1. There is no greater misfortune in the world than poverty; all have a contempt for it, and all regard [198]it with displeasure. No one honors the poor man, however heroic and eminent he may be; his subordinates serve him unwillingly, and readily show him insolence. He has no success, for lack of money; and, in fine, every undertaking costs him immense labors, fatigues, vigilance, and sorrow.

2. It is literally this which is occurring in these islands. The Moros deride us, and display their superiority compared to our weakness, which certainly is ignominious to the Catholic arms, and to the reputation of the [Spanish] nation. When we had [199]forces for punishing them, they were curbed and humiliated; since they have seen us poor and weak they have displayed their perfidy and boldness, and are treating us with the greatest insolence ever seen—for they invade even the villages along this bay, without there being, on our side, any means to prevent this.

3. The vassals of his Majesty, both Spaniards and natives, live in the sorrow which is aroused in them by their melancholy reflections on our poor and miserable condition. The Indians, who are civil only when they fear some punishment, regard their sovereign with little respect, and the Spanish nation with disgust at seeing it humiliated by the English, the Dutch, the French, and even the Moros; and they judge that the Spaniards are somewhat more than the Indians, but much less than the other nations. And, although they are confounded at the glorious successes which our armies have gained against the English since the capture of this military post, and at the heroic valor with which the unfaithful provinces have been punished, when they become aware of our actual poverty that will be enough to destroy their reverence and respect for the acts of the superior government, and to make them bold to commit any insolence, for our lack of means to restrain them from it.

4. For this same reason, nothing can be undertaken that will avail against the Moros who harass us,2 or against the Indians who refuse obedience [200]to the commands laid on them. The consequence of this is, that the scanty funds in the royal treasury are being consumed; that it is deprived of the receipts which it could have if we were in a respectable condition; and that a zealous governor of these islands labors and watches, in weariness and grief, to procure the remedy for so many evils, under the impossibility of finding it.

5. If we look at the condition of this fort and of that at Cavite, we shall lament, as is natural, the necessity of repairing their fortifications and building some new ones, of clearing out the ditches, of tearing down buildings, and of other works which will be deemed indispensable. If we turn our view to the artillery, we shall find it so defective, and part of it so useless, that for the defense of these forts it will be necessary to spend many thousands of pesos. If the gun-carriages which are needed and are actually lacking are built; if the forts are supplied with the gunpowder, balls, grapeshot, bombs, grenades, and other implements of war, and with iron, nails, mantelets, cordage, and oil, and, in short, with everything which ought to abound in the [royal] storehouses: the cost of all these things, which are necessary, will be enormous. If attention is given to the need of ships for transporting [hither] the situado, and of other smaller vessels for sending aid to the military posts, providing them with supplies, driving away the Moros, and transporting property from the provinces, one will be astounded at the contemplation [201]of these expenses. And, after all, he will draw the conclusion that nothing of what I have mentioned can be undertaken, for lack of money; that the Moros will keep us in a state of continual fear; and the Indians will act as caprice leads them; that at the first outbreak of war the forts will be found entirely defenseless; that the military posts will be exposed to destruction; and, in one word, that the lack of troops and money places these islands in imminent risk of their total destruction, by various paths, and our sovereign and the Spanish nation in grievous danger of losing their honor, reputation, and influence—which must be averted by such means as are possible; and one of these is, the abandonment of these domains.

6. If, then, they produce nothing; if to maintain them must cost so much that it weakens the royal exchequer, to the injury of other and more important domains; if for lack of money the honor of the Catholic arms cannot be maintained in these distant regions; if we are exposed to being the plaything of all the nations; if we cannot resist or confront the feeblest enemy who may attack us; and finally, if we must endure the ignominy of being discreditably deprived of these faithful vassals, with the loss of all that they have: it is better to anticipate these losses in good time, to abandon or sell these regions, and allow to all [their inhabitants] free opportunity to make their property secure and take refuge in other dominions, where the power of our beloved kings and lords may shield and defend them.

7. This is the method of saving expenses, and employing those funds for other and more useful purposes, and averting the ignominies to which we are [202]exposed—with danger not only to our property but to our lives. For we are surrounded by ferocious and inhuman enemies, such as are the English—who, warned by the events of the late war, will give no quarter if they return to these islands, on account of not exposing themselves to remain as prisoners within the walls of Manila and Cavite—the Moros, who will come to the aid of the said English, or alone by themselves if they see us very weak (and in every way those people are terrible, for they know not what humanity is); the Sangleys or Chinese, who are equally barbarous and bloodthirsty; and even the Indians, who also are cruel and ferocious.

8. The recent example of Pangasinan is the most melancholy warning. What obstinacy and blindness! what insolence and aversion toward the Spaniards! What treasons and apostasies! What murders, so inhuman and cruel! It is certain that the Indians desire to throw off the mild yoke of the Spaniards; that they are Christians, and vassals of our king, simply through fear, and fail to be either Christians or vassals when they consider us weak; and that they neither respect nor obey any one, when they find an opportunity for resistance.

9. The revolted Indians in the island of Bohol solemnize weddings among themselves, confer baptism, and perform other functions of the Catholics, for which purpose they have some persons who perform the duties of the father ministers in the villages; and this mockery, this scorn, this contumely they display for what is most sacred in our religion. They have fled from the villages, and live in their freedom in the hills; yet for this conduct they have experienced only kind treatment and promises of pardon, [203]to which they do not, and never will, pay any attention. If we had troops and money, those insurgents would be reduced; they would be good Christians and vassals, and the royal treasury would possess the receipts from their tributes; for only the fear of punishment is adequate to subject the Indians, and draw them toward what is right.

10. More recent is the case of Pangasinan, whose natives had just been making the same mockery of our Catholic religion, and showing the same contempt for it; but chastisement has reduced them to being Christians and vassals to our king. It is argued from this that, so long as we have not the forces for coercing the Indians, they will be our greatest and most terrible enemies—from whom we cannot free ourselves, save by the measure of abandoning the islands, in case we do not maintain them with respectable forces.

1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this country, so distant from its sovereign—who, besides the fact that it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary, urged that under no circumstances ought these islands [204]to be abandoned, which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign, and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.

2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that “for the sake of one single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the moneys that were being spent in these islands.”

3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at the beginning they would consume much money—as occurs in every new colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing—at the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years, with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be their ruin—an indication that we had a better opportunity than they to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the famous Legaspi established it—and [205]yet continually with new burdens, on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions, and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury, and were made up from that of Mexico.

4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made, to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition, and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost; he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon “San Joseph,” the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy, with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest, zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their urgent necessities—especially as no increase of the royal revenue was established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence—and the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they might have been increased—and with the necessity of holding the Moros in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these were greater than the incomes, the islands [206]have not retrieved their condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China, the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the [mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of these islands would be very pernicious—even laying aside religious motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.

5. I find another and greater objection to the [207]abandonment of these islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce with Nueva España—where they could land wherever they might please, and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias, in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the [route] northwest from Hudson’s Bay (called thus from the name of an English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747),3 have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical account of a modern geographer.

6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the Western Sea,4 which falls [208][into the ocean] above [i.e., north of] Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar, and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in 1728, 1731, and 1741—which have a certain agreement with those of the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640,5 north of California and northwest from Canada.

7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., “of the Kings”], and reached Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river—to which he gave the name Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter—he arrived at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake, called Ronquillo (from the [209]name of a captain in that squadron), and in one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place by the current from Bafin’s Bay, or else that of Hudson’s Bay.

8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard, and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of Davis’s Strait, or of Bafin’s Bay; and that in that place there was a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded that there was no passage or communication between the said strait and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592, as Samuel Ricard6 relates, with the idea of passing over to China by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspect [210]that there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson’s Bay; and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and perseverance—for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt, motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.

9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast—diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards—and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce. [211]

10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas—to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn,7 in order to go along the coast of the South—without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America—or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships of [212]this [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España—just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].

11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment of these islands can be seen in the Extracto historial8 of the commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer—contenting myself, lastly, with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This subject also is treated by the said Extracto historial, and by the chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this money they have waged most cruel war against us.

View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile from Recueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales (Amsterdam, 1725)

[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]

12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused us, and of the loss which [215]we have experienced from abandoning them; and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years’ expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines, if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated, and worked up.

13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly rich products—cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron, and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said in its place)—will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to those [who possess them].

14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniard [216]will be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands—even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion—on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.

1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable—to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes—so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India—in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor—by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar—ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, in [217]another invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.

2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.

3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto—devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.

4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attempts [218]to capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila—which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men.9

Plan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila

[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]

[221]

5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called “floating bastions” [baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength which can support [222]artillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels, which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.

6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better foreseen by those who understand the subject.

7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve, which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor, Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transporting [223]troops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros, and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs may progress in proportion to his ability.

8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands, with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance of timber and the low wages of the workmen.

9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.

10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in the [224]provinces—and these in time of war could retreat to the forts—and with three thousand who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making] earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.

11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete, it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular] footing of four [225]thousand men may always be maintained. They can easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally, they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent [son de potencias mui despejadas] usually—so much so that on this account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and, with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained here—with the additional consideration that they are better able than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships, which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España, to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it be permanent.

12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable, it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account it [226]is found that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean, they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this [sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way, or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service; and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces, where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor, both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.

13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty pesos for the captain’s pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor, the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable; young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent, among the soldiers also—who, with such pay, would not be so eager to desert the service.

14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies, according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very nearly the [227]sum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service, for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and, above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of either peace or war.

15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops stated in Señor Arandia’s regulations, amounts to the half more; and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.

1. Having constituted the aforesaid military force—or half of it, in order that the expense may be less at first—the reduction of all the Indian villages ought to be resolutely undertaken, as a matter that is absolutely essential, without which all the rest will be useless. This reduction made (which can be accomplished in less than a year), enumeration will be [228]made of the tribute-payers in all the provinces; after the reduction their numbers will be greatly increased, because the heads of barangay will not be able to hide the tributes as easily as they now do, or to commit thefts and dishonorable acts, as they have hitherto done. The ordinances will be made duly effective, especially in regard to plantations, and other measures will be adopted that are beneficial for the better government, both economic and civil, of the villages; government buildings will be erected in the chief towns, at least, that may serve to shelter the alcalde-mayor and the troops that he will have; also a storehouse, in which to keep the property of the royal exchequer. Good schoolmasters will be employed for the instruction of the Indians, and for teaching them our language; and the matters in which the father ministers should have the right to intervene, and those in which they ought to forbear, will be strictly regulated, without any dispensation. The cultivation of the land will be conducted with the utmost care; and, finally, the tribute will be increased, to the rate of two pesos a head each year. Although this is a very moderate impost, and is profitable not only to the king but to the Indians, in order to draw them out from their continual and pernicious slothfulness, this branch of revenue will produce annually one million, six hundred thousand pesos. This addition to the royal treasury, even when some deduction is made, as is ordinary, will not only support the expenses of my plan for army, artillery, and navy, but a considerable amount of silver will be left for other allotments from the royal exchequer, and for indemnifying the expenses with which the islands have been burdened, from the time of their conquest until now. [229]

2. The other increases and savings which the royal exchequer can make in its various branches I have set forth to his Majesty and to the superior government, and I will furnish a still more detailed account whenever it shall be deemed necessary. It is sufficient [here] to know that these can amount to some four hundred thousand pesos, and that, when added to the income from the tributes, the two items will amount to two millions of pesos annually; and even if half a million be deducted for contingencies and losses, and another half-million be spent in making payments, a million still remains as savings. Even considering the matter as gloomily and distrustfully as possible, there cannot fail to be an annual saving of half a million of pesos, as any one will understand who is moderately acquainted with the affairs of these islands.

3. With such receipts in the royal treasury, and with the aforesaid soldiery and their pay, and with navy, artillerists, and military supplies, what enterprises cannot be undertaken in these islands? Will this not be the most considerable establishment in all India? Will there be forces that can overcome us? Will the English, who have their forts and factories, with the necessary garrisons, venture again to invade this place? On the contrary, will they not fear, and with just cause, that we, superior then in forces, will attack them in their own colonies? I think that no one will doubt that the advantage is ours, assuming that my plan for savings and increases in the royal revenues is practicable; and I believe that, however numerous the difficulties which may accumulate in carrying it out, all will admit the suitability of these islands for attaining it, if only it be undertaken in [230]earnest and followed up persistently by all the governors; for if the military forces be placed on the footing that I propose, all the rest will be overcome without special difficulty; and I dare stake my head on it.

4. In order that the islands may enjoy the peace, tranquillity, and comfort which they should have, with evident benefit to the royal revenues, it is absolutely necessary to inflict exemplary punishment on the Moros of Jolo and Mindanao, whose insolence, perfidy, cruelties, piracies, seizing of captives, and deceitfulness have ruined these wretched provinces, and will entirely annihilate them unless the remedy be applied—and there is no other, than to attack them in their own territories, and give them no quarter; to destroy them, or else intimidate them so that they will never forget [their punishment]; and to put a stop to their raids, by some small forts, which can keep them in subjection—imposing on them a heavy tribute, which will indemnify the expenses of the expedition and the costs of the said forts and soldiers. The enterprise is easy and safe, when we have the men and the money; and the advantage and even necessity is the greatest one of these islands. Upon this I could expatiate at length, since this is a matter upon which I have worked with considerable application; but this point is sufficient, as being one of those most essential to the prosperity of these islands, and to make it evident that at the same time we can succeed in depriving the English of their factory in Jolo.10 This is another of the more important matters, [231]since in either peace or war they will entirely ruin these islands: in peace, by frauds and commercial intrigues; and in war, with small forces.

5. For the execution of all the aforesaid, and in order that the [military] establishment proposed may suffer no delay or procrastination, it would be expedient for his Majesty to give commission for this to the governors, and to the ministers of the Audiencia, with the insistence which is merited by this project, so assured and so beneficial; and the amplest powers should be given them to proceed in such manner as they shall judge, by the majority of votes [in councils of war], to be most expedient. For in consulting his Majesty in regard to some uncertainties, and waiting for his royal decisions, the delay of at least three years will be experienced; and in so long a time the postponement of action cannot fail to be injurious to the enterprise, and to cool interest in its continuation, when it ought to be pursued with the greatest ardor, zeal, and efficiency, deferring for this all other affairs, as being less important.

6. The first thing which should be attempted is, that his Majesty issue commands—provided he approve the project for making these domains respected, and the plan for economies and increases in the royal revenues—to the viceroy of Nueva España to send over here money and soldiers, in order to serve as a foundation for the work that is to be undertaken. For this is necessary to be done, even if there were no such project; for in its present condition the [232]place is without defense, and the government without forces to make itself obeyed; and there is no medium between the two extremes above stated—to abandon this country, or to maintain it with honor; and the latter cannot be secured without spending money, and without having sufficient troops to garrison the forts.

7. If to these succors from Nueva España were added two ships and five hundred soldiers from Europa, a corresponding force of officers, and abundance of military supplies—which could come to these islands by way of the Cape of Good Hope—great advantages would ensue. First, all the vassals in these islands would rejoice at seeing such succor as never before had been seen in them; second, the Indians would have some idea of the power of our sovereign, since, as a people of material ideas and little penetration, they do not consider or understand more than what enters through their eyes; third, they would feel more respect, fear, and dread, which is that which holds them in check, and obliges them to be Christians and vassals of our king. Fourth, such aid would serve as a terror to the Moros, and would allow the provinces, overwhelmed by their invasions, to take breath; fifth, all the soldiery would be disciplined and organized after the example of the said five hundred veteran soldiers, and with the sergeants and corporals of the latter a good corps of officers could be formed, filling vacant posts with them in place of the untrained and inexperienced (to whom can be given other appointments in the posts of alcalde-mayor, corregidor, etc.). Sixth, in these neighboring provinces the reduction [of the villages] and the increase of tribute could be immediately [233]undertaken, without risk of resistance on their part; and when the undertaking was concluded in this region, where it is easier to carry out such a measure, it would be continued in the other provinces, one after another. Thus in a short time the benefits set down in this project would be obtained, and with them the troops and their pay could be increased, fortifications and ships built, supplies provided (which could be done here), and the Moros who harass us destroyed.

1. As this matter is discussed with the greatest scruples by all the authors, it has seemed to me desirable to explain, as briefly as possible, the reasons which I consider just for the increase of tributes which I mention in the preceding chapter. I see therein from the start the obstacles and difficulties which this delicate question will occasion; but I will bring together the considerations which no author denies in this discussion; I will adapt their doctrines to the Indians of these islands, in order that the justification of my design may be evident; and I will conclude with touching upon some objections which have been raised by the most learned persons whom I have consulted on this point.

2. From the confusion and disorders of ancient times originated the selection of kings, to whom and to their successors the respective kingdoms entrusted the power of establishing laws; of forming towns, and of maintaining them in peace, justice, and social order; of appointing persons for government, civil, economic, and military; of establishing tribunals; [234]and, in fine, of providing their vassals with all the means conducive to their greatest comfort and security. The people bound themselves to contribute means for meeting these expenses, with the tributes and regular charges which might be necessary. By this mutual obligation between the kings and the vassals, the latter must be protected, defended from enemies, and maintained in peace and justice; and in return and acknowledgment they must also pay the tributes, since these are employed for the common benefit, and secure the stability and solidity of the state. If St. Paul counseled that tributes be paid to the heathen princes, with how much more reason ought they to be paid to our Catholic monarchs!

3. The payment of tributes is binding in the tribunal of conscience, under [penalty of] mortal sin, and with the obligation to make restitution when they are fraudulently withheld; and this opinion no author questions. But, as it is not possible to determine the quantity, opinions are divided, and many persons expand this matter, urging that the excessive imposition of tribute exonerates from the obligation to pay it, and establishing [the fact of] the said excess on various arguments, although I know not whether these are solid as is necessary. For, in order to speak with assurance on this matter, neither theology nor jurisprudence is sufficient; but it is necessary to know also the science of government and that of administration—which are little understood by some who clamor against excess in the tributes, without knowing whether or not there is any.

4. In matters of government, a statesman who is adorned with superior talents will distinguish the expenditures which are necessary from those which [235]are needlessly incurred; he will know whether the tributes are sufficient to meet the obligations of the crown; and he will make a calculation of the incomes and expenses of the royal exchequer. This neither the jurist nor the theologian can do, without knowledge of these matters, which are remote from their professions, and consequently they cannot be sure whether the tributes are sufficient, or are extravagantly spent, in order that they may establish the [charge of] excess in them, or the [right of] relief from paying them, or the [justice of] scruples at imposing them. But the theologian and the jurist who may have the said information will doubtless declare with most correctness, whether the tributes are excessive or moderate, and whether there is obligation to diminish them or necessity for increasing them, in order that sovereigns may not experience the aforesaid scruples, or the vassals have cause for not paying the tributes.

5. It cannot be denied that in all the nations of Europe the tributes have been increased in this century, as the Mercuries publish it; and this is right, because continually new things are discovered which render the old ones useless—for instance, a fortification which formerly was considered impregnable is [now] regarded as very frail and weak. On the other hand, the exertions which a power makes oblige it to incur greater expenses, and all of the powers strive to place themselves in a state of equilibrium which can render their respective domains secure. The abundance of silver has raised the prices of commodities, and, as everything costs much more than formerly, and the necessity for expenditures is infinitely greater, the increase of tributes cannot be [236]avoided, nor can the vassals be excused from the clear obligation to pay them, in proportion to the [demands of the] times, which cannot be the same.

6. The pious feeling with which the Indians have been regarded has rendered still more delicate the question of the tributes which have been imposed upon them; nevertheless, all our authors agree in justifying not only those which at first were laid upon them, but those which for just reasons were afterward increased. Moreover, it was decided by a council of very learned men whom the emperor Carlos Fifth consulted that the Indians ought to pay the same tributes which the other vassals were paying in España, appraising their value, and moderating the tax according to the resources of the tributaries and to what each province could carry and endure;11 and from this proceed to the laws which have been established, and the royal decrees that have been issued, for this purpose. These ordinances are even more benign than the aforesaid decision; for really the poverty of the Indians has been exaggerated more than is just, and it has been believed that by these moderate measures the conquest of the Indias, both spiritual and temporal, would be more easily effected—which I do not attribute to that, but to the great reverence which the reputation and glorious achievements of the Spaniards occasioned in the Indians.

7. Taking for granted then, the moderation (as all admit) of the tributes paid by the Indians, especially in these islands—where they paid only at the rate of four reals for each tributary, and of one real [237]a head which was afterward imposed in addition, one entire tribute finally paying ten reals, in accordance with ley 65, tit. 5, lib. 6, of the Recopilación de Indias, without there being, from the year 1602 until now, any further burden upon them—and assuming, as an unquestioned fact, that there has been a continual increase of new offices, new military posts, and many expenses in these very islands; as also that the urgent needs of the crown are now incomparably far greater than in the past century, it seems that by an undeniable conclusion the increase of tributes ought to be lawful, in proportion to the increase in the said expenses. For without the tributes the king cannot fulfil his obligations as such, in regard to his vassals; nor can the latter omit to contribute the means for their own preservation and security, which is what the sovereign must endeavor to obtain for them.

8. What reason will there be for the vassals in the peninsula of España being the only ones to be laden with an increase in the tributes, and for the vassals in the Indias not bearing the same increase? One class is under the same obligation as the other to pay their share to their king, for the necessary expenses of the monarchy. Let, then, a survey be made of the taxes and imposts which have been increased in España since the conquest of the Indias, and it will be seen what increase of tributes has been imposed upon the Spaniards in order to defray the expenses of the crown, while in the Indias hardly any increase has been made—although it accords with equitable justice that all should bear these burdens which conduce to the common welfare, and assure the stability and permanence of all the dominions. [238]

9. Even when the expenses of these islands were less, the tributes were not sufficient; and every year the generosity of our sovereign has sent and is sending the situado12 from Nueva España—which, [even] with the product of the tributes and of other royal taxes, is not enough to satisfy all the obligations of this royal treasury. This is an argument which demonstrates that these vassals do not contribute to their king the amount which, in the opinion of all, they are under obligation to pay; for they [239]ought to pay that which his Majesty spends for their comfort, for their spiritual and temporal government, for the administration of justice, and in defense of their persons and property. Besides all this, they ought to contribute to the royal revenues for the expenses of the wars, and the maintenance of troops and forts, of the navy, of state officials, and of the royal household—which, as indispensable and general expenses, ought to be exacted from all the vassals. But not only are these expenses never exacted from the vassals here, but these islands have been supported at the cost of the labors and fatigues of the other vassals, without any reason being found why one class should enjoy more privileges than the other while they receive equal benefits.

10. There are probably in all the world no vassals who are less burdened than are the Indians of these islands. They eat and drink without paying alcabala or any impost; the fabrics with which they clothe themselves, if made in the islands, pay nothing, and if they are of foreign make they bear no heavier burden than the light one of the customs duties; in the polos and personal services to which the king assigns them, he furnishes them with rations and pay according to the tariffs and ordinances of the provinces; and, finally, each Indian pays, at the end of the year, only five reals, from the age of eighteen years to that of sixty. I agree that at the beginning it was proper to proceed with this moderation, because the said tribute was then considered sufficient for the expenses, and those of the monarchy were also less in those times, on account of the scarcity of silver, which caused all commodities to be cheaper than they are now; and, finally, because they had not been conquered [240]by wars occasioned by their own perverse conduct, in order to impose on them heavy tributes at the discretion of the conqueror, as is just in such cases. For they submitted of their own accord, and our conquest was made not because they had previously furnished us with causes for war, but for the sake of their greater good, both spiritual and temporal; for this reason their tribute ought to be more moderate, but not so much so that, in order to relieve these vassals, it should be charged back to the others (as it has been, unjustly), in order to support these islands. For it does not accord with justice that exemption should be granted to these Indians from their obligations, as vassals, to pay their share toward the expenses of these dominions and of the entire monarchy, in [due] proportion; and that this favor [to them] should prove injurious to the rest of the vassals, who certainly are more worthy of consideration [than these], since they are more useful.

11. “In the time of their heathendom, they ought to be considered as slaves rather than as vassals of their tyrannical petty kings, to whom they paid service as vassals. These tyrants employed them in their grain-fields, and in gathering pearls, shells, gold, dyewood, amber, and civet; in timber-cutting, and in the construction of vessels; in a word, the people had nothing more than the labor appointed to them by their tyrant masters” (thus I explained the matter to his Majesty in a report of June 5, 1760, and [here] will copy exactly the rest of its contents regarding the increase of tributes). “Your Majesty conquered these dominions and these peoples, making rational beings from brutes, Christians from heathens, and rich people from poor ones. Your Majesty gave [241]them the freedom of the sea, the rivers, the lands, and the forests; established a governor, an Audiencia, and other courts, in order that they might be defended from their enemies and maintained in justice; formed bishoprics, with bishops and curas; and, in fine, you completed these benefits with the many privileges which are contained in the laws of the Indias, without further burden to them than the payment by each Indian of five reals. At the same time, they were able to pay much more, as it is just they should, considering that every vassal ought to contribute to his king and natural lord whatever is necessary to maintain the vassals in peace, justice, and social order; but in these islands not only does your Majesty not obtain what is needed to pay these expenses, but your Majesty supplies, and has supplied, an immense amount of money. If the rest of your vassals contributed in this proportion, your Majesty could not maintain your dominions, for you spend vastly more than what they yield to you; nor could the Indians of these islands, moreover, be instructed and governed if your Majesty spent upon them no more than you obtain from the fund of the tributes. Therefore, in order that these obligations may be reciprocal—that of your Majesty to maintain the Indians in social order, and theirs to contribute for the same—it is necessary that the tribute be proportioned to the expenses, and larger than what they are at present paying.”

12. Let these reflections be prudently considered, for, even without the constraint of the foregoing ones, they show the lawfulness of increasing the tribute; and at greater length I have stated the disposition of the Indians, as I also explained to his Majesty in the [242]said report: “They are a people who are given up to sloth; they work one day for the food for the entire week, and the rest of the time they are without occupation, and most often [spend that time] in gambling or drinking. That is a very unusual Indian who takes pains to have a comfortable house, and to accumulate some little property for the comfort of his children; for he [usually] only works for his food and for wretched clothing, for paying his tribute, and for gambling. This is more usually the case; as also is it certain that there are no vassals who have better opportunities for being rich, or can do so more easily. Those who were exempted from going to cut timber paid the overseer five pesos, three reals each, in order not to be obliged to do this work for the period of one month; and in this is evident the facility with which they make money when they choose, and when necessity urges them.”

13. Here comes in well what the governor has set forth in a memorandum of suggestions regarding the increase of the tributes, and I will extract from it what answers my purpose: “Among the numerous vices which are occasioned by the incredible laziness of the Indians, one is that of gambling. When they gamble on a cockfight, a multitude of people assemble, and all of them carry ready money for this purpose. The Indian women adorn themselves with many chains of gold, with pendants, and with rosaries ornamented with gold; with rings and bracelets of tumbac, and with many buttons of the said metals on their chemises. The Indians are accustomed to use much silver, and some gold and tumbac, on the said buttons and those on their jackets; in rings and clasps; on their knife-belts13 and weapons ornamented [243]with silver. For a burial they pay out twenty, forty, or sixty pesos; they spend enormous amounts in the banquets at their weddings, in the functions of gobernadorcillos, and in other things, which prove that the Indian, notwithstanding his great slothfulness, has money for everything except for the tribute.”

14. There is no province which does not yield many and excellent products, and, if the Indians were willing to apply themselves to a very moderate [amount of] labor, they could pay a larger tribute, and [yet] live with more comforts; for there are probably no vassals in all the world who have such facilities and opportunities for becoming rich as have the Indians of Filipinas. But this condition is not attained when there is slothfulness; and what means have the Spaniards used to banish this vice? None; for we are as languid and negligent as the Indians, and have left them in their freedom without seeking either their advancement or our own. The Spaniards do not go out of Manila, where all are gentlemen; they regard it as unworthy to devote themselves to any other pursuit than commerce; they employ themselves in swindling and begging alms, rather than seek a living in the provinces; and, more than all, they live in utter idleness. They loiter about, divert themselves with gambling and other vices, and become insolent in their licentious mode of speech, even that which they do not understand. For this reason Manila is the commonwealth most abominable for malicious tales, slanders, and factions,14 for [244]sloth and licentiousness; for even the citizen of most wealth and he who is most occupied will have at least ten months which he does not know how to employ.

15. Such is the example that we set to the Indians, and they imitate us so perfectly that they all desire to live as the Spaniard does, to wear the same costly ornaments, and to be rich—but without labor, and without ceasing to be idle or to divert themselves with all the other vices. If the many Spanish vagabonds who wander about Manila and its environs were distributed in the provinces, they would trade therein; they would marry Indian women of rank, would become rich with some application and labor, and would thus furnish a good example to the Indians. In this way the foreigners (and especially the French) have established their colonies, free from the error of our pernicious vanity, inaction, and sloth; and we, although better warned than they, are unwilling to change our ideas, but prefer to maintain the Indians in the same state of idleness.

16. The means for their not being idle is, that the Spaniards should work, and encourage and aid the Indians to cultivate their lands and utilize their products. An ordinance should be published that no Indian may be a gobernadorcillo or official of his village unless he cultivate and gather in a certain portion of rice, wheat, sugar, cacao, cotton, wax, or other product, regulated by what each province produces; that if they do not cultivate their lands they must lose them, the lands being adjudicated to other persons, in order that these may cultivate them; and that exemption from tributes, polos, and personal services be granted to those who shall most distinguish [245]themselves in tillage and harvesting. The idea is, to stimulate them in this manner to the tillage and cultivation of the lands which his Majesty grants to all the villages and the Indians who dwell in them; and these measures are very gentle compared to others which were decreed by the municipal law of the Indias. For in one of the ordinances of Mexico it is decreed that “the Indians must not be allowed to be idle, or to wander about as idlers and vagabonds; but they must work on their farms.” The authorities could compel them by force to obey this, as Señor Solorzano proves by various arguments in book 2, chapter 7 of his Política Indiana, demonstrating that no Indian would work if allowed his liberty, “through his natural inclination to an idle and easy life,” as is definitely stated in ley 1, tit. 13, lib. 6 (“Of the Indians”), and many others of the same Recopilación; and that the Indians resist work “because they are exceedingly slothful and fond of idleness, and are inclined to abandon themselves to intemperance, licentiousness, and other vices which idolatry occasions among them; and as they are so little covetous, and are content with so little for food and clothing, many passing their lives in the manner of beasts, some force and compulsion is necessary to make them give up this mode of life; for the devil prompts and persuades them not to serve or aid the Spaniards.

17. “On this account it has always been regarded as best to keep them occupied and at work, and in their heathen condition the same was done by their Ingas [i.e., Incas] and Montesumas—to such an extent that, when they lacked profitable and necessary occupation, their rulers set them to work at others that were only for pleasure, and of no use or benefit; [246]they were even made to collect little bags of lice, and to cut and carry to the mountains stones of enormous size.”

18. All this description seems written for the Indians of these islands, and he who may have any experience with them will decide that, in order to remove them from their sloth and their vices the increase of their tributes is indispensable, as is the necessity of compelling them by the said measure to perform work that is useful to the king, and likewise to themselves, in both spiritual and temporal interests—so much so that one can and ought to form the gravest scruples at allowing the Indians to remain in their present condition, since it is the origin of numberless evils (from which I shall pray God to deliver his Majesty and his ministers), through consenting to this so pernicious sloth, and not applying some remedy to it. At the same time with the increase of the tribute, the abundance of products and the wealth of the islands will be greater; for if the Indians now do a certain amount of work in order to pay five reals, they will be under necessity of working three times as much in order to pay two pesos.

19. In Nueva España, Señor Solorzano regards as lawful and very just the tribute of eight tostons (which are four pesos, each of eight silver reals), for each Indian, one-half more15 than what I rated in the increase which is here proposed. He who has any knowledge of the said kingdom and of these islands [247]will admit that the said rate is very moderate; for the Indians of America do not enjoy so great an abundance of products or so wide a market as do the natives of these islands. Also, there they have not, in proportion [to the extent of the country], as many troops and as many military posts as here; and these natives have fewer burdens of polos and personal services, and much less hardship, than those of Nueva España. Notwithstanding these advantages, which furnish just reason for imposing on these islands the same tribute which is regarded as just in Nueva España, I am fixing the rate at one-half less—for with the two pesos for each Indian I think that there will be more than enough to place the troops, the fortifications, and the navy, on a more respectable footing; to defend these vassals from the invasions of Moros and other enemies; and, by saving to his Majesty the royal situado and making amends for the enormous expenses which have burdened these islands, to furnish to the royal revenues some increase, and have means with which to meet the needs and obligations of the crown.

20. The difference which there may be between the Indians who were conquered by arms and those who voluntarily subjected themselves to our sway (as were those of these islands) is also found in the said regulation of rates, by which the latter will pay but one-half as much as the former; for this circumstance that I have mentioned does not relieve them from the obligations and burdens of vassals—although on account of it they have the right to be treated with more clemency, as they have been treated hitherto, and will be in the future—paying the two pesos as tribute, in order that his Majesty and the other vassals [248]need not defray the expenses to which the people of these islands ought to contribute, since these conduce to their spiritual and temporal welfare, and to the preservation and security of these dominions.

21. Besides this, it ought to be borne in mind that, from the first years of this conquest until the one in which we now are, nearly all the provinces have at various times rebelled and risen in arms; and not one of our authors doubts that for this kind of offense the Indians ought to be punished by an increase of their tributes, that this may serve them as a warning and example; for they [thus] lost the right to be treated with the mildness which their first voluntary submission deserved. If the Spaniards had proceeded after this fashion in these islands, it would have been an easy matter to increase the tributes, in order to save the situados. Moreover, with the examples in this war [i.e., with the English] we have most rightful cause for punishing, by some such means, the traitorous and revolted provinces, by [imposing] not only the two pesos of tribute, but much more, in order to make some distinction between the Indians who have continued faithful to our king and those who have rebelled and acted disloyally.

22. With these brief reflections the minds of those who have entertained some doubts or scruples in regard to the increase of tributes which I proposed in the preceding chapter would be convinced; but there would be other difficulties to overcome in this exceedingly delicate matter. People will tell me (as I have sometimes heard it said) that any person who proposes the increase of tributes commits mortal sin, and incurs the excommunication of the bull of the Cena. But I will reply with the upright and pious intention [249]which has influenced me to write on this subject—on which, in my opinion, depends the preservation of these islands and their Christian churches; for they will certainly be lost in a few years unless they produce [means] for the expenses which they occasion, or unless his Majesty increase the royal situado; this is a difficult matter, and he is under no obligation to do so. And it is sufficient for me, in order not to incur the said excommunication, that the bull of the Cena is not received in España in regard to matters of temporal government (in which our sovereigns are absolute), but only in what concerns ecclesiastical discipline, and the purity of the faith and the Catholic religion, in which the Spaniards have always affirmed the blindest obedience to the supreme pontiff and vicar of Christ on earth.

23. Nevertheless, I regard with the most profound veneration and respect all that is contained in the aforesaid bull, and its provisions regarding government taxes and tributes make me hesitate; for, assuming (as a good Catholic) some influence of the Holy Ghost for the said pontifical declaration,16 my mind would be full of remorse if at the same time when I defend the increase of tributes I did not oppose the malversation of their proceeds, the superfluous expenses, the lack of economy in those who administer them, and the numberless thefts from the royal revenues, which are the strongest objections that can be raised against my proposal.

24. It is certain that the vassals are under obligation to pay tribute to their kings, but it is likewise [250]certain that they have the right, in equity, that what they pay as tribute be well employed, and that punishment be administered to those who steal, extravagantly spend, or misapply those funds; for in the honest administration of the royal revenues consists the greatest comfort of the vassals and the prosperity of the [respective] monarchies. The remark made by a celebrated French writer is [worthy] of note: that if the ministers of the king of España in the Indias were not so dishonest the royal incomes would amount to more than those of all the powers of Europa. The vassal complies with the obligation which rests on him, but the kings do not fulfil theirs; for they let go without punishment all the theft, all the robbery, all the iniquity committed by their ministers. I am well aware that there cannot be government among men without these defects and vices, which without exception are utterly incurable, and all the nations of the world have committed them from the time of Adam; but he who knows our general misgovernment of the Indias and the numberless robberies which are committed [therein] will be astounded to see that the criminals are not punished. [At the same time] he is certain that the royal revenues are in great part consumed by those who manage them, while if some exemplary punishments were inflicted the thefts would be greatly checked; that, by not curbing these, heavier burdens are laid upon the vassals; and that these protest against the tributes which are imposed upon them, [levied] not strictly for the maintenance of the dominions, but in order to enrich the officials, who (especially in the Indias) make enormous fortunes with what they obtain by defrauding the royal exchequer—or, [251]to speak more correctly, by plundering those who pay tribute.

25. If in the collection, administration, and allotment of the royal revenues there were application, zeal, disinterestedness, and economy, it is evident that the vassals would not be compelled to contribute with so many imposts and taxes; for with what is plundered and misapplied in one year the expenses could be met for the half of the following year, and perhaps, instead of increasing the taxes, it would be possible to make some reductions of these to the vassals who should be considered most burdened.

26. I have not the slightest doubt that the tributes which have been hitherto paid in these islands are not sufficient for maintaining them in a condition so respectable as that which I have already proposed; and if for this chiefest reason I have defended the increase of tributes, I likewise retract this opinion in case our court do not apply the most effective remedies, in order to check the robberies and malversations which during my time I have seen, and that they may not be responsible before the stern tribunal of God for such hardships to the Indians, and for the robberies, which will be committed in greater number in proportion to the increase in the funds which will be handled. For, strict as is the obligation of the vassals to contribute to the expenses, or pay tribute, equally so is that of the sovereigns to make proper distribution of what is contributed, and to endeavor that it be not misapplied; and so long as kings do not fulfil this obligation, by appointing zealous and disinterested officials, and punishing with the greatest severity those who are not such, there will be few persons who will venture to express opinions in favor [252]of increasing the tributes. But [when such measures are taken] I will be the first to withdraw from this statement of my opinion; for I have always believed that the aforesaid condition [of honest administration] was inseparable from such increase.

27. I will note other objections which have been made to me against increasing the tributes; but, before mentioning them, I protest my veneration and blind obedience to the royal decrees of my king and sovereign, whose upright conscience will consider what is most in accordance with its internal peace, the rectitude of his royal intentions and the comfort of his vassals, by mercilessly punishing those who defraud the royal treasury, and issuing such other commands as are expedient.

28. There are many who restrict the powers of the sovereign which I mentioned in section 2 of this chapter, and who say that the [various] countries, when they instituted kings, did not dispossess themselves of all the authority which the people of the nation possessed; but that the latter reserved something, especially in the matter of taxes, which were proposed and demanded by the kings, while the vassals granted or denied them—[the objectors] drawing conclusions from this ancient method, and (especially in our España) from the convocation of parliament [cortes]; that the power of the king to grind his vassals is not absolute, and that these do not depend in such matters on the will of their kings alone. I frankly state these objections, which, even though they be paltry (on account of the positive opinion of the sovereign, supreme, and absolute power of our kings, who recognize no superior on earth), it is expedient for those who ought to anticipate them not [253]to overlook; for, in order to render a question clear, and to foresee all the difficulties in its decision and practical result, a knowledge of the replies and objections which may be made is always helpful. I content myself with pointing these out, and repeating my [assertion of] invariable obedience to the royal commands of my king and sovereign, as I stated in the preceding section.

29. [Some] persons will also raise objections against what I have stated in the fifth section, that in all nations imposts and taxes are increased, according to their necessities and exigencies, and that, when this time [of urgency] is ended, the vassals are set free from such burdens; but that in España there is no impost which may not be perpetual, as has generally been the case with all—and the “Man of San Quintin” demonstrates it in his memorial, attributing the ruin of the monarchy to [the imposts,] the millones and sisas especially.17

30. These and other objections I will answer briefly, by saying that the presumption of the law by which it is believed of all public officials that they conduct themselves conformably to justice, so long as quite the opposite is not evident, is stronger and more effective in favor of kings and their wise prime ministers—who, with more enlightenment, a profounder knowledge of the [affairs of] state, well-known zeal for the welfare of the monarchy, and [254]the proper maintenance of their lofty honor and character, have decided and will decide these matters, in which we who are inferior and of more limited abilities ought to render subordinate our own opinions, and honor with the utmost respect their wise decisions, persuading ourselves, as is just, that in their councils they have borne in mind all the considerations which can produce the most advantageous judgment, before it is made known to the public. For however satisfied one may be with their reasoning, he would admit that he was convinced if it were possible for him to hear the substantial arguments which influence the royal proceedings of our sovereign—on account of which I, more than any other person, submit these productions of my dull intellect to the superior comprehension of his Majesty and his zealous ministers, protesting that I do not presume to furnish enlightenment on these subjects because I might think that they do not possess it, but in order to manifest my intense desire that what is understood to be beneficial to the state, to the glory of the nation, and to the welfare of all the vassals, may be carried into execution.

31. It will be necessary to assume that the increase of tributes in these islands will be resented in the greater part of them, and that, in order to obtain it, the precaution of stationing fifty or sixty soldiers in each province will be necessary; in view of this, the Indians will not cause the least trouble, while if they see us without military forces the aforesaid increase will be entirely impracticable.

32. Equally it must be assumed that so long as the Moros invade the provinces the Indians will resist paying tribute; for they will represent that for [255]the defense of their villages they are employed during most of the year in making bulwarks, stockades, and little strongholds, and with weapons in their hands, on account of having no aid from the king which will secure them from the said invasions; and in truth they ought to be heeded in this point. To this end I repeat that in these islands some respectable forces are necessary, and with them must be punished the haughtiness and insolence of the Moros; for at the sight of this example the Indians will be encouraged, they will attend to their labors, they will regard with respect the affairs of his Majesty, and they will assuredly pay the tribute which may be imposed upon them, without danger of their revolting. To this end, a circular edict or decree should be drawn up, in which, suiting the mode of expression to the disposition of the Indians, should be fully explained to them the motives which constrain us to the said increase, and the obligation under which they lie to pay their share of the expenses for their spiritual and temporal maintenance under the mild sway of our Catholic king and sovereign, and for freeing them from the tyranny and servitude to which they would see themselves reduced if these islands should, for lack of military forces, pass over to another sovereign.

33. This edict or order, carefully prepared, and translated into the idiom of each province, can produce many good results if we proceed with an understanding of the character of the Indians, and [in accordance] with the ideas that are necessary, which ought to be communicated, by instructions, to all the alcaldes-mayor and corregidors of the provinces, according to the circumstances of each one—imposing [256]the most severe penalties on those who do not exactly fulfil the orders which the government may entrust to their management and conduct, and offering corresponding rewards to those who shall distinguish themselves in the execution and success of the new order of things, which ought to be established in each province.18

34. In order to [secure] the observance of the said ordinance, it will be expedient that when the tribute is increased the salaries likewise should be made larger. An alcalde-mayor has twenty-five pesos of salary a month, which makes three hundred pesos a year; but before he leaves Manila for the province to which he is assigned he spends a larger sum [than that] in the fees for his documents and in the notary’s office, and for the securities [that he must give]. In three years his term as alcalde comes to an end, and the expenses of his residencia cost him four hundred to five hundred pesos; and it needs but little less for the settlement, presentation, and despatch of the accounts of the royal revenue. Thus all the salary which he receives on account of being alcalde, which amounts to nine hundred pesos in the three years, is not sufficient for the aforesaid expenses; for the rest of their maintenance have been invented the thefts from the royal revenue which they handle, and from the Indians within their jurisdiction. For this reason, and likewise because these offices have usually been sold, as a rule they are filled by men who are not very trustworthy. But if suitable pay were assigned to them, there would be many persons of known probity who would seek them, [257]transgressions could be more severely punished, plundering would be decreased, the appointees would furnish better bondsmen for the security of the royal exchequer, and the Indians would not experience oppression.

35. The poverty of the alcaldes-mayor, their being loaded with debts when they go from Manila, and the ambition to become rich in a short time, draw them into trading with the product of the tributes in each province; they buy vessels, lade them with goods, and convey these to Manila, or send them to other provinces. If the vessel sink, if the Moros seize it, or if it run aground on some shoal and the goods are damaged, or if any other disaster occur, the alcalde loses nothing, for he possesses nothing; and the damage is suffered by the king alone.

36. All this would be remedied by paying them more; for there would be more reliable alcaldes, and they could be compelled to deposit in the royal treasury every year, by means of their agents, the royal revenue of their respective provinces, in order to avoid the aforesaid contingencies, which here are common.

37. With better alcaldes, all the provinces would be well governed. For what is more melancholy than to surrender authority over them to persons who are incompetent, nobodies, in distressed circumstances, vicious, and thieves? How is a man of this sort to govern fifteen, twenty, or forty thousand Indians? If he cares for nothing except for conducting his own business, how is he to attend to the affairs which concern the king and the Indians? If the alcalde is inefficient, or coarse, or ill-bred, or of little capacity, how is he to govern well? how is he to administer justice, and how civilize his subjects? How is [258]he to furnish reports on subjects which his limited intellect does not comprehend or fathom? How is he to look after the cultivation of the soil, the collection of its products, making plantations, and other things for which the ordinances provide?

38. This disappointment, this disorder, this misgovernment, and the thefts from the royal revenue can only be avoided or remedied, for the most part, by increasing the tribute and giving larger salaries to the alcaldes-mayor, the corregidors, and the other officers of justice in the provinces. There is occasion for the same increase of pay in the posts of public and royal officials, and the subordinates in the accountancy of the royal exchequer, in order to stimulate them to better work and greater zeal and application in the affairs of the royal finances.

39. In the royal storehouses there would be an end to the incredible infractions of law and the thefts by the storekeepers, by giving this position to honorable Spaniards, with suitable pay; and abolishing the mischievous abuses in the waste and consumption of supplies—with unchangeable regulations for the incomes and expenditures; for the respective account-books of the storehouses and the appointment of an auditor for verifying them; for the credits and debits of the accounts, with vouchers for them; for the obligation and responsibility of the storekeeper; for the weekly inspection which ought to be made by the royal officials, in order to acquaint themselves with the condition of all these matters, and ascertain whether or not they are properly attended to; and for many other things, which contribute to greater economy in the royal revenues.19 [259]

40. In order that there shall not be such confusion, it would be expedient to separate the storehouses, or divide what belongs to the artillery and military supplies from all the rest; and to abolish the dependence of the storehouses at Cavite on those of Manila, making the regulation that in the said port be entered and unladen whatever is necessary for the equipment of ships, galleys, and other vessels of the king, without its being necessary that the vessels from the provinces which come with property belonging to the royal account should unlade their cargoes in these storehouses [at Manila], from which various goods are sent back to the said port. This causes greater expense, on account of the detention of the seamen, and because of the vessels and men that afterward are employed in conveying to the said port what [supplies] it needs, in which also they are exposed to the uncertainties of the sea. This is avoided and spared by the direct discharge of cargo in the said port, where, in fact, the main storehouse ought to stand, because there three-fourths of the goods belonging to the royal account are consumed.

41. The superior government gives orders for the hasty equipment of some vessels to cruise against the Moros, and for other purposes. The cordage, the sails, and all the rest, are sent from the Manila storehouse; the said vessels set sail, and come to supply themselves with provisions at these storehouses. Who does not see the loss of time and the increase of expenses which are uselessly incurred, and which could be saved if the storehouses at Cavite contained what they need? [260]

42. Although what I have touched on in these last sections may seem a digression from the object of this chapter, they will be excused by those who remember what I had already stated in section 26, and by those who think that the increase of tributes will facilitate the increase of salaries. This measure will give the superior judges more discretionary power for punishing the thefts and illegal acts which are diminishing the royal patrimony, to the injury of the vassals—who have no right to complain that those who render them faithful and disinterested service should be well paid; but their right in justice calls for punishment to those who, receiving suitable pay, satiate their covetousness with the blood and sweat of those who are wretched.

43. With the increase of tribute, numberless other matters could be regulated, for the settlement of which it is needful to begin spending money. All my plan and project is based on this chapter, for in no other way—although these islands can be supported with the economies which I set forth to his Majesty in my advices of the year sixty, without the necessity of the royal situado—will it be possible to place the country in the respectable condition of strength which can oppose the nations who are established in this part of India, or to produce so great advantages to the royal exchequer. I therefore desire that these reflections of mine be carefully considered, in order that, with other opinions that carry more authority than mine, the royal and upright conscience of my beloved king and sovereign may make such decision as he shall hold most expedient; and I shall content myself with having brought forward what is dictated to me by fidelity and affection, [261]the zeal of a good Spaniard, desire for the glory and increase of the monarchy, and the general welfare of these islands and of the entire [Spanish] nation.

44. And if, notwithstanding the cogent reasons which justify the increase of the tributes, it be preferred to employ with these vassals an extraordinary degree of mercy, without a resulting deficiency in the means for supporting the islands with respectable forces this could be made practicable by establishing the tithes20 for the maintenance of the ministers of religious instruction, that of the cabildo of this holy metropolitan church, with its archbishop, and the suffragan bishops with their churches; for the wine for masses, and the oil for the lamps; and even for the missionaries—all with the saving, for the royal exchequer, of these great expenses.

45. Nearly all the provinces have their military posts, with the garrisons corresponding to the greater or less danger of enemies; and this expense is another of the heaviest incurred by the royal exchequer, which would be able to save it (in default of the increase of tributes) by laying upon the Indians and mestizos the burden of such contribution as shall be deemed necessary for maintaining the said military posts. [This would include] the pay of the troops in garrison, the cost of transporting them and of the shipment of provisions, clothing for the men, and the purchase of necessary arms; for all this would contribute [262]to the benefit of the provinces and of their inhabitants.

46. And if, for the same reason which I have stated for the military posts, there be exacted from the natives of the provinces the cost of the thousand soldiers distributed among them who are mentioned in sections 9 and 10 of chapter third, the total saving to the royal exchequer will exceed 260,000 pesos, or will come near to 300,000. With this, and the product from the tributes (if these are paid as hitherto), and from the other sources of income, there will be in the royal treasury funds sufficient for the maintenance of the islands according to my plan, provided that the rules be observed which I set forth in my memorandum of suggestions and in my advices to his Majesty. Thus will be secured these objects: to make our power respected throughout India, to avoid the expense of the royal situado which comes from Nueva España, and to gain the many advantages which have been mentioned. I shall speak of these in the second part of this work, in which I am going to treat of navigation and commerce, the gains from which will be more than enough for maintaining these dominions, even if the tributes are not increased.

1. I do not presume to utter new things, but to [263]arouse the minds of Spaniards to follow the examples of the other nations, to which end I have drawn from the works on history, both ancient and modern, what confirms this idea. [This chapter is interesting, but the limits of our space make it preferable to omit most of it, as having but slight connection with our main subject; the following sections are worth retaining.]

17. In the fifteenth century was begun the manufacture of woolen stuffs [paños] in Inglaterra; for before that they sold (as we are now doing) their woolens to other nations, especially to the Flemings and the people of Brabant—from whom some seditious persons went over to the said kingdom, about the year 1420, and taught manufactures to the English. Monsieur de Thou,21 however, attributes this establishment [of a new industry] to Queen Isabel [i.e., Elizabeth], and to the disturbances, on account of religion, in which the great Duke de Alva and the Inquisition of España were insulted—without having borne in mind, when he allowed his pen to move with the envious and bitter temper that swayed him, that, many years before the revolution of some of the seventeen [Netherlands] provinces which threw off the mild yoke of the Spaniards, the artisans of Lovaina [i.e., Louvain] had already introduced the manufacture of woolen stuffs in Londres.

18. The French, who in the opinion of Cardinal Richelieu were totally unfitted for commerce, have made with it and navigation the most felicitous progress, especially since the reign of Louis Fourteenth.

19. Nor must I omit the height of glory and [264]power to which the empire of the Muscovites has been raised since the reign of the great Czar Peter. That nation was ferocious, barbarous, and slothful, and had no intercourse with other and foreign nations. That glorious monarch formed the design of civilizing the vassals of his Russian empire, and of turning their inclinations toward political affairs, the sciences, the fine arts, and the great advantages which result from so praiseworthy occupations; but [even] his uncommon intellect found no other means [for this] than that of navigation and commerce. But he went incognito to Inglaterra and Holanda, under pretext of renewing certain treaties, but in reality with the idea of gaining instruction in those two sciences, which were his only aim. In this he actually succeeded, by dint of immense labor and mechanical occupations, which, if apparently they were unworthy of a prince, were afterward (as they still are) those which most enhanced his glory. Not to linger over what is well known, I conclude with what is to my purpose: that the great Czar Peter established commerce in his empire, overcoming insuperable difficulties; and from the year 1697 (which is the real date of that enterprise) to the present time so marvelous has been the progress of that empire that its forces by sea and land, its wealth and products, its manufactures, its vassals transformed from barbarians into civilized beings, learned men, and politicians, yield to [those of] no other power—all being due to commerce, which in the short time of sixty-seven years has wrought these apparently incredible prodigies.

20. The Swedes and Danes22 also have made [265]much progress through this means; and the Portuguese, glorious in their conquests and discoveries, have constantly declined ever since they neglected navigation and commerce, regarding these as occupations unworthy of their nobility.23 [266]

21. Almost the same has happened to our España; what fear, what respect, what terror, did not our armadas inspire in the four quarters of the world? There was no power that could resist them; but, not to linger on the glories of our nation, I leave that to the histories which relate them—especially those of the reigns of the pious king Don Fernando, the Catholic monarchs, the emperor Don Carlos Fifth, Don Phelipe Second, and Don Phelipe Fourth, who certainly protected navigation and commerce. I will assert [here] only what answers my purpose: that our navy declined, our great manufactures in Sevilla, Segovia, and other places retrograded, and our commerce deteriorated, with the continual wars; and, as we did not repair this damage, we were at the same time promoting the commerce of the other nations. These have made themselves rich through our negligence and inactivity—selling to us all the more commodities [267]the more we abandoned manufactures, and with their gains increasing their shipping the more that we gave up shipbuilding—until in these latest reigns our shipping and commerce were reëstablished. But it is necessary to extend our commerce further, in proportion to our vast domains; otherwise, we keep them greatly exposed [to danger]. For it has been now thoroughly proved that navigation and commerce have rendered formidable and terrible the forces and power of the nations who have practiced them, as also that from the decay or neglect of these activities has proceeded the ruin of kingdoms.

1. Some may think that this navigation is prohibited to the Spaniards by the treaties of peace, and that on this account we have not established a commerce like that of the Dutch, English, French, Swedes, Danes, and other nations. But it is certain that there is no such prohibition, and that our natural inactivity, laziness, and lack of application to commerce, has been the cause of our not undertaking the aforesaid navigation, which is equally free to us as to all the other powers. For the prohibition that the Englishman, the Dutchman, and the rest can lay upon us is, that our ships may not enter their ports, just as they have been forbidden to enter our ports; but they cannot hinder us from navigating in all the seas of the world, in accordance with natural right and the law of nations. That law does not allow the dominion of the sea to any power, according to Grotius, Heinsius, and others—contrary to the Mare clausum [i.e., [268]“closed sea”], of the Englishman Selden,24 who in regard to the dispute of the year 1653 defended the [English] dominion of the White Sea, and the right of forbidding this navigation to the Dutch; but they maintained their freedom with powerful fleets, and with the same arguments which justify the freedom which the Spaniards possess for navigating by way of the Cape of Good Hope.

2. As the Dutch have always regarded these islands with suspicion, fearing some injury to their own commerce, they likewise have striven in every way to make amends for the damages which they fear. One of these is the extension of our commerce, because it diminishes their own; and, in order to hinder it, they have sometimes chosen to avail themselves of article 5 in the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and of article 10 in that of Utrecht in 1714—in which is confirmed the said article 5, wherein it is provided that “the Spaniards shall retain their navigation to the Eastern Indias, in the same manner as they enjoy it at present, without being authorized to extend it further; as likewise the inhabitants of this Low Country [i.e., Netherlands] shall abstain from frequenting the places which the Castilians possess in the Eastern Indias.” From these expressions, and from the demarcation [made] by the supreme pontiff Alexander Sixth, the Dutch—who claim, by right of conquest, to enjoy the privileges and prerogatives of [269]the Portuguese—try to argue that our ships have no right to navigate by way of the Cape of Good Hope, nor along the regions of Asia—the Coromandel Coast, Vengala, the Red Sea, etc.—intending that these Philipinas Islands shall be the limits of our navigation to the west.

3–8. [In section 3, it is shown that the demarcation of Alexander VI was made only to check possible disputes between the great Catholic nations of Spain and Portugal, and its provisions referred only to their discoveries of lands and isles, and not at all to the navigation of the sea, which no power can claim, “since it is not fitted for other dominion than that of God.” Section 4 shows that the Portuguese and Spaniards have frequented each other’s ports, without any difficulties arising between them over the navigation of those seas, which has not been and could not be forbidden to the Spaniards; and that even if the Portuguese had had any such exclusive right it could not pass over to the Dutch when they conquered the former nation in India, especially as privileges granted by the Holy See to its Catholic followers could not be claimed by Protestants. In section 5 it is asserted that the previously-cited article 5 of the treaty of Westphalia does not forbid navigation past the Cape of Good Hope, but only the entrance of Spaniards or Dutch into ports belonging to the other power; that navigation on the high seas is, “by natural right, free to all the world,” and the object of the treaty was to protect both powers in their respective possessions and commerce. As further proof of this, Viana cites (in his section 6) the Hague treaty of 1650, and comments on it in section 7. In the following section he shows how the Dutch are [270]claiming what was never granted by Alexander VI, who separated only the conquests of Spain and Portugal, and not their navigations in the high seas, a distinction which has been observed in the practice of both countries, “who have freely navigated and traded through all the seas of the East and the West.” He claims that Japan and China “are, without doubt, included in the demarcation of Castilla.”]

9. Equally within the demarcation of España are included the kingdoms of Siam, Camboja, Cochinchina, and, in the other direction, Borney, the Molucas, and the other islands of the Malays—as was declared in the year 1524, by the geographers appointed for this purpose by the crowns of Castilla and Portugal, to whose decision the respective sovereigns agreed. As for the prohibition of navigation, if the demarcation of Alexander VI were to have been observed, it was clear that the Dutch must admit the right of the Spaniards to prevent their navigation through the seas of the kingdoms and provinces here enumerated, as also through those of Japan and China, to which the Dutch ships go every year; or else that they have not any right to forbid to the Spaniards the navigation by way of the Cape of Good Hope. For by the admission of those very Dutchmen, in a letter which the governor of Batavia wrote to the governor here [at Manila], in regard to a balandra seized by the Spaniards in the island of Mindanao (which belongs to the crown of España, and is within the limits of the aforesaid demarcation), they say that the Spaniards could not enjoy dominion over the rivers and ports of Mindanao, and that only the authority of the petty king there ought to be acknowledged; and they add that it is lawful [271]for any power to navigate there, and make observations on the situation of those lands and towns, and to trade therein with the vassals of the princes who possess them. This carries conviction [of the principle] that as little ought the Spaniards to recognize in Eastern India any other authority than that of the princes of the ports and towns where their ships make port; and that it is lawful to navigate through those seas, to reconnoiter those lands, and to trade with their vassals, as has been done hitherto. For our ships have gone to their ports, where they have been well received, as happened recently with the ship named “Guadalupe,” in the past year of 760; and those who have come to this city, under various flags—Moro, Armenian, Malabar, Chinese, Siamese, and others—have met the same friendly reception.

10–11. [Viana asserts that, although “long use and immemorial possession may be a certain title to dominion over the sea,” in such instances as that of the Venetians over the Adriatic, and the Greeks over the Ionian, this cannot be true of the claim made by the Dutch (as having conquered the Portuguese settlements) to the dominion of the great seas that lave India and Africa. These waters are too vast to be possessed by any one power, and have always been freely used by all nations. Moreover, the influence of Alexander VI and his successors had always been in favor of the Catholic monarchs of Spain, and of the preservation of the law of nations—“which presumption is taken for granted whenever for just cause temporal dominions are changed by the paramount power of the supreme pontiff.”25 He also cites Solorzano [272]to support his contention. The final section repeats the statement that the Dutch cannot forbid the Spaniards to navigate through the seas of India, and past the Cape of Good Hope; and adds, “Would to heaven that we had the eyes to perceive the advantages of this navigation, which are the following.” Thus he prepares for chapter iii.]

1. The distance of these islands [from España] deprives our court often of news; occasions delays in the correction of so many infractions of law; retards all governmental measures; gives opportunity for the commission of many iniquities; discourages those who are zealous for the royal service; causes incredible expenses to the royal exchequer, and to the inhabitants of these islands; and detains the citizens here, as if in a place of banishment,26 since they are not at liberty to return to España, nor have they means to pay the expenses of the long and grievous journey over land and sea, by way of Acapulco. All this would be in great part remedied by carrying on navigation and commerce by the Cape of Good Hope.

2. The clothing for the troops is brought from Mexico; it costs much, and serves only to kill the soldiers. If it came directly from España, it would be of better quality, cheaper, and more suitable for garments; and our [Spanish] manufactures would have this market. [273]

3. The wine for masses comes by way of Vera Cruz; it crosses the entire kingdom of Mexico, and is shipped at Acapulco; and it arrives here with so many leakages, damages, and costs for transportation that it costs very dear—and sometimes it is mixed with water, to replace what the muleteers drink on the route [across Mexico]. If it came by way of the Cape, there would not be this uncertainty about celebrating mass and the wine would cost much less.

4. The iron which has been purchased here from the Dutch, English, and others at very high prices would cost much less if it came directly from España, and foreigners would not carry away our silver. I say the same of the lead, copper, gunpowder, balls, bombs, grenades, and cannons, which have always been bought from foreigners, on account of the negligence of the Spaniards—who, although they have [material for] all the said [supplies] within the islands, go outside to find it, for lack of application in working the mines.

5. The many thousands of pesos which the king has expended in the transportation of missions by way of Nueva España, the detention of the religious in the said kingdom in order to await the galleon (for which delay the king pays), and the amount that is contributed for clothing to the religious orders of St. Dominic and St. Francis, would have been largely saved, and can be thus saved in the future, if the said route be established. Among the ships of that navigation will come to these islands many belonging to the commerce of Cadiz, and on the other hand other ships will go to Cadiz from here, among which there will be many who will undertake [to convey], some one article and others another of the numberless [274]commodities which can yield some profit. With this trade it will be known what the Philipinas are; our court will have more light [about them]; the infractions of law and the iniquitous acts, of which it will have accurate information, will be punished; and the measures of redress will not be delayed for four or five years, as is now the usual case.

6–7. [Viana (in section 6) reminds the government of the great advantage which the proposed route would give in sending news of an outbreak of war with any power, enforcing this by the ignorance of the Philippine colony, in the late war with England, of any hostilities with that country, of which Manila learned by the coming of the English squadron to attack that city. He urges (section 7) the lack of available shipping along the South American coast, and “the incredible amount of money which the equipment at Acapulco of the fragata ‘Santa Rosa’ (which by accident arrived at the said port from Perù) cost; and the injuries which would have followed to these islands if the divine Providence had not made ready the said fragata for our succor. Thus will be seen the advantage of the aforesaid navigation and commerce, for, without its costing the king any money, he will have in Cadiz vessels for carrying out the orders and despatching the succors and provisions which his royal compassion shall regard as expedient.”]

8. Conducting our commerce from these islands to España by way of the Cape of Good Hope, the commerce of the foreigners must necessarily be diminished, and they will not obtain so much silver from us. In most years there come to the port of Canton, in the empire of China, twenty-four, twenty-eight, [275]or thirty ships—English, French, Dutch, Swedish, and Danish; they carry our pesos fuertes (which is the money most valued in China and throughout India), and some European commodities, as fine woolen stuffs, and Brussels camlets [carros de oro] (which the Chinese use for their outer garments27 in the winter-time), some pearls, and clocks, and much wine; cochineal [grana] from our own America, and the opium of India, are also two main lines of this commerce.

9. Such is the lading of the said ships, which return to Europa with chà or tea, and with some porcelain, some articles of furniture in lacquered or varnished wood, rosewood escritoires, and candlesticks and other articles of white copper;28 and, finally, they carry a great amount of silk, both raw and in fabrics, which is their principal lading. The raw silk is used for the European manufactures, and with the fabrics they transact most of their trading. Each of the aforesaid nations has its agent in Canton, who during the year disposes of such goods as his ships could not sell; he furnishes to the Chinese the designs [for fabrics] which are every year invented, and they weave the stuffs of the same width as those of Europa. Afterward they sell these, as coming from Francia, Inglaterra, and other European countries, without any one being able to detect the fraud except those who have been in these islands—where it is notorious to all that this is true; and he who may doubt it will find this statement confirmed in the [276]“Universal Dictionary” of Sabary.29 A large portion of the said fabrics or stuffs come to Nueva España in our trading-fleets, and, although they are of the same quality as those which the galleons carry from here to Acapulco—with only the difference that the latter are wider and somewhat more lustrous than the former—there is a very great difference in the prices; for the mere name of “French” or “English” confers value and estimation on the said fabrics throughout the kingdom of Mexico, and the mere name of their being “Chinese” renders those which go by way of Acapulco of little value.

10. This fraud only the traders of Manila thoroughly understand, because they see it every year; the traders of Cadiz would be equally aware of it if they carried on commerce in the empire of China, as the foreigners do. They would also discover in the same way numberless small wares of Canton make which are sold in España as made in Londres and Paris, as is the case with the snuff-boxes of all kinds, whether gold or silver, or of tortoise-shell or other material; with lace-bobbins [palillos] of mother-of-pearl, ornamented with gold, and those of finely lacquered or varnished work, painted; and with various other curious articles of mother-of-pearl, ivory, etc.

11. All of these desirable articles, and many more, could be obtained by our ships, if they came via the Cape of Good Hope to these islands, which are on the route to Canton. At Cadiz they could take on cargoes of woolen stuffs, which here are used [277]for riding caps and coats,30 liveries, and in China for outer garments, as I have said; Brussels camlets, which both here and in that country are greatly used; wines (and thus the Swedes, who carry it from Cadiz to Canton, and the Dutch and the English—all of whom carry away our money, and make us pay sometimes a peso fuerte for a single bottle of red wine, and for that of Xeres—would be deprived of this [source of] profit); hats, which the foreigners sell to us at high prices; silk hose and thread under-stockings; mirrors; crystal chandeliers; branched candlesticks, and lanterns; vases, cups, and other kinds of glassware; European paper; thread for sewing; britannia linens, fabrics from Cambray, etc. (which are brought at much cost from Batavia); silver and gold galloons and laces, which also the Dutch sell (and would to Heaven that the great extravagance of Manila in this respect might be prohibited!); and numerous other articles, which persons who have a practical acquaintance with commerce can name better than I, and which, if used, would be recognized as highly beneficial.

12. Of course the said lines are of recognized utility and large profits, both for the Spaniards who may ship them by the said route of the Cape, and for those who will buy the goods in these islands, at more moderate prices. Above all, the profit would remain among Spaniards; our Spanish manufactures would have this additional market; we would succeed in stopping the foreigners from draining away all our silver. For it is an intolerable grief to good Spaniards [278]that, when more than two hundred millions of pesos have come to these islands since they were conquered, there are not now found in them eight hundred thousand pesos in ready money. [This is] because our own inactivity and lack of application causes us to buy from foreigners the very articles with which these dominions abound, or which they bring from our own España—as is the case with the iron, the copper, the lead, the saltpetre; with the cinnamon, cloves, and pepper; with the wines; with the woolen stuffs; with the mirrors; with the hats, hose, galloons, and other articles, of which some are manufactured in our España, and others are produced in these islands.

13. The Spanish ships which make their navigation by way of the Cape could supply, as I have said, these islands with what they need, and carry from them to Canton many excellent products which the foreign ships cannot include in their cargoes. Such are birds’-nests, nacre or mother-of-pearl, carey or black tortoise-shell, indigo and dyes from Pampanga, balate, tapa, deer’s sinews, hides, sybucao, ebony, lumber, and other things, which have a great consumption in China; on this account every year cargoes of these commodities are carried thither by the champans which come here to trade, and by the barks which depart from here for Emui and Macao. With these products, and with the commodities from España, the said vessels would ship at Canton the same goods that the foreigners are taking on; the royal duties at Cadiz would be the same; our manufactures would be greatly promoted; the profits would be as great [to the Spaniards] as the losses to the said foreigners; the products of these islands would be [279]cultivated according to the market for them; and, finally, in time many other advantages and benefits would be made evident.

14. The said ships returning from Canton by way of this city, in order to pursue their voyage to Cadiz, could carry some products of the islands—such as very fine petates or mats, hats of the same kind, and cotton; tortoise-shell, palomaria; tamarinds, dragon’s blood; manungal,31 and jars of the same wood, which is very medicinal; various especial roots; gold; sibucao, which resembles brazil-wood, for dyeing; pepper, which yields very abundantly wherever it is cultivated; sugar, which does not cost here two cuartos a libra; dried candied fruits; and, finally, they would have the benefit of the cinnamon, with which our mountains abound from Samboanga to Caraga in the island of Mindanao; it would be the most valuable line of commerce. These mountains are in the same degree of north latitude as those of Ceylan, where the Dutch obtain all the cinnamon; and it is judged, on account of their location, that the quality of the cinnamon also is the very same. For in Ceylan likewise cinnamon grows that is thick and gummy, like that of Samboangan, and if the latter were cultivated like the former, it would be equally [280]good.32 The cinnamon of Mindanao will be as good as that of Ceylan if the king prohibits the latter in his dominions, and facilitates the consumption of the former; and if the Spaniards had begun to sell their cinnamon before the Dutch did so, ours would now be of better quality than theirs.

15. As soon as I arrived in these islands and had made myself somewhat acquainted with this subject, the inactivity and indolence of our people caused me much sorrow; for although we possessed this exceedingly rich treasure, there had been no one who devoted himself to its development. This I explained, among other things, to his Majesty in my report of June 5, 1760, showing what these islands could produce, the valuable products with which they abound, and the possibility of maintaining them without the situado which annually comes from Mexico. In the following year came Don Nicolas Norton Nicols,33 [283]who, it seems, proposed at the court the project for [developing] the cinnamon, and brought a royal order from his Majesty that he should be aided therein. I did so, with the utmost energy and readiness, and this famous and skilful Englishman began to make plantations in Caraga; people assure me that he would have carried this work to completion if God had not taken away his life, through the grief which he experienced at the attack on us by the English, from whom he expected no favor. It was necessary that a foreigner should accomplish what no Spaniard had done in some two hundred years;34 he died on [284]account of our misfortunes, and now there will be no one who will devote himself to the same enterprise; for these citizens have no thought of any further occupation than their everlasting laziness, nor have they the spirit to risk four reals, or any zeal for the nation.

16. Even without its cultivation, there is a wide market for all the cinnamon which comes from Samboangan. The greater part of it is used in these islands, for chocolate, and brings a very good price; for ragouts and for liquors, it is stronger than that of Ceylan; and it is being shipped, as for several years past, to Nueva España. In Samboangan no cinnamon is procured besides what the natives gather in order to better their wretched condition, but this produces a sufficient quantity. This is enough to prove that if the Spaniards would apply themselves to the cultivation of the cinnamon of the said mountains; to making new plantations, the bark of which, as being more delicate, would yield better cinnamon than that of Ceylan; and to gather what Nature herself produces, without any [human] labor: this commodity alone would be capable of enriching the islands and the Spanish commerce, and of annihilating that of the Dutch. The Dutch company supports existence, notwithstanding its many losses and obligations, on the cinnamon and [other] spices, fixing the prices of these at its pleasure, as being masters of this commerce—which indemnifies them for their losses on other things, and for the incredible costs of fortresses, troops, and [commercial] establishments [285]in the aforesaid island of Ceylan (which would not be incurred in our cinnamon mountains).

17. The iron is another valuable product of these islands; there are mountains of this metal, the ores of which yield seventy-five per cent, only twenty-five per cent being lost in the fire. To judge from the abundance of ores in the said mountains, iron to supply the world can be obtained from them. Before the English came to attack us, the working of these mines was vigorously pushed; it was in charge of Don Juan Solano and Don Francisco Casañas. In less than eight months they established furnaces, coalpits, barracks, forges, and other facilities, and they mined a large quantity of iron; but everything was destroyed, as a result of the loss of Manila, because some malevolent persons went to plunder and destroy all the works. But it is absolutely certain that all the iron can be obtained [here] which the islands need for nails, plows, bolts, cannon-balls, bombs, grenades, cannons, and carajayes, and for other uses, which amount to more than one hundred thousand pesos every year, without the iron costing three pesos a pico. [It is also certain] that if this money remains within the islands—an amount of which hitherto the Dutch, English, and Chinese have drained us—they will become rich, and diminish the commerce of the foreigners.

18. The commerce in the iron that is necessary for these islands will alone produce, in fifteen or twenty years, more money than what they now have; and if the Indians were compelled to clothe themselves with the fabrics of the land, even with the little commerce that we have the islands would abound with silver. The trade with Nueva España in iron [286]would be extremely advantageous to his Majesty; for the mines of Sonora and other provinces further inland cannot be worked, on account of the transportation from Mexico of the great amount of iron and quicksilver that is necessary; and this, and the expenses which are added for the conveyance of silver to Mexico, leave very little profit to the miners.

19. In carrying the iron from these islands and the quicksilver from Peru to Acapulco or to La Navidad, these effects can be transported in small vessels, and with little expense, to the coast of Guadalajara; they will cost less than if purchased in Mexico; at least thirty or forty pesos will be saved on the transportation of every arroba; and, if on the return trip by the same route the silver is embarked for Acapulco, there will be a great saving of freight in the transportation of this metal.

20. Let a computation be made of the money which must have gone out from the islands since their conquest, in order to purchase the very products in which they abound, and the amount will be incalculable for the items of cinnamon, iron, saltpetre, and other products. Let also computation be made of what the outlays must have been for purchasing wines, mirrors, and the other things which, as I have stated above, could be brought directly from España; and it will be seen that by our own fault we have enriched our enemies, and that we could have annihilated their commerce and increased our own with only the sources of gain which are pointed out in the present exposition. Then let us, even though it be late, have the discernment to avert our total ruin, by striving, with glorious emulation, to secure the greatest prosperity for the Spanish nation. [287]

1. By a royal decree dated at Sevilla on March 23, 1733 (in which the project was carried out which was approved by his Majesty on April 26, 1732), there was established by our lord Don Phelipe Fifth, of undying memory, a company with the name of “Royal Company of Philipinas,”35 under fifty-eight articles and stipulations. These were full of the most unusual privileges and liberties that can be granted, and were even more advantageous to the Spaniards than those which Louis Fourteenth granted to the French for their Oriental Company; but I do not know exactly for what reason—some attribute it to the loss of Torres’s trading-fleet—the paternal affection did not prove effectual with which our beloved king and sovereign took an interest in making the Spanish monarchy prosperous by the extension and promotion of commerce (the only means for securing wealth), imitating the examples of almost all the nations of Europa, who, in order to become rich, have established their companies in the Orient.

2–12. [In these sections Viana expands this last statement, enumerating the nations who have enriched themselves by the Oriental trade, and the companies formed in each for this purpose. First were the Genovese and Venetians, who traded with India by way of the Red Sea; they were afterward driven out of this trade by the Portuguese, in consequence of the discovery by the latter of the route via Cape of Good Hope. (Section 3.) “Portuguese trading-fleets of thirty ships came to the commerce of India every year, and for Brasil alone sailed fifteen to twenty [288]ships laden with merchandise from India—besides others which carried on trade in China, Japon, Persia, Arabía, Mosambique, Melinda, Sofala, and other regions. But now that commerce is so reduced that only one or, at most, two ships sail from Lisboa yearly, which would not be the case if they had established a company with adequate capital, which is the only way of making commerce lasting.” The Dutch at first bought spices from the Portuguese, and then resold them at a huge profit to the other European nations; but Phelipe II prohibited the spice trade to Portugal, and the Dutch therefore formed a company to operate in the Orient, and trade directly with its peoples. As finally constituted in 1602, this company had (section 6) a capital of 6,600,000 florins (“according to Savary”); and “in less than four years the members received the principal of their shares with the great profits which they obtained.” At the time of Viana’s writing, the Dutch company were maintaining “twelve thousand men, regular troops, in their twenty-five fortresses in India, and were able to equip 30,000 militia in their colonies, especially that of Batavia” (Savary). Viana cites another authority, Samuel Ricard, who places this militia force at 100,000, and states that the company employed in the Eastern trade more than 160 ships, each carrying thirty to sixty cannon, besides forty ships of the line (which number was increased in time of war). This enterprise ruined the commerce of the Portuguese (who had been the first to open the sea-route to India); “from that time until now it has steadily diminished, and is the poorest in all India; this has been the result of their not having formed a company with capital, and with [289]respectable forces to oppose the conquests which the Dutch made. For they had a better opportunity than the latter, and it would have cost them less to maintain a flourishing commerce, as was that which they already possessed, than it cost the Dutch to establish a new commerce by dint of money, conquests, fortifications, and enormous expenses.” The English company (section 8) sent out its first fleet (of four ships) in the year 1600; its capital was 369,891 pounds sterling. After various fluctuations of fortune, it was reëstablished in 1698, and attained great prosperity, so that its capital had increased to 1,703,422 pounds. In Viana’s time, “the ships from Madrast for London (more than fifty in number) carry annual cargoes of five to six million pounds, according to the estimate of Sabary; and, taking into consideration the increase which this commerce has had since he published his famous work, the ‘Universal Dictionary,’ it must by this time be worth some ten millions. This does not include the operations of the private English traders who traffic among the colonies of India; this may be inferred from the duties which they pay in Madrast, which, at the rate of five per cent, produce for the company 80,000 pagodas. This sum amounts to 120,000 or 130,000 pesos, estimating the pagoda at twelve and sometimes thirteen silver reals.” The English company were maintaining in constant operation 150 ships and fragatas, and more than fifty smaller vessels, employed in their commerce between India and London alone; to the great expenses of this navy must be added those of the company’s forts and garrisons in India, which indicate how enormous were their profits. An Englishman told Viana that the king of [290]England was owing to the company more than 36,000,000 pesos, the amount of loans which they had made to the crown in various emergencies. The Oriental commerce of the Dutch was further encroached upon (section 11) by the trading companies formed later in France, Sweden, and Denmark, and proposed in Prussia;36 these were protected and fostered [291]by their respective governments. The commerce of the Dutch “would have been ruined if it were not for their being exclusive owners of the spice trade—of which only the Spaniards are able to deprive them, since we have in these islands cinnamon, pepper, cloves, and nutmeg.” As all those nations maintained forts, garrisons, and war-ships, the necessity of opposing these armaments with like forces has imposed on the Dutch enormous additional expenses. Viana says (section 12): “I know not what reason there can be why that which is so beneficial to all the powers should not, with even greater cause, be an advantage to España, which holds her conquests in peaceable possession, and has valuable products in her dominions; moreover, she has forts and ports which at little cost can be rendered impregnable, and better opportunities than any other nation for a very flourishing commerce. Yet she labors only to enrich [292]her enemies, abandoning to them the commerce which our people are unwilling to carry on, and surrendering to them our treasures and wealth, in exchange for the greater part of the commodities and products which our own lands produce.”]

13. If the Spaniards would form a company in the islands, similar to the foreign companies, and according to the pious anxiety with which the magnanimous heart of our beloved king and sovereign Don Phelipe Fifth, of undying memory, was concerned in this matter, all the nations who trade in India would have the same experience as the Portuguese and Dutch. Our commerce would annihilate or [at least] diminish that of all the India companies, who cannot find a market for their goods if they do not trade these in our dominions—and this they could not do if the Spanish company had large capital, and ships for navigation and trade in España and the Americas. If we could fortify the towns and garrison them, as has already been explained, the other nations would find themselves under the necessity of spending much more than they now do, in order to defend themselves against our power, if war should break out. This increase of expenses on the one hand, and diminution of their commerce on the other, are two excellent principles, which promise many advantages to the Spanish company—which, as it is not, like the others, compelled to incur these expenses, will be able to sell its commodities at lower prices, and the gains will be more certain.

14. In order to facilitate the establishment of this most beneficial company, the royal protection of our sovereign is absolutely necessary, and with it must be banished the contemptuous notion that the Spaniards [293]form of the commercial career; for that notion usually leads them to keep their chests full of silver, for which they sell the products of their family estates. As a rule, the Spaniards spend with great economy what is necessary for their maintenance, especially those in the little hamlets throughout the kingdom; and, as they enjoy no commerce, they deprive themselves of the benefits arising from commercial activities, with detriment to their families and to the public welfare. On the other hand, they imagine that there is too great a risk in the remittance of their silver by sea, because they are so little (or not at all) acquainted with nautical science and mercantile affairs; and, as timidity prevails in their minds over ambition, they consider themselves fortunate to keep their riches under their own eyes, without thinking of investing them. But they would take hazards on their money, if they were touched by that eager desire for gain which is inseparable from all commerce, and which is stimulated by the lure of profits.

15. There are, of course, many persons whose ability enables them to understand thoroughly the benefits of commerce; but they live remote from the marine ports, they have not trustworthy acquaintances to whom they can confide the management of their capital, and they sorrowfully deprive themselves of the benefits which they would derive from its employment, the result of which is that they lead idle lives, or sometimes yield to an extravagance which is excessive and impairs their fortunes. Even more melancholy than all that I have related is the sight of the Spanish nobility, without any occupation, and, as a rule, reared in extreme ignorance and idleness. [294]This is the source of many excesses, the beginning of ruin to the most robust constitutions, a hindrance to the generation of children, and a cause of the lessening of population which is continually growing more worthy of consideration.

16. Let there be formed, then, an Oriental company, and let the nobles of the kingdom contribute its funds; the profits [on these] will awaken in them a liking for commerce, and they will become acquainted with this most useful branch of knowledge. They will maintain their [business] relations, they will have some occupation, and will not use up their fortunes with vicious habits; their children will be brought up with a liking for commerce, and the fathers will have the satisfaction of employing some of their sons in appointments under the same company. This is the most certain means for securing the happiness of families and the prosperity of the entire monarchy; for, if commerce and the naval service (which follows the other closely) are promoted, there will be no vagabonds or idlers. Rather, idleness will come to an end, and with it many vices, on account of the enormous number of men whom a company with large capital needs to employ by land and sea—not only for its business positions, but for manufactures and navigation, in which persons from all spheres of life find an opening.

17. What a number of people must be employed by the English and Dutch companies in the more than one hundred and fifty ships which each company maintains for its commerce, and in the various colonies in which they have established that commerce! And what advantages result to these two powers from keeping so many people busy, maintaining [295]them at the company’s expense, and freeing them from the idleness in which they would [otherwise] live! If those countries had not so great a commerce, vagabonds and idlers would abound in them; but this class of people is not seen there. On the contrary, there is great application to all the arts and sciences; for all have employment, and all are useful—some in manufactures, others in the military or the naval service, and others in commerce, etc.

18. The attainment of these fortunate advantages depends on whether our beloved king and sovereign will assure to his vassals all his royal protection for the promotion of the said company, following the example of his glorious father, Don Phelipe Fifth, ever to be remembered; for the money of the royal treasury is the main foundation for this great and most useful enterprise. For it cannot be doubted that, animated by the same spirit, there will be many contributors to the capital of the said company—all the nobility of España, from the highest rank down; the guilds of Madrid, which now form a body of considerable importance; all the merchants of España, the two Americas, and these islands; some foreigners; and many religious communities, who have set aside the proceeds of their funds for pious contributions—convinced of the benefits of this commerce, and of the prosperity which will ensue to the Spanish nation; and regarding it as certain that (as will be mentioned hereafter) our Spanish merchants, if assured of their gains by way of these seas, and the method of supplying the Americas, in great part, with the materials for clothing which they need, without the burden of the royal imposts, will not long for the illegal purchase of foreign commodities. [296]

19. There are also other advantages, worthy of being known, which render the above-mentioned project more feasible. One of these is the abundance of timber for the construction of ships; at least ten ships can be built every year in these islands; and, by taking care of their many forests, even if a hundred ships were built now there would be enough timber left to construct every year the ten that I have mentioned. The Viscount del Puerto greatly praises (in book 9, chapter 10, article 2 of his Reflecciones militares37) the project of a friend of his (whose name he conceals) for forming a company in these islands; and among the products which it yields he mentions the timber called tiga (it is not known here by this name), extolling its strength, and setting forth the advantages of carrying this wood to España as ballast for the ships.

20. This wood (of which, according to the said author, the strong ships of Philipinas are built) is in my opinion the teca [i.e., teak], which comes from the Coast; or that which is known here (and I am inclined to think that this is meant) by the name of molave. This abounds in all the islands, and is so compact that it petrifies in the water, which I myself have seen; of it are made the ribs of the ship’s frame, the knees, and all the principal timbers that strengthen the ship. The keels are made of another wood, equally strong, which is called guijo; it never rots in the water, nor does the boring worm, which is bred on the ships in the port of Cavite, penetrate it. [297]There are other woods as useful as the guijo, and among them is the dongon, which is better. As a rule, the lower masts are made from the mangachapui, which is another timber of especial value; for, although it is somewhat heavy, it never splinters, and is very elastic. The yards and topmasts are of palo maria; and for whatever is made of boards the lavan, the banaba, and the tangili38 are also used, from which kinds of wood very long and broad planks are obtained. There are pines here, and various other kinds of trees, which can be put to the same use; and plantations could be made of the teca tree (the wood of which lasts more than a hundred years in the water), for there is more than enough land for this purpose in the vicinity of Manila and Cavite. Likewise, sawmills could be built, in order to save the expense of [hiring] sawyers; also dry-docks, for careening the ships and preserving them under cover.

21. In Ilocos are manufactured the blankets which serve as sails for our ships; and canvas can be made (as it has been) of excellent quality and in enormous quantities, for there is no end to the cotton [298]which is and can be gathered, with the greatest facility, and of the finest quality. Moreover, on the many tracts of land which the sloth of the Indians leaves untilled hemp could be cultivated—which, even if it should not yield well on the lands of one province, would without doubt succeed on those of another; for there is nothing among all the products of the earth which is not afforded by these islands, by searching for the climate—whether hot, cool, or temperate—which is suited to the needs of the crop. Flax would be produced with the same ease as hemp, without any other cultivation than that which rice receives on irrigated soil [en tubigan]; and the seed of both these plants has been sown, and is yielding very well, in the province of Cagayan.

22. There is much pitch, and cordage is so abundant that it can be supplied to all the ships of España, with what is made here; and, in order that it may be evident whether it is suited for this purpose, I will explain in detail how on this may depend the question of saving the expense of purchasing cordage in foreign kingdoms, by availing ourselves of that produced in our own dominions. [The fiber used for] cordage is both white and black; the former is known by the name of abaca, which is obtained from the bark of a tree resembling the plantain, the trunk of which is heckled like [the stems of] hemp. The fiber is very harsh; tar scorches it, and for this reason no tar is used in these ships; it is stronger than hemp, as experience has shown. It is usually of service no longer than for one voyage; the threads shrink much, and on this account all the cordage here is heavier than that of Europa. On twisting it, it is apt to break, and in order to avoid this it is cured by placing [299]it for some time in salt water, and drying it in the sunshine, then storing it until it is needed; for if this precaution be not taken, and it becomes spattered or moistened with fresh water, it will soon become rotten. With some additional expense the cordage could be made finer and smaller, without changing its quality; it would then be more easily handled, and the manœuvers of the ships would be more expeditious.

23. The [fiber for] black cordage (known as cabo negro)39 is obtained from a plant which they call gamù, very similar to the coco, and it is a veil which covers the entire tree, from the top down; it grows out between each pair of leaves [entre òja y òja] of the gamù, like long hair, or tufts of hair. It is exceedingly harsh, and for this reason it is used only for cables, of all sizes, and to some extent for tackle and rigging; and there is nothing with which to compare its strength. It lasts many years, but it is necessary to keep it either under water, or uncovered, where the dew and the rains bathe it; and in dry weather water is thrown over it, either salt or fresh, for its better preservation; for if it stands in the sun and wind, without these precautions, the threads break, and it loses its extraordinary strength. It is also preserved by keeping it in a shady place, where the wind strikes it but little. These two kinds of cordage are exceedingly abundant in these islands.

24. There is another sort of cordage, [made] from the husks of the coco, which is superior to the other two; for with the said fiber the ships can be [300]calked, and [even] after many years the bonote (thus they call it) comes out as fresh, strong, and sound as on the day when it was thrust between the planks. Of this species also there is a great abundance.

25. The anchors can be cast here, by putting into operation the iron mines of which mention has been made; and I can say the same of the cannons, the balls, the grape-shot, the bombs, and the grenades. For, I repeat, there is iron in these islands for supplying all the world, and there are men enough to mine and manufacture it, if there be brought from España some skilled directors (who are not found here). If it be desired to work the copper, there are mines of this also, although I cannot speak with the same certainty of these as of the iron mines; for I have not come across any records to show whether the said metal has been worked at any time, and what the product was. The same thing is true in regard to the lead mines, but I have seen ores from Paracale, which were smelted at Bacolor, by order of Don Simon de Anda; and I do not doubt that, if we had skilled master-workmen in this and other industries, many useful discoveries would be made through the agency of the aforesaid company, whose funds would allow the expenses that a private person is unable to incur.

26. To this concourse of advantages ought to be added the most important one that our Indians are exceedingly ingenious in the construction of ships. They do not understand arithmetic, or proportions and measures, or the computation of the weights of the various parts, or anything which requires knowledge; but if they have masters who will furnish to them models of the works, they imitate everything [301]with the greatest accuracy, for they have exceedingly keen eyesight, and indescribable facility in making whatever they see. For this reason we have here excellent carpenters, calkers, and the other artisans necessary for the construction of ships, and in whatever number may be desired.

27. There is not an Indian in these islands who has not a remarkable inclination for the sea; nor is there at present in all the world a people more agile in manœuvers on shipboard, or who learn so quickly nautical terms and whatever a good mariner ought to know. Their disposition is most humble in the presence of a Spaniard, and they show him great respect; but they can teach many of the Spanish mariners who sail in these seas. In the ships of España there are sure to be some Indians from these islands, and investigation can be made to ascertain what they are. The little that I understand about them makes me think that these are a people most suited for the sea; and that, if the ships are manned with crews one-third Spaniards and the other two-thirds Indians, the best mariners of these islands can be obtained, and many of them be employed in our warships. There is hardly an Indian who has sailed the seas who does not understand the mariner’s compass, and therefore on this [Acapulco] trade-route there are some very skilful and dexterous helmsmen. Their disposition is cowardly, but, when placed on a ship, from which they cannot escape, they fight with spirit and courage.

28. Let it be considered, then, whether these circumstances are worthy of regard, and highly advantageous for the company of which I am speaking—which likewise can save much money in the difference [302]of wages; and any one will reason that not one of the foreign companies has had the opportunities which these islands possess for the establishment of a company, since all these things which are easy and of little expense for the Spaniards were almost insuperable difficulties for the Dutch, the English, and the French—who succeeded in overcoming them by dint of silver, of conquests, and of fortifications; and by bringing from Europa supplies which we do not have to bring, because they abound in these islands.

29. In order not to be prolix in relating other advantages which the companies in general possess, as compared with the commerce of private persons, I refer to those which are set forth by the distinguished Don Miguel Zavala (in his celebrated memorial40 to Phelipe V of blessed memory), whose authority alone would be sufficient in order that no means should be neglected for establishing the aforesaid company in these islands; and I pass to other advantages which the said author explains. But first I will point out what relates to the fortunes in the Indias, which do not pass to the grandsons; this is accounted for by the vicious way in which the creoles, as a rule, are reared—the indolence and vices in which they are brought up, and the luxury and prodigality to which they are accustomed from childhood. If these fortunes, or the greater part of them, were [invested] in the company, they would not be so easily wasted; and, even if the sons should save nothing [303]from the profits, they would keep the principal which their fathers might bequeath to them in the aforesaid company. Or, in case there were some persons so reckless as to sell their shares, others would buy these, and the commerce and its gains would always remain for the benefit of the Spaniards.

30. With the funds of a company, enterprises could be undertaken that would be both extensive and easy. The province of Pampanga alone is capable of producing more sugar than can be consumed in China (to which the Sangleys carry it when it is cheap), in the coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and Vengala (where it is scarce, and is sold at a high price), and in all the ports of India; having a market, all that is required of this product will be supplied in abundance, especially if the said company encourages the Indians to cultivate their lands. It would be the same with the dyes; and with deer’s hides, sinews, and tapa (or dried meat) which all come from the same province, and are sold to the Chinese who come here to trade. By establishing a mart in the capital [of Pampanga], on the company’s account, it will gather in all the said products, in exchange for cloth, especially if credit be given to some persons until the time of the harvest; and the gains will be enormous, since profits will be made on the sale of the cloth, on the purchase of the products, and on the export of these to other colonies.

31. The same method ought to be observed in the other provinces for promoting the cultivation of the lands and the abundance of so highly valuable products as they yield; by this means there would be obtained in Pangasinan all the gold which the infidels bring down from the mountains there, which [304]exceeds three hundred thousand pesos each year, and with that which is brought from other provinces reaches five hundred thousand pesos. This commodity is very useful in all the commerce of India, and can also be carried to Europa, as is done by the English and Dutch, to whom regularly comes the gold from Philipinas; its current price is at the rate of sixteen pesos for the tae of 22-carat metal (each tae has the weight of ten reals), and in this ratio is purchased that of 21, 20, 19, and 18 carats.

32. In the provinces of Ilocos and Cagayan there might be excellent factories, to work up the great amount of fine cotton which they produce; and, by bringing skilled workmen from the Coast, the figured cottons which are brought thence could be made [here]. In all the Visayan Islands, in the province of Camarines, and in that of Albay, are made the choicest and finest webs, which they call nipis; and others, of commoner quality, which they call guinaras, and use for shirts. In Cagayan and Ilocos are woven very fine handkerchiefs, towels, coverlets, table-linen (which is of as good quality as that made in Flandes), terlingas, etc.; and if only these provinces are stimulated, and factories established with good master-workmen, the company can easily manufacture at least all the cloth which the Indians consume. As these number a million of souls, if we allow to each one an average consumption of no more than one peso, this would amount to a million of pesos; and the greater part of this amount, which now the Chinese, the Dutch, and the English carry away, would remain in the islands, and would increase the profits of the Spaniards and the losses of the said foreigners. [305]

33. The cacao is very abundant and cheap, and if it could find a market in other colonies and kingdoms the crop of it would be still greater, because the Indians would devote themselves to its cultivation.41 Entire groves of the coffee-tree could be planted, since it yields fruit everywhere; it is milder than that of Mage [i.e., Mocha?] and its fruit is gathered in the year when it is [first] planted, on account of the richness of the soil. Rice and wheat, if the natives applied themselves [to cultivating these], as they would do if they had a market for them, would be sold at good prices throughout China (where these grains are scarce), in Cochinchina, in Siam, in Camboja, in Pegu, and sometimes in the Malabar and Coromandel coasts. Wax—of which these mountains are full, and which is sold by the infidel Indians who inhabit them—has a great consumption here, and much of it is shipped to Nueva España; and if it were bartered for cloth, as was said above, it could be procured in greater quantity. Tobacco, oil, and sulphur are very abundant. Horses are valued in the said coasts, and, although there are many of them in these islands, there would be more if the ranchmen had a better sale for them; for at times they are accustomed to kill the horses, in order to dry their flesh and sell it. Carabaos and deer, whose flesh is likewise [306]dried, yield some pesos. In fine, the following are recognized articles of merchandise in different places in China, Cochinchina, Camboja, and Siam: sugar, rice, cotton; indigo, dyes, sibucao (a sort of Brasil-wood), deer’s sinews, pepper, black tortoise-shell (called carey), nacre shells (or mother-of-pearl),42 birds’-nests, ebony; tapa (or dried meat), balate and camaron (both which are shellfish), and bonga; cables of cabo negro—all of which commodities these islands produce. [To these must be added] cochineal from Nueva España, fine cloths and camlets from España; lead (which also is produced by these islands, although it is not mined), and other articles, as stated above, of which better information will be given by practical merchants.

34. For Vengala, the Coromandel and Malabar coasts, Persia, Zurrate, and other parts of India, are found useful indigo, sugar, sibucao, sulphur, siguey, birds’-nests, cotton, rice, gold, and horses; and, in one word, all that has been said in the preceding chapter (speaking of the private commerce which could be carried on via the Cape of Good Hope) ought to be understood, with greater reason, of the commerce which can be carried on by the company of which this chapter treats. For this reason I omit what I said there of the cinnamon and other products which the company could develop, with its funds and systematic arrangements, better than an individual could; for the latter may die, and the former continues perpetually to carry on the enterprises of manufactures, mining operations, the cultivation and [307]promotion of crops, and the exportation of all these to foreign kingdoms and colonies. For all will be successful in these islands with the Indians, who, if well paid, will do what they are ordered to.43

35. I have already mentioned the indescribable readiness with which our Indians learn perfectly whatever they see, even without the necessity of a master to instruct them. There are some who write well, without knowing how to read, as they have had no teacher; for by their natural inclination they devote themselves to imitation of the letters, and easily succeed in doing so, without being able to read what they write. This is one proof of their readiness, above mentioned, but they have still more of it in embroidery. It is a marvelous thing to see, that there is hardly an Indian who cannot embroider, and that they learn this art without any teacher save their own attention and their extraordinary patience. The hands of the Indian women are the most delicate, for every kind of sewing and needlework; and the company, by availing itself of this skill of our Indian men and women, could employ an innumerable number of people in embroidery, needlework, and the making of hose—they make them of fine quality, in Zebu of cotton, and in La Laguna of silk—and obtain much profit through these industries, in finding a market for them.

36. Near Paracali in the province of Camarines there is abundance of rock crystal, very transparent and choice. In the province of Cagayan are some stones that are very singular and rare; one of these [308]is emerald-green veined with gold or golden-brown, and when well polished it looks like a mirror, or like the finest jasper. Another is a stone as white as marble, similar to that which abounds in the mountains of San Matheo near Manila (from which has been made the paved floor of the Society’s church in this city); and who knows what Nature is keeping concealed, for our enlightenment, in the provinces and mountains of these islands? Assiduity, good taste, and the desire for knowledge would discover many things if there were Spaniards here who would devote themselves to the investigation and examination of the many rarities in the plan of Nature.

37. If there were any chemist and herbalist here, this likewise would be an immense aid for making further discoveries and experimenting with many trees, roots, herbs, and medicinal stones. For instance, the narra;44 in cups made from the wood of this tree water becomes, in a very short time, of a most beautiful blue color, and people say that it is useful for curing obstructions; the wood called manunga, which is extolled for its remarkable virtues; the seeds of the catbalonga, or St. Ignatius’s kernels, which are already known and esteemed in [309]Europa; the shell in which the cocoanut grows, in which water soon becomes exceedingly bitter; bezoar stones; and innumerable other articles from which homely remedies are made here, among the Spaniards as well as among the Indians. The latter make much use of the remedies produced in the islands, and know some, both herbs and woods, which cure the most hideous and bloody wound in twenty-four hours. The rhubarb45 may be smelled [sehuele] in many woodlands, and no one is acquainted with it; the herb of Calamba is especially good for preventing, by [the application of] its juice, the bad results of a blow or fall. More than all, in the mountains of Mindoro there is a tree called calinga, the bark of which has a delicious odor, which smells like cinnamon, cloves, and pepper all combined; I made a small quantity of chocolate, using the said bark powdered instead of cinnamon, and it was very pleasing to the taste. In the ship “Santissima Trinidad,” which the English captured, I was sending to Madrid some lozenges and many pieces of the said bark, which is a delicious flavor for seasoning ragouts; and I have used it in my household. Señor Anda also sent to Madrid the aforesaid bark, and, I think, chocolate made with it powdered. So great is the abundance of these trees that there are mountains, many leguas in extent, which produce them.

38. If the foreigners had these trees, they would have already introduced in the world the use of this [310]commodity, with enormous profits; and we, if we possessed industry, and zeal for the interests of the nation, would have been able with this tree, to lessen the consumption of the cinnamon and cloves of the Dutch. Let these points be considered, and the advantages will be recognized which can assuredly be expected by the company which may be formed in these islands—regarding it as certain that nothing will make progress, except by this means; rather, this colony will in a little while go wretchedly to destruction, without the least hope for its reëstablishment.

39. By way of conclusion to this chapter, I will note as the last (and an important) advantage of the aforesaid company the conspicuously fair treatment and friendly reception which the Spaniards have experienced, and may expect, throughout India. Our silver [money] is in good repute in all regions, and those peoples, especially the Chinese and the princes of India, show the greatest eagerness and make great efforts to obtain it, as being the most valuable for them; and, although the Dutch, English, French and other powers trade in this part of the world with our pesos, the Spanish ships are always better received in those ports, because they carry more silver and more products of these islands, which are held in very evident esteem.

40. Since I have been in Manila, I have seen only the traders from Canton and Emui in China visit this port,46 except the ship “Guadalupe,” which [311]went to the [Malabar?] Coast; and through its captain and officers I have heard of the friendly reception which they met in all the ports of India. But in other days the commerce of this colony was more extensive. In China it was established in the year 1598, and has been maintained without interruption; the king of Camboja asked this government for aid, and it was sent to him in the year 1594, leaving commerce with that country established. In the same year the king of Siam sent an embassy to open commerce with these islands, and in 1599 the said commerce was actually begun, by vessels which went from these islands, and which came from Siam, with which country the Spaniards have maintained the most friendly relations. This was recently experienced in the case of the ship which was built there in [312]the year 53, by order of our governor the Marques de Ovando, who sent thither letters for the said king of Siam; and the latter, in virtue of these, furnished a sufficient sum of money, and gave all the other assistance which they asked from him. In the year 718, the same king of Siam granted a piece of land, in order that the Spaniards might establish a trading-post there.

41. In the year 1596, commerce with these islands was established in Cochinchina, and the Spaniards declined to establish a trading-post [on the land] which this king afterward bestowed upon them. In Tunquin also the Spaniards undertook their commerce; and in Zurrate, Vengala, and other kingdoms of India, both Moorish and heathen, they have been equally well received. Although, on account of the reverses of this commonwealth and the lack of courage in its merchants, the Spaniards have given up this commerce for several years past, it cannot be doubted that the aforesaid company has the opportunity to establish itself advantageously, furnishing a market for the products of these islands, bringing hither those of the said kingdoms, and establishing (if that shall be expedient) some trading-posts—with which their purchases will be at more reasonable prices, and their gains in España and Nueva España more assured.

42. Here at the same time another advantage presents itself. The commerce which now is carried on with Acapulco by private persons suffers many losses, occasioned by the unsuccessful fairs there. These losses originate in the necessity of selling the goods in order to send back [to Manila] the money that they produce; for even if the merchants lose in the sale something on the principal which they shipped, [313]it is necessary to sell their goods in order to repay what they obtained from the obras pias for their investments. If the goods are left in Nueva España, in order to take advantage of an opportunity for better sale, they cannot meet the cost of the expenses, and here find themselves tormented by their creditors. The company cannot be placed in such straits, but will always sell their wares to advantage and profit; for when in Acapulco they do not obtain good returns on the merchandise, they can transfer it to the storehouse which they will have to establish in Mexico. This expedient alone will be sufficient to induce the Mexicans to make strenuous endeavors to be preferred in the sale at the said port, because they will not deceive the said company as they now do private persons, acting aggressively against them, in order to fix arbitrarily the prices of their goods—constrained as our merchants are to sell them, on account of the limitation of the time [of the fair], since the galleons ought to sail from the said port by the twenty-fifth of March.

43. I will conclude this chapter with the authority of the celebrated Don Geronimo Ustariz,47 who, although he disapproves the commerce [managed] by companies in España and the Americas, considers it expedient in these islands; and indeed, when his arguments against the establishment of the said companies are examined, it will be seen that they do not apply to this commerce—where, on the contrary, it will be seen that not even the least progress can be [314]secured, unless the company of which I am speaking be formed.

44. The same author, speaking of the commerce in spices, is inclined to think that it ought to be carried on directly by the Spaniards, by the same route which other nations adopt for it, arranging the purchases in these islands in order to supply the Americas and all España by the ports of Acapulco, Panama, and Portovelo. This exhibits the utility of what I have herein set forth, for it is confirmed by the three most earnest and distinguished Spaniards of this century, to wit, the Visconde del Puerto, Don Miguel de Zabala, and Don Geronimo Ustariz. But I am surprised that this last-named writer, who treats the subject of commerce so extensively and so acutely, with the greatest erudition and knowledge of whatever there is to be known of foreign nations and countries, should be ignorant that these islands produce in abundance cinnamon, pepper, and nutmeg, which, without the necessity of buying it from the Dutch, we can use for our benefit, in order to supply all our own dominions. This is a proof that the Spaniards of Philipinas do not apply themselves to becoming acquainted with this country, in order to make known its products; and that they would not be [thus] ignorant if the alcaldes-mayor would make reports—one to their successors, and another to the government—of the condition of each province, as I advised his Majesty in the past year of 1760.

1–3. [Viana makes remonstrance against “the limitations and restrictions with which the commerce [315]of the Spaniards is established.” These only enable foreigners to compete with them to greater advantage, and increase the gains of foreign traders. He adduces the examples of other nations in support of his position that commerce ought to be extended and freed from restrictions, as far as possible; and complains that Spaniards only are forbidden to trade with each other, in the colonies of that monarchy. (Section 3.) “The argument for this is apparently founded on the exportation of silver, and on the opposition made by the merchants of Cadiz, who are misled by foreigners, and that of the officials at Acapulco, who find their advantage in the said limitation. Those merchants are always inveighing against the injuries that result to their trade, and the check to our [Spanish] manufactures, with which arguments they have always tried to bring about the ruin of this [Philippine] commerce; but I will see if I cannot overthrow these arguments.”]

4. All the silver that is coined in the dominions of España comes to a halt in foreign kingdoms, among our greatest enemies. The treasures of the Indias pass through the aqueduct of Cadiz, without leaving even a trace on the conduits of the Spanish merchants, as can be demonstrated by [comparing] the riches that the Indias have produced, and the poverty of the Spaniards. Upon this point I refer to what Don Miguel de Zavala says in his memorial; and that which the celebrated Macanaz has written on the same subject ought to be printed on plates of gold, or, better, in the hearts of our sovereigns and their ministers of state, in order to cure the wounds of their vassals with the remedies which he proposes. For if all the silver is carried away from the dominions [316]of España, what more will she have, whether it go by way of Acapulco or by way of Cadiz? I assert that in Cadiz the commerce of the foreigners is greater than that of the Spaniards: the latter (with the exception of some strong business houses, which have been built up in this century) support themselves by being figureheads48 for the former, who cannot possess the commerce in their own behalf or in their own persons. This is disclosed by the “Universal dictionary of commerce,” in praising the good Catholic Spaniards in this illicit mode of carrying on business—which is the same as regarding them as being, even if not traitors, at least disobedient to their king. Here is seen the interested motive for [the claim] that the silver should not be exported by way of Acapulco, but that all should go to Cadiz, into the power of the foreigners—who are the ones who, in reality and with hidden hand, have always made opposition to this commerce of Manila.

5. Those who carry away the silver from Acapulco are all Spaniards, and the greater part of it accumulates in the empire of China, which has not waged war against us, nor will she do so, with the gains that we allow her; but those who carry away the silver which reaches Cadiz are the foreigners, and it is going to remain with the powers who are harassing and ruining us with our own wealth. Let these points of difference be compared, and decide whether it is not a weak argument, that of the export [of silver from Nueva España], against which so [317]much clamor has been made by the commerce of Cadiz—or, to speak more correctly, the convenience of the foreigners—and I believe that it will be outweighed, not only by the loss of the royal duties which are yielded to the royal treasury by the silver which goes to Cadiz, but by the injury that is caused to us by the profits which we furnish to the foreigners. Moreover, the silver carried away from Acapulco can yield the same [amount in] duties, in order to avoid the aforesaid loss, if it be considered of much importance—which it is not; for even if two millions of pesos were carried away each year, and the royal treasury deprived of the duties thereon (for which privation there is no necessity), that is not a sum which merits the great opposition, if not bitter hatred, of the commerce of Cadiz for this poor commerce [of Manila].

6. The other argument, that of the retardment which our manufactures of España would suffer [in competition] with those of China, is as easily overthrown. It is certain that our factories cannot furnish all the goods which are consumed in our dominions, and that on this account the silks, fabrics, hose, ribbons, etc., of other powers are allowed entrance therein; and what more need is there, in the case of these wares than of those of China, for declaiming against the injury which the latter, but not the former, occasion? There is no further difference except that the Spaniards trade with one class of the goods, and the foreigners with the other. Against the foreigners there is no one to raise objections, as some of them do against our own people; and as in these clamors there is no mention of the name of Englishmen, Frenchmen, Dutch, Swedes, Danes, [318]Irishmen, etc., but [only] of the commerce of Cadiz and of its Spanish traders, the motive for this opposition is better hidden, the injury which they exaggerate is more readily believed, the minds of people are preoccupied with impressions of this sort; and the commerce of Manila, which has neither capital nor fame nor authority, and not so much influence as that of Cadiz, is the one which always suffers, which is permitted [only] with restrictions, and which cannot repair the damages experienced by the merchants of Cadiz without knowing them.

7. Before this, I had already mentioned the great amount of silk, both raw and woven, which foreigners bring from China, and that with this they supply their own manufactures, and [likewise] obtain money from us by selling in España the fabrics from Canton as if they came from Paris, Londres, Amsterdam, etc. Is this, or is it not, detrimental to our manufactures? and, if it is, why is not an outcry made against it by the merchants of Cadiz? They will say that it is impossible to prohibit this commerce, while our own manufactures are in so backward a condition; but why will this argument not avail the Spanish merchants of Manila? They will say also that the foreigners introduce into España not fabrics from China, but those of their own manufacture; that, whether it be from one country or from another, the injury to our manufactures is the same. But what cannot be denied is, that the foreigners who obtain so great an amount of silk from China trade it in our dominions, and that we cannot do the same in order to deprive them of those enormous gains. If, then, the company of Spaniards were formed in these islands, they could convey from [319]China a great deal of raw silk for our factories, and many special fabrics which would be of as good quality as those of Europa; they could furnish them more cheaply than the foreigners do; and, above all, the profits would remain among the Spaniards. Our commerce would steadily flourish; we would have more ships, to make our dominions safe; the marine service would be increased; and necessarily there would be diminution in the commerce of the foreigners, for which our deluded Spaniards are pleading.

8. The royal duties will be the same, if the silk and fabrics of China are carried by our ships of the company, as if they were carried by the foreigners; and even if the kindness of our sovereign makes some reduction [in the duties], in order to favor the said company and subvert those that are hostile to it, other advantages, of greater importance than the aforesaid duties, will result to the crown, in the certain knowledge that, in the present state of things, that is prohibited to the Spaniards which is allowed to foreigners—that is, the introduction of goods from China which are difficult to recognize in España, on account of the facility with which European fabrics are imitated in Canton.

9. By allowing to the aforesaid company the importation of Chinese goods into España, while the prohibition to foreigners remains in force, the trading-fleets and galleons will be supplied; and these commodities will be purchased less from foreigners, in order that our own manufactures and commerce may gain some growth.

10. All the silk which our company will put on the market will diminish the amount sold by the foreigners; [320]and if they have not a market for this commodity they will take on smaller cargoes of it in China, Cochinchina, Canton, Tonquin, Tripara, Bengala, and Achem, and the said company will find it easier to purchase the silk. Before the nations of Europe carried away the silk from Canton, it could be bought at very low prices; but since they began to carry on this commerce—which was in the year 1685, in which the emperor of China opened his ports to all nations—up to the present time, the prices have risen more than three hundred per cent, as some merchants of this city have informed me.

11. In the six years that I have spent in Manila, the [price of] silk has risen every time; and because so much was being sent out of the country [of China], the emperor forbade, under the most rigorous penalties, the exportation of this product—of which an enormous amount is consumed in his empire, where it was already becoming scarce in the year 759—that it might be used by his vassals, whom he regards with the most extraordinary affection.

12. Finally, when the merchants of Cadiz become shareholders in the said company there will be no more talk of the export of silver by way of Acapulco, or of the injury to our manufactures from the fabrics of China; or the only ones who will cry out against it will be the foreigners connected with the said commerce [of Cadiz], when their names are made known, for they will not [then] have Spaniards to talk, as the saying is, “through a goose’s mouth.” If it shall be considered expedient (as it seems to me it is) that the aforesaid company may ship freely, and without any restriction, such wares as it shall think best to the kingdom of Nueva España, the [321]royal duties can be so adjusted that the royal treasury will not suffer a great loss, under the certainty that the goods of the said commercial company will all be duly registered, as also the silver which they bring in return; for its directors will possess no authority for anything except what is according to the rules in the like method of commerce. This legality in the declarations [of goods shipped] will result in great benefit to the aforesaid royal duties, even though these be more moderate than the duties which are exacted from private persons whose greed for gain urges them to convey, and to bring [here], many contraband articles.

13. For greater security on this point, it could be so regulated that there would not be the slightest uncertainty, by causing the agents or directors whom it will be necessary to have in this city, to write out the invoices of what they ship, according to the entries in their cash-books, and the same with the silver and the goods that are brought back in return—information of all this being sent from here to the officials at Acapulco, and reciprocally from that port to the officials at this capital, in order that on each side any possible infraction of the law may be known, and those engaged in the commerce be restrained from committing such. This exhibition of invoices and the returns in silver can be compared with the statements which the directors of the company will furnish, in order to ascertain whether the former agree with those which will be contained in the said statements. I take for granted that in the presentation, examination, and approval of these accounts there will be the supervision of some person appointed for that purpose by our sovereign—whose [322]royal and benevolent disposition will, it is to be believed, place some capital in the company that I have mentioned, as a foundation for this great work; and in this case it is hardly possible that the least crevice will be found by which the royal duties might suffer loss.

14. The nobility of España, from the highest rank down; the guilds of Madrid, who now form a commercial body of much importance; all the merchants of España, the kingdom of Mexico, Peru, and these islands; some foreigners; and many religious communities which have set aside the produce of their funds for pious purposes—all these will, without doubt, become shareholders in the aforesaid company, if they are convinced of the benefit of this commerce, and of the prosperity which will ensue to the Spanish nation; and when the said merchants have their gains by means of these seas assured, and a means of supplying the kingdom of Mexico with a great part of the goods which its people need, without the burden of the royal duties, it is certain that they will not desire to purchase foreign goods, except at such advantage as will prove detrimental to the foreigners.

15. It is also evident that the aforesaid company will be able to furnish its commodities at lower prices than the foreign companies do; for it does not have to incur so many expenses in maintaining troops, fortresses, etc., as do the Dutch, English, and French; nor will the costs of the navigation be so great, because the voyage is shorter. Moreover, the purchases will be [made] in China, at the same prices as those of the said foreigners; and consequently, the company transporting its merchandise [323]to España, and being able to furnish goods at more reasonable prices than the foreigners do, for these reasons the profits will be greater and the losses of the foreigners more certain. By carrying the goods from these islands to Nueva España, the company will hinder the illicit commerce of the said foreigners, who in sailing from India to Europa, and from Europa to their colonies in America, must incur more expense than the said Spaniards, and will not be able to furnish commodities at the same prices as the latter can.

16. The English who come to trade in China carry these goods to the ports of Inglaterra, pay there the duties on them, and afterward ship them to various regions—among these to Jamayca, from which island they carry on a very extensive illicit commerce with the Windward Islands; with Nueva España, through Honduras, and by way of the coasts of Campeche and Vera Cruz; and with Peru, through the colony of Sacramento, and various other places. The number of laden vessels which enter Jamaica every year exceeds five hundred; and by this can be estimated the value of the goods which are [thus] disposed of (for all of these are carried into our dominions), and the great amount of silver which they carry away from us, thus causing loss to the royal duties of his Majesty—which, in proportion to the said goods and the money which they produce, would be very large.

17. Sabary, whom I have cited, estimates at eight millions of pesos the illicit commerce which the English carry on, from Jamayca alone, with the Spaniards of America; and he states, to the discredit of our nation, that all the ministers and officials, [324]from the highest to the lowest, proceed by agreement to defraud the royal duties, and to become rich at the cost of what they seize from the royal revenues.

18. Probably no less is the amount of the fraudulent commerce carried on by the Dutch from Curazao; and much greater is that which is conducted by the two nations (and even by the French) in Puerto Rico, Cartagena, Buenos Ayres, Campeche, Honduras, Portovelo, Caracas, Guayaquil, and the Canarias Islands, and the other ports of the Windward Islands and the two Americas—as also is made known by the same author whom I have already cited, besides what we all know.

19. The new and very extensive territory which the aforesaid English now possess in North America, and on the Mexican Gulf as far as the Misisipi, renders this illicit commerce much easier for them by means of that coast, especially by way of the new Santender,49 which has a good harbor for vessels of moderate size, and many rivers; it is not far distant by land from Cretaro [i.e., Queretaro] and other rich cities of Nueva España, and by sea it is not far from Vera Cruz. With these great opportunities, the illicit commerce can be pushed to the utmost; for the ambition and covetousness of the trader despises no means which may bring him profit.

20. The commodities which the English illegally introduce [into our colonies] must necessarily be cheaper than those which go in our trading-fleets by way of Vera Cruz, for the latter pay many duties, [325]and the former none; and the very English who sell in Cadiz to the Spaniards, paying their duties, sell the same commodities in Nueva España at a lower price than in Cadiz. Therefore, if some efficacious remedy be not applied to these illicit importations, I think that our commerce will be ruined; that our trading-fleets will experience great losses; that the royal duties will be diminished; and that in Nueva España the illicit commerce will reach an even greater extent than in Perù. But it also seems to me that if the commerce from these islands to Acapulco is free to our company the aforesaid losses can be in great part averted, for the following reasons.

21. When the foreigners (and especially the English) obtain so much silk, both raw and woven, from China we must believe that they find this commerce profitable, and that the said commodity is very cheap in the said empire, compared with the prices of silks in Europa. The profit is more obvious in the woven goods, because the infinite number of people who inhabit China, and the abundance of workmen in every kind of occupation, cause their manufactures to be exceedingly cheap—as all of us who live in this part of the world know by experience, who every year send to Canton commissions for many articles, because they cost us less than to make the purchases in this city. For instance: The Chinese and the Spaniards carry silver from here to Canton, where it is worth three per cent more; and nevertheless a snuff-box, a salver, and other small articles of silver cost less there than when made here to order—which shows the great saving of [cost in the] manufacture which results from the great abundance of workmen, as I have said.

22. This advantage which the English have [326]through the commerce of Canton—to which port usually come every year thirteen or fourteen ships—can also be enjoyed by our company; and, buying at the same prices [as the English]; it can sell its goods at lower prices in Nueva España, even after paying the royal duties. For the English are obliged to make longer and more costly voyages, as is that from Canton to Inglaterra, and from there to España and Nueva España; while the Spaniards will sail from here to Acapulco. The former pay royal duties in Inglaterra, and the latter will pay these in Acapulco, saving the expenses of the second voyage which the English make, to their colonies in America. Finally, the Spaniards are not obliged to maintain, at so great expense as do the English, fortified posts and many troops, which are supported by their profits; for these reasons, the latter will not be able to sell their goods at the same price as that of the Spanish company. Consequently, they will not make illicit importations [into the Spanish colonies] of silks and [woolen] fabrics; and even those of their linen goads (which are most to be dreaded) can be diminished with [our importations of] the light linen goods of China [liencesillo] (which are used in Nueva España), with “elephants” and other goods from the coast, and, in due time, with the cotton cloths which will be woven in these islands. Here there is abundance of cotton, and of people for its cultivation and manufacture—especially if some masters in this art come from España, or, in case that fail, from the Coromandel or the Malabar coast; and if among the Indians be introduced the spinning-wheels which are already in use in the manufactures of España.

23. From all these arguments it will be possible [327]to conclude whether they are as well adapted to free commerce [of these islands] with the kingdom of Peru, and to that which the two Americas can mutually and reciprocally conduct between each other, in order that all the vassals may have a share in the extension of the commerce which hitherto has been prohibited to them; that the products of all the provinces may be increased, by the market which will be provided for them; that the Southern [i.e., Pacific] coasts of the said Americas may have an abundance of vessels; that they may mutually aid and defend each other from enemies; that by this means all our dominions remote from España may be more securely preserved; that our silver may have wide circulation among the Spaniards, who, occupied in this lawful traffic, will not expose their money to the risks of the illicit commerce; that the commerce of the foreigners may be diminished, without the least loss to the royal exchequer in the duties from them; and, in fine, that with the gains [from this commerce], and with the decreased exportation of silver to the foreign kingdoms of Europa, the prosperity of our monarchy may begin, and it may come to be the most worthy of respect in all the world, with the extension of its commerce—which is the sole and only means of attaining success; for no other means has been found more effectual, by either ancient or modern geniuses.

1. The difficulties and inconveniences which the celebrated Don Miguel de Zabala mentions, and the [328]manner in which he entirely removes them, ought to be borne in mind in this chapter (like all the rest that that great man wrote), in regard to the establishment of our commerce through companies, in order that by the said work, and by what I have set forth, even the dullest person may be convinced of the usefulness of the Spanish company in these islands. Notwithstanding that the principal difficulty, and the only one to be feared, is the efforts of the foreign powers, I will copy exactly the remarks of the said author, for perhaps not all those who see this document will have [opportunity to see] them; and I cannot dispel these fears with arguments more weighty, or persuasion more effective.

2–18. [Zabala admits the danger that other powers, angered at the loss of their gains through the success of a Spanish company, would endeavor to destroy it; but he regrets the timidity of the Spanish merchants, who allow themselves to remain at the mercy and dictation of foreigners. The Spaniards would readily take measures to end this, if entire secrecy were possible, but they fear failure if their intentions are known by the foreigners. They should remember that not only are the Spanish colonies in the Indias strictly forbidden to trade in any way with the other powers, but that the latter themselves had consented to these arrangements, which España had a right to make for her own colonies. Those powers will not seek by force the ruin of Spanish commerce, as that would be too costly an enterprise, but will endeavor to gain this end by craft and intrigue. If a Spanish commercial company were formed, its larger capital and more extensive business would enable it to withstand losses which would [329]ruin private persons. All of these considerations should relieve the fears which check the free and wide operation of Spanish commerce and thus keep it within the clutches of foreign traders. Zabala urges the formation of Spanish companies for commerce, on which must depend the security of gains therein and the prosperity of España.]

19. It is hardly possible that the nations of Europa will unite to hinder the company of these islands. The Dutch will not fail to appear with their pretended right of authority to prohibit to us the navigation by way of Cape Good Hope; but with the arguments which are presented in chapter 2, part ii [of this memorial], and those which our wise ministers of state can bring forward in favor of our well-known right in justice, the said Dutch will find themselves obliged to admit it, or they will fear the injury which we can inflict upon them by hindering their commerce in China, Japon, and other regions which are included in the arbitrary division and imaginary limit made by Pope Alexander Sixth.

20. On the other hand, likewise, the Dutch recognize and fear the superiority of the English, who are doing them much damage in India—as recently they experienced, in the past year of 760, in their establishments in Vengala, and even in those of the island of Ceylan, to judge by some shrewd suspicions that the English were encouraging the king of the said island in his revolt against the Dutch. If the Spaniards establish their company, the British forces will be further diverted, in case war should break out, by those of España and Francia; the Dutch will then consider themselves more secure, and will expect some aid in case they guide those nations to appropriate [330]some [English] establishments; for the aforesaid powers will not, for their own advantage, consent that the English attain further superiority by unjust means.

21. The French also have a like interest in the formation of the Spanish company, and they will promote it, in order to have its aid, which may be to them very important; for if they had had it in the late war they would not have lost all their establishments in India; nor would we have lost the fortified posts of Manila and Cavite, if we had had the said company.

22. The lack of a port on the coast of Africa as a landing-place for our ships is another of the difficulties which our navigation by way of Cape Good Hope may encounter; but our friendly relations with the court of Francia will open to us, without doubt, free entrance to the port of Mauritius. With a knowledge, too, of the ports on the said coast of Africa, we can establish ourselves where we think it best to, as the Dutch have done; or we can find some island, like that of Santa Elena,50 which the English occupy, or those of San Matheo and Acension, which serve the Portuguese for a way-station.

23. The last difficulty may be the greatest of all, and it consists in the probable opposition of the ministers and officials of his Majesty to the ministers and officials of the company. For I assume, in the pursuance of my plan, that there will be here ships of war, a suitable force for the safety of these towns, a governor and captain-general, a royal Audiencia, [331]royal officials, etc.; and that the company will have likewise its own ships, the construction of them, cloth manufactures in the provinces, the working of mines, the cultivation of cinnamon, and other enterprises, which without the aid of the government are difficult, but with it very easy. The aforesaid opposition to those of the company, and the unpleasant relations which follow (or are very probable) between the directors and the government, may be a very great impediment to all the said activities. But this, it seems to me, can be corrected by making suitable regulations, and his Majesty issuing very strict orders for their punctual observance, with heavy penalties against the transgressors; also by the company having so many protectors in the court as its shareholders, especially if the shares be taken by the highest nobility, as an example to the rest. These will be so many more public prosecutors, who will raise an outcry against those who, in whatever way, oppose the interests of the company; and who will demand punishment for him who deserves it, in order that this may serve as a warning to others—under the well-founded assumption that the growth of the aforesaid company can interest no one so much as it does our sovereign, in order that the crown and the nation may be maintained with dignity and splendor, and gain credit by our commerce, and by the riches which it will draw to us if that commerce be undertaken and continued with the ardor which is demanded by love for our country.

24. I do not dwell so much as I might on this last difficulty, because it seems to me that what I have said is alone sufficient for taking the necessary precautions. As little will I take time to enumerate [332]the advantages which would result to his Majesty from committing to the aforesaid company the government, management, and social order of these islands, with the obligation to maintain them with sufficient forces—for this purpose, [the crown] making over to it the tributes and the royal duties, and the company furnishing some amount to the royal revenues in acknowledgment of the [royal] authority, during the time while this sort of treaty or contract should last; on this subject, I could divulge something, if I did not realize the great difficulties therein.

25. Besides this, I consider that if his Majesty place these towns and islands under the plan that I have proposed, they can bring together their considerable military forces for the furtherance of the said company, and for such assistance as it may find necessary—so that the king may increase his royal revenues and the company save much expense, which will redound in material gains to its commerce, and to obvious damage to that of the foreigners.

26. By granting to the company the privilege of proposing [the names of] persons whom it considers trustworthy, to serve in the office of alcalde-mayor for the provinces where it will have its manufactures, cultivation of crops, or operation of mines, all possible advancement will be rendered easy, and the royal exchequer will preserve the royal revenues, by means of the said persons, for whom security will be given by the said company or its directors; and even the tributes of various provinces could be arranged, by agreement, with evident advantage and benefit to the royal exchequer.

27. Finally, all matters must be regulated on a [333]very substantial basis—questions of government, the cases in which preventive measures must be taken, the protection of the company, and the powers which must be granted to it, as will be unavoidable in order to obviate uncertainties and injurious dissensions, in regard to which suitable advices will be given on the proper occasion.

1–2. [Viana briefly restates some of the conclusions reached in foregoing chapters, and proceeds to consider the possibility of the route via the Cape of Good Hope proving impracticable, in which case he proposes as an alternative the route via Panama.]

3. God has placed an isthmus midway between the two Americas, with the port and bay of Panama on the coast of the Southern Sea, and that of Portovelo on the opposite coast; although the former is of use only for vessels of medium size, there is another, called Perico, which admits ships of the line, their lading being conveyed in small vessels to Panama, which is two leguas distant. The second, which is that of Portovelo, is one of the most beautiful and well-defended ports in America; there are disembarked the goods of the ships from España, and they are conveyed to Panama; and the gold and silver and some products of Peru, which arrive at the latter port at the time of the [Spanish] trading-fleets, are transported to that of Portovelo by land, and by the Chagre River, for the return of the ships to España.

4. The Spanish company, when established in [334]these islands, can have its storehouses and factors at the said ports; the ships which sail from here for Panama will leave there their cargoes, and bring back the goods which the ships of Cadiz will have carried to Portovelo; and these latter will in their turn do the same, leaving their cargoes at the said port, and, for their return voyage, taking aboard whatever might be sent to them from Panama.

5. This route would, without doubt, occasion greater expenses to the Spanish company than would the navigation via Cape Good Hope, but always many advantages to its commerce would result. If war should break out, the said route will be more secure from enemies, and our coasts will be better defended by the frequent visits of our ships to the said ports on the Southern coast; in that spacious sea they are not in danger of encountering enemies, as in the straits of Sunda, Malaca, and others of the Malayan Islands, through which it is necessary to pass in order to navigate through the seas of India and of the African coast, with risk from the nations of Europa who are established in both regions.

6. If the prosperity of the said company will be as great as the circumstances here set forth promise, we ought to expect that, in order to facilitate its commerce and save transportation, some part of its gains will be employed in the improvement of the Panama route—in making the Chagre River more navigable, and perhaps in seeking the easiest mode of joining the two seas, or in finding other means for conveying the goods by water from one port to the other.51 [335]

7. The idea of facilitating the commerce of España with these islands by the said route is not a new one, nor do I claim that it should be attributed to me; for it was brought forward in the year 1621, after the dangers of the navigation via Cape Horn [Cabo de Hornos] had been recognized, and it was realized what difficulties there were in conducting the commerce through those stormy seas. Information regarding it having been asked from the president and ministers of [the Audiencia of] Panama, “they brought forward so effectual arguments why it should not be permitted” (so Don Joseph de Veytia says, in his Norte de la contratacion) “that navigation by this route ceased.” [336]

8. Before undertaking any enterprise people’s minds are usually dismayed at the multitude of hindrances which present themselves to the imagination; but all these are overcome, as a rule, by assiduous application, for the success of the enterprises which always are as difficult in their first stages as they are easy and simple in the middle and end of their course. The subject of commerce has encountered in our España apparently insuperable difficulties, which have intimidated the leading ministers in its promotion; and, while it cannot be denied that our nation has devoted very little attention to that most useful study, the science of commerce, our people ought to distrust the reality of the disadvantages which have been exaggerated in other times, and investigate them in these happier days. Therein the same difficulties will not be found, or it will be possible to obviate the injury which may be feared, by effectual measures for the greater stability of the commerce, the security of our dominions, and the welfare of all the vassals.

9. In Francia there was so much distrust on the subject of commerce that, its promotion and extension being deemed impossible, every project of this kind was rejected. Cardinal Richelieu, in his political testament, regards the French as incapable of commerce, as I have said; and, before this famous minister, his predecessors discussed the matter in no other fashion. But the great Louis Fourteenth and his most zealous and able [minister], Monsieur Colvert, overcoming dangers, scorning inconveniences, and trampling on difficulties, resolutely undertook, with magnanimous souls, to render that easy which for so many centuries had been deemed difficult, and [337]finally they succeeded. Then why will it not be possible also to render the transaction of our commerce successful and easy by way of Panama, conquering the difficulties which will be alleged against it?

10. I am not ignorant of these hindrances; but I believe that, however strong they may be, they will not prevail over the welfare of the monarchy, and that the elevated and magnanimous royal soul of our beloved king and sovereign Don Carlos Third (whom may God preserve) and his zealous ministers will overcome the difficulties which have been hitherto considered insurmountable, and will hasten with suitable remedies to check the ruin of our dominions, which had its origin in the great amount of illicit commerce of the foreign nations. Perhaps they will form an entirely opposite idea from that of other times, regarding the conduct of our commerce by way of Panama, in order to provide from these islands the commodities which are needed for España and the Americas, to assure the royal duties, and to overthrow the foreigners—who, as I have said, will not be able to sell their merchandise at so moderate prices as the Spanish company can; and it will be the only effectual means of preventing the aforesaid illicit commerce.

11. I have set forth, sincerely and candidly, what my limited ability comprehends, and the knowledge that I have acquired of these islands; I have touched on these subjects as concisely as possible, in order not to render this document diffuse and too wearisome. I doubt not that in it will be found many defects, since the practical knowledge of commerce is remote from my profession; on these points, others who are more intelligent will be able to bring [338]forward their arguments. I will be content if all will be convinced of my love for the nation, of my desire for its greater prosperity, of my ardent zeal, and of my loyalty to my king and sovereign; these are the only motives which have constrained me to offer the reflections which I have here stated—availing myself, for this little work, of the small amount of leisure which the arduous occupations of my office leave free for me.

May God grant that the effects and results correspond to my good intentions; and for the sake of their best success, the preservation of these islands, the extension of Spanish commerce, and the happy advancement of the monarchy, may He render prosperous for many years the life of our beloved king and sovereign Don Carlos Third (whom may God preserve) Manila, February 10, 1765.

Francisco Leandro de Viana [339]