The Project Gutenberg EBook of Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatches from the Dardanelles, etc., by Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license Title: Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatches from the Dardanelles, etc. Author: Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton Release Date: January 13, 2017 [EBook #53959] Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SIR IAN HAMILTON'S *** Produced by MWS, Alan and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
General Sir Ian Hamilton.
| PAGE | |
| The First Despatch | 1 |
| The Second Despatch | 43 |
| Press Bureau Statements | 84 |
| Vice-Admiral de Robeck's Despatch | 89 |
| General Sir Ian Hamilton | Frontispiece | |
| Map 1 | facing | p. 16 |
| Map 2 | " | 32 |
| Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, | ||
| K.C.S.I. | " | 40 |
| Map 3 | " | 64 |
| Brigadier-General R. W. M. | ||
| Jackson, C.B. | " | 78 |
| Lieut.-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, | ||
| C.B. | " | 82 |
| Map 4 | " | 96 |
| Map 5 | " | 116 |
I was serving in the Royal Navy when Lieutenant Lucas, H.M.S. Hecla, earned the first Victoria Cross that was gazetted, for having thrown overboard a live shell. I was in the 21-gun battery before Sevastopol sixty-one years ago when Captain Sir William Peel, R.N., picked up from amongst a number of powder cases, and carried resting on his chest, a 42-pounder live Russian shell, which burst as he threw it over the parapet; and having seen many extraordinarily gallant deeds performed by men of all ranks in both Services, I think that I am a fair judge of fighting values.
Just sixty-one years ago an Ordinary Seaman, H.M.S. Queen, was one of a detachment of a Petty Officer and six Bluejackets who had left our advanced trenches carrying a heavy scaling ladder, 18 feet long, to enable the soldiers to cross the ditch of the Great Redan at Sevastopol. When the only surviving ladder-party was close up to the abatis, three of the men under the Rear[Pg viii] part of the ladder were shot down, and a young midshipman then put his shoulder under it. The boy was young, had already been wounded, and was moreover weak, being officially on the sick list, so doubtless was an inefficient carrier. The Bluejacket in front was unaffected by the storm of missiles of all sorts through which he had passed in crossing the 500 yards between our trenches and the Redan, although in his company of sixty men, nineteen sailors had been killed and twenty-nine wounded within twenty minutes.
The fire was vividly described by Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, who was looking on. He, with the experience of the Peninsular War, and having witnessed the assaults of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, thus portrayed it: "I never before witnessed such a continuous and heavy fire of grape and musketry"; and again: "I had no conception of such a shower of grape." The Bluejacket had remained apparently unconcerned by the carnage, but he realised that the now one-surviving carrier at the Rear end of the ladder was not doing much to help, and thinking that he was addressing a messmate, exclaimed encouragingly, as he half turned his head: "Come on, Bill, let's get our ladder up first," being shot dead as he finished the sentence.
I was often asked in the early days of[Pg ix] the War whether I thought that the men in the ranks were of the same fighting value as those of two generations ago, and invariably answered confidently as follows: "Yes, just the same at heart, but with better furnished heads." The contents of this Booklet clearly attest the accuracy of that opinion.
Education has done much to improve the "Fighting Services," but the most potent magnet for bringing out the best of the Anglo-Saxon Nation is the fuller appreciation of Democracy. The officers, not content with leading their men gallantly, which they have always done, now feel for them and with them as staunch comrades. All ranks are now nearer, geographically, mentally and morally, than they have ever been before to the heart of England.
Sixty years ago a brave officer could think of no better prize for the reward of gallantry than money, and a General about to assault Sevastopol on September 8, 1855, offered £5 for the first man inside the Great Redan.
When, in the winter 1854-5, the institution of the Victoria Cross was suggested, the Royal Warrant for which was not issued until 1856, nearly all the senior officers disliked the innovation, and our Government,[Pg x] realising this feeling, hesitated to entrust them with the selection of the recipients of the distinction. In one battalion the men were instructed to nominate a private soldier. They, as in all good regiments, reflected the views of their officers, as regards the innovation, and unanimously elected a comrade who, being trusted for his sobriety and honesty, used to carry down the grog-can at dinner-time to the trenches, and so, not only enjoyed a "soft billet," but was never under fire except for one hour in twenty-four.
A perusal of the despatches and of the London Gazette announcing the bestowal of decorations is like reading of the mortal combats described in Virgil's Twelfth Book of the "Æneid," and fills the mind with admiration.
It is perhaps only soldiers who can fully appreciate the enduring courage of the Munster Fusiliers, who, after losing half their numbers by drowning, and by fire of shrapnel and bullets, with their Brigadier-General, his Brigade-Major, and most of their Regimental officers down, could reform into remnants of Companies, and after a night without food, follow a Staff Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty Wylie, from the beach up to the Old Castle, and assault successfully Hill No. 141. These men are, indeed, worthy descendants[Pg xi] of their predecessors who carried the walls of Delhi in 1857.
No soldiers can read the story of the heroism shown by the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers commanded by Major Bishop; how they jumped ashore under a hurricane of lead which was rained on Beach W, and how they broke through the wire, and had by 10 a.m. carried three lines of hostile trenches, without feeling proud of the people of the "Clothing Towns." The men are worthy of their forefathers, who at Minden in 1759 advanced in line with "Colours flying and Drums beating" against a mass of hostile cavalry, which they defeated.
I hope that the young soldiers of the King's Own Scottish Borderers may be taught to recall, not only the deeds of their predecessors at Namur, 1695, and the glorious victory of the infantry over a mass of hostile cavalry, which they shared with the Lancashire Fusiliers; but also what their battalion did on Y Beach of the Dardanelles on April 26 last, when after many hours of fighting, causing the battalion a loss of 50 per centum, the survivors held with determination a trench which had been constructed for four times their number of effectives; and then, when orders were given to abandon the position, how the courage of a small Rear-guard[Pg xii] enabled all the wounded, ammunition, and stores to be safely re-embarked.
The burning courage of the Australian and New Zealand Division must make any soldier proud of his Colonial brothers. They were disembarked at night, and the units became unavoidably mixed up, for some of them had in their ardour followed up the Turks, whom they had repulsed, further than had been intended. It seems from a perusal of the despatch, that in spite of their short military training, the self-reliance naturally acquired by men who lead a less artificial life than those brought up in cities and towns in England, enabled our Colonials, inspired by their personal courage, to resist successfully for hours the attacks of a vastly superior number of Turks.
In a number of glorious deeds recorded in the London Gazette it is somewhat difficult to select any deed standing out beyond the rest, but it seems probable that the personal prowess of Lance-Corporal Albert Jacka, 14th Battalion Australian Imperial Forces, can scarcely ever be surpassed. During the night of May 19-20 he, with four other Australians, was holding a trench which was heavily attacked. The five men accounted for many Turks, but when Jacka's four comrades had been killed or wounded, the trench was[Pg xiii] rushed, and occupied by seven Moslems. Lance-Corporal Jacka attacked and killed all seven, five by successive shots from his rifle, and two with his bayonet.
Commander Unwin's exploits were remarkable. He had fitted admirably for the work in view the River Clyde steamship, and successfully beached her; and although hit by three bullets, he worked for hours in the water to save wounded men, and continued his self-sacrificing efforts until he became inanimate from cold and exhaustion.
One of Commander Unwin's subordinates, George Samson, who vied with him in tasks of enduring gallantry, belongs to the Royal Naval Reserve, and is mentioned for having worked on a lighter all day attending to the stricken until he was dangerously wounded. Yet at the annual dinner last week of the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union, when Samson, apparently now a Petty Officer, as modest as he is brave, was presented with a gold watch and chain, in returning thanks, said: "I would sooner land again in the Dardanelles than have to make a speech."
Commander Robinson is a remarkable instance not only of calculating courage, but also of the thorough training which Naval officers receive. "He refused to allow anyone to accompany him on his dangerous[Pg xiv] mission, as his men's white clothing made them very conspicuous. After having penetrated alone into a two-gun battery of the enemy, on the 26th February, he destroyed a gun and then returning for another demolition charge, wrecked the remaining piece."
The Commander-in-Chief at Gallipoli, affectionately termed by his friends in the Service "Johnnie," being a very brave man, appreciates the courage of those under his command. He showed great determination in the unhappy war in South Africa in 1881, when he was severely wounded, and in the battle of Eland's Laaghte in October, 1899, led so determinedly in front that he would have been recommended for the Victoria Cross but for his senior rank.
The Services in the Dardanelles are fortunate in having a scholarly General to narrate their stirring deeds, for many of our commanders, from Marlborough to Clyde, have felt more difficulty in writing a description of a victory than they had experienced in winning it.
In the last half century the power of appreciating noble deeds and the merits of capable officers has increased. The days are fortunately passed since our senior generals said: "We find all our officers are much of a[Pg xv] muchness."
There is now a more generous acknowledgment of the fact that the life of a labouring man is as much to him as is that of a peer to a duke's son; there has grown up amongst our soldiers a deeper sense of appreciating valour apart from natural or acquired advantages.
As Admiral Holmes and his Squadron in the St. Laurence enabled General Wolfe to capture Quebec in 1759, so Admiral John de Robeck has enabled General Sir Ian Hamilton to land his troops and hold the western coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and Hamilton, happier than Wolfe, lives to acknowledge his debt to the Senior Service, describing it affectionately as "The father and mother of the Army."
October 1. 1915 Evelyn Wood
From the General Commanding the Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force to the Secretary of State for
War, War Office, London, S.W.
My Lord,
I have the honour to submit my report on the operations in the Gallipoli Peninsula up to and including May 5.
In accordance with your Lordship's instructions I left London on March 13 with my General Staff by special train to Marseilles, and thence in H.M.S. Phæton to the scene of the naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, reaching Tenedos on March 17 shortly after noon.
Immediately on arrival I conferred with Vice-Admiral de Robeck, Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet; Général d'Amade, Commanding the French Corps Expéditionnaire; and Contre-Amiral Guepratte, in command of the French Squadron. At this conference past difficulties were explained to me, and the intention to make a fresh attack on the morrow was announced. The amphibious battle between warships and land fortresses[Pg 2] took place next day, March 18. I witnessed these stupendous events, and thereupon cabled your Lordship my reluctant deduction that the co-operation of the whole of the force under my command would be required to enable the Fleet effectively to force the Dardanelles.
By that time I had already carried out a preliminary reconnaissance of the north-western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula, from its isthmus, where it is spanned by the Bulair fortified lines, to Cape Helles, at its extremest point. From Bulair this singular feature runs in a south-westerly direction for 52 miles, attaining near its centre a breadth of 12 miles. The northern coast of the northern half of the promontory slopes downwards steeply to the Gulf of Xeros, in a chain of hills, which extend as far as Cape Sulva. The precipitous fall of these hills precludes landing, except at a few narrow gullies, far too restricted for any serious military movements. The southern half of the peninsula is shaped like a badly-worn boot. The ankle lies between Gaba Tepe and Kalkmaz Dagh; beneath the heel lie the cluster of forts at Kilid Bahr; whilst the toe is that promontory, five miles in width, stretching from Tekke Burnu to Sedd-el-Bahr.
The three dominating features in this southern section seemed to me to be:
(1) Sari Bair Mountain, running up in a succession of almost perpendicular escarpments to 970 feet. The whole mountain seemed to be a network of ravines and covered with thick jungle.
(2) Kilid Bahr plateau, which rises, a natural fortification artificially fortified, to a height of 700 feet to cover the forts of the Narrows from an attack from the Aegean.
(3) Achi Babi, a hill 600 feet in height, dominating at long field-gun range what I have described as being the toe of the peninsula.
A peculiarity to be noted as regards this last southern sector is that from Achi Babi to Cape Helles the ground is hollowed out like a spoon, presenting only its outer edges to direct fire from the sea. The inside of the spoon appears to be open and undulating, but actually it is full of spurs, nullahs, and confused under-features.
Generally speaking the coast is precipitous, and good landing-places are few. Just south of Tekke Burnu is a small sandy bay (W), and half a mile north of it is another small break in the cliffs (X). Two miles farther up the coast the mouth of a stream indents these same cliffs (Y 2), and yet another mile and a half up a scrub-covered gully looked as if active infantry might be able to scramble up it on to heights not altogether dissimilar to those of Abraham by Quebec (Y). Inside Sedd-el-Bahr is a sandy beach (V), about 300[Pg 4] yards across, facing a semicircle of steeply-rising ground, as the flat bottom of a half-saucer faces the rim, a rim flanked on one side by an old castle, on the other by a modern fort. By Eski Hissarlik, on the east of Morto Bay (S), was another small beach, which was, however, dominated by the big guns from Asia. Turning northwards again, there are two good landing-places on either side of Gaba Tepe. Farther to the north of that promontory the beach was supposed to be dangerous and difficult. In most of these landing-places the trenches and lines of wire entanglements were plainly visible from on board ship. What seemed to be gun emplacements and infantry redoubts could also be made out through a telescope, but of the full extent of these defences and of the forces available to man them there was no possibility of judging except by practical test.
Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to convince me that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success; whereas, on the other hand, a tentative or piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. The landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have described—a theatre strongly garrisoned throughout, and prepared for any such attempt—involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming in military history except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes. The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns or else[Pg 5] so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration and counter-attack which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt. It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable if awkward contingency, the separation by considerable intervals of the force.
The weather was also bound to play a vital part in my landing. Had it been British weather there would have been no alternative but instantly to give up the adventure. To land two or three thousand men, and then to have to break off and leave them exposed for a week to the attacks of 34,000 regular troops, with a hundred guns at their back, was not an eventuality to be lightly envisaged. Whatever happened the weather must always remain an incalculable factor, but at least by delay till the end of April we had a fair chance of several days of consecutive calm.
Before doing anything else I had to redistribute the troops on the transports to suit the order of their disembarkation. The bulk of the forces at my disposal had, perforce, been embarked without its having been possible to pay due attention to[Pg 6] the operation upon which I now proposed that they should be launched.
Owing to lack of facilities at Mudros redistribution in that harbour was out of the question. With your Lordship's approval, therefore, I ordered all the transports, except those of the Australian Infantry Brigade and the details encamped at Lemnos Island, to the Egyptian ports. On March 24 I myself, together with the General Staff, proceeded to Alexandria, where I remained until April 7, working out the allocation of troops to transports in minutest detail as a prelude to the forthcoming disembarkation. General d'Amade did likewise.
On April 1 the remainder of the General Headquarters, which had not been mobilized when I left England, arrived at Alexandria.
Apart from the rearrangements of the troops, my visit to Egypt was not without profit, since it afforded me opportunities of conferring with the G.O.C. Egypt and of making myself acquainted with the troops, drawn from all parts of the French Republic and of the British Empire, which it was to be my privilege to command.
By April 7 my preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable me to return with my General Staff to Lemnos, so as to put the finishing touches to my plan in close co-ordination with the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet.
The covering force of the 29th Division left Mudros Harbour on the evening of April 23 for the five beaches, S, V, W, X, and Y. Of these, V, W,[Pg 7] and X were to be main landings, the landings at S and Y being made mainly to protect the flanks, to disseminate the forces of the enemy, and to interrupt the arrival of his reinforcements. The landings at S and Y were to take place at dawn, whilst it was planned that the first troops for V, W, and X beaches should reach the shore simultaneously at 5.30 a.m. after half an hour's bombardment from the Fleet.
The transports conveying the covering force arrived off Tenedos on the morning of the 24th, and during the afternoon the troops were transferred to the warships and fleet-sweepers in which they were to approach the shore. About midnight these ships, each towing a number of cutters and other small boats, silently slipped their cables and, escorted by the 3rd Squadron of the Fleet, steamed slowly towards their final rendezvous at Cape Helles. The rendezvous was reached just before dawn on the 25th. The morning was absolutely still; there was no sign of life on the shore; a thin veil of mist hung motionless over the promontory; the surface of the sea was as smooth as glass. The four battleships and four cruisers which formed the 3rd Squadron at once took up the positions that had been allotted to them, and at 5 a.m., it being then light enough to fire, a violent bombardment of the enemy's defences was begun.[Pg 8] Meanwhile the troops were being rapidly transferred to the small boats in which they were to be towed ashore. Not a move on the part of the enemy; except for shells thrown from the Asiatic side of the Straits the guns of the Fleet remained unanswered.
The detachment detailed for S beach (Eski Hissarlik Point) consisted of the 2nd South Wales Borderers (less one company) under Lieut.-Colonel Casson. Their landing was delayed by the current, but by 7.30 a.m. it had been successfully effected at the cost of some fifty casualties, and Lieut.-Colonel Casson was able to establish his small force on the high ground near De Totts Battery. Here he maintained himself until the general advance on the 27th brought him into touch with the main body.
The landing on Y beach was entrusted to the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth (Marine) Battalion, Royal Naval Division, specially attached to the 29th Division for this task, the whole under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Koe. The beach at this point consisted merely of a narrow strip of sand at the foot of a crumbling scrub-covered cliff some 200 feet high immediately to the west of Krithia.
A number of small gullies running down the face of the cliff facilitated the climb to the summit,[Pg 9] and so impracticable had these precipices appeared to the Turks that no steps had been taken to defend them. Very different would it have been had we, as was at one time intended, taken Y 2 for this landing. There a large force of infantry, entrenched up to their necks, and supported by machine and Hotchkiss guns, were awaiting an attempt which could hardly have made good its footing. But at Y both battalions were able in the first instance to establish themselves on the heights, reserves of food, water, and ammunition were hauled up to the top of the cliff, and, in accordance with the plan of operations, an endeavour was immediately made to gain touch with the troops landing at X beach. Unfortunately, the enemy's strong detachment from Y 2 interposed, our troops landing at X were fully occupied in attacking the Turks immediately to their front, and the attempt to join hands was not persevered with.
Later in the day a large force of Turks were seen to be advancing upon the cliffs above Y beach from the direction of Krithia, and Colonel Koe was obliged to entrench. From this time onward his small force was subjected to strong and repeated attacks, supported by field artillery, and owing to the configuration of the ground, which here drops inland from the edge of the cliff, the guns of the supporting ships could render him little assistance. Throughout the afternoon and all through the night the Turks made assault after assault upon the British line. They threw bombs into the trenches, and, favoured by darkness, actually[Pg 10] led a pony with a machine gun on its back over the defences, and were proceeding to come into action in the middle of our position when they were bayoneted.
The British repeatedly counter-charged with the bayonet, and always drove off the enemy for the moment, but the Turks were in a vast superiority and fresh troops took the place of those who temporarily fell back. Colonel Koe (since died of wounds) had become a casualty early in the day, and the number of officers and men killed and wounded during the incessant fighting was very heavy. By 7 a.m. on the 26th only about half of the King's Own Scottish Borderers remained to man the entrenchment made for four times their number. These brave fellows were absolutely worn out with continuous fighting; it was doubtful if reinforcements could reach them in time, and orders were issued for them to be re-embarked. Thanks to H.M.S. Goliath, Dublin, Amethyst, and Sapphire, thanks also to the devotion of a small rearguard of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, which kept off the enemy from lining the cliff, the re-embarkation of the whole of the troops, together with the wounded, stores, and ammunition, was safely accomplished, and both battalions were brought round the southern end of the peninsula. Deplorable as the heavy losses had been, and unfortunate as was the tactical failure to make good so much ground at the outset, yet, taking the operation as it stood, there can be no doubt it has contributed greatly to the success of the main attack,[Pg 11] seeing that the plucky stand made at Y beach had detained heavy columns of the enemy from arriving at the southern end of the peninsula during what it will be seen was a very touch-and-go struggle.
The landing-place known as X beach consists of a strip of sand some 200 yards long by 8 yards wide at the foot of a low cliff. The troops to be landed here were the 1st Royal Fusiliers, who were to be towed ashore from H.M.S. Implacable in two parties, half a battalion at a time, together with a beach working party found by the Anson Battalion, Royal Naval Division. About 6 a.m. H.M.S. Implacable, with a boldness much admired by the Army, stood quite close in to the beach, firing very rapidly with every gun she could bring to bear. Thus seconded, the Royal Fusiliers made good their landing with but little loss. The battalion then advanced to attack the Turkish trenches on the Hill 114, situated between V and W beaches, but were heavily counter-attacked and forced to give ground. Two more battalions of the 87th Brigade soon followed them, and by evening the troops had established themselves in an entrenched position extending from half a mile round the landing-place and as far south as Hill 114. Here they were in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers, who had landed on W beach. Brigadier-General Marshall, commanding the 87th Brigade, had been[Pg 12] wounded during the day's fighting, but continued in command of the brigade.
The landing on V beach was planned to take place on the following lines:
As soon as the enemy's defences had been heavily bombarded by the Fleet, three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were to be towed ashore. They were to be closely followed by the collier River Clyde (Commander Unwin, R.N.), carrying between decks the balance of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and other details.
The River Clyde had been specially prepared for the rapid disembarkation of her complement, and large openings for the exit of the troops had been cut in her sides, giving on to a wide gangplank by which the men could pass rapidly into lighters which she had in tow. As soon as the first tows had reached land the River Clyde was to be run straight ashore. Her lighters were to be placed in position to form a gangway between the ship and the beach, and by this means it was hoped that 2,000 men could be thrown ashore with the utmost rapidity. Further, to assist in covering the landing, a battery of machine guns, protected by sandbags, had been mounted in her bows.
The remainder of the covering force detailed for this beach was then to follow in tows from the attendant battleships.
V beach is situated immediately to the west of Sedd-el-Bahr. Between the bluff on which stands Sedd-el-Bahr village and that which is crowned by No. 1 Fort the ground forms a very regular amphitheatre of three or four hundred yards radius. The slopes down to the beach are slightly concave, so that the whole area contained within the limits of this natural amphitheatre, whose grassy terraces rise gently to a height of a hundred feet above the shore, can be swept by the fire of a defender. The beach itself is a sandy strip some 10 yards wide and 350 yards long, backed along almost the whole of its extent by a low sandy escarpment about 4 feet high, where the ground falls nearly sheer down to the beach. The slight shelter afforded by this escarpment played no small part in the operations of the succeeding thirty-two hours.
At the south-eastern extremity of the beach, between the shore and the village, stands the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, a battered ruin with wide breaches in its walls and mounds of fallen masonry within and around it. On the ridge to the north, overlooking the amphitheatre, stands a ruined barrack. Both of these buildings, as[Pg 14] well as No. 1 Fort, had been long bombarded by the Fleet, and the guns of the forts had been put out of action; but their crumbled walls and the ruined outskirts of the village afforded cover for riflemen, while from the terraced slopes already described the defenders were able to command the open beach, as a stage is overlooked from the balconies of a theatre. On the very margin of the beach a strong barbed-wire entanglement, made of heavier metal and longer barbs than I have ever seen elsewhere, ran right across from the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr to the foot of the north-western headland. Two-thirds of the way up the ridge a second and even stronger entanglement crossed the amphitheatre, passing in front of the old barrack and ending in the outskirts of the village. A third transverse entanglement, joining these two, ran up the hill near the eastern end of the beach, and almost at right angles to it. Above the upper entanglement the ground was scored with the enemy's trenches, in one of which four pom-poms were emplaced; in others were dummy pom-poms to draw fire, while the debris of the shattered buildings on either flank afforded cover and concealment for a number of machine guns, which brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground already swept by rifle fire from the ridge.
Needless to say, the difficulties in the way of previous reconnaissance had rendered it impossible to obtain detailed information with regard either to the locality or to the enemy's preparations.
As often happens in war, the actual course of[Pg 15] events did not quite correspond with the intentions of the Commander. The River Clyde came into position off Sedd-el-Bahr in advance of the tows, and, just as the latter reached the shore, Commander Unwin beached his ship also. Whilst the boats and the collier were approaching the landing-place the Turks made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as if the landing was to be unopposed. But the moment the first boat touched bottom the storm broke. A tornado of fire swept over the beach, the incoming boats, and the collier. The Dublin Fusiliers and the naval boats' crews suffered exceedingly heavy losses while still in the boats. Those who succeeded in landing and in crossing the strip of sand managed to gain some cover when they reached the low escarpment on the further side. None of the boats, however, was able to get off again, and they and their crews were destroyed upon the beach.
Now came the moment for the River Clyde to pour forth her living freight; but grievous delay was caused here by the difficulty of placing the lighters in position between the ship and the shore. A strong current hindered the work and the enemy's fire was so intense that almost every man engaged upon it was immediately shot. Owing, however, to the splendid gallantry of the naval working party, the lighters were eventually placed in position, and then the disembarkation began.
A company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way; but, short as was the distance, few of the[Pg 16] men ever reached the farther side of the beach through the hail of bullets which poured down upon them from both flanks and the front. As the second company followed, the extemporized pier of lighters gave way in the current. The end nearest to the shore drifted into deep water, and many men who had escaped being shot were drowned by the weight of their equipment in trying to swim from the lighter to the beach. Undaunted workers were still forthcoming, the lighters were again brought into position, and the third company of the Munster Fusiliers rushed ashore, suffering heaviest loss this time from shrapnel as well as from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun fire.
(To face page 16.)
Map 1.
For a space the attempt to land was discontinued. When it was resumed the lighters again drifted into deep water, with Brigadier-General Napier, Captain Costeker, his Brigade-Major, and a number of men of the Hampshire Regiment on board. There was nothing for them all but to lie down on the lighters, and it was here that General Napier and Captain Costeker were killed. At this time, between 10 and 11 a.m., about one thousand men had left the collier, and of these nearly half had been killed or wounded before they could reach the little cover afforded by the steep, sandy bank at the top of the beach. Furt[Pg 17]her attempts to disembark were now given up. Had the troops all been in open boats but few of them would have lived to tell the tale. But, most fortunately, the collier was so constructed as to afford fairly efficient protection to the men who were still on board, and, so long as they made no attempt to land, they suffered comparatively little loss.
Throughout the remainder of the day there was practically no change in the position of affairs. The situation was probably saved by the machine-guns on the River Clyde, which did valuable service in keeping down the enemy's fire and in preventing any attempt on their part to launch a counter-attack. One half-company of the Dublin Fusiliers, which had been landed at a camber just east of Sedd-el-Bahr village, was unable to work its way across to V beach, and by midday had only twenty-five men left. It was proposed to divert to Y beach that part of the main body which had been intended to land on V beach; but this would have involved considerable delay owing to the distance, and the main body was diverted to W beach, where the Lancashire Fusiliers had already effected a landing.
Late in the afternoon part of the Worcestershire Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers worked across the high ground from W beach, and seemed likely to relieve the situation by taking the defenders of V beach in flank. The pressure on their own front, however, and the numerous barbed-wire entanglements which intervened, checked this advance, and at nightfall the Turkish garrison still[Pg 18] held their ground. Just before dark some small parties of our men made their way along the shore to the outer walls of the Old Fort, and when night had fallen the remainder of the infantry from the collier were landed. A good force was now available for attack, but our troops were at such a cruel disadvantage as to position, and the fire of the enemy was still so accurate in the bright moonlight, that all attempts to clear the fort and the outskirts of the village during the night failed one after the other. The wounded who were able to do so without support returned to the collier under cover of darkness; but otherwise the situation at daybreak on the 26th was the same as it had been on the previous day, except that the troops first landed were becoming very exhausted.
Twenty-four hours after the disembarkation began there were ashore on V beach the survivors of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and of two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. The Brigadier and his Brigade-Major had been killed; Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington Smith, commanding the Hampshire Regiment, had been killed and the Adjutant had been wounded. The Adjutant of the Munster Fusiliers was wounded, and the great majority of the senior officers were either wounded or killed. The remnant of the landing-party still crouched on the beach beneath the shelter of the sandy escarpment which had saved so many lives. With them were two officers of my General Staff—Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and[Pg 19] Lieutenant-Colonel Williams. These two officers, who had landed from the River Clyde, had been striving, with conspicuous contempt for danger, to keep all their comrades in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless imminent peril.
Now that it was daylight once more, Lieutenant-Colonels Doughty-Wylie and Williams set to work to organize an attack on the hill above the beach. Any soldier who has endeavoured to pull scattered units together after they have been dominated for many consecutive hours by close and continuous fire will be able to take the measure of their difficulties. Fortunately General Hunter-Weston had arranged with Rear-Admiral Wemyss about this same time for a heavy bombardment to be opened by the ships upon the Old Fort, Sedd-el-Bahr Village, the Old Castle north of the village, and on the ground leading up from the beach. Under cover of this bombardment, and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie, and Captain Walford, Brigade-Major R.A., the troops gained a footing in the village by 10 a.m. They encountered a most stubborn opposition and suffered heavy losses from the fire of well concealed riflemen and machine guns. Undeterred by the resistance, and supported by the naval gunfire, they pushed forward, and soon after midday they penetrated to the northern edge of the village,[Pg 20] whence they were in a position to attack the Old Castle and Hill 141. During this advance Captain Walford was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie had most gallantly led the attack all the way up from the beach through the west side of the village, under a galling fire. And now, when, owing so largely to his own inspiring example and intrepid courage, the position had almost been gained, he was killed while leading the last assault. But the attack was pushed forward without wavering, and, fighting their way across the open with great dash, the troops gained the summit and occupied the Old Castle and Hill 141 before 2 p.m.
W beach consists of a strip of deep, powdery sand some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide, situated immediately south of Tekke Burnu, where a small gully running down to the sea opens out a break in the cliffs. On either flank of the beach the ground rises precipitously, but, in the centre, a number of sand dunes afford a more gradual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. Much time and ingenuity had been employed by the Turks in turning this landing-place into a death trap. Close to the water's edge a broad wire entanglement extended the whole length of the shore, and a supplementary barbed network lay concealed under the surface of the sea in the shallows. Land mines and sea mines had been[Pg 21] laid. The high ground overlooking the beach was strongly fortified with trenches to which the gully afforded a natural covered approach. A number of machine guns also were cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as to be immune from a naval bombardment whilst they were converging their fire on the wire entanglements. The crest of the hill overlooking the beach was in its turn commanded by high ground to the north-west and south-east, and especially by two strong infantry redoubts near point 138. Both these redoubts were protected by wire entanglements about 20 feet broad, and could be approached only by a bare glacis-like slope leading up from the high ground above W beach or from the Cape Helles lighthouse. In addition, another separate entanglement ran down from these two redoubts to the edge of the cliff near the lighthouse, making intercommunication between V and W beaches impossible until these redoubts had been captured.
So strong, in fact, were the defences of W beach that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of April 25.
The landing at W had been entrusted to the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Bishop),[Pg 22] and it was to the complete lack of the sense of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success. As in the case of the landing at X, the disembarkation had been delayed for half an hour, but at 6 a.m. the whole battalion approached the shore together, towed by eight picket boats in line abreast, each picket boat pulling four ship's cutters. As soon as shallow water was reached, the tows were cast off and the boats were at once rowed to the shore. Three companies headed for the beach and a company on the left of the line made for a small ledge of rock immediately under the cliff at Tekke Burnu. Brigadier-General Hare, commanding the 88th Brigade, accompanied this latter party, which escaped the cross fire brought to bear upon the beach, and was also in a better position than the rest of the battalion to turn the wire entanglements.
While the troops were approaching the shore no shot had been fired from the enemy's trenches, but as soon as the first boat touched the ground a hurricane of lead swept over the battalion. Gallantly led by their officers, the Fusiliers literally hurled themselves ashore, and, fired at from right, left, and centre, commenced hacking their way through the wire. A long line of men was at once mown down as by a scythe, but the remainder were not to be denied. Covered by the fire of the warships, which had now closed right in to the shore, and helped by the flanking fire of the company on the extreme left, they broke through the entanglements and collected under the cliffs[Pg 23] on either side of the beach. Here the companies were rapidly re-formed, and set forth to storm the enemy's entrenchments wherever they could find them.
In making these attacks the bulk of the battalion moved up towards Hill 114 whilst a small party worked down towards the trenches on the Cape Helles side of the landing-place.
Several land mines were exploded by the Turks during the advance, but the determination of the troops was in no way affected. By 10 a.m. three lines of hostile trenches were in our hands, and our hold on the beach was assured.
About 9.30 a.m. more infantry had begun to disembark, and two hours later a junction was effected on Hill 114 with the troops which had landed on X beach.
On the right, owing to the strength of the redoubt on Hill 138, little progress could be made. The small party of Lancashire Fusiliers which had advanced in this direction succeeded in reaching the edge of the wire entanglements, but were not strong enough to do more, and it was here that Major Frankland, Brigade-Major of the 86th Infantry Brigade, who had gone forward to make a personal reconnaissance, was unfortunately killed. Brigadier-General Hare had been wounded earlier in the day, and Colonel Wolley-Dod, General Staff 29th Division, was now sent ashore to take command at W beach and organize a further advance.
At 2 p.m., after the ground near Hill 138 had been subjected to a heavy bombardment, the[Pg 24] Worcester Regiment advanced to the assault. Several men of this battalion rushed forward with great spirit to cut passages through the entanglement; some were killed, others persevered, and by 4 p.m. the hill and redoubt were captured.
An attempt was now made to join hands with the troops on V beach, who could make no headway at all against the dominating defences of the enemy. To help them out the 86th Brigade pushed forward in an easterly direction along the cliff. There is a limit, however, to the storming of barbed-wire entanglements. More of these barred the way. Again the heroic wire-cutters came out. Through glasses they could be seen quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as if they were pruning a vineyard. Again some of them fell. The fire pouring out of No. 1 fort grew hotter and hotter, until the troops, now thoroughly exhausted by a sleepless night and by the long day's fighting under a hot sun, had to rest on their laurels for a while.
When night fell, the British position in front of W beach extended from just east of Cape Helles lighthouse, through Hill 138, to Hill 114. Practically every man had to be thrown into the trenches to hold this line, and the only available reserves on this part of our front were the 2nd London Field Company R.E. and a platoon of the Anson Battalion, which had been landed as a beach working party.
During the night several strong and determined counter-attacks were made, all successfully repulsed[Pg 25] without loss of ground. Meanwhile the disembarkation of the remainder of the division was proceeding on W and X beaches.
The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps sailed out of Mudros Bay on the afternoon of April 24, escorted by the 2nd Squadron of the Fleet under Rear-Admiral Thursby. The rendezvous was reached just after half-past one in the morning of the 25th, and there the 1,500 men who had been placed on board H.M. ships before leaving Mudros were transferred to their boats. This operation was carried out with remarkable expedition, and in absolute silence. Simultaneously the remaining 2,500 men of the covering force were transferred from their transports to six destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. H.M. ships, together with the tows and the destroyers, proceeded to within some four miles of the coast, H.M.S. Queen (flying Rear-Admiral Thursby's flag) directing on a point about a mile north of Kaba Tepe. At 3.30 a.m. orders to go ahead and land were given to the tows, and at 4.10 a.m. the destroyers were ordered to follow.
All these arrangements worked without a hitch, and were carried out in complete orderliness and silence. No breath of wind ruffled the surface of the sea, and every condition was favourable save for the moon, which, sinking behind the ships, may have silhouetted them against its orb, betraying them thus to watchers on the shore.
A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected for the landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the Turks were not at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the tows having failed to maintain their exact direction the actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a blessing in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of the force of occupation has been much better defiladed from shell fire.
The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow strip of sand, about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and the south by two small promontories. At its southern extremity a deep ravine, with exceedingly steep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a north-easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore. Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is backed by the seaward face of the spur which forms the north-western side of the ravine. From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer except near the southern limit of the beach, where gentler slopes give access[Pg 27] to the mouth of the ravine behind. Further inland lie in a tangled knot the under-features of Sari Bair, separated by deep ravines, which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered with dense scrub, and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal mass of the mountain, from which they run north-west, west, south-west, and south to the coast.
The boats approached the land in the silence and the darkness, and they were close to the shore before the enemy stirred. Then about one battalion of Turks was seen running along the beach to intercept the lines of boats. At this so critical a moment the conduct of all ranks was most praiseworthy. Not a word was spoken—every one remained perfectly orderly and quiet awaiting the enemy's fire, which sure enough opened, causing many casualties. The moment the boats touched land the Australians' turn had come. Like lightning they leapt ashore, and each man as he did so went straight as his bayonet at the enemy. So vigorous was the onslaught that the Turks made no attempt to withstand it and fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry.
This attack was carried out by the 3rd Australian Brigade, under Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O. The 1st and 2nd Brigades followed promptly, and were all disembarked by[Pg 28] 2 p.m., by which time 12,000 men and two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery had been landed. The disembarkation of further artillery was delayed owing to the fact that the enemy's heavy guns opened on the anchorage and forced the transports, which had been subjected to continuous shelling from his field guns, to stand farther out to sea.
The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for sending any formed detachments post-haste as they landed to the critical point of the moment, the headlong valour of scattered groups of the men who had pressed far further into the peninsula than had been intended—all these led to confusion and mixing up of units. Eventually the mixed crowd of fighting men, some advancing from the beach, others falling back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified into a semicircular position with its right about a mile north of Gaba Tepe and its left on the high ground over Fisherman's Hut. During this period parties of the 9th and 10th Battalions charged and put out of action three of the enemy's Krupp guns. During this period also the disembarkation of the Australian Division was being followed by that of the New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades only).
From 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. the enemy, now reinforced to a strength of 20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a specially strong effort against the 3rd Brigade and the left of the 2nd Brigade. This counter-attack was, however, handsomely repulsed with the help of the guns of H.M. ships. Between 5 and 6.30 p.m. a third most determined[Pg 29] counter-attack was made against the 3rd Brigade, who held their ground with more than equivalent stubbornness. During the night again the Turks made constant attacks, and the 8th Battalion repelled a bayonet charge; but in spite of all the line held firm. The troops had had practically no rest on the night of the 24th to 25th; they had been fighting hard all day over most difficult country, and they had been subjected to heavy shrapnel fire in the open. Their casualties had been deplorably heavy. But, despite their losses and in spite of their fatigue, the morning of the 26th found them still in good heart and as full of fight as ever.
It is a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still more seriously. Several times our machine guns got on to them in close formation, and the whole surrounding country is still strewn with their dead.
The reorganization of units and formations was impossible during the 26th and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible until a reorganization could be effected, and it only remained to entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for bringing up ammunition, water, and supplies to the ridges—in itself a most difficult undertaking. Four battalions of the Royal Naval Division were sent up to reinforce the Army Corps on April 28 and 29.
On the night of May 2 a bold effort was made to seize a commanding knoll in front of the centre of the line. The enemy's enfilading machine guns were too scientifically posted, and 800 men were lost without advantage beyond the infliction of a corresponding loss to the enemy. On May 4 an attempt to seize Kaba Tepe was also unsuccessful, the barbed wire here being something beyond belief. But a number of minor operations have been carried out, such as the taking of a Turkish observing station; the strengthening of entrenchments; the reorganization of units, and the perfecting of communication with the landing-place. Also a constant strain has been placed upon some of the best troops of the enemy, who, to the number of 24,000, are constantly kept fighting and being killed and wounded freely, as the Turkish sniper is no match for the Kangaroo shooter, even at his own game.
The assistance of the Royal Navy, here as elsewhere, has been invaluable. The whole of the arrangements have been in Admiral Thursby's hands, and I trust I may be permitted to say what a trusty and powerful friend he has proved himself to be to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.
Concurrently with the British landings a regiment of the French Corps was successfully dis[Pg 31]embarked at Kum Kale under the guns of the French Fleet, and remained ashore till the morning of the 26th, when they re-embarked. Five hundred prisoners were captured by the French on this day.
This operation drew the fire of the Asiatic guns from Morto Bay and V beach on to Kum Kale, and contributed largely to the success of the British landings.
On the evening of the 26th the main disembarkation of the French Corps was begun, V beach being allotted to our Allies for this purpose, and it was arranged that the French should hold the portion of the front between the telegraph wire and the sea.
The following day I ordered a general advance to a line stretching from Hill 236 near Eski Hissarlik Point to the mouth of the stream two miles north of Tekke Burnu. This advance, which was commenced at midday, was completed without opposition, and the troops at once consolidated their new line. The forward movement relieved the growing congestion of the beaches, and by giving us possession of several new wells afforded a temporary solution to the water problem, which had hitherto been causing me much anxiety.
By the evening of the 27th the Allied forces had established themselves on a line some three miles long, which stretched from the mouth of the nullah, 3,200 yards north-east of Tekke Burnu, to Eski Hissarlik Point, the three brigades of the 29th Division less two battalions on the left and in the[Pg 32] centre, with four French battalions on the right, and beyond them again the South Wales Borderers on the extreme right.
Owing to casualties this line was somewhat thinly held. Still, it was so vital to make what headway we could before the enemy recovered himself and received fresh reinforcements that it was decided to push on as quickly as possible. Orders were therefore issued for a general advance to commence at 8 a.m. next day.
The 29th Division were to march on Krithia, with their left brigade leading, the French were directed to extend their left in conformity with the British movements and to retain their right on the coast-line south of the Kereves Dere.
The advance commenced at 8 a.m. on the 28th, and was carried out with commendable vigour, despite the fact that from the moment of landing the troops had been unable to obtain any proper rest.
(To face page 32.)
Map 2.
The 87th Brigade, with which had been incorporated the Drake Battalion, Royal Naval Division, in the place of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and South Wales Borderers, pushed on rapidly, and by 10 a.m. had advanced some two miles. Here the further progress of the Border Regiment was barred by a strong work on the left flank. They halted to concentrate and make dispositions[Pg 33] to attack it, and at that moment had to withstand a determined counter-attack by the Turks. Aided by heavy gun-fire from H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth, they succeeded in beating off the attack, but they made no further progress that day, and when night fell entrenched themselves on the ground they had gained in the morning.
The Inniskilling Fusiliers, who advanced with their right on the Krithia ravine, reached a point about three-quarters of a mile south-west of Krithia. This was, however, the farthest limit attained, and later on in the day they fell back into line with other corps.
The 88th Brigade on the right of the 87th progressed steadily until about 11.30 a.m., when the stubbornness of the opposition, coupled with a dearth of ammunition, brought their advance to a standstill. The 86th Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Casson, which had been held in reserve, were thereupon ordered to push forward through the 88th Brigade in the direction of Krithia.
The movement commenced at about 1 p.m., but though small reconnoitring parties got to within a few hundred yards of Krithia, the main body of the brigade did not get beyond the line held by the 88th Brigade. Meanwhile, the French had also pushed on in the face of strong opposition along the spurs on the western bank of the Kereves Dere, and had got to within a mile of Krithia with their right thrown back and their left in touch with the 88th Brigade. Here they were unable to make further progress; gradually the strength of the[Pg 34] resistance made itself felt, and our Allies were forced during the afternoon to give ground.
By 2 p.m. the whole of the troops with the exception of the Drake Battalion had been absorbed into the firing line. The men were exhausted, and the few guns landed at the time were unable to afford them adequate artillery support. The small amount of transport available did not suffice to maintain the supply of munitions, and cartridges were running short despite all efforts to push them up from the landing-places.
Hopes of getting a footing on Achi Babi had now perforce to be abandoned—at least for this occasion. The best that could be expected was that we should be able to maintain what we had won, and when at 3 p.m. the Turks made a determined counter-attack with the bayonet against the centre and right of our line, even this seemed exceedingly doubtful. Actually a partial retirement did take place. The French were also forced back, and at 6 p.m. orders were issued for our troops to entrench themselves as best they could in the positions they then held, with their right flank thrown back so as to maintain connection with our Allies. In this retirement the right flank of the 88th Brigade was temporarily uncovered, and the Worcester Regiment suffered severely.
Had it been possible to push in reinforcements in men, artillery, and munitions during the day, Krithia should have fallen, and much subsequent fighting for its capture would have been avoided.
Two days later this would have been feasible, but I had to reckon with the certainty that the enemy would, in that same time, have received proportionately greater support. I was faced by the usual choice of evils, and although the result was not what I had hoped, I have no reason to believe that hesitation and delay would better have answered my purpose.
For, after all, we had pushed forward quite appreciably on the whole. The line eventually held by our troops on the night of the 28th ran from a point on the coast three miles north-west of Tekke Burnu to a point one mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it was continued by the French south-east to the coast.
Much inevitable mixing of units of the 86th and 88th Brigades had occurred during the day's fighting, and there was a dangerous re-entrant in the line at the junction of the 87th and 88th Brigades near the Krithia nullah. The French had lost heavily, especially in officers, and required time to reorganize.
April 29 was consequently spent in straightening the line, and in consolidating and strengthening the[Pg 36] positions gained. There was a certain amount of artillery and musketry fire, but nothing serious.
Similarly, on the 30th, no advance was made, nor was any attack delivered by the enemy. The landing of the bulk of the artillery was completed, and a readjustment of the line took place, the portion held by the French being somewhat increased.
Two more battalions of the Royal Naval Division had been disembarked, and these, together with three battalions of the 88th Brigade withdrawn from the line, were formed into a reserve.
This reserve was increased on May 1 by the addition of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, which released the three battalions of the 88th Brigade to return to the trenches. The Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient had disembarked the whole of their infantry, and all but two of their batteries by the same evening.
At 10 p.m. the Turks opened a hot shell fire upon our position, and half an hour later, just before the rise of the moon, they delivered a series of desperate attacks. Their formation was in three solid lines, the men in the front rank being deprived of ammunition to make them rely only upon the bayonet. The officers were served out with coloured Bengal lights to fire from their pistols, red indicating to the Turkish guns that they were[Pg 37] to lengthen their range; white that our front trenches had been stormed; green that our main position had been carried. The Turkish attack was to crawl on hands and knees until the time came for the final rush to be made. An eloquent hortative was signed Von Zowenstern and addressed to the Turkish rank and file who were called upon, by one mighty effort, to fling us all back into the sea.
"Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy him!
"We shall not retire one step; for, if we do, our religion, our country, and our nation will perish!
"Soldiers! The world is looking at you! Your only hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give up your life in the attempt!"
The first momentum of this ponderous onslaught fell upon the right of the 86th Brigade, an unlucky spot, seeing all the officers thereabouts had already been killed or wounded. So when the Turks came right on without firing and charged into the trenches with the bayonet they made an ugly gap in the line. This gap was instantly filled by the 5th Royal Scots (Territorials), who faced to their flank and executed a brilliant bayonet charge against the[Pg 38] enemy, and by the Essex Regiment detached for the purpose by the Officer Commanding 88th Brigade. The rest of the British line held its own with comparative ease, and it was not found necessary to employ any portion of the reserve. The storm next broke in fullest violence against the French left, which was held by the Senegalese. Behind them were two British Field Artillery Brigades and a Howitzer Battery. After several charges and counter-charges the Senegalese began to give ground, and a company of the Worcester Regiment and some gunners were sent forward to hold the gap. Later, a second company of the Worcester Regiment was also sent up, and the position was then maintained for the remainder of the night, although about 2 a.m. it was found necessary to dispatch one battalion Royal Naval Division to strengthen the extreme right of the French.
About 5 a.m. a counter-offensive was ordered, and the whole line began to advance. By 7.30 a.m. the British left had gained some 500 yards, and the centre had pushed the enemy back and inflicted heavy losses. The right also had gained some ground in conjunction with the French left, but the remainder of the French line was unable to progress. As the British centre and left were now subjected to heavy cross fire from concealed machine guns, it was found impossible to maintain[Pg 39] the ground gained, and therefore, about 11 a.m., the whole line withdrew to its former trenches.
The net result of the operations was the repulse of the Turks and the infliction upon them of very heavy losses. At first we had them fairly on the run, and had it not been for those inventions of the devil—machine guns and barbed wire—which suit the Turkish character and tactics to perfection, we should not have stopped short of the crest of Achi Babi. As it was, all brigades reported great numbers of dead Turks in front of their lines, and 350 prisoners were left in our hands.
On the 2nd, during the day, the enemy remained quiet, burying his dead under a red crescent flag, a work with which we did not interfere. Shortly after 9 p.m., however, they made another attack against the whole Allied line, their chief effort being made against the French front, where the ground favoured their approach. The attack was repulsed with loss.
During the night 3rd/4th the French front was again subjected to a heavy attack, which they were able to repulse without assistance from my general reserve.
The day of the 4th was spent in reorganization, and a portion of the line held by the French, who had lost heavily during the previous night's fighting, was taken over by the 2nd Naval Brigade. The night passed quietly.
During the 5th the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire Division was disembarked and placed in reserve behind the British left.
Orders were issued for an advance to be carried out next day, and these and the three days' battle which ensued will be dealt with in my next despatch.
The losses, exclusive of the French, during the period covered by this despatch, were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering:
177 Officers and 1,990 other ranks killed.
412 Officers and 7,807 other ranks wounded.
13 Officers and 3,580 other ranks missing.
From a technical point of view it is interesting to note that my Administrative Staff had not reached Mudros by the time when the landings were finally arranged. All the highly elaborate work involved by these landings was put through by my General Staff working in collaboration with Commodore Roger Kayes, C.B., M.V.O., and the Naval Transport Officers allotted for the purpose by Vice-Admiral de Robeck. Navy and Army carried out these combined duties with that perfect harmony which was indeed absolutely essential to success.
(To face page 40.)
Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood K.C.S.I.
Throughout the events I have chronicled the Royal Navy has been father and mother to the Army. Not one of us but realises how much[Pg 41] he owes to Vice-Admiral de Robeck; to the warships, French and British; to the destroyers, mine sweepers, picket boats, and to all their dauntless crews, who took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to give their soldier comrades a fair run in at the enemy.
Throughout these preparations and operations Monsieur le Général d'Amade has given me the benefit of his wide experiences of war, and has afforded me, always, the most loyal and energetic support. The landing of Kum Kale planned by me as a mere diversion to distract the attention of the enemy was transformed by the Commander of the Corps Expéditionnaire de l'Orient into a brilliant operation, which secured some substantial results. During the fighting which followed the landing of the French Division at Sedd-el-Bahr no troops could have acquitted themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances, and under very heavy losses, than those working under the orders of Monsieur le Général d'Amade.
Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., was in command of the detached landing of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps above Kapa Tepe, as well as during the subsequent fighting. The fact of his having been responsible for the execution of these difficult and hazardous operations—operations which were crowned with a very remarkable success—speaks, I think, for itself.
Major-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C.B., D.S.O., was tried very highly, not only during[Pg 42] the landings, but more especially in the day and night attacks and counter-attacks which ensued. Untiring, resourceful, and ever more cheerful as the outlook (on occasion) grew darker, he possesses, in my opinion, very special qualifications as a Commander of troops in the field.
Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, C.B., is the best Chief of the General Staff it has ever been my fortune to encounter in war. I will not pile epithets upon him. I can say no more than what I have said, and I can certainly say no less.
I have many other names to bring to notice for the period under review, and these will form the subject of a separate report at an early date.
General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
August 26, 1915.
My Lord,
At the close of the ten days and ten nights described in my first despatch our troops had forced their way forward for some 5,000 yards from the landing-places at the point of the peninsula. Opposite them lay the Turks, who since their last repulse had fallen back about half a mile upon previously prepared redoubts and entrenchments. Both sides had drawn heavily upon their stock of energy and munitions, but it seemed clear that whichever could first summon up spirit to make another push must secure at least several hundreds of yards of the debatable ground between the two fronts. And several hundred yards, whatever it might mean to the enemy, was a matter of life or death to a force crowded together under gun fire on so narrow a tongue of land. Such was the situation on May 5, the date last mentioned in my despatch of the 20th of that month.
On that day I determined to continue my advance, feeling certain that even if my tired troops could not carry the formidable opposing lines they would at least secure the use of the intervening ground. Orders were forthwith issued for an attack.
The many urgent calls for reinforcements made during the previous critical fighting had forced me to disorganize and mix together several of the formations in the southern group, to the extent even of the French on our right having a British battalion holding their own extremest right. For the purposes of the impending fight it became therefore necessary to create temporarily a Composite Division, consisting of the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Infantry Brigades (withdrawn for the purpose from the northern section), together with a Naval Brigade formed of the Plymouth and Drake Battalions. The 29th Division was reconstituted into four brigades, i.e. the 88th and 87th Brigades, the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade (T.F.), and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. The French Corps Expéditionnaire was reinforced by the 2nd Naval Brigade, and the new Composite Division formed my General Reserve.
The 29th Division, whose left rested on the coast about three miles north-east of Cape Tekke, was ordered to direct, its right moving on the south-east edge of Krithia, while the Corps Expéditionnaire with the 2nd Naval Brigade had assigned to them for their first point of attack the commanding ridge running from north to south above the Kereves Dere. A foothold upon this ridge was essential, as its capture would ensure a safe pivot on which the 29th Division could swing in making any further advance. Communi[Pg 45]cation between these two sections of the attack was to be maintained by the Plymouth and Drake Battalions.
During the three days (May 6-8) our troops were destined to be very severely tried. They were about to attack a series of positions scientifically selected in advance which, although not yet joined up into one line of entrenchment, were already strengthened by works on their more important tactical features.
The 29th Division led off at 11 a.m., the French corps followed suit at 11.30 a.m.; every yard was stubbornly contested; some Brigades were able to advance, others could do no more than maintain themselves. Positions were carried and held, other positions were carried and lost; but, broadly, our gunners kept lengthening the fuses of their shrapnel, and by 1.30 p.m. the line had been pushed forward two to three hundred yards. Here and there this advance included a Turkish trench, but generally speaking the main enemy position still lay some distance ahead of our leading companies.
By 4.30 p.m. it became clear that we should make no more progress that day. The French Corps were held up by a strong field work. They had made good a point upon the crest line of the lower slope of the Kereves Dere ridge, but there they had come under a fire so galling that they[Pg 46] were unable, as it turned out, to entrench until nightfall. The 88th Brigade could not carry a clump of fir trees to their front; company after company made the perilous essay, but the wood, swept by hidden machine-guns, proved a veritable deathtrap. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade also were only just barely holding on and were suffering heavy losses from these same concealed machine-guns. The troops were ordered to entrench themselves in line and link up their flanks on either side.
At night, save for rifle fire, there was quiet along the whole British line. On the right a determined bayonet charge was made upon the French, who gave ground for the moment, but recovered it again at dawn.
Next morning (May 7) we opened with shrapnel upon the enemy's trenches opposite our extreme left, and at 10 a.m. the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade began the attack. But our artillery had not been able to locate the cleverly sited German machine-gun batteries, whose fire rendered it physically impossible to cross that smooth glacis. Next to the right the 88th Brigade swept forward, and the 1/5th Royal Scots, well supported by artillery fire, carried the fir trees with a rush. This time it was discovered that not only the enfilading machine-guns had made the wood so difficult to hold.[Pg 47] Amongst the branches of the trees Turkish snipers were perched, sometimes upon small wooden platforms. When these were brought down the surroundings became much healthier. The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, of the 87th Brigade, were pushed up to support the left of the 88th, and all seemed well, when, at 1.20 p.m., a strong Turkish counter-attack drove us back out of the fir clump. As an off-set to this check the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers captured three Turkish trenches, and a second battalion of the 87th Brigade, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, was sent forward on the left to make these good.
At 3 p.m. the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade again reported they were definitely held up by the accurate cross-fire of batteries of machine-guns concealed in the scrub on the ridge between the ravine and the sea, batteries which also enfiladed the left flank of the 88th Brigade as it endeavoured to advance in the centre. Unless we were to acquiesce in a stalemate the moment for our effort had arrived, and a general attack was ordered for 4.45 p.m., the whole of the 87th Brigade to reinforce the 88th Brigade, and the New Zealand Brigade to support it.
Despite their exhaustion and their losses the men responded with a will. The whole force, French and British, rose simultaneously and made[Pg 48] a rush forward. All along the front we made good a certain amount of ground, excepting only on our extreme left. For the third time British bayonets carried the fir clump in our centre, and when darkness fell the whole line (excepting always the left) had gained from 200 to 300 yards, and had occupied or passed over the first line of Turkish trenches.
The troops were now worn out; the new lines needed consolidating, and it was certain that fresh reinforcements were reaching the Turks. Balancing the actual state of my own troops against the probable condition of the Turks I decided to call upon the men to make one more push before the new enemy forces could get into touch with their surroundings.
Orders were therefore issued to dig in at sundown on the line gained; to maintain that line against counter-attack, and to prepare to advance again next morning. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade was withdrawn into reserve, and its place on the left was taken by the Brigade of New Zealanders.
General Headquarters were shifted to an entrenchment on a hill in rear of the left of our line. Under my plan for the fresh attack the New Zealand Brigade was to advance through the line held during the night by the 88th Brigade and press on towards Krithia. Simultaneously, the 87th Brigade was to threaten the works on the west of the ravine, whilst endeavouring, by means of parties of scouts and volunteers, to steal patches of ground from the areas dominated by the German machine-guns.
At 10.15 a.m. heavy fire from ships and batteries was opened on the whole front, and at 10.30 a.m. the New Zealand Brigade began to move, meeting with strenuous opposition from the enemy, who had received his reinforcements. Supported by the fire of the batteries and the machine-guns of the 88th Brigade, they pushed forward on the right and advanced their centre beyond the fir trees, but could make little further progress. By 1.30 p.m. about 200 yards had been gained beyond the previously most advanced trenches of the 88th Brigade.
At this hour the French Corps reported they could not advance up the crest of the spur west of Kereves Dere till further progress was made by the British.
At 4 p.m. I gave orders that the whole line, reinforced by the 2nd Australian Brigade, would fix bayonets, slope arms, and move on Krithia precisely at 5.30 p.m.
At 5.15 p.m. the ships' guns and our heavy artillery bombarded the enemy's position for a quarter of an hour, and at 5.30 p.m. the field guns opened a hot shrapnel fire to cover the infantry advance.
The co-operation of artillery and infantry in this attack was perfect, the timing of the movement being carried out with great precision. Some of the companies of the New Zealand regiments[Pg 50] did not get their orders in time, but acting on their own initiative they pushed on as soon as the heavy howitzers ceased firing, thus making the whole advance simultaneous.
The steady advance of the British could be followed by the sparkle of their bayonets until the long lines entered the smoke clouds. The French at first made no move, then, their drums beating and bugles sounding the charge, they suddenly darted forward in a swarm of skirmishers which seemed in one moment to cover the whole southern face of the ridge of the Kereves Dere. Against these the Turkish gunners now turned their heaviest pieces, and as the leading groups stormed the first Turkish redoubt the ink-black bursts of high-explosive shells blotted out both assailants and assailed. The trial was too severe for the Senegalese tirailleurs. They recoiled. They were rallied. Another rush forward, another repulse, and then a small supporting column of French soldiers was seen silhouetted against the sky as they charged upwards along the crest of the ridge of the Kereves Dere, whilst elsewhere it grew so dark that the whole of the battlefield became a blank.
Not until next morning did any reliable detail come to hand of what had happened. The New Zealanders' firing line had marched over the cunningly concealed enemy's machine-guns without seeing them, and these, reopening on our supports as they came up, caused them heavy losses. But the first line pressed on and arrived within a few[Pg 51] yards of the Turkish trenches which had been holding up our advance beyond the fir wood. There they dug themselves in.
The Australian Brigade had advanced through the Composite Brigade, and, in spite of heavy losses from shrapnel, machine-gun, and rifle fire, had progressed from 300 to 400 yards.
The determined valour shown by these two brigades, the New Zealand Brigade, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, and the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General the Hon. J. W. McCay, are worthy of particular praise. Their losses were correspondingly heavy, but in spite of fierce counter-attacks by numerous fresh troops they stuck to what they had won with admirable tenacity.
On the extreme left the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, made a final and especially gallant effort to advance across the smooth, bullet-swept area between the ravine and the sea, but once more the enemy machine-guns thinned the ranks of the leading companies of the South Wales Borderers, and again there was nothing for it but to give ground. But when night closed in the men of the 87th Brigade of their own accord asked to be led forward, and achieved progress to the extent of just about 200 yards. During the darkness the British troops everywhere entrenched themselves on the line gained.
On the right the French column, last seen as it grew dark, had stormed and still held the redoubt round which the fighting had centred until then. Both General d'Amade and General Simonin had been present in person with this detachment and had rallied the Senegalese and encouraged the white troops in their exploit. With their bayonets these brave fellows of the 8th Colonials had inflicted exceedingly heavy losses upon the enemy.
The French troops whose actions have hitherto been followed belonged, all of them, to the 2nd Division. But beyond the crest of the ridge the valley of the Kereves Dere lies dead to anyone occupying my post of command. And in this area the newly-arrived Brigade of the French 1st Division had been also fighting hard. Here they had advanced simultaneously with the 2nd Division and achieved a fine success in their first rush, which was jeopardized when a battalion of Zouaves was forced to give way under a heavy bombardment. But, as in the case of the 2nd Division, the other battalions of the 1st Régiment de Marche d'Afrique, under Lieutenant-Colonel Nieger, restored the situation, and in the end the Division carried and held two complete lines of Turkish redoubts and trenches.
The net result of the three days' fighting had been a gain of 600 yards on the right of the British[Pg 53] line and 400 yards on the left and centre. The French had captured all the ground in front of the Farm Zjimmerman, as well as a redoubt, for the possession of which there had been obstinate fighting during the whole of the past three days.
This may not seem very much, but actually more had been won than at first meets the eye. The German leaders of the Turks were quick to realize the fact. From nightfall till dawn on the 9th-10th efforts were made everywhere to push us back. A specially heavy attack was made upon the French, supported by a hot cannonade and culminating in a violent hand-to-hand conflict in front of the Brigade Simonin. Everywhere the assailants were repulsed, and now for the first time I felt that we had planted a fairly firm foothold upon the point of the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Meanwhile in the northern zone also, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps had strengthened their grip on Turkish soil. Whilst in the south we had been attacking and advancing they had been defending and digging themselves more and more firmly into those cliffs on which it had seemed at first that their foothold was so precarious.
On May 11, the first time for eighteen days and nights, it was found possible to withdraw the 29th Division from the actual firing line and to[Pg 54] replace it by the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and by the 42nd Division, which had completed its disembarkation two days previously. The withdrawal gave no respite from shells, but at least the men were, most nights, enabled to sleep.
The moment lent itself to reflection, and during this breathing space I was able to realize we had now nearly reached the limit of what could be attained by mingling initiative with surprise. The enemy was as much in possession of my numbers and dispositions as I was in possession of their first line of defence; the opposing fortified fronts stretched parallel from sea to straits; there was little scope left now, either at Achi Baba or at Kaba Tepe, for tactics which would fling flesh and blood battalions against lines of unbroken barbed wire. Advances must more and more tend to take the shape of concentrated attacks on small sections of the enemy's line after full artillery preparation. Siege warfare was soon bound to supersede manœuvre battles in the open. Consolidation and fortification of our front, improvement of approaches, selection of machine-gun emplacements and scientific grouping of our artillery under a centralized control must ere long form the tactical basis of our plans.
So soon, then, as the troops had enjoyed a day or two of comparative rest I divided my front into four sections. On the left was the 29th Division, to which the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was attached. In the left centre came the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division, on the right centre stood the Royal Naval Division, and at my right was[Pg 55] the Corps Expéditionnaire. Thus I secured organization in depth as well as front, enabling each division to arrange for its own reliefs, supports, and reserves, and giving strength for defence as well as attack. Hitherto the piecemeal arrival of reinforcements had forced a hand-to-mouth procedure upon head-quarters; now the control became more decentralized.
Already, before the new system of local efforts had come into working order, the 29th Indian Brigade had led the way towards it by a brilliant little affair on the night of May 10-11. The Turkish right rested upon the steep cliff north-east of Y beach, where the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion, Royal Naval Division, had made their first landing. Since those days the enemy had converted the bluff into a powerful bastion, from which the fire of machine-guns had held up the left of our attacks. Two gallant attempts by the Royal Munster Fusiliers and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers to establish a footing on this cliff on May 8 and 9 had both of them failed.
During the night of May 10-11 the 6th Gurkhas started off to seize this bluff. Their scouts descended to the sea, worked their way for some distance through the broken ground along the shore, and crawled hands and knees up the precipitous face of the cliff. On reaching the top they were[Pg 56] heavily fired on. As a surprise the enterprise had failed, but as a reconnaissance it proved very useful. On the following day Major-General H. B. Cox, commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, submitted proposals for a concerted attack on this bluff (now called Gurkha Bluff), and arrangements were made with the Navy for co-operation. These arrangements were completed on May 12; they included a demonstration by the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division and by our artillery and the support of the attack from the sea by the guns of H.M.S. Dublin and H.M.S. Talbot. At 6.30 a.m. on May 12 the Manchester Brigade and the 29th Divisional artillery opened fire on the Turkish trenches, and under cover of this fire a double company of the 1/6th Gurkhas once more crept along the shore and assembled below the bluff. Then, the attention of the Turks being taken up with the bombardment, they swiftly scaled the cliffs and carried the work with a rush. The machine-gun section of the Gurkhas was hurried forward, and at 4.30 p.m. a second double company was pushed up to join the first.
An hour later these two double companies extended and began to entrench to join up their new advanced left diagonally with the right of the trenches previously held by their battalion.
At 6 p.m. a third double company advanced across the open from their former front line of trenches under a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, and established themselves on this diagonal line between the main ravine on their right and the[Pg 57] newly captured redoubt. The 4th double company moved up as a support, and held the former firing line.
Our left flank, which had been firmly held up against all attempts on the 6th-8th, was now, by stratagem, advanced nearly 500 yards. Purchased as it was with comparatively slight losses (21 killed, 92 wounded) this success was due to careful preparation and organization by Major-General H. V. Cox, commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Bruce, commanding 1/6 Gurkhas, and Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) F. A. Wynter, R.G.A., commanding the Artillery Group supporting the attack. The co-operation of the two cruisers was excellent, and affords another instance of the admirable support by the Navy to our troops.
On May 14 General Gouraud arrived and took over from General d'Amade the command of the Corps Expéditionnaire. As General d'Amade quitted the shores of the peninsula he received a spontaneous ovation from the British soldiers at work upon the beaches.
The second division of the Corps Expéditionnaire, commanded by General Bailloud, had now completed disembarkation.
From the time of the small local push forward made by the 6th Gurkhas on the night of May 10-11[Pg 58] until June 4 the troops under my command pressed against the enemy continuously by sapping, reconnaissance, and local advances, whilst, to do them justice they (the enemy) did what they could to repay us in like coin. I have given the escalade of Gurkha Bluff as a sample; no forty-eight hours passed without something of the sort being attempted or achieved either by the French or ourselves.
Turning now to where the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps were perched upon the cliffs of Sari Bair, I must begin by explaining that their rôle at this stage of the operations was—first, to keep open a door leading to the vitals of the Turkish position; secondly, to hold up as large a body as possible of the enemy in front of them, so as to lessen the strain at Cape Helles. Anzac, in fact, was cast to play second fiddle to Cape Helles, a part out of harmony with the dare-devil spirit animating those warriors from the South, and so it has come about that, as your Lordship will now see, the defensive of the Australians and New Zealanders has always tended to take on the character of an attack.
The line held during the period under review by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps formed a rough semi-circle inland from the beach of Anzac Cove, with a diameter of about 1,100 yards. The firing line is everywhere close to the enemy's[Pg 59] trenches, and in all sections of the position sapping, counter-sapping, and bomb attacks have been incessant. The shelling both of the trenches and beaches has been impartial and liberal. As many as 1,400 shells have fallen on Anzac within the hour, and these of all calibres, from 11 inches to field shrapnel. Around Quinn's Post, both above and below ground, the contest has been particularly severe. This section of the line is situated on the circumference of the Anzac semicircle at the furthest point from its diameter. Here our fire trenches are mere ledges on the brink of a sheer precipice falling 200 feet into the valley below. The enemy's trenches are only a few feet distant.
On May 9 a night assault, supported by enfilade fire, was delivered on the enemy's trenches in front of Quinn's Post. The trenches were carried at the point of the bayonet, troops established in them, and reinforcements sent up.
At dawn on May 10 a strong counter-attack forced our troops to evacuate the trenches and fall back on Quinn's Post. In opposing this counter-attack our guns did great execution, as we discovered later from a Turkish officer's diary that two Turkish regiments on this date lost 600 killed and 2,000 wounded.
On the night of May 14-15 a sortie was made from Quinn's Post with the object of filling in[Pg 60] Turkish trenches in which bomb-throwers were active. The sortie, which cost us some seventy casualties, was not successful.
On May 14 Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood was slightly wounded, but, I am glad to say, he was not obliged to relinquish the command of his Corps.
On May 15 I deeply regret to say Major-General W. T. Bridges, commanding the Australian Division, received a severe wound, which proved fatal a few days later. Sincere and single-minded in his devotion to Australia and to duty, his loss still stands out even amidst the hundreds of other brave officers who have gone.
On May 18 Anzac was subjected to a heavy bombardment from large-calibre guns and howitzers. At midnight of the 18th-19th the most violent rifle and machine-gun fire yet experienced broke out along the front. Slackening from 3 a.m. to 4 a.m. it then broke out again, and a heavy Turkish column assaulted the left of No. 2 section. This assault was beaten off with loss. Another attack was delivered before daylight on the centre of this section; it was repeated four times and repulsed each time with very serious losses to the enemy. Simultaneously a heavy attack was delivered on the north-east salient of No. 4 section, which was repulsed and followed up, but the pressing of the counter-attack was prevented by shrapnel. Attacks[Pg 61] were also delivered on Quinn's Post, Courtney's Post, and along the front of our right section. At about 5 a.m. the battle was fairly joined, and a furious cannonade was begun by a large number of enemy guns, including 12-in. and 9·2-in., and other artillery that had not till then opened. By 9.30 a.m. the Turks were pressing hard against the left of Courtney's and the right of Quinn's Post. At 10 a.m. this attack, unable to face fire from the right, swung round to the left, where it was severely handled by our guns and the machine-guns of our left section. By 11 a.m. the enemy, who were crowded together in the trenches beyond Quinn's Post, were giving way under their heavy losses.
According to prisoners' reports 30,000 troops, including five fresh regiments, were used against us. General Liman von Sanders was himself in command.
The enemy's casualties were heavy, as may be judged from the fact that over 3,000 dead were lying in the open in view of our trenches. A large proportion of these losses were due to our artillery fire. Our casualties amounted to about 100 killed and 500 wounded, including nine officers wounded.
The next four days were chiefly remarkable for the carrying through of the negotiations for[Pg 62] the suspension of arms, which actually took place on May 24. About 5 p.m. on May 20 white flags and Red Crescents began to appear all along the line. In No. 2 section a Turkish staff officer, two medical officers, and a company commander came out and were met by Major-General H. B. Walker, commanding the Australian Division, halfway between the trenches. The staff officer explained that he was instructed to arrange a suspension of arms, for the removal of dead and wounded. He had no written credentials, and he was informed that neither he nor the General Officer Commanding Australian Division had the power to arrange such a suspension of arms, but that at 8 p.m. an opportunity would be given of exchanging letters on the subject, and that meanwhile hostilities would recommence after ten minutes' grace. At this time some stretcher parties on both sides were collecting wounded, and the Turkish trenches opposite ours were packed with men standing shoulder to shoulder two deep. Matters were less regular in front of other sections, where men with white flags came out to collect wounded. Meanwhile it was observed that columns were on the march in the valley up which the Turks were accustomed to bring up their reinforcements.
On hearing the report of these movements, General Sir W. R. Birdwood, commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, ordered his trenches to be manned against a possible attack. As the evening drew in the enemy's concentration continued, and everything pointed to their intention[Pg 63] of making use of the last of the daylight to get their troops into position without being shelled by our artillery. A message was therefore sent across to say that no clearing of dead or wounded could be allowed during the night, and that any negotiations for such a purpose should be opened through the proper channel and initiated before noon on the following day.
Stretcher and other parties fell back, and immediately firing broke out. In front of our right section masses of men advanced behind lines of unarmed men holding up their hands. Firing became general all along the line accompanied by a heavy bombardment of the whole position, so that evidently this attack must have been pre-arranged. Musketry and machine-gun fire continued without interruption till after dark, and from then up to about 4 a.m. next day.
Except for a half-hearted attack in front of Courtney's Post, no assault was made till 1.20 a.m., when the enemy left their trenches and advanced on Quinn's Post. Our guns drove the Turks back to their trenches, and beat back all other attempts to assault. By 4.30 on May 21 musketry fire had died down to normal dimensions.
As the Turks seemed anxious to bury their dead, and as human sentiment and medical science were both of one accord in favour of such a course, I sent Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, my Chief[Pg 64] of the General Staff, on May 22, to assist Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, commanding the Army Corps, in coming to some suitable arrangements with the representative sent by Essad Pasha. The negotiations resulted in a suspension of arms from 7.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. on May 24. The procedure laid down for this suspension of arms was, I am glad to inform your Lordships, correctly observed on both sides.
The burial of the dead was finished about 3 p.m. Some 3,000 Turkish dead were removed or buried in the area between the opposing lines. The whole of these were killed on or since May 18. Many bodies of men killed earlier were also buried.
On May 25, with the assistance of two destroyers of the Royal Navy, a raid was carried out on Nibrunesi Point. A fresh telephone line was destroyed and an observing station demolished.
On May 28, at 9 p.m., a raid was made on a Turkish post overlooking the beach 1,200 yards north of Kaba Tepe, H.M.S. Rattlesnake co-operating. A party of fifty rifles rushed the post, killing or capturing the occupants. A similar raid was made against an enemy trench to the left of our line which cost the Turks 200 casualties, as was afterwards ascertained.
(To face page 64.)
Map 3.
From May 28 till June 5 the fighting seemed to concentrate itself around Quinn's Post. Three[Pg 65] enemy galleries had been detected there, and work on them stopped by counter-mines, which killed twenty Turks and injured thirty. One gallery had, however, been overlooked, and at 3.30 a.m. on May 29, a mine was sprung in or near the centre of Quinn's Post. The explosion was followed by a very heavy bomb attack, before which our left centre sub-section fell back, letting in a storming party of Turks. This isolated one sub-section on the left from the two other sub-sections on the right.
At 5.30 a.m. our counter-attack was launched, and by 6 a.m. the position had been retaken with the bayonet by the 15th Australian Infantry Battalion, led by Major Quinn, who was unfortunately killed. All the enemy in the trench were killed or captured, and the work of restoration was begun.
At 6.30 a.m. the Turks again attacked, supported by artillery, rifle, and machine-gun fire and by showers of bombs from the trenches. The fine shooting of our guns and the steadiness of the infantry enabled us to inflict upon the enemy a bloody repulse, demoralizing them to such an extent that the bomb throwers of their second line flung the missiles into the middle of their own first line.
At 8.15 a.m. the attack slackened, and by 8.45 a.m. the enemy's attacks had practically ceased.
Our casualties in this affair amounted to 2 officers, 31 other ranks killed, 12 officers and 176 other ranks wounded. The enemy's losses must have been serious, and were probably equal to those sustained on May 9-10. Except for the first withdrawal in the confusion of the mine explosion, all ranks fought with the greatest tenacity and courage.
On May 30 preparations were made in Quinn's Post to attack and destroy two enemy saps, the heads of which had reached within 5 yards of our fire trench. Two storming parties of thirty-five men went forward at 1 p.m., cleared the sap heads and penetrated into the trenches beyond, but they were gradually driven back by Turkish counter-attacks, in spite of our heavy supporting fire, our casualties being chiefly caused by bombs, of which the enemy seem to have an unlimited supply.
During May 31 close fighting continued in front of Quinn's Post.
On June 1, an hour after dark, two sappers of the New Zealand Engineers courageously crept out and laid a charge of guncotton against a timber and sandbag bomb-proof. The structure was completely demolished.
After sunset on June 4 three separate enterprises were carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. These were undertaken in compliance[Pg 67] with an order which I had issued that the enemy's attention should be distracted during an attack I was about to deliver in the southern zone.
(1) A demonstration in the direction of Kaba Tepe, the Navy co-operating by bombarding the Turkish trenches.
(2) A sortie at 11 p.m. towards a trench 200 yards from Quinn's Post. This failed, but a second sortie by 100 men took place at 2.55 a.m. on June 5 and penetrated to the Turkish trench; demolished a machine-gun emplacement which enfiladed Quinn's Post, and withdrew in good order.
(3) At Quinn's Post an assault was delivered at 11 p.m. A party of sixty men, accompanied by a bomb-throwing party on either flank, stormed the enemy's trench. In the assault many Turks were bayoneted and twenty-eight captured. A working party followed up the attack and at once set to work. Meanwhile the Turkish trenches on the left of the post were heavily assailed with machine-gun fire and grenades, which drew from them a very heavy fire. After daybreak a strong bomb attack developed on the captured trench, the enemy using a heavier type of bomb than hitherto.
At 6.30 a.m. the trench had to be abandoned, and it was found necessary to retire to the original fire trench of the post and the bomb-proof in front of its left. Our casualties were eighty; those of the enemy considerably greater.
On June 5 a sortie was made from Quinn's Post by 2 officers and 100 men of the 1st Australian Infantry, the objective being the destruction of a machine-gun in a trench known as German Officer's Trench. A special party of ten men with the officer commanding the party (Lieutenant E. E. L. Lloyd, 1st Battalion (New South Wales) Australian Imperial Force) made a dash for the machine-gun; one of the ten men managed to fire three rounds into the gun at a range of 5 feet and another three at the same range through a loophole. The darkness of the trench and its overhead cover prevented the use of the bayonet, but some damage was done by shooting down over the parapet. As much of the trench as possible was dismantled. The party suffered some casualties from bombs, and was enfiladed all the time by machine-guns from either flank. The aim of this gallant assault being attained the party withdrew in good order with their wounded. Casualties in all were thirty-six.
I now return to the southern zone and to the battle of June 4.
From May 25 onwards the troops had been trying to work up within rushing distance of the enemy's front trenches. On May 25 the Royal Naval and 42nd Divisions crept 100 yards nearer[Pg 69] to the Turks, and on the night of May 28-29 the whole of the British line made a further small advance. On that same night the French Corps Expéditionnaire was successful in capturing a small redoubt on the extreme Turkish left west of the Kereves Dere.
All Turkish counter-attacks during May 29 were repulsed. On the night of May 30 two of their many assaults effected temporary lodgment. But on both occasions they were driven out again with the bayonet.
On every subsequent night up to that of June 3-4 assaults were made upon the redoubt and upon our line, but at the end of that period our position remained intact.
This brings the narrative up to the day of the general attack upon the enemy's front line of trenches which ran from the west of the Kereves Dere in a northerly direction to the sea.
Taking our line of battle from right to left the troops were deployed in the following order:—The Corps Expéditionnaire, the Royal Naval Division, the 42nd (East Lancs) Division and the 29th Division.
The length of the front, so far as the British troops were concerned, was rather over 4,000 yards, and the total infantry available amounted to 24,000 men, which permitted the General Officer Commanding 8th Army Corps to form a corps reserve of 7,000 men.
My General Head-quarters for the day were at the command post on the peninsula.
At 8 a.m. on June 4 our heavy artillery opened with a deliberate bombardment, which continued till 10.30 a.m. At 11 a.m. the bombardment recommenced, and continued till 11.20 a.m., when a feint attack was made which successfully drew heavy fire from the enemy's guns and rifles. At 11.30 a.m. all our guns opened fire and continued with increasing intensity till noon.
On the stroke of noon the artillery increased their range, and along the whole line the infantry fixed bayonets and advanced.
The assault was immediately successful. On the extreme right the French 1st Division carried a line of trench, whilst the French 2nd Division, with the greatest dash and gallantry, captured a strong redoubt called the "Haricot," for which they had already had three desperate contests. Only the extreme left of the French was unable to gain any ground, a feature destined to have an unfortunate effect upon the final issue.
The 2nd Naval Brigade of the Royal Naval Division rushed forward with great dash; the "Anson" Battalion captured the southern face of a Turkish redoubt which formed a salient in the enemy's line, the "Howe" and "Hood" Battalions captured trenches fronting them, and by 12.15 p.m. the whole Turkish line forming their first objective was in their hands. Their consolidating party went forward at 12.25 p.m.
The Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division advanced magnificently. In five minutes the first line of Turkish trenches were captured, and by 12.30 p.m. the Brigade had carried with a rush the line forming their second objective, having made an advance of 600 yards in all. The working parties got to work without incident, and the position here could not possibly have been better.
On the left the 29th Division met with more difficulty. All along the section of the 88th Brigade the troops jumped out of their trenches at noon and charged across the open at the nearest Turkish trench. In most places the enemy crossed bayonets with our men and inflicted severe loss upon us. But the 88th Brigade was not to be denied. The Worcester Regiment was the first to capture trenches, and the remainder of the 88th Brigade, though at first held up by flanking as well as fronting fire, also pushed on doggedly until they had fairly made good the whole of the Turkish first line.
Only on the extreme left did we sustain a check. Here the Turkish front trench was so sited as to have escaped damage from our artillery bombardment, and the barbed wire obstacle was intact. The result was that, though the 14th Sikhs on the right flank pushed on despite losses amounting to three-fourths of their effectives, the centre of the Brigade could make no headway. A company of the 6th Gurkhas on the left, skilfully led along the[Pg 72] cliffs by its commander, actually forced its way into a Turkish work, but the failure of the rest of the Brigade threatened isolation, and it was as skilfully withdrawn under fire. Reinforcements were therefore sent to the left so that, if possible, a fresh attack might be organized.
Meanwhile, on the right of the line, the gains of the morning were being compromised. A very heavy counter-attack had developed against the "Haricot." The Turks poured in masses of men through prepared communication trenches, and, under cover of accurate shell fire, were able to recapture that redoubt. The French, forced to fall back, uncovered in doing so the right flank of the Royal Naval Division. Shortly before 1 p.m. the right of the 2nd Naval Brigade had to retire with very heavy loss from the redoubt they had captured, thus exposing in their turn the "Howe" and "Hood" Battalions to enfilade, so that they, too, had nothing for it but to retreat across the open under exceedingly heavy machine-gun and musketry fire.
By 1.30 p.m. the whole of the captured trenches in this section had been lost again, and the Brigade was back in its original position, the "Collingwood" Battalion, which had gone forward in support, having been practically destroyed.
The question was now whether this rolling up of the newly captured line from the right would continue until the whole of our gains were wiped[Pg 73] out. It looked very like it, for now the enfilade fire of the Turks began to fall upon the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division, which was firmly consolidating the furthest distant line of trenches it had so brilliantly won. After 1.30 p.m. it became increasingly difficult for this gallant Brigade to hold its ground. Heavy casualties occurred; the Brigadier and many other officers were wounded or killed; yet it continued to hold out with the greatest tenacity and grit. Every effort was made to sustain the Brigade in its position. Its right flank was thrown back to make face against the enfilade fire and reinforcements were sent to try to fill the diagonal gap between it and the Royal Naval Division. But ere long it became clear that unless the right of our line could advance again it would be impossible for the Manchesters to maintain the very pronounced salient in which they now found themselves.
Orders were issued, therefore, that the Royal Naval Division should co-operate with the French Corps in a fresh attack, and reinforcements were despatched to this end. The attack, timed for 3 p.m., was twice postponed at the request of General Gouraud, who finally reported that he would be unable to advance again that day with any prospect of success. By 6.30 p.m., therefore, the 42nd Division had to be extricated with loss from the second line Turkish trenches, and had to content themselves with consolidating on the first line, which they had captured within five minutes of commencing the attack. Such was the spirit[Pg 74] displayed by this Brigade that there was great difficulty in persuading the men to fall back. Had their flanks been covered nothing would have made them loosen their grip.
No further progress had been found possible in front of the 88th Brigade and Indian Brigade. Attempts were made by their reserve battalions to advance on the right and left flanks respectively, but in both cases heavy fire drove them back.
At 4 p.m. under support of our artillery the Royal Fusiliers were able to advance beyond the first line of captured trenches, but the fact that the left flank was held back made the attempt to hold any isolated position in advance inadvisable.
As the reserves had been largely depleted by the despatch of reinforcements to various parts of the line, and information was to hand of the approach of strong reinforcements of fresh troops to the enemy, orders were issued for the consolidation of the line then held.
Although we had been forced to abandon so much of the ground gained in the first rush, the net result of the day's operations was considerable—namely, an advance of 200 to 400 yards along the whole of our centre, a front of nearly 3 miles. That the enemy suffered severely was indicated, not only by subsequent information, but by the fact of his attempting no counter-attack during the night, except upon the trench captured by the French 1st Division on the extreme right. Here two counter-attacks were repulsed with loss.
The prisoners taken during the day amounted[Pg 75] to 400, including 11 officers: amongst these were 5 Germans, the remains of a volunteer machine-gun detachment from the Goeben. Their commanding officer was killed and the machine-gun destroyed. The majority of these captures were made by the 42nd Division under Major-General W. Douglas.
From the date of this battle to the end of the month of June the incessant attacks and counter-attacks which have so grievously swelled our lists of casualties have been caused by the determination of the Turks to regain ground they had lost, a determination clashing against our firm resolve to continue to increase our holding. Several of these daily encounters would have been the subject of a separate despatch in the campaigns of my youth and middle age, but, with due regard to proportion, they cannot even be so much as mentioned here. Only one example each from the French, British, and Australian and New Zealand spheres of action will be most briefly set down so that Your Lordship may understand the nature of the demands made upon the energies and fortitude of the troops.
(1) At 4.30 a.m. on June 21 the French Corps Expéditionnaire attacked the formidable works that flank the Kereves Dere. By noon their 2nd Division had stormed all the Turkish first and second line trenches to their front and had captured the[Pg 76] Haricot redoubt. On their right the 1st Division took the first line of trenches, but were counter-attacked and driven out. Fresh troops were brought up and launched upon another assault, but the Turks were just as obstinate and drove out the second party before they had time to consolidate. At 2.45 p.m. General Gouraud issued an order that full use might be made of the remaining five hours of daylight, and that, before dark, these trenches must be taken and held, otherwise the gains of the 2nd Division would be sacrificed. At 6. p.m. the third assault succeeded; 600 yards of trenches remained in our hands, despite all the heavy counter-attacks made through the night by the enemy. In this attack the striplings belonging to the latest French drafts specially distinguished themselves by their forwardness and contempt of danger. Fifty prisoners were taken, and the enemy's casualties (mostly incurred during counter-attacks) were estimated at 7,000. The losses of the Corps Expéditionnaire were 2,500.
(2) The Turkish right had hitherto rooted itself with special tenacity into the coast. In the scheme of attack submitted by Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, commanding 8th Army Corps, our left, pivoting upon a point in our line about one mile from the sea, was to push forward until its outer flank advanced about 1,000 yards. If the[Pg 77] operation was successful then, at its close, we should have driven the enemy back for a thousand yards along the coast, and the trenches of this left section of our line would be facing east instead of, as previously, north-east. Obviously the ground to be gained lessened as our line drew back from the sea towards its fixed or pivoted right. Five Turkish trenches must be carried in the section nearest the sea: only two Turkish trenches in the section furthest from the sea. At 10.20 a.m. on June 28 our bombardment began. At 10.45 a.m. a small redoubt known as the Boomerang was rushed by the Border Regiment. At 11 a.m. the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, captured three lines of Turkish trenches. On their right the 4th and 7th Royal Scots captured the two Turkish trenches allotted to them, but further to the east; near the pivotal point the remainder of the 156th Brigade were unable to get on. Precisely at 11.30 a.m. the second attack took place. The 86th Brigade, led by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, dashed over the trenches already captured by their comrades of the 87th Brigade, and, pushing on with great steadiness, took two more lines of trenches, thus achieving the five successive lines along the coast. This success was further improved upon by the Indian Brigade, who managed to secure, and to place into a state of defence, a spur running from the west of the furthest captured Turkish trench to the sea. Our casualties were small; 1,750 in all. The enemy suffered heavily, especially in the repeated counter-attacks,[Pg 78] which for many days and nights afterwards they launched against the trenches they had lost.
(3) On the night of June 29 and 30 the Turks, acting, as we afterwards ascertained, under the direct personal order of Enver Pasha, to drive us all into the sea, made a big attack on the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, principally on that portion of the line which was under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley. From midnight till 1.30 a.m. a fire of musketry and guns of greatest intensity was poured upon our trenches. A heavy column then advanced to the assault, and was completely crumpled up by the musketry and machine-guns of the 7th and 8th Light Horse. An hour later another grand attack took place against our left and left centre, and was equally cut to pieces by our artillery and rifle fire. The enemy's casualties may be judged by the fact that in areas directly exposed to view between 400 and 500 were actually seen to fall.
On the evening of this day, June 30, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force suffered grievous loss owing to the wounding of General Gouraud by a shell. This calamity, for I count it nothing less, brings us down to the beginning of the month of July.
The command of the Corps Expéditionnaire français d'Orient was then taken over by General Bailloud, at which point I shall close my despatch.
Brigadier-General R. W. Melville Jackson, C.B., C.M.G.
(To face page 78.)
During the whole period under review the efforts and expedients whereby a great army has had its wants supplied upon a wilderness have, I believe, been breaking world records.
The country is broken, mountainous, arid, and void of supplies; the water found in the areas occupied by our forces is quite inadequate for their needs; the only practicable beaches are small, cramped breaks in impracticable lines of cliffs; with the wind in certain quarters no sort of landing is possible; the wastage, by bombardment and wreckage, of lighters and small craft has led to crisis after crisis in our carrying capacity, whilst over every single beach plays fitfully throughout each day a devastating shell fire at medium ranges.
Upon such a situation appeared quite suddenly the enemy submarines. On May 22 all transports had to be dispatched to Mudros for safety. Thenceforth men, stores, guns, horses, etc., had to be brought from Mudros—a distance of 40 miles—in fleet sweepers and other small and shallow craft less vulnerable to submarine attack. Every danger and every difficulty was doubled.
But the Navy and the Royal Engineers were not to be thwarted in their landing operations either by nature or by the enemy, whilst the Army Service Corps, under Brigadier-General F. W. B. Koe, and the Army Ordnance Corps, under Brigadier-General R. W. M. Jackson, have made[Pg 80] it a point of honour to feed men, animals, guns, and rifles in the fighting line as regularly as if they were only out for manœuvres on Salisbury Plain.
I desire, therefore, to record my admiration for the cool courage and unfailing efficiency with which the Royal Navy, the beach personnel, the engineers, and the administrative services have carried out these arduous duties.
In addition to its normal duties the Signal Service, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel M. G. E. Bowman-Manifold, Director of Army Signals, has provided the connecting link between the Royal Navy and the Army in their combined operations, and has rapidly readjusted itself to amphibious methods. All demands made on it by sudden expansion of the fighting forces or by the movements of General Head-quarters have been rapidly and effectively met. The working of the telegraphs, telephones, and repair of lines, often under heavy fire, has been beyond praise. Casualties have been unusually high, but the best traditions of the Corps of Royal Engineers have inspired the whole of their work. As an instance, the central telegraph office at Cape Helles (a dug-out) was recently struck by a high explosive shell. The officer on duty and twelve other ranks were killed or wounded and the office entirely demolished. But No. 72003 Corporal G. A. Walker, Royal[Pg 81] Engineers, although much shaken, repaired the damage, collected men, and within 39 minutes reopened communication by apologizing for the incident and by saying he required no assistance.
The Royal Army Medical Service have had to face unusual and very trying conditions. There are no roads, and the wounded who are unable to walk must be carried from the firing line to the shore. They and their attendants may be shelled on their way to the beaches, at the beaches, on the jetties, and again, though I believe by inadvertence, on their way out in lighters to the hospital ships. Under shell fire it is not as easy as some of the critically disposed seem to imagine to keep all arrangements in apple-pie order. Here I can only express my own opinion that efficiency, method, and even a certain quiet heroism have characterized the evacuations of the many thousands of our wounded.
In my three Commanders of Corps I have indeed been thrice fortunate.
General Gouraud brought a great reputation to our help from the battlefields of the Argonne, and in so doing he has added to its lustre. A happy mixture of daring in danger and of calm[Pg 82] in crisis, full of energy and resource, he has worked hand in glove with his British comrades in arms, and has earned their affection and respect.
Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood has been the soul of Anzac. Not for one single day has he ever quitted his post. Cheery and full of human sympathy, he has spent many hours of each twenty-four inspiring the defenders of the front trenches, and if he does not know every soldier in his force, at least every soldier in the force believes he is known to his Chief.
Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter-Weston possesses a genius for war. I know no more resolute Commander. Calls for reinforcements, appeals based on exhaustion or upon imminent counter-attacks are powerless to divert him from his aim. And this aim, in so far as he may be responsible for it, is worked out with insight, accuracy, and that wisdom which comes from close study in peace combined with long experience in the field.
In my first despatch I tried to express my indebtedness to Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, and I must now again, however inadequately, place on record the untiring, loyal assistance he has continued to render me ever since.
The thanks of every one serving in the Peninsula are due to Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell. All the resources of Egypt and all of his own remarkable administrative abilities have been ungrudgingly placed at our disposal.
Lieut.-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C.B.
(To face page 82.)
Finally, if my despatch is in any way to reflect the feelings of the force, I must refer to the shadow[Pg 83] cast over the whole of our adventure by the loss of so many of our gallant and true-hearted comrades. Some of them we shall never see again; some have had the mark of the Dardanelles set upon them for life, but others, and, thank God, by far the greater proportion, will be back in due course at the front.
August 10
Sir Ian Hamilton reports that fighting at several points on the Gallipoli peninsula has taken place during the last few days. Substantial progress has been made.
In the southern zone 200 yards on a front of 300 yards has been gained east of the Krithia road, and has been held in spite of determined counter-attacks, which have been repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.
Repeated attacks by the Turks elsewhere in this zone have been beaten off.
Several attacks by the French Corps have been made and their whole-hearted co-operation has proved of the greatest assistance.
In the Anzac zone a footing on the Chunuk Bair portion of Sari Bair has also been gained and a crest occupied after fierce fighting and the successful storming of strongly held positions.
Here, too, the enemy's losses have been considerable. The advance was commenced at night under cover of a searchlight from a destroyer.
Elsewhere a fresh landing was successfully effected and considerable progress made.
Six hundred and thirty prisoners have been taken together with one Nordenfelt gun, two bomb mortars, nine machine-guns, and a large number of bombs. Scattered about are quantities of the enemy's rifles, ammunition, and equipment.
August 11
The latest report from Sir Ian Hamilton states that severe fighting continued yesterday in the Gallipoli Peninsula, mainly in the Anzac zone and in that to the north.
The positions occupied were slightly varied in places, but the general result is that the area held at Anzac has been nearly trebled owing chiefly to the gallantry and dash of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, while to the north no further progress has yet been made.
The troops have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and the French battleship St. Louis is reported to have put out of action five out of six guns in Asiatic batteries.
Admiralty, August 16, 1915.
Triad, July 1, 1915.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith an account of the operations carried out on April 25 and 26, 1915, during which period the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was landed and firmly established in the Gallipoli Peninsula.
The landing commenced at 4.20 a.m. on 25th. The general scheme was as follows:
Two main landings were to take place, the first at a point just north of Gaba Tepe, the second on the southern end of the peninsula. In addition a landing was to be made at Kum Kale, and a demonstration in force to be carried out in the Gulf of Xeros near Bulair.
The night of the 24th-25th was calm and very clear, with a brilliant moon, which set at 3 a.m.
The first landing, north of Gaba Tepe, was carried out under the orders of Rear-Admiral[Pg 90] C. F. Thursby, C.M.G. His squadron consisted of the following ships:
| Battleships. | Cruiser. | Destroyers. | Seaplane Carrier. | Trawlers. | Balloon Ship. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Queen | Bacchante | Beagle | Ark Royal | 15 | Manica |
| London | Bulldog | ||||
| Prince of | Foxhound | ||||
| Wales | Scourge | ||||
| Triumph | Colne | ||||
| Chelmer | |||||
| Ribble |
To Queen, London, and Prince of Wales was delegated the duty of actually landing the troops. To Triumph, Majestic, and Bacchante the duty of covering the landing by gunfire.
In this landing a surprise was attempted. The first troops to be landed were embarked in the battleships Queen, London, and Prince of Wales.
The squadron then approached the land at 2.58 a.m. at a speed of 5 knots. When within a short distance of the beach selected for landing the boats were sent ahead. At 4.20 a.m. the boats reached the beach and a landing was effected.
The remainder of the infantry of the covering force were embarked at 10 p.m., 24th.
The troops were landed in two trips, the operation occupying about half an hour, this in spite[Pg 91] of the fact that the landing was vigorously opposed, the surprise being only partially effected.
The disembarkation of the main body was at once proceeded with. The operations were somewhat delayed owing to the transports having to remain a considerable distance from the shore in order to avoid the howitzer and field-guns' fire brought to bear on them and also the fire from warships stationed in the Narrows, Chanak.
The beach here was very narrow and continuously under shell fire. The difficulties of disembarkation were accentuated by the necessity of evacuating the wounded; both operations proceeded simultaneously. The service was one which called for great determination and coolness under fire, and the success achieved indicates the spirit animating all concerned. In this respect I would specially mention the extraordinary gallantry and dash shown by the 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade (Colonel E. G. Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O.), who formed the covering force. Many individual acts of devotion to duty were performed by the personnel of the Navy; these are dealt with below. Here I should like to place on record the good service performed by the vessels employed in landing the second part of the covering force; the seamanship displayed and the rapidity with which so large a force was thrown on the beach is deserving of the highest praise.
On the 26th the landing of troops, guns and stores continued throughout the day; this was a most trying service, as the enemy kept up an incessant shrapnel fire, and it was extremely difficult to locate the well-concealed guns of the enemy. Occasional bursts of fire from the ships in the Narrows delayed operations somewhat, but these bursts of fire did not last long, and the fire from our ships always drove the enemy's ships away.
The enemy heavily counter-attacked, and though supported by a very heavy shrapnel fire he could make no impression on our line which was every minute becoming stronger. By nightfall on April 26 our position north of Gaba Tepe was secure.
The landing at the southern extremity of the Gallipoli peninsula was carried out under the orders of Rear-Admiral R. E. Wemyss, C.M.G., M.V.O., his squadron consisting of the following ships:
| Battleships. | Cruisers. | Fleet Sweepers. | Trawlers. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Swiftsure | Euryalus | 6 | 14 |
| Implacable | Talbot | ||
| Cornwallis | Minerva | ||
| Albion | Dublin | ||
| Vengeance | |||
| Lord Nelson | |||
| Prince George |
Landings in this area were to be attempted at five different places; the conditions at each[Pg 93] landing varied considerably. The position of beaches is given below.
Position of Beach.—Y beach, a point about 7,000 yards north-east of Cape Tekeh. X beach, 1,000 yards north-east of Cape Tekeh. W beach, Cape Tekeh—Cape Helles. V beach, Cape Helles—Seddul Bahr. Camber, Seddul Bahr. S beach, Eski-Hissarlik Point.
Taking these landings in the above order: Landing at Y Beach.—The troops to be first landed, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, embarked on the 24th in the Amethyst and Sapphire, and proceeded with the transports Southland and Braemar Castle to a position off Cape Tekeh. At 4.0 a.m. the boats proceeded to Y beach, timing their arrival there at 5 a.m., and pulled ashore covered by fire from H.M.S. Goliath. The landing was most successfully and expeditiously carried out, the troops gaining the top of the high cliffs overlooking this beach without being opposed; this result I consider due to the rapidity with which the disembarkation was carried out and the well-placed covering fire from ships.
The Scottish Borderers were landed in two trips, followed at once by the Plymouth Battalion Royal Marines. These troops met with severe opposition on the top of the cliffs, where fire from covering ships was of little assistance, and, after[Pg 94] heavy fighting, were forced to re-embark on the 26th. The re-embarkation was carried out by the following ships: Goliath, Talbot, Dublin, Sapphire, and Amethyst. It was most ably conducted by the beach personnel and covered by the fire of the warships, who prevented the enemy reaching the edge of the cliff, except for a few snipers.
Landing at X Beach.—The 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers (two companies and M.G. section) embarked in Implacable on 24th, which ship proceeded to a position off the landing-place, where the disembarkation of the troops commenced at 4.30 a.m., and was completed at 5.15 a.m.
A heavy fire was opened on the cliffs on both sides. The Implacable approached the beach, and the troops were ordered to land, fire being continued until the boats were close into the beach. The troops on board the Implacable were all landed by 7 a.m. without any casualties. The nature of the beach was very favourable for the covering fire from ships, but the manner in which this landing was carried out might well serve as a model.
Landing at W Beach.—The 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers embarked in Euryalus and Implacable on the 24th, who proceeded to positions off the landing-place, where the troops embarked in the boats at about 4 a.m. Shortly after 5 a.m.[Pg 95] Euryalus approached W beach and Implacable X beach. At 5 a.m. the covering ships opened a heavy fire on the beach, which was continued up to the last moment before landing. Unfortunately this fire did not have the effect on the extensive wire entanglements and trenches that had been hoped for, and the troops, on landing at 6 a.m., were met with a very heavy fire from rifles, machine-guns, and pom-poms, and found the obstructions on the beach undamaged. The formation of this beach lends itself admirably to the defence, the landing-place being commanded by sloping cliffs offering ideal positions for trenches and giving a perfect field of fire. The only weakness in the enemy's position was on the flanks, where it was just possible to land on the rocks and thus enfilade the more important defences. This landing on the rocks was effected with great skill, and some maxims, cleverly concealed in the cliffs, and which completely enfiladed the main beach, were rushed with the bayonet. This assisted to a great extent in the success of the landing, the troops, though losing very heavily, were not to be denied and the beach and the approaches to it were soon in our possession.
The importance of this success cannot be overestimated; W and V beaches were the only two of any size in this area on which troops, other than infantry, could be disembarked, and failure to capture this one might have had serious consequences, as the landing at V was held up. The beach was being continuously sniped, and a fierce[Pg 96] infantry battle was carried on round it throughout the entire day and the following nights. It is impossible to exalt too highly the service rendered by the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers in the storming of the beach; the dash and gallantry displayed were superb. Not one whit behind in devotion to duty was the work of the beach personnel, who worked untiringly throughout the day and night, landing troops and stores under continual sniping. The losses due to rifle and machine-gun fire sustained by the boats' crews, to which they had not the satisfaction of being able to reply, bear testimony to the arduous nature of the service.
During the night of the 25th-26th enemy attacked continuously, and it was not till 1 p.m. on the 26th, when V beach was captured, that our position might be said to be secure.
The work of landing troops, guns, and stores continued throughout this period, and the conduct of all concerned left nothing to be desired.
(To face page 96.)
Map 4.
Landing at V Beach.—This beach, it was anticipated, would be the most difficult to capture; it possessed all the advantages for defence which W beach had, and in addition the flanks were strongly guarded by the old castle and village of Seddul Bahr on the east and perpendicular cliffs on the west; the whole foreshore was covered with [Pg 97]barbed wire entanglements which extended in places under the sea. The position formed a natural amphitheatre with the beach as stage.
The first landing here, as at all other places, was made in boats, but the experiment was tried of landing the remainder of the covering force by means of a collier, the River Clyde. This steamer had been specially prepared for the occasion under the directions of Commander Edward Unwin; large ports had been cut in her sides and gangways built whereby the troops could reach the lighters which were to form a bridge on to the beach.
V beach was subjected to a heavy bombardment similarly to W beach, with the same result, i.e., when the first trip attempted to land they were met with a murderous fire from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun, which was not opened till the boats had cast off from the steamboats.
A landing on the flanks here was impossible, and practically all the first trip were either killed or wounded, a few managing to find some slight shelter under a bank on the beach; in several boats all were either killed or wounded; one boat entirely disappeared, and in another there were only two survivors. Immediately after the boats had reached the beach the River Clyde was run ashore under a heavy fire rather towards the eastern end of the beach, where she could form a convenient breakwater during future landing of stores, etc.
As the River Clyde grounded, the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore were run out[Pg 98] ahead of the collier, but unfortunately they failed to reach their proper stations and a gap was left between two lighters over which it was impossible for men to cross; some attempted to land by jumping from the lighter which was in position into the sea and wading ashore; this method proved too costly, the lighter being soon heaped with dead and the disembarkation was ordered to cease.
The troops in the River Clyde were protected from rifle and machine-gun fire and were in comparative safety.
Commander Unwin, seeing how things were going, left the River Clyde and, standing up to his waist in water under a very heavy fire, got the lighters into position; he was assisted in this work by Midshipman G. L. Drewry, R.N.R., of H.M.S. Hussar; Midshipman W. St. A. Malleson, R.N., of H.M.S. Cornwallis; Able Seaman W. C. Williams, O.N. 186774 (R.F.R. B. 3766), and Seaman R.N.R. George McKenzie Samson, O.N. 2408A, both of H.M.S. Hussar.
The bridge to the shore, though now passable, could not be used by the troops, anyone appearing on it being instantly shot down, and the men in River Clyde remained in her till nightfall.
At 9.50 a.m. Albion sent in launch and pinnace manned by volunteer crews to assist in completing bridge, which did not quite reach beach; these[Pg 99] boats, however, could not be got into position until dark owing to heavy fire.
It had already been decided not to continue to disembark on V beach, and all other troops intended for this beach were diverted to W.
The position remained unchanged on V beach throughout the day, men of war and the maxims mounted in River Clyde doing their utmost to keep down the fire directed on the men under partial shelter on the beach.
During this period many heroic deeds were performed in rescuing wounded men in the water.
During the night of the 25-26 the troops in River Clyde were able to disembark under cover of darkness and obtain some shelter on the beach and in the village of Seddul Bahr, for possession of which now commenced a most stubborn fight.
The fight continued, supported ably by gunfire from H.M.S. Albion, until 1.24 p.m., when our troops had gained a position from which they assaulted Hill 141, which dominated the situation. Albion then ceased fire, and the hill, with old fort on top, was most gallantly stormed by the troops, led by Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. H. Doughty-Wylie, General Staff, who fell as the position was won. The taking of this hill effectively cleared the enemy from the neighbourhood of the V beach, which could now be used for the disembarkation of the[Pg 100] allied armies. The capture of this beach called for a display of the utmost gallantry and perseverance from the officers and men of both services—that they successfully accomplished their task bordered on the miraculous.
Landing on the "Camber," Seddul Bahr.—One half company Royal Dublin Fusiliers landed here, without opposition, the Camber being "dead ground." The advance from the Camber, however, was only possible on a narrow front, and after several attempts to enter the village of Seddul Bahr this half company had to withdraw after suffering heavy losses.
Landing at "De Totts" S Beach.—The 2nd South Wales Borderers (less one company) and a detachment 2nd London Field Company R.E. were landed in boats, convoyed by Cornwallis, and covered by that ship and Lord Nelson.
Little opposition was encountered, and the hill was soon in the possession of the South Wales Borderers. The enemy attacked this position on the evening of the 25th and during the 26th, but our troops were firmly established and with the assistance of the covering ships all attacks were easily beaten off.
Landing at Kum Kale.—The landing here was undertaken by the French.
It was most important to prevent the enemy[Pg 101] occupying positions in this neighbourhood, whence he could bring gun fire to bear on the transports off Cape Helles. It was also hoped that by holding this position it would be possible to deal effectively with the enemy's guns on the Asiatic shore immediately east of Kum Kale, which could fire into Seddul Bahr and De Totts.
The French, after a heavy preliminary bombardment, commenced to land at about 10 a.m., and by the afternoon the whole of their force had been landed at Kum Kale. When they attempted to advance to Yeni Shehr, their immediate objective, they were met by heavy fire from well-concealed trenches, and were held up just south of Kum Kale village.
During the night of the 25th and 26th the enemy made several counter-attacks, all of which were easily driven off; during one of these 400 Turks were captured, their retreat being cut-off by the fire from the battleships.
On the 26th, when it became apparent that no advance was possible without entailing severe losses and the landing of large reinforcements, the order was given for the French to withdraw and re-embark, which operation was carried out without serious opposition.
I now propose to make the following more general remarks on the conduct of the operations:
From the very first the co-operation between[Pg 102] Army and Navy was most happy; difficulties which arose were quickly surmounted, and nothing could have exceeded the tactfulness and forethought of Sir Ian Hamilton and his staff.
The loyal support which I received from Contre-Amiral E. P. A. Guepratte simplified the task of landing the Allied armies simultaneously.
The Russian fleet was represented by H.I.R.M.S. Askold, which ship was attached to the French squadron. Contre-Amiral Guepratte bears testimony to the value of the support he received from Captain Ivanoff, especially during the landing and re-embarkation of the French troops at Kum Kale.
The detailed organization of the landing could not be commenced until the Army Head-quarters returned from Egypt on April 10. The work to be done was very great, and the naval personnel and material available small.
Immediately on the arrival of the Army Staff at Mudros, committees, composed of officers of both services, commenced to work out the details of the landing operations, and it was due to these officers' indefatigable efforts that the expedition was ready to land on April 22. The keenness displayed by the officers and men resulted in a good standard of efficiency, especially in the case of the Australian and New Zealand Corps, who appear to be natural boatmen.
Such actions as the storming of the Seddul Bahr position by the 29th Division must live in history for ever; innumerable deeds of heroism and daring were performed; the gallantry and absolute contempt for death displayed alone made the operations possible.
At Gaba Tepe the landing and the dash of the Australian Brigade for the cliffs was magnificent—nothing could stop such men. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps in this, their first battle, set a standard as high as that of any army in history, and one of which their countrymen have every reason to be proud.
In closing this despatch I beg to bring to their Lordships' notice the names of certain officers and men who have performed meritorious service. The great traditions of His Majesty's Navy were well maintained, and the list of names submitted of necessity lacks those of many officers and men who performed gallant deeds unobserved and therefore unnoted. This standard was high, and if I specially mention one particular action it is that of Commander Unwin and the two young officers and two seamen who assisted him in the work of establishing communication between River Clyde and the beach. Rear-Admirals R. E. Wemyss, C.M.G., M.V.O., C. F. Thursby, C.M.G., and Stuart Nicholson, M.V.O., have rendered invaluable service. Throughout they have been indefatigable in their efforts to[Pg 104] further the success of the operations, and their loyal support has much lightened my duties and responsibilities.
I have at all times received the most loyal support from the Commanding Officers of His Majesty's ships during an operation which called for the display of great initiative and seamanship.
Captain R. F. Phillimore, C.B., M.V.O., A.D.C., as principal Beach Master, and Captain D. L. Dent, as principal Naval Transport Officer, performed most valuable service.
Commander Unwin and His Midshipmen
Commander Edward Unwin, R.N.
While in River Clyde, observing that the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore had broken adrift, Commander Unwin left the ship and under a murderous fire attempted to get the lighters into position. He worked on until, suffering from the effects of cold and immersion, he was obliged to return to the ship, where he was wrapped up in blankets. Having in some degree recovered, he returned to his work against the doctor's order and completed it. He was later again attended by the doctor, for three abrasions caused by bullets, after which he once more left the ship, this time in a lifeboat, to save[Pg 105] some wounded men who were lying in shallow water near the beach. He continued at this heroic labour under continuous fire, until forced to stop through pure physical exhaustion.
Midshipman George L. Drewry, R.N.R.
Assisted Commander Unwin at the work of securing the lighters under heavy rifle and maxim fire. He was wounded in the head, but continued his work and twice subsequently attempted to swim from lighter to lighter with a line.
Midshipman Wilfred St. A. Malleson, R.N.
Also assisted Commander Unwin, and after Midshipman Drewry had failed from exhaustion to get a line from lighter to lighter, he swam with it himself and succeeded. The line subsequently broke, and he afterwards made two further but unsuccessful attempts at his self-imposed task.
Able Seaman William Chas. Williams, O.N. 186774 (R.F.R. B.3766).
Held on to a line in the water for over an hour under heavy fire, until killed.
Seaman R.N.R. George McKenzie Samson, O.N. 2408A.
Worked on a lighter all day under fire, attending wounded and getting out lines; he was eventually dangerously wounded by maxim fire.
Lieut.-Commander Ralph B. Janvrin, R.N.
Conducted the trawlers into Morto Bay, for the landing at "De Totts," with much skill.
This officer showed great judgment and coolness under fire, and carried out a difficult task with great success.
Lieut. John A. V. Morse, R.N.
Assisted to secure the lighters at the bows of the River Clyde under a heavy fire, and was very active throughout the 25th and 26th at V beach.
Surgeon P. B. Kelly, R.N., Attached To R.N.A.S.
Was wounded in the foot on the morning of the 25th in River Clyde. He remained in River Clyde until morning of 27th, during which time he attended 750 wounded men, although in great pain and unable to walk during the last twenty-four hours.
Lieut.-Commander Adrian St. V. Keyes, R.N.
General Sir Ian Hamilton reports as follows: "Lieut.-Commander Keyes showed great coolness, gallantry, and ability. The success of the landing on Y beach was largely due to his good services. When circumstances compelled the force landed there to re-embark, this officer showed exceptional resource and leadership, successfully conducting that difficult operation."
I entirely concur in General Hamilton's opinion of this officer's services on April 25 and 26.
Commander William H. Cottrell, R.N.V.R.
This officer has organized the entire system of land communication; has laid and repaired cables several times under fire; and on all occasions shown zeal, tact, and coolness beyond praise.
Mr. John Murphy, Boatswain, Cornwallis.
Midshipman John Saville Metcalf, R.N.R., Triumph.
Midshipman Rupert E. M. Bethune, Inflexible.
Midshipman Eric Oloff de Wet, London.
Midshipman Charles W. Croxford, R.N.R., Queen.
Midshipman C. A. L. Mansergh, Queen.
Midshipman Alfred M. Williams, Euryalus.
Midshipman Hubert M. Wilson, Euryalus.
Midshipman G. F. D. Freer, Lord Nelson.
Midshipman R. V. Symonds-Taylor, Agamemnon.
Midshipman C. H. C. Matthey, Queen Elizabeth.
Lieut. Massy Goolden, Prince of Wales.
Recommended for accelerated promotion:
Mr. Charles Edward Bounton, Gunner, R.N., Queen Elizabeth.
The following officers are "Commended for service in action":
Capt. H. A. S. Fyler, Agamemnon, Senior Officer inside the Straits.
Capt. A. W. Heneage, M.V.O., who organized and trained the mine-sweepers.
Capt. E. K. Loring, Naval Transport Officer, Gabe Tepe.
Capt. H. C. Lockyer, Implacable.
Capt. C. Maxwell-Lefroy, Swiftsure.
Capt. the Hon. A. D. E. H. Boyle, M.V.O., Bacchante.
Capt. A. V. Vyvyan, Beach Master, Z beach.
Capt. C. S. Townsend, Beach Master, W beach.
Capt. R. C. K. Lambert, Beach Master, V beach.
Commander the Hon. L. J. O. Lambart, Queen.
Commander (now Captain) B. St. G. Collard, Assistant Beach Master, W beach.
Commander C. C. Dix, Assistant Beach Master, Z beach.
Commander N. W. Diggle, Assistant Beach Master, V beach.
Commander H. L. Watts-Jones, Albion (acting Captain).
Commander I. W. Gibson, M.V.O., Albion.
Lieut,-Commander (now Commander) J. B. Waterlow, Blenheim.
Lieut.-Commander H. V. Coates, Implacable.
Lieut.-Commander E. H. Cater, Queen Elizabeth.
Lieut.-Commander G. H. Pownall, Adamant (killed in action).
Lieut. A. W. Bromley, R.N.R., Euryalus.
Lieut. H. R. W. Turnor, Implacable.
Lieut. H. F. Minchin, Cornwallis.
Lieut. Oscar Henderson, Ribble.
Lieut. Kenneth Edwards, Lord Nelson.
Major W. T. C. Jones, D.S.O., R.M.L.I., Beach Master, X beach.
Major W. W. Frankis, R.M.L.I., Cornwallis.
Tempy. Surgeon W. D. Galloway, Cornwallis.
Mr. Alfred M. Mallett, Gunner T., Ribble.
Mr. John Pippard, Boatswain, Sapphire.
Midshipman Eric Wheler Bush, Bacchante.
Midshipman Charles D. H. H. Dixon, Bacchante.
Midshipman Donald H. Barton, London.
Midshipman A. W. Clarke, Implacable.
Proby. Midshipman Williams D. R. Hargreaves, R.N.R., Sapphire.
Midshipman F. E. Garner, R.N.R., Triumph.
Midshipman George H. Morris, R.N.R., Lord Nelson.
Midshipman the Hon. G. H. E. Russell, Implacable.
Midshipman D. S. E. Thompson, Implacable.
Midshipman W. D. Brown, Implacable.
The work accomplished by the destroyer flotillas fully maintained the high standard they have established in these waters.
On the 25th and 26th Wolverine (Commander O. J. Pretis) (killed in action), Scorpion (Lieut.-Commander (now Commander), A. B. Cunningham), Renard (Lieut.-Commander L. G. B. A. Campbell), Grampus (Lieut.-Commander R. Bacchus), Pincher (Lieut.-Commander H. W. Wyld), and Rattlesnake (Lieut.-Commander P. G. Wodehouse), carried out mine-sweeping operations under Captain Heneage inside the Dardanelles in a most satisfactory manner, being frequently under heavy fire. On the 26th the French sweepers Henriette (Lieut. de Vaisseau Auverny), Marius Chambon (Lieut. de Vaisseau Blanc), and Camargue (Lieut. de Vaisseau Bergeon) assisted them, Henriette doing particularly well.
Beagle (Commander (now Captain) H. R. Godfrey), Bulldog (Lieut.-Commander W. B. Mackenzie), Scourge (Lieut.-Commander H. de B. Tupper), Foxhound (Commander W. G. Howard), Colne (Commander C. Seymour), Chelmer (Lieut.-Commander (now Commander) H. T. England), Usk (Lieut.-Commander W. G. C. Maxwell), and Ribble (Lieut.-Commander R. W. Wilkinson) assisted in the disembarkation at Gaba Tepe.
Rear-Admiral Thursby reports as follows on the work accomplished by these boats:
"The destroyers under Captain C. P. R. Coode[Pg 111] (Captain 'D') landed the second part of the covering force with great gallantry and expedition, and it is in my opinion entirely due to the rapidity with which so large a force was thrown on the beach that we were able to establish ourselves there."
I entirely concur in Admiral Thursby's remarks on the good work performed by this division.
Special Recommendations
P.O. John Hepburn Russell, O.N. F.839, of the Royal Naval Air Service, was wounded in gallantly going to Commander Unwin's assistance.
P.O. Mech. Geoffrey Charlton Paine Rummings, O.N. F.813, Royal Naval Air Service, assisted Commander Unwin in rescuing wounded men.
P.O. Sec. Cl. Frederick Gibson, O.N. 191025, R.F.R. B.3829, Albion, jumped overboard with a line and got his boat beached to complete bridge from River Clyde to shore. He then took wounded to River Clyde under heavy fire.
Ord. Seaman Jesse Lovelock, Albion, J.28798, assisted in getting pontoon in position; also helped wounded on beach and in boats to reach River Clyde, displaying great gallantry and coolness under fire.
A.B. Lewis Jacobs, O.N. J.4081, Lord Nelson. Took his boat into V beach unaided, after[Pg 112] all the remainder of the crew and the troops were killed or wounded. When last seen Jacobs was standing up and endeavouring to pole the cutter to the shore. While thus employed he was killed.
Herbert J. G. Morrin, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 236225, Bacchante.
Alfred J. Chatwen, Ch. Yeo. Signals, O.N. 156109, Cornwallis.
Albert Playford, P.O., O.N. 202189, Cornwallis.
Arthur Roake, A.B., O.N. S.S. 1940 (R.F.R. B.88431), Cornwallis.
Henry Thomas Morrison, Seaman, R.N.R., O.N. 1495D, Albion.
Daniel Roach, Seaman, R.N.R., 1685D, Albion.
David S. Kerr, A.B., O.N. 239816, Ribble.
Albert Balson, P.O., O.N. 211943, Prince of Wales.
William Morgan, P.O., O.N. 193834, Prince of Wales.
James Getson, Stoker, P.O., O.N. 295438, London.
Edward L. Barons, A.B., O.N. J.7775, London.
William Putman, P.O., O.N. 236783, Queen.
Robert Fletcher, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 213297, Queen.
Samuel Forsey, A.B., S.S. 2359 (R.F.R. B.4597), Albion.
Henry J. Anstead, Acting C.P.O. 179989, Implacable.
Kenneth Muskett, Ldg. Seaman, J.1325, Implacable.
Thomas P. Roche, Ch. P.O. (Pensioner), O.N. 165533, Prince George.
John Maple, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 171890 (R.F.R. Chat. B.2658), Euryalus.
Henry Williams, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 176765 (R.F.R., Chat., B.1326), Euryalus.
William F. Hoffman, A.B., O.N. 195940 (R.F.R., Chat., B.2650), Euryalus.
Henry G. Law, A.B., O.N. 195366 (R.F.R., Chat., B.8261), Euryalus.
Henry Ridsdale, Stoker, R.N.R., O.N. 1136U, Euryalus.
Colin Mckechnie, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 157509, Lord Nelson (killed).
Stanley E. Cullum, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 225791, Lord Nelson (killed).
Frederick T. M. Hyde, A.B., O.N. J.21153, Lord Nelson (killed).
William E. Rowland, A.B., O.N. J.17029, Lord Nelson (wounded).
Albert E. Bex, A.B., O.N. J. 17223, Lord Nelson (wounded).
The above men from Lord Nelson were part of boats' crews landing troops on V beach, a service from which few returned.
Commended for service in action:
Harry E. Pallant, P.O., O.N. 186521, Implacable.
Jesse Bontoft, P.O., O.N. 193398, Implacable.
Thomas J. Twells, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 232269, Implacable.
Richard Mullis, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 220072, Implacable.
Matthew B. Knight, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 230546, Implacable.
John E. Mayes, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 196849 (R.F.R. B.8581), Implacable.
William J. White, P.O.I., O.N. 142848, Albion.
Frederick G. Barnes, P.O., O.N. 209085, Swiftsure.
Henry Minter, P.O., O.N. 163128, Queen Elizabeth.
Harry R. Jeffcoate, Sgt. R.M.L.I., Ch. 10526, Cornwallis.
Frank E. Trollope, Pte. R.M.L.I., Ch. 19239, Cornwallis.
George Brown, Ch. P.O., 276085, Sapphire.
Bertie Sole, Ldg. Seaman, 208019 (R.F.R., B. 10738), Sapphire.
Charles H. Soper, Signalman, J.9709, Sapphire.
Frank Dawe, A.B., 231502, Albion.
Samuel Quick, Seaman, R.N.R., 3109 B., Albion.
James Rice, Seaman, R.N.R., 519 D., Albion.
William Thomas, Seaman, R.N.R., 2208 B., Albion.
William H. Kitchen, Seaman, R.N.R., 4330 A., Albion.
Francis A. Sanders, A.B., 221315 (R.F.R., Chat., B.8199), Euryalus.
William F. Hicks, A.B., S.S. 4795, Euryalus.
William F. Hayward, A.B., 235109, London.
George Gilbertson, A.B., 207941 (R.F.R., B.4910), London.
Andrew Hope, A.B., S.S. 2837 (R.F.R., B.5847), London.
Charles A. Smith, A.B., J.27753, Lord Nelson (wounded).
Basil Brazier, A.B., J.6116, Lord Nelson (wounded).
Charles H. Smith, A.B., J.28377, Lord Nelson.
Henry A. B. Green, A.B. 238024, Lord Nelson (wounded).
No officer could have been better served by his staff than I have been during these operations. The energy and resource of my Chief of Staff, Commodore R. J. B. Keyes, was invaluable, and, in combination with Major-General Braithwaite—Chief of the General Staff—he established a most excellent working agreement between the two services.
Captain George P. W. Hope, of Queen Elizabeth, acted as my flag captain. His gift of organization was of the greatest assistance in dealing with the mass of details inseparable from an operation of such magnitude.
Commander the Hon. A. R. M. Ramsay has used his sound practical knowledge of gunnery to great advantage in working out, in connection with the military, the details of gunfire from the covering ships.
Captain William W. Godfrey, R.M., a staff officer of great ability, has given me invaluable assistance throughout the operations.
I would also mention my secretary, Mr. Basil F. Hood, Acting Paymaster, and secretarial staff, whose good services under the direction and example of Mr. Edward W. Whittington-Ince, Assistant Paymaster, will form the subject of a later separate report. Also Lieutenant-Commander James F. Sommerville (Fleet Wireless Telegraph Officer), and Flag Lieutenants L. S. Ormsby-Johnson, Hugh S. Bowlby, and Richard H. L. Bevan, who have performed good service in organizing with the military the intercommunication between the Allied Fleets and Armies.
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