Title: Principia mathematica, vol. 1 (of 3)
Author: Alfred North Whitehead
Bertrand Russell
Release date: February 26, 2026 [eBook #78050]
Language: English
Original publication: Cambridge: University Press, 1910
Credits: Richard Tonsing, Laura Natal, Michael Roe and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.) In memoriam of Greg Newby.
[Pg xi]
PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
London: FETTER LANE, E.C.
C. F. CLAY, MANAGER
Edinburgh: 100, PRINCES STREET
Berlin: A. ASHER AND CO.
Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS
New York: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
Bombay and Calcutta:
MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.
All rights reserved
BY
ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, Sc.D., F.R.S.
Fellow and late Lecturer of Trinity College, Cambridge
AND
BERTRAND RUSSELL, M.A., F.R.S.
Lecturer and late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge
VOLUME I
Cambridge
at the University Press
1910
Cambridge:
PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
| PAGE | |
| PREFACE | v |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| CHAPTER I. PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS OF IDEAS AND NOTATIONS | 4 |
| CHAPTER II. THE THEORY OF LOGICAL TYPES | 39 |
| CHAPTER III. INCOMPLETE SYMBOLS | 69 |
| PART I. MATHEMATICAL LOGIC. Summary of Part I |
91 |
| SECTION A. THE THEORY OF DEDUCTION | 94 |
| *1. Primitive Ideas and Propositions | 95 |
| *2. Immediate Consequences of the Primitive Propositions | 102 |
| *3. The Logical Product of two Propositions | 114 |
| *4. Equivalence and Formal Rules | 120 |
| *5. Miscellaneous Propositions | 128 |
| SECTION B. THEORY OF APPARENT VARIABLES | 132 |
| *9. Extension of the Theory of Deduction from Lower to Higher Types of Propositions |
132 |
| *10. Theory of Propositions containing one Apparent Variable | 143 |
| *11. Theory of two Apparent Variables | 157 |
| *12. The Hierarchy of Types and the Axiom of Reducibility | 168 |
| *13. Identity | 176 |
| *14. Descriptions | 181 |
| SECTION C. CLASSES AND RELATIONS | 196 |
| *20. General Theory of Classes | 196 |
| *21. General Theory of Relations | 211 |
| *22. Calculus of Classes | 217 |
| *23. Calculus of Relations | 226 |
| *24. The Universal Class, the Null-Class, and the Existence of Classes | 229 |
| *25. The Universal Relation, the Null Relation, and the Existence of Relations |
241[Pg xii] |
| SECTION D. LOGIC OF RELATIONS | 244 |
| *30. Descriptive Functions | 245 |
| *31. Converses of Relations | 251 |
| *32. Referents and Relata of a given Term with respect to a given Relation |
255 |
| *33. Domains, Converse Domains, and Fields of Relations | 260 |
| *34. The Relative Product of two Relations | 269 |
| *35. Relations with Limited Domains and Converse Domains | 278 |
| *36. Relations with Limited Fields | 291 |
| *37. Plural Descriptive Functions | 293 |
| *38. Relations and Classes derived from a Double Descriptive Function | 311 |
| Note to Section D |
314 |
| SECTION E. PRODUCTS AND SUMS OF CLASSES | 317 |
| *40. Products and Sums of Classes of Classes | 319 |
| *41. The Product and Sum of a Class of Relations | 331 |
| *42. Miscellaneous Propositions | 336 |
| *43. The Relations of a Relative Product to its Factors | 340 |
| PART II. PROLEGOMENA TO CARDINAL ARITHMETIC. Summary of Part II |
345 |
| SECTION A. UNIT CLASSES AND COUPLES | 347 |
| *50. Identity and Diversity as Relations | 349 |
| *51. Unit Classes | 356 |
| *52. The Cardinal Number 1 | 363 |
| *53. Miscellaneous Propositions involving Unit Classes | 368 |
| *54. Cardinal Couples | 376 |
| *55. Ordinal Couples | 383 |
| *56. The Ordinal Number |
395 |
| SECTION B. SUB-CLASSES, SUB-RELATIONS, AND RELATIVE TYPES | 404 |
| *60. The Sub-Classes of a given Class | 406 |
| *61. The Sub-Relations of a given Relation | 412 |
| *62. The Relation of Membership of a Class | 414 |
| *63. Relative Types of Classes | 419 |
| *64. Relative Types of Relations | 429 |
| *65. On the Typical Definition of Ambiguous Symbols | 434 |
| SECTION C. ONE-MANY, MANY-ONE, AND ONE-ONE RELATIONS | 437 |
| *70. Relations whose Classes of Referents and of Relata belong to given Classes |
439 |
| *71. One-Many, Many-One, and One-One Relations | 446 |
| *72. Miscellaneous Propositions concerning One-Many, Many-One, and One-One Relations |
462 |
| *73. Similarity of Classes | 476 |
| *74. On One-Many and Many-One Relations with Limited Fields | 490[Pg xiii] |
| SECTION D. SELECTIONS | 500 |
| *80. Elementary Properties of Selections | 505 |
| *81. Selections from Many-One Relations | 519 |
| *82. Selections from Relative Products | 524 |
| *83. Selections from Classes of Classes | 531 |
| *84. Classes of Mutually Exclusive Classes | 540 |
| *85. Miscellaneous Propositions | 549 |
| *88. Conditions for the Existence of Selections | 561 |
| SECTION E. INDUCTIVE RELATIONS | 569 |
| *90. On the Ancestral Relation | 576 |
| *91. On Powers of a Relation | 585 |
| *92. Powers of One-Many and Many-One Relations | 601 |
| *93. Inductive Analysis of the Field of a Relation | 607 |
| *94. On Powers of Relative Products | 617 |
| *95. On the Equi-factor Relation | 626 |
| *96. On the Posterity of a Term | 637 |
| *97. Analysis of the Field of a Relation into Families | 654 |
ALPHABETICAL LIST OF PROPOSITIONS REFERRED TO BY NAMES.
| Name | Number | |
| Abs | *2·01. | |
| Add | *1·3. | |
| Ass | *3·35. | |
| Assoc | *1·5. | |
| Comm | *2·04. | |
| Comp | *3·43. | |
| Exp | *3·3. | |
| Fact | *3·45. | |
| Id | *2·08. | |
| Imp | *3·31. | |
| Perm | *1·4. | |
| Simp | *2·02. | |
| " | *3·26. | |
| " | *3·27. | |
| Sum | *1·6. | |
| Syll | *2·05. | |
| " | *2·06. | |
| " | *3·33. | |
| " | *3·34. | |
| Taut | *1·2. | |
| Transp | *2·03. | |
| " | *2·15. | |
| " | *2·16. | |
| " | *2·17. | |
| " | *3·37. | |
| " | *4·1. | |
| " | *4·11. |
p. 14, line 2, for "states" read "allows us to infer."
p. 14, line 7, after "*3·03" insert "*1·7, *1·71, and *1·72."
p. 15, last line but one, for "function of " read "function
."
p. 34, line 15, for "" read "
."
p. 68, line 20, for "classes" read "classes of classes."
p. 86, line 2, after "must" insert "neither be nor."
p. 91, line 8, delete "and in *3·03."
p. 103, line 7, for "assumption" read "assertion."
p. 103, line 25, at end of line, for "" read "
."
p. 218, last line but one, for "" read "
" [owing to brittleness of the
type, the same error is liable to occur elsewhere].
p. 382, last line but one, delete "in the theory of selections (*83·92) and."
p. 487, line 13, for "*95" read "*94."
p. 503, line 14, for "*88·38" read "*88·36."
[Pg v]
THE mathematical treatment of the principles of mathematics, which is the subject of the present work, has arisen from the conjunction of two different studies, both in the main very modern. On the one hand we have the work of analysts and geometers, in the way of formulating and systematising their axioms, and the work of Cantor and others on such matters as the theory of aggregates. On the other hand we have symbolic logic, which, after a necessary period of growth, has now, thanks to Peano and his followers, acquired the technical adaptability and the logical comprehensiveness that are essential to a mathematical instrument for dealing with what have hitherto been the beginnings of mathematics. From the combination of these two studies two results emerge, namely (1) that what were formerly taken, tacitly or explicitly, as axioms, are either unnecessary or demonstrable; (2) that the same methods by which supposed axioms are demonstrated will give valuable results in regions, such as infinite number, which had formerly been regarded as inaccessible to human knowledge. Hence the scope of mathematics is enlarged both by the addition of new subjects and by a backward extension into provinces hitherto abandoned to philosophy.
The present work was originally intended by us to be comprised in a second volume of The Principles of Mathematics. With that object in view, the writing of it was begun in 1900. But as we advanced, it became increasingly evident that the subject is a very much larger one than we had supposed; moreover on many fundamental questions which had been left obscure and doubtful in the former work, we have now arrived at what we believe to be satisfactory solutions. It therefore became necessary to make our book independent of The Principles of Mathematics. We have, however, avoided both controversy and general philosophy, and made our statements dogmatic in form. The justification for this is that the chief reason in favour of any theory on the principles of mathematics must always be inductive, i.e. it must lie in the fact that the theory in question enables us to deduce ordinary mathematics. In mathematics, the greatest degree of self-evidence is usually not to be found quite at the beginning, but at some later point; hence the early deductions, until they reach this point, give reasons rather[Pg vi] for believing the premisses because true consequences follow from them, than for believing the consequences because they follow from the premisses.
In constructing a deductive system such as that contained in the present work, there are two opposite tasks which have to be concurrently performed. On the one hand, we have to analyse existing mathematics, with a view to discovering what premisses are employed, whether these premisses are mutually consistent, and whether they are capable of reduction to more fundamental premisses. On the other hand, when we have decided upon our premisses, we have to build up again as much as may seem necessary of the data previously analysed, and as many other consequences of our premisses as are of sufficient general interest to deserve statement. The preliminary labour of analysis does not appear in the final presentation, which merely sets forth the outcome of the analysis in certain undefined ideas and undemonstrated propositions. It is not claimed that the analysis could not have been carried farther: we have no reason to suppose that it is impossible to find simpler ideas and axioms by means of which those with which we start could be defined and demonstrated. All that is affirmed is that the ideas and axioms with which we start are sufficient, not that they are necessary.
In making deductions from our premisses, we have considered it essential to carry them up to the point where we have proved as much as is true in whatever would ordinarily be taken for granted. But we have not thought it desirable to limit ourselves too strictly to this task. It is customary to consider only particular cases, even when, with our apparatus, it is just as easy to deal with the general case. For example, cardinal arithmetic is usually conceived in connection with finite numbers, but its general laws hold equally for infinite numbers, and are most easily proved without any mention of the distinction between finite and infinite. Again, many of the properties commonly associated with series hold of arrangements which are not strictly serial, but have only some of the distinguishing properties of serial arrangements. In such cases, it is a defect in logical style to prove for a particular class of arrangements what might just as well have been proved more generally. An analogous process of generalization is involved, to a greater or less degree, in all our work. We have sought always the most general reasonably simple hypothesis from which any given conclusion could be reached. For this reason, especially in the later parts of the book, the importance of a proposition usually lies in its hypothesis. The conclusion will often be something which, in a certain class of cases, is familiar, but the hypothesis will, whenever possible, be wide enough to admit many cases besides those in which the conclusion is familiar.
We have found it necessary to give very full proofs, because otherwise it is scarcely possible to see what hypotheses are really required, or whether[Pg vii] our results follow from our explicit premisses. (It must be remembered that we are not affirming merely that such and such propositions are true, but also that the axioms stated by us are sufficient to prove them.) At the same time, though full proofs are necessary for the avoidance of errors, and for convincing those who may feel doubtful as to our correctness, yet the proofs of propositions may usually be omitted by a reader who is not specially interested in that part of the subject concerned, and who feels no doubt of our substantial accuracy on the matter in hand. The reader who is specially interested in some particular portion of the book will probably find it sufficient, as regards earlier portions, to read the summaries of previous parts, sections, and numbers, since these give explanations of the ideas involved and statements of the principal propositions proved. The proofs in Part I, Section A, however, are necessary, since in the course of them the manner of stating proofs is explained. The proofs of the earliest propositions are given without the omission of any step, but as the work proceeds the proofs are gradually compressed, retaining however sufficient detail to enable the reader by the help of the references to reconstruct proofs in which no step is omitted.
The order adopted is to some extent optional. For example, we have treated cardinal arithmetic and relation-arithmetic before series, but we might have treated series first. To a great extent, however, the order is determined by logical necessities.
A very large part of the labour involved in writing the present work has been expended on the contradictions and paradoxes which have infected logic and the theory of aggregates. We have examined a great number of hypotheses for dealing with these contradictions; many such hypotheses have been advanced by others, and about as many have been invented by ourselves. Sometimes it has cost us several months' work to convince ourselves that a hypothesis was untenable. In the course of such a prolonged study, we have been led, as was to be expected, to modify our views from time to time; but it gradually became evident to us that some form of the doctrine of types must be adopted if the contradictions were to be avoided. The particular form of the doctrine of types advocated in the present work is not logically indispensable, and there are various other forms equally compatible with the truth of our deductions. We have particularized, both because the form of the doctrine which we advocate appears to us the most probable, and because it was necessary to give at least one perfectly definite theory which avoids the contradictions. But hardly anything in our book would be changed by the adoption of a different form of the doctrine of types. In fact, we may go farther, and say that, supposing some other way of avoiding the contradictions to exist, not very much of our book, except what explicitly deals with types, is dependent upon the adoption of the doctrine of types in any form, so soon as it has been shown (as we claim[Pg viii] that we have shown) that it is possible to construct a mathematical logic which does not lead to contradictions. It should be observed that the whole effect of the doctrine of types is negative: it forbids certain inferences which would otherwise be valid, but does not permit any which would otherwise be invalid. Hence we may reasonably expect that the inferences which the doctrine of types permits would remain valid even if the doctrine should be found to be invalid.
Our logical system is wholly contained in the numbered propositions, which are independent of the Introduction and the Summaries. The Introduction and the Summaries are wholly explanatory, and form no part of the chain of deductions. The explanation of the hierarchy of types in the Introduction differs slightly from that given in *12 of the body of the work. The later explanation is stricter and is that which is assumed throughout the rest of the book.
The symbolic form of the work has been forced upon us by necessity: without its help we should have been unable to perform the requisite reasoning. It has been developed as the result of actual practice, and is not an excrescence introduced for the mere purpose of exposition. The general method which guides our handling of logical symbols is due to Peano. His great merit consists not so much in his definite logical discoveries nor in the details of his notations (excellent as both are), as in the fact that he first showed how symbolic logic was to be freed from its undue obsession with the forms of ordinary algebra, and thereby made it a suitable instrument for research. Guided by our study of his methods, we have used great freedom in constructing, or reconstructing, a symbolism which shall be adequate to deal with all parts of the subject. No symbol has been introduced except on the ground of its practical utility for the immediate purposes of our reasoning.
A certain number of forward references will be found in the notes and explanations. Although we have taken every reasonable precaution to secure the accuracy of these forward references, we cannot of course guarantee their accuracy with the same confidence as is possible in the case of backward references.
Detailed acknowledgments of obligations to previous writers have not very often been possible, as we have had to transform whatever we have borrowed, in order to adapt it to our system and our notation. Our chief obligations will be obvious to every reader who is familiar with the literature of the subject. In the matter of notation, we have as far as possible followed Peano, supplementing his notation, when necessary, by that of Frege or by that of Schröder. A great deal of the symbolism, however, has had to be new, not so much through dissatisfaction with the symbolism of others, as through the fact that we deal with ideas not previously symbolised. In all[Pg ix] questions of logical analysis, our chief debt is to Frege. Where we differ from him, it is largely because the contradictions showed that he, in common with all other logicians ancient and modern, had allowed some error to creep into his premisses; but apart from the contradictions, it would have been almost impossible to detect this error. In Arithmetic and the theory of series, our whole work is based on that of Georg Cantor. In Geometry we have had continually before us the writings of v. Staudt, Pasch, Peano, Pieri, and Veblen.
We have derived assistance at various stages from the criticisms of friends, notably Mr G. G. Berry of the Bodleian Library and Mr R. G. Hawtrey.
We have to thank the Council of the Royal Society for a grant towards the expenses of printing of £200 from the Government Publication Fund, and also the Syndics of the University Press who have liberally undertaken the greater portion of the expense incurred in the production of the work. The technical excellence, in all departments, of the University Press, and the zeal and courtesy of its officials, have materially lightened the task of proof-correction.
The second volume is already in the press, and both it and the third will appear as soon as the printing can be completed.
A. N. W.
B. R.
CAMBRIDGE,
November, 1910.
[Pg 1]
THE mathematical logic which occupies Part I of the present work has been constructed under the guidance of three different purposes. In the first place, it aims at effecting the greatest possible analysis of the ideas with which it deals and of the processes by which it conducts demonstrations, and at diminishing to the utmost the number of the undefined ideas and undemonstrated propositions (called respectively primitive ideas and primitive propositions) from which it starts. In the second place, it is framed with a view to the perfectly precise expression, in its symbols, of mathematical propositions: to secure such expression, and to secure it in the simplest and most convenient notation possible, is the chief motive in the choice of topics. In the third place, the system is specially framed to solve the paradoxes which, in recent years, have troubled students of symbolic logic and the theory of aggregates; it is believed that the theory of types, as set forth in what follows, leads both to the avoidance of contradictions, and to the detection of the precise fallacy which has given rise to them.
Of the above three purposes, the first and third often compel us to adopt methods, definitions, and notations which are more complicated or more difficult than they would be if we had the second object alone in view. This applies especially to the theory of descriptive expressions (*14 and *30) and to the theory of classes and relations (*20 and *21). On these two points, and to a lesser degree on others, it has been found necessary to make some sacrifice of lucidity to correctness. The sacrifice is, however, in the main only temporary: in each case, the notation ultimately adopted, though its real meaning is very complicated, has an apparently simple meaning which, except at certain crucial points, can without danger be substituted in thought for the real meaning. It is therefore convenient, in a preliminary explanation of the notation, to treat these apparently simple meanings as primitive ideas, i.e. as ideas introduced without definition. When the notation has grown more or less familiar, it is easier to follow the more complicated explanations which we believe to be more correct. In the body of the work, where it is necessary to adhere rigidly to the strict logical order[Pg 2] the easier order of development could not be adopted; it is therefore given in the Introduction. The explanations given in Chapter I of the Introduction are such as place lucidity before correctness; the full explanations are partly supplied in succeeding Chapters of the Introduction, partly given in the body of the work.
The use of a symbolism, other than that of words, in all parts of the book which aim at embodying strictly accurate demonstrative reasoning, has been forced on us by the consistent pursuit of the above three purposes. The reasons for this extension of symbolism beyond the familiar regions of number and allied ideas are many:
(1) The ideas here employed are more abstract than those familiarly considered in language. Accordingly there are no words which are used mainly in the exact consistent senses which are required here. Any use of words would require unnatural limitations to their ordinary meanings, which would be in fact more difficult to remember consistently than are the definitions of entirely new symbols.
(2) The grammatical structure of language is adapted to a wide variety of usages. Thus it possesses no unique simplicity in representing the few simple, though highly abstract, processes and ideas arising in the deductive trains of reasoning employed here. In fact the very abstract simplicity of the ideas of this work defeats language. Language can represent complex ideas more easily. The proposition "a whale is big" represents language at its best, giving terse expression to a complicated fact; while the true analysis of "one is a number" leads, in language, to an intolerable prolixity. Accordingly terseness is gained by using a symbolism especially designed to represent the ideas and processes of deduction which occur in this work.
(3) The adaptation of the rules of the symbolism to the processes of deduction aids the intuition in regions too abstract for the imagination readily to present to the mind the true relation between the ideas employed. For various collocations of symbols become familiar as representing important collocations of ideas; and in turn the possible relations—according to the rules of the symbolism—between these collocations of symbols become familiar, and these further collocations represent still more complicated relations between the abstract ideas. And thus the mind is finally led to construct trains of reasoning in regions of thought in which the imagination would be entirely unable to sustain itself without symbolic help. Ordinary language yields no such help. Its grammatical structure does not represent uniquely the relations between the ideas involved. Thus, "a whale is big" and "one is a number" both look alike, so that the eye gives no help to the imagination.
[Pg 3]
(4) The terseness of the symbolism enables a whole proposition to be represented to the eyesight as one whole, or at most in two or three parts divided where the natural breaks, represented in the symbolism, occur. This is a humble property, but is in fact very important in connection with the advantages enumerated under the heading (3).
(5) The attainment of the first-mentioned object of this work, namely the complete enumeration of all the ideas and steps in reasoning employed in mathematics, necessitates both terseness and the presentation of each proposition with the maximum of formality in a form as characteristic of itself as possible.
Further light on the methods and symbolism of this book is thrown by a slight consideration of the limits to their useful employment:
( Most mathematical investigation is concerned not with
the analysis of the complete process of reasoning, but with the
presentation of such an abstract of the proof as is sufficient
to convince a properly instructed mind. For such investigations
the detailed presentation of the steps in reasoning is of course
unnecessary, provided that the detail is carried far enough to guard
against error. In this connection it may be remembered that the
investigations of Weierstrass and others of the same school have shown
that, even in the common topics of mathematical thought, much more
detail is necessary than previous generations of mathematicians had
anticipated.
( In proportion as the imagination works easily in any region
of thought, symbolism (except for the express purpose of analysis)
becomes only necessary as a convenient shorthand writing to register
results obtained without its help. It is a subsidiary object of this
work to show that, with the aid of symbolism, deductive reasoning
can be extended to regions of thought not usually supposed amenable
to mathematical treatment. And until the ideas of such branches of
knowledge have become more familiar, the detailed type of reasoning,
which is also required for the analysis of the steps, is appropriate to
the investigation of the general truths concerning these subjects.
[Pg 4]
THE notation adopted in the present work is based upon that of Peano, and the following explanations are to some extent modelled on those which he prefixes to his Formulario Mathematico. His use of dots as brackets is adopted, and so are many of his symbols.
Variables. The idea of a variable, as it occurs in the present
work, is more general than that which is explicitly used in ordinary
mathematics. In ordinary mathematics, a variable generally stands for
an undetermined number or quantity. In mathematical logic, any symbol
whose meaning is not determinate is called a variable, and
the various determinations of which its meaning is susceptible are
called the values of the variable. The values may be any set of
entities, propositions, functions, classes or relations, according to
circumstances. If a statement is made about "Mr A and Mr B," "Mr A" and
"Mr B" are variables whose values are confined to men. A variable may
either have a conventionally-assigned range of values, or may (in the
absence of any indication of the range of values) have as the range
of its values all determinations which render the statement in which
it occurs significant. Thus when a text-book of logic asserts that
" is
," without any indication as to what
may be, what
is meant is that any statement of the form "
is
" is
true. We may call a variable restricted when its values are
confined to some only of those of which it is capable; otherwise, we
shall call it unrestricted. Thus when an unrestricted variable
occurs, it represents any object such that the statement concerned
can be made significantly (i.e. either truly or falsely)
concerning that object. For the purposes of logic, the unrestricted
variable is more convenient than the restricted variable, and we shall
always employ it. We shall find that the unrestricted variable is
still subject to limitations imposed by the manner of its occurrence,
i.e. things which can be said significantly concerning a
proposition cannot be said significantly concerning a class or a
relation, and so on. But the limitations to which the unrestricted
variable is subject do not need to be explicitly indicated, since they
are the limits of significance of the statement in which the variable
occurs, and are therefore intrinsically determined by this statement.
This will be more fully explained later[1].[Pg 5] To sum up, the three
salient facts connected with the use of the variable are: (1) that a
variable is ambiguous in its denotation and accordingly undefined:
(2) that a variable preserves a recognizable identity in various
occurrences throughout the same context, so that many variables can
occur together in the same context each with its separate identity: and
(3) that either the range of possible determinations of two variables
may be the same, so that a possible determination of one variable
is also a possible determination of the other, or the ranges of two
variables may be different, so that, if a possible determination of
one variable is given to the other, the resulting complete phrase is
meaningless instead of becoming a complete unambiguous proposition
(true or false) as would be the case if all variables in it had been
given any suitable determinations.
The uses of various letters. Variables will be denoted by single
letters, and so will certain constants; but a letter which has once
been assigned to a constant by a definition must not afterwards be used
to denote a variable. The small letters of the ordinary alphabet will
all be used for variables, except and
after *40, in which
constant meanings are assigned to these two letters. The following
capital letters will receive constant meanings:
,
,
,
,
,
and
. Among small Greek letters, we shall
give constant meanings to
,
and (at a later
stage) to
,
and
. Certain Greek capitals
will from time to time be introduced for constants, but Greek capitals
will not be used for variables. Of the remaining letters,
,
,
will be called propositional letters, and will
stand for variable propositions (except that, from *40 onwards,
must not be used for a variable);
,
,
,
,
,
and (until *33)
will be called functional
letters, and will be used for variable functions.
The small Greek letters not already mentioned will be used for
variables whose values are classes, and will be referred to simply as
Greek letters. Ordinary capital letters not already mentioned
will be used for variables whose values are relations, and will be
referred to simply as capital letters. Ordinary small letters
other than ,
,
,
,
,
will be used for
variables whose values are not known to be functions, classes, or
relations; these letters will be referred to simply as small Latin
letters.
After the early part of the work, variable propositions and variable functions will hardly ever occur. We shall then have three main kinds of variables: variable classes, denoted by small Greek letters; variable relations, denoted by capitals; and variables not given as necessarily classes or relations, which will be denoted by small Latin letters.
In addition to this usage of small Greek letters for variable classes, capital letters for variable relations, small Latin letters for variables of type wholly undetermined by the context (these arise from the possibility of[Pg 6] "systematic ambiguity," explained later in the explanations of the theory of types), the reader need only remember that all letters represent variables, unless they have been defined as constants in some previous place in the book. In general the structure of the context determines the scope of the variables contained in it; but the special indication of the nature of the variables employed, as here proposed, saves considerable labour of thought.
The fundamental functions of propositions. An aggregation of propositions, considered as wholes not necessarily unambiguously determined, into a single proposition more complex than its constituents, is a function with propositions as arguments. The general idea of such an aggregation of propositions, or of variables representing propositions, will not be employed in this work. But there are four special cases which are of fundamental importance, since all the aggregations of subordinate propositions into one complex proposition which occur in the sequel are formed out of them step by step.
They are (1) the Contradictory Function, (2) the Logical Sum, or Disjunctive Function, (3) the Logical Product, or Conjunctive Function, (4) the Implicative Function. These functions in the sense in which they are required in this work are not all independent; and if two of them are taken as primitive undefined ideas, the other two can be defined in terms of them. It is to some extent—though not entirely—arbitrary as to which functions are taken as primitive. Simplicity of primitive ideas and symmetry of treatment seem to be gained by taking the first two functions as primitive ideas.
The Contradictory Function with argument , where
is any
proposition, is the proposition which is the contradictory of
,
that is, the proposition asserting that
is not true. This is
denoted by
. Thus
is the contradictory function
with
as argument and means the negation of the proposition
. It will also be referred to as the proposition not-
. Thus
means not-
, which means the negation of
.
The Logical Sum is a propositional function with two arguments
and
, and is the proposition asserting
or
disjunctively, that is, asserting that at least one of the two
and
is true. This is denoted by
. Thus
is the logical sum with
and
as arguments. It is also called
the logical sum of
and
. Accordingly
means that
at least
or
is true, not excluding the case in which both
are true.
The Logical Product is a propositional function with two arguments
and
, and is the proposition asserting
and
conjunctively, that is, asserting that both
and
are true.
This is denoted by
, or—in order to make the dots act as
brackets in a way to be explained immediately—by
, or by
, or by
. Thus
is the logical product with[Pg 7]
and
as arguments. It is also
called the logical product of
and
. Accordingly
means that both
and
are true. It is easily seen that
this function can be defined in terms of the two preceding functions.
For when
and
are both true it must be false that either
is true. Hence in this book
is merely a shortened form of symbolism for
If any further idea attaches to the proposition "both
and
are true," it is not required here.
The Implicative Function is a propositional function with two arguments
and
, and is the proposition that either not-
or
is true, that is, it is the proposition
.
Thus if
is true,
is false, and accordingly the only
alternative left by the proposition
is that
is true. In other words if
and
are both true,
then
is true. In this sense the proposition
will be quoted as stating that
implies
. The idea contained
in this propositional function is so important that it requires a
symbolism which with direct simplicity represents the proposition
as connecting
and
without the intervention of
. But "implies" as used here expresses nothing else than the
connection between
and
also expressed by the disjunction
"not-
or
." The symbol employed for "
implies
,"
i.e. for "
" is "
." This
symbol may also be read "if
, then
." The association of
implication with the use of an apparent variable produces an extension
called "formal implication." This is explained later: it is an idea
derivative from "implication" as here defined. When it is necessary
explicitly to discriminate "implication" from "formal implication,"
it is called "material implication." Thus "material implication" is
simply "implication" as here defined. The process of inference, which
in common usage is often confused with implication, is explained
immediately.
These four functions of propositions are the fundamental constant (i.e. definite) propositional functions with propositions as arguments, and all other constant propositional functions with propositions as arguments, so far as they are required in the present work, are formed out of them by successive steps. No variable propositional functions of this kind occur in this work.
Equivalence. The simplest example of the formation of a more
complex function of propositions by the use of these four fundamental
forms is furnished by "equivalence." Two propositions and
are said to be "equivalent" when
implies
and
implies
. This relation between
and
is denoted by "
" Thus "
" stands for "
." It is easily seen that two propositions are equivalent
when, and only when, they are both true or are both false. Equivalence
rises in the scale of importance when we come to "formal implication"
and thus to "formal equivalence." It must not be supposed that two
propositions which are equivalent are in[Pg 8] any sense identical or even
remotely concerned with the same topic. Thus "Newton was a man" and
"the sun is hot" are equivalent as being both true, and "Newton was not
a man" and "the sun is cold" are equivalent as being both false. But
here we have anticipated deductions which follow later from our formal
reasoning. Equivalence in its origin is merely mutual implication as
stated above.
Truth-values. The "truth-value" of a proposition is truth if it is
true, and falsehood if it is false[2]. It will be observed that the
truth-values of ,
,
,
,
depend only upon those of
and
, namely
the truth-value of "
" is truth if the truth-value of
either
or
is truth, and is falsehood otherwise; that of
"
" is truth if that of both
and
is truth, and is
falsehood otherwise; that of "
" is truth if either that
of
is falsehood or that of
is truth; that of "
" is the opposite of that of
; and that of "
" is
truth if
and
have the same truth-value, and is falsehood
otherwise. Now the only ways in which propositions will occur in the
present work are ways derived from the above by combinations and
repetitions. Hence it is easy to see (though it cannot be formally
proved except in each particular case) that if a proposition
occurs in any proposition
which we shall ever have occasion
to deal with, the truth-value of
will depend, not upon
the particular proposition
, but only upon its truth-value;
i.e. if
, we shall have
.
Thus whenever two propositions are known to be equivalent, either may
be substituted for the other in any formula with which we shall have
occasion to deal.
We may call a function a "truth-function" when its argument
is a proposition, and the truth-value of
depends only
upon the truth-value of
. Such functions are by no means the
only common functions of propositions. For example, "
believes
" is a function of
which will vary its truth-value for
different arguments having the same truth-value:
may believe one
true proposition without believing another, and may believe one
false proposition without believing another. Such functions are not
excluded from our consideration, and are included in the scope of any
general propositions we may make about functions; but the particular
functions of propositions which we shall have occasion to construct
or to consider explicitly are all truth-functions. This fact is
closely connected with a characteristic of mathematics, namely, that
mathematics is always concerned with extensions rather than intensions.
The connection, if not now obvious, will become more so when we have
considered the theory of classes and relations.
Assertion-sign. The sign "," called the "assertion-sign,"
means that what follows is asserted. It is required for distinguishing
a complete proposition, which we assert, from any subordinate
propositions contained in it but[Pg 9] not asserted. In ordinary written
language a sentence contained between full stops denotes an asserted
proposition, and if it is false the book is in error. The sign
"
" prefixed to a proposition serves this same purpose in our
symbolism. For example, if "
" occurs, it is
to be taken as a complete assertion convicting the authors of error
unless the proposition "
" is true (as it is). Also a
proposition stated in symbols without this sign "
" prefixed
is not asserted, and is merely put forward for consideration, or as a
subordinate part of an asserted proposition.
Inference. The process of inference is as follows: a proposition
"" is asserted, and a proposition "
implies
" is
asserted, and then as a sequel the proposition "
" is asserted.
The trust in inference is the belief that if the two former assertions
are not in error, the final assertion is not in error. Accordingly
whenever, in symbols, where
and
have of course special
determinations,
have occurred, then "
" will occur if it is desired to
put it on record. The process of the inference cannot be reduced to
symbols. Its sole record is the occurrence of "
." It is of
course convenient, even at the risk of repetition, to write "
"
and "
" in close juxtaposition before
proceeding to "
" as the result of an inference. When this
is to be done, for the sake of drawing attention to the inference which
is being made, we shall write instead
which is to be considered as a mere abbreviation of the threefold
statement
Thus "
" may be read "
, therefore
," being in fact the same abbreviation, essentially, as this is;
for "
, therefore
" does not explicitly state, what is part of
its meaning, that
implies
. An inference is the dropping of
a true premiss; it is the dissolution of an implication.
The use of dots. Dots on the line of the symbols have two
uses, one to bracket off propositions, the other to indicate the
logical product of two propositions. Dots immediately preceded
or followed by "" or "
" or "
" or
"
," or by "
," "
," "
" ... or
"
," "
," "
" ...
or "
" or "
" or analogous expressions,
serve to bracket off a proposition; dots occurring otherwise serve
to mark a logical product. The general principle is that a larger
number of dots indicates an outside bracket, a smaller number
indicates an inside bracket. The exact rule as to the scope of the
bracket indicated by dots is arrived at by dividing the occurrences
of dots into three groups which we will name I, II, and III. Group I
consists of dots adjoining a sign of implication (
) or of
equivalence (
) or of disjunction (
) or of equality
by definition (
Df). Group II consists of dots following brackets
indicative of an apparent variable, such as
or
or
or[Pg 10]
or
or analogous expressions[3]. Group III consists of dots which stand
between propositions in order to indicate a logical product. Group
I is of greater force than Group II, and Group II than Group III.
The scope of the bracket indicated by any collection of dots extends
backwards or forwards beyond any smaller number of dots, or any
equal number from a group of less force, until we reach either
the end of the asserted proposition or a greater number of dots
or an equal number belonging to a group of equal or superior
force. Dots indicating a logical product have a scope which works both
backwards and forwards; other dots only work away from the adjacent
sign of disjunction, implication, or equivalence, or forward from the
adjacent symbol of one of the other kinds enumerated in Group II.
Some examples will serve to illustrate the use of dots.
"" means the proposition
"'
or
' implies '
or
.'" When we assert this
proposition, instead of merely considering it, we write
where the two dots after the assertion-sign show that what is asserted
is the whole of what follows the assertion-sign, since there are not
as many as two dots anywhere else. If we had written "
," that would mean the proposition
"either
is true, or
implies '
or
.'" If we
wished to assert this, we should have to put three dots after the
assertion-sign. If we had written "
," that would mean the proposition "either '
or
'
implies q, or p is true." The forms "
" and "
" have no meaning.
"" will mean "if
implies
, then if
implies
implies
." If we wish to assert this (which is true) we
write
Again "
" will mean "if '
implies
' implies '
implies
,' then
implies
." This is in general untrue.
(Observe that "
" is sometimes most conveniently read
as "
implies
," and sometimes as "if
, then
.")
"
"
will mean "if
implies
, and
implies
, then
implies
." In this formula, the first dot indicates a logical
product; hence the scope of the second dot extends backwards to the
beginning of the proposition. "
" will mean "
implies
; and if
implies
, then
implies
." (This is not true in
general.) Here the two dots indicate a logical product; since two
dots do not occur anywhere else, the scope of these two dots extends
backwards to the beginning of the proposition, and forwards to the end.
"" will mean "if either
or
is
true, then if either
or '
implies
' is true, it follows
that either
or
is true."[Pg 11] If this is to be asserted, we
must put four dots after the assertion-sign, thus:
(This proposition is proved in the body of the work; it is *2·75.) If
we wish to assert (what is equivalent to the above) the proposition:
"if either
or
is true, and either
or '
implies
' is true, then either
or
is true," we write
Here the first pair of dots indicates a logical product, while the
second pair does not. Thus the scope of the second pair of dots passes
over the first pair, and back until we reach the three dots after the
assertion-sign.
Other uses of dots follow the same principles, and will be explained as they are introduced. In reading a proposition, the dots should be noticed first, as they show its structure. In a proposition containing several signs of implication or equivalence, the one with the greatest number of dots before or after it is the principal one: everything that goes before this one is stated by the proposition to imply or be equivalent to everything that comes after it.
Definitions. A definition is a declaration that a certain newly-introduced symbol or combination of symbols is to mean the same as a certain other combination of symbols of which the meaning is already known. Or, if the defining combination of symbols is one which only acquires meaning when combined in a suitable manner with other symbols[4], what is meant is that any combination of symbols in which the newly-defined symbol or combination of symbols occurs is to have that meaning (if any) which results from substituting the defining combination of symbols for the newly-defined symbol or combination of symbols wherever the latter occurs. We will give the names of definiendum and definiens respectively to what is defined and to that which it is defined as meaning. We express a definition by putting the definiendum to the left and the definiens to the right, with the sign "=" between, and the letters "Df" to the right of the definiens. It is to be understood that the sign "=" and the letters "Df" are to be regarded as together forming one symbol. The sign "=" without the letters "Df" will have a different meaning, to be explained shortly.
An example of a definition is
It is to be observed that a definition is, strictly speaking, no part of the subject in which it occurs. For a definition is concerned wholly with the symbols, not with what they symbolise. Moreover it is not true or false, being the expression of a volition, not of a proposition. (For this reason,[Pg 12] definitions are not preceded by the assertion-sign.) Theoretically, it is unnecessary ever to give a definition: we might always use the definiens instead, and thus wholly dispense with the definiendum. Thus although we employ definitions and do not define "definition," yet "definition" does not appear among our primitive ideas, because the definitions are no part of our subject, but are, strictly speaking, mere typographical conveniences. Practically, of course, if we introduced no definitions, our formulae would very soon become so lengthy as to be unmanageable; but theoretically, all definitions are superfluous.
In spite of the fact that definitions are theoretically superfluous, it is nevertheless true that they often convey more important information than is contained in the propositions in which they are used. This arises from two causes. First, a definition usually implies that the definiens is worthy of careful consideration. Hence the collection of definitions embodies our choice of subjects and our judgment as to what is most important. Secondly, when what is defined is (as often occurs) something already familiar, such as cardinal or ordinal numbers, the definition contains an analysis of a common idea, and may therefore express a notable advance. Cantor's definition of the continuum illustrates this: his definition amounts to the statement that what he is defining is the object which has the properties commonly associated with the word "continuum," though what precisely constitutes these properties had not before been known. In such cases, a definition is a "making definite": it gives definiteness to an idea which had previously been more or less vague.
For these reasons, it will be found, in what follows, that the definitions are what is most important, and what most deserves the reader's prolonged attention.
Some important remarks must be made respecting the variables occurring in the definiens and the definiendum. But these will be deferred till the notion of an "apparent variable" has been introduced, when the subject can be considered as a whole.
Summary of preceding statements. There are, in the above,
three primitive ideas which are not "defined" but only descriptively
explained. Their primitiveness is only relative to our exposition
of logical connection and is not absolute; though of course such an
exposition gains in importance according to the simplicity of its
primitive ideas. These ideas are symbolised by "" and "
," and by "
" prefixed to a proposition.
Three definitions have been introduced:
[Pg 13]
Primitive propositions. Some propositions must be assumed
without proof, since all inference proceeds from propositions
previously asserted. These, as far as they concern the functions
of propositions mentioned above, will be found stated in *1, where
the formal and continuous exposition of the subject commences. Such
propositions will be called "primitive propositions." These, like the
primitive ideas, are to some extent a matter of arbitrary choice;
though, as in the previous case, a logical system grows in importance
according as the primitive propositions are few and simple. It will be
found that owing to the weakness of the imagination in dealing with
simple abstract ideas no very great stress can be laid upon their
obviousness. They are obvious to the instructed mind, but then so are
many propositions which cannot be quite true, as being disproved by
their contradictory consequences. The proof of a logical system is
its adequacy and its coherence. That is: (1) the system must embrace
among its deductions all those propositions which we believe to be
true and capable of deduction from logical premisses alone, though
possibly they may require some slight limitation in the form of an
increased stringency of enunciation; and (2) the system must lead to no
contradictions, namely in pursuing our inferences we must never be led
to assert both and not-
, i.e. both "
" and "
" cannot legitimately appear.
The following are the primitive propositions employed in the calculus of propositions. The letters "Pp" stand for "primitive proposition."
(1) Anything implied by a true premiss is true Pp.
This is the rule which justifies inference.
(2) ,
i.e. if or
is true, then
is true.
(3) ,
i.e. if is true, then
or
is true.
(4) ,
i.e. if or
is true, then
or
is true.
(5) ,
i.e. if either is true or "
or
" is true, then
either
is true or "
or
" is true.
(6) ,
i.e. if implies
, then "
or
" implies
"
or
."
(7) Besides the above primitive propositions, we require a primitive
proposition called "the axiom of identification of real variables."
When we have separately asserted two different functions of ,
where
is undetermined, it is often important to know whether
we can identify the
in one[Pg 14] assertion with the
in the
other. This will be the case—so our axiom allow us to infer—if both
assertions present x as the argument to some one function, that is
to say, if
is a constituent in both assertions (whatever
propositional function
may be), or, more generally, if
is a constituent in one assertion, and
is a constituent in the other. This axiom introduces notions which
have not yet been explained; for a fuller account, see the remarks
accompanying *3·03, *1·7, *1·71, and *1·72 (which is the statement of
this axiom) in the body of the work, as well as the explanation of
propositional functions and ambiguous assertion to be given shortly.
Some simple propositions. In addition to the primitive propositions we have already mentioned, the following are among the most important of the elementary properties of propositions appearing among the deductions.
The law of excluded middle:
This is *2·11 below. We shall indicate in brackets the numbers given to
the following propositions in the body of the work.
The law of contradiction (*3·24):
The law of double negation (*4·13):
The principle of transposition, i.e. "if implies
, then not-
implies not-
," and vice versa: this
principle has various forms, namely
as well as others which are variants of these.
The law of tautology, in the two forms:
i.e. "
is true" is equivalent to "
is true and
is true," as well as to "
is true or
is true." From a formal
point of view, it is through the law of tautology and its consequences
that the algebra of logic is chiefly distinguished from ordinary
algebra.
The law of absorption :
i.e. "
implies
" is equivalent to "
is equivalent
to
." This is called the law of absorption because it shows
that the factor
in the product is[Pg 15] absorbed by the factor
, if
implies
. This principle enables us to replace
an implication (
) by an equivalence (
whenever it is convenient to do so.
An analogous and very important principle is the following:
Logical addition and multiplication of propositions obey the
associative and commutative laws, and the distributive law in two
forms, namely
The second of these distinguishes the relations of logical addition and
multiplication from those of arithmetical addition and multiplication.
Propositional functions. Let be a statement
containing a variable
and such that it becomes a proposition
when
is given any fixed determined meaning. Then
is
called a "propositional function"; it is not a proposition, since owing
to the ambiguity of
it really makes no assertion at all. Thus
"
is hurt" really makes no assertion at all, till we have settled
who
is. Yet owing to the individuality retained by the ambiguous
variable
, it is an ambiguous example from the collection of
propositions arrived at by giving all possible determinations to
in "
is hurt" which yield a proposition, true or false. Also if
"
is hurt" and "
is hurt" occur in the same context,
where
is another variable, then according to the determinations
given to
and
, they can be settled to be (possibly) the same
proposition or (possibly) different propositions. But apart from some
determination given to
and
, they retain in that context
their ambiguous differentiation. Thus "
is hurt" is an ambiguous
"value" of a propositional function. When we wish to speak of the
propositional function corresponding to "
is hurt," we shall write
"
is hurt." Thus "
is hurt" is the propositional
function and "
is hurt" is an ambiguous value of that function.
Accordingly though "
is hurt" and "
is hurt" occurring
in the same context can be distinguished, "
is hurt"
and "
is hurt" convey no distinction of meaning at all.
More generally,
is an ambiguous value of the propositional
function
, and when a definite signification
is substituted for
,
is an unambiguous value of
.
Propositional functions are the fundamental kind from which the more
usual kinds of function, such as "" or "
" or
"the father of
," are derived. These derivative functions are
considered later, and are called "descriptive functions." The functions
of propositions considered above are a particular case of propositional
functions.
The range of values and total variation. Thus corresponding
to any propositional function , there is a range, or
collection, of values, consisting of all the propositions (true or
false) which can be obtained by giving[Pg 16] every possible determination to
in
. A value of
for which
is true
will be said to "satisfy"
. Now in respect to the truth
or falsehood of propositions of this range three important cases must
be noted and symbolised. These cases are given by three propositions
of which one at least must be true. Either (1) all propositions of the
range are true, or (2) some propositions of the range are true, or (3)
no proposition of the range is true. The statement (1) is symbolised
by "
," and (2) is symbolised by "
." No definition is given of these two symbols,
which accordingly embody two new primitive ideas in our system. The
symbol "
" may be read "
always," or
"
is always true," or "
is true for all possible
values of
." The symbol "
" may be
read "there exists an
for which
is true," or "there
exists an
satisfying
," and thus conforms to the
natural form of the expression of thought.
Proposition (3) can be expressed in terms of the fundamental ideas now
on hand. In order to do this, note that "" stands for
the contradictory of
. Accordingly
is
another propositional function such that each value of
contradicts a value of
and vice versa. Hence
"
" symbolises the proposition that every
value of
is untrue. This is number (3) as stated above.
It is an obvious error, though one easy to commit, to assume that
cases (1) and (3) are each other's contradictories. The symbolism
exposes this fallacy at once, for (1) is , and
(3) is
, while the contradictory of (1) is
. For the sake of brevity of symbolism
a definition is made, namely
Definitions of which the object is to gain some trivial advantage in brevity by a slight adjustment of symbols will be said to be of "merely symbolic import," in contradistinction to those definitions which invite consideration of an important idea.
The proposition is called the "total variation"
of the function
.
For reasons which will be explained in Chapter II, we do not take
negation as a primitive idea when propositions of the forms
and
are concerned, but
we define the negation of
, i.e.
of "
is always true," as being "
is sometimes
false," i.e. "
," and
similarly we define the negation of
as being
. Thus we put
In like manner we define a disjunction in which one of the propositions
is of the form "" or "(
"
in terms of a disjunction of propositions not of this form, putting
[Pg 17]
i.e. "either
is always true, or
is true" is to
mean "'
or
' is always true," with similar definitions
in other cases. This subject is resumed in Chapter II, and in *9 in the
body of the work.
Apparent variables. The symbol "(" denotes one
definite proposition, and there is no distinction in meaning between
"(
" and "
" when they occur in the same
context. Thus the "
" in "
" is not an ambiguous
constituent of any expression in which "(
" occurs; and
such an expression does not cease to convey a determinate meaning by
reason of the ambiguity of the x in the "
." The symbol "(
"
has some analogy to the symbol
for definite integration, since in neither case is the expression a
function of
.
The range of in "(
" or "(
"
extends over the complete field of the values of
for
which "
" has meaning, and accordingly the meaning of "(
"
or "(
" involves the supposition
that such a field is determinate. The
which occurs in "(
"
or "(
" is called (following Peano)
an "apparent variable." It follows from the meaning of "(
"
that the
in this expression is also an apparent
variable. A proposition in which
occurs as an apparent variable
is not a function of
. Thus e.g. "(
" will
mean "everything is equal to itself." This is an absolute constant,
not a function of a variable
. This is why the
is called an
apparent variable in such cases.
Besides the "range" of in "(
" or
"(
," which is the field of the values that
may have, we shall speak of the "scope" of
, meaning
the function of which all values or some value are being affirmed. If
we are asserting all values (or some value) of "
," "
"
is the scope of
; if we are asserting all values (or some
value) of "
," "
" is the scope
of
; if we are asserting all values (or some value) of "
,"
"
" will be the scope of
, and so on. The
scope of
is indicated by the number of dots after the "(
)"
or "
"; that is to say, the scope extends forwards until we
reach an equal number of dots not indicating a logical product, or a
greater number indicating a logical product, or the end of the asserted
proposition in which the "(
)" or "
" occurs, whichever
of these happens first[5]. Thus e.g.
will mean "
always implies
," but
will mean "if
is always true, then
is true for
the argument
."
Note that in the proposition
[Pg 18]
the two
's have no connection with each other. Since only one dot
follows the
in brackets, the scope of the first
is limited
to the "
" immediately following the
in brackets. It
usually conduces to clearness to write
since the use of different letters emphasises the absence of connection
between the two variables; but there is no logical necessity to use
different letters, and it is sometimes convenient to use the
same letter.
Ambiguous assertion and the real variable. Any value
"" of the function
can be asserted. Such an
assertion of an ambiguous member of the values of
is
symbolised by
Ambiguous assertion of this kind is a primitive idea, which cannot
be defined in terms of the assertion of propositions. This primitive
idea is the one which embodies the use of the variable. Apart from
ambiguous assertion, the consideration of "," which is an
ambiguous member of the values of
, would be of little
consequence. When we are considering or asserting "
," the
variable
is called a "real variable." Take, for example, the law
of excluded middle in the form which it has in traditional formal logic:
Here
and
are real variables: as they vary, different
propositions are expressed, though all of them are true. While
and
are undetermined, as in the above enunciation, no one
definite proposition is asserted, but what is asserted is any
value of the propositional function in question. This can only be
legitimately asserted if, whatever value may be chosen, that value is
true, i.e. if all the values are true. Thus the above form of
the law of excluded middle is equivalent to
i.e. to "it is always true that
is either
or not
." But these two, though equivalent, are not identical, and we
shall find it necessary to keep them distinguished.
When we assert something containing a real variable, as in e.g.
we are asserting any value of a propositional function. When we
assert something containing an apparent variable, as in
we are asserting, in the first case all values, in the second
case some value (undetermined), of the propositional function in
question. It is plain that[Pg 19] we can only legitimately assert "any
value" if all values are true; for otherwise, since the value of
the variable remains to be determined, it might be so determined as to
give a false proposition. Thus in the above instance, since we have
And generally, given an assertion containing a real variable
, we
may transform the real variable into an apparent one by placing the
in brackets at the beginning, followed by as many dots as there
are after the assertion-sign.
When we assert something containing a real variable, we cannot strictly
be said to be asserting a proposition, for we only obtain a
definite proposition by assigning a value to the variable, and then our
assertion only applies to one definite case, so that it has not at all
the same force as before. When what we assert contains a real variable,
we are asserting a wholly undetermined one of all the propositions
that result from giving various values to the variable. It will be
convenient to speak of such assertions as asserting a propositional
function. The ordinary formulae of mathematics contain such
assertions; for example
does not assert this or that particular case of the formula, nor does
it assert that the formula holds for all possible values of
, though it is equivalent to this latter assertion; it simply
asserts that the formula holds, leaving
wholly undetermined;
and it is able to do this legitimately, because, however
may be
determined, a true proposition results.
Although an assertion containing a real variable does not, in strictness, assert a proposition, yet it will be spoken of as asserting a proposition except when the nature of the ambiguous assertion involved is under discussion.
Definition and real variables. When the definiens contains one or more real variables, the definiendum must also contain them. For in this case we have a function of the real variables, and the definiendum must have the same meaning as the definiens for all values of these variables, which requires that the symbol which is the definiendum should contain the letters representing the real variables. This rule is not always observed by mathematicians, and its infringement has sometimes caused important confusions of thought, notably in geometry and the philosophy of space.
In the definitions given above of "" and "
"
and "
,"
and
are real variables, and
therefore appear on both sides of the definition. In the definition
of "
" only the function considered,
namely
, is a real variable; thus so far as concerns the
rule in question,
need not appear on the left. But when a real
variable is a function, it is necessary to indicate[Pg 20] how the argument
is to be supplied, and therefore there are objections to omitting an
apparent variable where (as in the case before us) this is the argument
to the function which is the real variable. This appears more plainly
if, instead of a general function
, we take some
particular function, say "
," and consider the definition
of
. Our definition gives
But if we had adopted a notation in which the ambiguous value "
,"
containing the apparent variable
, did not occur in
the definiendum, we should have had to construct a notation
employing the function itself, namely "
." This does not
involve an apparent variable, but would be clumsy in practice. In fact
we have found it convenient and possible—except in the explanatory
portions—to keep the explicit use of symbols of the type "
,"
either as constants [e.g.
] or as real variables,
almost entirely out of this work.
Propositions connecting real and apparent variables. The most important propositions connecting real and apparent variables are the following:
(1) "When a propositional function can be asserted, so can the proposition that all values of the function are true." More briefly, if less exactly, "what holds of any, however chosen, holds of all." This translates itself into the rule that when a real variable occurs in an assertion, we may turn it into an apparent variable by putting the letter representing it in brackets immediately after the assertion-sign.
(2) "What holds of all, holds of any," i.e.
This states "if
is always true, then
is true."
(3) "If is true, then
is sometimes true,"
i.e.
An asserted proposition of the form "
" expresses
an "existence-theorem," namely "there exists an
for which
is true." The above proposition gives what is in practice
the only way of proving existence-theorems: we always have to find
some particular
for which
holds, and thence to infer
"
." If we were to assume what is called the
multiplicative axiom, or the equivalent axiom enunciated by Zermelo,
that would, in an important class of cases, give an existence-theorem
where no particular instance of its truth can be found.
In virtue of "" and
"
," we have
"
,"
i.e. "what is always true is sometimes true." This would not
be the case if nothing existed; thus our assumptions contain the
assumption that there is something. This is involved in the principle[Pg 21]
that what holds of all, holds of any; for this would not be true if
there were no "any."
(4) "If is always true, and
is always true, then
'
' is always true," i.e.
(This requires that
and
should be functions which
take arguments of the same type. We shall explain this requirement at a
later stage.) The converse also holds; i.e. we have
It is to some extent optional which of the propositions connecting
real and apparent variables are taken as primitive propositions. The
primitive propositions assumed, on this subject, in the body of the
work (*9), are the following:
i.e. if either
is true, or
is true, then
(
is true. (On the necessity for this primitive
proposition, see remarks on *9·11 in the body of the work.)
(3) If we can assert , where y is a real variable, then we
can assert
; i.e. what holds of any, however
chosen, holds of all.
[Pg 22]
Formal implication and formal equivalence. When an implication,
say , is said to hold always, i.e.
when
, we shall say that
formally implies
; and propositions of the
form "
" will be said to state
formal implications. In the usual instances of implication,
such as "'Socrates is a man' implies 'Socrates is mortal,'" we have
a proposition of the form "
" in a case
in which "
" is true. In such
a case, we feel the implication as a particular case of a formal
implication. Thus it has come about that implications which are not
particular cases of formal implications have not been regarded as
implications at all. There is also a practical ground for the neglect
of such implications, for, speaking generally, they can only be
known when it is already known either that their hypothesis is
false or that their conclusion is true; and in neither of these cases
do they serve to make us know the conclusion, since in the first case
the conclusion need not be true, and in the second it is known already.
Thus such implications do not serve the purpose for which implications
are chiefly useful, namely that of making us know, by deduction,
conclusions of which we were previously ignorant. Formal
implications, on the contrary, do serve this purpose, owing to the
psychological fact that we often know "
"
and
, in cases where
(which follows from
these premisses) cannot easily be known directly.
These reasons, though they do not warrant the complete neglect of
implications that are not instances of formal implications, are reasons
which make formal implication very important. A formal implication
states that, for all possible values of , if the hypothesis
is true, the conclusion
is true. Since "
"
will always be true when
is false, it is only the values of
that make
true that are important in a formal
implication; what is effectively stated is that, for all these values,
is true. Thus propositions of the form "all
is
," "no
is
" state formal implications,
since the first (as appears by what has just been said) states
while the second states
And any formal implication "(
"
may be interpreted as: "All values of
which satisfy[6]
satisfy
," while the formal implication "(
"
may be interpreted as: "No values of
which satisfy
satisfy
."
We have similarly for "some is
" the formula
and for "some
is not
" the formula
Two functions ,
are called formally
equivalent when each always implies the other, i.e. when
and a proposition of this form is called a formal equivalence.
In virtue of what was said about truth-values, if
and
are formally equivalent, either may replace the other in
any truth-function. Hence for all the purposes of mathematics or of
the present work,
may replace
or
vice versa in any proposition with which we shall be concerned. Now
to say that
and
are formally equivalent is the
same thing as to say that
and
have
the same extension, i.e. that any value of
which
satisfies either satisfies the other. Thus whenever a constant function
occurs in our work, the truth-value of the proposition in which it
occurs depends only upon the extension of the function. A proposition
containing a function
and having this property
(i.e. that its truth-value depends only upon the extension of
will be called an extensional function of
. Thus the functions of functions with which we shall
be specially concerned will all be extensional functions of functions.
What has just been said explains the connection (noted above) between the fact that the functions of propositions with which mathematics is specially[Pg 23] concerned are all truth-functions and the fact that mathematics is concerned with extensions rather than intensions.
Convenient abbreviation. The following definitions give
alternative and often more convenient notations:
This notation "
" is due to Peano, who,
however, has no notation for the general idea "
." It
may be noticed as an exercise in the use of dots as brackets that we
might have written
In practice however, when
and
are
special functions, it is not possible to employ fewer dots than in the
first form, and often more are required.
The following definitions give abbreviated notations for functions of
two or more variables:
and so on for any number of variables;
and so on for any number of variables.
Identity. The propositional function " is identical with
" is expressed by
This will be defined (cf. *13·01), but, owing to certain difficult
points involved in the definition, we shall here omit it (cf. Chapter II). We have, of course,
The first of these expresses the reflexive property of identity:
a relation is called reflexive when it holds between a term
and itself, either universally, or whenever it holds between that
term and some term. The second of the above propositions expresses
that identity is a symmetrical relation: a relation is called
symmetrical if, whenever it holds between
and
, it
also holds between
and
. The third proposition expresses
that identity is a transitive relation: a relation is called
transitive if, whenever it holds between
and
and
between
and
, it holds also between
and
.
We shall find that no new definition of the sign of equality is required in mathematics: all mathematical equations in which the sign of equality is[Pg 24] used in the ordinary way express some identity, and thus use the sign of equality in the above sense.
If and
are identical, either can replace the other in any
proposition without altering the truth-value of the proposition; thus
we have
This is a fundamental property of identity, from which the remaining
properties mostly follow.
It might be thought that identity would not have much importance,
since it can only hold between and
if
and
are different symbols for the same object. This view, however, does
not apply to what we shall call "descriptive phrases," i.e.
"the so-and-so." It is in regard to such phrases that identity is
important, as we shall shortly explain. A proposition such as "Scott
was the author of Waverley" expresses an identity in which there is a
descriptive phrase (namely "the author of Waverley"); this illustrates
how, in such cases, the assertion of identity may be important. It is
essentially the same case when the newspapers say "the identity of the
criminal has not transpired." In such a case, the criminal is known by
a descriptive phrase, namely "the man who did the deed," and we wish
to find an
of whom it is true that "
= the man who did the
deed." When such an
has been found, the identity of the criminal
has transpired.
Classes and relations. A class (which is the same as a
manifold or aggregate) is all the objects satisfying
some propositional function. If is the class composed of
the objects satisfying
, we shall say that
is the class determined by
. Every propositional
function thus determines a class, though if the propositional
function is one which is always false, the class will be null,
i.e. will have no members. The class determined by the function
will be represented by
[7]. Thus
for example if
is an equation,
will
be the class of its roots; if
is "
has two legs and
no feathers,"
will be the class of men; if
is "
,"
will be the
class of proper fractions, and so on.
It is obvious that the same class of objects will have many determining functions. When it is not necessary to specify a determining function of a class, the class may be conveniently represented by a single Greek letter. Thus Greek letters, other than those to which some constant meaning is assigned, will be exclusively used for classes.
There are two kinds of difficulties which arise in formal logic; one
kind arises in connection with classes and relations and the other in
connection with descriptive functions. The point of the difficulty for
classes and relations, so far as it concerns classes, is that a class
cannot be an object suitable as an argument to any of its determining
functions. If represents[Pg 25] a class and
one
of its determining functions [so that
],
it is not sufficient that
be a false proposition, it
must be nonsense. Thus a certain classification of what appear to be
objects into things of essentially different types seems to be rendered
necessary. This whole question is discussed in Chapter II, on the
theory of types, and the formal treatment in the systematic exposition,
which forms the main body of this work, is guided by this discussion.
The part of the systematic exposition which is specially concerned with
the theory of classes is *20, and in this Introduction it is discussed
in Chapter III. It is sufficient to note here that, in the complete
treatment of *20, we have avoided the decision as to whether a class of
things has in any sense an existence as one object. A decision of this
question in either way is indifferent to our logic, though perhaps, if
we had regarded some solution which held classes and relations to be
in some real sense objects as both true and likely to be universally
received, we might have simplified one or two definitions and a few
preliminary propositions. Our symbols, such as "
"
and
and others, which represent classes and relations, are
merely defined in their use, just as
, standing for
has no meaning apart from a suitable function of
,
,
on which to operate. The result of our definitions is that the way in
which we use classes corresponds in general to their use in ordinary
thought and speech; and whatever may be the ultimate interpretation
of the one is also the interpretation of the other. Thus in fact our
classification of types in Chapter II really performs the single,
though essential, service of justifying us in refraining from entering
on trains of reasoning which lead to contradictory conclusions. The
justification is that what seem to be propositions are really nonsense.
The definitions which occur in the theory of classes, by which the idea of a class (at least in use) is based on the other ideas assumed as primitive, cannot be understood without a fuller discussion than can be given now (cf. Chapter II of this Introduction and also *20). Accordingly, in this preliminary survey, we proceed to state the more important simple propositions which result from those definitions, leaving the reader to employ in his mind the ordinary unanalysed idea of a class of things. Our symbols in their usage conform to the ordinary usage of this idea in language. It is to be noticed that in the systematic exposition our treatment of classes and relations requires no new primitive ideas and only two new primitive propositions, namely the two forms of the "Axiom of Reducibility" (cf. next Chapter) for one and two variables respectively.
The propositional function " is a member of the class
"
will be expressed, following Peano, by the notation
[Pg 26]
Here
is chosen as the initial of the word ἐστί. "
"
may be read "
is an
." Thus "
"
will mean "
is a man," and so on. For typographical convenience we
shall put
For "class" we shall write "Cls"; thus ""
means "
is a class."
We have
i.e. "'
is a member of the class determined by
' is equivalent to '
satisfies
,' or
to '
is true.'"
A class is wholly determinate when its membership is known, that is,
there cannot be two different classes having the same membership.
Thus if ,
are formally equivalent functions,
they determine the same class; for in that case, if
is a member
of the class determined by
, and therefore satisfies
, it also satisfies
, and is therefore a member
of the class determined by
. Thus we have
The following propositions are obvious and important:
i.e.
is identical with the class determined by
when, and only when,
"
is an
" is formally equivalent to
;
i.e. two classes
and
are identical when,
and only when, they have the same membership;
i.e. the class whose determining function is "
is an
" is
, in other words,
is the class of
objects which are members of
;
i.e. the class determined by the function
is a
class.
It will be seen that, according to the above, any function of one
variable can be replaced by an equivalent function of the form "." Hence any extensional function of functions which holds
when its argument is a function of the form "
,"
whatever possible value
may have, will hold also when its
argument is any function
. Thus variation of classes can
replace variation of functions of one variable in all the propositions
of the sort with which we are concerned.
In an exactly analogous manner we introduce dual or dyadic relations, i.e. relations between two terms. Such relations will be called simply "relations"; relations between more than two terms will be distinguished[Pg 27] as multiple relations, or (when the number of their terms is specified) as triple, quadruple, ... relations, or as triadic, tetradic, ... relations. Such relations will not concern us until we come to Geometry. For the present, the only relations we are concerned with are dual relations.
Relations, like classes, are to be taken in extension,
i.e. if and
are relations which hold between the
same pairs of terms,
and
are to be identical. We may regard
a relation, in the sense in which it is required for our purposes, as
a class of couples; i.e. the couple (
is to be one
of the class of couples constituting the relation
if
has
the relation
to
[8]. This view of relations as classes of
couples will not, however, be introduced into our symbolic treatment,
and is only mentioned in order to show that it is possible so to
understand the meaning of the word relation that a relation shall be
determined by its extension.
Any function determines a relation
between
and
. If we regard a relation as a class of couples, the relation
determined by
is the class of couples
for
which
is true. The relation determined by the function
will be denoted by
We shall use a capital letter for a relation when it is not necessary
to specify the determining function. Thus whenever a capital letter
occurs, it is to be understood that it stands for a relation.
The propositional function " has the relation
to
" will
be expressed by the notation
This notation is designed to keep as near as possible to common
language, which, when it has to express a relation, generally mentions
it between its terms, as in "
loves
," "
equals
,"
"
is greater than
," and so on. For "relation" we shall write
"Rel" thus "
" means "
is a relation."
Owing to our taking relations in extension, we shall have
i.e. two functions of two variables determine the same relation
when, and only when, the two functions are formally equivalent.
i.e. "
has to
the relation determined by the function
" is equivalent to
;
[Pg 28]
These propositions are analogous to those previously given for classes.
It results from them that any function of two variables is formally
equivalent to some function of the form ; hence, in extensional
functions of two variables, variation of relations can replace
variation of functions of two variables.
Both classes and relations have properties analogous to most of those
of propositions that result from negation and the logical sum. The
logical product of two classes and
is their
common part, i.e. the class of terms which are members of both.
This is represented by
. Thus we put
This gives us
i.e. "
is a member of the logical product of
and
" is equivalent to the logical product of "
is a member
of
" and "
is a member of
."
Similarly the logical sum of two classes and
is the class of terms which are members of either; we denote
it by
. The definition is
and the connection with the logical sum of propositions is given by
The negation of a class consists of those terms
for which "
" can be significantly and truly
denied. We shall find that there are terms of other types for which
"
" is neither true nor false, but nonsense. These terms
are not members of the negation of
.
Thus the negation of a class is the class of terms
of suitable type which are not members of it, i.e. the class
. We call this class "
"
(read "not
"); thus the definition is
and the connection with the negation of propositions is given by
In place of implication we have the relation of inclusion.
A class is said to be included or contained in a class
if all members of
are members of
,
i.e. if
. We write
"
" for "
is contained in
."
Thus we put
Most of the formulae concerning ,
,
,
remain true if we substitute
,
, -
,
. In place
of equivalence, we substitute identity; for "
" was
defined as "
," but "
"
gives "
,"
whence
.
[Pg 29]
The following are some propositions concerning classes which are
analogues of propositions previously given concerning propositions:
i.e. the common part of
and
is the negation
of "not
or not
";
i.e., "
is a member of
or not
";
i.e. "
is not a member of both
and not
";
The two last are the two forms of the law of tautology.
The law of absorption holds in the form
Thus for example "all Cretans are liars" is equivalent to "Cretans are identical with lying Cretans."
Just as we have
so we have
This expresses the ordinary syllogism in Barbara (with the premisses
interchanged); for "" means the same as
"all
's are
's," so that the above proposition
states: "If all
's are
's, and all
's are
's, then all
's are
's." (It should be
observed that syllogisms are traditionally expressed with "therefore,"
as if they asserted both premisses and conclusion. This is, of course,
merely a slipshod way of speaking, since what is really asserted is
only the connection of premisses with conclusion.)
The syllogism in Barbara when the minor premiss has an individual
subject is
e.g. "if Socrates is a man, and all men are mortals, then
Socrates is a mortal." This, as was pointed out by Peano, is not a
particular case of "
,"
since "
" is not a particular case of "
."
This point is important, since traditional logic is here mistaken. The
nature and magnitude of its mistake will become clearer at a later
stage.
For relations, we have precisely analogous definitions and propositions.
We put
[Pg 30]
Generally, when we require analogous but different symbols for relations and for classes, we shall choose for relations the symbol obtained by adding a dot, in some convenient position, to the corresponding symbol for classes. (The dot must not be put on the line, since that would cause confusion with the use of dots as brackets.) But such symbols require and receive a special definition in each case.
A class is said to exist when it has at least one member:
" exists" is denoted by "
" Thus we put
The class which has no members is called the "null-class," and is
denoted by "
." Any propositional function which is always
false determines the null-class. One such function is known to us
already, namely "
is not identical with
," which we denote by
"
." Thus we may use this function for defining
,
and put
The class determined by a function which is always true is called the
universal class, and is represented by ; thus
Thus is the negation of
. We have
i.e. "'
is a member of
' is always true"; and
i.e. "'
is a member of
' is always false." Also
i.e. "
is the null-class" is equivalent to "
does not exist."
For relations we use similar notations. We put
i.e. "
" means that there is at least
one couple
,
between which the relation
holds.
will be the relation which never holds, and
the relation which always holds.
is
practically never required;
will be the relation
. We have
[Pg 31]
There are no classes which contain objects of more than one type. Accordingly there is a universal class and a null-class proper to each type of object. But these symbols need not be distinguished, since it will be found that there is no possibility of confusion. Similar remarks apply to relations.
Descriptions. By a "description" we mean a phrase of the form
"the so-and-so" or of some equivalent form. For the present,
we confine our attention to the in the singular. We shall use
this word strictly, so as to imply uniqueness; e.g. we should
not say " is the son of
" if
had other sons
besides
. Thus a description of the form "the so-and-so" will
only have an application in the event of there being one so-and-so
and no more. Hence a description requires some propositional function
which is satisfied by one value of
and by no
other values; then "the
which satisfies
" is a
description which definitely describes a certain object, though we
may not know what object it describes. For example, if
is a
man, "
is the father of
" must be true for one, and only
one, value of
. Hence "the father of
" is a description of
a certain man, though we may not know what man it describes. A
phrase containing "the" always presupposes some initial propositional
function not containing "the"; thus instead of "
is the father of
" we ought to take as our initial function "
begot
";
then "the father of
" means the one value of
which satisfies
this propositional function.
If is a propositional function, the symbol
"
" is used in our symbolism in such a way that it
can always be read as "the
which satisfies
."
But we do not define "
" as standing for "the
which satisfies
," thus treating this last phrase as
embodying a primitive idea. Every use of "
," where
it apparently occurs as a constituent of a proposition in the place
of an object, is defined in terms of the primitive ideas already on
hand. An example of this definition in use is given by the proposition
"
" which is considered immediately. The
whole subject is treated more fully in Chapter III.
[Pg 32]
The symbol should be compared and contrasted with ""
which in use can always be read as "the
's which satisfy
." Both symbols are incomplete symbols defined
only in use, and as such are discussed in Chapter III. The symbol
"
" always has an application, namely to the class
determined by
; but "
" only has an
application when
is only satisfied by one value of
, neither more nor less. It should also be observed that the
meaning given to the symbol by the definition, given immediately below,
of
does not presuppose that we know the
meaning of "one." This is also characteristic of the definition of any
other use of
.
We now proceed to define "" so that it can
be read "the
satisfying
exists." (It will be observed
that this is a different meaning of existence from that which we
express by "
"). Its definition is
i.e. "the
satisfying
exists" is to mean
"there is an object
such that
is true when
is
but not otherwise."
The following are equivalent forms:
The last of these states that "the satisfying
exists" is equivalent to "there is an object
satisfying
,
and every object other than
does not satisfy
."
The kind of existence just defined covers a great many cases. Thus for
example "the most perfect Being exists" will mean:
which, taking the last of the above equivalences, is equivalent to
A proposition such as "Apollo exists" is really of the same logical
form, although it does not explicitly contain the word the. For
"Apollo" means really "the object having such-and-such properties,"
say "the object having the properties enumerated in the Classical
Dictionary[9]." If these properties make up the propositional function
, then "Apollo" means "
," and "Apollo exists"
means "
." To take another illustration, "the
author of Waverley" means "the man who (or rather, the object which)
wrote Waverley." Thus "Scott is the author of Waverley" is
Here (as we observed before) the importance of identity in
connection with descriptions plainly appears.
The notation "," which is long and inconvenient, is
seldom used, being chiefly required to lead up to another notation,
namely "
" meaning "the object having the relation
to
." That is, we put
The inverted comma may be read "of." Thus "
" is read "the
of
." Thus if
is the relation of father to son, "
"
means "the father of
"; if
is the relation of son to father,
"
" means "the son of
," which will[Pg 33] only "exist" if
has one son and no more.
is a function of
, but not a
propositional function; we shall call it a descriptive function.
All the ordinary functions of mathematics are of this kind, as will
appear more fully in the sequel. Thus in our notation, "
"
would be written "
," and "sin" would stand for the relation
which
has to
. Instead of a variable descriptive
function
, we put
, where the variable relation
takes the place of the variable function
. A descriptive function
will in general exist while
belongs to a certain domain, but not
outside that domain; thus if we are dealing with positive rationals,
will be significant if
is a perfect square, but not
otherwise; if we are dealing with real numbers, and agree that "
"
is to mean the positive square root (or, is to mean the
negative square root),
will be significant provided
is positive, but not otherwise; and so on. Thus every descriptive
function has what we may call a "domain of definition" or a "domain of
existence," which may be thus defined: If the function in question is
, its domain of definition or of existence will be the class of
those arguments
for which we have
, i.e.
for which
, i.e. for which there is one
, and no more, having the relation
to
.
If is any relation, we will speak of
as the "associated
descriptive function." A great many of the constant relations which
we shall have occasion to introduce are only or chiefly important on
account of their associated descriptive functions. In such cases, it is
easier (though less correct) to begin by assigning the meaning of the
descriptive function, and to deduce the meaning of the relation from
that of the descriptive function. This will be done in the following
explanations of notation.
Various descriptive functions of relations. If is any
relation, the converse of
is the relation which holds
between
and
whenever
holds between
and
.
Thus greater is the converse of less, before
of after, cause of effect, husband of
wife, etc. The converse of
is written[10]
or
. The definition is
The second of these is not a formally correct definition, since we
ought to define "Cnv" and deduce the meaning of
. But
it is not worth while to adopt this plan in our present introductory
account, which aims at simplicity rather than formal correctness.
A relation is called symmetrical if ,
i.e. if it holds between
and
whenever it holds
between
and
(and therefore vice versa). Identity,[Pg 34]
diversity, agreement or disagreement in any respect, are symmetrical
relations. A relation is called asymmetrical when it is
incompatible with its converse, i.e. when
, or, what is equivalent,
Before and after, greater and less, ancestor and descendant, are
asymmetrical, as are all other relations of the sort that lead to
series. But there are many asymmetrical relations which do not
lead to series, for instance, that of wife's brother[11]. A relation
maybe neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical; for example, this holds of
the relation of inclusion between classes:
and
will both be true if
,
but otherwise only one of them, at most, will be true. The relation
brother is neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical, for if
is
the brother of
,
may be either the brother or the sister of
.
In the propositional function , we call
the referent and
the relatum. The class
, consisting of all the
's which have the relation
to
, is called the class of
referents of
with respect to
; the class
,
consisting of all the
's to which
has the relation
,
is called the class of relata of
with respect to
. These
two classes are denoted respectively by
and
. Thus
The arrow runs towards
in the first case, to show that we are
concerned with things having the relation
to
; it runs away
from
in the second case to show that the relation
goes
from
to the members of
. It runs in
fact from a referent and towards a relatum.
The notations ,
are
very important, and are used constantly. If
is the relation of
parent to child,
= the parents of
,
= the children of
. We have
These equivalences are often embodied in common language. For example,
we say indiscriminately "
is an inhabitant of London" or "
inhabits London." If we put "
" for "inhabits," "
inhabits
London" is "
London," while "
is an inhabitant of London" is
"
."
[Pg 35]
Instead of and
we
sometimes use
,
, where "
"
stands for "sagitta," and "
" is "
" backwards.
Thus we put
These notations are sometimes more convenient than an arrow when the
relation concerned is represented by a combination of letters, instead
of a single letter such as
. Thus e.g. we should write
, rather than put an arrow over the whole
length of (
).
The class of all terms that have the relation to something or
other is called the domain of
. Thus if
is the
relation of parent and child, the domain of
will be the class of
parents. We represent the domain of
by "
." Thus we
put
Similarly the class of all terms to which something or other has the
relation
is called the converse domain of
; it is the
same as the domain of the converse of
. The converse domain of
is represented by "
"; thus
The sum of the domain and the converse domain is called the field, and
is represented by
: thus
The field is chiefly important in connection with series. If
is the ordering relation of a series,
will be the class
of terms of the series,
will be all the terms except
the last (if any), and
will be all the terms except
the first (if any). The first term, if it exists, is the only member
of
, since it is the only term which
is a predecessor but not a follower. Similarly the last term (if any)
is the only member of
. The condition
that a series should have no end is
,
i.e. "every follower is a predecessor"; the condition for no
beginning is
. These conditions are
equivalent respectively to
and
.
The relative product of two relations and
is
the relation which holds between
and
when there is an
intermediate term
such that
has the relation
to
and
has the relation
to
. The relative product of
and
is represented by
; thus we put
Thus "paternal aunt" is the relative product of sister and
father; "paternal grandmother" is the relative product of
mother and father; "maternal[Pg 36] grandfather" is the
relative product of father and mother. The relative
product is not commutative, but it obeys the associative law,
i.e.
It also obeys the distributive law with regard to the logical addition
of relations, i.e. we have
But with regard to the logical product, we have only
The relative product does not obey the law of tautology, i.e. we
do not have in general . We put
Thus paternal grandfather = (
,
maternal grandmother = (.
A relation is called transitive when ,
i.e. when, if
and
, we always have
,
i.e. when
Relations which generate series are always transitive; thus e.g.
If
is a relation which generates a series,
may conveniently
be read "precedes"; thus "
"
becomes "if
precedes
and
precedes
, then
always precedes
." The class of relations which generate series
are partially characterized by the fact that they are transitive and
asymmetrical, and never relate a term to itself.
If is a relation which generates a series, and if we have not
merely
, but
, then
generates a
series which is compact (überall dicht), i.e. such
that there are terms between any two. For in this case we have
i.e. if
precedes
, there is a term
such that
precedes
and
precedes
, i.e. there is
a term between
and
. Thus among relations which generate
series, those which generate compact series are those for which
.
[Pg 37]
Many relations which do not generate series are transitive, for example, identity, or the relation of inclusion between classes. Such cases arise when the relations are not asymmetrical. Relations which are transitive and symmetrical are an important class: they may be regarded as consisting in the possession of some common property.
Plural descriptive functions. The class of terms which
have the relation
to some member of a class
is denoted by
or
. The definition is
Thus for example let
be the relation of inhabiting, and
the class of towns; then
= inhabitants of
towns. Let
be the relation "less than" among rationals, and
the class of those rationals which are of the form
, for integral values of
; then
will be
all rationals less than some member of
, i.e. all
rationals less than
. If
is the generating relation of a
series, and
is any class of members of
,
will be predecessors of
's, i.e. the segment defined
by
. If
is a relation such that
always exists
when
,
will be the class of all terms of
the form
for values of
which are members of
;
i.e.
Thus a member of the class "fathers of great men" will be the father
of
, where
is some great man. In other cases, this will
not hold; for instance, let
be the relation of a number to any
number of which it is a factor; then
,
but this class is not composed of terms of the form "the factor
of
," where
is an even number, because numbers do not have
only one factor apiece.
Unit classes. The class whose only member is might be
thought to be identical with
, but Peano and Frege have shown that
this is not the case. (The reasons why this is not the case will be
explained in a preliminary way in Chapter II of the Introduction.) We
denote by "
" the class whose only member is
: thus
i.e. "
" means "the class of objects which are
identical with
."
The class consisting of and
will be
; the class got by adding
to a class
will
be
; the class got by taking away
from a
class
will be
. (We write
as an abbreviation for
.)
It will be observed that unit classes have been defined without
reference to the number ; in fact, we use unit classes to define
the number
. This number is defined as the class of unit classes,
i.e.
This leads to
From this it appears further that
i.e. "
is a unit class" is equivalent to
"the
satisfying
exists."
[Pg 38]
If ,
is the only member
of
, for the only member of
is the only term to
which
has the relation
. Thus "
"
takes the place of "(
," if
stands for
. In practice, "
" is a more
convenient notation than "(
," and is generally used
instead of "(
."
The above account has explained most of the logical notation employed in the present work. In the applications to various parts of mathematics, other definitions are introduced; but the objects defined by these later definitions belong, for the most part, rather to mathematics than to logic. The reader who has mastered the symbols explained above will find that any later formulae can be deciphered by the help of comparatively few additional definitions.
[1] Cf. Chapter II of the Introduction.
[2] This phrase is due to Frege.
[3] The meaning of these expressions will be explained later, and examples of the use of dots in connection with them will be given on pp. 17, 18.
[4] This case will be fully considered in Chapter III of the Introduction. It need not further concern us at present.
[5] This agrees with the rules for the occurrences of dots of the type of Group II as explained above, pp. 9 and 10.
[6]
A value of is said to satisfy
or
when
is true for that value of
.
[7]
Any other letter may be used instead of .
[8]
Such a couple has a sense, i.e. the couple
is different from the couple
, unless
. We
shall call it a "couple with sense," to distinguish it from the class
consisting of
and
. It may also be called an ordered
couple.
[9] The same principle applies to many uses of the proper names of existent objects, e.g. to all uses of proper names for objects known to the speaker only by report, and not by personal acquaintance.
[10] The second of these notations is taken from Schröder's Algebra und Logik der Relative.
[11] This relation is not strictly asymmetrical, but is so except when the wife's brother is also the sister's husband. In the Greek Church the relation is strictly asymmetrical.
[Pg 39]
THE theory of logical types, to be explained in the present Chapter, recommended itself to us in the first instance by its ability to solve certain contradictions, of which the one best known to mathematicians is Burali-Forti's concerning the greatest ordinal. But the theory in question is not wholly dependent upon this indirect recommendation: it has also a certain consonance with common sense which makes it inherently credible. In what follows, we shall therefore first set forth the theory on its own account, and then apply it to the solution of the contradictions.
I. The Vicious-Circle Principle.
An analysis of the paradoxes to be avoided shows that they all result
from a certain kind of vicious circle[12]. The vicious circles in
question arise from supposing that a collection of objects may contain
members which can only be defined by means of the collection as a
whole. Thus, for example, the collection of propositions will be
supposed to contain a proposition stating that "all propositions are
either true or false." It would seem, however, that such a statement
could not be legitimate unless "all propositions" referred to some
already definite collection, which it cannot do if new propositions are
created by statements about "all propositions." We shall, therefore,
have to say that statements about "all propositions" are meaningless.
More generally, given any set of objects such that, if we suppose the
set to have a total, it will contain members which presuppose this
total, then such a set cannot have a total. By saying that a set has
"no total," we mean, primarily, that no significant statement can be
made about "all its members." Propositions, as the above illustration
shows, must be a set having no total. The same is true, as we shall
shortly see, of propositional functions, even when these are restricted
to such as can significantly have as argument a given object . In
such cases, it is necessary to break up our set into smaller sets, each
of which is capable of a total. This is what the theory of types aims
at effecting.
[Pg 40]
The principle which enables us to avoid illegitimate totalities may be stated as follows: "Whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection"; or, conversely: "If, provided a certain collection had a total, it would have members only definable in terms of that total, then the said collection has no total." We shall call this the "vicious-circle principle," because it enables us to avoid the vicious circles involved in the assumption of illegitimate totalities. Arguments which are condemned by the vicious-circle principle will be called "vicious-circle fallacies." Such arguments, in certain circumstances, may lead to contradictions, but it often happens that the conclusions to which they lead are in fact true, though the arguments are fallacious. Take, for example, the law of excluded middle, in the form "all propositions are true or false." If from this law we argue that, because the law of excluded middle is a proposition, therefore the law of excluded middle is true or false, we incur a vicious-circle fallacy. "All propositions" must be in some way limited before it becomes a legitimate totality, and any limitation which makes it legitimate must make any statement about the totality fall outside the totality. Similarly, the imaginary sceptic, who asserts that he knows nothing, and is refuted by being asked if he knows that he knows nothing, has asserted nonsense, and has been fallaciously refuted by an argument which involves a vicious-circle fallacy. In order that the sceptic's assertion may become significant, it is necessary to place some limitation upon the things of which he is asserting his ignorance, because the things of which it is possible to be ignorant form an illegitimate totality. But as soon as a suitable limitation has been placed by him upon the collection of propositions of which he is asserting his ignorance, the proposition that he is ignorant of every member of this collection must not itself be one of the collection. Hence any significant scepticism is not open to the above form of refutation.
The paradoxes of symbolic logic concern various sorts of objects: propositions, classes, cardinal and ordinal numbers, etc. All these sorts of objects, as we shall show, represent illegitimate totalities, and are therefore capable of giving rise to vicious-circle fallacies. But by means of the theory (to be explained in Chapter III) which reduces statements that are verbally concerned with classes and relations to statements that are concerned with propositional functions, the paradoxes are reduced to such as are concerned with propositions and propositional functions. The paradoxes that concern propositions are only indirectly relevant to mathematics, while those that more nearly concern the mathematician are all concerned with propositional functions. We shall therefore proceed at once to the consideration of propositional functions.
[Pg 41]
II. The Nature of Propositional Functions.
By a "propositional function" we mean something which contains a
variable , and expresses a proposition as soon as a value
is assigned to
. That is to say, it differs from a proposition
solely by the fact that it is ambiguous: it contains a variable of
which the value is unassigned. It agrees with the ordinary functions
of mathematics in the fact of containing an unassigned variable:
where it differs is in the fact that the values of the function are
propositions. Thus e.g. "
is a man" or "
"
is a propositional function. We shall find that it is possible to
incur a vicious-circle fallacy at the very outset, by admitting as
possible arguments to a propositional function terms which presuppose
the function. This form of the fallacy is very instructive, and its
avoidance leads, as we shall see, to the hierarchy of types.
The question as to the nature of a function[13] is by no means an easy
one. It would seem, however, that the essential characteristic of a
function is ambiguity. Take, for example, the law of identity
in the form " is
," which is the form in which it is usually
enunciated. It is plain that, regarded psychologically, we have here a
single judgment. But what are we to say of the object of the judgment?
We are not judging that Socrates is Socrates, nor that Plato is Plato,
nor any other of the definite judgments that are instances of the law
of identity. Yet each of these judgments is, in a sense, within the
scope of our judgment. We are in fact judging an ambiguous instance of
the propositional function "
is
." We appear to have a single
thought which does not have a definite object, but has as its object
an undetermined one of the values of the function "
is
." It
is this kind of ambiguity that constitutes the essence of a function.
When we speak of "
" where
is not specified, we mean one
value of the function, but not a definite one. We may express this by
saying that "
" ambiguously denotes
,
,
, etc., where
,
,
, etc.,
are the various values of "
."
When we say that "" ambiguously denotes
,
,
, etc., we mean that "
" means one of the
objects
,
,
, etc., though not a definite
one, but an undetermined one. It follows that "
" only has a
well-defined meaning (well-defined, that is to say, except in so far as
it is of its essence to be ambiguous) if the objects
,
,
, etc., are well-defined. That is to say, a function
is not a well-defined function unless all its values are already
well-defined. It follows from this that no function can have among
its values anything which presupposes the function, for if it had,
we could not regard the objects ambiguously denoted by the function
as definite until the function was definite, while conversely, as we
have just seen, the function cannot be[Pg 42] definite until its values are
definite. This is a particular case, but perhaps the most fundamental
case, of the vicious-circle principle. A function is what ambiguously
denotes some one of a certain totality, namely the values of the
function; hence this totality cannot contain any members which involve
the function, since, if it did, it would contain members involving the
totality, which, by the vicious-circle principle, no totality can do.
It will be seen that, according to the above account, the values
of a function are presupposed by the function, not vice versa. It
is sufficiently obvious, in any particular case, that a value of
a function does not presuppose the function. Thus for example the
proposition "Socrates is human" can be perfectly apprehended without
regarding it as a value of the function " is human." It is true
that, conversely, a function can be apprehended without its being
necessary to apprehend its values severally and individually. If this
were not the case, no function could be apprehended at all, since
the number of values (true and false) of a function is necessarily
infinite and there are necessarily possible arguments with which we are
unacquainted. What is necessary is not that the values should be given
individually and extensionally, but that the totality of the values
should be given intensionally, so that, concerning any assigned object,
it is at least theoretically determinate whether or not the said object
is a value of the function.
It is necessary practically to distinguish the function itself from
an undetermined value of the function. We may regard the function
itself as that which ambiguously denotes, while an undetermined
value of the function is that which is ambiguously denoted. If the
undetermined value is written "," we will write the function
itself "
." (Any other letter may be used in place of
.) Thus we should say "
is a proposition," but "
is a propositional function." When we say "
is
a proposition," we mean to state something which is true for every
possible value of
, though we do not decide what value
is
to have. We are making an ambiguous statement about any value of the
function. But when we say "
is a function," we are not
making an ambiguous statement. It would be more correct to say that
we are making a statement about an ambiguity, taking the view that a
function is an ambiguity. The function itself,
, is the
single thing which ambiguously denotes its many values; while
,
where
is not specified, is one of the denoted objects, with
the ambiguity belonging to the manner of denoting.
We have seen that, in accordance with the vicious-circle principle, the
values of a function cannot contain terms only definable in terms of
the function. Now given a function , the values for the
function[14] are all propositions[Pg 43] of the form
. It follows
that there must be no propositions, of the form
, in which
has a value which involves
. (If this were the
case, the values of the function would not all be determinate until
the function was determinate, whereas we found that the function is
not determinate unless its values are previously determinate.) Hence
there must be no such thing as the value for
with the
argument
, or with any argument which involves
.
That is to say, the symbol "
" must not express a
proposition, as "
" does if
is a value for
.
In fact "
" must be a symbol which does
not express anything: we may therefore say that it is not significant.
Thus given any function
, there are arguments with
which the function has no value, as well as arguments with which it has
a value. We will call the arguments with which
has a
value "possible values of
." We will say that
is
"significant with the argument
" when
has a value
with the argument
.
When it is said that e.g. "" is
meaningless, and therefore neither true nor false, it is necessary to
avoid a misunderstanding. If "
" were interpreted
as meaning "the value for
with the argument
is true," that would be not meaningless, but false. It is
false for the same reason for which "the King of France is bald"
is false, namely because there is no such thing as "the value for
with the argument
." But when, with
some argument
, we assert
, we are not meaning to assert
"the value for
with the argument
is true"; we are
meaning to assert the actual proposition which is the value for
with the argument
. Thus for example if
is "
is a man,"
(Socrates) will be "Socrates is a
man," not "the value for the function '
is a man,'
with the argument Socrates, is true." Thus in accordance with our
principle that "
" is meaningless, we cannot
legitimately deny "the function '
is a man' is a man,"
because this is nonsense, but we can legitimately deny "the value for
the function '
is a man' with the argument '
is a
man' is true," not on the ground that the value in question is false,
but on the ground that there is no such value for the function.
We will denote by the symbol "(" the proposition "
always[15]," i.e. the proposition which asserts all the
values for
. This proposition involves the function
, not merely an ambiguous value of the function. The
assertion of
, where
is unspecified, is a different
assertion from the one which asserts all values for
,
for the former is an ambiguous assertion, whereas the latter is in no
sense ambiguous. It will be observed that "(
" does not
assert "
with all values of
," because, as we have seen,
there must be values of
with which "
" is meaningless.
What is asserted by "(
" is all propositions which are
values for
; hence it is[Pg 44] only with such values of
as
make "
" significant, i.e. with all possible arguments,
that
is asserted when we assert "(
." Thus
a convenient way to read "(
" is "
is true
with all possible values of
." This is, however, a less accurate
reading than "
always," because the notion of truth is not
part of the content of what is judged. When we judge "all men are
mortal," we judge truly, but the notion of truth is not necessarily in
our minds, any more than it need be when we judge "Socrates is mortal."
III. Definition and Systematic Ambiguity of Truth and Falsehood.
Since "(" involves the function
, it
must, according to our principle, be impossible as an argument to
. That is to say, the symbol "
" must
be meaningless. This principle would seem, at first sight, to have
certain exceptions. Take, for example, the function "
is
false," and consider the proposition "(
is false." This
should be a proposition asserting all propositions of the form "
is false." Such a proposition, we should be inclined to say, must be
false, because "
is false" is not always true. Hence we should be
led to the proposition
i.e. we should be led to a proposition in which "(
is
false" is the argument to the function "
is false," which
we had declared to be impossible. Now it will be seen that "(
is false," in the above, purports to be a proposition about all
propositions, and that, by the general form of the vicious-circle
principle, there must be no propositions about all propositions.
Nevertheless, it seems plain that, given any function, there is a
proposition (true or false) asserting all its values. Hence we are led
to the conclusion that "
is false" and "
is false" must not
always be the values, with the arguments
and
, for a single
function "
is false." This, however, is only possible if
the word "false" really has many different meanings, appropriate to
propositions of different kinds.
That the words "true" and "false" have many different meanings,
according to the kind of proposition to which they are applied, is
not difficult to see. Let us take any function , and let
be one of its values. Let us call the sort of truth which is
applicable to
"first truth." (This is not to assume
that this would be first truth in another context: it is merely to
indicate that it is the first sort of truth in our context.) Consider
now the proposition (
. If this has truth of the sort
appropriate to it, that will mean that every value
has
"first truth." Thus if we call the sort of truth that is appropriate to
(
"second truth," we may define "
has second truth" as meaning "every value for
has first truth," i.e. "(
.(
has first truth)."
Similarly, if we denote by "(
" the proposition
"
sometimes," i.e. as we may less accurately
express it, "
with some value of
," we find that
(
has second truth if there is an
with[Pg 45]
which
has first truth; thus we may define "
has second truth" as meaning "some value for
has first
truth," i.e. "(
."
Similar remarks apply to falsehood. Thus "
has
second falsehood" will mean "some value for
has first
falsehood," i.e. "(
,"
while "
has second falsehood"
will mean "all values for
have first falsehood,"
i.e. "(
." Thus the
sort of falsehood that can belong to a general proposition is different
from the sort that can belong to a particular proposition.
Applying these considerations to the proposition "( is false,"
we see that the kind of falsehood in question must be specified.
If, for example, first falsehood is meant, the function "
has first falsehood" is only significant when
is the sort of
proposition which has first falsehood or first truth. Hence "(
is false" will be replaced by a statement which is equivalent to
"all propositions having either first truth or first falsehood have
first falsehood." This proposition has second falsehood, and is
not a possible argument to the function "
has first
falsehood." Thus the apparent exception to the principle that
"
" must be meaningless disappears.
Similar considerations will enable us to deal with "not-" and with
"
or
." It might seem as if these were functions in which
any proposition might appear as argument. But this is due to a
systematic ambiguity in the meanings of "not" and "or," by which they
adapt themselves to propositions of any order. To explain fully how
this occurs, it will be well to begin with a definition of the simplest
kind of truth and falsehood.
The universe consists of objects having various qualities and standing
in various relations. Some of the objects which occur in the universe
are complex. When an object is complex, it consists of interrelated
parts. Let us consider a complex object composed of two parts
and
standing to each other in the relation
. The complex
object "
-in-the-relation-
-to-
" may be capable of being
perceived; when perceived, it is perceived as one object.
Attention may show that it is complex; we then judge that
and
stand in the relation
. Such a judgment, being
derived from perception by mere attention, may be called a "judgment
of perception." This judgment of perception, considered as an actual
occurrence, is a relation of four terms, namely
and
and
and the percipient. The perception, on the contrary, is a
relation of two terms, namely "
-in-the-relation-
-to-
,"
and the percipient. Since an object of perception cannot be nothing,
we cannot perceive "
-in-the-relation-
-to-
" unless a
is in the relation
to
. Hence a judgment of perception,
according to the above definition, must be true. This does not
mean that, in a judgment which appears to us to be one of
perception, we are sure of not being in error, since we may err in
thinking that our judgment has really been derived merely by analysis
of[Pg 46] what was perceived. But if our judgment has been so derived,
it must be true. In fact, we may define truth, where such
judgments are concerned, as consisting in the fact that there is a
complex corresponding to the discursive thought which is the
judgment. That is, when we judge "
has the relation
to
," our judgment is said to be true when there is a complex
"
-in-the-relation-
-to-
," and is said to be false
when this is not the case. This is a definition of truth and falsehood
in relation to judgments of this kind.
It will be seen that, according to the above account, a judgment does not have a single object, namely the proposition, but has several interrelated objects. That is to say, the relation which constitutes judgment is not a relation of two terms, namely the judging mind and the proposition, but is a relation of several terms, namely the mind and what are called the constituents of the proposition. That is, when we judge (say) "this is red," what occurs is a relation of three terms, the mind, and "this," and red. On the other hand, when we perceive "the redness of this," there is a relation of two terms, namely the mind and the complex object "the redness of this." When a judgment occurs, there is a certain complex entity, composed of the mind and the various objects of the judgment. When the judgment is true, in the case of the kind of judgments we have been considering, there is a corresponding complex of the objects of the judgment alone. Falsehood, in regard to our present class of judgments, consists in the absence of a corresponding complex composed of the objects alone. It follows from the above theory that a "proposition," in the sense in which a proposition is supposed to be the object of a judgment, is a false abstraction, because a judgment has several objects, not one. It is the severalness of the objects in judgment (as opposed to perception) which has led people to speak of thought as "discursive," though they do not appear to have realized clearly what was meant by this epithet.
Owing to the plurality of the objects of a single judgment, it follows that what we call a "proposition" (in the sense in which this is distinguished from the phrase expressing it) is not a single entity at all. That is to say, the phrase which expresses a proposition is what we call an "incomplete" symbol[16]; it does not have meaning in itself, but requires some supplementation in order to acquire a complete meaning. This fact is somewhat concealed by the circumstance that judgment in itself supplies a sufficient supplement, and that judgment in itself makes no verbal addition to the proposition. Thus "the proposition 'Socrates is human'" uses "Socrates is human" in a way which requires a supplement of some kind before it acquires a complete meaning; but when I judge "Socrates is human," the meaning is completed by the act of judging, and we no longer have an incomplete symbol. The fact that propositions are "incomplete symbols"[Pg 47] is important philosophically, and is relevant at certain points in symbolic logic.
The judgments we have been dealing with hitherto are such as are of the same form as judgments of perception, i.e. their subjects are always particular and definite. But there are many judgments which are not of this form. Such are "all men are mortal," "I met a man," "some men are Greeks." Before dealing with such judgments, we will introduce some technical terms.
We will give the name of "a complex" to any such object as
" in the relation
to
" or "
having the quality
," or "
and
and
standing in the relation
."
Broadly speaking, a complex is anything which occurs in the
universe and is not simple. We will call a judgment elementary
when it merely asserts such things as "
has the relation
to
," "
has the quality
" or "
and
and
stand in the relation
." Then an elementary judgment is
true when there is a corresponding complex, and false when there is no
corresponding complex.
But take now such a proposition as "all men are mortal." Here the
judgment does not correspond to one complex, but to many,
namely "Socrates is mortal," "Plato is mortal," "Aristotle is mortal,"
etc. (For the moment, it is unnecessary to inquire whether each of
these does not require further treatment before we reach the ultimate
complexes involved. For purposes of illustration, "Socrates is mortal"
is here treated as an elementary judgment, though it is in fact not
one, as will be explained later. Truly elementary judgments are not
very easily found.) We do not mean to deny that there may be some
relation of the concept man to the concept mortal which
may be equivalent to "all men are mortal," but in any case this
relation is not the same thing as what we affirm when we say that all
men are mortal. Our judgment that all men are mortal collects together
a number of elementary judgments. It is not, however, composed of
these, since (e.g.) the fact that Socrates is mortal is no
part of what we assert, as may be seen by considering the fact that
our assertion can be understood by a person who has never heard of
Socrates. In order to understand the judgment "all men are mortal," it
is not necessary to know what men there are. We must admit, therefore,
as a radically new kind of judgment, such general assertions as "all
men are mortal." We assert that, given that is human,
is
always mortal. That is, we assert "
is mortal" of every
which is human. Thus we are able to judge (whether truly
or falsely) that all the objects which have some assigned
property also have some other assigned property. That is, given any
propositional functions
and
, there
is a judgment asserting
with every
for which we have
. Such judgments we will call general judgments.
It is evident (as explained above) that the definition of truth
is different[Pg 48] in the case of general judgments from what it was in the
case of elementary judgments. Let us call the meaning of truth
which we gave for elementary judgments "elementary truth." Then when
we assert that it is true that all men are mortal, we shall mean that
all judgments of the form " is mortal," where
is a man, have
elementary truth. We may define this as "truth of the second order" or
"second-order truth." Then if we express the proposition "all men are
mortal" in the form
and call this judgment
, then "
is true" must be taken to
mean "
has second-order truth," which in turn means
In order to avoid the necessity for stating explicitly the limitation
to which our variable is subject, it is convenient to replace the
above interpretation of "all men are mortal" by a slightly different
interpretation. The proposition "all men are mortal" is equivalent to
"' is a man' implies '
is mortal,' with all possible values
of
." Here
is not restricted to such values as are men,
but may have any value with which "'
is a man' implies '
is
mortal'" is significant, i.e. either true or false. Such
a proposition is called a "formal implication." The advantage of this
form is that the values which the variable may take are given by the
function to which it is the argument: the values which the variable may
take are all those with which the function is significant.
We use the symbol "(" to express the general judgment
which asserts all judgments of the form "
." Then the judgment
"all men are mortal" is equivalent to
i.e. (in virtue of the definition of implication) to
As we have just seen, the meaning of truth which is applicable
to this proposition is not the same as the meaning of truth
which is applicable to "
is a man" or to "
is mortal." And
generally, in any judgment (
, the sense in which this
judgment is or may be true is not the same as that in which
is or may be true. If
is an elementary judgment, it is true
when it points to a corresponding complex. But (
does not point to a single corresponding complex: the corresponding
complexes are as numerous as the possible values of
.
It follows from the above that such a proposition as "all the judgments
made by Epimenides are true" will only be prima facie capable of truth
if all his judgments are of the same order. If they are of varying
orders, of which the nth is the highest, we may make n assertions of
the form "all the judgments of order made by Epimenides are
true," where
has all values[Pg 49] up to
. But no such judgment
can include itself in its own scope, since such a judgment is always of
higher order than the judgments to which it refers.
Let us consider next what is meant by the negation of a proposition
of the form "." We observe, to begin with,
that "
in some cases," or "
sometimes," is
a judgment which is on a par with "
in all cases," or
"
always." The judgment "
sometimes" is true if
one or more values of
exist for which
is true. We
will express the proposition "
sometimes" by the notation
"
," where "
" stands for "there
exists," and the whole symbol may be read "there exists an
such that
." We take the two kinds of judgment expressed
by "
" and "
" as
primitive ideas. We also take as a primitive idea the negation of an
elementary proposition. We can then define the negations of
and (
. The negation
of any proposition
will be denoted by the symbol "
."
Then the negation of
will be defined as
meaning
and the negation of
will be
defined as meaning "
." Thus, in
the traditional language of formal logic, the negation of a universal
affirmative is to be defined as the particular negative, and the
negation of the particular affirmative is to be defined as the
universal negative. Hence the meaning of negation for such propositions
is different from the meaning of negation for elementary propositions.
An analogous explanation will apply to disjunction. Consider the
statement "either , or
always." We will denote the
disjunction of two propositions
,
by "
." Then
our statement is "
." We will
suppose that
is an elementary proposition, and that
is always an elementary proposition. We take the disjunction of
two elementary propositions as a primitive idea, and we wish to
define the disjunction
This may be defined as "
," i.e.
"either
is true, or
is always true" is to mean
"'
or
' is always true." Similarly we will define
as meaning "
," i.e. we
define "either
is true or there is an
for which
is true" as meaning "there is an
for which either
or
is true." Similarly we can define a disjunction of two
universal propositions: "
"
will be defined as meaning "
,"
i.e. "either
is always true or
is always true" is to mean "'
or
'
is always true." By this method we obtain definitions of disjunctions
containing propositions of the form
or
(
in terms of disjunctions of elementary
propositions; but the meaning of "disjunction" is not the[Pg 50] same for
propositions of the forms (
, (
,
as it was for elementary propositions.
Similar explanations could be given for implication and conjunction, but this is unnecessary, since these can be defined in terms of negation and disjunction.
IV. Why a Given Function requires Arguments of a Certain Type.
The considerations so far adduced in favour of the view that a
function cannot significantly have as argument anything defined in
terms of the function itself have been more or less indirect. But a
direct consideration of the kinds of functions which have functions
as arguments and the kinds of functions which have arguments other
than functions will show, if we are not mistaken, that not only
is it impossible for a function to have itself or
anything derived from it as argument, but that, if
is
another function such that there are arguments
with which both
"
" and "
" are significant, then
and anything derived from it cannot significantly be argument to
. This arises from the fact that a function is
essentially an ambiguity, and that, if it is to occur in a definite
proposition, it must occur in such a way that the ambiguity has
disappeared, and a wholly unambiguous statement has resulted. A few
illustrations will make this clear. Thus "
," which we
have already considered, is a function of
; as soon as
is assigned, we have a definite proposition, wholly
free from ambiguity. But it is obvious that we cannot substitute for
the function something which is not a function: "
"
means "
in all cases," and depends for its significance
upon the fact that there are "cases" of
, i.e. upon
the ambiguity which is characteristic of a function. This instance
illustrates the fact that, when a function can occur significantly as
argument, something which is not a function cannot occur significantly
as argument. But conversely, when something which is not a function can
occur significantly as argument, a function cannot occur significantly.
Take, e.g. "
is a man," and consider "
is a man." Here there is nothing to eliminate the ambiguity which
constitutes
; there is thus nothing definite which
is said to be a man. A function, in fact, is not a definite object,
which could be or not be a man; it is a mere ambiguity awaiting
determination, and in order that it may occur significantly it must
receive the necessary determination, which it obviously does not
receive if it is merely substituted for something determinate in a
proposition[17]. This argument does not, however, apply directly as
against such a statement as "
is a man." Common
sense would pronounce such a statement to be meaningless, but it
cannot be condemned on the ground of ambiguity in its subject. We
need[Pg 51] here a new objection, namely the following: A proposition is
not a single entity, but a relation of several; hence a statement in
which a proposition appears as subject will only be significant if
it can be reduced to a statement about the terms which appear in the
proposition. A proposition, like such phrases as "the so-and-so,"
where grammatically it appears as subject, must be broken up into its
constituents if we are to find the true subject or subjects[18]. But
in such a statement as "
is a man," where
is a proposition,
this is not possible. Hence "
is a man" is
meaningless.
V. The Hierarchy of Functions and Propositions.
We are thus led to the conclusion, both from the vicious-circle
principle and from direct inspection, that the functions to which
a given object can be an argument are incapable of being
arguments to each other, and that they have no term in common with the
functions to which they can be arguments. We are thus led to construct
a hierarchy. Beginning with
and the other terms which can be
arguments to the same functions to which
can be argument, we come
next to functions to which
is a possible argument, and then to
functions to which such functions are possible arguments, and so on.
But the hierarchy which has to be constructed is not so simple as might
at first appear. The functions which can take
as argument form an
illegitimate totality, and themselves require division into a hierarchy
of functions. This is easily seen as follows. Let
be a function of the two variables
and
. Then if,
keeping
fixed for the moment, we assert this with all possible
values of
, we obtain a proposition:
Here, if
is variable, we have a function of
; but as this
function involves a totality of values of
[19], it
cannot itself be one of the values included in the totality, by the
vicious-circle principle. It follows that the totality of values of
concerned in (
is not
the totality of all functions in which
can occur as argument, and
that there is no such totality as that of all functions in which
can occur as argument.
It follows from the above that a function in which
appears as argument requires that "
" should not stand
for any function which is capable of a given argument, but
must be restricted in such a way that none of the functions which are
possible values of "
" should involve any reference to
the totality of such functions. Let us take as an illustration the
definition of identity. We might attempt to define "
is identical
with
" as meaning "whatever is true of
is true of
,"
i.e. "
always implies
." But here,[Pg 52] since we
are concerned to assert all values of "
implies
"
regarded as a function of
, we shall be compelled to impose
upon
some limitation which will prevent us from including
among values of
values in which "all possible values of
" are referred to. Thus for example "
is identical with
" is a function of
; hence, if it is a legitimate value of
in "
always implies
" we shall be able to
infer, by means of the above definition, that if
is identical
with
, and
is identical with
, then
is identical
with
. Although the conclusion is sound, the reasoning embodies
a vicious-circle fallacy, since we have taken "
implies
" as a possible value of
, which it cannot
be. If, however, we impose any limitation upon
, it may happen,
so far as appears at present, that with other values of
we
might have
true and
false, so that our proposed
definition of identity would plainly be wrong. This difficulty is
avoided by the "axiom of reducibility," to be explained later. For the
present, it is only mentioned in order to illustrate the necessity and
the relevance of the hierarchy of functions of a given argument.
Let us give the name "-functions" to functions that are
significant for a given argument
. Then suppose we take any
selection of
-functions, and consider the proposition "
satisfies all the functions belonging to the selection in question."
If we here replace
by a variable, we obtain an
-function;
but by the vicious-circle principle this
-function cannot be a
member of our selection, since it refers to the whole of the selection.
Let the selection consist of all those functions which satisfy
. Then our new function is
where
is the argument. It thus appears that, whatever selection
of
-functions we may make, there will be other
-functions
that lie outside our selection. Such
-functions, as the above
instance illustrates, will always arise through taking a function of
two arguments,
and
, and asserting all or some
of the values resulting from varying
. What is necessary,
therefore, in order to avoid vicious-circle fallacies, is to divide our
-functions into "types," each of which contains no functions which
refer to the whole of that type.
When something is asserted or denied about all possible values or
about some (undetermined) possible values of a variable, that variable
is called apparent, after Peano. The presence of the words
all or some in a proposition indicates the presence of
an apparent variable; but often an apparent variable is really present
where language does not at once indicate its presence. Thus for example
" is mortal" means "there is a time at which
will die." Thus
a variable time occurs as apparent variable.
The clearest instances of propositions not containing apparent variables are such as express immediate judgments of perception, such as "this is red" or "this is painful," where "this" is something immediately given. In other[Pg 53] judgments, even where at first sight no variable appears to be present, it often happens that there really is one. Take (say) "Socrates is human." To Socrates himself, the word "Socrates" no doubt stood for an object of which he was immediately aware, and the judgment "Socrates is human" contained no apparent variable. But to us, who only know Socrates by description, the word "Socrates" cannot mean what it meant to him; it means rather "the person having such-and-such properties," (say) "the Athenian philosopher who drank the hemlock." Now in all propositions about "the so-and-so" there is an apparent variable, as will be shown in Chapter III. Thus in what we have in mind when we say "Socrates is human" there is an apparent variable, though there was no apparent variable in the corresponding judgment as made by Socrates, provided we assume that there is such a thing as immediate awareness of oneself.
Whatever may be the instances of propositions not containing apparent
variables, it is obvious that propositional functions whose values do not
contain apparent variables are the source of propositions containing apparent
variables, in the sense in which the function is the source of the proposition
. For the values for
do not contain the apparent variable
,
which appears in
; if they contain an apparent variable
, this can be
similarly eliminated, and so on. This process must come to an end, since no
proposition which we can apprehend can contain more than a finite number
of apparent variables, on the ground that whatever we can apprehend must
be of finite complexity. Thus we must arrive at last at a function of as
many variables as there have been stages in reaching it from our original
proposition, and this function will be such that its values contain no apparent
variables. We may call this function the matrix of our original proposition
and of any other propositions and functions to be obtained by turning some
of the arguments to the function into apparent variables. Thus for example,
if we have a matrix-function whose values are
, we shall derive from it
, which is a function of
,
, which is a function of
,
, meaning "
is true with
all possible values of
and
." This last is a proposition
containing no real variable, i.e. no variable except
apparent variables.
It is thus plain that all possible propositions and functions are
obtainable from matrices by the process of turning the arguments to the
matrices into apparent variables. In order to divide our propositions
and functions into types, we shall, therefore, start from matrices,
and consider how they are to be divided with a view to the avoidance
of vicious-circle fallacies in the definitions of the functions
concerned. For this purpose, we will use such letters as ,
,
,
,
,
,
, to denote objects which
are neither propositions nor functions. Such objects we shall call
individuals. Such objects will be[Pg 54] constituents of propositions
or functions, and will be genuine constituents, in the sense
that they do not disappear on analysis, as (for example) classes do, or
phrases of the form "the so-and-so."
The first matrices that occur are those whose values are of the forms
i.e. where the arguments, however many there may be, are
all individuals. The functions
,
,
...,
since (by definition) they contain no apparent variables, and have
no arguments except individuals, do not presuppose any totality of
functions. From the functions
,
... we may proceed
to form other functions of
, such as (
,
(
, (
, (
, and so on. All these presuppose no
totality except that of individuals. We thus arrive at a certain
collection of functions of
, characterized by the fact that they
involve no variables except individuals. Such functions we will call
"first-order functions."
We may now introduce a notation to express "any first-order function."
We will denote any first-order function by "" and
any value for such a function by "
." Thus "
"
stands for any value for any function which involves no
variables except individuals. It will be seen that "
"
is itself a function of two variables, namely
and
. Thus
involves a variable which is not an
individual, namely
. Similarly "(
"
is a function of the variable
, and thus involves
a variable other than an individual. Again, if
is a given
individual,
is a function of
, but it is not a function of the form
,
because it involves an (apparent) variable
which is not
an individual. Let us give the name "predicate" to any first-order
function
(This use of the word "predicate" is
only proposed for the purposes of the present discussion.) Then the
statement "
implies
with all possible values
of
" may be read "all the predicates of
are predicates of
." This makes a statement about
, but does not attribute to
a predicate in the special sense just defined.
Owing to the introduction of the variable first-order function ,
we now have a new set of matrices. Thus "
" is
a function which contains no apparent variables, but contains the two
real variables
and
. (It should be observed
that when
is assigned, we may obtain a function whose values
do involve individuals as apparent variables, for example if
is (
. But so long as
is variable,
contains no apparent variables.) Again, if
is a
definite individual,
is a function of the one variable
. If
and
are definite individuals,
"
implies
" is a function of the two variables
,
, and so on. We are thus led to a
whole set of new matrices,
These matrices contain individuals and first-order functions as
arguments, but[Pg 55] (like all matrices) they contain no apparent variables.
Any such matrix, if it contains more than one variable, gives rise to
new functions of one variable by turning all its arguments except one
into apparent variables. Thus we obtain the functions
We will give the name of second-order matrices to such matrices as have first-order functions among their arguments, and have no arguments except first-order functions and individuals. (It is not necessary that they should have individuals among their arguments.) We will give the name of second-order functions to such as either are second-order matrices or are derived from such matrices by turning some of the arguments into apparent variables. It will be seen that either an individual or a first-order function may appear as argument to a second-order function. Second-order functions are such as contain variables which are first-order functions, but contain no other variables except (possibly) individuals.
We now have various new classes of functions at our command. In the
first place, we have second-order functions which have one argument
which is a first-order function. We will denote a variable function of
this kind by the notation , and any value
of such a function by
. Like
,
is a function of two variables, namely
and
. Among possible
values of
will be
(where
is constant),
,
, and so on.
(These result from assigning a value to
, leaving
to
be assigned.) We will call such functions "predicative functions of
first-order functions."
In the second place, we have second-order functions of two arguments,
one of which is a first-order function while the other is an
individual. Let us denote undetermined values of such functions by the
notation
As soon as
is assigned, we shall have a predicative function of
. If our function contains no first-order function
as apparent variable, we shall obtain a predicative function of
if we assign a value to
. Thus, to take the
simplest possible case, if
is
,
the assignment of a value to
gives us a predicative function
of
, in virtue of the definition of "
." But if
contains a first-order function as apparent
variable, the assignment of a value to
gives us a
second-order function of
.
In the third place, we have second-order functions of
individuals. These will all be derived from functions of the form
by turning
into an apparent
variable. We do not, therefore, need a new notation for them.
[Pg 56]
We have also second-order functions of two first-order functions, or of two such functions and an individual, and so on.
We may now proceed in exactly the same way to third-order matrices,
which will be functions containing second-order functions as arguments,
and containing no apparent variables, and no arguments except
individuals and first-order functions and second-order functions.
Thence we shall proceed, as before, to third-order functions; and so we
can proceed indefinitely. If the highest order of variable occurring in
a function, whether as argument or as apparent variable, is a function
of the th order, then the function in which it occurs is of the
th order. We do not arrive at functions of an infinite order,
because the number of arguments and of apparent variables in a function
must be finite, and therefore every function must be of a finite order.
Since the orders of functions are only defined step by step, there
can be no process of "proceeding to the limit," and functions of an
infinite order cannot occur.
We will define a function of one variable as predicative when
it is of the next order above that of its argument, i.e. of the
lowest order compatible with its having that argument. If a function
has several arguments, and the highest order of function occurring
among the arguments is the th, we call the function predicative
if it is of the
th order, i.e. again, if it is of
the lowest order compatible with its having the arguments it has. A
function of several arguments is predicative if there is one of its
arguments such that, when the other arguments have values assigned to
them, we obtain a predicative function of the one undetermined argument.
It is important to observe that all possible functions in the above
hierarchy can be obtained by means of predicative functions and
apparent variables. Thus, as we saw, second-order functions of an
individual are of the form
where
is a second-order predicative function. And speaking
generally, a non-predicative function of the
th order is
obtained from a predicative function of the
th order by turning
all the arguments of the
th order into apparent variables.
(Other arguments also may be turned into apparent variables.) Thus
we need not introduce as variables any functions except predicative
functions. Moreover, to obtain any function of one variable
,
we need not go beyond predicative functions of two variables.
For the function (
, where
is given, is a function of
and
, and is
predicative. Thus it is of the form
, and
therefore (
is of
the form (
. Thus speaking generally,
by a succession of steps we find that, if
is a
predicative function of a sufficiently high order, any assigned
non-predicative function of
will be of one of the two forms
where
is a predicative function of
and
.
[Pg 57]
The nature of the above hierarchy of functions may be restated as follows. A function, as we saw at an earlier stage, presupposes as part of its meaning the totality of its values, or, what comes to the same thing, the totality of its possible arguments. The arguments to a function may be functions or propositions or individuals. (It will be remembered that individuals were defined as whatever is neither a proposition nor a function.) For the present we neglect the case in which the argument to a function is a proposition. Consider a function whose argument is an individual. This function presupposes the totality of individuals; but unless it contains functions as apparent variables, it does not presuppose any totality of functions. If, however, it does contain a function as apparent variable, then it cannot be defined until some totality of functions has been defined. It follows that we must first define the totality of those functions that have individuals as arguments and contain no functions as apparent variables. These are the predicative functions of individuals. Generally, a predicative function of a variable argument is one which involves no totality except that of the possible values of the argument, and those that are presupposed by any one of the possible arguments. Thus a predicative function of a variable argument is any function which can be specified without introducing new kinds of variables not necessarily presupposed by the variable which is the argument.
A closely analogous treatment can be developed for propositions.
Propositions which contain no functions and no apparent variables may
be called elementary propositions. Propositions which are not
elementary, which contain no functions, and no apparent variables
except individuals, may be called first-order propositions. (It
should be observed that no variables except apparent variables
can occur in a proposition, since whatever contains a real
variable is a function, not a proposition.) Thus elementary and
first-order propositions will be values of first-order functions. (It
should be remembered that a function is not a constituent in one of its
values: thus for example the function " is human" is not a
constituent of the proposition "Socrates is human.") Elementary and
first-order propositions presuppose no totality except (at most) the
totality of individuals. They are of one or other of the three forms
where
is a predicative function of an individual. It
follows that, if
represents a variable elementary proposition
or a variable first-order proposition, a function
is either
or
or
.
Thus a function of an elementary or a first-order proposition may
always be reduced to a function of a first-order function. It follows
that a proposition involving the totality of first-order propositions
may be reduced to one involving the totality of first-order functions;
and this obviously applies equally to higher[Pg 58] orders. The propositional
hierarchy can, therefore, be derived from the functional hierarchy, and
we may define a proposition of the nth order as one which involves an
apparent variable of the
th order in the functional hierarchy.
The propositional hierarchy is never required in practice, and is only
relevant for the solution of paradoxes; hence it is unnecessary to go
into further detail as to the types of propositions.
VI. The Axiom of Reducibility.
It remains to consider the "axiom of reducibility." It will be seen
that, according to the above hierarchy, no statement can be made
significantly about "all -functions," where
is some given
object. Thus such a notion as "all properties of
," meaning
"all functions which are true with the argument
," will be
illegitimate. We shall have to distinguish the order of function
concerned. We can speak of "all predicative properties of
," "all
second-order properties of
," and so on. (If
is not an
individual, but an object of order
, "second-order properties of
" will mean "functions of order
satisfied by
.")
But we cannot speak of "all properties of
." In some cases, we can
see that some statement will hold of "all
th-order properties of
," whatever value
may have. In such cases, no practical harm
results from regarding the statement as being about "all properties of
," provided we remember that it is really a number of statements,
and not a single statement which could be regarded as assigning another
property to
, over and above all properties. Such cases will
always involve some systematic ambiguity, such as that involved in
the meaning of the word "truth," as explained above. Owing to this
systematic ambiguity, it will be possible, sometimes, to combine
into a single verbal statement what are really a number of different
statements, corresponding to different orders in the hierarchy. This is
illustrated in the case of the liar, where the statement "all
's
statements are false" should be broken up into different statements
referring to his statements of various orders, and attributing to each
the appropriate kind of falsehood.
The axiom of reducibility is introduced in order to legitimate a great
mass of reasoning, in which, prima facie, we are concerned with such
notions as "all properties of " or "all
-functions," and
in which, nevertheless, it seems scarcely possible to suspect any
substantial error. In order to state the axiom, we must first define
what is meant by "formal equivalence." Two functions
,
are said to be "formally equivalent" when, with
every possible argument
,
is equivalent to
,
i.e.
and
are either both true or
both false. Thus two functions are formally equivalent when they are
satisfied by the same set of arguments. The axiom of reducibility is
the assumption that, given any function
, there is a
formally equivalent predicative function,[Pg 59] i.e. there is
a predicative function which is true when
is true and false
when
is false. In symbols, the axiom is:
For two variables, we require a similar axiom, namely: Given any
function
, there is a formally equivalent
predicative function, i.e.
In order to explain the purposes of the axiom of reducibility, and the nature of the grounds for supposing it true, we shall first illustrate it by applying it to some particular cases.
If we call a predicate of an object a predicative function which
is true of that object, then the predicates of an object are only some
among its properties. Take for example such a proposition as "Napoleon
had all the qualities that make a great general." We may interpret this
as meaning "Napoleon had all the predicates that make a great general."
Here there is a predicate which is an apparent variable. If we put
"" for "
is a predicate required
in a great general," our proposition is
Since this refers to a totality of predicates, it is not itself a
predicate of Napoleon. It by no means follows, however, that there is
not some one predicate common and peculiar to great generals. In fact,
it is certain that there is such a predicate. For the number of great
generals is finite, and each of them certainly possessed some predicate
not possessed by any other human being—for example, the exact instant
of his birth. The disjunction of such predicates will constitute a
predicate common and peculiar to great generals[20]. If we call this
predicate
, the statement we made about Napoleon was
equivalent to
. And this equivalence holds
equally if we substitute any other individual for Napoleon. Thus we
have arrived at a predicate which is always equivalent to the property
we ascribed to Napoleon, i.e. it belongs to those objects which
have this property, and to no others. The axiom of reducibility states
that such a predicate always exists, i.e. that any property
of an object belongs to the same collection of objects as those that
possess some predicate.
We may next illustrate our principle by its application to
identity. In this connection, it has a certain affinity with
Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. It is plain that, if and
are identical, and
is true, then
is
true. Here it cannot matter what sort of function
may
be: the statement must hold for any function. But we cannot
say, conversely: "If, with all values of
,
implies
, then
and
are identical"; because "all values
of
" is inadmissible. If we wish to speak of "all values of
," we must confine ourselves to functions of one order. We may
confine
to predicates, or to[Pg 60] second-order functions, or to
functions of any order we please. But we must necessarily leave out
functions of all but one order. Thus we shall obtain, so to speak,
a hierarchy of different degrees of identity. We may say "all the
predicates of
belong to
," "all second-order properties of
belong to
," and so on. Each of these statements implies
all its predecessors: for example, if all second-order properties of
belong to
, then all predicates of
belong to
,
for to have all the predicates of
is a second-order property,
and this property belongs to
. But we cannot, without the help of
an axiom, argue conversely that if all the predicates of
belong
to
, all the second-order properties of
must also belong to
. Thus we cannot, without the help of an axiom, be sure that
and
are identical if they have the same predicates. Leibniz's
identity of indiscernibles supplied this axiom. It should be observed
that by "indiscernibles" he cannot have meant two objects which agree
as to all their properties, for one of the properties of
is to be identical with
, and therefore this property would
necessarily belong to
if
and
agreed in all
their properties. Some limitation of the common properties necessary to
make things indiscernible is therefore implied by the necessity of an
axiom. For purposes of illustration (not of interpreting Leibniz) we
may suppose the common properties required for indiscernibility to be
limited to predicates. Then the identity of indiscernibles will state
that if
and
agree as to all their predicates, they are
identical. This can be proved if we assume the axiom of reducibility.
For, in that case, every property belongs to the same collection of
objects as is defined by some predicate. Hence there is some predicate
common and peculiar to the objects which are identical with
. This
predicate belongs to
, since
is identical with itself; hence
it belongs to
, since y has all the predicates of
; hence y
is identical with
. It follows that we may define
and
as identical when all the predicates of
belong to
,
i.e. when (
. We
therefore adopt the following definition of identity[21]:
But apart from the axiom of reducibility, or some axiom equivalent in this connection, we should be compelled to regard identity as indefinable, and to admit (what seems impossible) that two objects may agree in all their predicates without being identical.
The axiom of reducibility is even more essential in the theory of
classes. It should be observed, in the first place, that if we assume
the existence of classes, the axiom of reducibility can be proved.
For in that case, given any function of whatever
order, there is a class
consisting of just those objects
which satisfy
. Hence "
" is equivalent
to "
belongs to
." But "
belongs to
"
is a statement containing no apparent variable, and is therefore a
predicative function of
. Hence if we assume the existence of[Pg 61]
classes, the axiom of reducibility becomes unnecessary. The assumption
of the axiom of reducibility is therefore a smaller assumption than
the assumption that there are classes. This latter assumption has
hitherto been made unhesitatingly. However, both on the ground of the
contradictions, which require a more complicated treatment if classes
are assumed, and on the ground that it is always well to make the
smallest assumption required for proving our theorems, we prefer to
assume the axiom of reducibility rather than the existence of classes.
But in order to explain the use of the axiom in dealing with classes,
it is necessary first to explain the theory of classes, which is a
topic belonging to Chapter III. We therefore postpone to that Chapter
the explanation of the use of our axiom in dealing with classes.
It is worth while to note that all the purposes served by the axiom
of reducibility are equally well served if we assume that there is
always a function of the th order (where
is fixed) which
is formally equivalent to
, whatever may be the order
of
. Here we shall mean by "a function of the
th
order" a function of the
th order relative to the arguments
to
; thus if these arguments are
absolutely of the
th order, we assume the existence of a function
formally equivalent to
whose absolute order is the
th. The axiom of reducibility in the form assumed above
takes
, but this is not necessary to the use of the axiom.
It is also unnecessary that
should be the same for different
values of
; what is necessary is that
should be constant so
long as
is constant. What is needed is that, where extensional
functions of functions are concerned, we should be able to deal with
any
-function by means of some formally equivalent function of a
given type, so as to be able to obtain results which would otherwise
require the illegitimate notion of "all
-functions"; but it does
not matter what the given type is. It does not appear, however, that
the axiom of reducibility is rendered appreciably more plausible by
being put in the above more general but more complicated form.
The axiom of reducibility is equivalent to the assumption that "any
combination or disjunction of predicates[22] is equivalent to a
single predicate," i.e. to the assumption that, if we assert
that has all the predicates that satisfy a function
there is some one predicate which
will have whenever
our assertion is true, and will not have whenever it is false, and
similarly if we assert that
has some one of the predicates that
satisfy a function
). For by means of this
assumption, the order of a non-predicative function can be lowered by
one; hence, after some finite number of steps, we shall be able to get
from any non-predicative function to a formally equivalent predicative
function. It does not seem probable that[Pg 62] the above assumption could
be substituted for the axiom of reducibility in symbolic deductions,
since its use would require the explicit introduction of the further
assumption that by a finite number of downward steps we can pass from
any function to a predicative function, and this assumption could not
well be made without developments that are scarcely possible at an
early stage. But on the above grounds it seems plain that in fact, if
the above alternative axiom is true, so is the axiom of reducibility.
The converse, which completes the proof of equivalence, is of course
evident.
VII. Reasons for Accepting the Axiom of Reducibility.
[Pg 63]
That the axiom of reducibility is self-evident is a proposition which can hardly be maintained. But in fact self-evidence is never more than a part of the reason for accepting an axiom, and is never indispensable. The reason for accepting an axiom, as for accepting any other proposition, is always largely inductive, namely that many propositions which are nearly indubitable can be deduced from it, and that no equally plausible way is known by which these propositions could be true if the axiom were false, and nothing which is probably false can be deduced from it. If the axiom is apparently self-evident, that only means, practically, that it is nearly indubitable; for things have been thought to be self-evident and have yet turned out to be false. And if the axiom itself is nearly indubitable, that merely adds to the inductive evidence derived from the fact that its consequences are nearly indubitable: it does not provide new evidence of a radically different kind. Infallibility is never attainable, and therefore some element of doubt should always attach to every axiom and to all its consequences. In formal logic, the element of doubt is less than in most sciences, but it is not absent, as appears from the fact that the paradoxes followed from premisses which were not previously known to require limitations. In the case of the axiom of reducibility, the inductive evidence in its favour is very strong, since the reasonings which it permits and the results to which it leads are all such as appear valid. But although it seems very improbable that the axiom should turn out to be false, it is by no means improbable that it should be found to be deducible from some other more fundamental and more evident axiom. It is possible that the use of the vicious-circle principle, as embodied in the above hierarchy of types, is more drastic than it need be, and that by a less drastic use the necessity for the axiom might be avoided. Such changes, however, would not render anything false which had been asserted on the basis of the principles explained above: they would merely provide easier proofs of the same theorems. There would seem, therefore, to be but the slenderest ground for fearing that the use of the axiom of reducibility may lead us into error.
VIII. The Contradictions.
We are now in a position to show how the theory of types affects the solution of the contradictions which have beset mathematical logic. For this purpose, we shall begin by an enumeration of some of the more important and illustrative of these contradictions, and shall then show how they all embody vicious-circle fallacies, and are therefore all avoided by the theory of types. It will be noticed that these paradoxes do not relate exclusively to the ideas of number and quantity. Accordingly no solution can be adequate which seeks to explain them merely as the result of some illegitimate use of these ideas. The solution must be sought in some such scrutiny of fundamental logical ideas as has been attempted in the foregoing pages.
(1) The oldest contradiction of the kind in question is the Epimenides. Epimenides the Cretan said that all Cretans were liars, and all other statements made by Cretans were certainly lies. Was this a lie? The simplest form of this contradiction is afforded by the man who says "I am lying"; if he is lying, he is speaking the truth, and vice versa.
(2) Let be the class of all those classes which are not members
of themselves. Then, whatever class
may be, "
is a
" is
equivalent to "
is not an
." Hence, giving to
the value
, "
is a
" is equivalent to "
is not a
."
(3) Let be the relation which subsists between two relations
and
whenever
does not have the relation
to
. Then, whatever relations
and
may be, "
has the
relation
to
" is equivalent to "
does not have the
relation
to
." Hence, giving the value
to both
and
, "
has the relation
to
" is equivalent to
"
does not have the relation
to
."
(4) Burali-Forti's contradiction[23] may be stated as follows: It can
be shown that every well-ordered series has an ordinal number, that the
series of ordinals up to and including any given ordinal exceeds the
given ordinal by one, and (on certain very natural assumptions) that
the series of all ordinals (in order of magnitude) is well-ordered.
It follows that the series of all ordinals has an ordinal number,
say. But in that case the series of all ordinals including
has the ordinal number
, which must be greater
than
. Hence
is not the ordinal number of all
ordinals.
(5) The number of syllables in the English names of finite integers tends to increase as the integers grow larger, and must gradually increase indefinitely, since only a finite number of names can be made with a given finite number of syllables. Hence the names of some integers must consist of at least nineteen syllables, and among these there must be a least. Hence "the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables"[Pg 64] must denote a definite integer; in fact, it denotes 111,777. But "the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables" is itself a name consisting of eighteen syllables; hence the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables can be named in eighteen syllables, which is a contradiction[24].
(6) Among transfinite ordinals some can be defined, while
others can not; for the total number of possible definitions is
[25], while the number of transfinite ordinals exceeds
. Hence there must be indefinable ordinals, and among
these there must be a least. But this is defined as "the least
indefinable ordinal," which is a contradiction[26].
(7) Richard's paradox[27] is akin to that of the least indefinable
ordinal. It is as follows: Consider all decimals that can be defined
by means of a finite number of words; let be the class of such
decimals. Then
has
terms; hence its members can
be ordered as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd,.... Let
be a number defined as
follows. If the
th figure in the
th decimal is
, let the
th figure in
be
(or 0, if
). Then
is different from all the members of
, since, whatever finite
value
may have, the
th figure in
is different from
the
th figure in the nth of the decimals composing
, and
therefore
is different from the
th decimal. Nevertheless we
have defined
in a finite number of words, and therefore
ought to be a member of
. Thus
both is and is not a member
of
.
In all the above contradictions (which are merely selections from an
indefinite number) there is a common characteristic, which we may
describe as self-reference or reflexiveness. The remark of Epimenides
must include itself in its own scope. If all classes, provided
they are not members of themselves, are members of , this must
also apply to
; and similarly for the analogous relational
contradiction. In the cases of names and definitions, the paradoxes
result from considering non-nameability and indefinability as elements
in names and definitions. In the case of Burali-Forti's paradox, the
series whose ordinal number causes the difficulty is the series of
all ordinal numbers. In each contradiction something is said about
all cases of some kind, and from what is said a new case seems
to be generated,[Pg 65] which both is and is not of the same kind as the
cases of which all were concerned in what was said. But this is
the characteristic of illegitimate totalities, as we defined them in
stating the vicious-circle principle. Hence all our contradictions are
illustrations of vicious-circle fallacies. It only remains to show,
therefore, that the illegitimate totalities involved are excluded by
the hierarchy of types which we have constructed.
(1) When a man says "I am lying," we may interpret his statement as:
"There is a proposition which I am affirming and which is false." That
is to say, he is asserting the truth of some value of the function "I
assert , and
is false." But we saw that the word "false"
is ambiguous, and that, in order to make it unambiguous, we must
specify the order of falsehood, or, what comes to the same thing, the
order of the proposition to which falsehood is ascribed. We saw also
that, if
is a proposition of the
th order, a proposition
in which
occurs as an apparent variable is not of the
th
order, but of a higher order. Hence the kind of truth or falsehood
which can belong to the statement "there is a proposition
which
I am affirming and which has falsehood of the
th order" is truth
or falsehood of a higher order than the
th. Hence the statement
of Epimenides does not fall within its own scope, and therefore no
contradiction emerges.
If we regard the statement "I am lying" as a compact way of
simultaneously making all the following statements: "I am asserting
a false proposition of the first order," "I am asserting a false
proposition of the second order," and so on, we find the following
curious state of things: As no proposition of the first order is being
asserted, the statement "I am asserting a false proposition of the
first order" is false. This statement is of the second order, hence the
statement "I am making a false statement of the second order" is true.
This is a statement of the third order, and is the only statement of
the third order which is being made. Hence the statement "I am making
a false statement of the third order" is false. Thus we see that the
statement "I am making a false statement of order " is false,
while the statement "I am making a false statement of order
" is
true. But in this state of things there is no contradiction.
(2) In order to solve the contradiction about the class of classes
which are not members of themselves, we shall assume, what will be
explained in the next Chapter, that a proposition about a class is
always to be reduced to a statement about a function which defines the
class, i.e. about a function which is satisfied by the members
of the class and by no other arguments. Thus a class is an object
derived from a function and presupposing the function, just as, for
example, presupposes the function
.
Hence a class cannot, by the vicious-circle principle, significantly be
the argument to its defining function, that is to say, if we denote[Pg 66]
by "
" the class defined by
, the
symbol "
" must be meaningless. Hence a
class neither satisfies nor does not satisfy its defining function,
and therefore (as will appear more fully in Chapter III) is neither
a member of itself nor not a member of itself. This is an immediate
consequence of the limitation to the possible arguments to a function
which was explained at the beginning of the present Chapter. Thus if
is a class, the statement "
is not a member of
" is always meaningless, and there is therefore no sense
in the phrase "the class of those classes which are not members of
themselves." Hence the contradiction which results from supposing that
there is such a class disappears.
(3) Exactly similar remarks apply to "the relation which holds between
and
whenever
does not have the relation
to
." Suppose the relation
is defined by a function
,
i.e.
holds between
and
whenever
is true, but not otherwise. Then in order to interpret
"
has the relation
to
" we shall have to suppose that
and
can significantly be the arguments to
. But
(assuming, as will appear in Chapter III, that
presupposes its
defining function) this would require that
should be able to
take as argument an object which is defined in terms of
, and
this no function can do, as we saw at the beginning of this Chapter.
Hence "
has the relation
to
" is meaningless, and the
contradiction ceases.
(4) The solution of Burali-Forti's contradiction requires some further developments for its solution. At this stage, it must suffice to observe that a series is a relation, and an ordinal number is a class of series. (These statements are justified in the body of the work.) Hence a series of ordinal numbers is a relation between classes of relations, and is of higher type than any of the series which are members of the ordinal numbers in question. Burali-Forti's "ordinal number of all ordinals" must be the ordinal number of all ordinals of a given type, and must therefore be of higher type than any of these ordinals. Hence it is not one of these ordinals, and there is no contradiction in its being greater than any of them[28].
(5) The paradox about "the least integer not nameable in fewer than
nineteen syllables" embodies, as is at once obvious, a vicious-circle
fallacy. For the word "nameable" refers to the totality of names, and
yet is allowed to occur in what professes to be one among names. Hence
there can be no such thing as a totality of names, in the sense in
which the paradox speaks of "names." It is easy to see that, in virtue
of the hierarchy of functions, the theory of types renders a totality
of "names" impossible. We may, in fact, distinguish names of different
orders as follows: (a) Elementary names will be such as are true
"proper names," i.e. conventional[Pg 67] appellations not involving
any description. (b) First-order names will be such as involve
a description by means of a first-order function; that is to say, if
is a first-order function, "the term which satisfies
" will be a first-order name, though there will not
always be an object named by this name. (c) Second-order names
will be such as involve a description by means of a second-order
function; among such names will be those involving a reference to
the totality of first-order names. And so we can proceed through a
whole hierarchy. But at no stage can we give a meaning to the word
"nameable" unless we specify the order of names to be employed; and
any name in which the phrase "nameable by names of order
" occurs
is necessarily of a higher order than the
th. Thus the paradox
disappears.
The solutions of the paradox about the least indefinable ordinal and
of Richard's paradox are closely analogous to the above. The notion of
"definable," which occurs in both, is nearly the same as "nameable,"
which occurs in our fifth paradox: "definable" is what "nameable"
becomes when elementary names are excluded, i.e. "definable"
means "nameable by a name which is not elementary." But here there
is the same ambiguity as to type as there was before, and the same
need for the addition of words which specify the type to which the
definition is to belong. And however the type may be specified,
"the least ordinal not definable by definitions of this type" is a
definition of a higher type; and in Richard's paradox, when we confine
ourselves, as we must, to decimals that have a definition of a given
type, the number , which causes the paradox, is found to have a
definition which belongs to a higher type, and thus not to come within
the scope of our previous definitions.
An indefinite number of other contradictions, of similar nature to the above seven, can easily be manufactured. In all of them, the solution is of the same kind. In all of them, the appearance of contradiction is produced by the presence of some word which has systematic ambiguity of type, such as truth, falsehood, function, property, class, relation, cardinal, ordinal, name, definition. Any such word, if its typical ambiguity is overlooked, will apparently generate a totality containing members defined in terms of itself, and will thus give rise to vicious-circle fallacies. In most cases, the conclusions of arguments which involve vicious-circle fallacies will not be self-contradictory, but wherever we have an illegitimate totality, a little ingenuity will enable us to construct a vicious-circle fallacy leading to a contradiction, which disappears as soon as the typically ambiguous words are rendered typically definite, i.e. are determined as belonging to this or that type.
[Pg 68]
Thus the appearance of contradiction is always due to the presence of words embodying a concealed typical ambiguity, and the solution of the apparent contradiction lies in bringing the concealed ambiguity to light.
In spite of the contradictions which result from unnoticed typical ambiguity, it is not desirable to avoid words and symbols which have typical ambiguity. Such words and symbols embrace practically all the ideas with which mathematics and mathematical logic are concerned: the systematic ambiguity is the result of a systematic analogy. That is to say, in almost all the reasonings which constitute mathematics and mathematical logic, we are using ideas which may receive any one of an infinite number of different typical determinations, any one of which leaves the reasoning valid. Thus by employing typically ambiguous words and symbols, we are able to make one chain of reasoning applicable to any one of an infinite number of different cases, which would not be possible if we were to forego the use of typically ambiguous words and symbols.
Among propositions wholly expressed in terms of typically ambiguous
notions practically the only ones which may differ, in respect of
truth or falsehood, according to the typical determination which they
receive, are existence-theorems. If we assume that the total number of
individuals is , then the total number of classes of individuals
is
, the total number of classes of classes of individuals
is
, and so on. Here
may be either finite or
infinite, and in either case
. Thus cardinals greater
than
but not greater than
exist as applied to classes
of classes, but not as applied to classes of individuals, so that
whatever may be supposed to be the number of individuals, there will
be existence-theorems which hold for higher types but not for lower
types. Even here, however, so long as the number of individuals is not
asserted, but is merely assumed hypothetically, we may replace the type
of individuals by any other type, provided we make a corresponding
change in all the other types occurring in the same context. That
is, we may give the name "relative individuals" to the members of an
arbitrarily chosen type
, and the name "relative classes of
individuals" to classes of "relative individuals," and so on. Thus so
long as only hypotheticals are concerned, in which existence-theorems
for one type are shown to be implied by existence-theorems for
another, only relative types are relevant even in existence-theorems.
This applies also to cases where the hypothesis (and therefore the
conclusion) is asserted, provided the assertion holds for any type,
however chosen. For example, any type has at least one member; hence
any type which consists of classes, of whatever order, has at least two
members. But the further pursuit of these topics must be left to the
body of the work.
[12] See the last section of the present Chapter. Cf. also H. Poincaré, "Les mathématiques et la logique," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Mai 1906, p. 307.
[13] When the word "function" is used in the sequel, "propositional function" is always meant. Other functions will not be in question in the present Chapter.
[14]
We shall speak in this Chapter of "values for "
and of "values of
," meaning in each case the same
thing, namely
,
,
, etc. The distinction
of phraseology serves to avoid ambiguity where several variables are
concerned, especially when one of them is a function.
[15] We use "always" as meaning "in all cases," not "at all times." Similarly "sometimes" will mean "in some cases."
[16] See Chapter III.
[17]
Note that statements concerning the significance of
a phrase containing "" concern the symbol
"
," and therefore do not fall under the rule that the
elimination of the functional ambiguity is necessary to significance.
Significance is a property of signs. Cf. p. 43.
[18] Cf. Chapter III.
[19]
When we speak of "values of " it is
, not
, that is to be assigned. This follows from the
explanation in the note on p. 42. When the function itself is the
variable, it is possible and simpler to write
rather than
, except in positions where it is necessary to emphasize
that an argument must be supplied to secure significance.
[20] When a (finite) set of predicates is given by actual enumeration, their disjunction is a predicate, because no predicate occurs as apparent variable in the disjunction.
[21] Note that in this definition the second sign of equality is to be regarded as combining with "Df" to form one symbol; what is defined is the sign of equality not followed by the letters "Df."
[22] Here the combination or disjunction is supposed to be given intensionally. If given extensionally (i.e. by enumeration), no assumption is required; but in this case the number of predicates concerned must be finite.
[23] "Una questione sui numeri transfiniti," Rendiconti del circolo matematico di Palermo, Vol. XI. (1897). See *256.
[24] This contradiction was suggested to us by Mr G. G. Berry of the Bodleian Library.
[25]
is the number of finite integers. See
*123.
[26] Cf. König, "Ueber die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre und das Kontinuumproblem," Math. Annalen, Vol. LXI. (1905); A. C. Dixon, "On 'well-ordered' aggregates," Proc. London Math. Soc. Series 2, Vol. IV. Part i. (1906); and E. W. Hobson, "On the Arithmetic Continuum," ibid. The solution offered in the last of these papers depends upon the variation of the "apparatus of definition," and is thus in outline in agreement with the solution adopted here. But it does not invalidate the statement in the text, if "definition" is given a constant meaning.
[27] Cf. Poincaré, "Les mathématiques et la logique," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Mai 1906, especially sections VII. and IX.; also Peano, Revista de Mathematica, Vol. VIII. No. 5 (1906), p. 149 ff.
[28] The solution of Burali-Forti's paradox by means of the theory of types is given in detail in *256.
[Pg 69]
(1) Descriptions. By an "incomplete" symbol we mean a symbol
which is not supposed to have any meaning in isolation, but is only
defined in certain contexts. In ordinary mathematics, for example,
and
are incomplete symbols: something
has to be supplied before we have anything significant. Such symbols
have what may be called a "definition in use." Thus if we put
we define the use of
, but
by itself
remains without meaning. This distinguishes such symbols from what
(in a generalized sense) we may call proper names: "Socrates,"
for example, stands for a certain man, and therefore has a meaning by
itself, without the need of any context. If we supply a context, as
in "Socrates is mortal," these words express a fact of which Socrates
himself is a constituent: there is a certain object, namely Socrates,
which does have the property of mortality, and this object is a
constituent of the complex fact which we assert when we say "Socrates
is mortal." But in other cases, this simple analysis fails us. Suppose
we say: "The round square does not exist." It seems plain that this is
a true proposition, yet we cannot regard it as denying the existence
of a certain object called "the round square." For if there were such
an object, it would exist: we cannot first assume that there is a
certain object, and then proceed to deny that there is such an object.
Whenever the grammatical subject of a proposition can be supposed not
to exist without rendering the proposition meaningless, it is plain
that the grammatical subject is not a proper name, i.e. not a
name directly representing some object. Thus in all such cases, the
proposition must be capable of being so analysed that what was the
grammatical subject shall have disappeared. Thus when we say "the round
square does not exist," we may, as a first attempt at such analysis,
substitute "it is false that there is an object
which is both
round and square." Generally, when "the so-and-so" is said not to
exist, we have a proposition of the form[29]
[Pg 70]
or some equivalent. Here the apparent grammatical subject
has completely disappeared; thus in
"
,"
is an
incomplete symbol.
By an extension of the above argument, it can easily be shown that
is always an incomplete symbol. Take,
for example, the following proposition: "Scott is the author of
Waverley." [Here "the author of Waverley" is
.]
This proposition expresses an identity; thus if "the
author of Waverley" could be taken as a proper name, and supposed to
stand for some object
, the proposition would be "Scott is
."
But if
is any one except Scott, this proposition is false; while
if
is Scott, the proposition is "Scott is Scott," which is
trivial, and plainly different from "Scott is the author of Waverley."
Generalizing, we see that the proposition
is one which may be true or may be false, but is never merely trivial,
like
; whereas, if
were a proper name,
would necessarily be either false or the same
as the trivial proposition
. We may express this by saying
that
is not a value of the propositional
function
, from which it follows that
is not
a value of
. But since
may be anything, it follows that
(
is nothing. Hence, since in use it has meaning, it
must be an incomplete symbol.
It might be suggested that "Scott is the author of Waverley" asserts that "Scott" and "the author of Waverley" are two names for the same object. But a little reflection will show that this would be a mistake. For if that were the meaning of "Scott is the author of Waverley," what would be required for its truth would be that Scott should have been called the author of Waverley: if he had been so called, the proposition would be true, even if some one else had written Waverley; while if no one called him so, the proposition would be false, even if he had written Waverley. But in fact he was the author of Waverley at a time when no one called him so, and he would not have been the author if every one had called him so but some one else had written Waverley. Thus the proposition "Scott is the author of Waverley" is not a proposition about names, like "Napoleon is Bonaparte"; and this illustrates the sense in which "the author of Waverley" differs from a true proper name.
[Pg 71]
Thus all phrases (other than propositions) containing the word the (in the singular) are incomplete symbols: they have a meaning in use, but not in isolation. For "the author of Waverley" cannot mean the same as "Scott," or "Scott is the author of Waverley" would mean the same as "Scott is Scott," which it plainly does not; nor can "the author of Waverley" mean anything other than "Scott," or "Scott is the author of Waverley" would be false. Hence "the author of Waverley" means nothing.
It follows from the above that we must not attempt to define
"(," but must define the uses of this symbol,
i.e. the propositions in whose symbolic expression it occurs.
Now in seeking to define the uses of this symbol, it is important to
observe the import of propositions in which it occurs. Take as an
illustration: "The author of Waverley was a poet." This implies (1)
that Waverley was written, (2) that it was written by one man, and not
in collaboration, (3) that the one man who wrote it was a poet. If
any one of these fails, the proposition is false. Thus "the author of
'Slawkenburgius on Noses' was a poet" is false, because no such book
was ever written; "the author of 'The Maid's Tragedy' was a poet" is
false, because this play was written by Beaumont and Fletcher jointly.
These two possibilities of falsehood do not arise if we say "Scott was
a poet." Thus our interpretation of the uses of
must be such as to allow for them. Now taking
to replace
"
wrote Waverley," it is plain that any statement apparently about
(
requires (1) (
and (2)
; here (1) states that at
least one object satisfies
, while (2) states that at most
one object satisfies
. The two together are equivalent to
Thus "
" must be part of what is affirmed
by any proposition about (
. If our proposition is
, what is further affirmed is
, if
. Thus we have
i.e. "the
satisfying
satisfies
" is to
mean: "There is an object
such that
is true when,
and only when,
is
, and
is true," or, more exactly:
"There is a
such that '
' is always equivalent to
'
is
,' and
." In this, "
" has
completely disappeared; thus "
" is merely symbolic,
and does not directly represent an object, as single small Latin
letters are assumed to do[30].
The proposition "" is easily shown to be
equivalent to "
." For, by the
definition, it is
i.e. "there is a
for which
,
and this
is
," which is equivalent to "
."
Thus "Scott is the author of Waverley" is equivalent to:
i.e. "
wrote Waverley" is true when
is Scott and
false when
is not Scott.
Thus although "" has no meaning by itself, it may be
substituted for
in any propositional function
, and we get
a significant proposition, though not a value of
.
[Pg 72]
When , as above defined, forms part of some
other proposition, we shall say that (
has a
secondary occurrence. When (
has a secondary
occurrence, a proposition in which it occurs may be true even when
(
does not exist. This applies, e.g. to the
proposition: "There is no such person as the King of France." We may
interpret this as
if "
" stands for "
is King of France." In either case,
what is asserted is that a proposition
in which (
occurs is false, and this proposition
is thus part of a
larger proposition. The same applies to such a proposition as the
following: "If France were a monarchy, the King of France would be of
the House of Orleans."
It should be observed that such a proposition as
is ambiguous; it may deny
, in which case it
will be true if (
does not exist, or it may mean
in which case it can only be true if (
exists. In
ordinary language, the latter interpretation would usually be adopted.
For example, the proposition "the King of France is not bald" would
usually be rejected as false, being held to mean "the King of France
exists and is not bald," rather than "it is false that the King of
France exists and is bald." When (
exists, the two
interpretations of the ambiguity give equivalent results; but when
(
does not exist, one interpretation is true and
one is false. It is necessary to be able to distinguish these in our
notation; and generally, if we have such propositions as
[Pg 73]and so on, we must be able by our notation to distinguish whether the
whole or only part of the proposition concerned is to be treated as the
"
" of our definition. For this purpose, we will
put "[(
]" followed by dots at the beginning of the
part (or whole) which is to be taken as
, the
dots being sufficiently numerous to bracket off the
;
i.e.
is to be everything
following the dots until we reach an equal number of dots not
signifying a logical product, or a greater number signifying a logical
product, or the end of the sentence, or the end of a bracket enclosing
"[(
]." Thus
It is important to distinguish these two, for if (
does not exist, the first is true and the second false. Again
Here again, when (
does not exist, the first is false
and the second true.
In order to avoid this ambiguity in propositions containing
(, we amend our definition, or rather our notation,
putting
By means of this definition, we avoid any doubt as to the portion
of our whole asserted proposition which is to be treated as the
"
" of the definition. This portion will be called
the scope of (
. Thus in
the scope of (
is
; but in
the scope is
; but in
It will be seen that when ( has the whole of the
proposition concerned for its scope, the proposition concerned cannot
be true unless
; but when (
has only part of the proposition concerned for its scope, it may
often be true even when (
does not exist. It will be
seen further that when
, we may enlarge or
diminish the scope of (
as much as we please without
altering the truth-value of any proposition in which it occurs.
If a proposition contains two descriptions, say ( and
(
, we have to distinguish which of them has the larger
scope, i.e. we have to distinguish
[Pg 74]
The first of these, eliminating (, becomes
which, eliminating (
becomes
and the same proposition results if, in (1), we eliminate first
(
and then (
. Similarly (2) becomes,
when (
and (
are eliminated,
(4) and (5) are equivalent, so that the truth-value of a proposition containing two descriptions is independent of the question which has the larger scope.
It will be found that, in most cases in which descriptions occur, their
scope is, in practice, the smallest proposition enclosed in dots or
other brackets in which they are contained. Thus for example
will occur much more frequently than
For this reason it is convenient to decide that, when the scope of an
occurrence of (
is the smallest proposition, enclosed
in dots or other brackets, in which the occurrence in question is
contained, the scope need not be indicated by "[(
]."
Thus e.g.
This convention enables us, in the vast majority of cases that actually
occur, to dispense with the explicit indication of the scope of a
descriptive symbol; and it will be found that the convention agrees
very closely with the tacit conventions of ordinary language on this
subject. Thus for example, if "(" is "the so-and-so,"
"
" is to be read "
is not the so-and-so,"
which would ordinarily be regarded as implying that "the so-and-so"
exists; but "
" is to be read "it is not
true that
is the so-and-so," which would generally be allowed
to hold if "the so-and-so" does not exist. Ordinary language is, of
course, rather loose and fluctuating in its implications on this
matter; but subject to the requirement of definiteness, our convention
seems to keep as near to ordinary language as possible.
[Pg 75]
In the case when the smallest proposition enclosed in dots or
other brackets contains two or more descriptions, we shall assume,
in the absence of any indication to the contrary, that one which
typographically occurs earlier has a larger scope than one which
typographically occurs later. Thus
These two propositions are easily shown to be equivalent.
(2) Classes. The symbols for classes, like those for descriptions, are, in our system, incomplete symbols: their uses are defined, but they themselves are not assumed to mean anything at all. That is to say, the uses of such symbols are so defined that, when the definiens is substituted for the definiendum, there no longer remains any symbol which could be supposed to represent a class. Thus classes, so far as we introduce them, are merely symbolic or linguistic conveniences, not genuine objects as their members are if they are individuals.
It is an old dispute whether formal logic should concern itself mainly with intensions or with extensions. In general, logicians whose training was mainly philosophical have decided for intensions, while those whose training was mainly mathematical have decided for extensions. The facts seem to be that, while mathematical logic requires extensions, philosophical logic refuses to supply anything except intensions. Our theory of classes recognizes and reconciles these two apparently opposite facts, by showing that an extension (which is the same as a class) is an incomplete symbol, whose use always acquires its meaning through a reference to intension.
In the case of descriptions, it was possible to prove that they are incomplete symbols. In the case of classes, we do not know of any equally definite proof, though arguments of more or less cogency can be elicited from the ancient problem of the One and the Many[31]. It is not necessary for our purposes, however, to assert dogmatically that there are no such things as classes. It is only necessary for us to show that the incomplete symbols which we introduce as representatives of classes yield all the propositions for the sake of which classes might be thought essential. When this has been shown, the mere principle of economy of primitive ideas leads to the non-introduction of classes except as incomplete symbols.
[Pg 76]
To explain the theory of classes, it is necessary first to explain the distinction between extensional and intensional functions. This is effected by the following definitions:
The truth-value of a proposition is truth if it is true, and falsehood if it is false. (This expression is due to Frege.)
Two propositions are said to be equivalent when they have the same truth-value, i.e. when they are both true or both false.
Two propositional functions are said to be formally equivalent
when they are equivalent with every possible argument, i.e.
when any argument which satisfies the one satisfies the other, and
vice versa. Thus " is a man" is formally equivalent to
"
is a featherless biped"; "
is an even prime" is
formally equivalent to "
is identical with 2."
A function of a function is called extensional when its
truth-value with any argument is the same as with any formally
equivalent argument. That is to say, is an
extensional function of
if, provided
is formally equivalent to
,
is equivalent to
. Here the apparent
variables
and
are necessarily of the type from which
arguments can significantly be supplied to
. We find no need to
use as apparent variables any functions of non-predicative types;
accordingly in the sequel all extensional functions considered are in
fact functions of predicative functions[32].
A function of a function is called intensional when it is not extensional.
The nature and importance of the distinction between intensional and
extensional functions will be made clearer by some illustrations. The
proposition "' is a man' always implies '
is a mortal'" is an
extensional function of the function "
is a man," because we
may substitute, for "
is a man," "
is a featherless biped,"
or any other statement which applies to the same objects to which
"
is a man" applies, and to no others. But the proposition "
believes that '
is a man' always implies '
is a mortal'"
is an intensional function of "
is a man," because
may never have considered the question whether featherless bipeds
are mortal, or may believe wrongly that there are featherless bipeds
which are not mortal. Thus even if "
is a featherless biped" is
formally equivalent to "
is a man," it by no means follows that
a person who believes that all men are mortal must believe that all
featherless bipeds are mortal, since he may have never thought about
featherless bipeds, or have supposed that featherless bipeds were not
always men. Again the proposition "the number of arguments that satisfy
the function
is
" is an extensional function
of
, because its truth or falsehood is unchanged
if we substitute for
any other function which is
true whenever
is true, and false whenever
is false. But the proposition "
asserts that the number
of arguments satisfying
is n" is an intensional
function of
,[Pg 77] since, if
asserts this
concerning
, he certainly cannot assert it concerning
all predicative functions that are equivalent to
,
because life is too short. Again, consider the proposition "two white
men claim to have reached the North Pole." This proposition states
"two arguments satisfy the function '
is a white man who
claims to have reached the North Pole.'" The truth or falsehood of this
proposition is unaffected if we substitute for "
is a white
man who claims to have reached the North Pole" any other statement
which holds of the same arguments, and of no others. Hence it is an
extensional function. But the proposition "it is a strange coincidence
that two white men should claim to have reached the North Pole," which
states "it is a strange coincidence that two arguments should satisfy
the function '
is a white man who claims to have reached
the North Pole,'" is not equivalent to "it is a strange coincidence
that two arguments should satisfy the function '
is Dr Cook
or Commander Peary.'" Thus "it is a strange coincidence that
should be satisfied by two arguments" is an intensional
function of
.
The above instances illustrate the fact that the functions of functions with which mathematics is specially concerned are extensional, and that intensional functions of functions only occur where non-mathematical ideas are introduced, such as what somebody believes or affirms, or the emotions aroused by some fact. Hence it is natural, in a mathematical logic, to lay special stress on extensional functions of functions.
When two functions are formally equivalent, we may say that they
have the same extension. In this definition, we are in close
agreement with usage. We do not assume that there is such a thing
as an extension: we merely define the whole phrase "having the same
extension." We may now say that an extensional function of a function
is one whose truth or falsehood depends only upon the extension of its
argument. In such a case, it is convenient to regard the statement
concerned as being about the extension. Since extensional functions are
many and important, it is natural to regard the extension as an object,
called a class, which is supposed to be the subject of all the
equivalent statements about various formally equivalent functions. Thus
e.g. if we say "there were twelve Apostles," it is natural to
regard this statement as attributing the property of being twelve to
a certain collection of men, namely those who were Apostles, rather
than as attributing the property of being satisfied by twelve arguments
to the function " was an Apostle." This view is encouraged
by the feeling that there is something which is identical in the case
of two functions which "have the same extension." And if we take such
simple problems as "how many combinations can be made of
things?"
it seems at first sight necessary that each "combination" should be a
single object which can be counted as one. This, however, is certainly
not necessary technically, and we see no reason to suppose that it is
true[Pg 78] philosophically. The technical procedure by which the apparent
difficulty is overcome is as follows.
We have seen that an extensional function of a function may be regarded
as a function of the class determined by the argument-function, but
that an intensional function cannot be so regarded. In order to
obviate the necessity of giving different treatment to intensional
and extensional functions of functions, we construct an extensional
function derived from any function of a predicative function ,
and having the property of being equivalent to the function
from which it is derived, provided this function is extensional,
as well as the property of being significant (by the help of the
systematic ambiguity of equivalence) with any argument
whose arguments are of the same type as those of
. The
derived function, written "
," is defined as
follows: Given a function
), our derived function
is to be "there is a predicative function which is formally equivalent
to
and satisfies
." If
is a
predicative function, our derived function will be true whenever
) is true. If
) is an extensional
function, and
is a predicative function, our derived
function will not be true unless
) is true; thus in
this case, our derived function is equivalent to
).
If
) is not an extensional function, and if
is a predicative function, our derived function may sometimes
be true when the original function is false. But in any case the
derived function is always extensional.
In order that the derived function should be significant for any
function , of whatever order, provided it takes
arguments of the right type, it is necessary and sufficient that
) should be significant, where
is any predicative function. The reason of this is that we
only require, concerning an argument
, the hypothesis
that it is formally equivalent to some predicative function
, and formal equivalence has the same kind of systematic
ambiguity as to type that belongs to truth and falsehood, and can
therefore hold between functions of any two different orders,
provided the functions take arguments of the same type. Thus by means
of our derived function we have not merely provided extensional
functions everywhere in place of intensional functions, but we have
practically removed the necessity for considering differences of
type among functions whose arguments are of the same type. This effects
the same kind of simplification in our hierarchy as would result from
never considering any but predicative functions.
If ) can be built up by means of the primitive ideas
of disjunction, negation, (
, and (
,
as is the case with all the functions of functions that explicitly
occur in the present work, it will be found that, in virtue of the
systematic ambiguity of the above primitive ideas, any function
whose arguments are of the same type as those of
can significantly be substituted for
in f without any other symbolic change. Thus in[Pg 79] such a case what
is symbolically, though not really, the same function
can
receive as arguments functions of various different types. If, with
a given argument
, the function
),
so interpreted, is equivalent to
) whenever
is formally equivalent to
, then
is equivalent to
) provided
there is any predicative function formally equivalent to
. At this point, we make use of the axiom of reducibility,
according to which there always is a predicative function formally
equivalent to
.
As was explained above, it is convenient to regard an extensional
function of a function as having for its argument not the function, but
the class determined by the function. Now we have seen that our derived
function is always extensional. Hence if our original function was
), we write the derived function
,
where "
)" may be read "the class of arguments
which satisfy
," or more simply "the class determined
by
." Thus "
" will mean:
"There is a predicative function
which is formally
equivalent to
and is such that
)
is true." This is in reality a function of
, but we
treat it symbolically as if it had an argument
).
By the help of the axiom of reducibility, we find that the usual
properties of classes result. For example, two formally equivalent
functions determine the same class, and conversely, two functions which
determine the same class are formally equivalent. Also to say that
is a member of
), i.e. of the class
determined by
, is true when
is true, and
false when
is false. Thus all the mathematical purposes for
which classes might seem to be required are fulfilled by the purely
symbolic objects
) provided we assume the axiom of
reducibility.
[Pg 80]
In virtue of the axiom of reducibility, if is
any function, there is a formally equivalent predicative function
; then the class
) is identical
with the class
), so that every class can be
defined by a predicative function. Hence the totality of
the classes to which a given term can be significantly said
to belong or not to belong is a legitimate totality, although the
totality of functions which a given term can be significantly
said to satisfy or not to satisfy is not a legitimate totality. The
classes to which a given term
belongs or does not belong are
the classes defined by
-functions; they are also the classes
defined by predicative
-functions. Let us call them
-classes. Then "
-classes" form a legitimate totality, derived
from that of predicative
-functions. Hence many kinds of general
statements become possible which would otherwise involve vicious-circle
paradoxes. These general statements are none of them such as lead to
contradictions, and many of them such as it is very hard to suppose
illegitimate. The fact that they are rendered possible by the axiom
of reducibility, and that they would otherwise be excluded by the
vicious-circle principle, is to be regarded as an argument in favour of
the axiom of reducibility.
The above definition of "the class defined by the function ,"
or rather, of any proposition in which this phrase occurs,
is, in symbols, as follows:
In order to recommend this definition, we shall enumerate five
requisites which a definition of classes must satisfy, and we shall
then show that the above definition satisfies these five requisites.
We require of classes, if they are to serve the purposes for which
they are commonly employed, that they shall have certain properties,
which may be enumerated as follows. (1) Every propositional function
must determine a class, which may be regarded as the collection of
all the arguments satisfying the function in question. This principle
must hold when the function is satisfied by an infinite number of
arguments as well as when it is satisfied by a finite number. It
must hold also when no arguments satisfy the function; i.e.
the "null-class" must be just as good a class as any other. (2) Two
propositional functions which are formally equivalent, i.e. such
that any argument which satisfies either satisfies the other, must
determine the same class; that is to say, a class must be something
wholly determined by its membership, so that e.g. the class
"featherless bipeds" is identical with the class "men," and the class
"even primes" is identical with the class "numbers identical with 2."
(3) Conversely, two propositional functions which determine the same
class must be formally equivalent; in other words, when the class is
given, the membership is determinate: two different sets of objects
cannot yield the same class. (4) In the same sense in which there are
classes (whatever this sense may be), or in some closely analogous
sense, there must also be classes of classes. Thus for example "the
combinations of things
at a time," where the
things
form a given class, is a class of classes; each combination of
things is a class, and each such class is a member of the specified
set of combinations, which set is therefore a class whose members are
classes. Again, the class of unit classes, or of couples, is absolutely
indispensable; the former is the number 1, the latter the number 2.
Thus without classes of classes, arithmetic becomes impossible. (5)
It must under all circumstances be meaningless to suppose a class
identical with one of its own members. For if such a supposition
had any meaning, "
" would be a significant
propositional function[33], and so would "
."
Hence, by (1) and (4), there would be a class of all classes satisfying
the function "
." If we call this class
, we shall have
Since, by our hypothesis, "
" is supposed
significant, the above equivalence, which holds with all possible
values of
, holds with the value
, i.e.
[Pg 81]
But this is a contradiction[34]. Hence "
" and
"
" must always be meaningless. In general,
there is nothing surprising about this conclusion, but it has two
consequences which deserve special notice. In the first place, a class
consisting of only one member must not be identical with that one
member, i.e. we must not have
. For we have
,
and therefore, if
, we have
,
which, we saw, must be meaningless. It follows that
"
" must be absolutely meaningless, not simply false. In
the second place, it might appear as if the class of all classes were
a class, i.e. as if (writing "Cls" for "class") "
"
were a true proposition. But this combination of symbols must be
meaningless; unless, indeed, an ambiguity exists in the meaning of
"Cls," so that, in "
," the first "Cls"
can be supposed to have a different meaning from the second.
As regards the above requisites, it is plain, to begin with, that,
in accordance with our definition, every propositional function
determines a class
). Assuming
the axiom of reducibility, there must always be true propositions
about
), i.e. true propositions of the form
. For suppose
is formally
equivalent to
, and suppose
satisfies
some function
. Then
) also satisfies
.
Hence, given any function
, there are true propositions
of the form
, i.e. true propositions in
which "the class determined by
" is grammatically the
subject. This shows that our definition fulfils the first of our five
requisites.
The second and third requisites together demand that the classes
) and
) should be identical when,
and only when, their defining functions are formally equivalent,
i.e. that we should have
Here the meaning of "
=
" is to
be derived, by means of a two-fold application of the definition of
, from the definition of
by the general definition of identity.
In interpreting "," we will adopt
the convention which we adopted in regard to (
) and
(
, namely that the incomplete symbol which occurs
first is to have the larger scope. Thus
becomes, by our definition,
which, by eliminating
), becomes
which is equivalent to
[Pg 82]
which, again, is equivalent to
which, in virtue of the axiom of reducibility, is equivalent to
Thus our definition of the use of
is such as to
satisfy the conditions (2) and (3) which we laid down for classes,
i.e. we have
Before considering classes of classes, it will be well to define
membership of a class, i.e. to define the symbol ","
which may be read "
is a member of the
class determined by
." Since this is a function of the
form
, it must be derived, by means of our
general definition of such functions, from the corresponding function
. We therefore put
This definition is only needed in order to give a meaning to
"
"; the meaning it gives is, in virtue of the
definition of
,
It thus appears that "
" implies
,
since it implies
, and
is equivalent to
;
also, in virtue of the axiom of reducibility,
implies
"
," since there is a predicative function
formally equivalent to
, and
must satisfy
, since
(ex hypothesi) satisfies
. Thus in
virtue of the axiom of reducibility we have
i.e.
is a member of the class
when,
and only when,
satisfies the function
which defines the
class.
We have next to consider how to interpret a class of classes. As we
have defined , we shall naturally regard a
class of classes as consisting of those values of
which satisfy
. Let us write
for
; then we may write
for
the class of values of
which satisfy
[35]. We
shall apply the same definition, and put
where "
" stands for any expression of the form
.
Let us take "" as an instance of
. Then
Just as we put
so we put
Thus we find
[Pg 83]
If we now extend the axiom of reducibility so as to apply to functions
of functions, i.e. if we assume
we easily deduce
Thus every function which can take classes as arguments, i.e. every function of functions, determines a class of classes, whose members are those classes which satisfy the determining function. Thus the theory of classes of classes offers no difficulty.
We have next to consider our fifth requisite, namely that
")" is to be meaningless. Applying
our definition of
, we find that if this
collection of symbols had a meaning, it would mean
i.e. in virtue of the definition
But here the symbol "
" occurs, which assigns a
function as argument to itself. Such a symbol is always meaningless,
for the reasons explained at the beginning of Chapter II (pp. 41-43).
Hence "
" is meaningless, and our
fifth and last requisite is fulfilled.
As in the case of ), so in that of
,
there is an ambiguity as to the scope of
if it occurs in a proposition which itself is part of a larger
proposition. But in the case of classes, since we always have the axiom
of reducibility, namely
which takes the place of
, it follows that the
truth-value of any proposition in which
occurs is
the same whatever scope we may give to
, provided
the proposition is an extensional function of whatever functions it
may contain. Hence we may adopt the convention that the scope is to be
always the smallest proposition enclosed in dots or brackets in which
occurs. If at any time a larger scope is required,
we may indicate it by "[
]" followed by dots, in the
same way as we did for
.
[Pg 84]
Similarly when two class symbols occur, e.g. in a proposition
of the form , we need not
remember rules for the scopes of the two symbols, since all choices
give equivalent results, as it is easy to prove. For the preliminary
propositions a rule is desirable, so we can decide that the class
symbol which occurs first in the order of writing is to have the larger
scope.
The representation of a class by a single letter can now
be understood. For the denotation of
is ambiguous, in so
far as it is undecided as to which of the symbols
,
,
, etc. it is to stand for,
where
,
,
, etc. are
the various determining functions of the class. According to the choice
made, different propositions result. But all the resulting propositions
are equivalent by virtue of the easily proved proposition:
Hence unless we wish to discuss the determining function itself,
so that the notion of a class is really not properly present, the
ambiguity in the denotation of
is entirely immaterial,
though, as we shall see immediately, we are led to limit ourselves
to predicative determining functions. Thus "
," where
is a variable class, is really "
,"
where
is a variable function, that is, it is
where
is a variable function. But here a difficulty arises
which is removed by a limitation to our practice and by the axiom
of reducibility. For the determining functions
,
, etc. will be of different types, though the axiom
of reducibility secures that some are predicative functions. Then, in
interpreting
as a variable in terms of the variation of any
determining function, we shall be led into errors unless we confine
ourselves to predicative determining functions. These errors especially
arise in the transition to total variation (cf. pp. 15, 16). Accordingly
It is the peculiarity of a definition of the use of a single letter
[viz.
] for a variable incomplete symbol that it, though
in a sense a real variable, occurs only in the definiendum,
while "
," though a real variable, occurs only in the
definiens.
Thus "" stands for
and "(
" stands for
Accordingly, in mathematical reasoning, we can dismiss the whole
apparatus of functions and think only of classes as "quasi-things,"
capable of immediate representation by a single name. The advantages
are two-fold: (1) classes are determined by their membership, so that
to one set of members there is one class, (2) the "type" of a class is
entirely defined by the type of its members.
Also a predicative function of a class can be defined thus
Thus a predicative function of a class is always a predicative function of any
predicative determining function of the class, though the converse does not
hold.
[Pg 85]
(3) Relations. With regard to relations, we have a theory
strictly analogous to that which we have just explained as regards
classes. Relations in extension, like classes, are incomplete symbols.
We require a division of functions of two variables into predicative
and non-predicative functions, again for reasons which have been
explained in Chapter II. We use the notation "" for a
predicative function of
and
.
We use "" for the function as opposed to its
values; and we use "
" for the relation (in
extension) determined by
. We put
Thus even when
is not an extensional
function of
,
is an
extensional function of
. Hence, just as in the case of
classes, we deduce
i.e. a relation is determined by its extension, and vice versa.
On the analogy of the definition of "," we put[36]
This definition, like that of "," is not
introduced for its own sake, but in order to give a meaning to
This meaning, in virtue of our definitions, is
and this, in virtue of the axiom of reducibility
is equivalent to
.
Thus we have always
Whenever the determining function of a relation is not relevant, we may
replace by a single capital letter. In
virtue of the propositions given above,
Classes of relations, and relations of relations, can be dealt with as classes of classes were dealt with above.
[Pg 86]
Just as a class must not be capable of being or not being a member
of itself, so a relation must neither be nor not be referent or
relatum with respect to itself. This turns out to be equivalent to the
assertion that cannot significantly be either
of the arguments
or
in
. This principle, again,
results from the limitation to the possible arguments to a function
explained at the beginning of Chapter II.
We may sum up this whole discussion on incomplete symbols as follows.
The use of the symbol "(" as if in "
"
it directly represented an argument to the function
is rendered possible by the theorems
The use of the symbol "" (or of a single
letter, such as
, to represent such a symbol) as if, in
"
," it directly represented an argument
to a function
, is rendered possible by the
theorems
Throughout these propositions the types must be supposed to be properly adjusted, where ambiguity is possible.
The use of the symbol ""(or of a
single letter, such as
, to represent such a symbol) as if, in
"
," it directly represented an
argument
to a function
, is rendered possible by the
theorems
Throughout these propositions the types must be supposed to be properly
adjusted where ambiguity is possible.
[Pg 87]
It follows from these three groups of theorems that these incomplete symbols are obedient to the same formal rules of identity as symbols which directly represent objects, so long as we only consider the equivalence of the resulting variable (or constant) values of propositional functions and not their identity. This consideration of the identity of propositions never enters into our formal reasoning.
Similarly the limitations to the use of these symbols can be
summed up as follows. In the case of (, the chief way
in which its incompleteness is relevant is that we do not always have
i.e. a function which is always true may nevertheless not be
true of (
. This is possible because
is not a value of
, so that even when all values
of
are true,
may not be true. This
happens when (
does not exist. Thus for example we
have (
, but we do not have
is only valid when
. As soon as we know
, the fact that (
) is an
incomplete symbol becomes irrelevant so long as we confine ourselves
to truth-functions[37] of whatever proposition is its scope. But even
when
, the incompleteness of (
may be relevant when we pass outside truth-functions. For example,
George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley,
i.e. he wished to know whether a proposition of the form
"
" was true. But there was no proposition of the
form "
" concerning which he wished to know if it was true.
In regard to classes, the relevance of their incompleteness is somewhat
different. It may be illustrated by the fact that we may have
For, by a direct application of the definitions, we find that
Thus we shall have
but we shall not necessarily have
under these circumstances, for two functions may well be formally
equivalent without being identical; for example,
[Pg 88]
but the function "
=the author of Waverley" has the property
that George IV wished to know whether its value with the argument
"Scott" was true, whereas the function "
=Scott" has no such
property, and therefore the two functions are not identical. Hence
there is a propositional function, namely
which holds without any exception, and yet does not hold when for
we substitute a class, and for
and
we substitute functions.
This is only possible because a class is an incomplete symbol, and
therefore "
" is not a value of
"
."
It will be observed that "" is not
an extensional function of
. Thus the scope of
) is relevant in interpreting the product
If we take the whole of the product as the scope of
,
the product is equivalent to
[Pg 89]
We may say generally that the fact that ) is an
incomplete symbol is not relevant so long as we confine ourselves to
extensional functions of functions, but is apt to become relevant for
other functions of functions.
[30]
We shall generally write "" rather
than "
" in future.
[31] Briefly, these arguments reduce to the following: If there is such an object as a class, it must be in some sense one object. Yet it is only of classes that many can be predicated. Hence, if we admit classes as objects, we must suppose that the same object can be both one and many, which seems impossible.
[33]
As explained in Chapter I (pp. 25, 26), ""
means "
is a member of the class
," or, more shortly,
"
is an
." The definition of this expression in terms of
our theory of classes will be given shortly.
[34] This is the second of the contradictions discussed at the end of Chapter II.
[35]
The use of a single letter, such as or
, to represent a variable class, will be further explained
shortly.
[Pg 91]
IN this Part, we shall deal with such topics as belong traditionally to symbolic logic, or deserve to belong to it in virtue of their generality. We shall, that is to say, establish such properties of propositions, propositional functions, classes and relations as are likely to be required in any mathematical reasoning, and not merely in this or that branch of mathematics.
The subjects treated in Part I may be viewed in two aspects: (1) as a deductive chain depending on the primitive propositions, (2) as a formal calculus. Taking the first view first: We begin, in *1, with certain axioms as to deduction of one proposition or asserted propositional function from another. From these primitive propositions, in Section A, we deduce various propositions which are all concerned with four ways of obtaining new propositions from given propositions, namely negation, disjunction, joint assertion and implication, of which the last two can be defined in terms of the first two. Throughout this first section, although, as will be shown at the beginning of Section B, our propositions, symbolically unchanged, will apply to any propositions as values of our variables, yet it will be supposed that our variable propositions are all what we shall call elementary propositions, i.e. such as contain no reference, explicit or implicit, to any totality. This restriction is imposed on account of the distinction between different types of propositions, explained in Chapter II of the Introduction. Its importance and purpose, however, are purely philosophical, and so long as only mathematical purposes are considered, it is unnecessary to remember this preliminary restriction to elementary propositions, which is symbolically removed at the beginning of the next section.
Section B deals, to begin with, with the relations of propositions
containing apparent variables (i.e. involving the notions of
"all" or "some") to each other and to propositions not containing
apparent variables. We show that, where propositions containing
apparent variables are concerned, we can define negation, disjunction,
joint assertion and implication in such a way that their properties
shall be exactly analogous to the properties of the corresponding ideas
as applied to elementary propositions. We show also that formal
implication, i.e. ""
considered as a relation of
to
, has
many properties analogous to those of material implication,
i.e. "
"[Pg 92] considered as a relation of
and
. We then consider predicative functions and the
axiom of reducibility, which are vital in the employment of
functions as apparent variables. An example of such employment
is afforded by identity, which is the next topic considered
in Section B. Finally, this section deals with descriptions,
i.e. phrases of the form "the so-and-so" (in the singular). It
is shown that the appearance of a grammatical subject "the so-and-so"
is deceptive, and that such propositions, fully stated, contain no such
subject, but contain instead an apparent variable.
Section C deals with classes, and with relations in so far as they are analogous to classes. Classes and relations, like descriptions, are shown to be "incomplete symbols" (cf. Introduction, Chapter III), and it is shown that a proposition which is grammatically about a class is to be regarded as really concerned with a propositional function and an apparent variable whose values are predicative propositional functions (with a similar result for relations). The remainder of Section C deals with the calculus of classes, and with the calculus of relations in so far as it is analogous to that of classes.
Section D deals with those properties of relations which have no analogues for classes. In this section, a number of ideas and notations are introduced which are constantly needed throughout the rest of the work. Most of the properties of relations which have analogues in the theory of classes are comparatively unimportant, while those that have no such analogues are of the very greatest utility. It is partly for this reason that emphasis on the calculus-aspect of symbolic logic has proved a hindrance, hitherto, to the proper development of the theory of relations.
Section E, finally, extends the notions of the addition and multiplication of classes or relations to cases where the summands or factors are not individually given, but are given as the members of some class. The advantage obtained by this extension is that it enables us to deal with an infinite number of summands or factors.
Considered as a formal calculus, mathematical logic has three analogous
branches, namely (1) the calculus of propositions, (2) the calculus of
classes, (3) the calculus of relations. Of these, (1) is dealt with
in Section A, while (2) and (3), in so far as they are analogous, are
dealt with in Section C. We have, for each of the three, the four
analogous ideas of negation, addition, multiplication, and implication
or inclusion. Of these, negation is analogous to the negative in
ordinary algebra, and implication or inclusion is analogous to the
relation "less than or equal to" in ordinary algebra. But the analogy
must not be pressed, as it has important limitations. The sum of two
propositions is their disjunction, the sum of two classes is the
class of terms belonging to one or other, the sum of two relations
is the relation consisting in the fact that one or other of the two
relations holds. The sum of a class of classes is the class of all
terms belonging to some one or other of the classes, and the sum of a
class of relations is the relation consisting in the fact that some
one relation of the class holds. The product of two propositions is
their joint assertion, the product of two classes is their common
part, the product of two relations is the relation consisting in the
fact that both the relations hold. The product of a class of classes
is the part common to all of them, and the product of a class of
relations is the relation consisting in the fact that all relations
of the class in question hold. The inclusion of one class in another
consists in the fact that all members of the one are members of the
other, while the inclusion of one relation in another consists in the
fact that every pair of terms which has the one relation also has the
other relation. It is then shown that the properties of negation,
addition, multiplication and inclusion are exactly analogous for
classes and relations, and are, with certain exceptions, analogous to
the properties of negation, addition, multiplication and implication
for propositions. (The exceptions arise chiefly from the fact that
" implies
" is itself a proposition, and can therefore imply
and be implied, while "
is contained in
," where
and
are classes, is not a class, and can therefore
neither contain nor be contained in another class
.) But
classes have certain properties not possessed by propositions: these
arise from the fact that classes have not a two-fold division
corresponding to the division of propositions into true and false, but
a threefold division, namely into (1) the universal class, which
contains the whole of a certain type, (2) the null-class, which has
no members, (3) all other classes, which neither contain nothing nor
contain everything of the appropriate type. The resulting properties
of classes, which are not analogous to properties of propositions, are
dealt with in *24. And just as classes have properties not analogous
to any properties of propositions, so relations have properties not
analogous to any properties of classes, though all the properties of
classes have analogues among relations. The special properties of
relations are much more numerous and important than the properties
belonging to classes but not to propositions. These special properties
of relations therefore occupy a whole section, namely Section D.
[Pg 94]
THE purpose of the present section is to set forth the first stage of the deduction of pure mathematics from its logical foundations. This first stage is necessarily concerned with deduction itself, i.e. with the principles by which conclusions are inferred from premisses. If it is our purpose to make all our assumptions explicit, and to effect the deduction of all our other propositions from these assumptions, it is obvious that the first assumptions we need are those that are required to make deduction possible. Symbolic logic is often regarded as consisting of two coordinate parts, the theory of classes and the theory of propositions. But from our point of view these two parts are not coordinate; for in the theory of classes we deduce one proposition from another by means of principles belonging to the theory of propositions, whereas in the theory of propositions we nowhere require the theory of classes. Hence, in a deductive system, the theory of propositions necessarily precedes the theory of classes.
But the subject to be treated in what follows is not quite properly
described as the theory of propositions. It is in fact the
theory of how one proposition can be inferred from another. Now
in order that one proposition may be inferred from another, it is
necessary that the two should have that relation which makes the one
a consequence of the other. When a proposition is a consequence
of a proposition
, we say that
implies
. Thus
deduction depends upon the relation of implication, and every deductive
system must contain among its premisses as many of the properties of
implication as are necessary to legitimate the ordinary procedure of
deduction. In the present section, certain propositions will be stated
as premisses, and it will be shown that they are sufficient for all
common forms of inference. It will not be shown that they are all
necessary, and it is possible that the number of them might
be diminished. All that is affirmed concerning the premisses is (1)
that they are true, (2) that they are sufficient for the theory of
deduction, (3) that we do not know how to diminish their number. But
with regard to (2), there must always be some element of doubt, since
it is hard to be sure that one never uses some principle unconsciously.
The habit of being rigidly guided by formal symbolic rules is a
safeguard against unconscious assumptions; but even this safeguard is
not always adequate.
[Pg 95]
Since all definitions of terms are effected by means of other terms, every system of definitions which is not circular must start from a certain apparatus of undefined terms. It is to some extent optional what ideas we take as undefined in mathematics; the motives guiding our choice will be (1) to make the number of undefined ideas as small as possible, (2) as between two systems in which the number is equal, to choose the one which seems the simpler and easier. We know no way of proving that such and such a system of undefined ideas contains as few as will give such and such results[38]. Hence we can only say that such and such ideas are undefined in such and such a system, not that they are indefinable. Following Peano, we shall call the undefined ideas and the undemonstrated propositions primitive ideas and primitive propositions respectively. The primitive ideas are explained by means of descriptions intended to point out to the reader what is meant; but the explanations do not constitute definitions, because they really involve the ideas they explain.
In the present number, we shall first enumerate the primitive ideas required in this section; then we shall define implication; and then we shall enunciate the primitive propositions required in this section. Every definition or proposition in the work has a number, for purposes of reference. Following Peano, we use numbers having a decimal as well as an integral part, in order to be able to insert new propositions between any two. A change in the integral part of the number will be used to correspond to a new chapter. Definitions will generally have numbers whose decimal part is less than ·1, and will be usually put at the beginning of chapters. In references, the integral parts of the numbers of propositions will be distinguished by being preceded by a star; thus "*1·01" will mean the definition or proposition so numbered, and "*1" will mean the chapter in which propositions have numbers whose integral part is 1, i.e. the present chapter. Chapters will generally be called "numbers."
PRIMITIVE IDEAS.
(1) Elementary propositions. By an "elementary" proposition
we mean one which does not involve any variables, or, in other
language, one which does not involve such words as "all," "some,"
"the" or equivalents for such words. A proposition such as "this
is red," where "this" is something given[Pg 96] in sensation, will be
elementary. Any combination of given elementary propositions by means
of negation, disjunction or conjunction (see below) will be elementary.
In the primitive propositions of the present number, and therefore
in the deductions from these primitive propositions in *2—*5, the
letters ,
,
,
will be used to denote elementary
propositions.
(2) Elementary propositional functions. By an "elementary
propositional function" we shall mean an expression containing an
undetermined constituent, i.e. a variable, or several such
constituents, and such that, when the undetermined constituent or
constituents are determined, i.e. when values are assigned to
the variable or variables, the resulting value of the expression in
question is an elementary proposition. Thus if is an undetermined
elementary proposition, "not-
" is an elementary propositional
function.
We shall show in *9 how to extend the results of this and the following numbers (*1—*5) to propositions which are not elementary.
(3) Assertion. Any proposition may be either asserted or
merely considered. If I say "Caesar died," I assert the proposition
"Caesar died," if I say "'Caesar died' is a proposition," I make a
different assertion, and "Caesar died" is no longer asserted, but
merely considered. Similarly in a hypothetical proposition, e.g.
"if , then
," we have two unasserted propositions,
namely "
" and "
," while what is asserted is that
the first of these implies the second. In language, we indicate
when a proposition is merely considered by "if so-and-so" or
"that so-and-so" or merely by inverted commas. In symbols, if
is a proposition,
by itself will stand for the unasserted
proposition, while the asserted proposition will be designated by
The sign "
" is called the assertion-sign[39]; it may be read
"it is true that" (although philosophically this is not exactly what
it means). The dots after the assertion-sign indicate its range; that
is to say, everything following is asserted until we reach either an
equal number of dots preceding a sign of implication or the end of the
sentence. Thus "
" means "it is true that
implies
," whereas "
" means
"
is true; therefore
is true[40]." The first of these does
not necessarily involve the truth either of
or of
, while
the second involves the truth of both.
(4) Assertion of a propositional function. Besides the assertion
of definite propositions, we need what we shall call "assertion of a
propositional function." The general notion of asserting any
propositional function is not used until *9, but we use at once the
notion of asserting various special elementary propositional functions.
Let be a propositional function whose argument is
;
then we may assert
without assigning a value to
.[Pg 97]
This is done, for example, when the law of identity is asserted in
the form "
is
." Here
is left undetermined, because,
however
may be determined, the result will be true. Thus when
we assert
, leaving
undetermined, we are asserting an
ambiguous value of our function. This is only legitimate if, however
the ambiguity may be determined, the result will be true. Thus take, as
an illustration, the primitive proposition *1·2 below, namely
i.e. "'
or
' implies
." Here p may be any
elementary proposition: by leaving
undetermined, we obtain
an assertion which can be applied to any particular elementary
proposition. Such assertions are like the particular enunciations in
Euclid: when it is said "let
be an isosceles triangle; then the
angles at the base will be equal," what is said applies to any
isosceles triangle; it is stated concerning one triangle, but
not concerning a definite one. All the assertions in the present
work, with a very few exceptions, assert propositional functions, not
definite propositions.
As a matter of fact, no constant elementary proposition will occur in
the present work, or can occur in any work which employs only logical
ideas. The ideas and propositions of logic are all general: an
assertion (for example) which is true of Socrates but not of Plato,
will not belong to logic[41], and if an assertion which is true of
both is to occur in logic, it must not be made concerning either, but
concerning a variable . In order to obtain, in logic, a definite
proposition instead of a propositional function, it is necessary to
take some propositional function and assert that it is true always or
sometimes, i.e. with all possible values of the variable or with
some possible value. Thus, giving the name "individual" to whatever
there is that is neither a proposition nor a function, the proposition
"every individual is identical with itself" or the proposition "there
are individuals" will be a proposition belonging to logic. But these
propositions are not elementary.
(5) Negation. If is any proposition, the proposition
"not-
," or "
is false," will be represented by "
."
For the present,
must be an elementary proposition.
(6) Disjunction. If and
are any propositions,
the proposition "
or
," i.e. "either
is true
or
is true," where the alternatives are to be not mutually
exclusive, will be represented by
This is called the disjunction or the logical sum of
and
. Thus "
" will mean "
is false or
is true";
will mean "it is false that either
or
is true," which is equivalent to "
and
are
both false";[Pg 98]
) will mean "it is false
that either
is false or
is false," which is equivalent to
"
and
are both true"; and so on. For the present,
and
must be elementary propositions.
The above are all the primitive ideas required in the theory of deduction. Other primitive ideas will be introduced in Section B.
Definition of Implication. When a proposition follows
from a proposition
, so that if
is true,
must also be
true, we say that
implies
. The idea of implication,
in the form in which we require it, can be defined. The meaning to be
given to implication in what follows may at first sight appear somewhat
artificial; but although there are other legitimate meanings, the one
here adopted is very much more convenient for our purposes than any of
its rivals. The essential property that we require of implication is
this: "What is implied by a true proposition is true." It is in virtue
of this property that implication yields proofs. But this property by
no means determines whether anything, and if so what, is implied by a
false proposition. What it does determine is that, if
implies
, then it cannot be the case that
is true and
is
false, i.e. it must be the case that either
is false or
is true. The most convenient interpretation of implication is to
say, conversely, that if either
is false or
is true, then
"
implies
" is to be true. Hence "
implies
" is to
be defined to mean: "Either
is false or
is true." Hence we
put:
Here the letters "Df" stand for "definition." They and the sign of equality together are to be regarded as forming one symbol, standing for "is defined to mean[42]." Whatever comes to the left of the sign of equality is defined to mean the same as what comes to the right of it. Definition is not among the primitive ideas, because definitions are concerned solely with the symbolism, not with what is symbolised; they are introduced for practical convenience, and are theoretically unnecessary.
In virtue of the above definition, when "" holds,
then either
is false or
is true; hence if
is true,
must be true. Thus the above definition preserves the essential
characteristic of implication; it gives, in fact, the most general
meaning compatible with the preservation of this characteristic.
PRIMITIVE PROPOSITIONS.
*1·1. Anything implied by a true elementary proposition is true. Pp[43].
The above principle will be extended in *9 to propositions which
are not elementary. It is not the same as "if is true,
then if
implies
,
is[Pg 99] true." This is a true
proposition, but it holds equally when
is not true and when
does not imply
. It does not, like the principle we are concerned
with, enable us to assert
simply, without any hypothesis. We
cannot express the principle symbolically, partly because any symbolism
in which
is variable only gives the hypothesis that
is true, not the fact that it is true[44].
The above principle is used whenever we have to deduce a
proposition from a proposition. But the immense majority
of the assertions in the present work are assertions of propositional
functions, i.e. they contain an undetermined variable. Since the
assertion of a propositional function is a different primitive idea
from the assertion of a proposition, we require a primitive proposition
different from *1·1, though allied to it, to enable us to deduce the
assertion of a propositional function "" from the assertions
of the two propositional functions "
" and "
."
This primitive proposition is as follows:
*1·11. When can be asserted, where
is a real
variable, and
can be asserted, where
is
a real variable, then
can be asserted, where
is a real
variable. Pp.
This principle is also to be assumed for functions of several variables.
Part of the importance of the above primitive proposition is due to the
fact that it expresses in the symbolism a result following from the
theory of types, which requires symbolic recognition. Suppose we have
the two assertions of propositional functions ""
and "
"; then the "
" in
is not absolutely anything, but anything for which as argument
the function "
" is significant; similarly in "
"
the
is anything for which "
"
is significant. Apart from some axiom, we do not know that
the
's for which "
" is significant are
the same as those for which "
" is significant. The primitive
proposition *1·11, by securing that, as the result of the assertions of
the propositional functions "
" and "
"
the propositional function
can also be asserted,
secures partial symbolic recognition, in the form most useful in
actual deductions, of an important principle which follows from the
theory of types, namely that, if there is any one argument a for which
both "
" and "
" are significant, then the range of
arguments for which "
" is significant is the same as the
range of arguments for which "
" is significant. It is obvious
that, if the propositional function "
" can be
asserted, there must be arguments a for which "
"
is significant, and for which, therefore, "
" and "
"
must be significant. Hence, by our principle, the values of
for which "
" is significant are the same as those for which
"
" is significant, i.e. the type of possible arguments
for
(cf. p. 15) is the same as that of possible
arguments for
. The[Pg 100] primitive proposition *1·11, since
it states a practically important consequence of this fact, is called
the "axiom of identification of type."
Another consequence of the principle that, if there is an argument
for which both
and
are significant, then
is significant whenever
is significant, and
vice versa, will be given in the "axiom of identification of real
variables," introduced in **1·72. These two propositions, *1·11
and *1·72, give what is symbolically essential to the conduct of
demonstrations in accordance with the theory of types.
The above proposition *1·11 is used in every inference from one
asserted propositional function to another. We will illustrate the use
of this proposition by setting forth at length the way in which it is
first used, in the proof of *2·06. That proposition is
We have already proved, in *2·05, the proposition
It is obvious that *2·06 results from *2·05 by means of *2·04, which is
For if, in this proposition, we replace
by
,
by
, and
by
, we obtain, as an
instance of *2·04, the proposition
and here the hypothesis is asserted by *2·05. Thus our primitive
proposition *1·11 enables us to assert the conclusion.
*1·2.
This proposition states: "If either is true or
is true,
then
is true." It is called the "principle of tautology," and
will be quoted by the abbreviated title of "Taut." It is convenient,
for purposes of reference, to give names to a few of the more important
propositions; in general, propositions will be referred to by their
numbers.
*1·3.
This principle states: "If is true, then '
or
'
is true." Thus e.g. if
is "to-day is Wednesday" and
is "to-day is Tuesday," the principle states: "If to-day is
Wednesday, then to-day is either Tuesday or Wednesday." It is called
the "principle of addition," because it states that if a proposition
is true, any alternative may be added without making it false. The
principle will be referred to as "Add."
*1·4.
[Pg 101]
This principle states that " or
" implies "
or
."
It states the permutative law for logical addition of propositions, and
will be called the "principle of permutation." It will be referred to
as "Perm."
1·5. .
This principle states: "If either is true, or '
or
' is
true, then either
is true, or '
or
' is true." It is a
form of the associative law for logical addition, and will be called
the "associative principle." It will be referred to as "Assoc." The
proposition
which would be the natural form for the associative law, has less
deductive power, and is therefore not taken as a primitive proposition.
*1·6 .
This principle states: "If implies
, then '
or
' implies '
or
.'" In other words, in an implication,
an alternative may be added to both premiss and conclusion without
impairing the truth of the implication. The principle will be called
the "principle of summation," and will be referred to as "Sum."
*1·7. If is an elementary proposition,
is an
elementary proposition. Pp.
*1·71. If and
are elementary propositions,
is an elementary proposition. Pp.
*1·72. If and
are elementary propositional
functions which take elementary propositions as arguments,
is an elementary propositional function. Pp.
This axiom is to apply also to functions of two or more variables. It
is called the "axiom of identification of real variables." It will
be observed that if and
are functions which take
arguments of different types, there is no such function as "
,"
because
and
cannot significantly have
the same argument. A more general form of the above axiom will be given
in *9.
The use of the above axioms will generally be tacit. It is only through them and the axioms of *9 that the theory of types explained in the Introduction becomes relevant, and any view of logic which justifies these axioms justifies such subsequent reasoning as employs the theory of types.
This completes the list of primitive propositions required for the theory of deduction as applied to elementary propositions.
[Pg 102]
Summary of *2.
The proofs of the earlier of the propositions of this number consist
simply in noticing that they are instances of the general rules given
in *1. In such cases, these rules are not premisses, since they
assert any instance of themselves, not something other than their
instances. Hence when a general rule is adduced in early proofs, it
will be adduced in brackets[45], with indications, when required, as
to the changes of letters from those given in the rule to those in
the case considered. Thus "Taut " will mean
what "Taut" becomes when
is written in place of
. If
"Taut
" is enclosed in square brackets before
an asserted proposition, that means that, in accordance with "Taut,"
we are asserting what "Taut" becomes when
is written in
place of
. The recognition that a certain proposition is an
instance of some general proposition previously proved or assumed is
essential to the process of deduction from general rules, but cannot
itself be erected into a general rule, since the application required
is particular, and no general rule can explicitly include a
particular application.
Again, when two different sets of symbols express the same proposition in virtue of a definition, say *1·01, and one of these, which we will call (1), has been asserted, the assertion of the other is made by writing "[(1).(*1·01)]" before it, meaning that, in virtue of *1·01, the new set of symbols asserts the same proposition as was asserted in (1). A reference to a definition is distinguished from a reference to a previous proposition by being enclosed in round brackets.
The propositions in this number are all, or nearly all, actually needed in deducing mathematics from our primitive propositions. Although certain abbreviating processes will be gradually introduced, proofs will be given very fully, because the importance of the present subject lies, not in the propositions themselves, but (1) in the fact that they follow from the primitive propositions, (2) in the fact that the subject is the easiest, simplest, and most elementary example of the symbolic method of dealing with the principles of mathematics generally. Later portions—the theories of classes, relations, cardinal numbers, series, ordinal numbers, geometry, etc.—all employ the same method, but with an increasing complexity in the entities and functions considered.
[Pg 103]
The most important propositions proved in the present number are the following:
I.e. implies that
implies
, i.e. a true
proposition is implied by any proposition. This proposition is called
the "principle of simplification" (referred to as "Simp"), because,
as will appear later, it enables us to pass from the joint assertion
of
and
to the assertion of
simply. When the special
meaning which we have given to implication is remembered, it will be
seen that this proposition is obvious.
*2·03.
*2·15.
*2·16.
*2·17.
These four analogous propositions constitute the "principle of transposition," referred to as "Transp." They lead to the rule that in an implication the two sides may be interchanged by turning negative into positive and positive into negative. They are thus analogous to the algebraical rule that the two sides of an equation may be interchanged by changing the signs.
*2·04.
This is called the "commutative principle" and referred to as "Comm."
It states that, if follows from
provided
is true,
then
follows from
provided
is true.
*2·05.
*2·06.
These two propositions are the source of the syllogism in Barbara (as
will be shown later) and are therefore called the "principle of the
syllogism" (referred to as "Syll"). The first states that, if
follows from
, then if
follows from
,
follows
from
. The second states the same thing with the premisses
interchanged.
*2·08.
I.e. any proposition implies itself. This is called the
"principle of identity" and referred to as "Id." It is not the same as
the "law of identity" (" is identical with
"), but the law of
identity is inferred from it (cf. *13·15).
*2·21.
I.e. a false proposition implies any proposition.
[Pg 104]
The later propositions of the present number are mostly subsumed under propositions in *3 or *4, which give the same results in more compendious forms. We now proceed to formal deductions.
*2·01.
This proposition states that, if implies its own falsehood, then
is false. It is called the "principle of the reductio ad
absurdum," and will be referred to as "Abs."[46] The proof is as
follows (where "Dem." is short for demonstration"):
Dem.
*2·02.
Dem.
*2·03.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 105]
In the last line of this proof, "(1).(2).*1·11" means that we are
inferring in accordance with *1·11, having before us a proposition,
namely ,
which, by (1), is implied by
,
which, by (2), is true. In general, in such cases, we shall omit
the reference to *1·11.
The above two propositions will both be referred to as the "principle of the syllogism" (shortened to "Syll"), because, as will appear later, the syllogism in Barbara is derived from them.
*2·07
Here we put nothing beyond "*1·3 ," because the
proposition to be proved is what *1·3 becomes when
is written in
place of
.
*2·08
Dem.
*2·1
Dem.
This is the law of excluded middle.
Dem.
[Pg 106]
*2·13.
This proposition is a lemma for *2·14, which, with *2·12, constitutes the principle of double negation.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 107]
Note on the proof of *2·15. In the above proof, it will be
seen that (3), (4), (6) are respectively of the forms ,
,
, where
is the proposition to be proved. From
,
,
the proposition
results by repeated applications
of *2·05 or *2·06 (both of which are called "Syll"). It is tedious
and unnecessary to repeat this process every time it is used; it will
therefore be abbreviated into
where (a) is of the form
, (b) of
the form
, (c) of the form
,
and (d) of the form
. The same
abbreviation will be applied to a sorites of any length.
Also where we have "" and "
,"
and
is the proposition to be proved, it is
convenient to write simply
where "etc." will be a reference to the previous propositions in
virtue of which the implication "
" holds. This
form embodies the use of *1·11 or *1·1, and makes many proofs at once
shorter and easier to follow. It is used in the first two lines of the
following proof.
Dem.
[Pg 108]
Note. The proposition to be proved will be called
"Prop," and when a proof ends, like that of *2·16, by an
implication between asserted propositions, of which the
consequent is the proposition to be proved, we shall write
"". Thus
"
" ends a proof, and more or less
corresponds to "Q.E.D."
Dem.
*2·15, *2·16 and *2·17 are forms of the principle of transposition, and will be all referred to as "Transp."
*2·18.
Dem.
This is the complement of the principle of the reductio ad absurdum. It states that a proposition which follows from the hypothesis of its own falsehood is true.
*2·2.
Dem.
*2·21.
The above two propositions are very frequently used.
*2·24.
[Pg 109]
*2·25.
Dem.
*2·26.
*2·27.
*2·3.
Dem.
This proposition and *2·32 together constitute the associative law
for logical addition of propositions. In the proof, the following
abbreviation (constantly used hereafter) will be employed[47]: When we
have a series of propositions of the form ,
,
, all asserted, and "
" is the
proposition to be proved, the proof in full is as follows:
It is tedious to write out this process in full; we therefore write simply
where "
" is the proposition to be proved. We indicate on
the left by references in square brackets the propositions in virtue
of which the successive implications hold. We put one dot (not two)
after "
," to show[Pg 110] that it is
, not "
," that
implies
. But we put two dots after
, to show that now the
whole proposition "
" is concerned. If "
" is
not the proposition to be proved, but is to be used subsequently in the
proof, we put
and then "(1)" means "
" The proof of *2·31 is as follows:
Dem.
Dem.
*2·33.
This definition serves only for the avoidance of brackets.
Dem.
[Pg 111]
The proofs of *2·37·38 are exactly analogous to that of *2·36. (We use "*2·37·38" as an abbreviation for "*2·37 and *2·38." Such abbreviations will be used throughout.)
The use of a general principle of deduction, such as either form
of "Syll," in a proof, is different from the use of the particular
premisses to which the principle of deduction is applied. The principle
of deduction gives the general rule according to which the inference is
made, but is not itself a premiss in the inference. If we treated it
as a premiss, we should need either it or some other general rule to
enable us to infer the desired conclusion, and thus we should gradually
acquire an increasing accumulation of premisses without ever being able
to make any inference. Thus when a general rule is adduced in drawing
an inference, as when we write "" the mention of "Syll" is only required in order
to remind the reader how the inference is drawn.
The rule of inference may, however, also occur as one of the ordinary
premisses, that is to say, in the case of "Syll" for example, the
proposition ""
may be one of those to which our rules of deduction are applied,
and it is then an ordinary premiss. The distinction between the two
uses of principles of deduction is of some philosophical importance,
and in the above proofs we have indicated it by putting the rule of
inference in square brackets. It is, however, practically inconvenient
to continue to distinguish in the manner of the reference. We shall
therefore henceforth both adduce ordinary premisses in square brackets
where convenient, and adduce rules of inference, along with other
propositions, in asserted premisses, i.e. we shall write
e.g.
*2·4.
Dem.
*2·41.
Dem.
*2·42.
*2·43.
*2·45.
*2·46.
[Pg 112]
*2·47.
*2·48.
*2·49.
*2·5.
*2·51.
*2·52.
*2·521.
*2·53.
Dem.
*2·54.
*2·55.
*2·56.
*2·6.
Dem.
*2·61.
*2·62.
*2·621.
*2·63.
*2·64.
*2·65.
*2·67.
Dem.
[Pg 113]
*2·68.
Dem.
*2·69.
*2·73.
*2·74.
*2·76.
*2·77.
*2·8.
Dem.
*2·81.
Dem.
*2·82.
*2·83.
*2·85.
Dem.
*2·86.
[38] The recognized methods of proving independence are not applicable, without reserve, to fundamentals. Cf. Principles of Mathematics, § 17. What is there said concerning primitive propositions applies with even greater force to primitive ideas.
[39] We have adopted both the idea and the symbol of assertion from Frege.
[40] Cf. Principles of Mathematics, § 38.
[41] When we say that a proposition "belongs to logic," we mean that it can be expressed in terms of the primitive ideas of logic. We do not mean that logic applies to it, for that would of course be true of any proposition.
[42] The sign of equality not followed by the letters "Df" will have a different meaning, to be defined later.
[43] The letters "Pp" stand for "primitive proposition," as with Peano.
[44] For further remarks on this principle, cf. Principles of Mathematics, § 38.
[45] Later on we shall cease to mark the distinction between a premiss and a rule according to which an inference is conducted. It is only in early proofs that this distinction is important.
[46] There is an interesting historical article on this principle by Vailati, "A proposito d'un passo del Teeteto e di una dimostrazione di Euclide," Rivista di Filosofia e scienze affine, 1904.
[Pg 114]
Summary of *3.
The logical product of two propositions and
is practically
the proposition "
and
are both true." But this as it stands
would have to be a new primitive idea. We therefore take as the logical
product the proposition
, i.e.
"it is false that either
is false or
is false," which is
obviously true when and only when
and
are both true. Thus
we put
where "" is the logical product of
and
.
This definition serves merely to abbreviate proofs.
When we are given two asserted propositional functions ""
and "
," we shall have "
"
whenever
and
take arguments of the same type. This
will be proved for any functions in *9; for the present, we are
confined to elementary propositional functions of elementary
propositions. In this case, the result is proved as follows:
By *1·7, and
are elementary
propositional functions, and therefore, by *1·72,
is an elementary propositional function. Hence by *2·11,
Hence by *2·32 and *1·01,
i.e. by *3·01,
Hence by *1·11, when we have "" and "
"
we have "
." This proposition
is *3·03. It is to be understood, like *1·72, as applying also to
functions of two or more variables.
The above is the practically most useful form of the axiom of identification of real variables (cf. *1·72). In practice, when the restriction to elementary propositions and propositional functions has been removed, a convenient means by which two functions can often be recognized as taking arguments of the same type is the following:
If contains, in any way, a constituent
and
contains, in any way, a constituent
,
then both
and
take arguments[Pg 115]
of the type of the argument
in
, and
therefore both
and
take arguments of the same
type. Hence, in such a case, if both
and
can be
asserted, so can
.
As an example of the use of this proposition, take the proof of *3·47.
We there prove
and what we wish to prove is
which is *3·47. Now in (1) and (2),
,
,
,
are
elementary propositions (as everywhere in Section A); hence by *1·7·71,
applied repeatedly, "
"
and "
"
are elementary propositional functions. Hence by *3·03, we have
whence the result follows by *3·43 and *3·33.
The principal propositions of the present number are the following:
*3·2
I.e. " implies that
implies
,"
i.e. if each of two propositions is true, so is their logical
product.
*3·27
I.e. if the logical product of two propositions is true, then each of the two propositions severally is true.
*3·3
I.e. if and
jointly imply
, then
implies
that
implies
. This principle (following Peano) will be
called "exportation," because
is "exported" from the hypothesis.
It will be referred to as "Exp."
*3·31
This is the correlative of the above, and will be called (following Peano) "importation" (referred to as "Imp").
*3·35
I.e. "if is true, and
follows from it, then
is
true." This will be called the "principle of assertion" (referred to as
"Ass"). It differs from *1·1 by the fact that it does not apply only
when
really is true, but requires merely the hypothesis
that p is true.
*3·43
[Pg 116]
I.e. if a proposition implies each of two propositions, then it implies their logical product. This is called by Peano the "principle of composition." It will be referred to as "Comp."
*3·45.
I.e. both sides of an implication may be multiplied by a common factor. This is called by Peano the "principle of the factor." It will be referred to as "Fact."
*3·47.
I.e. if implies
and
implies
, then
and
jointly imply
and
jointly. The law of
contradiction, "
)," is proved in this number
(*3·24); but in spite of its fame we have found few occasions for its
use.
*3·01.
*3·02.
*3·03. Given two asserted elementary propositional functions
"" and "
" whose arguments are
elementary propositions, we have
.
Dem.
*3·1.
*3·11.
*3·12.
*3·13.
*3·14.
*3·2.
*3·21.
*3·22.
This is one form of the commutative law for logical multiplication. A more complete form is given in *4·3.
Dem.
[Pg 117]
Note that, in the above proof, "(1)" stands for the proposition
as was explained in the proof of *2·31.
Dem.
The above is the law of contradiction.
*3·26.
Dem.
*3·27.
Dem.
*3·26·27 will both be called the "principle of simplification," like *2·02, from which they are deduced. They will be referred to as "Simp."
*3·3.
Dem.
*3·31.
Dem.
[Pg 118]
*3·34.
These two propositions will hereafter be referred to as "Syll"; they are usually more convenient than either *2·05 or *2·06.
*3·35.
*3·37.
Dem.
This is another form of transposition.
*3·4.
*3·41.
*3·42.
Dem.
This principle is analogous to *3·43. The analogy between *3·43 and *3·44 is of a sort which generally subsists between formulae concerning products and formulae concerning sums.
Dem.
[Pg 119]
*3·45.
This principle shows that we may multiply both sides of an implication by a common factor; hence it is called by Peano the "principle of the factor." We shall refer to it as "Fact." It is the analogue, for multiplication, of the primitive proposition *1·6.
Dem.
This proposition, or rather its analogue for classes, was proved by Leibniz, and evidently pleased him, since he calls it "præclarum theorema[48]."
Dem.
*3·48.
This theorem is the analogue of *3·47.
Dem.
[48] Philosophical works, Gerhardt's edition, Vol. VII. p. 223.
[Pg 120]
Summary of *4.
In this number, we shall be concerned with rules analogous, more or
less, to those of ordinary algebra. It is from these rules that the
usual "calculus of formal logic" starts. Treated as a "calculus," the
rules of deduction are capable of many other interpretations. But all
other interpretations depend upon the one here considered, since in all
of them we deduce consequences from our rules, and thus presuppose the
theory of deduction. One very simple interpretation of the "calculus"
is as follows: The entities considered are to be numbers which are all
either or
; "
" is to have the value
if
is
and
is
; otherwise it is to have the
value
;
is to be
if
is
, and
if
is
;
is to be
if
and
are
both
, and is to be
in any other case;
is to
be
if
and
are both
, and is to be
in any
other case; and the assertion-sign is to mean that what follows has the
value
. Symbolic logic considered as a calculus has undoubtedly
much interest on its own account; but in our opinion this aspect has
hitherto been too much emphasized, at the expense of the aspect in
which symbolic logic is merely the most elementary part of mathematics,
and the logical prerequisite of all the rest. For this reason, we shall
only deal briefly with what is required for the algebra of symbolic
logic.
When each of two propositions implies the other, we say that the two
are equivalent, which we write "." We put
*4·01.
It is obvious that two propositions are equivalent when, and only when, both are true or both are false. Following Frege, we shall call the truth-value of a proposition truth if it is true, and falsehood if it is false. Thus two propositions are equivalent when they have the same truth-value.
It should be observed that, if ,
may be substituted
for
without altering the truth-value of any function of
which involves no primitive ideas except those enumerated in *1. This
can be proved in each separate case, but not generally, because we have
no means of specifying (with our apparatus of primitive ideas) that a
function is one which can be built up out[Pg 121] of these ideas alone. We
shall give the name of a truth-function to a function
whose argument is a proposition, and whose truth-value depends only
upon the truth-value of its argument. All the functions of propositions
with which we shall be specially concerned will be truth-functions,
i.e. we shall have
The reason of this is, that the functions of propositions with which
we deal are all built up by means of the primitive ideas of *1. But it
is not a universal characteristic of functions of propositions to be
truth-functions. For example, "
believes
" may be true for
one true value of
and false for another.
The principal propositions of this number are the following:
*4·1.
*4·11.
These are both forms of the "principle of transposition."
This is the principle of double negation, i.e. a proposition is equivalent to the falsehood of its negation.
*4·2.
*4·21.
*4·22.
These propositions assert that equivalence is reflexive, symmetrical and transitive.
*4·25.
I.e. is equivalent to "
and
" and to "
or
," which are two forms of the law of tautology, and are the
source of the principal differences between the algebra of symbolic
logic and ordinary algebra.
*4·3.
This is the commutative law for the product of propositions.
*4·31.
This is the commutative law for the sum of propositions.
The associative laws for multiplication and addition of propositions, namely
*4·32.
*4·33.
The distributive law in the two forms
[Pg 122]
*4·4.
*4·41.
The second of these forms has no analogue in ordinary algebra.
*4·71.
I.e. implies
when, and only when,
is
equivalent to
. This proposition is used constantly; it enables
us to replace any implication by an equivalence.
*4·73.
I.e. a true factor may be dropped from or added to a proposition without altering the truth-value of the proposition.
*4·01.
*4·02.
This definition serves merely to provide a convenient abbreviation.
*4·1.
*4·11.
*4·12.
*4·13.
*4·14.
*4·15.
*4·2.
Dem.
[Pg 123]
Note. The above three propositions show that the relation of equivalence is reflexive (*4·2), symmetrical (*4·21), and transitive (*4·22). Implication is reflexive and transitive, but not symmetrical. The properties of being symmetrical, transitive, and (at least within a certain field) reflexive are essential to any relation which is to have the formal characters of equality.
*4·24.
Dem.
*4·25.
Note. *4·24·25 are two forms of the law of tautology, which is what chiefly distinguishes the algebra of symbolic logic from ordinary algebra.
*4·3.
Note. Whenever we have, whatever values and
may have,
we have also
For
*4·31.
*4·32.
Dem.
Note. Here "(1)" stands for ","
which is obtained from the above steps by *4·22. The use of *4·22 will
often be tacit, as above. The principle is the same as that explained
in respect of implication in *2·31.
*4·33.
[Pg 124]
The above are the associative laws for multiplication and addition. To avoid brackets, we introduce the following definition:
*4·34.
*4·36.
*4·37.
*4·38.
*4·39.
*4·4.
This is the first form of the distributive law.
Dem.
*4·41.
This is the second form of the distributive law—a form to which there
is nothing analogous in ordinary algebra. By the conventions as to
dots, "" means "
."
Dem.
*4·42.
Dem.
[Pg 125]
Dem.
Dem.
*4·45.
The following formulae are due to De Morgan, or rather, are the propositional analogues of formulae given by De Morgan for classes. The first of them, it will be observed, merely embodies our definition of the logical product.
*4·5.
*4·51.
*4·52.
*4·53.
*4·54.
*4·55.
*4·56.
*4·57.
[Pg 126]
The following formulae are obtained immediately from the above. They are important as showing how to transform implications into sums or into denials of products, and vice versa. It will be observed that the first of them merely embodies the definition *1·01.
*4·6.
*4·61.
*4·62.
*4·64.
*4·65.
*4·66.
*4·67.
*4·7.
Dem.
*4·71.
Dem.
The above proposition is constantly used. It enables us to transform every implication into an equivalence, which is an advantage if we wish to assimilate symbolic logic as far as possible to ordinary algebra. But when symbolic logic is regarded as an instrument of proof, we need implications, and it is usually inconvenient to substitute equivalences. Similar remarks apply to the following proposition.
*4·72.
Dem.
[Pg 127]
*4·73.
This proposition is very useful, since it shows that a true factor may be omitted from a product without altering its truth or falsehood, just as a true hypothesis may be omitted from an implication.
*4·74.
*4·76.
Dem.
Dem.
Note. The analogues, for classes, of *4·78·79 are false. Take,
e.g. *4·78, and put = English people,
= men,
=
women. Then
is contained in
or
, but is not contained
in
and is not contained in
.
*4·8.
*4·81.
*4·82.
*4·83.
Note. *4·82·83 may also be obtained from *4·43, of which they are virtually other forms.
*4·84.
*4·85.
*4·86.
*4·87 embodies in one proposition the principles of exportation and importation and the commutative principle.
[Pg 128]
Summary of *5.
The present number consists chiefly of propositions of two sorts: (1) those which will be required as lemmas in one or more subsequent proofs, (2) those which are on their own account illustrative, or would be important in other developments than those that we wish to make. A few of the propositions of this number, however, will be used very frequently. These are:
*5·1.
I.e. two propositions are equivalent if they are both true. (The statement that two propositions are equivalent if they are both false is *5·21.)
*5·32.
I.e. to say that, on the hypothesis ,
and
are
equivalent, is equivalent to saying that the joint assertion of
and
is equivalent to the joint assertion of
and
. This
is a very useful rule in inference.
*5·6.
I.e. " and not-
imply
" is equivalent to "
implies
or
."
Among propositions never subsequently referred to, but inserted for
their intrinsic interest, are the following: *5·11·12·13·14, which
state that, given any two propositions ,
, either
or
must imply
, and
must imply either
or
not-
, and either
implies
or
implies
; and
given any third proposition
, either
implies
or
implies
[49].
Other propositions not subsequently referred to are *5·22·23·24; in
these it is shown that two propositions are not equivalent when, and
only when, one is true and the other false, and that two propositions
are equivalent when, and only when, both are true or both false.
It follows (*5·24) that the negation of "" is equivalent to "
."
*5·54·55 state that both the product and the sum of
and
are
equivalent, respectively, either to
or to
.
The proofs of the following propositions are all easy, and we shall therefore often merely indicate the propositions used in the proofs.
[Pg 129]
*5·1.
*5·11.
*5·12.
*5·13.
*5·14.
*5·15.
Dem.
*5·16.
Dem.
*5·17.
Dem.
[Pg 130]
*5·18.
*5·19.
*5·22.
*5·23.
From *5·25 it appears that we might have taken implication, instead of
disjunction, as a primitive idea, and have defined "" as
meaning "
." This course, however, requires
more primitive propositions than are required by the method we have
adopted.
*5·3.
*5·31.
*5·32.
This proposition is constantly required in subsequent proofs.
*5·33.
*5·35.
*5·36.
*5·4.
*5·41.
*5·42.
*5·44.
*5·5.
*5·501.
*5·53.
*5·54.
*5·55.
*5·6.
*5·61.
*5·62.
[Pg 131]
*5·63.
*5·7.
*5·71.
In the following proof, as always henceforth, "" means the
hypothesis of the proposition to be proved.
Dem.
*5·74.
Dem.
*5·75.
Dem.
[49] Cf. Schröder, Vorlesungen über Algebra der Logik, Zweiter Band (Leipzig, 1891), pp. 270-271, where the apparent oddity of the above proposition is explained.
[Pg 132]
Summary of *9.
In the present number, we introduce two new primitive ideas, which may
be expressed as " is always[50] true" and "
is
sometimes[51] true," or, more correctly, as "
always" and
"
sometimes." When we assert "
always," we are
asserting all values of
, where "
" means
the function itself, as opposed to an ambiguous value of the function
(cf. pp. 15, 42); we are not asserting that
is true for
all values of
, because, in accordance with the theory of types,
there are values of
for which "
" is meaningless; for
example, the function
itself must be such a value. We
shall denote "
always" by the notation
where the "
" will be followed by a sufficiently large number of
dots to cover the function of which "all values" are concerned. The
form in which such propositions most frequently occur is the "formal
implication," i.e. such a proposition as
i.e. "
always implies
." This is the form
in which we express the universal affirmative "all objects having the
property
have the property
."
We shall denote " sometimes" by the notation
Here "
" stands for "there exists," and the whole symbol may
be read "there exists an
such that
."
In a proposition of either of the two forms , (
,
the
is called an apparent variable.
A proposition which contains no apparent variables is called
"elementary," and a function, all whose values are[Pg 133] elementary
propositions, is called an elementary function. For reasons explained
in Chapter II of the Introduction, it would seem that negation and
disjunction and their derivatives must have a different meaning when
applied to elementary propositions from that which they have when
applied to such propositions as
or
.
If
is an elementary function, we will in this
number call
and
"first-order
propositions." Then in virtue of the fact that disjunction and
negation do not have the same meanings as applied to elementary or to
first-order propositions, it follows that, in asserting the primitive
propositions of *1, we must either confine them, in their application,
to propositions of a single type, or we must regard them as the
simultaneous assertion of a number of different primitive propositions,
corresponding to the different meanings of "disjunction" and
"negation." Likewise in regard to the primitive ideas of disjunction
and negation, we must either, in the primitive propositions of *1,
confine them to disjunctions and negations of elementary propositions,
or we must regard them as really each multiple, so that in regard
to each type of propositions we shall need a new primitive idea of
negation and a new primitive idea of disjunction. In the present
number, we shall show how, when the primitive ideas of negation
and disjunction are restricted to elementary propositions, and the
,
,
of *1—*5 are therefore necessarily elementary
propositions, it is possible to obtain definitions of the negation and
disjunction of first-order propositions, and proofs of the analogues,
for first-order propositions, of the primitive propositions *1·2—·6.
(*1·1 and *1·11 have to be assumed afresh for first-order propositions,
and the analogues of *1·7·71·72 require a fresh treatment.) It follows
that the analogues of the propositions of *2—*5 follow by merely
repeating previous proofs. It follows also that the theory of deduction
can be extended from first-order propositions to such as contain two
apparent variables, by merely repeating the process which extends
the theory of deduction from elementary to first-order propositions.
Thus by merely repeating the process set forth in the present
number, propositions of any order can be reached. Hence negation and
disjunction may be treated in practice as if there were no difference
in these ideas as applied to different types; that is to say, when
"
" or "
" occurs, it is unnecessary in practice
to know what is the type of
or
, since the properties
of negation and disjunction assumed in *1 (which are alone used in
proving other properties) can be asserted, without formal change, of
propositions of any order or, in the case of
, of any two
orders. The limitation, in practice, to the treatment of negation or
disjunction as single ideas, the same in all types, would only arise
if we ever wished to assume that there is some one function of
whose value is always
, whatever may be the order of
,
or that there is some one function of
and
whose value is
always
, whatever may be the orders of
and
.
Such an assumption is not involved so long as
(and
) remain
real variables,[Pg 134] since, in that case, there is no need to give
the same meaning to negation and disjunction for different values
of
(and
), when these different values are of different
types. But if
(or
) is going to be turned into an apparent
variable, then, since our two primitive ideas
and
both demand some definite function
,
and restrict the apparent variable to possible arguments for
,
it follows that negation and disjunction must, wherever they occur in
the expression in which
(or
) is an apparent variable, be
restricted to the kind of negation or disjunction appropriate to a
given type or pair of types. Thus, to take an instance, if we assert
the law of excluded middle in the form
there is no need to place any restriction upon
: we may give
to
a value of any order, and then give to the negation and
disjunction involved those meanings which are appropriate to that
order. But if we assert
it is necessary, if our symbol is to be significant, that "
"
should be the value, for the argument
, of a function
; and this is only possible if the negation and disjunction
involved have meanings fixed in advance, and if, therefore,
is
limited to one type. Thus the assertion of the law of excluded middle
in the form involving a real variable is more general than in the form
involving an apparent variable. Similar remarks apply generally where
the variable is the argument to a typically ambiguous function.
In what follows the single letters p and q will represent
elementary propositions, and so will "," "
,"
etc. We shall show how, assuming the primitive ideas and propositions
of *1 as applied to elementary propositions, we can define and prove
analogous ideas and propositions as applied to propositions of the
forms
and
. By mere repetition of
the analogous process, it will then follow that analogous ideas and
propositions can be defined and proved for propositions of any order;
whence, further, it follows that, in all that concerns disjunction
and negation, so long as propositions do not appear as apparent
variables, we may wholly ignore the distinction between different
types of propositions and between different meanings of negation and
disjunction. Since we never have occasion, in practice, to consider
propositions as apparent variables, it follows that the hierarchy of
propositions (as opposed to the hierarchy of functions) will never be
relevant in practice after the present number.
The purpose and interest of the present number are purely philosophical, namely to show how, by means of certain primitive propositions, we can deduce the theory of deduction for propositions containing apparent variables from the theory of deduction for elementary propositions. From the purely technical point of view, the distinction between elementary and other propositions may be ignored, so long as propositions do not appear as apparent variables; we may then regard the primitive propositions of *1 as applying[Pg 135] to propositions of any type, and proceed as in *10, where the purely technical development is resumed.
It should be observed that although, in the present number, we prove
that the analogues of the primitive propositions of *1, if they hold
for propositions containing apparent variables, also hold for
such as contain
, yet we must not suppose that mathematical
induction may be used to infer that the analogues of the primitive
propositions of *1 hold for propositions containing any number of
apparent variables. Mathematical induction is a method of proof which
is not yet applicable, and is (as will appear) incapable of being used
freely until the theory of propositions containing apparent variables
has been established. What we are enabled to do, by means of the
propositions in the present number, is to prove our desired result for
any assigned number of apparent variables—say ten—by ten applications
of the same proof. Thus we can prove, concerning any assigned
proposition, that it obeys the analogues of the primitive propositions
of *1, but we can only do this by proceeding step by step, not by any
such compendious method as mathematical induction would afford. The
fact that higher types can only be reached step by step is essential,
since to proceed otherwise we should need an apparent variable which
would wander from type to type, which would contradict the principle
upon which types are built up.
Definition of Negation. We have first to define the negations of
( and (
. We define
the negation of
as
,
i.e. "it is not the case that
is always true"
is to mean "it is the case that
is sometimes
true." Similarly the negation of (
is to be
defined as
. Thus we put
*9·01.
*9·02.
To avoid brackets, we shall write in place of
, and
in
place of
. Thus:
*9·011.
*9·021.
Definition of Disjunction. To define disjunction when one or both of the propositions concerned is of the first order, we have to distinguish six cases, as follows:
*9·03. (
*9·04.
*9·05. (
*9·06.
*9·07. (
*9·08. (
[Pg 136]
(The definitions *9·07·08 are to apply also when and
are not both elementary functions.)
In virtue of these definitions, the true scope of an apparent
variable is always the whole of the asserted proposition in which
it occurs, even when, typographically, its scope appears to be only
part of the asserted proposition. Thus when (
or
appears as part of an asserted
proposition, it does not really occur, since the scope of the apparent
variable really extends to the whole asserted proposition. It will be
shown, however, that, so far as the theory of deduction is concerned,
(
and (
behave like propositions
not containing apparent variables.
The definitions of implication, the logical product, and equivalence
are to be transferred unchanged to ( and (
.
The above definitions can be repeated for successive types, and thus reach propositions of any type.
Primitive Propositions. The primitive propositions required are six in number, and may be divided into three sets of two. We have first two propositions which effect the passage from elementary to first-order propositions, namely
*9·1.
Of these, the first states that, if is true, then there is a
value of
which is true; i.e. if we can find an
instance of a function which is true, then the function is "sometimes
true." (When we speak of a function as "sometimes" true, we do not
mean to assert that there is more than one argument for which
it is true, but only that there is at least one.) Practically,
the above primitive proposition gives the only method of proving
"existence-theorems": in order to prove such theorems, it is necessary
(and sufficient) to find some instance in which an object possesses
the property in question. If we were to assume what may be called
"existence-axioms," i.e. axioms stating (
for some particular
, these axioms would give other methods
of proving existence. Instances of such axioms are the multiplicative
axiom (*88) and the axiom of infinity (defined in *120·03). But we have
not assumed any such axioms in the present work.
The second of the above primitive propositions is only used once,
in proving (,
which is the analogue of *1·2 (namely
when
is replaced by (
. The
effect of this primitive proposition is to emphasize the ambiguity of
the
required in order to secure (
. We have,
of course, in virtue of *9·1,
But if we try to infer from these that
,
we must use the[Pg 137] proposition
,
where
is (
. Now it will be found, on
referring to *4·77 and the propositions used in its proof, that this
proposition depends upon *1·2, i.e.
.
Hence it cannot be used by us to prove (
, and thus we are
compelled to assume the primitive proposition *9·11.
We have next two propositions concerned with inference to or from propositions containing apparent variables, as opposed to implication. First, we have, for the new meaning of implication resulting from the above definitions of negation and disjunction, the analogue of *1·1, namely
*9·12.
That is to say, given "" and "
,"
we may proceed to "
," even when the propositions
and
are not elementary. Also, as in *1·11, we may proceed
from "
" and "
"
to "
" where
is a real variable, and
and
are not necessarily elementary functions. It is in this
latter form that the axiom is usually needed. It is to be assumed for
functions of several variables as well as for functions of one variable.
We have next the primitive proposition which permits the passage
from a real to an apparent variable, namely "when may be
asserted, where
may be any possible argument, then (
may be asserted." In other words, when
is true however
may be chosen among possible arguments, then (
is
true, i.e. all values of
are true. That is to say,
if we can assert a wholly ambiguous value
, that must be
because all values are true. We may express this primitive proposition
by the words: "What is true in any case, however the case may
be selected, is true in all cases." We cannot symbolise this
proposition, because if we put
that means: "However
may be chosen,
implies (
,"
which is in general false. What we mean is: "If
is
true however
may be chosen, then (
is true." But we
have not supplied a symbol for the mere hypothesis of what is
asserted in "
," where
is a real variable,
and it is not worth while to supply such a symbol, because it would be
very rarely required. If, for the moment, we use the symbol
to express this hypothesis, then our primitive proposition is
In practice, this primitive proposition is only used for
inference, not for implication; that is to say, when we actually
have an assertion containing a real variable, it enables us to turn
this real variable into an apparent variable by placing it in brackets
immediately after the assertion-sign, followed by enough dots to reach
to the end of the assertion. This process will be called "turning
a real variable into an apparent variable." Thus we may assert our
primitive proposition, for technical use, in the form:
[Pg 138]
*9·13. In any assertion containing a real variable, this real variable may be turned into an apparent variable of which all possible values are asserted to satisfy the function in question. Pp.
We have next two primitive propositions concerned with types. These require some preliminary explanations.
Primitive Idea: Individual. We say that is "individual" if
is neither a proposition nor a function (cf. pp. 53, 54).
*9·131. Definition of "being of the same type." The
following is a step-by-step definition, the definition for higher types
presupposing that for lower types. We say that and
"are of
the same type" if (1) both are individuals, (2) both are elementary
functions taking arguments of the same type, (3)
is a function
and
is its negation, (4)
is
or
and
is
, where
and
are elementary functions, (5)
is
and
is (
,
where
,
are
of the same type, (6) both are elementary propositions, (7)
is
a proposition and
is
, or (8)
is (
and
is (
, where
and
are of the same type.
Our primitive propositions are:
*9·14. If "" is significant, then if
is of the
same type as
, "
" is significant, and vice versa. Pp.
(Cf. note on *10·121, p. 146.)
*9·15. If, for some , there is a proposition
,
then there is a function
, and vice versa. Pp.
It will be seen that, in virtue of the definitions,
In order to prove that (
and (
obey
the same rules of deduction as
, we have to prove that
propositions of the forms (
and (
may replace one or more of the propositions
,
,
in
*1·2—·6. When this has been proved, the previous proofs of subsequent
propositions in *2—*5 become applicable. These proofs are given below.
Certain other propositions, required in the proofs, are also proved.
*9·2.
The above proposition states the principle of deduction from the general to the particular, i.e. "what holds in all cases, holds in any one case."
Dem.
[Pg 139]
In the second line of the above proof, ""
is taken as the value, for the argument
, of the function
"
," where
is the argument. A similar
method of using *9·1 is employed in most of the following proofs.
*1·11 is used, as in the third line of the above proof, in almost all steps except such as are mere applications of definitions. Hence it will not be further referred to, unless in cases where its employment is obscure or specially important.
I.e. if always implies
, then "
always" implies "
always." The use of this proposition is
constant throughout the remainder of this work.
Dem.
This is the proposition to be proved, since "(" is the
same proposition as "(
," and "(
" is the
same proposition as "(
."
I.e. if always implies
, then if
is sometimes true, so is
. This proposition, like *9·21, is
constantly used in the sequel.
Dem.
[Pg 140]
This is the proposition to be proved, because ( is
the same proposition as (
, and (
is the same proposition as (
.
*9·23.
*9·24.
We are now in a position to prove the analogues of *1·2—·6, replacing
one of the letters ,
,
in those propositions by
(
or (
. The proofs are given below.
*9·3.
Dem.
*9·31.
This is the only proposition which employs *9·11.
Dem.
*9·32.
Dem.
*9·33.
[Pg 141]
*9·34.
Dem.
*9·35.
*9·36.
Dem.
*9·361.
*9·37.
*9·371.
*9·4.
Dem.
*9·401.
*9·41.
*9·411.
*9·42.
*9·421.
*9·5.
Dem.
*9·501.
*9·51.
Dem.
[Pg 142]
*9·511.
*9·52.
Dem.
*9·521.
*9·6.
*9·61. If and
are elementary
functions of the same type, there is a function
.
Dem.
By *9·14·15, there is an for which "
," and therefore
"
," are significant, and therefore so is "
,"
by the primitive idea of disjunction. Hence the result by *9·15.
The same proof holds for functions of any number of variables.
*9·62. If and
are
elementary functions, and the
-argument to
is of the same
type as the argument to
, there are functions
Dem.
By *9·15, there are propositions and
, where
by hypothesis
and
are of the same type. Hence by *9·14
there is a proposition
, and therefore, by the primitive
idea of disjunction, there is a proposition
,
and therefore, by *9·15 and *9·03, there is a proposition
(
. Similarly there is a proposition
(
. Hence the result, by *9·15.
*9·63. If ,
are elementary functions of the same type, there are functions
(
, etc. [Proof as above]
We have now completed the proof that, in the primitive propositions
of *1, any one of the propositions that occur may be replaced by
( or (
. It follows that, by merely
repeating the proofs, we can show that any other of the propositions
that occur in these propositions can be simultaneously replaced by
(
or (
. Thus all the primitive
propositions of *1, and therefore all the propositions of *2—*5, hold
equally when some or all of the propositions concerned are of one of
the forms (
, (
, which was to be
proved.
It follows, by mere repetition of the proofs, that the propositions
of *1—*5 hold when ,
,
are replaced by propositions
containing any number of apparent variables.
[50] We use "always" as meaning "in all cases," not "at all times." A similar remark applies to "sometimes."
[51] As above.
[Pg 143]
Summary of *10.
The chief purpose of the propositions of this number is to extend
to formal implications (i.e. to propositions of the form
) as many as possible of the
propositions proved previously for material implications, i.e.
for propositions of the form
. Thus e.g. we have
proved in *3·33 that
Then we have "if 'Socrates is a Greek' implies 'Socrates is a man,'
and 'Socrates is a man' implies 'Socrates is a mortal,' it follows
that 'Socrates is a Greek' implies 'Socrates is a mortal.'" But this
does not of itself prove that if all Greeks are men, and all men are
mortals, then all Greeks are mortals.
we have to prove
It is such propositions that have to be proved in the present
number. It will be seen that formal implication
)
is a relation of two functions
and
. Many of the formal properties of this relation
are analogous to properties of the relation "
" which
expresses material implication; it is such analogues that are to be
proved in this number.
We shall assume in this number, what has been proved in *9, that
the propositions of *1—*5 can be applied to such propositions as
( and (
. Instead of the method
adopted in *9, it is possible to take negation and disjunction as
new primitive ideas, as applied to propositions containing apparent
variables, and to assume that, with the new meanings of negation and
disjunction, the primitive propositions of *1 still hold. If this[Pg 144]
method is adopted, we need not take
as a
primitive idea, but may put
*10·01. (
In order to make it clear how this alternative method can be developed, we shall, in the present number, assume nothing of what has been proved in *9 except certain propositions which, in the alternative method, will be primitive propositions, and (what in part characterizes the alternative method) the applicability to propositions containing apparent variables of analogues of the primitive ideas and propositions of *1, and therefore of their consequences as set forth in *2—*5.
The two following definitions merely serve to introduce a notation
which is often more convenient than the notation
or
.
*10·02.
*10·03.
The first of these notations is due to Peano, who, however, has no
notation for ( except in the special case of a formal
implication.
The following propositions (*10·1·11·12·121·122) have already been given in *9. *10·1 is *9·2*10·11 is *9·13, *10·12 is *9·25, *10·121 is *9·14, and *10·122 is *9·15. These five propositions must all be taken as primitive propositions in the alternative method; on the other hand, *9·1 and *9·11 are not required as primitive propositions in the alternative method.
The propositions of the present number are very much used throughout the rest of the work. The propositions most used are the following:
I.e. what is true in all cases is true in any one case.
*10·11. If is true whatever possible argument
may be, then (
is true. In other words, whenever
the propositional function
can be asserted, so can the
proposition (
.
*10·21.
*10·22.
The conditions of significance in this proposition demand that
and
should take arguments of the same type.
*10·23.
I.e. if always implies
, then if
is
ever true,
is true.
*10·24.
[Pg 145]
I.e. if is true, then there is an
for
which
is true. This is the sole method of proving
existence-theorems.
*10·27.
I.e. if always implies
, then "
always" implies "
always." The three following propositions,
which are equally useful, are analogous to *10·27.
*10·271.
*10·28.
*10·281.
*10·35.
*10·42.
*10·5.
It should be noticed that whereas *10·42 expresses an equivalence, *10·5 only expresses an implication. This is the source of many subsequent differences between formulae concerning addition and formulae concerning multiplication.
*10·51.
This proposition is analogous to
which results from *4·63 by transposition.
Of the remaining propositions of this number, some are employed fairly often, while others are lemmas which are used only once or twice, sometimes at a much later stage.
*10·01. (
This definition is only to be used when we discard the method of *9 in
favour of the alternative method already explained. In either case we
have
*10·02.
*10·03.
*10·1.
*10·11. If is true whatever possible argument
may be, then (
is true. [*9·13]
[Pg 146]
This proposition is, in a sense, the converse of *10·1. *10·1 may be stated: "What is true of all is true of any," while *10·11 may be stated: "What is true of any, however chosen, is true of all."
According to the definitions in *9, this proposition is a mere
example of "," since by definition the two sides of the
implication are different symbols for the same proposition. According
to the alternative method, on the contrary, *10·12 is a substantial
proposition.
*10·121. If "" is significant, then if
is of the
same type as
, "
" is significant, and vice versa. [*9·14]
It follows from this proposition that two arguments to the same
function must be of the same type; for if and a are arguments
to
, "
" and "
" are significant,
and therefore
and
are of the same type. Thus the above
primitive proposition embodies the outcome of our discussion of the
vicious-circle paradoxes in Chapter II of the Introduction.
*10·122. If, for some , there is a proposition
,
then there is a function
, and vice versa. [*9·15]
*10·13. If and
take arguments of
the same type, and we have "
" and "
,"
we shall have "
."
Dem.
By repeated use of 9·61·62·63·131 (3), there is a function
. Hence by *2·11 and *3·01,
This proposition is true whenever it is significant, but it is not
always significant when its hypothesis is significant. For the thesis
demands that and
should take arguments of the same
type, while the hypothesis does not demand this. Hence, if it is to
be applied when
and
are given, or when
is
given as a function of
or vice versa, we must not argue from
the hypothesis to the thesis unless, in the supposed case,
and
take arguments of the same type.
Dem.
[Pg 147]
Dem.
This proposition is much more used than *10·2.
*10·22.
Dem.
The above proposition is true whenever it is significant; but, as was
pointed out in connexion with *10·14, it is not always significant when
"(" is significant.
*10·221. If contains a constituent
and
contains a constituent
,
where
is an elementary function and
are either constants or apparent variables,
then
and
take arguments of the
same type. This can be proved in each particular case, though not
generally, provided that, in obtaining
and
from
,
is only submitted to negations, disjunctions and
generalizations. The process may be illustrated by an example. Suppose
is (
, and
is
. By the definitions of *9,
is (
, and
is (
. Hence since the primitive ideas
(
and (
only apply to functions, there
are functions
,
. Hence there is a
proposition
. Hence, since "
"
and "
" are only significant[Pg 148] when
and
are propositions, there is a proposition
. Similarly,
for some
and
, there are propositions
and
. Hence by *9·14,
and
,
and
are respectively of the same type, and (again by *9·14) there
is a proposition
. Hence (*9·15) there are
functions
,
,
therefore there are propositions
i.e. there are propositions
,
, which was to
be proved. This process can be applied similarly in any other instance.
Dem.
In the above proof, we employ the definitions of *9. In the alternative
method, in which ( is defined in accordance with
*10·01, the proof proceeds as follows.
*10·23.
Dem.
[Pg 149]
Whenever we have an asserted proposition of the form ,
we can pass by *10·11·21 to an asserted proposition
. This passage is constantly required, as in
the last line but one of the above proof. It will be indicated merely
by the reference "*10·11·21," and the two steps which it requires will
not be separately put down.
This is *9·1. In the alternative method, the proof is as follows.
Dem.
*10·25.
*10·252.
*10·253.
In the alternative method, in which ( is defined
as in *10·01, the proofs of *10·252·253 are as follows.
*10·252.
*10·253.
Dem.
*10·26.
This is one form of the syllogism in Barbara. E.g. put
is a man,
is mortal,
= Socrates. Then the
proposition becomes:
"If all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal."
Another form of the syllogism in Barbara is given in *10·3. The two forms, formerly wrongly identified, were first distinguished by Peano and Frege.
This is *9·21. In the alternative method, the proof is as follows.
[Pg 150]
Dem.
Dem.
This is *9·22. In the alternative method, the proof is as follows.
Dem.
*10·29.
Dem.
This is an extension of the principle of composition.
This is the second form of the syllogism in Barbara.
Dem.
[Pg 151]
Dem.
In the second line of the proofs of *10·3 and *10·301, we abbreviate
the process of proof in a way which is often convenient. In *10·3, the
full process would be as follows:
The above two propositions show that formal implication and formal equivalence are transitive relations between functions.
*10·31.
Dem.
*10·311.
Dem.
The above two propositions are extensions of the principle of the factor.
*10·32.
Dem.
This proposition shows that formal equivalence is symmetrical.
*10·321.
Dem.
*10·322.
Dem.
[Pg 152]
*10·33.
Dem.
*10·34.
This follows immediately from *9·05·01 and *1·01. In the alternative method, the proof is as follows.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 153]
*10·36.
This follows immediately from *9·05. In the alternative method, the proof is as follows.
Dem.
The above proposition is only required in order to lead to the following:
*10·37.
Dem.
This proposition is only true when the conclusion is significant; the significance of the hypothesis does not insure that of the conclusion. On the conditions of significance, see the remarks on *10·4, below.
Dem.
[Pg 154]
In *10·4 and many later propositions, as in *10·39, the conclusion may
be not significant when the hypothesis is true. Hence, in order that it
may be legitimate to use *10·4 in inference, i.e. to pass
from the assertion of the hypothesis to the assertion of
the conclusion, the functions ,
,
,
must be such as to have overlapping ranges of significance. In virtue
of *10·221, this is secured if they are of the forms
,
,
,
.
It is also secured if
and
or
and
or
and
or
and
are of such forms,
for
and
must have overlapping ranges of significance
if the hypothesis is to be significant, and so must
and
.
Dem.
Observe that in the above proof the uses of *2·2 and *1·3 are only
legitimate if and
have overlapping ranges
of significance, for otherwise, if
is such that there is a
proposition
, it is such that there is no proposition
,
and conversely.
*10·411.
Dem.
*10·412.
*10·413.
Dem.
*10·414.
Dem.
The propositions *10·413·414 are chiefly used in cases where either
is replaced by
or
is replaced by
,
in which case half the hypothesis becomes superfluous, being true by
*4·2.
Dem.
[Pg 155]
This proposition is very frequently used. It should be contrasted with *10·5, in which we have only an implication, not an equivalence.
*10·43.
Dem.
Dem.
The converse of the above proposition is false. The fact that this proposition states an implication, while *10·42 states an equivalence, is the source of many subsequent differences between formulae concerning logical addition and formulae concerning logical multiplication.
*10·51.
Dem.
*10·52.
Dem.
*10·53.
Dem.
*10·541.
Dem.
[Pg 156]
The above proposition is only needed in order to lead to the following:
*10·542.
This proposition is a lemma for *84·43.
*10·55.
Dem.
This proposition is a lemma for *117·12·121.
*10·56.
Dem.
This proposition and *10·57 are used in the theory of series (Part V).
Dem.
[Pg 157]
Summary of *11.
In this number, the propositions proved for one variable in *10 are to
be extended to two variables, with the addition of a few propositions
having no analogues for one variable, such as *11·2·21·23·24 and
*11·53·55·6·7. "" stands for a proposition containing
and containing
; when
and
are unassigned,
is a propositional function of
and
. The
definition *11·01 shows that "the truth of all values of
"
does not need to be taken as a new primitive idea, but is definable
in terms of "the truth of all values of
." The reason is
that, when
is assigned,
becomes a function of one
variable, namely
, whence it follows that, for every possible
value of
, "(
" embodies merely the primitive idea
introduced in *9. But "(
" is again only a function of
one variable, namely
, since
has here become an apparent
variable. Hence the definition *11·01 below is legitimate. We put:
*11·01. (
*11·02. (
*11·03. (
*11·04. (
*11·05.
*11·06.
All the above definitions are supposed extended to any number of variables that may occur.
The propositions of this section can all be extended to any finite number of variables; as the analogy is exact, it is not necessary to carry the process beyond two variables in our proofs.
In addition to the definition *11·01, we need the primitive proposition
that "whatever possible argument may be,
is true
whatever possible argument
may be" implies the corresponding
statement with
and
interchanged. Either may be taken as the
meaning of "
is true whatever possible arguments
and
may be."
[Pg 158]
The propositions of the present number are somewhat less used than those of *10, but some of them are used frequently. Such are the following:
*11·1.
*11·11. If is true whatever possible arguments
and
may be, then (
is true.
These two propositions are the analogues of *10·1·11.
*11·2.
I.e. to say that "for all possible values of ,
is true for all possible values of
" is equivalent to
saying "for all possible values of
,
is true for
all possible values of
."
*11·3.
This is the analogue of *10·21.
*11·32.
I.e. "if always implies
, then
'
always' implies '
always.'" This is the
analogue of *10·21. *11·33·34·341 are respectively the analogues of
*10·271·28·281, and are also much used.
*11·35.
I.e. if always implies
, then if
is ever true,
is true. This is the analogue of *10·23.
*11·45.
This is the analogue of *10·35.
*11·54.
This proposition is useful because it analyses a proposition containing
two apparent variables into two propositions which each contain only
one. "" is a function of two variables, but is
compounded of two functions of one variable each. Such a function
is like a conic which is two straight lines: it may be called an
"analysable" function.
*11·55.
I.e. to say "there are values of and
for which
is true" is equivalent to saying "there is
a value of
for which
is true and for which there is a
value of
such that
is true."
*11·6.
This gives a transformation which is useful in many proofs.
*11·62.
This transformation also is often useful.
[Pg 159]
*11·01. (
*11·02. (
*11·03. (
*11·04. (
*11·05.
*11·06.
with similar definitions for any number of variables.
*11·07. "Whatever possible argument may be,
is true
whatever possible argument
may be" implies the corresponding
statement with
and
interchanged. Pp.
*11·1.
Dem.
*11·11. If is true whatever possible arguments
and
may be, then (
is true.
Dem.
By *10·11, the hypothesis implies that ( is true
whatever possible argument
may be; and this, by *10·11, implies
(
.
*11·12.
Dem.
This proposition is only used for proving *11·2.
*11·13. If ,
take their first and second arguments respectively of the same type,
and we have "
" and "
," we shall
have "
." [Proof as in *10·13]
Dem.
[Pg 160]
This proposition, like *10·14, is not always significant when its hypothesis is true. *11·13, on the contrary, is always significant when its hypothesis is true. For this reason, *11·13 may always be safely used in inference, whereas *11·14 can only be used in inference (i.e. for the actual assertion of the conclusion when the hypothesis is asserted) if it is known that the conclusion is significant.
Dem.
Note that "(" is the same proposition as
"(
"; a proposition is not a function of any apparent
variable which occurs in it.
*11·21.
Dem.
*11·22.
Dem.
*11·23.
Dem.
*11·24.
Dem.
*11·25.
[Pg 161]
*11·26.
Dem.
Note that the converse of this proposition is false. E.g. let
be the propositional function "if
is a proper fraction,
then
is a proper fraction greater than
." Then for all
values of
we have (
, so that (
is satisfied. In fact "(
"
expresses the proposition: "If
is a proper fraction, then there
is always a proper fraction greater than
." But "(
"
expresses the proposition: "There is a proper fraction which is greater
than any proper fraction," which is false.
*11·27.
Dem.
All the propositions of *10 have analogues which hold for two or more variables. The more important of these are proved in what follows.
Dem.
*11·31.
Here the conditions of significance on the right-hand side require that
and
should take arguments of the same types.
Dem.
The proofs of most of the following propositions are conducted exactly as those of *11·3·31 are conducted: the analogous proposition in *10 is used[Pg 162] twice, together with *10·27 or *10·271 or *10·28 or *10·281 as the case may be. When proofs conform to this pattern we shall merely give references to the propositions used.
*11·311. If ,
take arguments of the same type, and we have "
" and
"
," we shall have "
."
[Proof as in *10·13.]
*11·32.
*11·33.
*11·34.
*11·341.
*11·35.
*11·36.
Dem.
*11·37.
Dem.
In the following demonstration, "" means the hypothesis
of the proposition to be proved. We shall employ this abbreviation,
whenever convenient, in all cases where the proposition to be proved is
a hypothetical, i.e. is of the form "
." Similarly
"
" will mean "the hypothesis of (1)," and so on.
[Pg 163]
The above is a type of proof which recurs frequently in what follows. Proofs conforming to this pattern will be indicated only by the numbers of the propositions used.
*11·371.
*11·38.
*11·39.
*11·391.
Dem.
*11·4.
Dem.
*11·401.
*11·41.
*11·42.
*11·421.
*11·43.
*11·44.
[Pg 164]
*11·45.
*11·46.
*11·47.
*11·5.
Dem.
*11·51.
Dem.
*11·52.
Dem.
*11.521.
*11.53.
Dem.
*11·54.
Dem.
This proposition is very often used.
[Pg 165]
*11·55.
Dem.
This proposition is very often used.
*11·56.
Dem.
*11·57.
The use of *4·24 here depends upon the fact that ( and
(
are the same proposition.
*11·58.
*11·59.
Dem.
*11·6.
This proposition is very frequently employed in subsequent proofs.
Dem.
[Pg 166]
*11·61.
Dem.
*11·62.
Dem.
*11·63.
Dem.
*11·7.
Dem.
In the last line of the above proof, use is made of the fact that
are the same proposition.
The first use of the following proposition occurs in the proof of
*234·12. Its utility lies in its enabling us to pass from a hypothesis
containing two apparent variables, to the product of two hypotheses
each containing only one.
[Pg 167]
*11·71.
Dem.
[Pg 168]
The primitive idea "" has been explained to mean
"
is always true," i.e. "all values of
are true." But whatever function
may be, there will be
arguments
with which
is meaningless, i.e. with
which as arguments
does not have any value. The arguments
with which
has values form what we will call the "range of
significance" of
. A "type" is defined as the range
of significance of some function. In virtue of *9·14, if
,
, and
are significant, i.e. either true
or false, so is
. From this it follows that two types
which have a common member coincide, and that two different types
are mutually exclusive. Any proposition of the form
,
i.e. any proposition containing an apparent variable, determines
some type as the range of the apparent variable, the type being fixed
by the function
.
The division of objects into types is necessitated by the vicious-circle fallacies which otherwise arise[52]. These fallacies show that there must be no totalities which, if legitimate, would contain members defined in terms of themselves. Hence any expression containing an apparent variable must not be in the range of that variable, i.e. must belong to a different type. Thus the apparent variables contained or presupposed in an expression are what determines its type. This is the guiding principle in what follows.
As explained in *9, propositions containing variables are generated
from propositional functions which do not contain these apparent
variables, by the process of asserting all or some values of such
functions. Suppose is a proposition containing
;
we will give the name of generalization to the process which
turns
into
or
,
and we will give the name of generalized propositions to all
such as contain apparent variables. It is plain that propositions
containing apparent variables presuppose others not containing
apparent variables, from which they can be derived by generalization.
Propositions which contain no apparent variables we call elementary
propositions[53], and the terms of such propositions, other than
functions, we call individuals. Then individuals form the first
type.
[Pg 169]
It is unnecessary, in practice, to know what objects belong to the lowest type, or even whether the lowest type of variable occurring in a given context is that of individuals or some other. For in practice only the relative types of variables are relevant; thus the lowest type occurring in a given context may be called that of individuals, so far as that context is concerned. It follows that the above account of individuals is not essential to the truth of what follows; all that is essential is the way in which other types are generated from individuals, however the type of individuals may be constituted.
By applying the process of generalization to individuals occurring in elementary propositions, we obtain new propositions. The legitimacy of this process requires only that no individuals should be propositions. That this is so, is to be secured by the meaning we give to the word individual. We may explain an individual as something which exists on its own account; it is then obviously not a proposition, since propositions, as explained in Chapter II of the Introduction (p. 46), are incomplete symbols, having no meaning except in use. Hence in applying the process of generalization to individuals we run no risk of incurring reflexive fallacies. We will give the name of first-order propositions to such as contain one or more apparent variables whose possible values are individuals, but contain no other apparent variables. First-order propositions are not all of the same type, since, as was explained in *9, two propositions which do not contain the same number of apparent variables cannot be of the same type. But owing to the systematic ambiguity of negation and disjunction, their differences of type may usually be ignored in practice. No reflexive fallacies will result, since no first-order proposition involves any totality except that of individuals.
Let us denote by "" or "
"
or etc. an elementary function whose argument or arguments are
individual. We will call such a function a predicative function of
an individual. Such functions, together with those derived from
them by generalization, will be called first-order functions. In
practice we may without risk of reflexive fallacies treat first-order
functions as a type, since the only totality they involve is that of
individuals, and, by means of the systematic ambiguity of negation
and disjunction, any function of a first-order function which will
concern us will be significant whatever first-order function is taken
as argument, provided the right meanings are given to the negations and
disjunctions involved.
For the sake of clearness, we will repeat in somewhat different terms
our account of what is meant by a first-order function. Let us give
the name of matrix to any function, of however many variables,
which does not involve any apparent variables. Then any possible
function other than a matrix is derived from a matrix by means of
generalization, i.e. by considering the proposition which
asserts that the function in question is true with all[Pg 170] possible values
or with some value of one of the arguments, the other argument or
arguments remaining undetermined. Thus e.g. from the function
we shall be able to derive the four functions
of which the two first are functions of
, while the two last are
functions of
. (All propositions, with the exception of
such as are values of matrices, are also derived from matrices by the
above process of generalization. In order to obtain a proposition from
a matrix containing
variables, without assigning values to any of
the variables, it is necessary to turn all the variables into apparent
variables. Thus if
is a matrix, (
is
a proposition.) We will give the name first-order matrices to
such as have only individuals for their arguments, and we will give the
name of first-order functions (of any number of variables) to
such as either are first-order matrices or are derived from first-order
matrices by generalization applied to some (not all) of the arguments
to such matrices. First-order propositions will be such as
result from applying generalization to all the arguments to a
first-order matrix.
As we have already stated, the notation "" is used
for any elementary function of one variable. Thus "
"
represents any value of any elementary function of one variable. It
will be seen that "
" is a function of two variables, namely
and
. Since it contains no apparent variable, it
is a matrix, but since it contains a variable (namely
which is not an individual, it is not a first-order matrix. The same
applies to
, where a is some definite constant. We can build
up a number of new matrices, such as
All these are matrices which involve first-order functions among their
arguments. Such matrices we will call second-order matrices.
From these matrices, by applying generalization to their arguments,
whether to such as are functions or to such (if any) as are
individuals, we obtain new functions and propositions. Such functions
(together with second-order matrices) will be called second-order
functions, and such propositions will be called second-order
propositions. Thus we are led to the following definitions:
A second-order matrix is one which has at least one first-order matrix among its arguments, but has no arguments other than first-order matrices and individuals.
A second-order function is one which either is a second-order matrix or results from one by applying generalization to some (not all) of the arguments to a second-order matrix.
A second-order proposition is one which results from a second-order matrix by applying generalization to all its arguments.
[Pg 171]
In addition to the above illustrations of second-order matrices, we may give the following examples of second-order functions:
(1) Functions in which the argument is ,
(
,
, where
and
are constants,
, where
is
a constant function, and so on.
(2) Functions in which the arguments are and
:
where
and
are constants, and so on.
(3) Functions in which the argument is an individual
,
,
, where
is constant, and so on.
(4) Functions in which the arguments are and
,
, where
is constant,
(
and so on.
Examples of second-order functions might, of course, be multiplied indefinitely, but the above seem sufficient for purposes of illustration.
A second-order matrix of one variable will be called a predicative
second-order function of one variable or a predicative function
of a first-order matrix. Thus ,
and
are predicative functions of
.
Similarly a function of several variables of which at least one
is a first-order matrix, while the rest are either individuals or
first-order matrices, will be called predicative if it is a
matrix.
It will be seen, however, that a second-order function may have only individuals for its arguments; instances were given just now under the heading (3). Such functions we shall not call predicative, since predicative functions of individuals have already been defined as being such as are of the first order. Thus the order of a function is not determined by the order of its argument or arguments; indeed, the function may be of any order superior to the order or orders of its arguments.
A variable matrix whose argument is will be denoted
by
, and generally, a matrix whose arguments are
,
, ...
,
, ... (where there
is at least one function among the arguments) will be denoted by
Such a matrix is not of the first or second order, since it contains
the new variable
whose values are second-order matrices.
We proceed to construct new matrices as we did with the matrix
; these constitute third-order matrices. These
together with the functions derived from them by generalization are
called third-order functions, and the propositions derived
from third-order matrices by generalization are called third-order
propositions.
[Pg 172]
In this way we can proceed indefinitely to matrices, functions and propositions of higher and higher orders. We introduce the following definition:
A function is said to be predicative when it is a matrix. It will be observed that, in a hierarchy in which all the variables are individuals or matrices, a matrix is the same thing as an elementary function (cf. pp. 132, 133).
"Matrix" or "predicative function" is a primitive idea.
The fact that a function is predicative is indicated, as above, by a note of exclamation after the functional letter.
The variables occurring in the present work, from this point onwards, will all be either individuals or matrices of some order in the above hierarchy. Propositions, which have occurred hitherto as variables, will no longer do so except in a few isolated cases of which no subsequent use is made. In practice, for the reasons explained on p. 169, a function of a matrix may be regarded as capable of any argument which is a function of the same order and takes arguments of the same type.
In practice, we never need to know the absolute types of our variables,
but only their relative types. That is to say, if we prove
any proposition on the assumption that one of our variables is an
individual, and another is a function of order , the proof will
still hold if, in place of an individual, we take a function of order
, and in place of our function of order
we take a function
of order
, with corresponding changes for any other variables
that may be involved. This results from the assumption that our
primitive propositions are to apply to variables of any order.
We shall use small Latin letters (other than ,
,
,
for variables of the lowest type concerned in any context. For
functions, we shall use the letters
,
,
,
,
,
,
(except that, at a later stage,
will be defined as a constant relation, and
will be defined
as the order-type of the continuum).
We shall explain later a different hierarchy, that of classes and relations, which is derived from the functional hierarchy explained above, but is more convenient in practice.
When any predicative function, say , occurs as
apparent variable, it would be strictly more correct to indicate the
fact by placing "(
" before what follows, as thus:
"(
." But for the sake of brevity we
write simply "(
" instead of "(
." Since what
follows the
in brackets must always contain
with
arguments supplied, no confusion can result from this practice.
It should be observed that, in virtue of the manner in which our
hierarchy of functions was generated, non-predicative functions always
result from such as are predicative by means of generalization. Hence
it is unnecessary to introduce a special notation for non-predicative
functions of a given order[Pg 173] and taking arguments of a given order.
For example, second-order functions of an individual are always
derived by generalization from a matrix
where the functions
,
,
, ... are predicative. It
is possible, therefore, without loss of generality, to use no apparent
variables except such as are predicative.
We require, however, a means of symbolising a function whose order is
not assigned. We shall use "" or "
" or
etc. to express a function (
or
) whose order, relatively
to its argument, is not given. Such a function cannot be made into an
apparent variable, unless we suppose its order previously fixed. As the
only purpose of the notation is to avoid the necessity of fixing the
order, such a function will not be used as an apparent variable; the
only functions which will be so used will be predicative functions,
because, as we have just seen, this restriction involves no loss of
generality.
We have now to state and explain the axiom of reducibility.
It is important to observe that, since there are various types of propositions and functions, and since generalization can only be applied within some one type (or, by means of systematic ambiguity, within some well-defined and completed set of types), all phrases referring to "all propositions" or "all functions," or to "some (undetermined) proposition" or "some (undetermined) function," are prima facie meaningless, though in certain cases they are capable of an unobjectionable interpretation. Contradictions arise from the use of such phrases in cases where no innocent meaning can be found.
If mathematics is to be possible, it is absolutely necessary (as
explained in the Introduction, Chapter II) that we should have some
method of making statements which will usually be equivalent to what
we have in mind when we (inaccurately) speak of "all properties of
." (A "property of
" may be defined as a propositional
function satisfied by
.) Hence we must find, if possible, some
method of reducing the order of a propositional function without
affecting the truth or falsehood of its values. This seems to be what
common-sense effects by the admission of classes. Given any
propositional function
of whatever order, this is assumed
to be equivalent, for all values of
, to a statement of the form
"
belongs to the class
." Now assuming that there is
such an entity as the class
, this statement is of the first
order, since it involves no allusion to a variable function. Indeed
its only practical advantage over the original statement
is that it is of the first order. There is no advantage in assuming
that there really are such things as classes, and the contradiction
about the classes which are not members of themselves shows that, if
there are classes, they must be something radically different from
individuals. It would seem that the sole purpose which classes serve,
and one main reason which makes them linguistically convenient, is[Pg 174]
that they provide a method of reducing the order of a propositional
function. We shall, therefore, not assume anything of what may seem to
be involved in the common-sense admission of classes, except this, that
every propositional function is equivalent, for all its values, to some
predicative function of the same argument or arguments.
This assumption with regard to functions is to be made whatever may be
the type of their arguments. Let be a function, of any order,
of an argument
, which may itself be either an individual or a
function of any order. If
is a matrix, we write the function in
the form
; in such a case we call
a predicative
function. Thus a predicative function of an individual is a first-order
function; and for higher types of arguments, predicative functions take
the place that first-order functions take in respect of individuals. We
assume, then, that every function of one variable is equivalent, for
all its values, to some predicative function of the same argument. This
assumption seems to be the essence of the usual assumption of classes;
at any rate, it retains as much of classes as we have any use for,
and little enough to avoid the contradictions which a less grudging
admission of classes is apt to entail. We will call this assumption the
axiom of classes, or the axiom of reducibility.
We shall assume similarly that every function of two variables is equivalent, for all its values, to a predicative function of those variables, i.e. to a matrix. This assumption is what seems to be meant by saying that any statement about two variables defines a relation between them. We will call this assumption the axiom of relations or (like the previous axiom) the axiom of reducibility.
In dealing with relations between more than two terms, similar assumptions would be needed for three, four, ... variables. But these assumptions are not indispensable for our purpose, and are therefore not made in this work.
Stated in symbols, the two forms of the axiom of reducibility are as follows:
We call two functions ,
formally
equivalent when
, and similarly we call
and
formally
equivalent when
Thus the above axioms state that any function of one or two variables
is formally equivalent to some predicative function of one or
two variables, as the case may be.
[Pg 175]
Of the above two axioms, the first is chiefly needed in the theory of classes (*20), and the second in the theory of relations (*21). But the first is also essential to the theory of identity, if identity is to be defined (as we have done, in *13·01); its use in the theory of identity is embodied in the proof of *13·101, below.
We may sum up what has been said in the present number as follows:
(1) A function of the first order is one which involves no variables except individuals, whether as apparent variables or as arguments.
(2) A function of the (th order is one which has at least one
argument or apparent variable of order
, and contains no argument
or apparent variable which is not either an individual or a first-order
function or a second-order function or ... or a function of order
.
(3) A predicative function is one which contains no apparent variables, i.e. is a matrix. It is possible, without loss of generality, to use no variables except matrices and individuals, so long as variable propositions are not required.
(4) Any function of one argument or of two is formally equivalent to a predicative function of the same argument or arguments.
[Pg 176]
Summary of *13.
The propositional function " is identical with
" will
be written "
." We shall find that this use of the sign
of equality covers all the common uses of equality that occur in
mathematics. The definition is as follows:
This definition states that and
are to be called identical
when every predicative function satisfied by
is also satisfied by
. We cannot state that every function satisfied by
is
to be satisfied by
, because
satisfies functions of various
orders, and these cannot all be covered by one apparent variable.
But in virtue of the axiom of reducibility it follows that, if
and
satisfies
, where
is any function,
predicative or non-predicative, then
also satisfies
(cf. *13·101, below). Hence in effect the definition is as powerful as
it would be if it could be extended to cover all functions of
.
Note that the second sign of equality in the above definition is
combined with "," and thus is not really the same symbol
as the sign of equality which is defined. Thus the definition is not
circular, although at first sight it appears so.
The propositions of the present number are constantly referred to. Most of them are self-evident, and the proofs offer no difficulty. The most important of the propositions of this number are the following:
I.e. if and
are identical, any property of
is
a property of
.
This includes *13·101 together with the fact that if and
are identical any property of
is a property of
.
*13·15·16·17, which state that identity is reflexive, symmetrical and transitive.
*13·191.
[Pg 177]
I.e. to state that everything that is identical with has a
certain property is equivalent to stating that
has that property.
*13·195.
I.e. to state that something identical with has a certain
property is equivalent to saying that
has that property.
*13·22.
This is the analogue of *13·195 for two variables.
*13·01.
The following definitions embody abbreviations which are often convenient.
*13·02.
*13·03.
*13·1.
*13·101.
Dem.
In virtue of this proposition, if ,
satisfies any
function, whether predicative or non-predicative, which is satisfied
by
. It will be observed that the proof uses the axiom of
reducibility (*12·1). But for this axiom, two terms
and
might agree in respect of all predicative functions, but not in respect
of all non-predicative functions. We should thus be led to identities
of different degrees, according to the degree of the functions in
respect of which
and
agreed. Strict identity would, in this
case, have to be taken as a primitive idea, and *13·101 would have to
be a primitive proposition, as would also *13·15·16·17.
*13·11.
Dem.
[Pg 178]
*13·12.
Dem.
*13·13.
*13·14.
Dem.
In the above use of *10·3, ,
,
are regarded as three different functions of
, and
replaces the
of *10·3.
The above three propositions show that identity is reflexive (*13·15), symmetrical (*13·16), and transitive (*13·17). These are the three marks of relations having the formal properties which we associate commonly with the sign of equality.
*13·171.
*13·172.
*13·18.
*13·181.
*13·182.
*13·183.
Dem.
*13·19.
Dem.
This proposition is constantly used in subsequent proofs.
[Pg 179]
*13·192.
Dem.
This proposition is useful in the theory of descriptions (*14).
*13·193.
Dem.
This proposition is very often used.
*13·194.
This proposition is used in *37·65 and *101·14.
Dem.
The use of this proposition in subsequent proofs is very frequent.
*13·196.
*13·21.
Dem.
This proposition is the analogue, for two variables, of *13·191.
[Pg 180]
*13·22.
Dem.
This proposition is the analogue, for two variables, of *13·195. It is frequently used, especially in the theory of couples (*54, *55, *56).
The following proposition is useful in the theory of types. Its purpose
is to show that, if is any argument for which "
" is
significant, i.e. for which we have
,
then "
" is significant when, and only when,
is either
identical with a or not identical with
. It follows (as will be
proved in *20·81) that, if "
" and "
" are both
significant, the class of values of
for which "
" is
significant is the same as the class of those for which "
"
is significant, i.e. two types which have a common member are
identical.
In the following proof, the chief point to observe is the use of
*10·221. There are two variables, and
, to be identified.
In the first use, we depend upon the fact that
and
both occur in both (4) and (5): the occurrence of
in both
justifies the identification of the two
's, and when these
have been identified, the occurrence of
in both justifies
the identification of the two
's. (Unless the
's had been
already identified, this would not be legitimate, because "
" is
typically ambiguous if neither
nor
is of given type.) The
second use of *10·221 is justified by the fact that both
and
occur in both (2) and (6).
Dem.
[Pg 181]
Summary of *14.
A description is a phrase of the form "the term which etc.,"
or, more explicitly, "the term which satisfies
,"
where
, is some function satisfied by one and only
one argument. For reasons explained in the Introduction (Chapter III),
we do not define "the
which satisfies
,"
but we define any proposition in which this phrase occurs. Thus when
we say: "The term
which satisfies
satisfies
," we shall mean: "There is a term
such that
is true when, and only when,
is
, and
is true." That is, writing "
" for "the
term
which satisfies
,"
is to
mean
This, however, is not yet quite adequate as a definition, for when
(
occurs in a proposition which is part of a
larger proposition, there is doubt whether the smaller or the larger
proposition is to be taken as the "
." Take, for
example,
. This may be either
If "(
" is false, the first of these must be true, while the
second must be false. Thus it is very necessary to distinguish them.
The proposition which is to be treated as the ""
will be called the scope of (
. Thus
in the first of the above two propositions, the scope of
(
is
, while in the second
it is
. In order to avoid
ambiguities as to scope, we shall indicate the scope by writing
"
" at the beginning of the scope, followed by
enough dots to extend to the end of the scope. Thus of the above two
propositions the first is
while the second is
Thus we arrive at the following definition:
It will be found in practice that the scope usually required is
the smallest proposition enclosed in dots or brackets in which
"(" occurs. Hence[Pg 182] when this scope is to be given
to (
, we shall usually omit explicit mention of the
scope. Thus e.g. we shall have
Of these the first necessarily implies (
,
while the second does not. We put
This defines: "The satisfying
exists," which
holds when, and only when,
is satisfied by one value
of
and by no other value.
When two or more descriptions occur in the same proposition, there is need of avoiding ambiguity as to which has the larger scope. For this purpose, we put
It will be shown *14·113 that the truth-value of a proposition
containing two descriptions is unaffected by the question which has
the larger scope. Hence we shall in general adopt the convention that
the description occurring first typographically is to have the larger
scope, unless the contrary is expressly indicated. Thus e.g.
will mean
i.e.
By this convention we are able almost always to avoid explicit
indication of the order of elimination of two or more descriptions. If,
however, we require a larger scope for the later description, we put
*14·04
Whenever we have behaves,
formally, like an ordinary argument to any function in which it may
occur. This fact is embodied in the following proposition:
*14·18
That is to say, when ( exists, it has any property
which belongs to everything. This does not hold when (
does not exist; for example, the present King of France does not have
the property of being either bald or not bald.
If ( has any property whatever, it must exist. This
fact is stated in the proposition:
*14·21
This proposition is obvious, since "E" is, by
the definitions, part[Pg 183] of "
." When, in ordinary
language or in philosophy, something is said to "exist," it is always
something described, i.e. it is not something immediately
presented, like a taste or a patch of colour, but something like
"matter" or "mind" or "Homer" (meaning "the author of the Homeric
poems"), which is known by description as "the so-and-so," and is thus
of the form (
. Thus in all such cases, the existence of
the (grammatical) subject (
can be analytically inferred
from any true proposition having this grammatical subject. It would
seem that the word "existence" cannot be significantly applied to
subjects immediately given; i.e. not only does our definition
give no meaning to "
," but there is no reason, in
philosophy, to suppose that a meaning of existence could be found which
would be applicable to immediately given subjects.
Besides the above, the following are among the more useful propositions of the present number.
*14·202.
From the first equivalence in the above, it follows that
*14·204.
I.e. ( exists when there is something which
(
is.
We have
*14·205.
I.e. ( has the property
when there
is something which is (
and which has the property
.
We have to prove that such symbols as "(" obey the
same rules with regard to identity as symbols which directly represent
objects. To this, however, there is one partial exception, for instead
of having
we only have
*14·28.
I.e. "(" only satisfies the reflexive property
of identity if (
exists.
The symmetrical property of identity holds for such symbols as
(, without the need of assuming existence, i.e.
we have
*14·13.
*14·131.
Similarly the transitive property of identity holds without the need of assuming existence. This is proved in *14·14·142·144.
[Pg 184]
*14·01.
*14·02.
*14·03.
*14·04.
In virtue of our conventions as to the scope intended when no scope is explicitly indicated, the above proposition is the same as the following:
*14·101.
*14·111.
Dem.
*14·112.
In the above proposition, we assume the convention explained on p. 182, after the statement of *14·03.
This proposition shows that when two descriptions occur in the same proposition, the truth-value of the proposition is unaffected by the question which has the larger scope.
*14·12.
Dem.
[Pg 185]
*14·121.
Dem.
Dem.
The two following propositions (*14·123·124) are placed here because of the analogy with *14·122, but they are not used until we come to the theory of couples (*55 and *56).
*14·123.
Dem.
[Pg 186]
*14·124.
Dem.
Dem.
This proposition is not an immediate consequence of *13·16,
because "" is not a value of the function
"
." Similar remarks apply to the following propositions.
*14·131.
[Pg 187]
Dem.
In the above proposition, in accordance with our convention, the
descriptive expression ( is eliminated before
(
, because it occurs first in "(
";
but in "(
,"
(
is to be first eliminated. The order of elimination
makes no difference to the truth-value, as was proved in *14·113.
The above proposition may also be proved as follows:
*14·14.
*14·142.
Dem.
*14·144.
Dem.
*14·145.
[Pg 188]
Dem.
*14·15.
Dem.
*14·16.
Dem.
*14·17.
Dem.
It should be observed that we do not have
for, if
is
always false, and therefore
holds for all values of
. But we do have
[Pg 189]
*14·171.
Dem.
Dem.
The above proposition shows that, provided ( exists,
it has (speaking formally) all the logical properties of symbols which
directly represent objects. Hence when (
exists,
the fact that it is an incomplete symbol becomes irrelevant to the
truth-values of logical propositions in which it occurs.
*14·2.
Dem.
*14·201.
Dem.
Dem.
[The second half is proved in the same way as the first half.]
*14·203.
[Pg 190]
Dem.
*14·204.
Dem.
*14·205.
Dem.
This proposition shows that if any true statement can be made about
(, then (
must exist. Its use
throughout the remainder of the work will be very frequent.
When ( does not exist, there are still true
propositions in which "(
" occurs, but it has, in such
propositions, a secondary occurrence, in the sense explained in
Chapter III of the Introduction, i.e. the asserted proposition
concerned is not of the form
, but of the form
, in other words, the proposition which is
the scope of (
is only part of the whole asserted
proposition.
*14·22.
Dem.
[Pg 191]
As an instance of the above proposition, we may take the following: "The proposition 'the author of Waverley existed' is equivalent to 'the man who wrote Waverley wrote Waverley.'" Thus such a proposition as "the man who wrote Waverley wrote Waverley" does not embody a logically necessary truth, since it would be false if Waverley had not been written, or had been written by two men in collaboration. For example, "the man who squared the circle squared the circle" is a false proposition.
*14·23.
Dem.
Note that in the second line of the above proof *10·5, not only *3·26,
is required. For the scope of the descriptive symbol (
is the whole product
,
so that, applying *14·1, the proposition on the right in the first line
becomes
which, by *10·5 and *3·26, implies
*14·24.
Dem.
This proposition should be compared with *14·241, where, in virtue of
the smaller scope of (, we get an implication instead
of an equivalence.
Dem.
[Pg 192]
*14·25.
Dem.
*14·26.
Dem.
*14·27.
Dem.
*14·271.
Dem.
[Pg 193]
*14·272.
Dem.
The above two propositions show that and
are "extensional" properties of
,
i.e. their truth-value is unchanged by the substitution, for
, of any formally equivalent function
.
Dem.
This proposition states that ( is identical with
itself whenever it exists, but not otherwise. Thus for example the
proposition "the present King of France is the present King of France"
is false.
The purpose of the following propositions is to show that, when
, the scope of (
does not
matter to the truth-value of any proposition in which (
occurs. This proposition cannot be proved generally, but it can
be proved in each particular case. The following propositions show the
method, which proceeds always by means of *14·242, *10·23 and *14·11.
The proposition can be proved generally when (
occurs in the form
, and
occurs in what we may call a "truth-function," i.e. a function
whose truth or falsehood depends only upon the truth or falsehood of
its argument or arguments. This covers all the cases with which we are
ever concerned. That is to say, if
occurs in
any of the ways which can be generated by the processes of *1—*11,
then, provided
, the truth-value of
is the same as that of
[Pg 194]This is proved in the following proposition. In this proposition,
however, the use of propositions as apparent variables involves an
apparatus not required elsewhere, and we have therefore not used this
proposition in subsequent proofs.
Dem.
The following propositions are immediate applications of the above.
They are, however, independently proved, because *14·3 introduces
propositions (,
namely) as apparent variables, which we have
not done elsewhere, and cannot do legitimately without the explicit
introduction of the hierarchy of propositions with a reducibility-axiom
such as *12·1.
Dem.
The following propositions are proved in precisely the same way as *14·31; hence we shall merely give references to the propositions used in the proofs.
*14·32.
The equivalence asserted here fails when .
Thus, for example, let
be "
is King of France."
Then (
= the King of France. Let
be "
is bald." Then
the[Pg 195]
King of France exists and is not bald; but
it is false that the King of France exists and is bald. Of these the
first is false, the second true. Either might be meant by "the King of
France is not bald," which is ambiguous; but it would be more natural
to take the first (false) interpretation as the meaning of the words.
If the King of France existed, the two would be equivalent; thus as
applied to the King of England, both are true or both false.
*14·33.
*14·331.
*14·332.
This proposition does not require the hypothesis .
Dem.
Propositions of the above type might be continued indefinitely, but
as they are proved on a uniform plan, it is unnecessary to go beyond
the fundamental cases of ,
,
and
It should be observed that the proposition in which (
has the larger scope always implies the corresponding one in which
it has the smaller scope, but the converse implication only holds if
either (a) we have
or (b)
the proposition in which (
has the smaller scope
implies
. The second case occurs in *14·34,
and is the reason why we get an equivalence without the hypothesis
. The proposition in which (
has the larger scope always implies
, in
virtue of *14·21.
[Pg 196]
Summary of *20.
The following theory of classes, although it provides a notation to represent them, avoids the assumption that there are such things as classes. This it does by merely defining propositions in whose expression the symbols representing classes occur, just as, in *14, we defined propositions containing descriptions.
The characteristics of a class are that it consists of all the terms satisfying some propositional function, so that every propositional function determines a class, and two functions which are formally equivalent (i.e. such that whenever either is true, the other is true also) determine the same class, while conversely two functions which determine the same class are formally equivalent. When two functions are formally equivalent, we shall say that they have the same extension. The incomplete symbols which take the place of classes serve the purpose of technically providing something identical in the case of two functions having the same extension; without something to represent classes, we cannot, for example, count the combinations that can be formed out of a given set of objects.
Propositions in which a function occurs may depend, for their
truth-value, upon the particular function
, or they may depend
only upon the extension of
. In the former case, we
will call the proposition concerned an intensional function
of
; in the latter case, an extensional function of
. Thus, for example, (
or (
is an extensional function of
, because, if
is
formally equivalent to
, i.e. if
,
we have (
and (
. But on
the other hand "I believe (
" is an intensional
function, because, even if
, it by no
means follows that I believe (
provided I believe
(
. The mark of an extensional function
of a
function
is
[Pg 197]
(We write "
" when we wish to speak of the function
itself as opposed to its argument.) The functions of functions with
which mathematics is specially concerned are all extensional.
When a function of is extensional, it may be regarded
as being about the class determined by
, since its
truth-value remains unchanged so long as the class is unchanged.
Hence we require, for the theory of classes, a method of obtaining an
extensional function from any given function of a function. This is
effected by the following definition:
Here is in reality a function of
, which is defined whenever
is significant for predicative functions
. But it
is convenient to regard
as though it had
an argument
), which we will call "the class
determined by the function
." It will be proved
shortly that
is always an extensional
function of
, and that, applying the definition of
identity (*13·01) to the fictitious objects
) and
), we have
This last is the distinguishing characteristic of classes, and
justifies us in treating
) as the class determined by
.
With regard to the scope of ), and to the order
of elimination of two such expressions, we shall adopt the same
conventions as were explained in *14 for (
. The
condition corresponding to
which is always satisfied because of *12·1.
Following Peano, we shall use the notation
to express "
is a member of the class determined by
." We therefore introduce the following definition:
In this form, the definition is never used; it is introduced for the
sake of the proposition
which results from *20·02 and *20·01, and leads to
by the help of *12·1.
We shall use small Greek letters (other than ,
,
,
,
,
,
) to represent
classes, i.e. to stand for symbols of the form
or
. When a small Greek letter occurs as
apparent variable, it is to be understood to stand for a[Pg 198] symbol of
the form
, where
is properly the apparent
variable concerned. The use of single letters in place of such symbols
as
or
is practically almost
indispensable, since otherwise the notation rapidly becomes intolerably
cumbrous. Thus "
" will mean "
is a member of the
class
," and may be used wherever no special defining
function of the class
is in question.
The following definition defines what is meant by a class.
Note that the expression
"" has
no meaning in isolation: we have merely defined (in *20·01)
certain uses of such expressions. What the above definition
decides is that the symbol "Cls" may replace the symbol
"
," wherever
the latter occurs, and that the meaning of the combination of symbols
concerned is to be unchanged thereby. Thus "Cls," also, has no meaning
in isolation, but merely in certain uses.
The above definition, like many future definitions, is ambiguous as
to type. The Latin letter , according to our conventions, is to
represent the lowest type concerned; thus
is of the type
next above this. It is convenient to speak of a class as being of the
same type as its defining function; thus
is of the type
next above that of
, and "Cls" is of the type next above that of
. Thus the type of "Cls" is fixed relatively to the lowest
type concerned; but if, in two different contexts, different types are
the lowest concerned, the meaning of "Cls" will be different in these
two contexts. The meaning of "Cls" only becomes definite when the
lowest type concerned is specified.
Equality between classes is defined by applying *13·01, symbolically unchanged, to their defining functions, and then using *20·01.
The propositions of the present number may be divided into three sets. First, we have those that deal with the fundamental properties of classes; these end with *20·43. Then we have a set of propositions dealing with both classes and descriptions; these extend from *20·5 to *20·59 (with the exception of *20·53·54). Lastly, we have a set of propositions designed to prove that classes of classes have all the same formal properties as classes of individuals.
In the first set, the principal propositions are the following.
*20·15.
I.e. two classes are identical when, and only when, their defining functions are formally equivalent. This is the principal property of classes.
*20·31.
[Pg 199]
I.e. two classes are identical when, and only when, they have the same members.
*20·43.
This is the same proposition as *20·31, merely employing Greek letters
in place of and
.
*20·18.
I.e. if two classes are identical, any property of either belongs also to the other. This is the analogue of *13·12.
*20·2·21·22, which prove that identity between classes is reflexive, symmetrical and transitive.
*20·3.
I.e. a term belongs to a class when, and only when, it satisfies the defining function of the class.
In the second set of propositions (*20·3—·59), we show that, under
suitable circumstances, expressions such as ( may be
substituted for
in *20·3 and various other propositions of
the first set, and we prove a few properties of such expressions as
"(
," i.e. "the class which satisfies
the function
." Here it is to be remembered that "
"
stands for "
," and that "
" therefore
stands for "
." This is, in reality, a function
of
, namely the extensional function associated with
by means of *20·01. Thus an expression containing a
variable class is always an abbreviation for an expression containing a
variable function.
In the third set of propositions, we prove that variable classes satisfy all the primitive propositions assumed for variable individuals or functions, whence it follows, by merely repeating the proofs of the first set of propositions (*20·1—·43), that classes of classes have all the formal properties of classes of individuals or functions. We shall never have occasion explicitly to consider classes of functions, but classes of classes will occur constantly—for example, every cardinal number will be defined as a class of classes. Classes of relations, which will also frequently occur, will be considered in *21.
*20·01.
*20·02.
*20·03.
The three following definitions serve merely for purposes of abbreviation.
*20·04.
*20·05.
*20·06.
[Pg 200]
The following definitions merely extend to symbols representing classes the definitions which have already been given for other symbols, with the smallest possible modifications.
*20·07. (
*20·071. (
*20·072.
*20·08.
*20·081.
The propositions which follow give the most general properties of classes.
*20·11.
Dem.
This proves that every proposition about a class expresses an extensional property of the determining function of the class, and therefore does not depend for its truth or falsehood upon the particular function selected for determining the class, but only upon the extension of the determining function.
*20·111.
Dem.
Dem.
Thus the axiom of reducibility still holds for classes as arguments.
[Pg 201]
*20·12.
The meaning of "" is obtained by a
double application of *20·01 to *13·01, remembering the convention that
is to have a larger scope than
because it occurs first.
Dem.
*20·14.
Dem.
This proposition is the converse of *20·13.
*20·15.
This proposition states that two functions determine the same class when, and only when, they are formally equivalent, i.e. are satisfied by the same set of values. This is the essential property of classes, and gives the justification of the definition *20·01.
Dem.
In virtue of this proposition, all classes can be obtained from predicative functions. This fact is especially important when classes are used as apparent variables. For in that case, according to the definitions *20·07·071, the apparent variable really involved is a predicative function. In virtue of *20·151, this places no limitation upon the classes concerned, except the limitation which inevitably results from the nature of their membership.
[Pg 202]
A class, therefore, unlike a function, has its order completely determined by the order of its possible members, i.e. of the arguments which render its defining function significant.
*20·16.
*20·18.
*20·19.
Dem.
*20·191.
*20·2.
Dem.
*20·21.
*20·22.
[Pg 203]
The above propositions are not immediate consequences of
*13·15·16·17, for a reason analogous to that explained in the note
to *14·13, namely because is not a value of
, and therefore in particular "
"
is not a value of "
."
*20·23.
*20·24.
Dem.
Dem.
This proposition shows that is a member of the class determined
by
when, and only when,
satisfies
.
*20·33.
Dem.
Here is written in place of some expression of the form
. The use of the single Greek letter is more
convenient whenever the determining function is irrelevant.
*20·34.
Dem.
[Pg 204]
The above proposition and *20·25 illustrate the use of Greek letters as apparent variables.
*20·35.
*20·4.
*20·42.
A Greek letter, such as , is merely an abbreviation for an
expression of the form
, thus this proposition is
*20·32 repeated.
Dem.
The following propositions deal with cases in which both classes and descriptions occur. In such cases, we shall, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, adopt the convention that the descriptions are to have a larger scope than the classes, in applying the definitions *14·01 and *20·01.
Dem.
*20·51.
Dem.
*20·52.
Dem.
*20·53.
This is the analogue of *13·191.
[Pg 205]
Dem.
*20·54.
This proposition is the analogue of *13·195.
Dem.
*20·55.
Dem.
*20·56.
Dem.
*20·58.
Dem.
[Pg 206]
Dem.
In the following propositions, we shall prove that classes have all the formal properties of individuals, and have the same relations to classes of classes as individuals have to classes of individuals. It is only necessary to prove the analogues of our primitive propositions, and of our definitions in cases where their analogues are not themselves definitions. We shall take the propositions *10·1·11·12·121·122, rather than those of *9, and we shall prove the analogue of *10·01. As was pointed out in *10, we shall thus have proved everything upon which subsequent proofs depend. The analogues of *20·01·02 and of *14·01 remain definitions, but those of *10·01 and *13·01 become propositions to be proved. *9·131 must be extended by the definition: Two classes are "of the same type" when they have predicative defining functions of the same type. In addition to these, we have to prove the analogues of *10·1·11·12·121·122, *11·07 and *12·1·11. When these have been proved, the analogues of other propositions follow by merely repeating previous proofs. These analogues will, therefore, be quoted by the numbers of the original propositions whose analogues they are.
Dem.
This is the analogue of *10·01.
*20·61.
Dem.
This is the analogue of *10·1.
In practice we also need
This is *20·17.
We need further
This is *20·41.
[Pg 207]
*20·62. When is true, whatever possible
argument of the form
may be, then
(
is true.
This is the analogue of *10·11.
Dem.
when
is true, whatever possible argument
may be, then
(
is true, i.e. (by *20·07),
(
is true.
*20·63.
This is the analogue of *10·12.
Dem.
*20·631. If "" is significant, then if
is
of the same type as
, "
" is significant, and vice
versa.
This is the analogue of *10·121.
Dem.
By *20·151, is of the form
, and
therefore, by *20·01,
is a function of
.
Similarly
is of the form
, and
is a function of
. Hence by applying *10·121 to
and
the result follows.
*20·632. If, for some , there is a proposition
, then there is a function
, and vice versa.
Dem.
By the definition in *20·01, is a function of
. Hence the proposition follows from *10·122.
*20·633. "Whatever possible class may be,
is true whatever possible class
may be"
implies the corresponding statement with
and
interchanged except in "
." (The corresponding
exception is to be understood in *11·07.)
This is the analogue of *11·07, and follows at once from *11·07
because is a function of the defining functions of
and
.
*20·64.
Dem.
[Pg 208]
Observe that "" is merely an abbreviation for any symbol of
the form
. This is why nothing further is required
in the above proof.
The above proposition is the analogue of *10·14. Like that proposition,
it requires, for the significance of the conclusion, that and
should be functions which take arguments of the same type. This
is not required for the significance of the hypothesis. Hence, though
the above proposition is true whenever it is significant, it is not
true whenever its hypothesis is significant.
*20·7.
This is the analogue of *12·1.
[The proof proceeds as in *20·112, using *12·11 instead of *12·1.]
*20·702.
[Proof as in *20·701.]
*20·703.
Dem.
*20·701·702·703 give the analogues, for classes, of *12·11.
*20·71.
This is the analogue of *13·01.
[Pg 209]
This completes the proof that all propositions hitherto given apply to classes as well as to individuals. Precisely similar reasoning extends this result to classes of classes, classes of classes of classes, etc.
From the above propositions it appears that, although expressions such
as have no meaning in isolation, yet those of their
formal properties with which we have been hitherto concerned are the
same as the corresponding properties of symbols which have a meaning
in isolation. Hence nothing in the apparatus hitherto introduced
requires us to determine whether a given symbol stands for a class or
not, unless the symbol occurs in a way in which only a class can occur
significantly. This is an important result, which enables us to give
much greater generality to our propositions than would otherwise be
possible.
The two following propositions (*20·8·81) are consequences of *13·3.
The "type" of any object will be defined in *63 as the class of
terms either identical with
or not identical with
. We may
define the "type of the arguments to
" as the class of
arguments
for which "
" is significant, i.e. the
class
. Then the first of the
following propositions shows that if "
" is significant, the
type of the arguments to
is the type of
; the
second proposition shows that, if "
" and "
" are
both significant, the type of the arguments to
is the
same as the type of the arguments to
, because each is
the type of
. *20·8 will be used in *63·11, which is a fundamental
proposition in the theory of relative types.
Dem.
Dem.
In the third line of the above proof, the use of *10·121 depends upon
the fact that the "" in both (1) and (2) must be such as to render
the hypothesis significant, i.e. such as to render
[Pg 210]
significant. Hence the "
" in (1) and the "a" in (2) must be of the
same type, by *10·121, and hence by *10·13 we can assert the product of
(1) and (2), identifying the two "
's."
Since a type is the range of significance of a function, if
is a function which is always true,
must be
a type. For if a function is always true, the arguments for which it
is true are the same as the arguments for which it is significant;
hence
is the range of significance of
,
if (
holds. Thus any class
is a type
if (
. It follows that, whatever function
may be,
is a type; and in
particular,
is a type. Since
is
a member of this class, this class is the type to which a belongs. In
virtue of *20·8, if
is significant, the type to which a
belongs is the class of arguments for which
is significant,
i.e.
. And if there is any
argument a for which
and
are both significant,
then
and
have the same range of
significance, in virtue of *20·81.
[Pg 211]
Summary of *21.
The definitions and propositions of this number are exactly analogous
to those of *20, from which they differ by being concerned with
functions of two variables instead of one. A relation, as we
shall use the word, will be understood in extension: it may be regarded
as the class of couples ( for which some given function
is true. Its relation to the function
is just like that of the class to its determining function.
We put
Here "" has no meaning in isolation, but
only in certain of its uses. In *21·01 the alphabetical order
of
and
corresponds to the typographical order of
and
in
, so that
This is important in relation to the substitution-convention below.
It will be shown that
i.e. that two relations, as above defined, are identical when,
and only when, they are satisfied by the same pairs of arguments.
For substitution in and
, we adopt the convention that when a
function (as opposed to its values) is represented in a form involving
and
, or any other two letters of the alphabet,
the value of this function for the arguments
and
is to be
found by substituting
for
and
for
,
while the value for the arguments
and
is to be found by
substituting
for
and
for
. That
is, the argument mentioned first is to be substituted for the letter
which comes first in the alphabet, and the argument mentioned second
for the later letter; thus the mode of substitution depends upon the
alphabetical order of the letters which have circumflexes and
the typographical order of the other letters.
[Pg 212]
The above convention as to order is presupposed in the following
definition, where is the first argument mentioned and
the
second:
*21·02.
Hence, following the convention,
This definition is not used as it stands, but is introduced for the
sake of
which results from *21·01·02. We shall use capital Latin
letters to represent variable expressions of the form
, just as we used Greek letters for
variable expressions of the form
. If a capital
Latin letter, say
, is used as an apparent variable, it is
supposed that the
which occurs in the form "(
" or
"(
" is to be replaced by "(
" or "(
,"
while the
which occurs later is to be replaced by
"
." In fact we put
The use of single letters for such expressions as
is a practically indispensable convenience.
The following is the definition of the class of relations:
*21·03.
Similar remarks apply to it as to the definition of "Cls" (*20·03).
In virtue of the definitions *21·01·02 and the convention as to
capital Latin letters, the notation "" will mean "
has the
relation
to
." This notation is practically convenient, and
will, after the preliminaries, wholly replace the cumbrous notation
.
The proofs of the propositions of this number are usually omitted, since they are exactly analogous to those of *20, merely substituting *12·11 for *12·1, and propositions in *11 for propositions in *10.
The propositions of this number, like those of *20, fall into three sections. Those of the second section are seldom referred to. Those of the third section, extending to relations the formal properties hitherto assumed or proved for individuals and functions, are not explicitly referred to in the sequel, but are constantly relevant, namely whenever a proposition which has been assumed or proved for individuals and functions is applied to relations. The principal propositions of the first section are the following.
*21·15.
I.e. two relations are identical when, and only when, their defining functions are formally equivalent.
*21·31.
[Pg 213]
I.e. two relations are identical when, and only when, they hold between the same pairs of terms. The same fact is expressed by the following proposition:
*21·2·21·22 show that identity of relations is reflexive, symmetrical and transitive.
*21·3.
I.e. two terms have a given relation when, and only when, they satisfy its defining function.
*21·151.
I.e. every relation can be defined by a predicative function. Hence when, using *21·07 or *21·071, we have a relation as apparent variable, and are therefore confined to predicative defining functions, there is no loss of generality.
*21·01.
On the convention as to order in *21·01·02, cf. p. 211, and thus relate
,
to
,
so that
*21·02.
*21·03.
The following definitions merely extend to relations, with as little modification as possible, the definitions already given for other symbols.
*21·07. (
*21·071. (
*21·072.
*21·08.
*21·081.
The convention as to typographic and alphabetic order is here retained.
*21·082.
*21·083.
*21·1.
*21·11.
This proposition proves that every proposition about a relation expresses an extensional property of the determining function.
*21·111.
[Pg 214]
*21·112.
It is *12·1, not *12·11, which is required in this proposition, because
we are concerned with a function ( of one variable, namely
, although that one variable is itself a function of two
variables.
*21·12.
This is the first use of the primitive proposition *12·11, except in *20·701·702·703.
*21·13.
*21·14.
*21·15.
This proposition states that two double functions determine the same relation when, and only when, they are formally equivalent, i.e. are satisfied by the same pairs of arguments. This is a fundamental property of relations as defined above (*21·01).
*21·151.
*21·16.
*21·17.
*21·18.
*21·19.
*21·191.
*21·2.
*21·21.
*21·22.
*21·23.
*21·24.
*21·3.
[Pg 215]
This shows that has to y the relation determined by
when, and only when,
and
satisfy
.
Note that the primitive proposition *12·11 is again required here.
*21·31.
*21·32.
*21·33.
Here is written for some expression of the form
. The use of a single capital letter for a
relation is convenient whenever the determining function is irrelevant.
*21·4.
*21·41.
*21·42.
*21·43.
*20·5·51·52 have no analogues in the theory of relations.
*21·53.
*21·54.
*21·55.
*21·56.
*21·57.
*21·58.
The following propositions are the analogues of *20·6 ff., and have a similar purpose.
*21·6.
*21·61.
*21·62. When is true, whatever possible argument of the form
may be, (
is true. [Proof as in *20·62]
*21·63.
*21·631. If "" is significant, then if
is of the
same type as
, "
" is significant, and vice versa.
[Proof as in *20·631]
[Pg 216]
*21·632. If, for some , there is a proposition
, then
there is a function
, and vice versa.
[Proof as in *20·632]
*21·633. "Whatever possible relation may be,
is true whatever possible relation
may be" implies "whatever
possible relation
may be,
is true whatever possible
relation
may be."
[Proof as in *20·633]
*21·64.
*21·7.
*21·701.
*21·702.
*21·703.
*21·704.
*21·705.
*21·71.
From the above propositions it appears that relations, like classes, have all the formal properties which they would have if they were symbols having a meaning in isolation. Hence unless a symbol occurs in a way in which only a relation can occur significantly, we do not need to decide whether it stands for a relation or not. This result, like the corresponding result for classes mentioned at the end of *20, is important as giving greater generality to our propositions than they would otherwise possess. The results obtained in *20 and *21 for classes and relations whose members or terms are neither classes nor relations can be extended, by mere repetition of the proofs, to classes of classes, classes of relations, relations of classes, relations of relations, and so on.
[Pg 217]
Summary of *22.
In this number we reach what was historically the starting-point of
symbolic logic. The Greek letters used (except ,
,
,
) are always to stand for expressions of the form
, or, where the Greek letters are not apparent
variables,
. The small Latin letters may either
be such as have a meaning in isolation, or may represent classes or
relations; this is possible in virtue of the notes at the ends of *20
and *21. We put:
*22·01.
This defines "the class is contained in the class
," or "all
's are
's."
*22·02.
This defines the logical product or common part of two classes
and
.
*22·03.
This defines the logical sum of two classes; it is the class consisting of all the members of one together with all the members of the other.
*22·04.
This defines the negation of a class. It is read "not-." It
does not contain every object
concerning which "
"
is not true, but only those objects concerning which "
"
is false; i.e. it excludes those objects for
which "
" is meaningless. Thus it consists of all
objects, of the type next below
, which are not members of
; but it does not contain objects of any other type but this.
*22·05.
This definition gives an abbreviation which is often convenient.
The postulates required for the algebra of logic have been enumerated by Huntington[54]. In our notation, they are as follows.
[Pg 218]
We assume a class , with two rules of combination, namely
and
; and we then require the following ten postulates:
I a. is in the class whenever
and
are
in the class.
I b. is in the class whenever
and
are
in the class.
II a. There is an element such that
for every element
.
II b. There is an element such that
for every element
.
III a. whenever
,
,
and
are in the class.
III b. whenever
,
,
and
are in the class.
IV a.
whenever
,
,
,
,
,
,
, and
are in the
class.
IV b.
whenever
,
,
,
,
,
,
, and (
are in the
class.
V. If the elements and
in postulates II
a and II b exist and are unique, then for every element
there is an element
such that
and
.
VI. There are at least two elements, and
, in the class,
such that
.
The form of the above postulates is such that they are mutually independent, i.e. any nine of them are satisfied by interpretations of the symbols which do not satisfy the remaining one.
For our purposes, "" must be replaced by "
."
and
will be the null-class and the universal
class, which are defined in *24. Then the above ten postulates are
proved below, as follows:
I a. in *22·37, namely ""
I b. in *22·36, namely ""
II a. in *24·24, namely ""
II b. in *24·26, namely ""
III a. in *22·57, namely ""
III b. in *22·51, namely ""
IV a. in *22·69, namely ""
IV b. in *22·68, namely ""
V. in *24·21·22, namely "" and "
"
VI. in *24·1, namely ""
Hence, assuming Huntington's analysis of the postulates for the formal
algebra of logic, the propositions proved in what follows suffice
to establish that this algebra holds for classes. The corresponding
propositions of *23 and *25 prove that it holds for relations,
substituting ,
,
,
,
for
,
,
,
,
.
[Pg 219]
The principal propositions of the present number are the following:
(1) Those embodying the formal rules:
*22·51.
*22·57.
These embody the commutative law.
*22·52.
*22·7.
These embody the associative law.
*22·5.
*22·56.
These embody the law of tautology.
*22·68.
*22·69.
These embody the distributive law. It will be seen that the second results from the first by everywhere interchanging the signs of addition and multiplication.
*22·8.
This is the principle of double negation.
*22·81.
This is the principle of transposition.
(2) Other useful propositions:
*22·44.
*22·441.
These embody the two forms of the syllogism in Barbara.
*22·62.
*22·621.
These two propositions enable us to transform any inclusion (
into an equation.
*22·91.
I.e. " or
" is identical with "
or
the part of
which is excluded from
."
*22·01.
*22·02.
*22·03.
*22·04.
[Pg 220]
*22·05.
*22·1.
*22·2.
*22·3.
*22·31.
*22·32.
*22·33.
*22·34.
*22·35.
*22·351.
Dem.
This proposition is used in proving that the null-class is not identical with the class containing everything (*24·1), which is used to show that at least two classes exist. Our axioms do not suffice to prove that more than one individual exists, but they prove the existence of at least two classes and at least two relations.
*22·36.
*22·37.
*22·38.
*22·39.
Dem.
*22·391.
*22·392.
*22·4.
Dem.
*22·41.
[Pg 221]
*22·42.
*22·43.
*22·44.
This is one form of the syllogism in Barbara. Another form is the following:
*22·441.
*22·45.
Dem.
*22·46.
*22·47.
*22·48.
*22·481.
Dem.
*22·49.
*22·5.
Dem.
The above is the law of tautology for the logical multiplication of classes.
*22·51.
*22·52.
Thus logical multiplication of classes obeys the commutative and associative laws. References to *22·33·34·35 and to *20·43 will in future often be omitted.
*22·53.
This definition serves merely for the avoidance of brackets.
*22·54.
*22·55.
*22·551.
*22·56.
[Pg 222]
The above is the law of tautology for the logical addition of classes.
*22·57.
*22·58.
*22·59.
Dem.
The analogue of *4·78, i.e.
is false. We have only
A similar remark applies to the analogue of *4·79. Cf. *22·64·65.
Dem.
*22·61.
Dem.
The proof proceeds as in *22·62. The proposition *22·621 is one of the most useful propositions in the present number.
The process of obtaining *22·63 from *4·44 is of the same kind as the
process employed in the proofs that have been written out in this
number.[Pg 223] Hence only *4·44 is referred to. We shall similarly restrict
references for later propositions in this number. The process is always
roughly as follows: ,
,
are replaced by
,
,
; then *10·11 is applied, and such further
propositions of *10 as may be required, together with *22·33·34·35.
*22·631.
*22·632.
*22·633.
*22·64.
Dem.
The converse of this proposition does not hold, because the converse of *10·41 does not hold.
*22·65.
Here again the converse is untrue.
*22·66.
*22·68.
Dem.
*22·69.
The above propositions *22·68·69 are the two forms of the distributive law. Note that either results from the other by interchanging the signs of addition and multiplication.
*22·7.
*22·71.
*22·72.
*22·73.
*22·74.
[Pg 224]
Dem.
*22·8.
*22·81.
*22·811.
*22·82.
*22·83.
*22·831.
*22·84.
*22·85.
*22·86.
*22·87.
*22·84·85·86·87 are De Morgan's formulae.
*22·88.
This is a form of the law of excluded middle.
*22·89.
This is a form of the law of contradiction.
*22·9.
*22·91.
Dem.
*22·92.
*22·93.
Dem.
[Pg 225]
*22·94.
Dem.
This proposition is used in connection with mathematical induction, in *90·102, which is required for the proof of *90·132, which is one of the fundamental propositions in the theory of mathematical induction.
*22·95.
Dem.
[54] Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. Vol. 5, July 1904, p. 292.
[Pg 226]
Summary of *23.
The definitions and propositions of this number are to be exact
analogues of those of *22. Properties of relations which have no
analogues for classes will not be dealt with till Section D. Proofs
will be omitted in the present number, as they are precisely analogous
to those of analogous propositions in *22. In this number, as always
in future, capital Latin letters stand for expressions of the form
, or, where they are not being used as
apparent variables, for
. The principal
propositions of this number are the analogues of those of *22.
*23·01.
*23·02.
*23·03.
*23·04.
*23·05.
Similar remarks apply to these definitions as to those of *22.
*23·1.
*23·2.
*23·3.
*23·31.
*23·32.
*23·33.
*23·34.
*23·35.
*23·36.
*23·37.
*23·38.
[Pg 227]
*23·39.
*23·391.
*23·392.
*23·4.
*23·41.
*23·42.
*23·43.
*23·44.
*23·441.
*23·45.
*23·46.
*23·47.
*23·48.
*23·481.
*23·49.
*23·5.
*23·51.
*23·52.
*23·53.
*23·54.
*23·55.
*23·551.
*23·56.
*23·57.
*23·58.
*23·59.
*23·6.
*23·61.
*23·62.
*23·621.
*23·63.
*23·631.
*23·632.
*23·633.
[Pg 228]
*23·64.
*23·65.
*23·66.
*23·68.
*23·69.
*23·7.
*23·71.
*23·72.
*23·73.
*23·74.
*23·8.
*23·81.
*23·811.
*23·82.
*23·83.
*23·831.
*23·84.
*23·85.
*23·86.
*23·87.
*23·88.
*23·89.
*23·9.
*23·91.
*23·92.
*23·93.
*23·94.
*23·95.
[Pg 229]
Summary of *24.
The universal class, denoted by , is the class of all
objects of the type which, in the given context, is being denoted by
small Latin letters, i.e. of the lowest type concerned. Thus
, like "
," is ambiguous as to type. Its
definition is as follows:
*24·01.
Any other property possessed by everything would do as well as ","
but this is the only such property which we have hitherto studied.
The null-class, denoted by , is the class which has no
members. Like
, it is ambiguous as to type. We use the
same symbol,
, for null-classes of various types; but these
null-classes differ. The type of
is determined by that of
the terms
concerning which "
" is false: whatever
may be, "
" will not represent a true
proposition, but unless
is of the appropriate type, "
"
will be meaningless, not false. Thus
is of the
type next above that of an
concerning which "
"
is significant and false. The definition of
is
*24·02.
When a class is not null, so that it has one or more
members, it is said to exist. (This sense of "existence" must
not be confused with that defined in *14·02.) We write "
"
for "
exists." The definition is
*24·03.
In the present number, we shall deal first with the properties of
and
, then with those of existence. In
comparing the algebra of symbolic logic with ordinary algebra,
takes the place of
, while
combines the
properties of
and of
.
Among the more important properties of and
which are
proved in this number are the following:
I.e. "nothing is not everything." This is useful as giving us
the existence of at least two classes. If the monistic philosophers
were right in maintaining that only one individual exists, there would
be only two classes,[Pg 230] and
,
being
(in that case) the class whose only member is the one individual. Our
primitive propositions do not require the existence of more than one
individual.
*24·102·103 show that any function which is always true determines the universal class, and any function which is always false determines the null-class.
*24·21·22 give forms of the laws of contradiction and excluded
middle, namely "nothing is both and not-
"
(
and "everything is either
or not-
" (
.
*24·23·24·26·27 give the properties of and
with respect to addition and multiplication, namely:
multiplication by
and addition of
make
no change in a class (*24·26·24); addition of
gives
, and multiplication by
gives
(*24·27·23). It will be observed that the properties of
and
result from each other by interchanging addition and
multiplication.
I.e. " is contained in
" is equivalent to
"nothing is
but not
."
*24·311.
I.e. "no is a
" is equivalent to "nothing is
both
and
."
*24·411.
*24·43.
As a rule, propositions concerning are much less used than
the correlative propositions concerning
.
The properties of the existence of classes result from those of
, owing to the fact that
is the
contradictory of
, as is proved in *24·54. Thus we
have, in virtue of *24·3,
*24·55.
I.e. "not all 's are
's" is equivalent
to "there are
's which are not
's." This is the
familiar proposition of formal logic, that the contradictory of the
universal affirmative is the particular negative.
We have
*24·56.
*24·561.
I.e. if a sum exists, then one of the summands exists, and vice versa; and if a product exists, both the factors exist (but not vice versa).
The proofs of propositions in the present number offer no difficulty.
[Pg 231]
*24·01.
*24·02.
*24·03.
*24·1.
*24·101.
*24·102.
Dem.
Thus any function which is always true determines the universal class, and vice versa.
*24·103.
Dem.
*24·104.
Dem.
*24·105.
Dem.
*24·11.
Dem.
*24·12.
Dem.
[Pg 232]
*24·13.
Dem.
*24·14.
Dem.
*24·141.
Dem.
*24·15.
Dem.
*24·17.
*24·21.
*24·22.
*24·23.
*24·24.
The above two propositions (*24·23·24) exhibit the algebraical analogy
of to zero.
*24·26.
This exhibits the analogy of to 1.
*24·27.
This exhibits the analogy of to
.
*24·3.
Dem.
The above proposition is very frequently used.
[Pg 233]
*24·31.
Dem.
This proposition is the correlative of *24·3, but, unlike that
proposition, it is not useful in the sequel. Every proposition
concerning has a correlative concerning
, but
we shall often not give these correlatives, since they are seldom
required for subsequent proofs.
*24·311.
Dem.
*24·312.
Dem.
*24·313.
*24·32.
Dem.
*24·33.
Dem.
*24·34.
*24·35.
*24·36.
[Pg 234]
*24·37.
Dem.
*24·38.
Dem.
*24·39.
*24·4.
Dem.
*24·401.
Dem.
*24·402.
Dem.
[Pg 235]
*24·41. )
Dem.
*24·411. )
Dem.
*24·412.
Dem.
This proposition is used in *234·181, in the theory of continuous functions.
*24·42.
Dem.
*24·43.
Dem.
*24·431. )
This and the following proposition are lemmas for *24·44.
Dem.
[Pg 236]
*24·432.
Dem.
*24·45.
Dem.
*24·46.
Dem.
The following propositions, down to *24·495 inclusive, are lemmas inserted for use in much later propositions, most of them being only used a few times.
*24·47.
Dem.
*24·48.
[Pg 237]
Dem.
The above proposition, besides being used in the next two, is used in the theory of couples (*54·6), in the theory of greater and less (*117·632), and in the chapter on the ordering of classes by the principle of first differences (*170·68).
*24·481.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the theory of selections (*83·74), in the theory of greater and less (*117·582), and in the theory of transfinite induction (*257).
*24·482.
[Pg 238]
The above proposition is used in the theory of convergence (*232·34).
*24·49.
Dem.
*24·491.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the theory of selections (*83·63·65) and in the theory of segments of a series (*211·84).
*24·492.
Dem.
The above proposition is used fairly frequently, especially in the theory of series. It is first used in *93·273, in the theory of "generations."
*24·493.
Dem.
*24·494.
[Pg 239]
Dem.
This proposition is used in the theory of selections (*83·63 and *88·45).
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the theory of minimum points (*205·83·832·84).
In the remainder of this number we shall be concerned with the existence of classes. Many of the properties of the existence of classes follow from the fact that to say a class exists is equivalent to saying that the class is not equal to the null-class. This is proved in *24·54.
*24·5.
*24*51.
Dem.
This proposition states that the class of all objects of the type in question is not null, but has at least one member. The assumption that there is something, which is equivalent to this proposition, is implicit in the proposition *10·1, that what is true always is true in any instance. This would not hold if there were no instances of anything; hence it implies the existence of something. It will be observed that the above proposition (*24·52) depends on *24·1, which depends on *23·351, which depends on *10·251, which depends on *10·24, which depends on *10·1 or on *9·1. The assumption that there is something is involved in the use of the real variable, which would otherwise be meaningless. This is made explicit in *9·1, and in the proof of *9·2, which is the same proposition as *10·1.
*24·53.
[Pg 240]
*24·55.
*24·56.
*24·561.
*24·57.
Dem.
*24·571.
Dem.
*24·58.
*24·6.
Dem.
*24·61.
*24·62.
*24·63.
In this proposition, the conditions of significance require that
should be a class of classes. The condition "
"
is one required as hypothesis in many propositions. In virtue of the
above proposition, this hypothesis may be replaced by "
."
Dem.
This proposition is frequently used in later parts of the work. We
often have to deal with classes of existent classes, and the most
convenient form in which to state that all the members of a class of
classes exist is "."
[Pg 241]
Summary of *25.
This number contains the analogues, for relations, of the definitions and propositions of *24. Proofs will not be given, as they proceed precisely as in *24.
The universal relation, denoted by , is the relation
which holds between any two terms whatever of the appropriate types,
whatever these may be in the given context. The null relation,
, is the relation which does not hold between any
pair of terms whatever, its type being fixed by the types of the terms
concerning which the denial that it holds is significant. A relation
is said to exist when there is at least one pair of terms
between which it holds; "
exists" is written "
."
The propositions of this number are much less often referred to than those of *24, but for the sake of uniformity we have given the analogues of all propositions in *24, with the same numeration (except for the integral part).
All the remarks made in *24 apply, mutatis mutandis, in the present number.
*25·01.
*25·02.
*25·03.
*25·1.
*25·101.
*25·102.
*25·103.
*25·104.
*25·105.
*25·11.
*25·12.
[Pg 242]
*25·13.
*25·14.
*25·141.
*25·15.
*25·17.
*25·21.
*25·22.
*25·23.
*25·24.
*25·26.
*25·27.
*25·3.
*25·31.
*25·311.
*25·312.
*25·313.
*25·32.
*25·33.
*25·34.
*25·35.
*25·36.
*25·37.
*25·38.
*25·39.
*25·4.
*25·401.
*25·402.
*25·41.
*25·411.
*25·412.
*25·42.
*25·43.
*25·431.
*25·432.
*25·44.
[Pg 243]
*25·45.
*25·46.
*25·47.
*25·48.
*25·481.
*25·482.
*25·49.
*25·491.
*25·492.
*25·493.
*25·494.
*25·495.
*25·5.
*25·51.
*25·52.
*25·53.
*25·54.
*25·55.
*25·56.
*25·561.
*25·57.
*25·571.
*25·58.
*25·6.
*25·61.
*25·62.
*25·63.
[Pg 244]
In the present section we shall be concerned with such of the general properties of relations as have no analogues in the theory of classes. The notations introduced in this section will be used constantly throughout the rest of the work, and the ideas expressed in the definitions will be found to be of fundamental importance.
[Pg 245]
Summary of *30.
The functions hitherto considered, with the exception of a few
particular functions such as , have been
propositional, i.e. have had propositions for their values.
But the ordinary functions of mathematics, such as
,
,
, are not propositional. Functions of this kind always
mean "the term having such and such a relation to
." For this
reason they may be called descriptive functions, because
they describe a certain term by means of its relation to
their argument. Thus "
" describes the number
; yet propositions in which
occurs are
not the same as they would be if
were substituted for
. This appears e.g. from the proposition
"
," which conveys valuable information,
whereas "
" is trivial. Descriptive functions, like
descriptions in general, have no meaning by themselves, but only as
constituents of propositions[55].
The general definition of a descriptive function is:
That is, "" is to mean "the term
which has the relation
to
." If there are several terms or none having the relation
to
, all propositions about
, i.e. all
propositions of the form "
," will be false. The apostrophe
in "
" may be read "of." Thus if
is the relation of father
to son, "
" means "the father of
." If
is the relation
of son to father, "
" means "the son of
"; in this case, all
propositions of the form "
" will be false unless
has
one son and no more.
All the functions that occur in ordinary mathematics are instances
of the above definition; all are obtained in the above manner from
some relation. Thus in our notation "" takes the place of what
would commonly be "
," this latter notation being reserved for
propositional functions. We should write "
" in place
of "
," using "
" to express the relation of
to
when
.
A definition such as , where the meaning given to
the term defined is a description, must be understood to mean that the
term defined (in this case
) and the description assigned as
its meaning (in[Pg 246] this case (
are to be interchangeable
in use: the definition is, in a sense, more purely symbolic than other
definitions, since the description assigned as the meaning has itself
no meaning except in use. It would perhaps be more formally correct to
write
But even this definition would not be quite complete, because it
omits mention of the scope of the two descriptions and
. Thus the complete form would be
But it is unnecessary to adopt this form of definition, provided it
is understood that the definition *30·01 means that "
" may
be written for "(
" everywhere, i.e. in
indications of scope as well as elsewhere. The use of the definition
occurs always in accordance with the proposition:
which is *30·1, below.
It is to be observed that *30·01 does not necessarily involve
For this, by the definition, is equivalent to
which, by *14·28, only holds when
, i.e.
when there is one term, and no more, which has the relation
to
.
All the conventions as to scope explained in *14 are to be transferred
to , i.e., in the absence of any contrary indication, the
scope of
is to be the smallest proposition, enclosed in dots or
other brackets, in which the
in question occurs.
We put
This definition serves merely for the avoidance of brackets. It is to
be interpreted as meaning
In future, we shall often define a new expression as having a
descriptive phrase for its meaning; in such a case, the definition is
always to be interpreted as above. That is, any proposition in which
the new expression occurs is to be the proposition which is obtained
by substituting the old expression for the new one wherever the latter
occurs.
[Pg 247]
, in the above, is to be interpreted by first treating
as if it were not a descriptive symbol, and applying *30·01 and
*14·01 or *14·02 to
,
and by then applying *30·01 and *14·01 or *14·02 to
.
The majority of the propositions of the present number are immediate
consequences of the corresponding propositions in *14. Thus *14·31—·34
and *14·113 lead immediately to *30·12—·16, which show that, either
always or when exists, the "scope" of
or of
and
makes no difference to the truth-values of such propositions as
we are concerned with. We have
*30·18.
so that what holds of everything holds of , provided
exists. This results immediately from *14·18, and shows that, provided
exists, the fact that "
" is an incomplete symbol does
not prevent its being substituted as a value of
whenever we have
(
, or an assertion of the propositional function
.
One of the most used propositions of this number is:
*30·3.
which results immediately from *14·202. The following analogous proposition results from the above by means of *14·122:
*30·31.
I.e. "" involves, in addition to "
," the
statement that whatever has the relation
to
is identical
with
.
A proposition constantly referred to is:
*30·37.
In the hypothesis, might be replaced by
, but one or other of them is essential. For, by *14·21,
"
" implies
and
(these are
equivalent when
), and therefore cannot be true when
and
do not exist.
The use of *30·37 is chiefly in cases where or
or both are
replaced by descriptive functions. Suppose, for example, that
is
replaced by
. By *30·18, we may substitute
for
if
exists. By *14·21, both sides of the implication in *30·37 will
become false if
does not exist, and therefore the implication
will still hold. Hence whether
exists or not, we may substitute
it for
and obtain
In like manner, if we replace
by
, we obtain
A very important proposition is:
*30·4.
This proposition states that, provided exists, to say that
is the term which has the relation
to
is
equivalent to saying that a has the relation
to
. Thus for
example "
is the occupier of the house
" is equivalent to
"
occupies the house
," "
is the writer of Waverley" is
equivalent to[Pg 248] "
wrote Waverley," "
is the father of
"
is equivalent to "
begot
." But we cannot argue from "John
Smith inhabits London" to "John Smith is the inhabitant of
London."
We shall introduce in this and subsequent sections many constant
relations for which is always true. When
is such
that
is always true, we have, in virtue of *30·4,
for every possible value of
. The following proposition is useful
in cases where both
and
are such that
and
always exist:
*30·41.
Thus if we know that and
are always identical, we know
not only that
and
are identical, but also that
(and
therefore
) always exists.
*30·01.
*30·02.
In interpreting ,
is to be treated as an ordinary
symbol until
has been eliminated by *30·01 and *14·01 or
*14·02, and then the above definitions are to be applied to
.
*30·11.
The following propositions are immediate applications of *14·31 ff., made in accordance with *30·1.
*30·13.
*30·14.
*30·141.
*30·142.
*30·15.
The following two propositions are immediate consequences of *14·113·112.
*30·17.
[Pg 249]
*30·19.
*30·2.
In proving *30·2, we have to use the definition *30·01, not *30·1,
because is not of the form
. This appears if we attempt to apply the definition *14·01 to
, which leads to an expression containing
the meaningless constituent
. But by the definition
*30·01, every typographical occurrence of the symbol "
" means
what results when this symbol is replaced by "(
" hence
"
" means "
."
*30·21.
*30·22.
Note that we do not necessarily have
which is only true when
.
*30·3.
*30·31.
*30·32.
*30·33.
*30·34.
*30·341.
Dem.
*30·35.
*30·36.
Dem.
This proposition is very frequently used.
This is a very important proposition, of which the use is constant.
[Pg 250]
*30·41.
Dem.
*30·42.
The hypothesis ( is fulfilled by a number of
important special relations, of which examples will occur in the
subsequent numbers of the present section.
*30·5.
Dem.
*30·501.
On the meaning of "," see note to the definition *30·02.
Dem.
*30·51.
*30·52.
[Pg 251]
Summary of *31.
If is a relation, the relation which
has to
when
is called the converse of
. Thus greater
is the converse of less, before of after,
husband of wife. The converse of identity is identity,
and the converse of diversity is diversity. The converse of
is
written
(read "
-converse"). When
,
is called a symmetrical relation, otherwise it is called
not-symmetrical. When
is incompatible with
,
is called asymmetrical. Thus "cousin" is symmetrical,
"brother" is not-symmetrical (because when
is the brother of
,
may be either the brother or the sister of
, and
"husband" is asymmetrical.
The relation of to
is called "
." It
will be shown that every relation has one, and only one, converse;
hence, applying the notation of *30, that one is
.
Thus
. We have thus two notations for the
converse of
; the second is more convenient for the converse of a
relation not denoted by a single letter.
The more important propositions of the present number are the following:
*31·13.
I.e. any relation has a converse. Hence the relation
"
" verifies the hypothesis
,
i.e. we have
.
*31·32.
I.e. two relations are identical when, and only when, their converses are identical.
*31·33.
I.e. any relation is the converse of its converse.
[Pg 252]
Very many of the subsequent uses of the notion of the converse of a
relation require only the propositions which embody the definitions of
and
, namely
*31·11.
and
*31·131.
*31·01.
*31·02.
*31·1.
*31·101.
Dem.
*31·11.
*31·111.
*31·12.
Dem.
*31·13.
*31·131.
*31·132.
*31·14.
Dem.
*31·15.
[Pg 253]
*31·16.
Dem.
*31·17.
*31·18.
*31·21.
Dem.
*31·22.
*31·23.
Dem.
*31·24.
*31·32.
Dem.
*31·33.
Dem.
[Pg 254]
*31·34.
Dem.
*31·4.
*31·41.
*31·5.
*31·51.
Dem.
*31·52.
[Pg 255]
Summary of *32.
Given any relation , the class of terms which have the relation
to a given term
are called the referents of
,
and the class of terms to which a given term
has the relation
are called the relata of
. We shall denote by
the relation of the class of referents of
to
, and by
the relation of the class of
relata of
to
. It is convenient also to have a notation
for the relations of
and
to
. We shall denote the relation of
to
by "
," where "
" stands for
"sagitta." Similarly we shall denote by "
" the relation
of
to
, to suggest an arrow running from
right to left instead of from left to right.
and
are chiefly useful for the sake
of the descriptive functions to which they give rise; thus
and
.
Thus e.g. if
is the relation of
parent to son,
the parents of
,
the sons of
. If
is the relation
of less to greater among numbers of any kind,
numbers less than
, and
numbers
greater than
. When
exists,
is
the class whose only member is
. But when there are many terms
having the relation
to
,
, which is
the class of those terms, supplies a notation which cannot be supplied
by
. And similarly if there are many terms to which
has
the relation
,
supplies the notation for
these terms. Thus for example let
be the relation "
,"
i.e. the relation which
has to
when
.
Then "
" represents all values of
such that
, i.e. all values of
or
. Unlike the usual symbol, it is not ambiguous, since
instead of representing some one of these values, it represents the
class of them.
The definitions of ,
,
,
are as follows:
*32·01.
*32·02.
[Pg 256]
*32·03.
*32·04.
In virtue of the above definitions, we shall have ,
. This gives an
alternative notation which is convenient in dealing with a relation not
represented by a single letter.
It should be observed that if is a homogeneous relation
(i.e. one in which referents and relata are of the same
type), then
and
are not
homogeneous, but relate a class to objects of the type of its members.
In virtue of the definitions of and
, we shall have
*32·13.
*32·131.
Thus by *14·21, we always have
and
. Thus whatever relation
may be, we have
and
. We do not in general
have
or (
.
Thus taking
to be the relation of parent and child,
and
. Thus
, i.e.
when
is childless, and
, i.e.
,
when
is Adam or Eve. The two sorts
of existence,
and
,
can both be significantly predicated
of
, because "
" is a
descriptive function whose value is a class; and the same applies to
. It will be seen that (by *14·21)
,
but the converse implication does not hold in general.
We have
*32·16.
Also by *32·18·181,
Thus by the use of or
,
every statement of the form "
" can be reduced to a statement
asserting membership of a class. Since, however, the class in question
is given by a descriptive function, and descriptive functions are
defined by means of relations, we do not thus obtain a method of
reducing the theory of relations to the theory of classes.
*32·01.
*32·02.
[Pg 257]
*32·03.
*32·04.
*32·1.
*32·101.
*32·11.
*32·111.
*32·12.
*32·121.
"" must not be confounded with
"
." The former means that there is
such a class as
, which, as we have just seen,
is always true; the latter means that
is
not null, which is only true if
is a term to which some other
term has the relation
. Note that, by *14·21, both
and
imply
. The contradictory of
is not
,
but
.
This last would not imply
, but for
the fact that
is always true.
*32·13.
*32·131.
*32·132.
*32·133.
The use of *20·57 will in general be tacit. It happens constantly that we have propositions such as *32·13, in which a descriptive expression is shown to be identical with a class. In such cases, whenever the properties of the class are asserted of the descriptive expression, *20·57 is relevant.
*32·14.
Dem.
[Pg 258]
*32·15.
*32·16.
*32·18.
*32·181.
*32·182.
The transformation from "" to "
"
is one commonly effected in language. E.g. suppose "
" is
"
loves
," then "
" is "
is
a lover of
."
*32·19.
Dem.
*32·2.
*32·201.
*32·21.
*32·211.
*32·22.
*32·221.
*32·23.
*32·231.
*32·24.
Dem.
[Pg 259]
*32·241.
*32·25.
*32·251.
Notice that we do not have
Dem.
*32·31.
*32·32.
*32·33.
*32·34.
*32·35.
The proofs of the above propositions are similar to that of *32·3.
*32·4.
*32·41.
Dem.
*32·42.
[Pg 260]
Summary of *33.
If is any relation, the domain of
, which we denote
by
, is the class of terms which have the relation
to something or other; the converse domain,
,
is the class of terms to which something or other has the relation
; and the field,
, is the sum of the domain and the
converse domain. (Note that the field is only significant when
is
a homogeneous relation.)
The above notations ,
,
are
derivative from the notations
,
,
for the
relations, to a relation, of its domain, converse domain, and field
respectively. We are to have
hence we define
,
,
as follows:
*33·01.
*33·02.
*33·03.
The letter is chosen as the initial of the word "campus." We
require one other definition, namely of the relation of
to
when
is a member of the field of
. This relation, which we
will call
, is defined as follows:
*33·04.
We shall find that .
will be the relation of a relation to its domain,
will be the class of relations
having
for their domain. Similar remarks apply to
and
. The field of a relation is specially
important in connection with series.
The propositions of this number are constantly used throughout the
remainder of the work. The ideas of the domain, converse domain, and
field are very general, and have somewhat different uses for relations
of different[Pg 261] kinds. Consider first the sort of relation that gives
rise to a descriptive function . For this we require that
should exist whenever there is anything having the relation
to
, i.e. that there should never be more than one
term having the relation
to a given term
. In this case,
the values of
for which
exists will constitute the
"converse domain" of
, i.e.
, and the values
which
assumes for various values of
will constitute
the "domain" of
, i.e.
. Thus the converse
domain is the class of possible arguments for the descriptive function
, and the domain is the class of all values of the function.
Thus, for example, if
is the relation of the square of an integer
to
, then
=the square of
, provided
is
an integer. In this case,
is the class of integers,
and
is the class of perfect squares. Or again, suppose
is the relation of wife to husband; then
=the wife of
,
=married men,
=married women. In
such cases, the field usually has little importance; and if
the values of the function
are not of the same type as its
arguments, i.e. if the relation
is not homogeneous,
the field is meaningless. Thus, for example, if
is a homogeneous
relation,
and
are
not homogeneous, and therefore "
" and
"
" are meaningless.
Let us next suppose that is the sort of relation that generates
a series, say the relation of less to greater among integers. Then
= all integers that are less than some other integer =
all integers,
= all integers that are greater than some
other integer = all integers except 0. In this case,
= all
integers that are either greater or less than some other integer = all
integers. Generally, if
generates a series,
= all
members of the series except the last (if any),
= all
members of the series except the first (if any), and
= all
members of the series. In this case, "
" expresses the fact that
is a member of the series. Thus when
generates a series,
becomes important, and the relation
is likely to be
useful.
We shall have occasion to deal with many relations having some of the properties of series, and with many propositions which, though only important in connection with serial relations, hold much more generally. In such cases, the field of a relation is likely to be important. Thus in the section on Induction (Part II, Section E), where we are preparing the way for the construction of serial relations by means of a certain kind of non-serial relation, and throughout relation-arithmetic (Part IV), the fields of relations will occur constantly. But in the earlier parts of the work, it is chiefly domains and converse domains that occur.
Among the more important properties of domains, converse domains and fields, which are proved in the present number, are the following.
[Pg 262]
We have always ,
,
(*33·12·121·122). (The last of these, however, is only
significant when
is homogeneous.)
*33·13.
*33·131.
*33·132.
*33·14.
*33·16.
*33·2·21·22. The converse domain of a relation is the domain of its converse, the domain of a relation is the converse domain of its converse, and the field of a relation is the field of its converse.
*33·24.
*33·4.
with corresponding propositions (*33·41·42) for and
.
*33·43.
*33·431.
*33·5.
*33·51.
The proofs of propositions concerning and
are
usually similar to those for
, and are therefore often
omitted.
*33·01.
*33·02.
*33·03.
*33·04.
*33·1.
*33·101.
*33·102.
*33·103.
*33·11.
*33·111.
*33·112.
*33·12.
*33·121.
*33·122.
*33·123.
*33·124.
[Pg 263]
*33·125.
*33·13.
*33·131.
*33·132.
*33·14.
Dem.
*33·15.
Dem.
*33.151.
*33·152.
*33·16.
Dem.
*33·161.
*33·17.
*33·18.
Dem.
*33·181.
Dem.
*33·182.
If is the sort of relation which generates a series,
so that "
" may be read "
precedes
," then
is the condition that the series may[Pg 264]
have no last term, since it states that every term which follows some
term precedes some other term, and is therefore not the last of the
series.
*33·2.
Dem.
*33·21.
*33·22.
Dem.
*33·24.
Dem.
*33·241.
*33·25.
Dem.
[Pg 265]
*33·251.
*33·252.
*33·26.
Dem.
*33·261.
*33·262.
*33·263.
Dem.
*33·264.
*33·265.
*33·27.
Dem.
*33·271.
*33·272.
*33·28.
Dem.
[Pg 266]
*33·29.
*33·3.
Dem.
*33·31.
The three following propositions are used in the theory of selections (*80, *83 and *85). The second of them is also used in the theory of greater and less (*117) and in the theory of transitive relations (*201).
*33·32.
The converse of this proposition is not true.
Dem.
*33·33.
*33·34.
Dem.
*33·35.
Dem.
*33·351.
*33·352.
Dem.
[Pg 267]
The two following propositions (*33·4·41) are very frequently used.
*33·4.
Dem.
*33·41.
*33·42.
Dem.
*33·43.
Dem.
*33·431.
Dem.
*33·432.
Dem.
*33·44.
Dem.
*33·45.
[Pg 268]
Note that by our conventions as to denoting expressions, the scope of
both and
in the above is "
," and
is
to have the larger scope.
Dem.
*33·46.
*33·47.
Dem.
*33·48.
*33·5.
Dem.
*33·51.
is useful in ordinal arithmetic, where we are concerned with
a series generated by a relation
, and "
" expresses the
fact that
is a member of this series. The above two propositions
(*33·5·51) will be much used in Part IV, where we deal with the
foundations of ordinal arithmetic, but will not often be referred to
elsewhere.
*33·6.
Dem.
*33·61.
*33·62.
[Pg 269]
Summary of *34.
The relative product of two relations and
is the relation
which holds between
and
when there is an intermediate term
such that
has the relation
to
and
has
the relation
to
. Thus e.g. the relative product
of brother and father is paternal uncle; the
relative product of father and father is paternal
grandfather; and so on. The relative product of
and
is
denoted by "
"; the definition is:
*34·01.
This definition is only significant when and
belong to the same type.
The relative product of and
is called the square of
;
we put
*34·02.
*34·03.
The most useful propositions in the present number are the following:
*34·2.
I.e. the converse of a relative product is obtained by turning each factor into its converse and reversing the order of the factors.
I.e. the relative product obeys the associative law.
*34·25.
*34·26.
I.e. the relative product obeys the distributive law with respect to the logical addition of relations. (For logical multiplication instead of logical addition, we only get inclusion instead of identity; cf. *34·23·24.)
*34·34.
*34·36.
*34·41.
[Pg 270]
*34·01.
*34·02.
*34·03.
*34·1.
*34·11.
Dem.
*34·12.
*34·2.
Dem.
*34·202.
Dem.
*34·203.
*34·21.
Dem.
*34·22.
This definition serves merely for the avoidance of brackets.
[Pg 271]
*34·23.
Dem.
The converse of the above is not true.
*34·24.
*34·25.
Dem.
*34·26.
The above two forms of the distributive law, and the associative law (*34·21), are the only ones of the usual formal laws that hold for the relative product. The commutative law, in particular, does not hold in general.
*34·27.
Dem.
*34·28.
*34·29.
Dem.
[Pg 272]
In proving the equality of two relations, say and
, we
usually establish first an asserted proposition of the form
We then proceed by *11·11 (together with *11·3 in the second case) to
whence the result follows by *21·43. We shall in future omit these
steps, and write "
" after we have
established
A similar ellipsis will be made in proving the equality of classes.
*34·3.
Dem.
*34·301.
*34·302.
Dem.
*34·31.
Dem.
*34·32.
[Pg 273]
*34·33.
Dem.
*34·34.
Dem.
*34·35.
Dem.
*34·351.
*34·36.
Dem.
The following proposition is a lemma for *95·31.
*34·361.
Dem.
[Pg 274]
*34·37.
*34·38.
*34·4.
Dem.
*34·41.
Dem.
The above proposition is no longer true if we change the hypothesis
into , since (
may exist when
does not. Suppose, e.g., that
is the relation
of child to father, and
the relation of daughter to father.
Then (
= the granddaughter of
, but
= the
daughter of the child of
. The first exists whenever
has
only one granddaughter, while the second requires further that
should have only one child.
For the same reason we do not have
This will hold if
,
are one-many relations (cf. *71), but
not in general otherwise.
*34·42.
Dem.
[Pg 275]
*34·5.
*34·51.
Dem.
*34·52.
*34·53.
*34·531.
*34·54.
Dem.
*34·55.
*34·56.
*34·6.
Dem.
*34·62.
Dem.
The above proposition is a lemma for *160·51, as is also *34·73, which employs the above proposition.
*34·63.
Dem.
[Pg 276]
*34·7.
Dem.
Thus is always a symmetrical relation, i.e.
one which is equal to its converse.
*34·701.
*34·702.
Dem.
*34·703.
Dem.
*34·8.
Dem.
[Pg 277]
The hypothesis of the above proposition is the hypothesis that is
symmetrical (
) and transitive (
.
These are the formal properties of those relations which can suitably
be regarded as expressing equality in some respect.
*34·81.
The following propositions are lemmas for *34·85, which is used in *72·64:
*34·82.
Dem.
*34·83.
Dem.
*34·84.
Dem.
*34·841.
Dem.
[Pg 278]
Summary of *35.
In this section, we have to consider the relation derived from a given
relation by limiting either its domain or its converse domain
to members of some assigned class. A relation
with its domain
limited to members of
is written "
";
with its converse domain limited to members of
, it
is written "
"; with both limitations, it
is written "
." Thus
e.g. "brother" and "sister" express the same relation (that of a
common parentage), with the domain limited in the first case to males,
in the second to females. "The relation of white employers to coloured
employees" is a relation limited both as to its domain and as to its
converse domain. We put
*35·01.
with similar definitions for and
.
A particularly important case is the case in which the same limitation
is imposed on the domain and on the converse domain, i.e.
where we have a relation of the form "."
In this case, the limitation to members
of
may be more briefly stated as being imposed on
the field. For this case, it is convenient to adopt "
"
as an alternative notation. This case will be considered in *36.
It is convenient to consider in the present connection the relation
between and
which is constituted by x being a member of
and
being a member of
. This relation will be
denoted by "
." Thus we put
The chief importance of relations with limited fields arises
in the theory of series. Given a series generated by a relation
, let
be a class consisting of part of this series.
Then
is the field of the relation
[Pg 279]or
, and it is this relation which is the
generating relation of the series of members of
in the same
order which they have as parts of the original series. Thus parts of a
series, considered not merely as classes but as series, are dealt with
by means of serial relations with limited fields.
Relations with limited domains are not nearly so much used
as relations with limited converse domains. Relations with
limited converse domains play a great part in arithmetic, especially
in establishing the formal laws. What is wanted in such cases is a
one-one relation correlating two classes or two series. That is,
we want a relation such that not only does exist whenever
, but also
exists whenever
. The kind of relation which is most frequently found
to effect such a correlation is some such relation as
or
or
, or some other constant relation for
which we always have
, with its converse domain so
limited that, subject to the limitation, only one value of
gives any given value of
. Thus for example let
be a class of relations no two of which have the same domain; then
will give a one-one correlation
of these relations with their domains: if
,
, we
shall have
We shall also have
and
. Moreover the
converse domain of
is
,
and the domain of
is the class
of domains of members of
. Thus
gives a one-one correlation of
with the domains
of members of
. It is chiefly in such ways that relations
with limited converse domains are useful.
For purposes of reference, a great many propositions are given in the present number, but the propositions that will be used frequently are comparatively few. Among these are the following:
*35·21.
*35·31.
*35·354.
I.e. in a relative product it makes no difference whether we limit the converse domain of the first factor, or the domain of the second.
*35·412.
*35·452.
*35·48.
*35·52.
*35·61.
*35·64.
*35·65.
The hypothesis is fulfilled in the great
majority of cases in which we have occasion to use
.
*35·66.
*35·7.
[Pg 280]
This proposition is used very frequently, owing to the fact that limitation
of the converse domain is chiefly applied to such relations as give rise to
descriptive functions (e.g. ,
,
).
*35·71.
This proposition is useful for a reason similar to that which makes *35·7 useful.
*35·82.
Owing to this proposition, the properties of
can be deduced from the already proved properties of
, by putting
.
The relation "" is what may be called an
"analysable" relation, i.e. it holds between
and y when
and
, i.e. when
has a
property independent of
, and
has a property independent of
.
*35·85.
*35·86.
If either or
is null, so is
(*35·88).
*35·01.
*35·02.
*35·03.
*35·04.
*35·05.
The last definition serves merely for the avoidance of brackets.
*35·1.
*35·101.
*35·102.
*35·103.
*35·11.
Dem.
*35·12.
Dem.
[Pg 281]
*35·13.
Dem.
*35·14.
*35·15.
Dem.
*35·16.
*35·17.
*35·18.
*35·21.
Dem.
*35·22.
Dem.
*35·23.
*35·24.
*35·25.
[Pg 282]
*35·26.
Dem.
*35·27.
*35·31.
Dem.
*35·32.
*35·33.
*35·34.
*35·35.
Dem.
*35·351.
*35·352.
*35·354.
Dem.
*35·41.
*35·412.
[Pg 283]
*35·413.
*35·42.
*35·421.
*35·422.
*35·43.
Dem.
*35·431.
*35·432.
*35·44.
Dem.
*35·441.
*35·442.
*35·451.
Dem.
*35·452.
*35·453.
*35·454.
*35·46.
Dem.
*35·461.
[Pg 284]
*35·462.
*35·471.
Dem.
*35·472.
*35·473.
*35·474.
*35·48.
Dem.
*35·481.
*35·51.
Dem.
*35·52.
*35·53.
[Pg 285]
*35·61.
Dem.
*35·62.
*35·63.
Dem.
*35·64.
*35·641.
*35·642.
*35·643.
*35·644.
*35·65.
*35·66.
*35·671.
Dem.
*35·672.
*35·68.
Dem.
[Pg 286]
*35·7.
This proposition is very often used in the later parts of the work.
Dem.
*35·71.
Dem.
*35·75.
Dem.
*35·76.
Dem.
[Pg 287]
The rest of this number, down to *35·93 exclusive, is concerned with
, except *35·81·812.
*35·81.
*35·812.
*35·82.
Dem.
*35·822.
Dem.
Dem.
*35·831.
Dem.
[Pg 288]
*35·832.
*35·834.
Dem.
*35·84.
*35·85.
Dem.
*35·86.
*35·87.
Dem.
*35·881.
Dem.
*35·882.
[Pg 289]
*35·89.
Dem.
*35·891.
Dem.
*35·892.
*35·895.
*35·9.
Dem.
*35·91.
Dem.
*35·92.
[Pg 290]
Dem.
*35·931.
*35·932.
*35·94.
*35·941.
*35·942.
[Pg 291]
Summary of *36.
In this number we are concerned with the special case in which the
same limitation is imposed upon the domain and the converse domain
of a relation. In this case, the same result is achieved by imposing
the limitation on the field. It is convenient to be able to regard
as a descriptive
function of
or of
, which we secure by the notation
, whence, as will be explained in *38,
and
will both
mean
. If
is a serial relation, and
, "
" will stand for
"the terms of
arranged in the order determined by
,"
or, as we may call it briefly, "
in the
-order."
is defined as follows:
*36·01.
We thus have
*36·13.
Most of the propositions concerning
demand that
should have some at least of the characteristics
of a serial relation. Hence the propositions concerning
which can be given in the present number are,
for the most part, not the most useful propositions concerning
. The most useful propositions in the present
number are the following:
*36·25.
*36·29.
*36·3.
*36·33.
*36·01.
*36·11.
*36·13.
The following propositions are obtained from those of *35 by means of *36·11, which, as it is used in each case, is not referred to again.
*36·2.
*36·201.
*36·202.
*36·203.
*36·21.
[Pg 292]
*36·22.
Dem.
*36·23.
*36·24.
*36·241.
*36·25.
Dem.
*36·26.
*36·27.
*36·28.
*36·29.
*36·3.
Dem.
*36·31.
*36·32.
*36·33.
*36·34.
*36·35.
*36·4.
Dem.
[Pg 293]
Summary of *37.
In this number, we introduce what may be regarded as the plural of
. "
" was defined to mean "the term which has the relation
to
." We now introduce the notation "
" to mean
"the terms which have the relation
to members of
."
Thus if
is the class of great men, and
is the relation
of wife to husband,
will mean "wives of great men." If
is the class of fractions of the form
for integral values of
, and
is the relation "less than,"
will be the class of fractions each of which is less than
some member of this class of fractions, i.e.
will
be the class of proper fractions. Generally,
is the class
of those referents which have relata that are members of
.
We require also a notation for the relation of to
. This relation we will call
. Thus
is
the relation which holds between two classes
and
when
consists of all terms which have the relation
to
some member of
.
A specially important case arises when always exists if
. In this case,
is the class of all terms of
the form
when
. We will denote the hypothesis
that
always exists if
by the notation
, meaning "the
's of
's exist."
The definitions are as follows:
*37·01.
*37·02.
This definition serves merely for the avoidance of brackets.
Without it, "" would be ambiguous as between
(
and
, which are not
equal. In all cases in which a suffix occurs, we shall adopt the same
convention, i.e. we shall always put
[Pg 294]
*37·04.
Thus consists of all classes which have the relation
to some member of
.
is only
significant when
is a class of classes relatively to members
of the converse domain of
; in this case,
is a
class of classes relatively to members of the domain of
.
Here the symbol "" must be treated as a whole,
i.e. we must not regard it as making an assertion about
. If
, we must not suppose that we
shall be able to put "
," which would be nonsense,
just as "
" is nonsense even when
and
.
The notation , introduced in the present number, is
extremely useful, and embodies a very important idea. Its use is
somewhat different according to the kind of relation concerned.
Consider first the kind of relation which leads to a descriptive
function, say
. If
is a class of relations,
is the class of the domains of these relations.
In this case,
is a class each of whose members
is of the form
, where
. Again, let
us denote by "
" the relation of
to
;
then if we denote by "
" the class of cardinal numbers,
will denote all numbers that result from multiplying a cardinal
number by
, i.e. all multiples of
. Thus e.g.
will be the class of even numbers. If
is a
correlation between two classes
and
, i.e. a
relation such that, if
,
exists and is a member
of
, while conversely, if
,
exists and is a member of
, then
, and
we may regard
as a transformation applied to each member of
and giving rise to a member of
. It is by means of
such transformations that two classes are shown to be similar,
i.e. to have the same (cardinal) number of terms.
[Pg 295]
In the case of serial relations, the utility of the notation
is somewhat different. Suppose, for example, that
is
the relation of less to greater among real numbers. Then if
is any class of real numbers,
will be the segment of
real numbers determined by
, i.e. the class of real
numbers which are less than the limit or maximum of
. In any
series, if
is a class contained in the series and
is
the generating relation of the series,
is the segment
determined by
. If
has either a limit or a maximum,
say
,
will be
. But if
has neither a limit nor a maximum,
will be what
we may call an "irrational" segment of the series. We shall see at a
later stage that the real numbers may be identified with the segments
of the series of rationals, i.e. if
is the relation of
less to greater among rationals, the real numbers will be all classes
such as
, for different values of
. The real
numbers which correspond to rationals will be those resulting from a
which has a limit or maximum; the irrationals will be those
resulting from a
which has no limit or maximum.
The present number may be divided into various sections, as follows:
(1) First, we have various elementary properties of the terms defined
at the beginning of the number; this section ends with *37·29. (2) We
have next a set of propositions dealing with relative products, and
with such symbols as ,
, and so on.
The central proposition here is
*37·33.
By the definition, . Thus
This connects propositions
concerning such symbols as
with propositions
concerning relative products. This second section consists of
the propositions from *37·3 to *37·39. (3) We have next a set of
propositions on relations with limited domains and converse domains.
The chief of these are
*37·401.
*37·412.
*37·41.
These propositions on relations with limited domains and converse
domains, together with certain others naturally connected with
them, extend from *37·4 to *37·52. (4) We next have a number of
very important propositions on the consequences of the hypothesis
, i.e. the hypothesis that, for any
argument which is a member of
,
gives rise to a
descriptive function
. The chief proposition in this section is
*37·6.
Propositions with the hypothesis are applied to
the cases of
and
, in which
the hypothesis is verified. This section extends from *37·6 to *37·791.
(5) Finally, we have three propositions on the relative product of
with other relations. These propositions are
useful in relation-arithmetic (Part IV).
The propositions of the present number which are most used in the sequel, apart from those already mentioned, are the following (omitting such as merely embody definitions):
*37·15.
*37·16.
*37·2.
*37·22.
*37·25.
*37·26.
*37·265.
[Pg 296]
*37·29.
*37·32.
*37·45.
*37·46.
*37·61.
For example, let be the relation of father to son,
the class of Etonians,
the class of rich men; then
"
" states "all fathers of Etonians are rich,"
while "
" states "if a boy is an
Etonian, his father must be rich." In virtue of the above proposition,
these two statements are equivalent.
*37·62.
*37·63.
*37·01.
*37·02.
*37·03.
*37·04.
*37·05.
*37·1.
*37·101.
*37·102.
*37·103.
*37·104.
*37·105.
*37·106.
Dem.
*37·11.
*37·111.
[Pg 297]
*37·12.
*37·13.
Dem.
*37·131.
Dem.
*37·14.
Dem.
*37·15.
Dem.
*37·16.
*37·17.
Dem.
[Pg 298]
*37·171.
Dem.
*37·18.
Dem.
*37·181.
*37·2.
Dem.
The above proposition (*37·2) is one of the forms of asyllogistic
inference due to Leibniz's teacher Jungius. The instance given by
Jungius is: "Circulus est figura; ergo qui circulum describit, is
figuram describit[56]." Here the class of circles is our ,
the class of figures is our
, and the relation of describing
is our
.
*37·201.
*37·202.
Dem.
*37·211.
*37·212.
*37·22.
[Pg 299]
This proposition is very frequently used. The fact that here we have identity, while in *37·21 we only have inclusion, is due to the fact that *10·42 states an equivalence, while *10·5 only states an implication.
Dem.
*37·221.
*37·222.
*37·23.
*37·231.
The type of "" here is that type whose members are of
the same type as
. In the proof, use is made of the
convention that a Greek letter always stands for an expression of the
form
.
Dem.
As appears in the above proof, it is necessary, when a proposition
containing "" is to be proved, to abandon the notation
with Greek letters, and revert to the explicit functional notation.
*37·24.
Dem.
[Pg 300]
*37·25.
Dem.
*37·26.
Dem.
*37·261.
*37·262.
*37·263.
Dem.
*37·265.
Dem.
[Pg 301]
*37·27.
*37·271.
*37·28.
Dem.
Dem.
*37·301.
*37·302.
*37·31.
Dem.
*37·311.
*37·32.
Dem.
[Pg 302]
*37·321.
*37·322.
*37·323.
*37·33.
Dem.
*37·34.
Dem.
*37·341.
*37·35.
Dem.
*37·351.
[Pg 303]
*37·352.
*37·353.
Dem.
*37·354.
*37·355.
*37·36.
*37·37.
*37·371.
This definition serves merely for the avoidance of brackets. Like *37·03, this definition will be extended to all suffixes.
*37·38.
Dem.
*37·401.
*37·402.
Dem.
*37·41.
[Pg 304]
*37·411.
Dem.
*37·412.
Dem.
*37·413.
Dem.
*37·42.
*37·421.
*37·43.
Dem.
*37·431.
*37·44.
*37·441.
*37·45.
*37·451.
*37·46.
*37·461.
*37·462.
*37·47.
Dem.
[Pg 305]
*37·5.
Dem.
*37·501.
Dem.
*37·502.
*37·51.
Dem.
The following propositions, down to *37·7 exclusive, are concerned
with the special properties of which result from the
hypothesis
, defined in *37·05. The hypothesis
is important, because it has many consequences
and is satisfied in many cases with which we wish to deal.
This proposition is very important, and is used constantly.
Dem.
[Pg 306]
*37·601.
Dem.
*37·61.
Dem.
*37·62.
Dem.
[Pg 307]
The above is the type of inference concerning which Jevons says[57]:
"I remember the late Prof. De Morgan remarking that all Aristotle's
logic could not prove that 'Because a horse is an animal, the head of a
horse is the head of an animal.'" It must be confessed that this was a
merit in Aristotle's logic, since the proposed inference is fallacious
without the added premiss " the head of the horse in
question." E.g. it does not hold for an oyster or a hydra. But
with the addition
, the above proposition gives an
important and common type of asyllogistic inference.
*37·63.
Dem.
This proposition is very frequently used.
*37·64.
Dem.
Dem.
*37·66.
Dem.
[Pg 308]
*37·67.
Dem.
*37·68.
Dem.
*37·69.
Dem.
A specially important case of is
or
. This
case will be further studied later (in *70); for the present, we
shall only give a few preliminary propositions about it. It will be
observed that the hypothesis
or
is always verified, in virtue of
*32·12·121. Hence the following applications of *37·6 ff.:
*37·701.
[Pg 309]
*37·702.
*37·703.
*37·704.
*37·705.
*37·706.
*37·707.
*37·708.
*37·709.
*37·71.
*37·711.
*37·712.
*37·713.
*37·72.
Dem.
*37·721.
*37·73.
*37·731.
[Pg 310]
Observe that the 's which occur in this proposition will not
be all of the same type. E.g. if
relates individuals to
individuals, the first
will be the class of no individuals,
while the second and third will be the class of no classes. Thus
the ambiguity which attaches to the type of
must be
differently determined for different occurrences of
in
this proposition. In general, when this is the case with our ambiguous
symbols, we shall adopt a notation which indicates the fact. But when
the ambiguous symbol is
, it seems hardly worth while.
*37·74.
Dem.
*37·75.
*37·76.
Dem.
*37·761.
*37·77.
*37·771.
*37·772.
*37·773.
*37·78.
*37·781.
*37·79.
*37·8.
Dem.
*37·81.
*37·82.
[56] We quote from Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, Chapter III, § 15 (p. 75 n.).
[57] Principles of Science, chap. I. (p. 18 of edition of 1887).
[Pg 311]
Summary of *38.
A double descriptive function is a non-propositional function of two
arguments, such as ,
,
,
,
,
,
,
. The
propositions of the present number apply to all such functions,
assuming the notation to be (as in the above instances) a functional
sign placed between the two arguments. In order to deal with all
analogous cases at once, we shall in this number adopt the notation
where "
" stands for any such sign as
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
, or any
functional sign to be hereafter defined and satisfying the condition
The derived relations and classes with which we shall be concerned
may be illustrated by taking the case of
. The
relation of
to
will be written
,
and the relation of
to
will be
written
. Thus we shall have
The utility of this notation is chiefly due to the possibility of such
notations as
and
. For
example, take such a phrase as "the foreign members of English Clubs."
Then if we put
= foreigners,
= English Clubs, we
have
Or again, let
be a conic, and
a pencil of lines;
then
In this case, since
, we have
. But when the function concerned is not
commutative, this does not hold. Thus for example we do not have
.
The notations of this number will be frequently applied hereafter to
. In accordance with what was said above, we write
for the relation of
to
, and
for the
relation of
to
. Hence we have
Hence
will be the class of relations obtained by
taking members of
[Pg 312] and relatively multiplying them by
. Thus if
were the class of relations first cousin,
second cousin, etc., and
were the relation of parent to child,
would be the class of relations first cousin once
removed, second cousin once removed, etc., taken in the sense which
goes from the older to the younger generation.
It is often convenient to be able to exhibit and
kindred expressions as descriptive functions of the first argument
instead of the second. For this purpose we put
with similar notations for other descriptive double functions. We then
have, just as in the case of
,
This enables us to form the class
. This class is chiefly useful because the members of its members
(i.e.
, as we shall define it
in *40) constitute the class of all products
that can be
formed of a member of
and a member of
.
Thus we are led to three general definitions for descriptive double
functions, namely (if be any such function)
Since
is again a descriptive double
function, the first two of the above definitions can be applied to it.
The third definition, for typographical reasons, cannot be applied
conveniently, though theoretically it is of course applicable. The
relations
and
represent the
general idea contained in some of the uses in mathematics of the term
'operation,' e.g. +1 is the operation of adding 1.
The uses of the notations introduced in the present number occur
chiefly in arithmetic (Parts III and IV). Few propositions can be given
at this stage, since most of the important uses of the notation here
introduced depend upon the substitution of some special function for
the general function "" here used. In the present
number, the propositions given are all immediate consequences of the
definitions.
*38·01.
*38·02.
*38·03.
*38·1.
[Pg 313]
*38·101.
*38·11.
*38·12.
*38·13.
*38·131.
*38·2.
*38·21.
*38·22.
*38·23.
*38·24.
Dem.
*38·3.
*38·31.
[Pg 314]
General Observations on Relations. The notion of "relation" is so general that it is important to realize the different sorts of relations to which the notations defined in the preceding section may be applied. It often happens that a proposition which holds for any relation is only important for relations of certain kinds; hence it is desirable that the reader should have in mind some of the principal kinds of relations. Of the various uses to which different sorts of relations may be put, there are three which are specially important, namely (1) to give rise to descriptive functions, (2) to establish correlations between different classes, (3) to generate series. Let us consider these in succession.
(1) In order that a relation may give rise to a descriptive
function, it must be such that the referent is unique when the
relatum is given. Thus, for example, the relations
,
,
,
,
,
,
, defined above, all give rise to
descriptive functions. In general, if
gives rise to a descriptive
function, there will be a certain class, namely
, to
which the argument of the function must belong in order that the
function may have a value for that argument. For example, taking
the sine as an illustration, and writing "
" instead of
"
,"
must be a number in order that
may
exist. Then
is the relation of
to
when
. If we put
numbers between
and
, both included,
will
be the relation of
to
when
and
.
The converse of this relation, which is
,
will also give rise to a descriptive function; thus
that
value of
which lies between
and
.
This illustrates a case which arises very frequently, namely, that
a relation
does not, as it stands, give rise to a descriptive
function, but does do so when its domain or converse domain is suitably
limited. Thus for example the relation "parent" does not give rise to
a descriptive function, but does do so when its domain is limited to
males or limited to females. The relation "square root," similarly,
gives rise to a descriptive function when its domain is limited
to positive numbers, or limited to negative numbers. The relation
"wife" gives rise to a descriptive function when its converse domain
is limited to Christian men, but not when Mohammedans are included.
The domain[Pg 315] of a relation which gives rise to a descriptive function
without limiting its domain or converse domain consists of all
possible values of the function; the converse domain consists of all
possible arguments to the function. Again, if
gives rise to a
descriptive function,
will be the class of
those arguments for which the value of the function is
. Thus
consists of all numbers whose sine is
,
i.e. all values of
. Again,
will
be the sines of the various members of
. If
is a
class of numbers, then, by the notation of *38,
will be the doubles of those numbers,
the trebles
of them, and so on. To take another illustration, let
be a
pencil of lines, and let
be the intersection of a line
with a given transversal. Then
will be the intersections
of lines belonging to the pencil with the transversal.
(2) Relations which establish a correlation between two classes are
really a particular case of relations giving rise to descriptive
functions, namely the case in which the converse relation also
gives rise to a descriptive function. In this case, the relation is
"one-one," i.e. given the referent, the relatum is determinate,
and vice versa. A relation which is to be conceived as a correlation
will generally be denoted by or
. In such cases, we are
as a rule less interested in the particular terms
and
for which
, than in classes of such terms. We generally, in
such cases, have some class
contained in the converse
domain of our relation
, and we have a class
such
that
. In this case, the relation
correlates
the members of
and the members of
. We shall
have also
, so that, for such a relation,
the correlation is reciprocal. Such relations are fundamental in
arithmetic, since they are used in defining what is meant by saying
that two classes (or series) have the same cardinal (or ordinal) number
of terms.
[Pg 316]
(3) Relations which give rise to series will in general be denoted
by or
, and in propositions whose chief importance
lies in their application to series we shall also, as a rule,
denote a variable relation by
or
. When
is used,
it may be read as "precedes." Then
may be read
"follows,"
may be read "predecessors of
,"
may be read "followers of
."
will be all members of the series generated by
except the last (if any),
will be all members of the
series except the first (if any),
will be all the members of
the series.
will consist of all terms preceding some
member of
. Suppose, for example, that our series is the
series of real numbers, and that
is the class of members of
an ascending series
,
,
, ...
, ...
Then
will be the segment of the real numbers defined
by this series, i.e. it will be all the predecessors of the
limit of the series. (In the event of the series
,
,
, ...
, ... growing without limit,
will be the whole series of real numbers.)
It very often happens that a relation has more or less of a serial
character, without having all the characteristics necessary for
generating series. Take, for example, the relation of son to father.
It is obvious that by means of this relation series can be generated
which start from any man and end with Adam. But these series are not
the field of the relation in question; moreover this relation is not
transitive, i.e. a son of a son of is not a son of
. If, however, we substitute for "son" the relation "descendant
in the direct male line" (which can be defined in terms of "son" by
the method explained in *90 and *91), and if we limit the converse
domain of this relation to ancestors of
in the direct male line,
we obtain a new relation which is serial, and has for its
field
and all his ancestors in the direct male line. Again, one
relation may generate a number of series, as for example the relation
"
is east of
." If
and
are points on the earth's
surface, and in the eastern hemisphere, this relation generates one
series for every parallel of latitude. By confining the field of the
relation further to one parallel of latitude, we obtain a relation
which generates a series. (The reason for confining
and
to one hemisphere is to insure that the relation shall be transitive,
since otherwise we might have
east of
and
east of
, but
west of
.)
A relation may have the characteristics of all the three kinds of
relations, provided we include in the third kind all those which
lead to series by some such limitations as those just described. For
example, the relation , i.e. (in virtue of the notation of
*38) the relation of
to
, where
is supposed to be
a finite cardinal integer, has the characteristics of all three kinds
of relations. In the first place, it leads to the descriptive function
(
, i.e.
. In the second place, it correlates
with any class
of numbers the class obtained by adding
1 to each member of
, i.e. (
. This
correlation may be used to prove that the number of finite integers is
infinite (in one of the two senses of the word "infinite"); for if we
take as our class
all the natural numbers including 0, the
class (
consists of all the natural numbers except 0, so
that the natural numbers can be correlated with a proper part[58] of
themselves. Again the relation
may be used, like that of father
to son, to generate a series, namely the usual series of the natural
numbers in order of magnitude, in which each has to its immediate
predecessor the relation
. Thus this relation partakes of the
characteristics of all three kinds of relations.
[58] I.e. a part not the whole. On this definition of infinity, see *124.
[Pg 317]
Summary of Section E.
In the present section, we make an extension of ,
,
,
. Given
a class of classes, say
, the product of
(which
is denoted by
is the common part of all the members of
, i.e. the class consisting of those terms which
belong to every member of
. The definition is
If
has only two members,
and
say,
. If
has three
members,
,
,
, then
;
and so on. But this process can only
be continued to a finite number of terms, whereas the definition of
does not require that
should be finite. This
notion is chiefly important in connection with the lower limits of
series. For example, let
be the class of rational numbers
whose square is greater than 2, and let "
" mean "
,
where
and
are rationals." Then if
,
will be the class of rationals less than
x. Thus
will be the class of such
classes as
, where
. Thus
the product of
, which we call
, will be the class of rationals
which are less than every member of
, i.e. the
class of rationals whose squares are less than 2. Each member of
is a segment of the series of
rationals, and
is the lower limit of
these segments. It is thus that we prove the existence of lower limits
of series of segments.
Similarly the sum of a class of classes is defined as
the class consisting of all terms belonging to some member of
; i.e.
i.e.
belongs to the sum of
if
belongs
to some
. This notion plays the same part for upper limits
of series of segments as
plays for lower limits. It has,
however, many more other uses than
, and is altogether
a more important conception. Thus in cardinal arithmetic, if no two
members of
have any term in common, the arithmetical sum of
the numbers of members possessed by the various members of
is the number of members possessed by
.
[Pg 318]
The product of a class of relations ( say) is the relation
which holds between
and
when
and
have every
relation of the class
. The definition is
The properties of
are analogous to those of
, but its uses are fewer.
The sum of a class of relations ( say) is the relation which
holds between
and
whenever there is a relation of the class
which holds between
and
. The definition is
This conception, though less important than
, is more
important than
. The summation of series and ordinal
numbers depends upon it, though the connection is less immediate than
that of the summation of cardinal numbers with
.
Instead of defining ,
,
,
, it would be formally more correct to define
,
,
and
, which are the relations giving rise
to the above descriptive functions. Thus we should have
whence we should proceed to
But in cases where the relation, as opposed to the descriptive
function, is very seldom required, it is simpler and easier to give
the definition of the descriptive function in the first instance. In
such cases, the relation is always tacitly assumed to be also defined;
i.e. when we give a definition of the form
where
is some previously defined relation, we always assume that
this definition is to be regarded as derived from
In addition to products and sums, we deal, in the present section,
with certain properties of the relations and
,
the meanings of which result from the notation introduced in *38.
Such relations are very useful in arithmetic. The reason for dealing
with them in the present section is that a large proportion of the
propositions to be proved involve sums of classes of classes or
relations.
[Pg 319]
Summary of *40.
In this number, we introduce the two notations (explained above)
Both these notions will be found increasingly useful as we proceed,
but
remains more useful than
throughout. It
is required for the significance of
and
that
should be a class of classes.
In the present number, the most useful propositions are the following:
*40·12.
I.e. the product of is contained in every member of
.
*40·13.
I.e. every member of is contained in the sum of
.
*40·15.
I.e. is contained in the product of
if
is contained in every member of
, and vice versa.
*40·151.
I.e. the sum of is contained in
if every
member of
is contained in
, and vice versa.
*40·2.
I.e. the product of the null-class of classes is the universal
class. This may seem paradoxical at first sight, but it is really not
so. The fewer members has, the larger, speaking generally,
becomes. If
has no members, then
has
no members to which a given term
does not belong, and therefore
belongs to
.
*40·23.
I.e. unless is null, its product is contained in its
sum.
*40·38.
This proposition is very often used in arithmetic. What it states
is as follows: Given a class of classes , take its sum,
, and then consider all the[Pg 320] terms that have the
relation
to some member of
; this gives the class
; next, take each separate member of
, say
, and form the class
, consisting of all terms
having the relation
to some member of
. The class of
all such classes as
, for various
's which are
members of
, is
; the sum of this class, by the
above proposition, is the same as
.
*40·4.
This proposition requires, for significance, that should always
be a class. The proposition states that, if
always exists when
, then the sum of all classes which have the relation
to some member of
consists of all members of such
classes as
, where
.
*40·5.
This proposition results from *40·4 by substituting
for
in that proposition.
*40·51.
In virtue of *40·5, is
correlative to
. Thus if
is a serial relation,
consists of terms preceding the whole
of
, and
consists of terms preceding part of
. If
has a lower limit, it will be the upper limit
or maximum of
; if
has an upper
limit, it will be the upper limit of
.
*40·61.
In this proposition the hypothesis is essential, since, if ,
and
.
*40·1.
*40·11.
*40·12.
Dem.
*40·13.
Dem.
[Pg 321]
*40·14.
*40·141.
*40·15.
Dem.
*40·151.
Dem.
This proposition is frequently used.
*40·16.
Dem.
*40·161.
Dem.
*40·17.
Dem.
[Pg 322]
*40·171.
Dem.
*40·18.
Dem.
*40·181.
Dem.
*40·19.
This proposition is the extension of *22·6.
Dem.
[Pg 323]
*40·2.
Dem.
*40·21.
Dem.
In the above proposition, the two 's are of different types,
since
is of the type next above that of
. Thus
it would be more correct to write
But in the case of it is not very important to keep the
types distinct.
*40·22.
Dem.
In this proposition, the two 's are of the same type.
*40·221.
Dem.
Observe that the hypothesis is essential to this
proposition, since when
,
and
. Thus
*40·23.
Dem.
Observe that the hypothesis is essential to this
proposition, since when
,
and
. Thus
[Pg 324]
*40·24.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the proof of *215·25.
*40·25.
Dem.
*40·26.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in the proof of *216·51.
*40·27.
Dem.
The following propositions are only significant when is
a relation whose domain consists of classes, for they concern
or
, and therefore require that
should be a class of classes.
*40·31.
*40·32.
Dem.
[Pg 325]
*40·33.
The following propositions no longer require that the domain of
should be composed of classes.
*40·35.
Dem.
*40·36.
Dem.
*40·38.
Dem.
This proposition is frequently used in the proofs of arithmetical propositions.
*40·4.
This proposition is only significant when .
Dem.
[Pg 326]
*40·41.
*40·42.
Dem.
This proposition is used in *40·57, where we take ,
,
.
*40·43.
Dem.
*40·44.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in the proof of *84·44.
*40·45.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in the proof of *94·402.
*40·451.
Dem.
[Pg 327]
Dem.
*40·51.
is the class of terms each of which
has the relation
to every member of
, just as
is the class of terms each of which has the relation
to some member of
. In the theory of series,
plays an important part, correlative to
that played by
(which is
,
by *40·5). If
is a class contained in a series whose
generating relation is
, then
will
be the predecessors of all members of
, while
will be the predecessors of some
.
*40·52.
*40·53.
*40·54.
*40·55.
From this point onwards to *40·69, the propositions are inserted on account of their use in the theory of series.
*40·56.
In the above proposition, the conditions of significance require that
should be a class of relations.
*40·6.
*40·61.
Dem.
[Pg 328]
*40·62.
The two following propositions (*40·63·64) are used in proving *40·65, which is used in *204·63.
*40·63.
Dem.
*40·64.
*40·66.
Dem.
*40·68.
Dem.
This proposition is used in the theory of series (*206·2).
*40·681.
The following proposition is used in *211·56.
[Pg 329]
*40·682.
Dem.
Dem.
The above propositions concerning
and
of course have analogues for
and
.
But owing to *40·5, these analogues are more simply stated as
properties of
and
. Thus, for example,
*37·264 is the analogue of *40·67. The above propositions concerning
and
will
be used in the theory of series, but until we reach that stage they
will seldom be referred to.
Dem.
[Pg 330]
This proposition is of considerable importance, since it gives
a compact form for the class of all values of the function
obtained by taking
in the class
and
in the class
. Thus, for example, suppose
is the class of numbers which are multiples of 3, and
is
the class of numbers which are multiples of 5, and
represents the arithmetical product of
and
, then
will be the class of products of multiples of 3 and
multiples of 5, i.e. the class of multiples of 15. Again suppose
and
are both classes of relations; then
will be all relative products
obtained by choosing
in the class
and
in the class
.
*40·71.
Dem.
The hypothesis , which appears
in *40·8·81, is one which plays an important part at a later stage.
In the theory of induction (Part II, Section E) it characterizes a
hereditary class, and in the theory of series it characterizes
an upper section (when combined with
).
*40·8.
Dem.
*40·81.
Dem.
[Pg 331]
Summary of *41.
The propositions to be given in this number, down to *41·3 exclusive, are
the analogues of those of *40, excluding those from *40·3 onwards, which
have no analogues. Proofs will not be given, in this number, when they are
exactly analogous to those of propositions with the same decimal part in *40.
The smaller importance of and
, as compared with
and
, is
illustrated by the smaller number of propositions in *41 as compared
with *40.
Our definitions are
*41·01.
*41·02.
Of the propositions preceding *41·3, which are analogues of propositions in *40, the only two that are frequently used are
*41·13.
*41·151.
Of the remaining propositions of this number, which have no analogues
in *40, the most important are *41·43·44·45, namely
These propositions are constantly required in the theory of selections
(Part II, Section D) and in relation-arithmetic. Most of the other
propositions of this number are used only once or not at all.
*41·01.
*41.02.
*41·1.
*41·11.
*41·12.
*41·13.
[Pg 332]
*41·14.
*41·141.
*41·15.
*41·151.
*41·16.
*41·161.
*41·17.
*41·171.
*41·18.
*41·181.
*41·19.
*41·2.
*41·21.
*41·22.
*41·221.
*41·23.
*41·24.
*41·25.
*41·26.
*41·27.
Dem.
*41·31.
*41·32.
*41·33.
*41·34.
Dem.
[Pg 333]
*41·341.
*41·342.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in *85·22.
*41·35.
Dem.
*41·351.
*41·4.
Dem.
*41·41.
*41·42.
Dem.
*41·43.
Dem.
[Pg 334]
*41·44.
*41·45.
Dem.
*41·5.
Dem.
*41·51.
Dem.
The above proposition, which is used in *92·31, states that, if
and
are classes of relations, the relative product
of the relational sum of
and the relational sum of
is the relational sum of all the relative products formed of a member
of
and a member of
.
The following proposition is used in *96·111.
[Pg 335]
*41·52.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in *162·32 and in *166·461.
*41·6.
Dem.
[Pg 336]
Summary of *42.
The present number contains various propositions concerning products and sums of classes. They are concerned chiefly with classes of classes of classes, or with relations of relations of relations. These are required respectively in cardinal and in ordinal arithmetic. Thus *42·1 is used in *112 and *113, which are concerned with cardinal addition and multiplication, while *42·12·2 are used in *160 and *162, which are concerned with ordinal addition. *42·22, though not explicitly referred to, is useful in facilitating the comprehension of propositions on series of series of series, or rather on relations between relations between relations, which are required in connection with the associative law of multiplication in relation-arithmetic.
Here must, for significance, be a class of classes
of classes. The proposition states that if we take each member,
, of
, and form
, and then form the
sum of all the classes so obtained, the result is the same as if we
form the sum of the sum of
. This is the associative law for
, and is (as will appear later) the source of the associative law
of addition in cardinal arithmetic. The way in which this proposition
comes to be the associative law for
may be seen as follows:
Suppose
consists of two classes,
and
;
suppose
in turn consists of the two classes
and
, and
of the two classes
and
. Then
. (This will
be proved later.) Thus
has two members, one of which is
, while the other is
. Thus
But
has four members, namely
,
,
,
. Thus
.
Thus our proposition leads to
which is obviously a case of the associative law.
[Pg 337]
Our proposition states the associative law generally, including the case where the number of brackets, or of summands in any bracket, is infinite. The proof is as follows.
Dem.
*42·11.
Dem.
This is the associative law for products. Supposing again, for
illustration, that consists of the two classes
,
, while
consists of the two classes
,
and \beta of the two classes
,
, then
consists of the two classes
and
, so that
, while
. Thus
our proposition becomes
A descriptive function whose arguments are classes or
classes of classes may be said to obey the associative law provided
This equation may be interpreted as follows: Given a class ,
divide it into any number of subordinate classes, so that no member is
left out, though one member may belong to two or more classes. Let the
classes into which
is divided make up the class
,
so that
is a class of classes, and
. Then
the above equation asserts that if we first form the
of the
various sub-classes of
, and then the
of the resulting
class, the result is the same as if we formed the
of
directly.
In some cases—for example, that of arithmetical addition of
cardinals—the above equation holds only when no two members of
have a common term, i.e. when the parts into which
is divided are mutually exclusive.
[Pg 338]
For a descriptive function whose arguments are relations of relations, we shall find another form for the associative law; this form plays in ordinal arithmetic a part analogous to that played by the above form in cardinal arithmetic.
*42·12.
Dem.
*42·13.
Dem.
*42·2.
This proposition assumes that is a relation between relations.
For example, suppose we have a series of series, whose generating
relations are ordered by the relation
. Then
is the
class of these generating relations;
is the relation
"one or other of the generating relations which compose
,"
and
is the class of all the terms occurring in any
of the series.
is the fields of the various series, and
is again all the terms occurring in any of the series.
is all the terms belonging to fields of series which are
members of
, and
is all members of
fields of members of the field of
; each of these again is all the
terms occurring in any of the series. The proof is as follows:
Dem.
[Pg 339]
The following propositions apply to a relation of relations of
relations. These propositions are useful for proving associative laws
in ordinal arithmetic, since these laws deal with series of series of
series, and series of series of series are most simply constituted by
supposing the generating relations of the constituent series to be
ordered by relations which are themselves ordered by a relation .
*42·21.
Dem.
If , in the above proposition, is a relation which generates a
series of series of series, the above gives various forms for the
class of ultimate terms of these series. Thus suppose
;
then
is a relation between generating relations of series. If
now
,
is the generating relation of a series which
we may regard as composed of individuals. The class of individuals so
obtainable may be expressed in any of the above forms, as well as in
others which are not given above.
*42·3.
Dem.
*42·31.
[Pg 340]
Summary of *43.
The purpose of the present number is to give certain propositions on
the relation which holds between and
whenever
,
or whenever
, or whenever
,
where
and
are fixed. In virtue of the general definitions
of *38, these relations are respectively
,
, and
(
. Such relations are of great utility both
in cardinal and in ordinal arithmetic; they are also much used in the
theory of induction (Part II, Section E). In place of the notation
(
, which is cumbrous, we adopt the more compact
notation
. If
is a class of relations,
will be the class of relations
where
,
will be the class of relations
where
, and (
will
be the class of relations
where
.
These classes of relations are often required in subsequent work.
In virtue of our definitions, we have
*43·112.
The propositions most used in the present number (except such as merely embody definitions) are the following:
*43·302.
*43·411.
*43·421.
The remaining propositions are used seldom, but their uses, when they are used, are important.
*43·01.
[Pg 341]
At a later stage (in *150) we shall introduce a simpler notation
for the special case of . The following
propositions are for the most part immediate consequences of the
definitions, and proofs are therefore usually omitted.
*43·1.
*43·101.
*43·102.
*43·11.
*43·111.
*43·112.
*43·12.
*43·121.
*43·122.
*43·2.
Dem.
*43·201.
*43·202.
*43·21.
*43·211.
*43·212.
*43·213.
*43·22.
*43·3.
*43·301.
*43·302.
*43·31.
Dem.
*43·311.
*43·312.
*43·34.
*43·4.
*43·401.
*43·41.
[Pg 342]
*43·411.
*43·42.
Dem.
*43·421.
*43·43.
Dem.
*43·48.
*43·481.
*43·49.
Dem.
*43·491.
*43·5.
*43·51.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the proof of *74·773.
[Pg 343]
[Pg 345]
THE objects to be studied in this Part are not sharply distinguished from those studied in Part I. The difference is one of degree, the objects in this Part being of somewhat less general importance than those of Part I, and being studied more on account of their bearing on cardinal arithmetic than on their own account. Although cardinal arithmetic is the goal which determines our course in Part II, all the objects studied will be found to be also required in ordinal arithmetic and the theory of series. As this Part advances, the approach to cardinal arithmetic becomes gradually more marked, until at last nothing is lacking except the definition of cardinal numbers, with which Part III opens.
Section A of this Part deals with unit classes and couples. A
unit class is the class of terms identical with a given term,
i.e. the class whose only member is the given term. (As
explained in the Introduction, Chapter III, pp. 80 to 83, the class
whose only member is is not identical with
.) We define
as the class of all unit classes, leaving it to Part III to show
that
, so defined, is a cardinal number. In like manner, we define
a (cardinal or ordinal) couple, and then define
as the class of
all couples. The propositions on couples will not be much referred to
in the remainder of the present Part, since their use belongs chiefly
to arithmetic (Parts III and IV). On the other hand, the properties of
unit classes are constantly required in Sections C, D, E of this Part.
Section B deals, first, with the class of sub-classes of a given class,
i.e. of classes contained in a given class. The sub-classes
of a given class are often important in arithmetic. Next we consider
the class of sub-relations of a given relation, i.e. relations
contained in a given relation. The propositions on this subject are
analogous to those on sub-classes, but less important. Next we consider
the question of "relative types," i.e. taking any object ,
and calling its type
, we give a notation for expressing in
terms of
the type of classes of which
is a member, or
of relations in which
may be either referent or relatum, and
so on. The notations introduced in this connection are very useful
in arithmetic, especially in connection with existence-theorems. But
the propositions of Section B are very seldom required in the later
sections of the present Part.
[Pg 346]
Section C, which deals with one-many, many-one and one-one relations,
is very important, and is constantly relevant in the sequel. A relation
is one-many when no term has more than one referent, many-one if no
term has more than one relatum, and one-one if it is both one-many and
many-one. In this section, we define the notion of similarity,
upon which all cardinal arithmetic is based: two classes are said to
be similar when there is a one-one relation whose domain is the
one and whose converse domain is the other. We prove the elementary
properties of similarity, including the Schröder-Bernstein theorem,
namely: If is similar to part of
, and
is
similar to part of
, then
is similar to
.
Section D deals with the notion of selections, upon which both
cardinal and ordinal multiplication are based. A selection from a set
of classes is a class consisting of one member from each class of the
set. Thus a selective relation may be defined as one which, for
a given class of classes
, makes
a member of
whenever
is a member of
. More exactly,
a selective relation for a class of classes
is one which
is one-many, which has
for its converse domain, and is
such that, if
, then
. Such a relation
may be called an
-selector from
. More generally,
we may define a
-selector from
as a relation which
is one-many, which has
for its converse domain, and which
is contained in
. The theory of selectors is very important in
arithmetic. But until we come to cardinal multiplication in Part III,
Section B, the propositions of this fourth section will seldom be
relevant.
Section E deals with mathematical induction, not in the special form in which it applies to finite integers (this is considered in Part III, Section C), but in a general form in which it applies to all relations. The propositions of this section are of very great importance, primarily in the theory of finite and infinite (Part III, Section C, and Part V, Section E), but also in many other subjects, and especially in the derivation of series from one-many, many-one or one-one relations—for example, in ordering the "rational" points of a projective space by means of successive constructions of harmonic points. The ideas involved in this section are somewhat complicated, and we must refer the reader to the section itself for an account of them.
[Pg 347]
Summary of Section A.
In this section we begin (*50) by introducing a notation for the
relation of identity, as opposed to the function
""; that is, calling the relation of identity I, we put
The purpose of this definition is chiefly convenience of notation.
The definition enables us to speak of
,
,
,
,
,
etc., which we could not otherwise do.
At the same time we introduce diversity, which is defined as the
negation of identity, and denoted by the letter . The properties
of
and
result immediately from *13, since
We next introduce a very important notation, due to Peano, for the
class whose only member is . If we took a strictly and purely
extensional view of classes, we should naturally suppose this class to
be identical with
. But in view of the theory of classes explained
in *20, it is plain that
can never be identical with a class of
which it is a member, even when it is the only member of that class.
Peano uses the notation "
" for the class whose only member
is
; we shall alter this to "
," following our general
notation for descriptive functions. Thus we are to have
Hence we take as our definition
since this definition gives the desired value of
. The
properties of
are many and important.
It is important to observe that "" means
"the only member of
." Thus it exists when, and only when,
has one member and no more, in which case
is of the form
, if x is its only member. Thus
"
" means the same as "(
,"
and "
" means the same as
"(
." What we call "
" is
denoted, in Peano's notation, by "
."
[Pg 348]
Classes of the form are called unit classes, and
the class of all such classes is called 1. This is the cardinal number
1, according to the definition of cardinal numbers which will be given
in *100. The properties of 1, so far as they do not depend upon other
cardinals, or upon the fact that 1 is a cardinal, will be studied in
*52.
After a number (*53) containing various propositions involving 1 or
, we pass to the consideration of cardinal couples (*54) and
ordinal couples (*55). A cardinal couple is a class
, where
. The class of such couples is defined as
2, and will be shown at a later stage (*101) to be a cardinal number.
An ordinal couple, which, unlike a cardinal couple, involves an order
as between its members, is defined as a relation
(cf. *35·04), where we may either add
or not.
The properties of ordinal couples are in part analogous to those of
unit classes, in part to those of cardinal couples. In *56, we define
the ordinal number 2 (which we denote by
, to distinguish
it from the cardinal 2) as the class of all ordinal couples
, where
. It will be shown
at a later stage that this is an ordinal number according to our
definition of ordinal numbers (*153 and *251).
[Pg 349]
Summary of *50.
The purpose of the present number is primarily notational. For
notational reasons, we must be able to express identity and
diversity as relations, and not merely as propositional functions,
i.e. we require a notation for and
. We therefore put
In spite of the fact that diversity is merely the negation of identity, the kinds of propositions which employ diversity are quite different from the kinds that employ identity. Identity as a relation is required, to begin with, in the theory of unit classes, which is our reason for treating of it at this stage. It is next required, constantly, in the theory of mathematical induction (Part II, Section E). It is required also in showing that cardinal and ordinal similarity are reflexive. These are its principal uses.
Diversity, on the other hand, is required almost exclusively in the theory of series (Part V), and the first number in that theory will be devoted to diversity. Until that stage, diversity will seldom be referred to, with one important exception, namely in proving the associative law of multiplication in relation-arithmetic (*174).
The most important propositions on identity in the present number are the following:
50·16.
50·4.
50·5.
50·51.
50·52.
50·62.
50·63.
[Pg 350]
The most important propositions on diversity in the present number are the following:
*50·23.
*50·24.
*50·43.
*50·45.
*50·47.
It will be observed that all these propositions are concerned with
or
, both of which are
satisfied if
is a serial relation. The hypothesis
or
characterizes an asymmetrical relation, i.e. one which,
if it holds between
and
, cannot hold between
and
.
*50·01.
*50·02.
Most of the propositions of this number are obvious, and call for no comment.
*50·1.
*50·11
*50·12.
*50·13.
*50·14.
*50·15.
*50·16.
Dem.
*50·17.
Dem.
*50·2.
Dem.
[Pg 351]
*50·21.
Dem.
*50·22.
*50·23.
*50·24.
Dem.
*50·3.
*50·31.
Dem.
*50·32.
Dem.
In the above proposition (*50·33), the hypothesis
is equivalent to the hypothesis that more than one object exists of
the type in question. This can be proved for all except the lowest
type. For the lowest type, we can only prove the existence of at
least one object: this is proved in *24·52. For the next type, we can
prove the existence of at least two objects, namely
and
; these are distinct, by*24·1. For a class of order
,
we can prove the existence of
objects. But for the class of
individuals we cannot prove,[Pg 352] from our primitive propositions, that
there is more than one object in the universe, and therefore we cannot
prove
. We might, of course, have included among our
primitive propositions the assumption that more than one individual
exists, or some assumption from which this would follow, such as
But very few of the propositions which we might wish to prove depend
upon this assumption, and we have therefore excluded it. It should be
observed that most philosophers, being monists, deny this assumption.
*50·34.
Dem.
*50·35.
*50·4.
Dem.
*50·41.
Dem.
[Pg 353]
*50·42.
Dem.
*50·43.
This proposition is useful in the theory of series.
"" is the characteristic
of an asymmetrical relation.
*50·44.
Dem.
*50·45.
*50·46.
*50·47.
Dem.
This proposition is used in the theory of series. If is a
serial relation, we shall have
and
.
*50·5.
Dem.
[Pg 354]
*50·51.
*50·52.
Dem.
*50·53.
Dem.
*50·54.
Dem.
*50·55.
Dem.
*50·56.
Dem.
*50·57.
Dem.
[Pg 355]
*50·58.
Dem.
*50·59.
Dem.
*50·6.
Dem.
*50·61.
Dem.
*50·62.
*50·63.
*50·64.
*50·65.
*50·7.
*50·71.
*50·72.
*50·73.
*50·74.
Dem.
*50·75.
*50·76.
Dem.
*50·761.
[Pg 356]
Summary of *51.
In this number we introduce a new descriptive function ,
meaning "the class of terms which are identical with
," which is
the same thing as "the class whose only member is
." We are thus
to have
But
. Hence we secure what we
require by the following definition:
*51·01.
As a matter of notation, it might be thought that
would do as well as
, and that this
definition is superfluous. But we need also the converse of this
relation, and "
" is not a sufficiently
convenient symbol.
The propositions of this number are constantly used in what follows. It
should be observed that the class whose members are and
is
, the class whose members are
,
,
is
, the class formed by
adding
to
is
, and the class
formed by taking
away from
is
.
(If
is not a member of
, this is equal to
.)
The distinction between and
is one of the merits of
Peano's symbolic logic, as well as of Frege's. On the basis of our
theory of classes, the necessity for the distinction is of course
obvious. But apart from this, the following consideration makes the
necessity apparent. Let
be a class; then the class whose
only member is
has only one member, namely
, while
may have many members. Hence the class whose only member is
cannot be identical with
[59].
The propositions of the present number which are most used are the following:
*51·15.
*51·16.
[Pg 357]
This proposition is useful because it enables us to replace membership
of a class () by inclusion in the class (
).
*51·211.
*51·221.
*51·222.
*51·4.
I.e. an existent class contained in a unit class must be identical with the unit class. From this proposition it will follow that 0 is the only cardinal which is less than 1.
*51·51.
For classes, has the same uses that
(
has for functions; "
" means
"the only member of
." We have
*51·59.
*51·01.
*51·1.
Dem.
*51·11.
*51·12.
*51·13.
*51·131.
*51·14.
*51·141.
*51·15.
*51·16.
*51.161.
*51·17.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the theory of selections (*83·71).
[Pg 358]
*51·2.
Dem.
The above proposition shows how to replace membership of a class by
inclusion in a class; thus for example it gives:
Before Peano and Frege, the relation of membership () was
regarded as merely a particular case of the relation of inclusion
(
). For this reason, the traditional formal logic treated
such propositions as "Socrates is a man" as instances of the universal
affirmative
, "All
is
," which is what we express by
"
." This involved a confusion of fundamentally
different kinds of propositions, which greatly hindered the development
and usefulness of symbolic logic. But by means of the above proposition
(*51·2), we can always obtain a proposition stating an inclusion
(namely "
") which is equivalent to a given
proposition stating membership of a class (namely "
").
*51·21.
Dem.
*51·211.
Dem.
*51·22.
Dem.
*51·221.
Dem.
[Pg 359]
*51·222.
*51·23.
Dem.
*51·231.
Dem.
This proposition states that a member of
must be either
or
, and vice versa, i.e. that
is the class whose only members are
and
.
*51·233.
Dem.
Dem.
*51·236.
*51·237.
[Pg 360]
*51·238.
Dem.
*51·239.
Dem.
*51·24.
Dem.
*51·25.
*51·3.
Dem.
*51·34.
*51·35.
*51·36.
*51·36 is frequently used.
*51·37.
[Pg 361]
Dem.
*51·401.
Dem.
This proposition shows that unit classes are the smallest existent classes.
Dem.
The two following propositions are lemmas for *51·43.
*51·42.
Dem.
*51·421.
[Pg 362]
The following propositions are concerned with ,
i.e. with the relation of the only member of a unit class to
that class. If
is a unit class,
is
its only member. (
and
are equal whenever either exists, and any proposition about the
one is equivalent to the same proposition about the other.
*51·51.
Dem.
*51·511.
*51·52.
*51·53.
*51·54.
*51·55.
Dem.
*51·56.
Dem.
*51·57.
Dem.
*51·58.
*51·59.
[59] This argument is due to Frege. See his article "Kritische Beleuchtung einiger Punkte in E. Schröder's Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik," Archiv für Syst. Phil., vol. I. p. 444 (1895).
[Pg 363]
Summary of *52.
In this number, we introduce the cardinal number 1, defined as the
class of all unit classes. The fact that 1 so defined is a cardinal
number is not relevant at present, and cannot of course be proved until
"cardinal number" has been defined. For the present, therefore, 1 is to
be regarded simply as the class of all unit classes, unit classes being
such classes as are of the form for some
.
Like and
, 1 is ambiguous as to type: it means
"all unit classes of the type in question." The symbol "
,"
where
is a type, will mean "all unit classes whose sole
members belong to the type
" (cf. *65). Thus e.g.
"
)" will mean "
is a class consisting
of one individual," if "
" stands for the class of
individuals.
The properties of 1 to be proved in the present number are what we may call logical as opposed to arithmetical properties, i.e. they are not concerned with the arithmetical operations (addition, etc.) which can be performed with 1, but with the relations of 1 to unit classes. The arithmetical properties of 1 will be considered later, in Part III.
The propositions of the present number which are most used are the following:
*52·16.
I.e. is a unit class if, and only if, it is not null,
and all its members are identical.
*52·22.
We shall define 0 as . Thus the above proposition
states that a class has one member or none when, and only when, all its
members are identical.
*52·41.
[Pg 364]
This proposition is obtainable from *52·4 by transposition, i.e. by negating each side of the equivalence.
*52·46
I.e. two unit classes are identical when, and only when, one is contained in the other, and when and only when they have a common part.
*52·01
*52·1
*52·11
*52·12
Dem.
*52·13
Dem.
*52·14
*52·15
*52·16
*52·17
*52·171
*52·172
*52·173
*52·18
Dem.
*52·181
*52·2
Dem.
[Pg 365]
*52·21.
Dem.
*52·22.
*52·23.
Dem.
*52·24.
*52·3.
Dem.
*52·31.
Dem.
*52·4.
Dem.
[Pg 366]
This proposition is frequently useful. We shall define the number 0 as
; thus the above proposition states that a class has
one member or none when, and only when, all its members are identical.
It will be seen that
does not imply
, and therefore allows the possibility of
having no members.
*52·41.
Dem.
*52·42.
Dem.
*52·43.
*52·44.
Dem.
*52·45.
Dem.
52·46.
Dem.
[Pg 367]
*52·6.
Dem.
*52·601.
Dem.
*52·602.
*52·61.
*52·62.
Dem.
*52·63.
*52·64.
Dem.
*52·7.
Dem.
[Pg 368]
Summary of *53.
The propositions to be given in this number are mostly such as would
have come more naturally at an earlier stage, but could not be given
sooner because they involved unit classes. It is to be observed that
is the class consisting of the members
and
, while
is the relation which holds
only between
and
. If
and
are classes,
is a class of classes, its members
being
and
. If
and
are relations,
is a relation of relations; and so on.
The present number begins by connecting products and sums ,
,
,
, in cases
where the members of
or
are specified, with
the products or sums
,
,
,
. We have
*53·01.
*53·14.
with similar propositions for ,
and
.
We have next a set of propositions on sums and products of classes of unit classes. The most important of these is
*53·22.
We have next a proposition showing that the sum of is null
when, and only when,
is either null or has the null-class
for its only member, i.e.
*53·24.
(Here we write "," to show that the
"
" in question is of the next type above that of the other
two
's.)
We have next various propositions on the relations of
and
and
in various
cases, first for a general relation
, and then for the particular
relation
defined in *40. Three of these propositions are very
frequently used, namely:
*53·3.
*53·301.
[Pg 369]
*53·31.
The remaining propositions of this number are of less importance, and are seldom referred to.
*53·01.
Dem.
*53·02.
Dem.
*53·03.
*53·04.
*53·1.
Dem.
This proposition can be extended to
, etc. It
shows the connection (for finite classes of classes) between
the product
and the product of the members
*53·11.
Dem.
Similar remarks apply to this proposition as to *53·1.
*53·12.
This proposition shows the connection between the product
for a class
consisting of two relations
and
, and
the product
. The proposition can be extended to the
product of any given finite class of relations.
*53·13.
Similar remarks apply to this proposition as to *53·12.
*53·14.
Dem.
[Pg 370]
*53·15.
*53·16.
*53·17.
The above proposition and the next are both used in connection with mathematical induction (*91·55 and *97·46 respectively).
*53·18.
Dem.
*53·181.
*53·2.
This proposition requires, for significance, that should
be a class of classes. It is used in *88·47, in the number on the
existence of selections and the multiplication axiom.
Dem.
*53·21.
This proposition requires, for significance, that should be
a class of relations.
*53·22.
Dem.
*53·221.
Dem.
[Pg 371]
*53·222.
Dem.
Dem.
*53·231.
Dem.
*53·24.
Dem.
In the enunciation and the last line of the proof of the above
proposition, we write "" rather than
"
," because this
must be of the type next
above that of the
in "
."
The following proposition is used in the theory of selections (*83·731).
*53·25.
Dem.
[Pg 372]
*53·3.
Dem.
The above proposition is very frequently used.
*53·301.
Dem.
*53·302.
The above proposition is used in the cardinal theory of exponentiation (*116·71).
*53·31.
The above proposition is one of which the subsequent use is frequent.
Dem.
*53·32.
Dem.
*53·33.
*53·34.
*53·35.
Dem.
[Pg 373]
The above proposition may also be proved as follows:
*53·4.
Dem.
*53·5.
Dem.
In the above proof, as usually where "Cls" or other type-symbols occur, it is necessary to abandon the notation by Greek letters and revert to the explicit notation.
*53·51.
*53·52.
Dem.
*53·53.
The following propositions are inserted because of their
connection with the definition of
in *70.
and
(
are both important classes.
*53·6.
Dem.
*53·601.
Dem.
*53·602.
*53·603.
*53·604.
Dem.
*53·611.
*53·612.
*53·613.
*53·614.
Dem.
*53·615.
[Pg 375]
The two following propositions are used in *70·12.
*53·62.
Dem.
*53·621.
*53·63.
*53·631.
*53·64.
[Pg 376]
Summary of *54.
Couples are of two kinds, namely (1) ,
in which there is no order as between
and
, and (2)
, in which there is an order. We may
distinguish these two kinds of couples as cardinal and ordinal
respectively, since (as will be shown hereafter) the class of all
couples of the form
(where
) is
the cardinal number 2, while the class of all couples of the form
(where
) is the ordinal number
2, to which, for the sake of distinction, we assign the symbol
"
," where the suffix "
" stands for "relational," because
the ordinal 2 is a class of relations. In the present and the following
numbers, we shall define 2 and
as the classes of cardinal and
ordinal couples respectively, leaving it to a later stage to show that
2 and
, so defined, are respectively a cardinal and an ordinal
number. An ordinal couple will also be called an ordered couple
or a couple with sense. Thus a couple with sense is a couple of
which one comes first and the other second.
We introduce here the cardinal number 0, defined as .
That 0 so defined is a cardinal number, will be proved at a later
stage; for the present, we postpone the proof that 0 so defined has the
arithmetical properties of zero.
Cardinal couples are much less important, even in cardinal arithmetic, than ordinal couples, which will be considered in the two following numbers (*55 and *56). It is necessary, however, to prove some of the properties of cardinal couples, and this will be done in the present number. Some properties of cardinal couples which have been already proved are here repeated for convenience of reference. The definitions of 0 and 2 are:
*54·01.
*54·02.
Most of the propositions of the present number, except those that merely embody the definitions (*54·1·101·102) are used very seldom. The following are among the most important.
*54·26.
*54·3.
[Pg 377]
*54·4.
*54·53.
*54·56.
*54·01.
*54·02.
*54·1.
*54·101.
*54·102.
The two following propositions have already occurred in *51, but are here repeated, because they belong to the subject of the present number.
*54·21.
*54·25.
Dem.
*54·26.
Dem.
*54·27.
*54·271.
Dem.
[Pg 378]
*54·3.
Dem.
Dem.
This proposition shows that a class contained in a couple is either the null-class or a unit class or the couple itself, whence it will follow that 0 and 1 are the only numbers which are less than 2.
*54.41.
Dem.
*54·411.
[Pg 379]
*54·42.
Dem.
*54·43.
Dem.
From this proposition it will follow, when arithmetical addition has been defined, that 1 + 1 = 2.
*54·44.
Dem.
*54·441.
Dem.
[Pg 380]
This proposition is used in *163·42, in the theory of relations of mutually exclusive relations.
*54·442.
*54·443.
*54·45.
*54·451.
*54·452.
*54·46.
*54·5.
Dem.
*54·51.
Dem.
*54·52.
*54·53.
Dem.
[Pg 381]
*54·531.
Dem.
*54·54.
Dem.
In the above proposition, ""
secures that
has not more than two members, while
"(
" secures that
has not fewer than two members.
*54·55.
Dem.
[Pg 382]
*54·56.
Dem.
In virtue of this proposition, a class which is neither null nor a unit class nor a couple contains at least three distinct members. Hence it will follow that any cardinal number other than 0 or 1 or 2 is equal to or greater than 3. The above proposition is used in *104·43, which is an existence-theorem of considerable importance in cardinal arithmetic.
Dem.
The above proposition is useful in dealing with sets of couples
formed of one member of a class and one member of a class
, where
and
have no members in common. It
is used in the theory of cardinal multiplication (*113·148).
[Pg 383]
Summary of *55.
Ordinal couples, which are now to be considered, are much more
important, even in cardinal arithmetic, than cardinal couples. Their
properties are in part analogous to those of cardinal couples, but
in part also to those of unit classes; for they are the smallest
existent relations, just as unit classes are the smallest existent
classes. The properties which are analogous to those of unit classes
do not demand that the two terms of the couple should be distinct,
i.e. they hold for as well as
for
(where
); on the other
hand, the properties which are analogous to those of cardinal couples
do in general demand that the two terms of the ordinal couple should be
distinct.
The notation is cumbrous, and does not
readily enable us to exhibit the couple as a descriptive function of
for the argument
, or vice versa. We therefore introduce
a new symbol, "
," for the couple. In a couple
, we shall call
the referent of the couple, and
the relatum. In virtue of the definitions in *38, this gives
rise to two relations,
and
; hence we
obtain the notations
,
,
,
and so
on, which will be much used in the sequel. It should be observed
that
means the class of ordinal couples in
which
is referent and a member of
is relatum, while
or
denotes the
class of couples having
as relatum and a member of
as
referent;
denotes all such classes
of couples as
, where y is any member of
; and in virtue of *40·7,
denotes all ordinal couples of which the referent is a member of
, while the relatum is a member of
. This is a
very important class, which will be used to define the product of two
cardinal numbers; for it is evident that the number of members of
is the product of the number of
members of
and the number of members of
.
[Pg 384]
The first few propositions of the present number are immediate
consequences of the definition of and the notations
introduced in *38. We then proceed to various elementary properties
of the relation
, of which the most used are the
following:
*55·13.
*55·15.
*55·16.
*55·202.
This proposition should be contrasted with *54·22, as giving one reason why ordinal couples are more useful in arithmetic than cardinal couples. In virtue of the above proposition, when two ordinal couples are identical, their referents are identical, and their relata are identical.
We proceed next to various properties of the relations
and
. These relations play a great part in
arithmetic. It will be observed that if two terms have the relation
, the referent is a couple whose relatum is the
relatum in the relation
, i.e. when we have
, we have
(cf. *55·122).
Similar remarks apply to the relation
. The class
, consisting of all couples whose referent is a
member of
, while the relatum is
, is important. We have
*55·232.
This proposition is frequently useful.
We proceed next (*55·3—·51) to give various properties of
which are analogous to the properties of unit
classes. Among the more important of these properties are the following:
*55·3.
This is the analogue of *51·31.
*55·34.
This is the analogue of *51·4.
*55·5.
This is the analogue of *54·4.
We then proceed to such properties of ordinal couples as are not
analogous to those of unit classes. For connecting the cardinal number
2 with the ordinal number , we have the proposition
*55·54.
[Pg 385]
This proposition shows that the only asymmetrical relations which
have a given cardinal couple for their
field are the two corresponding ordinal couples
and
. We have next a set of propositions on the
relative products of couples and other relations, i.e. on
,
, and
. These propositions are very
useful in arithmetic. The chief of them is
*55·61.
Finally we have four propositions which belong, by their subject, to *43, but could not be given there, because the proofs make use of ordinal couples.
*55·01.
*55·02.
This definition serves merely for the avoidance of brackets.
*55·1.
*55·11.
*55·12.
*55·121.
*55·123.
Dem.
*55·132.
*55·134.
*55·14.
*55·15.
*55·16.
Dem.
The above proposition is important, and will be frequently used.
[Pg 386]
*55·161.
Dem.
*55·17.
*55·2.
Dem.
*55·201.
*55·202.
Dem.
The above proposition is important.
*55·21.
*55·22.
*55·221.
[Pg 387]
*55·222.
Dem.
*55·223.
*55·224.
Dem.
*55·23.
*55·231.
*55·232.
Dem.
*55·233.
The above two propositions are frequently useful in arithmetic.
*55·24.
Dem.
*55·241.
[Pg 388]
*55·25.
Dem.
*55·251.
This proposition is used in the theory of cardinal multiplication (*113·142).
*55·26.
*55·261.
*55·262.
*55·27.
*55·28.
*55·281.
*55·282.
*55·283.
*55·29.
*55·291.
*55·292.
The following propositions, down to *55·51 inclusive, give properties of ordinal couples which are analogous to the properties of unit classes.
*55·3.
The first half of this proposition is the analogue of *51·2; like that proposition, it gives a means of reducing propositions to the form of inclusions. For the second half, compare *51·31.
*55·31.
This proposition is the analogue of *51·23.
Dem.
[Pg 389]
*55·32.
Dem.
*55·33.
*55·34.
Dem.
*55·341.
Dem.
*55·35.
Dem.
*55·36.
Dem.
*55·37.
Dem.
The following proposition is the analogue of *51·232.
*55·4.
[Pg 390]
*55·41.
Dem.
The above proposition is the analogue of *51·234. The following proposition (*55·42) is the analogue of *51·235.
*55·42.
Dem.
*55·43.
This proposition is the analogue of *51·41.
Dem.
*55·431.
[Pg 391]
Dem.
*55·44.
Dem.
The above proposition is the analogue of *51·43.
*55·5.
Dem.
The above proposition is the analogue of *54·4.
[Pg 392]
Dem.
In the remainder of the present number, we are concerned with properties of ordinal couples which have no analogues for unit classes.
*55·52.
*55·521.
*55·53.
Dem.
*55·54.
[Pg 393]
Dem.
*55·57.
*55·571.
*55·572.
*55·573.
*55·58.
*55·581.
*55·582.
*55·583.
The above propositions are frequently useful in arithmetic. Their
use arises as follows. Let ,
,
,
be classes of which
is correlated with
by the relation
, and
with
by the relation
. Then if
, the
couple consisting of the correlate of
and the correlate of
is (
, i.e., by the above,
, i.e.
(
. Thus the relation
correlates the couples, in
and
, composed of the correlates of terms in
and
. The most useful form, in practice, of *55·583, is that
given below in *55·61.
*55·6.
*55·61.
*55·62.
Dem.
[Pg 394]
*55·621.
The four following propositions belong to *43, but are inserted here because the proof uses *55·13.
*55·63.
Dem.
*55·631.
*55·632.
Dem.
*55·64.
[Pg 395]
Summary of *56.
In this number, we have to consider the class of those relations which
are each constituted by a single couple. In case the two members of
this couple are not identical, the class of such relations is (as will
be shown later) the ordinal number 2, which, to distinguish it from
the cardinal number 2, we denote by "." (Here the suffix
is intended to suggest "relational.") The class of all relations
consisting of a single couple, without the restriction that the
two members of the couple are to be distinct, will be denoted by
"
." This is not an ordinal number. It will be observed that
there is no ordinal number 1, because ordinal numbers apply to series,
and series must have more than one member if they have any members.
This will appear more fully when we come to deal with series.
The properties of are largely analogous to those of 1,
while the properties of
are more analogous to those of 2.
Most of the propositions of the present number are seldom referred to in the sequel, but such references as occur are important. The most useful propositions in the present number are the following.
*56·111.
*56·112.
*56·113.
Observe that "" means "relations whose fields have two
terms."
*56·13.
*56·37.
I.e. is the class of asymmetrical relations whose fields have two terms.
*56·381.
*56·39.
I.e. the relations which are couples whose referent and relatum are identical are the relations whose fields consist of a single term.
[Pg 396]
*56·01.
*56·02.
*56·03.
*56·1.
*56·101.
Dem.
*56·102.
Dem.
*56·103.
Dem.
*56·104.
*56·11.
*56·111.
Dem.
[Pg 397]
*56·112.
Dem.
*56·113.
Dem.
*56·114.
*56·12.
Dem.
*56·121.
*56·122.
*56·13.
Dem.
might be defined as the ordinal number 1, since it
is what we shall call a relation number (cf. *153). But we wish our
ordinal numbers to be[Pg 398] classes of serial relations, and such
relations have the property of being contained in diversity. Hence if
we were to define
as the ordinal number 1, we should
introduce a tiresome exception, from which trivial complications would
be introduced into ordinal arithmetic. We have, therefore, not adopted
this course.
*56·14.
Dem.
*56·141.
*56·15.
Dem.
*56·151.
*56·16.
Dem.
[Pg 399]
*56·17.
Dem.
*56·18.
Dem.
*56·19.
Dem.
*56·191.
*56·2.
*56·21.
*56·22.
*56·24.
*56·25.
*56·26.
This proposition is the analogue of *52·4.
[Pg 400]
Dem.
*56·261.
Dem.
*56·262.
Dem.
*56·27.
Dem.
*56·28.
Dem.
*56·281.
Dem.
[Pg 401]
Dem.
*56·3.
Dem.
The steps from (2) to the conclusion are analogous to those from (2) of *56·29 to the conclusion of *56·29. Analogous steps in succeeding proofs will be merely indicated as above.
*56·31.
*56·32.
Dem.
*56·33.
Dem.
[Pg 402]
*56·34.
Dem.
*56·35.
Dem.
*56·36.
Dem.
The following proposition, in addition to being used in *56·38, is used in the elementary theory of series (*204·463).
*56·37.
Dem.
[Pg 403]
This proposition is important as establishing the connection between the cardinal and ordinal 2. It shows that the ordinal 2 consists of those asymmetrical relations whose fields have (cardinal) 2 terms. It is used in the theory of well-ordered series (*250·44).
The following proposition, in addition to being used in *56·39, is used in relation-arithmetic (*165·38) and in the theory of series (*205·4).
*56·381.
Dem.
Dem.
This proposition establishes the connection between
and 1, showing that
is the class of those relations
whose fields consist of a single term. It is used in the discussion
of
and
and
as relation-numbers
(*153·301).
*56·4.
Dem.
This proposition is the analogue of *53·23. It is used in the number on exponentiation in relation-arithmetic (*176·19).
[Pg 404]
Summary of Section B.
In this section, we consider first the classes contained in a given
class and the relations contained in a given relation. If
is any class, the classes contained in
are the members
of
; these are also called the
sub-classes of
, or (sometimes) the "parts" of
.
In this last usage, they are called "proper parts" when they are not
coextensive with
, this phrase being formed on the analogy of
"proper fractions." The sub-classes of
are all the classes
that can be formed from members of
; they are the same thing
as the "combinations" of members of
taken any number at
a time. If
is the number of members of
,
is
the number of sub-classes of
, whether
be finite or
infinite. The number of sub-classes of
is always greater
than the number of members of
. On account of these and other
propositions, the class of sub-classes of a given class is an important
function of the class. If the class is
, we denote the class
of its sub-classes by "
." This is a descriptive
function, derived from the relation "
," defined as follows:
The sub-relations of a given relation are all the relations contained
in the given relation, i.e. all relations which imply the given
relation for all possible arguments. That is, if is the given
relation,
is a sub-relation of
if
.
Thus denoting the class of sub-relations of
by "
,"
we are to have
hence we take as the definition of "
" the following:
Sub-relations have properties analogous to those of sub-classes, but
they are of somewhat less importance. It should, however, be observed
that when one series is contained in another, i.e. is obtained
by selecting some of the terms of the other series without changing
their order, then the generating relation of the one series is a
sub-relation of the generating relation of the other series. (It is not
the case that a sub-relation of the[Pg 405] generating relation of a series
must generate a contained series, for its field may fall apart into
detached portions, or otherwise fail of being serial.)
We shall also consider in this section (*62) the relation of membership
of a class, i.e. the relation which has to
when
. This relation bears the same relation to "
"
as "
" bears to "
." Strictly speaking, we ought
to introduce a new notation for it, putting (say)
But as
, unlike "
," is a letter, and capable of being
conveniently used alone, it seems more desirable, from the point of
view of avoiding unnecessary duplication of symbols, to put
Strictly speaking, this definition is faulty, since it gives two
different meanings to "
." But practically this does not matter,
since the above definition gives
where the first
has the meaning just defined, while the second
has the old meaning. Thus all that is really required of the above
definition, namely to give a meaning to formulae in which
occurs without referent or relatum, is effected without the danger of
any confusion that could lead to errors.
The chief importance of as a relation arises from the fact
that relations contained in
play a very important part in
arithmetic. Take, for example, the problem of selecting one term out of
each member of a class of classes: in this case we require a selecting
relation
which is such that whenever
,
is
a member of
, i.e. such that
. (This condition is only part of the definition of a selecting
relation; the complete definition is given in *80.)
Three numbers in this section (*63, *64, *65) are devoted to the
discussion of relative types. Given a variable , we
often want to define the relative types of other variables, or of
ambiguous symbols, occurring in the same context; that is, we wish to
express the types of these other symbols in terms of that of
.
We use "
" for the type of
, "
" for the
type in which
is contained. Then
,
, and
. Also we
introduce a notation (*65) for giving typical definiteness, relatively
to
, to typically ambiguous symbols. This notation is very useful
in cardinal and ordinal arithmetic, since numbers are typically
ambiguous, and the failure to take account of this fact has led to
the contradictions concerning the greatest cardinal and the greatest
ordinal.
[Pg 406]
Summary of *60.
Our definitions in this number are as follows:
*60·01.
This defines the relation to a class of the class of all its sub-classes.
*60·02.
This defines the relation to a class of the class of all its
existent sub-classes, i.e. of all its sub-classes except
. This is often required, as, for example, in the statement
of Zermelo's axiom: "Given any class
, there is a relation
such that, if
is any existent sub-class of
,
is a member of
," i.e.
This axiom, or its equivalent the multiplicative axiom, plays (as
will appear hereafter) an important part as the hypothesis to many
propositions in cardinal arithmetic.
*60·03.
A is a class whose members are classes.
*60·04.
A is a class whose members are classes whose members
are classes, i.e. a
is a class of classes of
classes.
Apart from propositions which merely embody the definitions, the most useful propositions in this number are the following:
*60·3.
*60·32.
*60·34.
*60·362.
I.e. and
are the only sub-classes of a
unit class
.
*60·5.
*60·57.
*60·6.
[Pg 407]
The propositions of this number are chiefly useful in cardinal and ordinal arithmetic, but uses also occur in the theory of series; hardly any uses occur before cardinal arithmetic.
*60·01.
*60·02.
*60·03.
*60·04.
*60·1.
*60·11.
*60·12.
*60·13.
*60·14.
*60·15.
*60·2.
*60·21.
*60·22.
*60·23.
*60·24.
*60·3.
*60·31.
*60·32.
Dem.
*60·321.
Dem.
[Pg 408]
*60·33.
We write "" on the right, to indicate that the
concerned is of higher type than the
on the
left.
Dem.
*60·34.
*60·35.
*60·36.
*60·361.
*60·362.
*60·37.
Dem.
Dem.
*60·38.
Dem.
[Pg 409]
*60·39.
*60·391.
This proposition is used in the theory of the continuity of functions (*234·202).
*60·4.
*60·41.
The following proposition is used in the theory of well-ordered series (*250·14).
*60·42.
*60·43.
*60·44.
The following proposition is required in the theory of "first differences" (*170·65).
*60·45.
Dem.
*60·5.
Dem.
[Pg 410]
*60·501.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the theory of cardinal multiplication (*115·17).
*60·51.
The following proposition is used in the cardinal theory of finite and infinite (*124·541).
*60·52.
*60·53.
Dem.
*60·54.
*60·55.
Dem.
*60·56.
The following proposition is used frequently.
*60·57.
Dem.
*60·6.
[Pg 411]
The following proposition is used in connection with cardinal multiplication and with greater and less (*115·17 and *117·66).
*60·62.
*60·7.
Dem.
*60·71.
*60·72.
[Pg 412]
Summary of *61.
The propositions of this number (except that *61·371·372·373 imperfectly correspond to *60·371) are the analogues of those with the same decimal part in *60. Proofs are omitted, as they are exactly analogous to those in *60. There are very few subsequent references to the propositions of this number.
*61·01.
*61·02.
*61·03.
*61·04.
*61·1.
*61·11.
*61·12.
*61·13.
*61·14.
*61·15.
*61·2.
*61·21.
*61·22.
*61·23.
*61·24.
*61·3.
*61·31.
*61·32.
*61·321.
*61·33.
[Pg 413]
*61·34.
*61·35.
*61·36.
*61·361.
*61·362.
*61·37.
*61·371.
*61·372.
*61·373.
*61·38.
*61·39.
*61·391.
*61·4.
*61·41.
*61·42.
*61·43.
*61·44.
*61·5.
*61·501.
*61·51.
*61·52.
*61·53.
*61·54.
*61·55.
*61·56.
*61·6.
The analogue of *60·61 is not given, because we have no suitable notation for expressing it.
*61·62.
*61·7.
[Pg 414]
Summary of *62.
When "" was defined, in *20, it was defined as a
propositional function; and this mode of definition was necessary,
because we had to treat of this function before treating of relations.
But for many purposes it is desirable to regard
as a relation,
so that "
" becomes an instance of the notation "
."
This requires, strictly speaking, a change in the meaning of
"
," but it is a change which does not falsify any of the
previous propositions in which "
" occurs; for if we call
the new meaning "
," i.e. if we put
Hence it is unnecessary in practice to have a new notation for the new
meaning, and we put simply
This definition, though strictly incorrect, is recommended by its
convenience, and by the fact that it cannot lead to any harmful
confusions. The new meaning of
may be taken as replacing
the old throughout the remainder of this work.
The uses of the propositions of the present number occur almost
exclusively in the theory of selections from a class of classes
(*83, *84, *85 and *88). Such selections are effected by means of
selective relations, part of whose definition is that they are
contained in . Hence the uses of the present number.
If
is the class of classes from which a selection
is to be made, a selective relation will in fact be contained
in
; hence the properties of
become important. Some of these
properties are given in *62·4 ff.
The most important propositions of the present number are the following:
*62.2.
*62.231.
*62.26.
*62.3.
*62.42.
[Pg 415]
*62·43.
*62·55.
*62·01.
*62·1.
In the above proposition, the first has the newly-defined
meaning, while the second has the old meaning. In virtue of the above
proposition, the new meaning may be substituted for the old in all
propositions hitherto proved concerning
, and may take the place
of the old meaning in all that follows.
Dem.
*62·21.
Thus consists of the classes of which
is a member.
*62·22.
Dem.
*62·23.
Dem.
*62·231.
*62·24.
Dem.
*62·25.
Dem.
[Pg 416]
Dem.
Dem.
*62·31.
Note that, since is not a homogeneous relation, i.e.
not one in which referent and relatum belong to the same type,
is strictly meaningless. For if we have
, the two
's have different
meanings, and do not therefore properly give
. But
it is convenient to allow
, on the understanding that the
ambiguity of
is to be differently determined for the two
factors in the product
, namely the second
must make both referent and relatum belong to the next type above that
to which they respectively belong for the first
.
Dem.
*62·32.
*62·33.
Dem.
The use of *20·41 in the above proof depends upon the fact that
is merely an abbreviation for an expression of the form
.
*62·34.
Dem.
[Pg 417]
The relation is very important in
cardinal arithmetic, in connection with the problem of selection from
the members of
, i.e. of extracting one term out of
each of the members of
. A relation which is to effect this
selection must be contained in
.
*62·41.
Dem.
*62·42.
Dem.
*62·43.
Dem.
*62·44.
Dem.
*62·45.
Dem.
[Pg 418]
This proposition is useful in the theory of selections. It is used in the proof of *83·27, and thence of *83·28.
*62·5.
Dem.
*62·51.
Dem.
*62·52.
Dem.
*62·53.
*62·54.
*62·55.
Dem.
*62·56.
Dem.
*62·57.
Dem.
[Pg 419]
Summary of *63.
The notations introduced in this and the two following numbers serve to
express the type of one variable in terms of the type of another. They
are very useful in arithmetic, where it is necessary to take account
of types in order to avoid contradictions. The two chief notations are
"," for the type in which
is contained, and
"
," for the type of which
is a member. We put
*63·02.
This defines "the type of members of ," or "the type which is
of the same type as
." The characteristic of a type is that
if
is a type, we have
and conversely, if
, then
is a type. For
in that case, "
" is true whenever it is significant,
i.e. whenever
belongs to the type which is the range of
significance of
in "
." Consequently
is
this range of significance, i.e. is a type.
Since we have (, it follows that
is a type. It is not "the type of
,"
but "the type of the members of
." (In case
is
null, "the type of the members of
" may be interpreted as
meaning "the type to which
belongs when '
' is
significant.") "The type of
," i.e. the type of which
is a member, is defined as follows:
*63·01.
By what was said above, "" is the type of the members
of
, i.e. the type of
. By combining the
definitions of
and
, we obtain
Thus
In short, consists of everything either identical or not identical with
,
that is, every
for which there is such a proposition, whether true or false,
as "
." We put "
" here instead of "
," because
need not be a
class, and is in fact subject to no limitation whatever, whereas "
" is
not significant unless
is a class, and therefore we write "
" rather
[Pg 420]than "
."
We put also
*63·011.
This definition serves merely to bring notationally into line
with
and the types
defined below.
In virtue of *20·8, we have
i.e. if "
" is significant, then the range of
significance of the function
is the type of
. It
follows that two ranges of significance which overlap are identical,
and two different ranges of significance have no member in common.
It will be seen that is always of the next type above that
of
, and
(if
is a class of classes) is of
the next type below that of
. We put
*63·03.
so that is the type next below that in which
is contained. Thus if
is a class of classes of
individuals,
is the class of individuals. We put also
*63·04.
*63·041.
*63·05.
*63·051.
Thus given any two objects which are members of any one of the
following: the type of , the type of the classes to which
belongs, the type of the classes to which these classes belong, and so
on, we can express the type of either of our two objects by means of
its relation to the other object.
The propositions of this and the two following numbers will hardly ever be used until we come to cardinal arithmetic. They are used constantly in the first section on cardinal arithmetic, and they are constantly relevant in the first section on relation-arithmetic. Moreover they are usually required for cardinal and ordinal existence-theorems.
Among the most useful propositions of the present number are the following:
*63·103.
*63·105.
I.e. if either is or is not a member of
,
then the type of
is the type which contains
. This
proposition uses *20·8.
*63·13.
I.e. if there is any function satisfied by both and
,
then
is of the type of
. It is necessary to the use of
this proposition that, if
is a typically[Pg 421] ambiguous
function, it should receive the same typical determination for
and for
. For example, we have always
and
;
but we must not regard these as values of one function
,
because such a function is typically ambiguous. On the other
hand,
and
are values of one function
,
because here the presence of a renders the function typically
determinate.
*63·15.
*63·19.
*63·16.
This proposition, which depends upon *63·11, and thence upon *20·8 and *13·3, and thence upon *9·14·15, is vital to the whole theory of types.
*63·32.
*63·371.
*63·383.
We shall have generally , where
we may count suffixes as negative indices, so that
or
according as
or
is the greater.
*63·5.
This proposition is used constantly.
*63·51.
*63·52.
*63·53.
The above four propositions, together with four similar ones (*63·54·55·56·57), give transformations which enable us to express any relation of type, as between class and members or members of members or etc., that is likely to occur in practice.
*63·64.
This proposition is often used in the first section on cardinal arithmetic.
*63·66.
*63·01.
*63·011.
*63·02.
*63·03.
*63·04.
*63·041.
[Pg 422]
*63·05.
*63·051.
*63·1.
*63·101.
*63·102.
*63·103.
*63·104.
*63·105.
*63·106.
*63·107.
Dem.
*63·108.
*63·109.
*63·11.
Dem.
*63·12.
Dem.
*63·13.
*63·14.
*63·15.
*63·151.
[Pg 423]
*63·152.
*63·16.
Dem.
*63·17.
*63·18.
*63·181.
Dem.
*63·182.
*63·19.
Dem.
[Pg 424]
*63·191.
*63·2.
Dem.
*63·21.
Dem.
*63·22.
Dem.
*63·23.
Propositions of the same kind as the above can obviously be extended to
, etc.
*63·3.
Dem.
*63·31.
Dem.
Note that the use of *10·221 in the above proof depends upon the fact
that occurs both in (2) and in (3), so that these are
both of the form
.
[Pg 425]
*63·32.
*63·321.
Dem.
*63·33.
*63·34.
Dem.
*63·35.
*63·36.
*63·361.
*63·37.
*63·371.
Dem.
*63·38.
Dem.
*63·381.
Dem.
[Pg 426]
*63·382.
*63·383.
Dem.
*63·384.
*63·39.
*63·391.
Dem.
*63·392.
Dem.
*63·4.
Dem.
*63·41.
Dem.
*63·42.
*63·43.
*63·44.
It is obvious that the analogues of the above propositions will hold
for and
,
and
, etc. We shall not
prove these analogues, but if occasion arises we shall assume them,
referring to the corresponding propositions for
and
.
*63·5.
Dem.
[Pg 427]
*63·51.
Dem.
*63·52.
Dem.
*63·53.
Dem.
*63·54.
Dem.
*63·55.
[Pg 428]
*63·56.
Dem.
*63·57.
*63·61.
*63·62.
Dem.
*63·621.
*63·63.
Dem.
*63·64.
Dem.
*63·65.
*63·66.
*63·661.
*63·67.
*63·68.
[Pg 429]
Summary of *64.
In the present number, we introduce notations defining the type of a
relation relatively to the types of its domain and converse domain,
when these types are given relatively to some fixed class .
If
is any relation, it is of the same type as
. If
and
are both of the
same type as
,
is of the same type as
,
which is of the same type as
.
The type of
we call
, and the type of
we call
, and the type of
we call
, and the type of
we call
,
and the type of
we call
. We thus have a means of expressing the type of
any relation
in terms of the type of
, provided the
types of the domain and converse domain of
are given relatively
to
.
The most useful propositions of the present number are the following:
*64·16.
*64·201.
*64·231.
Here "" will only be significant if
and
are homogeneous relations, which is not required by the rest of the
proposition. When
and
are homogeneous relations we have
*64·24.
This proposition is useful in connecting ordinal and cardinal existence-theorems.
*64·312.
*64·5.
This proposition is frequently used. It states that the class of
relations whose referents are of the type of members of
while its relata are of the type of members of
(i.e.
the class of all relations contained in
)
is the type of
and
is also the type of
.
*64·55.
[Pg 430]
*64·57.
The propositions of the present number are mostly obvious, though formal proofs are sometimes not very easily found. The use of the propositions of this number occurs chiefly in the first section on relation-arithmetic and in the proofs of existence-theorems in ordinal arithmetic and the theory of ratio.
*64.01.
*64.011.
*64.012.
*64.013.
*64.014.
*64.02.
*64.021.
*64.022.
*64.03.
*64.031.
*64.04.
*64.041.
*64.1.
Dem.
*64.11.
*64.12. )
Dem.
[Pg 431]
*64·13.
*64·14.
*64·15.
*64·16. )
Dem.
By putting (where
and
are some
index and suffix which have been defined) for
and
for
, the above propositions give results
applicable to any of the types defined at the beginning of this number,
because of
.
*64·2.
*64·201.
Dem.
*64·21. )
Dem.
*64·22.
*64·23.
Dem.
*64·231.
Dem.
[Pg 432]
*64·24.
This proposition is only significant when and
are
homogeneous relations.
Dem.
*64·3.
Dem.
*64·31.
*64·311.
*64·312.
*64·313.
*64·32.
Dem.
Similarly the other equivalences are proved.
*64·33.
Dem.
Similarly the other equivalences are proved.
*64·34.
[Pg 433]
*64·5.
*64·51.
*64·52.
*64·53.
Dem.
This proposition is used in connection with cardinal addition (*110·18).
*64·54.
*64·55.
Dem.
*64·56.
Dem.
*64·57.
*64·6.
Dem.
*64·61.
Dem.
*64·62.
Dem.
*64·63.
Dem.
[Pg 434]
Summary of *65.
In this number we are concerned with definitions and propositions in
which an ambiguous symbol is determined as belonging to some assigned
type. If "" is an ambiguous symbol representing a class
(such as
or
for example), "
"
is to denote what
becomes when its members are determined
as belonging to the type of
, while "
" denotes what
becomes when its members are determined as belonging to the
type of
. Thus e.g. "
" will be everything
of the same type as
, i.e.
;
will
be
. Similarly if "
" stands for a relation of ambiguous
type, such as
or
,
will denote
what
becomes when its domain is confined within the type of
;
will denote what
becomes when its domain and
converse domain are confined respectively within the types of
and
;
will have the domain and converse domain confined
respectively to the types of
and
; with analogous
meanings for
and
. Throughout this number,
and
do not stand for proper variables, but for typically
ambiguous symbols.
The notations of the present number are used in the elementary parts of the theory of cardinals and ordinals, i.e. in Part III, Section A, and in Part IV, Section A. The only proposition, however, which is much used, is
*65·13.
Here is supposed to be a typically ambiguous symbol. The
first equivalence, "
,"
merely embodies the definition of
(*65·01). It
is the second equivalence that is important. Let us, for the sake of
illustration, put 1 in place of
. Then we are to have
(Since 1 is a class of classes, we shall have to suppose that
is a class.) Consider
. If
,
. But we have
. Hence
, whence
.
Also if
, of course
.
Thus
.
The converse implication follows from *22·621. The reason for the
proposition is that a symbol such as "1," if it occurs in such a
proposition as
, must, for significance, be
determined as meaning that 1 which is of the same type as
,
i.e. the class of all[Pg 435] unit classes which are of the same type
as members of
. And similarly, when we put
,
that does not mean that
is the class of all unit classes,
but only that it is the class of all unit classes of the appropriate
type, which, if
, will be
. The
proposition "
" is true whenever it is significant, but
is typically definite when
is given, whereas 1
is typically ambiguous. The use of the above proposition lies in its
enabling us to substitute typically definite symbols for such as are
typically ambiguous.
Another useful proposition is
*65·2.
Here is supposed to be a typically ambiguous symbol; the proposition
states that if
is typically defined as going from objects of type
to objects
of type
, then
must go from objects of type
to objects of type
. This
proposition is only used twice (*102·3 and *154·2), but both uses are of great
importance, the one in cardinal and the other in ordinal arithmetic.
The only other proposition of this number which is subsequently used is
*65·3.
This proposition is used in *102·84.
*65·03.
*65·04.
*65·1.
*65·11.
*65·12.
*65·13.
Dem.
*65·14.
*65·15.
[Pg 436]
*65·16.
*65·2.
Dem.
Dem.
*65·22.
This and the following three propositions are proved as *65·21 is proved.
*65·23.
*65·24.
*65·25.
*65·3.
Dem.
[Pg 437]
Summary of Section C.
In the present section we have to consider three very important
classes of relations, of which the use in arithmetic is constant. A
one-many relation is a relation such that, if
is any
member of
, there is one, and only one, term
which
has the relation
to
, i.e.
.
Thus the relation of father to son is one-many, because every
son has one father and no more. The relation of husband to wife is
one-many except in countries which practise polyandry. (It is one-many
in monogamous as well as in polygamous countries, because, according
to the definition, nothing is fixed as to the number of relata for a
given referent, and there may be only one relatum for each given
referent without the relation ceasing to be one-many according to the
definition.) The relation in algebra of
to
is one-many,
but that of
to
is not, because there are two different
values of
that give the same value of
.
When a relation is one-many,
exists whenever
, and vice versa; i.e. we have
Thus relations which give descriptive functions that are existent
whenever their arguments belong to the converse domains of the
relations in question are one-many relations. Hence ,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
are all of them
one-many relations.
When is a one-many relation,
is a one-valued function;
conversely, every one-valued function is derivable from a one-many
relation. A many-valued function of
is a member of
, where
is not a
unit class, and any one of its members is regarded as a value of the
function for the argument y; but a one-valued function of
is the single term
which is obtained when
is one-many.
Thus for example the sine would, in our notation, appear as a relation,
i.e. we should put
[Pg 438]
so that "
" has the usual meaning of
. Then
instead of
, we should have
,
which would be the class of values of
; and instead of
"
," which is a misleading notation because
and
do not imply
, we should
have
. Similar remarks would apply to
any of the other functions that occur in analysis.
A relation is called many-one when, if
is any member
of
, there is one, and only one, term
to which
has the relation
, i.e.
. Thus many-one relations are the converses of one-many relations.
When a relation
is many-one,
exists whenever
.
A relation is called one-one when it is both one-many and
many-one, or, what comes to the same, when both it and its converse are
one-many. Of the one-many relations above enumerated, ,
,
,
,
,
,
,
are one-one.
Two classes ,
are said to be similar when
there is a one-one relation
such that
, i.e. when their terms can be connected one to one,
so that no term of either is omitted or repeated. We write "
" for "
is similar to
."
When two classes are similar, the cardinal numbers of their terms are
the same; it is this fact chiefly that makes one-one relations of
fundamental importance in cardinal arithmetic.
According to the above, a relation is one-many when
Similarly a relation is many-one when
and a relation is one-one when both conditions are
fulfilled. The classes
,
, which appear here, are often
important; some of their properties have already been given in
*37·77·771·772·773 and in *53·61 to *53·641.
It is convenient to regard one-many, many-one and one-one relations
as particular cases of relations which, for some given and
, have
Hence, without a new definition, "" becomes the
class of one-one relations; also, as will be shown, "
" becomes the class of one-many relations, and
"
" becomes the class of many-one relations.
Although it is chiefly these three special values of
that are important, we shall begin by a general study of classes of
relations of the form
.
[Pg 439]
Summary of *70.
If and
are two given classes of classes, a
relation
is said to belong to the class
if
whenever
,
and
whenever
.
If only one of these conditions is to be imposed, this result is
secured by replacing the class involved in the other condition by
"
," since "
"
always holds, and so does "
,"
and therefore neither imposes any limitation on
. In the most
important cases,
and
are either both cardinal
numbers, or one is a cardinal number while the other is
.
In virtue of *37·702·703, the conditions above mentioned as imposed
upon by membership of
are equivalent
to
This form is used in the definition (*70·01).
The propositions of the present number are hardly ever used except
in *71, where and
are both replaced by
or
. The most useful propositions are
*70·1.
(This merely embodies the definition.)
*70·13.
*70·22.
*70·4.
*70·41.
*70·42.
*70·54.
with similar propositions for and
.
*70·62.
with a similar proposition for .
[Pg 440]
*70·1.
*70·11.
*70·13.
Dem.
*70·14.
*70·15.
*70·16.
*70·17.
Dem.
*70·171.
*70·18.
[Pg 441]
*70·2.
Dem.
*70·21.
Dem.
*70·22.
Dem.
[Pg 442]
*70·3.
Dem.
*70·31.
Dem.
*70·32.
Dem.
*70·4.
Dem.
*70·41.
*70·43.
*70·431.
*70·44.
*70·441.
*70·45.
[Pg 443]
*70·451.
*70·46.
*70·461.
*70·47.
*70·471.
*70·48.
*70·481.
*70·51.
Dem.
*70·52.
*70·53.
Dem.
[Pg 444]
*70·54.
Dem.
*70·55.
*70·56.
*70·57.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 445]
*70·62.
Dem.
*70·63.
[Pg 446]
Summary of *71.
In this number we shall be concerned with the more elementary
properties of one-many, many-one, and one-one relations. These
properties are very numerous and very important. The properties of
many-one relations (i.e. of relations belonging to the class
) result from those of one-many relations
by means of *70·5, whence it follows that many-one relations are
the converses of one-many relations. It is thus only necessary to
interchange
and
,
and
,
and
in order to obtain
a property of a many-one relation from a property of a one-many
relation. Or we may repeat the various steps of any proof, making the
above interchanges at every step, and the analogous proposition will
result. For this reason, in what follows, we shall omit all proofs of
properties of many-one relations, confining ourselves to proving the
analogous properties of one-many relations.
In virtue of *70·42, one-one relations (i.e. relations belonging
to the class ) are the relations which are both
one-many and many-one; hence their properties result from combining the
properties of one-many and many-one relations. We shall omit the proofs
when they consist merely in such combinations.
A one-many relation gives rise to a descriptive function which is
existent whenever its argument belongs to the converse domain of
the relation. That is, if , we
have
whenever
. Conversely, if
a descriptive function
exists for the argument
, then
is one-many so far as that argument is concerned, i.e.
. Thus we find
The descriptive function derived from a one-many relation
has thus a definite value whenever
, and
not otherwise. Thus the class of arguments for which such a function
exists is the converse domain of the relation which gives rise to the
function, i.e.
and the converse implication also holds.
It often happens that a relation which is not in general
one-many becomes so when its domain, converse domain, or field
is subjected to some limitation. For example, let be the
relation of parent to child,
the class of males, and[Pg 447]
the class of females. Then
is not one-many, but
and
are one-many,
and in fact (
= the father of
,
(
= the mother of
. We shall often
have occasion to deal with relations obtained by limitations imposed
on
or
; thus
belongs to the class
, and has
for its domain. The class
may be so constituted
that only one relation
fulfils this condition; in that
case,
.
Since
, we find
.
This type of condition,
or
or
, is one which
frequently occurs in subsequent work. Another condition which often
occurs is
.
When this condition is realized, a term
which belongs to the
field of one relation of the class
does not belong to the
field of any other relation of this class, i.e. the fields of
relations of this class are mutually exclusive.
For purposes of realizing imaginatively the properties of one-many relations, it is often convenient to picture their structure as in the accompanying figure.
Here ,
,
, ... form the domain of
, and all the
points in the oval marked
are such that
has the relation
to each of them, with similar conditions
for
and
. What characterizes
as a
is the absence of overlapping in the ovals. For if
and
had a point in
common, this would be a relatum both to
and
, and both
and
would be referents to it; whereas in a
, no term has more than one referent.
[Pg 448]
The above figure illustrates a very important property of one-many
relations, namely
In the above figure, is the relation of
identity confined to
,
,
,.... If
were not a
, we could sometimes go from
to some term
of
by the relation
, and thence back to
by the relation
. But when
,
must bring us
back to the point from which we started.
When , each of the ovals
,
,
, ... in the above figure shrinks to a single
point, so that
. Thus
when
is given as a
, it will be
a
if
.
This proposition is constantly used, and so is the consequence that
is a
if
.
(These propositions are *71·54·55 below.)
The hypothesis is equivalent to the
hypothesis
(cf. *71·17, below), and the hypothesis
is equivalent to
These are for many purposes the most convenient hypotheses to use.
The most useful propositions in the present number are the following.
(We omit here propositions concerning or
which are mere analogues of propositions concerning
.)
*71·16.
This gives the connection of one-many relations with descriptive functions. We have also
*71·163.
For many of the constant relations defined from time to time, such as
or
, the following proposition is useful:
*71·166.
This might have been taken as the definition of one-many relations,
if we had not wished to derive them from the more general notion of
. In proving that a relation is one-many,
*71·17 is more often employed than any other proposition.
*71·22.
*71·25.
*71·36.
*71·381.
[Pg 449]
(This proposition is more useful than the corresponding property of
)
*71·55.
This proposition is constantly used. For example, putting
for
, it gives
Most of the relations used to establish correlations in arithmetic are
obtained from a one-many relation, such as , by imposing
some limitation on the converse domain which makes the relation one-one.
*71·571.
Here "" is
, which has already played a large part as a
hypothesis, e.g. in *37·6 ff.
*71·7.
Thus for example we shall have .
*71·01.
*71·02.
*71·03.
*71·04.
*71·1.
*71·101.
*71·102.
*71·103.
*71·11.
*71·111.
*71·112.
*71·12.
*71·121.
*71·122.
*71·13.
*71·131.
[Pg 450]
*71·132.
*71·14.
*71·141.
*71·142.
*71·15.
*71·151.
*71·152.
*71·16.
Dem.
This proposition is very important; it exhibits the connection of descriptive functions with one-many relations.
*71·161.
*71·162.
*71·163.
Dem.
*71·164.
*71·165.
*71·166.
Dem.
*71·167.
[Pg 451]
*71·168.
*71·17.
This proposition is constantly used in the sequel.
Dem.
*71·171.
*71·172.
*71·18.
Dem.
*71·182.
*71·19.
Dem.
*71·191.
*71·192.
[Pg 452]
*71·2.
*71·21.
Dem.
*71·211.
*71·212.
*71·22.
Dem.
*71·221.
*71·222.
*71·223.
*71·224.
*71·225.
*71·23.
*71·231.
*71·232.
*71·233.
Dem.
[Pg 453]
*71·234.
*71·235.
*71·241.
*71·242.
*71·243.
*71·244.
Dem.
*71·245.
*71·25.
Dem.
*71·251.
*71·252.
*71·25 may also be deduced from *70·6, as follows:
[Pg 454]
Alternative Dem. of *71·25.
Similarly *71·251 may be deduced from *70·61.
*71·26.
*71·261.
*71·27.
*71·271.
*71.28.
*71·281.
*71·29.
*71·31.
*71·311.
*71·312.
*71·32.
*71·321.
*71·33.
Dem.
[Pg 455]
*71·331.
*71·332.
*71·333.
*71·34.
*71·341.
*71·35.
Dem.
*71·351.
*71·352.
*71·36.
Dem.
*71·361.
*71·362.
*71·37.
Dem.
*71·371.
[Pg 456]
*71·38.
Dem.
*71·381.
*71·4.
*71·401.
*71·41.
*71·411.
*71·42.
*71·421.
*71·43.
*71·431.
*71·44.
*71·441.
*71·45.
Dem.
*71·451.
[Pg 457]
*71·46.
Dem.
*71·461.
*71·47.
Dem.
*71·471.
*71·48.
Dem.
*71·481.
The following proposition is used in the theory of derivatives of a series (*216·411).
*71·49.
Dem.
*71·491.
This proposition is used in the theory of derivatives of a series (*216·4) and in the theory of ordinal numbers (*251·11).
*71·5.
Dem.
[Pg 458]
*71·501.
*71·51.
Dem.
*71·511.
*71·52.
Dem.
*71·521.
*71·53.
Dem.
*71·531.
*71·532.
*71·54.
This proposition and the next (*71·55) are very often used.
Dem.
[Pg 459]
*71·55.
Dem.
*71·56.
Dem.
*71·561.
*71·57.
Dem.
*71·571.
Dem.
*71·572.
[Pg 460]
*71·58.
Dem.
*71·59.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in the theory of selections (*80·91).
*71·6.
Dem.
*71·61.
[Pg 461]
Dem.
*71·611.
*71·612.
*71·613.
*71·613 is used in the theory of series (*206·6), and in the theory of "similarity of position" (*272·131).
*71·7.
Dem.
*71·701.
[Pg 462]
Summary of *72.
In this number we shall prove various propositions involving ,
, or
, but not embodying fundamental properties of these
classes of relations.
The present number begins with various propositions (*72·1-·191) showing that various special relations are one-many or one-one. The most useful of these are
*72·182.
*72·184.
We have next a set of propositions concerning when
and
are one-many, or
when
is one-one, and
kindred matters. The most useful of these is
*72·241.
We have next a set of propositions (*72·3-·341) concerning products and sums of classes of relations; of these the one most used is
*72·32.
which is an extension of *71·24.
We have next a set of propositions (*72·4—·481) giving various
relations of and
when
, or of
and
when
. The more useful propositions
of this set are those that have the hypothesis
;
these are occasionally useful in arithmetic. We have
*72·401.
*72·411.
[Pg 463]
For example, the relation of son to father is many-one. Let
= Cabinet Ministers,
= fools; then assuming
,
it will follow that the sons of Cabinet Ministers and the sons of
(male) fools have no common member. If we make
the relation of
son to parent (which is not many-one), it no longer follows that the
sons of Cabinet Ministers and the sons of fools have no common member.
We have
*72·451.
The effect of this proposition is that if and
are both contained in
, and
, then
(using
.
We next have a set of propositions concerned with the relations
of and (
, or, what
comes to the same thing, with the circumstances under which
and under which
. We have
*72·502.
Thus for example the fathers of the children of wise fathers are the
class of wise fathers; but the fathers of the children of wise parents
are not all wise, and the parents of the children of wise parents are
not all wise—the first because "" fails,
the second because "
" fails.
We have also
*72·52.
We have next a set of propositions (*72·59—·66) in which the
relative product occurs if
,
or
if
.
The most useful propositions in this set are
*72·591.
*72·601.
*72·66.
This is the "principle of abstraction." It shows that every relation
which has the formal properties of equality, i.e. which is
transitive and symmetrical, is equal to the relative product of a
many-one relation into its converse; i.e. whenever the relation
holds between
and
, there is a term
such
that
, where
is a many-one relation;
and *72·64 shows that this term
may be taken to be
, which is equal to
.
This principle embodies a great part of the reasons for our definitions
of the various kinds of numbers; in seeking these definitions, we
always have, to begin with, some transitive symmetrical relation which
we regard as sameness of number; thus by *72·64, the desired properties
of the numbers of the kind in question are secured by taking the number
of an object to be the class of objects to which the said object has
the transitive symmetrical relation in question. It is in this way
that we are led to define cardinal numbers as classes of classes, and
ordinal numbers as classes of relations.
[Pg 464]
The remaining propositions of this number are of less importance, with the exception of
*72·92.
This proposition shows that every relation contained in a one-many relation is obtainable by a limitation of the converse domain. Thus e.g. every relation contained in that of father to son can be specified by specifying the class of sons who are to be its converse domain; for then all the fathers of these sons must be included to provide referents. But if we take the relation of parent and child, which is not one-many or many-one, a contained relation is not determinate even when both its domain and its converse domain are given; for the relation may relate some of the children in any one family to the father and some to the mother, and so long as all the children and both parents are each related to some one by the relation, the domain and converse domain remain unchanged by permutations within the family.
Dem.
*72·11.
Dem.
*72·12.
*72·121.
Dem.
*72·13.
*72·131.
*72·132.
*72·14.
This proposition applies to a great many of the relations we have to
deal with, for example ,
,
,
,
,
,
, etc.
*72·15.
[Pg 465]
In *72·16 below, has the meaning defined in *40·01, and does
not represent a variable proposition. Similarly s in *72·161 has the
meaning defined in *40·02.
*72·16.
Dem.
*72·161.
*72·162.
*72·163.
*72·17.
Dem.
*72·18.
*72·181.
*72·182.
Dem.
*72·184.
*72·185.
*72·19.
*72·192.
*72·193.
[Pg 466]
*72·2.
Dem.
*72·201.
*72·202.
*72·21.
Dem.
*72·211.
*72·22.
Dem.
*72·221.
*72·23.
Dem.
*72·24.
Dem.
*72·241.
[Pg 467]
*72·242.
Dem.
*72·243.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *272·4·41, which are used in the theory of "rational series," i.e. series ordinally similar to the series of rationals.
*72·25.
Dem.
The propositions and
, which have been previously proved, are
particular cases of the above; the former is a particular case because
.
*72·26.
[Pg 468]
In this proposition, the conditions of significance require that the
domain of should consist of classes. This proposition is used in
*72·27.
Dem.
*72·27.
*72·27 is used in *74·63·631 and again in *163·15.
Dem.
*72·301.
*72·302.
*72·303.
*72·31.
Dem.
*72·311.
*72·312.
*72*32.
Dem.
[Pg 469]
*72·321.
*72·322.
*72·323.
Dem.
*72·34.
Dem.
This proposition should be compared with *40·37 and *40·38.
Dem.
When is not a
, we only have in
general (cf. *37·21)
*72·401.
*72·41.
*72·411.
[Pg 470]
*72·42.
*72·421.
*72·43.
Dem.
*72·431.
*72·44.
*72·441.
*72·441 is used in the theory of cardinal exponentiation (*116·659).
*72·45.
Dem.
*72·451.
*72·46.
*72·461.
*72·47.
Dem.
*72·471.
[Pg 471]
*72·48.
Dem.
*72·49.
Dem.
*72·491.
*72·492.
*72·5.
Dem.
*72·501.
*72·502.
*72·503.
*72·504.
Note that means
, not
(
. *72·504 is used in the theory of segments of a
series (*211·64).
*72·51.
*72·511.
*72·512.
Dem.
*72·513.
*72·52.
[Pg 472]
*72·53.
Dem.
*72·54.
Dem.
*72·541.
*72·55.
Dem.
*72·551.
*72·57.
Dem.
[Pg 473]
Dem.
*72·591.
*72·6.
*72·601.
*72·61.
*72·611.
The following propositions lead up to the "principle of abstraction" (*72·66), which, though not explicitly referred to in the sequel, has a certain intrinsic interest, and generalizes a type of reasoning frequently employed by us.
Dem.
*72·621.
Dem.
*72·622.
*72·63.
Dem.
[Pg 474]
Dem.
*72·65.
*72·7.
Dem.
*72·71.
*72·72.
*72·8.
The above proposition is used in *72·62.
*72·81.
*72·9.
Dem.
[Pg 475]
*72·91.
Dem.
*72·911.
*72·92.
Dem.
*72·921.
*72·93.
Dem.
*72·931.
*72·94.
Dem.
[Pg 476]
Summary of *73.
Two classes and
are said to be similar
when there is a one-one relation whose domain is
and whose
converse domain is
. We express "
is similar to
" by the notation "
."
When two classes are similar, they have the same cardinal number of
terms: it is this fact which gives importance to the relation of
similarity.
We have
The relation of similarity is that of the domain of a
to the converse domain, i.e. it is the relative product of
and
,
or, what comes to the same thing, it is the relative product of
and
.
Most of the properties of similarity result immediately from those of one-one relations and offer no difficulty of any kind.
When there are relations which correlate 's with
's
so as to make
similar to
, we denote the class of
such relations by "
."
Thus we have
When, as in this case, we have a descriptive double function closely connected with a relation, we shall make it a practice to distinguish the descriptive double function by a bar.
It is to be observed that "," like
and
and
and
, is ambiguous as to
type, and only acquires a definite meaning when the types of its domain
and converse domain are specified. The domain and the converse domain
may or may not be of the same type, i.e. "
" may
or may not be a homogeneous relation. This enables us to speak of two
classes of different types as having the same number of terms. We
shall return to this point in connection with cardinal numbers (cf.
especially *102—*106).
The propositions of the present number are important, and are very
frequently referred to throughout cardinal arithmetic. In order to
prove that two classes and
have the same cardinal
number of terms, it is[Pg 477] generally necessary, in the fundamental
arithmetical propositions with which we are concerned, actually to
construct a relation
such that
.
Such relation will be called a correlator of
and
. It will usually be obtained by taking some
relation
for which we have (
, and limiting the
converse domain to
, so that
is the
required correlator. Very frequently we shall have
,
not
, but
will be such
that
.
Among the more important propositions of the present number are the following:
*73·142.
I.e. is a correlator of
and
if (1)
is one-one, (2)
is contained in the converse domain of
, (3)
is the class of those terms which have the relation
to members of
.
*73·2.
This results immediately from the definition.
*73·22.
*73·3.
*73·31.
*73·32.
The above three propositions show that similarity is reflexive, symmetrical and transitive.
*73·36.
*73·41.
Thus every class is similar to a class
of
higher type, and consisting wholly of unit classes.
*73·45.
Thus 1 is the class of all classes similar to any unit class.
*73·48.
Thus 0 is the class of all classes similar to the null-class.
*73·611.
This proposition is very often useful. For arithmetical purposes,
we often wish to obtain mutually exclusive classes. Now whether or
not and
be mutually exclusive,
and
are mutually exclusive provided
. Thus by means of the above proposition we can always
construct mutually exclusive classes each similar to a given class,
i.e. each having some assigned number of members.
*73·71.
This proposition is fundamental in the theory of addition.
[Pg 478]
*73·88.
I.e. "if is similar to a part of
, and
is similar to a part of
, then
is
similar to
." This is the Schröder-Bernstein theorem. The
proof given below is due to Zermelo.
*73·01.
*73·02.
*73·03.
*73·04.
*73·11.
Dem.
*73·12.
*73·13.
[Pg 479]
Dem.
*73·131.
*73·14.
Dem.
The use of this proposition in proving similarity is very frequent.
*73·141.
*73·142.
Dem.
*73·15.
Dem.
[Pg 480]
Dem.
The following propositions, down to *73·241, are deduced from
preceding propositions of this number just as ""
was deduced in *73·2 from *73·1. The proofs are therefore merely
indicated by references to the previous propositions of this number
which are used.
*73·21.
*73·22.
*73·23.
*73·231.
*73·24.
Dem.
This proposition will be convenient in such cases as the following: Let
be a class of relations whose domains are mutually exclusive,
i.e. such that no two members of
have domains which
have a member in common, and suppose we wish to prove that the class
of these domains is similar to
.[Pg 481] The class of domains is
, and we have (
. Hence
we have only to prove (putting
in place of the
of
*73·25)
which, in the case supposed, is proved immediately.
*73·26.
Dem.
*73·27.
*73·28.
Dem.
*73·3.
Dem.
This is the reflexive property of similarity. The conditions of
significance require that should be a class of some type,
but impose no restriction as to the type of class.
*73·301.
Dem.
*73·31.
This proposition shows that similarity is a symmetrical relation.
*73·311.
Dem.
[Pg 482]
*73·32.
This proposition shows that similarity is a transitive relation. Thus we have now proved that similarity is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive.
*73·33.
*73·34.
Dem.
*73·35.
Dem.
*73·36.
Dem.
*73·37.
Dem.
*73·4.
[Pg 483]
*73·41.
This proposition is useful, because it gives a class
( similar to
but of higher type. Thus if
is a cardinal number, and it is known that in a certain type
there are classes having
terms, it follows that there will be
classes having
terms in the next higher type, and therefore in
the next type above that, and so on. No corresponding means exist for
lowering the type.
*73·42.
Dem.
This proposition gives a means of lowering the type without altering
the cardinal number, provided our class is composed wholly of
unit classes; for
is of the type next below
the type of
. But when
is not composed wholly of
unit classes, this construction fails.
*73·43.
*73·44.
Dem.
*73·45.
Dem.
*73·46.
[Pg 484]
*73·47.
Dem.
*73·48.
The following proposition is used in the theory of double similarity (*111·111).
*73·5.
Dem.
*73·501.
Dem.
[Pg 485]
*73·51.
Dem.
*73·511.
*73·52.
Dem.
*73·521.
*73·53.
*73·531.
*73·61.
*73·611.
*73·62.
*73·621.
*73·63.
Dem.
[Pg 486]
The above proposition is used once in connection with cardinal addition (*112·231), and once in connection with cardinal multiplication (*114·561).
The following proposition (*73·69) is a lemma for *73·7.
*73·69.
Dem.
*73·7.
*73·701.
Dem.
*73·72.
Dem.
The following propositions give the proof of the Schröder-Bernstein theorem, namely: If one class is similar to part of another, and the other is similar to part of the one, then the two classes are similar. The proof here given is due to Zermelo[60]. An explanation of the following proof is given in connection with another proof in the summary of *94.
*73·8.
Dem.
*73·801.
Here "Hp*73·8" means "the hypothesis of *73·8."
Dem.
*73·802.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 488]
*73·812.
Dem.
*73·82.
Dem.
*73·821.
Dem.
Dem.
*73·84.
Dem.
*73·841.
[Pg 489]
Dem.
*73·85.
*73·86.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
This is the Schröder-Bernstein theorem.
[60] Math. Annalen, vol. LXV. Heft 2, February 1908.
[Pg 490]
Summary of *74.
The purpose of the present number is to collect together various
propositions in which we have such hypotheses as
or in which such hypotheses are shown to be deducible from others.
Hypotheses of this kind occur very frequently, and it is important to
be able to deal with them easily. For the sake of completeness, we
shall here repeat propositions previously proved on this subject.
The propositions of this number are mostly of the nature of
lemmas, to be used in the theory of selections (Part II, Section
D), and in cardinal and ordinal arithmetic. The most useful of
them are *74·772·773·774·775. These propositions are concerned
with circumstances under which or
,
with or without some limitation of the converse domain,
is a one-one relation. The reason they are important is that the
correlators by means of which many of the fundamental theorems of
cardinal and ordinal arithmetic are proved are such relations as
(with the converse domain limited) for
suitable values of
and
. The above-mentioned propositions
are as follows:
*74·772.
The hypothesis of this proposition will be verified if we put, for
example, . Thus
. This proposition is
used in *116·531, which is used in proving one of the formal laws of
exponentiation, namely
.
This proposition is used in connection with both cardinal and ordinal
multiplication and exponentiation. If
and
correlate
with
and
with
, then if we take for
the
class of all ordinal couples that can be formed of an
and
a
, (
will be the class
of all couples[Pg 491] that can be formed of a
and a
.
Thus in virtue of the above proposition, if
is similar to
and
is similar to
, the class of ordinal
couples formed of a
and a
is similar to the class
of ordinal couples formed of an
and a
. This result
is useful because we define the product of the number of members of
and the number of members of
as the number of
ordinal couples formed of an
and a
.
*74·774.
This proposition is useful when, for example, is
.
*74·775.
This is a particular case of *74·773, and has similar uses.
*74·1.
Dem.
*74·11.
*74·12.
*74·13.
*74·131.
*74·14.
*74·141.
*74.15.
*74·151.
*74·16.
*74·161.
*74·17.
*74·171.
*74·2.
Dem.
[Pg 492]
*74·201.
*74·21.
*74·211.
*74·22.
*74·221.
*74·23.
*74·231.
*74·24.
*74·25.
*74·251.
*74·26.
Dem.
*74·27.
Dem.
[Pg 493]
*74·271.
*74·3.
Dem.
*74·301.
*74·31.
Dem.
*74·311.
*74·32.
Dem.
*74·4.
Dem.
[Pg 494]
*74·41.
Dem.
*74·42.
*74·43.
*74·44.
*74·5.
Dem.
*74·51.
Dem.
*74·511.
*74·52.
Dem.
[Pg 495]
*74·521.
*74·53.
Dem.
*74·531.
*74·6.
Dem.
*74·61.
Dem.
*74·62.
Dem.
[Pg 496]
*74·63.
*74·631.
*74·632.
*74·7.
Dem.
*74·701.
*74·71.
*74·711.
*74·72.
Dem.
*74·721.
*74·73.
*74·731.
*74·74.
*74·741.
*74·75.
Dem.
*74·751.
[Pg 497]
*74·76.
*74·761.
*74·77.
Dem.
*74·771.
*74·772 and its immediate successors are of very great use in cardinal and ordinal arithmetic.
*74·772.
*74·773.
Dem.
*74·774.
Dem.
[Pg 498]
*74·775.
*74·8.
Dem.
*74·801.
*74·81.
Dem.
*74·811.
*74·82.
Dem.
*74·821.
[Pg 499]
*74·822.
*74·823.
*74·83.
*74·831.
*74·832.
*74·833.
*74·84.
Dem.
*74·841.
*74·842.
*74·843.
[Pg 500]
Summary of Section D.
The subject to be considered in this section is important chiefly
in connection with multiplication, both cardinal and ordinal. In
order to get a definition of multiplication which is not confined
to the case where the number of factors is finite, we have to seek
a construction by which, from a given class of classes,
say, we construct another class which, when
is finite,
has that number of terms which, in the usual elementary sense, is
the product of the numbers of terms in the various classes which are
members of
, and which, whether
is finite or not,
obeys as many as possible of the formal laws of multiplication. The
usual elementary sense of multiplication is derived from addition;
that is to say,
is to be the number of terms in
, where
is a class of
mutually exclusive
classes each having
members, or vice versa. This sense can be
extended to any finite number of factors, but not to an infinite number
of factors; hence for a number of factors which may be infinite we
require a different definition, and this is derived from the theory of
selections.
Selections are of two kinds, selections from classes of classes, and selections from relations. The latter is the more general notion, from which the former is derived. But as the former is an easier notion, we will begin by explaining selections from classes of classes.
Given a class of classes , a class
is called a
selected class of
when
is formed by choosing
one term out of each member of
. For example, if
consists of two members,
and
, and if
and
, then
is a
selected class of
. If every constituency elects a local man,
Parliament is a selected class of the constituencies. If
is
a class of mutually exclusive classes, i.e. a class no two of
whose members have any member in common, then a selected class consists
of only one term from each member of
; i.e.
is
a selected class if
But if
is not a class of mutually exclusive classes, this
does not hold necessarily; for a term
which is a member of
both
and
(where
)
may be chosen as the representative of
, while some other
term may be[Pg 501] chosen as the representative of
, so that two
members of
may belong to the selected class. Again, if
is a class of mutually exclusive classes, the relation of
the representative to its class must be one-one, because, since no
term belongs to two classes which are members of
, no term
can be the representative of two classes. But when
is not
a class of mutually exclusive classes, a term which belongs to two
classes
and
may be chosen as the representative of
both. Thus the relation of the representative to its class may be only
one-many, not one-one.
The relation of the representative to its class may be called a
selective relation. A selective relation of is
one which selects, from every class
which is a member of
, a certain member
as the representative of
; that is, we have, if
is the selective relation,
This condition is equivalent to
If is a selective relation,
is a selected class;
and if
is a selected class, there is a selective relation
such that
. Thus the study of selections from classes
of classes is wholly contained in the study of selective relations.
The class of selective relations from a class is called
. Thus
Then
is the class of selected
classes.
It will be seen that, if ,
may be any
member of
, and we get a different
for each different
member of
. Thus if we keep the representatives of all
the other members of
unchanged, the number of selective
relations to be obtained by varying the representative of
is the number of members of
. Hence the number of selective
relations altogether may be fitly defined as the product of the
numbers of terms possessed by the various members of
. In
case
is finite, this agrees with the usual definition of
multiplication; and whether
is finite or infinite, the
product so defined obeys all the formal laws of multiplication.
To illustrate the notion of selective relations, let us take a very
simple case, the case where consists of two classes
and
, each of which has two members. Let
and
be the members of
,
and
the members of
. We assume
,
,
.
Then the selective relations of
are the following:
[Pg 502]
Thus they are four in number, i.e. the number of members of
is the product of the number of members of
and the number of members of
. A similar process
would show that our definition of the product agrees with the usual
definition in any case in which all the numbers concerned are finite.
Selections from relations are an obvious generalization of
selections from classes of classes. We had above
We put, generally,
which we derive from the definition
This is the fundamental definition in the subject of selections. We
have, in virtue of this definition,
When
, we may call
the
class of selections from
. Thus generally,
is the class of selections from
provided
; and if this condition is not
fulfilled,
. We may call the class
the class of "
-selections from
."
The class of "
-selections from
" will be what we
previously called the class of "selective relations of
."
It will be observed that we have
Thus if
is a class of mutually exclusive
classes,
selects one from each of these classes, and is
therefore a selective class of
; hence in
this case
In Cardinal Arithmetic, is the important
notion, and the more general notion
is seldom
required. In Ordinal Arithmetic,
is the important
notion. It will be seen that
Thus
is only significant when
is a
class of relations; in this case we have
[Pg 503]Thus
chooses a representative member of the field of every
member of
. The most important case is when
is of
the form
, where
is a serial relation whose field consists
of serial relations. Then
becomes the field of a
relation which may be defined as the ordinal product of the relations
composing
; in this way we get an infinite ordinal product
analogous to the infinite cardinal product. This will be explained at a
later stage (*172).
Although it is chiefly and
that will be required in the sequel, we shall
treat
generally, because this introduces
little extra complication, and most of the theorems which hold for
or
have exact analogues
for
.
, as above defined, is the class of one-many
relations contained in
and having
for their converse
domain. We know of no proof that there always are such relations when
. In fact, the proposition
is equivalent to the "multiplicative axiom," i.e. to the axiom
that, given any class of mutually exclusive classes, none of which is
null, there is at least one class formed of one member from each of
these classes. (This equivalence is proved in *88·36, below.) It is
also equivalent to Zermelo's axiom[61], which is
hence also it is equivalent to the proposition that every class can be
well-ordered. In the absence of evidence as to the truth or falsehood
of these various propositions, we shall not assume their truth, but
shall explicitly introduce them as hypotheses wherever they are
relevant.
In the present section, we shall begin (*80) by considering such
properties of as do not depend upon any
hypothesis as to
. We shall then (*81) proceed to consider
such further properties of
as result from
the hypothesis
.
This hypothesis is important, because it is verified in many
of the applications we wish to make, and because it leads to
important properties of
which are not true in
general when
is not subject to any hypothesis. These special
properties are mostly due to the fact that when
is a many-one relation,
consists of
one-one relations (not merely of one-many relations, as it does in
the general case). This is proved in *81·1. We then (*82) proceed
to consider the case of relative products, i.e. (
.
It will appear that, with a suitable hypothesis,
(
and
.
In the following number (*83) we apply the results of *80 to the
particular case where
is replaced by
, which is
the important case for cardinal arithmetic. In *84 we apply the
propositions of *81 to the case where
is replaced by
,
and where, therefore, we have the hypothesis
.
This hypothesis is equivalent to the hypothesis that no two members of
have any members in common, i.e. that
[Pg 504]
When
fulfils this hypothesis, it is a class of
mutually exclusive classes. For classes of mutually exclusive
classes we adopt the notation "
."
It is shown in *84·14 that a
is one for which we have
.
When
is a
,
is a one-one relation, and
.
Also in this case
consists of
all classes formed of one member from each member of
,
i.e. all classes
such that
In *85, we prove various important propositions, of which the chief is
a form of the associative law[62], namely
Finally, in *88, we consider the question of the existence of
selections. This cannot in general be proved when
is an
infinite class. The assumption that
is never
null unless one member of
is null is equivalent to various
other assumptions, for example to the assumption that every class can
be well-ordered. One of these equivalent assumptions is called the
"multiplicative axiom." This axiom is equivalent to the assumption that
an arithmetical product cannot be zero unless one of its factors is
zero, and is regarded by some mathematicians as a self-evident truth.
This can be proved when the number of factors is finite, i.e.
when
is a finite class, but not when the number of factors
is infinite. We have not assumed its truth in the general case where
it cannot be proved, but have included it in the hypotheses of all
propositions which depend upon it.
[61] See his "Beweis, dass jede Menge wohlgeordnet werden kann," Math. Annalen, Vol. LIX. pp. 514-516.
[62] Cf. notes to *42·1·11.
[Pg 505]
Summary of *80.
In this number, we shall give such properties of as
follow most directly from the definition, without any restrictive
hypothesis as to
.
If ,
selects one member of
, whenever
, as the
selected referent of
. For, since
,
we have
; and since
, we have
,
i.e.
.
Calling
the selected referent of
, it
is evident that we may replace
by any other member
of
, and still have a member of
. (This is proved in *80·4.) Thus if
has any members at all, we can get as many
members as there are members of
by merely
altering the selected referent of
, leaving the other selected
referents unchanged.
In the present section, we first prove various simple properties of
. Most of these are almost immediate consequences
of
*80·14.
The most useful of them are
*80·291.
*80·3.
*80·33.
We then have various propositions (*80·4—·46) concerned with when
. Of these the most important are the
following:
*80·41.
I.e. given a selective relation , the selected referent of
(where
) may be replaced by any other term
having the relation
to
, and we shall still have a selective
relation.
*80·45.
We then have a set of propositions (*80·5—·54) connecting
( with
and
. These are chiefly
useful as leading to the next set
[Pg 506]
(*80·6—·69), connecting with
and
. The most useful of
these are the following:
*80·6.
*80·65.
*80·66.
We have next a set of propositions (*80·7—·78) dealing with the
relations of and
when (e.g.)
and
. These
propositions are seldom used, but they would be useful in considering
division.
We next have a set of propositions (*80·8—·84) dealing with the
relations of and
. The most
useful are
*80·81.
*80·82.
Finally, we have four propositions (*80·9—·93) on
and one on
.
The most useful of these is
*80·9.
*80·01.
*80·1.
*80·11.
*80·12.
*80·13.
*80·14.
*80·15.
*80·16.
Dem.
*80·17.
Dem.
[Pg 507]
This proposition is used in the theory of ordinal multiplication (*172·162).
*80·2.
Dem.
*80·21.
*80·22.
Dem.
*80·23.
Dem.
*80·24.
*80·25.
Dem.
Note that is a unit class, not the null-class. It is owing to this
fact (as will appear later) that, if
is any cardinal,
. See the note to
*83·15.
[Pg 508]
*80·27.
Dem.
*80·28.
Dem.
*80·29.
Dem.
*80·291.
Dem.
*80·3.
Dem.
*80·31.
Dem.
*80·32.
Dem.
[Pg 509]
*80·33.
Dem.
*80·34.
Dem.
*80·35.
*80·36.
Dem.
This proposition is used in dealing with greater and less among cardinals (*117·68).
This proposition is important. It shows that, if
and
is the selected referent of
(i.e. is
, then
may be replaced by any other member of
without our ceasing to have a member of
.
Dem.
[Pg 510]
*80·41.
Dem.
*80·42.
Dem.
*80·43.
Dem.
*80·44.
Dem.
*80·45.
Dem.
[Pg 511]
Dem.
*80·51.
Dem.
*80·511.
Dem.
*80·52.
Dem.
[Pg 512]
*80·53.
Dem.
Dem.
*80·6.
Dem.
*80·61.
Dem.
[Pg 513]
*80·62.
*80·621.
Dem.
*80·63.
*80·64.
Dem.
*80·65.
*80·651.
Dem.
*80·66.
Dem.
*80·661.
Dem.
[Pg 514]
*80·67.
Dem.
*80·68.
Dem.
*80·69.
Dem.
Dem.
*80·71.
Dem.
[Pg 515]
*80·72.
*80·73.
Dem.
*80·731.
Dem.
*80·732.
Dem.
*80·74.
Dem.
*80·75.
*80·76.
Dem.
[Pg 516]
*80·761.
Dem.
*80·77.
Dem.
*80·771.
Dem.
Dem.
Dem.
*80·81.
Dem.
*80·82.
Dem.
[Pg 517]
The following proposition is used in *80·84 and in the theory of double similarity (*111·3).
*80·83.
Dem.
Dem.
The three following propositions are useful both in cardinal and in ordinal multiplication (*113 and *172).
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 518]
80·9·91 can be extended, by precisely similar proofs, to any finite
number of variables ,
, .... They will, on occasion, be
assumed for three or four variables, without fresh proofs.
*80·92.
Dem.
*80·94.
From this proposition, together with *80·26 (which gives ,
we shall obtain an inductive proof that
exists
whenever
is a finite class contained in
(cf.
*120·611).
[Pg 519]
Summary of *81.
When is a many-one relation,
has many important properties which do not
hold in the general case. In the first place,
consists wholly of one-one relations. In the second place, if
,
takes one term and
no more out of each member of
.
Again, if
,
is determinate
when
is given; i.e.
.
It follows that
is similar to
;
hence the number of members of
is the number
of ways of choosing one member out of each class belonging to
. It should be remembered that when
is many-one,
is a class of mutually exclusive classes, i.e. no two different
members of
have any common member. This
follows immediately from *71·181.
As explained in the introduction to this section, the propositions of
this number are chiefly useful on account of their application to the
case of . This application is made in *84. The most important
propositions in this number are:
*81·14.
This proposition, by exhibiting as a function of
,
leads immediately to
*81·21.
This is the principal proposition of this number. The following also is important:
*81·22.
*81·1.
Dem.
[Pg 520]
*81·11.
Dem.
*81·12.
Dem.
*81·13.
Dem.
*81·14.
This proposition, by exhibiting as a function of
,
shows that a member of
is determinate
when its domain is given, provided
.
*81·15.
Dem.
[Pg 521]
*81·2.
Dem.
*81·21.
This proposition is very important. The class
, when
, is formed, as we shall prove later, by
making every possible selection of one term out of each member of
, each such selection giving us one
member of
. The fact that, with the
above hypothesis, the class of classes
has the same number of terms as
(which results
from the above proposition), is of great utility in the theory of
cardinal multiplication and exponentiation.
*81·211.
Dem.
*81·212.
[Pg 522]
Dem.
*81·22.
*81·221.
Dem.
*81·23.
Dem.
*81·24.
Dem.
[Pg 523]
*81·25.
Dem.
*81·26.
Dem.
*81·3.
Dem.
*81·31.
Dem.
[Pg 524]
Summary of *82.
The propositions contained in this number are not much used except in
connection with the associative law for cardinal multiplication, but
they have a certain intrinsic interest. We prove in this number that,
with a suitable hypothesis, ( results
from
by multiplying each member by
,
i.e.
*82·272.
Also under a suitable hypothesis the domains of (
are the domains of
, i.e.
*82·32.
In the applications of propositions of the present number
in *85, and
are replaced by
and
. By *62·26,
;
thus we obtain relations between
and
.
*82·2.
Dem.
[Pg 525]
*82·21.
Dem.
*82·22.
Dem.
*82·221.
Dem.
*82·23.
Dem.
[Pg 526]
Dem.
*82·24.
Dem.
*82·241.
Dem.
*82·25.
*82·251.
[Pg 527]
*82·26.
*82·261.
*82·27.
*82·271.
*82·272.
Dem.
*82·28.
*82·29.
*82·291.
*82·3.
Dem.
*82·31.
Dem.
[Pg 528]
*82·32.
Dem.
*82·33.
Dem.
The following propositions (*82·4·41·411·42) are lemmas for *83·43, which is used in the proof of *114·5, in the theory of cardinal multiplication.
*82·4.
Dem.
*82·41.
Dem.
[Pg 529]
*82·411.
*82·42.
Dem.
*82·45.
Dem.
*82·5.
*82·51.
*82·52.
Dem.
[Pg 530]
*82·53.
Dem.
[Pg 531]
Summary of *83.
In this number, the general propositions which have been proved for
are to be applied to the important special case
where
is
. In this case, we have selections from classes
of classes: if
,
picks out a
representative
from each class
which is
a member of
; i.e. we have
The propositions of this number result from those of previous numbers
either immediately, by the substitution of for
, or by the
use of propositions of *62, notably
(*62·2), and
(*62·3).
The propositions of the present number follow, in the main, the same
course as those of *80, with substituted for
(except
that the special forms of propositions before *80·2 are not given).
We have first a set of propositions resulting immediately from early
propositions of *80. Of these the most used are:
*83·11.
This leads to the proposition that an arithmetical product is null if one of its factors is null. (We cannot prove the converse universally without assuming the multiplicative axiom.)
*83·15.
Thus is a unit class. This is the source of
the proposition
, where
is a cardinal (cf. note to
*83·15).
*83·2.
Here is the "representative" of
.
*83·21.
We have next a set of propositions (*83·4—·44) on selections from unit classes and classes of unit classes. We have
[Pg 532]
*83·41.
This leads to the proposition that a product of one factor is equal to that factor.
*83·43.
This leads to
*83·44.
whence it follows that a product of factors, each of which is one, is one. This holds even if the number of factors is infinite or zero.
We have next a set of propositions (*83·5—*·58) on changing the representative of a class, and on selections from a class of classes some of which are unit classes. These propositions are seldom referred to in the sequel.
We have next (*83·6—·74) a set of propositions on
the domains of selections, i.e. on the class
. We have
*83·66.
(The hypothesis here cannot be dispensed with unless we assume the multiplicative axiom.)
*83·7.
We have next two propositions (*83·8·81) on the types of
and
. The
type of
is the same as that of
(*83·81).
The last set of propositions in this number (*83·9—·904) deals with the existence of selections. We have
*83·9.
*83·901.
*83·904.
From these propositions we shall deduce by mathematical induction that
whenever is a finite class,
exists
unless
(cf. *120·62). Thus a product consisting
of a finite number of factors (which may themselves be either finite or
infinite) can only vanish if one of the factors vanishes.
*83·1.
Dem.
*83·11.
[Pg 533]
*83·12.
*83·13.
*83·14.
In virtue of this proposition, the product of 0 cardinal numbers is
1—a proposition of which a particular case, namely , is
familiar. This arithmetical proposition results from the above as
follows. We shall define the product of the numbers of members of
as the number of members of
.
Thus when
, the number of members of
is a product of 0 factors. Now by the
above proposition,
has one member, namely
. Hence a product of 0 factors is 1.
*83·16.
*83·2.
*83·21.
*83·22.
*83·23.
*83·24.
*83·25.
*83·26.
*83·271.
*83·29.
*83·3.
*83·31.
*83·41.
[Pg 534]
This proposition shows that a cardinal product of one factor
is equal to that one factor. For the number of members of
is the product of the numbers of
members of members of
, i.e. it is a product
whose only factor is the number of members of
. By the
above proposition, this product is equal to the number of members of
.
*83·42.
Dem.
This proposition shows that a cardinal product whose factors
are all 1 is 1. For is a class whose members
are all unit classes, and thus the number of members of
is the product of a number of 1's; and
by the above proposition,
is a unit
class, its sole member being
.
This result is rendered more explicit by *83·43·44.
*83·43.
Dem.
Dem.
It follows from this proposition that if is a class of
classes for which there are selections, and if one member (not null)
be added to
, there are still selections from the resulting
class of classes.
*83·51.
[Pg 535]
*83·52.
*83·54.
Dem.
*83·55.
Dem.
*83·56.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in the theory of cardinal multiplication (*114·41).
*83·57.
Dem.
[Pg 536]
Dem.
This proposition shows that in a product any number of factors each equal to 1 may be omitted without altering the value of the product.
The following propositions, down to *83·74, are concerned with the domains of selective relations, i.e. with the selected classes.
Dem.
*83·61.
Dem.
*83·62.
Dem.
[Pg 537]
*83·64.
Observe that the hypothesis required here is ,
not
as in *83·63.
Dem.
The following proposition is used in connection with cardinal multiplication (*115·14).
*83·641.
Dem.
[Pg 538]
*83·65.
Dem.
*83·66.
Dem.
*83·7.
*83·71.
Dem.
*83·72.
Dem.
*83·73·731 are lemmas for *83·74.
*83·73.
Dem.
[Pg 539]
Dem.
Dem.
*83·8.
Dem.
Dem.
*83·901.
*83·902.
*83·903.
*83·9·904 leads to an inductive proof (to be given later) of
whenever
is a finite
class of classes none of which is
.
[Pg 540]
Summary of *84.
A class of mutually exclusive classes is one such that,
if
and
are two different members of
,
and
have no common members; i.e. it is
a class composed of non-overlapping classes. Classes of mutually
exclusive classes have many important properties. They are important
in cardinal arithmetic, among other reasons, because if
is a class of mutually exclusive classes, the cardinal number of
is the sum of the cardinal numbers of the members of
. Also if
is a class of mutually exclusive
classes, the number of selected classes of
(i.e.
) is the same as the number of
selective relations (i.e.
)
" is a class of mutually exclusive classes" is written
"
."
An important case is when no member of is null; in this case
we write
For a which is contained in a class of
classes
, we write
on the analogy of the notation
.
The definitions are as follows:
*84·01.
*84·02.
*84·03.
The propositions of this number begin (*84·1—·14) with various equivalent forms for the definitions. Of these the most useful are:
*84·11.
*84·13.
The last of these is specially important, because it renders the
propositions of *81 applicable to when
[Pg 541]
.
We have next (*84·2—·28) a set of propositions dealing with various
special cases, such as and 1. The most useful of these are
*84·23.
*84·241.
*84·25.
We next have a set of propositions (*84·3—·37) which are immediate consequences of propositions in *81, by means of *84·14. The most useful of these is
*84·3.
We next have a set of propositions (*84·4—·43) dealing with the
domains of selections from a . These are
for the most part still immediate consequences of propositions in *81,
in virtue of *84·14. The most useful are
*84·41.
This proposition applies to such cases as the relations of rows and columns. Imagine any set of terms arranged in rows and columns so as to form a rectangle. Then each column is a selection from the rows, and each row is a selection from the columns. This is a particular case of the above proposition.
We next have a set of propositions on ,
, and
(*84·5—·55). The most
important of these are
*84·51.
*84·53.
Finally we have a set of propositions (*84·59—·62) showing
circumstances under which is a
.
The only one of these which is used subsequently is
*84·62.
*84·01.
*84·02.
*84·03.
[Pg 542]
*84·11.
*84·12.
*84·121.
*84·13.
Dem.
*84·131.
*84·132.
*84·133.
*84·134.
Dem.
*84·135.
Dem.
[Pg 543]
*84·14.
Dem.
This proposition is important, since it enables us to apply the
propositions of *81 to when
.
Dem.
*84·21.
Note. is the class of all unit classes
whose members are classes; this results from *65·02. Thus "
"
is equivalent to "
consists of one class."
Dem.
*84·22.
Dem.
*84·23.
*84·24.
Dem.
*84·241.
Dem.
[Pg 544]
*84·242.
*84·25.
Dem.
*84·26.
Dem.
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned with selections from
a . In virtue of *84·14, the
propositions of *81 which have the hypothesis
become applicable when
is
and
is a
. Thus
has
many important properties when
is a
which it does not have in the general case.
*84·31.
*84·32.
*84·33.
*84·34.
*84·341.
[Pg 545]
*84·342.
*84·35.
Dem.
*84·41.
This is an important proposition, since it shows that, when
is a
, the number of classes that can be
selected from
is the product of the numbers of the various
classes that are members of
.
*84·411.
*84·412.
This proposition gives what might be taken as the definition of the
class of selected classes, namely
We might, starting with this as our definition, deal with the class
of selected classes without first considering selective relations.
The disadvantages of this method would be, first, that it requires
that should be a
if it is
to give the results desired in arithmetic; secondly, that it is much
more cumbrous technically than the method which proceeds by selective
relations; thirdly, that it does not enable us to deal with selection
from a class of classes as a particular case of selection from a
relation (namely from
, and therefore
does not yield theorems of such generality as those obtained by the
method adopted above.
*84·42.
*84·421.
[Pg 546]
*84·422.
*84·43.
Dem.
Dem.
It might be supposed that the converse of the above
would also hold. But this is not the case; for although
secures that
and
cannot overlap when they are unequal, yet we may have
without having
, so that if
,
we shall have
,
whence, if
, it follows that
is not a
even if
.
*84·51.
Dem.
[Pg 547]
*84·52.
Dem.
*84·521.
Dem.
The above proposition is a lemma for *84·522, which is used in an important proposition on relations of mutually exclusive relations (*163·17).
*84·522.
Dem.
*84·53.
Dem.
[Pg 548]
*84·54.
Dem.
*84·6.
*84·61.
[Pg 549]
Summary of *85.
In this number certain important propositions are proved, and the other propositions of this number are mainly lemmas. The most important propositions are the following:
*85·1 and *85·14, which show that if
is a
, then the
domains of
are the same as the
domains of
,
and
is similar to
, thus reducing the
problem of selections from many-one relations to that of selections
from classes of classes.
*85·27 and *85·43, which show that if ,
consists of the relational sums
of the domains of
and is similar
to
; i.e. the class of
-selections from
is similar to the class obtained
as follows: take the members of
one by one, and form the
-selections of each; we thus obtain a class of classes, each class
being of the form
, where
;
we then make a selection from this class of classes; this selection is
a member of
; the number of such
selections is the same as the number of
.
*85·28 and *85·44, which are special cases of *85·27 and *85·43,
but more useful than these. *85·44 is the source of the associative
law in cardinal multiplication; it states that, if is a
,
has the
same number of members as
.
(On associative laws in general, see the notes to *42·1·11.)
That is to say, if we form the class of selective relations
(
for every
which is a member
of
, and then form the class of selective relations
for
, we get the same number of terms
as if we proceeded to form the class of selective relations for
. The way in which this proposition yields
the associative law of multiplication may be explained as follows.
We shall define the product of the numbers of members of
as the number of
. Thus e.g. if the
numbers of the members of
are
,
the number of
is
. Suppose the
other members of
are
and
, and that
and
again have three members each. Then the
number of
is the product of
the numbers of
,
,
, i.e. it is the product of
,
and
[Pg 550]
.
But the numbers of the members of are
Thus the number of is
Hence *85·44 enables us to conclude that
which is a case of the associative law. In fact *85·44 gives us this
law in its general form, when the number of brackets, and of factors in
each bracket, may be infinite or finite indifferently.
Another important pair of propositions is *85·53·54. These enable us to
reduce the problem of selections for any relation to the problem
of selections from a class of classes. The method is as follows: Given
any term , form the class of ordered couples of which
is
relatum while the referent is a term having the relation
to
. Call this class of couples
. Form this
class for every
which is a member of
; we thus obtain a
class of classes, namely
. Then the number
of selections from this class of classes is the same as the number of
.
We have one other important pair of propositions in this number,
namely *85·61·63. These show that what is called "Zermelo's axiom" is
equivalent to what is called the "multiplicative axiom." Zermelo's
axiom[63] is to the effect that if is any class,
is never null, i.e.
. The
"multiplicative axiom" is to the effect that if
,
there is at least one class formed by taking one representative
from each member of
, which is equivalent to
In *85·63, these two axioms are shown to be equivalent. From Zermelo's theorem[64] it follows that both are equivalent to the assumption that every class can be well-ordered. This will be proved later (*258).
The above-mentioned propositions, stated symbolically, are as follows:
*85·27.
*85·28.
[Pg 551]
*85·43.
*85·44.
The following propositions depend upon the definition
*85·5.
I.e. is the class of all couples whose
relatum is y while the referent has the relation
to
. We
then have
*85·53.
giving a construction for by means of
, and
*85·54.
which reduces the question of the existence of -selections to that
of the existence of
-selections.
*85·61.
This proposition gives a construction for any -selection in
terms of an
-selection from a
,
and reduces the question of the existence of the former to that of
the existence of the latter. A particularly important case is when
. This is considered in
*85·63.
*85·1.
Dem.
*85·11.
Dem.
*85·111.
*85·112.
*85·12.
Dem.
[Pg 552]
This proposition is used in connection with ordinal multiplication (*173·14).
*85·13.
Dem.
In the above proposition, the hypothesis required
as to by *82·231 is only
;
but since
,
.
The above proposition is used in connection with "families" (*97·31).
*85·14.
Dem.
*85·21·22 are lemmas for *85·24, which, with *85·26, is required for *85·27.
*85·21.
Here
can also be written
.
The brackets are omitted because no other meaning is possible.
Dem.
[Pg 553]
Dem.
The following propositions are lemmas for *85·26.
*85·241.
Dem.
*85·243.
Dem.
*85·244.
Dem.
*85·245.
Dem.
*85·25.
[Pg 554]
Dem.
The following proposition is a lemma for *85·31.
*85·3.
The conditions of significance here and in *85·31·32·33·34 require
.
Dem.
The following propositions, down to *85·42 inclusive, deal
with circumstances under which we can infer from
. *85·32·33·34 are not subsequently used;
the remainder are used in proving *85·43.
Dem.
[Pg 555]
Dem.
*85·33.
The proof proceeds exactly as in *85·32.
*85·34.
The following propositions, *85·4·41·42, are lemmas for *85·43·44, which latter are of fundamental importance, since they are the source of the associative law in cardinal arithmetic.
*85·4.
*85·41.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 556]
Dem.
The following proposition is used in connection with cardinal multiplication (*114·301).
*85·45.
Dem.
The purpose of the following propositions, down to *85·55, is to
show how to get from a class of classes a class of selections
having the same number of terms as . For this
purpose we introduce a new notation, representing a rather important
analysis of the couples contained in a given relation. A couple
is contained in a relation
when
; thus
if, keeping
fixed, we form the class of couples
,
all these couples are contained in
. We put
*85·5.
[Pg 557]
Then .
Also
is the
class of all couples contained in
, and
. We shall now prove that
,
so that every member of
can be derived from a
member of
, and the problem
of the existence of
is reduced to that of the
existence of selections from a class of mutually exclusive existent
classes.
*85·51.
*85·52.
*85·53.
Dem.
*85·54.
Dem.
The following proposition is frequently useful.
Dem.
*85·56.
*85·6.
Dem.
The following proposition is frequently employed.
[Pg 558]
*85·601.
Dem.
*85·61.
*85·62.
Dem.
Note. (
is "Zermelo's axiom." The above proposition shows that this is
true if
[Pg 559]
which again is true if
in virtue of *84·412. The last of these is the "multiplicative axiom,"
which is thus shown to imply "Zermelo's axiom."
The following propositions lead up to *85·72, which is used in the theory of double similarity (*111·3).
*85·7.
Dem.
*85·701.
*85·702.
*85·71.
This proposition asserts that if we can select one sub-class out of
each member of (where
is a class of classes),
then selections from the sub-classes so obtained are selections from
.
Dem.
[Pg 560]
The following proposition is a lemma employed in the theory of double similarity (*111·313).
*85·81.
Dem.
[Pg 561]
Summary of *88.
The existence of selections cannot, so far as is known at present, be
proved in general. That is, we cannot prove any of the following:
These various propositions can be shown to be all equivalent inter se; and in virtue of Zermelo's theorem (cf. *258), they are equivalent to the proposition "every class can be well-ordered." In the present number we have to prove the above equivalences, as well as certain propositions giving the existence of selections in various particular cases.
The most apparently obvious of the above propositions is the last,
namely: "If is a class of mutually exclusive classes, no
one of which is null, there is at least one class
which takes
one and only one member from each member of
." This we shall
define as the "multiplicative axiom."
We will call a multipliable relation (denoted by "Rel
Mult") if
exists, or, what is equivalent, if
Thus we put
We will call a multipliable class of classes if
exists, i.e. we put
The multiplicative axiom will be denoted by "." Thus we put
In the present number, we shall first give various equivalent forms
of the assumption that is a multipliable relation (*88·1—·15);
we shall then do the same for multipliable classes of classes
(*88·2—·26); next we shall give various equivalent forms of the
multiplicative axiom (*88·3—·39).[Pg 562] (Some important equivalent forms
cannot be given at this stage, as they depend upon definitions not
yet given, such as the definitions of cardinal multiplication and
of well-ordered series. Cf. *114·26 and *258·37.) Finally we shall
give propositions showing that various special classes of classes
are multipliable. Most of these propositions will not be used in
the sequel, but they illustrate the nature of the difficulties
involved in proving that a class of classes is multipliable, and
some of them show that mere size does not prevent a class from
being multipliable. For example, *88·48 shows that, given any class
of classes
, if each member
is replaced by
, the result is a multipliable class
of classes; but the only effect of this change is to increase the
number of members of each member of our class of classes by one.
The chief propositions in this number which are afterwards referred to are the following:
*88·22.
*88·32.
*88·33.
*88·361.
*88·37.
The above is usually the most convenient form of the multiplicative axiom.
*88·372.
This proposition is used in *114, to prove that the multiplicative axiom is equivalent to the proposition that a cardinal product vanishes when, and only when, one of its factors vanishes.
*88·01.
*88·02.
*88·03.
*88·11.
Dem.
[Pg 563]
*88·12
Dem.
*88·13
*88·14
Dem.
*88·21.
*88·22.
Dem.
*88·23
*88·24
Dem.
*88·25
Dem.
[Pg 564]
Dem.
*88·31.
Dem.
*88·32.
*88·33.
Note that ( is Zermelo's axiom.
Dem.
[Pg 565]
*88·34.
Dem.
*88·35.
Dem.
*88·361.
*88·37.
Dem.
[Pg 566]
*88·371.
*88·372.
This proposition shows that the multiplicative axiom is equivalent to the assumption that a cardinal product is zero when, and only when, one of its factors is zero.
*88·373.
Dem.
*88·38.
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned with certain cases in which a construction exists by which the existence of selections can be proved.
*88·4.
Dem.
[Pg 567]
*88·41.
*88·411.
Dem.
*88·42.
In virtue of this proposition, as will be proved later, every finite
class of existent classes is a . For we
have
; and, by the above, a
remains a
when one existent class is added as an additional member; hence the
result follows by induction.
*88·43.
Dem.
*88·431.
*88·44.
*88·441.
Dem.
[Pg 568]
Dem.
Dem.
The proof proceeds as in *88·46.
*88·5.
*88·51.
*88·52.
*88·53.
[Pg 569]
Summary of Section E.
The subjects to be treated in this section are certain general
ideas of which a particular instance is afforded by mathematical
induction. Mathematical induction is, in fact, the application to the
number-series of a conception which is applicable to all relations,
and is often very important. The conception in question is that
which we shall call the ancestral relation with respect to
a given relation. If is the given relation, we denote the
corresponding ancestral relation by "
"; the
name is chosen because, if
is the relation of parent and
child,
will be the relation of ancestor and
descendant—where, for convenience of language, we include
among
his own ancestors if
is a parent or a child of anything.
It would commonly be said that has to
the relation of
ancestor to descendant if there are a certain number of intermediate
people
,
,
, ... such that in the series
,
,
,
, ...
each term has to the next the relation of
parent and child. But this is not an adequate definition, because the
dots in
represent an unanalysed idea. We may then try to amend this definition
by saying that there is a finite class
of intermediate terms
such that one member (
) of
is a child of
, one
(
) is a parent of
, every member of
except
is a child of one (and only one) member of
, and every member
of
except
is a parent of one (and only one) member of
. This definition is open to several objections. In the first
place, it is very complicated; in the second place, there will, in
regard to a general relation, be difficulty in securing the uniqueness
of the member of
which is to be a parent (or a child) of a
given member of
; in the third place (and this is the really
fatal objection) the proposed definition states that
is
to be a finite class, and we shall find that finitude, in the
relevant sense, is only defined by means of the very conception of the
ancestral relation which we are here engaged in defining. In fact, if
denotes the relation of
to
, where
is
a cardinal number, then a finite cardinal (in the sense we require) is
[Pg 570]one to which 0 has the relation
, i.e.
one of which 0 is an ancestor with respect to the relation
Hence we must not use the notion of finitude in defining the ancestral
relation. In fact, the ancestral relation is defined as follows.
Let us call a hereditary class with respect to
if
, i.e. if successors of
's
(with respect to
) are
's. Thus, for example, if
is
the class of persons named Smith,
is hereditary with respect to
the relation of father to son. If
is the Peerage,
is
hereditary with respect to the relation of father to surviving eldest
son. If
is numbers greater than 100,
is hereditary with
respect to the relation of
to
; and so on. If now
is an ancestor of
, and
is a hereditary class to
which
belongs, then
also belongs to this class. Conversely,
if
belongs to every hereditary class to which
belongs,
then (in the sense in which a is one of his own ancestors if
is
anybody's parent or child)
must be an ancestor of
. For to
have
for one's ancestor is a hereditary property which belongs
to
, and therefore, by hypothesis, to
. Hence
is an
ancestor of
when, and only when,
belongs to the field of
the relation in question and
belongs to every hereditary class to
which
belongs. This property may be used to define the ancestral
relation; i.e. since we have
we put
We then have
Here
may be called "the
descendants of
." It is the class of terms of which
is an
ancestor.
To make plain the relation of the above to mathematical induction, put
0 for , and
for
. Then, since 1=0+1, we have
. Again
Thus we find
Thus if
is a descendant of 0,
belongs to every
class to which 0 belongs and to which
belongs whenever
belongs. Hence mathematical induction, starting from 0,
will prove properties of
. In elementary mathematics it is
customary to speak as if this held of all integers, i.e.
as if
(as above defined)
included all integers; but in fact only finite integers (in[Pg 571] one
of the two senses which the word finite may have) belong to the
class
, and they belong to it
by definition, being defined as the class
i.e. as
in the above
sense. To infinite numbers, inductive proofs of this kind starting from
0 cannot be applied.
The study of will occupy *90. The
relation
holds between
and
if
or
or
or etc. The
study of this "etc." occupies *91, "on the powers of a relation." We
may, for many technical purposes, regard
as
the 0th power of
; the other powers are
,
, etc. If
is a power of
, so is
. Now
is
,
according to the definition in *38. Thus if we have
must be a power of
, because the class of powers of
is
a value of
which satisfies the hypothesis
Conversely, if
is a power of
, then
is reached by
repetitions of the process of turning
into
, starting
this process with
. Hence if
is a power of
, we shall
have
Consequently, if we denote the class of powers of by
, we have
We might use this as the definition of
; but we can
get a somewhat simpler form. For the above is shown, without much
difficulty, to be equivalent to
that is,
belongs to the ancestry of
with respect to
,
in other words,
is reached from
by proceeding along
the series
which is the same as the series
The relation
is important on its own
account. We put
and then we put
We often want to include among the powers
of
; the class consisting of
together with
we call
. The definition is
[Pg 572]
whence we easily prove
The relation of being related by some power of
(other than
) is a very important one. We denote it by
, and put
Thus when
, we have one of
,
,
, etc. It is easy to prove that
In a series in which every term (except the first, if there is a first)
has an immediate predecessor, and every term (except the last, if there
is a last) has an immediate successor, if
is the relation of a
term to its immediate successor,
is the relation of
any earlier term to any later one.
The next number (*92) concerns itself with some special properties of the powers of one-many, many-one and one-one relations.
The next number (*93) analyses the field of a relation into successive
generations; e.g. if the relation is that of parent
and child, the first generation will consist of Adam and Eve, the
second of their children, the third of their grandchildren, and so
on, taking always the longest route from Adam and Eve when there
have been intermarriages between generations. That is, taking any
relation , the first generation is
,
the second is
, the third is
, and so on. Generally, if
is a
power of
(including
), the corresponding
generation is
In order to express this more conveniently, we introduce a new
symbol , which is required also on other grounds,
especially in series. "
" may be read "minimum
with respect to
." We regard "
" as "
precedes
"; then in a class
, the "minima of
" will
be those members of
which belong to
and are not
preceded by any other members of
, i.e.
.
We put therefore
Hence we have
i.e.
consists of
those members of
which are not preceded by any other
members of
. (If
has a single first term, this
term is
.) Thus we have, when
is a power of
,
[Pg 573]
Thus
, where
is any
power of
(including
) is the generation
of
corresponding to
; thus the whole class of generations is
. Hence we
put
where "
" stands for "generation."
The notation "" will not be much used until we come
to series, but then it will be constantly used. At present, we shall
only give such properties of
as are necessary for
our immediate purposes, but in Part V (on series) we shall devote a
number (*205) to its properties.
In this number we also introduce the notation "" for "
."
"
" may be read "
begins
." If there is a single
beginning of
, this is
; otherwise the class of beginnings
is
, which =
. Thus
if
is the relation of father and son,
= Adam; if
is the relation of parent and child,
= Adam
and Eve.
will be the end of
, if there is one;
generally,
will be the class of ends,
i.e.
. The first generation of
is
. If
, any
generation of
is
, where
is the corresponding power of
.
The field of a relation consists, in general, not only of the
generations of , but also of another part, the part in which,
however far we go backwards, we never reach a beginning. This part is
. The two parts
and
are mutually exclusive, and together
exhaust
.
The two next numbers, *94 and *95, are hardly ever relevant in
subsequent propositions, and may therefore be omitted by any reader
who is not interested in their subject-matter. *94 deals with powers
of relative products. It is only used in the following number (*95),
on "equi-factor relations." The matter to be dealt with in this number
may be explained as follows. In dealing with correlations and similar
topics, we often wish to consider the series of relations
Now we have not yet at our command a definition of
, where
is any finite number; thus we cannot define a general term
of this series as
. We need therefore a
different method of definition. We have
and so on. Thus if
is any power of (
, a
general term of our series is
. For convenience of notation, we
put
[Pg 574]
Then our series consists of (
. The sum of all
relations of this class is considered in this number.
The principal propositions proved in *94 and *95 are two which have the
same hypothesis as the Schröder-Bernstein theorem, namely
These two propositions state that, with the above hypothesis,
The two combined reconstitute the Schröder-Bernstein theorem, since
Thus they present, so to speak, an itemized account of the equality
proved by the Schröder-Bernstein theorem.
*96, on the posterity of a term, is concerned with the properties
of , chiefly when
. In this case, in general,
consists of two parts,
first an open series and then a cyclic series. Either of these may
vanish, or may reduce to a single term. If we call the two parts
and
, the whole of
precedes the whole
of
, and
,
.
Thus if either
or
vanishes,
.
If
vanishes, the series never returns into itself,
that is,
.
If
exists, there is a definite power of
, say
, such that
. If
and
both exist, there is one term, namely the successor
of the last term of
, which has just two immediate
predecessors, one in
and one in
; every other
term of
has only one immediate
predecessor in
. Thus
is shaped like a
, with
at the tip of the tail.
[Pg 575]
*97 deals with the analysis of the field of a relation into families.
Taking any member of
, the family of
with
respect to
is
,
which we write
. Thus the
class of families is
.
Those families which contain a member of
are
.
If we regard
as arranged in a rectangle, in which the
generations are the successive rows, then
will be the columns. Thus the relation of
to
may be
regarded as a generalized form of the relation of rows and columns.
Under a suitable hypothesis, each row is a selection from the columns,
and each column a selection from the rows. This is expressed in the
following proposition:
whence we derive existence-theorems for selections in the cases
concerned.
The importance of the ideas dealt with in the present section is very
great. These ideas dominate the treatment of finite and infinite,
the theory of progressions and , and the transition
from series generated by one-one or many-one relations of consecutive
terms to series generated by transitive relations of before
and after. Wherever, in short, mathematical induction is used
the ideas treated in this section are required. The portions of our
subsequent work in which this section is most referred to are the two
sections on finite and infinite cardinals and ordinals (Part III,
Section C and Part V, Section E). In the general theory of cardinals,
i.e. in Part III, Sections A and B, before the distinction of
finite and infinite has been introduced, the present section will be
seldom if ever referred to[65].
[65]
The present section is based on the work of Frege, who
first defined the ancestral relation. See his Begriffsschrift
(Halle, 1879), Part III., pp. 55-87. Cf. also his
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol. I. (Jena, 1893), §§
45, 46 (pp. 59, 60). In this work the ancestral relation is used to
prove the properties of finite cardinals and .
[Pg 576]
Summary of *90.
If is any relation, "
" is to mean
"
is an ancestor of
with respect to
," where a term
counts as its own ancestor provided it belongs to the field of
.
The definition of
is as follows:
90·01.
That is, is to hold when
belongs to
the field of
, and
belongs to every hereditary class to
which
belongs; a hereditary class being a class
such that
, i.e. such that all successors of
's are
's.
This definition serves merely to decide the ambiguity
between and
, either of which might be meant of
. It will be shown, however, that the
two are equal (*90·132).
The most important propositions of this number are the following:
90·112.
I.e. if and if
is
a hereditary property belonging to
, then it belongs to
.
*90·12.
I.e. is reflexive throughout the field
of
, but not elsewhere.
*90·14
*90·15.
*90·151.
*90·16.
*90·163.
I.e. is a hereditary
class.
[Pg 577]
*90·17.
*90·21.
*90·22.
I.e. the classes that are hereditary with respect to
are the same as those that are hereditary with respect to
.
*90·31.
*90·32.
*90·33.
*90·4.
*90·01.
*90·02.
*90·1.
*90·101.
Dem.
*90·102 is a lemma for *90·11.
Dem.
*90·111.
Dem.
[Pg 578]
*90·12.
Dem.
*90·13.
Dem.
The following proposition is a lemma for *90·132.
*90·131.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 579]
In accordance with our general convention as regards suffixes,
and with the definition *90·02,
means
, not
(
.
*90·14.
Dem.
*90·141.
*90·15.
Dem.
Note that may be conveniently regarded as
the 0th power of
. By *50·64·65, when multiplied by
it
gives
; also it is contained in
,
,
etc. I has properties, as regards relational multiplication,
analogous to those of 1 in ordinary multiplication; thus to regard
as the 0th power of
is analogous to
regarding 1 as the 0th power of
, where
is a number.
*90·151.
Dem.
*90·16.
Dem.
[Pg 580]
*90·161
Dem.
*90·162
*90·163
This proposition is important, since it proves that
is a hereditary class.
*90·164
This proposition shows that is
a hereditary class.
*90·17
Note that means (
.
Dem.
*90·171
*90·172
Dem.
*90·18
Dem.
[Pg 581]
*90·21.
Dem.
*90·22.
Dem.
*90·23.
*90·23 is useful in the theory of sections of a series (*211). A
section of the series generated by is defined as a class
satisfying
*90·24.
Dem.
This proposition shows that if is a hereditary class which
contains
, then
contains all the descendants of
's.
*90·25.
Dem.
[Pg 582]
*90·26.
Dem.
*90·27.
Dem.
*90·31.
Dem.
In the last line of the above proof, the process is as
follows. Writing for
,
(2) becomes
, while (3) becomes
. Hence, by
(2) and (3),
Hence, by *90·112,
, which is the
proposition to be proved.
*90·311.
Dem.
[Pg 583]
*90·32.
Dem.
*90·33.
Dem.
*90·331.
*90·34.
*90·341.
*90·35.
Dem.
[Pg 584]
*90·351.
Dem.
*90·36.
*90·4.
Dem.
*90·41.
Dem.
*90·42.
Dem.
[Pg 585]
Summary of *91.
In the present number, we consider the class of relations
Each of these has to its predecessor the relation ; we have
Thus every term of the series has to
the relation (
; hence the powers of
may be defined
as those relations which have to
the relation (
. The series of powers starting with
instead of with
is similarly composed of
those relations which have to
the relation
. (This class consists of the previous
class together with
.) To say that the
relation
holds between
and
turns
out to be equivalent to saying that one of the relations
holds between
and
; and to say that the relation
holds between
and
turns out to be equivalent to saying that one of the relations
holds between
and
. Thus we might have begun by defining
powers of
, and proceeded to define
as
their sum.
For notational convenience we put
Then the definition of powers of
excluding
is
and the definition of powers of
including
is
(Here the letters "id" are added to suggest that identity is to be
added to
.)
We put also
[Pg 586]
Many of the propositions in this number are very often used. Among the more important propositions are the following:
*91·17.
*91·171.
*91·373.
These are formulae of induction. The first two state that if the
property is hereditary with respect to
, then if
belongs to
it belongs to any member
of
, while if
belongs to
it belongs
to any member of
. The third gives a form of induction
which is sometimes more powerful than the second. It states that if
is hereditary provided its argument is a power of
, and
if
, then every power of
satisfies
, and vice
versa.
*91·23.
*91·24.
These two propositions are very useful as giving relations of
and
.
*91·27.
*91·271.
We do not have in general .
If
is the sort of relation which generates a series (i.e.
is either itself serial, or such that
is serial),
the above would characterize a series without a first or last term. To
illustrate the matter, consider a series of four terms,
,
,
,
, and let
be the relation of immediately preceding
in this series. Thus
holds between
and
,
and
,
and
. Then
holds between
and
,
and
; thus
, which belongs to
, does not
belong to
.
holds only between
and
;
thus neither
nor
belongs to
. All powers
of
beyond the third are null. On the other hand, if we take a
cyclic relation, such as that of left-hand neighbour at a dinner-table,
we shall always have
,
whatever power of
may be.
*91·282.
This proposition shows that is a hereditary class with
respect to
.
*91·34.
This proposition states that the relative product is commutative when
each factor is or a power of
.
We come next to propositions concerning . We have
*91·502.
[Pg 587]
*91·504.
*91·511.
*91·52.
*91·54.
*91·52·54 are fundamental in the theory of inductive relations.
*91·542.
This proposition is particularly useful when (as often happens)
we have . In that case, it gives
.
*91·55.
*91·56.
Thus is always transitive, which is one of the three
characteristics of serial relations (cf. *204). We shall find that
is often serial when
is not so.
*91·574.
*91·602.
*91·01.
*91·02.
*91·03.
*91·04.
*91·05.
The first two of the above definitions are introduced merely for
notational convenience. The other three represent ideas of great
importance. The last is especially useful when a series is given as the
field of a one-one relation between consecutive terms—as, e.g.,
when the series of natural numbers is given as the field of the
relation of to
. Then
is the relation
of any earlier term to any later term—e.g., in the above case
of the natural numbers, the relation of a less integer to a greater.
*91·1.
Dem.
[Pg 588]
*91·12.
*91·13.
*91·14.
*91·15.
*91·16.
*91·17.
*91·171.
These propositions are of great importance, because they enable us to
prove that a property belongs to every power of
if it
belongs to
(or
) and also belongs to
whenever it belongs to
.
*91·2.
Dem.
*91·201.
*91·204.
Dem.
*91·205.
*91·21.
Dem.
[Pg 589]
*91·211
*91·212
Dem.
*91·213
*91·22
*91·221
*91·23
Dem.
*91·231
*91·24
Dem.
*91·241
Dem.
The last line of the above proof is obtained as follows: writing
for
(1) becomes
But by *91·11, writing for the
of *91·11, and
for the
, we have
Hence, by (1) and (2), , i.e.
which is the proposition to be proved.
[Pg 590]
*91·242.
Dem.
*91·25.
Dem.
*91·251.
*91·26.
*91·261.
*91·262.
*91·263.
*91·264.
*91·27.
Dem.
[Pg 591]
Dem.
*91·28.
*91·281.
*91·282.
*91·283.
The following propositions show that the relative product of two powers
of is commutative, i.e. (cf. *91·34)
We also have (cf. *91·341)
It is these propositions (as will appear in the sequel) which are the source of the commutative law for the addition of finite ordinals. Ordinals in general are not commutative, just as relative products in general are not commutative; but owing to the fact that relative products whose factors are powers of a given relation are commutative, finite ordinals are commutative.
*91·3.
Dem.
*91·301.
*91·302.
Dem.
[Pg 592]
*91·303.
*91·304.
*91·31.
*91·33.
Dem.
*91·331.
Dem.
Dem.
This is the commutative law for the relative product of two powers of
.
Dem.
[Pg 593]
*91·342.
Dem.
*91·343.
*91·35.
*91·351.
*91·352.
*91·36.
*91·37.
Dem.
*91·371.
*91·372.
*91·373.
*91·41.
*91·411.
*91·42.
*91·421.
*91·43.
Dem.
[Pg 594]
*91·431.
*91·44.
Dem.
*91·45.
Dem.
*91·46.
The remainder of this number is concerned with and
its relations to
.
*91·502.
*91·503.
*91·504.
Dem.
The following propositions are concerned mainly with the relations of
and
. These relations are
embodied in the propositions
[Pg 595]
*91·51.
Dem.
*91·511.
*91·512.
Dem.
*91·513.
Dem.
*91·514.
Dem.
[Pg 596]
*91·52.
*91·521.
Dem.
*91·522.
*91·53.
Dem.
*91·54.
*91·541.
*91·542.
*91·543.
Dem.
*91·544.
*91·545.
[Pg 597]
*91·546.
Dem.
*91·56.
Dem.
*91·561.
*91·562.
*91·57.
*91·571.
*91·572.
*91·573.
*91·574.
Dem.
*91·575.
Dem.
*91·58.
*91·581.
*91·59.
Dem.
[Pg 598]
*91·6.
Dem.
*91·601.
Dem.
*91·602.
Dem.
*91·603.
Dem.
*91·62.
[Pg 599]
This formula should be compared with *90·11, in which an
analogous formula is given for . It will
be observed that here we do not require to add
,
for if
, the above formula leads
to
, i.e. to
. Hence
,
i.e.
.
It will be observed that
holds whenever
belongs to every hereditary class which contains the immediate
successors of
, whereas
holds whenever
belongs to every hereditary class to which
itself belongs.
*91·7.
*91·71.
Dem.
*91·711.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in the theory of minimum points in a series (*205·68).
*91·72.
Dem.
*91·721.
Dem.
By means of *91·73 or *91·731, the powers of can often be
arranged in a series, the rule of arrangement being that
comes
earlier than
if[Pg 600]
, and later in the converse case.
But we shall only get an open series from this arrangement if
;
otherwise the powers from a certain point onwards form a cyclic series.
*91·732.
Dem.
*91·74.
*91·75.
Dem.
[Pg 601]
Summary of *92.
If , it follows that, starting from
a given term
, there is only one series of terms
such that
Thus for example the relation of son to father is a ;
and starting from a given man, the series of ancestors
in the direct male line (which is the above series
,
,
,...) is unique and determinate. A result of this
property of many-one relations is that if, starting from a term
,
we go backwards a certain number of steps to a term
, and then
forward a greater number of steps to a term
, we must pass through
in going from
to
; while if the number of steps from
to
is less than that from
to
,
must lie
on the road from
to
. These facts are expressed by the
proposition:
In the present number, we have to establish various propositions of this kind.
We prove in this number various propositions which are used in the discussion of "families" in *96 and *97, and some which are used in the theory of finite and infinite. But on the whole the propositions of this number are not much used. The most important of them are the following:
*92·11.
with a similar proposition (*92·111) for .
*92·132.
with a similar proposition (*92·133) for .
*92·14.
On this proposition, compare the remarks on *91·271 in the introduction
to *91. If is a serial relation,
is the condition that the series may have no last term.
*92·31.
*92·311.
[Pg 602]
*92·1.
Dem.
*92·101.
*92·102.
*92·11.
Dem.
*92·112.
*92·113.
*92·12.
*92·121.
*92·13.
Dem.
*92·131.
In this number, when proofs have been given for ,
we shall omit the proofs of corresponding propositions
for
, as these are always exactly
analogous to the proofs for
.
*92·132.
[Pg 603]
*92·14.
Dem.
*92·141.
*92·142.
Dem.
*92·143.
*92·144.
Dem.
*92·145.
*92·146.
Dem.
*92·147.
*92·15.
[Pg 604]
*92·151.
*92·152.
*92·153.
*92·16.
Dem.
*92·161.
*92·17.
Dem.
*92·171.
*92·18.
Dem.
*92·181.
[Pg 605]
*92·19.
Dem.
*92·191.
*92·3.
Dem.
*92·301.
Dem.
*92·311.
[Pg 606]
*92·312.
*92·32.
Dem.
*92·33.
Dem.
*92·34.
Dem.
[Pg 607]
Summary of *93.
For this number, we introduce three new notations, of which the first
two will be used constantly, especially in the theory of series, while
the third will be seldom used except in the present section. The two
which are constantly used are
i.e.
is a member of
and of
, and no member of
precedes
in
.
The letter may be regarded as standing for "begins." Thus if we
take any member
of
, and proceed backwards and forwards as
far as possible by
-steps, we obtain a series which may be called
the "family" of
: this series, if it has a first term, has one
which is a member of
; thus the members of
are the beginners of families. For example,
if
is the relation of a peer to his heir, "
" will mean
"
is a peer who is not the heir of a peer"; thus
is the
first of his family. If
is the relation of parent and child,
"
" will be satisfied only by Adam and Eve; and so for other
relations.
The definition of is
Hence
. If
is
the generating relation of a series which has a first term, that first
term is
; if there is a last term it is
.
If is any class, we may call a term
a minimum
of
with respect to
if it is a member of
and
of
, but does not follow any member of
, i.e.
is not a member of
. We denote this relation of
to
by "
"; thus we have
and the definition of
is
[Pg 608]
We shall also, when convenient, write "" in place of
"
."
We have .
If is serial,
reduces
to a single term if it is not null; thus if a class
has a
first term, this term is
. We also put
and then
, if it exists, is the last
term of
in the
-series. Thus if
is the class of peers, and
is the relation of father
to son,
consists
of those peers who are the first of their line, while
consists of those peers who
are the last of their line. If
is a class of numbers, and
is the relation of less to greater,
is the smallest member of
(if it exists), and
is the largest (if it exists).
and "
" and "
" will be used constantly in connection with
series, where the two latter will be considered in detail, but the present number
is more specially concerned with a less general idea, namely that of generations.
Take, e.g., the relation of parent and child; let us call it
. Then
the first generation consists of those who are parents but not children,
i.e.
; the second consists of those who are children but not grandchildren,
i.e.
, i.e.
, i.e.
;
the third consists of those
who are grandchildren but not great-grandchildren, i.e.
, i.e.
, i.e.
; and so on. Also we
have
hence the generations of
are
. Thus we
put
where "
" stands for "generation."
When is a one-many relation, such as that of father and son,
every generation is of the form
,
where
is a power of
(including
).
When
is not a one-many relation, this is not in general the case.
The generations of do not in general exhaust the field of
. For
will only belong to a generation of
if
can be reached by successive
-steps starting from a member of
. If some of the families constituting the
field of
have no beginning, the members of these families will
not belong to any generation of
. Such terms together constitute
the class
which is the same class.
[Pg 609]
Thus the field of may be divided into two mutually exclusive
portions,
and
.
The present number begins with some elementary properties of
and
and
. We then (*93·2—·275)
consider such properties of generations as do not demand any hypothesis
as to
. We prove
*93·25.
*93·261.
and we prove (*93·274·275) that and
are mutually exclusive, and together
constitute
. We then proceed to a set of propositions
(*93·3—·41) demanding that P should be one-many or many-one or
one-one. We prove
*93·32.
*93·36.
*93·381.
and various other properties of and
when
.
The propositions of this number are used throughout the rest of this section; they are also used in the cardinal theory of finite and infinite. The early propositions, down to *93·12 inclusive, are also used in the theory of series.
*93·01.
*93·02.
*93·021.
*93·03.
*93·1.
*93·101.
*93·102.
*93·103.
Dem.
[Pg 610]
*93·104.
Dem.
*93·11.
*93·111.
*93·112.
Dem.
*93·113.
*93·114.
*93·115.
*93·116.
*93·117.
*93·118.
*93·13.
*93·131.
Dem.
[Pg 611]
*93·132.
Dem.
*93·21.
*93·22.
*93·221.
*93·23.
Dem.
*93·231.
Dem.
*93·24.
Dem.
[Pg 612]
*93·25.
Dem.
*93·26.
Dem.
*93·261.
Dem.
*93·27.
[Pg 613]
Dem.
*93·271.
Dem.
*93·272.
Dem.
*93·274.
Dem.
*93·31.
Dem.
[Pg 614]
*93·32.
*93·33.
*93·34.
*93·35.
Dem.
*93·36.
Dem.
*93·37.
*93·38.
Dem.
[Pg 615]
*93·381.
*93·382.
*93·4.
Dem.
*93·412.
Dem.
*93·42.
Dem.
*93·431.
Dem.
[Pg 616]
The following propositions, not being needed in subsequent propositions, are here inserted without proof, merely for the sake of their intrinsic interest.
*93·5.
*93·51.
*93·52.
*93·53.
*93·54.
*93·55.
*93·56.
[Pg 617]
Summary of *94.
In this number we shall be chiefly concerned with propositions
connecting powers of with powers of
. If
is a power of
,
will be a power of
.
If
is a power of
, it is a product of the
form
If we transfer the initial to the end, we get a power of
.
Thus there is a power of
, say
, such that
If , we find
by rearranging and observing that
. Thus
Expressions of the form are constantly
needed. They will be specially dealt with in *150, and will occur
constantly in the sequel.
The above connections of and
are embodied in the following propositions:
*94·14.
*94·21.
*94·31.
From *94·4 to *94·54, the propositions are all concerned with
and
. We prove
*94·5.
*94·51.
[Pg 618]
Finally we prove (*94·53·54) that if either is one-one
and
, or
is one-one and
,
then
is similar to
.
The only proposition of this number which is ever subsequently referred to is the last, *94·64, which, owing to the fact that the Schröder-Bernstein theorem has been already proved (*73·88), is only used in *95·23. But *95·23 itself is never referred to again. The reader may therefore omit the reading of the propositions of this number (as also of *95) without detriment to the understanding of what follows; he should, however, read the summaries.
The chief importance of the propositions in the present number is
when and
fulfil the hypothesis of the Schröder-Bernstein
theorem, i.e.
In this case, gives what we may call a "reflexion" of
into part of itself; this part may be again reflected by
into a part of itself, and so on. The terms in
which are eliminated sooner or later by this process of reflexion
constitute
, since any one reflexion
eliminates terms which constitute one generation of
.
The terms not eliminated by any number of reflexions constitute
. These two sets of terms together
constitute
, i.e.
. In
this number and *95 we shall prove that, with the Schröder-Bernstein
hypothesis,
These two propositions together yield a proof of the Schröder-Bernstein theorem, in virtue of *93·274·275. This proof is essentially the same as Bernsteinʻs published originally by Borel[66].
The nature of the two proofs of the Schröder-Bernstein theorem, namely Zermelo's (that given in *73) and Bernstein's (that to be given in this number and *95) will be best apprehended by means of figures.
In Zermelo's proof, we first prove that if is one-one, and
is a class contained in
and containing
, then
is similar both to
and to
. In the figure, the points of the outer
rectangle form
, those of the[Pg 619] inner rectangle form
, and those of the outer oval form
. Thus the
shaded portion of the figure is
. We now define
a class of classes
by the following characteristics:
is a member of
if (1)
is contained in
, (2)
contains the whole of the shaded area,
(3)
, i.e. if
is a
member of
, so is any term to which
has the relation
. Our proposition is obtained by considering
,
i.e. the area common to all the members of
. We
prove (*73·81) that
and (*73·811) that
does not contain any of the shaded area. In
the figure,
is the smaller oval. We then
prove (*73·83) that
consists entirely of the shaded
portion and the smaller oval. Hence
(the larger oval)
consists of two mutually exclusive parts, namely
and
, the latter being that part of the
inner rectangle which lies outside the inner oval. Assuming now that
is one-one,
is similar to
;
hence, adding
, it follows that
is similar to
, and therefore to
.
In order to obtain hence the Schröder-Bernstein theorem, it is
only necessary to replace by
and
by
, and to assume further that
is a one-one whose
domain contains
. Then
,
and we obtain (*73·87)
, and
therefore
, which was to be proved.
In Bernstein's proof, we have the two relations and
from the beginning. In the left-hand part of the figure, the
outer rectangle is
, which =
, the oval is
, and the second rectangle is
. Thus the points of the outer but not the
second rectangle form the first generation of
. Within
we can form a third rectangle, which will
be
, i.e.
. The points belonging to the second
rectangle but not to the third form the second generation of
. We can proceed in this way to continually smaller
rectangles. The points which sooner or later are left outside
some rectangle form
; those which are
common to all the rectangles form
.
A similar analysis,[Pg 620] exhibited in the right-hand part of the
figure, may be applied to
, which is thus divided
into
and
.
We prove in this number (*94·53) that, with a hypothesis
which is part of the hypothesis of the Schröder-Bernstein
theorem,
;
in the next number (*95·71) we prove that with the hypothesis of the
Schröder-Bernstein theorem,
.
Hence by addition,
.
*94·12.
Dem.
*94·13.
*94·14.
Dem.
*94·2.
Dem.
[Pg 621]
*94·201.
Dem.
*94·21.
Dem.
*94·22.
Dem.
[Pg 622]
*94·3.
Dem.
*94·31.
The following series of propositions lead up to the proof that when
, or
, we have
Dem.
[Pg 623]
*94·401.
Dem.
Dem.
*94·41.
Dem.
*94·42.
Dem.
*94·43.
*94·441.
*94·442.
*94·5.
Dem.
[Pg 624]
*94·51.
*94·52.
Dem.
*94·6.
Dem.
*94·61.
Dem.
*94·62.
Dem.
[Pg 625]
*94·63.
Dem.
Dem.
[66] Leçons sur la théorie des fonctions (Paris, 1898), Note I (pp. 102-7).
[Pg 626]
Summary of *95.
The purpose of this number may be explained as follows. Consider the
series of relations
it is required to find a means of defining this series without the use
of numbers. If we used numbers, and had the definition given later
(*301) of
where
is any finite integer, the general
term of the series would be
. But we have
not yet defined numbers, and we therefore desire some means, not
involving numbers, of expressing what is intended when we say that,
in a given term of the series, the same power of
and of
is to be involved. This we do as follows. Using the definition of
in *43, we have
Thus the general term of our series is got by taking any power of
(
, and forming
. The whole of the terms of the
series are therefore constituted by the terms which have to
the
relation (
; i.e. they are
. For convenience
of notation we put[67]
Thus the class of relations we wish to consider is
(.
To illustrate the nature of (, suppose
is the relation "first cousin," while
is the relation of child
to parent and
is the relation of parent to child. Then
is the relation "second cousin,"
is
the relation "third cousin," and so on. Thus (
is the class
of all relations of cousinship which do not involve a difference of
generation; and "
" will mean
"
is a cousin of
in the same generation."
Most of the propositions in this number are inserted because they are
required in the proof of *95·52, which states that, under suitable
circumstances, .
This proposition itself is proved mainly because it is required in the
proof of *95·63, which states that, if
,
are one-one's each
of which has its converse domain contained in its domain, and if the[Pg 627]
first generation of
is similar to the first generation of
,
then the sum of the generations of
is similar to the sum of the
generations of
. This leads immediately to a proposition (*95·71)
which is half of the Schröder-Bernstein theorem (the other half being
*94·53 or *94·54), namely: "If
and
are one-one's each of
which has its converse domain contained in the domain of the other,
then the sum of the generations of
is similar to the sum of
the generations of
."
*95·01. (
*95·1.
Dem.
Dem.
*95·12.
Dem.
*95·13.
*95·131.
Dem.
[Pg 628]
*95·132.
*95·14.
Dem.
The use of *95·11 in the last line of the above proof proceeds by
substituting for
.
*95·21.
Dem.
*95·211.
Dem.
*95·212.
*95·22.
[Pg 629]
*95·221.
Dem.
*95·222.
Dem.
*95·24.
*95·3.
Dem.
*95·301.
*95·302.
Dem.
*95·303.
*95·304.
*95·305.
[Pg 630]
Dem.
*95·32.
*95·33.
Dem.
*95·34.
*95·35.
*95·351.
Dem.
*95·352.
*95·36.
Dem.
[Pg 631]
*95·361.
*95·37.
*95·38.
Dem.
*95·381.
*95·382.
Dem.
*95·383.
*95·4.
Dem.
[Pg 632]
*95·41.
*95·411.
*95·42.
Dem.
*95·43.
Dem.
*95·431.
Dem.
*95·44.
[Pg 633]
Dem.
*95·45.
Dem.
*95·46.
Dem.
*95·47.
Dem.
[Pg 634]
*95·471.
*95·51.
Dem.
*95·511.
Dem.
*95·6.
[Pg 635]
Dem.
*95·601.
*95·61.
*95·62.
Dem.
*95·64.
The following example may illustrate the scope of *95·65. Let ,
be the generating relations of two well-ordered series, neither
of which has a last term. Put
. Then
is the relation of immediately preceding in the
-series, and
is the relation of immediately preceding in the
-series. We
shall have
[Pg 636]
Also, except in certain exceptional cases,
,
are the first derivatives of the two series
(including the first terms of the two series).
states that, starting from any term of the series and going backwards, a finite
number of steps will bring us to a member of the first derivative, which is
true. Hence, by *95·65, neglecting certain exceptional cases, we arrive at
the result that if the first derivatives of two well-ordered series have the
same cardinal number of terms, then the series themselves have the same
cardinal number of terms. This proposition can of course be proved otherwise;
the above is merely mentioned as an illustration of the results of
*95·65.
*95·7.
Dem.
Dem.
This proposition and *94·53 or *94·54 together reconstitute the
Schröder-Bernstein theorem (*73·88). For, in virtue of *93·274·275 and
*73·71, they together give
and with this hypothesis
[67]
This notation is used in the present number only. In
*257, we shall introduce a different and wholly unconnected meaning for
(. A temporary definition is indicated by the
letters "
" followed by a reference in square brackets to
the number or numbers in which the definition is used.
[Pg 637]
Summary of *96.
By the "posterity" of a term with respect to a relation
we mean the class
.
In the present number, we shall be chiefly concerned with
the relation (
, i.e. the relation
confined
to the posterity of
. We shall also be concerned with
(
and (
,
which, as is proved in *96·13, are respectively
The most interesting case is when . In this case,
is in
general shaped like a
, with
at the tip of the tail; that
is,
may be divided into two
parts, the first an open series, the second a closed series. If
is the junction of the two, we shall have
We have also, when ,
It thus appears that
is divided into two parts, the first consisting of those terms
for which
, the second of those
for which
. The first wholly precedes the
second; the first exists if
, the
second if
.
Every term in
has one and only
one immediate predecessor, except the term (if it exists) at the
junction of the tail and circle of the
; this term has just
two immediate predecessors, one in the tail and one in the circle.
But if either the tail or the circle is null, then every term in
has only one immediate predecessor,
and therefore
[Pg 638]
(these definitions being only to apply within *96). Then
is
the open part of the series
,
and
is the circular part. The open part wholly precedes the
circular part, provided
; i.e.
If and
both exist,
has a last
term, say
. The successor of this term,
, is the
only term in
which has two
immediate predecessors in
,
namely
and
.
The most important applications of the propositions of the
present number are in the theory of finite and infinite, both
cardinal and ordinal. When is many-one, then if
exists, or, more generally, if
has a last term,
is a finite class,
i.e. what we shall call a "
" (cf.
*120). That is, we have
If exists, but has no last term,
is a progression (cf.
*122) when its terms are arranged in the order generated by
.
That is, giving to
and
the meanings given by
Cantor (cf. *123 and *263), and using "
" for the class
of one-one relations which generate progressions, we have
Another very important proposition in the proof of which the
present number is useful is *121·47, which proves that if
is either one-many or many-one, and
and
are any two
terms whatever, then
(which we call the "interval" from
to
) is always a finite
class. The proof that progressions are well-ordered series depends upon
the propositions of this number, since it uses *122·23, which depends
upon *96·52.
The present number begins with a series of propositions (ending with
*96·16) on and
, both in general and when
. We then proceed to a few
propositions (*96·2-·25) on (
when
; with
the exception of *96·24, these propositions are all used in the
cardinal theory of finite and infinite. They are, however, less
important than the subsequent propositions, which are concerned with
[Pg 639]
when
.
If is a many-one relation, and x is a member of
, the relation
in general arranges
(i.e. the posterity
of
) in a figure such as is here given. The relation
holds
between each dot and the next, starting from
, and travelling
round the circle in the sense indicated by the arrow. The dots from
to
constitute
, and the dots in the circle
constitute
.
is the last term of
,
i.e.
;
is
, and
is
, or,
what comes to the same thing,
.
is the only term which has more than one immediate predecessor
in
;
always exists if
neither
nor
is null, and conversely, if
exists, neither
nor
is null. The proof of these
propositions is long; the following are useful stages in the proof.
If , the whole posterity of
is
itself (*96·33); if
and
,
and
constitute the whole posterity of
(*96·331), and so on. The successors of members of
belong to
(*96·341), and the predecessors of members of
, if they belong to
,
belong to
(*96·351). (It should be observed that,
since
is only assumed to be many-one, not one-one,
every member of
may have any number of predecessors which do not belong to
. We have a series
of propositions, beginning with *96·4, which deal with the
hypothesis
. We prove (*96·42) that if
and
, then
, i.e.
belongs to
. We prove (*96·431) that
wholly
precedes
; that (
and
(
are both one-one (*96·45), so that if
, one of
and
must belong to
and the other to
(*96·441). Hence it follows (*96·453)
that if either
(in which case
or (
(in which case
,
then (
is
a one-one relation. (This proposition is used twice in the cardinal
theory of finite and infinite, namely in *121·43 and *122·17.) Hence we
arrive at the proposition (*96·47) that if two different members
and
of
both immediately
precede a term
, then one of
and
(say
) is the
last term of
,
is its immediate successor and
is
the immediate predecessor of
in
, i.e. we have
Thus
,
,
are unique if they exist. We prove next
(*96·475) that
,
,
exist when, and only when, neither
nor
is null.
It follows from the above propositions that if is one-one, either
or
must be null (*96·491), i.e. the
posterity of a term is either an open series or a cycle, and cannot
have the
-shape.
[Pg 640]
*96·01.
*96·02.
*96·1.
*96·101.
*96·102.
*96·103.
Dem.
*96·104.
Dem.
*96·11.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 641]
*96·112.
Dem.
*96·121.
*96·122.
*96·131.
*96·14.
*96·141.
Dem.
*96·142.
*96·143.
Dem.
*96·144.
Dem.
[Pg 642]
*96·15.
Dem.
*96·151.
Dem.
*96·152.
*96·153.
*96·154.
*96·155.
Dem.
*96·156.
Dem.
*96·157.
*96·158.
Dem.
[Pg 643]
*96·159.
Dem.
Dem.
*96·21.
Dem.
*96·22.
Dem.
*96·23.
Dem.
[Pg 644]
Dem.
Dem.
The following propositions lead up to *96·32, i.e.
which is a proposition used in the following number (*97).
*96·3·301·302·303 are also frequently used elsewhere.
*96·3.
*96·301.
*96·302.
*96·303.
*95·31.
*96·311.
Dem.
[Pg 645]
Dem.
Dem.
This process of proof can obviously be extended to any finite cycle of terms.
*96·34.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 646]
*96·342.
*96·35.
Dem.
*96·352.
The following propositions are lemmas for *96·45·47.
Dem.
*96·401.
Dem.
*96·402.
Dem.
*96·403.
Dem.
[Pg 647]
*96·41.
Dem.
Dem.
*96·421.
Dem.
Dem.
*96·432.
Dem.
[Pg 648]
*96·44.
Dem.
*96·442.
The following proposition (*96·45) is important.
*96·451.
*96·452.
Dem.
Dem.
*96·46.
[Pg 649]
Dem.
*96·461.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 650]
The above proposition, since it exhibits ,
,
as
functions of
and
, shows that there is at most one
in
having more than one
immediate predecessor, and that this one has exactly one immediate
predecessor in
and one in
. (These results
require *96·441, in addition to *96·462.) Thus we arrive at the
following proposition:
We still have to prove
or, what comes to the same thing because of *96·441,
This is effected in the following propositions.
*96·472.
Dem.
*96·473.
*96·474.
Dem.
[Pg 651]
This proposition and *96·45·47 embody the main results of this number.
*96·48.
Dem.
In the above proposition we write
"" rather than
"
," because the latter implies the
existence of
.
*96·49.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 652]
*96·492.
Dem.
The above proposition is used in *122·52.
The following propositions, not being needed in the sequel, are merely stated:
*96·5.
Dem.
*96·501.
*96·502.
Dem.
*96·51.
[Pg 653]
Dem.
Dem.
The proposition is used in *122·23.
[Pg 654]
Summary of *97.
In this number, we consider not only the posterity
of a term, but the ancestry and posterity together,
i.e. .
We put
Thus the whole family of a term, i.e. its ancestry and posterity
together, is . The most
important case here is when
; in this case
families are mutually exclusive, i.e. we have
In case and
belongs to
a family which has a beginning, i.e. in case
, the whole family of
consists of the
posterity of the beginning, i.e. we have
whence
*97·21.
When , the relation of
to
may be pictured as the relation of rows to columns. E.g.
let the field of
consist of the dots in the accompanying
rectangle, and let each dot have the relation
to the dot
below it. Then the top row is
, the second
[Pg 655]row is
, the third is
,
and so on; thus the rows are the generations of
. Again,
if
is any dot in the top row, the column beginning
with
is
,
and if
is any member of this column, the column is
. Thus the columns are
the families of
. It will be seen that in the case represented
by the above figure, every family consists of a selection from the
generations, and every generation consists of a selection from the
families, i.e.
The circumstances under which this occurs will be considered in the present number (*97·3—·47). The results are summed up in *97·47.
The remaining propositions (*97·5—·58) are concerned with
circular families of one-one relations. If ,
is a
circular family if
. In that case, we have
; moreover there is a
definite power of
, say
, such that every member of the
family of
has the relation
to itself (*97·54). (The same
will hold, of course, of all powers of
.) The families of a
are all either circular or open, i.e. we have
(*97·55) either
,
or
.
The
-shaped families considered in *96 are
not possible for a
, since in such families the
term at the junction of the tail and the circle has two predecessors.
The family of any member of
must be open (*97·57).
The family of a member of
need not be
closed, but cannot have a beginning; if open, it forms a series of
type
or
,
according as it has or has not an end[68].
Finite open families are contained in
; families of type
are contained
in
; those of
type
, in
;
those of type
and circular families are contained in
.
Those of type
are distinguished
from circular families by the fact that in the former we do not have
, while in the latter we do have this.
In addition to the propositions already mentioned, the most useful propositions of the present number are the following:
*97·13.
*97·17.
*97·5.
*97·501.
[Pg 656]
*97·01.
Observe that "" means that
is to be included
if it is a member of
, but not otherwise; for
if
, and otherwise
.
*97·1.
Dem.
*97·101.
Dem.
*97·11.
Dem.
*97·111.
\text{D}em.
*97·12.
Dem.
[Pg 657]
*97·13.
Note. is to mean (
, not (
.
The latter is unmeaning, since
is never a homogeneous relation, and therefore its square and higher
powers are unmeaning.
Dem.
*97·14.
*97·15.
Dem.
*97·16.
Dem.
*97·17.
Dem.
*97·18.
[Pg 658]
Dem.
*97·2.
Dem.
*97·21.
Dem.
*97·22.
*97·23.
[Pg 659]
Dem.
*97·231.
Dem.
*97·24.
Dem.
*97·241.
Dem.
*97·242.
[Pg 660]
The remaining propositions of this number (except *97·5 ff.) are
concerned with proving that, under certain hypotheses,
These propositions have the merit of proving the existence of selections in the cases to which they apply.
Dem.
*97·301.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 661]
*97·32.
*97·33.
Dem.
*97·34.
Dem.
*97·341.
*97·35.
[Pg 662]
Dem.
*97·36.
*97·37.
Dem.
*97·38.
Dem.
*97·4.
Dem.
*97·401.
Dem.
*97·402.
Dem.
[Pg 663]
*97·403.
Dem.
*97·41.
*97·42.
Dem.
*97·43.
Dem.
[Pg 664]
*97·44.
Dem.
*97·45.
Dem.
Dem.
[Pg 665]
Dem.
Dem.
*97·501.
*97·51.
*97·52.
[Pg 666]
*97·53.
Dem.
*97·56.
Dem.
It follows from this proposition that every family is either wholly
contained in the generations of or wholly contained in
, which may be called the residue of
the field of
.
[68]
Here the type "" is the
type of converses of relations of type
, i.e. the
type of the negative integers in order of magnitude, ending with
,
being the type of the positive integers in order of
magnitude, and therefore
being
the type of negative and positive integers in order of magnitude.
CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
All items in the Errata, from all three volumes, have been added and corrected accordingly.
The author's notation as ‘*2·37·38’ is an abbreviation for *2·37 and *2·38. For this reason, these numbers were not considered in the cross-references.
The lemma *84.44 cited on page 326 was not described by the authors in the corresponding section.