*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10860 ***

EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY

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THE GRACCHI MARIUS AND SULLA

BY

A.H. BEESLEY

WITH MAPS

1921




PREFACE


It would be scarcely possible for anyone writing on the period
embraced in this volume, to perform his task adequately without making
himself familiar with Mr. Long's 'History of the Decline of the Roman
Republic' and Mommsen's 'History of Rome.' To do over again (as though
the work had never been attempted) what has been done once for all
accurately and well, would be mere prudery of punctiliousness. But
while I acknowledge my debt of gratitude to both these eminent
historians, I must add that for the whole period I have carefully
examined the original authorities, often coming to conclusions widely
differing from those of Mr. Long. And I venture to hope that from
the advantage I have had in being able to compare the works of two
writers, one of whom has well-nigh exhausted the theories as the
other has the facts of the subject, I have succeeded in giving a more
consistent and faithful account of the leaders and legislation of the
revolutionary era than has hitherto been written. Certainly there
could be no more instructive commentary on either history than the
study of the other, for each supplements the other and emphasizes
its defects. If Mommsen at times pushes conjecture to the verge of
invention, as in his account of the junction of the Helvetii and
Cimbri, Mr. Long, in his dogged determination never to swerve from
facts to inference, falls into the opposite extreme, resorting to
somewhat Cyclopean architecture in his detestation of stucco. But
my admiration for his history is but slightly qualified by such
considerations, and to any student who may be stimulated by the
volumes of this series to acquire what would virtually amount to an
acquaintance first-hand with the narratives of ancient writers, I
would say 'Read Mr. Long's history.' To do so is to learn not only
knowledge but a lesson in historical study generally. For the writings
of a man with whom style is not the first object are as refreshing as
his scorn for romancing history is wholesome, and the grave irony with
which he records its slips amusing.

A.H.B.




CONTENTS.


CHAPTER I.

ANTECEDENTS OF THE REVOLUTION.

Previous history of the Roman orders--The Ager Publicus--Previous
attempts at agrarian legislation--Roman slavery--The first Slave
War--The Nobiles, Optimates, Populares, Equites--Classification of the
component parts of the Roman State--State of the transmarine provinces


CHAPTER II.

TIBERIUS GRACCHUS.

Scipio Aemilianus--Tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus--His agrarian
proposals--Wisdom of them--Grievances of the possessors--Octavius
thwarts Gracchus--Conduct of Gracchus defended--His other intended
reforms--He stands again for the tribunate--His motives--His murder


CHAPTER III.

CAIUS GRACCHUS.

Blossius spared--The law of T. Gracchus carried out--Explanation
of Italian opposition to it--Attitude of Scipio Aemilianus--His
murder--Quaestorship of Caius Gracchus--The Alien Act of
Pennus--Flaccus proposes to give the Socii the franchise--Revolt and
extirpation of Fregellae--Tribunate of Caius Gracchus--Compared to
Tiberius--His aims--His Corn Law defended--His Lex Judiciaria--His law
concerning the taxation of Asia--His conciliation of the equites--His
colonies--He proposes to give the franchise to the Italians--Other
projects--Machinations of the nobles against him--M. Livius Drusus
outbids him--Stands again for the tribunate, but is rejected--His
murder--Some of his laws remain in force--The Maria Lex--Reactionary
legislation of the Senate--The Lex Thoria--All offices confined to a
close circle


CHAPTER IV.

THE JUGURTHINE WAR.

Legacy of Attalus--Aristonicus usurps his kingdom--Settlement of
Asia--Jugurtha murders Hiempsal and attacks Adherbal--His intrigues
at Rome and the infamy of M. Aemilius Scaurus and the other Roman
nobles--Three commissions bribed by Jugurtha--Adherbal murdered--Rome
declares war and Jugurtha bribes the Roman generals, Bestia and
Scaurus--Memmius denounces them at Rome--Jugurtha summoned to Rome,
where he murders Massiva--He defeats Aulus Albinos--Metellus sent
against him Jugurtha defeated on the Muthul--Keeps up a guerilla
warfare--Marius stands for the consulship, and succeeds
Metellus--Bocchus betrays Jugurtha to Sulla--Settlement of Numidia


CHAPTER V.

THE CIMBRI AND TEUTONES.

Recommencement of the Social struggle at Rome--Marius the popular
hero--Incessant frontier-warfare of the Romans--The Cimbri defeat
Carbo and Silanus--Caepio and 'The Gold of Tolosa'--The Cimbri defeat
Scaurus and Caepio--Marius elected consul--The Cimbri march towards
Spain--Their nationality--Their plan of operations--Plan of
Marius--Battle of Aquae Sextiae--Battle of Vercellae


CHAPTER VI.

THE ROMAN ARMY.

Second Slave War--Aquillius ends it--Changes in the Roman
army--Uniform equipment of the legionary--Mariani muli--The cohort
the tactical unit--The officers--Numbers of the legion--The pay--The
praetorian cohort--Dislike to service--The army becomes professional


CHAPTER VII.

SATURNINUS AND DRUSUS.

Saturninus takes up the Gracchan policy, in league with Glaucia and
Marius--The Lex Servilia meant to relieve the provincials, conciliate
the equites, and throw open the judicia to all citizens--Agrarian law
of Saturninus--His laws about grain and treason--Murder of Memmius,
Glaucia's rival--Saturninus is attacked and deserted by Marius--The
Lex Licinia Minucia heralds the Social War--Drusus attempts
reform--Obliged to tread in the steps of the Gracchi--His proposals
with regard to the Italians, the coinage, corn, colonies and the
equites--Opposed by Philippus and murdered


CHAPTER VIII.

THE SOCIAL WAR.

Interests of Italian capitalists and small farmers opposed--The Social
War breaks out at Asculum--The insurgents choose Corfinium as their
capital--In the first year they gain everywhere--Then the Lex Julia is
passed and in the second year they lose everywhere--The star of Sulla
rises, that of Marius declines--The Lex Plautia Papiria--First year
of the war--The confederates defeat Perperna, Crassus, Caesar,
Lupus, Caepio, and take town after town--The Umbrians and Etruscans
Revolt--Second year--Pompeius triumphs in the north, Cosconius in
the south-east, Sulla in the south-west--Revolution at Rome--The
confederates courted by both parties--The rebellion smoulders on till
finally quenched by Sulla after the Mithridatic War


CHAPTER IX.

SULPICIUS.

Financial crisis at Rome--Sulpicius Rufus attempts to reform the
government, and complete the enfranchisement of the Italians--His laws
forcibly carried by the aid of Marius--Sulla driven from Rome flies to
the army at Nola, and marches at their head against Marius--Sulpicius
slain--Marius outlawed--Sulla leaves Italy after reorganizing the
Senate and the comitia


CHAPTER X.

MARIUS AND CINNA.

Flight of Marius--His romantic adventures at Circeii, Minturnae,
Carthage--Cinna takes up the Italian cause--Driven from Rome by
Octavius, he flies to the army in Campania and marches on Rome--Marius
lands in Etruria--Octavius summons Pompeius from Etruria and
their armies surround the city--Marius and Cinna enter Rome--The
proscriptions--Seventh consulship and death of Marius--Cinna supreme


CHAPTER XI.

THE FIRST MITHRIDATIC WAR.

Sertorius in Spain--Cyrene bequeathed to Rome--Previous history of
Mithridates--His submission to Aquillius--Aquillius forces on a
war--He is defeated and killed by Mithridates--Massacre of Romans in
Asia--Mithridates repulsed at Rhodes


CHAPTER XII.

SULLA IN GREECE AND ASIA.

Aristion induces Athens to revolt--Sulla lands in Epirus, and besieges
Athens and the Piraeus--His difficulties--He takes Athens and the
Piraeus, and defeats Archelaus at Chaeroneia and Orchomenus--Terms
offered to Mithridates--Tyranny of the latter--Flaccus comes to Asia
and is murdered by Fimbria, who is soon afterwards put to death by
Sulla


CHAPTER XIII.

SULLA IN ITALY.

Sulla lands at Brundisium and is joined by numerous adherents--Battle
of Mount Tifata--Sertorius goes to Spain--Sulla in 83 is master of
Picenum, Apulia, and Campania--Battle of Sacriportus--Sulla blockades
young Marius in Praeneste--Indecisive war in Picenum between Carbo
and Metellus--Repeated attempts to relieve Praeneste--Carbo flies
to Africa--His lieutenants threaten Rome--Sulla comes to the rescue
--Desperate attempt to take the city by Pontius--Battle of the
Colline Gate--Sulla's danger--Death of Carbo, of Domitius
Ahenobarbus--Exploits of Pompeius in Sicily and Africa--His
vanity--Murena provokes the second Mithridatic War--Sertorius in
Spain--His successes and ascendency over the natives


CHAPTER XIV.

PERSONAL RULE AND DEATH OF SULLA.

The Sullan proscriptions--Sulla and Caesar--The Cornelii--Sulla's
horrible character--His death and splendid obsequies


CHAPTER XV.

SULLA'S REACTIONARY MEASURES.

The Leges Corneliae--Sulla remodels the Senate, the quaestorship,
the censorship, the tribunate, the comitia, the consulship, the
praetorship, the augurate and pontificate, the judicia--Minor laws
attributed to him--Effects of his legislation the best justification
of the Gracchi


LIST OF PHRASES

INDEX

MAPS.

MARCH OF SULLA AND ARCHELAUS BEFORE CHAERONEIA

BATTLE OF CHAERONEIA




THE

GRACCHI, MARIUS AND SULLA.

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CHAPTER I.

ANTECEDENTS OF THE REVOLUTION.


During the last half of the second century before Christ Rome was
undisputed mistress of the civilised world. A brilliant period of
foreign conquest had succeeded the 300 years in which she had overcome
her neighbours and made herself supreme in Italy. In 146 B.C. she had
given the death-blow to her greatest rival, Carthage, and had annexed
Greece. In 140 treachery had rid her of Viriathus, the stubborn
guerilla who defied her generals and defeated her armies in Spain.
In 133 the terrible fate of Numantia, and in 132 the merciless
suppression of the Sicilian slave-revolt, warned all foes of the
Republic that the sword, which the incompetence of many generals had
made seem duller than of old, was still keen to smite; and except
where some slave-bands were in desperate rebellion, and in Pergamus,
where a pretender disputed with Rome the legacy of Attalus, every land
along the shores of the Mediterranean was subject to or at the mercy
of a town not half as large as the London of to-day. Almost exactly a
century afterwards the Government under which this gigantic empire had
been consolidated was no more.

Foreign wars will have but secondary importance in the following
pages. [Sidenote: The history will not be one of military events.] The
interest of the narrative centres mainly in home politics; and though
the world did not cease to echo to the tramp of conquering legions,
and the victorious soldier became a more and more important factor in
the State, still military matters no longer, as in the Samnite and
Punic wars, absorb the attention, dwarfed as they are by the great
social struggle of which the metropolis was the arena. In treating of
the first half of those hundred years of revolution, which began
with the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus and ended with the battle of
Actium, it is mainly the fall of the Republican and the foreshadowing
of the Imperial system of government which have to be described.
[Sidenote: In order to understand the times of the Gracchi it is
necessary to understand the history of the orders at Rome.] But, in
order to understand rightly the events of those fifty years, some
survey, however brief, of the previous history of the Roman orders is
indispensable.

[Sidenote: The patres.] When the mists of legend clear away we see a
community which, if we do not take slaves into account, consisted
of two parts--the governing body, or patres, to whom alone the term
Populus Romanus strictly applied, and who constituted the Roman State,
and the governed class, or clientes, who were outside its pale. The
word patrician, more familiar to our ear than the substantive from
which it is formed, came to imply much more than its original meaning.
[Sidenote: The clients.] In its simplest and earliest sense it was
applied to a man who was sprung from a Roman marriage, who stood
towards his client on much the same footing which, in the mildest form
of slavery, a master occupies towards his slave. As the patronus was
to the libertus, when it became customary to liberate slaves, so in
some measure were the Fathers to their retainers, the Clients. That
the community was originally divided into these two sections is known.
What is not known is how, besides this primary division of patres and
clientes, there arose a second _political_ class in the State, namely
the plebs. The client as client had no political existence. [Sidenote:
The plebeians.] But as a plebeian he had. Whether the plebs was formed
of clients who had been released from their clientship, just as slaves
might be manumitted; or of foreigners, as soldiers, traders, or
artisans were admitted into the community; or partly of foreigners and
partly of clients, the latter being equalised by the patres with the
former in self-defence; and whether as a name it dated from or was
antecedent to the so-called Tullian organization is uncertain. But we
know that in one way or other a second political division in the State
arose and that the constitution, of which Servius Tullius was the
reputed author, made every freeman in Rome a citizen by giving him a
vote in the Comitia Centuriata. Yet though the plebeian was a citizen,
and as such acquired 'commercium,' or the right to hold and devise
property, it was only after a prolonged struggle that he achieved
political equality with the patres. [Sidenote: Gradual acquisition
by the plebs of political equality with the patres.] Step by step he
wrung from them the rights of intermarriage and of filling offices of
state; and the great engine by which this was brought about was the
tribunate, the historical importance of which dates from, even though
as a plebeian magistracy it may have existed before, the first
secession of the plebs in 494 B.C. [Sidenote: Character of the
tribunate.] The tribunate stood towards the freedom of the Roman
people in something of the same relation which the press of our time
occupies towards modern liberty: for its existence implied free
criticism of the executive, and out of free speech grew free action.
[Sidenote: The Roman government transformed from oligarchy into a
plutocracy.]

Side by side with those external events which made Rome mistress first
of her neighbours, then, of Italy, and lastly of the world, there went
on a succession of internal changes, which first transformed a pure
oligarchy into a plutocracy, and secondly overthrew this modified form
of oligarchy, and substituted Caesarism. With the earlier of these
changes we are concerned here but little. The political revolution was
over when the social revolution which we have to record began. But the
roots of the social revolution were of deep growth, and were in fact
sometimes identical with those of the political revolution. [Sidenote:
Parallel between Roman and English history.] Englishmen can understand
such an intermixture the more readily from the analogies, more or less
close, which their own history supplies. They have had a monarchy.
They have been ruled by an oligarchy, which has first confronted and
then coalesced with the moneyed class, and the united orders have been
forced to yield theoretical equality to almost the entire nation,
while still retaining real authority in their own hands. They have
seen a middle class coquetting with a lower class in order to force
an upper class to share with it its privileges, and an upper class
resorting in its turn to the same alliance; and they may have noted
something more than a superficial resemblance between the tactics
of the patres and nobiles of Rome and our own magnates of birth and
commerce. Even now they are witnessing the displacement of political
by social questions, and, it is to be hoped, the successful solution
of problems which in the earlier stages of society have defied the
efforts of every statesman. Yet they know that, underlying all the
political struggles of their history, questions connected with
the rights and interests of rich and poor, capitalist and toiler,
land-owner and land-cultivator, have always been silently and
sometimes violently agitated. Political emancipation has enabled
social discontent to organize itself and find permanent utterance, and
we are to-day facing some of the demands to satisfy which the Gracchi
sacrificed their lives more than 2,000 years ago. [Sidenote: The
struggle between the orders chiefly agrarian.] With us indeed the
wages question is of more prominence than the land question, because
we are a manufacturing nation; but the principles at stake are much
the same. At Rome social agitation was generally agrarian, and the
first thing necessary towards understanding the Gracchan revolution is
to gain a clear conception of the history of the public land.

[Sidenote: Origin of the Ager Publicus.] The ground round a town like
Rome was originally cultivated by the inhabitants, some of whom, as
more food and clothing were required, would settle on the soil. From
them the ranks of the army were recruited; and, thus doubly oppressed
by military service and by the land tax, which had to be paid in coin,
the small husbandman was forced to borrow from some richer man in the
town. Hence arose usury, and a class of debtors; and the sum of debt
must have been increased as well as the number of the debtors by the
very means adopted to relieve it. [Sidenote: Fourfold way of dealing
with conquered territory.] When Rome conquered a town she confiscated
a portion of its territory, and disposed of it in one of four ways.
[Sidenote: Colonies.] 1. After expelling the owners, she sent some of
her own citizens to settle upon it. They did not cease to be Romans,
and, being in historical times taken almost exclusively from the
plebs, must often have been but poorly furnished with the capital
necessary for cultivating the ground. [Sidenote: Sale.] 2. She sold
it; and, as with us, when a field is sold, a plan is made of its
dimensions and boundaries, so plans of the land thus sold were made on
tablets of bronze, and kept by the State. [Sidenote: Occupation.] 3.
She allowed private persons to 'occupy' it on payment of 'vectigal,'
or a portion of the produce; and, though not surrendering the title to
the land, permitted the possessors to use it as their private property
for purchase, sale, and succession. [Sidenote: Commons.] 4. A portion
was kept as common pasture land for those to whom the land had been
given or sold, or by whom it was occupied and those who used it paid
'scriptura,' or a tax of so much per head on the beasts, for whose
grazing they sent in a return. This irregular system was fruitful in
evil. It suited the patres with whom it originated, for they were
for a time the sole gainers by it. Without money it must have been
hopeless to occupy tracts distant from Rome. The poor man who did so
would either involve himself in debt, or be at the mercy of his richer
neighbours, whose flocks would overrun his fields, or who might oust
him altogether from them by force, and even seize him himself and
enroll him as a slave. The rich man, on the other hand, could use
such land for pasture, and leave the care of his flocks and herds
to clients and slaves. [Sidenote: This irregular system the germ of
latifundia.] So originated those 'latifundia,' or large farms, which
greatly contributed to the ruin of Rome and Italy. The tilled land
grew less and with it dwindled the free population and the recruiting
field for the army. Gangs of slaves became more numerous, and were
treated with increased brutality; and as men who do not work for their
own money are more profuse in spending it than those who do, the
extravagance of the Roman possessors helped to swell the tide of
luxury, which rose steadily with foreign conquest, and to create in
the capital a class free in name indeed, but more degraded, if less
miserable, than the very slaves, who were treated like beasts through
Italy. It is not certain whether anyone except a patrician could claim
'occupation' as a right; but, as the possessors could in any case
sell the land to plebeians, it fell into the hands of rich men,
to whichever class they belonged, both at Rome, and in the Roman
colonies, and the Municipia; and as it was never really their
property--'dominium'--but the property of the State, it was a constant
source of envy and discontent among the poor.

[Sidenote: Why complaints about the Public Land became louder at the
close of the second century B.C.] As long as fresh assignations of
land and the plantations of colonies went on, this discontent could
be kept within bounds. But for a quarter of a century preceding our
period scarcely any fresh acquisitions of land had been made in Italy,
and, with no hope of new allotments from the territory of their
neighbours, the people began to clamour for the restitution of their
own. [Sidenote: Previous agrarian legislation. Spurius Cassius.] The
first attempt to wrest public land from possessors had been made long
before this by Spurius Cassius; and he had paid for his daring with
his life. [Sidenote: The Licinian Law.] More than a century later the
Licinian law forbade anyone to hold above 500 'jugera' of public land,
for which, moreover, a tenth of the arable and a fifth of the grazing
produce was to be paid to the State. The framers of the law are said
to have hoped that possessors of more than this amount would shrink
from making on oath a false return of the land which they occupied,
and that, as they would be liable to penalties for exceeding the
prescribed maximum, all land beyond the maximum would be sold at a
nominal price (if this interpretation of the [Greek: kat' oligon] of
Appian may be hazarded) to the poor. It is probable that they did not
quite know what they were aiming at, and certain that they did not
foresee the effects of their measure. In a confused way the law
may have been meant to comprise sumptuary, political, and agrarian
objects. It forbade anyone to keep more than a hundred large or five
hundred small beasts on the common pasture-land, and stipulated for
the employment of a certain proportion of free labour. The free
labourers were to give information of the crops produced, so that
the fifths and tenths might be duly paid; and it may have been
the breakdown of such an impossible institution which led to the
establishment of the 'publicani.' [Sidenote: Composite nature of the
Licinian law.] Nothing, indeed, is more likely than that Licinius and
Sextius should have attempted to remedy by one measure the specific
grievance of the poor plebeians, the political disabilities of the
rich plebeians and the general deterioration of public morals; but,
though their motives may have been patriotic, such a measure could no
more cure the body politic than a man who has a broken limb, is blind,
and in a consumption can be made sound at every point by the heal-all
of a quack. Accordingly the Licinian law was soon, except in its
political provisions, a dead letter. Licinius was the first man
prosecuted for its violation, and the economical desire of the nation
became intensified. [Sidenote: The Flaminian law.] In 232 B.C.
Flaminius carried a law for the distribution of land taken from the
Senones among the plebs. Though the law turned out no possessors, it
was opposed by the Senate and nobles. Nor is this surprising, for any
law distributing land was both actually and as a precedent a blow to
the interests of the class which practised occupation. What is at
first sight surprising is that small parcels of land, such as must
have been assigned in these distributions, should have been so
coveted. [Sidenote: Why small portions of land were so coveted.] The
explanation is probably fourfold. Those who clamoured for them were
wretched enough to clutch at any change; or did not realise to
themselves the dangers and drawbacks of what they desired; or intended
at once to sell their land to some richer neighbour; or, lastly,
longed to keep a slave or two, just as the primary object of the 'mean
white' in America used to be to keep his negro. [Sidenote: Failure
of previous legislation.] On the whole, it is clear that legislation
previous to this period had not diminished agrarian grievances, and it
is clear also why these grievances were so sorely felt. The general
tendency at Rome and throughout Italy was towards a division of
society into two classes--the very rich and the very poor, a tendency
which increased so fast that not many years later it was said that out
of some 400,000 men at Rome only 2,000 could, in spite of the city
being notoriously the centre to which the world's wealth gravitated,
be called really rich men. To any patriot the progressive extinction
of small land-owners must have seemed piteous in itself and menacing
to the life of the State. On the other hand, the poor had always one
glaring act of robbery to cast in the teeth of the rich. A sanguine
tribune might hope permanently to check a growing evil by fresh
supplies of free labour. His poor partisan again had a direct
pecuniary interest in getting the land. Selfish and philanthropic
motives therefore went hand in hand, and in advocating the
distribution of land a statesman would be sure of enlisting
the sympathies of needy Italians, even more than those of the
better-provided-for poor of Rome.

[Sidenote: Roman slavery.] Incidental mention has been made of the
condition of the slaves in Italy. It was the sight of the slave-gangs
which partly at least roused Tiberius Gracchus to action, and some
remarks on Roman slavery follow naturally an enquiry into the nature
of the public land. The most terrible characteristic of slavery is
that it blights not only the unhappy slaves themselves, but their
owners and the land where they live. It is an absolutely unmitigated
evil. As Roman conquests multiplied and luxury increased, enormous
fortunes became more common, and the demand for slaves increased also.
Ten thousand are said to have been landed and sold at Delos in one
day. What proportion the slave population of Italy bore to the free at
the time of the Gracchi we cannot say. It has been placed as low as 4
per cent., but the probability is that it was far greater. [Sidenote:
Slave labour universally employed.] In trades, mining, grazing,
levying of revenue, and every field of speculation, slave-labour
was universally employed. If it is certain that even unenfranchised
Italians, however poor, could be made to serve in the Roman army, it
was a proprietor's direct interest from that point of view to employ
slaves, of whose services he could not be deprived.

[Sidenote: Whence the slaves came. Their treatment.] A vast impetus
had been given to the slave-trade at the time of the conquest of
Macedonia, about thirty-five years before our period. The
great slave-producing countries were those bordering on the
Mediterranean--Africa, Asia, Spain, &c. An organized system of
man-hunting supplied the Roman markets, and slave-dealers were part of
the ordinary retinue of a Roman army. When a batch of slaves reached
its destination they were kept in a pen till bought. Those bought
for domestic service would no doubt be best off, and the cunning,
mischievous rogue, the ally of the young against the old master of
whom we read in Roman comedy, if he does not come up to our ideal
of what a man should be, does not seem to have been physically very
wretched. Even here, however, we see how degraded a thing a slave was,
and the frequent threats of torture prove how utterly he was at the
mercy of a cruel master's caprice. We know, too, that when a master
was arraigned on a criminal charge, the first thing done to prove his
guilt was to torture his slaves. But just as in America the popular
figure of the oily, lazy, jocular negro, brimming over with grotesque
good-humour and screening himself in the weakness of an indulgent
master, merely served to brighten a picture of which the horrible
plantation system was the dark background; so at Rome no instances of
individual indulgence were a set-off against the monstrous barbarities
which in the end brought about their own punishment, and the ruin
of the Republic. [Sidenote: Dread inspired by the prospect of Roman
slavery.] Frequent stories attest the horrors of Roman slavery felt
by conquered nations. We read often of individuals, and sometimes of
whole towns, committing suicide sooner than fall into the conquerors'
hands. Sometimes slaves slew their dealers, sometimes one another. A
boy in Spain killed his three sisters and starved himself to avoid
slavery. Women killed their children with the same object. If, as it
is asserted, the plantation-system was not yet introduced into Italy,
such stories, and the desperate out-breaks, and almost incredibly
merciless suppression of slave revolts, prove that the condition of
the Roman slave was sufficiently miserable. [Sidenote: The horrors of
slavery culminated in Sicily.] But doubtless misery reached its climax
in Sicily, where that system was in full swing. Slaves not sold for
domestic service were there branded and often made to work in chains,
the strongest serving as shepherds. Badly fed and clothed, these
shepherds plundered whenever they found the chance. Such brigandage
was winked at, and sometimes positively encouraged, by the owners,
while the governors shrank from punishing the brigands for fear of
offending their masters. As the demand for slaves grew, slave-breeding
as well as slave-importation was practised. No doubt there were as
various theories as to the most profitable management of slaves then
as in America lately. Damophilus had the instincts of a Legree: a
Haley and a Cato would have held much the same sentiments as to the
rearing of infants. Some masters would breed and rear, and try to get
more work from the slave by kindness than harshness. Others would work
them off and buy afresh; and as this would be probably the cheapest
policy, no doubt it was the prevalent one. And what an appalling vista
of dumb suffering do such considerations open to us! Cold, hunger,
nakedness, torture, infamy, a foreign country, a strange climate, a
life so hard that it made the early death which was almost inevitable
a comparative blessing--such was the terrible lot of the Roman
slave. At last, almost simultaneously at various places in the Roman
dominions, he turned like a beast upon a brutal drover. [Sidenote:
Outbreaks in various quarters.] At Rome, at Minturnae, at Sinuessa,
at Delos, in Macedonia, and in Sicily insurrections or attempts at
insurrections broke out. They were everywhere mercilessly suppressed,
and by wholesale torture and crucifixion the conquerors tried to
clothe death, their last ally, with terror which even a slave dared
not encounter. In the year when Tiberius Gracchus was tribune (and the
coincidence is significant), it was found necessary to send a consul
to put down the first slave revolt in Sicily. It is not known when it
broke out. [Sidenote: Story of Damophilus.] Its proximate cause was
the brutality of Damophilus, of Enna, and his wife Megallis. His
slaves consulted a man named Eunous, a Syrian-Greek, who had long
foretold that he would be a king, and whom his master's guests had
been in the habit of jestingly asking to remember them when he came
to the throne. [Sidenote: The first Sicilian slave war.] Eunous led a
band of 400 against Enna. He could spout fire from his mouth, and his
juggling and prophesying inspired confidence in his followers. All the
men of Enna were slain except the armourers, who were fettered and
compelled to forge arms. Damophilus and Megallis were brought with
every insult into the theatre. He began to beg for his life with some
effect, but Hermeias and another cut him down; and his wife, after
being tortured by the women, was cast over a precipice. But their
daughter had been gentle to the slaves, and they not only did not harm
her, but sent her under an escort, of which this Hermeias was one, to
Catana. Eunous was now made king, and called himself Antiochus. He
made Achaeus his general, was joined by Cleon with 5,000 slaves, and
soon mustered 10,000 men. Four praetors (according to Florus) were
defeated; the number of the rebels rapidly increased to 200,000; and
the whole island except a few towns was at their mercy. In 134 the
consul Flaccus went to Sicily; but with what result is not known.
In 133 the consul L. Calpurnius Piso captured Messana, killed 8,000
slaves, and crucified all his prisoners. In 132 P. Rupilius captured
the two strongholds of the slaves, Tauromenium and Enna (Taormina and
Castragiovanni). Both towns stood on the top ledges of precipices, and
were hardly accessible. Each was blockaded and each was eventually
surrendered by a traitor. But at Tauromenium the defenders held out,
it is said, till all food was gone, and they had eaten the children,
and the women, and some of the men. Cleon's brother Comanus was taken
here; all the prisoners were first tortured, and then thrown down the
rocks. At Enna Cleon made a gallant sally, and died of his wounds.
Eunous fled and was pulled out of a pit with his cook, his baker, his
bathman, and his fool. He is said to have died in prison of the same
disease as Sulla and Herod. Rupilius crucified over 20,000 slaves, and
so quenched with blood the last fires of rebellion.

Besides the dangers threatening society from the discontent of the
poor, the aggressions of the rich, the multiplication and ferocious
treatment of slaves, and the social rivalries of the capital, the
condition of Italy and the general deterioration of public morality
imperatively demanded reform. It has been already said that we do
not know for certain how the plebs arose. But we know how it wrested
political equality from the patres, and, speaking roughly, we may date
the fusion of the two orders under he common title 'nobiles,' from
the Licinian laws. [Sidenote: The 'nobiles' at Rome.] It had been a
gradual change, peaceably brought about, and the larger number having
absorbed the smaller, the term 'nobiles,' which specifically meant
those who had themselves filled a curule office, or whose fathers had
done so, comprehended in common usage the old nobility and the new.
The new nobles rapidly drew aloof from the residuum of the plebs, and,
in the true _parvenu_ spirit, aped and outdid the arrogance of the old
patricians. Down to the time of the Gracchi, or thereabouts, the two
great State parties consisted of the plebs on the one hand, and these
nobiles on the other. [Sidenote: The 'optimates' and 'populares.']
After that date new names come into use, though we can no more fix the
exact time when the terms optimates and populares superseded previous
party watchwords than we can when Tory gave place to Conservative, and
Whig to Liberal. Thus patricians and plebeians were obsolete terms,
and nobles and plebeians no longer had any political meaning, for each
was equal in the sight of the law; each had a vote; each was eligible
to every office. But when the fall of Carthage freed Rome from all
rivals, and conquest after conquest filled the treasury, increased
luxury made the means of ostentation more greedily sought. Office
meant plunder; and to gain office men bribed, and bribed every day
on a vaster scale. If we said that 'optimates' signified the men
who bribed and abused office under the banner of the Senate and its
connections, and that 'populares' meant men who bribed and abused
office with the interests of the people outside the senatorial pale
upon their lips, we might do injustice to many good men on both sides,
but should hardly be slandering the parties. Parties in fact they were
not. They were factions, and the fact that it is by no means easy
always to decide how far individuals were swayed by good or bad
motives, where good motives were so often paraded to mask base
actions, does not disguise their despicable character. Honest
optimates would wish to maintain the Senate's preponderance from
affection to it, and from belief in its being the mainstay of the
State. Honest populares, like the Gracchi, who saw the evils of
senatorial rule, tried to win the popular vote to compass its
overthrow. Dishonest politicians of either side advocated conservatism
or change simply from the most selfish personal ambition; and in time
of general moral laxity it is the dishonest politicians who give the
tone to a party. The most unscrupulous members of the ruling ring, the
most shameless panderers to mob prejudice, carry all before them. Both
seek one thing only--personal ascendency, and the State becomes the
bone over which the vilest curs wrangle.

[Sidenote: Who the equites were.] In writing of the Gracchi reference
will be made to the Equites. The name had broadened from its original
meaning, and now merely denoted all non-senatorial rich men. An
individual eques would lean to the senatorial faction or the faction
of men too poor to keep a horse for cavalry service, just as his
connexions were chiefly with the one or the other. How, as a body, the
equites veered round alternately to each side, we shall see hereafter.
Instead of forming a sound middle class to check the excesses of both
parties, they were swayed chiefly by sordid motives, and backed up
the men who for the time seemed most willing or able to gratify their
greed. What went on at Rome must have been repeated over again with
more or less exactitude throughout Italy, and there, in addition to
this process of national disintegration, the clouds of a political
storm were gathering. The following table will show at a glance the
classification of the Roman State as constituted at the outbreak of
the Social War.

  _Cives Romani_:
  1. Rome
  2. Roman Colonies
  3. Municipia

  Roman Colonies and Municipia are Praefectura.

  _Peregrini_:
  1. Latini or Nomen Latinum
     a. Old Latin towns except such as had been made Municipia
     b. Colonies of old Latin towns
     c. Joint colonies (if any) of Rome and old Latin towns
     d. Colonies of Italians from all parts of Italy founded by Rome
        under the name of Latin Colonies
  2. Socii, i.e. Free inhabitants of Italy
  3. Provincials, i.e. Free subjects of Rome out of Italy

[Sidenote: Rights of Cives Romani.] The Cives Romani in and out of
Rome had the Jus Suffragii and the Jus Honorum, i.e. the right to vote
and the right to hold office. [Sidenote: The Roman Colony.] A _Roman
Colony_ was in its organization Rome in miniature, and the people
among whom it had been planted as a garrison may either have retained
their own political constitution, or have been governed by a
magistrate sent from Rome. They were not Roman citizens except as
being residents of a Roman city, but by irregular marriages with
Romans the line of demarcation between the two peoples may have grown
less clearly defined. [Sidenote: The Praefectura.] _Praefectura_ was
the generic name for Roman colonies and for all Municipia to which
prefects were sent annually to administer justice. [Sidenote:
Municipia] _Municipia_ are supposed to have been originally those
conquered Italian towns to which Connubium and Commercium, i.e. rights
of intermarriage and of trade, were given, but from whom Jus Suffragii
and Jus Honorum were withheld. These privileges, however, were
conferred on them before the Social War. Some were governed by Roman
magistrates and some were self-governed. They voted in the Roman
tribes, though probably only at important crises, such as the
agitation for an agrarian law. They were under the jurisdiction of the
Praetor Urbanus, but vicarious justice was administered among them by
an official called _Praefectus juri dicundo_, sent yearly from Rome.

[Sidenote: The Latini.] The Latini had no vote at Rome, no right of
holding offices, and were practically Roman subjects. A Roman who
joined a Latin colony ceased to be a Roman citizen. Whether there was
any difference between the internal administration of a Latin colony
and an old Latin town is uncertain. The Latini may have had Commercium
and Connubium, or only the former. They certainly had not Jus
Suffragii or Jus Honorum, and they were in subjection to Rome. A Latin
could obtain the Roman franchise, but the mode of doing so at this
time is a disputed point. Livy mentions a law which enabled a Latin to
obtain the franchise by migrating to Rome and being enrolled in the
census, provided he left children behind him to fill his place. There
is no doubt that either legally or irregularly Latini did migrate to
Rome and did so obtain the citizenship, but we know no more. Others
say that the later right by which a Latin obtained the citizenship in
virtue of filling a magistracy in his native town existed already.

[Sidenote: The Socii.] Of the Socii, all or many of them had treaties
defining their relations to Rome, and were therefore known as
Foederatae Civitates. They had internal self-government, but were
bound to supply Rome with soldiers, ships, and sailors.

[Sidenote: Grievances of the Latins and allies.] At the time of the
Gracchi discontent was seething among the Latins and allies. There
were two classes among them--the rich landlords and capitalists, who
prospered as the rich at Rome prospered, and the poor who were weighed
down by debt or were pushed out of their farms by slave-labour, or
were hangers-on of the rich in the towns and eager for distributions
of land. The poor were oppressed no doubt by the rich men both of
their own cities and of Rome. The rich chafed at the intolerable
insolence of Roman officials. It was not that Rome interfered with
the local self-government she had granted by treaty, but the Italians
laboured under grievous disabilities and oppression. So late as the
Jugurthine war, Latin officers were executed by martial law, whereas
any Roman soldier could appeal to a civil tribunal. Again, while the
armies had formerly been recruited from the Romans and the allies
equally, now the severest service and the main weight of wars fell
on the latter, who furnished, moreover, two soldiers to every Roman.
Again, without a certain amount of property, a man at Rome could not
be enrolled in the army; but the rule seems not to have applied
to Italians. Nor was the civil less harsh than the military
administration. A consul's wife wished to use the men's bath at
Teanum; and because the bathers were not cleared out quickly enough,
and the baths were not clean enough, M. Marius, the chief magistrate
of the town, was stripped and scourged in the market-place. A free
herdsman asked in joke if it was a corpse that was in a litter passing
through Venusia, and which contained a young Roman. Though not even an
official, its occupant showed that, if lazy, he was at least alive, by
having the peasant whipped to death with the litter straps. In short,
the rich Italians would feel the need of the franchise as strongly as
the old plebeians had felt it, and all the more strongly because the
Romans had not only ceased to enfranchise whole communities, but were
chary of giving the citizenship even to individuals. The poor also had
the ordinary grievances against their own rich, and were so far likely
to favour the schemes of any man who assailed the capitalist class,
Roman or Italian, as a whole; but they none the less disliked Roman
supremacy, and would be easily persuaded to attribute to that
supremacy some of the hardships which it did not cause.

[Sidenote: State of the transmarine provinces.] While such fires were
slowly coming to the surface in Italy, and were soon to flame out in
the Social War, the state of the provinces out of the peninsula was
not more reassuring. The struggle with Viriathus and the Numantine war
had revealed the fact that the last place to look for high martial
honour or heroic virtue was the Roman army. If a Scipio sustained the
traditions of Roman generalship, and a Gracchus those of republican
rectitude, other commanders would have stained the military annals
of any nation. [Sidenote: Deterioration of Roman generalship.] Roman
generals had come to wage war for themselves and not for the State.
They even waged it in defiance of the State's express orders. If they
found peace in the provinces, they found means to break it, hoping to
glut their avarice by pillage or by the receipt of bribes, which it
was now quite the exception not to accept, or to win sham laurels and
cheap triumphs from some miserable raid on half-armed barbarians.
Often these carpet-knights were disgracefully beaten, though infamy in
the provinces sometimes became fame at Rome, and then they resorted
to shameful trickery repeated again and again. [Sidenote: and of the
Army.] The State and the army were worthy of the commanders. The
former engaged in perhaps the worst wars that can be waged. Hounded on
by its mercantile class, it fought not for a dream of dominion, or
to beat back encroaching barbarism, but to exterminate a commercial
rival. The latter, which it was hard to recruit on account of the
growing effeminacy of the city, it was harder still to keep under
discipline. It was followed by trains of cooks, and actors, and the
viler appendages of oriental luxury, and was learning to be satisfied
with such victories as were won by the assassination of hostile
generals, or ratified by the massacre of men who had been guaranteed
their lives. The Roman fleet was even more inefficient than the army;
and pirates roved at will over the Mediterranean, pillaging this
island, waging open war with that, and carrying off the population as
slaves. A new empire was rising in the East, as Rome permitted the
Parthians to wrest Persia, Babylonia, and Media from the Syrian kings.
The selfish maxim, _Divide et impera_, assumed its meanest form as it
was now pursued. It is a poor and cowardly policy for a great nation
to pit against each other its semi-civilised dependencies, and to fan
their jealousies in order to prevent any common action on their part,
or to avoid drawing the sword for their suppression. Slave revolts,
constant petty wars, and piracy were preying on the unhappy
provincials, and in the Roman protectorate they found no aid. All
their harsh mistress did was to turn loose upon them hordes of
money-lenders and tax-farmers ('negotiatores,' and 'publicani'), who
cleared off what was left by those stronger creatures of prey, the
proconsuls. Thus the misery caused by a meddlesome and nerveless
national policy was enhanced by a domestic administration based on
turpitude and extortion.

[Sidenote: Universal degeneracy of the Government, and decay of the
nation.] Everywhere Rome was failing in her duties as mistress of the
civilised world. Her own internal degeneracy was faithfully reflected
in the abnegation of her imperial duties. When in any country the
small-farmer class is being squeezed off the land; when its labourers
are slaves or serfs; when huge tracts are kept waste to minister to
pleasure; when the shibboleth of art is on every man's lips, but ideas
of true beauty in very few men's souls; when the business-sharper is
the greatest man in the city, and lords it even in the law courts;
when class-magistrates, bidding for high office, deal out justice
according to the rank of the criminal; when exchanges are turned into
great gambling-houses, and senators and men of title are the chief
gamblers; when, in short, 'corruption is universal, when there is
increasing audacity, increasing greed, increasing fraud, increasing
impurity, and these are fed by increasing indulgence and ostentation;
when a considerable number of trials in the courts of law bring out
the fact that the country in general is now regarded as a prey, upon
which any number of vultures, scenting it from afar, may safely
light and securely gorge themselves; when the foul tribe is amply
replenished by its congeners at home, and foreign invaders find any
number of men, bearing good names, ready to assist them in
robberies far more cruel and sweeping than those of the footpad or
burglar'--when such is the tone of society, and such the idols before
which it bends, a nation must be fast going down hill.

A more repulsive picture can hardly be imagined. A mob, a moneyed
class, and an aristocracy almost equally worthless, hating each other,
and hated by the rest of the world; Italians bitterly jealous of
Romans, and only in better plight than the provinces beyond the sea;
more miserable than either, swarms of slaves beginning to brood
over revenge as a solace to their sufferings; the land going out of
cultivation; native industry swamped by slave-grown imports; the
population decreasing; the army degenerating; wars waged as a
speculation, but only against the weak; provinces subjected to
organized pillage; in the metropolis childish superstition, whole sale
luxury, and monstrous vice. The hour for reform was surely come. Who
was to be the man?

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER II.

TIBERIUS GRACCHUS.


[Sidenote: Scipio Aemilianius.] General expectation would have pointed
to Scipio Aemilianus, the conqueror of Numantia and Carthage, and the
foremost man at Rome. He was well-meaning and more than ordinarily
able, strict and austere as a general, and as a citizen uniting Greek
culture with the old Roman simplicity of life. He was full of scorn of
the rabble, and did not scruple to express it. 'Silence,' he cried,
when he was hissed for what he said about his brother-in-law's death,
'you step-children of Italy!' and when this enraged them still more,
he went on: 'Do you think I shall fear you whom I brought to Italy
in fetters now that you are loose?' He showed equal scorn for such
pursuits as at Rome at least were associated with effeminacy and vice,
and expressed in lively language his dislike of singing and dancing.
'Our children are taught disgraceful tricks. They go to actors'
schools with sambucas and psalteries. They learn to sing--a thing
which our ancestors considered to be a disgrace to freeborn children.
When I was told this I could not believe that men of noble rank
allowed their children to be taught such things. But being taken to a
dancing school I saw--I did upon my honour--more than fifty boys and
girls in the school; and among them one boy, quite a child, about
twelve years of age, the son of a man who was at that time a candidate
for office. And what I saw made me pity the Commonwealth. I saw the
child dancing to the castanets, and it was a dance which one of our
wretched, shameless slaves would not have danced.' On another occasion
he showed a power of quick retort. As censor he had degraded a man
named Asellus, whom Mummius afterwards restored to the equites.
Asellus impeached Scipio, and taunted him with the unluckiness of his
censorship--its mortality, &c. 'No wonder,' said Scipio, 'for the man
who inaugurated it rehabilitated you.'

Such anecdotes show that he was a vigorous speaker. He was of a
healthy constitution, temperate, brave, and honest in money matters;
for he led a simple life, and with all his opportunities for extortion
did not die rich. Polybius, the historian, Panaetius, the philosopher,
Terence and Lucilius, the poets, and the orator and politician
Laelius were his friends. From his position, his talents, and his
associations, he seemed marked out as the one man who could and
would desire to step forth as the saviour of his country. But such
self-sacrifice is not exhibited by men of Scipio's type. Too able to
be blind to the signs of the times, they are swayed by instincts too
strong for their convictions. An aristocrat of aristocrats, Scipio was
a reformer only so far as he thought reform might prolong the reign of
his order. From any more radical measures he shrank with dislike,
if not with fear. The weak spot often to be found in those cultured
aristocrats who coquet with liberalism was fatal to his chance of
being a hero. He was a trimmer to the core, who, without intentional
dishonesty, stood facing both ways till the hour came when he was
forced to range himself on one side or the other, and then he took the
side which he must have known to be the wrong one. Palliation of the
errors of a man placed in so terribly difficult a position is only
just; but laudation of his statesmanship seems absurd. As a statesman
he carried not one great measure, and if one was conceived in his
circle, he cordially approved of its abandonment. To those who claim
for him that he saw the impossibility of those changes which his
brother-in-law advocated, it is sufficient to reply that Rome did
not rest till those changes had been adopted, and that the hearty
co-operation of himself and his friends would have gone far to turn
failure into success. But his mind was too narrow to break through the
associations which had environed him from his childhood. When Tiberius
Gracchus, a nobler man than himself, had suffered martyrdom for the
cause with which he had only dallied, he was base enough to quote from
Homer [Greek: os apoloito kai allos hotis toiaita ge hoezoi]--'So
perish all who do the like again.'

[Sidenote: Tiberius Gracchus.] But the splendid peril which Scipio
shrank from encountering, his brother-in-law courted with the fire
and passion of youth. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was, according to
Plutarch, not quite thirty when he was murdered. Plutarch may have
been mistaken, and possibly he was thirty-five. His father, whose
name he bore, had been a magnificent aristocrat, and his mother
was Cornelia, daughter of Hannibal's conqueror, the first Scipio
Africanus, and one of the comparatively few women whose names are
famous in history. He had much in common with Scipio Aemilianus, whom
he resembled in rank and refinement, in valour, in his familiarity
with Hellenic culture, and in the style of his speeches. Diophanes, of
Mitylene, taught him oratory. The philosopher, Blossius, of Cumae, was
his friend. He belonged to the most distinguished circle at Rome. He
had married the daughter of Appius, and his brother had married the
daughter of Mucianus. He had served under Scipio, and displayed
striking bravery at Carthage; and, as quaestor of the incompetent
Mancinus, had by his character for probity saved a Roman army from
destruction; for the Numantines would not treat with the consul, but
only with Gracchus. No man had a more brilliant career open to him
at Rome, had he been content only to shut his eyes to the fate that
threatened his country. But he had not only insight but a conscience,
and cheerfully risked his life to avert the ruin which he foresaw.
His character has been as much debated as his measures, and the most
opposite conclusions have been formed about both, so that his name
is a synonym for patriot with some, for demagogue with others. Even
historians of our own day are still at variance as to the nature of
his legislation. But from a comparison of their researches, and an
independent examination of the authorities on which they are based,
something like a clear conception of the plans of Gracchus seems
possible. What has never, perhaps, as yet been made sufficiently plain
is, who it was that Gracchus especially meant to benefit. Much of the
public land previously described lay in the north and south of Italy
from the frontier rivers Rubicon and Macra to Apulia. It formed, as
Appian says, the largest portion of the land taken from conquered
towns by Rome. [Sidenote: Agrarian proposals of Gracchus.] What
Gracchus proposed was to take from the rich and give to the poor some
of this land. It was, in fact, merely the Licinian law over again with
certain modifications, and the existence of that law would make the
necessity for a repetition of it inexplicable had it not been a
curious principle with the Romans that a law which had fallen into
desuetude ceased to be binding. But it actually fell short of the law
of Licinius, for it provided that he who surrendered what he held over
and above 500 jugera should be guaranteed in the permanent possession
of that quantity, and moreover might retain 250 jugera in addition for
each of his sons. Some writers conjecture that altogether an occupier
might not hold more than 1,000 jugera.

Now the first thing to remark about the law is that it was by no
means a demagogue's sop tossed to the city mob which he was courting.
Gracchus saw slave labour ruining free labour, and the manhood
and soil of Italy and the Roman army proportionately depreciated.
[Sidenote: Nothing demagogic about the proposal.] To fill the vacuum
he proposed to distribute to the poor not only of Rome but of the
Municipia, of the Roman colonies, and, it is to be presumed, of the
Socii also, land taken from the rich members of those four component
parts of the Roman State. This consideration alone destroys at once
the absurd imputation of his being actuated merely by demagogic
motives; but in no history is it adequately enforced. No demagogue at
that epoch would have spread his nets so wide. At the same time it
gives the key to the subsequent manoeuvres by which his enemies strove
to divide his partisans. Broadly, then, we may say that Gracchus
struck boldly at the very root of the decadence of the whole
peninsula, and that if his remedy could not cure it nothing else
could. [Sidenote: The Socii--land-owners.] How the Socii became
possessors of the public land we do not know. Probably they bought it
from Cives Romani, its authorised occupiers, with the connivance of
the State. We now see from whom the land was to be taken, namely, the
rich all over Italy, and to whom it was to be given, the poor all over
Italy; and also the object with which it was to be given, namely,
to re-create a peasantry and stop the increase of the slave-plague.
[Sidenote: Provision against evasions of the law.] In order to prevent
the law becoming a dead letter like that of Licinius, owing to poor
men selling their land as soon as they got it, he proposed that the
new land-owners should not have the right to dispose of their land to
others, and for this, though it would have been hard to carry out, we
cannot see what other proviso could have been substituted. Lastly, as
death and other causes would constantly render changes in the holdings
inevitable, he proposed that a permanent board should have the
superintendence of them, and this too was a wise and necessary
measure.

[Sidenote: Provision for the administration of the law.] We can
understand so much of the law of Gracchus, but it is hard thoroughly
to understand more. It has been urged as a difficulty not easily
explained that few people, after retaining 500 jugera for themselves
and 250 for each of their sons, would have had much left to surrender.
But this difficulty is imaginary rather than real; for Appian says
that the public land was 'the greater part' of the land taken by Rome
from conquered states, and the great families may have had vast
tracts of it as pasture land. [Sidenote: Things about the law hard to
understand.] There are, however, other things which with our meagre
knowledge of the law we cannot explain. For instance, was a hard
and fast line drawn at 500 jugera as compensation whether a man
surrendered 2 jugera or 2,000 beyond that amount? Again, considering
the outcry made, it is hard to imagine that only those possessing
above 500 jugera were interfered with. But this perhaps may be
accounted for by recollecting that in such matters men fight bravely
against what they feel to be the thin end of the wedge, even if they
are themselves concerned only sympathetically. What Gracchus meant to
do with the slaves displaced by free labour, or how he meant to decide
what was public and what was private land after inextricable confusion
between the two in many parts for so many years, we cannot even
conjecture. The statesmanlike comprehensiveness, however, of his main
propositions justifies us in believing that he had not overlooked such
obvious stumbling-blocks in his way. [Sidenote: Appian's criticism of
the law.] When Appian says he was eager to accomplish what he thought
to be a good thing, we concur in the testimony Appian thus gives to
Gracchus having been a good man. But when he goes on to say he was so
eager that he never even thought of the difficulty, we prefer to judge
Gracchus by his own acts rather than by Appian's criticism or the
similar criticisms of modern writers. [Sidenote: Speeches of Gracchus
explaining his motives.] The speeches ascribed to him, which are
apparently genuine, seem to show that he knew well enough what he was
about. 'The wild beasts of Italy,' he said, 'have their dens to retire
to, but the brave men who spill their blood in her cause have nothing
left but air and light. Without homes, without settled habitations,
they wander from place to place with their wives and children; and
their generals do but mock them when at the head of their armies they
exhort their men to fight for their sepulchres and the gods of their
hearths, for among such numbers perhaps there is not one Roman who has
an altar that has belonged to his ancestors or a sepulchre in which
their ashes rest. The private soldiers fight and die to advance the
wealth and luxury of the great, and they are called masters of the
world without having a sod to call their own.' Again, he asked, 'Is
it not just that what belongs to the people should be shared by the
people? Is a man with no capacity for fighting more useful to his
country than a soldier? Is a citizen inferior to a slave? Is an alien
or one who owns some of his country's soil the best patriot? You have
won by war most of your possessions, and hope to acquire the rest of
the habitable globe. But now it is but a hazard whether you gain the
rest by bravery or whether by your weakness and discords you are
robbed of what you have by your foes. Wherefore, in prospect of such
acquisitions, you should if need be spontaneously and of your own free
will yield up these lands to those who will rear children for the
service of the State. Do not sacrifice a great thing while striving
for a small, especially as you are to receive no contemptible
compensation for your expenditure on the land, in free ownership of
500 jugera secure for ever, and in case you have sons, of 250 more for
each of them.

The striking point in the last extract is his remark about a 'small
thing.' It is likely, enough that the losses of the proprietors as a
body would not be overwhelming, and that the opposition was rendered
furious almost as much by the principle of restitution, and
interference with long-recognised ownership, as by the value of what
they were called on to disgorge. Five hundred jugera of slave-tended
pasture-land could not have been of very great importance to a rich
Roman, who, however, might well have been alarmed by the warning of
Gracchus with regard to the army, for in foreign service, and not in
grazing or ploughing, the fine gentleman of the day found a royal road
to wealth. [Sidenote: Grievances of the possessors.] On the other hand
it is quite comprehensible both that the possessors imagined that they
had a great grievance, and that they had some ground for their belief.
A possessor, for instance, who had purchased from another in the full
faith that his title would never be disturbed, had more right to be
indignant than a proprietor of Indian stock would have, if in case of
the bankruptcy of the Indian Government the British Government should
refuse to refund his money. There must have been numbers of such cases
with every possible complexity of title; and even if the class that
would be actually affected was not large, it was powerful, and every
landowner with a defective title would, however small his holding
(provided it was over 30 jugera, the proposed allotment), take the
alarm and help to swell the cry against the Tribune as a demagogue and
a robber. This is what we can state about the agrarian law of Tiberius
Gracchus. It remains to be told how it was carried.

[Sidenote: How the law was carried.] Gracchus had a colleague named
Octavius, who is said to have been his personal friend. Octavius had
land himself to lose if the law were carried, and he opposed it.
Gracchus offered to pay him the value of the land out of his own
purse; but Octavius was not to be so won over, and as Tribune
interposed his veto to prevent the bill being read to the people that
they might vote on it. Tiberius retorted by using his power to suspend
public business and public payments. One day, when the people were
going to vote, the other side seized the voting urns, and then
Tiberius and the rest of the Tribunes agreed to take the opinion of
the Senate. The result was that he came away more hopeless of success
by constitutional means, and doubtless irritated by insult. He then
proposed to Octavius that the people should vote whether he or
Octavius should lose office--a weak proposal perhaps, but the proposal
of an honest, generous man, whose aim was not self-aggrandisement but
the public weal. Octavius naturally refused. Tiberius called together
the thirty-five tribes, to vote whether or no Octavius should
be deprived of his office. [Sidenote: Octavius deprived of the
Tribunate.] The first tribe voted in the affirmative, and Gracchus
implored Octavius even now to give way, but in vain. The next sixteen
tribes recorded the same vote, and once more Gracchus interceded with
his old friend. But he spoke to deaf ears. The voting went on, and
when Octavius, on his Tribunate being taken from him, would not go
away, Plutarch says that Tiberius ordered one of his freedmen to drag
him from the Rostra.

These acts of Tiberius Gracchus are commonly said to have been the
beginning of revolution at Rome; and the guilt of it is accordingly
laid at his door. And there can be no doubt that he was guilty in the
sense that a man is guilty who introduces a light into some chamber
filled with explosive vapour, which the stupidity or malice of others
has suffered to accumulate. But, after all, too much is made of this
violation of constitutional forms and the sanctity of the Tribunate.
[Sidenote: Defence of the conduct of Gracchus.] The first were effete,
and all regular means of renovating the Republic seemed to be closed
to the despairing patriot, by stolid obstinacy sheltering itself
under the garb of law and order. The second was no longer what it had
been--the recognised refuge and defence of the poor. The rich, as
Tiberius in effect argued, had found out how to use it also. If all
men who set the example of forcible infringement of law are criminals,
Gracchus was a criminal. But in the world's annals he sins in good
company; and when men condemn him, they should condemn Washington
also. Perhaps his failure has had most to do with his condemnation.
Success justifies, failure condemns, most revolutions in most men's
eyes. But if ever a revolution was excusable this was; for it
was carried not by a small party for small aims, but by national
acclamation, by the voices of Italians who flocked to Rome either to
vote, or, if they had not votes themselves, to overawe those who had.
How far Gracchus saw the inevitable effect of his acts is open to
dispute. [Sidenote: Gracchus not a weak sentimentalist.] But probably
he saw it as clearly as any man can see the future. Because he was
generous and enthusiastic, it is assumed that he was sentimental and
weak, and that his policy was guided by impulse rather than reason.
There seems little to sustain such a judgment other than the desire of
writers to emphasise a comparison between him and his brother. If
his character had been what some say that it was, his speeches would
hardly have been described by Cicero as acute and sensible, but not
rhetorical enough. All his conduct was consistent. He strove hard
and to the last to procure his end by peaceable means. Driven into
a corner by the tactics of his opponents, he broke through the
constitution, and once having done so, went the way on which his acts
led him, without turning to the right hand or the left. There seems
to be not a sign of his having drifted into revolution. Because a
portrait is drawn in neutral tints, it does not follow that it is
therefore faithful, and those writers who seem to think they must
reconcile the fact of Tiberius having been so good a man with his
having been, as they assert, so bad a citizen, have blurred the
likeness in their anxiety about the chiaroscuro. No one would affirm
that Tiberius committed no errors; but that he was a wise as well as
a good man is far more in accordance with the facts than a more
qualified verdict would be.

[Sidenote: Mean behaviour of the Senate.] The Senate showed its spite
against the successful Tribune by petty annoyances, such as allowing
him only about a shilling a day for his official expenditure, and, as
rumour said, by the assassination of one of his friends. But, while
men like P. Scipio Nasica busied themselves with such miserable
tactics, Tiberius brought forward another great proposal supplementary
to his agrarian law. [Sidenote: Proposal of Gracchus to distribute the
legacy of Attalus.] Attalus, the last king of Pergamus, had just died
and left his kingdom to Rome. Gracchus wished to divide his treasures
among the new settlers, and expressed some other intention of
transferring the settlement of the country from the Senate to the
people. As to the second of these propositions it would be unsafe
as well as unfair to Gracchus to pronounce judgment on it without
a knowledge of its details. The first was both just and wise and
necessary, for previous experience had shown that the first temptation
of a pauper land-owner was to sell his land to the rich, and, as the
law of Gracchus forbade this, he was bound to give the settler a fair
start on his farm. [Sidenote: Retort of the Senate.] The Senate took
fresh alarm, and it found vent again in characteristically mean
devices. One senator said that a diadem and a purple robe had been
brought to Gracchus from Pergamus. Another assailed him because men
with torches escorted him home at night. Another twitted him with the
deposition of Octavius. To this last attack, less contemptible than
the others, he replied in a bold and able speech, which practically
asserted that the spirit of the constitution was binding on a citizen,
but that its letter under some circumstances was not.

[Sidenote: Other intended reforms of Gracchus.] He was also engaged in
meditating other important reforms, all directed against the Senate's
power. Plutarch says that they comprised abridgment of the soldier's
term of service, an appeal to the people from the judices, and the
equal partition between the Senate and equites of the privilege of
serving as judices, which hitherto belonged only to the former.
According to Velleius, Tiberius also promised the franchise to all
Italians south of the Rubicon and the Macra, which, if true, is
another proof of his far-seeing statesmanship. To carry out such
extensive changes it was necessary to procure prolongation of office
for himself, and he became a candidate for the next year's tribunate.
[Sidenote: Gracchus stands again for the Tribunate. His motives.] To
say that considerations of personal safety dictated his candidature
is a very easy and specious insinuation, but is nothing more. It is
indeed a good deal less, for it is utterly inconsistent with the other
acts of an unselfish, dauntless career. At election-time the first
two tribes voted for Tiberius. Then the aristocracy declared his
candidature to be illegal because he could not hold office two years
running. It may have been so, or the law may have been so violated
as to be no more valid than the Licinian law, which, though never
abrogated, had never much force. [Sidenote: Tactics of the Senate.]
To fasten on some technical flaw in his procedure was precisely in
keeping with the rest of the acts of the opposition. But those writers
who accuse Tiberius of being guilty of another illegal act in standing
fail to observe the force of the fact, that it was not till the first
two tribes had voted that the aristocracy interfered. This shows that
their objection was a last resort to an invalid statute, and a deed
of which they were themselves ashamed. However, the president of the
tribunes, Rubrius, hesitated to let the other tribes vote; and when
Mummius, Octavius's substitute, asked Rubrius to yield to him the
presidency, others objected that the post must be filled by lot, and
so the election was adjourned till the next day.

It was clear enough to what end things were tending, and Tiberius,
putting on mourning committed his young son to the protection of the
people. It need hardly be said that the father's affection and the
statesman's bitter dismay at finding the dearest object of his life
about to be snatched from him by violence need not have been tinged
with one particle of personal fear. A man of tried bravery like
Gracchus might guard his own life indeed, but only as be regarded it
as indispensable to a great cause. That evening he told his partisans
he would give them a sign next day if he should think it necessary to
use force at his election. It has been assumed that this proves he was
meditating treason. But it proves no more than that he meant to repel
force forcibly if, as was only too certain, force should be used, and
this is not treason. No other course was open to him. The one weak
spot in his policy was that he had no material strength at his back.
Even Sulla would have been a lost man at a later time, if he had not
had an army at hand to which he could flee for refuge, just as without
the army Cromwell would have been powerless. But it was harvest-time
now, and the rural allies of Gracchus were away from home in the
fields. [Sidenote: Murder of Gracchus.] The next day dawned, and with
it occurred omens full of meaning to the superstitious Romans. The
sacred fowls would not feed. Tiberius stumbled at the doorway of his
house and broke the nail of his great toe. Some crows fought on the
roof of a house on the left hand, and one dislodged a tile, which
fell at his feet. But Blossius was at his side encouraging him, and
Gracchus went on to the Capitol and was greeted with a great cheer
by his partisans. [Sidenote: Different accounts given by Appian and
Plutarch.] Appian says that when the rich would not allow the election
to proceed, Tiberius gave the signal. Plutarch tells us that Fulvius
Flaccus came and told him that his foes had resolved to slay him, and,
having failed to induce the consul Scaevola to act, were arming their
friends and slaves, and that Gracchus gave the signal then. As Appian
agrees with Plutarch in his account of Nasica's conduct in the Senate,
the last is the more probable version of what occurred. Nasica called
on Scaevola to put down the tyrant. Scaevola replied that he would not
be the first to use force. Then Nasica, calling on the senators to
follow him, mounted the Capitol to a position above that of Gracchus.
Arming themselves with clubs and legs of benches, his followers
charged down and dispersed the crowd. Gracchus stumbled over some
prostrate bodies, and was slain either by a blow from P. Satyreius, a
fellow-tribune, or from L. Rufus, for both claimed the distinction. So
died a genuine patriot and martyr; and so foul a murder fitly heralded
the long years of bloodshed and violence which were in store for the
country which he died to save.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER III.

CAIUS GRACCHUS.


[Sidenote: Revenge of the aristocracy.] Over three hundred of the
people were killed and thrown into the Tiber, and the aristocracy
followed up their triumph as harshly as they dared. They banished
some, and slew others of the tribune's partisans. Plutarch says that
they fastened up one in a chest with vipers. When Blossius was brought
before his judges he avowed that he would have burned the Capitol if
Gracchus had told him to do it, so confident was he in his leader's
patriotism--an answer testifying not only to the nobleness of the two
friends, but to the strong character of one of them. Philosophers are
not so impressed by weak, impulsive men. Blossius was spared, probably
because he had connexions with some of the nobles rather than because
his reply inspired respect. But while the aristocracy was making war
on individuals, the work of the dead man went on, as if even from the
grave he was destined to bring into sharper relief the pettiness of
their projects by the grandeur of his own.

[Sidenote: The law of Gracchus remains in force.] The allotment of
land was vigorously carried out; and when Appius Claudius and Mucianus
died, the commissioners were partisans of Tiberius--his brother Caius,
M. Fulvius Flaccus, and C. Papirius Carbo. [Sidenote: Its beneficial
effects.] In the year 125, instead of another decrease in the
able-bodied population, we find an increase of nearly 80,000. It seems
probable that this increase was solely in consequence of what the
allotment commissioners did for the Roman burgesses. Nor, if the
Proletarii and Capite Censi were not included in the register of those
classed for military service, is the increase remarkable, for it would
be to members of those classes that the allotments would be chiefly
assigned. Moreover, the poor whom the rich expelled from their lands
did not give in their names to the censors, and did not attend to the
education of their children. These men would, on receiving allotments,
enrol themselves. The consul of the year 132 inscribed on a public
monument that he was the first who had turned the shepherds out of
the domains, and installed farmers in their stead; and these farmers
became, as Gracchus intended, a strong reinforcement to the Roman
soldier-class, as well as a check to slave labour. What was done at
Rome was done also, it is said, throughout Italy, and if on the same
scale, it must have been a really enormous measure of relief to the
poor, and a vast stride towards a return to a healthier tenure of the
land. [Sidenote: Difficulties and hardships in enforcing it.] But it
is not hard to imagine what heart-burnings the commissioners must have
aroused. Some men were thrust out of tilled land on to waste land.
Some who thought that their property was private property found to
their cost that it was the State's. Some had encroached, and their
encroachments were now exposed. Some of the Socii had bought parcels
of the land, and found out now that they had no title. Lastly, some
land had been by special decrees assigned to individual states, and
the commissioners at length proceeded to stretch out their hands
towards it.

Historians, while recording such things, have failed to explain why
the chief opposition to the commissioners arose from the country which
had furnished the chief supporters of Tiberius, and what was the exact
attitude assumed by Scipio Aemilianus. It is lost sight of that as at
Rome there were two classes, so there were two classes in Italy. It
is absurd constantly to put prominently forward the sharp division of
interests in the capital, and then speak of the country classes as
if they were all one body, and their interests the same. [Sidenote:
Divisions in Italy similar to those in Rome.] The natural and
apparently the only way of explaining what at first sight seems the
inconsistency of the country class is to conclude, that the men who
supported Tiberius were the poor of the Italian towns and the small
farmers of the country, while the men who called on Scipio to save
them from the commissioners were the capitalists of the towns and the
richer farmers--some of them voters, some of them non-voters--with
their forces swollen, it may be, by not a few who, having clamoured
for more land, found now that the title to what they already had was
called in question. Though this cannot be stated as a certainty, it at
least accounts for what historians, after many pages on the subject,
have left absolutely unexplained, and it presents the conduct of
Scipio Aemilianus in quite a different light from the one in which it
has commonly been regarded. He is usually extolled as a patriot who
would not stir to humour a Roman rabble, but who, when downtrodden
honest farmers, his comrades in the wars, appealed to him, at once
stepped into the arena as their champion. [Sidenote: Attitude of
Scipio Aemilianus.] In reality he was a reactionist who, when the
inevitable results of those liberal ideas which had been broached in
his own circle stared him in the face, seized the first available
means of stifling them. The world had moved too fast for him. As
censor, instead of beseeching the gods to increase the glory of the
State, he begged them to preserve it. And no doubt he would have
greatly preferred that the gods should act without his intervention.
Brave as a man, he was a pusillanimous statesman; and when confronted
by the revolutionary spirit which he and his friends had helped to
evoke, he determined at all costs to prop up the senatorial power.
[Sidenote: His unpopularity with the Senate.] But the Senate hated
him, partly as a trimmer, and partly because by his personal character
he rebuked their baseness. He had just impeached Aurelius Cotta, a
senator, and the judices, from spite against him, had refused to
convict. So he turned to the Italian land-owners, and became
the mouthpiece of their selfishness, for a selfish or at best a
narrow-minded end. The nobles must have, at heart, disliked his
allies; but they cheered him in the Senate, and he succeeded in
practically strangling the commission by procuring the transfer of its
jurisdiction to the consuls. The consul for the time being immediately
found a pretext for leaving Rome, and a short time afterwards Scipio
was found one morning dead in his bed. [Sidenote: His death.] He had
gone to his chamber the night before to think over what he should say
next day to the people about the position of the country class, and,
if he was murdered, it is almost as probable that he was murdered by
some rancorous foe in the Senate as by Carbo or any other Gracchan. It
was well for his reputation that he died just then. Without Sulla's
personal vices he might have played Sulla's part as a politician, and
his atrocities in Spain as well as his remark on the death of Tiberius
Gracchus--words breathing the very essence of a narrow swordsman's
nature--showed that from bloodshed at all events he would not have
shrunk. It is hard to respect such a man in spite of all his good
qualities. Fortune gave him the opportunity of playing a great part,
and he shrank from it. When the crop sprang up which he had himself
helped to sow, he blighted it. But because he was personally
respectable, and because he held a middle course between contemporary
parties, he has found favour with historians, who are too apt to
forget that there is in politics, as in other things, a right course
and a wrong, and that to attempt to walk along both at once proves a
man to be a weak statesman, and does not prove him to be a great or
good man.

[Sidenote: The early career of Caius Gracchus.] In B.C. 126 Caius
Gracchus, seven years after he had been made one of the commissioners
for the allotment of public land, was elected quaestor. Sardinia was
at that time in rebellion, and it fell by lot to Caius to go there as
quaestor to the consul Orestes. It is said that he kept quiet when
Tiberius was killed, and intended to steer clear of politics. But
one of those splendid bursts of oratory, with which he had already
electrified the people, remains to show over what he was for ever
brooding. 'They slew him,' he cried, 'these scoundrels slew Tiberius,
my noble brother! Ah, they are all of one pattern.' He said this in
advocating the Lex Papiria, which proposed to make the re-election of
a tribune legal. But Scipio opposed the law, and it was defeated then,
to be carried, however, a few years later. Again, in the year of his
quaestorship, he spoke against the law of M. Junius Pennus, which
aimed at expelling all Peregrini from Rome. They were the very men by
whose help Tiberius had carried his agrarian law, and when Caius spoke
for them he was clearly treading in his brother's steps. At a later
time he declared that he dreamt Tiberius came to him and said, 'Why do
you hesitate? You cannot escape your doom and mine--to live for the
people and die for them.' Such a story would be effective in a speech,
and particularly effective when told to a superstitious audience; but
his day-dreams we may be sure were the cause and not the consequence
of his visions of the night. For there can be no doubt that the
younger brother had already one purpose and one only--to avenge the
death of Tiberius and carry out his designs.

Such omens as Roman credulity fastened on when the political air was
heavy with coming storm abounded now. With grave irony the historian
records: 'Besides showers of oil and milk in the neighbourhood of
Veii, a fact of which some people may doubt, an owl, it is said, was
seen on the Capitol, which may have been true.' Fulvius Flaccus, the
friend of Gracchus, made the first move. [Sidenote: Proposition of
Fulvius Flaccus. Its significance.] In order to buy off the opposition
of the Socii to the agrarian law, he proposed to give them the
franchise, just as Licinius, when he had offered the poor plebeians a
material boon, offered the rich ones a political one, so as to secure
the united support of the whole body. The proposal was significant,
and it was made at a critical time. The poor Italians were chafing, no
doubt, at the suspension of the agrarian law. The rich were indignant
at the carrying of the law of Pennus. Other and deeper causes of
irritation have been mentioned above. In the year of the proposal of
Flaccus, and very likely in consequence of its rejection, Fregellae--a
Latin colony--revolted. [Sidenote: Revolt and punishment of
Fregellae.] The revolt was punished with the ferocity of panic. The
town was destroyed; a Roman colony, Fabrateria, was planted near its
site; and for the moment Italian discontent was awed into sullen
silence. No wonder the Senate was panic-stricken. Here was a real
omen, not conjured up by superstition, that one of those towns, which
through Rome's darkest fortunes in the second Punic War had remained
faithful to her, should single-handed and in time of peace raise the
standard of rebellion. Was Fregellae indeed single-handed? The Senate
suspected not, and turned furiously on the Gracchan party, and, it is
alleged, accused Caius of complicity with the revolt. [Sidenote: Caius
Gracchus accused of treason. He stands for the tribunate.] It was rash
provocation to give to such a man at such a time. If he was accused,
he was acquitted, and he at once stood for the tribunate. Thus the
party which had slain his brother found itself again at death-grips
with an even abler and more implacable foe.

[Sidenote: Prominence of Gracchus at home and abroad.] There is no
doubt that for some time past Caius Gracchus, young as he was, and
having as yet filled none of the regular high offices, had had the
first place in all men's thoughts. His first speech had been received
by the people with wild delight. He was already the greatest orator in
Rome. His importance is shown by the Senate's actually prolonging the
consul's command, in order to keep his quaestor longer abroad. But his
friends were consoled for his absence by the stories they heard of
the respect shown to him by foreign nations. The Sardinians would not
grant supplies to Orestes, and the Senate approved their refusal. But
Gracchus interposed, and they voluntarily gave what they had before
appealed against. Micipsa, son of Masinissa, also sent corn to
Orestes, but averred that it was out of respect to Gracchus. The
Senate's fears and the esteem of foreigners were equally just. What
the life of Gracchus was in Sardinia he has himself told us; and from
the implied contrast we may judge what was the life of the nobles of
the time. [Sidenote: His description of the life of a noble.] 'My
life,' he said to the people, 'in the province was not planned to suit
my ambition, but your interests. There was no gormandising with me,
no handsome slaves in waiting, and at my table your sons saw more
seemliness than at head-quarters. No man can say without lying that
I ever took a farthing as a present or put anyone to expense. I was
there two years; and if a single courtesan ever crossed my doors, or
if proposals from me were ever made to anyone's slave-pet, set me down
for the vilest and most infamous of men. And if I was so scrupulous
towards slaves, you may judge what my life must have been with your
sons. And, citizens, here is the fruit of such a life. I left Rome
with a full purse and have brought it back empty. Others took out
their wine jars full of wine, and brought them back full of money.'

Such was the man who now came back to Rome to demand from the
aristocracy a reckoning for which he had been yearning with undying
passion for nearly ten years. An exaggerated contrast between him and
Tiberius at the expense of the latter has been previously condemned.
The man who originates is always so far greater than the man who
imitates, and Caius only followed where his brother led. He was not
greater than but only like his brother in his bravery, in his culture,
in the faculty of inspiring in his friends strong enthusiasm and
devotion, in his unswerving pursuit of a definite object, and, as his
sending the son of Fulvius Flaccus to the Senate just before his
death proves in the teeth of all assertions to the contrary, in his
willingness to use his personal influence in order to avoid civil
bloodshed. [Sidenote: Caius compared with Tiberius.] The very dream
which Caius told to the people shows that his brother's spell was
still on him, and his telling it, together with his impetuous oratory
and his avowed fatalism, militates against the theory that Tiberius
was swayed by impulse and sentiment, and he by calculation and reason.
But no doubt he profited by experience of the past. He had learned how
to bide his time, and to think generosity wasted on the murderous crew
whom he had sworn to punish. Pure in life, perfectly prepared for a
death to which he considered himself foredoomed, glowing with one
fervent passion, he took up his brother's cause with a double portion
of his brother's spirit, because he had thought more before action,
because he had greater natural eloquence, and because being forewarned
he was forearmed.

In spite of the labours of recent historians, the legislation of Caius
Gracchus is still hard to understand. Where the original authorities
contradict each other, as they often do, probable conjecture is the
most which can be attained, and no attempt will be made here to
specify what were the measures of the first tribunate of Caius and
what of the second. [Sidenote: The general purpose of the legislation
of Caius.] The general scope and tendency of his legislation is clear
enough. It was to overthrow the senatorial government, and in the
new government to give the chief share of the executive power to the
mercantile class, and the chief share of the legislative power to the
country class. These were his immediate aims. Probably he meant to
keep all the strings he thus set in motion in his own hands, so as to
be practically monarch of Rome. But whether he definitely conceived
the idea of monarchy, and, looking beyond his own requirements,
pictured to himself a successor at some future time inheriting the
authority which he had established, no one can say. In such vast
schemes there must have been much that was merely tentative. But had
he lived and retained his influence we may be sure that the Empire
would have been established a century earlier than it was.

[Sidenote: Date of the tribunate of Caius, December 10, B.C. 124.]
Rome was thronged to overflowing by the country class, and the nobles
strained every nerve in opposition when Caius was elected tribune. He
was only fourth on the list out of ten, and entered on his office on
December 10, B.C. 124. With a fixed presentiment of his own fate, he
felt that, even if he wished to remain passive, the people would not
permit him to be so. He might, he said, have pleaded that he and his
young child were the last representatives of a noble line--of P.
Africanus and Tiberius Gracchus--and that he had lost a brother in the
people's cause; but the people would not have listened to the plea. It
has been said that his mother dissuaded him from his intentions. But
the fragments on which the statement is based are as likely as not
spurious; and Cornelia's fortitude after she had lost both her sons
would hardly have been shown by one capable of subordinating public to
private interests.

[Sidenote: Story of his mother's sentiments.] It is far more likely
that when in his stirring speeches he spoke of his home as no place
for him to visit, while his mother was weeping and in despair, he was
influenced by her adjurations to avenge his brother, and not by any
craven warnings against sharing his fate. However this may have been,
no timid influences could be traced in the fiery passion of his first
speeches. [Sidenote: Story of the means by which he modulated his
voice when speaking.] He was, in fact, so carried away by his feelings
that he had to resort to a curious device in order to keep his voice
under control. A man with a musical instrument used, it is said, to
stand near him, and warn him by a note at times if he was pitching his
voice too high or too low. It was now that he told his stories of the
flogging of the magistrate of Teanum and the murder of the Venusian
herdsman, and we can imagine how they would incense his hearers
against the nobles. Against one of them, Octavius, he specially
directed a law, making it illegal for any magistrate previously
deposed by the people to be elected to office; but this, at Cornelia's
suggestion it is said, he withdrew. Another law also had special
reference to the fate of Tiberius. It made illegal the trial of any
citizen for an offence which involved the loss of his civic rights
without the consent of the people. [Sidenote: Caius procures the
banishment of Popillius Laenas.] This law, if in force, would have
prevented the ferocity with which Popillius Laenas hunted down the
partisans of Tiberius; and Caius followed it up according to the
oration De Domo, by procuring against Popillius a sentence of
outlawry. One of the fragments from his speeches was probably spoken
at this time. In it he told the people that they now had the chance
they had so long and so passionately desired; and that, if they did
not avail themselves of it, they would lay themselves open to the
charge of caprice or of ungoverned temper. Popillius anticipated the
sentence by voluntary retirement from Rome.

[Sidenote: His Lex Frumentaria.] Having satisfied his conscience by
the performance of what no doubt seemed to him sacred duties, Caius
at once set to work to build up his new constitution. It is commonly
represented that in order to gain over the people to his side he
cynically bribed them by his Lex Frumentaria. Now if this were true,
and Caius were as clear-sighted as the same writers who insist on the
badness of the law describe him to have been, it is hard to see how
they can in the same breath eulogise his goodness and nobleness. To
gain his ends he would have been using vile means, and would have been
a vile man. [Sidenote: The common criticism on it unjust.] Looking,
however, more closely into the law, we are led to doubt whether it was
bad, or, at all events, even granting that eventually it led to evil,
whether it would have appeared likely to do so to Caius. The public
land, it must be remembered, was liable to an impost called vectigal.
This vectigal went into the Aerarium, which the nobles had at their
disposal. Now the law of Caius appears to have fixed a nominal price
for corn to all Roman citizens, and if the market price was above this
price the difference would have to be made good from the Aerarium. We
at once see the object of Caius, and how the justice of it might have
blinded him to the demoralising effects of his measure. 'The public
land,' he said in effect, 'belongs to all Romans and so does the
vectigal. If you take that to which you have no right, you shall give
it back again in cheap corn.' In short, it was a clever device for
partially neutralising the long misappropriation of the State's
property by the nobles, and for giving to the people what belonged
to the people--to each man, as it were, so many ears of corn from
whatever fraction would be his own share of the land. [Sidenote:
Contrast between the just proposal of Caius and the demagogy of
Drusus.] When Drusus was afterwards set up to outbid Caius, he
proposed that the vectigal should be remitted, and that the land that
had been assigned might be sold by the occupier. How this would catch
the farmer's fancy is as obvious as is its odious dishonesty. It was
dishonest to the State because it was only fair that each occupier
should contribute to its funds, and because it did away with the
hope of filling Italy with free husbandmen. It was dishonest to the
occupier himself, because it put in his way the worst temptation to
unthriftiness. When Caius renewed his brother's laws he purposely
charged the land distributed to the poor with a yearly vectigal.
How different was this from the mere demagogic trick of Drusus!
It appears, then, that the Lex Frumentaria of Caius is not the
indefensible measure which modern writers, filled with modern notions,
have called it. It has, moreover, been well said that it was a kind
of poor-law; and, even if bad in itself, may have been the least bad
remedy for the pauperism which not Caius, but senatorial misgovernment
had brought about. No doubt it conferred popularity on Caius, and no
doubt his popularity was acceptable to him; but there is no ground for
believing that his noble nature deliberately stooped to demoralise the
mob for selfish motives.

[Sidenote: His Lex Judiciaria.] One great party, however, he had thus
won over to his side. The Lex Judiciaria gained over the equites
also. It has been before explained that the equites at this time were
non-senatorial rich men. Senators were forbidden by law to mix in
commerce, though no doubt they evaded the law. Between the senatorial
and moneyed class there was a natural ill-will, which Caius proceeded
to use and increase. His exact procedure we do not know for certain.
According to some authorities he made the judices eligible from the
equites only, instead of from the Senate. In the epitome of Livy it is
stated that 600 of the equites were to be added to the number of the
senators, so that the equites should have twice as much power as the
Senate itself. This at first sight seems nonsense. But Caius may have
proposed that for judicial purposes 600 equites should form, as it
were, a second chamber, which, being twice as numerous, would permit
two judices for every senatorial judex. In form he may have devised
that 'counter-senate,' which, as it has been shown, he in fact
created. [Sidenote: The effects of it. The Senate abased, the equites
exalted.] But whether Caius provided that all the judices or only
two-thirds of them should be chosen from the equites, and in whatever
way he did so, he did succeed in exalting the moneyed class and
abasing the Senate. In civil processes, and in the permanent and
temporary commissions for the administration of justice, the equites
were henceforth supreme. Even the senators themselves depended on
their verdict for acquittal or condemnation, and the chief power in
the State had changed hands. Of course the change would not be felt
at once to the full; but this was the most trenchant stroke which
Gracchus aimed at the Senate's power. Here, again, it is customary to
write of his actions as if they were governed solely by feeling, quite
apart from all considerations of right and wrong. But Cicero declares
that for nearly fifty years, while the equites discharged this office,
there was not even the slightest suspicion of a single eques being
bribed in his capacity as judex; and after every allowance has been
made for Ciceronian exaggeration, the statement may at least warrant
us in believing that Gracchus had some reason for hoping that his
change would be a change for the better, even if, as Appian declares,
it turned out in the end just the opposite. Indeed, it is beyond
question that, as the provinces were governed by the senatorial class,
judices who had to decide cases like those of Cotta would be more
fairly chosen from the equites than from the class to which Cotta
belonged.

[Sidenote: The taxation of Asia.] We know little of the arrangements
for the taxation of Asia made by Gracchus. He provided that the taxes
should be let by auction at Rome, which would undoubtedly be a boon
to the Roman capitalists and a check to provincial competition. He is
said also to have substituted the whole system of direct and indirect
taxes for the previously existing system of fixed payments by the
various states. There was a certain narrowness about the conceptions
of both the Gracchi with regard to the transmarine world, which was
common to all Romans; to which, for instance, Tiberius gave expression
when he spoke of the conquest of the whole world as a thing which his
audience had a right to expect; and this sentiment may have in this
instance influenced Caius to use harshness. [Sidenote: The common
criticism on the measure of Caius unjust.] But even here to condemn
without more knowledge of his measures would be unjust. Fixed payments
it must be remembered were not always preferable to tithes of the
produce. In a sterile year the payers of vectigalia would be best off.
Again, if a rich province like Asia did not pay tribute in proportion
to other provinces, a re-adjustment of its taxes would not seem to the
Romans unfair; and perhaps auction at Rome would after all be less
mischievous than a hole-and-corner arrangement in the provinces. If
the sheep were to be fleeced, they would not be shorn closest in the
capital. [Sidenote: Measure for the relief of publicani.] To another
of his provisions at all events no one could object--the one which
gave relief to such publicani as had suffered loss in collecting the
revenue.

[Sidenote: Alleged privileges conferred on the equites.] Gracchus had
thus raised the equites above the Senate at Rome in the courts of
justice, and opened a golden harvest to them in the provinces. It
is conjectured that he also gave them the distinction of a golden
finger-ring and reserved seats at the public spectacles. Two classes
were thus gratified, the city poor and the city rich. [Sidenote:
Caius attempts to conciliate the farmer class and the Italians.] But
Gracchus had to deal also with those of the country class in whose
favour his brother's agrarian law had been passed, and with those
who had resented the law. To provide for the former he renewed the
operation of his brother's law, which had been suspended by Scipio's
intervention, and probably took away its administrations from
the consuls and restored it to triumvirs; and as that might be
insufficient, he began the establishment of many colonies in various
parts of the peninsula; and even beyond it at Carthage, to which he
invited colonists from all parts of Italy. To compensate and benefit
the latter he proposed to give them the franchise, so as to secure
them from such outrages as that of Teanum. For though such of them
as belonged to Roman colonies or municipia possessed the franchise
already, the mass of the Latins and Italians did not possess it. There
are different accounts of this measure; but Appian says that he wished
to give the Latini the Jus Suffragii and Jus Honorum, and to the rest
of the Italians the Jus Suffragii only. But here he reckoned without
his host. [Sidenote: Feeling at Rome.] The boons of colonies and cheap
bread, and the prospect of a slice out of the public land occupied by
Italians, were all not strong enough to overcome the deep, ingrained
prejudice against extending the franchise. Rich and poor Romans met
here on the common ground of narrow pride, and the offence caused by
this wise project probably paved the way for the tribune's fall.

In speaking of the motives which induced Tiberius to seek the
tribunate a second time (p. 33) it has been said that he was not
influenced by personal considerations, but wanted time to carry out
his measures. This view is confirmed by what Appian says about Caius,
namely, that he was elected a second time; for already a law had been
enacted to this effect, that if a tribune could not find time for
executing in his tribunate what he had promised, the people might give
the office to him again in preference to anyone else. This has been
pronounced to be a blunder on Appian's part, but without adequate
reason. It was in fact the natural and inevitable law which Caius
would insist on first, and he would plead for it precisely on the
grounds which Appian states. It is also clear that such a law once
passed made virtual monarchy at Rome possible. [Sidenote: Other
measures of Caius.] In fact the other measures of Caius were both
worthy of a great and wise monarch, and might with good reason
be thought to be designed to lead to monarchy. [Sidenote: Roads.
Granaries. Soldiers' uniform. Age for service.] He constructed
magnificent roads--along which, it would be whispered, his voters
might come more easily to Rome. He built public granaries. He gave
the soldiers clothing at the cost of the State. He made seventeen the
minimum age for service in the army. He himself superintended the
plantation of his own colonies. Everywhere he made his finger felt;
but whether this was of set purpose or only from his constitutional
energy it is hard to decide. His chief object, however, was to
overthrow the Senate; and we have not yet exhausted the list of his
assaults upon it. [Sidenote: Change in nomination to provinces.]
Hitherto it had been the custom for the Senate to name the consular
provinces for the next year after the election of the consuls, which
meant that if a favourite was consul a rich province was given to him,
and if not, a poor one. Caius enacted that the consular provinces
should be named before the election of the consuls. By way, perhaps,
of softening this restriction he took away from the tribunes their
veto on the naming of the consular provinces. [Sidenote: Alleged
change in the order of voting.] He is further supposed, though on
slender evidence, to have changed the order of voting in the Comitia
Centuriata. Formerly the first class voted first. Now the order of
voting first was to be settled by lot, and so the influence of the
rich would be diminished.

[Sidenote: General criticism of his schemes.] Such, in outline, was
the grand scheme of Caius Gracchus. If he was less single-minded in
his aims than his brother, he could hardly help being so; and, having
to reconcile so many conflicting interests, he may have swerved from
what would have been his own ideal. But that his main purpose was to
break down a rotten system, and establish a sound one on its ruins,
and that no petty motive of expediency guided him, but only the one
principle, 'salus populi suprema lex,' is incontrovertible. When we
think of him so eloquent, resolute, and energetic, conceiving such
great projects and executing them in person, making the regeneration
of his country his lodestar in spite of his ever-present belief that
he would, in the end, fall by the same fate as his brother, we think
of him as one of the noblest figures in history--a purer and less
selfish Julius Caesar.

[Sidenote: Machinations of the nobles.] As the petty acts of the
nobles had brought out into relief the large policy of Tiberius, so
it was now. They resorted to even lower tricks than accusations of
tyranny, and found in the fatuity or dishonesty of Drusus a tool even
more effective than Nasica's brutality. The plantation of a colony at
Carthage was looked at askance by many Romans. It was the first
colony planted out of Italy, and the superstitious were filled with
forebodings which the Senate eagerly exaggerated. Such colonies had
repeatedly out-grown and overtopped the parent state. The ground had
been solemnly cursed, and the restoration of the town forbidden. When
the first standard was set up by the colonists a blast of wind, it is
said, blew it down, and scattered the flesh of the victims; and wolves
had torn up the stakes that marked out the site. Such malicious
stories met with readier credence, because, if it is true that Caius
had called for colonists from all Italy, and Junonia was to be a Roman
colony, he was evading the decree of the people against extending the
franchise; and he was thus admitting to it, by a side-wind, those to
whom it had just in the harshest manner been refused. For, when the
vote had been taken, every man not having a vote had been expelled
from the city, and forbidden to come within five miles of it till the
voting was over. Caius had come to live in the Forum instead of on the
Palatine when he returned to Rome, among his friends as he thought;
and still even in little matters he stood forward as the champion of
the poor against the rich. There was going to be a show of gladiators
in the Forum, and the magistrates had enclosed the arena with benches,
which they meant to hire out. Caius asked them to remove the benches,
and, on their refusal, went the night before the show and took them
all away. Anyone who has witnessed modern athletic sports, and
observed how a crowd will hem in the competitors so that only a few
spectators can see, although an equally good view can be obtained by
a great number if the ring is enlarged, will perceive Caius's object,
and be slow to admit that he spoiled the show. But though such acts
pleased the people, all of them had not forgiven him the proposition
about the franchise; and his popularity was on the wane. [Sidenote:
Drusus outbids Caius.] The Senate had suborned one of his colleagues,
M. Livius Drusus, to outbid him. Either Drusus thought he was guiding
the Senate into a larger policy when he was himself merely the
Senate's puppet, and this his son's career makes probable, or he was
cynically dishonest and unscrupulous.

Caius had meditated, it may be, many colonies, but, according to
Plutarch, had at this time only actually settled two. Drusus proposed
to plant twelve, each of 3,000 citizens. Caius had superintended
the settlement himself, and employed his friends. With virtuous
self-denial Drusus washed his hands of all such patronage. Caius had
imposed a yearly tax on those to whom he gave land; Drusus proposed to
remit it. Caius had wished to give the Latins the franchise; Drusus
replied by a comparatively ridiculous favour, which, however, might
appeal more directly to the lower class of Latins. No Latin, he said,
should be liable to be flogged even when serving in the army. Drusus
could afford to be liberal. His colonies were sham colonies. His
remission of the vectigal was a thin-coated poison. His promise to the
Latins was at best a cheap one, and was not carried out. But none the
less his treachery or imbecility served its purpose, and the greedier
and baser of the partisans of Gracchus began to look coldly on their
leader. [Sidenote: Caius rejected for the tribunate.] It is stated,
indeed, that on his standing for the tribunate a third time he was
rejected by fraud, his colleagues having made a false return of the
names of the candidates. In any case he was not elected, and one of
the consuls for the year 121 was L. Opimius, his mortal foe.

The end was drawing near. Sadly Caius must have recognised that his
presentiments would soon be fulfilled, and that he must share his
brother's fate. [Sidenote: Preparations for civil strife.] His foes
proposed to repeal the law for the settlement of Junonia, and,
according to Plutarch, others of his laws also. Warned by the past,
his friends armed. Men came disguised as reapers to defend him. It is
likely enough that they were really reapers, who would remember why
Tiberius lost his life, and that their support would have saved him.
Fulvius was addressing the people about the law when Caius, attended
by some of his partisans, came to the Capitol. He did not join the
meeting, but began walking up and down under a colonnade to wait its
issue. Here a man named Antyllus, who was sacrificing, probably in
behalf of Opimius the consul, either insulted the Gracchans and was
stabbed by them, or caught hold of Caius's hand, or by some other
familiarity or importunity provoked some hasty word or gesture from
him, upon which he was stabbed by a servant. As soon as the deed
was done the people ran away, and Caius hastened to the assembly to
explain the affair. But it began to rain heavily; and for this, and
because of the murder, the assembly was adjourned. Caius and Fulvius
went home; but that night the people thronged the Forum, expecting
that some violence would be done at daybreak. Opimius was not slow to
seize the opportunity. He convoked the Senate, and occupied the temple
of Castor and Pollux with armed men. The body of Antyllus was placed
on a bier, and with loud lamentations borne along the Forum; and as
it passed by the senators came out and hypocritically expressed their
anger at the deed. Then, going indoors, they authorised the consul,
by the usual formula, to resort to arms. He summoned the senators and
equites to arm, and each eques was to bring two armed slaves. The
equites owed much to Gracchus, but they basely deserted him now.
Fulvius, on his side, armed and prepared for a struggle. All the night
the friends of Caius guarded his door, watching and sleeping by turns.
[Sidenote: Fighting in Rome.] The house of Fulvius was also surrounded
by men, who drank and bragged of what they would do on the morrow, and
Fulvius is said to have set them the example. At daybreak he and his
men, to whom he distributed the arms which he had when consul taken
from the Gauls, rushed shouting up to the Aventine and seized it.
Caius said good-bye to his wife and little child, and followed, in his
toga, and unarmed. He knew he was going to his death, but

  For his country felt alone,
  And prized her blood beyond his own.

One effort he made to avert the struggle. He induced Fulvius to send
his young son to the Senate to ask for terms. The messenger returned
with the Senate's reply that they must lay down their arms, and the
two leaders must come and answer for their acts. Caius was ready to
go. But Fulvius was too deeply committed, and sent his son back again,
upon which Opimius seized him, and at once marched to the Aventine.
There was a fight, in which Fulvius was beaten, and with another son
fled and hid himself in a bath or workshop. His pursuers threatened
to burn all that quarter if he was not given up; so the man who had
admitted him told another man to betray him, and father and son were
slain.

[Sidenote: Murder of Caius.] Meanwhile Caius, who had neither armed
nor fought, was about to kill himself in the temple of Diana, when his
two friends implored him to try and save himself for happier
times. Then it is said he invoked a curse on the people for their
ingratitude, and fled across the Tiber. He was nearly overtaken; but
his two staunch friends, Pomponius and Laetorius, gave their lives for
their leader--Pomponius at the Porta Trigemina below the Aventine,
Laetorius in guarding the bridge which was the scene of the feat of
Horatius Cocles. As Caius passed people cheered him on, as if it was
a race in the games. He called for help, but no one helped him--for a
horse, but there was none at hand. One slave still kept up with him,
named Philocrates or Euporus. Hard pressed by their pursuers the two
entered the grove of Furina, and there the slave first slew Caius
and then himself. A wretch named Septimuleius cut off the head of
Gracchus; for a proclamation had been made that whosoever brought
the heads of the two leaders should receive their weight in gold.
Septimuleius, it is said, took out the brains and filled the cavity
with lead; but if he cheated Opimius, Opimius in his turn cheated
those who brought the head of Fulvius, for as they were of the lower
class he would pay them nothing. The story may be false; but Opimius
was subsequently convicted of selling his country's interests to
Jugurtha for money, so that with equal likelihood it may be true. In
the fight and afterwards he put to death 3,000 men, many of whom were
innocent, but whom he would not allow to speak in their defence. The
houses of Caius and Fulvius were sacked, and the property of the slain
was confiscated. Then the city was purified, and the ferocious knave
Opimius raised a temple to Concord, on which one night was found
written 'The work of Discord makes the temple of Concord.' That year
there was a famous vintage, and nearly two centuries afterwards there
was some wine which had been made at the time that Caius Gracchus
died. The wine, says the elder Pliny, tasted like and had the
consistency of bitterish honey. But the memory of the great tribune
has lasted longer than the wine, and will be honoured for ever by all
those who revere patriotism and admire genius. He for whom at the
last extremity friend and slave give their lives does not fall
ingloriously. Even for a life so noble such deaths are a sufficient
crown.

[Sidenote: The mother of the Gracchi.] The child of Caius did not long
survive him. The son of Tiberius died while a boy. Only Cornelia, the
worthy mother of the heroic brothers, remained. She could (according
to the purport of Plutarch's pathetic narrative) speak of them without
a sigh or tear; and those who concluded from this that her mind was
clouded by age or misfortune, were too dull themselves to comprehend
how a noble nature and noble training can support sorrow, for though
fate may often frustrate virtue, yet 'to bear is to conquer our fate.'

[Sidenote: Position of the nobles after the murder. Lex Maria.] The
nobles no doubt thought that, having got rid of Gracchus, they had
renewed their own lease of power. But they had only placed themselves
at the mercy of meaner men. The murderous scenes just related happened
in 121 B.C., and in 119 we read of a Lex Maria, the first law, that is
to say, promulgated by the destined scourge of the Roman aristocracy.
Every Roman could vote, and voted by ballot, and was eligible to
every office. The first law of Marius was to protect voters from the
solicitations of candidates for office. It is significant that the
nobles opposed it, though in the end it was carried. Stealthy intrigue
was now their safest weapon, but their power was tottering to its
fall. Too jealous of each other to submit to the supremacy of one, it
only remained for them to be overthrown by some leader of the popular
party, and the Republic was no more. Yet, as if smitten by judicial
blindness, they proceeded to hasten on their own ruin by reactionary
provocations to their opponents. [Sidenote: Gracchan laws remain in
force.] They dared not interfere with the corn law of Caius, for now
that every man had a vote, which he could give by ballot, they were
dependent on the suffrages of the mob. Neither dared they till
seventeen years later make an attempt to interfere with the selection
of the judices from the equestrian order, and even then the attempt
failed. The scheme of taxation in the province of Asia was also left
untouched. But what they dared to do they did. They prosecuted the
adherents of Gracchus. They recalled Popillius from exile. When
Opimius was arraigned for 'perduellio,' or misuse of his official
power to compass the death of a citizen, they procured his acquittal.
But when Carbo was accused of the same crime, they remembered that he
had been a partisan of Tiberius, though since a renegade, and would
not help him. So while Opimius got off, the champion of Opimius was
driven to commit suicide--a fitting close to a contemptible career.

[Sidenote: Reactionary legislation.] But they soon assailed measures
as well as men. The Lex Baebia appears to have secured those who had
actually established themselves at Carthage in their allotments; but
the Senate annulled the colonies which Caius had planned in Italy,
and, with one exception, Neptunia, broke up those already settled.
[Sidenote: The agrarian law annulled.] Then by three successive
enactments it got rid of the agrarian law, and plunged Italy again
into the decline from which by the help of that law she was emerging.
1. The occupiers were allowed again to sell their land. Tiberius had
expressly forbidden this, and now the rich at once began to buy out
the small owners, whom they often evicted by means more or less
foul. 2. A tribune named Borius, or Thorius, prohibited any further
distribution of land, thus knocking on the head the permanent
commission. These two laws were tantamount to handing over to the
rich in the city and the country the greater part of the public
land, giving them a legal title to it instead of the possession on
sufferance with which the Gracchi had interfered. The mouths of the
farmers were stopped by the pernicious but tempting permission to sell
their land. The people were cajoled by the vectigalia, which Drusus
had abolished, being reimposed, and the proceeds divided among
them. 3. Encouraged by the general acquiescence in these insidious
aggressions they induced a tribune, whose name is conjectured to have
been C. Baebius, to do away with the vectigalia altogether. [Sidenote:
Lex Thoria.] The date of this law, usually called the Thorian law, was
111 B.C. The real Thorian law was probably carried in 118 B.C. Between
these dates the rich would have been getting back the land from the
poor occupiers, and so, when the Senate abolished the vectigalia,
it was really pocketing them, and once for all and by a legal form
turning the public into private land. This law, which is here called
the Baebian law, Cicero ascribes to Spurius Thorius, who, he says,
freed the land from the vectigal. But as Appian says that Spurius
Borius imposed the vectigal, it is assumed that Cicero confused names,
that the Spurius Borius of Appian was Spurius Thorius, and that the
tribune whom Cicero calls Thorius was really quite another person.
However that may be, the law would benefit the rich, because the rich
would be owners of the land. Certain provisions of it were directly
meant to prevent opposition in the country. For if many of the poor
farmers would grumble at being ousted from their land, the land which
had been specially assigned to Latin towns, and of which Tiberius
Gracchus had threatened to dispossess them, was left in the same state
as before his legislation; that is to say, the Senate did not give
the occupiers an indefeasible title, but it did not meddle with
them. Moreover, it amply indemnified the Socii and Latini who had
surrendered land for the colonies of Caius, while some compensation
was given to poor farmers by a clause, that in future a man might only
graze ten large and fifty smaller beasts on the pastures of what still
remained public land. By this law the jurisdiction over land which had
been assigned by the triumvirs was given to the consuls, censors,
and praetors, the jurisdiction over cases in which disputes with the
publicani required settlement being granted to the consuls, praetors,
and, as such cases would occur chiefly in the provinces which were
mostly under propraetors, to propraetors also.

[Sidenote: Pernicious results of the reaction.] The results of this
reactionary legislation are partly summed up by Appian, when he
attributes to it a dearth of citizens, soldiers, and revenue. To our
eyes its effects are clearer still. Slave labour and slave-discontent,
'latifundia,' decrease of population, depreciation of the land,
received a fresh impetus, and the triumphant optimates pushed the
State step by step further down the road to ruin. For the end for
which they struggled was not the good of Italy, much less of the
world, but the supremacy of Rome in Italy, and of themselves in Rome.
Wealth and office were shared by an ever narrowing circle. Ten years
after the passing of the Baebian law, it was said that among all the
citizens there were only 2,000 wealthy families. And between the
years 123 and 109 B.C. four sons and probably two nephews of Quintus
Metellus gained the consulship, five of the six gained triumphs, and
one was censor, while he himself had filled all the highest offices
of the State. Thus, as Sallust says, the nobles passed on the chief
dignities from hand to hand.

There must have been many of the Gracchan party, now left without a
head, who burned for deliverance from such despicable masters. But
they were for the time disorganized and cowed. [Sidenote: Caius
Marius.] There was one man whom Scipio Aemilianus was said to have
pointed out in the Numantine war as capable, if he himself died, of
taking his place; and the rough soldier had already come forward as a
politician, on the one hand checking the optimates by protecting the
secrecy and efficiency of the ballot, and on the other defying the mob
by opposing a distribution of corn; but for the present no one could
tell how far he would or could go, and though he had already been made
praetor, the Metelli could as yet afford to despise him. The death of
Caius prolonged the Senate's misrule for twenty years. Twenty years
of shame at home and abroad--the turpitude of the Jugurthine war--a
second and more stubborn slave revolt in Sicily--the apparition of
the Northern hordes inflicting disaster after disaster upon the Roman
armies, which in 105 B.C. culminated in another and more appalling
Cannae--these things had yet to come about before the cup of the
Senate's infamy was full, and before those who had drawn the sword
against the Gracchi perished by the sword of Marius, impotent,
unpitied, and despised.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER IV.

THE JUGURTHINE WAR.


[Sidenote: Attalus of Pergamus.] Attalus III., the last of that
supple dynasty which had managed to thrive on the jealous and often
treacherous patronage of Rome, left his dominions at his death to
the Republic. He had begun his reign by massacring all his father's
friends and their families, and ended it as an amateur gardener and
dilettante modeller in wax; so perhaps the malice of insanity had
something to do with the bequest, if indeed it was not a forgery.
Aristonicus, a natural son of a previous king, Eumenes II., set it at
naught and aspired to the throne.

[Sidenote: Aristonicus usurps the kingdom of Pergamus.] Attalus died
in 133, the year of the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus, when Scipio
was besieging Numantia, and the first slave revolt was raging in
Sicily. The Romans had their hands full, and Aristonicus might have
so established himself as to give them trouble, had not some of the
Asiatic cities headed by Ephesus, and aided by the kings of Cappadocia
and Bithynia, opposed him. He seized Leucae (the modern Lefke) and
was expelled by the Ephesians. But when the Senate found time to send
commissioners, he was already in possession of Thyatira, Apollonia,
Myndus, Colophon, and Samos. Blossius, the friend of Gracchus, had
come to him, and the civil strife at Rome must have raised his
hopes. [Sidenote: Conduct of Crassus, illustrating Roman rule in the
province.] But in the year 131 P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, the
father-in-law of Caius Gracchus, was consul, and was sent to Asia. He
was Pontifex Maximus, rich, high-born, eloquent, and of great legal
knowledge; and from his intimacy with the Gracchi and Scipio he must
have been an unusually favourable specimen of the aristocrat of the
day. And this is what he did in Asia. He was going to besiege Leucae,
and having seen two pieces of timber at Elaea, sent for the larger
of them to make a battering ram. The builder, who was the chief
magistrate of the town, sent him the smaller piece as being the most
suitable, and Crassus had him stripped and scourged. Next year he was
surprised by the enemy near Leucae. Apparently he could have got off
if he had not been laden with his collections in Asia, to procure
which he had intrigued to prevent his colleague Flaccus getting that
province. Unable to escape, he provoked his captor to kill him by
thrusting a stick into his eye. His death was a striking comment on
the Senate's government. Cruelty and culture, personal bravery and.
incompetence--such an alloy was now the best metal which its most
respectable representatives could supply.

[Sidenote: End of Aristonicus and settlement of the kingdom.]
Aristonicus was now the more formidable because he had roused the
slaves, among whom the spirit of revolt, in sympathy with the rest of
their kind throughout the Roman world, was then working. But in the
year 130 M. Perperna surprised him, and carried him to Rome. Blossius
committed suicide. The pretender was strangled in prison. Part of his
territory was given to the kings who had helped the consul, one of
whom was the father of the great Mithridates. Phrygia was the share
assigned to him; but the Senate took it back from his successor,
saying that the consul Aquillius had been bribed to give it. The
consul may have been base or the Senate mean, or, what is more
probable, the baseness of the one was used as a welcome plea by the
other's meanness. The European part was added to the province of
Macedonia. The Lycian confederacy received Telmissus. The rest was
formed into a province, which was called Asia--the name being at once
an incentive to and a nucleus for future annexation. Such a nucleus
they already possessed in the province of Africa, and there also war
was kindled by the ambition of a bastard.

[Sidenote: Jugurtha.] Jugurtha was the illegitimate son of Mastanabal,
Micipsa's brother. He had served at Numantia under Scipio, along with
his future conqueror Marius. There he had begun to intrigue with
influential Romans for the succession to the Numidian kingdom, and
had been rebuked by Scipio, who told him he should cultivate the
friendship, not of individual Romans, but of the State. But in
Jugurtha's heart a noble sentiment found no echo. Brave, treacherous,
restless, an able commander, a crafty politician, adroit in discerning
and profiting by other men's bad qualities, wading to the throne
through the blood of three kinsmen, he in some respects resembles
Shakspeare's Richard III.,--his 'prime of manhood daring, bold, and
venturous,' his 'age confirmed, proud, subtle, sly, and bloody.'
[Sidenote: Micipsa's will.] Micipsa had shared the kingdom with his
two brothers, who died before him; and as this, which was Scipio's
arrangement, had not worked badly in his own case, he in his turn left
his kingdom between Adherbal, Hiempsal, and Jugurtha. Adherbal was
weak and pusillanimous, Hiempsal hot-tempered and rash. Jugurtha, ten
or fifteen years older than either, was the favourite of the nation,
his handsome, martial figure and his reputation as a soldier according
with the notions of a race of riders as to what a king should be.
Hiempsal soon provoked him by refusing to yield the place of honour to
him at their first meeting; and when Jugurtha said that Micipsa's acts
during the last five years of his life should be held as null because
of his impaired faculties, Hiempsal retorted that he agreed with him,
for it was within three years that he had adopted Jugurtha. [Sidenote:
Jugurtha gets rid of Hiempsal.] Hiempsal went to a town called
Thirmida, to the house of a man who had been in Jugurtha's service.
This man Jugurtha bribed to procure a model of the town keys, which
were taken to Hiempsal each evening. Then his men, getting into
Thirmida one night, cut off Hiempsal's head and took it to their
master. He then proceeded to seize town after town; all the best
warriors rallied to his standard, and in a pitched battle he defeated
Adherbal, who fled to Rome, whither he had previously sent ambassadors
imploring aid. Jugurtha also sent envoys with plenty of money, to be
given first to his old comrades, and then to men likely to be useful.
At once the indignation which the wrongs of the brothers had roused
at Rome cooled down. [Sidenote: M. Aemilius Scaurus.] But M. Aemilius
Scaurus, the chief of the aristocracy, seems to have been bidding for
a higher price than was at first offered him, and by his influence ten
commissioners were appointed to divide the kingdom. Scaurus had in his
youth thought of becoming a money-lender, a trade in which he would
certainly have excelled; and he may very likely have hoped to make
something out of the commission, as the exemplary Opimius, murderer of
Caius Gracchus, did. [Sidenote: Jugurtha bribes the commissioners.]
This man, whom Cicero extols as a most excellent citizen, had opposed
Jugurtha at Rome but being in consequence treated by the king in
Numidia with marked deference, joined the majority of his colleagues
in swallowing the bribes offered to them. So Adherbal received the
eastern half which, though it contained the capital Cirta and better
harbours and towns, consisted mostly of barren sand, while the more
fertile portion was assigned to his rival.

[Sidenote: Jugurtha assails Adherbal, who appeals to the Senate.] This
took place in the year 117 B.C. Scarcely had the commissioners left
the province when the successful villain again took up arms. Adherbal,
after much long-suffering and sending a complaint to Rome, was driven
to do the same in self-defence. But he was defeated between Cirta and
the sea, and would have been taken in Cirta had not the colony of
Italians resident there beaten off the horsemen in pursuit. [Sidenote:
A second commission, hoaxed or bribed by Jugurtha.] Meanwhile
Adherbal's message had reached Rome, and the Senate, with its
high sense of responsibility, sent ten young men to Numidia as
adjudicators. Perhaps, indeed, it was not mere carelessness which sent
these young hopefuls to the best school of bribery in the world. They
were bidden to insist simply on the war ceasing, and the two kings
settling their disputes by law. And yet the news of the battle and the
siege of Cirta had reached Rome. Jugurtha came to them, and said that
his merits had won Scipio's approval, and that, conscious of right,
he could not submit to wrong; he then gravely charged Adherbal with
plotting against his life, and promised to send ambassadors to Rome.
Then the ten young men without even seeing Adherbal, left Africa, not
we may conjecture so lightly laden as they came there.

The town of Cirta stood on the promontory of a peninsula formed by a
loop of the river Ampsaga, and was almost impregnable. Modern writers
represent it as a square spur, thrust out into a gorge which runs
between two mountain-ranges, this gorge being spanned by a bridge at
one corner of the square. The town, now known as Constantina, and
distant 48 miles from the sea and 200 from Algiers, has been described
as occupying a bold and commanding situation on a steep, rocky hill,
with the river Rummel flowing on three sides of its base, the country
around being a high terrace between the chains of the maritime and
central Atlas. [Sidenote: Adherbal blockaded in Cirta.] Such being
the strength of the place, Jugurtha could only hope to reduce it by
blockade, and it was only after four months that two of Adherbal's men
got out and carried a piteous appeal from their master to the Senate,
adjuring them, not indeed to give him back his kingdom, but to save
his life. [Sidenote: A third commission.] Some of the Senate were for
sending an army to Africa at once, but in those days honest men
were always in the minority, and three commissioners were sent
instead--Scaurus, the man who had so lively an appreciation of his
own value, at their head. [Sidenote: Jugurtha is admonished by it.]
Jugurtha, after a desperate attempt to storm Cirta before they
arrived, came to them at Utica, where he was admonished at great
length. Then this precious trio left Africa, as the ten young men had
done; and the surrender of Cirta followed, either because despair led
its defenders to hope that submission, as it would save the enemy
trouble, might conciliate him, or perhaps because water or food
ran short. [Sidenote: Cirta taken and Adherbal murdered.] Jugurtha
immediately tortured Adherbal to death, and put every Numidian and
Italian in the place to the sword.

[Sidenote: Genuine indignation at Rome.] Then at last a thrill of
genuine anger went through Rome. The honour of the State had been
sorely wounded, but gold had been thus far a pleasant salve. Now,
however, the equites were touched in their hearts at the fate probably
of some of their own kinsmen, and almost certainly in an even more
sensitive part--their purses. For no doubt there were commercial
relations between the Italian community at Cirta and the Roman
merchants, and here their gains were confiscated at one stroke by a
savage. The senators, on the other hand, who had taken Numidian money,
tried to quash discussion, and would have succeeded if the tribune,
Caius Memmius, had not overawed them by his harangues. [Sidenote: War
declared. Bestia sails to Africa.] Fresh envoys, who had been sent by
Jugurtha with a fresh bribery fund, were ordered to leave Italy in ten
days; and Bestia sailed for Africa, taking with him as his second
in command Scaurus, who felt, no doubt, that a patriot was at last
rewarded. [Sidenote: Jugurtha bribes the generals.] There was some
fighting, and then the money from which Roman virtue had shrunk in
Italy could be resisted no longer. The itching palm of Scaurus was at
length filled as full as he thought mere decency demanded. Bestia
was also gratified, Jugurtha's submission was accepted, hostilities
ceased, and the consul sailed home to superintend the next year's
elections.

[Sidenote: Harangues of the tribune Memmius.] But Memmius, justly
incensed, now took a bolder tone. We cannot tell how far Sallust
reports what he really said, or how far he drew on his own invention.
But if he has given us Memmius's own words, they must have rung in the
ears of many an honest Roman like the trumpet-notes of that still more
eloquent tribune whose body, ten years before, had been hurled
into the Tiber. For he cast in the teeth of his audience their
pusillanimity in suffering their champions to be murdered, and
allowing so worthless a crew to lord it over them. It had been
shameful enough that they had witnessed in silence the plunder of the
treasury, the monopoly of all high office, and kings and free states
cringing to a handful of nobles; but now a worse thing had been done,
and the honour of the Republic trafficked away. And the men who had
done this felt neither shame nor sorrow, but strutted about with a
parade of triumphs, consulships, and priesthoods, as if they were men
of honour and not thieves. After these and similar home-thrusts, he
called upon the people to insist on Jugurtha being brought to Rome,
for so they would test the reality of his surrender. The tribune's
eloquence prevailed. The praetor Cassius was sent to bring Jugurtha
under a promise of safe-conduct. Jugurtha hesitated. Bestia's officers
were treading in their general's steps, taking bribes, selling as
slaves the Numidians who had deserted to them, and pillaging the
country. Jugurtha was fast becoming the national hero instead of the
chief of a faction, and might have even then dreamt of defying Rome.
However, he yielded and, as it was not in his nature to do things by
halves, came in the mean dress which was assumed to excite compassion.
He did more. This was the year of the so-called Thorian law.
[Sidenote: Jugurtha comes to Rome, and bribes the tribune Baebius.]
Caius Baebius, who may have been the author of that law, was tribune,
and not of the stamp of Memmius. He took Jugurtha's bribes, and when
the king was being cross-questioned by Memmius, interposed his veto,
and forbade him to reply. Thus once again, though the people were
furious, the old plan seemed to be working well.

[Sidenote: Murder of Massiva.] But now a cousin of the king, named
Massiva, a grandson of Masinissa, at the instigation of the consul
Albinus, claimed the Numidian crown. In the present state of parties
he was sure of support, so Jugurtha had recourse to the second
weapon which he always used when the first was useless. He had him
assassinated by his adherent Bomilcar, and assisted the latter to
escape from Italy. At last his savage audacity had overstepped even
the forbearance of the rogues in his pay. [Sidenote: Jugurtha expelled
from Rome.] He was ordered to leave Rome, and, as he went, uttered
the famous epigram, 'A city for sale, and when the first buyer comes,
doomed to ruin!' [Sidenote: Futile campaign of Albinus.] It is
possible that Spurius Albinus, who was next sent against him, was
playing the game of Scaurus and Bestia over again; for he effected
nothing in his campaign in 110. Nor does his brother's rashness
exonerate him. Left as propraetor in charge of the army, this man, in
January 109, determined to try and carry off Jugurtha's treasures by
a _coup de main_. To do this he marched against Suthul, where the
treasures were kept, at a season when the heavy rains turn the land
into water. [Sidenote: Jugurtha overthrows Aulus Albinus.] Jugurtha
retreated into the interior, enticing Aulus Albinus by hopes of coming
to terms, and meanwhile tampering with his officers. Then, on a
dark night, he surrounded the army. The traitors whom he had bribed
deserted their posts. The soldiers threw away their arms, and next day
Jugurtha forced Aulus to agree to go under the yoke, to make peace,
and, perhaps, in mockery of the Senate's treatment of the Numidian
envoys, to leave Numidia in ten days. Of course the Senate would not
acknowledge the treaty. Nor did they even go through the farce of
surrendering the man who had made it. The chivalry of the era of
Regulus would have seemed quixotic to cynics like Scaurus. The other
Albinus, hastening to Africa, found the troops mutinous, and could
effect nothing. Another tribune now stepped forward to impeach all,
whether soldiers or civilians, who had assisted Jugurtha to the
prejudice of the State. In spite of the aid of the rich Latins, who
had just been gratified by the remission of the vectigal, the
senators were beaten and the bill passed. Triumvirs were appointed to
investigate the matter; but one of them was Scaurus, sure to float
most buoyantly where the scum of scoundrelism was thickest. [Sidenote:
Banishment of Romans who had taken Jugurtha's bribes.] The judices
were equites, and among those condemned were Bestia, Sp. Albinus,
Opimius, and Caius Cato, the grandson of Cato the censor. Opimius died
at Dyrrhachium, a poor man; and probably no harder punishment could
have befallen him.

The history of the Jugurthine war has been thus far related at greater
length than the space at command would warrant if it was merely a
history of military details. But it is a striking commentary on the
politics of the time and the vices of the government. The state of
society could not be more succinctly summed up than in the words with
which Jugurtha quitted Rome. What was it which made the nobles so
greedy of money as to be lost to all shame in hunting for it? A speech
supposed to have been delivered that very year partly answers the
question: 'Gourmands say that a meal is not all that it ought to be
unless, precisely when you are relishing most what you are eating,
your plate is removed and another, and better, and richer one is
put in its place. Your exquisite, who makes extravagance and
fastidiousness pass for wit, calls that the "bloom of a meal." "The
only bird," says he, "which you should eat whole is the becafico. Of
every other bird, wild or tame, nothing, unless your host be a mean
fellow, but the hinder parts will be served, and enough of them to
satisfy everybody. People who eat the fore parts have no palate." If
luxury goes on at this rate there will soon be nothing left but for
them to have their meats nibbled at for them by some one else, to save
them the toil of eating. Already the couches of some men are decorated
more lavishly with silver and purple and gold than those of the
immortal gods.'

If the war up to this stage had revealed the hopeless depravity of the
senatorial government, its subsequent course revealed what shape
the revolution about to engulf that government would assume. The
consulship of Marius, won in spite of Metellus, signified really the
fall of the Republic and the rise of monarchy, while the rivalry of
Marius and Sulla showed that supreme authority would be competed for,
not in the forum but the camp. The law of Manilius necessitated an
earnest prosecution of the war. [Sidenote: Metellus appointed to the
command against Jugurtha. His character.] Quintus Caecilius Metellus
was elected consul for the year 109, and received Numidia as his
province. He was a stern, proud man; but if in his childish hauteur he
had a double portion of the foible of his order, he was free from many
of its vices. He set to work at once to rediscipline the army; and
his punishment of deserters, abominable in itself, was no doubt an
effective warning that the new general was not a man with whom it was
safe to trifle. The Romans were never gentle to the deserter unless he
deserted to them. They threw him to wild beasts, or cut off his hands.
Metellus did more. He buried 3,000 men to their waists, made the
soldiers use them as targets, and finally burned them.

[Sidenote: Battle on the Muthul.] Jugurtha was alarmed, and sent to
offer terms, asking only a guarantee for his life. Metellus returned
evasive answers, and secretly intrigued with the messengers for the
surrender or assassination of the king. But though assassination had
become one of the recognised weapons of a Roman noble, Metellus was a
novice in the art by the side of Jugurtha, who determined to die hard
now he was at bay. The Romans had to cross a range of mountains, after
which they descended into a plain through which the river Muthul
(probably a branch of the modern Mejerda) ran eighteen miles off.
Between them and the river was hilly ground--probably a spur from
the range. On this hilly ground the king posted Bomilcar, with the
infantry and elephants. He himself, with the best of the foot and the
cavalry, waited nearer the mountains. Metellus saw the snare, but was
obliged to get water, and in making for the river was surrounded. But
the new discipline told. Though isolated, each Roman division fought
bravely. Metellus and Marius carried the hills. Rufus dispersed the
picked infantry, and killed or captured all the elephants. Jugurtha's
plan was masterly, but it had failed. [Sidenote: Jugurtha keeps up a
guerilla warfare.] His army dispersed, as such armies do upon defeat,
and he was reduced to carrying on a guerilla warfare, spoiling the
springs where Metellus was marching, and cutting off stragglers.
Metellus split his army into two columns; Marius commanded one and he
the other, and so they marched, ravaging the country and capturing the
towns, ready to form a junction whenever it was necessary. At last
they came to Zama; and, while Metellus was attempting to storm the
town, Jugurtha surprised his camp. Though beaten off in this assault
he attacked the Romans again next day, and Metellus was obliged to
give up his enterprise. [Sidenote: Metellus tampers with Bomilcar.]
After garrisoning the towns which he had taken, he went into winter
quarters, probably at Utica, where he proceeded to tamper with
Bomilcar. That traitor urged Jugurtha to surrender, and the king gave
up his elephants, the deserters, and a large sum of money. But when it
came to giving up himself his heart failed him, and, having discovered
Bomilcar's treachery, he slew him, and once more resolved to fight.

[Sidenote: Marius stands for the consulship, 107 B.C.] The preceding
military operations are supposed to have taken place in the year 108
B.C. Marius went to Rome to stand for the consulship, and while he was
away, in 107, Metellus retained the command. Jugurtha's cause even now
was not hopeless. The Numidians adored him, and were smarting under
the Roman devastations. [Sidenote: Revolt of Vaga.] The chief town
occupied by the Romans, Vaga--the modern Baja--revolted in the winter,
and the commander, Turpilius, a Latin, rightly or wrongly was executed
by Metellus for collusion with the enemy. But Metellus was eager to
end the war, and pressed the king hard. Jugurtha lost another battle,
and fled to Thala; but Metellus marched fifty miles across the desert,
and forced him to flee by night out of the town, which was taken after
a siege of forty days. But now a new enemy confronted the Romans.
[Sidenote: Bocchus joins Jugurtha.] Bocchus, king of Mauretania,
formed an alliance with his son-in-law, Jugurtha, and was induced by
him to march against Cirta, which was in the possession of the Romans.
About the same time Metellus heard that Marius was coming to supersede
him. The proud man shed tears of rage, and would not move further for
fear of hazarding his own reputation, or lessening the difficulties of
his successor.

[Sidenote: Marius succeeds to the command.] The African war now
promised hard work and little glory or profit to the soldiers, and
Jugurtha's bribing days were over. Hence it was hard to recruit the
legions, and Marius took men from the Proletarii and Capite Censi,
classes usually exempt from service. With these troops, who would be
more easily satisfied and more manageable, he filled up the gaps in
the legions in Africa, and set to work, as Metellus had done, taking
towns and forts and plundering the country. Bocchus had separated from
Jugurtha, for they hoped that the Romans having two foes to chase
would be the more easily harassed. But Marius was always on his guard,
and beat, though he could never capture, Jugurtha whenever he came
across him. [Sidenote: Capture of Capsa.] There is an oasis in the
south of Tunis, and a town, Gafsa, in it, which in those days was
called Capsa. This town Marius captured after a laborious march
of nine or ten days, and, though the inhabitants surrendered, he
ruthlessly massacred every adult Numidian in it, and sold the rest as
slaves. One other exploit of his is told by Sallust, but with
such blunders of geography as render identification of the place
impossible. Carrying fire and sword through the land, Marius reached
a fort in which the king's treasures were. It stood on a precipice,
which was considered inaccessible on all sides but one. For many days
he strove in vain to gain the walls by this road, and only an accident
saved him from failure in the end. A Ligurian in the army, while
gathering snails, unconsciously got nearly to the top of the hill.
Finding this out he clambered further and got a full view of the town.
[Sidenote: Capture of another stronghold.] Next day Marius sent ten
men with horns and trumpets and the Ligurian as guide, while he
himself assailed the town by the road. As soon as they were at the
top he ordered an assault on the walls. The men marched up with their
shields locked over their heads, and at the same moment the Roman
trumpets were heard at the side of the town over the precipice. The
Numidians fled and the fort was won.

[Sidenote: Marius marches for Cirta.] Here, wherever the place was,
Marius was joined by Sulla with some cavalry; and having gained his
end, he marched eastward towards Cirta, intending to winter his men in
the maritime towns. [Sidenote: Attempts of Jugurtha to surprise
his march.] But the Numidian king had nerved himself for one last
desperate effort. By the promise of a third of his kingdom he bribed
Bocchus to join him, and one night at dusk surprised the retiring
army. Only discipline saved it. Like the English at Inkermann, the
Romans fought in small detached groups, till Marius was able to
concentrate his men on a hill, while Sulla by his orders occupied
another hard by. The barbarians surrounded them and kept up a revel
all night, deeming their prey secure. But at dawn Marius bade the
horns strike up, and with a shout the soldiers charged down and
dispersed the enemy with ease. Then the march went on till they were
near Cirta. Again Jugurtha attempted to cut off the retreat. Volux,
son of Bocchus, had brought him some fresh infantry. While the cavalry
engaged Sulla, Bocchus led these men round to attack the rear.
Jugurtha, who was fighting against Masinissa in the front, rode also
to the rear, and, holding up a bloody head, cried out that he had
slain Marius. The Romans began to give way, when Sulla, like Cromwell
at Marston Moor, having done his own work charged the troops of
Bocchus on the flank. Still Jugurtha fought on, and fled only when
all around him were slain. The result of this battle was that Bocchus
became anxious to come to terms. Sulla was sent to arrange them.
But Bocchus hated the Romans, while he feared them; and fresh
solicitations from Jugurtha made him again waver. [Sidenote:
Negotiations of Bocchus with Rome.] Soon afterwards, by permission
of Marius, he sent an embassy to Rome. The Senate replied that they
excused his past errors, and that he should have the friendship and
alliance of Rome when he had earned it. Then ensued intrigue upon
intrigue. [Sidenote: Sulla persuades Bocchus to betray Jugurtha.]
Sulla daringly visited Bocchus, and after some days' hesitation,
during which Sulla pressed him to betray Jugurtha, and Jugurtha
pressed him to betray Sulla, the Moorish king at last decided on which
side his interests lay. The Roman devised a trap. The arch-traitor was
ensnared, and was carried in chains to Rome, where he was led in his
royal robes by the triumphal car of Marius, and, it is said, lost his
senses as he walked along. One wonders with what relish Scaurus and
his tribe, after gazing at the spectacle, sat down to their becaficoes
that day. Then he was thrust into prison, and as they hasted to strip
him, some tore the clothes off his back, while others in wrenching out
his earrings pulled off the tips of his ears with them. And so he was
thrust down naked into the Tullianum. 'Hercules, what a cold bath!' he
cried, with the wild smile of idiocy, as they cast him in. [Sidenote:
Death of Jugurtha.] For six days he endured the torments of
starvation, and then died. [Sidenote: Division of the Numidian
kingdom.] The most westerly portion of his kingdom, corresponding to
the modern province of Algiers, was given to Bocchus, the rest of it
to Gauda, Jugurtha's half-brother. The Romans did not care to turn
into a province a country of which the frontiers were so hard to
guard. But they received some Gaetulian tribes in the interior into
free alliance, so that they had plenty of opportunities for meddling
if they wished to do so.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER V.

THE CIMBRI AND TEUTONES.


The Jugurthine war ended in 105 B.C. In one way it had been of real
service to Rome. A terrible crisis was at hand, and this war had given
her both soldiers and a general worthy of the name. Before, however,
the story of the struggle with the Cimbri is told, something must be
said about what had been going on at Rome, about the man who had now
most influence there, and about his rivals. [Sidenote: Recommencement
of the social struggle at Rome.] The great social struggle had
recommenced. The personal rivalry between Marius and Sulla had begun
before the Cimbric war. During that war men held as it were their
breath in terror, but nevertheless it was as if only an interlude in
that deadly civil strife, for which each of the contending parties was
already arrayed. C. Marius was now fifty years old. Cato, the censor,
was of opinion that no man can endure so much as he who has turned the
soil and reaped the harvest. Marius was such a man. His family were
clients of the Herennii. His father was a day-labourer of Cereatae,
called today Casamare, after his illustrious son, and he himself
served in the ranks in Spain. [Sidenote: Previous career and present
position of Marius.] Soon made an officer, he won Scipio's favour as a
brave, frugal, incorruptible, and trusty soldier, who never quarrelled
with his general's orders, even when they ran as counter to his own
inclinations as the expulsion of all soothsayers from the camp before
Numantia. On coming home he was lucky enough to marry the aunt of
Julius Caesar, whose high birth and wealth opened the door to State
honours, which to a man of his origin was at this time otherwise
virtually closed. In 119 B.C. he was tribune, and had by the measures
previously noticed won the reputation of an upright and patriotic
politician, who would truckle neither to the nobles nor the mob. From
this time, however, the feud with the Metelli began; for he ordered L.
Caecilius Metellus, the consul, to be cast into prison for resisting
his ballot-law, though, as the Senate yielded, the order was not
carried into effect. In 115 he gained the praetorship, and an
absurd charge of bribery trumped up against him indicated a rising
disposition among the nobles to snub the aspiring plebeian. He was
propraetor in Spain the next year, and showed his usual vigour there
in putting down brigandage. With the soldiers he was as popular as Ney
was with Napoleon's armies, for he was one of them, rough-spoken as
they were, fond of a cup of wine, and never scorning to share their
toils. While he was with Metellus at Utica, a soothsayer prophesied
that the gods had great things in store for him, and he asked Metellus
for leave to go to Rome and stand for the consulship. Metellus replied
that when his own son stood for it it would be time enough for Marius.
The man at whom he sneered resented sneers. There is evidence that the
simple nature of the rough soldier was becoming already spoiled by
constant success. He was burning with ambition, and would ascribe
the favours of heaven to his own merits. He at once set to work
to undermine the credit of his commander with the army, the Roman
merchants, and Gauda, saying that he himself would soon bring the war
to an end if he were general. Metellus can hardly have been a popular
man anywhere, and his strictness must have made him many enemies. Thus
he scornfully refused Gauda a seat at his side, and an escort of Roman
horse. Gauda and the rest wrote to Rome, urging that Marius should
have the army. Metellus with the worst grace let him go just twelve
days before the election. But the favourite of the gods had a fair
wind, and travelled night and day. The artisans of the city and
the country class from which he sprang thronged to hear him abuse
Metellus, and boast how soon he would capture or kill Jugurtha, and he
was triumphantly elected consul for the year 107.

How his after achievements turned his head we shall see. Already there
were drops of bitterness in the sweet cup of success. It was Metellus
who was called Numidicus, not he, and it was Sulla whose dare-devil
knavery had entrapped the king. The substantial work had been done
by the former. The _coup de théâtre_ which completed it revealed
the latter as a rival. Marius fumed at the credit gained by
these aristocrats; and when Bocchus dedicated on the Capitol a
representation of Sulla receiving Jugurtha's surrender, he could not
conceal his wrath. [Sidenote: L. Cornelius Sulla.] In Sulla he perhaps
already recognised by instinct one who would outrival him in the end.
He was the very antipodes of Marius in everything except bravery and
good generalship, and faith in his star. He was an aristocrat. He was
dissolute. He was an admirer of Hellenic literature. War was not his
all in all as a profession. If he had a lion's courage, the fox in him
was even more to be feared. He, like Marius, owed his rise partly to a
woman, but, characteristically, to a mistress, not a wife, who helped
him as Charles II.'s sultana helped the young Churchill. If the
boorish nature of the one degenerated with age into bloodthirsty
brutality, the other was from the first cynically destitute of
feeling. He would send men to death with a jest, and the cold-blooded,
calculating, remorseless infamy of his entire career excites a
repulsion which we feel for no other great figure in history, not even
for the first Napoleon. Sulla's whole soul must have recoiled from the
coarse manners of the man under whom he first won distinction, and,
while he scorned his motives, he must, as he saw him gradually
floundering into villainy, have felt the serene superiority of a
natural genius for vice. But at present it was not his game to show
his animosity. Though Marius had given fresh umbrage to the optimates
by coming from his triumph (Jan. 1, 104 B.C.) into the Senate wearing
his triumphal robes, with the people he was the hero of the hour, and
when the storm in the North broke, it was the safest course for Sulla
to follow the fortunes of his old commander, who in his turn could not
dispense with so able a subordinate.

[Sidenote: Frontier wars of Rome previous to the Cimbric invasion.]
The Romans were constantly at war on the frontiers. Besides the
natural quarrels which would arise between them and lawless
barbarians, it was the interest of their generals to make small wars
in order to gain sounding names and triumphs. Such wars, however, by
no means always ended in Roman victories; and while in the last thirty
years of the second century before the Christian era there were
many wars, there were also many defeats. [Sidenote: The Iapydes.]
Sempronius Tuditanus had a triumph for victories over the Iapydes,
an Illyrian nation; but he was first beaten by them. [Sidenote: The
Salyes.] In 125 the Salyes, a Ligurian people, who stretched from
Marseilles westwards to the Rhone and northwards to the Durance,
attacked Marseilles. Flaccus went to its aid, and triumphed over the
Salyes in 123. [Sidenote: The Balearic Islands.] Quintus Caecilius
Metellus subdued the Balearic Islands in the same year, and relieved
Spain from the descents of pirates, who either lived in those islands
or used them as a rendezvous. The Salyes again gave trouble in 122,
and Calvinus took their capital, which was most probably the modern
Aix, establishing there the colony of Aquae Sextiae. This colony was
the _point d'appui_ for further conquests. The most powerful nations
of Gaul were the Aedui and Arverni, whose territory was separated by
the Elaver, the modern Allier. The Arverni were rivals of the Aedui
and friends of the Allobroges, a tribe in the same latitude, but on
the east of the Rhone. The Romans made an alliance with the Aedui, and
the proconsul Domitius Ahenobarbus, in 122 or 121 B.C., charged the
Allobroges with violating Aeduan territory, and with harbouring the
king of the Salyes. [Sidenote: The Allobroges.] The Allobroges were
helped by the Arverni, and Domitius defeated their united forces near
Avignon, with the loss of 20,000 men. Fabius succeeded Domitius, and
marched northwards across the Isara. [Sidenote: The Arverni.] Near its
junction with the Rhone, on August 8, 121, he defeated with tremendous
carnage the Arverni who had crossed to help the Allobroges. [Sidenote:
Defeat of the Arverni, B.C. 121.] The number of the slain amounted, it
is said, to 120,000 or 150,000. The king of the Arverni was caught and
sent to Rome, and the Allobroges became Roman subjects. It was the
year of the death of Caius Gracchus, of the famous vintage, and of a
great eruption of Mount Etna. [Sidenote: The Staeni.] In 118 B.C. M.
Marcius Rex annihilated the Staeni, probably a Ligurian tribe of the
Maritime Alps, who were in the line of the Roman approach to South
Gaul, and for this success he gained a triumph. In the same year it
was resolved, in spite of the opposition of the Senate, to colonise
Narbo, which was the key to the valley of the Garonne, and was on
the route to the province of Tarraconensis. Thus was established the
province named from the time of Augustus the Narbonensis, embracing
the country between the Cevennes and the Alps, as far north-east as
Geneva; and a road, called Via Domitia, was laid down from the Rhone
to the Pyrenees. [Sidenote: The Dalmatae.] In 117 B.C. L. Caecilius
Metellus triumphed over the Illyrian Dalmatae whom he had attacked
without cause, or never attacked at all, as it was said, for which he
was surnamed Dalmaticus. [Sidenote: The Karni.] In 115 M. Aemilius
Scaurus, whose name we have met with before, triumphed over the Karni,
a tribe to the north of the Adriatic. C. Porcius Cato, consul in 114,
was not so lucky. [Sidenote: The Scordisci.] He lost his army in
defending the Macedonian frontier against a tribe of Gauls called
Scordisci, who were in their turn defeated by M. Livius Drusus in 112,
and M. Minucius Rufus in 109 B.C. The year between their first victory
and first defeat was remarkable, not, indeed, because one Metellus
triumphed for what he had done in Sardinia, and another for what he
had done in Thrace; but in that year the Cimbri came in collision with
Rome. [Sidenote: First collision with Cimbri.] Cn. Papirius Carbo, the
consul, was sent against them as they had crossed or were expected to
cross the Roman frontiers. Some were in Noricum, and to them he sent
to say that they were invading a people who were the friends of Rome.
They agreed to evacuate the country; but Carbo treacherously attacked
them, and was disgracefully beaten at a place called Noreia.
[Sidenote: Defeat of Silanus.] Four years later, in the year 109, M.
Junius Silanus, colleague of Marius, met the same barbarians, who had
now crossed the Rhine, in the new province of South Gaul, and was in
his turn defeated.

[Sidenote: The Cimbri rouse the Helvetii.] The movements of the Cimbri
made the Helvetii restless. [Sidenote: Defeat of Longinus.] One of
their clans, the Tiguroni, which dwelt between the Jura, the Rhone,
and the lake of Geneva, defeated and slew the consul Longinus in 107
B.C., and forced his lieutenant, Popillius Laenas, to go under the
yoke. Tolosa thereupon rose against the Romans, and put the troops
which garrisoned it in chains. By treachery Q. Servilius Caepio
recovered the town, and sent off its treasures to Marseilles.
[Sidenote: The gold of Tolosa.] The ill-gotten gold, however, was
seized on the way by robbers, whom Caepio himself was accused of
employing. His name was destined, however, to be linked with a great
disaster as well as a thievish trick. The Cimbri, who had hitherto
petitioned the Romans for lands to settle on, were now meditating a
raid into Italy. On the left bank of the Rhone, in 105, they overthrew
M. Aurelius Scaurus, whom they took prisoner and put to death. Cnaeus
Mallius Maximus commanded the main force on that side of the river,
and he told Caepio, who as consul was in command on the right bank, to
cross and effect a junction. But Caepio was as wilful as Minucius had
shown himself towards another Maximus in the Second Punic War. When
his superior began to negotiate with the Cimbri, he thought it was
a device to rob him of the honour of conquering them, and in his
irritation rashly provoked a battle, in which he was beaten and lost
his camp. [Sidenote: Defeat of Caepio and Maximus.] The place of his
defeat his camp is not known. Maximus was also defeated, and the
Romans were reported to have lost 80,000 men and 20,000 camp
followers. There was terrible dismay at Rome. The Gaul seemed again
to be at its gates. [Sidenote: Consternation at Rome. Marius elected
consul for 104.] The time of mourning for the dead was abridged. Every
man fit for service had to swear not to leave Italy, and the captains
in Italian ports took an oath not to receive any such man on board.
Marius also was elected consul for 104.

[Sidenote: The Cimbri move off towards Spain.] But fortune helped the
Romans more than all these precautions. The Cimbri, after wilfully
destroying every vestige of the spoils they had taken, in fulfilment,
probably, of some vow, wandered westward on a plundering raid towards
the Pyrenees, the road thither having been lately provided, as it
were, for them by Domitius. [Sidenote: Beaten back by Celtiberi, they
are joined by the Teutones in South Gaul.] In the Celtiberi they met
with foes who sold too dearly the little they had to lose, and again
they surged back into South Gaul, where they were joined by the
Teutones, and once more threatened Italy. [Sidenote: How the Romans
had been occupied meanwhile.] But meantime the generals of the
Republic had not been idle. Rutilius Rufus, the old comrade of Marius,
had been diligently drilling troops, having engaged gladiators to
teach them fencing. Probably Marius was engaged in the same work at
the beginning of 104, and then went to South Gaul, where, as we
hear of Sulla capturing the king of the Tectosages, he was no doubt
collecting supplies and men, and suppressing all disaffection in the
province. He also cut a canal from the Rhone, about a mile above
its mouth, to a lake supposed to be now the Étang de l'Estouma; for
alluvial deposits had made access to the river difficult, and he
wanted the Rhone as a highway for his troops and commissariat.
[Sidenote: Marius consul in 103 and 102 B.C.] In 103 he was made
consul for the third time, and again in 102. And now he was ready to
meet the invaders.

[Sidenote: Nationality of the Cimbri.] Who these invaders were has
been a matter of hot dispute. Were they Celts? Were they Teutons? Did
they come from the Baltic shores, or the shores of the Sea of Azof; or
were they the Homeric Cimmerii who dwelt between the Dnieper and the
Don? Or did their name indicate their personal qualities, and not
their previous habitation? The following seems the most probable
conjecture. In the great plain which runs along the Atlantic and the
southern shore of the Baltic, from the Pyrenees to the Volga, there
had been in pre-historic times a movement constantly going on among
the barbarous inhabitants like the ebb and flow of a great sea. The
Celts had reached Spain and Italy on the south, and Germany and the
Danube on the east. Then, making the Rhine their frontier, they had
settled down into semi-civilised life. Now the Teutonic tribes were
in their turn going through the same process of flux and reflux; and
impelled probably at this time by some invasion of other tribes, or
possibly, as Strabo says, by some great inundation of the sea, these
invading nations, for they were not armies but whole nations, came
roaming southwards in search of a new home. Celts there were among
them, for the Helvetii had joined them, and therefore Helvetic chiefs.
But the names still exist in modern Denmark and near the Baltic.
Caesar did not think they were Celts. The light hair and blue eyes of
the warriors, and the hair of old age on the heads of children,
which excited the astonishment of the Romans, are not Celtic
characteristics. We may therefore set them down as Teutonic by race.
The name Cimbri is probably derived from some word of their own,
Kaemper, meaning champions or spoilers, and their last emigration was
from the country between the Rhine, the Danube, and the Baltic. They
were a tall, fierce race, who fought with great swords and narrow
shields, and wore copper helmets and mail. [Sidenote: Their mode
of fighting, etc.] The men in their front ranks were often linked
together so as to make retreat impossible. Their priestesses cheered
them on in battle, and, when prisoners were taken, cut their throats
over a great bowl, and then, ripping them up, drew auguries from their
entrails.

[Sidenote: Plan of the invaders.] The plan of the invaders was that
one body, consisting of the Teutones, Ambrones, and Tugeni, should
descend into Italy on the west, the Cimbri on the east. Whence the
Teutones had come to join the Cimbri we do not know. They joined them
in South Gaul. [Sidenote: The Ambrones.] The Ambrones may have been a
clan of the Helvetii, as the Tugeni were. [Sidenote: Plan of Marius.]
Marius waited for the western division at the confluence of the Isara
and the Rhone, near the spot where Fabius had defeated the Arverni,
his object being to command the two main roads into Italy, over the
Little St. Bernard and along the coast. He did not follow the example
of his old commander Scipio Aemilianus, in expelling soothsayers
from his camp; for he had a Syrian woman, named Martha, with him to
foretell the future. The soldiers had their own pet superstitions.
They had caught two vultures, put rings on their necks and let them
go, and so knew them again as they hovered over the army. When the
barbarians reached the camp they tried to storm it. But they were
beaten back, and then for six days they filed past with taunting
questions, whether the Romans had any messages to send their wives.
Marius cautiously followed, fortifying his camp nightly. They were
making for the coast-road; and as they could not have taken their
wagons along it, they were marching, as Marius had seen, to their own
destruction. His strategy was masterly, for he was winning without
fighting; but accident brought on an engagement. [Sidenote: Scene of
the battle of Aquae Sextiae.] East of Aquae Sextiae (the modern Aix)
Marius had occupied a range of hills, one of which is to this day
called Sainte Victoire. The Arc flowed below. The soldiers wanted
water, and Marius told his men that they might get it there if they
wanted it, for he wished to accustom them to the barbarians' mode of
fighting. Some of the barbarians were bathing; and on their giving the
alarm, others came up, and a battle began. The first shock was between
the Ambrones and Ligurians. The Romans supported the latter, and the
Ambrones fled across the Arc to the wagons, where the women, assailing
both pursuers and pursued with yells and blows, were slain with the
men. So ended the first day's fight.

All night and next day the barbarians prepared for a final struggle.
Marius planted an ambuscade of mounted camp-followers, headed by a
few foot and horse in some ravines on the enemy's rear. [Sidenote:
Circumstances of the battle.] He drew the legions up in front of the
camp, and the cavalry went ahead to the plain. The barbarians charged
up the hill, but were met by a shower of 'pila,' which the legionaries
followed up by coming to close quarters with their swords. The enemy
were rolled back down the hill, and at the same time with loud cries
the ambuscade attacked them from behind. Then the battle became a
butchery, in which, it was said, 200,000 men were slain, and among
them Teutoboduus, their king. Others, however, say that he was taken
prisoner, and became the chief ornament of Marius's triumph. Much of
the spoil was gathered together to be burnt, and Marius, as the army
stood round, was just lighting the heap, when men came riding at full
speed and told him he was elected consul for the fifth time. The
soldiers set up a joyful cheer, and his officers crowned him with
a chaplet of bay. The name of the village of Pourrières (Campus de
Putridis) and the hill of Sainte Victoire commemorate this great fight
to our day, and till the French Revolution a procession used to be
made by the neighbouring villagers every year to the hill, where a
bonfire was lit, round which they paraded, crowned with flowers, and
shouting 'Victoire, Victoire!'

[Sidenote: The Cimbri.] Meanwhile Catulus was waiting for the Cimbri
on the east. A son of M. Aemilius Scaurus fled before them in the pass
of Tridentum, and in 102 B.C., about the time of the battle of Aquae
Sextiae, they poured down the valley on the east of the Athesis
(Adige). [Sidenote: Catulus on the Adige.] Catulus was posted just
below Verona on the west bank, with a bridge connecting him with a
smaller force on the other side. When the foe appeared his men took to
flight; but the detachment on the east side stood its ground, and kept
the enemy from crossing the bridge in pursuit. The Cimbri admired
their bravery, and when they had forced the bridge let its defenders
go. Pursuing Catulus, they cut him off from a river for which he was
making, probably the Ticinus, though according to some, the Po. He
then pretended to encamp on a hill as if for a long stay. The Cimbri
dispersed over the country, and Catulus immediately came down,
assaulted their camp and crossed the river, where he was joined by
the victorious army of Gaul and by Marius, who had been to Rome.
[Sidenote: Battle with the Cimbri, July 30, 101 B.C.] The village
festival on the hill of Sainte Victoire was held in May. The battle
with the Cimbri was fought on July 30, 101. More than a year therefore
had elapsed since the Teutones were defeated. But it was the
barbarians' custom not to fight in winter, and they were in a rich
country which had not been invaded for a century, where they were
revelling in unwonted comforts. So they spread themselves over the
land as far as the Sesia; and when Marius came, they sent, it is
said, and asked for land for the Teutones whom they were awaiting.
[Sidenote: Story of the Cimbric embassy to Marius.] Marius replied
that their brothers had all the land they wanted already. Upon which
they requested him to name a field and a day for battle. Marius
answered that Romans never consulted their foes on such points, but he
would humour them, and named the Campi Raudii, near Vercellae. Such a
story bears falsehood on the face of it. It is absurd to suppose that
the Cimbri had not heard of the defeat of the Teutones, which had
taken place more than a year before. Very likely they asked for land,
and finding that they would only get hard blows, determined to bring
matters to a crisis at once. Sulla's memoirs were Plutarch's authority
for what followed, and Sulla hated Marius. [Sidenote: Story of
Marius's jealousy of Catulus.] He said that Marius, expecting that the
fighting would be on the wings, posted his own men there, that they
might gain the glory, but that the brunt of the battle was borne by
Catulus in the centre; and that such a dust rose that Marius was for a
long time out of the battle, and knew not where he was. It seems that
the barbarian cavalry feigned a flight, hoping to turn and take the
Romans between themselves and their infantry. But the Romans drove
back the cavalry on the infantry. [Sidenote: Circumstances of the
battle.] However this may be, Marius had shown his usual good
generalship. He had fed his men before the battle, and so manoeuvred
that sun, wind, and dust were in the enemy's faces. His own men were
in perfect training, and in the burning heat did not turn a hair. But
the Northmen were fresh from high living, and could not bear up long.
When they gave way, the same scenes as at Aquae Sextiae took place
among the women. One hundred and twenty thousand men, it is said, were
killed--among them the gallant Boiorix, their king--and 60,000 taken
prisoners. Disputes rose as to who had really won the day. Marius
generously insisted on Catulus sharing his triumph. But it was to him
that the popular voice ascribed the victory, and there can be little
doubt that the popular voice was right.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER VI.

THE ROMAN ARMY.


While Rome was trembling for the issue of the war with the Cimbri, she
was forced to send an army elsewhere. [Sidenote: Slave revolts.] There
was at this time another general stir among the slave population.
There were risings at Nuceria, at Capua, in the silver mines of
Attica, and at Thurii, and the last was headed by a Roman eques, named
Minucius or Vettius. He wanted to buy a female slave; and, failing to
raise the money which was her price, armed his own slaves, was joined
by others, assumed the state and title of king, and fortified a camp,
being at the head of 3,500 men. Lucullus, the praetor, marched against
him with 4,400 men; but though superior in numbers, he preferred
Jugurthine tactics, and bribed a Greek to betray Vettius, who
anticipated a worse fate by suicide. [Sidenote: Second slave rebellion
in Sicily.] But, as before, the fiercest outbreak was in Sicily.
Marius had applied for men for his levies to Nicomedes, king of
Bithynia, who replied that he had none to send, because the Roman
publicani had carried off most of his subjects and sold them as
slaves. Thereupon the Senate issued orders that no free member of an
allied state should be kept as a slave in a Roman province. [Sidenote:
Weakness of Licinius Nerva.] P. Licinius Nerva, governor of Sicily, in
accordance with these orders, set free a number of Sicilian slaves;
but, worked on by the indignation of the proprietors, he backed out of
what he had begun to do, and, having raised the hopes of the slaves,
caused an insurrection by disappointing them. He suppressed the first
rebels by treachery. But he was a weak man, and delayed so long in
attacking another body near Heraclea, that when he sent a lieutenant
to attack them with 600 men they were strong enough to beat him.
[Sidenote: Salvius elected king.] By this success they supplied
themselves with arms, and then elected Salvius as their king, who
found himself at the head of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 horse. With
these troops he attacked Morgantia, and, on the governor coming to
relieve it, turned on him and routed him; and by proclaiming that
anyone who threw down his arms should be spared, he got a fresh supply
for his men. [Sidenote: Athenion heads the slaves in the west.] Then
the slaves of the west rose near Lilybaeum, headed by Athenion, a
Cilician robber-captain before he was a slave, and a man of great
courage and capacity, who pretended to be a magician and was elected
king. [Sidenote: Salvius takes the name of Tryphon.] Salvius took the
name of Tryphon, a usurper of the Syrian throne in 149. Athenion,
deferring to his authority, became his general, and Triocala, supposed
to be near the modern Calata Bellotta, was their head-quarters. In
some respects this second slave revolt was a repetition of the first.
As the Cilician Cleon submitted to the impostor Eunous, who called
himself Antiochus, so now the Cilician Athenion submitted to the
impostor Salvius, who called himself Tryphon. [Sidenote: Lucullus sent
to Sicily, 103 B.C.] The outbreak had probably begun in 105, but it
was not till 103 that Lucullus, who had put down Vettius, was sent
to Sicily with 1,600 or 1,700 men. [Sidenote: Battle of Scirthaea.]
Tryphon, distrusting Athenion, had put him in prison. But he released
him now, and at Scirthaea a great battle was fought, in which 20,000
slaves were slain, and Athenion was left for dead. Lucullus, however,
delayed to attack Triocala, and did nothing more, unless he destroyed
his own military stores in order to injure his successor C. Servilius.
To say that if he did so, such mean treason could only happen in
a government where place depends on a popular vote, is a random
criticism, for, though nominally open to all, the consulship was
virtually closed, except to a few families, which retained now, as
they had always done, the high offices in their own hands, and, when
Marius forced this close circle, Metellus is said to have acted much
as Lucullus did.

Servilius was incapable. Athenion, who at Tryphon's death became
king, surprised his camp, and nearly captured Messana. [Sidenote: M'.
Aquilius ends the war.] But, in 101, M'. Aquilius was sent out, and
defeated Athenion and slew him with his own hand. A batch of 1,000
still remained under arms, but surrendered to Aquilius. He sent them
to Rome to fight with wild beasts in the arena. They preferred to die
by each other's swords there. Satyrus and one other were left last,
and Satyrus after killing his comrade slew himself. The misery caused
in Sicily by this long war, which ended in 100 B.C., may be estimated
by the fact that, whereas Sicily usually supplied Rome with corn, it
was now desolated by famine, and its towns had to be supplied with
grain from Rome.

After this narration of the military events of the period to the
beginning of the second century B.C., it is natural to consider the
changes which Marius had effected in the army--the instrument of his
late conquests. [Sidenote: Changes in the Roman army.] We cannot tell
how many of the innovations now introduced were initiated by him, but
they were introduced about this date. Before his time the Hastati,
Principes, and Triarii, ranked according to length of service,
had superseded the Servian classes. From his time this second
classification also ceased. [Sidenote: Arms of the legionary.] Every
legionary was armed alike with the heavy pilum--an iron-headed javelin
6 feet 9 inches long, the light pilum, a sword, and a coat of armour.
Besides these he had to carry food and other burdens, which would vary
according to the length and object of the march, such as stakes for
encampment, tools, &c. [Sidenote: The 'Marian mules.'] Marius invented
what were called 'Mariani muli' to ease the soldier--forked sticks,
with a board at the end to bear the bundle, carried over the
shoulders. Before his time the army had ceased to be recruited solely
from Roman citizens. Not only had Italians been drafted into it,
but foreign mercenaries were employed, such as Thracians, Africans,
Ligurians, and Balearians. [Sidenote: The light troops auxiliaries.]
After his time the Velites are not mentioned, and all the light-armed
troop were auxiliaries. [Sidenote: The cohort the tactical unit.]
Before his time the maniple had been the tactical unit. Now it was the
cohort. [Sidenote: Composition of the legion.] A legion consisted of
ten cohorts, each cohort containing three maniples, and each maniple
two centuries. The legion's standard was the eagle, borne by the
oldest centurion of the first cohort. Each cohort had its 'signum,'
or ensign. [Sidenote: Standards.] Each maniple had its 'vexillum,' or
standard. [Sidenote: Officers.] There were two centurions for each
maniple, one commanding the first and the other the second century,
and taking rank according to the cohort to which they belonged, which
might be from the first to the tenth. The youngest centurion officered
the second century of the third maniple of the tenth cohort. The
oldest officered the first century of the first maniple of the first
cohort, and was called 'primus-pilus,' and the 'primi ordines,' or
first class of centurions, consisted of the six centurions of the
first cohort. These corresponded to our non-commissioned officers,
were taken from the lower classes of society, and were seldom made
tribunes. [Sidenote: The tribunes.] The tribunes were six to each
legion, were taken from the upper class, and after being attached
to the general's suite, received the rank of tribune, if they were
supposed to be qualified for it. The tribunes were originally
appointed by the consuls. Afterwards they had been elected, partly by
the people and partly by the consuls. Caesar superseded the tribunes
by 'legati' of his own, to one of whom he would entrust a legion, and
appointed some, but probably not all, of the tribunes, and Marius, it
seems likely, did the same. [Sidenote: Numbers of the legion.] The
normal number of a legion had been 4,200 men and 300 horse, but was
often larger. [Sidenote: The pay.] The pay of a legionary was in
the time of Polybius two obols a day for the private, four for a
centurion, and six for a horse soldier, besides an allowance of corn.
But deductions were made for clothing, arms, and food. Hence the law
of Caius Gracchus (cf. p. 51); but from the first book of the Annals
of Tacitus we find that such deductions long continued to be the
soldier's grievance. Auxiliary troops received an allowance of corn,
but no pay from Rome. [Sidenote: The engineers.] The engineers of the
army were called Fabri, under a 'praefectus,' the 'Fabri Lignarii'
having the woodwork, and the 'Fabri Ferrarii' the ironwork of the
enginery under their special charge, [Sidenote: The staff.] and all
were attached to the staff of the army, which consisted of the general
and certain officers, such as the legati, or generals of division, and
the quaestors, or managers of the commissariat. [Sidenote: The Cohors
Praetoria.] One of the most significant changes that had sprung up
of late years was one which was introduced by Scipio Aemilianus at
Numantia--the institution of a body-guard, or Cohors Praetoria. It
consisted of young men of rank, who went with the general to learn
their profession, or as volunteers of troops specially enlisted for
the post, who would often be veterans from his former armies. The term
Evocati was applied to such veterans strictly, but also to any men
specially enlisted for the purpose. [Sidenote: The equites.] It is
probable that the equites no longer formed the cavalry of a legion,
but only served in the general's body-guard, as tribunes and
praefects, or on extraordinary commissions. The cavalry in Caesar's
time appears to have consisted entirely of auxiliaries.

[Sidenote: Disinclination for service at Rome.] There had been for a
long time among the wealthier classes a growing disinclination for
service, and as the middle class was rapidly disappearing, there
had been great difficulty in filling the ranks. The speeches of the
Gracchi alluded to this, and it had been experienced in the wars with
Viriathus, with Jugurtha, with Tryphon, and with the Cimbri. One
device for avoiding it we have seen, by the orders issued to the
captains of ships in Italian ports. Among Roman citizens, if not
among the allies, some property qualification had been required in a
soldier. [Sidenote: Marius enrols the Capite Censi.] Marius tapped a
lower stratum, and allowed the Capite Censi to volunteer. To such men
the prospect of plunder would be an object, and they would be far more
at the bidding of individual generals than soldiers of the old stamp.
Thus though obligation to service was not abolished, volunteering was
allowed, and became the practice; and the army, with a new drill, and
no longer consisting of Romans or even Italians, but of men of all
nations, became as effective as of old, if not more so, and at the
same time a body detached from the State. [Sidenote: The army ceases
to be a citizen army.] The citizen was lost in the professional, and
patriotism was superseded by the personal attachment of soldiers of
fortune, who knew no will but that of their favourite commander or
their own selfishness. Their general could reward them with money, and
extort land for them from the State; and when Marius after Vercellae
gave the franchise to two Italian cohorts, saying that he could not
hear the laws in the din of arms, he was giving to what was becoming a
standing army privileges which could not be conferred by a consul, but
only by a king.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER VII.

SATURNINUS AND DRUSUS.


[Sidenote: Attitude of Marius.] With such a weapon in his hand Marius
came back to Rome, intoxicated with success. He thought his marches in
two continents worthy to be compared with the progresses of Bacchus,
and had a cup made on the model of that of the god. He spoke badly; he
was easily disconcerted by the disapproval of an audience; he had no
insight into the evils, or any project for the reformation, of the
State. But the scorn of men like Metellus had made him throw himself
on the support of the people from whom he sprang; and they, idolising
him for his dazzling exploits as a soldier, looked to him as their
natural leader, and the creator of a new era. Indeed it needed no
stimulus from without to whet his ambitious cravings. That seventh
consulship which superstition whispered would be surely his he had yet
to win; and in all his after conduct he seems to have been guided
by the most vulgar selfishness, which in the end became murderous
insanity. But while he hoped to use all parties for his own
advancement--a game in which he of all men was least qualified to
succeed--other and abler politicians were bent on using him for the
overthrow of the optimates.

[Sidenote: Saturninus.] The harangues of Memmius had shown that the
spirit of the Gracchi was still alive in Rome; and now Lucius Apuleius
Saturninus took up their revolutionary projects with a violence
to which they had been averse, but for which the acts of their
adversaries had become a fatal precedent. Of Saturninus himself we
do not know much more than that he was an eloquent speaker, and
a resolute though not over-scrupulous man at a time when to be
scrupulous was equivalent to self-martyrdom or self-effacement.
[Sidenote: Glaucia.] In something of the same relation in which
Camille Desmoulins stood to Danton, Caius Servilius Glaucia, a wit
and favourite of the people, stood towards the sombre and imperious
Saturninus, and both hoped to effect their aims by the aid of Marius.
If they are to be judged by their acts alone we can hardly condemn
them. [Sidenote: Defence of their policy.] They tried to do what the
Gracchi had attempted before them, what Drusus attempted after them,
and what, when they and Drusus had fallen, as the Gracchi had fallen,
the Social War finally effected. No historian has given sufficient
prominence to the fact that it was primarily a country movement
of which each of these men was the leader; a movement of unbroken
continuity, though each used his own means and had his own special
temperament. If this is kept in view, we shall no longer consider with
some modern historians that no event perhaps in Roman history is so
sudden, so unconnected, and accordingly so obscure in its original
causes as this revolt or conspiracy of Saturninus.

Like Caius Gracchus, Saturninus represented rural as opposed to urban
interests, and the interests of the provinces as opposed to those
of the capital. Like Caius, too, he endeavoured to conciliate the
equites; but they had all the Roman prejudice against admitting
Italians to a level with themselves, and the attempt to play off
party against party utterly failed. In vain Saturninus tried to defy
opposition by enlisting the support of the Marian veterans. The rich,
the noble, and the city mob united against him; and when he seized the
Capitol, it was to defend himself against all three. In the year 100
B.C. Marius was consul for the sixth time, Glaucia was praetor, and
Saturninus was a second time tribune. A triumvirate so powerful might,
if united, have overthrown the Constitution. But the vanity and
vacillation of Marius were the best allies of the optimates; and it
was no grown man, but Caius Julius Caesar, a child born in that same
year, who was destined to subvert their rule. [Sidenote: The
Lex Servilia. The equites and the judicia.] Saturninus had been
instrumental in securing the election of Marius to his fifth
consulship in 102, and it was about that time that the Lex Servilia
was carried. This law defined the liability of Roman officials to
trial for extortion in the provinces, and, by a process of elimination
(for senators, workers for hire, and others were expressly declared
ineligible), practically left to the equites the jurisdiction in such
trials. Whether or no the law of Gracchus had been repealed by another
Servilian law--that of Q. Servilius Caepio--we cannot say for certain.
If so, the second Servilian law repealed the first. But, whether it
restored power to the equites or only confirmed them in it, in theory
it left the office of judex open to all citizens, for, while it
excluded so many citizens that in practice the judicia were closed to
all but the equestrian class, it did not assign the office to any one
class in particular. It also provided that anyone not a citizen who
won his suit against an official should by virtue of doing so obtain
the citizenship. [Sidenote: Threefold purpose of the Lex Servilia.] So
that we may trace in this law a threefold policy--an attempt (1) to
relieve the provincials, by making prosecutions for extortion easy,
and even putting a premium on them; (2) to conciliate the equites; (3)
to pave the way for the overthrow of class jurisdiction by, nominally
at least, leaving the judicia open to all who did not come under
specified restrictions. Cicero inveighs against Glaucia as a demagogue
of the Hyperbolus stamp. But there was more of the statesman than the
demagogue in this law.

When Saturninus was a candidate for the tribunate, he and Glaucia are
said to have set on men to murder Nonius, another candidate, who they
feared might use his veto to thwart their projects. Marius had
been previously elected consul, and supported Saturninus in his
candidature, as Saturninus had supported him. [Sidenote: Personal
reasons for Marius joining Saturninus.] Marius may have been induced
to enter into this alliance by the desire to gratify a personal
grudge, for the rival candidate had been the man he most detested, Q.
Metellus; and the first measure of Saturninus was a compliment to
him and a direct blow aimed at Metellus. [Sidenote: Agrarian law of
Saturninus.] This was an agrarian law which would benefit the Marian
veterans; and as it contained a proviso that any senator refusing
to swear to observe it within five days should be expelled from the
Senate, it would be sure to drive Metellus from Rome. But if there was
diplomacy in this measure of Saturninus, there was sagacity also. What
discontent was seething in Italy the Social War soon proved, and this
was an attempt to appease it. Saturninus had previously proposed
allotments in Africa; now he proposed to allot lands in Transalpine
Gaul, Sicily, Achaia, and Macedonia, and to supply the colonists with
an outfit from the treasure taken from Tolosa. Marius was to have the
allotment of the land. [Sidenote: Difficulty about this agrarian law.]
There is a difficulty as to these colonies which no history solves.
They were Roman colonies to which only Roman citizens were eligible,
and yet the Roman populace opposed the law. The Italians, on the
contrary, carried it by violence. Some have cut the knot by supposing
that, though the colonies were Roman, Italians were to be admitted to
them. But there is another possible explanation. It is certain that
many Italians passed as citizens at Rome. In 187 B.C. 12,000 Latins,
passing as Roman citizens, had been obliged to quit Rome. In 95 B.C.
there was another clearance of aliens, which was one of the immediate
causes of the Social War. Fictitious citizens might have found it easy
to obtain allotments from a consul whose ears, if first made deaf by
the din of arms, had never since recovered their hearing. However
this may be, it was the rural party which by violence procured a
preponderance of votes at the ballot-boxes, and it was the town
populace which resisted what it felt to be an invasion of its
prerogative by the men from the country. [Sidenote: Exile of
Metellus.] Marius is said to have got rid of Metellus by a trick. He
pretended that he would not take the oath which the law demanded, but,
when Metellus had said the same thing, told the Senate that he would
swear to obey the law as far as it was a law, in order to induce the
rural voters to leave Rome, and Metellus, scorning such a subterfuge,
went into exile.

[Sidenote: Corn-law of Saturninus.] Another law of Saturninus either
renewed the corn-law of Caius Gracchus, or went farther and made the
price of grain merely nominal. This law was no doubt meant to recover
the favour of the city mob, which he had forfeited by his agrarian
law. But Caepio, son, probably, of the hero of Tolosa, stopped
the voting by force, and the law was not carried. [Sidenote: Law of
treason.] The third law of Saturninus was a Lex de Majestate, a law by
which anyone could be prosecuted for treason against the State, and
which was not improbably aimed specially at Caepio, who was impeached
under it. It seems at any rate certain that of these laws the agrarian
was the chief, and the others subsidiary; in other words, that he and
Glaucia were working together on an organized plan, and striving to
admit the whole Roman world into a community of rights with Rome. They
thought that with the Marian soldiers at their back they would be
safer than Gracchus with his bands of reapers; and so they may have
taken the initiative in violence from which, both by past events and
the acts of men like Caepio, it was certain that the optimates would
not shrink. It is difficult to apportion the blame in such cases.
[Sidenote: Civil strife. Saturninus seizes the Capitol.] But when
Glaucia stood for the consulship of 99, and his rival Memmius, a
favourite with the people, was murdered, an attack was made on
Saturninus, who hastily sent for aid to his rural supporters and
seized the Capitol. He found then that in reckoning on Marius he had
made a fatal blunder. That selfish intriguer had been alarmed by the
popular favour shown to an impostor named Equitius, who gave out that
he was the son of Tiberius Gracchus, and who, being imprisoned by
Marius, was released by the people and elected tribune. He may
have been jealous too of the popularity of Saturninus with his own
veterans, and at the same time anxious to curry favour with the foes
of Saturninus--the urban populace. [Sidenote: Marius turns on his
friends.] So, instead of boldly joining his late ally, he became the
general of the opposite party, drove Saturninus and his friends from
the Forum, and, when they had surrendered, suffered them to be pelted
to death in the Curia Hostilia where he had placed them. [Sidenote:
Death of Saturninus and Glaucia.] Saturninus, it is said, had been
proclaimed king before his death. If so he had at least struck for a
crown consistently and boldly; and even if his attempt for the moment
united the senatorial party and the equites, while the city mob stood
wavering or hostile, he might nevertheless have forestalled the empire
by a century had Marius only had half his enterprise or nerve. In an
epoch of revolution it is idle to judge men by an ordinary standard.
How far personal ambition and how far a nobler ideal animated
Saturninus no man can say. Those who condemn him must condemn Cromwell
too.

For the moment the power of the optimates seemed restored. The spectre
of monarchy had made the men of riches coalesce with their old rivals
the men of rank; and the mob, ungrateful for an unexecuted corn-law,
chafed at Italian pretensions. Metellus, the aristocrat, was recalled
to Rome amid the enthusiasm of the anti-Italian mob, and P. Furius was
torn to pieces for having opposed his return. [Sidenote: Marius falls
into disrepute.] Marius slunk away to the East, finding that his
treachery had only isolated him and brought him into contempt; and
there, it is said, he tried to incite Mithridates to war. Sextus
Titius indeed brought forward an agrarian law in 99 B.C. But he was
opposed by his colleagues and driven into exile. Two events soon
happened which showed not only the embittered feelings existing
between the urban and rural population, but also the sympathy with
the provincials felt by the better Romans, and, as an inference, the
miserable condition of the provincials themselves. [Sidenote: The Lex
Licinia Minucia.] The first was the enactment, in 95 B.C., of the Lex
Licinia Minucia, which ordered Latins and Italians resident at Rome
to leave the city. [Sidenote: and the prosecution of Rutilius Rufus
foreshadow the Social War.] The second was the prosecution and
conviction of Publius Rutilius Rufus, nominally for extortion, but
really because, by his just administration of the province of Asia, he
had rebuked extortion and the equestrian courts which connived at it.
Though most of the senators were as guilty as the equites, the mass,
like M. Scaurus, who was himself impeached for extortion, would ill
brook being forced to appear before their courts, and be eager to take
hold of their maladministration of justice as a pretext for abrogating
the Servilian law.

[Sidenote: Drusus attempts a reform.] One more attempt at reform was
to be made, this time by one of the Senate's own members, but only to
be once more defeated by rancorous party-spirit and besotted urban
pride. Marcus Livius Drusus was son of the man whom the Senate had put
forward to outbid Caius Gracchus. He was a haughty, upright man, of
an impetuous temper--such a man as often becomes the tool of less
courageous but more dexterous intriguers. M. Scaurus had been
impeached for taking bribes in Asia, and it is said that in his
disgust he egged on Drusus to restore the judicia to the Senate.
Drusus was probably one of those men whom an aristocracy in its
decadence not rarely produces. [Sidenote: Attitude of Drusus.] He
disliked the preponderance of the moneyed class. He could not feel the
vulgar Roman's antipathy to giving Italians the franchise, for he saw
it exercised by men who were in his eyes infinitely more contemptible.
He disliked also and despised the vices of his own order. Mistaking
the crafty suggestions of Scaurus for a genuine appeal to high
motives, flattered by it, and by the confidence of the Italians, he
thought that he could educate his party, and by his personal influence
induce it to do justice to Italy. But this conservative advocate of
reform was not wily enough tactician for the times in which he lived,
or the changes which he meditated. His attempts to improve on the
devices of Saturninus and Gracchus were miserable failures; and the
senators who used him, or were influenced by him, shrank from his side
when they saw him follow to their logical issue the principles which
they had advocated either for selfish objects or only theoretically.

[Sidenote: Main object of Drusus to aid the Italians.] Whether this is
the true view of the character and position of Drusus or not, we may
feel sure that he was in earnest in his advocacy of Italian interests,
and that this was the main object of his reforms. [Sidenote: Sops to
the mob: Depreciation of the coinage. Colonies. Corn-law.] To silence
the mob at Rome, he slightly depreciated the coinage so as to relieve
debtors, established some colonies--perhaps those promised by his
father--and carried some law for distributing cheap grain. [Sidenote:
Sop to the senate and equites.] Senators like Scaurus he courted by
handing over the judicia once more to the Senate, while, by admitting
300 equites to the Senate, he hoped to compensate them for the wound
which he thus inflicted on their material interests and their pride.
The body thus composed was to try cases of judices accused of taking
bribes. But the Senate scorned and yet feared the threatened invasion
by which it would be severed into two antagonistic halves. The
equites left behind were jealous of the equites promoted; and where
Drusus hoped to conciliate both classes, he only drew down their
united animosity upon himself. Even in Italy his plans were not
unanimously approved. Occupiers of the public land, who had never
yet been disturbed in their occupation--such as those who held the
Campanian domain land--were alarmed by this plan of colonisation,
which not only called in question once more their right of tenure,
but even appropriated their land. But though the large land-owners
were adverse to him, the great mass of the Italians was on his side;
and it was by their help that he carried the first three of his laws,
which he shrewdly included in one measure. Thus those who wanted land
or grain were constrained to vote for the changes in the judicia
also. But, as there was a law expressly forbidding this admixture of
different measures in one bill, he left an opening for his opponents
of which they soon took advantage. [Sidenote: Philippus opposes
Drusus.] Chief of these opponents was the consul Philippus. When the
Italians crowded into Rome to support Drusus, which they would do by
overawing voters at the ballot-boxes, by recording fictitious votes,
and by escorting Drusus about, so as to lend him the support which an
apparent majority always confers, Philippus came forward as the
champion of the opposite side. He seems to have been a turncoat, with
a fluent tongue and few principles. He had no sympathy with the
generous, if flighty, liberalism of the party of Drusus. No doubt it
seemed to him weak sentimentalism; and he openly said that he must
take counsel with other people, as he could not carry on the
government with such a Senate. Accordingly he appealed to the worst
Roman prejudices, viz. the selfishness of large occupiers and the
anti-Italian sentiments of the mob. This explains his being numbered
among the popular party, with which the Italian party was not now
identical. Drusus, when his subsidiary measures had proved abortive,
grew desperate. As his influence in the Senate waned he entered
into closer alliance with the Italians, who, on their part, bound
themselves by an oath to treat as their friend or enemy each friend
or enemy of Drusus; and it is conjectured, from a fragment of
Diodorus, that 10,000 of them, led by Pompaedius Silo, armed with
daggers, set out for Rome to demand the franchise, but were persuaded
to desist from their undertaking. [Sidenote: Drusus almost monarch.]
Monarchy seemed once more imminent; and now, as in the case of
Gracchus, it is impossible to say whether the attitude of the
champion of reform was due to the force of circumstances or to
settled design. But Philippus was equal to the occasion. He induced
the Senate to annul the laws of Drusus already carried, and summoned
the occupiers of the public land whom that law affected, to come and
confront the Italians in Rome. [Sidenote: Assassination of Drusus.]
A battle in the streets would have no doubt ensued; but it was
prevented by the assassination of Drusus, who was one evening stabbed
mortally in his own house. It is said that when dying he ejaculated
that it would be long before the State had another citizen like him.
He seems to have had much of the disinterested spirit of Caius
Gracchus, though with far inferior ability; and, like him, he left a
mother Cornelia, to do honour by her fortitude to the memory of her
son. That year the presentiment of coming political convulsions found
expression in reports of supernatural prodigies, while 'signs both on
the earth and in the heavens portended war and bloodshed, the tramp
of hostile armies, and the devastation of the peninsula.'

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER VIII.

THE SOCIAL WAR


In a previous chapter the relations now existing between Rome and her
dependents have been described. For two centuries the Italians had
remained faithful to Rome through repeated temptations, and even
through the fiery trial of Hannibal's victorious occupation. But the
loyalty, which no external or sudden shock could snap, had been slowly
eaten away by corrosives, which the arrogance or negligence of the
government supplied. [Sidenote: Interests of Italian capitalists and
Italian farmers opposed.] It is clear from the episode of Drusus
that there was as wide a breach between Italian capitalists and
cultivators, as there had been between Roman occupiers and the first
clamourers for agrarian laws. So, at the outbreak of the war, Umbria
and Etruria, whence Philippus had summoned his supporters, because the
farmer class had been annihilated and large land-owners held the
soil, remained faithful to Rome. But where the farmer class still
flourished, as among the Marsi, Marrucini, and the adjacent districts,
discontent had been gathering volume for many years. No doubt the
demoralisation of the metropolis contributed to this result; and, as
intercourse with Rome became more and more common, familiarity with
the vices of their masters would breed indignation in the minds of the
hardier dependents. Who, they would ask themselves, were these Scauri,
these Philippi, men fit only to murder patriots and sell their country
and themselves for gold, that they should lord it over Italians? Why
should a Roman soldier have the right of appeal to a civil tribunal,
and an Italian soldier be at the mercy of martial law? Why should two
Italians for every one Roman be forced to fight Rome's battles? Why
should insolent young Romans and the fine ladies of the metropolis
insult Italian magistrates and murder Italians of humbler rank? This
was the reward of their long fidelity. If here and there a statesman
was willing to yield them the franchise, the flower of the
aristocracy, the Scaevolae and the Crassi, expelled them by an
Alien Act from Rome. They had tried all parties, and by all been
disappointed, for Roman factions were united on one point, and one
only--in obstinate refusal to give Italians justice. The two glorious
brothers had been slain because they pitied their wrongs. So had
Scipio. So had the fearless Saturninus. And now their last friend,
this second Scipio, Drusus, had been struck down by the same cowardly
hands. Surely it was time to act for themselves and avenge their
benefactors. They were more numerous, they were hardier than their
tyrants; and if not so well organized, still by their union with
Drusus they were in some sort welded together, and now or never was
the time to strike. For the friends of Drusus were marked men. Let
them remain passive, and either individual Italians would perish by
the dagger which had slain Drusus, or individual communities by the
sentence of the Senate which had exterminated Fregellae.

[Sidenote: Outbreak of the Social War.] The revolt broke out at
Asculum. Various towns were exchanging hostages to secure mutual
fidelity. Caius Servilius, the Roman praetor, hearing that this was
going on at Asculum, went there and sharply censured the people in the
theatre. He and his escort were torn to pieces, the gates were shut,
every Roman in the town was slain, and the Marsi, Peligni, Marrucini,
Frentani, Vestini, Picentini, Hirpini, the people of Pompeii and
Venusia, the Iapyges, the Lucani, and the Samnites, and all the people
from the Liris to the Adriatic, flew to arms; [Sidenote: The allies
who remained faithful to Rome.] and though here and there a town like
Pinna of the Vestini, or a partisan like Minutius Magius of Aeclanum,
remained loyal to Rome, all the centre and south of Italy was soon in
insurrection. Perhaps at Pinna the large land-owners or capitalists
were supreme, as in Umbria and Etruria, which sided with Rome, as also
did most of the Latin towns, the Greek towns Neapolis and Rhegium, and
most of Campania, where Capua became an important Roman post during
the war. [Sidenote: The rebels demand the franchise.] The insurgents,
emboldened by the swift spread of the rebellion, sent to demand the
franchise as the price of submission. But the old dogged spirit which
extremity of danger had ever aroused at Rome was not dead. [Sidenote:
Rage of the equites. The law of Varius.] The offer was sternly
rejected, and the equites turned furiously on the optimates, or the
Italianising section of the optimates, to whose folly they felt that
the war was due. With war the hope of their gains was gone; and,
enraged at this, they took advantage of the outbreak to repay the
Senate for its complicity in the attempt of Drusus to deprive them of
the judicia. Under a law of Varius, who is said by Cicero to have been
the assassin of Drusus and Metellus, Italian sympathisers were brought
to trial, and either convicted and banished, or overawed into silence.
Among the accused was Scaurus. But now, as ever, that shifty man
emerged triumphant from his intrigues. He aped the defence of Scipio,
and retired not only safe, but with a dignity so well studied that but
for his antecedents it might have seemed sincere. A Spaniard accused
him, he said, and Scaurus, chief of the Senate, denied the accusation.
Whether of the twain should the Romans believe?

[Sidenote: Perils of the crisis.] For such prosecutions there was
indeed some excuse, for the prospect was threatening. Mithridates
might at any moment stop the supplies from Asia. The soldiers of the
enemy were men who had fought in Roman armies and been trained to
Roman discipline; they were led by able captains, and were more
numerous than the forces opposed to them. And yet the war must be a
war of detachments, where numbers were all-important. It was no time
for hesitation about purging out all traitors or waverers. But
the courts that tried other cases were closed for the time. The
distributions of grain were curtailed. The walls were put in order.
Arms were prepared as fast as possible. A fleet was collected from
the free cities of Greece and Asia Minor. Levies were raised from
the citizens, from Africa, and from Gaul. Lastly, in view of the
inevitably scattered form which the fighting would take, each consul
was to have five lieutenants. [Sidenote: Generals of Rome.] Lupus was
to command in the northern district, from Picenum to Campania. Among
the generals who acted under him were the father of Pompeius Magnus,
and Marius. Samnium, Campania, and the southern district fell to
Lucius Julius Caesar, and among the five officers who went with him
were also two men of mark, Publius Licinius Crassus and Sulla. We
shall see how by an exhaustive process the Romans, after a series of
defeats, were at last driven to employ as generals-in-chief the two
rivals who were now subordinates and were thus carefully kept aloof.

[Sidenote: Corfinium the capital of the confederates.] The
confederates on their part were equally energetic. They had chosen as
their capital Corfinium, on the river Aternus (Pescara), because of
its central position with reference to the insurrection, and soon made
it evident that the Roman franchise was no longer the limit to their
aspirations, but that they aimed at the conquest of Rome herself.
[Sidenote: Measures of the confederates.] They called their capital
Italica. In it they built a forum, and fortified its walls. They
issued a new coinage. They chose two consuls, twelve praetors, and a
senate of five hundred, and gave the franchise to every community
in arms on their side. They mustered an army of 100,000 men, and
entrusted the command against Lupus in the north and west to
Pompaedius Silo, with six lieutenants under him; the command against
Caesar in the south and east was given to a noted Samnite, named Caius
Papius Mutilus.

It is easier to get a general idea of the war than of its details,
though the latter are not without interest. The results of the first
year were, in spite of some victories, most unfavourable to Rome. The
insurgents were encouraged. The insurrection had spread to Umbria and
Etruria, and the Romans had at one time almost despaired. [Sidenote:
General survey of the war.] But in council they retrieved what they
had lost in the camp. A most politic concession of the franchise
checked all further disaffection in the very nick of time. The revolt
in Umbria and Etruria was speedily suppressed, and at the close of the
second year of the war, B.C. 89, the insurrection itself was virtually
at an end. For, though the Sulpician revolution at Rome prevented its
absolute extinction, and some embers of it still lingered for five
years more, and though Roman forces were still required after 89 B.C.
among the Sabines in Samnium, in Lucania, and at Nola, the war as
a war ended in that year. [Sidenote: Twofold division of the war.]
Consequently we may divide it into two periods, each well defined and
each consisting of a year, the first in which the confederate cause
triumphed and Marius lost credit; the second in which the cause of
Rome triumphed, and Sulla enhanced his reputation and became the
foremost man at Rome.

[Sidenote: B.C. 90. First year of the war. Attempt on Asculum by
Pompeius.] The war began, as was natural, with an attempt to take
Asculum. But the townsmen, manning the walls with the old men past
service, surprised Cnaeus Pompeius by a sally, and defeated him.
[Sidenote: Pompeius defeated and driven into Firmum.] Subsequently he
was again defeated at Faleria and driven into Firmum, a Latin colony
which held out for Rome. There he stayed till Servius Sulpicius came
to his help. [Sidenote: Pompeius, relieved by Sulpicius, besieges
Asculum.] On the approach of Sulpicius he sallied out. The enemy,
taken in front and rear, was routed, and Pompeius began the siege of
Asculum. It was not taken till the next year, 89, and only after a
desperate battle before its walls. Judacilius, who had come to relieve
the town of which he was a native, though the day was lost, forced his
way inside the walls, and held out for several months longer. Finally,
when it was impossible to protract the defence, he had a pile of wood
made, and a table placed on it at which he feasted with friends. Then,
taking poison, he had the pile fired. When the Romans got in they
took fearful vengeance, slaying all the officers and men of position,
expelling the rest of the inhabitants, and confiscating their
property. Such was the fate of the ringleaders of the rebellion.

[Sidenote: The confederates assail the towns which cling to Rome.] As
Asculum was the first object of Roman vengeance, so the confederates
directed their first efforts against the towns in their neighbourhood
which refused to join them. Silo assailed Alba and Mutilus Aesernia.
The consul Caesar, sending ahead Marcellus and Crassus into Samnium
and Lucania, followed in person as soon as he could. Put he was beaten
by Vettius Scato in Samnium with the loss of 2,000 men. [Sidenote:
They take Aesernia and are joined by Venafrum.] Venafrum thereupon
revolted; and, though one account says that Sulla relieved Aesernia,
it was at best only a partial or a temporary relief, for it
capitulated before the close of the year. How the siege of Alba
ended we do not know. Defeat after defeat was now announced at Rome.
[Sidenote: Perperna defeated.] Perperna lost 4,000 men, and most of
his other soldiers threw away their arms on the battlefield. For this
Lupus deprived him of his command and attached his troops to those
of Marius. [Sidenote: Crassus defeated. Grumentum taken by the
confederates.] Crassus was beaten in Lucania and shut up in Grumentum,
which was besieged and taken. [Sidenote: Story of the generosity of
some slaves.] A pleasant story is told about some slaves of this
town. They had deserted to the confederates, and when the town was
taken made straight for the house where they had lived and dragged
their mistress away, telling people they were going to have their
revenge on her at last. And so they saved her. [Sidenote: Nola taken
by the confederates.] While the troops of Crassus were cooped up in
Grumentum Mutilus descended into Campania and obtained possession of
Nola by treason. Two thousand soldiers also went over to him. The
officers remained loyal and were starved to death. [Sidenote: Town
after town won by the confederates.] Stabiae, Salernum, Pompeii,
Herculaneum, and probably Nuceria were taken in quick succession;
and, with his army swollen by deserters and recruits from the
neighbourhood, Mutilus laid siege to Acerrae. Caesar hastened to
relieve it. But Canusium and Venusia had joined the insurgents, and
in Venusia Oxyntas, son of Jugurtha, had been kept prisoner by the
Romans. Mutilus now put royal robes on him, and the Numidians in
Caesar's army, when they saw him, deserted in troops, so that Caesar
was forced to send the whole corps home.

[Sidenote: Caesar gains the first success for Rome; but is afterwards
defeated.] But out of this misfortune came the first gleam of success
which had as yet shone on the Roman arms. Mutilus ventured to attack
Caesar's camp, was driven back; and in the retreat the Roman cavalry
cut down 6,000 of his men. Though Marius Egnatius soon afterwards
defeated Caesar, this victory in some sort dissipated the gloom of
the capital; and while the two armies settled again into their old
position at Acerrae, the garb of mourning was laid aside at Rome for
the first time since the war began. Lupus and Marius meanwhile had
marched against the Marsi. Marius, in accordance with his old tactics
against the Cimbri, advised Lupus not to hazard a battle. But Lupus
thought that Marius wanted to get the consulship next year and reserve
for himself the honours of the war. So he hastened to fight, and,
throwing two bridges over the Tolenus, crossed by one himself, leaving
Marius to cross by the other. [Sidenote: Lupus defeated by the Marsi.]
As soon as the consul had reached the opposite bank, an ambuscade set
by Vettius Scato attacked him, and slew him and 8,000 of his men.
Their bodies, floating down the river, told Marius what had happened.
Like the good soldier that he was, he promptly crossed and seized the
enemy's camp. This disaster happened June 11, B.C. 90, and caused
great consternation in Rome. But at Rome small merit was now discerned
in any success gained by the veteran general, and Caepio, who had
opposed Drusus and was therefore a favourite with the equites, was
made joint commander in the north. It was a foolish choice. The
prudence of Marius and a victory over the Peligni gained by Sulpicius
were neutralised by the new general's rashness. Pompaedius Silo, who
must have been a thoroughly gallant man, came in person to the Roman
camp, bringing two young slaves whom he passed off as his own children
and offered as hostages for the sincerity of the offer he made, which
was to place his camp in Caepio's hands. [Sidenote: Caepio defeated
and slain by Silo.] Caepio went with him, and Pompaedius, running up a
hill to look out, as he said, for the enemy, gave a signal to men whom
he had placed in ambush. Caepio and many of his men were slain, and at
last Marius was sole commander. He advanced steadily but warily into
the Marsian country. Silo tauntingly told him to come down and fight,
if he was a great general. [Sidenote: Prudence of Marius.] 'Nay,'
replied Marius, 'if you are a great general, do you make me.' At
length he did fight; and, as he always did, won the day. In another
battle the Marrucinian leader, and 6,000 of the Marsi were slain.
[Sidenote: Success of Sulla.] But Sulla was at that time co-operating
with Marius, having apparently, when the Romans evacuated most of
Campania, marched north to form a junction with him; and beside his
star that of Marius always paled. Marius had shrunk from following the
enemy into a vineyard. Sulla, on the other side of it, cut them off.
Not that Marius was always over-cautious. Once in this war he said
to his men, 'I don't know which are the greatest cowards, you or
the enemy, for they dare not face your backs, nor you theirs.' But
everything he now did was distrusted at home; and while some men
disparaged his successes, and said that he was grown old and clumsy,
others were more afraid of him than of the enemy, with whom indeed
there was some reason to think that he had too good an understanding.
[Sidenote: A secret understanding, possibly, between Marius and the
confederates.] For once, when his army and Silo's were near each
other, both generals and men conversed, cursing the war, and with
mutual embraces adjuring each other to desist from it. If the story be
true, it is a sufficient reason for the Senate's conduct, inexplicable
except by political reasons, in not employing Marius at all in the
following year.

[Sidenote: Revolt of the Umbrians and Etruscans.] It was probably at
the close of this year that the revolt of the Umbrians and Etruscans
took place, and that Plotius defeated the Umbrians, and Porcius Cato
the Etruscans. On a general review of this piecemeal campaign it is
plain that the Romans had been worsted. On the main scene of war,
Campania, they had been decisively defeated, and the country was in
the enemy's power. In Picenum and the Marsian territory the balance
was more even; but Lupus and Caepio had been slain, Perperna and
Pompeius had been defeated, and on the whole the confederates had
carried off the honours of the war. [Sidenote: Results of the first
year of the war.] Now Umbria was in insurrection, Mithridates was
astir in Asia, and there were symptoms of revolt in Transalpine Gaul.
A selfish intriguer like Marius might very likely have thought of
throwing in his lot with the Italians, for theirs seemed to be the
winning side. But on honester men such considerations produced quite
another effect. [Sidenote: The party of Drusus revives.] The party of
Drusus took heart again, and appealed to the results of the war as
a proof of his patriotic foresight and of the moderation of his
counsels. They got the administration of the Varian Law into their own
hands, and turned it against its authors, Varius himself being exiled.
The consul Caesar had personal reasons for being disquieted with
the war, if the story of Orosius be true, that, when he asked for a
triumph for his victory at Acerrae, the Senate sent him a mourning
robe as a sign of what they thought of his request. [Sidenote: The Lex
Julia.] In any case he was the author of that Lex Julia which really
terminated the Social War. [Sidenote: Various accounts of the law.]
There are different accounts given of this law. According to Gellius
it enfranchised all Latium, by which he must mean to include all the
Latin colonies. According to Cicero it enfranchised all Italy except
Cisalpine Gaul. According to Appian it enfranchised all the Italians
still faithful. In any case those enfranchised were not to be enrolled
in the old tribes lest they should swamp them by their votes, but in
eight new ones, which were to vote only after the others. [Sidenote:
The Lex Plautia Papiria.] The Lex Julia was immediately followed by
the Lex Plautia Papiria, framed by the tribunes M. Plautius Silvanus
and C. Papirius Carbo. This law seems to have been meant to supplement
the other. The Lex Julia rewarded the Italians who had remained
faithful. The Lex Plautia Papiria held out the olive branch to the
Italians who had rebelled. It enfranchised any citizen of an allied
town who at the date of the law was dwelling in Italy, and made a
declaration to the praetor within sixty days. In the same year, and in
connexion no doubt with these measures, the Jus Latii was conferred on
a number of towns north of the Po, by which every magistrate in his
town might, if he chose, claim the franchise. Some of the free allies
of Rome did not look upon the Lex Julia as a boon. Heracleia and
Neapolis hesitated to accept it, the latter having special privileges,
such as exemption from service by land, which it valued above the
franchise. Probably these towns and Rhegium made a special bargain,
and, while accepting the franchise, retained their own language and
institutions. [Sidenote: Effects of these laws.] The general result
of the legislation was this. All Italy and all Latin colonies in
Cisalpine Gaul, together with all allied communities in Cisalpine Gaul
south of the Po, received the franchise. All the other Cisalpine towns
north of the Po received the Jus Latii. A general amnesty was in
fact offered; and though the provisions as to the new tribes were
unsatisfactory, its effect was soon apparent.

[Sidenote: B.C. 89 The second year of the war.] [Sidenote: Successes
of Pompeius in the north.] The consuls for 89 were Lucius Porcius
Cato, who took command of the army in the Marian district, and Cnaeus
Pompeius, who retained the command in Picenum. Caesar was succeeded
in Campania by Sulla. Flushed with hope, the confederates opened the
campaign by despatching 15,000 men across the Apennines to join the
Etruscan insurgents. But Pompeius intercepted and slew 5,000 of them,
and dispersed the rest, who, even if they had reached Etruria, would
have found that they had come on a bootless errand. He followed up
this success by blow after blow. One of his lieutenants, Sulpicius,
crushed the Marrucini at Teate. Another, Q. Metellus Piso, subdued the
Marsi. Pompeius in person fought a great battle before Asculum, as
before related, and captured the town; and in the following year
the Peligni and Vestini submitted to him.

[Sidenote: Successes of Cosconius in the south-east.] In the
south-east of Italy, Cosconius, the praetor, burnt Salapia in Apulia,
received the submission of Cannae, and besieged Canusium. Marius
Egnatius came to its aid; but though he at first drove back Cosconius
to Cannae, he or his successor was defeated and slain in another
fight, and Cosconius became master of all Apulia and the Iapygian
peninsula, which he laid waste with fire and sword.

[Sidenote: Successes of Sulla in the south-west.] While the Roman
supremacy was thus re-established all along the east coast, Sulla, in
Campania, was equally triumphant. He recovered Stabiae in April, and
his lieutenant, T. Didius, took Herculaneum in June. Didius, however,
lost his life in the assault. Sulla next besieged Pompeii, defeated
Cluentius who came to its aid, again defeated him between Pompeii
and Nola, and a third time at the gates of Nola, where Cluentius was
slain. About this time Aulus Postumius Albinus, while in charge of
the fleet, was murdered by his own men, recruits probably whom he was
bringing from Rome to Sulla's army. Sulla pardoned the mutineers,
saying that he knew they would wipe out their crime by their bravery,
and they did so in the fights with Cluentius. By such politic clemency
and never-varying good fortune Sulla bound the army to his own
interests.

Leaving Nola behind him, he crossed the Hirpinian frontier and marched
on Aeclanum. The townsmen, who were expecting a Lucanian reinforcement
that day, asked for time to deliberate. Sulla gave them an hour, and
occupied the hour in heaping vine osiers round the wooden walls. Not
choosing to be burnt the townsmen surrendered, and Sulla sacked the
place. He then marched northwards into Samnium. The mountain-passes
were held by Mutilus, who hemmed in Sulla near Aesernia. Sulla
pretended to treat for peace, and, when the enemy were off their
guard, marched away in the night, leaving a trumpeter to sound all
the watches as if the army was still in position. He seems to have
defeated Mutilus after this, and, leaving Aesernia behind as he had
left Nola, finally, before going home to sue for the consulship of 88
B.C., stormed Bovianum. He had managed the campaign in a bold and able
way, where less daring generalship might have failed.

[Sidenote: First Bovianum, and then Aesernia, becomes the confederate
capital.] As the insurrection was thus being stamped out on either
coast, Bovianum had become the capital of the insurgents instead of
Corfinium. Now Bovianum was taken, and Aesernia became its centre. The
occupation of the Hirpinian territory cut off the Samnites from the
South of Italy, where the Lucanians and Bruttians remained in arms.
Except for some trifling operations, which Pompeius had to carry out
in order to complete the pacification of his district, all that was
now left for the commanders of 88 was to crush the rebels in these two
isolated divisions, and the war would be at an end. [Sidenote: B.C.
88. Desperation of the confederates.] The rebels indeed prepared for a
desperate resistance. Five generals were appointed, Pompaedius Silo,
the Marsian, at their head; and, by enrolling slaves and calling out
fresh levies, the Samnites mustered an army of 50,000 men. Once more,
almost single-handed, they prepared to strive with their old enemy for
the sovereignty of Italy. The gallant Silo signalised his appointment
by recovering Bovianum, but he was soon afterwards slain. He is said
to have been defeated in a great battle by Mamercus Aemilius, and to
have fallen in it. Appian says that Metellus defeated him in Iapygia;
Orosius, that Sulpicius defeated him in Apulia. However that may be,
with him the last gleam of hope for the Samnite cause faded away. They
made, it is said, a treaty with Mithridates; but long before that king
could have reached Italy, if he had been able to make the attempt,
there would have been no allies to support him. In Lucania Aulus
Gabinius, made rash by some successes, assaulted the confederate camp,
but was repulsed and slain. Lamponius, the Lucanian general, remained
master of the country, and attempted to take Rhegium, with the view
of crossing over to Sicily and renewing the rebellion there. But the
attempt failed. [Sidenote: Revolution at Rome, and the part taken by
the insurgents in it.] Nola, however, still held out in Campania; and
now there occurred a revolution at Rome which postponed the final
subjugation of the insurgents till after the battle of the Colline
Gate. For convenience and clearness the part taken by them in this
revolution may be here summarised. Sulla, as consul, was besieging
Nola when he was recalled to Rome by the Sulpician revolution and his
election to the command against Mithridates. A Samnite army had come
to relieve it, but had been defeated by Sulla. Three Roman corps
still remained to keep the Samnites in check and besiege Nola, under
Claudius, Metellus, and Plotius. It was to Nola that Cinna came, and
seduced a large portion of the besiegers to follow him to Rome. Upon
this the insurgents suddenly found themselves, instead of hunted
desperadoes, courted as allies by two parties. The Senate again
offered the terms of the Lex Plautia Papiria to all in arms, and some
accepted them. But the Nolans, when Metellus was recalled and the long
siege was then raised in 87 B.C., marched out and burnt Abella.
The Samnites demanded, as the price of their assistance, that the
prisoners, spoils, and deserters should be restored, and that they
and the Romans who had joined them should receive the franchise. The
Senate refused, and the Samnites at once joined Cinna and Marius, who
were pledged not only to give the franchise, but also to enrol all
the new voters in the old tribes; a measure which was ratified by the
Senate in the year of Cinna's last consulship, 84 B.C. On Sulla's
return to Italy they with the Lucanians, who had meanwhile been
practically independent, were the most eager supporters of Marius's
son. [Sidenote: Pontius of Telesia.] In 82 Pontius of Telesia, at the
head of a Samnite force, with the desperate hardihood inspired by
centuries of hatred, marched straight on Rome, and the city was saved
only by Sulla's victory at the Colline Gate. Three days after the
battle Sulla massacred all his prisoners. He knew that death alone
could disarm such implacable foes. The Samnite name, he said, with
his cold ferocity, must be erased from the earth, or Rome could never
rest. The Samnites evacuated Nola in the year 80 B.C., and then their
last great leader, C. Papius Mutilus, having fled in disguise to his
wife at Teanum, was disowned by her and slew himself. [Sidenote:
Fate of Samnium.] Sulla carried his threats into effect. He captured
Aesernia, and spread a desolation all around, from which the country
has never recovered to this day. Then, and not till then, the stubborn
resistance of the most relentless foes of Rome was finally suppressed.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER IX.

SULPICIUS.


The terrible disintegration which the Social War had brought on Italy
was faithfully reproduced in Rome. There, too, every man's hand was
against his neighbour. Creditor and debtor, tribune and consul, Senate
and anti-Senate, fiercely confronted each other. Personal interests
had become so much more prominent, and old party-divisions were so
confused by the schemes of Italianising politicians, aristocratic in
their connexions, but cleaving to part at least of the traditional
democratic programme, that it is very hard to see where the views of
one faction blended with those of another and where they clashed.
[Sidenote: The Sulpician revolution difficult to understand.] Still
harder is it to dissect the character of individuals; to decide, for
instance, how far a man like Sulpicius was swayed by disinterested
principles, and how far he fought for his own hand. We need not make
too much of the fact that he appealed to force, because violence
was the order of the day, and submission to the law simply meant
submission to the law of force. But there are some parts of his career
apparently so inconsistent as almost to defy explanation which in any
case can be little more than guesswork.

[Sidenote: Sulpicius.] Publius Sulpicius Rufus was now in the prime of
life, having been born in 124 B.C. He was an aristocrat, an orator of
great force and fire, and a friend of Drusus, whose views he shared
and inherited. Cicero speaks of him in no grudging terms. 'Of all the
speakers I have heard Sulpicius was the grandest, and, so to speak,
most tragic. Besides being powerful, his voice was sweet and resonant.
His gestures and movements, elegant though they were, had nothing
theatrical about them, and his oratory, though quick and fluent, was
neither redundant nor verbose.' [Sidenote: Financial crisis at Rome.]
The year before his tribunate had been a turbulent one at Rome. The
Social War and Asiatic disturbances had brought about a financial
crisis. Debtors, hard pressed by their creditors, invoked obsolete
penalties against usury in their defence, and the creditors, because
the praetor Asellio attempted to submit the question to trial,
murdered him in the open Forum. The debtors responded by a cry for
_tabulae novae_, or a sweeping remission of all debts. Of these
debtors many doubtless would belong to the lower orders; but, from a
proposal of Sulpicius made the next year, it appears probable that
some were found in the ranks of the Senate. War had made money
'tight,' to use the phraseology of our modern Stock Exchange, and
reckless extravagance could no longer be supported by borrowing.

[Sidenote: Sulpicius the successor of Drusus.] Sulpicius inherited the
policy of Drusus, which was to reconstruct the Senatorial Government
on an Italian basis. Like Drusus he had to conciliate prejudices in
order to carry out his design. Plutarch says that he went about with
600 men of the equestrian order, whom he called his anti-Senate. No
doubt it was to please these equites, who would belong to the party of
creditors, that he proposed that no one should be a senator who owed
more than 2,000 denarii. No doubt, too, he would have filled the
vacancies thus created by the expulsion of reckless anti-Italian
optimates, from the ranks of these equites, just as Drusus had done.
[Sidenote: He attempts to remodel the government.] Just like Drusus,
too, he had to court the proletariate, and this he did by proposing to
enrol freedmen in the tribes. This, as they were generally dependent
on men of his own order, he could do without prejudice to the
new-modelled aristocracy which he was attempting to organize. He also
proposed to grant an amnesty to those who had been exiled by the Lex
Varia, hoping, no doubt, to gain more by the adherents who would
return to Rome than he would lose by the return of men like Varius
himself. He had opposed such an amnesty before; but on such a point he
might have easily changed his views, especially if a strong cry was
being raised by the friends of the exiles. He had a personal feud with
the Julian family, because he had opposed Caesar's illegal candidature
for the consulship; but, having fortified himself by such alliances,
he proceeded to carry out the main design of Drusus, namely, the
complete enfranchisement of the Italians. [Sidenote: Pro-Italian
measure of Sulpicius.] This, perhaps, would be especially distasteful
to the Julii, as superseding the Lex Julia and the Lex Plautia
Papiria, which to them, no doubt, seemed ample and more than ample
concessions. Sulpicius, on the other hand, and the minority of the
Senate which sided with him, saw that under the cover of clemency a
grievous wrong was being done. For not only were the Italians who had
submitted since the terms of the Lex Plautia took effect without the
franchise, but from the fact of their rebellion they had lost their
old privileges as allied States. Even those who had benefited by these
concessions had benefited only in name. As they voted in new tribes,
their votes were valueless, and often would not be recorded at all;
for a majority on most questions would be assured long before it came
to their turn to vote. To a statesman imbued with the views of Drusus
such a distribution of the franchise must have seemed impolitic
trickery; and, like Drusus, Sulpicius resorted to questionable means
in order to gain the end on which he had set his heart.

Rome was thus broken up into two camps, not as of yore broadly marked
off by palpable distinctions of rank, property, or privilege, but each
containing adherents of all sorts and conditions, though in the Senate
the opponents of Sulpicius had the majority. When Sulpicius proposed
to enrol the Italians in the old tribes, the consuls proclaimed a
justitium, or suspension of all public business for some religious
observances. It is said by some modern writers that the object of
Sulpicius in proposing to enrol the Italians in the old tribes was to
secure the election of Marius to the command against Mithridates. It
is certain, indeed, that Marius longed for it. [Sidenote: Attitude of
Marius.] Daily he was to be seen in the Campus Martius exercising with
the young men, and, though old and fat, showing himself nimble in
arms and active on horseback--conduct which excited some men's
good-humoured sympathy, but shocked others, who thought he had much
better go to Baiae for the baths there, and that such an exhibition
was contemptible in one of his years. Sulpicius may have thought
Marius quite fit for the command, and was warranted in thinking so
by the events of the Social War; but there is no more ground for
supposing that the election of Marius was his primary object than for
considering Plutarch's diatribe a fair estimate of his character.
[Sidenote: Connection of Marius and Sulpicius explained.] He was the
friend and successor of Drusus, and his alliance with Marius was a
means to the end which in common with Drusus he had in view, and
not the end itself. This consideration is essential to a true
understanding of the politics of the time, and just makes the
difference whether Sulpicius was a petty-minded adventurer or
deliberately following in the lines laid down for him by a succession
of statesmen. [Sidenote: Street-fighting.] To the manoeuvre of the
consul he replied by a violent protest that it was illegal. Rome was
being paraded by his partisans--3,000 armed men, and there was a
tumult in which the lives of the consuls were in danger. One, Pompeius
Rufus, escaped, but his son was killed. The other, Sulla, annulled
the justitium, but is said to have got off with his life only because
Marius generously gave him shelter in his own house. In these
occurrences it is impossible not to see that the consuls were the
first to act unfairly. Sulpicius had been intending to bring forward
his laws in the regular fashion. They thwarted him by a trick. Whether
he in anger gave the signal for violence, or whether, as is quite as
likely, his Italian partisans did not wait for his bidding, the blame
of the tumult lay at the door of the other side. In such cases he is
not guiltiest who strikes the first blow, but he who has made blows
inevitable.

[Sidenote: The Sulpician laws carried by force.] The laws of Sulpicius
were carried. [Sidenote: Sulla flies to the army, which marches on
Rome.] Sulla fled to the army; and, perhaps, it was only now that
Sulpicius, knowing or thinking that he knew that Sulla would march on
Rome, carried a resolution in the popular assembly for making Marius
commander in the east. Two tribunes were accordingly sent to the camp
at Nola to take the army from Sulla. His soldiers immediately slew
them; and, burning for the booty of Asia and attached to their
fortunate leader, they, when without venturing to hint at the means
by which he could avenge it, he complained of the wrong done to him,
clamorously called on him to lead them to Rome. All his officers,
except one quaestor, left him; but he set out with six legions and was
joined by Pompeius on the way. Two praetors met him and forbade his
advance. They escaped with their lives, but the soldiers broke their
fasces and tore off their senatorial robes. A second and a third time
the Senate sent to ask his intentions. 'To release Rome from her
tyrants,' was the grim reply. Then he vouchsafed an offer that the
Senate, Marius, and Sulpicius should meet him in the Campus Martius to
come to terms. If this meant that he would come with his army at his
back, it was an absurd proposal. If it meant that he would come alone,
it was a falsehood. In either case it was a device to fritter away
time. [Sidenote: Sulla's astuteness and superstition.] For all the
while that he was bandying meaningless messages he continued his
onward march. He had sacrificed, and the soothsayer Postumius, when he
saw the entrails, had stretched out his hands to him, and offered to
be kept in chains for punishment after the battle if it was not a
victory. He, too, had himself seen a vision of good omen. Bellona, or
another goddess, had, he dreamed, put a thunderbolt in his hands, and,
naming his enemies one by one, bidden him strike them, and they were
consumed to ashes.

Again envoys came from the Senate forbidding him to come within five
miles of Rome. Perhaps they still felt as secure in the immemorial
freedom of the city from military rule as the English Parliament did
before Cromwell's _coup d'état_. Again he amused them, and no doubt
himself also, with a falsehood, and, professing compliance, followed
close upon their heels. With one legion he occupied the Caelian Gate,
with another under Pompeius the Colline Gate, with a third the Pons
Sublicius, while a fourth was posted outside as a reserve. Thus, for
the first time, a consul commanded an army in the city, and soldiers
were masters of Rome. [Sidenote: Street-fighting.] Marius and
Sulpicius met them on the Esquiline and, pouring down tiles from the
housetops, at first beat them back. But Sulla, waving a burning torch,
bade his men shoot fiery arrows at the houses, and drove the Marians
from the Esquiline Forum. Then he sent for the legion in reserve, and
ordered a detachment to go round by the Subura and take the enemy in
the rear. In vain Marius made another stand at the temple of Tellus.
In vain he offered liberty to any slaves that would join him. He
was beaten and fled from the city. Thus Sulla, having by injustice
provoked disorder, quelled it by the sword, and began the civil war.
Sulpicius, Marius, and ten others were proscribed, and Sulla is said
to have still further stimulated the pursuit of Marius by setting a
price on his head. [Sidenote: Sulpicius slain.] Sulpicius was killed
at Laurentum, and, according to Velleius Paterculus, Sulla fixed up
the eloquent orator's head at the Rostra, a thing not unlikely to have
been done by a man to whose nature such grim irony was thoroughly
congenial. [Sidenote: Stories of Sulla.] He evinced it on this
occasion in another way, which may have suggested to Victor Hugo his
episode of Lantenac and the gunner. He gave the slave who betrayed
Sulpicius his freedom, and then had him hurled from the Tarpeian Rock.
After this he set to work to restore such order as would enable him to
hasten to the east.

[Sidenote: Why Sulla left Italy.] Various explanations have been
offered to account for his moderation at this conjuncture, and for his
leaving Italy precisely when his enemies were again gathering for an
attack. But the true one has never yet, perhaps, been suggested. Who
was it that had made him supreme at Rome? The army. What had been the
bribe which had won it over? A campaign in Asia under the fortunate
Sulla. Without that army he was powerless, nay, he was a dead man.
Therefore it was absolutely necessary to execute his pledge to the
army, which would have no keen desire to encounter its countrymen in
Italy. No doubt he coveted the glory and spoil of the Asiatic command;
but it is absurd to suppose that he would have quitted Italy now of
his own free will. He had no choice in the matter. He was bound hand
and foot by his promises to the soldiers; and all that he could do was
by plausible moderation to win as many friends, conciliate as many
foes, as possible, throw on Cinna, whom he could not hope to keep
quiet, the guilt of perjury, and trust to fortune for the rest. This
is a probable and consistent view of what now took place at Rome; and
every other account makes out Sulla to have been either inconsistent,
which he never was, for he was always uniformly selfish; or patriotic,
which he never was, if patriotism consists in sacrificing private to
public considerations; or indifferent, which he was in principle but
never in practice, unless where his own interests were not threatened
and only the suffering of others involved.

[Sidenote: Sulla's measures.] His first measure was to annul the
Sulpician laws. Secondly, to relieve the debtors, some colonies were
established, and a law was passed about interest, the terms of which
we do not know. Thirdly, the Senate, thinned by the Social War and
the Varian law, was recruited by 300 optimates. Fourthly, because
Sulpicius had resisted the proclamation of a justitium--that device by
which the Senate had virtually, though not legally, retained in its
own hands the power of discussing any measure before it was submitted
to the people--therefore for the future no measure was to be submitted
to the people till it had been previously discussed by the Senate. In
other words, the Senate was now confirmed by law in a privilege
which it had hitherto only exercised by the employment of a fiction.
Fifthly, the votes were to be taken, not in the Comitia Tributa, but
in the Comitia of Centuries. Sixthly, the five classes were no longer
to have an equal voice, but the first class was, as in the Servian
constitution, to have nearly half the votes. As the first class
consisted of those who had an estate of 100,000 sesterces, this
ordinance changed the democracy into a timocracy, transferring the
power from the people generally to the wealthier classes: but,
considering how voting had been manipulated of late, it was perhaps a
measure due to the Senate quite as much as to Sulla. On the whole he
legislated as little as he could and proscribed as few as he could.
[Sidenote: Opposition to Sulla.] But he tried to get two of his
partisans, Servius and Nonius, elected consuls for the year 87.
Instead of them, however, L. Cornelius Cinna, a determined leader of
the populares, was elected; and though Cnaeus Octavius, his colleague,
was one of the optimates, he was not Sulla's creature. In another
quarter his arrangements were thwarted even more unpleasantly. He had
got a decree framed by the people, giving the army of the north to his
friend Q. Pompeius Rufus, and recalling Cn. Pompeius Strabo. But the
latter procured the assassination of the former, and remained at the
head of the army. Still Sulla showed no resentment. A tribune named
Virginius was threatening to prosecute him. But he contented himself
with making Cinna ascend the Capitol with a stone in his hand, and,
throwing it down before a number of spectators, solemnly swear to
observe the new constitution. Then, leaving Metellus in Samnium
and Appius Claudius at Nola, he hurried to Capua, and embarking at
Brundusium felt, no doubt, that if he must pay his debt to the army
before the army would commit fresh treasons for him, it was not
unpleasant now to be forced away from the wasps' nest which he had
stirred up round him at home. And so, making a virtue of a necessity,
he sailed with a light heart from the chance of assassination at Rome
to fame and fortune in the East.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER X.

MARIUS AND CINNA.


[Sidenote: Flight of Marius.] Meanwhile what had become of Marius?
Already a halo of legend was gathering round his name, and all Italy
was ringing with his adventures. When he had fled from Rome (not sorry
now, we may be sure, that he had gone through his late exhibitions
in the Campus Martius), he had sent his son to some of his
father-in-law's farms to get necessary provisions. Young Marius was
overtaken by daylight, before he could get to his father-in-law's
farm, and pack the things up, and was nearly caught by those on his
track. But the farm-bailiff saw them in time, and, hiding him in a
cart full of beans, yoked the teams, and drove him to Rome. [Sidenote:
Ostia.] There young Marius went to his wife's house, and, getting
what he wanted, set out at nightfall for Ostia, and finding a ship
starting for Africa, went aboard. His father had not waited for his
return. He too had embarked at Ostia for Africa with his son-in-law.
But now in his old age the sea was not so kind to him as when, in
his bold and confident youth, he had sailed to sue for his first
consulship from the very land to which he was now flying. A storm came
on, and the ship was blown southwards along the coast. Marius begged
the captain to keep clear of Tarracina, because Geminius, a leading
man there, was his bitter foe. [Sidenote: Circeii.] But the storm
increased; Marius was sea-sick, and they were forced to go ashore at
Circeii (Monte Circello). Some herdsmen told them that horsemen had
just been there in pursuit; so they spent the night in a thick wood,
hungry, and tortured by anxiety. Next day they went to the coast
again, and Marius implored the men to stand by him, telling them that
when he was a child an eagle's nest fell into his lap, with seven
young ones in it, and the soothsayers had said that it meant that
he should attain to the highest honours seven times. [Sidenote:
Minturnae.] About two miles and a half from Minturnae they spied some
horsemen making towards them; and, plunging into the sea, they swam
towards some merchantmen near the shore. Two slaves swam with Marius,
keeping him up, and he got into one ship, and his son-in-law into the
other, while the horsemen shouted to the crew to put ashore, or throw
Marius overboard. The captains consulted together, and a terrible
moment it must have been for the fugitives. But the spell of the
Cimbric victories was potent still, and the captains replied that they
would not give up Marius. So the soldiers rode off in a rage. But the
sailors, having so far acted generously, were anxious to get rid of
their dangerous guest, and, landing at the mouth of the Liris, on
pretence of waiting for a fair wind, told Marius to go ashore and get
some rest, and, while he was lying down, sailed away. Half stupified,
he scrambled through bogs, and dykes, and mud, till he came to an
old man's cottage, and begged the owner to shelter a man who, if he
escaped, would reward him beyond his hopes. The man told him that he
could hide him in a safer place than his cottage; and, showing him a
hole by the riverside, covered him up in it with some rushes. But he
was soon rudely disturbed. Geminius was on his trail, and Marius heard
some of his emissaries loudly threatening the old man for hiding an
outlaw. In his terror Marius stripped and plunged into the river, and
so betrayed himself to the pursuers, who hauled him out naked and
covered with mud, and gave him up to the magistrates of Minturnae. By
these he was placed under a strong guard in the house of a woman named
Fannia. She, like Geminius, had a personal grudge against him, for in
his sixth consulship he had fined her four drachmas for ill-conduct.
But now when she saw his misery she forgot her resentment, and did
her best to cheer him. Nor was this difficult, for the stout heart of
Marius had never failed him. He told Fannia that, as he was coming to
her house, an ass had come out to drink at a neighbouring fountain,
and, fixing its eyes steadily on him, had brayed aloud and frisked
vivaciously, whence he augured that he would find safety by sea. The
magistrates, however, had resolved to kill him, and sent a Cimbrian
to do the deed, for no citizen would do it. The man went armed with
a sword into the gloomy room where Marius lay. But soon he ran out
crying, 'I cannot slay Marius.' He had seen eyes glaring in the
darkness, and had heard a terrible voice say, 'Darest thou slay Caius
Marius?' His heart had failed him; he had thrown down the sword and
fled. Either the magistrates now changed their minds, or the people
forced them to let Marius go, or perhaps Fannia connived at his
escape. Plutarch says that the people escorted him to the coast, and,
when they came to a sacred grove, called the Marician Grove, which no
man might enter, but which it would take a long time to go round, an
old man had led the way into it, saying that no place was so sacred
but that it might be entered to save Marius. [Sidenote: Aenaria.] In
some way he reached the coast where a friend had secured a vessel,
and being driven by the wind to Aenaria (Ischia), he there found his
son-in-law and sailed for Africa.

[Sidenote: Eryx.] Want of water forced them to put in at Eryx on the
N.W. of Sicily; but the Roman quaestor there was on the look-out, and
killing sixteen of the crew nearly took Marius. Landing at Meninx
(Jerbah), the fugitive heard that his son was in Africa too, and had
gone to Hiempsal, King of Numidia, to ask for aid, upon which he set
sail again and landed at Carthage. [Sidenote: Carthage.] The Roman
governor there sent to warn him off from Africa. Marius was dumb with
indignation, but on being asked what answer he had to send, replied,
so ran the story, 'Go and say you have seen Caius Marius sitting on
the ruins of Carthage.'

Hiempsal meanwhile had been keeping young Marius in a sort of
honourable captivity. But, according to a story similar to that told
of Thomas à Becket's father, a damsel of the country had fallen in love
with his handsome face, and helped him to escape. [Sidenote: Circina.]
Father and son now retired to Circina (Kerkennah), where news soon
reached him which brought him back to Italy.

[Sidenote: Counter-revolutions at Rome.] Hardly had Sulla left
Brundusium when the truce which he had patched up was broken. Cinna
being bribed, as was said probably without foundation, with 300
talents, had demanded that the Italians lately enfranchised should be
enrolled in the old tribes. [Sidenote: Cinna.] We do not know very
much about Cinna, but we do seem to gather that he was bold, resolute,
not ungenerous or bloodthirsty; and it cannot be too strongly insisted
on that, like Saturninus, and Sulpicius, and Drusus, he was only
demanding justice. [Sidenote: Street-fighting. Cinna driven from
Rome.] Octavius opposed him, and, hearing that Cinna's partisans were
threatening the tribunes in the Forum, he charged down the Via Sacra
with a band of followers, and dispersed them, and a great number of
Cinna's followers were slain. On this Cinna left Rome, and, joined by
Sertorius, whom we shall hear of again, went round the towns mustering
his friends. The Senate declared his consulship to be void, and
elected L. Cornelius Merula in his place. [Sidenote: His cause
espoused by the Campanian army.] Cinna, with characteristic audacity,
instantly hastened to the army in Campania; and, rending his clothes
and throwing himself on the ground, so worked on the pity of the
soldiers that they lifted him up, and told him he was consul still,
and might lead them where he pleased. [Sidenote: Marius lands in
Etruria.] Then, visiting the Italian towns, he obtained many recruits;
and, hearing that Marius had landed in Etruria (perhaps on his
invitation), he agreed to act in concert with him, in spite of the
opposition of Sertorius.

[Sidenote: The Senate summons Pompeius from Picenum.] Meanwhile
Octavius and Merula had fortified the city, had sent for troops from
Cisalpine Gaul, and had summoned the proconsul Pompeius from Picenum.
Pompeius came and halted at the Colline Gate. It was suspected that
he was waiting to join the successful side. With him was his son,
afterwards called 'the Great,' who now showed of what stuff he was
made by putting down a mutiny against his father and baffling a plot
for his own assassination. [Sidenote: Marius sacks Ostia, and he,
Sertorius, and Cinna hem Rome in.] Marius, with a band of Moors, and
the slaves whom he had collected from the Etrurian field-gangs, was
admitted by treachery into Ostia and sacked the town. Cinna marched to
the right bank of the Tiber, opposite the Janiculum. Sertorius held
the river above the city, and a corps was sent to Ariminum to prevent
any help coming from North Italy. [Sidenote: The Senate summons
Metellus, and courts the alliance of the Samnites.] At this crisis the
Senate sent for Metellus and tried to obtain the aid of the Samnites,
who, as we have seen, joined Marius and Cinna. The treachery of a
tribune in command of the Janiculum gave the Marians admission to
the city. But they were driven out again, and might even have been
dislodged from the Janiculum had not Pompeius persuaded Octavius to
check the pursuit. Pompeius was playing a waiting game, ready to join
the strongest, or crush both parties, as he saw his chance. And now
within the city starvation set in, and a pestilence spread. Marius had
blocked up the Tiber, and occupied the outlying towns on which the
communications of the capital depended. Nor could the Senate trust its
own troops. [Sidenote: Death of Pompeius.] Pompeius was killed by a
thunder-bolt--not less suspicious than that which slew Romulus--and
his body had been torn from the bier, and dragged through the streets
by the people. [Sidenote: Disaffection in the Senate's troops.] The
soldiers of Octavius cheered Cinna when he marshalled his troops
opposite them near the Alban Mount. Moreover the leaders themselves
were at variance. Octavius, seeing the humour of his men, was afraid
to fight, but would concede nothing. Metellus wished for a compromise.
Both armies were now outside the city, the pestilence probably having
driven the Marians to withdraw. But Marius had command of the Via
Appia, the Tiber, and most of the neighbourhood; and the famine became
sorer in Rome. [Sidenote: Incompetence of Octavius and Metellus.] The
soldiers wished Metellus to take the command from Octavius, and, on
his refusal, deserted in crowds to the enemy. So also did the slaves,
to whom Octavius would not promise freedom, as Cinna gladly did.
[Sidenote: The Senate submits to Cinna.] At last the Senate sent
to make terms with Cinna; but while they were stickling about
acknowledging his title of consul, he advanced to the gates. Then they
surrendered at discretion, only begging him to swear to shed no blood.
Cinna, refusing to be bound by this condition, promised that he would
not voluntarily do so. For he saw by his side the grim figure of the
man to whom he had given pro-consular powers, who had already taunted
him with weakness for conferring with the Senate at all, and in whose
sullen, unshorn face he read a craving for vengeance which nothing but
blood would satisfy.

[Sidenote: A massacre at Rome.] When Cinna entered the city, Marius,
with savage irony, said that an outlaw had no business within the
walls, and he would not come in till the sentence had been formally
rescinded by a meeting of the people in the Forum. But the gates,
when once he had passed them, were closed, and for five days and five
nights Rome became a shambles. Appian says that Marius and Cinna had
both sworn to spare the life of Octavius. But Marius was never a liar,
and the story is false on the face of it; for just before this Appian
relates how, when Cinna had promised to be merciful, Marius would
make no sign. [Sidenote: Death of Octavius.] Octavius is said to have
seated himself in his official chair, dressed in his official robes,
on the Janiculum, and to have awaited the assassins there. His head
was fastened up in front of the Rostra in emulation of the ghastly
precedent set by Sulla. He was an obstinate, dull man; and if this
burlesque of the conduct of the senators when the Gauls took Rome was
really enacted, the theatrical display must have been cold comfort for
those of his party on whom his incapacity brought ruin. [Sidenote:
Chief victims of the massacre.] [Sidenote: The Caesars.] Among the
latter were the brothers Caesar, Caius, who had sought to be consul
before he was praetor, and had been denounced for it by Sulpicius,
and Lucius, the conqueror at Acerrae and author of the Julian law.
[Sidenote: Publius Crassus.] Publius Crassus, consul in 97, and one of
Caesar's lieutenants in the Social War, fled with his son, and when
overtaken first stabbed his son and then himself. [Sidenote: Marcus
Antonius.] Marcus Antonius, the great forensic orator, was so odious
to Marius that the latter, on hearing that he was taken, wished, so
the story runs, to go and kill him with his own hand. Antonius was in
hiding, and was betrayed by the indiscretion of a slave, who, being
questioned by a wine-seller why he was buying more or better wine
than usual, whispered to him that it was for Marcus Antonius. On the
soldiers coming to kill him, he pleaded so eloquently for his life
that they wept and would not touch him. But their officer, who was
waiting below, impatiently came up and cut off his head with his own
hand. Lucius Merula opened his veins, and so bled to death. His crime
was that he had been made consul when Cinna was deposed. His last act
seems odd to us, but pathetically bespoke the man's piety and recalls
the last scene in the life of Demosthenes. He wrote on a tablet that
he had taken off his official cap when opening his veins, so as to
avoid the sacrilege of a flamen of Jupiter dying with it on his head.
[Sidenote: Catulus.] Marius had behaved generously once to Q. Lutatius
Catulus, his old colleague against the Cimbri; but Catulus had helped
to drive him into exile, and there was to be no second mistake of that
sort. 'He must die,' he said, when the relatives of Catulus pleaded
for his life. It is not unlikely that disease, and drinking, and his
late hardships had made the old man insane. He had been occasionally
good-natured in former days; now he seemed to gloat in carnage. For
every sneer cast at him, for every wrong done to him in past years, he
took a horrible revenge. When Cinna had summoned him, he had said that
he would settle the question of enrolment in the tribes once for all.
He wished not to select victims, but to massacre all the leading
optimates. Sertorius begged Cinna to check the slaughter. Cinna did
try to curb the outrages of the slave bands; but he dared not break
with Marius, whom he named as joint consul with himself for the year
86. But as soon as his colleague was dead, he and Sertorius surrounded
the ruffians and killed them to a man.

[Sidenote: Death of Marius.] Marius did not live much longer. He had
had his revenge. He had gained his seventh consulship. It is said
that, telling his friends that after such vicissitudes it would be
wrong to tempt fate further, he took to his bed and after seven days
died. He drank hard, was seized with pleurisy, and in his last hours
became delirious. He fancied that he was in Asia, and by shouts and
gestures cheered on the army of his dreams, and with 'such a stern and
iron-clashing close' died January 13 or 17. He was more than seventy
years old, and had enjoyed his seventh consulship for either thirteen
or seventeen days.

Lucius Valerius Flaccus succeeded Marius as consul, and passed a
law making one-fourth of a debt legal tender for payment of it; and
probably in the same year the denarius was restored to its standard
value. A census was also held, which would include the new Italian
citizens, and Philippus, whose opposition to Drusus on this very
question had helped to kindle the Social War, was censor. [Sidenote:
Settlement of Italian disabilities by Cinna.] Cinna, as he was pledged
to do so, must have carried some measure for enrolling the Italians
in the old tribes; but we can only conjecture what was actually done.
Sulpicius had already carried such a measure, but it had been probably
revoked by Sulla before he left Italy. In 84, just before his return,
the Senate, it is said, gave the Italians the right of voting, and
distributed the libertini, or freed slaves, among the thirty-five
tribes. Perhaps this was a formal ratification of what had been passed
before under Cinna's coercion.

[Sidenote: Cinna's supremacy.] Cinna was now all-powerful at Rome.
For four successive years, 87 to 84 B.C., he was consul; and with the
exception of Asia, Macedonia, Greece, and Africa, where Metellus had
escaped and was in arms, the whole Roman world was at his feet. But
he did not know how to use his power. He may have removed the
restrictions on grain, and did proclaim Sulla and Metellus outlaws;
but, though he should have bent every energy to hinder Sulla's return,
he did worse than nothing, and, instead of Sertorius, sent the
incapable Flaccus and the ruffian Fimbria against the general who had
just taken Athens and defeated Archelaus. The miscarriage of their
enterprise will be told in the next chapter. When Cinna suddenly
became alive to the fact that the avenger was at hand, and that either
he must act promptly or Sulla would be in Rome, he hastened to Ancona,
where he sent one division of the army across to the opposite coast.
But the second division was driven back by a storm; and the soldiers
then dispersed, saying that they would not fight against their own
countrymen. On this the rest of the army refused to embark. Cinna went
to harangue them, and one of his lictors in clearing a way struck
a soldier. Another soldier struck him. [Sidenote: Cinna slain at
Ancona.] Cinna told his lictors to seize this second mutineer, and in
the tumult that arose Cinna was slain. Plutarch says that the troops
murdered him because he was suspected of having killed Pompeius, and
that, when he tried to bribe a centurion with a signet-ring to spare
him, the centurion replied that he was not going to seal a bond but
slay a tyrant. But Cinna probably died as he lived, a brave man, and
one who could not have held ascendency for so long, and over men like
Sertorius, had he not been an able as well as a brave man.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XI.

THE FIRST MITHRIDATIC WAR.


Events have been anticipated in order to relate the close of Cinna's
career. But it is time now to say what Sulla had been doing, and who
that Mithridates was whose name for so long had been formidable at
Rome.

[Sidenote: Foreign events after the second slave war.] After the
defeat of the northern hordes and the suppression of the second slave
revolt, there was a war with the Celtiberi in Spain, in 97, in
which Sertorius showed himself already an adroit and bold officer.
[Sidenote: Sertorius in command against the Celtiberi.] He was in
winter quarters at Castulo (Cazlona), and his men were so disorderly
that the Spaniards were emboldened to attack them in the town;
Sertorius escaped, rallied those soldiers who had also escaped,
marched back, and after putting those in the town to the sword,
dressed his troops in the dead men's clothes, and so obtained
admission to another town which had helped the enemy. But the hero of
the campaign was Titus Didius, afterwards Caesar's lieutenant in the
Social War. He had some hard fighting and captured Termesus, the chief
town of the Arevaci, and Colenda.--He earned his triumph by other
means also. There was a town near Colenda, the inhabitants of which
the Romans wished to destroy. Didius told them that he would give them
the lands of Colenda, and they came to receive their allotments. As
soon as they were within his lines, his soldiers set on them and slew
them all.

[Sidenote: Africa.] In 96 B.C. Ptolemaus Apion bequeathed Cyrene--a
narrow strip of terraced land on the north coast of Africa, situated
between the Libyan deserts and the Mediterranean--to Rome. The Romans
did not refuse the legacy; but they took no trouble to govern the
country. The cities of Cyrene were declared to be free. In other
words, while nominally subject to Rome, so that she might interfere
when she pleased, they were left to govern themselves. Such government
was no government; but it was in accordance with the deliberate policy
of the senatorial party.

[Sidenote: Crimes and intrigues of Mithridates.] It was in the same
year that Mithridates committed the first of the series of crimes
which eventually brought him into collision with Rome. His sister
had married the King of Cappadocia. Mithridates assassinated him.
Nicomedes, King of Bithynia, seized Cappadocia and married the widowed
sister of Mithridates. Having slain one brother-in-law, Mithridates
expelled the other, and set on the throne his sister's son. But when
his nephew refused to welcome home Gordius, the man who had murdered
his father, Mithridates marched against and assassinated him. Then he
set on the throne his own son, to whom he gave his nephew's name, and
made Gordius his guardian. Him the Cappadocians expelled, and raised
to the throne another nephew of Mithridates; but Mithridates instantly
drove him from power. Nicomedes now appealed to the Senate, and
produced, as he asserted, a third nephew of Mithridates as a claimant
for the crown. To support his assertion he sent his wife to Rome to
swear she had had three sons. Mithridates, as if in burlesque of the
imposture, sent Gordius to swear that the youth on the throne was son
of a Cappadocian king who had died more than thirty years before. The
Senate decided as a lion might between two jackals quarrelling over
a carcase. It took Cappadocia from Mithridates and Paphlagonia from
Nicomedes, and declared both countries free. But the Cappadocians
clamoured for a king, and so, in 93, the Senate appointed Ariobarzanes
I. Mithridates then stirred up Tigranes, King of Armenia, to expel
Ariobarzanes, who fled to Rome. Sulla was sent to restore him, and
did so in 92, after defeating the Cappadocians under Gordius and the
Armenians. [Sidenote: The Romans come in contact with the Parthians.]
It was when he was on this mission that the Romans and Parthians
confronted each other for the first time. The Parthians sent an
embassy to ask for the alliance of Rome. Three chairs were set for
Ariobarzanes, Sulla, and Orobazus; and Sulla, who was only propraetor,
took the central seat. This incensed the Parthian king; and he
revenged himself not on Sulla, but on the unfortunate Orobazus, whom
he put to death. A Chaldean in the Parthian's suite, after studying
Sulla's face, predicted great things for him; which pleased Sulla as
much as it would have done Marius, for he believed in his luck just as
his rival did in his seventh consulship. But when he came home he was
impeached for taking bribes from Ariobarzanes, and no doubt he had
made his trip which was so gratifying to his pride not less profitable
also, and had had his appetite whetted for a second taste of eastern
treasures. Mithridates, meanwhile, was brooding over his humiliation
and meditating revenge. He went on a journey incognito through the
Roman province of Asia and Bithynia, intending to attack both if he
found himself strong enough. When he came back he found that his wife,
who was also his sister, had been unfaithful to him, and he put her to
death. He had now murdered a wife, a sister, a brother, and a nephew.
He had also imprisoned his mother, and was equally merciless to his
sons, his daughters, and his concubines. At his death, it is said, a
paper was found in which he had foredoomed his most trusted servants,
and he slew all the inmates of his harem in order to hinder them from
falling into his enemies' hands.

[Sidenote: Early years of Mithridates.] His whole history is in
fact one long record of sensuality, treachery, and murder. From
his earliest years he had breathed, as it were, an atmosphere of
assassination. His father had been assassinated when he was eleven
years old. His guardians and even his own mother had then plotted to
assassinate him. They placed him on a wild horse, and made him perform
exercises with the javelin on it. When his precocious vigour defeated
their hopes, they tried to poison him. But by studying antidotes he
made his body poison-proof, or at least was reputed to have done so,
and, flying from his enemies, lived for seven years through all the
hardships of a wild and wandering life, in which he never slept under
a roof, and hunted and fought with wild beasts, to emerge in manhood a
very tiger himself for strength, and beauty of body, and ferocity of
disposition, a tyrant who spared neither man in his ambition nor
woman in his lust. [Sidenote: His physical vigour.] His stature
was gigantic, his strength and activity such as took captive the
imagination of the East. He could, it was believed, outrun the deer;
out-eat and out-drink everyone at the banquet; strike down flying
game unerringly; tame the wildest steed, and ride 120 miles in a day.
Twenty-two nations obeyed him, and he could speak the dialect of
each. A veneer of Greek refinement was spread thinly over the savage
animalism of the man. [Sidenote: Pseudo-civilisation of his court.] He
was a virtuoso, and had a wonderful collection of rings. He maintained
Greek poets and historians, and offered prizes for singing. He had
shrewdness enough to employ Greek generals, but not enough to keep him
from being grossly superstitious.

[Sidenote: His kingdom and how it was acquired.] For twenty years
(110-90 B.C.) he had been with never-resting activity extending his
empire, before the Romans assailed him. He had inherited from his
ancestors the kingdom of Pontus, or Cappadocia on the Pontus, which
had been one of the two satrapies into which Cappadocia was divided
at the time of the Macedonian conquest. Mithridates IV. had married a
princess of the Greek race, the sister of Seleucus, King of Syria.
His grandfather had conquered Sinope and Paphlagonia, as far as the
Bithynian frontier. His father had helped the Romans in the third
Punic War, had been styled the friend of Rome, and had been rewarded
with the province of Phrygia nominally for his services against
Aristonicus, the pretender to the kingdom of Attalus, but had been
deprived of it afterwards when it was found out that really it had
been put up for auction by Manius Aquillius, who was completing the
subjugation of the adherents of the pretender. The boundaries of
Pontus at his accession cannot be strictly defined. On the east it
stretched towards the Caucasus and the sources of the Euphrates,
Lesser Armenia being dependent on it. On the south and south-west
its frontiers were Cappadocia and Galatia. On the west nominally
Paphlagonia was the frontier, for the grandfather of Mithridates had
been induced by the Romans to promise to evacuate his conquests.
But Sinope was then, and continued to be, the capital of the Pontic
kingdom, and both Paphlagonia and Galatia were virtually dependent.
This was the territory to which Mithridates was heir, and which, true
to the policy of his father and grandfather, he constantly strove by
force or fraud to extend. [Sidenote: Mithridates extends his kingdom.]
To the east of the Black Sea he conquered Colchis on the Phasis,
and converted it into a satrapy. To the north he was hailed as the
deliverer of the Greek towns on that coast and in the region now
known as the Crimea, which from the constant exaction of tribute by
barbarous tribes were, in the absence of any protectorate like that of
Athens, falling into decay. By sea, and perhaps across the Caucasus by
land, Mithridates sent his troops under the Greek generals Neoptolemus
and Diophantus. Neoptolemus won a victory over the Tauric Scythians at
Panticapaeum (Kertch), and the kingdom of Bosporus in the Crimea was
ceded to his master by its grateful king. Diophantus marched westwards
as far as the Tyras (Dneister), and in a great battle almost
annihilated an army of the Roxolani, a nomadic people who roamed
between the Borysthenes (Dneiper) and the Tanais (Don). By these
conquests Mithridates acquired a tribute of 200 talents (48,000_l_.),
and 270,000 bushels of grain, and a rich recruiting ground for his
armies. [Sidenote: His alliance with Tigranes.] On the east he annexed
Lesser Armenia, and entered into the closest alliance with Tigranes,
King of Greater Armenia, which had lately become a powerful kingdom,
giving him his daughter Cleopatra in marriage. If the allies had any
defined scheme of conquest, it was that Mithridates should occupy Asia
Minor and the coast of the Black Sea, and Tigranes the interior and
Syria. How the King intrigued and meddled in Cappadocia and Bithynia
has been previously related; and when he had marched into Cappadocia
it was at the head of 80,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and 600 scythed
chariots.

Such was the history, the power, and the character of the great
potentate who had yielded to the demands of Sulla, the propraetor,
but who now awaited the attack of Sulla, the proconsul, with proud
disdain. Much, indeed, had happened since the year 92 to justify such
feelings. Hardly had Sulla reinstated Ariobarzanes when Tigranes drove
him out again, and restored the son of Mithridates; while in Bithynia
the younger son of Nicomedes, Socrates, appeared in arms against his
elder brother, Nicomedes II., who on his father's death had been
acknowledged as king by Rome. Socrates had soldiers from Pontus with
him; but Mithridates, though his hand was plain in these disturbances,
outwardly stood aloof; and the Senate, sending Manius Aquillius to
restore the two kings, ordered Mithridates to aid him with troops if
they were wanted. [Sidenote: Mithridates submits to Aquillius.] The
king submitted as before, not, indeed, sending troops, but without
resisting, and as a proof of his complacency put Socrates to death.
This happened in the year 90, when Rome was pressed hardest by the
Italians, and at first sight it seems astonishing that he should not
have seized on so favourable a moment. But in those days news would
travel from the west of Italy to Sinope but slowly and uncertainly,
and Mithridates would have the fate of Antiochus in mind to warn him
how the foes of the great republic fared, and the history of Pergamus
to testify to the prosperity of those who remained its friends.
Sulla's proud tone in 92 would not have lessened this impression;
and, before he appealed to force, the crafty king hoped to make his
position securer by fraud. Partly, therefore, from real awe, partly
because he was not yet ready, he obeyed Aquillius as he had obeyed
Sulla. But Aquillius, who had once put up Phrygia to auction, knew
what pickings there were for a senator when war was afoot in Asia, and
perhaps may have had the honester notion that, as Mithridates was sure
to go to war soon, it was for the public as well as for his private
interest to act boldly and strike the first blow. So he forced the
reluctant Bithynian king to declare war, and to ravage with an army
the country round Amastris while his fleet shut up the Bosporus. Still
Mithridates did not stir; all that he did was to lodge a complaint
with the Romans, and solicit their mediation or their permission to
defend himself. [Sidenote: Aquillius forces on a war.] Aquillius
replied that he must in no case make war on Nicomedes. It is easy to
conceive how such an answer affected a man of the king's temper. He
instantly sent his son with an army into Cappadocia. But once more he
tried diplomacy. [Sidenote: Ultimatum of Mithridates.] Pelopidas, his
envoy, came to Aquillius, and said that his master was willing to aid
the Romans against the Italians if the Romans would forbid Nicomedes
to attack him, their ally. If not, he wished the alliance to be
formally dissolved. Or there was yet another alternative. Let the
commissioners and himself appeal to the Senate to decide between them.
The commissioners treated the message as an insult. Mithridates,
they said, must not attack Nicomedes, and they intended to restore
Ariobarzanes. Possibly the conduct of Aquillius was due to his having
been heavily bribed by Nicomedes, who must have felt that when the
Romans were gone he would be like a mouse awaiting the cat's spring;
for it is difficult to imagine the foolhardiness which without some
such tangible stimulus would at that moment have plunged him into war.

[Sidenote: War begun. Energy of Mithridates.] But when once the die
was cast, Mithridates threw himself into the war with the energy of
long-suppressed rage. He sent to court the alliance of Egypt and the
Cretan league, to whom he represented himself as the champion of
Greece against her tyrant. He tried to stir up revolts in Thrace and
Macedonia. He arranged with Tigranes that an Armenian army should
co-operate with him, leaving him the land it occupied, but carrying
off the plunder. He gave the word, and a swarm of pirate ships swept
the Mediterranean under his colours. He summoned an army of 250,000
foot, 40,000 horse, and 130 scythed chariots, a fleet of 300 decked
vessels, and 100 other ships called 'Dicrota' with a double bank of
oars. He formed and armed in Roman fashion a foreign contingent, in
which many Romans and Italians enlisted; and he placed able Greek
generals, Archelaus and Neoptolemus, over his troops. [Sidenote:
Forces of Rome.] To meet this formidable array the Romans had a fleet
off Byzantium, the army of Nicomedes, which was still between Sinope
and Amastris, and three corps, each of 40,000 men, but composed for
the most part of hastily organized Asiatics; one under Cassius between
Bithynia and Galatia, another under Aquillius between Bithynia and
Pontus, and a third under Oppius in Cappadocia. The war was decided
almost in a single battle. [Sidenote: Victory of Mithridates over
Nicomedes.] Neoptolemus and Archelaus routed the Bithynian army on
the river Amnias, and captured the camp and military chest. It was a
fierce and for some time a doubtful fight, and seems to have been
decided by the scythed chariots, which spread terror in the Bithynian
ranks. [Sidenote: Victory over Aquillius.] Nicomedes fled to
Aquillius, who was defeated by Archelaus near Mount Scorobas, and fled
with the king across the Sangarius to Pergamus, whence he attempted to
reach Rhodes. Cassius retreated to Phrygia, and tried to discipline
his raw levies. But, finding this impossible; he broke up the army and
led the Roman troops with him to Apameia. The fleet in the Black Sea
was surrendered by its commander.

[Sidenote: Mithridates' progress through Phrygia, Mysia and Asia.]
Thus, triumphant by sea and land, Mithridates, after settling
Bithynia, marched through Phrygia and Mysia into the Roman province
Asia, and was hailed everywhere as a deliverer, for after his
victories he had sent home all his Asiatic prisoners with presents.
Then he sent messengers into Lycia and Pamphylia to seek the alliance
of those countries. Oppius was in Laodicea, on the Lycus. The king
offered the townsmen immunity if they surrendered him, and, when they
did so, carried him about as a show. [Sidenote: Fate of Aquillius.]
Aquillius was also given up by the Mytileneans and made to ride in
chains on an ass, calling out who he was wherever he went. At Pergamus
Mithridates slew him by pouring molten gold down his throat--a savage
punishment, which, however, confirms the impression that it was Roman
avarice which forced on the war. Magnesia on the Maeander, Ephesus,
and Mitylene welcomed the king joyfully, and Stratoniceia, in Caria,
was captured. He then attacked Magnesia near Mount Sipylus, prepared
to invade Rhodes, and issued a hideous order for an exterminating
massacre of every Roman and Italian in Asia on an appointed day.
Punishments were proclaimed for anyone who should hide one of the
proscribed or bury his body; rewards were promised for all who killed
or denounced them. Slaves who slew their masters were to be freed. The
murder of a creditor was to be taken as payment by a debtor of half
his debt. [Massacre of Romans and Italians.] There were dreadful
scenes on the fatal day--the thirtieth after the order was issued--in
the Asiatic cities. In Pergamus the victims fled to the temple of
Aesculapius, and were shot down as they clung to the statues. At
Ephesus they were dragged out from the temple of Artemis and slain. At
Adramyttium they swam out to sea, but were brought back and killed,
and their children were drowned. At Cos alone was any mercy shown.
There those who had taken refuge in the temple of Aesculapius were
spared. The number of the slain was said to be 80,000 or even 120,000,
which must have been, however, an incredible exaggeration. [Sidenote:
Objects of the massacre.] By this fiendish crime Mithridates must,
though he was mistaken, have felt that he cut himself off for
ever from all reconciliation with Rome. But no doubt he acted on
calculation. For not only did he get rid of men who might have
recruited the Roman armies; not only did he gratify the long-hoarded
hatred of the farmers and peasants of whom Roman publicans and Roman
slave-masters had so long made a prey; not only did he oblige the
debtors by wiping out their debts and even the very memory of them
in their creditors' blood, but he might well count on putting his
accomplices also beyond the pale of Roman mercy, and so linking them
to his own fortunes. Moreover, vengeance seemed remote. For Sulla had
just marched on Rome instead of to the east, and a civil war in
Italy might make Mithridates permanently supreme in Asia. [Sidenote:
Mithridates' settlement of his new acquisitions.] So he made Pergamus
his capital, leaving Sinope to his son as vice-regent, while
Cappadocia, Phrygia, and Bithynia were turned into satrapies. All
arrears of taxes were remitted; and so wealthy had his spoils made him
that exemption for five years to come was promised to the towns that
had obeyed his orders.

[Sidenote: Reverses of Mithridates. He retires to Pergamus.] But
the tide was already on the turn. In Paphlagonia there was still
resistance. Archelaus was repulsed and wounded at Magnesia.
Mithridates in person was forced to abandon the siege of Rhodes. His
revenge was sated; he was tired of the hardships of a war which he
meant his generals to conduct in future; and with a new wife he went
back to Pergamus, to his rings, and his music, and debaucheries, at
the very time that a shudder had gone through Italy at the tidings of
the massacre, and when Sulla was on his way to avenge it.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XII.

SULLA IN GREECE AND ASIA.


[Sidenote: Aristion at Athens.] A citizen of Athens, named Aristion,
whose mother was an Egyptian slave, and who was the son or adopted
son of one Athenion, had been sent by the Athenians as ambassador to
Mithridates. He had been a schoolmaster and teacher of rhetoric,
and professed the philosophy of Epicurus. He gained the ear of
Mithridates, and sent home flaming accounts of the king's power, and
of his intention of restoring the democracy at Athens. The Athenians
sent some ships of war to bring him home from Euboea, with a present
of a silver-footed litter; and in this, clothed in purple, and with
a fine ring on his finger, which he had got probably from his friend
Mithridates, he came back to Athens with much parade. [Sidenote:
Revolt of Athens from Rome.] In a set speech he dilated on the king's
splendid successes, and advised the people to declare themselves
independent and elect him their general. They did so, and he very soon
massacred his opponents and made himself despot. Thus Athens and
the Piraeus passed into the hands of Mithridates. The spirit of
disaffection to Rome spread rapidly. [Sidenote: Revolt of the
Achaeans, Laconians, and Boeotians.] When Archelaus appeared in
Greece, the Achaeans, Laconians, and Boeotians, with the exception of
Thespiae, joined him, while the Pontic fleet seized Euboea and
Demetrias, a town at the head of the gulf of Pagasae.

Sura was sent by the Roman governor of Macedonia to make head against
the invaders. He won a naval battle and captured Sciathus, where all
the spoils of the enemy were stored. [Sidenote: Conflicts between the
Romans and the forces of Mithridates in Boeotia.] Then he marched into
Boeotia, and, after a three days' engagement with the combined forces
of Archelaus and Aristion, pushed Archelaus back to the coast. The
war, perhaps, might have been ended here; but at this moment Lucullus
came to announce the approach of Sulla, and to warn Sura that the war
had been entrusted to him. So Sura retired to Macedonia. [Sidenote:
Sulla lands in Epirus, 87 B.C., and marches on Athens.] Sulla had left
Brundusium in 87, and, landing on the coast of Epirus, gathered what
supplies he could from Aetolia and Thessaly, and marched straight
for Athens. It was soon seen that the foundations of the empire of
Mithridates were based on sand. The Boeotians at once submitted,
including Thebes, which had joined the king. [Sidenote: Siege of the
Piraeus and Athens.] Sulla then began two sieges, that of the Piraeus
where Archelaus was, and that of Athens defended by Aristion.
Archelaus had before shown himself an intrepid soldier, and he baffled
all Sulla's efforts with equal ingenuity and courage. After an
unsuccessful attempt to storm the walls, Sulla retired to Eleusis
and Megara, thus keeping up his communications with Thebes and the
Peloponnese, and set to work constructing catapults and other engines,
and preparing an earthwork from which he meant to attack the wall with
them. For these purposes he cut down the trees of the Academia and the
Lyceum. He was kept informed of intended sallies by two slaves inside
the town, who threw out leaden balls with words cut on them. But
as fast as the earthwork rose Archelaus built towers on the walls
opposite to it, and thence harassed the besiegers. [Sidenote: Battle
at the Piraeus. Archelaus nearly taken.] He was also reinforced by
Mithridates, and then came out and fought a battle which was for some
time doubtful; but he was forced to retire at length with the loss of
2,000 men. He himself remained till the last. The gates were shut and
he had to be drawn up by a rope over the wall.

[Sidenote: Sulla's difficulties.] The affairs of Sulla, however, were
in no flourishing condition. He had come to Greece with only 30,000
men, with no fleet, and little money. He was forced to plunder the
shrines of Epidaurus, Olympia, and Delphi. His messenger to Delphi
came back saying that he had heard the sound of a lute in the temple,
and dared not commit the sacrilege. But Sulla sent him back, saying
that he was sure the sound was a note of welcome, and that the god
meant him to have the treasure. He promised to pay it back some day,
and he kept his word, for he confiscated half the land of Thebes and
applied the proceeds to reimbursing the sacred funds. In his worst
straits he was always ready with some such mockery. [Sidenote: Sulla
sends Lucullus to Egypt.] Winter was now at hand, and Sulla despatched
Lucullus to Egypt to get ships. The refusal of the King of Egypt shows
what was now thought of the Roman power. Sulla then formed a camp
at Eleusis and continued the siege, and so shook the great tower of
Archelaus by a simultaneous discharge of twelve leaden balls from
his catapults that it had to be drawn back. [Sidenote: Blockade of
Athens.] By means of the two slaves he was also able to frustrate the
attempts of Archelaus to throw supplies into Athens, which was now
suffering from hunger, for Sulla had surrounded it with forts and
turned the siege into a blockade. Mithridates now sent his son into
Macedonia with an army, before which the small Roman force there had
to retire. After this success the prince marched towards Athens, but
died on the way. [Sidenote: Desperate defence of the Piraeus.] At the
Piraeus scenes occurred which were afterwards repeated at the siege of
Jerusalem. Archelaus undermined the earthwork and Sulla made another
determined attempt to take the wall by storm. He battered down part
of it, fired the props of his mine and so brought down more, and sent
troops by relays to escalade the breach. But Archelaus, like the
Plataeans in the Peloponnesian war, built an inner crescent-shaped
wall, from which he took the assailants in front and on both flanks
when they tried to advance. [Sidenote: Sulla turns the siege into a
blockade.] At last, wearied by this dogged resistance, Sulla turned
the siege of the Piraeus also into a blockade, which meant simply that
he hindered Archelaus from helping Athens, for he could not prevent
the influx of supplies from the sea.

[Sidenote: Athens taken March 1, B.C. 86.] Athens meanwhile was in
dreadful straits. Wheat was selling at nearly 3_l_. 10_s_. a gallon,
and the inhabitants were feeding on old leather bottles, shoes, and
the bodies of the dead. A deputation came out, but Sulla sent them
back because they began an harangue on the deeds of their ancestors,
put into their mouths, no doubt, by the rhetorician Aristion. Sulla
told them they were the scum of nations, not descended from the old
Athenians at all, and that instead of listening to their rhetoric he
meant to punish their rebellion. On the night of March 1, 86 B.C., he
broke into the town amid the blare of trumpets and the shouts of his
troops. He told his men to give no quarter, and the blood, it was
said, ran down through the gates into the suburbs. [Sidenote: Aristion
slain.] Aristion fled to the Acropolis. Hunger forced him in the end
to capitulate, and he was killed. Sulla meanwhile had forced on the
siege of Piraeus still more vigorously. He got past the crescent wall,
only to find other walls similarly constructed behind it; but he
gradually drove Archelaus into Munychia, or the peninsular part of
Piraeus, and as he had no ships he could do nothing more. [Sidenote:
Archelaus sails from Piraeus, and joins Taxiles, sent by Mithridates
with reinforcements.] Either before or after the capture of the
Acropolis Archelaus sailed away, in obedience to a summons from
Taxiles, a new general whom Mithridates had sent with an army of
100,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and ninety scythed chariots into Greece.
With these forces and the troops previously sent with his master's
son he formed a junction at Thermopylae, marched into Phocis down the
valley of the Cephissus, attempted but failed to take Elateia, and
came up with Sulla near Chaeroneia. [Sidenote: Sulla forms a
junction with Hortensius.] Sulla had marched into Boeotia and joined
Hortensius, who had a brought some troops from Thessaly. But he is
said by Appian to have had not a third of the enemy's numbers, while
Plutarch affirms that he had only 15,000 foot and 1,500 horse.

[Illustration: Map to illustrate the March of SULLA and ARCHELAUS
before Chaeroneia.]

[Sidenote: Position of the two armies.] Sulla was on the west bank of
the Cephissus, on an eminence named Philoboeotus, and Archelaus on the
other side of the river not far off. Sulla's soldiers were alarmed by
the numbers and splendour of the enemy, for the brass and steel
of their armour 'kindled the air with an awful flame like that of
lightning.' [Sidenote: Manoeuvres of Sulla and Archelaus.] Archelaus,
marching down the valley of the Cephissus, tried to seize a strong
position called the Acropolis of the Parapotamii, situated on the
Assus, which joined the Cephissus to the south of both armies. But
Sulla, who had wearied out his men by drudgery in dyke-making, and
made them eager for a fight, crossed the Cephissus, seized the
position first, and then, crossing the Assus, took up his position
under Mount Edylium. Here he encamped opposite Archelaus, who, having
also crossed the Assus, was now at a place called Assia, which was
nearer Lake Copais. Thence Archelaus made an attempt on Chaeroneia;
but Sulla was again beforehand with him, and garrisoned the place
with one legion. South of Chaeroneia was a hill called Thurium. This
Archelaus seized. Sulla then brought the rest of his troops across
the Cephissus, to form a junction with the legion in Chaeroneia and
dislodge the enemy from Thurium. He left Murena on the north of the
Cephissus to keep the enemy in check at Assia. Archelaus, however,
also brought his main army across the Cephissus after Sulla. Murena
followed him, and Sulla drew up his army with his cavalry on each
wing, himself commanding the right and Murena the left. The armies
were now opposite each other, Sulla to the south, then Archelaus, then
the Cephissus.

[Sidenote: Battle of Chaeroneia.] Sulla sent some troops round Thurium
to the hills behind Chaeroneia, and in the enemy's rear. The enemy ran
down in confusion from Thurium, where they were met by Murena with
Sulla's left wing, and were either destroyed or driven back upon the
centre of the line of Archelaus, which they threw into disorder. Sulla
on the right advanced so quickly as to prevent the scythed chariots
from getting any impetus, by which they were rendered useless, for the
soldiers easily eluded them when driven at a slow pace, and as soon as
they had passed killed the horses and drivers. Archelaus now extended
his right wing in order to surround Murena. Hortensius, whom Sulla had
posted on some hills to the left of his left wing on purpose to defeat
this manoeuvre, immediately pressed forward to attack this body on its
left flank. But Archelaus drove him back with some cavalry, and nearly
surrounded Hortensius.

[Illustration: First position of the two armies at CHAERONEIA.]
[Illustration: Second position of the two armies at CHAERONEIA.]

Sulla hastened to his aid, and Archelaus, seeing him coming, instantly
counter-marched and attacked Sulla's right in his absence, while
Taxiles assailed Murena on the left. But Sulla hastened back, too,
after leaving Hortensius to support Murena, and, when he appeared, the
right wing drove back Archelaus to the Cephissus. Murena was equally
triumphant on the left wing, and the barbarians fled pell-mell to the
Cephissus, only 10,000 of them reaching Chalcis in Euboea. [Sidenote:
Sulla's falsehood about the battle.] Appian says the Romans lost only
thirteen men, while Plutarch, on the authority of Sulla's Memoirs,
says that they lost four. This is absurd. Sulla seems to have told
some startling lies in his Memoirs, perhaps to prove that he had been
the favourite of fortune, which was a mania of his.

[Sidenote: Dorylaus reinforces Archelaus.] Mithridates, when he heard
of the defeat of Archelaus, sent Dorylaus with 8,000 men to Euboea,
where he joined the remnant of the army of Archelaus, and crossing
to the mainland met Sulla at Orchomenus. Sulla was in Phthiotis, to
confront L. Valerius Flaccus who had come to supersede him, but he
returned as soon as he heard that Dorylaus had landed. Orchomenus is
just north of the Cephissus where it runs into Lake Copais, and a
stream called Melas, rising on the east of Orchomenus, joined the
Cephissus near its mouth, the neighbouring ground being a marsh.
[Sidenote: Battle of Orchomenus. Disposition of Archelaus' army.]
Archelaus did not want to fight, but Dorylaus hinted at treachery and
had, no doubt, been ordered by Mithridates to avenge Chaeroneia.
Near Mount Tilphossium, however, to the south of Lake Copais, he was
worsted by Sulla in a skirmish, and thinking better of the advice of
Archelaus tried to prolong the war. Archelaus, indeed, seems to have
commanded in the battle, for Mithridates was shrewd enough to know
when he had a good general. He drew up his army in four lines, the
scythed chariots in front, behind them the Macedonian phalanx, then
his auxiliaries, including Italian deserters, and, lastly, his
light-armed troops. On each flank he posted his cavalry. [Sidenote:
Sulla's arrangements.] Sulla, who was weak in cavalry, dug two ditches
guarded by forts, one on each flank, so as to keep off the enemy's
horse. Then he drew up his infantry in three lines, leaving gaps in
them for the light troops and cavalry to come through from the rear
when needed. To the second line stakes were given, with orders to
plant them so as to form a palisade; and the first line, when the
chariots charged, retired behind the palisade, while the light troops
advanced through the gaps and hurled missiles at the horses and
drivers. The chariots turned and threw the phalanx into confusion, and
when Archelaus ordered up his cavalry, Sulla sent round his to take
them in the rear. At one time, however, the contest was doubtful, and
the Romans wavered, till they were put to shame by their general, who,
seizing a standard and advancing towards the foe, cried out, 'When
those at home ask where it was you abandoned your leader, say, it was
at Orchomenus.' This great victory, in which Sulla showed generalship
of a high order, ended the first Mithridatic war. The date is not
quite certain. Probably it happened in 86.

[Sidenote: Sulla winters in Thessaly.] After the battle Sulla wintered
in Thessaly, where he built a fleet, being tired of waiting for
Lucullus. [Sidenote: He confers with Archelaus at Delium.] At Delium
he met Archelaus and each urged the other to turn traitor, Archelaus
promising that Mithridates would aid Sulla against Cinna; Sulla
advising Archelaus to dethrone Mithridates. It was a curious way of
showing the respect which they entertained for each other's ability;
but Sulla was too scornful of Asiatic aid, and Archelaus too loyal
to listen to such suggestions. However, when Archelaus fell ill
afterwards, Sulla was so attentive to him, besides giving him land
in Euboea and styling him friend of the Roman people, that it was
suspected that Archelaus had been playing into his hands all along. It
was a most unlikely suspicion; for nothing was more natural than that
now, when Sulla was making terms with Mithridates and going to meet
Fimbria, he should wish to make Archelaus his friend. For after all he
had resolved to forget the Asiatic massacre and not push Mithridates
to desperation. [Sidenote: Terms offered by Sulla to Mithridates.] The
terms agreed upon were these: Mithridates was to surrender Cappadocia,
Paphlagonia, Bithynia, Asia, and the islands, eighty ships of war, all
prisoners and deserters; he was to give pay and provisions to Sulla's
men, and provide a war indemnity of 3,000 talents (732,000_l_.); to
restore to their homes the refugees from Macedonia, and those whom, as
will be related hereafter, he had carried off from Chios; and to hand
over more of his ships of war to such states as Rhodes in alliance
with Rome. Mithridates was then to be recognised as the ally of Rome.
He chafed at the terms, the proposal of which indeed brought out the
long-headed intrepidity of Sulla's character in the strongest light.
Walking, as it were, on the razor-edge of two precipices, he never
faltered once. The Romans could not charge him with not having carried
into effect the original purpose of the war--the restoration of
Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes--nor could Mithridates fail in the end to
listen to the voice of Archelaus. When he at first rejected the terms,
Sulla advanced towards Asia, plundering some of the barbarous tribes
on the frontiers of Macedonia, and reducing that province to order.
But Mithridates did not hesitate long. [Sidenote: Tyranny and
difficulties of Mithridates.] He, too, was in a difficult position.
The inhabitants of Asia Minor soon found that in yielding to him they
had exchanged whips for scorpions. He suspected that the defeat of
Archelaus at Chaeroneia would excite rebellion, and he seized as many
of the Galatian chiefs as he could, and slew them with their wives and
children. The consequence was that the surviving chiefs expelled the
man whom he had sent as satrap. He suspected the Chians also, and
made them give up their arms and the children of their chief men
as hostages. Then he made a requisition on them for 2,000 talents
(488,000_l_.), and because they could not raise the money, or because
the tyrant pretended that there was a deficiency, the citizens were
shipped off to the east of the Black Sea, and the island was occupied
by colonists. The man who had managed the affair of Chios was sent to
play the same game at Ephesus. But the people were on their guard,
slew him, and raised the standard of rebellion. Tralles, Hypaepa,
Metropolis, Sardis, Smyrna, and other towns followed their example.
Mithridates tried to buoy up his sinking cause, attracting debtors by
the remission of debts, resident aliens by the gift of the citizenship
of the towns which they inhabited, and slaves by the promise of
freedom--devices of a desperate man. A plot was laid against his life
which was betrayed, and in his fury he launched out into yet more
savage excesses. He sent a set of men to collect depositions, and they
slew indiscriminately those who were denounced, 1600, it is said, in
all.

[Sidenote: Fimbria mutinies against and murders Flaccus.] These events
must have occurred in the winter of 86-85 B.C., when Flaccus was on
his march from the Adriatic coast through Macedonia and Thrace
for Asia. Flaccus had quarrelled with his lieutenant Fimbria, and
superseded him. The latter, when Flaccus had crossed from Byzantium
to Chalcedon, induced the troops, who hated their general, to mutiny.
Flaccus returned in haste; but, learning what had happened, fled back
to Chalcedon and thence to Nicomedia. Here Fimbria, finding him hidden
in a well, murdered him, and threw his head into the sea. [Sidenote:
He defeats the son of Mithridates and pursues the king.] Then,
attacking the king's son, he defeated him at the river Rhyndacus, and
pursued the king himself to Pergamus and Pitane, where he would have
taken him but that he crossed over to Mitylene, while Fimbria had no
ships and was thus baulked of his prey. Another event had happened to
aggravate his irritation. [Sidenote: Lucullus off the coast of Asia
Minor. Overtures of Fimbria to him.] Lucullus, sent by Sulla to
collect a fleet, had, as has been related (p. 153), failed in Egypt.
But he had procured ships from Syria and Rhodes, induced Cos and
Cnidus to revolt, and driven out the Pontic partisans from Chios and
Colophon. He was now in the neighbourhood, when Mithridates was at
Pitane. [Sidenote: Mithridates meets Sulla and thy come to terms.]
But, he turned a deaf ear to Fimbria's request for aid, and after
defeating Neoptolemus, the king's admiral, met Sulla in the Thracian
Chersonese, and conveyed him across to Dardanus, in the Troad, where
Mithridates came to meet him. Each had one feeling in common--dread
lest the other should make terms with Fimbria; and the bargain was
soon struck in spite of Sulla's soldiers, who were thus after all
baulked of the long-looked-for Asiatic campaign and their desire to
take revenge for the great massacre. But Sulla, as we have seen (p.
153), got some money to quiet them; and they were in his power in Asia
almost as much as he had been in theirs at Rome. He at once led them
against Fimbria, who was near Thyatira, in Lydia. [Sidenote: Fimbria's
men desert to Sulla. Fimbria commits suicide.] He summoned that leader
to hand over his army, and the soldiers began to desert to him.
Fimbria tried to force them to swear obedience to him, and slew the
first who refused. Then he sent a slave to assassinate Sulla; and the
discovery of this attempt so maddened Sulla's soldiers that Fimbria
dared not trust even Sulla's promised safe-conduct and slew himself.
[Sidenote: Sulla's measures.] Sulla incorporated his troops with his
own army, and proceeded to regulate the affairs of Asia. Those towns
which had remained faithful to Rome or had sided with him were
liberally rewarded. All slaves who refused to return to their masters
were slain. The towns that resisted were punished and their walls
destroyed. The ringleaders in the massacre were put to death. The
taxpayers were forced to pay at once the previous five years' arrears
and a fine of 20,000 talents (4,880,000_l_.), and Lucullus was left
to collect it. In order to raise this sum the unhappy Asiatics
were obliged to mortgage their public buildings to the Italian
money-lenders; but Sulla got the whole of it, and scarcely was he
gone when pirates, hounded on by Mithridates, came, like flocks of
vultures, to devour what the eagles had left.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XIII.

SULLA IN ITALY.


[Sidenote: Sulla sets out homewards.] Leaving Murena in Asia with
Fimbria's legions, Sulla, in 84 B.C., with his soldiers in good
humour, and with full coffers, at last set out homewards. Three days
after sailing from Ephesus he reached the Piraeus. Thence he wrote to
the Senate in a different style from that in which he had communicated
his victory over Fimbria, when he had not mentioned his own outlawry.
He now recounted the Senate all that he had done, and contrasted it
with what had been done to him at Rome, how his house had been
destroyed, his friends murdered, and his wife and children forced to
fly for their lives. He was on his way, he said, to punish his enemies
and those who had wronged him. Other men, including the
newly-enfranchised Italians, need be under no apprehension. We do not
know much of what had been going on at Rome beyond what has been
related in a previous chapter. Cinna and Carbo, the consuls, were
making what preparations they could when the letter arrived. But it
struck a cold chill of dread into many of the Senate, and Cinna and
Carbo were told to desist for a time, while an embassy was sent to
Sulla to try and arrange terms, and to ask, if he wished to be assured
of his own safety, what were his demands. But when the ambassadors
were gone, Cinna and Carbo proclaimed themselves consuls for 83, so
that they might not have to come back to Rome to hold the elections;
and Cinna was soon afterwards murdered at Ancona. The tribunes then
compelled Carbo to come back and hold the elections in the regular
manner; and Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus and Caius Norbanus were
elected.

Meanwhile the ambassadors had found Sulla in Greece, and had received
his answer. [Sidenote: Sulla's response to an embassy from Rome.]
He said that he would never be reconciled to such criminals as his
enemies, though the Romans might, if they chose; and that, as for his
own safety, he had an army devoted to him, and should prefer to secure
the safety of the Senate and his own adherents. He sent back with the
ambassadors some friends to represent him before the Senate, and,
embarking his army at the Piraeus, ordered it to go round the coast to
Patrae in Achaia, and thence to the shores opposite Brundisium. He,
himself, having a fit of gout, went to Euboea, to try the springs of
Aedepsus. [Sidenote: Story of Sulla and some fishermen.] One day,
says Plutarch, while he was walking on the shore there some fishermen
brought him some fine fish. He was much pleased, but when they told
him that they were citizens of Halae, a town which he had destroyed
after the battle of Orchomenos, he said in his grim way, 'What! is
there a man of Halae still alive?' But then he told the men to take
heart, for the fish had pleaded eloquently for them. From Euboea he
crossed to the mainland to rejoin his troops. They were about 40,000
in number, and more than 200,000 men were, he said, in arms against
him in Italy. [Sidenote: Devotion of Sulla's troops to him.] But
Sulla, who had connived at their mutinies, their vices, and their
breaches of discipline, who had always led them to victory, and
had never yet thrown aside that mask of moderation which veiled an
inflexible determination to be revenged--Sulla who had been so long
the sole representative of authority, and to whom they had learned to
look for their ultimate reward, was their hero and hope. They offered
him their money, and of their own accord swore not to disperse or to
ravage the country. Sulla refused their money. Indeed he must have had
plenty of his own. But now, when slowly and still very cautiously he
was unfolding his designs, such devotion must have been very welcome.

[Sidenote: Sulla lands at Brundisium, B.C. 83.] Early in 83 he sailed
from Dyrrhachium to Brundisium, and was at once received by the town.
He was particularly anxious not to rouse against himself the Italians,
with whom his name was anything but popular, and he solemnly swore to
respect their lately-acquired rights. Adherents soon flocked to him.
[Sidenote: He is joined by Crassus;] Marcus Licinius Crassus came from
Africa, and was sent to raise troops among the Marsi. He asked for an
escort, for he had to go through territory occupied by the enemy. 'I
give thee,' said Sulla hotly, 'thy father, thy brother, thy friends
and thy kinsmen, who were cut off by violence and lawlessness, and
whose murderers I am now hunting down.' [Sidenote: by Metellus Pius;]
Quintus Metellus Pius came from Liguria, whither he had escaped from
Africa, after holding out there against the Marians as long as he
could. [Sidenote: by Ofella;] Quintus Lucretius Ofella also came, soon
to find to his cost that he had chosen a master who could as readily
forget as accept timely service. [Sidenote: by Cn. Pompeius;] Most
welcome of all was Cneius Pompeius, welcome not only for his talents,
energy, and popularity, but because he did not come empty-handed. He
had taken service under Cinna, but had been looked on with distrust,
and an action had been brought against him to make him surrender
plunder which his father, Cneius Pompeius Strabo, was said to have
appropriated when he took Auximum. Carbo had pleaded for him, and he
had been acquitted. But, as soon as Sulla was gaining ground in Italy,
he went to Picenum where he had estates, and expelled from Auximum the
adherents of Carbo, and then passing from town to town won them one by
one from his late protector's interests, and got together a corps of
three legions, with all the proper equipment and munitions of war.
Three officers were sent against him at the head of three divisions;
but they quarrelled, and Pompeius, who is said to have slain with his
own hand the strongest horseman in the enemy's ranks, defeated one of
them and effected a junction with Sulla somewhere in Apulia. Sulla's
soldierly eye was pleased at the sight of troops thus successful, and
in good martial trim; and when Pompeius addressed him as Imperator,
he hailed him by the same title in return. Or, perhaps, he was only
playing on the youth's vanity, for Pompeius, who was for his courage
and good looks the darling of the soldiers and the women, was very
vain, and flattery was a potion which it seems to have been one
of Sulla's cynical maxims always to administer in strong doses.
[Sidenote: by Philippus;] Later on he was joined by Philippus, the foe
of Drusus, who for shifty and successful knavery seems to have been
another Marcus Scaurus; [Sidenote: by Cethegus;] by Cethegus, who
had been one of his bitterest enemies, which to a man of Sulla's
business-like disposition would not be an objection, so long as he
could make himself useful at the time; [Sidenote: by Verres.] and by
Caius Verres, a late quaestor of Carbo, who had embezzled the public
money in that capacity, and thus began by tergiversation and theft a
notorious career.

Sulla marched northwards through Apulia, gaining friends by committing
no devastation, and sending proposals of peace to the consul Norbanus,
which were as hypocritical as was his abstinence from ravaging the
country. He meant to deal with these Samnites through whose country he
was marching at some other time. At present it was most politic not to
provoke them. According to Appian, he met the consul at Canusium, on
the Aufidus. [Sidenote: Battle of Mount Tifata. Defeat of Norbanus.]
But it is probable that this is a mistake, and that the first battle
was fought at Mount Tifata, a spur of the Apennines, near Capua.
Norbanus had seized Sulla's envoys, and this so enraged the soldiers
of the latter that they charged down the hill with irresistible
impetuosity, and killed 6000 of the foe. Norbanus fled to Capua. Only
seventy of the Sullans were killed. Sulla now crossed the Volturnus,
and marching along the Appian Road met the other consul, Scipio, at
Teanum, with whom he opened negotiations. Scipio sent Sertorius to
Norbanus, who was blockaded in Capua, to consult him on the terms
proposed. Sertorius, who had guessed what was coming and hoped to
prevent it by something more efficacious than the advice of Norbanus,
went out of his way and seized Suessa. This would interrupt Sulla's
immediate communications with the sea, of which he was master. Sulla
complained; but all the while he was, as Sertorius had warned Scipio,
corrupting the Consul's troops. [Sidenote: Scipio's troops desert to
Sulla.] They murmured when Scipio returned the hostages which Sulla
had given; and, when the latter on their invitation approached their
lines they went over to him in a body. On hearing of this Carbo said,
that in contending with Sulla he had to contend with a lion and a fox,
and that the fox gave him most trouble.

It may be noted here that Sulla, whose calculated moderation was
paying him well--the more pleasantly because he knew that he could
wreak his revenge afterwards at his leisure--never scrupled to employ
every kind of subterfuge and lie. [Sidenote: Sulla's mendacity.] He
tricked and lied on his march to Rome in 88. He lied foully to the
Samnites after the battle of the Colline Gate. And he lied in his
Memoirs, when he said that he only lost four at Chaeroneia, and
twenty-three at Sacriportus, where he also said that he killed 20,000
of the foe. Absurd assertions like these may have been dictated as a
sort of lavish acknowledgment paid to fortune, of whom he liked to be
thought the favourite--lies that no one believed or was expected to
believe, but keeping up a fiction of which it was his foible to be
proud. [Sidenote: His success due greatly to desertions.] Another
thing we may note is, that this was only the first of a long series
of treasons to which, as much almost as to his own generalship, Sulla
owed his final success. Five cohorts deserted at Sacriportus. Five
more went over from Carbo to Metellus. Two hundred and seventy cavalry
went over from Carbo to Sulla in Etruria. A whole legion, despatched
by Carbo to relieve Praeneste, joined Pompeius. At the battle of
Faventia 6000 deserted, and a Lucanian legion did the same directly
afterwards. Naples and Narbo were both banded over by treachery. We
hear also of commanders deserting. On the other hand, nothing is said
of anyone deserting from Sulla, so that from the very beginning the
contest could never have been really considered doubtful.

[Sidenote: Sertorius sent to Spain. No capable man left to oppose
Sulla.] After this signal success at Teanum Sertorius was sent to
Spain, either because, as is likely, he made bitter comments on the
consul's incompetence, or because it was important to hold Spain as a
place for retreat. Carbo hastened to Rome to and at his instigation
the Senate outlawed all the senators who had joined Sulla--a suicidal
step, which would contrast fatally with Sulla's crafty moderation.
[Sidenote: Burning of the Capitol.] It was about this time that the
Capitol, and in it the Sibylline books, were burnt. Some people said
that Carbo burnt it, though what his motive could be is difficult to
conjecture. Sulla very likely regretted the loss of the Sibylline
books as much as any man. [Sidenote: Sulla's situation at the close of
83 B.C.] With this the first year of the civil war ended. Sulla was
master of Picenum, Apulia, and Campania; had disposed of two consuls
and their armies; and had, by conciliation and swearing to respect
their rights, made friends of some of the newly-enfranchised Italian
towns.

The consuls for the next year (82) were Carbo and young Marius. The
Marian governor in Africa was suspected of wishing to raise the slaves
and to make himself absolute in the province. Consequently the Roman
merchants stirred up a tumult, in which he was burnt alive in his
house. In Sardinia the renegade Philippus did some service by
defeating the Marian praetor, and so securing for Sulla the corn
supply of the islands. In the spring Sulla seized Setia, a strong
position on the west of the Volscian Mountains. Marius was in the same
neighbourhood, and he retreated to Sacriportus on the east of the same
range. [Sidenote: Battle of Sacriportus.] Sulla followed him, his aim
being to get to Rome. A battle took place at Sacriportus. Marius was
getting the worst of it on the left wing, when five cohorts and two
companies of cavalry deserted him. The rest fled with great slaughter,
and Sulla pressed so hard on them that the gates of Praeneste were
shut, to hinder him getting in with the fugitives. Marius was thus
left outside, and, like Archelaus at Piraeus, had to be hoisted over
the walls by ropes. [Sidenote: Sulla wins the battle and besieges
Praeneste.] Sulla captured 8000 Samnites in the battle, and now, for
the first time, when the road to Rome was opened and victory seemed
secure, showed himself in his true colours, and slew all of them to a
man. [Sidenote: Massacre at Rome by order of young Marius.] An equally
savage butchery had been going on in Rome, where Marius, before he was
blockaded in Praeneste, had given orders to massacre the leaders of
the opposite faction. The Senate was assembled as if to despatch
business in the Curia Hostilia, and there Carbo's cousin and the
father-in-law of Pompeius were assassinated. The wife of the latter
killed herself on hearing the news. Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the chief
pontiff, and the first jurist who attempted to systematise Roman law,
fled to the temple of Vesta, and was there slain. The corpses of those
who had been killed were thrown into the Tiber, and Marius had the
ferocious satisfaction of feeling that his enemies would not be able
to exult over his own imminent ruin. [Sidenote: Sulla comes to Rome.]
Sulla, leaving Ofella to blockade Praeneste, hastened to Rome, but
there was no one on whom to take vengeance, for his foes had fled.
He confiscated their property, and tried to quiet apprehensions by
telling the people that he would soon re-establish the State. But he
could not stay long in the city, for matters looked threatening in the
north.

[Sidenote: Metellus and Carbo in the north.] In this quarter the
contest was more stubborn, because the newly enfranchised towns were
stronger partisans of Marius. Metellus had fought a battle on the
Aesis, the frontier river of Picenum, against Carrinas, one of Carbo's
lieutenants, and after a hard fight had beaten him and occupied the
adjacent country. This brought Carbo against him with a superior army,
and Metellus could do nothing till the news of Sacriportus frightened
Carbo into retreating to Ariminum, that he might secure his
communications and get supplies from the rich valley of the Po.
Metellus immediately resumed the offensive. He defeated in person one
division of Carbo, five of whose cohorts deserted in the battle. His
lieutenant, Pompeius, defeated Censorinus at Sena and sacked the town.
Pompeius is also said to have crossed the Po and taken Mediolanum
(Milan), where his soldiers massacred the senate. Metellus, meanwhile,
had gone by sea along the east coast north of Ariminum, and had thus
cut off Carbo's communications with the valley of the Po. This drove
Carbo from his position, and he marched into Etruria, where he fought
a battle near Clusium with Sulla, who had just arrived from Rome. In a
cavalry fight near the Clanis, 270 of Carbo's Spanish horse went
over to Sulla, and Carbo killed the rest. There was another fight
at Saturnia, on the Albegna, and there, too, Sulla was victorious.
[Sidenote: Indecisive combats.] He was less fortunate in a general
engagement near Clusium, which after a whole day's fighting ended
indecisively. Carbo was, however, now reduced to great straits.
Carrinas was defeated by Pompeius and Crassus near Spoletum, and
retired into the town. Carbo sent a detachment to his aid; but it was
cut to pieces by an ambuscade laid by Sulla. Bad news, too, reached
him from the south, where Marius was beginning to starve in Praeneste.
[Sidenote: Carbo attempts to relieve Praeneste.] He sent a strong
force of eight legions to raise the siege; but Pompeius waylaid and
routed them, and surrounded their officer who had retreated to a hill.
But the latter, leaving his fires alight, marched off by night,
and returned to Carbo with only seven cohorts; for his troops had
mutinied, one legion going off to Ariminum and many men dispersing to
their homes. [Sidenote: A second attempt also fails.] A second attempt
to relieve Praeneste was now made from the south. Lamponius from
Lucania, whom we last heard of in the Social War (p. 120), and Pontius
Telesinus from Samnium, marched at the head of 70,000 men into Latium.
This movement drew Sulla from Etruria. He threw himself between Rome
and the enemy, and occupied a gorge through which they had to pass
before they could get to Praeneste. The Latin Road branches off near
Anagnia, one route leading straight to Rome, the other making a detour
through Praeneste. [Sidenote: The dead lock at Praeneste.] It was
somewhere here that Sulla took his stand; and neither could the
southern army break through his lines, nor Marius break through those
of Ofella, though he made determined attempts to do so.

Meanwhile Carbo and Norbanus, released from the pressure of Sulla's
army, struck across the Apennines to overwhelm Metellus; but their
imprudence ruined them. [Sidenote: Overthrow of Carbo by Metellus.]
Coming on Metellus at Faventia (Faenza) when their troops were weary
after a day's march, they attacked him in the evening, hoping to
surprise him. But the tired men were defeated. Ten thousand were
killed; 6000 surrendered or deserted. The rest fled, and only 1000
effected an orderly retreat to Arretium. Nor did the disaster end
here. A Lucanian legion, coming to join Carbo, deserted to Metellus on
hearing the result of the battle, and the commander sent to offer his
submission to Sulla. Sulla characteristically replied that he must
earn his pardon, and the other, nothing loth, asked Norbanus and his
officers to a banquet and murdered all who came. Norbanus refused the
invitation and escaped to Rhodes; but when Sulla sent to demand that
he should be given up he committed suicide. [Sidenote: Third attempt
to relive Praeneste.] Carbo had still more than 30,000 men at Clusium,
and he made a third attempt to relieve Praeneste by sending Damasippus
with two legions to co-operate from the north with the Samnites on the
south. [Sidenote: Carbo flies to Africa.] But Sulla found means to
hold them in check, and Carbo, on the news of other disasters--at
Fidentia, where Marcus Lucullus defeated one of his lieutenants, and
at Tuder, which Marcus Crassus took and pillaged--lost heart and fled
to Africa. Plutarch says that Lucullus, having less than a third of
the numbers of the enemy, was in doubt whether to fight. But just then
a gentle breeze blew the flowers from a neighbouring field, which fell
on the shields and helmets of the soldiers in such a manner that they
seemed to be crowned with garlands, and this so cheered them that they
won an easy victory. After Carbo's flight his army was defeated by
Pompeius near Clusium. [Sidenote: Carbo's lieutenants threaten Rome.]
The rest of it, under Carrinas and Censorinus, joined Damasippus, and,
taking up a position twelve miles from Rome in the Alban territory,
threatened the capital and forced Sulla to break up his quarters,
where he had been barring the roads to Praeneste and Rome. [Sidenote:
Sulla comes to the rescue.] The sequel is uncertain; but it is
probable that when the three commanders marched into Latium, Sulla was
obliged to detach cavalry to harass them, and soon afterwards to march
with all his forces to prevent Rome being taken. Why Carrinas did not
assault Rome at once as he came south, we cannot say. Probably the
relief of Praeneste was the most urgent necessity, and he hoped, after
setting Marius free, to overwhelm Sulla first, then Pompeius, and then
to take Rome. But, if these were his plans, the furious impetuosity of
the Samnites disarranged them. [Sidenote: Desperate attempt of Pontius
Telesinus.] Pontius, as soon as he saw Sulla's troops weakened, in
order to oppose Carrinas, forced his way by night along the Latin
Road, gathered up the troops of Carrinas on the march, and at daybreak
was within a few miles of Rome. Sulla instantly followed, but by the
Praenestine Road, which was somewhat longer; and when he got to Rome
about midday, fighting had already taken place, and the Roman cavalry
had been beaten under the walls of the city.

[Sidenote: Battle of the Colline Gate.] It was November, B.C. 82.
Sunset was near and Sulla's men were weary, but he was determined or
was compelled to fight. Giving his men some hasty refreshment, he at
once formed the line of battle before the Colline Gate, and the last
and most desperate conflict of the civil war began. Sulla's left wing
was driven back to the city walls, and fugitives brought word to
Ofella at Praeneste that the battle was lost. [Sidenote: Danger of
Sulla.] Sulla himself was nearly slain. He was on a spirited white
horse, cheering on his men. Two javelins were hurled at him at once.
He did not see them, but his groom did, and he lashed Sulla's horse so
as to make it leap forward, and the javelins grazed its tail. Sulla
wore in his bosom a small golden image of Apollo, which he brought
from Delphi. He now kissed it with devotion, and prayed aloud to
the god not to allow him to fall ingloriously by the hands of his
fellow-citizens, after leading him safe through so many perils to the
threshold of the city. But neither courage nor superstition availed
him against the fury of the Samnite onset. For the first time in his
life Sulla was beaten, and either retreated into Rome or maintained a
desperate struggle close to the walls during the night. On the right
wing, however, Crassus had gained the day, had chased the foe to
Antemnae, and halting there sent to Sulla for a supply of food. Thus
apprised of his good fortune, he hastened to join Crassus. That
division of the enemy which had beaten him had doubtless heard the
same news, and must have dispersed or joined the rest of their forces
at Antemnae. But in any case they were full of despair. Three thousand
offered to surrender. But Sulla never gave mercy, though he often sold
it for an explicit or tacit consideration. He swore to spare them if
they turned on their own comrades. They did so, and Sulla, taking them
to Rome with four or five thousand other prisoners, placed them in
the Circus Flaminius and had them all slain. [Sidenote: Sulla's
cold-blooded ferocity.] He was haranguing the Senate in the temple of
Bellona, and the cries of the poor wretches alarmed his audience; but
he told them to attend to what he was saying, for the noise they heard
was only made by some malefactors, whom he had ordered to be
chastised. This last blind rush of the Sabellian bull on the lair of
the wolves, which Pontius had told his followers they must destroy,
had failed only by a hair's breadth, and since the days of the Gauls
Rome had never been in such peril. But now at last Sulla had
triumphed, and could afford to gratify his pent-up passion for
vengeance. This butchery in the Circus was but the beginning of what
he meant to do. [Sidenote: Executions.] The four leaders, Pontius,
Carrinas, Damasippus, and Censorinus, were all beheaded; and, in the
same ghastly fashion in which, it was said, Hannibal had learnt the
death of Hasdrubal, so those blockaded in Praeneste learnt the fate of
the relieving army and their own fate also by seeing four heads stuck
on poles outside the town walls. They were half starving and could
resist no longer. Marius and a younger brother of Pontius killed each
other before the surrender. Ofella sent the head of Marius to Sulla,
who had it fixed up before the Rostra, and jeered at it in his
pitiless fashion, quoting from Aristophanes the line,

  You should have worked at the oar before trying to handle the helm.

[Sidenote: Massacre at Praeneste.] Then he went to Praeneste, and made
all the inhabitants come outside and lay down their arms. The Roman
senators who had been in the place had been already slain by Ofella.
Three groups were made of the rest, consisting of Samnites, Romans,
and Praenestines. The Romans, the women, and the children were spared.
All the others, 12,000 in number, were massacred, and Praeneste was
given over to pillage.

[Sidenote: Fate of Norba.] So ruthless an example provoked a desperate
resistance at Norba. It was betrayed to Lepidus by night; but the
citizens stabbed and hung themselves or each other, and some locking
themselves inside their houses, set them in flames. A wind was blowing
and the town was consumed. So at Norba there was neither pillage nor
execution. Nola was not taken till two years afterwards, and we have
seen (p. 121) what became of Mutilus on its surrender. [Sidenote:
Sulla's vengeance in Samnium.] Aesernia, the last Samnite capital in
the Social War, was captured in the same year (80), and Sulla did his
best to fulfil his threat of extirpating the Samnite name. In Etruria
Populonium held out longer, and in Strabo's time was still deserted--a
proof of the punishment which it received. Volaterrae was the last
town to submit. In 79 its garrison surrendered, on condition of their
lives being spared. But the soldiers of the besieging force raised a
cry of treason and stoned their general, and a troop of cavalry sent
from Rome cut the garrison to pieces.

[Sidenote: Fate of Carbo. Pompeius in Sicily.] In the provinces there
was still much to be done. Pompeius was sent to Sicily, and on his
arrival Perperna, the Marian governor, left the island. Carbo had
come over from Africa to Cossura, and was taken and brought before
Pompeius. Pompeius condemned the man who had once been his advocate,
and sent his head to Sulla. It is said that Carbo met his death in a
craven way, begging for a respite. Whether this is true or not, he
seems to have been a selfish and incapable man. But if it be true that
Pompeius, while he had Carbo's companions instantly slain, purposely
spared Carbo himself in order to have the satisfaction of trying him,
he was less to be envied than the man he tried. He divorced his wife
at this time in order to marry Sulla's step-daughter, who was also
divorced from her husband for the purpose. From Sicily Pompeius
was sent to Africa, where Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus was in arms.
Crossing offer with 120 ships and 800 transports he landed some of his
troops at Utica and some at Carthage.

[Sidenote: Decay of discipline in Roman armies.] The decay of
discipline in the Roman armies is illustrated by an incident which
occurred at Carthage. One soldier found some treasure, and the rest
would not stir for several days till they were convinced that there
was nothing more to be found. Pompeius looked on and laughed at them.
Sulla's way of treating his soldiers was already bearing fruit, and
was one of the worst of the evils which he brought on Italy; for he
who goes about scattering smiles and smooth words in order to win a
name, for good-nature will always find others to run him a race in
such meanness, and so discipline becomes subverted and states are
ruined.

[Sidenote: Domitius Ahenobarbus conquered and slain by Pompeius in
Africa.] Pompeius found Domitius strongly posted behind a ravine.
Taking advantage of a tempest, he crossed it and routed the enemy. His
men hailed him Imperator: but he said he would not take the title till
they had taken the camp. The camp was then stormed and Domitius slain.
Pompeius also captured the towns held by the partisans of Domitius,
and defeated and took prisoner the Marian usurper who had expelled
Hiempsal, King of Numidia. Hiempsal was restored and his rival put
to death. On returning to Utica Pompeius found a message from Sulla,
telling him to disband his troops except one legion and wait till his
successor came. [Sidenote: Vanity of Pompeius.] The men mutinied,
for they liked Pompeius, and Sulla was told that Pompeius was in
rebellion. He remarked that 'in his old age it was his fate to fight
with boys'--a saying to which Pompeius's speech, 'that more men
worshipped the rising than the setting sun,' may have been intended
as a rejoinder. But soon he was relieved by hearing that the politic
Pompeius had appeased the mutiny. Sulla had the art of yielding with
a good grace when it was necessary, and, seeing how popular Pompeius
was, he went out to meet him on his return and greeted him by the name
'Magnus.' The vain young man asked for a triumph. His forty days'
campaign had indeed been brilliant; but he was not even a praetor, the
lowest official to whom a triumph was granted, nor a senator, but
only an eques. Sulla at first was astonished at the request, but
contemptuously replied, 'Let him triumph; let him have his triumph.'

[Sidenote: Sulla has Ofella slain.] Two other officials of Sulla gave
him trouble. One, Ofella, stood for the consulship against his wishes,
and went about with a crowd of friends in the Forum. But with a man
like Sulla it was foolish to presume on past services. He had no
notion of allowing street-riots again, and sent a centurion who cut
Ofella down. The people brought the centurion to him, demanding
justice. [Sidenote: Sulla's parables.] Sulla told them the man had
done what he ordered, and then spoke a grim parable to them. A rustic,
he said, was so bitten by lice that twice he took off his coat and
shook it. But as they went on biting him he burnt it. And so those
who had twice been humbled had better not provoke him to use fire the
third time. [Sidenote: Murena provokes the second Mithridatic war.]
The other officer was Murena, who had been left in Asia. He raised
troops besides the legions left with him, forced Miletus and other
Asiatic towns to supply a fleet, and then stirred up the second
Mithridatic war. The Colchians had revolted, and Mithridates suspected
his son of fostering the revolt in order to be set over them. So he
invited him to come to his court, put him there in chains of gold, and
soon killed him. He had also, it seems, threatened Archelaus, who fled
from him and represented to the ready ears of Murena, that Mithridates
still held part of Cappadocia, and was collecting a powerful army.
Murena advanced into Cappadocia, took Comana, and pillaged its temple.
Mithridates appealed to the treaty; but Murena asked where it was,
for the terms had never been reduced to a written form. [Sidenote:
Mithridates appeals to the Senate.] The king then sent to the Senate.
Murena crossed the Halys, and retired into Phrygia and Galatia with
rich spoil. [Sidenote: Murena defeated.] Disregarding a prohibition
of the Senate, he again attacked the king, who at last sent Gordius
against him, and soon after, coming up in person, defeated Murena
twice and drove him into Phrygia. For this success Mithridates lit on
a high mountain a bonfire, which, it is said, was seen more than a
hundred miles away by sailors in the Black Sea. [Sidenote: Sulla puts
a stop to the war.] Sulla sent orders to Murena to fight nor more; and
Mithridates, on condition of being reconciled to Ariobarzanes, was
allowed to keep as much of Cappadocia as was in his possession. He
gave a great banquet in honour of the occasion; and Murena went home,
where he had a triumph. Sulla probably granted it to him after his
defeats with more pleasure than he granted it to Pompeius for his
victories.

[Sidenote: Sertorius in Spain.] The ablest of the Marian generals was,
it has been seen, virtually unemployed in the Civil War. Sertorius,
when sent to Spain, seized the passes of the Pyrenees. Sulla, in 81,
sent against him, Q. Annius Luscus, who found one of the lieutenants
of Sertorius so strongly posted that he could not get past him.
However this lieutenant was assassinated by one of his own men,
and his troops abandoned their position. [Sidenote: He flies to
Mauretania. At Pityussa.] Sertorius had few men, and fled to New
Carthage, and thence to Mauretania. Here he was attacked by the
barbarians, and re-embarking, was on his way back to Spain, when he
fell in with some Cilician pirates with whom he attacked Pityussa
(Iviza) and expelled the Roman garrison. [Sidenote: At Gades.] Annius
hastened to the rescue and worsted him in a fight, after which
Sertorius sailed away through the Straits of Gibraltar to Gades
(Cadiz). Here some sailors told him of two islands which the Spaniards
believed to be the Islands of the Blest, with a pleasant climate and a
fruitful soil. In these islands--probably Madeira--Sertorius wished
to settle. [Sidenote: In Mauretania.] But, when his Cilician allies
sailed to Mauretania to restore some prince to his throne, he went
there too and fought on the other side. Sulla sent help to the prince,
but Sertorius defeated the commander and was joined by the troops.
[Sidenote: Invited to Spain.] Now, when once more at the head of
a Roman army, he was invited to Spain by the Lusitani, who were
preparing to revolt against Rome. With 2,600 Romans and 700 Africans
he crossed the sea, gaining a victory over the Roman cruisers on his
way, and set to work organizing and drilling the Lusitani in Roman
fashion. [Sidenote: His white fawn.] One of them gave him a white
fawn, and Sertorius declared that it had been given him by Diana.
After this, when he obtained any secret intelligence he said that the
fawn had told him, and brought it out crowned with flowers, if it was
some officer's success of which he had heard. By such means, and by
introducing a gay and martial uniform among his troops, he made his
army both well-disciplined and devoted to him personally, and defeated
one governor of Further Spain on the Baetis (Guadalquiver). [Sidenote:
Defeats Metellus Pius.] Gaining afterwards a series of successes over
Q. Metellus Pius, who had been sent against him, he was still in arms
and master of a considerable part of Spain when Sulla died.

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XIV.

THE PERSONAL RULE AND DEATH OF SULLA.


Sulla was to all intents and purposes a king in Rome. He harangued
the people on what he had achieved, and told them that if they were
obedient he would make things better for them, but that he would not
spare his enemies, and would punish everyone who had sided with them
since Scipio violated his covenant. [Sidenote: Reign of terror in
Rome.] Then began a reign of terror. Not only did he kill his enemies,
but gave over to his creatures men against whom he had no complaint to
make. At last a young noble, Caius Metellus, asked him in the Senate,
'Tell us, Sulla, when there is to be an end of our calamities. We do
not ask thee to spare those whom those hast marked out for punishment,
but to relieve the suspense of those whom thou hast determined to
save.' Sulla replied that he did not yet know. 'Then,' said Metellus,
'let us know whom thou intendest to destroy.' [Sidenote: Sulla's
proscriptions.] Sulla answered by issuing a first proscription list,
including eighty names. People murmured at the illegality of this, and
in two days, as if to rebuke their presumption, he issued a second of
220, and as many more the next day. Then he told the people from the
rostrum that he had now proscribed all that he remembered, and those
whom he had forgotten must come into some future proscription. Such
a speech would seem incredible if put into the mouth of any other
character it history; but it is in keeping with Sulla's passionless
and nonchalant brutality. The ashes of Marius he ordered to be dug up
and scattered in the Anio, the only unpractical act we ever read of
him committing. Death was ordained for every one who should harbour or
save a proscribed person, even his own brother, son, or parent. But
he who killed a proscribed man, even if it was a slave who slew his
master or a son his father, was to receive two talents. Even the son
and grandson of those proscribed were deprived of the privileges of
citizenship, and their property was confiscated. Not only in Rome but
in all the cities of Italy this went on. Lists were posted everywhere,
and it was a common saying among the ruffianly executioners, 'His fine
home was the death of such an one, his gardens of another, his hot
baths of a third,' for they hunted down men for their wealth more than
from revenge. [Sidenote: Story illustrative of the time.] One day a
quiet citizen came into the Forum, and out of mere curiosity read the
proscription list. To his horror he saw his own name. 'Wretch,' he
cried, 'that I am, my Alban villa pursues me!' and he had not gone far
when a ruffian came up and killed him. [Sidenote: Sulla and Julius
Caesar.] The famous Julius Caesar was one of those in danger. He would
not divorce his wife at the bidding of Sulla, who confiscated her
property if not his as well, being so far merciful for some reason
which we do not know. [Sidenote: Story of Roscius.] One case has been
made memorable by the fact that Cicero was the counsel for one of the
sufferers. Two men named Roscius procured the assassination of a
third of the same name by Sulla's favourite freedman, Chrysogonus,
who then got the name of Roscius put on the proscription list, and,
seizing on his property, expelled the man's son from it. He having
friends at Rome fled to them, and made the assassins fear that they
might be compelled to disgorge. So they suddenly charged the son with
having killed his father. The most frightful circumstance about the
case is not the piteous injustice suffered by the son, but the abject
way in which Cicero speaks of Sulla, comparing him to Jupiter who,
despite his universal beneficence, sometimes permits destruction, not
on purpose but because his sway is so world-wide, and scouting the
idea of its being possible for him to share personally in such wrongs.
It has been well said, 'We almost touch the tyrant with our finger.'
Cicero soon afterwards left Rome, probably from fear of Sulla.

[Sidenote: Wholesale punishment of towns.] It is said that the names
of 4,700 persons were entered on the public records as having fallen
in the proscriptions, besides many more who were assassinated for
private reasons. Whole towns were put up for auction, says one writer,
such as Spoletum, Praeneste, Interamna, and Florentia. By this we may
understand that they lost all their land, their privileges, and
public buildings, perhaps even the houses themselves. Others, such as
Volaterrae and Arretium, were deprived of all privileges except that
of Commercium or the right of trade.

[Sidenote: Sulla rewards his soldiers and establishes a permanent
party.] Sulla's friends attended such auctions and made large
fortunes. One of his centurions, named Luscius, bought an estate for
10,000,000 sesterces, or 88,540_l_. of our money. One of his freedmen
bought for 20_l_. 12_s_. an estate worth 61,000_l_. Crassus, Verres,
and Sulla's wife, Metella, became in this way infamously rich. In
spite of such nominal prices, the sale of confiscated estates produced
350,000,000 sesterces, or nearly 3,000,000_l_. of our money. Sulla
approved of such purchases, for they bound the buyers to his
interests, and ensured their wishing to uphold his acts after his
death. With the same view of creating a permanent Sullan party in
Italy, and at the same time to fulfil his pledges to the soldiers, he
allotted to them all public lands in Italy hitherto undistributed,
and all confiscated land not otherwise disposed of. In this way he
punished and rewarded at a stroke. No fewer than 120,000 allotments
were made and twenty-three legions provided for. There was in it a
plausible mimicry of the democratic scheme of colonies which Sulla
must have thoroughly enjoyed. Thus in Italy he provided a standing
army to support his new constitution. [Sidenote: The Cornelii.] In
Rome itself, by enfranchising 10,000 slaves whose owners had been
slain, he formed a strong body of partisans ever ready to do his
bidding; these were all named Cornelii. A man is known by his
adherents, and the worst men were Sulla's _protégés_.

[Sidenote: Catiline.] Catiline's name rose into notoriety amid these
horrors. He was said not only to have murdered his own brother, but,
to requite Sulla for legalising the murder by including this brother's
name in the list of the proscribed, to have committed the most
horrible act of the Civil War--the torture of Marcus Marius
Gratidianus. This man, because he was cousin of Marius, was offered
up as a victim to the manes of Catulus, of whom the elder Marius had
said, 'He must die.' This poor wretch was scourged, had his limbs
broken, his nose and hands cut off, and his eyes gouged out of their
sockets. Finally his head was cut off, and Cicero's brother writes
that Catiline carried it in his hands streaming with blood. But no one
would attach much importance to what the Ciceros said of Catiline, and
two circumstances combine to point to his innocence of such extreme
enormities. One is that it was the son of Catulus who begged as a boon
from Sulla the death of this Marius, and his name was very likely
confused with Catiline's in the street rumours of the time; and the
other and more direct piece of evidence is, that Catiline was tried in
the year 64 for murders committed at this time, and was acquitted. It
is a curious thing that the obloquy which has clung to Catiline's name
on such dubious reports has never attached in the same measure to the
undoubted horrors and abominations of Sulla's career.

Sulla, though he meant above all to have his own way, had no objection
to use constitutional forms where they could be conveniently employed.
He made the Senate pass a resolution approving his acts, and, as there
were no consuls in 82, after the death of Marius and Carbo, he retired
from Rome for a while and told the Senate to elect an Interrex, in
conformity with the prescribed usage under such circumstances. Then
he wrote to the Interrex and recommended that a Dictator should be
appointed, not for a limited time, but till he had restored quiet in
the Roman world, and, with a touch of that irony which he could not
resist displaying in and out of season, went on to say that he thought
himself the best man for the post. [Sidenote: Sulla's power.] Thus,
in November 82, he was formally invested with despotic power over
the lives and property of his fellow-citizens, could contract or
extend the frontiers of the State, could change as he pleased the
constitution of the Italian towns and the provinces, could legislate
for the future, could nominate proconsuls and propraetors, and could
retain his absolute power as long as he liked. He might have dispensed
with consuls altogether. But he did not care to do this. The consuls
whom he allowed to be elected for 81 were of course possessed of
merely nominal power. Twenty-four lictors preceded him in the streets.
He told the people to hail him as 'Felix,' declared that his
least deliberate were his most successful actions, signed himself
'Epaphroditus' when he wrote to Greeks, named his son and daughter
Faustus and Fausta, boasted that the gods held converse with him
in dreams, and sent a golden crown and axe to the goddess whom
he believed to be his patroness. Like Wallenstein, he mingled
indifference to bloodshed with extreme superstition and boundless
self-confidence. But, as the historian remarks, 'a man who is
superstitious is capable of any crime, for he believes that his gods
can be conciliated by prayers and presents. The greatest crimes have
not been committed by men who have no religious belief.' No doubt
to his mind there was a sort of judicial retribution in all this
bloodshed; and, as he tried to make himself out the favourite of the
gods, so by formally announcing the close of the proscription lists
for June 1, 81 B.C., he spread some veil of legality over his
shameless violence. [Sidenote: Peculiarly horrible nature of Sulla's
acts.] There is something particularly revolting in the business-like
and systematic way in which he went about his murderous work,
appointing a fixed time for it to end, a fixed list of the victims; a
fixed price to be paid per head, a fixed exemption for the murderers
from his own law 'De Sicariis.' Modern idolaters of a policy of blood
and iron may profane history by their glorification of human monsters;
but no sophistry can blind an independent reader to the real nature of
Sulla's character and acts. He organized murder, and filled Italy with
idle soldiers instead of honest husbandmen. He did so in the interests
of a class--a class whose incapacity for government he had discovered;
and yet, knowing that his re-establishment of this class could only
be temporary, he fortified it by every means in his power, and then,
after a theatrical finale, returned to the gross debaucheries in which
he revelled. Anything more selfish or cynical cannot be conceived, and
those who call vile acts by their plain names will not feel inclined
to become Sulla's apologists.

When he died he left behind him, it is said, what he may have meant as
his epitaph, an inscription containing the purport of three lines in
the 'Medea'--

  Let no man deem me weak or womanly,
  Or nerveless, but of quite another mood,
  A scourge to foes, beneficent to friends.

Pompeius, the only man who had successfully bearded him, was the only
friend not mentioned in his will. If anything could palliate his
remorseless selfishness it is the candour with which he confessed it.
He had made a vast private fortune out of his countrymen's misery.
When he surrendered his dictatorship he offered a tenth of his
property to Hercules, and gave a banquet to the people on so profuse a
scale that great quantities of food were daily thrown into the Tiber.
Some of the wine was forty years old, perhaps wine of that vintage
which was gathered in when Caius Gracchus died. [Sidenote: He divorces
Metella and marries again.] In the middle of the banquet his wife
Metella sickened, and in order that, as Pontifex, he might prevent
his home being polluted by death he divorced her, and removed her to
another house while still alive. Soon afterwards he married another
wife, who at a gladiatorial show came and plucked his sleeve, in
order, as she said, to obtain some of his good fortune. [Sidenote: His
abdication.] The rest of his life was spent, near Cumae, in hunting,
writing his memoirs, amusing himself with actors, and practising all
sorts of debauchery. Ten days before he died he settled the affairs
of the people of Puteoli at their request, and was busy in collecting
funds to restore the Capitol up to the last. [Sidenote: His death.]
Some say he died of the disease which destroyed Herod. Some say that
there is no such disease. Others say that he broke a blood-vessel when
in a rage. He is described as having blue eyes, and a pale face so
blotched over that it was likened to a mulberry sprinkled with meal.

[Sidenote: Rivalry of Lepidus and Pompeius.] His death, 78 B.C., was
the signal for that break-up of his political institutions to which
he had wilfully shut his eyes. The great men at Rome began to wrangle
over his very body before it was cold. Lepidus, whom Pompeius, against
Sulla's wishes, had helped to the consulship, opposed a public
funeral. The other consul supported it. Sulla had with his usual
shrewdness divined the character of Lepidus, and told Pompeius that he
was only making a rival powerful. Pompeius opposed Lepidus now, for he
knew that the partisans of Sulla would insist on doing honour to his
memory. [Sidenote: Funeral of Sulla.] Appian describes the funeral at
length. 'The body was borne on a litter, adorned with gold and other
royal array, amid the flourish of trumpets, and with an escort of
cavalry. After them followed a concourse of armed men, his old
soldiers, who had thronged from all parts and fell in with the
procession as each came up. Besides these there was as vast a crowd of
other men as was ever seen at any funeral. In front were carried the
axes and the other symbols of office which had belonged to him as
dictator. But it was not till the procession reached Rome that the
full splendour of the ceremonial was seen. More than 2,000 crowns of
gold were borne in front, gifts from towns, from his old comrades in
arms, and his personal friends. In every other respect, too, the pomp
and circumstance of the funeral was past description. In awe of the
veterans all the priests of all the sacred fraternities were there in
full robes, with the Vestal Virgins, and all the senators, and all
the magistrates, each in his garb of office. Next, in array that
contrasted with theirs, came the knights of Rome in column; then all
the men whom Sulla had commanded in his wars, and who had vied
with each other in hastening there, carrying gilded standards
and silver-plated shields. There was also a countless host of
flute-players, making now most tender, now most wailing music. A cry
of benediction, raised by the senators, was taken up by the knights
and the soldiers, and re-echoed by the people, for some mourned his
loss in reality, and others feared the soldiers and dreaded him
in death as much as in life, the present scene recalling dreadful
memories. That he had been a friend to his friends they could not but
admit; but to the rest, even when dead, he was still terrible. The
body was exhibited before the rostra, and the greatest orator of the
time spoke the funeral oration; for Faustus, Sulla's son, was too
young to do so. Then some strong senators took up the litter on their
shoulders and bore it to the Campus Martius, where kings only were
wont to be buried. There it was placed on the funeral pyre; and the
knights and all the army circled round it in solemn procession. And
that was Sulla's ending.'

To the student of history the story of such a funeral seems like
the prostration of a nation of barbarians before the car of some
demon-god. If the strong personality of the man--with all that
dauntless bravery, that unerring sagacity, that trenchant
tongue--still after two thousand years fascinates attention, if we are
forced to own that for sheer power of will and intellect he stands in
the very foremost rank of men, yet we feel also that in the case of
such superhuman wickedness tyrannicide would, if it ever could, cease
to be a crime.


       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XV.

SULLA'S REACTIONARY MEASURES.


It is difficult to say about part of the legislation of this period
whether it was directly due to Sulla or not, just as some of the
changes in the army may or may not have been due to Marius, but were
certainly made about his time. The method of gathering together all
the changes made within certain dates, attributing them to one man,
and basing an estimate of his character on them, has a simplicity
about it which enables the writer to be graphic and spares the reader
trouble, but is an unsatisfactory way of presenting history. Enough,
however, is known of Sulla's own measures to make their general
tendency perfectly plain. [Sidenote: Main object of Sulla's laws.] His
main object was to restore the authority of the Senate, and to do more
than restore it, to give it such power as might, if it was true to
itself, secure it from mob-rule on the one hand and tyranny on the
other. Though he foresaw that his efforts would be futile, he was none
the less energetic in making them, and may reasonably have hoped that
they would at all events last his time, and enable him to enjoy
himself in Campania, undisturbed by another revolution. Our
acquaintance with his laws is only second-hand, for none of them
survive in their original form. They are known as Leges Corneliae, a
term which, though applicable to some other laws, is usually applied
to those of his making.

The Senate had originally been an advising council. Then it had
acquired superior authority, and issued commands to the magistrates.
It was placed by Sulla in a still higher position. [Sidenote: He
reconstitutes the Senate;] To fill up its exhausted ranks he admitted
to it 300 of the equestrian order; and, though it is not certain what
its numbers were to be, it is probable that they were fixed at about
500. Then he provided for keeping the list full for the future.
[Sidenote: fills it up from the quaestors;] Hitherto a man had become
a senator either at the censor's summons (of which he was practically
certain if he had been tribune or quaestor), or, if he had been
consul, praetor or aedile. [Sidenote: increases the number of the
quaestors;] Sulla made the quaestorship instead of the aedileship the
regular stepping-stone, and increased the number of the quaestors
to twenty. [Sidenote: degrades the censorship.] He also, in all
probability, though it is not certain, took away from the censors
their right of conferring or taking away senatorial rank. 'Once a
senator, always a senator,' was therefore now the rule; and as the
quaestors, who were the main source of supply, were nominated by the
Comitia Tributa, the Senate became a more representative as well as a
more permanent body than before, and independent of the magistrates.

[Sidenote: Legislative initiative given to the Senate.] Secondly, we
have seen that Sulla had given to the Senate by law the power which it
had previously exercised only by custom, of deliberating on a measure
before it was submitted to the vote of the Comitia. This was one
security against any measure being carried against its interests.
Before this the practice had been either for the Senate through the
tribunes to submit a measure to the vote, or for the tribunes to
submit a measure of their own after obtaining the Senate's authority
to do so. Saturninus, as we have seen, had overridden this custom, and
the only way in which the Senate could maintain its old privileges
would have been either by proclaiming a justitium, as it did on that
occasion, or by picking out some technical informality in the passing
of the plebiscitum, had not Sulla thus made its previous authorisation
absolutely indispensable. [Sidenote: Curtailment of the tribunes'
prerogative.] The tribunes, being deprived of the power of proposing a
measure at will to the Comitia Tributa, would also lose the power of
prosecuting anyone before it, and probably lost the right of convening
meetings in order to address the people. Sulla, too, provided that
those who had been tribunes should be ineligible to other offices,
and, though the right of veto seems to have been left to them, it is
not clear that it was left without restrictions, while the abuse of it
was made a heavily punishable offence. It is likely also that he made
senators the only persons eligible to the tribunate. Positively,
therefore, by making the Senate's previous consent to a law necessary,
and negatively by these limitations of the prerogative of the
tribunes, legislative power was placed wholly in the Senate's hands.

[Sidenote: Changes in the Comitia.] Thirdly, the balance in the
Comitia themselves was so adjusted that the voting would be mostly in
the Senate's interests. Something has already been said of Sulla's
changes on this head, in reverting to the Servian mode of voting (p.
129). Some explanation of what this means may be given here. Sulla did
not abolish the Comitia Tributa; but the measures just mentioned, as
they left the practical power of legislation with the Senate, left the
formal power with the Comitia Centuriata. [Sidenote: History of the
Comitia Tributa and Centuriata.] We know the origin of the Comitia
Centuriata. We do not know the origin of the Comitia Tributa. But
we do know that by degrees the latter obtained legislative power
co-ordinate with that of the former, and that the Plebiscitum became
as binding on the nation as the Lex. There were in short two parallel
bodies in which the people could make laws--ranged in the one by
tribes, and voting on measures submitted to them by their tribunes;
ranged in the other by centuries, and voting on measures submitted to
them by the consul. But as the State became more and more democratic,
the Comitia Tributa was more used than the Comitia Centuriata, in
which legislation was gradually confined to special matters assigned
to them by law or custom. Besides these functions the Comitia Tributa
decided on war or peace, elected the tribunes, aediles, and lesser
magistrates, and also usurped judicial power, arraigning magistrates
for their conduct in office, &c. The functions of the Comitia
Centuriata were, as we have, seen, also legislative. They elected to
the higher magistracies and exercised jurisdiction in capital cases, a
function which grew out of the Roman citizen's right to appeal. Each
century had one vote; and as by the Servian arrangement the first
class, though containing fewest voters, had nevertheless, owing to its
highest assessment, most votes, it could by itself outvote the other
classes. At some time or other this classification was altered; and a
new system, based partly on centuries and partly on tribes, came into
use. Each tribe was divided into ten centuries, five of seniors and
five of juniors. The first class consisted of one of each of these
from each tribe, so that, as there were thirty-five tribes, each class
would consist of seventy centuries. It is said by some that the first
class included also thirty-five centuries, or eighteen centuries of
equites. If this be true, the first class would still have retained
the preponderance of votes. In any case it had the best of the voting,
for even if it was decided by lot which century of all the centuries
should vote first, still the first class voted second, and the moral
effect of the wealthier and weightier citizens voting one way or other
would naturally influence the votes of the other centuries. Moreover
some say that the lot was confined to the centuries of the first
class. Such then was the original and such the modified constitution
of the Comitia Centuriata. [Sidenote: Sulla's legislation about the
Comitia.] Appian expressly states that Sulla reverted to the original
mode of voting. But he may be confusing things, and only mean that
Sulla took the voting power from the Comitia Tributa and vested it in
the Comitia Centuriata. And this probably is what Sulla did.

[Sidenote: Curtailment of the power of the consuls and praetors.]
Fourthly, as Sulla weakened the censorship in order to exalt the
Senate's authority at its expense, so, to prevent any individual again
obtaining undue influence, he ordained that no man should be consul
till he had been first quaestor and then praetor, and that no man
should be re-eligible to a curule office till after an interval of ten
years. This, however, was not enough. It was his object to curtail the
powers of every magistrate. And therefore, though the consulate was
not dangerous to the Senate in the sense that the tribunate was, he
laid hands both on it and on the praetorship. [Sidenote: Previous
powers of the two offices.] The functions of the consuls and praetors
had hitherto been these. The consuls had the general superintendence
of all except judicial matters at home, and the military
superintendence in all the provinces except Sicily, Sardinia, and the
two Spains, in which they only occasionally exercised their imperium.
One praetor, the Praetor Urbanus, presided over civil suits between
Roman citizens. Another, the Praetor Peregrinus, superintended such
suits between a citizen and an alien or between two aliens. The other
four were over the four above-mentioned provinces. In case of need
one man could do the work both of the Praetor Urbanus and the Praetor
Peregrinus, leaving his colleague free for a military command. Or the
consul or praetor might have his term of office extended, being bound
to continue in his command till a successor arrived. Or one consul
might manage the ordinary functions of both, and the other be
similarly left free for some special employment. The Senate could in
any given year assign, as business to be superintended by a consul or
a praetor, some military command or judicial commission, and then the
consuls or praetors had to settle by lot or by agreement who should
undertake it. As the State grew greater these special assignations had
to be made oftener. [Sidenote: The new scheme.] There had been eight
officials for eight offices; now five new superintendents had to be
provided for Asia, Africa, Macedonia, Narbo, and Cilicia, as well as
one for the Quaestio de Repetundis. To enable eight men to do the work
of fourteen the Senate made prolongation of office for a second year
the rule, and the officials confined by the nature of these duties to
the city during these years of office were generally sent at the end
of it to the transmarine provinces where most money was to be made.
Sulla increased the six praetors to eight, and made the two years'
term of office the legal term. But if this added to their power in
appearance, he diminished it in reality by separating the civil from
the military functions altogether. The consuls and praetors were to
manage the civil business of Rome. The proconsuls and propraetors were
to command the army. In the first year of office the two consuls
had the general administration of Rome, and two of the praetors its
judicial administration. The other six presided over the various
courts. In the second the ten exercised the imperium in Sicily,
Sardinia, the two Spains, Asia, Africa, Macedonia, Cilicia, and the
two Gauls, and none of them might stay in his province beyond thirty
days after his successor's arrival; or, under penalties for treason,
might leave his province during his term; or attack a foreign power
without express leave from home. [Sidenote: Effect of the new scheme.]
The effect of all this is plain. Whereas formerly the magistrates,
directly elected in the Comitia, might combine civil and military
authority, now the military authority could only be held by those
whose term of office was prolonged by the Senate's pleasure; for,
though the practice became invariable, it remained at the Senate's
discretion to break through it when it chose.

[Sidenote: Co-optation restored to the colleges.] Fifthly, having thus
lessened the power of the censors, consuls, praetors, and tribunes, he
by way of compensation--a serio-comic compensation it must have
seemed to his shrewd yet superstitious mind--restored the right
of co-optation to the sacred colleges of augurs and pontiffs, and
increased their numbers, thus multiplying harmless objects of rivalry
analogous to the ribands and garters of modern courts.

Sixthly, he took away from the equites and restored to the Senate the
judicia.

[Sidenote: Restoration of the Judicia to the Senate.] The judicia have
been often mentioned, and something maybe said about them here. In
civil suits the praetor, as we have seen, had the superintendence.
Sometimes he decided a case at once. Sometimes, if he thought the case
should be tried, he appointed a judex, giving him certain instructions
by which after the investigation he must decide the case. His action
here would be something like one of our judge's charges, but given
before hearing the evidence. There is nothing to prove that a judex of
this kind was at this time taken from any special class, or that
Sulla interfered with the established mode of procedure. [Sidenote:
Organisation of criminal courts.] It was about the constitution of the
criminal courts that the long struggle had raged between the Senate
and equites and here he made great changes. He found some permanent
criminal courts (e.g. the Quaestio de Repetundis, or court for
investigating cases of extortion in the provinces) already in
existence. He instituted or settled others; but it cannot be
ascertained how many of the following, which were in existence after
his time, were due to him. There were at least nine of these permanent
courts (Quaestiones Perpetuae): the Quaestio Majestatis; de vi; de
sicariis &c; de veneficiis; de parricidio; de falso; de repetundis;
peculatus; ambitus; or courts for trying cases of treason, violence,
assassination, poisoning, parricide, forgery, extortion, embezzlement,
and bribery. And there may have been more, e.g. de adulteriis and de
plagiis, for trying cases of adultery and the enslavement of freemen.
[Sidenote: Procedure in the courts.] His object in consolidating them
was to take from the Comitia the settlement of criminal cases, and to
obviate the necessity for appointing special commissions. For there
was no appeal from the quaestio, and a special commission was seldom
requisite when so many courts were available.

To preside in these courts there were six praetors; but, as there were
more courts than praetors, a senator, called judex quaestionis, was
appointed annually for each court where a president was wanting,
something after the fashion by which one of our judges sometimes in
press of business appoints a barrister as his deputy to clear off the
cases. The praetor, or judex quaestionis, presided over the judices in
each court, and the judices returned a verdict by a majority of votes,
sometimes given by ballot, sometimes openly. In choosing these judices
this was the process. The whole number available was, it is said, 300,
divided into three decuriae. In any given case the praetor named the
decuria from which the jurymen were to be taken, and then drew from an
urn containing their names the number assigned by law for the case to
be decided. Each side could then challenge a certain number, and fresh
names were drawn from the urn in place of those challenged. What Sulla
did was to supply these decuriae from the senators instead of the
equites.

One of the permanent courts found by Sulla already existing was that
of the Centumviri, who had jurisdiction over disputed inheritances.
The members of it were elected by the tribes, three by each tribe,
105 in all. Though it was directly elected by the people, Sulla could
apprehend no danger from such a court, and did not meddle with it.

[Sidenote: Other measures attributed to Sulla.] Other measures are
attributed to Sulla on evidence more or less probable, such as the
suppression of gratuitous distributions of corn; the abolition of the
right of freedmen to vote, and of the reserved seats appropriated to
the equites at public festivals; the re-establishment in Asia of fixed
taxes instead of the farming system; the extension of Italy proper
from the Aesis to the Rubicon, and the conversion of Cisalpine Gaul
into a province. It may be considered certain that he did all that
he could to humiliate the equites; but the settlement of Italy was
probably not due to him.

[Sidenote: His minor measures.] Other minor laws of which he was the
author dealt with specific criminal offences or social matters. One,
as we have seen (p. 196) specified the penalties for all sorts of
assassination and poisoning. Another dealt with forgery, another with
violence to the person or property, another with marriage and probably
adultery. Another was a sumptuary law, which is said to have limited
the price of certain luxuries. If this was the case it was even
sillier than other sumptuary laws, for it would have encouraged
instead of checking gluttony. Lastly, there was a law for the
settlement of his colonies through Italy, and at Aleria in Corsica.

[Sidenote: Effects of Sulla's legislation.] Sulla had for the moment
undone by his legislation the work of ages. He gagged free speech by
the disabilities attached to the tribunate. He kept the government
within a close circle by his process of recruiting the Senate. He made
the magistrates subordinate to the Senate. He filled Italy and Rome
with his own partisans, and therefore with those of the Senate, and
he gave back to the Senate that coveted possession of the judicia for
which it had struggled so long with the equites. But a system which
could endure only by the repression not only of hostile interests but
of the ambition of its own adherents carried in itself the seeds
of early dissolution. Almost before the reaction was complete a
counter-reaction had begun. Abdication only revealed monarchy, and the
broad road which Sulla had laid over the breakers and quicksands of
revolution in reality paved the way to a throne.

[Sidenote: Sulla's abdication a farce.] When be abdicated, he offered
to render account to anyone for his acts, and there is a story that
one young man thereupon followed him to his home loading him with
abuse, which Sulla listened to with meekness. If the story be true,
the incident was probably a pre-arranged part of the ceremony of
abdication, which in everything, except the fact that Sulla slipped
off the cares of government, was of course a farce. His funeral showed
what his real power continued to be, and, if another anecdote be true,
just before his death he had a magistrate of Puteoli strangled
because he had not collected in time his town's subscription to the
restoration of the Capitol. He had in fact done mischievously what the
Gracchi would have done beneficently; and greedy swordsmen occupied
the soil which the tribunes would have divided peaceably among
peaceable men. [Sidenote: The policy of the Gracchi justified by after
events.] The civil wars and the triumvirates are the best vindication
of the policy of the Gracchi, unless we can bring ourselves to fancy
that the Gracchi created, instead of attempting wisely to satisfy,
the demands of the age. By an orderly intermixture of Italians and
foreigners with the corrupt body of Roman citizens new life might have
been infused into the old system, and something foreshadowing modern
representative government have been established, without proscription
or praetorian rule. As it was, the vices of society only became
aggravated at an era of violence, and the sharpest remedies failed to
stay the creeping paralysis by which it was assailed.

The gradual depopulation of Italy has already been described. In spite
of Sulla's colonies the ruin of the country must have been vastly
accelerated by his civil wars and those which followed them. And,
while the honest country class was dying out, the town class was ever
plunging deeper into frivolity and voluptuousness. To defray the cost
of the sumptuous life of the capital the fashionable spendthrift was
forced to resort to extortion in the provinces, which, as we have
seen, became so crying an evil that a permanent court existed for
dealing with it before the time of Sulla. The greedy throve on usury,
or involved the State in war, to fill their own purses. The fortunes
amassed by an Aquillius, a Verres, a Lucullus, spoke as eloquently of
Rome's rapacity abroad as did those of Crassus or Sulla in Italy. Such
being the state of things under the government which Sulla strove
to perpetuate, his character as a statesman deserves as strong
reprobation as his conduct as a man. To lay down power from a sense of
duty is one thing. Cynically to shrink from responsibility is another.
The misery of the following half-century must be laid chiefly at
Sulla's door. The inevitable goal to which everything was tending was
as patent in his time as in the time of Augustus. Whatever may have
been for the interest of the Roman aristocracy, monarchy was by this
time for the interest of the Roman world.




LIST OF PHRASES


_It has been suggested that the following List of Phrases occurring in
the History may be useful. But the definitions are only approximately
precise._

_Aerarium_. The State treasury.

_Capite Censi_. Roman citizens rated by the head only, as having no
property.

_Cives Romani_. Citizens of Rome, a Roman colony, or a Municipium.

_Clientes_. Dependents of the Patres. Free, but not Cives Romani.

_Comitia Centuriata_. The subdivisions (193 or 194 in number) of the
six classes into which the Romans were divided, according to property,
were called Centuries, and the assembly of them Comitia Centuriata.

_Comitia Tributa_. The assembly in which the people voted according to
the tribes or territorial divisions.

_Dominium_. Ownership.

_Equites_. Originally the men rich enough to maintain war-horses;
afterwards the rich class corresponding to our city men.

_Flamen_. A priest of some particular god.

_Frumentaria_. Lex. A law for cheapening corn.

_Imperator_. The title given on the battle-field to a successful
general by his soldiers.

_Imperium_. The power given by the State to an individual who was to
command an army.

_Interrex_. An official appointed to hold an election of consuls when
the regular mode of election had not been followed.

_Judicia_. Bodies of jurymen (judices) who tried criminal cases.

_Jugerum_. A measure of surface 240 feet long, 120 broad.

_Justitium_. A suspension of public business for some religious
observance.

_Latifundia_. Large estates cultivated by slave-labour.

_Latini_. See p. 16.

_Legati_. Officers of the general's suite corresponding to our
generals of division.

_Libertini_. The class of freedmen known as Liberti, with reference to
freeborn men, Libertini with reference to each other.

_Municipia_. Conquered Italian towns having the right of acquiring
property in the Roman State (Commercium), and marrying the daughter of
a Roman citizen (Connubium), but unable to acquire the honours of the
State (Jus Honoris), or to vote at Rome (Jus Suffragii).

_Negotiatores_. Money-lenders.

_Nobiles_. The offspring of men who had held a curule office.

_Optimates_. The senatorial party at and after the era of the Gracchi.

_Patres_. 1. Originally Cives Romani, the governing body at Rome. 2.
Afterwards the Senate.

_Patronus_. A Pater with reference to a Client. A Dominus with
reference to a Libertus.

_Perduellio_. Abuse of official position injurious to the State.

_Pilum_. A wooden shaft 4 feet long, with an iron head 2 feet 3 inches
long. There was also a lighter kind.

_Plebiscitum_. 1. A resolution of the people. 2. Equivalent to lex.

_Plebs_. Originally the free citizens of Rome who had no political
privileges.

_Populares_. The anti-senatorial party at and after the time of the
Gracchi.

_Possessor_. An occupier of public land.

_Praefectura_. A Roman colony, or Municipium, in which a Roman
Praefectus administered justice.

_Proletarii_. Roman citizens rated at less than 1,500 asses.

_Publicani_. Farmers of the revenue.

_Rostra_. A name given to the stage in the Forum where speakers
addressed the people. So called because ornamented with beaks of ships
captured from the enemy.

_Scriptura_. A tax paid to the State on cattle grazing on public land.

_Socii_. Free inhabitants of Italy. See p. 16.

_Vectigal_. 1. A tax of 1/10th of the year's crops. 2. The revenue
produced by the Scriptura.




INDEX


Adherbal.
Aedui, the.
Ager Publicus.
Agrarian law, the first.
Ahenobarbus, Domitius.
Albinus, Aulus.
Albinus, Sp.
Allobroges, the.
Ambrones, the.

Antyllus.
Aquae Sextiae.
Archelaus.
Aristion.
Aristonicus.
Army, the Roman.
Arverni, the.
Asculum.
Asia, taxation of.
Athenion.
Athens, siege of.
Attalus of Pergamus.

Baebius.
Bestia.
Blossius.
Bocchus.
Bomilcar.

Caepio, Q. Servilius.
Calvinus.
Capsa.
Carbo.
Cassius, Sp.
Catiline.
Catulus.
Centumviri, the.
Chaeroneia, battle of.
Cimbri.
Cinna, L. Cornelius.
Cirta.
Cives Romani, the.
Cleon.
Clientes.
Colline Gate, battle of the.
Colony, a Roman.
Comitia Centuriata.
Comitia Tribunata.
Commercium.
Connubium.
Cornelia.
Crassus, P. Licinius.

Damophilus.
Domitia, Via.
Drusus, M. Livius.

England, history of Rome compared to that of.
Equites, the.
Equitius.
Eunous.

Fimbria.
Flaccus, Fulvius.
Fregellae, revolt of.

Gauda.
Geminus.
Glaucia, C. Servilius.
Gordius.
Gracchus, C.
Gracchus, T.

Helvetii, the.
Hortensius.

Jugurtha.
Jus Honorum.
--Suffragii.

Laenas Popilius.
Lamponius.
Lex Baebia.
--Cassia.
--Flaminia.
--Frumentaria of C. Gracchus.
--Judiciaria of C. Gracchus.
--Julia.
--Junia de Peregrinis.
--Licinia.
--Maria.
--Papiria.
--Plautia Papiria.
--Servilia.
--Thoria.
Lucullus,(1); (2).
Lupus.
Luxury at Rome.

M. Antonius.
M'. Aquillius.
Mariani Muli.
Marius, C.(1); (2).
Massiva.
Megallis.
Memmius.
Merula, L.
Metellus, Q. Caecilius.
Mithridates.
Municipium.
Murena.
Mutilus, C. Papius.

Nobiles.
Norbanus.

Octavius.
Ofella.
Opimius.
Optimates.

Orchomenus.
Oxyntas.

Patres.
Perduellio.
Peregrini, the.
Philippus.
Piraeus, siege of.
Plebeians.
Pompeius, Cn.(1); (2).

Pontius, C.
Populares.
Praefectura.
Proscriptions of Marius and Cinna.

Provincials.

Quaestio.

Rhone, canal cut from, by Marius.
Roscius.
Rubrius.
Rufus Rutilius.
Rupillius.

Sacriportus, battle of.
Salvius.

Salyes, the
Saturninus,
Satyreius, P.
Satyrus.
Scaevola.
Scaurus, M. Aemilius.
Scipio Aemilianus.
Scipio Nasica.
Septimuleius.
Sertorius.
Silo, Pompaedius.
Slavery, Roman.
Slave War, the first.
--    --   the second.
Social War, The.
Society, deterioration of Roman.

Sulla, L. Cornelius.
Sulla's laws.

Sulpician laws, the.
Sulpicius.

Taxiles.
Teanum, story of Roman cruelty at.
Teutones, the.
Thala.
Tifata, battle of.
Tigranes.
Tiguroni, the.
Tolosa, the gold of.
Tribunate.
Tuditanus, Sempronius.
Tugeni, the.
Turpilius.

Vaga.
Venusia, story of a herdsman at.
Vercellae.
Verres.
Vettius.
Vettius Scato.
Volux.





End of Project Gutenberg's The Gracchi Marius and Sulla, by A.H. Beesley

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