The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Belgian Front, by Captain Willy Breton.

The illustrations are from photographs
taken by the Photographic Service
of the Belgian Army
Command

Everyone knows how severely the Belgian Army was tested in the initial stages of the campaign. Caught unawares by the war while in the midst of re-organisation, it had to struggle alone, for long weeks on end, against forces greatly superior in both numbers and equipment, suddenly hurled against it in accordance with a deliberate and carefully planned scheme of attack.

Yet the Belgian Army bravely faced the enemy, grimly determined to fulfil its duty to the last, and at once aroused enthusiasm by its heroic resistance at Liège, from August 8 onwards, to the onset of several army corps. On the 12th the troops emerged victoriously from the bloody engagements at Haelen; and not till the 18th, and then only to escape being overwhelmed by the ever-rising flood of invasion, did the Belgian Army abandon its positions at La Gette and fall back on Antwerp, the national stronghold in which would be concentrated the whole of the country's powers of opposition. Its retreat was covered by rearguards which fought fiercely, especially at Hautem Ste. Marguerite. Namur, threatened since August 19th, fell to the enemy on the 23rd, after several of its forts had been destroyed by a terrific bombardment and the complete investment of the position made further resistance impossible. By a desperate effort, some 12,000 men of the 4th Division escaped the assailant's grip and succeeded in reaching France in the first instance, and Antwerp subsequently.

The army, left to its own devices in the great fortress which it still hoped to make impregnable, continued the stubborn fight against its implacable foe, though it had[Pg 6] suffered cruel losses and the Germans had initiated a reign of terror in the invaded provinces. It did everything possible to assist the Allies against the common enemy; first, by a sortie, made while the battle of the Somme was in progress; and then by a second vigorous and timely attack which coincided with the immortal victory of the Marne. For four days (September 9-13, 1914) the Belgian troops hurled themselves on the strong German positions facing Antwerp, drove back the masking forces in them, and prevented three whole divisions from going to the support of von Kluck's hard-pressed army. The part played by the Belgian Army in the battles of the Marne was, although an indirect one, very important and effective—as the Germans themselves have admitted.[A]

While engaged in continually harassing the enemy and also putting the fortress into a proper condition for defence, the Belgian Army was preparing, in the closing days of September, for a fresh and vigorous offensive to be directed chiefly against the left wing of the German containing forces, when it was confronted by a pressing danger which completely altered the aspect of affairs.

The Germans, having massed before Antwerp all the huge resources at their disposal, decided to attack the Belgian Army as it lay by breaching the defences of the fortress. On September 29th the first shells from the mammoth guns fell on the forts of Waelhem and Wavre-Sainte-Catherine, doing fearful damage, and from that moment the fate of Antwerp was sealed. The Belgian commander saw this clearly; and one of the things most greatly to his credit will always be that in these tragically momentous hours he was able to keep a stout heart and make the manly decision to abandon a position which he could not hold, in order to save his fighting army and continue the struggle elsewhere without respite or signs of weakening.

To cover the operations of evacuating from Antwerp all supplies that could be moved, and to ensure the army's retreat towards the coast, the Belgian troops, though exhausted and half-dead with fatigue, fought steadily for eight days under a fire of unprecedented violence.

The order for a general retreat was not given till the night of October 6-7, by which time the limit of resistance had been reached. Only one narrow avenue still lay open—between the Scheldt on the one side and the Dutch frontier and the sea on the other. Protected at first by a flanking guard (a cavalry division and two infantry divisions) and later by a rear-guard of two cavalry divisions, the field army managed by a miracle to reach the Yser, without leaving anything behind in the hands of the enemy during that epic retreat in which the exhausted troops had to cover more than 100 kilometres of congested roads.

The Yser line had not been designedly selected. But at the moment it happened to be the nearest line on which the Belgian Army could link up with the Allied forces now gradually advancing northwards along what has been termed "the sea-board route." Prodigies of valour and endurance were still needed to make the continuous front a fact and to shatter the enemy's efforts in the great battle of Flanders.

It is not my intention to recapitulate here the ensuing changes of fortune. The first act of the drama was, as everybody knows, the desperate fight which the "Belgian Army of ragamuffins"—now reduced to 80,000 men, with but 48,000 rifles and 350 guns—put up on the Yser during the last two weeks of October, against 150,000 Germans—mostly fresh troops—employing at least 500 guns of all calibres. Except for a reinforcement of 6,000 French marines, it was at first unsupported, yet it maintained an heroic resistance for eight days, fired by the passionate appeal and the example of its king. After October 23rd it had the help of the first detachments from the French division under Grossetti, and kept up the fight for another week with almost superhuman energy.

On the 31st the Germans were driven from Ramscapelle, and obliged to give ground before the inundation, whose dark, stealthy waters slowly but surely invaded the low-lying plain between the river and the Nieuport-Dixmude railway.

The battle of the Yser was then practically over. It had ended in victory, and the direct road to Dunkirk and Calais was barred to the enemy. He had suffered huge losses; but those of the Belgian Army also had been heavy enough—they were placed at 11,000 killed and missing and 9,000[Pg 8] wounded, a total of some 25,000 men, including those put out of action by sickness and exhaustion. The cadres had been so depleted that some regiments had only about ten officers left. Material was in a sad condition; half of the guns, rifles and machine-guns were useless, at least for the time being, and reserves of ammunition had given out.

The men looked hardly human in their ragged clothing. There were terrible gaps in their ranks. The infantry—to mention only the arm which had the hardest fighting to do—was reduced to 32,000 rifles. Yet, in spite of its weakness and its destitution—all the more pitiable now that winter was approaching—this army set about mounting guard over the last fragment of Belgian soil which its valour had preserved for the fatherland.

Three years have passed, and it still clings obstinately to its position, though the front originally defended in the battle of the Yser has been gradually lengthened. Circumstances have not hitherto allowed the Belgian Army to undertake operations on a large scale. Except for the considerable part which it played in checking the German attack on Steenstraat (April-May, 1915), when poisonous gas made its first appearance, its activities have been limited to minor operations, carried out chiefly with the object of improving its positions. These last have, however, been held with admirable courage and tenacity. Simultaneously with the tremendous effort which resulted in its glorious resurrection, the Belgian Army has done wonders along this front under peculiarly trying conditions, by dint of hard work and stoical endurance. Amid mud and water its soldiers have raised fortifications which are models of strength and ingenuity. So that the Belgian front, despite the unparalleled difficulties to be overcome, is admittedly among those whose defences have been constructed in the most solid possible manner. It is, in fact, a vast fortress, extending over many square kilometres. The visitor may be astonished when he notes the degree of perfection to which the Belgian Command has brought the organisation, properly so-called, of an army now consisting of robust men, well supplied with all kinds of armament and technical material, self-reliant and confident in its renewed strength; but he is dumbfounded when he realises what infinite labour was needed to build across these wet plains, oozing water[Pg 9] everywhere, the impassable barrier which has arisen under the very guns of the enemy.

We propose to notice briefly here the chief features of this last enterprise, which is unknown to the world in general. Perhaps a description of it will lead to fuller appreciation of the part played by the Belgian Army since its front was immobilised on the Yser, and to a better understanding of the energy, goodwill and endurance of which it has given proof.

The Front to be Held—The Task before the Belgian Army—General Features of the Country to be Organised for Defence.

After their failure to trample upon the remnants of the Belgian Army and take Calais, the Germans had transferred their activities to the Ypres district, where they hoped that attacks pressed home with the utmost fury would enable them to effect their purpose. This second stage in the battle of Flanders ended in the enemy experiencing a second check as costly as the first. While it was in progress, the Germans, with the double object of holding the Allied forces on the north and of trying to force the Yser at that point, renewed their assaults on the Dixmude bridgehead. On November 10th, 1914, the weakened French and Belgian troops, whose muddy trenches had been blown to pieces by the bombardment, had to give ground before the enemy's pressure and fall back on to the left bank of the Yser, leaving the ruins of Dixmude in the hands of the Germans. But all attempts of the enemy to cross the river were fruitless. The Germans encountered so stubborn a resistance that they soon abandoned a project which had already cost them frightful losses.

With the approach of winter, fighting gradually died down all along the Flanders front. The two opponents were exhausted, and were obliged to reconstitute their forces and organise their respective positions. From this time onwards there was nothing to record save a few local engagements of short duration, though fierce and always entailing heavy casualties. The enemy's artillery, however, took advantage of its numerical superiority and greater weight in the Belgian sector to keep up a ceaseless and destructive[Pg 10] fire upon our works, now in their earliest stages, and on the villages which acted as cantonments for our wearied troops. One after the other, the humble townlets of the Yser front crumbled into dust, shot to pieces by shell and devoured by fire.

It was in this devastated and desolate region, and in the depth of a severe winter, that the hastily reformed Belgian Army—as yet hardly recovered from its terrible experiences and still lacking a thousand necessaries—had to set to work to convert into a solid rampart the weak barrier on which the enemy's attacks had been broken only by prodigies of heroism.

The front entrusted to its care extended from the outskirts of Nieuport to the old Knocke fort at the confluence of the Yser with the Yperlée. Passing round the east side of Nieuport, it rejoins the railway to the south of the town and then follows the railway embankment to Dixmude, separated by the inundation from the Yser itself. To the south-west of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke the front curves inwards to meet the Yser dyke at the 16th milestone, and runs along the left bank of the river, skirting the lands which the flood waters, working steadily southwards, have converted into swamps.

As fast as the Belgian Army regained its strength the front was extended further, along the Yperlée and the Ypres canal, to the north of Steenstraat in the first instance, and then to Boesinghe. So it is really the Belgian Army which has definitely organised the whole front up to the latter place, over a distance of at least 31 kilometres.

If one considers only the portion which had to be defended by the army in the early stages—that between the sea and Fort Knocke—it is clear that a heavy strain was put upon the weak effectives left in being after the battle of the Yser—a strain all the greater because the gaps in the ranks could be filled but slowly and with great difficulty.

The inundations certainly protected a large part of the front and made the enemy's attacks less formidable. But the protection might be nullified by frost. A great deal of work was, therefore, needed to enable the area of the inundation to be regulated at will, to prevent the water invading our own trenches, and to make it impossible for the enemy to use the inundation against us.

It would be a serious mistake to assume that this sheet of water formed an impassable obstacle at all points. Where it seemed to give the greatest security—between the Nieuport-Dixmude railway and the Yser—the roads and tracks, which are causeways in all weathers, and the small risings in the ground near the buildings and farms scattered about the country, stood out of the great lagoon and offered chances of getting across, or formed islands that might usefully be occupied.

From the first Belgians and Germans had fought for the possession of these points, in order to cover their main positions and prevent access to them by the creation of advanced posts in the very heart of the floods. Further to the south, the water had spared the Dixmude region, where the ground rises slightly. At this place the two foes lay facing one another, separated only by the width of the Yser—some 15 to 20 yards. Just as it was necessary to organise a bridgehead able to resist any attack at Nieuport—where the locks are—so at Dixmude, where we were in close contact with the enemy, we had to construct a bastion of the strongest possible kind, since this was a vital spot in the Belgian line, and the enemy's repeated attempts upon it showed clearly enough how extremely important he considered its possession to be.

Still further south, the Belgian front clung to the western bank of the canal formed by the Yser and Yperlée, while the enemy occupied the other, keeping as close to it as he could and standing off only when compelled to do so by the floods.

To sum up: though the main positions were not very near together, the advanced posts of both sides threatened each other, in some instances at point-blank range. The Germans, who were well aware of the weakness of the Belgian Army, would not have failed to profit by the least negligence on our part, nor to try for an easy success at any weak point discovered in our lines. But no chance of the kind was given them.

The system of defence created by the Belgian Army along the front, as briefly described above, served a double purpose.

First, it gave support to the left flank of the Allied forces along the western front, and at this end barred the most southerly roads to Dunkirk and Calais.

Secondly, it preserved unviolated for Belgium the last fragment of her national soil—an object of both political and military importance.

While the first shows with sufficient clearness the importance of the part undertaken by the Belgian Army, the latter explains even more fully the great value which that army sets upon the positions entrusted to its valour. It realises in full the seriousness of its task, for by relieving the Allies of all anxiety concerning the most northerly part of their front, it gives them the necessary freedom of action for dealing the enemy, in selected sectors, those heavy blows which have already repeatedly shaken the might of Germany.

But how the Belgian soldiers' readiness to do their part without flinching stiffened into a firm resolve when they reflected that, in doing it, they were also defending against the enemy's greed the last few square miles of Belgian territory, in which the air they breathed was still free, in which lived their king! What a holy enthusiasm was kindled in their hearts by the prospect of one day leaping from their trenches to drive out the tyrannical and cruel oppressor!

These are the noble feelings whence spring the moral strength and stout-heartedness of our troops—qualities which have enabled them to endure without a murmur severe privations, the cruel separation from all they hold most dear, the long sojourn in their comfortless trenches, amid water and mud and ruins that become more and more depressing—heart-breaking surroundings among which they will have to pass yet a fourth winter, now close at hand.

To give a better idea of the work imposed on the Belgian Army it will be convenient to summarise what, in the present war, is implied by organising the defences of a sector. The power of modern artillery and explosives, which are able to destroy the most massive fortifications, renders it impossible to rest content with a single position, however strong it may be. Hence the absolute necessity for extending the state of defence to a deep zone and for creating [Pg 13]several successive positions. This is the only way of localising a temporary success, such as the enemy may win at any time if he take the necessary steps and be willing to pay a heavy price for it. Moreover, every position must itself consist of a series of defensive lines, a short distance apart, each covered by its own subsidiary defences.

These conditions are all the more difficult to fulfil when the defences are rendered less permanent by the nature of the ground, as is the case on the Belgian front, where one cannot burrow into soil which is practically at sea level. It thus comes about that—to take an example—the organised zone, 10 to 12 kilometres deep, between the two natural defensive lines of the Yser and the Loo canal, is nothing more than an unbroken series of organised lines, placing as many successive obstacles in the path of an assailant who may have succeeded in breaking through at any point.

The positions nearest to the enemy are necessarily continuous; and the lie of each is influenced not merely by the terrain but still more by the arbitrary direction of the contact lines of the two opponents. Each line, therefore, follows a twisting course. More or less straight stretches are succeeded by salients and re-entrant angles which take the most varied forms. The defences embrace farms and other premises and small woods, all converted into points d'appui. Where such are lacking at important points, they must be created artificially.

Communication trenches, allowing movement out of sight of the enemy, connect the various positions, and the successive lines of a position, with one another. Shelters have to be constructed everywhere—they cannot be built too strong, to protect the men as much as possible from bombardment and from the weather during their long spells on guard in the trenches. Special emplacements must be most carefully prepared for machine-guns, bomb-throwers and trench-mortars, which play a part too important to need special comment.

The whole zone is dotted over at various distances from the enemy with batteries, or emplacements for batteries, of all calibres. You will understand that their construction represents a vast amount of hard and exact work, and that only with the greatest difficulty can they be more or less satisfactorily hidden from the enemy's direct or aerial[Pg 14] observation in a plain that is practically bare and commanded everywhere by the Clercken heights.

The magnitude of the movements of troops and material, as well as the need for ensuring rapid transfer in all directions, have compelled the creation of all means of communication to alleviate the existing shortage—roads, tracks and railways of standard or narrow gauge. The execution of such work is attended by great difficulty where the soft nature of the soil gives an unreliable foundation. You may imagine also how complicated the task is when foot-bridges, in many cases several hundred yards long, have to be carried right across the floods in full view of the enemy, to give access to the most advanced positions. In conclusion, we may mention among the most important undertakings the vast network of telegraph and telephone wires, with which the whole of the occupied zone has to be covered in order to inter-connect the numberless centres and keep them in touch with the posts close to the enemy lines.

Topographically, the sector which the Belgian Army has had to organise and defend is certainly one of the worst. This will be denied neither by the British units which this year occupied the Nieuport district nor by the French units linked up with the Belgians near Boesinghe and Steenstraat. Several descriptions have been written of the peculiar appearance presented by this low-lying, perfectly flat, region between the Franco-Belgian frontier, the sea coast and the Yser, and known as the "Veurne-Ambacht." It is a monotonous plain of alluvial soil, which centuries of toil have slowly won from the waters. As far as the eye can see stretch water-meadows, which serve as pasturage for large numbers of cattle. That they may be flooded during the winter and drained again later in the year, these water-meadows are surrounded by irrigation ditches three to four yards wide—"vaarten" or "grachten," as they are called locally.

A glance at the Staff map reveals so great a number of these ditches that the district appears to be nothing more than a huge marsh. As a matter of fact, the country is subdivided into innumerable lots by this inextricable tangle of ditches, and looks like a huge fantastic chess-board. With[Pg 15] the approach of winter the "vaarten" become brimful of water; and at any time of the year a short spell of rain makes them overflow and transform the ground into a morass.

During the happy times of peace the only shelter to be found on the plain was that of the villages or hamlets, their houses as a rule grouped round a slated steeple, and of the isolated farms whose red roofs relieved the monotony of the landscape with bright splashes of colour. Apart from Nieuport and Dixmude it could boast but one town of any importance—Furnes the dismal, which German shells soon reduced to deserted ruins.

In this essentially agricultural country, boasting not a single manufacturing industry, a people of simple tastes, strongly attached to the fruitful soil which supplied most of their wants, lived a peaceful, sober life, into which, at regular intervals, the village fairs introduced an element of rude and boisterous gaiety. Property here has always been much subdivided, and large farms are quite the exception. So that in Belgium, which as a whole is so rich and thickly-populated, "Veurne-Ambacht" has always been regarded as a district that would afford an army the minimum of billeting facilities and of the various supplies required.

Communications, too, are few and far between. Except for the Nieuport-Dixmude railway—which follows the same course as our main positions—and a few very second-rate light railways, there is but one line, that connecting Dixmude and Furnes with Dunkirk; and it is only a single line without depôts or sidings.

Roads worthy of the name are rare enough. One of them, which begins at Nieuport and passes through Ramscapelle, Oudecapelle and Loo, runs almost parallel to the front, under the enemy's direct fire. To the west there is only one more, the high-road from Furnes to Ypres. This, also, is of great importance, although, being within range of the German guns, it is constantly subjected to bombardment.

Lateral communications towards the front are confined on the one side to the roads which connect Furnes with Nieuport and Pervyse; and on the other to the by-roads which the main Furnes-Ypres highway throws off towards Oudecapelle, Loo and Boesinghe.

The remainder of the system is made up of badly-paved or dirt roads, which are rendered useless by the lightest shower. Men and horses get bogged in a deep, sticky mud, from which they can extricate themselves only by the severest exertion. Of a truth the thick, clinging mud of "Veurne-Ambacht" is a persistent and terrible enemy, which one can only curse and fight without respite.

We may add that this inhospitable region is entirely exposed to an observer stationed at any of several favourable points east of the Yser. The plain is commanded on the north from the top of the Westende dunes; centrally, from near Keyem; on the south, by the Clercken heights, where the ground rises to Hill 43. Not a movement, not a single work undertaken by the Belgian troops escaped the enemy until the clever but very complex arrangement of artificial screens was evolved which now protects almost the whole of this vast plain from direct observation.

The above is a short and imperfect description of the region in which the Belgian Army has made a stand for the last three years, and which it has converted into a practically impregnable fortress. The features emphasised by us will enable readers to understand the very special character of the defence works which it has had to construct, and the amount of patient labour which was and still is imposed on it.

For Germany is not the only foe that the Belgian Army has to fight. It must struggle ceaselessly with the weather and the treacherous water which oozes from the inhospitable soil and gnaws at the foundations of defences whereon shells and bombs fall day in, day out. It lives in a country which has a disagreeable climate; where rain persists for two-thirds of the year; where dense and quickly-forming fogs spread an icy murk in the winter; where fierce storms rise suddenly and at times blow with extraordinary violence.

Before we proceed to a short account of the main defensive works, special attention should be drawn to certain constructive features common to them all.

We must remember that it is impossible to excavate even to a slight depth, except in some parts of the more southerly front, where the ground rises on a gentle slope. Drive a[Pg 17] spade in but a few inches, and you strike water. The result is that defence-works of all kinds have had to be built with imported material.

The trenches of the Belgian line are not the least like the narrow, deep ditches of the western front, of which we all have seen many illustrations taken from all points of view. Properly speaking, they are nothing else than ramparts raised above the ground. Behind these breast-works, built throughout with the greatest difficulty, the defenders tread on the natural ground, which thus really forms the bottom of what is incorrectly named a "trench."

The mere fact that one cannot excavate obviously makes it necessary to bring up from the rear—often from a great distance—all the materials required, including earth, hundreds of thousands of cubic yards of which is piled up in millions of bags.

The transport of these materials meant a very formidable task, especially in the early days. We have referred to the country's deficiency in means of communication of any value. So everything—sand-bags, stakes, tree-trunks, rails, cement, bricks, shingle, hurdles, barbed wire—has to be moved to the front lines by night on men's backs or in light vehicles able to carry only a strictly limited load, as a heavy one could not be got along the muddy and soft roads. Need one dwell upon the peculiar difficulties encountered in consolidating the ground sufficiently to bear the weight of special defences, such as those of concrete?

Not till long after the battle of the Yser, when the main positions had been adequately strengthened, could attention be given to improving the road system by building new roads and constructing additional railways of narrow and standard gauge. It is, therefore, not surprising that the recollection of the labour, more particularly that done during the winter, has remained a veritable nightmare to the men engaged upon the task. Shot and shell raked them incessantly. They had to toil knee-deep in water and mud, perished with cold, whipped by wind and rain. Owing to the depleted condition of the ranks, most of the fighting forces had, one may say, to mount guard continuously along an extended and still imperfectly consolidated front.

An appeal was made to the older classes, elderly garrison troops, or "old overcoats" as the soldiers picturesquely[Pg 18] called them. Working tirelessly behind the lines, they "shovelled their fatherland into little bags," so they jokingly described it among themselves. These old fellows, assisted by a few resting (?) units, toiled day and night, preparing all the indispensable materials and carrying them to the front trenches over sodden roads swept by the enemy's fire. There, the stoical defenders of the Yser, protected by watchful guards and with their rifles always ready to hand, patiently, persistently and with marvellous pluck raised bit by bit the invincible barrier which they had sworn to hold against every new effort of the enemy.

The inundation let loose at the most critical period of the battle of the Yser, when the enemy had succeeded in crossing the river at Saint Georges, Schoorbakke, Tervaete and near Oud-Stuyvekenskerke, could not at first be so regulated as to harass the enemy only. It had gradually invaded part of our own trenches, and it was therefore an urgent matter to get the waters under complete control, lest the heroic means employed should compel the Belgian Army to abandon positions held hitherto at so serious a cost of life. To effect this, important works had to be put in hand without delay; some for defence, others for offence.

The first defensive measure consisted in the construction of trenches, which it was imperative to build at once, whether in water which oozed up at all points or in deep mud. Working with feverish activity, men piled sand-bags, brought up in a constant stream from the rear, on the marshy soil. In this manner parapets of a steadily increasing solidity slowly formed a continuous front which, though still of doubtful strength, sufficed to protect the occupied zone against surprise attacks.

Before the business of putting the ground in a proper state of defence could be initiated, the inundation had to be got under effectual control. This implied, let us note, the power to flood the ground on the enemy's side at will, while preventing the water passing beyond a sharply defined line, and making it quite impossible for the enemy to threaten us in turn.

The enormous technical difficulties which our engineers had to overcome can easily be imagined. We may observe,[Pg 19] in the first place, that the Yser district is intersected by many small tributaries of the river and by a number of interconnected canals. The two zones—our own and that of the enemy—thus had direct communication with one another, so that, unless minute precautions were taken, and a great deal of work done, it was not possible to flood either zone without exposing the other to a similar fate.

Nor was this all. The enemy was, and still is, at liberty to lower the water level by "bleeding" the inundation on his side. To defeat such attempts, it was necessary to put ourselves in a position to turn the requisite volume of water towards his lines.

Finally, provision must be made for draining off the water promptly and carefully, should the need arise, so as to prevent a disaster being caused by the enemy increasing the inundation, or merely by the torrential rain which falls at times with disheartening persistence in this depressing region. A constant struggle between the two opponents was thus always in progress. Let us say at once that the ingenuity and unwearying exertions of our men always triumphed in contests of this kind. They continue to dominate the situation completely, and the Germans have had to own themselves beaten.

The reader will realise that we cannot give a detailed description of the measures taken; the most difficult and complicated of which were unquestionably those designed to protect the Belgian lines from inundations let loose on the enemy's positions.

It has been mentioned more than once that, thanks to their command of Nieuport and its locks, the Belgians held the key of the inundations in their hands. But we must not forget that for three years German shells have been continually directed at the locks and bridges. The works that have had to be undertaken, carried out and maintained in good condition throughout this region will astonish the experts when it is possible to reveal their real character.

What shall be said, then, of the great importance of the many barrages which we have had to raise; of the dykes—some of them more than a kilometre long—of the strengthening of the banks along the canals and water-courses that furrow the country in all directions?

The embankments are of two main kinds: the solid and those with sluices. The second are used in places where the free play of the water must be allowed and regulated. It will easily be believed that the construction of these artificial barriers, able to withstand heavy pressure, needed the piling up of 100,000, 200,000 and even 300,000 sand-bags apiece; that not fewer than a million bags were required for the largest dyke, the contents of which were a trifling 30,000 cubic yards!

We cannot say more on the subject here; but the few figures given will, we think, convey an adequate idea of the vast work entailed in controlling the inundations.

When the first dyke, running continuously along the front, had been finished, and the waters were sufficiently under control to relieve all fears of a serious catastrophe, and when the water-posts disputed with the enemy had been occupied in the midst of the floods, we had to give immediate attention to improving the lines, completing earthworks and organising the depth of the positions in accordance with the general principles set forth above.

There was no time to be lost. With the return of fine weather we had to expect a renewal of activity on the part of the enemy, who apparently had not given up his ambitious designs on Dunkirk and Calais. In each of the sectors which our depleted divisions had to guard, operations were organised on a systematic plan, with the firm determination of carrying them through in the shortest time possible. Work of any importance could not, of course, be done in broad daylight, for, as we have already said, nothing escaped the enemy's notice. Though far away, his guns never ceased to plough up the grounds, and to what losses should we not have exposed ourselves had we attempted to strengthen our positions in daylight, close up to his fines and before his very eyes!

So in the depths of a wet and severe winter our men had to toil during the night, under the most trying conditions imaginable. Now that these have been considerably improved, thanks to a perfect organisation which extends to the smallest details, it is difficult to realise the enormous efforts and the real physical suffering which the defenders[Pg 21] of the Yser had to face during those long months of the early part of the war.

The unit detailed for work in the front line of a given sector was, by the irony of words, "resting," or partly resting—which means that it was quartered among ruins in cantonments partially destitute of resources, a long way from the workshops to which it had to find its way at night-fall. "Doing their bit" valiantly, sustained by a self-confidence which never deserted them, the men showed on all occasions the greatest goodwill, and—despite certain reports to the contrary—unfailing good humour. They grumbled a good deal, goodness knows; and who would not have done the same in their place? But they kept going, enduring hard labour and privation, under the stimulus of a burning desire to punish the enemy who was responsible for all the troubles that afflicted them.

Clad in the most weird and often deplorable clothes, these men trudged along through the darkness of the night, over muddy tracks and sodden roads, towards the marshy belt of flooded meadows. This tramp through the night was a real penance. At every step the men stumbled in the heavy and sticky mud, over displaced cobbles or in shell-holes brimming with water. They had to struggle along in this fashion, sometimes for hours on end, to reach the "material depôts" where such sand-bags, stakes, corrugated iron sheets, barbed wire and tools as could be got together were distributed among them. To-day there is an abundance of all these things; but at the time of which we write supplies were very short, and one had to get along as best one could with anything that came to hand in a haphazard way which now seems pitiable.

However, what did it matter? Carrying loads which added to the difficulties of progress, the men plodded along almost indistinguishable paths and tracks where the least slip threatened to send them headlong into deep mud. Extreme caution was needed to avoid rousing the enemy. Lights were constantly thrown up from his lines, flooding the dreary country with their pale radiance. When one rose, the men instantly threw themselves flat in the mire. Occasionally the column would be surprised before it could take cover, and be subjected to bursts of machine-gun fire. In this way many brave fellows died an obscure[Pg 22] death while performing one of the most thankless and disagreeable tasks imaginable.

On reaching the scene of action, the men set to work, forgetting their fatigue in the anxiety to add their quotum to that done on the previous night before daylight should return; raising and consolidating the frail rampart of sandbags, building fresh shelters or arranging the auxiliary defences in front of the trenches.

What words can fitly describe the patience, courage and endurance of these workers, perpetually overlooked by the enemy, toiling to exhaustion under the fire of machine-guns trained on our lines, exposed to death-dealing bombs, a single one of which would sometimes nullify the efforts of a whole night or burst like a thunder-clap in the midst of a group of men, scattering death and horrible wounds?

No suffering, however, could break their indomitable will. Admirable they were and are. Nothing could be more touching than the self-sacrificing spirit which animated these heroes. They had not even the satisfaction of being able to return blow for blow, to increase their keenness and energy. On the contrary, they knew that death threatened them, not while rifle in hand and drunk with the madness of the fray, but while ingloriously wielding a common trenching-tool.

This dreadful life lasted for weeks and months on end. Think of the exhaustion of it, when the same men had to work every night, then take their turn on guard in the trenches without any chance of getting a really refreshing sleep! Later on, the bringing of the regiments up to full strength and the advanced condition of the work fortunately made it possible to arrange a judicious rotation of duty. Nevertheless, our men have never been able to consider their job quite done, since on the Belgian front one has constantly to reconstruct, repair, even entirely rebuild, fortifications damaged by the enemy's fire or by water—that second foe which is often more destructive than the first.

The best means of arriving at a due appreciation of the perseverance shown by the Belgian troops and of the time required for the completion of their task, is a numerical statement of the work actually achieved. We may note that the whole front organised by the Belgian Army extends[Pg 23] for about 31 kilometres (19¼ miles), as measured along the front line of trenches; also, that this system of continuous or discontinuous positions has a great depth, and that each position is made up of several lines, one behind the other, their number varying according to tactical requirements or topographical conditions.

Without fear of being accused of exaggeration, we may, therefore, reckon the total length of the trenches which the Belgian Army had to make, as 10 to 15 times that of the front itself. To this we must add the many kilometres of communication trenches which allow the men to move from one line to another without being seen and to a certain extent without being hit by the enemy.

At a low estimate the total work amounts to at least 400 kilometres of earthworks [B]—the distance, as the crow flies, from Paris to Cologne or from Paris to Strassburg, or half as much again as that from Ostend to Arlon, the longest stretch which can be measured in Belgium.

The accompanying photographs show several views of the trenches of the Belgian front on the Yser, and give a better idea than any words of the real convict work accomplished during three years of incessant labour in horribly difficult ground. Just think what it involved! Every yard of fire-trench—traverses and parados included—required the moving of 7 to 8 cubic metres of earth; every yard of communication trench, the transport and placing of at least 4 cubic metres. You will not be far out if you reckon at 39½ million cubic metres (49-2/3; million cubic yards) the volume of the earthworks raised on the Belgian front in the construction of the main and communication trenches alone.

Trenches of both classes are either formed entirely of sand-bags or very solidly revetted with sand-bags, wattles or bricks. All these materials have had to be laboriously brought up from the rear. We mention this fact again, as it cannot be over-emphasised. The total number of bags used runs into tens of millions, while the superficial area of the hurdles placed in position must be reckoned in thousands of square yards.

But the mere making of the trenches is not the whole business. They must be protected from attack by means of a dense and deep system of auxiliary defences—networks of barbed wire, chevaux de frise, land mines, etc. What statistician could calculate the number of the hundreds of thousands of stakes that have been driven and the thousands of miles of wire arranged in front of the parapets by our heroic workers?

Wherever our lines are near those of the enemy—who as a rule possesses the great advantage of commanding them—special works are needed to prevent bullets enfilading the trenches and doing havoc. All these trenches are, therefore, covered with a series of arches, which may be seen in some of our photographs. The soft bottoms of the whole system of defences must also be carefully consolidated to render their occupation possible and to enable the men to move about with ease. Duckboards, assembled just behind the front and then brought into the lines, have had to be laid everywhere with infinite labour in the muddy bottom of the trenches—dozens of miles of them—and relaid heaven only knows how often!

It would be a good thing if one could regard the works when once carried through as definitely finished; but that would be too much to hope for, since the most solid revetments crumble in sorry fashion under bombardment, and the elements also seem to be bent on destroying them. Anything heavy settles little by little, owing to the lack of consistency in the subsoil. In bad weather especially, when the rain never ceases and the floods spread, our men daily report parapets giving way and duckboards disappearing under the water or mud. Then everything has to be done over again. One must set to work, with a patience ever sorely tried, to reconstruct laboriously what was originally put together only by the most strenuous efforts. Thus it has come about that many of the trenches have had to be reformed five or six times.

So far we have dealt only with the main positions. We turn now to the prodigious effort demanded by the construction of advanced fortifications right in the middle of the floods. The first step is to make foot-bridges, several kilometres long in some places. (One of our photographs gives a striking view of such a bridge.) Over these, which[Pg 25] the enemy can sweep with his fire, all the materials needed for making the advanced works must be carried, usually on men's backs and in any case by very precarious means of transport. A mere "water-post" requires thousands of sand-bags, so you can form some idea of the labour implied in the building of one of the many important posts situated in the inundated area to protect our main positions. All the earthworks, reckoned in hundreds of cubic yards; all the concrete emplacements which alone are able to withstand the continual bombardment; all the close networks of barbed wire have had to materialise but a few yards away from the enemy's lines. You may well ask yourself whence the men have drawn the reserves of perseverance, energy and pluck that were needed in such conditions for raising fortifications like these above the waters.

Most of the works already referred to were carried out either entirely or chiefly by the infantry, who, after hours of guard duty in the trenches, laid aside the rifle only to pick up a tool and indefatigably continue their rough and dangerous labour among the same scenes of ruin and devastation.

We have remarked in passing that much detail work of widely different kinds has had to go forward simultaneously with the organisation proper of the defensive positions. Its execution was entrusted to special troops; engineers (sappers), bridge-builders, telegraphists, railway corps, etc., as well as to many labour companies consisting of men of the older classes attached to the engineers. Men of the heavy and field artillery have had to make the many emplacements for batteries of all calibres, which have increased steadily in number as the Belgian Army has been able to get and assemble in its workshops an abundance of the requisite material. It is impossible to describe the innumerable works of this kind in detail without straying too far, so we will content ourselves here with reviewing them briefly and giving some figures which will enable the reader to appreciate the great responsibilities assumed by the various branches.

1. Concrete Shelters, Redoubts and Fighting-Posts.—The weakness of earthworks constructed with sand-bags, which are scattered in all directions by bursting shells, has compelled us to build numerous concrete shelters, though the[Pg 26] work is beset by many difficulties and sometimes has to be executed right under the enemy's nose—bombproofs, machine-gun posts and fighting-posts for the battalion, regimental and battery staffs. All construction of this kind must be preceded by a thorough consolidation of the ground, which in its natural condition is too soft to support such heavy weights. At several points in the front lines themselves we have also had to make particularly strong points d'appui, usually concrete redoubts, in which a large garrison may hold out to the last man.

The importance of these works will be inferred from the statement that their construction has involved the use of at least 300,000 to 400,000 cubic yards of concrete.

2. Communications.—It will be remembered that the district occupied by the Belgian Army was poorly supplied with railways, roads and usable tracks. After the battle of Flanders (October to November, 1914) the continuous movement of troops over the existing roads, added to the effects of bombardment and bad weather, had done great damage to almost all the few available means of communication. This state of things had to be promptly remedied, both to accelerate putting the sector into a state of defence and, what was still more urgent, to enable all kinds of supplies required by the troops and the materials for the defence works to be brought up.

Special units, therefore, laid in the advanced army zone some 180 kilometres of new railways of standard gauge, and several hundred kilometres of Decauville railway. The light tracks were gradually pushed through the communication and main trenches, and even along the foot-bridges leading to the main pickets.

So that our men might cross the countless canals, streams and ditches met with everywhere, and move over flooded and marshy areas, the Belgian engineers built hundreds of bridges and thousands of culverts, besides some tens of kilometres of the foot-bridges already described. As an example, we may mention that one of these foot-bridges, crossing a marsh in the southern part of the front, is quite 800 metres long.

As for the road-system, existing roads had to be remade and improved, while new ones were built and narrow ones widened and strengthened sufficiently to carry all kinds of[Pg 27] traffic. This road-building and mending was applied to 400 kilometres of roads and usable tracks in all; and absorbed some 500,000 tons of road metal and as many tons of sand—which involved the moving and handling of, say, 1,000,000,000 tons of various materials.

The upkeep of the roads, which carry a dense and continuous traffic, demands unceasing labour, especially in the winter.

In conclusion, we should mention that there are, in addition to the road-system properly so-called, many infantry routes and approaches for artillery which have had to be made with great difficulty across marshes and soft meadowland.

3. Various Forms of Construction.—One cannot pretend to give even a bare list of the varied and numberless erections for which our engineers have been responsible behind the Belgian front, to accommodate the fighting troops and auxiliary services and mitigate the scarcity of suitable quarters. For three years German guns have battered everything within range, and converted the humble, peaceful villages of Veurne-Ambacht into heaps of ruins. One must go far behind the front to find any premises that have still escaped shell-fire. In them have been established all the organisations which need not be actually in the lines, and there also are quartered as large a part as possible of the resting units. But they cannot hold all the troops not in the trenches; and it will readily be understood that battalions held in reserve and warned first in case of an attack, must be near enough to throw themselves into the fight without loss of time. The problem has been solved by building a large number of huts in each divisional sector; yet without grouping them so closely as to afford an easy mark to the enemy's guns and aeroplanes. So the hutments, capable of accommodating some 100,000 men and about 15,000 horses, have been scattered over the whole of the district occupied.

In addition, much has had to be done and many buildings have had to be erected, in order to secure the best possible conditions for the elaborate organisations of the medical service, even in the fighting zone. We have had to provide bombproof first-aid stations, dressing-stations, and field hospitals, in many cases quite close to the lines, under[Pg 28] circumstances the difficulties of which have already been sufficiently emphasised.

Huge hospitals, with several thousands of beds, have had to be built from the foundations upwards for the reception of the wounded not able to endure removal to the rear. Furnes, the only town in the district, at first provided invaluable accommodation; but, when systematic bombardment of the city endangered even the lives of the poor wounded, the hospital services had to be transferred elsewhere. The splendid hospital at La Panne, Adinkerke, Hoogstade and Beveren-sur-Yser, have long been regarded as models of their kind, though their establishment was attended by serious difficulties. Every possible modern improvement has been turned to account in their equipment; and although within earshot of the never-silent guns, they have accomplished marvels which the greatest authorities on the subject have on many occasions unstintedly and rightly praised.

We may conclude by just mentioning the aviation and balloon parks, the necessary installations for the various technical services, and the repair shops for motor- and horse-drawn vehicles, all of which have been established in the advanced zone by the Belgian Army. The vast amount of labour represented by these undertakings is self-evident, as the district contained practically no supplies of the materials needed.

4. Artificial Screens.—Unless we were to be content to expose ourselves to grave inconveniences and suffer huge losses, it is obvious that we could not long tolerate the enemy's full command of a plain entirely devoid of any cover able to interfere with his observations. The only means of blinding him was to protect all our works with artificial screens, composed of branches, hurdles and canvas set or hung all over the area occupied. Viewed by an observer in the German lines, these screens overlap in such a way as to form a virtually unbroken barrier, impenetrable to the eye.

To the layman this picturesque solution of the problem may seem simplicity itself, because he does not take into account the trouble of establishing these screens. As usual, all materials have to be brought to the spot from the rear. Fabulous quantities of branches are transported to the front[Pg 29] by rail or barge, then loaded on to vehicles and taken to the workshops, where they are converted into enormous screens to be placed in carefully selected positions by special gangs detailed for the purpose.

As the supply of branches is not enough to meet all requirements, our resourceful fellows make use of reeds cut in the marshes of flooded meadows, some of them adjacent to the enemy's lines. The reeds are tied into large bundles and carried on the back to the hurdle-works, there to be interwoven and arranged between suitable supports.

Many thousands of square metres of these artificial masks have been set up all over the great plain. But, unfortunately, they are as fragile as they are picturesque. The wind, which often rises to a gale in this coastal region, blows them down or makes yawning holes in them; so they need constant attention. However, our long-enduring men have worked so well that the enemy cannot now watch what goes on in our lines.

5. The Supply of Drinking Water.—By a peculiar irony of fate, although the Belgian soldiers live in a country so saturated with water that every possible means must be employed to combat it, they would die of thirst had not works of considerable magnitude been undertaken to provide them with water fit to drink. During the battle of the Yser, when complete disorganisation reigned among the supply services of our valiant but unlucky army, many of the men could quench their thirst only with the muddy and loathsome water of the ditches which served them as trenches. As soon as that tragic fight was over, the greatest precautions had to be taken to prevent an epidemic of typhoid fever decimating what remained of our army. The existing wells in the fighting area had been invaded by the brackish flood water, in which floated hundreds of corpses; while those in the districts not yet ravaged by fire scarcely sufficed for local needs.

So to the rear, as in other cases, we had to look for drinkable water, which must be got up to the front lines in spite of transport difficulties.

As soon as circumstances allowed, we began to sink an adequate number of wells; and while in some places our fighting men obstinately strove to protect their defensive works from the treacherous floods, in others our workmen[Pg 30] dug and bored into the unkindly soil in search of a stratum yielding potable water, which was struck at a depth of 125 metres—sometimes even further down. This alone will give some idea of the obstacles that had at all costs to be overcome. Our desperate and unwearied efforts were happily crowned with success, and soon the whole army, including the many auxiliary services of the advanced zone, enjoyed an abundance of good water.

6. The Telephone System.—Everybody knows how very important the telephone has become during the present war; but even the most far-sighted people who had strongly urged the general employment of this essentially practical and rapid means of communication, had not anticipated the extraordinarily wide scope which was to be given it.

To-day the telephone is the real bond of union between all units serving at the front, from the observer crouching in his advanced post to the commander-in-chief. It links those who issue commands with those who obey them, the lowest with the highest, and makes it possible for all efforts directed towards a single end to be correlated most efficiently in the performance of the common task. If so bold a comparison may be permitted, the telephonic network is the nervous system traversing the huge body of an army in action. The best mode of showing the prime importance of this network is to give some figures, which certainly exceed all the calculations that the layman would be likely to make. Would he imagine, for instance, that, by about the middle of the year 1917, the telephone wires of a single sector held by the Belgians had a total length greater than half that of the equator, or exactly 21,950 kilometres?

It is not difficult to realise what labour was needed to install such a system. The innumerable wires and posts had not merely to be put in place, but to be protected from destruction, sheltered against incessant bombardment, and repaired at once if unavoidably damaged. In the most dangerous areas the wires had to be buried deep, or, where they crossed flooded areas, laid under water. This meant the excavating and filling-in of hundreds of kilometres of deep trenches before the delicate work of burying wires and cables was completed. The 21,950 kilometres of wires in the Belgian front system are made up of 6,600 kilometres of buried or submerged wires and 15,350 kilometres of aerial[Pg 31] line. The telephone instruments in use number nearly 8,000; the exchange switch-boards, not far short of 1,000.

Let us add that this network requires unremitting attention, and that it is being extended and improved daily, and we shall have said enough to give an idea of the prodigious task accomplished by the special corps entrusted with the management of this arduous undertaking.

7. The Batteries.—The Belgian Army began the war with but a limited supply of 75-mm. guns and hardly a couple of dozen 149-mm. and 150-mm. howitzers; so that it was for a long time compelled to face its powerfully equipped enemy on very unequal terms, a state of things which gave rise to much anxiety. Its battery crews, however, though so seriously handicapped, always fought with remarkable courage and technical skill. During the violent battle of the Yser, especially, their self-sacrifice and devotion won the deepest admiration: and they were also largely responsible for the heroic stand which will be one of the most glorious pages in our army's history.

It was apparent in the very first encounters that artillery would play a much more important part than had been assigned to it by pre-war theory. As soon as the two opponents had dug themselves in opposite one another, it became evident that strong entrenchments, forming an unbroken barrier along an extensive front, could be mastered only by the number and weight of guns brought into action.

We shall say nothing here about the great effort which enabled us to solve the second part of this momentous problem,[C] our immediate object being to demonstrate the intense effort which the fighting army had to put forth in organising the Yser front.

When the last struggles of the battle had ceased, our artillerymen vied with one another in the keenness and industry with which they screened their pieces from enemy observation in the open plain whereon they had perforce to establish them. It was impossible to dig into the ground and sink the guns behind solid earthworks. As with the trenches, all structures had to be laboriously fashioned out[Pg 32] of imported materials, not merely under the enemy's eyes but under the fire of his formidable artillery. Over and over again the gunners had to cease work in order to reply to the enemy, giving him as much as he gave, and showing themselves always ready for a fight, whatever the odds. The duel over, they picked up their tools, repaired any damage done, and cheerfully carried on.

However, thanks to the steady augmentation of Belgian resources, the German superiority gradually disappeared; while, on the other hand, the number of works to be executed increased. As the positioning of mere field-pieces was a very troublesome business, one can guess what was entailed by the installation on such unstable ground of heavy batteries with ponderous platforms to support them. Nevertheless, our men patiently overcame all difficulties.

An imposing number of batteries—greater than the public imagines—is now disposed en échelon over the plain. Cannon, howitzers and mortars are hidden so skilfully that they can hardly be detected even at a short distance. Hundreds of concrete shelters have been built for ammunition dumps and headquarters. Among the ruins rise practically indestructible observation posts, themselves invisible from afar, but commanding the whole country. From these a ceaseless watch is kept upon the enemy's lines. Artificial screens protect the works from direct observation, and clever "camouflage" entirely conceals them from overhead view. To mislead the enemy, "dummy" batteries are scattered about everywhere. Many reserve positions have also been prepared so that, should the need arise, the batteries may be shifted and re-concentrated in different sectors.

It has been, one sees, a great enterprise; and the men who have worked so hard and unremittingly may well feel a legitimate pride in what they have so successfully accomplished. Yet in this, as in other spheres of activity, work can never stop. Bad weather and bombardment alike inflict constant havoc; and in spite of the most ingenious precautions the enemy always succeeds eventually in spotting the emplacement of this or that battery or in marking off an area which conceals a group of batteries. A furious fire from heavy guns is then concentrated upon the point discovered, and by the time our artillery manages to[Pg 33] silence it the damage done is sometimes of such a nature that works which represent long months of labour may have to be practically reconstructed.

We have now described the most outstanding features of the remarkable feat which the Belgian Army has accomplished with the object of rendering impregnable the important sector of the western front entrusted to its watchful care. It may claim to have safely defended the vital route leading to Dunkirk and Calais.

Mere written words can, however, but imperfectly convey a complete idea of the colossal work it did among most discouraging and desolate surroundings; and prudence forbids us to say anything at all about many, and those by no means the least considerable, of the operations. Moreover, the few data which we have been permitted to give are but a slight indication of the efforts unsparingly made by men and officers alike.

The task was done in self-effacing silence; the world at large scarcely knows of it. But perhaps in these few pages we may have succeeded in making the merit of our fearless and tenacious troops better appreciated, and in showing how well they have earned the homage due to the determined energy which they have displayed for more than three years, with no thought but that of valiantly performing a duty of prime importance to the common cause, though it brings no glory with it.

Can anyone realise fully the kind of life Belgian soldiers are leading, even now that the essential military works are completed? A division guarding a sector of the front invariably divides its time between duty in the trenches, outpost duty and rest. Rest! magic word! You would like to think that our men enjoy a blissful calm, long hours of pleasant freedom, lounging about all the day, almost forgetful of the war and its cruel chances. Alack! how far the reality falls short of this seductive vision! "Rest" means shelter in comfortless hutments or squalid cantonments, with a truss of straw to serve as bed. Fatigue duties are needed to prepare, load up and move the materials for all the works whose upkeep and completion demand[Pg 34] constant care. Then there are the long route marches to keep the troops in perfect training, and drill in which military instruction is given and our men are taught the latest modes of fighting with a view to making future attacks. At night come alarms and enemy shells bombarding their quarters and poisoning them with asphyxiating gases.

When on outpost duty in the second-line positions one must always be ready for a fight. When the German guns concentrate an intense fire upon certain sectors, one must wait stolidly and stoically in the shelters which a single shell can blow to atoms. Then, too, whenever the chance is offered, one must toil to restore defence works which are as constantly knocked to pieces again. With nightfall come the reliefs, a long and tiresome business, surrounded by deadly peril if the enemy be on his guard and puts up a barrage, searching the ground with sudden, furious bursts of machine-gun fire.

In the trenches one has to keep a close and cautious lookout, always watching the enemy's lines, mind and body ever alert, while pitiless death prowls about and threatens at every point. At times, no doubt, the hours pass slowly with tiresome monotony. A heavy silence broods over this corner of the great battlefield wherein the Belgian soldiers, tramping along the bottom of the trenches or huddled in a dark shelter, dream at length of all that they have in tender memory, the affections, the hopes left behind them in the country now oppressed and tyrannised over by the invader. Their souls are full of bitterness, as with fixed stare they dumbly surrender themselves to their sad musings. A mad desire comes over them to clasp again to their breast, if only for a moment, some suffering dear one—whether still living or with eyes closed for ever in death, they do not know. So violent an access of home-sickness sweeps over them that at times they cannot restrain their tears.

Then, suddenly, all heads are raised: eyes flash like points of steel. Let a shell whistle over the trenches and burst a few yards further on, and these men, who a moment ago were numbed by their gloomy broodings, become in a trice the fighters whose keenness awakes when danger threatens.

Explosions, nearer and yet nearer. The earth quivers under the continuous shell-bursts. An acrid smoke spreads[Pg 35] in the trenches, now all alive. The men rush to arms. With an eye glued to their peep-holes the look-outs feverishly scrutinise the enemy's lines, while the infantry lean against the broad, high parapets or crouch in their dug-outs, stoically waiting for the rain of steel and fire to cease falling about their ears.

But the bombardment, far from dying down, seems to increase in fury. Here come grenades and torpedoes, bursting everywhere with a terrible din, excavating huge holes in the ground, throwing up great sheaves of earth and mud, scattering sand-bags, stakes, planks and beams in all directions, demolishing with fiendish persistency the ramparts built so painstakingly by our stubborn workers.

We on our part have been prompt to reply to the enemy's fire. Our gunners are already busy; mortars and bomb-throwers discharge a stream of projectiles into the opposite trenches without intermission. And soon, far away on the plain, the batteries also lift up their voices. The long-drawn-out, deep growls of the heavy guns mingle with the sharp barks of the "soixante-quinze." Everything round about the bombarded trench seems to be engulfed in the terrific uproar.

The struggle continues obstinately, with periodic bursts of excessive violence, until the enemy's fire is mastered and dies away into silence. When quiet returns, the officer of the guard, in his half-demolished post, pens his terse report by the flickering light of a candle:—

Some may imagine that the Belgian troops must have had their readiness to attack blunted, and their desire to leap over the entanglements and hurl themselves on the enemy weakened, by their long immobility in the same trenches, by the never-ending construction of defensive[Pg 36] works, by the interminable residence in the same monotonous environment.

But they are wrong. Their sadly mistaken conclusions would soon be corrected could they but see how eagerly our soldiers contend for the honour of taking part in those adventurous patrols in No Man's Land and in the risky reconnaissances towards the German lines. If 10 volunteers be called for, a hundred offer themselves. Hardly a night passes without some expeditions of this kind being set on foot. Then are fought in the darkness weird and deadly combats, wherein our men display magnificent courage and wonderful dash.

Neither bad weather nor suffering can quench their desire to conquer and their hot eagerness to fling themselves upon the enemy and hunt him out of the country which he has remorselessly despoiled. As the soldiers of justice and right, they wish to be—and will be—the soldiers also of deliverance and liberty. They know that their hour is coming and that they cannot choose it; but they are ready to throw themselves heart and soul into the thick of the fray when they get the impatiently awaited signal.

Meanwhile they are content simply to do their hard duty in what remains of a free country—a tiny corner of Belgium where the eye sees nothing but a vast battlefield with its ruins; its camps, bubbling with active life; its hospitals, homes of suffering; its cemeteries, too, where rest those who died for their fatherland.

Printed in Great Britain by Alabaster, Passmore & Sons, Ltd., London and Maidstone.

FOOTNOTES:

[A] See Les Batailles de la Marne (Die Schlachten an der Marne), by An Officer of the German General Staff. Translated from the German by Th. Buyse. Van Œst & Cie, Paris, 1917.

[B] Going into detail, we may point out that 60 kilometres of fire and communication trenches are included in the area of the front line organised defensively for a single division occupying but a very narrow sector.

[C] For information on this subject, consult Les Établissements d'artillerie belges pendant la guerre, by Captain Willy Breton. Berger-Levrault, Paris and Nancy, 1917.