
social injustice and economic inequality, but facts of moral causation.

The overbearing attitude of the rich and the noble, the unnecessary
sufferings of the poor, the over-production of criminals, and suchlike
social phenomena arise from the imperfection of our present social
organisation, which is based upon the doctrine of absolute private
ownership. People are allowed to amass wealth unlimitedly for their
own use and to bequeath it to the successors who do not deserve it in
any way. And they do not pay regard to the injuries this system may
incur upon the general welfare of the community to which they belong,
and upon other members individually. The rich might have slaughtered
economically and consequently politically and morally millions of
their brethren before they could reach places of social eminence they
now occupy and enjoy to its full extent. They might have sacrificed
hundreds of thousands of victims on the altar of Mammon in order to
carry out their vast scheme of self-aggrandisement. And, what is
worse, the wealth thus accumulated by an individual is allowed by the
law to be handed down to his descendants, who are in a sense the
parasitic members of the community. They are privileged to live upon
the sweat and blood of others, who know not where to lay their heads,
and who are daily succumbing to the heavy burden, not of their free
choice, but forced upon them by society.

Let us here closely see into the facts. There is one portion of
society that does almost nothing toward {189} the promotion of the
general welfare, and there is another portion that, besides carrying
the burden not of its own, is heroically struggling for bare existence.
These sad phenomena which, owing to the imperfection of social
organisation, we daily witness about us,--should we attribute them to
diversity of individual karma and make individuals responsible for
what is really due to the faulty organisation of the community to which
they belong? No, the doctrine of karma certainly must not be understood
to explain the cause of our social and economical imperfection.

The region where the law of karma is made to work supreme is our moral
world, and cannot be made to extend also over our economic field.
Poverty is not necessarily the consequence of evil deeds, nor is
plenitude that of good acts. Whether a person is affluent or needy is
mostly determined by the principle of economy as far as our present
social system is concerned. Morality and economy are two different
realms of human activity. Honesty and moral rectitude do not
necessarily guarantee well-being. Dishonesty and the violation of the
moral law, on the contrary, are very frequently utilised as handmaids
of material prosperity. Do we not thus see many good, conscientious
people around us who are wretchedly poverty-stricken? Shall we take
them as suffering the curse of evil karma in their previous lives,
when we can understand the fact perfectly well as a case of social
injustice? It is not necessary by any means, nay, it is even productive
of evil, to establish a relation {190} between the two things that in
the nature of their being have no causal dependence. Karma ought not
to be made accountable for economic inequality.

A virtuous man is contented with his cleanliness of conscience and
purity of heart. Obscure as is his present social position, and
miserable as are his present pecuniary conditions, he has no mind to
look backward and find the cause of his social insignificance there,
nor is he anxious about his future earthly fortune which might be
awaiting him when his karmaic energy appears in a new garment. His
heart is altogether free from such vanities and anxieties. He is
sufficient unto himself as he is here and now. And, as to his
altruistic aspect of his moral deeds, he is well conscious that their
karma would spiritually benefit everybody that gets inspired by it,
and also that it would largely contribute to the realisation of
goodness on this earth. Why, then, must we contrive such a poor theory
of karma as is maintained by some, in order that they might give him a
spiritual solace for his material misfortune?

Vulgar people are too eager to see everything and every act they
perform working for the accumulation of earthly wealth and the
promotion of material welfare. They would want to turn even moral
deeds which have no relation to the economic condition of life into
the opportunities to attain things mundane. They would desire to have
the law of karmaic causation applied to a realm, where prevails an
entirely different set of laws. In point of fact, what proceeds from
{191} meritorious deeds is spiritual bliss only,--contentment,
tranquillity of mind, meekness of heart, and immovability of
faith,--all the heavenly treasures which could not be corrupted by
moth or rust. And what more can the karma of good deeds bring to us?
And what more would a man of pious heart desire to gain from his being
good? “Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye
shall drink, nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the
life more than meat and the body more than raiment?” Let us then do
away with the worldly interpretation of karma, which is so contrary to
the spirit of Buddhism.

As long as we live under the present state of things, it is impossible
to escape the curse of social injustice and economic inequality. Some
people must be born rich and noble and enjoying a superabundance of
material wealth, while others must be groaning under the unbearable
burden imposed upon them by cruel society. Unless we make a radical
change in our present social organisation, we cannot expect every one
of us to enjoy equal opportunity and fair chance. Unless we have a
certain form of socialism installed which is liberal and rational and
systematic, there must be some who are economically more favored than
others. But this state of affairs is a phenomenon of worldly
institution and is doomed to die away sooner or later. The law of
karma, on the contrary, is an eternal ordinance of the will of the
Dharmakâya as manifested in this world of {192} particulars. We must
not confuse a transient accident of human society with an absolute
decree issued from the world-authority.


 _An Individualistic View of Karma._

There is another popular misconception concerning the doctrine of
karma, which seriously mars the true interpretation of Buddhism. I
mean by this an individualistic view of the doctrine. This view
asserts that deeds, good or evil, committed by a person determine only
his own fate, no other’s being affected thereby in any possible way,
and that the reason why we should refrain from doing wrong is: for we,
and not others, have to suffer its evil consequences. This conception
of karma which I call individualistic, presupposes the absolute
reality of an individual soul and its continuance as such in a new
corporeal existence which is made possible by its previous karma.
Because an individual soul is here understood as an independent unit,
which stands in no relation to others, and which therefore neither
does influence nor is influenced by them in any wise. All that is done
by oneself is suffered by oneself only and no other people have
anything to do with it, nor do they suffer a whit thereby.

Buddhism, however, does not advocate this individualistic
interpretation of karmaic law, for it is not in accord with the theory
of non-âtman, nor with that of Dharmakâya.

According to the orthodox theory, karma simply means the conservation
or immortality of the inner {193} force of deeds regardless of their
author’s physical identity. Deeds once committed, good or evil, leave
permanent effects on the general system of sentient beings, of which
the actor is merely a component part; and it is not the actor himself
only, but everybody constituting a grand psychic community called
“Dharmadhâtu” (spiritual universe), that suffers or enjoys the outcome
of a moral deed.

Because the universe is not a theatre for one particular soul only; on
the contrary, it belongs to all sentient beings, each forming a
psychic unit; and these units are so intimately knitted together in
blood and soul that the effects of even apparently trifling deeds
committed by an individual are felt by others just as much and just as
surely as the doer himself. Throw an insignificant piece of stone into
a vast expanse of water, and it will certainly create an almost
endless series of ripples, however imperceptible, that never stop till
they reach the furthest shore. The tremulation thus caused is felt by
the sinking stone as much as the water disturbed. The universe that
may seem to crude observers merely as a system of crass physical
forces is in reality a great spiritual community, and every one of
sentient beings forms its component part. This most complicated, most
subtle, most sensitive, and best organised mass of spiritual atoms
transmits its current of moral electricity from one particle to
another with utmost rapidity and surety. Because this community is at
bottom an expression of one Dharmakâya. However diversified {194} and
dissimilar it may appear in its material individual aspect, it is
after all no more than an evolution of one pervading essence, in which
the multitudinousness of things finds its unity and identity.
Therefore, it is for the interests of the community at large, and not
for their own welfare only, that sincere Buddhists refrain from
transgressing moral laws and are encouraged to promote goodness. Those
whose spiritual insight thus penetrates deep into the inner unity and
interaction of all human souls are called Bodhisattvas.

It is with this spirit, let me repeat, that pious Buddhists do not
wish to keep for themselves any merits created by their acts of love
and benevolence, but wish to turn them over (_parivarta_) to the
deliverance of all sentient creatures from the darkness of ignorance.
The most typical way of concluding any religious treatise by Buddhists,
therefore, runs generally in the following manner:


 “The deep significance of the three karmas as taught by Buddha,
 I have thus completed elucidating in accord with the Dharma and logic:
 By dint of this merit I pray to deliver all sentient beings
 And to make them soon attain to perfect enlightenment.”[88]


Or,


 “All the merits arising from this my exposition
 May abide and be universally distributed among all beings;
 And may they ascend in the scale of existence and increase in bliss
  and wisdom,
 And soon attain to an enlightenment supreme, perfect, great, and
  far-reaching.”[89]

{195}

The reason why a moral deed performed by one person would contribute
to the attainment by others of supreme enlightenment, is that souls
which are ordinarily supposed to be individual and independent of
others are not so in fact, but are very closely intermingled with one
another, so that a stir produced in one is sooner or later transmitted
to another influencing it rightfully or wrongfully. The karmaic effect
of my own deed determines not only my own future, but to a not little
extent that of others; hence those invocations just quoted by pious
Buddhists who desire to dedicate all the merits they can attain to the
general welfare of the masses.

The ever-increasing tendency of humanity to widen and facilitate
communication in every possible way is a phenomenon illustrative of
the intrinsic oneness of human souls. Isolation kills, for it is
another name for death. Every soul that lives and grows desires to
embrace others, to be in communion with them, to be supplemented by
them, and to expand infinitely so that all individual souls are
brought together and united in the one soul. Under this condition only
a man’s karma is enabled to influence other people, and his merits can
be utilised for the promotion of general enlightenment.

{196}


 _Karma and Determinism._

If the irrefragability of karma means the predetermination of our
moral life, some would reason, the doctrine is fatalism pure and
simple. It is quite true that our present life is the result of the
karma accumulated in our previous existences, and that as long as the
karma preserves its vitality there is no chance whatever to escape its
consequences, good or evil. It is also true that as the meanest
sparrow shall not fall on the ground without the knowledge of God, and
as the very hairs of our heads are all numbered by him, so even a
single blade of grass does not quiver before the evening breeze
without the force of karma. It is also true that if our intellect were
not near-sighted as it is, we could reduce a possible complexity of
the conditions under which our life exists into its simplest terms,
and thus predict with mathematical precision the course of a life
through which it is destined to pass. If we could record all our
previous karma from time immemorial and all its consequences both on
ourselves and on those who come in contact with us, there would be no
difficulty in determining our future life with utmost certainty. The
human intellect, however, as it happens, is incapable of undertaking a
work of such an enormous magnitude, we cannot perceive the full
significance of determinism; but, from the divine point of view,
determinism seems to be perfectly justified, for there cannot be any
short-sightedness on the part of a world-soul as to the destiny of the
universe, which {197} is nothing but its own expression. It is only
from the human point of view that we feel uncertain about our final
disposition and endeavor to explain existence now from a mechanical,
now from a teleological standpoint, and yet, strange enough, at the
bottom of our soul we feel that there is something mysterious here
which makes us cry, either in despair or in trustful resignation, “Let
thy will be done.” While this very confidence in “thy will” proves
that we have in our inmost consciousness and outside the pale of
intellectual analysis a belief in the supreme order, which is
absolutely preordained and which at least is not controllable by our
finite, limited, fragmentary mind, yet the doctrine of karma must not
be understood in the strictest sense of fatalism.

As far as a general theory of determinism is concerned, Buddhism has
no objection to it. Grant that there is a law of causation, that every
deed, actualised or thought of, leaves something behind, and that this
something becomes a determining factor for our future life; then how
could we escape the conclusion that “each of us is inevitable” as
Whitman sings? Religious confidence in a divine will that is supposed
to give us always the best of things, is in fact no more than a
determinism. But if, in applying the doctrine to our practical life,
we forget to endeavor to unfold all the possibilities that might lie
in us, but could be awakened only after strenuous efforts, there will
be no moral characters, no personal responsibility, no noble
aspirations; the mind will be nothing but a reflex nervous system and
life a sheer machinery.

{198}

In fact karma is not a machine which is not incapable of regeneration
and self-multiplication. Karma is a wonderful organic power; it grows,
it expands, and even gives birth to a new karma. It is like unto a
grain of mustard, the least of all seeds, but, being full of vitality,
it grows as soon as it comes in contact with the nourishing soil and
becometh a tree so that the birds of the air come and lodge in the
branches thereof. Its mystery is like that of sympathetic waves that
pass through all the hearts which feel the great deeds of a hero or
listen to the story of a self-sacrificing mother. Karma, good or evil,
is contagious and sympathetic in its work. Even a most insignificant
act of goodness reaps an unexpectedly rich crop. Even to the vilest
rogue comes a chance for repentance by dint of a single good karma
ever effected in his life, which has extended through many a kalpa.
And the most wonderful thing in our spiritual world is that the karma
thus bringing repentance and Nirvâna to the heart of the meanest
awakens and rekindles a similar karma potentially slumbering in other
hearts and leads them to the final abode of enlightenment.

Inasmuch as we confine ourselves to general, superficial view of the
theory of karma, it leads to a form of determinism, but in our
practical life which is a product of extremely complicated factors,
the doctrine of karma allows in us all kinds of possibilities and all
chances of development. We thus escape the mechanical conception of
life, we are saved from the despair of predetermination, though this
is true to a great extent; {199} and we are assured of the
actualisation of hopes, however remote it may be. Though the curse of
evil karma may sometimes hang upon us very heavily, there is no reason
to bury our aspirations altogether in the grave; on the contrary, let
us bear it bravely and perform all the acts of goodness to destroy the
last remnant of evil and to mature the stock of good karma.


 _The Maturing of Good Stock (kuçalamûla) and the
 Accumulation of merits (punyaskandha)._

One of the most significant facts, which we cannot well afford to
ignore while treating of the doctrine of karma, is the Buddhist belief
that Çâkyamuni reached his supreme Buddhahood only after a long
practise of the six virtues of perfection (_pâramitâs_) through many
a rebirth. This belief constitutes the very foundation of the ethics
of Buddhism and has all-important bearings on the doctrine of karma.

The doctrine of karma ethically considered is this: Sentient beings
can attain to perfection not by an intervention from on high, but
through long, steady, unflinching personal efforts towards the
actualisation of ideals, or, in other words, towards the maturing of
good stock (_kuçalamûla_) and the accumulation of merits
(_punyaskandha_). This can be accomplished only through the karma of
good deeds untiringly practised throughout many a generation. Each
single act of goodness we perform to-day is recorded with {200} strict
accuracy in the annals of human evolution and is so much the gain for
the cause of righteousness. On the contrary, every deed of ill-will,
every thought of self-aggrandisement, every word of impurity, every
assertion of egoism, is a drawback to the perfection of humanity. To
speak concretely, the Buddha represents the crystalisation in the
historical person of Çâkyamuni of all the good karma that was
accumulated in innumerable kalpas previous to his birth. And if
Devadatta, as legend has him, was really the enemy of the Buddha, he
symbolises in him the evil karma that was being stored up with the
good deeds of all Buddhas. Later Buddhism has thus elaborated to
represent in these two historical figures the concrete results of good
and evil karma, and tries to show in what direction its followers
should exercise their spiritual energy.

The doctrine of karma is, therefore, really the theory of evolution
and heredity as working in our moral field. As Walt Whitman fitly
sings, in every one of us, “converging objects of the universe” are
perpetually flowing, through every one of us is “afflatus surging and
surging--the current and index.” And these converging objects and this
afflatus are no more than our karma which is interwoven in our being
and which is being matured from the very beginning of consciousness
upon the earth. Each generation either retards or furthers the
maturing of karma and transmits to the succeeding one its stock either
impaired or augmented. Those who are blind enough not to {201} see the
significance of life, those who take their ego for the sole reality,
and those who ignore the spiritual inheritance accumulated from time
immemorial,--are the most worthless, most ungrateful, and most
irresponsible people of the world. Buddhism calls them the children of
Mâra engaged in the work of destruction.

Dr. G. R. Wilson of Scotland states a very pretty story about a royal
robe in his article on “The Sense of Danger” (_The Monist_, 1903,
April), which graphically illustrates how potential karma stored from
time out of mind is saturated in every fibre of our subliminal
consciousness or in the Âlayavijñâna, as Buddhists might say. The
story runs as follows:

“An Oriental robe it was, whose beginning was in a prehistoric dynasty
of which the hieroglyphics are undecipherable. With that pertinacity
and durability so characteristic of the East, this royal garment has
been handed down, not through hundreds of years, but through hundreds
of generations,--generations, some of them, unconsciously long and
stale and dreary; others short and quick and merry. A garment of kings,
this, and of queens, a garment to which, as tradition prescribed, each
monarch added something of quality,--a jewel of price, a patch of
gold, a hem of rich embroidery,--and with each contribution a legend,
worked into the imperishable fibre, told the story of the giver. Did
something of the personality of these kings and queens linger in the
work of their hands? If so, the robe was no dead thing, no mere
covering to be lightly assumed or lightly laid aside, but a living
{202} power, royal influence, and the wearer, all unwitting, must have
taken on something of the character of the dead. It is a princess of
the royal blood, perhaps, sensitive and mystical, trembling on the
apprehensive verge of monarchy, who dons the robe, and as she dons it,
tingles to its message. These great rubies that blaze upon its front
are the souvenirs of bloody conquerors. As she fingers them idly, she
is thrilled with an emotion she does not understand, for in her blood
something answers to the fighting spirit they embody. Pearls are for
peace. That rope has been strung by kings and queens who favored art
and learning; and as the girl’s fingers stray towards them the
inspiration changes and her mind reverts to the purposes of the
civilised scholar. Here is a gaudy hem, the legacy of an unfaithful
queen, steeped in intrigue all her life until her murder ended it; and
as the maiden lifts it to examine it more closely, she learns with
shame and blushes, yet not knowing what has wrought this change in
her, that, deep down in her character, are mischievous possibilities,
possibilities of wickedness and disgrace that will dog the footsteps
of her reign. Suchlike are the suggestions which the hidden parts of
the mind bring forth, and in such subtle manner are they born.”

The doctrine of karma thus declares that an act of love and good-will
you are performing here is not for your selfish interests, but it
simply means the appreciation of the works of your worthy ancestors
and the discharge of your duties towards {203} all humanity and your
contribution to the world-treasury of moral ideals. Mature good stock,
accumulate merits, purify evil karma, remove the ego-hindrance, and
cultivate love for all beings; and the heavenly gate of Nirvâna will
be opened not only to you, but to the entire world.

We can sing with Walt Whitman the immortality of karma and the eternal
progress of humanity, thus:


 “Did you guess anything lived only its moment?
 The world does not so exist--no part palpable or impalpable so exist;
 No consummation exists without being from some long previous
  consummation--and that from some other,
 Without the farthest conceivable one coming a bit nearer the beginning
  than any.”[90]


 _Immortality._

We read in the _Milinda-pañha_:

“Your Majesty, it is as if a man were to ascend to the story of a
house with a light, and eat there; and the light in burning were to
set fire to the thatch; and the thatch in burning were to set fire to
the house; and the house in burning were to set fire to the village;
and the people of the village were to seize him, and say, ‘Why, O man,
did you set fire to the village?’ and he were to say, ‘I did not set
fire to the village. The fire of the lamp by whose light I ate was a
different one from the one which set fire to the village’; {204} and
they, quarreling, were to come to you. Whose cause, Your Majesty,
would you sustain?”

“That of the people of the village, Reverend Sir,” etc.

“And why?”

“Because, in spite of what the man might say, the latter fire sprang
from the former.”

“In exactly the same way, Your Majesty, although the name and form
which is born into the next existence is different from the name and
form which is to end at death, nevertheless, it is sprung from it.
Therefore is one not freed from one’s evil deeds.”

The above is the Buddhist notion of individual identity and its
conservation, which denies the immortality of the ego-soul and upholds
that of karma.

Another good way, perhaps, of illustrating this doctrine is to follow
the growth and perpetuation of the seed. The seed is in fact a
concrete expression of karma. When a plant reaches a certain stage of
development, it blooms and bears fruit. This fruit contains in it a
latent energy which under favorable conditions grows to a mature plant
of its own kind. The new plant now repeats the processes which its
predecessors went through, and an eternal perpetuation of the plant is
attained. The life of an individual plant cannot be permanent
according to its inherent nature, it is destined to be cut short some
time in its course. But this is not the case with the current of an
ever-lasting vitality that has been running in the plant ever since
the beginning of the world. Because this current is not individual in
its nature and stands above the vicissitudes {205} which take place in
the life of particular plants. It may not be manifested in its kinetic
form all the time, but potentially it is ever present in the being of
the seed. Changes are simply a matter of form, and do not interfere
with the current of life in the plant, which is preserved in the
universe as the energy of vegetation.

This energy of vegetation is that which is manifested in a mature
plant, that which makes it blossom in the springtime, that which goes
to seed, that which lies apparently dormant in the seeds, and that
which resuscitates them to sprout among favorable surroundings. This
energy of vegetation, this mysterious force, when stated in Buddhist
phraseology, is nothing else than the vegetative expression of karma,
which in the biological world constitutes the law of heredity, or the
transmission of acquired character, or some other laws which might be
discovered by the biologist. And it is when this force manifests
itself in the moral realm of human affairs that karma obtains its
proper significance as the law of moral causation.

Now, there are several forms of transmission, by means of which the
karma of a person or a people or a nation or a race is able to
perpetuate itself to eternity. A few of them are described below.

One may be called genealogical, or, perhaps, biological. Suppose here
are descendants of an illustrious family, some of whose ancestors
distinguished themselves by bravery, or benevolence, or intelligence,
or by some other praiseworthy deeds or faculties. These {206} people
are as a rule respected by their neighbors as if their ancestral
spirits were transmitted through generations and still lingering among
their consanguineous successors. Some of them in the line might have
even been below the normal level in their intellect and morals, but
this fact does not altogether nullify the possibility and belief that
others of their family might some day develop the faculties possessed
by the forefathers, dormant as they appear now, through the
inspiration they could get from the noble examples of the past. The
respect they are enjoying and the possibility of inspiration they may
have are all the work of the karma generated by the ancestors. The
author or authors of the noble karma are all gone now, their bones
have long returned to their elements, their ego-souls are no more,
their concrete individual personalities are things of the past; but
their karma is still here and as fresh as it was on the day of its
generation and will so remain till the end of time. If some of them,
on the other hand, left a black record behind them, the evil karma
will tenaciously cling to the history of the family, and the
descendants will have to suffer the curse as long as its vitality is
kept up, no matter how innocent they themselves are.

Here one important thing I wish to note is the mysterious way in which
evil karma works. Evil does not always generate evils only; it very
frequently turns out to be a condition, if not a cause, which will
induce a moral being to overcome it with his {207} utmost spiritual
efforts. His being conscious of the very fact that his family history
is somehow besmirched with dark spots, would rekindle in his heart a
flickering light of goodness. His stock of good karma finally being
brought into maturity, his virtues would then eclipse the evils of the
past and turn a new page before him, which is full of bliss and glory.
Everything in this world, thus, seems to turn to be merely a means for
the final realisation of Good. Buddhists ascribe this spiritual
phenomenon to the virtues of the upâya (expediency) of the Dharmakâya
or Amitâbha Buddha.[91]

To return to the subject. It does not need any further illustration to
show that all these things which have been said about the family are
also true of the race, the tribe, clan, nation, or any other form of
community. History of mankind in all its manifold aspects of existence
is nothing but a grand drama visualising the Buddhist doctrine of
karmaic immortality. It is like an immense ocean whose boundaries
nobody knows and the waves of events now swelling and surging, now
ebbing, now whirling, now refluxing, in all times, day and night,
illustrate how the laws {208} of karma are at work in this actual
life. One act provokes another and that a third and so on to eternity
without ever losing the chain of karmaic causation.

Next, we come to a form of karma which might be called historical. By
this I mean that a man’s karma can be immortalised by some historical
objects, such as buildings, literary works, productions of art,
implements, or instruments. In fact, almost any object, human or
natural, which, however insignificant in itself, is associated with
the memory of a great man, bears his karma, and transmits it to
posterity.

Everybody is familiar with the facts that all literary work embodies
in itself the author’s soul and spirit, and that posterity can feel
his living presence in the thoughts and sentiments expressed there,
and that whenever the reader draws his inspiration from the work and
actualises it in action, the author and the reader, though corporeally
separate and living in different times, must be said spiritually
feeling the pulsation of one and the same heart. And the same thing is
true of productions of art. When we enter a gallery decorated with the
noble works of Græcean or Roman artists, we feel as if we were
breathing right in the midst of these art-loving people and seem to
reawaken in us the same impressions that were received by them. We
forget, as they did, the reality of our particular existence, we are
unconsciously raised above it, and our imagination is filled with
things not earthly. What a mysterious power it is!--the {209} power by
which those inanimate objects carry us away to a world of ideals! What
a mysterious power it is that reawakens the spirits of by-gone artists
on a sheet of canvas or in a piece of marble! It was not indeed
entirely without truth that primitive or ignorant people intuitively
believed in the spiritual power of idols. What they failed to grasp
was the distinction between the subjective presence of a spirit and
its objective reality. As far as their religious feeling, and not
their critical intellect, was concerned, they were perfectly justified
in believing in idolatry. Taking all in all, these facts unmistakably
testify the Buddhist doctrine of the immortality of karma. A chord of
karma touched by mortals of bygone ages still vibrates in their works,
and the vibration with its full force is transmitted to the sympathetic
souls down to the present day.

Architectural creations bear out the doctrine of karma with no less
force than works of art and literature. As the uppermost bricks on an
Egyptian pyramid would fall on the ground with the same amount of
energy that required to raise them up in the times of Pharaohs; as a
burning piece of coal in the furnace that was dug out from the heart
of the earth emits the same quantity of heat that it absorbed from the
sun some hundred thousand years ago; even so every insignificant bit
of rock or brick or cement we may find among the ruins of Babylonian
palaces, Indian topes, Persian kiosks, Egyptian obelisks, or Roman
pantheons, is fraught with the same spirit and soul that actuated
{210} the ancient peoples to construct those gigantic architectural
wonders. The spirit is here, not in its individual form, but in its
karmaic presence. When we pick these insignificant, unseemly pieces,
our souls become singularly responsive to inspirations coming from
those of the past, and our mental eyes vividly perceive the splendor
of the gods, glory of the kings, peace of the nation, prosperity of
the peoples, etc., etc. Because our souls and theirs are linked with
the chain of karmaic causation through the medium of those visible
remains of ancient days. Because the karma of those old peoples is
still breathing its immortality in those architectural productions and
sending its sympathetic waves out to the beholders. When thus we come
to be convinced of the truth of the immortality of karma, we can truly
exclaim with Christians, “O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where
is thy victory?”

It is hardly necessary to give any further illustration to establish
the doctrine of karma concerning its historical significance. All
scientific apparatus and instruments are an undying eye-witness of the
genius of the inventors. All industrial machines and agricultural
implements most concretely testify the immortality of karma created by
the constructors, in exact proportion as they are beneficial to the
general welfare and progress of humanity. The instruments or machines
or implements may be superseded by later and better ones, and possibly
altogether forgotten by succeeding generations, but this does not
annul the fact that the {211} improved ones were only possible through
the knowledge and experience which came from the use of the older
ones, in other words, that the ideas and thoughts of the former
inventors are still surviving through those of their successors, just
as much as in the case of genealogical karma-transmission. Whatever
garb the karma of a person may wear in its way down to posterity, it
is ever there where its inspiration is felt. Even in an article of
most trivial significance, even in a piece of rag, or in a slip of
time-worn paper, only let there be an association with the memory of
the deceased; and an unutterable feeling imperceptibly creeps into the
heart of the beholder; and if the deceased were known for his
saintliness or righteousness, this would be an opportunity for our
inspiration and moral elevation according to how our own karma at that
moment is made up.

We now come to see more closely the spiritual purport of karmaic
activity. Any intelligent reader could infer from what has been said
above what important bearing the Buddhist doctrine of karma has on our
moral and spiritual life. The following remarks, however, will greatly
help him to understand the full extent of the doctrine and to pass an
impartial judgment on its merits.

Here, if not anywhere else, looms up most conspicuously the
characteristic difference between Buddhism and Christianity as to
their conception of soul-activity. Christianity, if I understand it
rightly, conceives our soul-phenomena as the work of an {212}
individual ego-entity, which keeps itself mysteriously hidden
somewhere within the body. To Christians, the soul is a metaphysical
being, and its incarnation in the flesh is imprisonment. It groans
after emancipation, it craves for the celestial abode, where, after
bodily death, it can enjoy all the blessings due to its naked
existence. It finds the nectar of immortality up in Heaven and in the
presence of God the father and Christ the son, and not in the
perpetuation of karma in this universe. The soul of the wicked, on the
other hand, is eternally damned, if it is conceded that they have any
soul. As soon as it is liberated from the bodily incarceration, it is
hurled into the infernal fire, and is there consumed suffering
unspeakable agony. Christianity, therefore, does not believe in the
transmigration or reincarnation of a soul. A soul once departed from
the flesh never returns to it; it is either living an eternal life in
Heaven or suffering an instant annihilation in Hell. This is the
necessary conclusion from their premises of an individual concrete
ego-soul.

Buddhism, however, does not teach the metaphysical existence of the
soul. All our mental and spiritual experiences, it declares, are due
to the operations of karma which inherits its efficiency from its
previous “seeds of activity” (_karmabîja_), and which has brought the
five skandhas into the present state of co-ordination. The present
karma, while in its force, generates in turn the “seeds of activity”
which under favorable conditions grow to maturity again. Therefore, as
long {213} as the force of karma is thus successively generated, there
are the five skandhas constantly coming into existence and working
co-ordinately as a person. Karma-reproduction, so to speak, effected
in this manner, is the Buddhist conception of the transmigration of a
soul.

A Japanese national hero, General Kusunoki Masashige, who was an
orthodox Buddhist, is said to have uttered the following words when he
fell in the battle-field: “I will be reborn seven times yet and
complete discharging my duties for the Imperial House.” And he did not
utter these words to no purpose. Because even to-day, after the lapse
of more than seven hundred years, his spirit is still alive among his
countrymen, and indeed his bronze statue on horseback is solemnly
guarding the Japanese Imperial palace. He was reborn more than seven
times and will be reborn as long as the Japanese as a nation exist on
earth. This constant rebirth or reincarnation means no more nor less
than the immortality of karma. Says Buddha: “Ye disciples, take after
my death those moral precepts and doctrines which were taught to you
for my own person, for I live in them.” To live in karma, and not as
an ego-entity, is the Buddhist conception of immortality. Therefore,
the Buddhists will perfectly agree with the sentiment expressed by a
noted modern poet in these lines:


 “We live in deeds, not years; in thoughts, not in breaths:
 In feelings, not in figures on a dial,
 We should count time by heart-throbs. He most lives
 Who thinks most, feels the noblest, acts the best.”


{214}

Some may like to call this kind of immortality unsatisfactory, and
impetuously demand that the ego-soul, instead of mysterious force of
karma, should be made immortal, as it is more tangible and better
appreciated by the masses. The Buddhist response to such a demand
would be; “If their intellectual and moral insight is not developed
enough to see truth in the theory of karma, why, we shall let them
adhere as long as they please to their crude, primitive faith and rest
contented with it.” Even the Buddha could not make children find
pleasure in abstract metaphysical problems, whatever truth and genuine
spiritual consolation there might be in them. What their hearts are
after are toys and fairy-tales and parables. Therefore, a motto of
Buddhism is: “Minister to the patients according to their wants and
conditions.” We cannot make a plant grow even an inch higher by
artificially pulling its roots; we have but to wait till it is ready
for development. Unless a child becomes a man, we must not expect of
him to put away childish things.

The conclusion that could be drawn from the above is obvious. If we
desire immortality, let there be the maturing of good karma and the
cleansing of the heart from the contamination of evils. In good karma
we are made to live eternally, but in evil one we are doomed, not only
ourselves but every one that follows our steps on the path of evils.
Karma is always generative; therefore, good karma is infinite bliss,
and evil one is eternal curse. It was for this reason that at the
appearance of the Buddha in the Jambudvîpa {215} heaven and earth
resounded with the joyous acclamation of gods and men. It was a signal
triumph for the cause of goodness. The ideal of moral perfection found
a concrete example in the person of Çâkyamuni. It showed how the
stock of good karma accumulated and matured from the beginning of
consciousness on earth could be crystalised in one person and brought
to an actuality even in this world of woes. The Buddha, therefore, was
the culmination of all the good karma previously stored up by his
spiritual ancestors. And he was at the same time the starting point
for the fermentation of new karma, because his moral “seeds of
activity” which were generated during his lifetime have been scattered
liberally wherever his virtues and teachings could be promulgated.
That is, his karma-seeds have been sown in the souls of all sentient
beings. Every one of these seeds which are infinite in number will
become a new centre of moral activity. In proportion how strong it
grows and begins to bear fruit, it destroys the seeds of evil doers.
Good karma is a combined shield and sword, while it protects itself it
destroys all that is against it. Therefore, good karma is not only
statically immortal, but it is dynamically so; that is to say, its
immortality is not a mere absence of birth and death, but a constant
positive increase in its moral efficiency.

Pious Buddhists believe that every time Buddha’s name is invoked with
a heart free from evil thoughts, he enters right into the soul and
becomes integral part of his being. This does not mean, however, that
{216} Buddha’s ego-substratum which might have been enjoying its
immortal spiritual bliss in the presence of an anthropomorphic God
descends on earth at the invocation of his name and renders in that
capacity whatever help the supplicant needs. It means, on the other
hand, that the Buddhist awakens in his personal karma that which
constituted Buddhahood in the Buddha and nourishes it to maturity.
That which constitutes Buddhahood is not the personal ego of the
Buddha, but his karma. Every chemical element, whenever occasioned to
befree itself from a combination, never fails to generate heat which
it absorbed at the time of combination with other elements; and this
takes place no matter how remote the time of combination was. It is
even so with the karma-seed of Buddha. It might have been in the
barren soil of a sinful heart, and, being deeply buried there for many
a year, might have been forgotten altogether by the owner. But, sooner
or later, it will never fail to grow under favorable conditions and
generate what it gained from the Buddha in the beginning of the world.
And this regeneration will not be merely chemical, but predominantly
biological; for it is the law which conditions the immortality of
karma.




 PRACTICAL BUDDHISM.

{217}

 CHAPTER IX.
 THE DHARMAKÂYA.

/We/ have considered the doctrine of Suchness (_Bhûtatathâtâ_) under
“Speculative Buddhism,” where it appeared altogether too abstract to
be of any practical use to our earthly life. The theory as such did
not seem to have any immediate bearings on our religious consciousness.
The fact is, it must pass through some practical modification before
it fully satisfies our spiritual needs. As there is no concrete figure
in this world that is a perfect type of mathematical exactitude,--since
everything here must be perceived through our more or less distorted
physical organs; even so with pure reason: however perfect in itself,
it must appear to us more or less modified while passing through our
affective-intellectual objectives. This modification of pure reason,
however, is necessary from the human point of view; because mere
abstraction is contentless, lifeless, and has no value for our
practical life, and again, because our religious cravings will not be
satisfied with empty concepts lacking vitality.

We may sometimes ignore the claims of reason {218} and rest satisfied,
though usually unconsciously, with assertions which are conflicting
when critically examined, but we cannot disregard by any means those
of the religious sentiment, which finds satisfaction only in the very
fact of things. If it ever harbored some flagrant contradictions in
the name of faith, it was because its ever-pressing demands had to be
met with even at the expense of reason. The truth is: the religious
consciousness first of all demands fact, and when it attains that, it
is not of much consequence to it whether or not its intellectual
interpretation is logically tenable. If on the other hand logic be
all-important and demand the first consideration and the sentiment had
to follow its trail without a murmuring, our life would surely lose
its savory aspect, turn tasteless, our existence would become void,
the world would be a mere succession of meaningless events, and what
remains would be nothing else than devastation, barrenness, and
universal misery. The truth is, in this life the will predominates and
the intellect subserves; which explains the fact that while all
existing religions on the one hand display some logical inaccuracy and
on the other hand a mechanical explanation of the world is gaining
ground more and more, religion is still playing an important part
everywhere in our practical life. Abstraction is good for the exercises
of the intellect, but when it is the question of life and death we
must have something more substantial and of more vitality than
theorisation. It may not be a mathematically exact {219} and certain
proposition, but it must be a working, living, real theory, that is,
it must be a faith born of the inmost consciousness of our being.

What practical transformations then has the doctrine of Suchness, in
order to meet the religious demands, to suffer?


 _God._

Buddhism does not use the word God. The word is rather offensive to
most of its followers, especially when it is intimately associated in
vulgar minds with the idea of a creator who produced the world out of
nothing, caused the downfall of mankind, and, touched by the pang of
remorse, sent down his only son to save the depraved. But, on account
of this, Buddhism must not be judged as an atheism which endorses an
agnostic, materialistic interpretation of the universe. Far from it.
Buddhism outspokenly acknowledges the presence in the world of a
reality which transcends the limitations of phenomenality, but which
is nevertheless immanent everywhere and manifests itself in its full
glory, and in which we live and move and have our being.

God or the religious object of Buddhism is generally called
Dharmakâya-Buddha and occasionally Vairocana-Buddha or
Vairocana-Dharmakâya-Buddha; still another name for it is
Amitâbha-Buddha or Amitâyur-Buddha,--the latter two being mostly
used by the followers of the Sukhâvatî sect of Japan and China.
{220} Again, very frequently we find Çâkyamuni, the Buddha, and the
Tathâgata stripped of his historical personality and identified with
the highest truth and reality. These, however, by no means exhaust a
legion of names invented by the fertile imagination of Buddhists for
their object of reverence as called forth by their various spiritual
needs.


 _Dharmakâya._

Western scholars usually translate Dharmakâya by “Body of the Law”
meaning by the Law the doctrine set forth by Çâkyamuni the Buddha.
It is said that when Buddha was preparing himself to enter into
eternal Nirvâna, he commanded his disciples to revere the Dharma or
religion taught by him as his own person, because a man continues to
live in the work, deeds, and words left behind himself. So, Dharmakâya
came to be understood by Western scholars as meaning the person of
Buddha incarnated in his religion. This interpretation of the term is
not very accurate, however, and is productive of some very serious
misinterpretations concerning the fundamental doctrines of Mahâyânism.
Historically, the Body of the Law as the Buddha incarnate might have
been the sense of Dharmakâya, as we can infer from the occasional use
of the term in some Hînayâna texts. But as it is used by Eastern
Buddhists, it has acquired an entirely new significance, having
nothing to do with the body of religious teachings established by the
Buddha.

{221}

This transformation in the conception of Dharmakâya has been effected
by the different interpretation the term Dharma came to receive from
the hand of the Mahâyânists. Dharma is a very pregnant word and
covers a wide range of meaning. It comes from the root _dhṛ_, which
means “to hold,” “to carry”, “to bear,” and the primitive sense of
dharma was “that which carries or bears or supports,” and then it came
to signify “that which forms the norm, or regulates the course of
things,” that is, “law,” “institution,” “rule,” “doctrine,” then,
“duty,” “justice,” “virtue,” “moral merit,” “character,” “attribute,”
“essential quality,” “substance,” “that which exists,” “reality,”
“being,” etc., etc. The English equivalent most frequently used for
dharma by Oriental scholars is law or doctrine. This may be all right
as far as the Pâli texts go; but when we wish to apply this
interpretation to the Mahâyâna terms, such as Dharmadhâtu, Dharmakâya,
Dharmalakṣa, Dharmaloka, etc., we are placed in an awkward position
and are at a loss how to get at the meaning of those terms. There are
passages in Mahâyâna literature in which the whole significance of the
text depends upon how we understand the word dharma. And it may even
be said that one of the many reasons why Christian students of Buddhism
so frequently fail to recognise the importance of Mahâyânism is due to
their misinterpretation of dharma. Max Mueller, therefore, rightly
remarks in his introduction to an English translation of the
_Vajracchedîka Sûtra_, when he says: “If we {222} were always to
translate dharma by law, it seems to me that the whole drift of our
treatise would become unintelligible.” Not only that particular text
of Mahâyânism, but its entire literature would become utterly
incomprehensible.

In Mahâyânism Dharma means in many cases “thing,” “substance,” or
“being,” or “reality,” both in its particular and in its general
sense, though it is also frequently used in the sense of law or
doctrine. Kâya may be rendered “body,” not in the sense of personality,
but in that of system, unity, and organised form. Dharmakâya, the
combination of dharma and kâya, thus means the organised totality of
things or the principle of cosmic unity, though not as a purely
philosophical concept, but as an object of the religious consciousness.
Throughout this work, however, the original Sanskrit form will be
retained in preference to any English equivalents that have been used
heretofore; for Dharmakâya conveys to the minds of Eastern Buddhists a
peculiar religious flavor, which, when translated by either God or the
All or some abstract philosophical terms, suffers considerably.


 _Dharmakâya as Religious Object._

As aforesaid, the Dharmakâya is not a product of philosophical
reflection and is not exactly equivalent to Suchness; it has a
religious signification as the object of the religious consciousness.
The Dharmakâya is a soul, a willing and knowing being, one that is
{223} will and intelligence, thought and action. It is, as understood
by the Mahâyânists, not an abstract metaphysical principle like
Suchness, but it is living spirit, that manifests itself in nature as
well as in thought. The universe as an expression of this spirit is
not a meaningless display of blind forces, nor is it an arena for the
struggle of diverse mechanical powers. Further, Buddhists ascribe to
the Dharmakâya innumerable merits and virtues and an absolute perfect
intelligence, and makes it an inexhaustible fountain-head of love and
compassion; and it is in this that the Dharmakâya finally assumes a
totally different aspect from a mere metaphysical principle, cold and
lifeless.

The _Avatamsaka Sûtra_ gives some comprehensive statements concerning
the nature of the Dharmakâya as follows:

“The Dharmakâya, though manifesting itself in the triple world, is
free from impurities and desires. It unfolds itself here, there, and
everywhere responding to the call of karma. It is not an individual
reality, it is not a false existence, but is universal and pure. It
comes from nowhere, it goes to nowhere; it does not assert itself, nor
is it subject to annihilation. It is forever serene and eternal. It is
the One, devoid of all determinations. This Body of Dharma has no
boundary, no quarters, but is embodied in all bodies. Its freedom or
spontaneity is incomprehensible, its spiritual presence in things
corporeal is incomprehensible. All forms of corporeality are involved
therein, it is able to create all things. Assuming any concrete {224}
material body as required by the nature and condition of karma, it
illuminates all creations. Though it is the treasure of intelligence,
it is void of particularity. There is no place in the universe where
this Body does not prevail. The universe becomes, but this Body
forever remains. It is free from all opposites and contraries, yet it
is working in all things to lead them to Nirvâna.”


 _More Detailed Characterisation._

The above gives us a general, concise view as to what the Dharmakâya
is, but let me quote the following more detailed description of it, in
order that we may more clearly and definitely see into the
characteristically Buddhistic conception of the highest being.[92]

“O ye, sons of Buddha! The Tathâgata[93] is not a particular dharma,
nor a particular form of activity, nor has it a particular body, nor
does it abide in a particular place, nor is its work of salvation
confined to one particular people. On the contrary, it involves in
itself infinite dharmas, infinite activities, infinite bodies, infinite
spaces, and universally works for the salvation of all things.

“O ye, sons of Buddha! It is like unto space. Space[94] contains in
itself all material existences and all the vacuums that obtain between
them. Again, it establishes {225} itself in all possible quarters, and
yet we cannot say of it that it is or it is not in this particular
spot, for space has no palpable form. Even so with the Dharmakâya of
the Tathâgata. It presents itself in all places, in all directions,
in all dharmas, and in all beings; yet the Dharmakâya itself has not
been thereby particularised. Because the Body of the Tathâgata has no
particular body but manifests itself everywhere and anywhere in
response to the nature and condition of things.

“O ye, sons of Buddha! It is like unto space. Space is boundless,
comprehends in itself all existence, and yet shows no trace of passion
[partiality]. It is even so with the Dharmakâya of the Tathâgata. It
illuminates all good works worldly as well as religious, but it
betrays no passion or prejudice. Why? Because the Dharmakâya is
perfectly free from all passions and prejudices.[95]

“O ye, sons of Buddha! It is like unto the Sun. The benefits conferred
by the light of the sun upon all living beings on earth are
incalculable: e.g. by dispelling darkness it gives nourishment to all
trees, herbs, grains, plants, and grass; it vanquishes humidity; it
illuminates ether whereby benefitting all the {226} living beings in
air; its rays penetrate into the waters whereby bringing forth the
beautiful lotus-flowers into full blossom; it impartially shines on
all figures and forms and brings into completion all the works on
earth. Why? Because from the sun emanate infinite rays of life-giving
light.

“O ye, sons of Buddha! It is even so with the Sun-Body of the
Tathâgata which in innumerable ways bestows benefits upon all beings.
That is, it benefits us by destroying evils, all good things thus
being quickened to growth; it benefits us with its universal
illumination which vanquishes the darkness of ignorance harbored in
all beings; it benefits us through its great compassionate heart which
saves and protects all beings; it benefits us through its great loving
heart which delivers all beings from the misery of birth and death; it
benefits us by the establishment of a good religion whereby we are all
strengthened in our moral activities; it benefits us by giving us a
firm belief in the truth which cleanses all our spiritual impurities;
it benefits by helping us to understand the doctrine by virtue of
which we are not led to disavow the law of causation; it benefits us
with a divine vision which enables us to observe the metempsychosis of
all beings; it benefits us by avoiding injurious deeds which may
destroy the stock of merits accumulated by all beings; it benefits us
with an intellectual light which unfolds the mind-flowers of all
beings; it benefits us with an aspiration whereby we are enlivened to
practice all that constitutes Buddhahood. Why? Because the Sun-Body
{227} of the Tathâgata universally emits the rays of the Light of
Intelligence.

“O ye, sons of Buddha! When the day breaks, the rising sun shines
first on the peaks of all the higher mountains, then on those of high
mountains, and finally all over the plains and fields; but the sunlight
itself does not make this thought: I will shine first on all the
highest mountains and then gradually ascending higher and higher shine
on the plains and fields. The reason why one gets the sunlight earlier
than another is simply because there is a gradation of height on the
surface of the earth.

“O ye, sons of Buddha! It is even so with the Tathâgata who is in
possession of innumerable and immeasurable suns of universal
intelligence. The innumerable rays of the Light of Intelligence,
emanating everlastingly from the spiritual Body of the Tathâgata,
will first fall on the Bodhisattvas and Mahâsattvas who are the
highest peaks among mankind, then on the Nidânabuddhas, then on the
Çrâvakas, then on those beings who are endowed with definitely good
character, as they will each according to his own capacity
unhesitatingly embrace the doctrine of deliverance, and finally on all
common mortals whose character may be either indefinite or definitely
bad, providing them with those conditions which will prove beneficial
in their future births. But the Light of Intelligence emanating from
the Tathâgata does not make this thought: ‘I will first shine on the
Bodhisattvas {228} and then gradually pass over to all common mortals,
etc.’ The Light is universal and illuminates everything without any
prejudice, yet on account of the diversity that obtains among sentient
beings as to their character, aspirations, etc., the Light of
Intelligence is diversely perceived by them.

“O ye, sons of Buddha! When the sun rises above the horizon, those
people born blind, on account their defective sight, cannot see the
light at all, but they are nevertheless benefited by the sunlight, for
it gives them just as much as to any other beings all that is
necessary for the maintenance of life: it dispels dampness and
coldness and makes them feel agreeable, it destroys all the injurious
germs that are produced on account of the absence of sunshine, and
thus keeps the blind as well as the not-blind comfortable and healthy.

“O ye, sons of Buddha! It is even so with the Sun of Intelligence of
the Tathâgata. All those beings whose spiritual vision is blinded by
false doctrine, or by the violation of Buddha’s precepts, or by
ignorance, or by evil influences, never perceive the Light of
Intelligence; because they are devoid of faith. But they are
nevertheless benefited by the Light; for it disperses indiscriminately
for all beings the sufferings arising from the four elements, and
gives them physical comforts; for it destroys the root of all passions,
prejudices, and pains for unbelievers as well as for believers... By
virtue of this omnipresent Light of Intelligence, the Bodhisattvas
will attain perfect purity and the {229} knowledge of all things, the
Nidânabuddhas and Çravakas will destroy all passions and desires;
mortals poorly endowed and those born blind will rid of impurities,
control the senses, and believe in the four views;[96] and those
creatures living in the evil paths of existence such as hell, world of
ghosts, and the animal realm, will be freed from their evils and
torture and will, after death, be born in the human or celestial
world...

“O ye, sons of Buddha! The Light of Dharmakâya is like unto the full
moon which has four wondrous attributes: (1) It outdoes in its
brilliance all stars and satellites; (2) It shows in its size increase
and decrease as observable in the Jambudvîpa; (3) Its reflection is
seen in every drop or body of clear water; (4) Whoever is endowed with
perfect sight, perceives it vis-a-vis.

“O ye, sons of Buddha! Even so with the Dharmakâya of the Tathâgata,
that has four wondrous attributes: (1) It eclipses the stars of the
Nidânabuddhas, Çrâvakas, etc.; (2) It shows in its earthly life a
certain variation which is due to the different natures of the beings
to whom it manifests itself,[97] while the Dharmakâya {230} itself
is eternal and shows no increase or decrease in any way; (3) Its
reflection is seen in the Bodhi (intelligence) of every pure-hearted
sentient being; (4) All who understand the Dharma and obtain
deliverance, each according to his own mental calibre, think that they
have really recognised in their own way the Tathâgata face to face,
while the Dharmakâya itself is not a particular object of
understanding, but universally brings all Buddha-works into
completion.

“O ye, sons of Buddha! The Dharmakâya is like unto the Great Brahmarâja
who governs three thousand chiliocosms. The Râja by a mysterious trick
makes himself seen universally by all living beings in his realm and
causes them to think that each of them has seen him face to face; but
the Râja himself has never divided his own person nor is he in
possession of diverse features.

“O ye, sons of Buddha! Even so with the Tathâgata; he has never
divided himself into many, nor has he ever assumed diverse features.
But all beings, each according to his understanding and strength of
faith, recognise the Body of the Tathâgata, while he has never made
this thought that he will show himself to such and such particular
people and not to others...

“O ye, sons of Buddha! The Dharmakâya is like unto the maniratna in
the waters, whose wondrous {231} light transforms everything that
comes in contact with it to its own color. The eyes that perceive it
become purified. Wherever its illumination reaches, there is a
marvelous display of gems of every description, which gives pleasure
to all beings to see.

“O ye, sons of Buddha! It is even so with the Dharmakâya of the
Tathâgata, which may rightly be called the treasure of treasures, the
thesaurus of all merits, and the mine of intelligence. Whoever comes
in touch with this light, is all transformed into the same color as
that of the Buddha. Whoever sees this light, all obtains the purest
eye of Dharma. Whoever comes in touch with this light, rids of poverty
and suffering, attains wealth and eminence, enjoys the bliss of the
incomparable Bodhi”......


 _Dharmakâya and Individual Beings._

From these statements it is evident that the Dharmakâya or the Body
of the Tathâgata, or the Body of Intelligence, whatever it may be
designated, is not a mere philosophical abstraction, standing aloof
from this world of birth and death, of joy and sorrow, calmly
contemplates on the folly of mankind; but that it is a spiritual
existence which is “absolutely one, is real and true, and forms the
raison d’être of all beings, transcends all modes of upâya, is free
from desires and struggles [or compulsion], and stands outside the
pale of our finite understanding.”[98] It is {232} also evident that
the Dharmakâya though itself free from ignorance (_avidyâ_) and
passion (_kleça_) and desire (_tṛṣnâ_), is revealed in the finite and
fragmental consciousness of human being, so that we can say in a sense
that “this body of mine is the Dharmakâya”--though not absolutely; and
also in a generalised form that “the body of all beings is the
Dharmakâya, and the Dharmakâya is the body of all beings,”--though in
the latter only imperfectly and fractionally realised. As we thus
partake something in ourselves of the Dharmakâya, we all are ultimately
destined to attain Buddhahood when the human intelligence, Bodhi, is
perfectly identified with, or absorbed in, that of the Dharmakâya, and
when our earthly life becomes the realisation of the will of the
Dharmakâya.


 _The Dharmakâya as Love._

Here an important consideration forces itself upon us which is, that
the Dharmakâya is not only an intelligent mind but a loving heart,
that it is not only a god of rigorism who does not allow a hair’s
breadth deviation from the law of karma, but also an incarnation of
mercy that is constantly belaboring to develop the most insignificant
merit into a field yielding rich harvests. The Dharmakâya relentlessly
punishes the wrong and does not permit the exhaustion of their karma
without sufficient reason; and yet its hands are always directing our
life toward the actualisation {233} of supreme goodness. “Pangs of
nature, sins of will, defects of doubt, and stains of
blood,”--discouraging and gloomy indeed is the karma of evil-doers!
But the Dharmakâya, infinite in love and goodness, is incessantly
managing to bring this world-transaction to a happy terminus. Every
good we do is absorbed in the universal stock of merits which is no
more nor less than the Dharmakâya. Every act of lovingkindness we
practice is conceived in the womb of Tathâgata, and therein nourished
and matured, is again brought out to this world of karma to bear its
fruit. Therefore, no life walks on earth with aimless feet; no chaff
is thrown into the fire unquenchable. Every existence, great or
insignificant, is a reflection of the glory of the Dharmakâya and as
such worthy of its all-embracing love.

For further corroboration of this view let us cite at random from a
Mahâyâna sutra:[99]


 “With one great loving heart
 The thirsty desires of all beings he quencheth with coolness
  refreshing;
 With compassion, of all doth he think,
 Which like space knows no bounds;
 Over the world’s all creation
 With no thought of particularity he revieweth.

 “With a great heart compassionate and loving,
 All sentient beings by him are embraced;
 With means (_upâya_) which are pure, free from stain, and all
  excellent,
 He doth save and deliver all creatures innumerable.

{234}

 “With unfathomable love and with compassion
 All creations caressed by him universally;
 Yet free from attachment his heart is.

 “As his compassion is great and is infinite,
 Bliss unearthly on every being he confereth,
 And himself showeth all over the universe;
 He’ll not rest till all Buddhahood truly attains.”


 _Later Mahâyânists’ view of the Dharmakâya._

The above has been quoted almost exclusively from the so-called sûtra
literature of Mahâyâna Buddhism, which is distinguished from the
other religio-philosophical treatises of the school, because the
sûtras are considered to be the accounts of Buddha himself as recorded
by his immediate disciples.[100] Let us now see by way of further
elucidation what views were held concerning the Dharmakâya by such
writers as Asanga, Vasubandhu, etc.

We read in the _General Treatise on Mahâyânism_ by Asanga and
Vasubandhu the following statement:

“When the Bodhisattvas think of the Dharmakâya, how have they to
picture it to themselves?

“Briefly stated, they will think of the Dharmakâya by picturing to
themselves its seven characteristics, which constitute the faultless
virtues and essential {235} functions of the Kâya. (1) Think of the
free, unrivaled, unimpeded activity of the Dharmakâya, which is
manifested in all beings; (2) Think of the eternality of all perfect
virtues in the Dharmakâya; (3) Think of its absolute freedom from all
prejudice, intellectual and affective; (4) Think of those spontaneous
activities that uninterruptedly emanate from the will of the
Dharmakâya; (5) Think of the inexhaustible wealth, spiritual and
physical, stored in the Body of the Dharma; (6) Think of its
intellectual purity which has no stain of onesidedness; (7) Think of
the earthly works achieved for the salvation of all beings by the
Tathâgatas who are reflexes of the Dharmakâya.”

As regards the activity of the Dharmakâya, which is shown in every
Buddha’s work of salvation, Asanga enumerates five forms of operation:
(1) It is shown in his power of removing evils which may befall us in
the course of life, though the Buddha is unable to cure any physical
defects which we may have, such as blindness, deafness, mental
aberration, etc. (2) It is shown in his irresistible spiritual
domination over all evil-doers, who, base as they are, cannot help
doing some good if they ever come in the presence of the Buddha. (3)
It is shown in his power of destroying various unnatural and
irrational methods of salvation which are practiced by followers of
asceticism, hedonism, or Ishvaraism. (4) It is shown in his power of
curing those diseased minds that believe in the reality, permanency,
and indivisibility of the ego-soul, that is, in the pudgalavâda. (5)
It is shown in his inspiring {236} influence over those Bodhisattvas
who have not yet attained to the stage of immovability as well as over
those Çrâvakas whose faith and character are still in a state of
vacillation.


 _The Freedom of the Dharmakâya._

Those spiritual influences over all beings of the Dharmakâya through
the enlightened mind of a Buddha, which we have seen above as stated
by Asanga, are fraught with religious significance. According to the
Buddhist view, those spiritual powers everlastingly emanating from the
Body of Dharma have no trace of human elaboration or constrained
effort, but they are a spontaneous overflow from its immanent
necessity, or, as I take it, from its free will. The Dharmakâya does
not make any conscious, struggling efforts to shower upon all sentient
creatures its innumerable merits, benefits, and blessings. If there
were in it any trace of elaboration, that would mean a struggle within
itself of divers tendencies, one trying to gain ascendency over
another. And it is apparent that any struggle and its necessary ally,
compulsion, are incompatible with our conception of the highest
religious reality. Absolute spontaneity and perfect freedom is one of
those necessary attributes which our religious consciousness cannot
help ascribing to its object of reverence. Buddhists therefore
repeatedly affirm that the activity of the Dharmakâya is perfectly
free from all effort and coercion, external and internal. Its every
act of creation or salvation {237} or love emanates from its own free
will, unhampered by any struggling exertion which characterises the
doings of mankind. This free will which is divine, standing in such a
striking contrast with our own “free will” which is human and at best
very much limited, is called by the Buddhists the Dharmakâya’s
“Purvapranidhânabala.”[101]

As the Dharmakâya works of its own accord it does not seek any
recompense for its deed; and it is evident that every act of the
Dharmakâya is always for the best welfare of its creatures, for they
are its manifestations and it must know what they need. We do not have
to ask for our “daily bread,” {238} nor have we to praise or eulogise
its virtues to court its special grace, nor is there any necessity for
us to offer prayer or supplication to the Dharmakâya. Consider the
lilies of the field which neither toil nor spin,--and I might
add,--which ask not for any favoritism from above; yet are they not
arrayed even better than Solomon in all his glory? The Dharmakâya
shines in its august magnificence everywhere there is life, nay, even
where there is death. We are all living in the midst of it and yet,
strange to say, as “the fish knows not the presence of water about
itself,” and also as “the mountaineers recognise not the mountains
among which they hunt,” even so we know not whence that power comes
whose work is made manifest in us and whither it finally leadeth us.
In spite of this profound ignorance, we really feel that we are here,
and thereby we rest supremely contented. For we believe that all this
is wrought through the mysterious and miraculous will of the
Dharmakâya, who does all excellent works and seeks no recompense
whatever.


 _The Will of the Dharmakâya._

Summarily speaking, the Dharmakâya assumes three essential aspects as
reflected in our religious consciousness: first, it is intelligence
(_prajñâ_); secondly, it is love (_karunâ_); and thirdly, it is the
will (_pranidhânabala_). We know that it is intelligence from the
declaration that the Dharmakâya directs the course of the universe,
not blindly but rationally; we know again that it is love because it
embraces all {239} beings with fatherly tenderness;[102] and finally
we must assume that it is a will, because the Dharmakâya has firmly
set down its aim of activity in that good shall be the final goal of
all evil in the universe. Without the will, love and intelligence will
not be realised; without love, the will and intelligence will lose
their impulse; without intelligence, love and the will will be
irrational. In fact, the three are co-ordinates and constitute the
oneness of the Dharmakâya; and by oneness I mean the absolute, and
not the numerical, unity of all these three things in the being of the
Dharmakâya, for intelligence and love and the will are differentiated
as such only in our human, finite consciousness.

Some Buddhists may not agree entirely with the view here expounded.
They may declare: “We conform to your view when you say the Dharmakâya
is intelligence and love, as this is expressly stated in the sûtras
and çâstras; but we do not see how it could be made a will. Indeed,
the Scriptures say that the Dharmakâya is in possession of the
Pranidhânabala, but this bala or power is not necessarily the will, it
is the power of prayers or intense vows. The Dharmakâya actually made
solemn vows, and their spiritual energy abiding in the world of
particulars works out its original plan and makes possible the
universal salvation of all creatures.”

It is quite true that the word pranidhânabala means {240} literally
“the power of original prayers.” But this literary rendering totally
ignores its inner significance without which the nature of the
Dharmakâya would become unintelligible. We admit that the Dharmakâya
knows no higher existence by which it is conditioned, nor has it any
fragmentary, limited consciousness like that of human being, nor has
it any intrinsic want by which it is necessitated to appeal to
something other than itself. It is, therefore, utterly nonsensical to
speak of its prayer, “original” or borrowed, as some Buddhists are
inclined to think. On the other hand, we are perfectly justified in
saying that whatever is done by the Dharmakâya is done by its own
free will independent of all the determinations that might affect it
from outside.

But I can presume the reason why they speak of the prayers of the
Dharmakâya instead of its will. Here we have an instance of emotional
outburst. The fervency of the intense religious sentiment not
infrequently carries us beyond the limits of the intellect, landing us
in a region full of mysteries and contradictions. It anthropomorphises
everything beyond the proper measure of intellection and ascribes all
earthly human feelings and passions to an object which the mind
well-balanced demands to be above all the forms of human helplessness.
The Buddhists, especially those of the Sukhâvatî sect,[103] recognise
the existence {241} of an all-powerful will, all-embracing love, and
all-knowing intelligence in the Dharmakâya, but they want to represent
it more concretely and in a more humanly fashion before the mental
vision of the less intellectual followers. The result thus is that the
Dharmakâya in spite of its absoluteness made prayers to himself to
emancipate all sentient beings from the sufferings of birth and death.
But are not these self-addressed prayers of the Dharmakâya which
sprang out of its inmost nature exactly what constitutes its will?




 CHAPTER X.
 THE DOCTRINE OF TRIKÂYA.

{242}

 (/Buddhist Theory of Trinity/.)


 _The Human and the Super-human Buddha._

/One/ of the most remarkable differences between the Pâli and the
Sanskrit, that is, between the Hînayâna and the Mahâyâna Buddhist
literature, is in the manner of introducing the characters or persons
who take principal parts in the narratives. In the former, sermons are
delivered by the Buddha as a rule in such a natural and plain language
as to make the reader feel the presence of the teacher,
fatherly-hearted and philosophically serene; while in the latter
generally we have a mysterious, transcendent figure, more celestial
than human, surrounded and worshipped by beings of all kinds, human,
celestial, and even demoniac, and this mystical central character
performing some supernatural feats which might well be narrated by an
intensely poetical mind.

In the Pâli scriptures, the texts as a rule open with the formula,
“Thus it was heard by me” (_Evam me sutam_), then relate the events,
if any, which induced the Buddha to deliver them, and finally lead the
reader to the main subjects which are generally written in {243} lucid
style. Their opening or introductory matter is very simple, and we do
not notice anything extraordinary in its further development. But with
the Mahâyâna texts it is quite different. Here we have, as soon as
the curtain rises with the stereotyped formula, “Evam mayâ çrutam,”
a majestic prologue dramatically or rather grotesquely represented,
which prepares the mind of the audience to the succeeding scenes, in
which some of the boldest religio-philosophical proclamations are
brought forth. The perusal of this introductory part alone will
stupefy the reader by its rather monstrous grandeur, and he may
without much ado declare that what follows must be extraordinary and
may be even nonsensical.

The following is an illustration showing the typical manner of
introducing the characters in the Mahâyâna texts.[104]

“Thus it was heard by me. Buddha was once staying at Râjagriha, on
the Gridhrakuta mountain. He was in the Hall of Ratnachandra in the
Double Tower of Chandana. Ten years passed since his attainment of
Buddhahood. He was surrounded by a hundred thousand Bhikṣus and
Bodhisattvas and Mahâsattvas numbering sixty times as many as the
sands of the Ganges. All of them were in possession of the greatest
spiritual energy; they had paid homage to thousands of hundred
millions {244} of niyutas[105] of Buddhas; they were able to set
rolling the never-sliding-back Wheel of Dharma; and whoever heard
their names could establish themselves firmly in the Highest Perfect
Knowledge. Their names were.... [Here about fifty Bodhisattvas are
mentioned.]

“All these Bodhisattvas numbering sixty times as many as the sands of
the Ganges coming from innumerable Buddha-countries were accompanied
by numberless Devas, Nâgas, Yakṣas, Gandharvas, Açuras, Garudas,
Kinnaras, and Mahoragas.[106] This great assembly all joined in
revering, honoring, paying homage to the Bhagavat, the World-honored
One.

“At this time the Bhagavat in the Double Tower of Chandana seated
himself in the assigned seat, entered upon a samâdhi, and displayed a
marvelous phenomenon. There appeared innumerable lotus-flowers with
thousand-fold petals and each flower as large as a carriage-wheel.
They had perfectly beautiful color and fragrant odour, but their
petals containing celestial beings in them were not yet unfolded. They
all were raised now by themselves high up in the heavens and hung over
the earth like a canopy of pearls. Each one of these lotus-flowers
emitted innumerable rays of light and simultaneously grew in size with
wonderful vitality. But through the divine power of Buddha they all of
{245} a sudden changed color and withered. All the celestial Buddhas
sitting cross-legged within the flowers now came into full view, shone
with innumerable hundred thousand-fold rays of light. At this moment
the transcendent glory of the spot was beyond description.”...

As is here thus clearly shown, the Buddha in the Mahâyâna scriptures
is not an ordinary human being walking in a sensuous world; he is
altogether dissimilar to that son of Suddhodana, who resigned the
royal life, wandered in the wilderness, and after six years’ profound
meditation and penance discovered the Fourfold Noble Truth and the
Twelve Chains of Dependence; and we cannot but think that the Mahâyâna
Buddha is the fictitious creation of an intensely poetic mind. Let it
be so. But the question which engages us now is, “How did the
Buddhists come to relegate the human Buddha to oblivion, as it were,
and assign a mysterious being in his place invested with all possible
or sometimes impossible majesty and supernaturality?” This question,
which marks the rise of Mahâyâna Buddhism, brings us to the doctrine
of Trikâya,--which in a sense corresponds to the Christian theory of
trinity.

According to this doctrine, the Buddhists presume a triple existence
of the Tathâgata, that is, the Tathâgata is conceived by them as
manifesting himself in three different forms of existence: the Body of
Transformation, the Body of Bliss, and the Body of Dharma. Though they
are conceived as three, they are in fact all the manifestations of one
Dharmakâya,--the Dharmakâya that revealed itself in the historical
Çâkyamuni {246} Buddha as a Body of Transformation, and in the Mahâyâna
Buddha as a Body of Bliss. However differently they may appear from
the human point of view, they are nothing but the expression of one
eternal truth, in which all things have their _raison d’être_.


 _An Historical View._

At present we are not in possession of any historical documents that
will throw light on the question as to how early this doctrine of
Trikâya or Buddhist trinity conception came to be firmly established
among Northern Buddhists and found its way in an already-finished form
as such into the Mahâyâna scriptures. As far as we know, it was
Açvaghoṣa, the first Mahâyâna philosopher, who incorporated this
conception in his _Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahâyâna_
as early as the first century before Christ. This work, as the author
declares, is a sort of synopsis of the Mahâyâna teachings, elucidating
their principal features as taught by the Buddha in his various sûtras.
It is not an original work which expounds the individual views of
Açvaghoṣa concerning Buddhism. He wrote the book in a concise and
comprehensive form, in order that the later generations who remote
from the Buddha could not have the privilege of being inspired by his
august presence, might peruse it with concentration of mind and
synthetically grasp the whole significance of many lengthy and
voluminous sûtras. Therefore, in the _Awakening of Faith_, we are
supposed {247} not to find any Mahâyâna doctrines that were not
already taught by the Buddha and incorporated in the sûtras.
Everything Açvaghoṣa treats in his work must be considered merely a
recapitulation of the doctrines which were not only formulated but
firmly established as the Mahâyâna faith long before him. His is
simply the work of a recorder. He carefully scanned all the Mahâyâna
scriptures that had existed prior to his time and faithfully collected
all the principal teachings of Mahâyânism here and there scatteringly
told in them. His merit lies in compilation and systematisation.

This being the case, we must assume that all the doctrines that are
found in Açvaghoṣa and distinct from those usually held to be
Hînayânistic are the teachings elaborated by Buddhists from the time
of Buddha’s death down to the time of Açvaghoṣa. But as the latter
apparently believes all these doctrines as Buddha’s own and raises no
doubt concerning their later origin, even if they were so, we must
assume again that these doctrines were in a state of completion long
before Açvaghoṣa’s time. If our calculation is correct that he lived
in the first century before Christ, the Mahâyâna faith must be said to
have been formulated at least two hundred years prior to his
age,--taking this presumably as the time that is required for the
formulation and dogmatical establishment of a doctrine. This
calculation places the development of the Mahâyâna faith during the
first century after the Buddha, and, we know, it was during this time
that so many schools and divisions,--among {248} which we must also
find the so-called “primitive” Buddhism of Ceylon, arose among the
Buddhists,--each claiming to be the only authentic transmission of the
Buddha’s teaching. Did Mahâyânism come out of this turmoil of
contention? Did it boldly raise itself from this chaos and claim to
have solved all the questions and doubts that agitated the minds of
Buddhists after the Nirvâna? For certain we do not know anything
concerning the chronology of the development of Buddhist philosophy
and dogmas in India, at least before Açvaghoṣa; but, as far as our
Chinese Buddhist literature records, we must conclude that this was
most probably the case.

To give our readers a glimpse of the state of things that were taking
place in those early days of Buddhism in India, I will quote some
passages from Vasumitra’s _Discourse on the Points of Controversy by
the Different Schools of Buddhism_,--the work once referred to in the
beginning of this book. The two principal schools that arose soon
after the Nirvâna of the Buddha were, as is well known, the Elders
and the Great Council, and though they were further divided into a
number of smaller sections and their views became so complex and
intermixed that some of the Elders shared similar views with the Great
Council School and vice versa, yet we can fairly distinguish one from
the other and describe the essential peculiarities of each school.
These points of difference, generally speaking, are as follows,
confining ourselves to their conceptions about the Buddha:

{249}

(1) According to the School of the Great Council, the Buddha’s
personality is transcendental (_lokottara_), and all the Tathâgatas
are free from the defilements that might come from the material
existence (_bhâva-âçrava_).[107] For in the Buddha all evil passions
hereditary and acquired were eternally uprooted, and his presence on
earth was absolutely spotless. (_The Vibhaṣa_, CLXXIII.) Contending
this view, the Elders held that the Buddha’s personality was not free
from Bhâvâçrava, though his mind was fully enlightened. His corporeal
existence was the product of blind love veiled with ignorance and
tangled with attachment. If this were not so, the Buddha’s feature
would not have awakened an impure affection in the heart of a maiden,
an ill-will in the heart of a highwayman, stupidity in the mind of an
ascetic, and arrogance in that of a haughty Brahman. These incidents
which {250} happened during the life of the Buddha evince that his
corporeal presence was apt to agitate others’ hearts, and to that
extent it was contaminated by Bhâvâçrava.

(2) The Great Council School insists that every word uttered by a
Tathâgata has a religious, spiritual meaning and purports to the
edification of his fellow-beings; that his one utterance is variously
interpreted by his audience each according to his own disposition, but
all to his spiritual welfare; that every instruction given out by the
Buddha is rational and perfect. Against these views the Elders think
that the Buddha occasionally uttered things which had nothing to do
with the enlightenment of others; that even with the Buddha something
was out of his attainment, for instance, he could not make every one
of his hearers perfectly understand his preachings; that though the
Buddha never taught anything irrational and heretical, yet all his
speeches were not perfect, he said some things which had no concern
with rationality or orthodoxy.

(3) The corporeal body (_rûpakâya_) of the Buddha has no limits
(_koṭi_); his majestic power has no limits; every Buddha’s life is
unlimited; a Buddha knows no fatigue, knows not when to rest, always
occupying himself with the enlightenment of all sentient beings and
with the awakening in their hearts of pure faith. Against these
tendencies of the Great Council School to deify the historical Buddha,
the Elders generally insist on the humanity of Buddhahood. Though the
{251} Elders agree with the Great Council in that the body assumed by
the Buddha as the result of his untiring accumulation of good karma
through eons of his successive existences possesses a wonderful power,
spiritual and material, they do not conceive it to be beyond all
limitations.

(4) The Great Council School says that with the Buddha sleep is not
necessary and he has no dreams. The Elders admit that the Buddha never
dreams, but denies that he does not need any sleep.

(5) As the Buddha is always in the state of a deep, exalted spiritual
meditation, it is not necessary for him to think what to say when
requested to answer certain questions. Though he might appear to the
inquirers as if he thoroughly cogitates over the problems presented to
him for solution, the Buddha’s response is in fact immediate and
without any efforts. The Elders, on the other hand, presume the
Buddha’s mental calculation as to how to express his ideas as best
suited to the understanding of the audience. Indeed, he does not
cogitate over the problem itself, for with him everything is
transparent, but he thinks over the best method of presenting his
ideas before his pupils.[108]

{252}

Now to return to the doctrine of Dharmakâya and Trikâya. When we
consider these controversies as above stated, it is apparent that
among many other questions which arose soon after the demise of the
Buddha Çâkyamuni, there was one, which in all probability most
agitated the minds of his disciples. I mean the question of the
personality of Buddha. Was he merely a human being like ourselves?
Then, how could he reach such a height of moral perfection? Or was he
a divine being? But Buddha himself did not communicate anything to his
disciples concerning his divinity, nor did he tell them to accept the
Dharma on account of his divine personality, but solely for the sake
of truth. But for all that how could the disciples ever eradicate from
their hearts the feeling of sacred reverence for their teacher, which
was so indelibly engraved there? Whenever they recalled the sermons,
anecdotes, or gâthâs of their master, the truth and spirit embodied
in them and the author must have become so closely associated that
they could not but ask themselves: “What in the Buddha caused him to
perceive and declare these solemn profound truths? What was it that
formed in him such a noble majestic character? What was there in the
mind of Buddha that raised him to such a perfection of intellectual
and religious life? How was it possible that, possessed of such
exalted moral and spiritual virtues, Buddha too had to succumb to the
law of birth and death that is the lot of common mortals?” Some such
questions must have been repeatedly asked before they {253} could
answer them by the doctrines of Dharmakâya and Trikâya.


 _Who was the Buddha?_

The evidence that these questions were constantly disturbing the minds
of the disciples ever since the Master’s entrance into Parinirvâna,
is scatteringly revealed throughout the Buddhist texts both Southern
and Northern. The regret of the immediate followers that they did not
ask the Buddha to prolong his earthly life, while the Buddha told them
that he could do so if he wished, and their lamentation over the
remains of the Blessed One, “How soon the Light of the World has
passed away!”[109]--these utterances may be considered the first
drops foreboding the showers of doubt and speculation as to his
personality.

According to the _Suvarna Prabhâ Sûtra_,[110] a Bodhisattva, by the
name of Ruciraketu, was greatly annoyed by the doubt why Çâkyamuni
Tathâgata had such a short life terminating only at eighty. He {254}
taught the disciples that those who did not injure any living beings,
and those who generously practised charity, in their former lives,
could enjoy a considerably long life on earth; why then was the life
of the Blessed One himself cut so short, who practised those virtues
from time immemorial? The sûtra now records that this doubt was
dispelled by the declaration of four Tathâgatas who mysteriously
appeared to the sceptic and told him that “Every drop of water in the
vast ocean can be counted, but the age of Çâkyamuni none can
measure. Crush the mount Sumeru into particles as fine as mustard
seeds and we can count them, but the age of Çâkyamuni none can
measure..... the Buddha never entered into Parinirvana; the Good
Dharma will never perish. He showed an earthly death merely for the
benefits of sentient beings.”.....

Here we have the conception of a spiritual Dharmakâya germinating out
of the corporeal death of Çâkyamuni.[111] Here we have the bridge
that spans {255} the wide gap between the human Çâkyamuni Buddha and
the spiritual existence of the Dharmakâya. The Buddha did not die
after he partook of the food offered by Chunda. His age was not
eighty. His life did not pass to an airy nothingness when his cinerary
urns were divided among kings and Brahmans. His virtues and merits
which were accumulated throughout innumerable kalpas, could not come
to naught so abruptly. What constituted the essence of his life--and
that of ours too--could not perish with the vicissitudes of the
corporeal existence. The Buddha as a particular individual being was
certainly subject to transformation--so is every mortal, but his truth
must abide forever. His Dharmakâya is above birth and death and even
above Nirvâna; but his Body of Transformation comes out of the womb
of Tathâgata as destined by karma and vanishes into it when the karma
exhausts its force. The Buddha who is still seated at the summit of
the Gridhrakuta, delivering to all beings the message of joy and
bliss, and who among other precious teachings bequeathed to us {256}
such sûtras as the _Avatamsaka_, the _Pundarîka_, etc., is no more
nor less than an expression of the eternal spirit. Thus came the
doctrine of Dharmakâya to be formulated by the Mahâyânists, and
from this the transition to that of Trikâya was but a natural sequence.
Because one without the other could not give an adequate solution of
the problems above cited.


 _The Trikâya as Explained in the Suvarna Prabhâ._

What then is the Trikâya or triple body of the Tathâgata? It is (1)
Nirmâna Kâya, the Body of Transformation; (2): Sambhoga Kâya, the Body
of Bliss; and (3) Dharma Kâya, the Body of Dharma. If we draw a
parallelism between the Buddhist and the Christian trinity, the Body
of Transformation may be considered to correspond to Christ in the
flesh, the Body of Bliss either to Christ in glory or to Holy Ghost,
and Dharmakâya to Godhead.

Let us again quote from the _Suvarna Prabhâ_, in which (I-tsing’s
translation, chap. III.) we find the following statements concerning
the doctrine of Trikâya.

“The Tathâgata, when he was yet at the stage of discipline, practised
divers deeds of morality for the sake of sentient beings. The practise
finally attained perfection, reached maturity, and by virtue of its
merits he acquired a wonderful spiritual power. The power enabled him
to respond to the thoughts, deeds, and livings of sentient beings. He
thoroughly understood them and never missed the right opportunity
{257} [to respond to their needs]. He revealed himself in the right
place and in the right moment; he acted rightly, assuming various
bodily forms [in response to the needs of mortal souls]. These bodily
forms are called the Nirmânakâya of the Tathâgata.

“But when the Tathâgatas, in order to make the Bodhisattvas thoroughly
conversant with the Dharma, to instruct them in the highest reality,
to let them understand that birth-and-death (_samsâra_) and Nirvâna
are of one taste, to destroy the thoughts of the ego, individuality,
and the fear [of transmigration], and to promote happiness, to lay
foundation for innumerable Buddha-dharmas, to be truly in accord with
Suchness, the knowledge of Suchness, and the Spontaneous Will,
manifest themselves to the Bodhisattvas in a form which is perfect
with the thirty-two major and eighty minor features of excellence and
shining with the halo around the head and the back, the Tathâgatas are
said to have assumed the Body of Bliss or Sambhogakâya.[112]

“When all possible obstacles arising from sins [material, intellectual,
and emotional] are perfectly removed, and when all possible good
dharmas are preserved, there would remain nothing but Suchness and the
knowledge of Suchness,--this is the Dharmakâya.

“The first two forms of the Tathâgata are provisional [and temporal]
existences; but the last one is a reality, wherein the former two find
the reason of {258} their existence. Why? Because when deprived of the
Dharma of Suchness and of knowledge of non-particularity, no
Buddha-dharma can ever exist; because it is Suchness and Knowledge of
Suchness that absorbs within itself all possible forms of
Buddha-wisdom and renders possible a complete extinction of all
passions and sins [arising from particularity].”

According to the above, the Dharmakâya which is tantamount to Suchness
or Knowledge of Suchness is absolute; but like the moon whose image is
reflected in a drop of water as well as in the boundless expanse of
the waves, the Dharmakâya assumes on itself all possible aspects from
the grossest material form to the subtlest spiritual existence. When
it responds to the needs of the Bodhisattvas whose spiritual life is
on a much higher plane than that of ordinary mortals, it takes on
itself the Body of Bliss or Sambhogakâya. This Body is a supernatural
existence, and almost all the Buddhas in the Mahâyâna scriptures
belong to this class of being. Açvaghoṣa (p. 101) says: “The Body has
infinite forms. The form has infinite attributes. The attribute has
infinite excellences. And the accompanying fruition, that is, the
region where they are destined to be born [by their previous karma],
also has infinite merits and ornamentations. Manifesting itself
everywhere, the Body of Bliss is infinite, boundless, limitless,
unintermittent [in its activity] which comes directly from the Mind
[Dharmakâya].”

But the Buddhas revealed to the eyes of common {259} mortals are not
of this kind. They are common mortals themselves, and the earthly
Çâkyamuni who came out of the womb of Mâyâdevî and passed away under
the sâla trees at the age of eighty years was one of them. He was
essentially a manifestation of the Dharmakâya, and as such we ordinary
people also partake something of him. But the masses, unless favored
by good karma accumulated in the past, are generally under the spell
of ignorance. They do not see the glory of Dharmakâya in its perfect
purity shining in the lilies of the field and sung by the fowls of the
air. They are blindly groping in the dark wilderness, they are vainly
seeking, they are wildly knocking. To the needs of these people the
Dharmakâya responds by assuming an earthly form as a human Buddha.


 _Revelation in All Stages of Culture._

_En passant_, let us remark that it is in this sense that Christ is
conceived by Buddhists also as a manifestation of the Dharmakâya in a
human form. He is a Buddha and as such not essentially different from
Çâkyamuni. The Dharmakâya revealed itself as Çâkyamuni to the Indian
mind, because that was in harmony with its needs. The Dharmakâya
appeared in the person of Christ on the Semitic stage, because it
suited their taste best in this way. The doctrine of Trikâya, however,
goes even further and declares that demons, animal gods,
ancestor-worship, nature-worship, and what not, are all due to the
activity and revelation of the Dharmakâya responding to the spiritual
needs of barbarous {260} and half-cultured people. The Buddhists think
that the Dharmakâya never does things that are against the spiritual
welfare of its creatures, and that whatever is done by it is for their
best interests at that moment of revelation, no matter how they
comprehend the nature of the Dharmakâya. The Great Lord of Dharma
never throws a pearl before the swine, for he knows the animal’s needs
are for things more substantial. He does not reveal himself in an
exalted spiritual form to the people whose hearts are not yet capable
of grasping anything beyond the grossly material. As they understand
animal gods better than a metaphysical or highly abstracted being, let
them have them and derive all possible blessings and benefits through
their worshiping. But as soon as they become dissatisfied with the
animal or human-fashioned gods, there must not be a moment’s hesitation
to let them have exactly what their enlightened understanding can
comprehend.[113] {261} They are thus all the while being led, though
unconsciously on their part, to the higher and higher region of
mystery, till they come fully to grasp the true and real meaning of
the Dharmakâya in its absolute purity, or, to use Christian
terminology, till “we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the
glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory, even as
by the Spirit of the Lord.” (2 Cor III. 18.)

The Mahâyânists now argue that the reason why Çâkyamuni entered into
Parinirvana when his worldly career was thought by him to be over is
that by this his resignation to the law of birth and death, he wished
to exemplify in him the impermanency of worldly life and the folly of
clinging to it as final reality. As for his Dharmakâya, it has an
eternal life, it was never born, and it would never perish; and when
called by the spiritual needs of the Bodhisattvas, it will cast off
the garb of absoluteness and preach in the form of a Sambhogakâya
“never-ceasing sermons which run like a stream for ever and aye.” It
will be evident from this that Buddhists are ready to consider all
religious or moral leaders of mankind, whatever their nationality, as
the Body of Transformation of the Dharmakâya. Translated into Christian
thoughts, God reveals himself in every being that is worthy of him. He
reveals himself not only at a certain {262} period in history, but
everywhere and all the time. His glory is perceived throughout all the
stages of human culture. This manifestation, from the very nature of
God, cannot be intermittent and sporadic as is imagined by some
“orthodox Christians.” The following from St. Paul’s first Epistle to
the Corinthians (Chap. XIII), when read in this connection, sounds
almost like a Buddhist philosopher’s utterance: “Now there are
diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are diversities
of administrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of
operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all. But the
manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal.
For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the
word of knowledge by the same Spirit; to another faith by the same
Spirit; to another the gifts of healing by the same Spirit; to another
the working of miracles; to another prophecy; to another divers kinds
of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues; but all these
worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man
severally as he will. For as the body is one and hath many members,
and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so
also is Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptised into one body,
whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have
been all made to drink into one Spirit.”

{263}


 _The Sambhogakâya._

One peculiar point in the doctrine of Trikâya, which modern minds find
rather difficult to comprehend, is the conception of the Sambhogakâya,
or the Body of Bliss. We can understand the relation between the
Dharmakâya and Nirmânakâya, the latter being similar to the notion of
God incarnate or to that of Avatara. Inasmuch as the Dharmakâya does
not exist outside the triple world but in it as the raison d’être of
its existence, all beings must be considered a partial manifestation
of it; and in this sense Buddhists sometimes call themselves
Bodhisattvas, that is, beings of intelligence, because intelligence
(_Bodhi_) is the psychological aspect of the Dharmakâya as realised in
sentient beings. But the conception of Sambhogakâya is altogether too
mysterious to be fathomed by a limited consciousness. The fact becomes
more apparent when we are told that the Sambhogakâya, Body of Bliss,
is a corporeal existence and at the same time filling the universe and
that there are two forms of the Body of Bliss, one for self-enjoyment
and the other as a sort of religious object for the Bodhisattvas.

That the Body of Bliss is corporeal and yet infinite has already been
shown by the quotations from the _Suvarna Prabhâ_ and Açvaghoṣa on
the preceding pages. For further confirmation of this point no less
authority than Asanga and Vasubandhu will be here referred to.

In _A Comprehensive Treatise on the Mahâyana_ and {264} in its
commentary, the author Asanga and the commentator Vasubandhu endeavor
to prove why the Body of Bliss cannot be the raison d’être of the
Dharmakâya, instead of vice versa; and in this connection they argue
that (1) the Body of Bliss consists of the five Skandhas, that is, of
material form (_rûpa_), sensation (_vedanâ_), ideas (_samjñâ_), deeds
(_sanskâra_), and consciousness (_vijñâna_); (2) it is subject to
particularisation; (3) it reveals different virtues and characters
according to the desires of Bodhisattvas; (4) even to the same
individual it appears differently at different times; (5) when it
manifests itself simultaneously before an assemblage of Bodhisattvas
of divers characters and qualifications, it at once assumes divers
forms, in order to satisfy their infinitely diversified inclinations;
(6) it is a creation of the Âlayavijñâna, All-conserving Mind.

These six peculiarities of the Body of Bliss as enumerated by Asanga
and Vasubandhu make it indeed entirely dependent on the Dharmakâya,
but they do not place us in any better position to penetrate into the
deep mystery of its nature. Its supernatural incomprehensibility
remains the same forever. In a certain sense, however, the Body of
Bliss may be considered to be corresponding to the Christian idea of
an angel. Supernaturalness and luminosity are the two characters
possessed by both, but angels are merely messengers of God
communicating the latter’s will to human beings. When they reveal
themselves to a specially favored person, it is not of their own {265}
account. When they speak to him at all, it is by the name of the being
who sent them. They do not represent him, they do not act his own will
by themselves. On the contrary, the Body of Bliss is the master of its
own. It is an expression of the Dharmakâya. It instructs and benefits
all the creatures who come to it. It acts according to its own will
and judgment. In these respects the Body of Bliss is altogether
different from the Christian conception of angels. But will it be more
appropriately compared to Christ in glory?

Let us make another quotation from later authorities than Asanga and
his brother Vasubandhu, and let us see more convincingly what
complicated notions are involved in the idea of the Body of Bliss.
According to the commentators on Vasubandhu’s _Vijñânamâtra Çâstra_
(a treatise on the Yoga philosophy),[114] the Body of Bliss has two
distinct aspects: (1) The body obtained by the Tathâgata for his
self-enjoyment, by dint of his religious discipline through eons; (2)
The body which the Tathâgata manifests to the {266} Bodhisattvas in
Pure Land (_sukhâvatî_). This last body is in possession of wonderful
spiritual powers, reveals the Wheel of Dharma, resolves all the
religious doubts raised by the Bodhisattvas, and lets them enjoy the
bliss of the Mahâyâna Dharma.


 _A Mere Subjective Existence._

Judging from all these characterisations, the most plausible
conclusion that suggests itself to modern sceptical minds is that the
Sambhogakâya must be a mere creation of an intelligent, finite mind,
which is intently bent on reaching the highest reality, but, not being
able, on account of its limitations, to grasp the object in its
absoluteness, the finite mind fabricates all its ideals after its own
fashion into a spiritual-material being, which is logically a
contradiction, but religiously an object deserving veneration and
worship. And this being is no more than the Body of Bliss.[115] It
lies half way between the pure being of Dharmakâya and the earthly
form of Nirmânakâya, the Body of Transformation. It does not belong
to either, but partakes something of both. It is in a sense spiritual
{267} like the Dharmakâya, and yet it cannot go beyond material
limitations, for it has a form, definite and determinate. When the
human soul is thirsty after a pure being or an absolute which cannot
be comprehended in a palpable form, it creates a hybrid, an imitation,
or a reflection, and tries to be satisfied with it, just as a little
girl has her innate and not yet fully developed maternity satisfied by
tenderly embracing and nursing the doll, an inanimate imitation of a
real living baby. And the Mahâyânists seem to have made most of this
childish humanness. They produced as many sûtras as their spiritual
yearnings demanded, quite regardless of historical facts, and made the
Body of Bliss of the Tathâgata the author of all these works. For if
the Dharmakâya of the Tathâgata never entered into Parinirvâna, why
then could he not deliver sermons and cite gâthâs as often as beings
of intelligence (Bodhisattvas) felt their needs? The _Suvarna Prabhâ_
(fas. 2, chap. 3) again echoes this sentiment as follows:

“To illustrate by analogy, the sun or the moon does not make any
conscious discrimination, nor does the water-mirror, nor the light
[conceived separate from the body from which it emanates]. But when
all these three are brought together, there is produced an image [of
the sun or the moon in the water]. So it is with Suchness and
Knowledge of Suchness. It is not possessed of any particular
consciousness, but by virtue of the Spontaneous Will [inherent in the
nature of Suchness, or what is the same thing, in the {268}
Dharmakâya], the Body of Transformation or of Bliss [as a shadow of
the Dharmakâya] reveals itself in response to the spiritual needs of
sentient beings.

“And, again, as the water-mirror boundlessly expanding reflects in all
different ways the images of âkâsa (void space) through the medium
of light, while space itself is void of all particular marks, so the
Dharmakâya reflects its images severally in the receiving minds of
believers, and this by virtue of Spontaneous Will. The Will creates
the Body of Transformation as well as the Body of Bliss in all their
possible aspects, while the original, the Dharmakâya, does not suffer
one whit a change on this account.”

According to this, it is evident that whenever our spiritual needs
become sufficiently intense there is a response from the Dharmakâya,
and that this response is not always uniform as the recipient minds
show different degrees of development, intellectually and spiritually.
If we call this communion between sentient souls and the Dharmakâya
an inspiration, all the phenomena that flow out of fulness of heart
and reflect purity of soul should be called “works of inspiration”;
and in this sense the Mahâyânists consider their scriptures as
emanating directly from the fountainhead of the Dharmakâya.


 _Attitude of Modern Mahâyânists._

Modern Mahâyânists in full accordance with this interpretation of
the Doctrine of Trikâya do not place {269} much importance on the
objective aspects of the Body of Bliss (_Sambhogakâya_). They consider
them at best the fictitious products of an imaginative mind; they
never tarry a moment to think that all these mysterious Tathâgatas or
Bodhisattvas who are sometimes too extravagantly and generally too
tediously described in the Mahâyâna texts are objective realities,
that the Sukhâvatîs or Pure Lands[116] are decorated with such
worldly stuff as gold, silver, emerald, cat’s eye, pearl, and other
precious stones, that pious Buddhists would be transferred after their
death to these ostentatiously ornamented heavens, be seated on the
pedestals of lotus-flowers, surrounded by innumerable Bodhisattvas and
Buddhas, and would enjoy all the spiritual enjoyments that human mind
can conceive. On the contrary, modern Buddhists look with disdain on
these egotistic materialistic conceptions of religious life. For, to a
fully enlightened soul, of what use could those worldly treasures {270}
be? What happiness, earthly or heavenly, does such a soul dream of,
outside the bliss of embracing the will of the Dharmakâya as his own?


 _Recapitulation._

To sum up, the Buddha in the Pâli scriptures was a human being, though
occasionally he is credited to have achieved things supernatural and
superhuman. His historical career began with the abandonment of a
royal life, then the wandering in the wilderness, and a long earnest
meditation on the great problems of birth-and-death, and his final
enlightenment under the Bodhi tree, then his fifty years’ religious
peregrination along the valleys of the Ganges, and the establishment
of a religious system known as Buddhism, and finally his eternal
entrance into the “Parinirvâna that leaves nothing behind”
(_anupadhiçeṣanirvâna_). And as far as plain historical facts are
concerned, these seem to exhaust the life of Çâkyamuni on earth. But
the deep reverence which was felt by his disciples could not be
satisfied with this prosaic humanness of their master and made him
something more than a mortal soul. So even the Pâli tradition gives
him a supramundane life besides the earthly one. He is supposed to
have been a Bodhisattva in the Tuṣita heaven before his entrance into
the womb of Mâyâdevî. The honor of Bodhisattvahood was acceded to him
on account of his deeds of self-sacrifice which were praised throughout
his innumerable past incarnations. While he was walking {271} among us
in the flesh, he was glorified with the thirty-two major and eighty
minor excellent characteristics of a great man.[117] But he was not
the first Buddha that walked on earth to teach the Dharma, for there
were already seven Buddhas before him, nor was he the last one that
would appear among us, for {272} a Bodhisattva by the name of Maitreya
is now in heaven and making preparations for the attainment of
Buddhahood in time to come. But here stopped the Pâli writers, they
did not venture to make any further speculation on the nature of
Buddhahood. Their religious yearnings did not spur them to a higher
flight of the imagination. They recited simple sûtras or gâthâs,
observed the çilas (moral precepts) as strictly and literally as they
could, and thought the spirit of their Master still alive in these
instructions;--let alone the personality of the Tathâgata.

But there was at the same time another group of the disciples of the
Buddha, whose religious and intellectual inclinations were not of the
same type as their fellow-believers; and on that account a simple
faith in the Buddha as present in his teachings did not quite satisfy
them. They perhaps reasoned in this fashion: “If there were seven
Buddhas before the advent of the Great Muni of Çakya and there would
be one more who is to come, where, let us ask, did they derive their
authority and knowledge to preach? How is it that there cannot be any
more Buddhas, that they do not come to us much oftener? If they were
human beings like ourselves, why not we ourselves be Buddhas?” These
questions, when logically carried out, naturally led them to the
theory of Dharmakâya, that all the past Buddhas, and those to come,
and even we ordinary mortals made of clay and doomed to die soon, owe
the raison d’être of their existence to the Dharmakâya, which alone
is immortal in us {273} as well as in Buddhas. The first religious
effort we have to make is, therefore, to recognise this archetype of
all Buddhas and all beings. But the Dharmakâya as such is too abstract
for the average mind to become the object of its religious
consciousness; so they personified or rather materialised it. In other
words, they idealised Çâkyamuni, endowed him not only with the
physical signs (_lakṣas_) of greatness as in the Pâli scriptures,
but with those of celestial transfiguration, and called him a Body of
Bliss of the Tathâgata; while the historical human Buddha was called
a Body of Transformation and all sentient beings Bodhisattvas, that
is, beings of intelligence destined to become Buddhas.

This idealised Buddha, or, what is the same thing, a personified
Dharmakâya, according to the Mahâyâna Buddhists, not only revealed
himself in the particular person of Siddhârtha Gautama in Central
Asia a few thousand years ago, but is revealing himself in all times
and all places. There is no specially favored spot on the earth where
only the Buddha makes his appearance; from the zenith of Akaniṣta
heaven down to the bottom of Nâraka, he is manifesting uninterruptedly
and unintermittently and is working out his ideas, of which, however,
our limited understanding is unable to have an adequate knowledge. The
_Avatamsaka Sûtra_ (Buddhabhadra’s translation, fas. 45, chap. 34)
describes how the Buddha works out his scheme of salvation in all
possible ways. (See also the _Saddharma_ {274} _pundarîka_, Kern’s
translation, chap. 2, p. 30 et seq., and also pp. 413-411.).

“In this wise the Buddha teaches and delivers all sentient beings
through his religious teachings whose number is innumerable as atoms.
He may reveal sometimes in the world of devas, sometimes in that of
Nâgas, Yakṣas, Gandharvas, Asuras, Garudas, Kinnaras, Mahoragas, etc.,
sometimes in the world of Brahmans, sometimes in the world of human
beings, sometimes in the palace of Yâmarâja (king of death), sometimes
in the underworld of damned spirits, ghosts, and beasts. His
all-swaying compassion, intelligence, and will would not rest until
all beings had been brought under his shelter through all possible
means of salvation. He may achieve his work of redemption sometimes by
means of his name, sometimes by means of memory, sometimes of voice,
sometimes of perfect illumination, sometimes of the net of
illumination. Whenever and wherever conditions are ripe for his
appearance, he would never fail to present himself before sentient
beings and also to manifest views of grandeur and splendor.

“The Buddha does not depart from his own region, he does not depart
from his seat in the tower; yet he reveals himself in all the ten
quarters of the globe. He would sometimes emanate from his own body
the clouds of Nirmânakâyas, or sometimes reveal himself in an
undivided personality, and itinerating in all quarters would teach and
deliver all sentient beings. He may assume sometimes the form of a
Çrâvaka, sometimes that of a Brahmadeva, sometimes that of {275} an
ascetic, sometimes that of a good physician, sometimes that of a
tradesman, sometimes that of a Bhikṣu [or honest worker], sometimes
that of an artist, sometimes that of a deva. Again, he may reveal
himself sometimes in all the forms of art and industry, sometimes in
all the places of congregation, such as towns, cities, villages, etc.
And whatever his subjects for salvation may be, and whatever his
surroundings, he will accommodate himself to all possible conditions
and achieve his work of enlightenment and salvation”[118]....

The practical sequence of this doctrine of Trikâya is apparent; it
has ever more broadened the spirit of tolerance in Buddhists. As the
Dharmakâya universally responds to the spiritual needs of all sentient
beings in all times and in all places and at any stage of their
spiritual development, Buddhists consider all spiritual leaders,
whatever their nationality and personality, as the expressions of the
one omnipotent Dharmakâya. And as the Dharmakâya always manifests
itself for the best interests of sentient creatures, even those
doctrines and their authors that are apparently against the teachings
of Buddhism are tolerated through the conviction that they are all
moving according to the Spontaneous Will that pervades everywhere and
works all the time. Though, superficially, they may appear as evils,
their central and final aim is goodness and harmony which are destined
by the Will of the Dharmakâya to overcome this world of tribulations
and {276} contradictions. The general intellectual tendency of
Buddhism has done a great deal towards cultivating a tolerant spirit
in its believers, and we must say that the doctrine of Trinity which
appears sometimes too radical in its pantheistic spirit has
contributed much to this cause.




 CHAPTER XI.
 THE BODHISATTVA.

{277}

/Next/ to the conception of Buddha, what is important in Mahâyâna
Buddhism is that of Bodhisattva (intelligence-being) and of that which
constitutes its essence, Bodhicitta, intelligence-heart. As stated
above, the followers of Mahâyânism do not call themselves Çrâvakas
or Pratyekabuddhas or Arhats as do those of Hînayânism; but they
distinguish themselves by the title of Bodhisattva. What this means
will be the subject-matter of this chapter.

Let us begin with a quotation from the _Saddharma-pundarîka Sûtra_,
in which a well-defined distinction between the Çrâvakas and the
Pratyekabuddhas and the Bodhisattvas is given.[119]


 _The Three Yânas._

“Now, Çâriputra, the beings who have become wise, have faith in the
Tathâgata, the father of the world, and consequently apply themselves
to his commandments.

“Amongst them there are some who, wishing to follow the dictate of an
authoritative voice, apply themselves to the commandment of the
Tathâgata to {278} acquire the knowledge of the Four Great Truths,
for the sake of their own complete Nirvana. These, one may say, to be
those who, seeking the vehicle of the Çrâvaka, fly from the triple
world.....

“Other beings desirous of the unconditioned knowledge, of
self-restraint and tranquillity, apply themselves to the commandment
of the Tathâgata to learn to understand the Twelve Chains of
Dependence, for the sake of their own complete Nirvana. These, one may
say, to be those who, seeking the vehicle of the Pratyekabuddha, fly
from the triple world.....

“Other beings again desirous of omniscience, Buddha-knowledge,
absolute knowledge, unconditioned knowledge, apply themselves to the
commandment of the Tathâgata and to learn to understand the knowledge,
powers, and conviction of the Tathâgata, for the sake of the common
weal and happiness, out of compassion to the world, for the benefit,
weal and happiness of the world at large, of both gods and men, for
the sake of the complete Nirvana of all beings. These, one may say,
to be those who seeking the Great Vehicle (_Mahâyâna_) fly from the
triple world. Therefore, they are called Bodhisattva-mahâsattvas.”.....

This characterisation of the Bodhisattvas as distinct from the
Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas constitutes one of the most significant
features of Mahâyâna Buddhism. Here the Bodhisattva does not exert
himself in religious discipline for the sake of his own weal, but for
the sake of the spiritual benefit of all his fellow-creatures. If he
will, he could, {279} like the Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, enter
into eternal Nirvana that never slides back; he could enjoy the
celestial bliss of undisturbed tranquillity in which all our worldly
tribulations are forever buried; he could seclude himself from the
hurly-burly of the world, and, sitting cross-legged in a lonely cave,
quietly contemplate on the evanescence of human interests and the
frivolity of earthly affairs, and then self-contentedly await the time
of final absorption into the absolute All, as streams and rivers
finally run into one great ocean and become of one taste. But, in
spite of all these self-sufficient blessings, the Bodhisattva would
not seek his own ease, but he would mingle himself in the turmoil of
worldly life and devote all his energy to the salvation of the masses
of people, who, on account of their ignorance and infatuation, are
forever transmigrating in the triple world, without making any
progress towards the final goal of humanity.

Along this Bodhisattvaic devotion, however, there was another current
of religious thought and practice running among the followers of
Buddha. By this I mean the attitude of the Çrâvakas and the
Pratyekabuddhas. Both of them sought peace of mind in asceticism and
cold philosophical speculation. Both of them were intently inclined to
gain Nirvana which may be likened unto an extinguished fire. It was
not theirs to think of the common weal of all beings, and, therefore,
when they attained their own redemption from earthly sins and
passions, their religious discipline was completed, and no further
attempt was {280} made by them to extend the bliss of their personal
enlightenment to their fellow-creatures.[120] They recoiled from
mingling themselves among vulgar people lest their holy life should
get contaminated. They did not have confidence enough in their own
power to help the masses to break the iron yoke of ignorance and
misery. Moreover, everybody was supposed to exert himself for his own
emancipation, however unbearable his pain was for others could not do
anything to alleviate it. Sympathy was of no avail; because the reward
of his own karma good or evil could be suffered by himself alone, nor
could it be avoidable even by the doer himself. Things done were done
{281} once for all, and their karma made an indelible mark on the
pages of his destiny. Even Buddha who was supposed to have attained
that exalted position by practising innumerable pious deeds in all his
former lives, could not escape the fruit of evil karma which was quite
unwittingly committed by him. This iron arm of karma seizes everybody
in person and does not allow any substitute whatever. Those who wish
to give a halt to the working of karma could do so only by applying a
counter-force to it, and this with no other hand than his own. The
Mahâyânist conception of Bodhisattvahood may be considered an effort
somewhat to mitigate this ruthless mechanical rigidity of the law of
karma.

{282}


 _Strict Individualism._

The Buddhism of the Çrâvakas and the Pratyekabuddhas is the most
unscrupulous application to our ethico-religious life of the
individualistic theory of karma. All things done are done by oneself;
all things left undone are left undone by oneself. They would say:
“Your salvation is exclusively your own business, and whatever
sympathy I may have is of no avail. All that I can do toward helping
you is to let you see intellectually the way to emancipation. If you
do not follow it, you have but to suffer the fruition of your folly. I
am helpless with all my enlightenment, even with my Nirvana, to
emancipate you from the misery of perpetual metempsychosis.” But with
the Buddhism of the Mahâyâna Bodhisattvas the case is entirely
different. It is all-sympathy, it is all-compassion, it is all-love. A
Bodhisattva would not seclude himself into the absolute tranquillity
of Nirvana, simply because he wishes to emancipate his
fellow-creatures also from the bondage of ignorance and infatuation.
Whatever rewards he may get for his self-enjoyment as the karma of his
virtuous deeds, he would turn them over (_parivarta_) towards the
uplifting of the suffering masses. And this self-sacrifice, this
unselfish devotion to the welfare of his fellow-beings constitutes the
essence of Bodhisattvahood. The ideal Bodhisattva, therefore, is
thought to be no more than an incarnation of Intelligence and Love, of
Prajñâ and Karunâ.

The irrefragability of karma seems to be satisfactory {283} from the
intellectual and individualistic standpoint, for the intellect demands
a thorough application of logic, and individualism does not allow the
transferring of responsibility from one person to another. From this
viewpoint, therefore, a rigorous enforcement as demanded by Hînayânism
of the principle of self-emancipation does not show any logical fault;
divine grace must be suspended as the curse of karma produced by
ignorance tenaciously clings to our soul. But when viewed from the
religious side of the question, this inflexibility of karma is more
than poor mortals can endure. They want something more elastic and
pliable that yields to the supplication of the feeling. When
individuals are considered nothing but isolated, disconnected atoms,
between which there is no unifying bond which is the feeling, they are
too weak to resist and overcome the ever-threatening force of evil,
whose reality as long as a world of particulars exists cannot be
contradicted. This religious necessity felt in our inmost
consciousness may explain the reason why Mahâyâna Buddhism proposed
the doctrine of parivarta (turning over) founded on the oneness of
Dharmakâyâ.


 _The Doctrine of Parivarta._

The doctrine of turning over (_parivarta_) of one’s own merits to
others is a great departure from that which seems to have been the
teaching of “primitive Buddhism.” In fact, it is more than a departure,
it {284} is even in opposition to the latter in some measure. Because
while individualism is a predominant feature in the religious practice
of the Çrâvakas and the Pratyekabuddhas, universalism or
supra-individualism, if I am allowed to use these terms, is the
principle advocated by the Bodhisattvas. The latter believe that all
beings, being a manifestation of the Dharmakâya, are in their essence
of one nature; that individual existences are real so far as
subjective ignorance is concerned; and that virtues and merits issuing
directly from the Dharmakâya which is intelligence and love, cannot
fail to produce universal benefit and to effect final emancipation of
all beings. Thus, the religion of the Bodhisattvas proposes to achieve
what was thought impossible by the Çrâvakas and the Pratyekabuddhas,
that is, the turning over of one’s own merits to the service of others.

It is in this spirit that the Bodhisattvas conceive the seriousness of
the significance of life; it is in this spirit that, pondering over
the reason of their existence on earth, they come to the following
view of life:

“All ignorant beings are daily and nightly performing evil deeds in
innumerable ways; and, on this account, their suffering beggars
description. They do not recognise the Tathâgata, do not listen to
his teachings, do not pay homage to the congregation of holy men. And
this evil karma will surely bring them a heavy crop of misery. This
reflection fills the heart of a Bodhisattva with gloomy feelings,
which in turn {285} gives rise to the immovable resolution, that he
himself will carry all the burdens for ignorant beings and help them
to reach the final goal of Nirvana. Inestimably heavy as these burdens
are, he will not swerve nor yield under their weight. He will not rest
until all ignorant beings are freed from the entangling meshes of
desire and sin, until they are uplifted above the darkening veil of
ignorance and infatuation; and this his marvelous spiritual energy
defies the narrow limitations of time and space, and will extend even
to eternity when the whole system of worlds comes to a conclusion.
Therefore, all the innumerable meritorious deeds practised by the
Bodhisattvas are dedicated to the emancipation of ignorant beings.

“The Bodhisattvas do not feel, however, that they are being compelled
by any external force to devote their lives to the edification and
uplifting of the masses. They do not recognise any outward authority,
the violation of which may react upon them in the form of a punishment.
They have already passed beyond this stage of world-conception which
implies a dualism; they are on the contrary moving in a much wider and
higher sphere of thought. All that is done by them springs from their
spontaneous will, from the free activity of the Bodhicitta, which
constitutes their reason of existence; and thus there is nothing
compulsory in their thoughts and movements. [To use Laotzean
terminology, they are practising non-action, _wu wei_, and whatever
may appear to the ignorant and unenlightened as a strenuous and
restless life, is merely a natural {286} overflow from the
inexhaustible fount of energy called Bodhicitta, heart of
intelligence].”[121]


 _Bodhisattva in “Primitive” Buddhism._

The notion of Bodhisattva was not entirely absent in “primitive”
Buddhism, only it did not have such a wide signification. All Buddhas
were Bodhisattvas in their former lives. The Jâtaka stories minutely
describe what self-sacrificing deeds were done by them and how by the
karma of these merits they finally attained Buddhahood. Çâkyamuni
was not the only Buddha, but there had already been seven or
twenty-four Buddhas prior to him, and the coming Buddha to be known as
Maitreya is believed to be disciplining himself in the Tuṣita heaven
and going through the stages of Bodhisattvahood. The one who is thus
destined to be the future Buddha must be extraordinarily gifted in
spiritual energy. He must pass through eons of self-discipline, must
practise deeds of non-atman with unflinching courage and fortitude
through innumerable existences.

The following quotation from the Jâtaka tales will be sufficient to
see what ponderous and exacting conditions were conceived by the
so-called Hînayânists to be necessary for a human being to become a
fully qualified Buddha.[122]

{287}

“Of men it is he, and only he, who is in a fit condition by the
attainment of saintship in that same existence, that can successfully
make a wish to be a Buddha. Of those in a fit condition it is only he
who makes the wish in the presence of a living Buddha that succeeds in
his wish; after the death of a Buddha a wish made at a relic shrine,
or at the foot of a Bo-tree, will not be successful. Of those who make
the wish in the presence of a Buddha it is he and only he who has
retired from the world that can successfully make the wish, and not
one who is a layman. Of those who have retired from the world it is
only he who is possessed of the Five High Powers and is master of the
Eight Attainments that can successfully make the wish, and no one can
do so who is lacking in these excellences. Of those, even, who possess
these excellences, it is he, and only he, who has such firm resolve
that he is ready to sacrifice his life for the Buddhas that can
successfully make the wish, but no other. Of those who possess this
resolve it is he, and only he, who has great zeal, determination,
strenuousness, and endeavor in striving for the qualities that make a
Buddha that is successful. The following comparisons will show the
intensity of the zeal. If he is such a one as to think: ‘The man who,
if all within the rim of the world were to become water, would be
ready to swim across it with his own arms and get further shore,--he
is the one to attain the Buddhaship: or, in case all within the rim of
the world were to become a {288} jungle of bamboo, would be ready to
elbow and trample his way through it and get to the further side,--he
is the one to attain the Buddhaship; or, in case all within the rim of
the world were to become a _terra firma_ of thick-set javelins, would
be ready to tread on them and go afoot to the further side,--he is the
one to attain the Buddhaship; or, in case all within the rim of the
world were to become live coals, would be ready to tread on them and
so get to the further side,--he is the one to attain the
Buddhaship,’--if he deems not even one of these feats too hard for
himself but has such great zeal, determination, strenuousness, and
power of endeavor that he would perform these feats in order to attain
the Buddhaship, then, but not otherwise, will his wish succeed.”

From this it is apparent that everybody could not become a Buddha in
“primitive” Buddhism; the highest aspiration that could be cherished
by him was to believe in the teachings of Buddha, to follow the
precepts laid down by him, and to attain at most to Arhatship. The
idea of Arhatship, however, was considered by Mahâyânists cold,
impassionate, and hard-hearted, for the saint calmly reviews the sight
of the suffering masses; and therefore Arhatship was altogether
unsatisfactory to be the object for the Bodhisattvas of their high
religious aspirations.

The Mahâyânists wanted to go even beyond the attainment of Arhatship,
however exalted its spirituality may be. They wanted to make every
humble soul {289} a being like Çâkyamuni, they wanted lavishly to
distribute the bliss of enlightenment; they wanted to remove all the
barriers that were supposed to lie between Buddhahood and the common
humanity. But how could they do this when the iron hands of karma held
tight the fate of each individual! How was it possible for him to
identify his being with the ideal of mankind? Perhaps this serious
problem could not very well be solved by Buddhists, when their memory
of the majestic personality of Çâkyamuni was still vivid before their
mental eyes. It was probably no easy task for them to overcome the
feeling of awe and reverence which was so deeply engraved in their
hearts, and to raise themselves to such a height as reached by their
Master, even ideally. This was certainly an act of sacrilege. But, as
time advances, the personal recollection of the Master would naturally
wane and would not play so much influence as their own religious
consciousness which is ever fresh and active. Generally speaking, all
great historical characters that command the reverence and awe of
posterity do so only when their words or acts or both unravel the
deepest secrets of the human heart. And this feeling of awe and
reverence and even of worship is not due so much to the great
characters themselves as to the worshiper’s own religious
consciousness. History passes, but the heart persists. An individual
called Çâkyamuni may be forgotten in the course of time, but the
sacred chord in the inmost heart struck by him reverberates through
eternity. So with the Mahâyâna Buddhists, {290} the religious sentiment
at last asserted itself in spite of the personal recollection and
reverential feeling for the Master. And perhaps in the following way
was the reasoning then advanced by them relative to the great problem
of Buddhahood.


 _We are all Bodhisattvas._

As Çâkyamuni was a Bodhisattva in his former lives destined to become
a Buddha, so we are all Bodhisattvas and even Buddhas in a certain
sense, when we understand that all sentient beings, the Buddha not
excepted, are one in the Dharmakâya. The Dharmakâya manifests in us as
Bodhi which is the essence of Buddhas as well as of Bodhisattvas. This
Bodhi can suffer no change whatever in quantity even when the
Bodhisattva attains finally to the highest human perfection as
Çâkyamuni Buddha. In this spirit, therefore, the Buddha exclaimed when
he obtained enlightenment, “It is marvelous indeed that all beings
animate and inanimate universally partake of the nature of
Tathâgatahood.” The only difference between a Buddha and the ignorant
masses is that the latter do not make manifest in them the glory of
Bodhi.

They only are not Bodhisattvas who, enveloped in the divine rays of
light in a celestial abode, philosophically review the world of
tribulations. Even we mortals made of dust are Bodhisattvas,
incarnates of the Bodhi, capable of being united in the all-embracing
love of the Dharmakâya and also of obliterating the {291} individual
curse of karma in the eternal and absolute intelligence of the
Dharmakâya. As soon as we come to live in this love and intelligence,
individual existences are no hindrance to the turning over
(_parivarta_) of one’s spiritual merits (_punya_) to the service of
others. Let us only have an insight into the spirituality of our
existence and we are all Bodhisattvas and Buddhas. Let us abandon the
selfish thought of entering into Nirvana that is conceived to
extinguish the fire of heart and leave only the cold ashes of
intellect. Let us have sympathy for all suffering beings and turn over
all our merits, however small, to their benefit and happiness. For in
this way we are all made the Bodhisattvas.[123]


 _The Buddha’s Life._

This spirit of universal love prevails in all Mahâyâna literature,
and the Bodhisattvas are everywhere represented as exercising it with
utmost energy. The Mahâyânists, therefore, could not rest satisfied
with a simple, prosaic, and earthly account of Çâkyamuni, {292} they
wanted to make it as ideal and poetic as possible, illustrating the
gospel of love, as was conceived by them, in every phase of the life
of the Buddha.

The Mahâyânists first placed the Buddha in the Tuṣita heaven before
his birth, (as was done by the Hînayânists), made him feel pity for
the distressed world below, made him resolve to deliver it from “the
ocean of misery which throws up sickness as its foam, tossing with the
waves of old age, and rushing with the dreadful onflow of death,” and
after his Parinirvana, they made him abide forever on the peak of the
Mount Vulture delivering the sermon of immortality to a great
assemblage of spiritual beings. In this wise, they explained the
significance of the appearance of Çâkyamuni on earth, which was
nothing but a practical demonstration of the “Great Loving Heart”
(_mahâkarunâcitta_).


 _The Bodhisattva and Love._

Nâgârjuna in his work on the _Bodhicitta_[124] elucidates the
Mahâyânist notion of Bodhisattvahood as follows:

“Thus the essential nature of all Bodhisattvas is a great loving heart
(_mahâkarunâcitta_), and all sentient beings constitute the object
of its love. Therefore, all the Bodhisattvas do not cling to the
blissful taste {293} that is produced by the divers modes of mental
tranquilisation (_dhyâna_), do not covet the fruit of their
meritorious deeds, which may heighten their own happiness.

“Their spiritual state is higher than that of the Çrâvakas, for they
do not leave all sentient beings behind them [as the Çrâvakas do].
They practise altruism, they seek the fruit of Buddha-knowledge
[instead of Çrâvaka-knowledge].

“With a great loving heart they look upon the sufferings of all
beings, who are diversely tortured in Avici Hell in consequence of
their sins--a hell whose limits are infinite and where an endless
round of misery is made possible on account of all sorts of karma
[committed by sentient creatures]. The Bodhisattvas filled with pity
and love desire to suffer themselves for the sake of those miserable
beings.

“But they are well acquainted with the truth that all those diverse
sufferings causing diverse states of misery are in one sense
apparitional and unreal, while in another sense they are not so. They
know also that those who have an intellectual insight into the
emptiness (_çûnyatâ_) of all existences, thoroughly understand why
those rewards of karma are brought forth in such and such ways
[through ignorance and infatuation].

“Therefore, all Bodhisattvas, in order to emancipate sentient beings
from misery, are inspired with great spiritual energy and mingle
themselves in the filth of birth and death. Though thus they make
themselves {294} subject to the laws of birth and death, their hearts
are free from sins and attachments. They are like unto those
immaculate, undefiled lotus-flowers which grow out of mire, yet are
not contaminated by it.

“Their great hearts of sympathy which constitute the essence of their
being never leave suffering creatures behind [in their journey towards
enlightenment]. Their spiritual insight is in the emptiness
(_çûnyatâ_) of things, but [their work of salvation] is never outside
the world of sins and sufferings.”


 _The Meaning of Bodhi and Bodhicitta._

What is the meaning of the word “Bodhisattva”? It is a Sanskrit term
consisting of two words, “Bodhi,” and “sattva.” _Bodhi_ which comes
from the root _budh_ meaning “to wake,” is generally rendered
“knowledge” or “intelligence.” _Sattva_ (_sat-tva_) literally means
“state of being”; thus “existence,” “creature,” or “that which is,”
being its English equivalent. “Bodhisattva” as one word means “a being
of intelligence,” or “a being whose essence is intelligence.” Why the
Mahâyânists came to adopt this word in contradistinction to Çrâvaka is
easily understood, when we see what special significance they attached
to the conception of Bodhi in their philosophy. When Bodhi was used by
the Çrâvakas in the simple sense of knowledge, it did not bear any
particular import. But as soon as it came to express some metaphysical
relation to the conception of Dharmakâya, it ceased to be used in its
generally accepted sense.

{295}

Bodhi, according to the Mahâyânists, is an expression of the
Dharmakâya in the human consciousness. Philosophically speaking,
Suchness or Bhûtatathâtâ is an ontological term, and Dharmakâya or
Tathâgata or Buddha bears a religious significance; while all these
three, Bodhi, Bhûtatathâtâ, and Dharmakâya, and their synonyms are
nothing but different aspects of one and the same reality refracting
through the several defective lenses of a finite intellect.

Bodhi, though essentially an epistemological term, assumes a
psychological sense when it is used in conjunction with citta, i.e.
heart or soul. Bodhicitta, or Bodhihṛdaya which means the same thing,
is more generally used than Bodhi singly in the Mahâyâna texts,
especially when its religious import is emphasised above its
intellectual one. Bodhicitta, viz. intelligence-heart is a reflex in
the human heart of its religious archetype, the Dharmakâya.

Bodhicitta when further amplified is called
anuttara-samyak-sambodhicitta, that is, “intelligence-heart that is
supreme and most perfect.”

It will be easily understood now that what constitutes the essence of
the Bodhicitta is the very same thing that makes up the Dharmakâya.
For the former is nothing but an expression of the latter, though
finitely, fragmentarily, imperfectly realised in us. The citta is an
image and the Dharmakâya the prototype, yet one is just as real as
the other, only the two must not be conceived dualistically. There is
a Dharmakâya, there is a human heart, and the former reflects itself
{296} in the latter much after the fashion of the lunar reflection in
the water:--to think in this wise is not perfectly correct; because
the fundamental teaching of Buddhism is to view all these three
conceptions, the Dharmakâya, human heart, and the reflections of the
former in the latter, as different forms of one and the same activity.


 _Love and Karunâ._

The Bodhicitta or Intelligence-heart, therefore, like the Dharmakâya
is essentially love and intelligence, or, to use Sanskrit terms,
_karunâ_ and _prajñâ_. Here some may object to the use of the term
“love” for karunâ, perhaps on the ground that karunâ does not exactly
correspond to the Christian notion of love, as it savors more of the
sense of commiseration. But if we understand by love a sacrifice of
the self for the sake of others (and it cannot be more than that),
then karunâ can correctly be rendered love, even in the Christian
sense. Is not the Bodhisattva willing to abandon his own Nirvanic
peace for the interests of suffering creatures? Is he not willing to
dedicate the karma of his meritorious deeds performed in his
successive existences to the general welfare of his fellow-beings? Is
not his one fundamental motive that governs all his activities in life
directed towards a universal emancipation of all sentient beings? Is
he not perfectly willing to forsake all the thoughts and passions that
arise from egoism and to embrace the will of the Dharmakâya? If this
be the case, then there is {297} no reason why karunâ should not
be rendered by love.

Christians say that without love we are become sounding brass or a
tinkling cymbal; and Buddhists would declare that without karunâ we
are like unto a dead vine hanging over a frozen boulder, or like unto
the cold ashes left after a blazing fire.

Some may say, however, that the Buddhist sympathy or commiseration
somewhat betrays a sense of passive contemplation on evils. When
Christians say that God loves his creatures, the love implies activity
and shows God’s willingness to do whatever for the actual benefits of
his subject-beings. Quite true. Yet when the Buddha is stated to have
declared that all sentient beings in the triple world are his own
children or that he will not enter into his final Nirvana unless all
beings in the three thousand great chiliocosms, not a single soul
excepted, are emancipated from the misery of birth and death, his
self-sacrificing love must be considered to be all-comprehensive and
at the same time full of energy and activity. Whatever objections
there may be, we do not see any sufficient reason against speaking of
the love-essence of the Dharmakâya and the Bodhicitta.


 _Nâgârjuna and Sthiramati on the Bodhicitta._

Says Nâgârjuna in his _Discourse on the Transcendentality of the
Bodhicitta_: “The Bodhicitta is free from all determinations, that is,
it is not included in the categories of the five skandhas, the twelve
âyatanas, and the eighteen dhâtus. It is not a particular {298}
existence which is palpable. It is non-atmanic, universal. It is
uncreated and its self-essence is void [_çûnya_, immaterial, or
transcendental].

“One who understands the nature of the Bodhicitta sees everything with
a loving heart, for love is the essence of the Bodhicitta.

“The Bodhicitta is the highest essence.

“Therefore, all Bodhisattvas find their raison d’être of existence in
this great loving heart.

“The Bodhicitta, abiding in the heart of sameness (_samatâ_) creates
individual means of salvation (_upaya_).[125] {299} One who
understands this heart becomes emancipated from the dualistic view of
birth and death and performs such acts as are beneficial both to
oneself and to others.”

Sthiramati advocates in his _Discourse on the
Mahâyâna-Dharmadhâtu_[126] the same view as Nâgârjuna’s on the
nature of the Bodhicitta, which I summarise here: “Nirvâna, Dharmakâya,
Tathâgata, Tathâgata-garbha, Paramârtha, Buddha, Bodhicitta, or
Bhûtatathâtâ,--all these terms signify merely so many different
aspects of one and the same reality; and Bodhicitta is the name given
to a form of the Dharmakâya or Bhûtatathâtâ as it manifests itself in
the human heart, and its perfection, or negatively its liberation from
all egoistic impurities, constitutes the state of Nirvana.”

Being a reflex of the Dharmakâya, the Bodhicitta is practically the
same as the original in all its characteristics; so continues
Sthiramati: “It is free from compulsive activities; it has no
beginning, it has no end; it cannot be defiled by impurities, it
cannot be obscured by egoistic individualistic prejudices; it is
incorporeal, it is the spiritual essence of Buddhas, {300} it is the
source of all virtues earthly as well as transcendental; it is
constantly becoming, yet its original purity is never lost.

“It may be likened unto the ever-shining sunlight which may
temporarily be hidden behind the clouds. All the modes of passion and
sin arising from egoism may sometimes darken the light of the
Bodhicitta, but the Citta itself forever remains free from these
external impurities. It may again be likened unto all-comprehending
space which remains eternally identical, whatever happenings and
changes may occur in things enveloped therein. When the Bodhicitta
manifests itself in a relative world, it looks as if being subject to
constant becoming, but in reality it transcends all determinations, it
is above the reach of birth and death (_samsâra_).

“So long as it remains buried under innumerable sins arising from
ignorance and egoism, it is productive of no earthly or heavenly
benefit. Like the lotus-flower whose petals are yet unfolded, like the
gold that is deeply entombed under the débris of dung and dirt, or
like the light of the full moon eclipsed by Açura; the Bodhicitta,
when blindfolded by the clouds of passion, avarice, ignorance, and
folly, does not reveal its intrinsic spiritual worth.

“Destroy at once with your might and main all those entanglements;
then like the full-bloomed lotus-flower, like genuine gold purified
from dirt and dust, like the moon in a cloudless sky, like the sun in
its full glory, like mother earth producing all kinds of {301}
cereals, like the ocean containing innumerable treasures, the eternal
bliss of the Bodhicitta will be upon all sentient beings. All sentient
beings are then emancipated from the misery of ignorance and folly,
their hearts are filled with love and sympathy and free from the
clinging to things worthless.

“However defiled and obscured the Bodhicitta may find itself in
profane hearts, it is essentially the same as that in all Buddhas.
Therefore, says the Muni of Çakya: ‘O Çâriputra, the world of sentient
beings is not different from the Dharmakâya; the Dharmakâya is not
different from the world of sentient beings. What constitutes the
Dharmakâya is the world of sentient beings; and what constitutes the
world of sentient beings is the Dharmakâya.’

“As far as the Dharmakâya or the Bodhicitta is concerned, there is no
radical distinction to be made between profane hearts and the Buddha’s
heart; yet when observed from the human standpoint [that is, from the
phenomenal side of existence] the following general classification can
be made:

“(1) The heart hopelessly distorted by numberless egoistic sins and
condemned to an eternal transmigration of birth and death which began
in the timeless past, is said to be in the state of profanity.

“(2) The heart that, loathing the misery of wandering in birth and
death and taking leave of all sinful and depraved conditions, seeks
the Bodhi in the ten virtues of perfection (_pâramitâ_) and 84,000
Buddha-dharmas and disciplines itself in all meritorious deeds, {302}
is said to be the [spiritual] state of a Bodhisattva.

“(3) The state in which the heart is emancipated from the obscuration
of all passions, has distanced all sufferings, has eternally effaced
the stain of all sins and corruptions, is pure, purer, and purest,
abides in the essence of Dharma, has reached the height from which the
states of all sentient beings are surveyed, has attained the
consummation of all knowledges, has realised the highest type of
manhood, has gained the power of spiritual spontaneity which frees one
from attachment and hesitation,--this spiritual state is that of the
fully, perfectly, enlightened Tathâgata”.


 _The Awakening of the Bodhicitta._

The Bodhicitta is present in the hearts of all sentient beings. Only
in Buddhas it is fully awakened and active with its immaculate
virility, while in ordinary mortals it is dormant and miserably
crippled by its unenlightened intercourse with the world of
sensuality. One of the most favorite parables told by the Mahâyânists
to illustrate this point is to compare the Bodhicitta to the moonlight
in the heavens. When the moon shines with her silvery light in the
clear, cloudless skies, she is reflected in every drop and in every
mass of water on the earth. The crystal dews on the quivering leaves
reflect her like so many pearls hung on the branches. Every little
water-pool, probably formed temporarily by heavy showers in the
daytime, reflects her like so many stars descended {303} on earth.
Perhaps some of the pools are muddy and others even filthy, but the
moonlight does not refuse to reflect her immaculate image in them. The
image is just as perfect there as in a clear, undisturbed, transparent
lake, where cows quench their thirst and swans bathe their taintless
feathers. Wherever there is the least trace of water, there is seen a
heavenly image of the goddess of night. Even so with the Bodhicitta:
where there exists a little warmth of the heart, there it unfailingly
glorifies itself in its best as circumstances permit.

Now, the question is: How should this dormant Bodhicitta in our hearts
be awakened to its full sense? This is answered more or less
definitely in almost all the Mahâyâna writings, and we may here
recite the words of Vasubandhu from his _Discourse on the Awakening of
the Bodhicitta_,[127] for they give us a somewhat systematic
statement of those conditions which tend to awaken the Bodhicitta from
its lethargic inactivity. (Chap. II.)

The Bodhicitta or Intelligence-heart is awakened in us (1) by thinking
of the Buddhas, (2) by reflecting on the faults of material existence,
(3) by observing the deplorable state in which sentient beings are
living, and finally (4) by aspiring after those virtues which are
acquired by a Tathâgata in the highest enlightenment.

{304}

To describe these conditions more definitely:

(1) _By thinking of the Buddhas._ “All Buddhas in the ten quarters, of
the past, of the future, and of the present, when first started on
their way to enlightenment, were not quite free from passions and sins
(_kleça_) any more than we are at present; but they finally succeeded
in attaining the highest enlightenment and became the noblest beings.

“All the Buddhas, by strength of their inflexible spiritual energy,
were capable of attaining perfect enlightenment. If enlightenment is
attainable at all, why should we not attain it?

“All the Buddhas, erecting high the torch of wisdom through the
darkness of ignorance and keeping awake an excellent heart, submitted
themselves to penance and mortification, and finally emancipated
themselves from the bondage of the triple world. Following their
steps, we, too, could emancipate ourselves.

“All the Buddhas, the noblest type of mankind, successfully crossed
the great ocean of birth and death and of passions and sins; why,
then, we, being creatures of intelligence, could also cross the sea of
transmigration.

“All the Buddhas manifesting great spiritual power sacrificed the
possessions, body, and life, for the attainment of omniscience
(_sarvajñâ_); and we, too, could follow their noble examples.”

(2) _The faults of the material existence._ “This our bodily existence
consisting of the five skandhas and the four mahats (elements) is a
perpetuator of innumerable {305} evil deeds; and therefore it should
be cast aside. This our bodily existence constantly secretes from its
nine orifices filths and impurities which are truly loathsome; and
therefore it should be cast aside. This our bodily existence,
harboring within itself anger, avarice, and infatuation, and other
innumerable evil passions, consumes a good heart; and therefore it
should be destroyed. This our bodily existence is like a bubble, like
a spatter, and is decaying every minute. It is an undesirable
possession and should be abandoned. This our bodily existence engulfed
in ignorance is creating evil karma all the time, which throws us into
the whirlpool of transmigration through the six gatis.”

(3) _The miserable conditions of sentient beings which arouse the
sympathy of the Bodhisattvas._ “All sentient beings are under the
bondage of ignorance. Spell-bound by folly and infatuation, they are
suffering the severest pain. Not believing in the law of karma, they
are accumulating evils; going astray from the path of righteousness,
they are following false doctrines; sinking deeper in the whirlpool of
passions, they are being drowned in the four waters of sin.

“They are being tortured with all sorts of pain. They are needlessly
haunted by the fear of birth and death and old age, and do not seek
the path of emancipation. Mortified with grief, anxiety, tribulation,
they do not refrain from committing further foul deeds. Clinging to
their beloved ones and being always afraid of separation, they do not
understand that there {306} is no individual reality, that individual
existences are not worth clinging to. Trying to shun enmity, hatred,
pain, they cherish more hatred.”........

(4) _The virtues of the Tathâgata._ “All the Tathâgatas, by virtue
of their discipline, have acquired a noble, dignified mien which
aspires every beholder with the thought that dispels pain and woe. The
Dharmakâya of all the Tathâgatas is immortal and pure and free from
evil attachments. All the Tathâgatas are possessed of moral
discipline, tranquillity, intelligence, and emancipation. They are not
hampered by intellectual prejudices and have become the sanctuary of
immaculate virtues. They have the ten bâlas (powers), four abhayas
(fearlessness), great compassion, and the three smṛtyupasthânas
(contemplations). They are omniscient, and their love for suffering
beings knows no bounds and brings all creatures back to the path of
righteousness, who have gone astray on account of ignorance.”

 * * *

In short, the Intelligence-heart or Bodhicitta is awakened in us
either when love for suffering creatures (which is innate in us) is
called forth, or when our intellect aspires after the highest
enlightenment, or when these two psychical activities are set astir
under some favorable circumstances. As the Bodhicitta is a
manifestation of the Dharmakâya in our limited conscious mind, it
constantly longs for a unification with {307} its archetype, in spite
of the curse of ignorance heavily weighing upon it. When this
unification is not effected for any reason, the heart (_citta_) shows
its dissatisfaction in some way or other. The dissatisfaction may take
sometimes a morbid course, and may result in pessimism, or misanthropy,
or suicide, or asceticism, or some other kindred eccentric practices.
But if properly guided and naturally developed, the more intense the
dissatisfaction, the more energetic will be the spiritual activity of
a Bodhisattva.


 _The Bodhisattva’s Pranidhâna._

Having awakened his Bodhicitta from its unconscious slumber, a
Bodhisattva will now proceed to make his vows.

Let me remark here, however, that “vow” is not a very appropriate term
to express the meaning of the Sanskrit _pranidhâna_. Pranidhâna is a
strong wish, aspiration, prayer, or an inflexible determination to
carry out one’s will even through an infinite series of rebirths.
Buddhists have such a supreme belief in the power of will or spirit
that, whatever material limitations, the will is sure to triumph over
them and gain its final aim. So, every Bodhisattva is considered to
have his own particular pranidhânas in order to perform his share in
the work of universal salvation. His corporeal shadow may vanish as
its karma is exhausted, but his pranidhâna survives and takes on a
new garment, which procedure being necessary to {308} keep it ever
effective. All that is needed for a Bodhisattva to do this is to make
himself a perfect incarnation of his own aspirations, putting
everything external and foreign under their controlling spiritual
power. Buddhists are so thoroughly idealistic and their faith in ideas
and ideals is so unshakable that they firmly believe that whatever
they aspire to will come out finally as real fact; and, therefore, the
more intense and permanent and born of the inmost needs of humanity,
the more certain are our yearnings to be satisfied. (This belief, by
the way, will help to explain the popular belief among the Buddhists
that any strong passion possessed by a man will survive him and take a
form, animate or inanimate, which will best achieve its end.)

According to Vasubandhu whom we have quoted several times, the
Bodhisattvas generally are supposed to make the following ten
pranidhânas, which naturally spring from a great loving heart now
awakened in them:[128]

(1) “Would that all the merits I have accumulated in the past as well
as in the present be distributed among all sentient beings and make
them all aspire after supreme knowledge, and also that this my
pranidhâna be constantly growing in strength and sustain me
throughout my rebirths.

(2) “Would that, through the merits of my work, {309} I may, wherever
I am born, come in the presence of all Buddhas and pay them homage.

(3) “Would that I be allowed all the time to be near Buddhas like
shadow following object, and never to be away from them.

(4) “Would that all Buddhas instruct me in religious truths as best
suited to my intelligence and let me finally attain the five spiritual
powers of the Bodhisattva.

(5) “Would that I be thoroughly conversant with scientific knowledge
as well as the first principle of religion and gain an insight into
the truth of the Good Law.

(6) “Would that I be able to preach untiringly the truth to all
beings, and gladden them, and benefit them, and make them intelligent.

(7) “Would that, through the divine power of the Buddha, I be allowed
to travel all over the ten quarters of the world, pay respect to all
the Buddhas, listen to their instructions in the Doctrine, and
universally benefit all sentient beings.

(8) “Would that, by causing the wheel of immaculate Dharma to revolve,
all sentient beings in the ten quarters of the universe who may listen
to my teachings or hear my name, be freed from all passions and awaken
in them the Bodhicitta.

(9) “Would that I all the time accompany and protect all sentient
beings and remove for them things which are not beneficial to them and
give them innumerable blessings, and also that through the sacrifice
{310} of my body, life, and possessions I embrace all creatures and
thereby practise the Right Doctrine.

(10) “Would that, though practising the Doctrine in person, my heart
be free from the consciousness of compulsion and unnaturalness, as all
the Bodhisattvas practise the Doctrine in such a way as not practising
it yet leaving nothing unpractised; for they have made their
pranidhânas for the sake of all sentient beings.”




 CHAPTER XII.
 TEN STAGES OF BODHISATTVAHOOD.

{311}


 _Gradation in our Spiritual Life._

/Theoretically/ speaking, as we have seen above, the Bodhi or
Bodhicitta is in every sentient being, and in this sense he is a
Bodhisattva. In profane hearts it may be found enveloped in ignorance
and egoism, but it can never be altogether annulled. For the Bodhi,
when viewed from its absolute aspect, transcends the realm of birth
and death (_samsâra_), is beyond the world of toil and trouble and is
not subject to any form of defilement. But when it assumes a relative
existence and is only partially manifested under the cover of
ignorance, there appear various stages of actualisation or of
perfection. In some beings it may attain a more meaningful expression
than in others, while there may be even those who apparently fail on
account of their accursed karma to show the evidence of its presence.
This latter class is usually called “Icchantika,” that is, people who
are completely overwhelmed by the passions. They are morally and
religiously a mere corpse which even a great spiritual physician finds
it almost impossible to resuscitate. But, philosophically considered,
the glory of the Bodhi must be admitted {312} to be shining even in
these dark, ignorant souls. Such souls, perhaps, will have to go round
many a cycle of transmigration, before their karma loses its poignancy
and becomes susceptible to a moral influence with which they may come
in contact.

This accursed force of karma is not the same in all beings, it admits
of all possible degrees of strength, and causes some to suffer more
intensely than others. But there is no human heart or soul that is
absolutely free from the shackle of karma and ignorance, because this
very existence of a phenomenal world is a product of ignorance, though
this fact does not prove that this life is evil. The only heart that
transcends the influence of karma and ignorance and is all-purity,
all-love, and all-intelligence, is the Dharmakâya or the absolute
Bodhi itself. The life of a Bodhisattva and indeed the end of our
religious aspiration is to unfold, realise, and identify ourselves
with the love and intelligence of that ideal and yet real Dharmakâya.

The awakening of the Bodhicitta (or intelligence-heart) marks the
first step towards the highest good of human life. This awakening must
pass through several stages of religious discipline before it attains
perfection. These stages are generally estimated by the Mahâyânists
at ten. They appear, however, to our modern sceptical minds to be of
no significant consequence, nor can we detect any very practical and
well-defined distinction between successive stages. We fail to
understand what religious necessity impelled the Hindu Buddhists to
establish such apparently unimportant {313} stages one after another
in our religious life. We can see, however, that the first awakening
of the Bodhicitta does not transform us all at once to Buddhahood; we
have yet to overcome with strenuous efforts the baneful influence of
karma and ignorance which asserts itself too readily in our practical
life. But the marking of stages as in the gradation of the Daçabhûmî
in our spiritual progress seems to be altogether too artificial.
Nevertheless I here take pains as an historical survey to enumerate
the ten stages and to give some features supposed to be most
characteristic of each Bhûmî (stage) as expounded in the _Avatamsaka
Sutra_. Probably they will help us to understand what moral
conceptions and what religious aspirations were working in the
establishment of the doctrine of Daçabhûmî, for it elaborately
describes what was considered by the Mahâyânists to be the essential
constituents of Bodhisattvahood, and also shows what spiritual routine
a Buddhist was expected to pursue.

The ten stages are: (1) Pramuditâ, (2) Vimalâ, (3) Prabhâkarî, (4)
Arcismatî, (5) Sudurjayâ, (6) Abhimukhî, (7) Dûrangamâ, (8) Acalâ, (9)
Sâdhumatî, (10) Dharmameghâ.


 (1) _The Pramuditâ._

Pramuditâ means “delight” or “joy” and marks the first stage of
Bodhisattvahood, at which the Buddhists emerge from a cold,
self-sufficing, and almost nihilistic contemplation of Nirvâna as
fostered by the Çrâvakas {314} and Pratyekabuddhas. This spiritual
emergence and emancipation is psychologically accompanied by an
intense feeling of joy, as that which is experienced by a person when
he unexpectedly recognises the most familiar face in a faraway land of
strangers. For this reason the first stage is called “joy.”

Even in the midst of perfect tranquillity of Nirvâna in which all
passions are alleged to have died away as declared by ascetics or
solitary philosophers, the inmost voice in the heart of the
Bodhisattva moans in a sort of dissatisfaction or uneasiness, which,
though undefined and seemingly of no significance, yet refuses to be
eternally buried in the silent grave of annihilation. He vainly gropes
in the darkness; he vainly seeks consolation in the samâdhi of
non-resistance or non-activity; he vainly finds eternal peace in the
gospel of self-negation; his soul is still troubled, not exactly
knowing the reason why. But as soon as the Bodhicitta
(intelligence-heart) is awakened from its somnolence, as soon as the
warmth of love (_mahâkarunâ_) penetrates into the coldest cell of
asceticism, as soon as the light of supreme enlightenment
(_mahâprajñâ_) dawns upon the darkest recesses of ignorance, the
Bodhisattva sees at once that the world is not made for self-seclusion
nor for self-negation, that the Dharmakâya is the source of “universal
effulgence,” that Nirvâna if relatively viewed in contrast to
birth-and-death is nothing but sham and just as unreal as any worldly
existence; and these insights finally lead him to feel that he cannot
rest quiet until all sentient beings are {315} emancipated from the
snarl of ignorance and elevated to the same position as now occupied
by himself.


 (2) _The Vimalâ._

Vimalâ means “freedom from defilement,” or, affirmatively, “purity.”
When the Bodhisattva attains, through the spiritual insight gained at
the first stage, to rectitude and purity of heart, he reaches the
second stage. His heart is now thoroughly spotless, it is filled with
tenderness, he fosters no anger, no malice. He is free from all the
thoughts of killing any animate beings. Being contented with what
belongs to himself, he casts no covetous eyes on things not his own.
Faithful to his own betrothed, he does not harbor any evil thoughts on
others. His words are always true, faithful, kind, and considerate. He
likes truth, honesty, and never flatters.


 (3) _The Prabhâkarî._

Prabhâkarî means “brightness,” that is, of the intellect. This
predominantly characterises the spiritual condition of the Bodhisattva
at this stage. Here he gains the most penetrating insight into the
nature of things. He recognises that all things that are created are
not permanent, are conducive to misery, have no abiding selfhood
(_âtman_), are destitute of purity, and subject to final decay. He
recognises also that the real nature of things, however, is neither
created nor subject to destruction, it is eternally abiding in the
selfsame essence, and transcends the limits of time {316} and space.
Ignorant beings not seeing this truth are always worrying over things
transient and worthless, and constantly consuming their spiritual
energy with the fire of avarice, anger, and infatuation, which in turn
accumulates for their future existences the ashes of misery and
suffering. This wretched condition of sentient beings further
stimulates the loving heart of the Bodhisattva to seek the highest
intelligence of Buddha, which, giving him great spiritual energy,
enables him to prosecute the gigantic task of universal emancipation.
His desire for the Buddha-intelligence and his faith in it are of such
immense strength that he would not falter even for a moment, if he is
only assured of the attainment of the priceless treasure, to plunge
himself into the smeltering fire of a volcano.


 (4) _The Arciṣmatî._

Arciṣmatî, meaning “inflammation,” is the name given to the fourth
stage, at which the Bodhisattva consumes all the sediments of
ignorance and evil passions in the fiery crucible of the purifying
Bodhi. He practises here most strenuously the thirty-seven virtues
called Bodhipâkṣikas which are conducive to the perfection of the
Bodhi. These virtues consist of seven categories:

(I) Four Contemplations (_smṛtyusthâna_): 1. On the impurity of the
body; 2. On the evils of sensuality; 3. On the evanescence of the
worldly interests; 4. On the non-existence of âtman in things
composite.

(II) Four Righteous Efforts (_samyakprahâna_): 1. To {317} prevent
evils from arising; 2. To suppress evils already existing; 3. To
produce good not yet in existence; 4. To preserve good already in
existence.

(III) Four Forces of the Will (_ṛddhipâda_): 1. The determination
to accomplish what is willed; 2. The energy to concentrate the mind on
the object in view; 3. The power of retaining the object in memory; 4.
The intelligence that perceives the way to Nirvâna.

(IV) Five Powers (_indrya_), from which all moral good is produced: 1.
Faith; 2. Energy; 3. Circumspection; 4. Equilibrium, or tranquillity
of mind; 5 Intelligence.

(V) Five Functions (_bala_): Same as the above.[129]

(VI) Seven Constituents of the Bodhi (_bodhyanga_): 1. The retentive
power; 2. Discrimination; 3. Energy; 4. Contentment; 5. Modesty; 6.
The balanced mind; 7. Large-heartedness.

(VII) The Eightfold Noble Path (_âryamârga_): 1. Right view; 2. Right
resolve; 3. Right speech; 4. Right conduct; 5. Right livelihood; 6.
Right recollection; 8. Right tranquilisation, or contemplation.

{318}


 (5) _The Sudurjayâ._

Sudurjayâ means “very difficult to conquer.” The Bodhisattva reaches
this stage when he, completely armed with the thirty-seven
Bodhipâkṣikas and guided by the beacon-light of Bodhi, undauntedly
breaks through the column of evil passions. Provided with the two
spiritual provisions, love and wisdom, and being benefitted by the
spirits of all the Buddhas of the past, present, and future, the
Bodhisattva has developed an intellectual power to penetrate deep into
the system of existence. He perceives the Fourfold Noble Truth in its
true light; he perceives the highest reality in the Tathâgata; he
also perceives that the highest reality, though absolutely one in its
essence, manifests itself in a world of particulars, that relative
knowledge (_samvrtti_) and absolute knowledge (_paramârtha_) are two
aspects of one and the same truth, that when subjectivity is disturbed
there appears particularity, and that when it is not disturbed there
shines only the eternal light of Tathâgatajñâ (Tathâgata-knowledge).


 (6) _The Abhimukhî._

Abhimukhî means “showing one’s face,” that is, the presentation of
intelligence (_prajñâ_) before the Bodhisattva at this stage.

The Bodhisattva enters upon this stage by reflecting on the essence of
all dharmas which are throughout of one nature. When he perceives the
truth, his heart is filled with great love, he serenely contemplates
on {319} the life of ignorant beings who are constantly going astray
yielding themselves to evil temptations, clinging to the false
conception of egoism, and thus making themselves the prey of eternal
damnation. He then proceeds to contemplate the development of evils
generally. There is ignorance, there is karma; and in this fertile
soil of blind activity the seeds of consciousness are sown; the
moisture of desire thoroughly soaks them, to which the water of egoism
or individuation is poured on. The bed for all forms of particularity
is well prepared, and the buds of nâmarûpas (name-and-form) most
vigorously thrive here. From these we have the flowers of sense-organs,
and which come in contact with other existences and produce
impressions, feel agreeable sensations, and tenaciously cling to them.
From this clinging or the will to live as the principle of
individuation or as the principle of bhâva as is called in the Twelve
Nidânas, another body consisting of the five skandhas comes into
existence, and, passing through all the phases of transformation,
dissolves and disappears. All sentient beings are thus kept in a
perpetual oscillation of combination and separation, of pleasure and
pain, birth and death. But the insight of the Bodhisattva has gone
deeply into the inmost essence of things, which forever remains the
same and in which there is no production and dissolution.


 (7) _The Dûrangamâ._

Dûrangamâ means “going far away.” The Bodhisattva enters upon this
stage by attaining the so-called {320} Upâyajñâ, i.e. the knowledge
that enables him to produce any means or expediency suitable for his
work of salvation. He himself abides in the principles of _çûnyatâ_
(transcendentality), _animitta_ (non-individuality), and _apranihita_
(desirelessness), but his lovingkindness keeps him busily engaged
among sentient beings. He knows that Buddhas are not creatures
radically and essentially different from himself, but he does not stop
tendering them due homage. He is always contemplating on the nature of
the Absolute, but he does not abandon the practice of accumulating
merits. He is no more encumbered with worldly thoughts, yet he does
not disdain managing secular affairs. He keeps himself perfectly aloof
from the consuming fire of passion, but he plans all possible means
for the sake of sentient beings to quench the enraging flames of
avarice (_lobha_), anger (_dveṣa_), and infatuation (_moha_). He
knows that all individual existences are like dream, mirage, or the
reflection of the moon in the water, but he works and toils in the
world of particulars and submits himself to the domination of karma.
He is well aware of the transcendental nature of Pure Land
(_sukhâvatî_), but he describes it with material colors for the sake
of unenlightened masses. He knows that the Dharmakâya of all the
Buddhas is not a material existence, but he does not refuse to dignify
himself with the thirty-two major and eighty minor excellent features
of a great man or god (_mahâpuruṣa_). He knows that the language of
all the Buddhas does not fall within the ken of human comprehension,
but {321} he endeavors with all contrivances (_upâya_) to make it
intelligible enough to the understanding of people. He knows that all
the Buddhas perceive the past, present, and future in the twinkling of
an eye, but he adapts himself to divers conditions of the material
world and endeavors to help sentient beings to understand the
significance of the Bodhi according to their destinies and
dispositions. In short, the Bodhisattva himself lives on a higher
plane of spirituality far removed from the defilements of worldliness;
but he does not withdraw himself to this serene, unmolested
subjectivity; he boldly sets out in the world of particulars and
senses; and, placing himself on the level of ignorant beings, he works
like them, he toils like them, and suffers like them; and he never
fails all these times to practise the gospel of lovingkindness and to
turn over (_parivarta_) all his merits towards the emancipation and
spiritual edification of the masses, that is, he never gets tired of
practising the ten virtues of perfection (_pâramitâ_).

That is to say, (1) the Bodhisattva practises the virtue of charity
(_dâna_) by freely giving away to all sentient creatures all the
merits that he has acquired by following the path of Buddhas. (2) He
practises the virtue of good conduct (_çîla_) by destroying all the
evil passions that disturb serenity of mind. (3) He practises the
virtue of patience (_kṣânti_), for he never gets irritated or excited
over what is done to him by ignorant beings. (4) He practises the
virtue of strenuousness (_vriya_), for he never gets tired of {322}
accumulating merits and of promoting good-will among his
fellow-creatures. (5) He practises the virtue of calmness (_dhyâna_),
for his mind is never distracted in steadily pursuing his way to
supreme knowledge. (6) He practises the virtue of intelligence
(_prajñâ_), for he always restrains his thoughts from wandering away
from the path of absolute truth. (7) He practises the virtue of
tactfulness (_upâya_), for he has an inexhaustible mine of
expediencies ready at his command for the work of universal salvation.
(8) He practises the virtue of will-to-do (_pranidhâna_) by
determinedly following the dictates of the highest intelligence. (9)
He practises the virtue of strength (_bala_), for no evil influences,
no heretical thoughts can ever frustrate or slacken his efforts for
the general welfare of people. (10) Finally, he practises the virtue
of knowledge, (_jñâna_), by truthfully comprehending and expounding
the ultimate nature of beings.


 (8) _The Acalâ._

Acalâ, “immovable,” is the name for the eighth stage of
Bodhisattvahood. When a Bodhisattva, transcending all forms of
discursive or deliberate knowledge, acquires the highest, perfect
knowledge called _anutpattikadharmakṣânti_, he is said to have gone
beyond the seventh stage. Anutpattikadharmakṣânti literally means
“not-created-being-forbearance”; and the Buddhists use the term in the
sense of keeping one’s thoughts in conformity to the views that
nothing in this world {323} has ever been created, that things are
such as they are, i.e. they are Suchness itself. This knowledge is
also called non-conscious or non-deliberate knowledge in
contradistinction to relative knowledge that constitutes all our
logical and demonstrative knowledge. Strictly speaking, this so-called
knowledge is not knowledge in its ordinary signification, it is a sort
of unconscious or subconscious intelligence, or immediate knowledge as
some call it, in which not only willing and acting, but also knowing
and willing are one single, undivided exhibition of activity, all
logical or natural transition from one to the other being altogether
absent. Here indeed knowledge is will and will is action; “Let there
be light,” and there is light, and the light is good; it is the state
of a divine mind.

At this stage of perfection, the Bodhisattva’s spiritual condition is
compared to that of a person who, attempting when in a dreamy state to
cross deep waters, musters all his energy, plans all schemes, and,
while at last at the point of starting on the journey, suddenly wakes
up and finds all his elaborate preparations to no purpose. The
Bodhisattva hitherto showed untiring spiritual efforts to attain the
highest knowledge, steadily practised all virtues tending to the
acquirement of Nirvâna, and heroically endeavored to exterminate all
evil passions, and at the culmination of all these exercises, he
enters all of a sudden upon the stage of Acalâ and finds the previous
elaboration mysteriously vanished from his conscious mind. He
cherishes {324} now no desire for Buddhahood, Nirvâna, or Bodhicitta,
much less after worldliness, egoism, or the satisfaction of evil
passions. The conscious striving that distinguished all his former
course has now given way to a state of spontaneous activity, of
saintly innocence, and of divine playfulness. He wills and it is done.
He aspires and it is actualised. He is nature herself, for there is no
trace in his activity that betrays any artificial lucubration, any
voluntary or compulsory restraint. This state of perfect ideal freedom
may be called esthetical, which characterises the work of a genius.
There is here no trace of consciously following some prescribed laws,
no pains of elaborately conforming to the formula. To put this
poetically, the inner life of the Bodhisattva at this stage is like
the lilies of the field whose glory is greater than that of Solomon in
all his human magnificence.

Kant’s remarks on this point are very suggestive, and I will quote the
following from his _Kritik der Urteilskraft_ (Reclam edition, p. 173):

“Also muss die Zweckmässigkeit im Produkte der schönen Kunst, ob sie
zwar absichtlich ist, doch nicht absichtlich scheinen: d.i., schöne
Kunst muss als Natur anzusehen sein, ob man sich ihrer zwar als Kunst
bewusst ist. Als Natur aber erscheint ein Produkt der Kunst dadurch,
dass zwar alle Pünktlichkeit in der Uebereinkunst mit Regeln, nach
denen allein das Produkt das werden kann, was es soll sein,
angetroffen wird, aber ohne Peinlichkeit, d.i., ohne eine Spur zu
zeigen, dass die Regel dem Künstler vor Augen {325} geschwebt und
seinen Gemüthskräften Fesseln angelegt haben.”[130]


 (9) _The Sâdhumatî._

Sâdhumatî, meaning “good intelligence,” is the name given to the
ninth stage of Bodhisattvahood. All the Bodhisattvas are said to have
reached here, when sentient beings are benefitted by the Bodhisattva’s
attainment of the highest perfect knowledge, which is unfathomable by
the ordinary human intelligence. The knowledge leads them to the
Dharma of the deepest mystery, to the Samâdhi of perfect spirituality,
to the Dhâranî of divine spontaneity, to Love of absolute purity, to
the Will of utmost freedom.

The Bodhisattva will acquire at this stage the four Pratisamvids
(comprehensive knowledge), which are (1) Dharmapratisamvid, (2)
Arthapratisamvid, (3) Niruktipratisamvid, (4) Pratibhanapratisamvid.
By the Dharmapratisamvid, the Bodhisattvas understand the {326}
self-essence (_svabhâva_) of all beings; by the Arthapratisamvid,
their individual attributes; by the Niruktipratisamvid, their
indestructibility; by the Pratibhanapratisamvid, their eternal order.
Again, by the first intelligence they understand that all individual
dharmas have no absolute reality; by the second, that they are all
subject to the law of constant becoming; by the third, that they are
no more than mere names; by the fourth, that even mere names as such
are of some value. Again, by the first intelligence, they comprehend
that all dharmas are of one reality which is indestructible; by the
second, that this one reality differentiating itself becomes subject
to the law of causation; by the third, that by virtue of a superior
understanding all Buddhas become the object of admiration and the
haven of all sentient beings; by the fourth, that in the one body of
truth all Buddhas preach infinite lights of the Dharma.


 (10) _The Dharmameghâ._

Dharmameghâ, “clouds of dharma,” is the name of the tenth and final
stage of Bodhisattvahood. The Bodhisattvas have now practised all
virtues of purity, accumulated all the constituents of Bodhi, are
fortified with great power and intelligence, universally practise the
principle of great love and sympathy, have deeply penetrated into the
mystery of individual existences, fathomed the inmost depths of
sentiency, followed step by step the walk of all the Tathâgatas. Every
thought cherished by the Bodhisattva now dwells in {327} all the
Tathâgatas’ abode of eternal tranquillity, and every deed practised
by him is directed towards the ten balas (power),[131] four
vaiçâradyas (conviction),[132] and eighteen avenikas (unique
characteristics),[133] of the Buddha. By these virtues the Bodhisattva
has now acquired the knowledge of all things (_sarvajñâ_), is dwelling
in the sanctum sanctorum of all dhâraṇîs and samâdhis, have arrived at
the summit of all activities.

{328}

The Bodhisattva at this stage is a personification of love and
sympathy, which freely issue from the fount of his inner will. He
gathers the clouds of virtue and wisdom, in which he manifests himself
in manifold figures; he produces the lightnings of Buddhi, Vidyâs,
and Vaiçâradyas; and shaking the whole world with the thunder of
Dharma he crushes all the evil ones; and pouring forth the showers of
Good Law he quenches the burning flames of ignorance {329} and passion
in which all sentient creatures are being consumed.

 * * *

The above presentation of the Daçabhûmî[134] of Bodhisattvahood
allows us to see what ideal life is held out by the Mahâyânists
before their own eyes and in what respect it differs from that of the
Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas as well as from that of other religious
followers. Mahâyânism is not contented to make us mere transmitters
or “hearers” of the teachings of the Buddha, it wants to inspire with
all the religious and ethical motives that stirred the noblest heart
of Çâkyamuni to its inmost depths. It fully recognises the intrinsic
worth of the human soul; and, holding up its high ideals and noble
aspirations, it endeavors to develop all the possibilities of our
soul-life, which by our strenuous efforts and all-defying courage will
one day be realised even on this earth of impermanence. We as
individual existences are nothing but shadows which will vanish as
soon as the conditions disappear that make them possible; we as mortal
beings are no more than the {330} thousands of dusty particles that
are haphazardly and powerlessly scattered about before the cyclone of
karma; but when we are united in the love and intelligence of the
Dharmakâya in which we have our being, we are Bodhisattvas, and we
can immovably stand against the tempest of birth and death, against
the overwhelming blast of ignorance. Then even an apparently
insignificant act of lovingkindness will lead finally to the eternal
abode of bliss, not the actor alone, but the whole community to which
he belongs. Because a stream of love spontaneously flows from the lake
of Intelligence-heart (_Bodhicitta_) which is fed by the inexhaustible
spring of the Dharmakâya, while ignorance leads only to egoism,
hatred, avarice, disturbance, and universal misery.




 CHAPTER XIII.
 NIRVÂNA.

{331}

/Nirvâna/, according to Mahâyâna Buddhism, is not understood in its
nihilistic sense. Even with the Çrâvakas or Hînayânists, Nirvâna in
this sense is not so much the object of their religious life as the
recognition of the Fourfold Noble Truth, or the practise of the
Eightfold Path, or emancipation from the yoke of egoism. It is mostly
due, as far as I can see, to non-Buddhist critics that the conception
of Nirvâna has been selected among others as one of the most
fundamental teachings of Buddha, declaring it at the same time to
consist in the annihilation of all human passions and aspirations,
noble as well as worthless.

In fact, Nirvâna literally means “extinction” or “dissolution” of the
five skandhas, and therefore it may be said that the entering into
Nirvâna is tantamount to the annihilation of the material existence
and of all the passions. Catholic Buddhists, however, do not understand
Nirvâna in the sense of emptiness, for they say that Buddhism is not a
religion of death nor for the dead, but that it teaches how to attain
eternal life, how to gain an insight into the real nature of things,
and how to regulate our conduct {332} in accordance with the highest
truth. Therefore, Buddhism, when rightly understood in the spirit of
its founder, is something quite different from what it is commonly
supposed to be by the general public.

I will endeavor in the following pages to point out that Nirvâna in
the sense of a total annihilation of human activities, is by no means
the primary and sole object of Buddhists, and then proceed to
elucidate in what signification it is understood in the Mahâyâna
Buddhism and see what relative position Nirvâna in its Mahâyânistic
sense occupies in the body of Buddhism.


 _Nihilistic Nirvâna not the First Object._

In order to see the true signification of Nirvâna, it is necessary
first to observe in what direction Buddha himself ploughed the waves
in his religious cruise and upon what shore he finally debarked. This
will show us whether or not Nirvâna as nihilistic nothingness is the
primary and sole object of Buddhism, to which every spiritual effort
of its devotees is directed.

If the attainment of negativistic Nirvâna were the sole aim of
Buddhism, we should naturally expect Buddha’s farewell address to be
chiefly dealing with that subject. In his last sermon, however, Buddha
did not teach his disciples to concentrate all their moral efforts on
the attainment of Nirvânic quietude disregarding all the forms of
activity that exhibit themselves in life. Far from it. He told them,
according to the _Mahânibbâna sutta_ (the Book of the Great {333}
decease, _S. B. E._ Vol. XI. p. 114) that “Decay is inherent in all
component things! Work out your salvation with diligence!” This
exhortation of the strenuous life is quite in harmony with the last
words of Buddha as recorded in Açvaghoṣa’s _Buddhacarita_ (Chinese
translation, Chap. XXVI). They were:


 “Even if I lived a kalpa longer,
 Separation would be an inevitable end.
 A body composed of various aggregates,
 Its nature is not to abide forever.

 “Having finished benefiting oneself and others,
 Why live I longer to no purpose?
 Of gods and men that should be saved,
 Each and all had been delivered.

 “O ye, my disciples!
 Without interruption transmit the Good Dharma!
 Know ye that things are destined to decay!
 Never again abandon yourselves to grief!

 “But pursue the Way with diligence,
 And arrive at the Home of No-separation!
 I have lit the Lamp of Intelligence,
 That shining dispels the darkness of the world.

 “Know ye that the world endureth not!
 As ye should feel happy [when ye see]
 The parents suffering a mortal disease
 Are released by a treatment from pain;

 “So with me, I now give up the vessel of misery,
 Transcend[135] the current of birth and death,
 And am eternally released from all pain and suffering.
 This too must be deemed blest.

{334}

 “Ye should well guard yourselves!
 Never give yourselves up to indulgence!
 All that exists finally comes to an end!
 I now enter into Nirvâna.”[136]


In this we find Buddha’s characteristic admonition to his disciples
not to waste time but to work out their salvation with diligence and
rigor, but we fail to find the gospel of annihilation, the supposedly
fundamental teaching of Buddhism.

Did then Buddha start in his religious discipline to attain the
absolute annihilation of all human aspirations and after a long
meditation reach the conclusion that contradicted his premises? Far
from it. His first and last ambition was nothing else than the
emancipation of all beings from ignorance, misery, and suffering
through enlightenment, knowledge, and truth. When Mâra the evil one
was exhausting all his evil powers upon the destruction of the Buddha
in the beginning of his career, the good gods in the heavens exclaimed
to the evil one:[137]

“Take not on thyself, O Mâra, this vain fatigue,--throw aside thy
malevolence and retire to thy home. This sage cannot be shaken by thee
any more than the mighty mountain Meru by the wind.

{335}

“Even fire might lose its hot nature, water its fluidity, earth its
steadiness, but never will he abandon his resolution, who has acquired
his merit by a long course of actions through unnumbered eons.

“Such is the purpose of his, that heroic effort, that glorious
strength, that compassion for all beings,--until he attains the
highest wisdom [or suchness, _tattva_], he will never rise from his
seat, just as the sun does not rise without dispelling the darkness.

“Pitying the world lying distressed amidst diseases and passions, he,
the great physician, ought not to be hindered, who undergoes all his
labors for the sake of the remedy-knowledge.

“He, who, when he beholds the world drowned in the great flood of
existence and unable to reach the further shore, strives to bring them
safely across,--would any right-minded soul offer him wrong?

“The tree of knowledge, whose roots go deep in firmness, and whose
fibres are patience,--whose flowers are moral actions and whose
branches are memory and thought,--and which gives out the Dharma as
its fruit,--surely when it is growing it should not be cut down.”

These words of the good gods in the heavens truthfully echo the motive
that stirred Çâkyamuni to take up his gigantic task of universal
salvation, and we are unable here as before to perceive a particle of
the nihilistic speculation which is supposed to characterise Nirvâna.
The Buddha from the very first of his religious course searched after
the light that will illuminate {336} the whole universe and dispel the
darkness of nescience.

What enlightenment, then, did the Buddha, pursuing his first object,
finally gain? What truth was it that he is said to have discovered
under the Bodhi tree after six years’ penance and deep meditation? As
is universally recognised, it was no more than the Fourfold Noble
Truth and the Twelve Chains of Dependence, which are acknowledged by
the Mahâyânists as well as by the Hînayânists as the essentially
original teachings of the Buddha. What then was his subjective state
when he discovered these truths? How did he feel in his inmost being
after this intellectual triumph over egoistic thoughts and passions?
According to the Southern tradition, the famous Hymn of Victory is
said to be his utterance on this occasion. It reads (The _Dharmapada_,
153):


 “Many a life to transmigrate,
 Long quest, no rest, hath been my fate,
 Tent-designer inquisitive for;
 Painful birth from state to state.

 “Tent-designer, I know thee now;
 Never again to build art thou;
 Quite out are all thy joyful fires,
 Rafter broken and roof-tree gone;
 Into the vast my heart goes on,
 Gains Eternity--dead desires.”[138]


In this Hymn of Victory, the “tent-designer” means {337} the ego that
is supposed to be a subtle existence behind our mental experiences. As
was pointed out elsewhere the negative phase of Buddhism consists in
the eradication of this ego-substratum or the “designer” of eternal
transmigration. The Buddha now finds out that this ego-soul is a
fantasmagoria and has no final existence; and with this insight his
ego-centric desires that troubled him so long are eternally dead; he
feels the breaking up of their limitations; he is absorbed in the
Eternal Vast, in which we all live and move and have our being. No
shadow is perceptible here that suggests anything of an absolute
nothingness supposed to be the attribute of Nirvâna.

Before proceeding further, let us see what the Mahâyâna tradition
says concerning this point. The tradition varies in this case as in
many others. According to Beal’s _Romantic History of Buddha_, which
is a translation of a Chinese version of the _Buddhacarita_ (_Fo pen
hing ching_),[139] Buddha is reported to have exclaimed this:


 “Through ages past have I acquired continual merit,
 That which my heart desired have I now attained,
 How quickly have I arrived at the ever-constant condition,
 And landed on the very shore of Nirvâna.
 The sorrows and opposition of the world,
 The Lord of the Kâmalokas, Mâra Pisuna,
 These are unable now to affect, they are wholly destroyed;
 By the power of religious merit and of wisdom are they cast away.
 Let a man but persevere with unflinching resolution,
 And seek Supreme Wisdom, it will not be hard to acquire it;
 When once obtained, then farewell to all sorrows,
 All sin and guilt are forever done away.”[140]

{338}

Viewing the significance of Buddhism in this light, it is evident that
Buddha did not emphasise so much the doctrine of Nirvâna in the sense
of a total abnegation of human aspirations as the abandonment of
egoism and the practical regulation of our daily life in accordance
with this view. Nirvâna in which all the passions noble and base are
supposed to have been “blown out like a lamp” was not the most coveted
object of Buddhist life. On the contrary, Buddhism advises all its
followers to exercise most strenuously all their spiritual energy to
attain perfect freedom from the bondage of ignorance and egoism;
because that is the only way in which we can conquer the vanity of
worldliness and enjoy the bliss of eternal life. The following verse
from the _Visuddhi Magga_ (XXI) practically {339} sums up the teaching
of Buddhism as far as its negative and individual phase is concerned:


 “Behold how empty is the world,
 Mogharâja! In thoughtfulness
 Let one remove belief in self,
 And pass beyond the realm of death.
 The king of death will never find
 The man who thus the world beholds.”[141]


 _Nirvâna is Positive._

It is not my intention here to investigate the historical side of this
question; we are not concerned with the problem of how the followers
of Buddha gradually developed the positive aspect of Nirvâna in
connection with the practical application of his moral and religious
{340} teachings; nor are we engaged in tracing the process of
evolution through which Buddha’s noble resolution to save all sentient
beings from ignorance and misery was brought out most conspicuously by
his later devotees. What I wish to state here about the positive
conception of Nirvâna and its development is this: The Mahâyâna
Buddhism was the first religious teaching in India that contradicted
the doctrine of Nirvâna as conceived by other Hindu thinkers who saw
in it a complete annihilation of being, for they thought that
existence is evil, and evil is misery, and the only way to escape
misery is to destroy the root of existence, which is nothing less than
the total cessation of human desires and activities in Nirvânic
unconsciousness. The Yoga taught self-forgetfulness in deep
meditation; the Samkhya, the absolute separation of Puruṣa from
Prakṛti, which means undisturbed self-contemplation; the Vedânta,
absorption in the Brahma, which is the total suppression of all
particulars; and thus all of them considered emancipation from human
desires and aspirations a heavenly bliss, that is, Nirvâna.
Metaphysically speaking, they might have been correct each in its own
way, but, ethically considered, their views had little significance in
our practical life and showed a sad deficiency in dealing with
problems of morality.

The Buddha was keenly aware of this flaw in their doctrines. He
taught, therefore, that Nirvâna does not consist in the complete
stoppage of existence, but in the practise of the Eightfold Path. This
moral {341} practise leads to the unalloyed joy of Nirvâna, not as
the tranquillisation of human aspirations, but as the fulfilment or
unfolding of human life. The word Nirvâna in the sense of annihilation
was in existence prior to Buddha, but it was he who gave a new
significance to it and made it worthy of attainment by men of moral
character. All the doctrinal aspects of Nirvâna are later additions or
rather development made by Buddhist scholars, according to whom their
arguments are solidly based on some canonical passages. Whatever the
case may be, my conviction is that those who developed the positive
significance of Nirvâna are more consistent with the spirit of the
founder than those who emphasised another aspect of it. In the _Udâna_
we read (IV., 9):


 “He whom life torments not,
 Who sorrows not at the approach of death,
 If such a one is resolute and has seen Nirvâna,
 In the midst of grief, he is griefless.
 The tranquil-minded Bhikkhu, who has uprooted the thirst for
  existence,
 By him the succession of births is ended,
 He is born no more.”[142]


According to the Mahâyânistic conception Nirvâna is not the
annihilation of the world and the putting an end to life; but it is to
live in the whirlpool of birth and death and yet to be above it. It is
affirmation and fulfilment, and this is done not blindly and
egoistically, for Nirvâna is enlightenment. Let us see how this is.

{342}


 _The Mahâyânistic Conception of Nirvâna._

While the conception of Nirvâna seems to have remained indefinite and
confused as far as Hînayânism goes, the Mahâyâna Buddhists have
attached several definite shades of meaning to Nirvâna and tried to
give each of them some special, distinctive character. When it is used
in its most comprehensive metaphysical sense, it becomes synonymous
with Suchness (_tattva_) or with the Dharmakâya. When we speak of
Buddha’s entrance into Nirvâna, it means the end of material
existence, i.e., death. When it is used in contrast to birth and death
(_samsâra_) or to passion and sin (_kleça_), it signifies in the
former case an eternal life or a state of immortality, and in the
latter case a state of consciousness that follows from the recognition
of the presence of the Dharmakâya in individual existences. Nirvâna
has thus become a very comprehensive term, and this fact adds much to
the confusion and misunderstanding with which it has been treated ever
since Buddhism became known to the Occident. The so-called “primitive
Buddhism” is not altogether unfamiliar with all these meanings given
to Nirvâna, though in some cases they might have been but faintly
foreshadowed. Most of European missionaries and scholars have ignored
this fact and wanted to see in Nirvâna but one definite, stereotyped
sense which will loosen or untie all the difficult knots connected
with its use. One scholar would select a certain passage in a certain
sûtra, where the meaning {343} is tolerably distinct, and taking this
as the key endeavor to solve all the rest; while another scholar would
do the same thing with another passage from the scriptures and refute
other fellow-workers. The majority of them, however, have found for
missionary purposes to be advantageous to hold one meaning prominently
above all the others that may be considered possibly the meaning of
Nirvâna. This one meaning that has been made specially conspicuous is
its negativistic interpretation.

According to the _Vijñânamâtra çâstra_ (Chinese version Vol. X.), the
Mahâyâna Buddhists distinguish four forms of Nirvâna. They are:

(1) _Absolute Nirvâna_, as a synonym of the Dharmakâya. It is
eternally immaculate in its essence and constitutes the truth and
reality of all existences. Though it manifests itself in the world of
defilement and relativity, its essence forever remains undefiled.
While it embraces in itself innumerable incomprehensible spiritual
virtues, it is absolutely simple and immortal; its perfect
tranquillity may be likened unto space in which every conceivable
motion is possible, but which remains in itself the same. It is
universally present in all beings whether animate or inanimate[143]
and makes their existence real. In one respect it can be identified
with them, that is, it can be pantheistically viewed; but in the other
respect it is transcendental, {344} for every being as it is is not
Nirvâna. This spiritual significance is, however, beyond the ken of
ordinary human understanding and can be grasped only by the highest
intelligence of Buddha.

(2) _Upadhiçeṣa Nirvâna_, or Nirvâna that has some residue. This is a
state of enlightenment which can be attained by Buddhists in their
lifetime. The Dharmakâya which was dormant in them is now awakened and
freed from the “affective obstacles,”[144] but they are yet under the
bondage of birth and death; and thus they are not yet absolutely free
from the misery of life: something still remains in them that makes
them suffer pain.

(3) _Anupadhiçeṣa Nirvâna_, or Nirvâna that has no residue. This is
attained when the Tathâgata-essence (the Dharmakâya) is released from
the pain of birth and death as well as from the curse of passion and
sin. This form of Nirvâna seems to be what is generally understood by
Occidental missionary-scholars as the Nirvâna of Buddhists. While in
lifetime, they have been emancipated from the egoistic conception of
the soul, they have practised the Eightfold Path, and they {345} have
destroyed all the roots of karma that makes possible their
metempsychosis in the world of birth and death (_samsâra_), though as
the inevitable sequence of their previous karma they have yet to
suffer all the evils inherent in the material existence. But at last
they have had even this mortal coil dissolved away, and have returned
to the original Absolute from which by virtue of ignorance they had
come out and gone through a cycle of births and deaths. This state of
supramundane bliss in the realm of the Absolute is Anupadiçeṣa
Nirvâna, that is, Nirvâna that has no residue.

(4) _The Nirvâna that has no abode._ In this, the Buddha-essence has
not only been freed from the curse of passion and sin (_kleça_), but
from the intellectual prejudice, which most tenaciously clings to the
mind. The Buddha-essence or the Dharmakâya is revealed here in its
perfect purity. All-embracing love and all-knowing intelligence
illuminate the path. He who has attained to this state of subjective
enlightenment is said to have no abode, no dwelling place, that is to
say, he is no more subject to the transmigration of birth and death
(_samsâra_), nor does he cling to Nirvâna as the abode of complete
rest; in short, he is above Samsâra and Nirvâna. His sole object in
life is to benefit all sentient beings to the end of time; but this he
proposes to do not by his human conscious elaboration and striving.
Simply actuated by his all-embracing love which is of the Dharmakâya,
he wishes to deliver all his fellow-creatures from misery, he does
{346} not seek his own emancipation from the turmoil of life. He is
fully aware of the transitoriness of worldly interests, but on this
account he desires not to shun them. With his all-knowing intelligence
he gains a spiritual insight into the ultimate nature of things and
the final course of existence. He is one of those religious men “that
weep, as though they wept not; that rejoice as though they rejoiced
not; that buy, as though they possessed not; that use this world, as
not abusing it; for the fashion of this world passes away.” Nay, he is
in one sense more than this; his life is full of positive activity,
because his heart and soul are devoted to the leading of all beings to
final emancipation and supreme bliss. When a man attains to this stage
of spiritual life, he is said to be in the Nirvâna that has no abode.

A commentator on the _Vijñânamâtra Çâstra_ adds that of these four
forms of Nirvâna the first is possessed by every sentient being,
whether it is actualised in its human perfection or lying dormant _in
posse_ and miserably obscured by ignorance; that the second and third
are attained by all the Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, while it is a
Buddha alone that is in possession of all the four forms of Nirvâna.


 _Nirvâna as the Dharmakâya._

It is manifest from the above statement that in Mahâyânism Nirvâna
has acquired several shades of meaning psychological and ontological.
This apparent confusion, however, is due to the purely idealistic
{347} tendency of Mahâyânism, which ignores the distinction usually
made between being and thought, object and subject, the perceived and
the perceiving. Nirvâna is not only a subjective state of
enlightenment but an objective power through whose operation this
beatific state becomes attainable. It does not simply mean a total
absorption in the Absolute or of emancipation from earthly desires in
lifetime as exemplified in the life of the Arhat. Mahâyânists perceive
in Nirvâna not only this, but also its identity with the Dharmakâya,
or Suchness, and recognise its universal spiritual presence in all
sentient beings.

When Nâgârjuna says in his _Mâdhyamika Çâstra_[145] that: “That is
called Nirvâna which is not wanting, is not acquired, is not
intermittent, is not non-intermittent, is not subject to destruction,
and is not created;” he evidently speaks of Nirvâna as a synonym of
Dharmakâya, that is, in its first sense as above described. Chandra
Kîrti, therefore, rightly comments that Nirvâna is
_sarva-kalpanâ-kṣaya-rûpam_,[146] i.e., that which transcends all
the forms of determination. {348} Nirvâna is an absolute, it is above
the relativity of existence (_bhâva_) and non-existence
(_abhâva_).[147]

Nirvâna is sometimes spoken of as possessing four attributes; (1)
eternal (_nitya_), (2) blissful (_sukha_), (3) self-acting (_âtman_),
and (4) pure (_çuçi_). Judging from these qualities thus ascribed to
Nirvâna as its essential features, Nirvâna is here again identified
with the highest reality of Buddhism, that is, with the Dharmakâya.
It is eternal because it is immaterial; it is blissful because it is
above all sufferings; it is self-acting because it knows no
compulsion; it is pure because it is not defiled by passion and
error.[148]

{349}


 _Nirvâna in its Fourth Sense._

No further elucidation is needed for the first signification of
Nirvâna, for we have treated it already when explaining the nature of
the Dharmakâya. Nor is it necessary for us to dwell upon the second
and the third phases of it. The Occidental missionary-scholars and
Orientalists, however one-sided and often biased, have almost
exhaustively investigated these points from the Pâli sources. What
remains for us now is to analyse the Mahâyânistic conception of
Nirvâna which was stated above as its fourth signification.

Nirvâna, briefly speaking, is a realisation in this life of the
all-embracing love and all-knowing intelligence of Dharmakâya. It is
the unfolding of the reason of existence, which in the ordinary human
life remains more or less eclipsed by the shadow of ignorance and
egoism. It does not consist in the mere observance of the moral
precepts laid down by Buddha, nor in the blind following of the
Eightfold Path, nor in retirement from the world and absorption in
abstract meditation. The Mahâyânistic Nirvâna is full of energy and
activity which issues from the all-embracing love of the Dharmakâya.
There is no passivity in it, nor a keeping aloof from the hurly-burly
of worldliness. {350} He who is in this Nirvâna does not seek a rest
in the annihilation of human aspirations, does not flinch in the face
of endless transmigration. On the contrary, he plunges himself into
the ever-rushing current of Samsâra and sacrifices himself to save
his fellow-creatures from being eternally drowned in it.

Though thus the Mahâyâna Nirvâna is realised only in the mire of
passions and errors, it is never contaminated by the filth of
ignorance. Therefore, he that is abiding in Nirvâna, even in the
whirlpool of egoism and in the darkness of sin, does not lose his
all-seeing insight that penetrates deep into the ultimate nature of
being. He is aware of the transitoriness of things. He knows that this
life is a mere passing moment in the eternal manifestation of the
Dharmakâya, whose work can be realised only in boundless space and
endless time. As he is fully awake to this knowledge, he never gets
engrossed in the world of sin. He lives in the world like unto the
lotus-flower, the emblem of immaculacy, which grows out of the mire
and yet shares not its defilement. He is also like unto a bird flying
in the air that does not leave any trace behind it. He may again be
likened unto the clouds that spontaneously gather around the mountain
peak, and, soaring high as the wind blows, vanish away to the region
where nobody knows. In short, he is living in, and yet beyond, the
realm of Samsâra and Nirvâna.

We read in the _Vimalakirti Sûtra_ (chap. VIII.):

“Vimalakirti asks Mañjuçri: ‘How is it that you {351} declare all
[human] passions and errors are the seeds of Buddhahood?’

“Mañjuçri replies: ‘O son of good family! Those who cling to the view
of non-activity [_asamskrita_] and dwell in a state of eternal
annihilation do not awaken in them supremely perfect knowledge
[_anuttara-samyak-sambodhi_]. Only the Bodhisattvas, who dwell in the
midst of passions and errors, and who, passing through the [ten]
stages, rightly contemplate the ultimate nature of things, are able to
awaken and attain intelligence [_prajñâ_].

“‘Just as the lotus-flowers do not grow in the dry land, but in the
dark-colored, waterly mire, O son of good family, it is even so [with
intelligence (_prajñâ_ or _bodhi_)] In non-activity and eternal
annihilation which are cherished by the Çrâvakas and the
Pratyekabuddhas, there is no opportunity for the seeds and sprouts of
Buddhahood to grow. Intelligence can grow only in the mire and dirt of
passion and sin. It is by virtue of passion and sin that the seeds and
sprouts of Buddhahood are able to grow.

“‘O son of good family! Just as no seeds can grow in the air, but in
the filthy, muddy soil,--and there even luxuriously,--O son of good
family, it is even so [with the Bodhi]. It does not grow out of
non-activity and eternal annihilation. It is only out of the
mountainous masses of egoistic, selfish thoughts that Intelligence is
awakened and grows to the incomprehensible wisdom of Buddha-seeds.

“‘O son of good family! Just as we cannot obtain {352} priceless
pearls unless we dive into the depths of the four great oceans, O son
of good family, it is even so [with Intelligence]. If we do not dive
deep into the mighty ocean of passion and sin, how could we get hold
of the precious gem of Buddha-essence? Let it therefore be understood
that the primordial seeds of Intelligence draw their vitality from the
midst of passion and sin.’” In a Pauline epistle we read, “From the
foulness of the soil, the beauty of new life grows.” And Emerson
sings:


 “Let me go where’er I will,
 I hear a sky-born music still.
 ’Tis not in the high stars alone,
  Nor in the cup of budding flowers,
 Nor in the redbreast’s mellow tone,
  Nor in the bow that smiles in showers,
 But in the mud and scum of things.
 There always, always, something sings.”


Do we not see here a most explicit statement of the Mahâyânistic
sentiment?


 _Nirvâna and Samsâra are One._

The most remarkable feature in the Mahâyânistic conception of Nirvâna
is expressed in this formula: “Yas kleças so bodhi, yas samsâras tat
nirvânam.” What is sin or passion, that is Intelligence, what is birth
and death (or transmigration), that is Nirvâna. This is a rather bold
and revolutionising proposition in the dogmatic history of Buddhism.
But it is no more than the natural development of the spirit that was
breathed by its founder.

{353}

In the _Viçeṣacinta-brahma-paripṛccha Sûtra_,[149] it is said that
(chap. II):

“Samsâra is Nirvâna, because there is, when viewed from the ultimate
nature of the Dharmakâya, nothing going out of, nor coming into,
existence, [samsâra being only apparent]: Nirvâna is samsâra, when it
is coveted and adhered to.”

In another place (_op. cit._) the idea is expressed in much plainer
terms: “The essence of all things is in truth free from attachment,
attributes, and desires; therefore, they are pure, and, as they are
pure, we know that what is the essence of birth and death that is the
essence of Nirvâna, and that what is the essence of Nirvâna that is
the essence of birth and death (_samsâra_). In other words, Nirvâna
is not to be sought outside of this world, which, though transient, is
in reality no more than Nirvâna itself. Because it is contrary to our
reason to imagine that there is Nirvâna and there is birth and death
(_samsâra_), and that the one lies outside the pale of the other,
and, therefore, that we can attain Nirvâna only after we have
annihilated or escaped the world of birth and death. If we are not
hampered by our confused subjectivity, this our worldly life is an
activity of Nirvâna itself.”

Nâgârjuna repeats the same sentiment in his _Mâdhyamika Çâstra_, when
he says:

{354}


 “Samsâra is in no way to be distinguished from Nirvâna:
 Nirvâna is in no way to be distinguished from Samsâra.”[150]


Or,


 “The sphere of Nirvâna is the sphere of Samsâra:
 Not the slightest distinction exists between them.”[151]


Asanga goes a step further and boldly declares that all the
Buddha-dharmas, of which Nirvâna or Dharmakâya forms the foundation,
are characterised with the passions, errors, and sins of vulgar minds.
He says in _Mahâyâna-Sangraha Çâstra_ (the Chinese Tripitaka, Japanese
edition of 1881, _wang_ VIII., p. 84):

“(1) All Buddha-dharmas are characterised with eternality, for the
Dharmakâya is eternal.

“(2) All Buddha-dharmas are characterised with an extinguishing power,
for they extinguish all the obstacles for final emancipation.

“(3) All Buddha-dharmas are characterised with regeneration, for the
Nirmânakâya [Body of Transformation] constantly regenerates.

“(4) All Buddha-dharmas are characterised with the power of
attainment, for by the attainment [of truth] they subjugate
innumerable evil passions as cherished by ignorant beings.

“(5) All Buddha-dharmas are characterised with the desire to gain, ill
humor, folly, and all the other {355} passions of vulgar minds, for it
is through the Buddha’s love that those depraved souls are saved.

“(6) All Buddha-dharmas are characterised with non-attachment and
non-defilement, for Suchness which is made perfect by these virtues
cannot be defiled by any evil powers.

“(7) All Buddha-dharmas are above attachment and defilement, for
though all Buddhas reveal themselves in the world, worldliness cannot
defile them.”[152]

Buddha-dharma means any thing, or any virtue, or any faculty, that
belongs to Buddhahood. Non-attachment is a Buddha-dharma, love is a
Buddha-dharma, wisdom is a Buddha-dharma. and in fact anything is a
Buddha-dharma which is an attribute of the Perfect One, not to mention
the Dharmakâya or Nirvâna which constitutes the very essence of
Buddhahood. Therefore, the conclusion which is to be drawn from those
seven propositions of Asanga as above quoted is this: Not only is this
world of constant transformation as a whole Nirvâna, but its apparent
errors and sins and evils are also the various phases of the
manifestation of Nirvâna.

The above being the Mahâyânistic view of Nirvâna, it is evident that
Nirvâna is not something transcendental or that which stands above
this world of birth {356} and death, joy and sorrow, love and hate,
peace and struggle. Nirvâna is not to be sought in the heavens nor
after a departure from this earthly life nor in the annihilation of
human passions and aspirations. On the contrary, it must be sought in
the midst of worldliness, as life with all its thrills of pain and
pleasure is no more than Nirvâna itself. Extinguish your life and
seek Nirvâna in anchoretism, and your Nirvâna is forever lost. Consign
your aspirations, hopes, pleasures, and woes, and everything that
makes up a life to the eternal silence of the grave, and you bury
Nirvâna never to be recovered. In asceticism, or in meditation, or in
ritualism, or even in metaphysics, the more impetuously you pursue
Nirvâna, the further away it flies from you. It was the most serious
mistake ever committed by any religious thinkers to imagine that
Nirvâna which is the complete satisfaction of our religious feeling
could be gained by laying aside all human desires, ambitions, hopes,
pains, and pleasures. Have your own Bodhi (intelligence) thoroughly
enlightened through love and knowledge, and everything that was
thought sinful and filthy turns out to be of divine purity. It is the
same human heart, formerly the fount of ignorance and egoism, now the
abode of eternal beatitude--Nirvâna shining in its intrinsic
magnificence.

Suppose a torch light is taken into a dark cell, which people had
hitherto imagined to be the abode of hideous, uncanny goblins, and
which on that account they wanted to have completely destroyed to the
{357} ground. The bright light now ushered in at once disperses the
darkness, and every nook and corner therein is perfectly illumined.
Everything in it now assumes its proper aspect. And to their surprise
people find that those figures which they formerly considered to be
uncanny and horrible are nothing but huge precious stones, and they
further learn that every one of those stones can be used in some way
for the great benefit of their fellow-creatures. The dark cell is the
human heart before the enlightenment of Nirvâna, the torch light is
love and intelligence. When love warms and intelligence brightens, the
heart finds every passion and sinful desire that was the cause of
unbearable anguish now turned into a divine aspiration. The heart
itself, however, remains the same just as much as the cell, whose
identity was never affected either by darkness or by brightness. This
parable nicely illustrates the Mahâyânistic doctrine of the identity
of Nirvâna and Samsâra, and of the Bodhi and Kleça, that is, of
intelligence and passion.

Therefore, it is said:


 “All sins transformed into the constituents of enlightenment!
 The vicissitudes of Samsâra transformed into the beatitude of Nirvâna!
 All these come from the exercise of the great religious discipline
  (_upâya_);
 Beyond our understanding, indeed, is the mystery of all Buddhas.”[153]


{358}


 _The Middle Course._

In one sense the Buddha always showed an eclectic, conciliatory,
synthetic spirit in his teachings. He refused to listen to any extreme
doctrine which elevates one end too high at the expense of the other
and culminates in the collapse of the whole edifice. When the Buddha
left his seat of enlightenment under the Bodhi tree, he made it his
mission to avoid both extremes, asceticism and hedonism. He proved
throughout his life to be a calm, dignified, thoughtful,
well-disciplined person, and at no time irritable in character,--in
this latter respect being so different from the sage of Nazareth, who
in anger cast out all the tradesmen in the temple and overthrew the
tables of the money-changers, and who cursed the fig tree on which he
could not find any fruit but leaves unfit to appease his hunger. The
doctrine of the Middle Path (_Mâdhyamârga_), whatever it may mean
morally and intellectually, always characterised the life and doctrine
of Buddha as well as the later development of his teachings. His
followers, however different in their individual views, professed as a
rule to pursue steadily the Middle Path as paved by the Master. Even
when Nâgârjuna proclaimed his celebrated doctrine of Eight No’s which
seems to superficial critics nothing but an absolute nihilism, he said
that the Middle Path could be found only in those eight no’s.[154]

{359}

Mahâyânism has certainly applied this synthetic method of Buddha to
its theory of Nirvâna and ennobled it by fully developing its immanent
signification. In the _Discourse on Buddha-essence_, Vasubandhu quotes
the following passage from the _Çrimala Sûtra_, which plainly shows
the path along which the Mahâyânists traveled before they reached
their final conclusion: “Those who see only the transitoriness of
existence are called nihilists, and those who see only the eternality
of Nirvâna are called eternalists. Both views are incorrect.”
Vasubandhu then proceeds to say: “Therefore, the Dharmakâya of the
Tathâgata is free from both extremes, and on that account it is called
the Great Eternal Perfection. When viewed from this absolute standpoint
of Suchness, the logical distinction between Nirvâna and Samsâra cannot
in reality be maintained, and hereby we enter upon the realm of
non-duality.” And this realm of non-duality is the Middle Path of
Nirvâna, not in its nihilistic, but in its Mahâyânistic, significance.


 _How to Realise Nirvâna._

How can we attain the Middle Path of Nirvâna? How can we realise a
life that is neither pessimistic asceticism nor materialistic
hedonism? How can we steer through the whirlpools of Samsâra without
being {360} swallowed up and yet braving their turbulent gyration? The
answer to this can readily be given, when we understand, as repeatedly
stated above, that this life is the manifestation of the Dharmakâya,
and that the ideal of human existence is to realise within the
possibilities of his mind and body all that he can conceive of the
Dharmakâya. And this we have found to be all-embracing love and
all-seeing intelligence. Destroy then your ignorance at one blow and
be done with your egoism, and there springs forth an eternal stream of
love and wisdom.

Says Vasubandhu: “By virtue of Prajñâ [intelligence or wisdom], our
egoistic thoughts are destroyed: by virtue of Karuṇâ [love],
altruistic thoughts are cherished. By virtue of Prajñâ, the
[affective] attachment inherent in vulgar minds is abolished; by
virtue of Karuṇâ, the [intellectual] attachment as possessed by the
Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas is abolished. By virtue of Prajñâ,
Nirvâna [in its transcendental sense] is not rejected; by virtue of
Karuṇâ, Samsâra [with its changes and transmigrations] is not rejected.
By virtue of Prajñâ the truth of Buddhism is attained; by virtue of
Karuṇâ, all sentient beings are matured [for salvation].”

The practical life of a Buddhist runs in two opposite, though not
antagonistic, directions, one upward and the other downward, and the
two are synthesised in the Middle Path of Nirvâna. The upward
direction points to the intellectual comprehension of the truth, while
the downward one to a realisation of all-embracing {361} love among
his fellow-creatures. One is complemented by the other. When the
intellectual side is too much emphasised at the expense of the
emotional, we have a Pratyekabuddha, a solitary thinker, whose
fountain of tears is dry and does not flow over the sufferings of his
fellow-beings. When the emotional side alone is asserted to the
extreme, love acquires the egoistic tint that colors everything coming
in contact with it. Because it does not discriminate and takes
sensuality for spirituality. If it does not turn out sentimentalism,
it will assume a hedonistic form. How many superstitious, or foul, or
even atrocious deeds in the history of religion have been committed
under the beautiful name of religion, or love of God and mankind! It
makes the blood run cold when we think how religious fanatics burned
alive their rivals or opponents at the stake, cruelly butchered
thousands of human lives within a day, brought desolation and ruin
throughout the land of their enemies,--and all these works of the
Devil executed for sheer love of God! Therefore, says Devala, the
author of the _Discourse on the Mahâpuruṣa_ (Great Man): “The wise
do not approve lovingkindness without intelligence, nor do they
approve intelligence without lovingkindness; because one without the
other prevents us from reaching the highest path.” Knowledge is the
eye, love is the limb. Directed by the eye, the limb knows how to
move; furnished with the limb, the eye can attain what it perceives.
Love alone is blind, knowledge alone is lame. It is only when one is
supplemented {362} by the other that we have a perfect, complete man.

In Buddha as the ideal human being we recognise the perfection of love
and intelligence; for it was in him that the Dharmakâya found its
perfect realisation in the flesh. But as far as the Bodhisattvas are
concerned, their natural endowments are so diversified and their
temperament is so uneven that in some the intellectual elements are
more predominant while in others the emotional side is more pronounced,
that while some are more prone to practicality others preferably look
toward intellectualism. Thus, as a matter of course, some Bodhisattvas
will be more of philosophers than of religious seers. They may tend in
some cases to emphasise the intellectual side of religion more than
its emotional side and uphold the importance of prajñâ (intelligence)
above that of karuṇâ (love). But the Middle Path of Nirvâna lies in
the true harmonisation of prajñâ and karuṇâ, of bodhi and upâya, of
knowledge and love, of intellect and feeling.


 _Love Awakens Intelligence._

But if we have to choose between the two, let us first have
all-embracing love, the Buddhists would say; for it is love that
awakens in us an intense desire to find the way of emancipating the
masses from perpetual sufferings and eternal transmigration. The
intellect will now endeavor to realise its highest possibilities; the
Bodhi will exhibit its fullest strength. When it is found out that
this life is an expression of the Dharmakâya which is one and eternal,
that {363} individual existences have no selfhood (_âtman_ or
_svabhâva_) as far as they are due to the particularisation of
subjective ignorance, and, therefore, that we are true and real only
when we are conceived as one in the absolute Dharmakâya, the
Bodhisattva’s love which caused him to search after the highest truth
will now unfold its fullest significance.

This love, or faith in the Mahâyâna, as it is sometimes called, is
felt rather vaguely at the first awakening of the religious
consciousness, and agitates the mind of the aspirant, whose life has
hitherto been engrossed in every form of egocentric thought and
desire. He no more finds an unalloyed satisfaction, as the Çrâvakas
or the Pratyekabuddhas do, in his individual emancipation from the
curse of Samsâra. However sweet the taste of release from the bond of
ignorance, it is lacking something that makes the freedom perfectly
agreeable to the Bodhisattva who thinks more of others than of
himself; to be sweet as well as acceptable, it must be highly savored
with lovingkindness which embraces all his fellow-beings as his own
children. The emancipation of the Çrâvaka or of the Pratyekabuddha
is like a delicious food which is wanting in saline taste, for it is
no more than a dry, formal philosophical emancipation. Love is that
which stimulates a man to go beyond his own interests. It is the
mother of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. The sacred motive that induces
them to renounce a life of Nirvânic self-complacency, is nothing but
their boundless love for all beings. They do {364} not wish to rest in
their individual emancipation, they want to have all sentient creatures
without a single exception emancipated and blest in paradisiacal
happiness. Love, therefore, bestows on us two spiritual benefits: (1)
It saves all beings from misery and (2) awakens in us the
Buddha-intelligence.

The following passages quoted at random from Devala’s _Mahâpuruṣa_
will help our readers to understand the true signification of Nirvâna
and the value of love (_karuṇâ_) as estimated by the Mahâyânists.

“Those who are afraid of transmigration and seek their own benefits
and happiness in final emancipation, are not at all comparable to
those Bodhisattvas, who rejoice when they come to assume a material
existence once again, for it affords them another opportunity to
benefit others. Those who are only capable of feeling their own
selfish sufferings may enter into Nirvâna [and not trouble themselves
with the sufferings of other creatures like themselves]; but the
Bodhisattva who feels in himself all the sufferings of his
fellow-beings as his own, how can he bear the thought of leaving
others behind while he is on his way to final emancipation, and when
he himself is resting in Nirvânic quietude?..... Nirvâna in truth
consists in rejoicing at other’s being made happy, and Samsâra in not
so feeling. He who feels a universal love for his fellow-creatures
will rejoice in distributing blessings among them and find his Nirvâna
in so doing.[155]

{365}

“Suffering really consists in pursuing one’s egotistic happiness,
while Nirvâna is found in sacrificing one’s welfare for the sake of
others. People generally think that it is an emancipation when they
are released from their own pain, but a man with loving heart finds it
in rescuing others from misery.

“With people who are not kindhearted, there is no sin that will not be
committed by them. They are called the most wicked whose hearts are
not softened at the sight of others’ misfortune and suffering.

“When all beings are tortured by avarice, passion, ill humor,
infatuation, and folly, and are constantly threatened by the misery of
birth and death, disease and decay..... how can the Bodhisattva live
among them and not feel pity for them?

“Of all good virtues, lovingkindness stands foremost.... It is the
source of all merit.... It is the {366} mother of all Buddhas.... It
induces others to take refuge in the incomparable Bodhi.

“The loving heart of a Bodhisattva is annoyed by one thing, that all
beings are constantly tortured and threatened by all sorts of pain.”

Let us quote another interesting passage from a Mahâyâna sûtra.

When Vimalakirti was asked why he did not feel well, he made the
following reply, which is full of religious significance: “From
ignorance there arises desire and that is the cause of my illness. As
all sentient beings are ill, so am I ill. When all sentient beings are
healed of their illness, I shall be healed of my illness, too. Why?
The Bodhisattva suffers birth and death because of sentient beings. As
there is birth and death, so there is illness. When sentient beings
are delivered from illness, the Bodhisattvas will suffer no more
illness. When an only son in a good family is sick, the parents feel
sick too: when he is recovered they are well again. So it is with the
Bodhisattva. He loves all sentient beings as his own children. When
they are sick, he is sick too. When they are recovered, he is well
again. Do you wish to know whence this [sympathetic] illness is? The
illness of the Bodhisattva comes from his all-embracing love
(_mahâkarunâ_).”

This gospel of universal love is the consummation of all religious
emotions whatever their origin. Without this, there is no
religion--that is, no religion that is animated with life and spirit.
For it is in the fact {367} and nature of things that we are not moved
by mere contemplation or mere philosophising. Every religion may have
its own way of intellectually interpreting this fact, but the
practical result remains the same everywhere, viz. that it cannot
survive without the animating energy of love. Whatever sound and fine
reasoning there may be in the doctrine of the Çrâvaka and the
Pratyekabuddha, the force that is destined to conquer the world and to
deliver us from misery is not intellection, but the will, i.e. the
pûrvapranidhâna of the Dharmakâya.


 _Conclusion._

We now conclude. What is most evident from what we have seen above is
that the Mahâyâna Nirvâna is not the annihilation of life but its
enlightenment, that it is not the nullification of human passions and
aspirations but their purification and ennoblement. This world of
eternal transmigration is not a place which should be shunned as the
playground of evils, but should be regarded as the place of
ever-present opportunities given to us for the purpose of unfolding
all our spiritual possibilities and powers for the sake of the
universal welfare. There is no need for us to shrink, like the snail
into his cozy shelter, before the duties and burdens of life. The
Bodhisattva, on the contrary, finds Nirvâna in a concatenation of
births and deaths and boldly faces the problem of evil and solves it
by purifying the Bodhi from subjective ignorance.

{368}

His rule of conduct is:


 “Sabba pâpassa akaranam,
 Kusalassa upasampada,
 Sacitta pariyodapanam;
 Etam buddhânu sâsanam.”[156]


His aspirations are solemnly expressed in this, which we hear daily
recited in the Mahâyâna Buddhist temples and monasteries and
seminaries:


 “Sentient beings, however innumerable, I take vow to save;
 Evil passions, however inextinguishable, I take vow to destroy;
 The avenues of truth, however numberless, I take vow to study;
 The way of the Enlightened, however unsurpassable, I take vow to
  attain.”


And an indefatigable pursuit of these noble aims will finally lead to
the heaven of the Buddhists, Nirvâna, which is not a state of eternal
quietude, but the source of energy and intelligence.

By way of summary, and to avoid all misconceptions, let me repeat once
more that Nirvâna is thus no negation of life, nor is it an idle
contemplation on the misery of existence. The life of a Buddhist
consists by no means in the monotonous repetition of reciting the
sûtras and going his rounds for meals. Far from that. He enters into
all the forms of life-activity, for he does not believe that universal
emancipation {369} is achieved by imprisoning himself in the cloister.

Theoretically speaking, Nirvâna is the dispersion of the clouds of
ignorance hovering around the light of Bodhi. Morally, it is the
suppression of egoism and the awakening of love (_karunâ_).
Religiously, it is the absolute surrender of the self to the will of
the Dharmakâya. When the clouds of ignorance are dispersing, our
intellectual horizon gets clearer and wider; we perceive that our
individual existences are like bubbles and lightnings, but that they
obtain reality in their oneness with the Body of Dharma. This
conviction compels us to eternally abandon our old egoistic conception
of life. The ego finds its significance only when it is conceived in
relation to the not-ego, that is, to the _alter_; in other words,
self-love has no meaning whatever unless it is purified by love for
others. But this love for others must not remain blind and
unenlightened, it must be in harmony with the will of the Dharmakâya
which is the norm of existence and the reason of being. The mission of
love is ennobled and fulfilled in its true sense when we come to the
faith that says “thy will be done.” Love without this resignation to
the divine ordinance is merely another form of egoism: the root is
already rotten, how can its trunk, stems, leaves, and flowers make a
veritable growth?

Let us then conclude with the following reflections of the Bodhisattva,
in which we read the whole signification of Buddhism.

{370}

“Having practised all the six virtues of perfection (_pâramitâ_) and
innumerable other meritorious deeds, the Bodhisattva reflects in this
wise:

“‘All the good deeds practised by me are for the benefit of all
sentient beings, for their ultimate purification [from sin]. By the
merit of these good deeds I pray that all sentient beings be released
from the innumerable sufferings suffered by them in their various
abodes of existence. By the turning over (_parivarta_) of these deeds
I would be a haven for all beings and deliver them from their
miserable existences; I would be a great beacon-light to all beings
and dispel the darkness of ignorance and make the light of intelligence
shine.’

“He reflects again in this wise:

“‘All sentient beings are creating evil karma in innumerable ways, and
by reason of this karma they suffer innumerable sufferings. They do
not recognise the Tathâgata, do not listen to the Good Law, do not
pay homage to the congregation of holy men. All these beings carry an
innumerable amount of great evil karma and are destined to suffer in
innumerable ways. For their sake I will in the midst of the three evil
creations suffer all their sufferings and deliver every one of them.
Painful as these sufferings are, I will not retreat, I will not be
frightened, I will not be negligent, I will not forsake my
fellow-beings. Why? Because it is the will [of the Dharmakâya] that
all sentient beings should be universally emancipated.’

{371}

“He reflects again in this wise:

“‘My conduct will be like the sun-god who with his universal
illumination seeks not any reward, who ceases not on account of one
unrighteous person to make a great display of his magnificent glory,
who on account of one unrighteous person abandons not the salvation of
all beings. Through the dedication (_parivarta_) of all my merits I
would make every one of my fellow-creatures happy and joyous.’” (The
_Avatamsaka Sûtra_, fas XIV).

{372}




APPENDIX.

{373}

{374}

{375}

 HYMNS OF MAHÂYÂNA FAITH.

 DHARMAKÂYA (TATHÂGATA).[a01]

 In all beings there abideth the Dharmakâya;
 With all virtues dissolved in it, it liveth in eternal calmness.
 It knoweth nor birth nor death, coming nor going;
 Not one, not two; not being, not becoming;
 Yet present everywhere in worlds of beings:
 This is what is perceived by all Tathâgatas.
 All virtues, material and immaterial,
 Dependent on the Dharmakâya, are eternally pure in it.

 Like unto the sky is the ultimate nature of the Dharmakâya;
 Far away from the six dusts, it is defilement-free.
 Of no form and devoid of all attributes is the Dharmakâya,
 In which are void both actor and action:
 The Dharmakâya of all Buddhas, thus beyond comprehension,
 Quells all the struggles of sophistry and dialectics,
 Distances all the efforts of intellection,
 Thoughts all are dead in it, and suchness alone abideth.

 ---

{376}

 THE DHARMAKÂYA OF TATHÂGATA.[a02]

 In all the worlds over the ten quarters,
 O ye, sentient creatures living there,
 Behold the most venerable of men and gods,
 Whose spiritual Dharma-body is immaculate and pure.

 As through the power of one mind,
 A host of thoughts is evolved:
 So from one Dharma-body of Tathâgata,
 Are produced all the Buddha-bodies.

 In Bodhi nothing dual there existeth,
 Nor is any thought of self present:
 The Dharma-body, undefiled and non-dual,
 In its full splendor manifesteth itself everywhere.

 Its ultimate reality is like unto the vastness of space;
 Its manifested forms are like unto magic shows;
 Its virtues excellent are inexhaustible,
 This, indeed, the spiritual state of Buddhas only.

 All the Buddhas of the present, past, and future,
 Each one of them is an issue of the Dharma-body immaculate and pure;
 Responding to the needs of sentient creatures,
 They manifest themselves everywhere, assuming corporeality which is
  beautiful.

 They never made the premeditation
 That they would manifest in such and such forms.
 Separated are they from all desire and anxiety,
 And free and self-acting are their responses.

{377}

 They do not negate the phenomenality of dharmas,
 Nor do they affirm the world of individuals:
 But manifesting themselves in all forms,
 They teach and convert all sentient creatures.

 The Dharma-body is not changeable,
 Neither is it unchangeable;
 All dharmas [in essence] are without change,
 But manifestations are changeable.

 The Sambodhi knoweth no bounds,
 Extending as far as the limits of the Dharmaloka itself;
 Its depths are bottomless, and its extent limitless;
 Words and speeches are powerless to describe it.

 Of all the ways that lead to Enlightenment
 The Tathâgata knoweth the true significance;
 Wandering freely all over the worlds,
 Obstacles he encountereth nowhere.

 ---

 THE TATHÂGATA. (1)[a03]

 The Tathâgata appeared not on earth,
 Nor did he enter into Nirvana;
 By the supreme power of his inmost will,
 He reveals himself freely as he wills.[a04]

 This fact is beyond comprehension,
 Belongs not to the sphere of a limited consciousness,
 Only an intelligence perfect and gone beyond
 Is able to have an insight into the realm of Buddhas.

{378}

 The material body is not the Tathâgata,
 Nor is the voice, nor the sound:
 Yet he is not beyond the visible and the audible:
 The Buddha has indeed a power miraculous.

 People of little faith are unable to know
 The inmost adytum of Buddhahood.
 It is by the perfecting of primordial karma-intelligence
 That the realm of all Buddhas is revealed.

 All Buddhas come from nowhere,
 And depart for nowhere:
 The Body of Dharma that is pure, immaculate, and incomprehensible,
 Is invested with a power miraculously free.

 In infinity of worlds,
 Revealing itself in the body of Tathâgata,
 It universally preaches the Law supremely excellent,
 And in its heart no attachment lingers.

 An intellect that knows no limits or bounds
 Perceives no obstacles in all dharmas,
 And penetrates into the depths of the Dharmaloka,
 Revealing itself with a power miraculously divine.

 All sentient beings and all creatures,
 It understandeth thoroughly without difficulty:
 Its Bodies of Transformation are innumerable,
 And universally revealed in all the worlds.

 Those who seek after All-knowledge
 May in course of time attain perfect enlightenment;
 Let them above all purify the heart
 And complete their discipline in Bodhisattvahood.

{379}

 And then they will see the Tathâgata’s
 Immeasurable power that comes from his free will;
 Devoid of all doubts they are, and accompanied
 With sages whose virtue is unsurpassable.

 ---

 THE TATHÂGATA (2).[a05]

 The Tathâgata, in pure golden color,
 And in person resplendent and majestic,
 In innumerable ages past,
 All merits hath accumulated.

 With bliss and wisdom all in perfection,
 And the highest enlightenment attaining.
 And with great loving heart animated,
 He now appeareth in this world of endurance.

 Men and devas and the eight hosts of demons,
 All pay him homage most reverent,
 Who, from his inmost self-being,
 Preacheth the deepest spiritual Dharma.

 Which is so unfathomably deep,
 That Buddha alone can understand it:
 Multitudes of beings, ignorant and blind,
 Listening to it, are unable to comprehend.

 The Tathâgata is the great leader of beings;
 With skill that is excellent and marvellous,
 Guiding all those ignorant souls,
 By degrees bringeth them to Enlightenment.

{380}

 The heart of all beings is miraculously bright,
 And eternally calm in its being.
 Pure and immaculate and defilement-free,
 It is replenished with all merits.

 Its essence is like unto the sky:
 Devoid of all limitations,
 Knoweth neither birth nor death,
 And there is neither coming nor departing.

 Eternally abiding in the Dharma-essence,
 It is immovable as the Mount Sumeru;
 The oneness in it of all beings
 Is indeed beyond finite knowledge.

 Vulgar minds from time immemorial,
 Blindly clinging to all passions,
 Are thrown deep into the ocean of pain,
 And know not how to escape.

 The most profound doctrine of Tathâgata,
 Full of meaning, spiritual and transcendental,
 With recipient intellects in all degrees,
 In harmony unfoldeth he the Law.

 A shower of one taste from above
 Covering all the ten quarters,
 Grasses and trees, woods and forests,
 Roots and trunks, large and small,

 Of all growing on this vast earth,
 Nothing is there that thereby itself benefiteth not.
 The Law delivered by the Tathâgata
 May even be likened unto it.

{381}

 With one voice which is wondrous,
 He giveth utterance to thoughts innumerable,
 That are received by audience of all sort,
 Each understanding them in his own way.

 In this wise among the assemblage,
 None is there but that enters upon Buddha-knowledge
 Such is Buddha’s miraculous power,
 Truly called “Incomprehensible.”

 ---

 REPENTANCE.[a06]

 Those who repent as prescribed by the Dharma,
 Altogether their earthly sins uproot;
 As fire on doomsday the world will consume,
 With its mountain peaks and infinite seas.

 Repentance burns up of earthly desires the fuel;
 Repentance to heaven the sinners is leading;
 Repentance the bliss of the four Dhyânas imparteth;
 Repentance brings showers of jewels and gems;

 Repentance a holy life renders firm as a diamond;
 Repentance transports to the palace of bliss everlasting;
 Repentance from the triple world’s prison releases;
 Repentance makes blossom the bloom of the Bodhi.

 ---

{382}

 ALL BEINGS ARE MOTHERS AND FATHERS.

 All sentient beings in transmigration travel through the six gatis,
 Like unto a wheel revolving without beginning and end,
 Becoming in turn fathers and mothers, men and women:
 Generations and generations, each owes something to others.

 Ye should then regard all beings as fathers and mothers;
 Though this truth is too hidden to be recognised without the aid of
  Holy Knowledge,
 All men are your fathers,
 All women are your mothers.

 While not yet requiting their love received in your prior lives,
 Why should ye, thinking otherwise, harbor enmity?
 Ever thinking of love, endeavor ye to benefit one another;
 And provoke ye not hostility, quarreling and insulting.

 ---

 THE TEN PARÂMITÂS.

 O ye, sons of Buddha, in the Holy Way trained,
 With the Heart of Highest Intelligence awakened,
 And living in seclusion at the Aranyaka,
 Should practice the ten pâramitâs.

 At daily meal think ye first of almsgiving,
 And also distribute among beings the Treasure of Law;
 When the three rings[a07] are pure, it is called true charity;
 Through this practice perfected are the merits of discipline.

{383}

 Would ye understand the merits of almsgiving?
 Know ye that it comes from the heart pure, and not from the wealth
  given;
 A precious treasure with a heart unclean,
 Is surpassed by a mite with a heart clean.

 Wealth giving is a dâna-pâramitâ,
 And there are other dâna-pâramitâs:
 To give away one’s life, wife, or children,
 This is called blood-giving.

 Should a man of good family come and ask for the Law
 Let him have all the Mahâyâna sûtras explained,
 And awaken in him the Heart of Highest Intelligence;
 This is called a true pâramitâ.

 With sympathy and pure faith and conscience,
 Embrace ye all beings and befree them from greed,
 That they might attain to the highest intelligence of the Tathâgata:
 The giving of wealth and of the Law is the first pâramitâ.

 Firmly observing the three sets of the Bodhisattva-çîlas,[a08]
 O ye, evolve the Bodhi, distance birth-and-death,
 Guard the Law of Buddha and make it long live in the world,
 Repent the violation of the çîlas, and be always mindful of the true
  ones.

 Subdue ye anger and hate and cultivate in your heart love and
  sympathy;
 Mindful of the karma past, harbor ye not evil thoughts against
  offenders;
 Be not reluctant for the sake of all beings to sacrifice life:
 This is called the pâramitâ of meekness.

 In practicing what is hard to practice, hesitate ye not awhile;
 With ever-increasing energy through three asankheya kalpas,
 Defile not yourselves, but always discipline the heart;
 And for the sake of all creatures seek ye salvation.

{384}

 Entering into and rising from the Samâdhi, spiritual freedom is
  obtained:
 Transforming yourselves and travelling in all the ten quarters,
 Have for all beings the cause of evil desire removed,
 And let them seek deliverance in the doctrine of Samâdhi.

 Would ye desire to attain to True Intelligence?
 Friendly approach Bodhisattvas and Tathâgatas;
 Gladly listening to the doctrine transcendental and sublime,
 Attain ye the three disciplines[a09] and remove the two
  obstacles[a10].

 Recognising difference in the disposition of beings,
 Apply the medicine proper for each disease:
 Love and sympathy, skill and expediency, each fitting the case,
 Try the proper means for the benefit of the multitudes.

 Would ye know the true meaning of existence?
 The middle path lies in non-attachment, neither “yea” nor “nay”;
 Intelligence pure is unfathomable and unites in Suchness;
 Identify mine with thine, embracing the whole.

 By the force of intellect, grasping the nature of beings,
 Teach the masses each in accord with his capacity;
 The force of intellect penetrating through the heart of all beings,
 Destroys the root of transmigration in birth and death.

 Intelligently judging between black and white,
 Conscientiously take hold of one and put the other aside, and let
  each rest in its place;
 Samsâra and Nirvâna are but one in their essence;
 Fulfilling the meaning of existence, cherish ye not self-conceit.

 These ten deeds of excellence
 Comprise all eighty-four thousand virtues;
 Each in its class excels all the others,
 And is called the Pâramitâ of Bodhisattva.

{385}

 Eighty-four thousand samâdhis
 Becalm the disturbant mind of all beings;
 Eighty-four thousand dhâranîs
 Keep away all the prejudices and evil influences.

 The Great Sage, King of Dharma, with marvellous skill,
 Teacheth the Law in three ways and converteth all beings;
 Casting the net of the Doctrine in the ocean of birth and death,
 He draweth out men and gods to the abode of bliss.

 ---

 THE BODHI.[a11]

 All things are of the Bodhi,
 The Bodhi is in all things;
 The Bodhi and all things are one:
 Who knoweth this is called the World-honored.

 ---

 NIRVANA AND THE THREE EVILS.

 Greed is Nirvana;
 So is hate, and folly;
 In these three passions
 There dwells a Buddha-dharma inexpressible.

 Who severalises, thinking,
 There’s greed, and hate, and folly,
 He is as far from Buddha,
 As heaven from earth.

 The Bodhi and greed,
 They’re one, not two:
 Out of one Dharma-gate cometh all;
 Here’s sameness, no diversity.

{386}

 This hearing, the vulgar stand aghast;
 Far from the Buddha-path are they.
 The heart, when innocent of greed,[a12]
 Is never troubled.

 In whose mind self is lurking still,
 And who imagines that something he has,
 Greedy is this man called,
 And he is bound for hell.

 What is the true nature of greed,
 That is the nature of Buddha-dharma;
 What is the nature of Buddha-dharma,
 That is the nature of greed.[a13]

 These two are of one nature;
 That is, of no-nature;
 Who knoweth this truth,
 Would be the world-leader.

 ---

 NON-ATMAN AND PREJUDICE.[a14]

 There once was an ignorant man;
 So afraid of the sky was he
 That piteously crying he wandered away.
 Of its sudden collapse he was fearful.
 But the sky has no boundary,
 And to nobody ’t will be harmful.
 It was due to his ignorance
 That he trembled so fitfully.
 With the Bhikshus and Brahmans
 It is even so, who are prejudiced.
 Learning that empty is the world,
 Alarmed are they at heart;
 And wrongly imagine that if empty were the nature of Âtman
 Nothingness would be the end of all work.

 ---

{387}

 NON-ACTION.

 As the vacuity of sky,
 Being so clear and free of cloud and fog,
 Upon the earth below,
 Betrays no signs a shower to give:
 So the enlightened
 Betray no learning, no intelligence:
 And we, sentient beings,
 Can trace no efforts in their deliverance of the Law.[a15]

 ---

 SELF-DELUSION.

 There lived once a painter,
 Who such a monstrous Yaksha painted
 That he himself was terrified
 And losing all his senses on the ground he fell:
 ’Tis even so with vulgar minds;
 Infatuated, self-deluded by the senses,
 Of their own error they are unaware,
 And go from birth to birth without an end.

 ---

 ALL IN ONE.

 As all the waters in the valley
 Are emptied in the ocean
 Which is of one and the same taste:
 So the enlightened,
 Whatever is
 Good and beneficial,
 Turn over to the Bodhi
 And to that Reality
 In which all things become of one and the same taste.

 ---

{388}

 NIHILISM.

 The vast vacuity of space,
 How limitless and measureless!
 But in the midst of the void
 How could a farmer sow his seeds?
 ’Tis even so with Nihilism:
 The past is gone forever,
 The future’s not here yet,
 And in the present no Buddha-seeds have they.

 ---

 THE NIHILIST.

 A man who suffers from a disease incurable,
 However excellent his treatment be,
 Impossible he will find his health to gain,
 For his defies all means of remedy.
 ’Tis even so with them who walk in the way of emptiness;
 No matter whereso’er they be,
 How blindly they are clinging unto it!
 Such I declare to be incurable.

 ---

 THE BUDDHA’S DHARMA (1)

 As in its oneness the element earth
 Embraces diversities of objects,
 And discriminates not this or that;
 Even so is it with all the Buddha’s Dharma.

 As in its oneness the element fire
 Burns everything on earth,
 And discriminates not in its nature;
 Even so is it with all the Buddha’s Dharma.

{389}

 As waters in the vast ocean,
 Absorbing hundreds of streams,
 Are of the same taste forever;
 Even so is it with all the Buddha’s Dharma.

 As the dragon-god with thunder and lightning
 Brings showers on the earth all over,
 And the rain-drops discriminate not;
 Even so is it with all the Buddha’s Dharma.

 ---

 THE BUDDHA’S DHARMA. (2)

 As in her oneness mother earth
 Creates diversities of seeds
 And in her inmost no discrimination knows;
 E’en so is it with all the Buddha’s Dharma.

 As in the cloudless sky the sun
 O’er the ten quarters all illuminates,
 And in its brightness shows no difference;
 E’en so is it with all the Buddha’s Dharma.

 As high up in the heavens is the moon
 Beheld by all beings on earth,
 And there’s nowhere her glory reaches not;
 E’en so is it with all the Buddha’s Dharma.

 The Brahma-râja great
 In thousands of worlds himself all manifests
 And knows in his being no diversities;
 E’en so is it with all the Buddha’s Dharma.

 ---

{390}

 THE PASSIONS AND WISDOM.

 Only in the filthiness of soil,
 Could the seed be sown and grow;
 Even so in the mire of passion
 Cherished by all sentient beings
 All over the world,
 If by the sons of Buddha well attended to,
 There will grow the seed of Buddha-dharma.

 Just as in filth and mud
 The lotus grows and blooms,
 Even so in a heart defiled with evil karma
 The seeds of Buddha-dharma are growing.

 ---

 IGNORANCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT. (1)

 A mansion there was once which was a hundred thousand years of age;
 No occupant was there, nor doors nor windows;
 Devas and men, all of a sudden,
 There came and burned a lamp;
 And the darkness that dwelt so long
 Departed instantly without a word.
 The inky darkness that the mansion filled
 Resisted not, “I’ve lived here for ages,
 And I’ll never be removed from here.”
 Even with karma-consciousness and the horde of passions in the heart,
 The analogy holds true.
 Though there abiding many hundred thousand kalpas,
 Their ultimate nature is not true nor real.
 When a traveler, day or night,
 Enters upon the truthful path,
 The lamp of wisdom burns in its full splendor;
 And the horde of evil passions
 Cannot tarry there, even for a moment.

 ---

{391}

 IGNORANCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT. (2)

 Bright shines the lamp,
 And the inky night is gone.
 But with the darkness
 The quarters vanish not;
 Yet this illuminating lamp,
 If not in the dark, nowhere doth shine:
 For light and dark depend upon each other;
 No selfhood having,[a16] they’re empty.
 ’Tis even so with enlightenment.
 In comes enlightenment,
 And out goes ignorance of its own accord.
 But both are like unto the flowers in the air,
 For neither by itself exists;
 Impossible is one alone, either to keep or to forego.

 ---

 THE BODHISATTVA AND ALL BEINGS[a17]

 Great Mother Earth
 All creatures
 Provides and nourishes,
 But from none of them
 She seeks a favor special, nor is she to any partial:
 So is the Bodhisattva.
 Since his awakening of the Heart,
 Until he gains the depths of the Law
 And realises the highest knowledge,
 He toils to save all creatures,
 Himself no favor seeking, nor to others granting any;
 Regardless of friend and enemy,
 Embracing all with single heart,
 He fashions one and all for Bodhi.

 * * *

{392}

 The element Water
 All permeating
 Makes herbs and trees
 In luxury grow,
 Yet any favor special it nor shows nor seeks;
 So is the Bodhisattva;
 With a pure heart of love
 All sentient beings equally embraces he;
 All permeating gradually, universally,
 The seeds immaculate he nourishes,
 Which, breaking down all evils powerful,
 Obtain the fruit of Buddha-knowledge.

 * * *

 The element Fire
 Matures and ripens all
 The tender shoots of the cereals;
 Yet the element fire
 From those young plants
 No favor seeks, nor any shows to them;
 So is the Bodhisattva:
 With knowledge-fire
 Matures he all
 The tender shoots of creatures;
 Yet he from them
 No favor special seeks, nor shows he any.

 * * *

 The element Air,
 By reason of its virtue,
 Pervades all over Buddha-lands;
 With the Bodhisattva
 ’Tis even so,
 Who with consummate skill
 To Buddha’s children
 Preaches the Doctrine Holy.

 ---

{393}

 THE BODHISATTVA.

 /His Firmness/.

 As Mâra, the evil one,
 Commanding his four armies,
 Even by the devas in the Kâmaloka,
 Cannot be overwhelmed;
 So is the Bodhisattva,
 Whose heart, pure and clean,
 By all the hosts of Evil,
 Cannot be tempted, nor confused.

 /His Progress/.

 As the new moon,
 In size increasing gradually,
 Becomes perfect and full in the end;
 Even so the Bodhisattva,
 With a heart defilement-free,
 All the good dharmas seeking and performing,
 In virtue gradually progresses,
 And finally obtains the Law of Purity, perfect and full.

 /His Enlightenment/.

 The rising sun,
 All illumining,
 All forms and images in the world
 In glory are revealed;
 So is the Bodhisattva:
 The light of knowledge emitting,
 And sentient beings illumining,
 Bringeth he all to wisdom.

{394}

 /His Fearlessness/.

 Lion, the king of beasts,
 Majestic, overpowering,
 And in the forest wandering,
 Knows he no fear, no terror;
 So is the Bodhisattva:
 Calmly abiding in Learning,
 Intelligence, and Morality,
 Throughout the universe,
 Wherever he wanders about,
 Knows he no fear, no doubt.

 /His Energy/.

 The giant elephant,
 With energy wondrous,
 A burden heavy carrying,
 Shows not the least fatigue;
 So is the Bodhisattva:
 Bearing, for the sake of the masses,
 The misery of the flesh,
 He shows not the least apathy.

 /His Purity/.

 The lotus-flower,
 Though growing in the marshy land,
 By dirt, or mire, or filth
 Is not defiled;
 So is the Bodhisattva:
 Though living in this world,
 No form of passion
 Ever touches him.

{395}

 /His Self-sacrifice/.

 There lived once a man
 Who craftily and skillfully
 Felled the trunks of trees,
 But left the roots untouched,
 That after due time
 They might once more be growing;
 ’Tis even so with the Bodhisattva:
 With the upâya that is excellent,
 Desires and passions down he fells,
 But leaves their seed unscathed
 By reason of his all-embracing love,
 And thereby ever and anon comes he on earth.[a18]

 ---

 THE BODHISATTVA’S HOMELESS LIFE.[a19]

 The homeless Bodhisat regards the home life [or the world at large]
 As a hurricane that abates not awhile,
 Or as the moon’s illusive image in water cast,
 Which the imagination takes deliberately for the real.

 The water in itself contains no lunar image [real];
 The real moon, dependent on water clear, a shadow casts;
 So are all beings unreal; only conditionally they exist;
 Yet ’tis imagined by the vulgar that an Atman they have.

 The Atman is the product of conditions, and real it is not;
 But for a reality the imagination it takes.
 Have the two prejudices[a20] removed,
 And we perceive Intelligence most high and peerless.

{396}

 Our confused imagination is like unto a black storm,
 Blowing over the woods of birth and death, stirs up the leaves of
  consciousness:
 By the four winds of fallacy ’tis haunted all the time,
 And five damnation-causes it produces,
 Entwining are indeed the roots of evil, which are three,
 Through birth and death doth transmigration ever onward move.

 Who to the Sutras listen and in them devoutly believe,
 The right view they acquire, removing all the thoughts which are
  fallacious,
 And every instant growing are Seeds of Intelligence,
 And the Samâdhi of knowledge great and of spirituality is awakened.

 When well disciplined in speculation deep and subtle,
 In the dark no more we grope, nor do we reap the crop of pain;
 Perceiving Suchness in the ultimate nature of things,
 Subject and object both gone, and vanished are all sins.

 Female and male, they’re attributes, and they are void essentially:
 The ignorant imagine and create the two which only relatively exist.
 The Buddha has destroyed permanently the cause of ignorance,
 And in the ultimate reality nothing particular sees he, male or
  female.

 The excellent fruit of wisdom, if ever attained, remains the same for
  aye;
 The vulgar nathless imagine wrongly and see therein a thing concrete
  and definite.
 The Buddha’s features thirty-two are after all no-features;
 Who sees no-features in the features, the feature true he understands.

{397}

 To wander homeless, and immaculate deeds to practise,
 Over the heart to watch, in solitude quietly to sit:
 This is the rightful way the Bodhisattva cleanses his heart;
 Erelong will he attain the fruit of enlightenment.

 ---

 THE BUDDHIST.[a21]

 Encourage not, for your self-interests,
 Heterodoxy and false doctrines;
 A merciful heart for all have ye;
 Remove stupidity and untruth from your minds;
 Be ye Tathâgata’s most faithful servants;
 And teach the masses who are ignorant,
 To them the Bodhi impart, on yourselves it practising;
 And thereby make the Buddha’s name resound on earth;
 Deliver the multitudes from sin and initiate them
 To the perfect enlightenment of the Buddha:
 Ye by these virtues firmly stand,
 And your Intelligence-heart doth never fail.

 ---

 HYMN TO THE BODHISATTVA.[a22]

 With lovingkindness, a Great Being who saves and protects,
 Regards all beings impartially as his only child;
 Energetically, cheerfully, and without stint,
 His life he sacrifices, uprooting pain, and bringing bliss
  unspeakable.

 Surely he will attain the height of truth and beauty,
 Forever be freed from the entanglement of birth and death.
 And erelong will he the fruit of enlightenment obtain,
 Eternally peaceful, and in the Uncreate joy finding.

 ---

{398}

 A VOW OF THE BODHISATTVA.[a23]

 For the sake of all sentient beings on earth,
 I aspire for the abode of enlightenment which is most high;
 In all-embracing love awakened, and with a heart steadily firm,
 Even my life I will sacrifice, dear as it is.

 In enlightenment no sorrows are found, no burning desires;
 ’Tis enjoyed by all men who are wise.
 All sentient creatures from the turbulent waters of the triple world,
 I’ll release, and to eternal peace them I’ll lead.

 ---

 THE TRUE HOMELESS ONE.[a24]

 Though not wearing the yellow robe,
 Whose heart is free from defilement,
 In the doctrine of Buddhas,
 He is the true homeless one.

 Though not devoid of showy ornaments,
 Who has cut off all entanglements,
 And in whose heart exists neither knottiness nor looseness,
 He is the true homeless one.

 Though not initiated by the Rules,
 Whose heart is clean of all evil thoughts,
 And open only to tranquillity, intelligence, and virtuous deeds,
 He is the true homeless one.

 Though not instructed in the Law,
 Whose insight goes deep into the ultimate,
 And is no more deluded by sham appearances,
 He is the true homeless one.

{399}

 The mind that takes no thought of the ego,
 That goes beyond the illusory phenomena,
 Yet sinks not into stupidity
 Truly awakened to Intelligence it is.

 Whose mind, awakened to Intelligence,
 Sees no substantiality in the ego,
 And, not seeing, yet remains firm,
 This man cannot be injured.

 ---

 THE BODHISATTVA’S SPIRITUAL LIFE.[a25]

 Like unto the vast ocean that receives
 All the waters, and yet overflows not;
 Even so is the Bodhisattva,
 Who knoweth no fatigue in seeking the merits of the Dharma.

 Again, like unto the vast ocean that absorbs
 All the streams, and yet shows no increase;
 Even so is the Bodhisattva,
 Who, receiving the deepest Dharma, nothing gaineth.[a26]

 Again, like unto the vast ocean that refuses to take filth,
 And wherein when absorbed doth foulness change to purity;
 Even so is the Bodhisattva,
 Whom all the filth of passion cannot tarnish.

 Again, like unto the vast ocean whose bottom is unfathomable;
 Even so is the Bodhisattva,
 Whose virtues and wisdom are so immeasurable
 That none ever knows their limits.

{400}

 Again, like unto the vast ocean in which there’s no diversity,
 All the waters and streams pouring thereinto become of one taste
  alone;
 Even so is the Bodhisattva,
 Who listeneth to one note of Dharma.

 Again, like unto the vast ocean that existeth not
 For the interests of one individual;
 Even so is the Bodhisattva,
 Whose aspirations are for the benefit of all.

 Again, like unto the vast ocean that embosoms the jewel called
  “all-jewel.”
 Of which all jewels are produced;
 Even so is the jewel-treasure of the Bodhisattva,
 For it is through this that all the other jewels shine.

 Again, like unto the vast ocean that produces the three kinds of
  jewel,
 And yet discriminates not between them;
 Even so is the teaching of the Bodhisattva,
 Who, equally delivering the three yânas, maketh not any distinction.

 Again, like unto the vast ocean that by degrees becomes deeper;
 Even so is the Bodhisattva,
 Who, practising virtues for the sake of all,
 Forever aspireth after the deepest omniscience.

 Again, like unto the vast ocean that harbors not a corpse;
 Even so is the Bodhisattva,
 Who, with the heart of purity and the vow of Bodhi,
 Harboreth not a passion, nor the thought of the Çrâvaka.

 ---

{401}

 THE BODHISATTVA’S FAITH. (1)[a27]

 Perceiving all in one,
 And one in all,
 The Bodhisattva diligent in his work
 Is never given up to indolence.

 Pain he shunneth not, to pleasure he clingeth not,
 As he is ever bent on the deliverance of all beings;
 To him all Buddhas will themselves reveal,
 And of their presence he is never weary.

 He is in the deepest depths of the Dharma,
 Where is found the inexhaustible ocean of merit.
 All sentient beings in the fivefold path of existence,
 He loveth as his own child;
 Removing things unclean and filthy,
 Supplying them with dharmas pure and immaculate.

 ---

 THE BODHISATTVA’S FAITH. (2)[a28]

 While to the doctrine most high listening,
 The Light of Pure Intelligence within me glows,
 That shining over all the universe
 All the enlightened ones to me reveals.

 Who think there are individuals
 They put themselves in the position most difficult;
 Dharmas have no ego-master which is real,
 For they are merely names and expressions.

 The vulgar and ignorant know not
 That within themselves they have a reality true and real,
 That the Tathâgata is not of any particular form;
 Therefore the Tathâgata they see not.

{402}

 Dirt and dust obscuring their intelligence-eye,
 Enlightenment perfect and true they see not;
 And throughout kalpas immeasurable and innumerable,
 In the stream of birth and death they go a-rolling.

 Wandering and rolling is Samsâra,
 No-more-a-rolling is Nirvâna;
 Yet Samsâra and Nirvâna,
 Absolutely, exists neither of them.

 To believer in falsehood and sophistry,
 Samsâra is here and Nirvâna there;
 Clearly they grasp not the Dharma of ancient sages,
 Nor understand the Path Incomparable.

 Those who thus cling to forms individual,
 Of Buddha’s universal enlightenment, though they hear,
 Themselves negate, and away they wander from the right course of
  thought;
 Therefore, they cannot see the Buddha.

 Who the Dharma of Truth perceive,
 Serene they are for aye, and abide in Suchness;
 Enlightenment most truthful they understand,
 Transcending words and all the modes of speech.

 Illusory are all forms individual;
 No such thing as dharma here exists:
 No enlightened ones
 Seek Truth in things particular.

 Whose insight to the past extends,
 To the future and over the present,
 And who fore’er abides in serenity of Suchness,
 He’s said to be a Tathâgata.

 ---

{403}

 THE BODHISATTVA’S FAITH. (3)[a29]

 I would rather suffer sufferings innumerable
 That I might listen to the voices of Buddhas,
 Than enjoy all sorts of pleasure
 And not hear Buddhas’ names.

 The reason why since ages out of mind
 We suffer sufferings countless
 And transmigrate through birth and death,
 Is that we have not heard Buddhas’ names.

 A reality that exists in things unreal,
 A perfect Intellect synthetising truth and falsehood,
 And that which transcends all the modes of relativity,
 This is called the Bodhi.

 Buddhas of the present are not products of composite conditions,
 Nor are those of the past, nor those of the future.
 What is formless in all forms,
 That is the true essence of Buddhas.

 Who thus perceives
 The deepest significance of all existences,
 In innumerable Buddhas, he will see
 The truth and reality of the Dharma-body.

 The Dharma-body knows truth as true,
 And falsehood as false,
 And well understands the realm of reality;
 Therefore, it is called perfect intellect.

 The enlightened has nothing enlightened,
 Which is the true spirituality of all Buddhas:
 And in this wise they behave,
 Neither to be one nor to be two.

{404}

 They see the one in the many,
 They see the many in the one
 The Dharma has nothing to depend upon;
 How could it be a product of combination?

 The actor and the action,
 Neither really subsists:
 Who can understand this,
 Seeks not reality in either of them.

 And here where reality is unseekable,
 Buddhas find there the resting abode
 The Dharma has nothing to depend upon;
 And the enlightened have nothing to cling to.

{405}




 NOTES
 TO THE APPENDIX.

[a01] This and the following are translations from some Mahâyâna texts
in the Buddhist Tripitaka, which were rendered into the Chinese
language at various times from Sanskrit mostly through the co-operation
of the Hindu missionaries and Chinese scholars. A detailed analysis of
these texts is most urgently needed, as they contain many informations
of great importance not only concerning the history of Buddhism in
India but also concerning early Hindu culture generally. A rather
incomplete idea as to their contents and material and general character
will be attained by the perusal of Rev. Nanjo’s _Catalogue of the
Chinese Tripitaka_, Oxford, 1883.

_Mahâyâna-mûlajâta-hṛdayabhûmi-dhyâna Sûtra_, (Nanjo, no. 955,) fas.
iii.

[a02] The _Avatamsaka_, fas. xiv., p. 73.

[a03] _The Avatamsaka_, (Buddhabhadra’s translation), fas. xiv, p. 72.

[a04] To conceive the Tathâgata as a personal being who appeared on
earth for a certain limited time and then eternally disappeared is not
Mahâyânistic. He reveals himself constantly and of his own will in
this world of particulars.

[a05] _Sarvadharma-pravṛtti-nirdeça Sûtra_ (Nanjo, no. 1012).

[a06] _Mahâyâna-mûlajâta-hrdavabhûmi-dhyâna Sûtra_ (Nanjo 955), fas.
iii, p. 75.

[a07] The three rings are: 1. the giver, 2. the receiver, and 3. the
thing given, material or immaterial.

[a08] Precepts. The three sets are: 1. one relating to good behavior,
2. to the accumulation of merit, and 3. to lovingkindness toward all
beings.

{406}

[a09] The mental (subjective), physical (objective), and oral.

[a10] The intellectual and the affective.

[a11] _Sarvadharma-pravṛtti-nirdeça Sûtra._

[a12] Literally, “when greed is neither born nor dead.” This means, to
live in the world as not living in it. This subjective divine
innocence is thought by Buddhists the essence of the religious life.
The consciousness of one’s worth, or self-conceit, is a great obstacle
in the path of perfect virtue. As in the case of mechanical work or
physical exercise, we attain perfect skillfulness only when the work
is involuntarily done, i.e., without any conscious effort on the part
of the performer; so in our moral and spiritual life we attain the
height of virtuousness or saintliness when we identify ourselves with
the reason of our being. This is Laotze’s doctrine of non-action or
non-resistance, and also the teaching of the _Bhagavadgîta_. As
remarked elsewhere, when a man reaches this stage of religious life,
he ceases to be human, but divine, in the sense that he transcends the
world of good and evil and eternally abides in the realm of the
beautiful.

[a13] This is a very radical statement and is enough to frighten timid
moralists and “God-fearing” pietists. Therefore, it is said that “Give
not that which is holy to the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before
swine.” But think not that this is expounding antinomianism.

[a14] This and all the following are taken from the _Kâṣyapa-Parivarta_
(Nanjo, 805).

[a15] This gâthâ may not be very intelligible to our readers. The
sense is: Whatever is done by a Buddha or Bodhisattva does not come
from logical calculation or deliberate premeditation, but immediately
from his inmost heart, which, in most natural and freest manner,
responds to the needs of the suffering. This response is altogether
free from all human elaboration, for the Buddha shows no painful and
struggling efforts in so doing. Everything he does is like the work of
nature herself. His life is above the narrow sphere of human morality
which is marked with a desperate struggle between good and evil. His
is in the realm of the divinely beautiful.

{407}

[a16] “Having no selfhood” (_svabhâva_), means that things have no
independent existence, no self-nature which will eternally preserve
their thingish identity. This theory has been explained in the chapter
dealing with the doctrine of non-atman. To state summarily, darkness
and light are conditioned by each other; apart from darkness there is
no light, and conversely, without light darkness has no meaning. Even
so with enlightenment and ignorance: one independent of the other,
they have no existence, they cannot be conceived. They are like
imaginary flowers in the air projected there by a confused
subjectivity. They are nothing but our ideal fabrication. To cling to
God only, forgetting that we are living in the world below, in the
world of relativity, is just as much one-sided as to lose ourselves in
the whirlpool of earthly pleasures without the thought of God. Life,
however, is not antithetic, but synthetic. Truth is never one-sided,
it is always in the middle. Therefore, seek enlightenment in ignorance
and truth in error. A dualistic interpretation of the world and life
is not approved by Buddhists. Compare the sentiment expressed herein
with Emerson’s poem as elsewhere quoted, in which these lines occur:


 “But in the mud and scum of things,
 There always, always, something sings.”


[a17] _The Kâṣyapaharivarta Sûtra_ (Nanjo, 805.).

[a18] The sense is: The Bodhisattva never desires a complete
absorption in the Absolute, in which no individual existences are
distinguishable. He always leaves the “Will to live” unhurt, as it
were, so that he could come in this world of particulars ever and
anon. What he has destroyed is the egoistic assertion of the Will, for
the aim of Buddhism is not to remove the eternal principle of life,
but to manifest it in its true significance. The wishes of the
Bodhisattva, therefore, are never egocentric; he knows that
transmigration and rebirth are painful, but as it is by rebirth alone
that he could mingle himself in the world of sin and save the
suffering creatures therein, he never shuns the misery of life. His
work of revelation is constant and eternal.

[a19] _The Mahâyâna-mûlajâti-hrdayabhûmi-dhyâna Sûtra_, fas. IV.

{408}

[a20] The two prejudices or obstacles that lie in our way to
enlightenment are: 1 that which arises from intellectual
shortsightedness; 2. that which arises from impurity of heart.

[a21] _Sûtra on Mahâkâṣyapa’s Question Concerning the Absolute._

[a22] _Suvarna-Prabhâ Sûtra._

[a23] _Suvarna-Prabhâ Sûtra_, Chap. 26

[a24] _Padmapani Sûtra_, Fas. 8.

[a25] _The Avatamsaka Sutra._

[a26] This means that the heart of the Bodhisattva which is pure and
eternal in its essential nature has nothing added externally to it by
studying the Dharma; for the Dharma is nothing else than the
expression of his own heart.

[a27] The _Avatamsaka_, fas. IX, p. 48. This pantheistic thought of
the One-All is generally considered to be Buddhistic; but the truth is
that every genuine religious sentiment inevitably leads us to this
final conviction. Even in the so-called transcendental monotheistic
Christianity, we find the pantheistic thought boldly proclaimed and
put in contrast to the idea of “our Father which art in Heaven.” For
instance, read the following passage from Thomas à Kempis: “He to whom
all things are one, he who reduceth all things to one, and seeth all
things in one, may enjoy a quiet mind, and remain at peace in God.”
(Chap. III.) The passage in the Gospel of John declaring that “the
Father is in me and I in him,” when logically carried out, comes to
echo the same sentiment entertained by Buddhists, who recognise a
manifestation of the Dharmakâya in all beings, animate as well as
inanimate. The Christianity of to-day is that of Paul as expounded in
his letters, but the future one will advance a few steps more and will
be that of John.

[a28] From the _Avatamsaka Sutra_.

[a29] From the _Avatamsaka Sutra_.




 INDEX.

{409}

Abhimukî (sixth stage of Bodhisattvahood), 318.

Acalâ (eighth stage of Bodhisattvahood), 322.

Açoka, King, 49.

Açrava (evil), explained, 249 ft.

Açûnya, 22, 95.

Açvaghosha, 4, 8, 61 ft., 65 ft., 111, 115; on Âlaya, 66 ft., 129, 139
ft.; _Awakening of Faith_, 7; on Suchness, 99; on Ignorance, 118; and
Dionysius, 102 ft.; _Buddhacarita_, quoted, 147; on Mahâyânism, 246;
on the Sambhogakâya, 258, 333.

Agnosticism, 25.

Âlaya (or Âlaya-vijñâna), All-conserving Soul, 66; as depository of
“germs”, 66; creator of the universe, 68; and the Garbha, 125 et seq.;
its evolution, 128; and the soul, 165; and the twelve nidânas, 183.

Amitâbha, 207, 219, 269.

Anânârtha (non-particularisation), 72.

Ânanda attempts to locate the soul, 157.

Ânâpânam, exercise in breathing, 53 ft.

Arada, 146.

Arcismatî (fourth stage of Bodhisattvahood), 316.

Arhatship and Mahâyânism, 288.

Âryadeva, 3 ft., 8, 60.

Asanga (and Vasubandhu), 4, 62, 65, 69, 87, 88, 153, 231, 234, 263,
354.

{410}

Asceticism repudiated, 52, 53.

Atman, and Samkhyan Lingham, 38; and the Vedantic çarîra, 38; and
Vijñâna, 39; and unity of consciousness, 40; and karma, 41; and
impermanency, 43; and egoism, 44; and the “old man”, 165. (_See also_
“ego” and “soul”.)

Atonement, vicarious, 291 ft.

_Avatamsaka Sûtra_, The, on Bodhisattva’s reflections, 369 et seq.

Avenikas (unique features), 327 ft.

Avidyâ (ignorance), 35 et seq., 115.


Balas, the ten, of the Buddha, 327.

Beal, Samuel, refuted, 20 et seq. _Catena of Buddhist Scriptures_,
quoted, 157 ft.; _Romantic History of Buddha_, quoted, on Buddha’s
enlightenment, 337.

_Bhagavadgîta_, quoted, 126 ft.

Bhûtatathâtâ (Suchness), 99 et seq; and Mahâyâna, 7; and perfect
knowledge, 92.

Bodhi (wisdom), 46; and Prajñâ etc., defined, 82 ft.; as perfect
knowledge, 92; its meaning explained, 294; by Nâgârjuna, 297; as a
reflex of Dharmakâya, 299; how awakened in human heart, 302.

Bodhicitta (Intelligence-heart), 52. (_See also_ “Bodhi.”)

Bodhi-Dharma, of Dhyâna sect, 103, 149, 155.

Bodhipakshikas, the seven, 316 et seq.

Bodhisattva, above samsara and nirvana, 72; in the three yânas, 277;
the conception of, in primitive Buddhism, 286; we are, 290; and love,
292; his ten pranidhanas, 308; his reflections, 369.

Bodhisattvahood, ten stages of, 70, 311 et seq.

Bodhisattva-yâna, 9.

_Brahdaranyaka Upanishad_, quoted, 102 ft.

{411}

Buddha, and his self-relying spirit, 57; culmination of good karma,
215; in the Mahâyâna texts, 243; the idealisation of, historically
treated, 249 et seq.; in the Trikâya, 252; the human, and the
spiritual Dharmakâya, 255; his 32 major and 80 minor marks of
greatness, 271; in the process of idealisation, 289; in the
Mahâyânism, 291; and Mâra, 334; on the ego-soul in the beginning of
his religious career, 337.

_Buddhacarita_, quoted, 57.

Buddhadharma, 355.

_Buddha-Essence, Discourse on_, 357 ft.

Buddha-intelligence, 364.

Buddhism(s), geographically divided, 3, 4; two, 4 et seq.; and
atheism, 31; and the soul problem, 31 et seq.; and agnosticism, 35;
and modern psychology, 40; intellectual, 56 et seq.; liberal, 56 et
seq.; and speculation, 81 et seq.; and science, 97.

Buddhist(s) classified, 8 et seq.; life and love, 52; ideal, 53;
aspiration, 368; rule of conduct, 368.


Çâkyamuni contrasted to Devadatta, 200.

Carlyle’s _Hero-Worship_, quoted, 325 ft.

Causation, universal, and emptiness, 176.

Christ and Buddha, compared, 57, 58.

Christian conception of the ego-soul, 166.

Christianity, the growth of, compared with Mahâyânism, 12 et seq.; and
its founder, 13; not intellectual, 79.

Çikshas (moral rules), ten, 70 ft.

Confucius, 63 ft.

Consciousness, subliminal, 201.

Conservation of energy, and karma, 34.

Convictions, the four, of the Buddha, 327.

{412}

Çrâvaka, 277.

Çrâvaka-yâna, 9.

_Çrimâla Sûtra_, quoted, 127.

Çûnyatâ, (or çûnya), 22, 95; and Christian critics, 105; explained,
173; and universal causation, 176.


Daçabhûmi, (_see_ “ten stages of Bodhisattvahood”), 311, 329.

Deussen, P., quoted, 107.

Devala, 361, 364.

Dharma, its meaning, 21, 221.

Dharmadhatu, 115 ft., 193.

Dharmakâya, Mahâyâna, 7; briefly explained, 20, 45 et seq.; the
highest principle, 35; and Brahman, 46; and Paramâtman, 46; and God of
Christians, 46; as love and wisdom, 46, 54, 55; and non-ego, 47; and
the Golden Rule, 48; and Bodhisattvas, 61; its universal incarnation,
63 ft.; in the Trikâya, 73, 257; as perfect knowledge, 92; and prajñâ,
94; as a cosmic mind, 123; a unity, 193; and Suchness, 217; as God,
219; as religious object, 222; in the _Avatamsaka Sutra_, 223; its
detailed characterisation, 224; in the phenomenal world, 231; as love,
232; as a loving heart in the _Avatamsaka_, 233; its seven
characteristics, 234; by Asanga and Vasubandhu, 234; its five modes of
operation, 235; its freedom, 236; its pûrvanidhânabala, 237; as
rational will, 238; as father, 239; and its perpetual revelation, 259;
the evolution of its conception, 272; all beings are one in, 290; and
the Bodhi, 295.

_Dharmapada_, The, quoted, 34, 145, 336, 368.

Dharmamegha (tenth stage of Bodhisattvahood), 326.

Dharmapala, the Anâgarika, 3 ft.

_Discourse on Buddha-Essence_, The, by Vasubandhu, 357.

Dûrangama (seventh stage of Bodhisattvahood), 319.

{413}


Ego, not the source of energy, 55; noumenal, 145, 163; phenomenal,
145; empirical, 163.

Egoism and the evolution of Manas, 134.

Ego-soul, and its attributes, 147; and the five skandhas, 149; located
by Ananda, 157; and the Christian flesh, 166; and the Vedantic
conception, 167 et seq.; and Nâgârjuna, 168; and svabhava, 171; and
Christians, 212; as conceived by Buddha when he started on his
religious career, 337. (_See also_ “Ego”, “âtman” and “soul”).

Ekacitta, (one mind or thought), 70 ft.

Elders, the School of, 248 et seq.

Elephant and the blind, 100.

Emerson, quoted, 29.

Enlightenment, 55, 119; and manas, 134; two obstacles to, 344 ft.


Faith, its contents vary, 27 et seq.

Fatalism, 196.


Gautama and Christ, 29. (_See also_ “Buddha”).

God, the Buddhist, 219. (_See also_ “Dharmakâya”).

Goethe’s Faust, quoted, 181.

Golden Rule, the, universal, 54.

Great Council School, the, 248 et seq.

Guyau, French sociologist, 50 ft., 84.


Hartmann’s Unbewusste, 137.

Hetus and Pratyayas, 33, 41, 142, 148.

Hînayânism, 1, 60, 63, 280.

Hugo, Victor, quoted, 58.

Hui-K’e, second patriarch of Zen sect, 148.

{414}


Iccantika (incapable of salvation), 311.

Ignorance, 35 et seq.; and evolution, 115; and consciousness, 120; no
evil, 122; when evil? 124; and Tathâgata-Garbha, 126; and Manas, 133;
and Prakrit, 138 ft.

_Imitation of Christ_, 364 fn.

Immortality, 38; and Dharmakâya, 54; karmaic and not individual, 214.

Injustice, social, and karma, 186

Intelligence, awakened by love, 362.


_Jâtaka Tales_, the, quoted, 156.

Jesus, 6.

Jîvâtman, 145.


Kant, 6; _Critique of Pure Reason_, quoted, 324.

Karma, and the law of causation, 33; briefly explained, 33 et seq.;
and non-atman, 42; and suchness, 181; defined, 181; the working of,
183; irrefragable, 184; and injustice, 186; and the moral laws, 189;
an individualistic view, 192; and the desire to communicate, 195; and
determinism, 196; not like a machine, 198; and immortality, 203; and
Walt Whitman (quoted), 203; how transmitted, 205; and Dharmakâya, 207;
and productions of art, 208; and invention, 210; and “seeds of
activity,” 212.

Karma-seeds, 134.

Karunâ (love), 46, 82, 238, 296; and Prajñâ, 360.

_Kathopanishad_, quoted, 47.

Knowledge (sambodhi), 3 ft.; three kinds of, 67, 87.

Kuçalamûla, 199.


_Lalita Vistara_, quoted, on Nirvana, 338 fn.

{415}

_Lankavatara Sutra_, quoted, 41, 130.

Laotze, 63 ft.

Laotzean _Wu wei_, 285.

Love, and ego, 55; and Nirvana, 362.


_Madhyâmika_, The, on Nirvana, 347.

Madhyâmika school, 21, 62, 66; and the Yogacarya, on truth, 95.

_Mahâpurusa, Discourse on the_, 361.

Mahâsangika, 1 ft.

Mahâyâna, 1 et seq; its original meaning, 7; and Bodhisattvas, 61; and
Hînayâna, 70; and spiritual life, 71; and Samkhya, 136.

_Mahâyâna-Abhisamaya Sutra_, quoted, 45.

_Mahâyâna-Sangraha Çâstra_, 354.

Mahâyânism, (Mahâyâna Buddhism), defined, 10 et seq.; is it genuine?
11 et seq.; as a living faith, 14 et seq.; and its Christian critics,
15; misunderstood, 16 et seq.; historically treated, 60 et seq.; and
Sthiramati, 61 et seq.; its seven features, 62 et seq.; and
metempsychosis, 64; ten essential features, 65 et seq.; in its two
phases, 76 et seq.; no nihilism, 135 ft.; the development of, 247; and
individualism, 282.

Maitreya, 272.

Manas (self-consciousness), 132.

Mañjuçri, 106.

Manovijñâna (ego-consciousness), 67, 69.

Masashige, Kusunoki, 213.

Maudsley, H., quoted, 80.

Max Mueller, quoted, 108 ft., 110 ft., 221.

Mâya, subjective ignorance, 47.

Merits, the accumulation of, 199.

{416}

Middle path, Doctrine of the, 59, 358; of Eight No’s, 103.

_Milinda-Panha_, quoted, 203.

Mitra, Rajendra, referred to, 329 ft.

Monier Monier-Williams, refuted, 18 et seq.


Nâgârjuna, 3 ft., 4, 8, 21, 60, 66, 95, 96, 100, 103, 168, 171, 173,
292, 297, 353.

Nâgasena and King Milinda, 153.

“Na iti,” 102.

Nânâtva, (difference), 72 ft.

Nidânas, the twelve, 36 et seq., 179, 182.

Nirmanakâya, (Body of Transformation), 73, 257, 268.

Nirvana, 19; and its non-Buddhist critics, 49; briefly explained, 49
et seq.; and the surrender of ego, 50; and Dharmakâya, 51; and love,
51, 58; and pessimism, 52; and ethics, 53; and Parinishpanna
(knowledge), 94; what is, 331 et seq.; not nihilistic, 332;
Mahâyânistic, 341; and Dharmakâya, 342; the Mahâyânistic conception
of, 342 et seq.; absolute, 343; four forms of, 343; upadhiçesa, 344;
Anupadhiçesa, 344, that has no abode, 345; and I Cor. 7, 30-31, 346;
as synonym of Dharmakâya, 346 by Chandra Kirti, 347; its four
attributes, 348; its religious phase, 349; and Emerson, 352; and
samsara are one, 352; and St. Paul, 352; and the Eight No’s of
Nâgârjuna, 358; the realisation of, 360; as the Middle Path, 362;
comprehensively treated, 367 et seq.

Non-âtman, 37 et seq.; in things, 41 et seq, 170; and impermanence of
things, 141, (_see also_ “non-ego”, “self”, “soul”, “ego”).

Non-duality, the Dharma of, 106.

Non-ego and Dharmakâya, 47; and the Ganges water, 156.

{417}

No’s, The Eight, of Nâgârjuna, 358.


“Old man” and Atman, 165.


Paramârtha-satya (absolute truth), 91 et seq.

Paramâtman, 145.

Pâramitâ, 3 ft.; six, 68; ten, 321.

Paratantra (relative knowledge), 67; explained, 89.

Parikalpita (illusion), 67; explained, 88.

Parinishpanna (perfect knowledge), 67; explained, 91.

Parivarta, (turning over), 19, 194; doctrine of, 283.

Paul, Apostle, quoted, 48, 166, 260, 262.

Pingalaka, Nâgârjuna’s commentator, quoted, 172.

Prabhâkarî (third stage of Bodhisattvahood), 315.

Prajñâ (and Bodhi), defined, 82 ft.; 82, 97, 119, 238, 360.

Prakṛti (Samkyan primordial matter), 66 ft.

Pramûditâ (first stage of Bodhisattvahood), 313.

Pranidhâna, a Bodhisattva’s, 307.

Pratisamvids, the four, 325.

Pratyâyasamutpâda, (Nidânas), 36 et seq.

Pratyekabuddha, 278.

Pratyekabuddha-yâna, 9.

Precepts, the ten moral, 70 ft.

Pudgala (ego), 42, 143 ft.

Punyaskandha, 199.

Pure Lands, 269.

Purusha (Samkyan soul), 66 ft.

Pûrvanidhânabala, 237.


Religion, its significance, 22 et seq.; not revealed, 23; and mystery,
24; its intellectual and emotional sides, 25 et seq.; and science, 26;
intellect and feeling in, 77; and philosophy, 78; subjective, 81 et
seq.; not a philosophical system, 85.

{418}

Rockhill’s _Life of the Buddha_, quoted, on Nirvana, 338 fn.


_Saddharma Pundarîka_, quoted, 260 ft., 274, 277.

Sadhumatî, (ninth stage of Bodhisattvahood), 325.

Samatâ (sameness), 72 ft.

Sambodhi, (_see_ “Bodhi”).

Sambhogakâya (Body of Bliss), 65 ft., 73, 257; in Açvaghosha, 258; its
six features, 264; a mere subjective existence, 266.

Samkhya philosophy, and Yogacarya school, 67 ft.; referred to, 146
ft.; on Nirvana, 340.

Samvrtti-satya (conditional truth), 95 et seq.

_Samyukta Nikaya_, quoted, 156, 185.

Sanskaras, enumerated, 151 et seq.

Schopenhauer, 181.

Skandhas, the five, 32 ft., 149.

Soul-substance, denied, 164.

Sthavira, 1 ft.

Sthiramati, on Mahâyânism, 61 et seq.; on Bodhicitta, 299.

Suchness, (_see also_ Bhûtatathâtâ), 3; the first principle of
Buddhism, 99 et seq.; indefinable, 101; conditioned, 109; in history,
110; in the world, 113; and the Bodhi, 114; and ignorance, 117; in its
various modes, 125; and Dharmakâya, 127; and karma, 181.

Sudurjayâ, (fifth stage of Bodhisattvahood), 318.

Sukhâvatî sect, the, 4, 240.

Sumedha, the story of, 280.

_Sûrangama Sutra_, quoted, 157.

_Suvarna Prabha Sutra_, 253 ft.

Svabhava, and non-ego, 170 et seq.; and emptiness, 175.

{419}


“Tat tvam asi,” 47, 135 ft.

Tathâgata-Garbha, 125, 145.

Teleology, 86.

Tennyson, quoted, 82.

Tîrthakas, 8.

Tolstoi, quoted, in connection with karma, 207 ft.

Trikâya, (trinity), 73, 242, 256, 275.

Truth (satya), conditional and transcendental, 95.


_Udâna_, quoted, 52, 338 ft., 341.

Universe, a mind, 122.

Upâya (expediency), 64, 260 ft.; its meaning explained, 298 ft.

Upâyajñâ, 320.


Vaiçaradyas (convictions), the four, 327 ft.

Vairocana, 219.

Vasubandhu, 87, 153; his _Abhidharmakoça_, referred to, 37; on
Mahâyâna, 66; _On the Completion of Karma_, quoted, 194; _The
Distinguishing of the Mean_, quoted, 195; on _Bodhicitta_, 303; on
Nirvana, 357, 359, 360.

Vasumitra, on _Various Schools of Buddhism_, 1 ft.

Vedanta philosophy, and the Mahâyânism, 108 ft.; on Nirvana, 340; on
Atman, 144.

_Vicesacinta-brahma-Pariprccha Sutra_, 353.

Victory, the hymn of, 336.

Vijñâna, and atman, 39.

Vijnânamâtra, (nothing but ideas), 70.

_Vijnânamâtra çâstra_, 265 ft., 343.

Vimala (second stage of Bodhisattvahood), 315.

Vimalakîrti, 106, 350, 366.

_Visuddhi Magga_, quoted, 339, 348 ft.

{420}


Waddell, refuted, 21 et seq.

Whitman, Walt, quoted, 155 ft., 197.

Wilson, Dr. G. R., quoted, 201.


Yoga philosophy, The, on Nirvana, 340.

Yogacarya school, 62, 65, 87, 92, 95.

_Yogavasistha_, a vedantic book, quoted, 167.




 ENDNOTES.

 INTRODUCTION NOTES.

[1] According to Vasumitra’s _Treatise on the Points of Contention
by the Different Schools of Buddhism_, of which there are three
Chinese translations, the earliest being one by Kumârajîva (who came
to China in A.D. 401), the first great schism seems to have broken out
about one hundred years after the Buddha. The leader of the dissenters
was Mahâdeva, and his school was known as the Mahâsangîka (Great
Council), while the orthodox was called the school of Sthaviras
(Elders). Since then the two schools subdivided themselves into a
number of minor sections, twenty of which are mentioned by Vasumitra.
The book is highly interesting as throwing light on the early pages of
the history of Buddhism in India.
((1))

[2] The Anagârika Dharmapala of Ceylon objects to this geographical
distinction. He does not see any reason why the Buddhism of Ceylon
should be regarded as Hînayânism, when it teaches a realisation of the
Highest Perfect Knowledge (_Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi_) and also of the
six Virtues of Perfection (_Pâramitâ_),--these two features, among
some others, being considered to be characteristic of Mahâyânism. It
is possible that when the so-called Mahâyânism gained great power all
over Central India in the times of Nâgârjuna and Âryadeva, it also
found its advocates in the Isle of Lion, or at least the followers of
Buddha there might have been influenced to such an extent as to modify
their conservative views. At the present stage of the study of
Buddhism, however, it is not yet perfectly clear to see how this took
place. When a thorough comparative review of Pâli, Singhalese,
Tibetan, Sanskrit, and Chinese Buddhist documents is effected, we
shall be able to understand the history and development of Buddhism to
its full extent.

[3] Translated into English by the author, 1900. The Open Court Pub.
Co. Chicago.

[4] These terms are explained elsewhere.

[5] Followers of any religious sects other than Buddhism. The term
is sometimes used in a contemptuous sense, like heathen by Christians.

[6] The conception of Dharmakâya constitutes the central point in
the system of Mahâyânism, and the right comprehension of it is of
vital importance. The Body of the Law, as it is commonly rendered in
English, is not exact and leads frequently to a misconception of the
entire system. The point is fully discussed below.




 CHAPTER I NOTES.

[7] They are: (1) form or materiality (_rûpa_), (2) sensation
(_vedanâ_), (3) conception (_samjnâ_), (4) action or deeds (_samkâra_),
and (5) consciousness (_vijnâna_). These terms are explained
elsewhere.

[8] _The Dhammapada_, v. 165. Tr. by A. J. Edmunds.

[9] _The Dhammapada_, v. 127.

[10] This last passage should not be understood in the sense of a
total abnegation of existence. It means simply the transcendentality
of the highest principle.

[11] _The Kathopaniṣad_, IV. 10.

[12] Guyau, a French sociologist, refers to the Buddhist conception
of Nirvâna in his _Non-Religion of the Future_. I take his
interpretation as typical of those non-Buddhist critics who are very
little acquainted with the subject but pretend to know much. (English
translation, pp. 472-474.)

“Granted the wretchedness of life, the remedy that pessimists propose
is the new religious salvation that modern Buddhists are to make
fashionable... The conception is that of Nirvâna. To sever all the
ties which attach you to the external world; to prune away all the
young offshoots of desire, and recognise that to be rid of them is a
deliverance; to practise a sort of complete psychial circumcision; to
recoil upon yourself and to believe that by so doing you enter into
the society of the great totality of things (the mystic would say, of
God); to create an inner vacuum, and to feel dizzy in the void and,
nevertheless, to believe that the void is plenitude supreme, pleroma,
these have always constituted temptations to mankind. Mankind has been
tempted to meddle with them, as it has been tempted to creep up to the
verge of dizzy precipices and look over... Nirvâna leads, in fact, to
the annihilation of the individual and of the race, and to the logical
absurdity that the vanquished are the victors over the trials and
miseries of life.”

Then, the author recites the case of one of his acquaintances, who
made a practical experiment of Nirvâna, rejecting variety in his diet,
giving up meat, wine, every kind of ragout, every form of condiment,
and reducing to its lowest possible terms the desire that is most
fundamental in every living being--the desire of food, and substituting
a certain number of cups of pure milk. “Having thus blunted his sense
of taste and the grosser of his appetites, having abandoned all
physical activity, he thought to find a recompense in the pleasure of
abstract meditation and of esthetic contemplation. He entered to a
state which was not that of dreamland, but neither was it that of real
life, with its definite details.”

[13] For detailed explanation of this term see Chapter XI.

[14] _The Udâna_, Ch. VIII, p. 118. Translation by General Strong.

[15] This is a peculiarly Indian religious practice, which consists
in counting one’s exhaling and inhaling breaths. When a man is
intensely bent on the practise, he gradually passes to a state of
trance, forgetting everything that is going on around and within
himself. The practise may have the merit of alleviating nervousness
and giving to the mind the bliss of relaxation, but it oftentimes
leads the mind to a self-hypnotic state.

[16] Here Nirvâna is evidently understood to mean self-abnegation
or world-flight or quietism, which is not in accord with the true
Buddhist interpretation of the term.

[17] The sentiment of the Golden Rule is not the monopoly of
Christianity; it has been expressed by most of the leaders of thought,
thus, for instance: “Requite hatred with virtue” (Lao-tze). “Hate is
only appeased by love” (Buddha). “Do not do to others what ye would
not have done to you by others” (Confucius). “One must neither return
evil, nor do any evil to any one among men, not even if one has to
suffer from them” (Plato, _Crito_, 49).

[18] _The Buddhacarita_, Book IX, 63-64.

[19] According to one Northern Buddhist tradition, Buddha is
recorded to have exclaimed at the time of his supreme spiritual
beatitude: “Wonderful! All sentient beings are universally endowed
with the intelligence and virtue of the Tathâgata!”




 CHAPTER II NOTES.

[20] His date is not known, but judging from the contents of his
works, of which we have at present two or three among the Chinese
Tripitaka, it seems that he lived later than Açvaghoṣa, but prior to,
or simultaneously with, Nâgârjuna. This little book occupies a very
important position in the development of Mahâyânism in India. Next to
Açvaghoṣa’s _Awakening of Faith_, the work must be carefully studied
by scholars who want to grasp every phase of the history of Mahâyâna
school as far as it can be learned through the Chinese documents.

[21] Be it remarked here that a Bodhisattva is not a particularly
favored man in the sense of chosen people or elect. We are all in a
way Bodhisattvas, that is, when we recognise the truth that we are
equally in possession of the Samyak-sambodhi, Highest True
Intelligence, and through which everybody without exception can attain
final enlightenment.

[22] _Mahâyâna-abhidharma-sangîti-çâstra_, by Asanga. Nanjo, No.
1199.

[23] _Yogâcârya-bhûmi-çâstra_, Nanjo, No. 1170. The work is supposed
to have been dictated to Asanga by a mythical Bodhisattva.

[24] By Asanga. Nanjo, 1177.

[25] _Mahâyâna-samparigraha-çâstra_, by Asanga. Nanjo, 1183.

[26] Perceiving an incarnation of the Dharmakâya in every spiritual
leader regardless of his nationality and professed creed, Mahâyânists
recognise a Buddha in Socrates, Mohammed, Jesus, Francis of Assisi,
Confucius, Laotze, and many others.

[27] Ancient Hindu Buddhists, with their fellow-philosophers,
believed in the existence of spiritually transfigured beings, who, not
hampered by the limitations of space and time, can manifest themselves
everywhere for the benefit of all sentient beings. We notice some
mysterious figures in almost all Mahâyâna sûtras, who are very often
described as shedding innumerable rays of light from the forehead and
illuminating all the three thousand worlds simultaneously. This may
merely be a poetic exaggeration. But this Sambhogakâya or Body of
Bliss (see Açvaghoṣa’s _Awakening of Faith_, p. 101) is very difficult
for us to comprehend as it is literally described. For a fuller
treatment see the chapter on “Trikâya.”

[28] Though I am very much tempted to digress and to enter into a
specific treatment concerning these two Hindu Mahâyâna doctrines, I
reluctantly refrain from so doing, as it requires a somewhat lengthy
treatment and does not entirely fall within the scope of the present
work.

[29] That Açvaghoṣa’s conception of the Âlaya varies with the view
here presented may be familiar to readers of his _Awakening of Faith_.
This is one of the most abstruse problems in the philosophy of Mahâyâna
Buddhism, and there are several divergent theories concerning its
nature, attributes, activities, etc. In a work like this, it is
impossible to give even a general statement of those controversies,
however interesting they may be to students of the history of
intellectual development in India.

The Âlayavijñâna, to use the phraseology of Samkhya philosophy, is a
composition, so to speak, of the Soul (_puruṣa_) and Primordial Matter
(_prakṛti_). It is the Soul, so far as it is neutral and indifferent
to all those phenomenal manifestations, that are going on within as
well as without us. It is Primordial Matter, inasmuch as it is the
reservoir of everything, whose lid being lifted by the hands of
Ignorance, there instantly springs up this universe of limitation and
relativity. Enlightenment or Nirvâna, therefore, consists in
recognising the error of Ignorance and not in clinging to the products
of imagination.

[30] For a more detailed explanation of the ideal philosophy of the
Yogâcâra, see my article on the subject in _Le Muséon_, 1905.

[31] “One mind” or “one heart” meaning the mental attitude which is
in harmony with the monistic view of nature in its broadest sense.

[32] These ten stages of spiritual development are somewhat minutely
explained below. See Chapter XII.

[33] The ten moral precepts of the Buddha are: (1) Kill no living
being; (2) Take nothing that is not given; (3) Keep matrimonial
sanctity; (4) Do not lie; (5) Do not slander; (6) Do not insult; (7)
Do not chatter; (8) Be not greedy; (9) Bear no malice; (10) Harbor no
scepticism.

[34] Mahâyânism recognises two “entrances” through which a
comprehensive knowledge of the universe is obtained. One is called the
“entrance of sameness” (_samatâ_) and the other the “entrance of
diversity” (_nânâtva_). The first entrance introduces us to the
universality of things and suggests a pantheistic interpretation of
existence. The second leads us to the particularity of things
culminating in monotheism or polytheism, as it is viewed from
different standpoints. The Buddhists declare that neither entrance
alone can lead us to the sanctum sanctorum of existence; and in order
to obtain a sound, well-balanced knowledge of things in general, we
must go through both the entrances of universality and particularity.

[35] The doctrine of Trikâya will be given further elucidation in
the chapter bearing the same title.




 CHAPTER III NOTES.

[36] No efforts have yet been made systematically to trace the
history of the development of the Mahâyâna thoughts in India as well
as in China and Japan. We have enough material at least to follow the
general course it has taken, as far as the Chinese and Tibetan
collections of Tripitaka are concerned. When a thorough comparison by
impartial, unprejudiced scholars of these documents has been made with
the Pali and Sanskrit literature, then we shall be able to write a
comprehensive history of the human thoughts that have governed the
Oriental people during the last two thousand years. When this is done,
the result can further be compared with the history of other religious
systems, thus throwing much light on the general evolution of humanity.

[37] _Prajñâ_, _bodhi_, _buddhi_, _vidyâ_ and _jñâ_ or _jñâna_ are
all synonymous and in many cases interchangeable. But they allow a
finer discrimination. Speaking in a general way, _prajñâ_ is reason,
_bodhi_ wisdom or intelligence, _buddhi_ enlightenment, _vidyâ_
ideality or knowledge, and _jñâ_ or _jñâna_ intellect. Of these five
terms, _prajñâ_ and _bodhi_ are essentially Buddhistic and have
acquired technical meaning, In this work both _prajñâ_ and _bodhi_ are
mostly translated by intelligence, for their extent of meaning closely
overlaps each other. But this is rather vague, and wherever I thought
the term intelligence alone to be misleading, I either left the
originals untranslated, or inserted them in parentheses. To be more
exact, _prajñâ_ in many cases can safely be rendered by faith, not a
belief in revealed truths, but a sort of immediate knowledge gained by
intuitive intelligence. _Prajñâ_ corresponds in some respects to
wisdom, meaning the foundation of all reasonings and experiences. It
may also be considered an equivalent for Greek _sophia_. Bodhi, on the
other hand, has a decidedly religious and moral significance. Besides
being _prajñâ_ itself, it is also love (_karunâ_): for, according to
Buddhism, these two, _prajñâ_ and _karunâ_, constitute the essence of
Bodhi. May Bodhi be considered in some respects synonymous with the
divine wisdom as understood by Christian dogmatists? But there is
something in the Buddhist notion of Bodhi that cannot properly be
expressed by wisdom or intelligence. This seems to be due to the
difference of philosophical interpretation by Buddhists and Christians
of the conception of God. It will become clearer as we proceed farther.




 CHAPTER IV NOTES.

[38] For detailed exposition of the three forms of knowledge, the
reader is requested to peruse Asanga’s _Comprehensive Treatise on
Mahâyânism_ (Nanjo’s Catalogue, No. 1183), Vasubandhu’s work on
Mahâyâna idealism (_Vijnânamâtra Çâstra_, Nanjo, No. 1215), the _Sûtra
on the Mystery of Deliverance_ (_Sandhinirmocana-sûtra_, Nanjo. Nos.
246 and 247), etc.

[39] When the eminent representatives of both parties, such as
Dharmapala and Bhavaviveka, were at the height of their literary
activity in India about the fifth or sixth century after Christ, their
partisan spirit incited them bitterly to denounce each other,
forgetting the common ground on which their principles were laid down.
Their disagreement in fact on which they put an undue emphasis was of
a very trifling nature. It was merely a quarrel over phraseology, for
one insisted on using certain words just in the sense which the other
negated.

[40]

 “Dve satye samupâçritya buddhânâm dhardeçanâ
 Lokasamvṛttisatyañ ca satyañ ca paramârthataḥ.
 Ye ca anayor na jânanti vibhâgam satyayor dvayoḥ,
 Te tatvam na vijânanti gambhîrabuddhaçâsane.”


[41]

 Vyavahâram anâçritya paramârtho na deçyate,
 Paramârtham anâgamya nirvâṇam na adhigamyata.
                    _The Mâdhyamika_, p. 181.




 CHAPTER V NOTES.

[42]
Cf. _The Udâna_, chapter VI.

[43]

 Svabhâvam parabhâvanca, bhâvancâbhâvameva ca,
 Ye paçyanti, na paçyante tatvam hi buddhaçâsane.


[44]

 Astîti çâçvatagrâho, nâstîtyucchedadarçanam:
 Tasmâdastitvanâstitve nâçriyeta vicaksanah


[45]

 Astîti nâstîti ubhe ‘pi antâ
 Çuddhî açuddhîti ime ‘pi antâ;
 Tasmâdubhe anta vivarjayitvâ
 Madhye ‘pi syânam na karoti paṇditah.


[46] This is the famous phrase in the _Brhadaranyaka Upanisad_
occurring in several places (II, 3, 6; III, 9, 26; IV, 2, 4; IV, 4,
22; IV, 5, 5). The Atman or Brahman, it says, “is to be described by
No, No! He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended; he is
imperishable, for he cannot perish; he is unattached, for he does not
attach himself; unfettered, he does not suffer, he does not fail. Him
(who knows), these two do not overcome, whether he says that for some
reason he has done evil, or for some reason he has done good--he
overcomes both, and neither what he has done, nor what he has omitted
to do, affects him.”

[47] _The Awakening of Faith_, p. 59. Cf. this with the utterances
of Dionysius the Areopagite, as quoted by Prof. W. James in his
_Varieties of Religious Experience_, pp. 416-417: “The cause of all
things is neither soul nor intellect; nor has it imagination, opinion,
or reason, or intelligence; nor is it spoken or thought. It is neither
number, nor order, nor magnitude, nor littleness, nor equality, nor
inequality, nor similarity, nor dissimilarity. It neither stands, nor
moves, nor rests.... It is neither essence, nor eternity, nor time.
Even intellectual contact does not belong to it. It is neither science
nor truth. It is not even royalty nor wisdom; not one; not unity; not
divinity or goodness; nor even spirit as we know it.”.... _ad libitum_.

[48]

 Anirodham anutpâdam anucchedam açâçvatam,
 Anekârtham anânârtham anâgamam anirgamam.
      (_Mâdhyamika Çâstra_, first stanza.)


[49]

 Param nirodhâdbhagavân bhavatîtyeva nohyate,
 Na bhavatyubhayam ceti nobhayam ceti nohyate:
 Atiṣṭhamâno ‘pi bhagavân bhavatîtyeva nohyate,
 Na bhavatyubhayam ceti nobhayam ceti nohyate.
                         (_Mâdhyamika_, p. 199).


[50] He was the third son of king of Kâçi (?) in southern India. He
came to China A.D. 527 and after a vain attempt to convert Emperor Wu
to his own view, he retired to a monastery, where, it is reported, he
spent all day in gazing at the wall without making any further venture
to propagate his mysticism. But finally he found a most devoted
disciple in the person of Shen Kuang, who was once a Confucian, and
through whom the Dhyâna school became one of the most powerful Mahâyâna
sect in China as well as in Japan. Dharma died in the year 535. Besides
the one here mentioned, he had another audience with the Emperor. At
that time, the Emperor said to Dharma: “I have dedicated so many
monasteries, copied so many sacred books, and converted so many bhiksus
and bhiksunis: what do you think my merits are or ought to be?” To
this, however, Dharma replied curtly, “No merit whatever.”

[51] Another interesting utterance by a Chinese Buddhist, who,
earnestly pondering over the absoluteness of Suchness for several
years, understood it one day all of a sudden, is: “The very instant
you say it is something (or a nothing), you miss the mark.”

[52] _The Vimalakîrti Sûtra_, Kumârajîva’s translation, Part II,
Chapter 5.

[53]
Deussen relates, in his address delivered before the Bombay
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1893, a similar attitude
of a Vedantist mystic in regard to the highest Brahma. “The
Bhava, therefore, when asked by the king Vaksalin, to explain the
Brahman, kept silence. And when the king repeated his request
again and again, the rishi broke out into the answer: ‘I tell it you,
but you don’t understand it; _çânto ’yam âtmâ_, this âtmâ is silence!’”

[54] It is a well-known fact that the Vedanta philosophy, too,
makes a similar distinction between Brahman as sagunam (qualified) and
Brahman as nirgunam (unqualified). The former is relative, phenomenal,
and has characteristics of its own; but the latter is absolute, having
no qualification whatever to speak of, it is absolute Suchness. (See
Max Mueller’s _The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy_, p. 220 et seq.)

Here, a very interesting question suggests itself: Which is the
original and which is the copy, Mahâyânism or Vedantism? Most of
European Sanskrit scholars would fain wish to dispose of it at once by
declaring that Buddhism must be the borrower. But I am strongly
inclined to the opposite view, for there is reliable evidence in favor
of it. In a writing of Açvaghoṣa, who dates much earlier than Çankara
or Badarayana we notice this distinction of absolute Suchness and
relative Suchness. He writes in his _Awakening of Faith_ (p. 55 et
seq.) that though Suchness is free from all modes of limitation and
conditionality, and therefore it cannot be thought of by our finite
consciousness, yet on account of Avidyâ inherent in the human mind
absolute Suchness manifests itself in the phenomenal world, thereby
subjecting itself to the law of causality and relativity and proceeds
to say that there is a twofold aspect in Suchness from the point of
view of its explicability. The first aspect is trueness as negation
(_çûnyatâ_) in the sense that it is completely set apart from the
attributes of all things unreal, that it is a veritable reality. The
second aspect is trueness as affirmation (_açûnyatâ_), in the sense
that it contains infinite merits, that it is self-existent. Considering
the fact that Açvaghoṣa comes earlier than any Vedanta philosophers,
it stands to reason to say that the latter might have borrowed the
idea of distinguishing the two aspects of Brahma from their Buddhist
predecessors.

Çankara also makes a distinction between _saguna_ and _nirguna vidya_,
whose parallel we find in the Mahâyânist _samvṛtti_ and _paramârtha
satya_.

[55] While passing, I cannot help digressing and entering on a
polemic in this footnote. The fact is, Western Buddhist critics
stubbornly refuse to understand correctly what is insisted by Buddhists
themselves. Even scholars who are supposed to be well informed about
the subject, go astray and make false charges against Buddhism. Max
Mueller, for example, declares in his _Six Systems of Indian
Philosophy_ (p. 242) that “An important distinction between Buddhists
and Vedantists is that the former holds the world to have arisen from
what is not, the latter from what is, the Sat or Brahman.” The reader
who has carefully followed my exposition above will at once detect in
this Max Mueller’s conclusion an incorrect statement of Buddhist
doctrine. As I have repeatedly said, Suchness, though described in
negative terms, is not a state of nothingness, but the highest possible
synthesis that the human intellect can reach. The world did not come
from the void of Suchness, but from its fulness of reality. If it were
not so, to where does Buddhism want us to go after deliverance from
the evanescence and nothingness of the phenomenal world?

Max Mueller in another place (op. cit. p. 210) speaks of the
Vedantists’ assertion of the reality of the objective world for
practical purposes (_vyavahârârtham_) and of their antagonistic
attitude toward “the nihilism of the Buddhists.” “The Buddhists” this
seems to refer to the followers of the Mâdhyamika school, but a careful
perusal of their texts will reveal that what they denied was not the
realness of the world as a manifestation of conditional Suchness, but
its independent realness and our attachment to it as such. The
Mâdhyamika school was not in any sense a nihilistic system. True, its
advocates used many negative terms, but what they meant by them was
obvious enough to any careful reader.

[56] Dharmadhâtu is the world as seen by an enlightened mind, where
all forms of particularity do not contradict one another, but make one
harmonious whole.

[57] The word literally means recollection or memory. Açvaghoṣa
uses it as a synonym of ignorance, and so do many other Buddhist
philosophers.

[58] _Smṛti_ or _citta_ or _vijñâna_. They are all used by Açvaghoṣa
and other Buddhist authors as synonymous. _Smṛti_ literally means
memory; _citta_, thought or mentation; and _vijñâna_ is generally
rendered by consciousness, though not very accurately.




 CHAPTER VI NOTES.

[59] Cf. the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ (_S. B. E._ Vol. VIII, chap. XIV, p.
107): “The Brahman is a womb for me, in which I cast the seed. From
that, O descendant of Bharata! is the birth of all things. Of the
bodies, O son of Kunti! which are born from all wombs, the main womb
is the great Brahman, and I am the father, the giver of the seed.”

[60] This is translated from the Chinese of Çikṣananda; the Sanskrit
reads as follows:


 “Tarangâ hi udadher yadvat pavanapratyaya îritâ,
 Nṛtyamânâh pravartante vyucchedaç ca na vidhyate:
 Âlayodhyas tathâ nityam viṣayapavana îritaḥ,
 Cittâis tarangavijñânâir nṛtyamânâḥ pravartate.”


[61]
From the Chinese. The Sanskrit reads as follows:


 “Nîle rakte ‘tha lavaṇe çankhe kṣîre ca çârkare,
 Kaṣayâiḥ phalapuṣpâdyâih kiraṇâ yatha bhâskare:
 No ‘nyena ca nânanyena tarangâ hi udadher matâ;
 Vijñânâni tathâ sapta, cittena saha samyuktâ.
 Udadheḥ pariṇâmo ‘sâu tarangânâm vicitratâ,
 Âlayam hi tathâ cittam vijñânâkhyam pravartate;
 Cittam manaç ca vijñânam lakṣaṇârtham prakalpyate;
 Âbhinna lakṣanâ hi aṣtâu na lakṣyâ na ca lakṣaṇâ.
 Udadheç ca tarangânâm yathâ nâsti viçeṣanâ.
 Vijñânânam tathâ citte pariṇâmo na labhyate.
 Cittena cîyate karmaḥ, manasâ ca vicîyate,
 Vijñânena vijânâti, dṛçyam kalpeti pañcabhiḥ.”


[62] A little digression here. It has frequently been affirmed of
the ethics of Mahâyânism that as it has a nihilistic tendency its
morality turns towards asceticism ignoring the significance of the
sentiment and instinct. It is true that Mahâyânism perfectly agrees
with Vedantism when the latter declares: “If the killer thinks that he
kills, if the killed thinks that he is killed, they do not understand;
for this one does not kill, nor is that one killed.” (_The
Katopanishad_, II 19.) This belief in non-action (Laotzean _Wu Wei_)
apparently denies the existence of a world of relativity, but he will
be a superficial critic who will stop short at this absolute aspect of
Mahâyâna philosophy and refuses to consider its practical side. As we
have seen above, Buddhists do not conceive the evolution of the
Manovijñâna as a fault on the part of the cosmic mind, nor do they
think the assertion of Ignorance altogether wrong and morally evil.
Therefore, Mahâyânism does not deny the claim of reality to the world
of the senses, though of course relatively, and not absolutely.

Again, “Tat tvam asi” (thou art it) or “I am the Buddha”--this
assertion, though arrogant it may seem to some, is perfectly
justifiable in the realm of absolute identity, where the serene light
of Suchness alone pervades. But when we descend on earth and commingle
in the hurly-burly of our practical, dualistic life, we cannot help
suffering from its mundane limitations. We hunger, we thirst, we
grieve at the loss of the dearest, we feel remorse over errors
committed. Mahâyânism does not teach the annihilation of those human
passions and feelings.

There was once a recluse-philosopher, who was considered by the
villagers to have completely vanquished all natural desires and human
ambitions. They almost worshipped him and thought him to be superhuman.
One day early in Winter, a devotee approached him and reverentially
inquired after his health. The sage at once responded in verse:


 “A hermit truly I am, world-renounced;
 Yet when the ground is white with snow,
 A chill goes through me and I shiver.”


A false conception of religious saintliness as cherished by so many
pious-hearted, but withal ignorant, minds, has led them into some of
the grossest superstitions, whose curse is still lingering even among
us. Our earthly life has so many limitations and tribulations. The
ills that the flesh is heir to must be relieved by some material,
scientific methods.

[63] That the Buddhist Ignorance corresponds to the Sâmkhya
Prakṛti can be seen also from the fact that some Samkhya commentators
give to Prakṛti as its synonyms such terms as _çâkti_ (energy) which
reminds of karma or sankâra, _tamas_ (darkness), _mâyâ_, and even the
very word _avidyâ_ (ignorance)

[64] This view of the oneness of the Âlaya or Citta (mind) may not
be acceptable to some Mahâyânists, particularly to those who advocate
the Yogâcâra philosophy; but the present author is here trying to
expound a more orthodox and more typical and therefore more
widely-recognised doctrine of Mahâyânism, i.e., that of Açvaghoṣa.




 CHAPTER VII NOTES.

[65] _Pudgala_ or _pudgalasamjña_ is sometimes used by Mahâyânists
as a synonym of âtman. The Buddhist âtman in the sense of
ego-substratum may be considered to correspond to the Vedantist
Jîvâtman, which is used in contradistinction to Paramâtman, the
supreme being or Brahma.

[66] Mahâyâna Buddhists generally understand the essential
characteristic of âtman to consist in freedom, and by freedom they
mean eternality, absolute unity, and supreme authority. A being that
is transitory is not free, as it is conditioned by other beings, and
therefore it has no âtman. A being that is an aggregate of elemental
matter or forms of energy is not absolute, for it is a state of mutual
relationship, and therefore it has no âtman. Again, a being that has
no authoritative command over itself and other beings, is not free,
for it will be subjected to a power other than itself, and therefore
it has no âtman. Now, take anything that we come across in this world
of particulars; and does it not possess one or all of these three
qualities: transitoriness, compositeness, and helplessness or
dependence? Therefore, all concrete individual existences not
excepting human beings have no âtman, have no ego, that is eternal,
absolute, and supreme.

[67] Tent-designer is a figurative term for the ego-soul. Following
the prevalent error, the Buddha at first made an earnest search after
the ego that was supposed to be snugly sitting behind our mental
experiences, and the result was this utterance.

[68] _The Dharmapada_, vs. 153-154. Tr. by A. J. Edmunds.

[69] _Prakṛtivikṛtayas._ This is a technical term of Sâmkhya
philosophy and means the modes of Prakrti, as evolved from it and as
further evolving on. See Satis Chandra Banarji, _Samkhya-Philosophy_,
p. XXXIII et seq.

[70] The passages quoted here as well as one in the next paragraph
are taken from Açvaghoṣa’s _Buddhacarita_.

[71] _The Questions of King Milinda, Sacred Books of the East_,
Vol. XXXV.

[72] This reminds us of the passage quoted elsewhere from the
_Katha-Upanishad_; cf. the footnote to it.

[73] As cited elsewhere, Bodhi-Dharma of the Dhyâna sect, when
questioned in a similar way, replied, “I do not know.” Walt Whitman
echoes the same sentiment in the following lines:


 “A child said, what is the grass? fetching it to me with full hands;
 How could I answer the child? I do not know what it is, any more than
  he.”


[74] There seem to be two Chinese translations of this Sûtra, one
by Kumârajîva and the other by Paramârtha, but apparently they are
different texts bearing the same title. Besides these two, there is
another text entirely in Chinese transliteration. Owing to
insufficiency of material at my disposal here, I cannot say anything
definite about the identity or diversity of these documents. The
following discussion that is reported to have taken place between the
Buddha and Ananda is an abstract prepared from the first and the
second fasciculi of Paramârtha’s (?) translation. Beal gives in his
_Catena of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese_ (pp. 286-369) an
English translation of the first four fasc. of the _Surangama_. Though
this translation is not quite satisfactory in many points the reader
may find there a detailed account of the discussion which is here only
partially and roughly recapitulated.

[75] Cf. the following which is extracted from the _Questions of
King Milinda_ (Sacred Books of the East, vol. XXXV, 133): “If there be
a soul [distinct from the body] which does all this, then if the door
of the eye were thrown down [if the eye were plucked out] could it
stretch out its head, as it were, through the larger aperture and
[with greater range] see forms much more clearly than before? Could
one hear sounds better if the ears were cut off, or taste better if
the tongue were pulled out, or feel touch better if the body were
destroyed?”

[76]

 Nirvikalpo ‘smi ciddipo nirahankaravasanaḥ
 Tvaya ahankarabijena na sambaddho ‘smi asanmaya (31)


[77]

 Yathâ bhûtatayâ na ahammano na tvam na vâsanâ
 Atmâ çuddhacidabhasaḥ kevalo yam vijṛbhate. (44)


[78] The following is a somewhat free translation of the original
Chinese of Kumârajîva, which pretty closely agrees with the Sanskrit
text published by the Buddhist Text Society of India.

[79] The Sanskrit text does not give this passage.

[80]

 Lakṣyâl lakṣaṇam anyac cet syât tal lakṣyam alakṣanam.


[81]

 Rûpâdi vyatirekena yathâ kumbho na vidyate,
 Vâhyâdi vyatireṇa tathâ rûpam na vidyate.


[82] Abstracted from Pingalaka’s _Commentary on the Mâdhyamika
Çâstra_, Chapter VII. The Chinese translation is by Kumârajîva.

[83] The passage in parentheses is taken from Chandrakîrti’s
_Commentary on Nâgârjuna_, pp. 180-181.




 CHAPTER VIII NOTES.

[84] The Twelve Nidânas are: (1) Ignorance (_avidyâ_), (2) action
(_sanskâra_), (3) Consciousness (_vijñâna_), (4) Name-and-form
(_nâmarûpa_), (5) Six Sense-organs (_âyatana_), (6) Contact (_sparça_),
(7) Sensation (_vedanâ_), (8) Desire (_trṣnâ_), (9) Attachment
(_upâdâna_), (10) Procreation (_bhâva_), (11) birth (_jati_), (12) Old
Age, Death, etc. (_jarâ_, _marana_, _çoka_, etc.).

[85] From a Chinese Mahâyâna sutra.

[86] The Pâli Jâtaka, no. 222. Translation by W. H. Rouse.

[87] Warren’s _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 214.

[88] _On the Completion of Karma_, by Vasubandhu. Nanjo, No. 1222.

[89] _The Distinguishing of the Mean_, by Vasubandhu. Nanjo, 1248.

[90] “Manhattan’s Streets I Saunter’d, Pondering.” I might have
quoted the whole poem, if not for limitation of space.

[91] If we understand the following words of Tolstoi in the light
which we gain from the Buddhist doctrine of karmaic immortality, we
shall perhaps find more meaning in them than the author himself wished
to impart: “My brother who is dead acts upon me now more strongly than
he did in life; he even penetrates my being and lifts me up towards
him.”




 CHAPTER IX NOTES.

[92] The _Avatamsaka Sûtra_, Chinese translation by Buddhabhadra,
fas. XXXIV.

[93] That is the Dharmakâya personified.

[94] In Hindu philosophy space is always conceived as an objective
entity in which all things exist.

[95] This should be understood in the sense that “God maketh his
sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just
and on the unjust.” The Dharmakâya is universal in its love, as space
is in its comprehensiveness. Because it is absolutely free from human
desires and passions that are the product of egoism and therefore tend
always to be discriminative and exclusive.

[96] The four views are: That the physical body is productive of
impurities; that sensuality causes pain; that the individual soul is
not permanent; and that all things are devoid of the Atman.

[97] That is to say: The Dharmakâya, that assumes all forms of
existence according to what class of being it is manifesting itself,
is sometimes conceived by the believers to be a short-lived god,
sometimes an immortal spirit, sometimes a celestial being of one
hundred kalpas, and sometimes an existence of only a moment. As there
are so many different dispositions, characters, karmas, intellectual
attainments, moral environments, etc., so there are as many Dharmakâyas
as subjectively represented in the minds of sentient beings, though
the Dharmakâya, objectively considered, is absolutely one.

[98] Asanga’s _General Treatise on Mahâyânism_. (_Mahâyâna
samparigraha_).

[99] The _Avatamsaka Sûtra_, chap. 13, “On Merit.”

[100] This is by no means the case, for some of the Mahâyâna sûtras
are undoubtedly productions of much later writers than the immediate
followers of the Buddha, though of course it is very likely that some
of the most important Mahâyâna canonical books were compiled within a
few hundred years after the Nirvana of the Master.

[101] “Purvapranidhânabala” is frequently translated “the power of
original (or primitive) prayer.” Literally, pûrva means “former” or
“original” or “primitive”; and pranidhâna, “desire” or “vow” or
“prayer”; and bala, “power.” So far as literary rendering is concerned,
“power of original prayer” seems to be the sense of the original
Sanskrit. But when we speak of primitive prayers of the Dharmakâya or
Tathâgata, how shall we understand it? Has prayer any sense in this
connection? The Dharmakâya can by its own free will manifest in any
form of existence and finish its work in whatever way it deems best.
There is no need for it to utter any prayer in the agony of struggle
to accomplish. There is in the universe no force whatever which is
working against it so powerfully as to make it cry for help; and there
cannot be any struggle or agony in the activity of the Dharmakâya. The
term prayer therefore is altogether misleading and inaccurate and
implicates us in a grave error which tends to contradict the general
Buddhist conception of Dharmakâya. We must dispense with the term
entirely in order to be in perfect harmony with the fundamental
doctrine of Buddhism. This point will receive further consideration
later.

[102] “I am the father of all beings, and they are my children.”
(The _Avatamsaka_, the _Pundarîka_, etc.)

[103] To get more fully acquainted with the significance of the
Sukhâvatî doctrine, the reader is advised to look up the Sukhâvatî
sûtras in the _Sacred Books of the East_, Vol. XLIX.




 CHAPTER X NOTES.

[104] What follows is selected from a short sûtra called _The
Mahâvaipulya-Tathâgatagarbha Sûtra_, translated into Chinese by
Buddhabhadra of the Eastern Tsin dynasty (A.D. 371-420). Nanjo, No.
384.

[105] _Niyuta_ is an exceedingly large number, but generally
considered to be equal to one billion.

[106] All these are unhuman forms of existence, including demons,
dragon-kings, winged beasts, etc.

[107] Âçrava literally means “oozing,” or “flowing out,” and the
Chinese translators rendered it by _lou_, dripping, or leaking. Roughly
speaking, it is a general name for evils, principally material and
sensuous. According to an Indian Buddhist scholar, Âçrava has threefold
sense: (1) “keeping,” for it retains all sentient beings in the
whirlpool of birth and death; (2) “flowing,” for it makes all sentient
beings run in the stream of birth and death; (3) “leaking,” or
“oozing,” for it lets such evils as avarice, anger, lust, etc., ooze
out from the six sense-organs after the fashion of an ulcer, which
lets out blood and filthy substance. The cause of Âçrava is a blind
will, and its result is birth and death. Specifically, Bhâvâçrava is
one of the three Âçravas, which are (1) kâmâçrava, (2) vidyâçrava, and
(3) bhâvâçrava. The first is egotistic desires, the second is
ignorance, and the third is the material existence which we have to
suffer on account of our previous karma.

[108] Our thoughtful readers must have noticed here that the
conceptions of the Buddha as entertained by the Mahâsangika School
(Great Council) closely resemble those of the Mahâyâna Buddhism.
Though we are still unable to trace step by step the development of
Mahâyânism in India, the hypothesis assumed by most of Japanese
Buddhist scholars is that the Mahâsangika was Mahâyânistic in tendency.

[109] The _Mahâparinibbâna sutta_.

[110] There are three Chinese translations of this sûtra: the first,
by Dharmarakṣa during the first two decades of the fifth century A.D.;
the second, by Paramârtha of the Liang dynasty, who came to China A.D.
546 and died A.D. 569; and the third, by I-tsing of the Tang dynasty
who came back from his Indian pilgrimage in the year 695 and translated
this sûtra A.D. 703. The last is the only complete Chinese translation
of the _Suvarnâ Prabhâ_. A part of the original Sanskrit text recovered
in Nepal was published by the Buddhist Text Society of India in 1898.
Nanjo, Nos. 126, 127, 130.

[111] The notion that great men never die seems to be universal.
Spiritually they would never perish, because the ideas that moved them
and made them prominent in the history of humanity are born of truth.
And in this sense every person who is possessed of worthy thoughts is
immortal, while souls that are made of trumpery are certainly doomed
to annihilation. But the masses are not satisfied with this kind of
immortality. They must have something more tangible, more sensual, and
more individual. The notion of bodily resurrection of Christ is a fine
illustration of this truth. When the followers of Christ opened the
master’s grave, they did not find his body, so says legend, and they
at once conceived the idea of resurrection, for they reasoned that
such a great man as Jesus could not suffer the same fate that befalls
common mortals only. The story of his corporeal resurrection now
took wing and went wild; some heard him speak to them, some saw him
break bread, and others even touched his wounds. What a grossly
materialistic conception early Christians (and alas, even some of the
twentieth century) cherished about resurrection and immortality! It is
no wonder, therefore, that primitive Buddhists raised a serious
question about the personality of Buddha which culminated in the
conception of the Sambhogakâya, Body of Bliss, by Mahâyânists.

[112] Compare this to the transfigured Christ.

[113] Cf. I Cor. XIII, II. “When I was a child, I spake as a child,
I understood as a child, I thought as a child, but when I became a
man, I put away childish things.” This point of our ever-ascending
spiritual progress is well illustrated in the _Saddharma-pundarîka
Sûtra_. See Chapters II, III, IV, V, and XI. The following passage
quoted from chap. II, p. 49 (Kern’s translation) will give a tolerably
adequate view concerning diversity of means and unity of purpose as
here expounded: “Those highest of men have, all of them, revealed most
holy laws by means of illustrations, reasons and arguments, with many
hundred proofs of skillfulness (_upâyakauçalya_). And all of them have
manifested but one vehicle and introduced but one on earth; by one
vehicle have they led to full ripeness inconceivably many thousands of
kotis of beings.” As was elsewhere noted, this doctrine is sometimes
known as the theory of Upâya. Upâya is very difficult term to translate
into English; it literally means “way,” “method,” or “strategy.” For
fuller interpretation see p. 298, footnote.

[114] This is one of the most important philosophical works of the
Yogacâra school. Vasubandhu wrote the text (Nanjo, No. 1215) which
consists only of thirty verses, but there appeared many commentators
after the death of the author, who naturally entertained widely
different views among themselves on the subject-matter, as it is too
tersely treated in the text. Hsüen Tsang made selections out of the
ten noted Hindu exegetists in A.D. 659 and translated them into the
Chinese language. The compilation consists of ten fascicles and is
known as _Discourse on the Ideality of the Universe_ (a free rendering
of the Chinese title _Chang wei shi lun_, Nanjo, No. 1197).

[115] May I venture to say that the conception of God as entertained
by most Christians is a Body of Bliss rather than the Dharmakâya
itself? In some respects their God is quite spiritual, but in others
he is thought of as a concrete material being like ourselves. It seems
to me that the human soul is ever struggling to free itself from this
paradox, though without any apparent success, while the masses are not
so intellectual and reflective enough as to become aware of this
eternal contradiction which is too deeply buried in their minds.

[116] The reader must not think that there is but one Pure Land
which is elaborately described in the _Sukhâvatî Vyûha Sûtra_ as the
abode of the Tathâgata Amitâbha, situated innumerable leagues away in
the West. On the contrary, the Mahâyâna texts admit the existence of
as innumerable pure lands as there are Tathâgatas and Bodhisattvas,
and every single one of these holy regions has no boundary and is
coexistent with the universe, and, therefore, their spheres necessarily
intercrossing and overlapping one another. It would look to every
intelligent mind that those innumerable Buddha-countries existing in
such a mysterious and incomprehensible manner cannot be anything else
than our own subjective creation.

[117] For a description of these marks see the _Dharmasangraha_, pp.
53 ff. A process of mystifying or deifying the person of Buddha seems
to have been going on immediately after the death of the Master; and
the Mahâyânistic conception of Nirmânakâya and Sambhogakâya is merely
the consummation of this process. Southern Buddhists who are sometimes
supposed to represent a more “primitive” form of Buddhism describe
just as much as Mahâyânism the thirty-two major and eighty minor
excellent physical marks of a great man as having been possessed by
Çâkyamuni, (for instance, see the _Milindapañha_, _S. B. E._ Vol. XXXV.
p. 116). But any person with common sense will at once see the
absurdity of representing any human being with those physical
peculiarities. And this seems to have inspired more rational
Mahâyânists to abandon the traditional way of portraying the human
Buddha with those mysterious signs. They transferred them through the
doctrine of Trikâya to the characterisation of the Sambhogakâya
Buddha, that is, to the Buddha enjoying in a celestial abode the fruit
of his virtuous earthly life. The Buddha who walked in the flesh as
the son of King Suddhodana was, however, no more than an ordinary
human being like ourselves, because he appeared to us in a form of
Nirmânakâya, i.e. as a Body of Transformation, devoid of any such
physical peculiarities known as thirty-two or eighty lakṣanas.
Southern Buddhists, so called, seem, however, to have overlooked the
ridiculousness of attributing these fantastic signs to the human
Buddha; and this fact explains that as soon as the memory of the
personal disciples of Buddha about his person vanished among the later
followers, intense speculation and resourceful imagination were
constantly exercised until the divers schools settled the question
each in its own way.

[118] Cf. I Cor. XI. 19 et seq.




 CHAPTER XI NOTES.

[119]
Kern’s English translation (_S. B. E._ Vol. XXI), Chap. III, p. 80.

[120] It should be noted here that the idea of universal salvation
was lacking altogether in the followers of Hînayânism. But what
distinguished it so markedly from Mahâyânism is that the former did
not extend the idea wide enough, but confined it to Buddhahood only.
Buddha attained omniscience in order that he might deliver the world,
but we, ordinary mortals, are too ignorant and too helpless to aspire
for Buddhahood; let us be contented with paying homage to Buddha and
faithfully observing his precepts as laid down by him for our spiritual
edification. Our knowledge and energy are too limited to cope with
such a gigantic task as to achieve a universal salvation of mankind;
let a Buddha or Bodhisattva attempt it while we may rest with a
profound confidence in him and in his work. Thoughts somewhat like
these must have been going about in the minds of the Hînayânists, when
their Mahâyâna brethren were making bold to strive after Buddhahood
themselves. The difference between the two schools of Buddhism, when
most concisely expressed, is this: While one has a most submissive
confidence in the Buddha, the other endeavors to follow his example by
placing himself in his position. The following quotation (“the Story
of Sumedha,” a Jâtaka tale, from Warren’s _Buddhism_, p. 14) in which
Sumedha, one of the Buddha’s former incarnations, expresses his
resolve to be a Buddha, may just as well be considered as that of a
Mahâyânist himself, while the Hînayânists would not dare to make this
wish their own:


 “Or why should I, valorous man,
 The ocean seek to cross alone?
 Omniscience first will I achieve,
 And men and gods convey across.

 “Since now I make this earnest wish,
 In presence of this Best of Men,
 Omniscience sometime I’ll achieve,
 And multitude convey across.

 “I’ll rebirth’ circling stream arrest,
 Destroy existence’s three modes;
 I’ll climb the sides of Doctrine’s ship,
 And men and gods convey across.”


[121] This is a very rough summary of the doctrine that is known as
Parivarta and expounded in the _Avatamsaka Sûtra_, fas. 21-22 where
ten forms of Parivarta are distinguished and explained at length.

[122] Warren’s _Buddhism in Translations_, the “Story of Sumedha,”
pp. 14-15.

[123] It may be interesting to Christian readers to note in this
connection that modern Buddhists do not reject altogether the idea of
vicarious atonement, for their religious conviction as seen here
admits the parivarta of a Bodhisattva’s merits to the spiritual
welfare of his fellow-creatures. But they will object to the Christian
interpretation that Jesus was sent down on earth by his heavenly
father for the special mission to atone for the original sin through
the shedding of his innocent blood, for this is altogether too puerile
and materialistic.

[124] The full title of the work is _A Treatise on the
Transcendentality of Bodhicitta_ (Nanjo, No. 1304). It is a little
book consisting of seven or eight sheets in big Chinese type. It was
translated into Chinese by Dânapâla (Shih Hu) during the tenth century
of the Christian Era.

[125] Upaya, meaning “expedient,” “stratagem,” “device,” or “craft,”
has a technical sense in Buddhism. It is used in contrast to
intelligence (_prajñâ_) and is synonymous with love (_karunâ_). So,
Vimalakîrti says in the sûtra bearing his name (chap. 8, verses 1-4):
“Prajñâ is the mother of the Bodhisattva and Upaya his father; there
is no leader of humanity who is not born of them.” Intelligence
(_prajñâ_) is the one, the universal, representing the principle of
sameness (_samatâ_), while Upaya is the many, being the principle of
manifoldness (_nânâtvâ_). From the standpoint of pure intelligence,
the Bodhisattvas do not see any particular suffering existences, for
there is nothing that is not of the Dharmakâya: but when they see the
universe from the standpoint of their love-essence, they recognise
everywhere the conditions of misery and sin that arise from clinging
to the forms of particularity. To remove these, they devise all
possible means that are directed towards the attainment of the final
aim of existence. There is only one religion, religion of truth, but
there are many ways, many means, many upayas, all issuing from the
all-embracing love of the Dharmakâya and equally efficient to lead the
masses to supreme enlightenment and universal good. Therefore,
ontologically speaking, this universe, the Buddhists would say, is
nothing but a grand display of Upayas by the Dharmakâya that desires
thereby to lead all sentient beings to the ultimate realisation of
Buddhahood. In many cases, thus, it is extremely difficult to render
upaya by any of its English equivalents and yet to retain its original
technical sense unsuffered. This is also the case with many other
Buddhist terms, among which we may mention Bodhi, Dharmakâya, Prajñâ,
Citta, Parivarta, etc. The Chinese translators have _fang p’ien_ for
upaya which means “means-accommodation.”

[126] Its full title is _A Discourse on the Non-duality of the
Mahâyâna-Dharmadhâtu_. It consists of less than a dozen pages in
ordinary Chinese large print. It was translated by Deva-prajñâ and
others in the year 691 A.D.

[127] This work was translated by Kumârajîva into Chinese at the
beginning of the fifth century A.D. It is divided into two fascicles,
each consisting of about one score of Chinese pages.

[128] The above is a liberal rendering of the first part of the
Chapter III, in Vasubandhu’s _Bodhicitta_.




 CHAPTER XII NOTES.

[129] The distinction between the five indriyas and the five balas
seems to be rather redundant. But the Hindu philosophers usually
distinguish actor from action, agent from function or operation. Thus
the sense-organs are distinguished from sensations or
sense-consciousnesses, and the manovijñâna (mind) from its functions
such as thinking, attention, memory, etc. The âtman has thus come to
be considered the central agent that controls all the sensuous and
intellectual activities. Though the Buddhists do not recognise this
differentiation of actor and action in reality, they sometimes loosely
follow the popular usage.

[130] In this connection it is very interesting also to note that
Carlyle expresses the same sentiment about the greatness of Shakespeare
in his _Hero Worship_. “If I say that Shakspeare is the greatest of
Intellects, I have said all concerning him. But there is more in
Shakspeare’s intellect than we have yet seen It is what I call an
unconscious intellect; there is more virtue in it that he himself is
aware of. Novalis beautifully remarks of him, that those dramas of his
are Products of Nature too, as deep as Nature herself. I find a great
truth in this saying, Shakspeare’s Art is not Artifice; the noblest
worth of it is not there by plan or precontrivance. It grows from the
deeps of Nature, through this noble sincere soul, who is a voice of
Nature.”

[131] The ten powers of the Buddha are: (1) The mental power which
discriminates between right and wrong, (2) The knowledge of the
retribution of karma, (3) The knowledge of all the different stages of
creation, (4) The knowledge of all the different forms of deliverance,
(5) The knowledge of all the different dispositions of sentient
beings, (6) The knowledge of the final destination of all deeds, (7)
The knowledge of all the different practices of meditation,
deliverance, and tranquilisation, (8) The knowledge of former
existences, (9) The unlimited power of divination, (10) The knowledge
of the complete subjection of evil desires (_âçrava_).

[132] The four convictions (_vaiçâradyas_) of the Buddha are: (1)
That he has attained the highest enlightenment, (2) That he has
destroyed all evil desires, (3) That he has rightly described the
obstacles that lie in the way to a life of righteousness, (4) That he
has truthfully taught the way of salvation.

[133] The eighteen unique characteristics which distinguish the
Buddha from the rest of mankind are: (1) He commits no errors. Since
time out of mind, he has disciplined himself in morality, meditation,
intelligence, and lovingkindness, and as the result his present life
is without faults and free from all evil thoughts. (2) He is faultless
in his speeches. Whatever he speaks comes from his transcendental
eloquence and leads the audience to a higher conception of life. (3)
His mind is faultless. As he has trained himself in samâdhi, he is
always calm, serene, and contented. (4) He retains his sameness of
heart (_samâhitacitta_), that is, his love for sentient beings is
universal and not discriminative. (5) His mind is free from thoughts
of particularity (_nânâtvasamjñâ_), that is, it is abiding in truth
transcendental, his thoughts are not distracted by objects of the
senses. (6) Resignation (_upekṣâ_). The Buddha knows everything, yet
he is calmly resigned. (7) His aspiration is unfathomable, that is,
his desire to save all beings from the sufferings of ignorance knows
no bounds. (8) His energy is inexhaustible, which he applies with
utmost vigor to the salvation of benighted souls. (9) His mentation
(_smṛti_) is inexhaustible, that is, he is ever conscious of all the
good doctrines taught by all the Buddhas of the past, present, and
future. (10) His intelligence (_prajñâ_) is inexhaustible, that is,
being in possession of all-intelligence which knows no limits, he
preaches for the benefits of all beings. (11) His deliverance
(_vimukti_) is permanent, that is, he has eternally distanced all evil
passions and sinful attachments. (12) His knowledge of deliverance
(_vimuktijñâna_) is perfect, that is, his intellectual insight into
all states of deliverance is without a flaw. (13) He possesses a
wisdom which directs all his bodily movements towards the benefit and
enlightenment of sentient beings. (14) He possesses a wisdom which
directs all his speeches toward the edification and conversion of his
fellow-creatures. (15) He possesses a wisdom which reflects in his
clear mind all the turbulent states of ignorant souls, from which he
removes the dark veil of nescience and folly. (16) He knows all the
past. (17) He knows all the future. (18) He knows all the present.

[134] For an elaborate exposition of the Daçabhûmî, see the
_Avatamsaka_ (sixty volume edition, fas. 24-27), the _Çûrangama_,
Vasubandhu’s Commentary on Asanga’s _Comprehensive Treatise on
Mahâyanism_ (fas. 10-11), the _Vijnânamâtra Çâstra_ (fas. 9), etc.,
and for a special treatment of the subject consult the sûtra bearing
the name, which by the way exists in a Sanskrit version and whose
brief sketch is given by Rajendra Mitra in his _Nepalese Buddhist
Literature_, p. 81 et seq.




 CHAPTER XIII NOTES.

[135] Literally, “to advance against.”

[136] Cf. Beal’s translation in the _S. B. E._ Vol XIX. pp. 306-307,
vs. 2095-2101. Beal utterly misunderstands the Chinese original.

[137] The _Buddhacarita_, Cowell’s translation in the _S. B. E._
Vol. XLIX. p. 145.

[138] From A. J. Edmunds’s translation of _Dhammapada_.

[139] P. 225. Beal’s translation is not always reliable, and I
would have my own if the Chinese original were at all accessible.

[140] The gâthâs supposed to be the first utterance of the Buddha
after his enlightenment, according to Rockhill’s _Life of the Buddha_
(p. 33) compiled from Tibetan sources, give an inkling of nihilism,
though I am inclined to think that the original Tibetan will allow a
different interpretation when examined by some one who is better
acquainted with the spirit of Buddhism than Rockhill. Rockhill betrays
in not a few cases his insufficient knowledge of the subject he treats.
His translation of the gâthâs is as follows:


 “All the pleasures of the worldly joys,
 All which are known among the gods,
 Compared with the joy of ending existence,
 Are not as its sixteenth part.

 “Sorry is he whose burden is heavy,
 And happy he who has cast it down;
 When once he has cast off his burden,
 He will seek to be burthened no more.

 “When all existences are put away,
 When all notions are at an end,
 When all things are perfectly known,
 Then no more will craving come back.”


In the _Udâna_, II., 2, we have a stanza corresponding to the first
gâthâ here cited, but the _Udâna_ does not say “the joy of ending
existence,” but “the destruction of desire.”

According to the _Lalita Vistara_, the Buddha’s utterance of victory
is (Râjendra Mitra’s Edition p. 448):


 “Cinna vartmopaçânta rajâh çuṣkâ âçravâ na punaḥ çravanti.
 Chinne vartmani varttate duḥkhasyaiṣonta ucyate.”


[141] Warren’s _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 376.

[142] General D. M. Strong’s translation, p. 64.

[143] The text does not expressly say “animate or inanimate”, but
this is the author’s own interpretation according to the general
spirit of Mahâyânism.

[144] There are two obstacles to final emancipation: (1) affective,
and (2) intellectual. The former is our unenlightened affective or
emotional or subjective life and the latter our intellectual prejudice.
Buddhists should not only be pure in heart but be perfect in
intelligence. Pious men are of course saved from transmigration, but
to attain perfect Buddhahood they must have a clear, penetrating
intellectual insight into the significance of life and existence and
the destiny of the universe. This emphasising of the rational element
in religion is one of the most characteristic points of Buddhism.

[145] This is one of the most important philosophical texts of
Mahâyânism. Its original Sanskrit with the commentary of Chandra Kîrti
has been edited by Satis Chandra Acharya and published by the Buddhist
Text Society of India. The original lines run as follows (p. 193):


 “Aprahînam, asamprâptam, anucchinnam, açâçvatam,
 Aniruddham, anutpannam, evam nirvânam ucyate.”


[146] Literally, that which is characterised by the absence of all
characterisation.

[147] Cf. the following from the _Mâdhyamika_:

 “Bhaved abbâvo bhâvaç ca nirvânam ubhayam katham:
 Asamskṛtam ca nirvânam bhâvâbhavâi ca samskṛtam.”
 Or, “Tasmânna bhâvo nâbhâvo nirvânamiti yujyate.”


[148] In the _Visuddhi-Magga_ XXI. (Warren’s translation, p. 376 et
seq.), we read that there are three starting points of deliverance
arising from the consideration of the three predominant qualities of
the constituents of being: 1. The consideration of their beginnings
and ends leads the thoughts to the unconditioned; 2. The insight into
their miserableness agitates the mind and leads the thoughts to the
desireless; 3. The consideration of the constituents of being as not
having an ego leads the thoughts to the empty. And these three, we are
told, constitute the three aspects of Nirvâna as unconditioned,
desireless, and empty. Here we have an instance in the so-called
Southern “primitive” Buddhism of viewing Nirvâna in the Mahâyânistic
light which I have here explained at length.

_En passant_, let us remark that as Buddha did not leave any document
himself embodying his whole system, there sprang up soon after his
departure several schools explaining the Master’s view in divers ways,
each claiming the legitimate interpretation; that in view of this fact
it is illogical to conclude that Southern Buddhism is the authoritative
representation par excellence of original Buddhism, while the Eastern
or the Northern is a mere degeneration.

[149] There are three Chinese translations of this Mahâyâna text, by
Dharmarakṣa, Kumârajîva, and Bodhiruci, between 265 and 517 A.D.

[150]

 Samsârasya ca nirvânât kincid asti viçeṣaṇam:
 Na nirvâṇasya samsârât kincid asti viçesaṇam.


[151]

 Nirvâṇasya ca yâ kotiḥ kotiḥ samsârasya ca,
 Vidyâdanantaraṃ kincit susukṣnaṃ vidyate.


[152] Concerning the similarity in meaning of this statement to the
one just preceding, a commentator says that the sixth is the statical
view of Suchness (or Dharmakâya) and the seventh its dynamical view.
One explains what the highest reality of Buddhism is and the other
what it does or works.

[153] _The Discourse on Buddha-essence_ by Vasubandhu. The Japanese
Tripitaka edition of 1881, fas. II., p. 84, where the stanza is quoted
from the _Sûtra on the Incomprehensible_.

[154] This is expressed in the first verse of the _Mâdhyamika
Çâstra_, which runs as follows:

 “Anirodham anutpâdam anucchedam açâçvatam
 Anekârtham anânârtham anâgamam anirgamam.”


Literally translated these lines read:


 “No annihilation, no production, no destruction, no persistence,
 No unity, no plurality, no coming in, no going out.”


[155] Compare this Buddhist sentiment of universal love with that of
the Christian religion and we shall see the truth that all religions
are one at the bottom. We read in Thomas à Kempis’s _Imitation of
Christ_ (ch. XIII): “My son, I descended from heaven for thy salvation;
I took upon me thy sorrows, not necessity but love drawing me thereto;
that thou thyself mightest learn patience and bear temporal sufferings
without repining. For from the hour of my birth, even until my death
on the cross, I was not without suffering of grief.” This is exactly
the sentiment that stimulates the Bodhisattvas to their gigantic task
of universal salvation. Those who are free from sectarian biases will
admit without hesitation that there is but one true religion which may
assume various forms according to circumstances. “Many are the roads
to the summit, but when reached there we have but one universal
moonlight.”

[156] The _Dharmapada_, XIV. 5. Mr. A. J. Edmunds’s translation is,


 “Ceasing to do all wrong,
 Initiation into goodness,
 Cleansing the heart:
 This the religion of the Buddhas.”




 TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES.

Page numbers are given in {curly brackets}.

The following have been left as-printed:

Archaic and inconsistent spellings (_e.g._, Corea, Nirvâna/Nirvana,
coördination/co-ordination, efficience/efficiency,
Âlaya-vijñâna/Âlayavijñâna, etc.).

Ellipses of varying lengths.

(p. 317) The Eightfold Noble Path is listed omitting the seventh step
(Right mindfulness). Also, the sixth step is usually given as “Right
effort,” not “Right recollection.”

The usage of both “fn.” and “ft.” to denote “footnote” in the Index.

Lastly, some syntactical errors with possible corrections given in
square brackets:

(p. 83) “Its foundation lies too deeply buried in [the] human heart to
be damaged by knowledge or science.”

(p. 104) “When Bodhi-Dharma... saw Emperor Wu of [the] Liang dynasty
(A.D. 502-556), he was asked...”

(p. 214) “In good karma we are made to live eternally, but in [an]
evil one we are doomed...”

(p. 215) “Pious Buddhists believe that... he enters right into the
soul and becomes [an] integral part of his being.”

Alterations to the text:

Abandon the use of drop-caps.

Convert footnotes to endnotes and add a corresponding entry in the
TOC.

Punctuation corrections: several missing/invisible periods and a few
commas, some quotation mark pairings/nestings, etc.

[TOC]

Add missing “Two Forms of Knowledge” subsection under Chapter IV.

Under Chapter XII, change “Bhimukhî” to “Abhimukhî”.

[Introduction]

Change “the other schools, which _latter_ became a class by itself” to
_later_.

“led to the dissension _af_ Mahâyânism and Hînayânism” to _of_.

“Kant, for instance, as _promotor_ of German philosophy” to _promoter_.

“a few _centnries_ after Açvaghoṣa, the progressive party” to
_centuries_.

“while the _Prayekabuddhas_ and the Çrâvakas are considered” to
_Pratyekabuddhas_.

“Buddhism cannot ignore the _significane_ of Mahâyânism” to
_significance_.

“their rival religion as _denegerated_, because it went” to
_degenerated_.

“This fact so miserably spoils their _purityof_ sentiment” to _purity
of_.

“his intellect becomes _pitiously_ obscured by his” to _piteously_.

“_refering_ to the Mahâyâna conception of Dharmakâya” to _referring_.

[Chapter I]

“that, owing to a crime _commited_ by them” to _committed_.

“do not recognise the evanescence of _wordly_ things” to _worldly_.

“The _dotrine_ of nescience or ignorance is technically” to _doctrine_.

“sons and daughters, wives _aud_ husbands, all transfigured” to _and_.

“and which therefore were utterly _desplicable_” to _despicable_.

“in response to the pathetic _persuation_ of his father’s” to
_persuasion_.

[Chapter II]

“Sthiramati in his _Indroduction_ to Mahâyânism” to _Introduction_.

“As the silkworm imprisons itself in the _cacoon_ created” to _cocoon_.

“realm of the absolute and the abode of _non-particurality_” to
_non-particularity_.

[Chapter III]

“satisfy the inmost _yearings_ of the human heart” to _yearnings_.

“which consists of the inmost _yearings_ of the human heart” to
_yearnings_.

[Chapter IV]

“World-views Founded on the Three _Froms_ of Knowledge” to _Forms_.

(p. 94, fn. 1) “Nanjo. Nos. 246 _aud_ 247), etc.” to _and_.

“From this, it is to be _infered_ that Buddhism never” to _inferred_.

[Chapter V]

(_Nâgârjana’s_ famous doctrine of “The Middle Path) to _Nâgârjuna’s_.

“is no more than a fragment of the _absoulte_ Bhûtatathâtâ” to
_absolute_.

“to be very logical and free from serious _dufficulties_” to
_difficulties_.

“Adam with Eve, Buddha with Devadatta, etc., _ect_.,” to _etc_.

[Chapter VI]

“and _Buddi_ and Ahankâra. Buddhi, intellect, is defined” to _Buddhi_.

(p.139, fn. 1) “doctrine of Mahâyânism, i.e.. that of” change third
period to a comma.

[Chapter VII]

“fixed state of things in which perfect _equillibrium_” to
_equilibrium_.

“the noumenal ego as the raison _d’ être_ of our” to _d’être_.

(literally means “aggregate” or “_aglomeration_”) to _agglomeration_.

(saying: “_This‘middle’_ is extremely indefinite) to _This ‘middle’_.

“the hypothesis of the _permament_ existence of an” to _permanent_.

(The term “_sabhâva_” (self-essence or noumenon) is) to _svabhâva_.

“they are like the _will-‘o-the-wisp_” to _will-o’-the-wisp_.

“If the Fourfold Noble Truth _dœs_ not exist” to _does_.

“The _Buddha ’s_ teaching rests on the discrimination” to _Buddha’s_.

[Chapter VIII]

“He is _sufficent_ unto himself as he is here and now” to _sufficient_.

“and the accumulation of of merits (_punyaskandha_)” delete one _of_.

“Every one of these seeds which are _infinte_ in number” to _infinite_.

[Chapter IX]

“than devastation, _barreness_, and universal misery” to _barrenness_.

“Even so with the _Dharkâya_ of the Tathâgata” to _Dharmakâya_.

“Even so with the Dharmakâya of _theT athâgata_” to _the Tathâgata_.

“such as blindness, deafness, mental _abberration_, etc.” to
_aberration_.

“It _anthroposises_ everything beyond the proper measure” to
_anthropomorphises_.

[Chapter X]

(p. 243, fn. 1) “the Eastern Tsin dynasty (A.D, 371-420)” change the
comma to a period.

“the work once _refered_ to in the beginning of this book” to
_referred_.

“describe the the essential peculiarities of each school” delete one
_the_.

(p. 253, fn. 2) “A part of the _orginal_ Sanskrit text” to _original_.

“Asanga and Vasubandhu will be here _refered_ to” to _referred_.

“pious Buddhists would be _transfered_ after their death” to
_transferred_.

(p. 271, fn. 1) “eighty minor _exellent_ physical marks of a great” to
_excellent_.

(_same_) “They _transfered_ them through the doctrine of Trikâya” to
_transferred_.

[Chapter XI]

“which was quite unwittingly _commited_ by him” to _committed_.

“does not allow the _transfering_ of responsibility” to _transferring_.

“It is _uncreate_ and its self-essence is void” to _uncreated_.

[Chapter XII]

“On the evanescence of the _wordly_ interests” to _worldly_.

“3. Circumspection; 4. _Equillibrium_, or tranquillity” to
_Equilibrium_.

“aloof from the consuming fire of _passsion_” to _passion_.

“He practises the virtue of _strenuousuess_ (_vriya_)” to
_strenuousness_.

[Chapter XIII]

“And am eternally released from all pain and _suffe ring_” to
_suffering_.

(p. 334, fn. 2) “Cowell’s translation in the S. B. E. Vol. _ILIX_. p.
145” to _XLIX_.

“When we speak of _Buddha ’s_ entrance into Nirvâna” to _Buddha’s_.

“love is a Buddha-dharma, wisdom is a _Buddha dharma_” to
_Buddha-dharma_.

“emancipation of the Çrâvaka or of the _Prayekabuddha_” to
_Pratyekabuddha_.

“hearts are not softened at the sight of others, misfortune and
suffering” change the comma to a (possessive) apostrophe.

“he does not believe that universal _emanciipation_” to _emancipation_.

“but that _thay_ obtain reality in their oneness with” to _they_.

“do not pay homage to the _congregration_ of holy men” to
_congregation_.

[Appendix]

“Devoid of all _liminations_” to _limitations_.

“None is there but that enters upon _Buddh a-knowledge_” to
_Buddha-knowledge_.

“All _senient_ beings in transmigration travel through” to _sentient_.

“I’ll release, and to eternal _pease_ them I’ll lead” to _peace_.

“In the stream of birth and death they go _arolling_” to _a-rolling_.

“No-more-_arolling_ is Nirvâna” to _a-rolling_.

Change two incidents of _Nonjo_ to _Nanjo_.

“The Avatamsaka _Sutru_” to _Sutra_.

[Index]

(_Imitation of Christ_, _365_ fn.) to _364_.

(_Lalita Vistara_, quoted, on Nirvana, _339_ fn.) to _338_.

(Max Mueller, quoted, 108 ft., _111_ ft., 221.) to _110_.

(Prajñâ (and Bodhi), defined, _62_ ft.; 82, 97, 119, 238, 360.) to
_82_.

(Prakṛti (Samkyan primordial matter), _67_ ft.) to _66_.

(Purusha (Samkyan soul), _67_ ft.) to _66_.

(“Tat tvam asi,” 47, _136_ ft.) to _135_.

(_Udâna_, quoted, 52, _339_ ft., 341.) to _338_.

(Upâya (expediency), 64, _261_ ft.; its meaning) to _260_.

 [End of text]








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