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Copyright, 1911,
By Walter Krueger.

The translation of this book was undertaken at the instance of Major John F. Morrison, General Staff, who desired to make use of it in the course in tactics in the Army Service Schools.

It is an epitome of the interpretation and application of tactical principles in the various armies, discussed in the light of the tactical views and methods prevailing in Germany, and amplified by numerous examples from military history.

The professional value of this book to all officers of our Regular Army and Militia who are endeavoring to gain a working knowledge of tactics, is so obvious that any comment would be superfluous.

Army Service Schools,
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas,
December, 1910.

The first volume of “Tactics,” which appeared in its first edition in 1896, and for which the preparatory work reached back more than a decade, now appears in its fourth edition in a completely changed form. The lessons gained in war and improvements in weapons have corrected many earlier views. While the Boer war confused the views on infantry combat and brought forth more lessons in a negative than in a positive form, the Russo-Japanese war has had a great educating influence, in that it corroborated the soundness of the lessons gained in the Franco-German war, but also in that it amplified those lessons commensurate with the improvements in weapons. The fundamental principles upon which success depends have remained the same.

For a long time I hesitated to comply with my publisher’s wishes for a new edition. It would not have been difficult to publish long ago a new edition, based upon the many lessons of war communicated to me by members of foreign armies soon after the Russo-Japanese war. But, after an extended period of theoretical work, I was more inclined to avail myself once more of the opportunity of gaining practical experience by service with troops. Pure theoretical reflection is only too apt to depart from the requirements of practice and to overlook the friction appearing everywhere. The battalion commander, more than any one else, is called upon to act as the tactical instructor of his officers and knows best where the shoe pinches. Moreover, the proximity of the maneuver ground to my present station gave me an opportunity of observing the[vi] field training of a large number of battalions and regiments of infantry and artillery, and to compare notes with brother officers of the other arms. In addition, several trips abroad and, incidental thereto, visits to battlefields, furnished valuable suggestions. I postponed issuing the new edition until the publication of the new Russian and Japanese Drill Regulations, which, with our own excellent regulations, best illustrate the lessons learned from the war in the Far East. For this fourth edition I was further able to draw upon the new French (1904), Italian (1905), Belgian (1906), U. S. (1904), British (1905), and Swiss (1908) Drill Regulations. This enumeration alone justifies the statement, “completely revised,” appearing on the title page.

I have earnestly endeavored to make use of foreign experiences in detail. The words of Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton of the British Army, to whose writings I owe a great deal, deserve special attention in studying the drill regulations of foreign armies: “It is a blessing that the greater and prouder an army, the more immovably it is steeped in conservatism, so that as a whole it is finally incapable of assimilating the lessons gained by other armies. Military attachés may discover the most important points in the training and employment of foreign armies and urgently recommend their imitation, but their comrades will pay no more attention to them than did Napoleon III. to Stoffel’s reports on the Prussian army before the outbreak of the Franco-German war.”

The treatment of the subject matter has remained the same throughout; it represents, as in the first edition, the principle that tactical lessons must be deduced from human nature, from the effect of weapons, and from experience in war, proper regard being had for national characteristics and historical transmission. Tactics is psychology. My statements in regard to fire effect are based, as before, upon the works of His Excellency, Lieutenant-General[vii] Rohne. The publications of Historical Section I of the Great General Staff and the splendid works of the late Major Kunz, furnish the basis for examples cited from military history. An almost too copious literature is already available on the Russo-Japanese war. The monographs (Einzelschriften) of the Great General Staff, and of Streffleur, especially “Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern,” published by the latter, afford a rich field for research.

It is not difficult to cite examples from military history in support of any tactical procedure, but such examples require a very careful sifting before they can be recommended as worthy models for our action in front of the enemy.

The Austrians deduced the necessity of the most brutal shock action from the experience gained by them in their combats in Upper Italy in 1859, and the British were not very far removed from completely denying the feasibility of making an attack soon after the Boer war; but the desire to avoid losses was forced into the background by the necessity of annihilating the enemy. In the Far East the Russians finally had to learn again the same bitter lessons as at Plevna.

Simultaneously with this fourth edition, there appears in Athens a translation in Modern Greek from the pen of Captain Strategos of the Greek General Staff, well known to many German officers from his War Academy days.

It is hoped that the fourth edition may receive the same kind reception at home and abroad that was given its three predecessors. For all communications, suggestions or corrections, directed either to me or to my publisher, I will be sincerely grateful.

The Author.

Posen, March, 1908.

g. = gram = 15,432 troy grains.
kg. = kilogram = 1000 g. = 2.2 lbs.
kgm. = a unit of work accomplished in raising a kilogram through a meter against the force of gravity.
m. = meter = 39.37 in.
km. = kilometer = 1000 m. or ⁵⁄₈ mile.
x = pace.

[1]

[2]

1. WAR.

Clausewitz, in his work On War, defines war as “a continuation of state policy by other means; an act of violence committed to force the opponent to comply with our will.” The civil code is incapable of furnishing full satisfaction to individuals in cases of outraged honor, and is obliged, under certain circumstances, to allow the injured party to obtain such satisfaction by immediate chastisement of the offender or by challenging him to a duel. In like manner there is no law which could afford nations complete satisfaction for affronts to their honor; and it is obvious that it would be as impossible to abolish war in the world, in the family of nations, as it would be to abolish dueling among the subjects of a state. The total abolition of dueling would produce the same results on the life of the individual that the cessation of wars would produce on the development of the national life of every state and on the intercourse of nations with one another. “Eternal peace,” wrote Moltke on December 11th, 1880, to Professor Bluntschli, “is a dream, and not even a beautiful one; for war is a part of God’s system in ruling the universe. In war, man develops the highest virtues; courage and unselfishness, devotion to duty and self-sacrifice even to death. Without war the world would stagnate in materialism.” Treitschke ventured a similar opinion in 1869.[1] “Every nation, especially a refined and cultured one, is apt to lapse into effeminacy and selfishness during a protracted period of peace. The unlimited comfort enjoyed by society causes not only the downfall of the state but destroys at the same time all those ideals which make life worth living. Narrow provincialism or selfish and worldly activity, looking only toward the gratification of all desires of the individual, undermines the foundations of a higher moral philosophy and the belief in ideals. Fools arrive at the vain conclusion that the life object of the individual is acquisition and enjoyment; that the purpose of the state is simply to facilitate the business affairs of its citizens; that man is appointed by an all-wise providence to buy cheaply and to sell at a profit; they conclude that war, which interferes with man’s activities, is the greatest evil, and that modern armies are only a sorry remnant of mediaeval barbarism. * * * It proves a positive blessing to such a generation if fate commits it to a great and righteous war, and the more it has become attached to the comfortable habits of mere social existence, the more violent the reaction which rouses it to warlike deeds in the service of the state. * * *” “The moment the state calls, ‘My life, my existence is at stake,’ there is aroused in a free people that highest of all virtues, the courage of self-sacrifice, which can never exist in time of peace nor be developed to such an extent by peaceful pursuits. Millions are united in the one thought—the fatherland; they are animated by that common sentiment of devotion unto death—patriotism—which, once experienced, is never again forgotten, and which ennobles and hallows the life of a whole generation. * * *” The greatness of war lies in those very phases which an effeminate civilization deems impious. “A great nation must be powerful,” exclaimed Scherr, in 1870.[2] “That is not only its duty, but its nature. If opposition is encountered, a nation is not only permitted to force a way for its righteous cause and resort to war, but it is its duty to do so. War always has been, and, so long as men and nations exist on the earth, it always will be, the ultima ratio.”

[3]

Since war is the ultima ratio of state policy, and as a sovereign state must insist on absolute independence in determining its affairs and its course of action, it follows that the verdict of a court of arbitration, on the larger and more serious questions, can have a decisive influence on the action of the contending parties only if the arbitrator possesses the power to enforce his decision, and is embued with a determination to use that power. Thus the Pope was able to arbitrate the question of right between Germany and Spain as to the possession of the Caroline Islands, but a like verdict could never decide the question of might between Germany and France as to the possession of Alsace-Lorraine.[3]

The utopian plans for a universal international court of arbitration are chimerical and conjured up by idealists unacquainted with the harsh facts of reality, if their ideas are not, indeed—as are many proposals for disarmament—calculated to serve as a cloak for ambitious plans.

If diplomatic means do not suffice to adjust a dispute, then the question of right between two states at once becomes a question of might. But the existence of a spirit of fair play is taken into account nevertheless, for each party to the controversy will seek to have the justice of its cause recognized. The moral support engendered by fighting for a just cause is so great that no state is willing to dispense with it.[4] This circumstance, coupled with the growing power of public opinion and with the influence of representative government, has contributed to reduce the number of wars. Wars between cabinets, like those in the days of Louis XIV., are no longer[4] possible. As a result of the universal liability to service, the whole nation takes part in a war; every class of society suffers and has its pursuits interfered with; everything presses to an early decision, to a prompt crushing of the opponent.

This is attained by defeating the enemy’s forces, by occupying the hostile country and seizing the enemy’s sources of supply, so that he will be convinced of the futility of further resistance. (Campaigns of 1859, 1866, and 1870-71). Only in the rarest cases will it be necessary to continue the war until the power of resistance of the hostile state is completely destroyed. (American Civil War). The extent to which the enemy’s power of resistance may have to be crippled or broken, in order to compel peace, depends upon his tenacity. Political considerations will also have to be taken into account in answering this question. From the military point of view, however, the purpose of every war will always be the complete overthrow of the enemy.

2. STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

Precise definitions of strategy and tactics, clearly fixing the scope of each, have been vainly sought in the past. That efforts in this direction have led to no results is only natural, as tactics and strategy are complementary subjects that often encroach upon each other, while grand tactics is frequently identical with strategy.

Von Bülow, the author of The Spirit of Modern Warfare (1798)[5], calls those movements strategical which are made outside the enemy’s sphere of information. Von Willisen considers strategy the science of communications, tactics the science of fighting. Von Clausewitz calls strategy the science of the use of battles for the purpose of the war[5] (Jomini: “l’art de diriger les armées sur les théatres d’opérations”)[6], tactics the science of the use of military forces in battle (Jomini: “l’art de diriger les troupes sur les champs de bataille”).[7][8] General von Horsetzki (1892) defines strategy as the study of the conditions necessary for success in war. Archduke Charles calls strategy the “science of war” and tactics the “art of war”. Frederick the Great and Napoleon always employed the term “l’art de guerre” instead of the term “strategy”. None of these definitions are comprehensive enough, because they do not cover marches, outposts, the supply service, and enterprises in minor tactics. Professor Delbrück’s definition is much more appropriate: “Strategy is the science of utilizing military resources for the attainment of the object of the war, tactics the art of leading troops into and in battle.” Thiers, the French historian, instead of seeking to define strategy and tactics, contents himself with explaining the problems of each: “Le stratège doit concevoir le plan de campagne, embrasser d’un seul coup d’oeil tout le théatre présumé de la guerre, tracer lignes d’opérations et diriger les masses sur les points décisifs. Le tacticien a pour mission de régler l’ordre de leurs marches, de les disposer en bataille aux différents points, indiqués par le stratège, d’engager l’action, de la soutenir et de manoeuvrer pour atteindre le but proposé.”[9] Fieldmarshal Moltke calls strategy “the[6] application of common sense to the conduct of war.”[10] For practical purposes it is sufficient to define strategy as the science of the conduct of war, tactics as the science of troop-leading. Strategy brings about the decision on the theater of war, while the duty of carrying it out, in the manner desired by the commander-in-chief, devolves upon tactics. Thus the strategical idea culminates on the battlefield. The concentric advance of the Prussian armies into Bohemia in 1866 naturally led to a complete envelopment of the Austrians on the field of Königgrätz. The German attack in the battle on the Hallue, Dec. 23rd, 1870, was based on the strategical requirement of driving the French from their line of retreat leading to Arras and Bapaume, by enveloping their right flank. The attempts made by the 15th Infantry Division, which was holding the enemy in front, to envelop the left wing of the French, interfered with the execution of the correct strategical plan. Thus, in following up a success, in itself quite unimportant (the capture of Bussy), the leading basic principle was forgotten. The same thing happened here that Moltke censured in his official report on the war of 1866, wherein he stated: “The higher commanders have not been able to make their influence felt down to the subordinate grades. Frequently, as soon as the divisions and brigades have come in contact with the enemy, all control over them has entirely ceased.”

Archduke Charles considered the subordination of tactics to strategy a law. “Tactics should execute the conceptions of strategy; where the two come in conflict, where strategical considerations are opposed to tactical interests, the strategical considerations should, as a rule, take precedence. Tactics must occupy a subordinate place and attempt to neutralize existing disadvantages by skillful dispositions.” Clausewitz not unjustly censures Archduke Charles for placing advantages of terrain in the first rank, and for failing to attach the proper importance to the annihilation of the hostile forces.[7] Should the demands of strategy conflict with those of tactics on the battlefield, the latter must unquestionably take precedence, since the general’s foremost thought must be the annihilation of the hostile forces. Tactical considerations should likewise govern in the selection of the direction of attack in a battle, strategical reasons for striking in this or that direction becoming effective only after the attainment of tactical success. It is true that strategy, by directing the armies and their concentration on the battlefield, provides tactics with the tools for fighting and assures the probability of victory; but, on the other hand, the commander-in-chief appropriates the fruits of each victory and makes them the basis for further plans. “The demands of strategy are silent in the presence of tactical victory; they adapt themselves to the newly created situation.” Fieldmarshal Moltke.[11]

3. THE METHOD OF INSTRUCTION.

While Archduke Charles considers mathematical axioms the basis of the higher art of war, military history is for us the principal source from which to gather knowledge.[12]

In military history we have a guide by which, if we lack personal experience in war, we can test the results of our reflections and of our experience on the drillground. Military history moreover enables us to appreciate those controlling[8] factors which, in map problems, do not appear at all, and which, in exercises on the terrain, appear only in a restricted measure. One must learn the conduct of war from the experience of others; one’s own experience is costly and is almost invariably gained too late. That experience in war, of itself, is not sufficient (aside from the fact that it is gained too late in a given case) is illustrated by the defeat of the Austrians in 1866, of the French in 1870-71, and of the British in South Africa. “Les Autrichiens,” says Colonel Foch,[13] “ont fait la guerre sans la comprendre, les Prussiens l’ont compris sans la faire, mais ils l’ont étudiée.” “Military history is neither a compilation of clever theories nor a book designed for whiling away idle moments. It is, on the contrary, a careful teacher, who, if we are attentive, allows us to view and grasp matters which we have never before been in a position to see, but which, nevertheless, are liable to confront us in the same, a similar, or a changed form, and demand unpremeditated, instant and decisive action, entailing heavy responsibilities. Military history, it is true, offers us, in the first instance, only events and their outline, conditions and phenomena, but it also presents, what the cleverest theory is unable to furnish, a graphic illustration of the disturbing elements in war, an illustration of the influences, doubts, embarrassments, unforeseen accidents, surprises and delays. It describes the course pursued by commanders and by practical military common sense in surmounting these difficulties. It prepares in advance the mental balance necessary at the moment of action; it should prepare also for the unexpected. It affords a substitute for lack of military experience, for the accumulation of which the life of the individual, prior to the moment of action, has been too short.”[14] The pedantic enumeration of a few examples in support of a stated opinion cannot[9] suffice. It should not be difficult to find examples from military history in support of any opinion; frequently even an incorrect tactical contention can be vindicated by such examples. For in war the action taken is as often wrong as correct; the scales are turned by factors which in most cases appear indistinctly or not at all. The experiences of military history must, therefore, only be used with caution if tactical lessons are to be drawn from them. “A mere allusion to historical events,” says Clausewitz in his chapter on examples, “has the further disadvantage that some readers are either not sufficiently acquainted with these events, or remember them too imperfectly to enter into the author’s ideas, so that such students are compelled to accept his statements blindly or to remain unconvinced. It is, of course, very difficult to describe historical events as they ought to be described if they are to be used as proofs, for authors usually lack the means, as well as the time and space, necessary for such descriptions. We maintain, however, that in establishing a new or a doubtful view, a single event, thoroughly described, is more instructive than a mere allusion to ten. The principal evil resulting from a superficial reference to historical events does not lie in the fact that the author cites them incorrectly in support of his theory, but in the fact that he has never become thoroughly acquainted with those events. In consequence of such a superficial, haphazard treatment of history, a hundred erroneous views and theoretical projects are created, which would never have appeared if the author had been compelled to deduce, from a careful analysis of the connected facts in the case, what he publishes and wishes to support by historical proofs. If we have convinced ourselves of the above outlined difficulties attending the employment of historical examples, and appreciate the necessity for thoroughness in their treatment, we will come to the conclusion that the more recent military history is the most natural source from which to select examples, inasmuch as recent history[10] alone is sufficiently known and analyzed.”[15] The events from military history mentioned in this work are cited simply as proofs of certain phenomena; the proper analysis of these proofs must be left to the student.

The applicatory method[16] is used frequently by preference as the system of instruction, but its creator, General von Verdy du Vernois, considers it merely a complement of the deductive method, on which it is predicated and based. “The weakness of the whole applicatory system of instruction lies in the fact that a textbook based upon it, although written by a master hand, can portray only isolated examples, and that these, studied again and again, soon lose their value in the same manner as a maneuver terrain that has become too well known. For, although we ordinarily find principles represented in a connected form, this method of instruction can only convey them in a fragmentary manner in connection with the details of the events described.”[17] The success of the applicatory method depends largely upon the individuality of the instructor, and owes its charm to the personal intercourse between teacher and pupil. Only an expert, who possesses a thorough professional knowledge, who is master of his subject, and who has the faculty of presenting it skillfully, will be able to produce imaginary scenes which faithfully represent reality and are free from objectionable features. By constant practice with specific cases, under the most diverse situations, the nature of war may in this way be taught and initiative developed as well as facility acquired in issuing appropriate, clear, and concise orders. One danger of using nothing but the applicatory method must be noted. The instructor, as representative of a definite theory, finds it comparatively easy to select the conditions governing a specific case in such a way that the theory which he represents necessarily[11] appears to be the correct one. This is especially true when the director of an applicatory problem determines the action of the opposing side. The two methods (the applicatory, or inductive, and the deductive) must be so supplemented that the lesson in tactics clearly illustrates the purpose and object of a tactical operation and allows of the attainment of a thorough knowledge of the means necessary to gain that object.[18] “He who is able to understand the situation, has a definite purpose in view, and knows the means with which to carry out that purpose, will, by a simple mental operation, arrive in each particular case at an appropriate decision, and will be able, furthermore, to carry out that decision, provided he does not lose his head. If a clear comprehension of the purpose in view and of the means for carrying out that purpose lie within the sphere of theory, the estimate of the situation and the decision are governed by the circumstances of the particular case. Should the training in this direction lie outside the sphere of theory, it will logically belong to the domain of the applicatory method of instruction. The two methods must, therefore, supplement each other.

If the decision is to culminate in action, strength of character is required, providing the determination to execute, in spite of unavoidable difficulties, what has been recognized as proper, and also the professional ability necessary to carry out the determination to its logical conclusion. All that theory can do toward forming this character is to emphasize its importance and to refer students to military history. The applicatory method, however, can develop strength of character by compelling the student to form decisions under pressure of a specified time limit (in solving problems) or by subjecting him to the influences of certain situations such as would[12] be encountered in war (maneuvers). The means available in tactical instruction in time of peace, for the development of strength of character, are, however, very limited when compared with the great demands made by the abnormal conditions of war, so out of all proportion to those of peace. This should be thoroughly understood, lest we overestimate the value of these means as well as the results to be obtained from them in times of peace.

After theory has fulfilled its mission of clearly indicating the purpose and object of an operation, as well as the means by which it may be attained, and applicatory practice has performed its office of developing initiative and professional skill, a third factor is still necessary—the study of military history. From this fountain of knowledge both “theory” and “applicatory method” must draw their material; to this source they must again and again refer in order to guard against erroneous ideas of their own creation, which are often as different from reality as day is from night.”[19]

Viewed as the science of the leading and employment of troops, tactics may be divided into two parts:

1. Formal tactics, or that contained in drill regulations. This portion of tactics furnishes the formations used by troops when assembled, on the march, and in action, and contains the regulations governing the conduct in battle of troops acting alone without regard to the coöperation of the other arms, and without reference to the terrain.

2. Applied tactics[20] deals with the combined action of the several arms on the march, in camp, and in action, taking into account influences of the terrain, seasons, and the time of day in field warfare. Fortress warfare should, strictly[13] speaking, be included under this heading; that is to say, the employment of tactical principles[21] pertaining to the mobile arms, in conjunction with foot-artillery and technical troops on a prepared battlefield. The principles are the same in field and fortress warfare; the only difference between them lies in the employment of the means necessitated by the preparation of a field of battle in time of peace. Military history shows that a clear distinction between field and fortress warfare is impossible. (Sebastopol, Düppel, Plevna, and Port Arthur).

4. DRILL REGULATIONS.

Drill regulations are the accumulation of the tactical views and lessons of a certain period. They illustrate the tactical condition which becomes perceptible at the moment of a certain development of the fighting tools as represented by man and weapons. Man, in his peculiarities, in his weaknesses, is the constant. He constitutes the psychological element, inseparable from the science of combat, and as such is the definitely given magnitude; the effect of weapons, however, appears always as the variable factor. New weapons, therefore, necessitate new tactics.

It will be observed also “that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change.”[22] The history of the tactics of the 19th Century furnishes[14] more than one instructive example of the magnitude of such “obstinate conservatism.”

It is a marked peculiarity of manuals of instruction, that, no matter with what far-sightedness such regulations may have been originally compiled, they become antiquated in a comparatively short time. Napoleon estimated this period at ten years. Frequent changes are certainly not desirable, if tactical development is not to be interfered with and if inconveniences are to be avoided in organizing our mobile army from our peace organizations, Reservists, and Landwehr. On the other hand, the regulations must keep abreast of requirements if the conditions to which they owe their existence have changed. In his “Military Fantasies” the Prince de Ligne wrote in 1783: “An article which should be added to all drill regulations, and which, I know not why, is omitted, is: ‘Act sometimes contrary to the regulations.’ It is just as necessary to teach that one must act contrary to the regulations, as to teach the disorder of troops as it will occur in action.”

It is always dangerous to be behind the times, as troops thereby relinquish a superiority previously possessed over others, which knowledge they must later purchase, with streams of blood, in the face of hostile bullets. Of what avail, to the Austrians in 1866, to the Russians in 1877, were all their valiant assaults, made with tactical formations that had outlived their usefulness in the face of newer weapons, although made with the firm determination to conquer?

The self-sacrificing spirit and firmly rooted discipline of the troops found an insurmountable obstacle in the rapid fire of unshaken infantry. The war experiences of our regiments show that bullets quickly write a new tactics, demolish superannuated formations and create new ones. But[15] at what a sacrifice![23] In the Franco-German war, superior leadership and a better artillery permitted us to pay this price for the lesson. But how an army fares when it lacks these auxiliaries is shown by the British experiences in South Africa. The initial failure of accustomed tactical formations causes a dread of the frontal attack and finally leads some tacticians to deny entirely even the feasibility of such an attack. In peace training, therefore, set forms are of less importance; stress should be laid on developing the faculty of adaptation to changing conditions of combat and terrain.

Further development and justification of the principles of the drill regulations, and the modification of those principles under certain assumptions, are reserved to the science of tactics. Drill regulations should not be textbooks of tactics, but, on the other hand, a textbook of tactics should deal with formations only in so far as that is necessary to ensure a clear comprehension of the fundamental principles.

“Regulations and the science of combat are in a certain sense very different subjects. The regulations are law, authority—no doubt can be entertained on this point; but that also invests them with the character of something fixed, at least for a certain space of time. They cannot be kept up to date so as to meet quickly enough the rapidly changing and ever growing demands of modern combat: that would indeed be an unfair requirement, impossible of realization. Here must enter the science of combat, which should be independent in every direction, which should know no fixed rules, and which should point to no other authority than that of truth and reality. It is not the province of the science of[16] combat, like that of regulations, to retain that which is in keeping with prevailing views and forms; it must take into consideration the fleeting theory and practice, ever developing and changing anew.”[24]

A positive system of tactics will therefore be based upon one’s own drill regulations, from the standpoint of which it will investigate and compare the principles of the service manuals of the different powers, and finally develop the science still further by the aid of experience gained from military history and the knowledge of the effect of weapons. While these are the ever changing but nevertheless measurable factors of tactical reflection, a third, perhaps the most important factor, must be added, viz., that the leader must reckon with the action of men frequently exposed to the influence of great exertions and great mental agitation. A doctrine of tactics which does not properly appreciate the psychological element stagnates in lifeless pedantry.

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19]

1. THE IMPORTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY.

In all modern armies infantry is, in virtue of its numbers and importance, the principal arm. Since the introduction of firearms, infantry has gradually increased in importance and numbers as compared with the other arms.

The manner in which infantry fights imprints its distinguishing mark on the tactics of an entire period; thus, according to the combat formations of infantry, we may speak of a period of “linear,” “column,” and “extended order” tactics. Infantry can be equipped more cheaply and trained[20] more quickly than the other arms. In July, 1870, the French army consisted of 116 infantry regiments and 21 rifle battalions, but 38 rifle battalions were raised in addition to a large number of regiments of gardes mobiles and volunteers.

Infantry is as well adapted for combat with firearms as for combat with the bayonet, for attack as for defense, for action in close as in extended order. It can fight on any terrain which is at all passable, and is more independent of weather and seasons than the other arms; it surpasses the other arms in endurance, a man, on account of his will power, bearing privations and exertions better than a horse. On the other hand, the losses suffered by foot troops in action and through exertions on the march are greater than those of the mounted arms.[25]

The rate of march of infantry is so slow that in reconnaissance it can only by great exertions attain results which a small force of cavalry would obtain without appreciable effort. Infantry acting alone therefore unquestionably requires the assignment of mounted men for reconnaissance and messenger duty. As regards reconnaissance, infantry is like a man walking in the dark, who can guard against collisions only by stretching out his hand and feeling his way.

The lack of artillery support will also make itself felt when infantry encounters fire at ranges at which it is defenseless, owing to the limited range of its rifle. Infantry cannot dispense with artillery when it has to attack localities or fortified points in villages.

The infantry of the 19th Century fell heir to the distinction made in the 18th Century between heavy infantry (infantry of the line) and light infantry, the latter being employed only in skirmish duty and in the service of security. In the 18th Century the expensive method of recruiting by[21] means of bounties made it necessary to avoid using troops in indecisive, costly fire actions, and to preserve the expensive personnel for decisive shock action en masse. Skirmishing was left to volunteer battalions, to Jägers, and to Füsiliers. In Prussia the number of Füsilier battalions was increased to 24 at the close of the 18th Century. Napoleon I. was, on principle, opposed to the theory of light infantry. He demanded but one species of infantry, “a good infantry.” In spite of this, however, he became the originator of an élite infantry, when, for reasons of discipline, he created one voltigeur and one grenadier company in each battalion. While battalion tactics predominated, i.e., until the close of the campaign of 1866, this arrangement was imitated in most states. At the time of the Russo-Turkish war, Russia still had in each battalion a fifth company, one of sharpshooters, which, though not recruited at the expense of the other companies, was formed of better material and received special training in extended order fighting. Following the example set by Austria, Prussia, in 1812, designated the third rank principally for extended order fighting, by forming it into a third platoon in each company when in action. This was called the sharpshooters’ platoon and was composed of the best shots and the most skillful men of the company. As late as the campaign of 1866 there were instances of the employment of the combined sharpshooter platoons of a battalion. Here we have an actual élite force assembled in provisional organizations, not at the expense of the rest of the troops, however.

The system of column tactics, which required that every company should be equally skilled in extended order fighting, led to the abolishment of élite companies. The Prussian élite, consisting of the platoons formed from the third rank, although not always compatible with the employment of company columns, was not abolished until 1876. The experience of the Franco-German war had shown that, in view of the[22] extensive use of extended order formations, an independent employment of single platoons was out of the question, as in the course of an action the firing line absorbs not only entire companies, but regiments and brigades; and, moreover, that every platoon, as a unit for fire action, must possess those elements which will carry it forward even after its leader has fallen.

Napoleon formed his Guards by selecting men and officers from the entire army for use as a battle reserve. By granting them privileges and by loading them with distinctions, he attached them to his person, and they assumed the character of household troops of a dynasty.

The Prussian and Russian Guards are differently constituted. They are not, strictly speaking, corps d’élite, for they are not selected from the ranks of the army. While it is true that the Prussian Guard receives a better class of recruits and the composition of its corps of officers and the selection of its commanders guarantee conspicuous results, its principal superiority lies in the fact that it serves constantly under the eye of the emperor.

Since the introduction of accurate breechloading weapons, and their use by all infantry, Jägers and riflemen have no tactical excuse for existing, except where they are specially trained in mountain warfare (Chasseurs alpins, Alpini)[26], or where they are intended to serve as a support for cavalry divisions. (France). While Jäger-battalions are at present employed like the rest of the infantry, they are retained by us as such because of tradition and for reasons of organization (they are recruited from forestry personnel), and an attempt is made in their tactical employment to turn their excellent marksmanship and skill in the use of ground to good account whenever possible. Jägers will be employed in defense, preferably for holding important points, and for combat[23] and service of security on difficult terrain. Military experience has shown, however, that in actual war it was seldom possible to take advantage of these special characteristics; that in most cases the Jägers were used as other infantry, and that infantry units fighting shoulder to shoulder with Jägers accomplished as good results as the latter. Since the war of 1866 the demand for special employment of Jägers has ceased. The brief course of the campaign of 1866, in which our infantry acted mostly on the offensive, gave the Jägers an opportunity for profitable employment only where, contrary to accepted notions, they fought side by side with the rest of the infantry.[27]

Mountain warfare presents such difficult problems to troops, requires a sum total of endurance, energy and intelligence, physical qualifications and special familiarity, that neither every recruit nor every unit of the army will quite fulfill all its demands, although the experience of Suworov, during his campaign in the Alps, apparently contradicts this statement. Many disadvantages can be neutralized by peace training and discipline, of course, but training alone will not suffice. For overcoming the difficulties peculiar to mountain warfare, a suitable equipment permitting free movement, and at the same time ensuring the comfort of the men while at[24] rest, is necessary. The lack of such mountain equipment is keenly felt even during short exercises lasting only a few days. Even Switzerland plans at present the formation of three mountain brigades. Austria already has special mountain brigades assembled for mountain warfare in its Kaiser-Jäger, Rural Riflemen, and also in the troops of Bosnia and Dalmatia. The Italian Alpini (consisting of 22 battalions in time of peace, to which militia companies are attached on mobilization, and which have in addition a reserve of 22 territorial companies) form a selected corps which is doubtless capable of accomplishing excellent results. The Italians propose to attach machine guns to these units. It is worthy of note that these troops carry explosives. In France the troops garrisoned in the Alpine districts are divided into thirteen groups, each consisting of one battalion, one mountain battery, one engineer company, and machine guns.

As modern fire effect makes it impossible for mounted officers to direct the firing line, it was natural to use the more improved means of communication, the telephone and telegraph, in addition to the visual signals employed by the navy.

The improvements made in weapons have had a further influence on the transformation of the infantry. Even a small force of infantry can with its magazine fire inflict annihilating losses in a very short time on closed bodies offering favorable targets, especially when this fire is delivered from a flanking position. This requires, on the one hand, that greater attention be paid during combat to local reconnaissance, which can be but imperfectly made by mounted officers with the troops, and, on the other hand, it necessitates the employment of smaller independent detachments for our own security and for harassing the enemy. Intimately connected herewith is the introduction of machine guns, possessing great mobility, which enables them to take advantage of rapidly passing moments for pouring a heavy fire on the[25] enemy and also for reinforcing the independent cavalry in advance of the army.

In England it was decided to form mounted infantry charged with the additional duty of augmenting the fire of a cavalry division, and of furnishing the commander-in-chief with a reserve possessing the requisite mobility to permit its being thrown to any threatened point of the long battle lines of today. But of what importance is the fire of a single battalion in the large armies of the present day? The principal drawback to the employment of mounted infantry is, however, that, when mounted, it is defenseless against cavalry, and that, while in motion, it really needs a supporting force. In the Boer war the mounted infantry grew finally to a strength of 50,000 men. As it was not confronted by cavalry, it made good during the execution of wide turning movements, which Lord Roberts employed with success for the purpose of striking the flank of the Boers, who always rapidly extended their lines. In spite of these good services, it could not be denied that mounted infantry had many faults. The men knew nothing of the care of their mounts, as is evidenced by the large percentage of horses which became unserviceable. As mounted infantry units were improvised bodies, they lacked the requisite training in marching and tactical employment. After the war had lasted for some time, the mounted infantrymen, however, had completely forgotten their infantry character and deported themselves like cavalrymen, even if only as poor ones. Thus, we find toward the close of the campaign numerous attacks made by mounted infantry on the British side, as, strange to relate, also on that of the Boers.

In this experiment of creating mounted infantry, all those drawbacks which had been learned for centuries were exemplified. As an improvisation, mounted infantry disturbs the cohesion of organizations; if permanently organized, it must become cavalry, just as the dragoons became cavalry:[26] for mounted infantry is neither flesh, fish, nor fowl and cannot endure.

The British Drill Regulations (1904) for mounted infantry lay down the following principles for its employment:

The creation of mounted infantry is only proper where climatic conditions make long marches by European troops impossible, or in cases where the arrival of a few soldiers at distant points will exert a potent influence on the actions of[27] an opponent. As shown by our experience in Southwest Africa, the proper field for mounted infantry is colonial (guerrilla) warfare, especially when it is important to prevent the outbreak of threatened disorders and to let the country return quickly to a state of peace upon completion of the principal actions. On European theaters of war, space is lacking for the employment of mounted infantry, and, moreover, there are not enough horses. In organizing mounted infantry, an auxiliary arm, which can be of use only occasionally, has been created at the expense of infantry and cavalry. The infantry itself should endeavor to meet all demands for local reconnaissance and communication, without weakening the cavalry for its principal duties, and without, in so doing, crippling its own fighting efficiency.

For the purpose of reconnaissance, patrols or scouting detachments are used. Their usefulness in difficult country and in enterprises against the enemy’s flank or rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, by advancing on side roads, they can hamper the enemy’s reconnaissance, secure the flanks of their own force, ascertain the probable extent of the prospective battlefield, and, finally, having gained a firm foothold, they can become very annoying to the hostile artillery. In a large battle the necessary elbow room for such employment is lacking. To form special organizations of picked men, as is done in Russia, is always of doubtful value. An organization cannot dispense with its best men in action; it needs them as group leaders and as substitutes for disabled non-commissioned officers. While everything goes without a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an organization is of little importance; the drawbacks to this procedure become apparent, however, when heavy losses deplete the ranks, when the line begins to waver, when, in the absence of officers, only the example of courageous men prevents the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly appreciate the importance of psychological impressions during critical combat situations; they state: “The man who feels his[28] courage and coolness going, in the excitement of battle, should look toward his officers. Should they have fallen, he will find plenty of non-commissioned officers and brave privates whose example will revive his courage.” (Par. 268 German I. D. R.). If it becomes necessary to despatch a stronger infantry force on a mission of minor importance, it will usually be better to detail an entire company than to improvise a detachment whose leader would know his men only imperfectly. From the standpoint of training, scouting detachments have an entirely different value. They give young infantry officers, who are tied to a command, an opportunity to develop self-confidence, decision, and tactical judgment; to cope with hardships and difficulties on their own responsibility. In this manner characteristics may be developed in the young officers which will be of benefit to them in a large battle. It is obvious that scouts should be assigned bicycles to give them the mobility which infantry lacks.

If the roads are good, cyclists[28] will frequently be able to take the place of cavalry in messenger service. In this case they remain with their organizations and perform the same duties as the other soldiers. The employment of cyclists is in accord with the principle that in war every resource the country offers for warfare should be utilized. The advantage of the use of cyclists for messenger service and their value to the command generally is obvious; they are, in addition, adapted for reconnaissance work and for reinforcing the divisional cavalry. Cyclists, however, do not lend themselves to the formation of separate organizations for battle purposes (each division has 110 cyclists), for a large number of picked men would thereby be withdrawn from the ranks of the troops engaged. An improvised cyclist detachment would, in addition, accomplish very little, as it would lack the thorough peace training requisite for cohesive action as an organization.[29] If the opinion is entertained that cyclist detachments could furnish substantial aid to the cavalry[29] in advance of the army, that they could be employed profitably in the supply districts and in minor operations, and, finally, if the available material in the country is to be utilized, nothing remains but to proceed to the creation of cyclist companies in time of peace. The material necessary for repairs and for ammunition supply can only be entrusted to permanent organizations. The advantages of cyclists are their great mobility,[30] their prompt readiness for firing, and, above all else, the noiselessness of their movements. Their weakness lies in their dependence upon a complicated machine, in the comparatively large road space taken up by them on the march (100 cyclists in column of twos take up about 250 to 300 m. road space), and in their dependence on the terrain. The last mentioned drawback can be remedied apparently only by the adoption of a folding wheel, but, since the cyclist’s equipment cannot be secured on the machine, it is better in difficult country to push the wheels or to leave them behind under guard when necessary.

According to the Cyclist Regulations dated September 10th, 1904, the cyclist company is to be looked upon as infantry, which is capable of moving at great speed, but is tied to the network of roads. The cyclist companies are principally intended for defensive action, holding an important point until the arrival of infantry. They are also to serve as support for cavalry and artillery, but are not adapted for reconnaissance work. Since it is difficult for them to secure their flanks on the march, they are to be used mainly in combination with other arms.

In winter campaigns, when wheel and horse cannot be used, recourse is had to the Canadian snowshoe (a web shoe) or to the Norwegian snowshoe or ski (skee). In France, Italy, Austria,[31] Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland marching on snowshoes is assiduously practiced, while in Germany the troops have so far done little in this line. The ski is, however, coming more and more into vogue among the rural population of the German mountains.

Deep snow is an effective obstacle for troops not equipped with snowshoes. This is not entirely due to the fact that the march is retarded, but to the unusual difficulties attending the service of security. Covering bodies are stalled. Besides, the difficulties of maintaining communication with neighboring detachments are increased when valleys or abrupt[31] declivities intervene between the forces. The only remedy in such cases is to employ the snowshoe, upon which one can move rapidly without regard to roads, and up or down hill without difficulty. Patrols can be despatched to adequate distances from the marching body on skis alone. Ski-runners can perform the same duty which cavalry performs on the plain; for instance, they can occupy points in advance which are of importance to us, dispute crossings with the enemy, and hold him at bay. Ski detachments alone are able to reconnoiter the condition of roads and test the carrying power of snow in advance of a command, and they alone can furnish the connecting links in an extended outpost position, because they alone are able to move off the roads. During halts they furnish guards; in action they easily turn the enemy’s flanks, reconnoiter his weak points as well as the position of his reserves; and after the fight they maintain contact with him as patrols. They can hasten forward in advance of a command and prepare cantonments and bivouacs, and attend to the cooking.

The great depth of a detachment of ski-runners is a disadvantage. Each ski-runner takes up 2.20 m., and in addition a distance of 1 m. must be left between men. Besides, as the men are not all equally skilled in using skis, the road space taken up by a detachment of runners is increased considerably. This necessitates the employment of small detachments not exceeding 100 men. The proper sphere of ski-runners is patrol duty. In winter campaigns ski-runners are a necessary substitute for cavalry. In Scandinavia reconnaissance detachments are composed of ski-runners and cavalry, the horses pulling the runners. This permits a very rapid movement over snow-covered ground and may also be employed where the use of the much slower sled is impracticable owing to the nature of the terrain. Much practice is undoubtedly necessary to acquire proficiency[32] in this sport[32], for it surely cannot be easy to preserve an upright position on skis behind a galloping horse, while at the same time overcoming all the difficulties of the ground. When troopers cannot continue to perform reconnaissance work, they are replaced by snowshoe or ski-runners. The snowshoe performances in France, since the establishment by War Department order of a training school in Briançon, are worthy of note. According to the experiences gained at that institution, a period of four weeks is ample for training men for extended mountain marches. On January 18th, 1904, a body of men on snowshoes covered a distance of 80 km., including a climb of 1,700 m., in 20 hours (4 hours’ rest included).

2. THE TACTICAL UNIT.

By the term tactical unit is meant the smallest element of a body of troops capable of sustaining an action independently, of performing a simple combat task, and the elements of which (man and horse) are personally known to the leader. Moreover, the tactical unit should be small enough to allow of its being controlled by the voice of a single leader. This requirement limits the battle front of the tactical unit to about 100 m., which corresponds approximately to the front of a troop[33] (Eskadron) in line, or to that of a battery of six pieces. The frontage of the tactical unit of cavalry might with advantage be decreased, while that of artillery, on account of its stability in action, might be extended, were it not for the fact that the increase in the quantity of matériel and in the number of horses involved in such extension would make the supervision of the unit too[33] difficult for a single person. In nearly all large armies the strength of a troop (Eskadron) of cavalry and of a field battery is approximately 150 horses.[34] This corresponds approximately to what the farmer of northern Germany considers suitable to keep together in one establishment. If the estate is larger, requiring more than 150 men and horses, subsidiary farms[35] are established.

While column tactics were in vogue, the above mentioned requirements of a tactical unit were completely fulfilled by the battalion, but this is no longer the case. It is quite impossible for one voice to control the movements of a battalion in action; this is scarcely possible in case of a company. On the other hand, a company is too weak to carry out an independent mission in action. Nothing less than a battalion possesses the requisite fighting power, strength, and capacity for subdivision, to sustain an action independently, to solve minor problems of combat, and to remain a body full of fighting efficiency even after sustaining serious losses such as are unavoidable in every modern infantry action.

To attempt a further definition of the term “tactical unit” would be of little value. General von Scherff in a logical manner[36] constructs a “troop unit”[37] from “fighting groups”[38] (squad of infantry or cavalry, or one gun), several of which form a “fighting unit”[39] (company, troop or battery), “possessing the requisite power to carry out a specific task,” and placed under the command of a responsible leader. “The definition of a fighting unit includes, on principle, its indivisibility in action. Dispersion is a crime, division[34] at least an evil.” The “combat unit”[40] consists of a number of fighting units. “The commander of the combat unit (infantry battalion, cavalry regiment, or artillery battalion) should be able to lead it as a compact entity, and should have the power of employing its component parts independently for combined action against some point.” General von Scherff has found imitators in Austria, where the term body of troops (Truppenkörper) is applied to an organization having the necessary means for feeding, clothing, and equipping the men, and which is composed of a number of “basic units.”[41] Such “basic units” as can be supervised, handled, and controlled directly by one leader, who knows the individual men thereof and their characteristics, are the troop (Eskadron), battery, and company. Von Boguslawski[42] applies the term “fighting unit” to organizations from the company (troop) to the brigade, which act in accordance with the tactics of their arm, supported by the other arms, in the sphere assigned to them by orders or by circumstances. Divisions, which, by the coöperation of the three arms, are capable of independent employment on the march and in action, he calls “combat units.” According to Boguslawski, army corps are “battle units,”[43] with which the commander reckons in battle, and which are strong enough to meet an energetic attack or to execute one themselves.

3. ORGANIZATION.

The basic unit of infantry is the company, from 200 to 250 men strong in the larger armies. It seems hardly practicable to exceed a strength of 150 men, as this is about the greatest number in which a relation based upon personal influence of the leader on his subordinates can still be obtained.[35] In armies in which companies are composed of more than 200 men, the numbers in excess of this figure may be regarded as a margin of safety, intended to maintain the company at a strength of 200 rifles after the first casualties of a campaign, produced by marching, detached service and battle losses. In view of the losses, which frequently increase with extraordinary rapidity in modern battles, it appears undesirable to fix a lower figure than that above mentioned, as the companies would otherwise lose their independence and could no longer be considered basic units.

[36]

The actual training of troops must be completed in the company. Combat by an independent company is the exception; combat by battalion the rule. By the consolidation of four companies into one unit, the battalion, consisting of 800-1,000 rifles, is formed. The French Chasseur battalions are the only ones that consist of six companies, because their proposed independent employment, for instance, in mountain warfare, makes it more often necessary to detach small units than is the case in operations on more favorable terrain.

In the four-company organization the battalion possesses an asset which enables it to adapt itself easily to any combat situation. The battalion organization is the outgrowth[37] of practical necessity; the regimental commander cannot handle 12-16 companies without difficulty, and an intermediate unit, the battalion, is necessary. The battalion is the practical, and the regiment, consisting of 3 or 4 battalions, the ideal unit. Regiments consisting of two battalions do not possess the same advantages, as the regimental staff becomes superfluous during each necessary division of the regiment. Two battalion regiments do indeed facilitate command; they are, however, more expensive in time of peace and are of advantage in action only when formed into brigades of six battalions each, in which case the commander has a compactly organized reserve available.

“The regiment, by reason of its history, the uniformity of its training, the esprit de corps of its officers, and its division into three battalions—thereby facilitating subdivision—is pre-eminently fitted for carrying out definite combat tasks.” (Par. 470 German I. D. R.). A glance at the map of the battle of Vionville (5B of the German General Staff work on the Franco-German war) shows that regiments, whenever they entered the field intact, fought as unbroken units throughout the battle, whereas brigade organizations were frequently broken up.

This breaking up of brigades is practically induced by the two regiment brigade organization. (Par. 471 German I. D. R.). When once the brigade commander has assigned sections or points of attack to his regiments, there remains very little for him to do. He can form a reserve only by taking two battalions from one regiment, or one battalion from each. The brigade is, however, not like the regiment, an entity of bodies of troops, but a unit assembled for tactical purposes, which may, without regard to the whole, be increased or diminished by one or more battalions in case of necessity. On the march and in action the brigade organization as a subdivision of the division cannot always be maintained; groups are frequently formed in which the normal[38] units must be broken up. In large battles the brigade is the largest force which may yet be employed as an intact unit, although the employment of infantry by regiments will continue to be the rule. Brigade commanders are necessary for decreasing units of command and desirable for relieving the division commanders of a part of their work. In time of peace brigade commanders are useful for directing recruitment and, moreover, as connecting links between regiments and the division. The unmistakable advantages of the three-battalion organization have induced the United States to form its brigades of three regiments, each of three battalions (of 400 men each). An English division consists of three brigades of four battalions each.

4. INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT.[45]

Earth as a covering material and, incidental thereto, the adoption of the small spade after the Russo-Turkish war, have increased in importance owing to the greater penetrating power of the modern infantry bullets. The disadvantages of the spade lie in the danger of its being misused and in the consequent impairment of offensive spirit. There is, moreover, danger that the fire effect will be impaired and subordinated to considerations of cover. The spade should therefore not be employed on every occasion, but only when the tactical purpose in view requires it.

What the weight of the portable intrenching equipment of the Japanese, Russian, and British infantry will be, is still undecided, but experiments are being made with a uniform tool. When we consider, that for the purpose of intrenching, one man requires a space of 1.20 m., and for handling his rifle a space of 0.8 m., and that when intrenching under fire all the men cannot work, it is obvious that it would be impracticable[39] to equip each man with an intrenching tool. According to all experience, it is sufficient to furnish every other man with spade or pick. In addition to this, however, a company requires a large number of wire cutters. Only the French infantry is equipped with explosives, every regiment having 108 cartridges.

The following table shows the intrenching tool equipment available in each battalion:

5. THE LOAD OF THE INFANTRYMAN.

The load carried by the infantryman should not exceed one-third of the man’s weight (84 kg.), or not more than 28 kg. According to the “Regulations for the Employment of Infantry Equipment, M/95,” the load of a soldier whose height is 1.67 m. (the equipment consisting of new experimental pieces) is about 27 kg., distributed as follows:

[40]

COMPARISON.[51]

[41]

II. THE FORMATIONS.

1. THE ISSUE OF ORDERS.

Troops are set in motion by words of command, and, when these do not suffice, by orders. (Orders give information of the situation and the intentions of the commander, and assign tasks, but leave the recipient free to choose the method of carrying them out). When commands are given from a distance, time and energy may be saved by employing the telephone and visual signals. To these may be added shouts, signs, and the following signals: To advance, the leader raises the arm; to indicate that the command is to follow him, he extends his raised arm in the direction of march; to halt, he lowers the arm; to deploy, both arms are raised laterally to the height of the shoulders, and if necessary the direction the skirmish line is to take is subsequently indicated with one extended arm; to assemble his men, the leader describes a circle above his head with one arm. These signals may also be made with the sabre or rifle. Additional signals should be agreed upon beforehand in each separate case. If a signal is made to a body of troops in close order, it is meant, in the first place, for its leader. (Par. 11 German I. D. R.). Other signals, such as those indicating a change of direction of march, or a change in the battle formation, must be specially agreed upon beforehand. Trumpet signals are only used by troops in garrison at drills, and in barracks or billets as service calls. To prevent troops from misunderstanding signals or from obeying those not intended for them, all trumpet calls in battle, except “charge,” “fix bayonet,” and “attention,” are forbidden.

[42]

2. THE PURPOSE OF FORMATIONS. COMPARISON BETWEEN LINE AND COLUMN.

The object of assembly formations is to unite troops, usually prior to a movement, in a restricted space permitting an easy survey of the entire body. Assembly formations serve also the purpose of placing troops in readiness before starting on a march, before beginning an action, and for moving them on the battlefield when out of reach of hostile fire (columns). Route formations should permit an orderly, comfortable march of the troops, as much of the available width of road being used as possible, a space being[43] left for orderlies and mounted messengers, and for troops which are drawn forward. In order to permit a prompt deployment of troops for action, it is necessary to reduce their depth. Columns only are suitable for moving troops. The situation existing at the moment will determine to what extent allowances may be made for the comfort of the troops, or how far considerations of comfort should be ignored in view of readiness for action, and to what extent the depth of the columns should be decreased.

The formations for moving troops (to be employed in marching across country and to be used on the battlefield) should be such as to cause the least discomfort to the troops, should make it possible to avoid obstacles, to utilize cover, facilitate changes of front and direction of march, and permit a prompt deployment in any direction. These formations are columns unless the hostile fire effect makes a deployment into line necessary.

Battle formations should be such as to permit the employment of all weapons (rifles, lances, sabres, and guns). This requirement is not satisfied by columns, but only by the line. Modern fire effect excludes every employment of close order formations under effective hostile fire and compels the most extensive deployment.

Whether line or column is the preferable battle formation is a question belonging to a bygone age. The battles of the British in Spain and at Waterloo, the engagement at Groszbeeren, and the attack of the six battalions of Borke’s Brigade (the 8th) at the Katzbach,[61] amply demonstrate that the defeat of the Prussians at Jena was not due to the employment of linear battle formations alone. In a fight with an equal opponent, formed in columns, well trained and disciplined troops, formed in line that allows of the use of all the rifles and is suitable for shock action as well, have always carried off the victory.[62] On the other hand, in the battles[44] of the Empire we find columns formed, which of necessity excluded a large part of the men from participation in the action, but which were designed to break through the hostile battle line by sheer momentum. At Wagram, Macdonald’s Corps was formed with eight deployed battalions in rear of each other in a single column, supported on the flanks by seven and eight battalions respectively, also in column. At Austerlitz and Waterloo we find attack formations in which from eight to twelve battalions of a division were deployed one in rear of the other at distances of twenty paces. Column and line must be examined with reference to their mobility, their vulnerability and their fire and shock power.

The column possesses greater mobility and is better adapted than the line for executing changes of front and for taking advantage of the cover afforded by the ground. In a column steadiness and shock power (produced by the crowding forward of the ranks in rear) and the influence exerted by the officers, is greater than in a line.

The line is more dependent on the terrain in its movements. The characteristics of the line are great frontal fire power, weakness of the flanks, difficulty of quickly changing front, and the ever present danger of being pierced. The line has been called the formation of the bold, the column that of the weak.

On account of the increased penetrating power of infantry projectiles, especially at short ranges, a column will suffer greater losses than a line; at longer ranges the curvature of the trajectory causes bullets which pass over the first echelon to strike the second or third. On ground falling with respect to the line of sight, lines, and on ground rising with respect to the line of sight, columns are exposed to greater losses when they come within the beaten zone.[64]

[46]

3. THE COMPANY.

(a) Formation of the Company.
(Par. 83 German I. D. R.).

In the company the files are placed in two ranks according to height from right to left. Each four files form a squad or group, and the entire company is divided into three platoons (Züge). When a platoon consists of more than three squads it is divided into two sections (Halbzüge).

In the normal formation of the company, the three platoons, each in two ranks,[65] are posted on a line in numerical order from right to left. This formation facilitates firing and in garrison meets the requirements of barrack life, each two squads forming a section (Korporalschaft) under a non-commissioned officer. During the campaign of 1866 Prince Frederick Charles gave permission to arrange companies so that friends and relatives could serve together in the same squad or section. A company formed in this fashion would, of course, not look so well on parade as one formed regularly, the men according to height from right to left flank, but it would without doubt give a better account of itself in action. For details of the formation of a company and division into fractions see pars. 82-85, German I. D. R. The squad leaders and the two range finders in each platoon are[47] posted as file closers at facing distance in rear of the rear rank of the company.

Germany.

The non-commissioned officers are posted in the front rank, on the flanks and in the center of the platoons in Russia, Austria, and Switzerland. In Germany and Italy they are all posted in rear of the line as file closers, and it is their duty to supervise the men. In France a part of the non-commissioned officers are posted in the front rank, the remainder as file closers. A German company of 200 men has a front of 100 paces, or 80 m. The infantryman with field equipment occupies a space about 75 cm. square.

[48]

FRONT AND FACING DISTANCE.

(b) Division of the Company Into Three or Four Platoons.

In Austria, France, and Italy, platoons are considered as distinct bodies, so long as they have sufficient numerical strength. They are placed side by side and constitute the company in line. In Germany and Russia the company is at[49] each formation divided into platoons of approximately equal strength. In the armies of Austria, France, and Italy, it is contended that the soldier has nothing further to learn when once he is taken up for duty in the company. All movements are executed, after preparatory commands given by the company commanders, by commands of execution or signals given by platoon commanders. The execution of movements is retarded by this procedure and the movement itself becomes clumsy. It would also seem that the multiplicity of commands in the simple, oft-repeated movements, is superfluous, especially in the weak platoons at peace strength.

France.

[50]

The companies of all powers, those of Germany, Japan, and Belgium excepted, are divided into four platoons; each two platoons may in addition be combined into a half-company. The German, Japanese, and Belgian companies are divided into three platoons. “The platoon is not an independent subdivision by reason of the mere fact that it consists of a certain number of men, but because the term platoon denotes a force led by a man of superior intelligence. The officer commanding the platoon makes it what it should be. The strength of the platoon is therefore solely dependent upon the number of officers available.” (von Scherff).

The obvious advantage of the three-platoon organization of the company is that fewer platoon commanders are required, which fact is well worthy of attention in the mobilization of units of both Line and Reserve, especially in view of the extraordinarily heavy casualties among the troop leaders in the course of a campaign.[66]

On the other hand, it should be remembered that in armies consisting of militia it is considerably more difficult to command a platoon of 60-70 men than to command one of 40-50 men. A disadvantage inseparably connected with the four-platoon company is the small size of the platoons during peace exercises. On account of this circumstance most regulations permit the three-platoon formation when the company is small, because platoons consisting of less than ten files are of no instructional value. An advantage of the three-platoon company is the simplicity and rapidity with which changes from one formation to another may be effected.

The three-unit column of platoons is very broad for movements on the battlefield. It offers, when numbering 200 rifles, a target about 25 m. wide and only 15 m. deep. The four-unit column of platoons is better suited for movements. With a front of 17 m., its depth is only 15 m., when the[52] distances between platoons are assumed to be 6 paces (Austria, France, Italy, Russia, 5 paces). (See p. 62).

For a company consisting of 200 rifles, the following would be the forms:

The other advantages praised by advocates of the four-unit company are:

1. That a smaller platoon is more suitable for field service—that a picket is perhaps only in the rarest cases to be made 60 men strong.

2. That a small platoon makes a better and more comprehensive employment of the company in action possible, as the company commander has an opportunity to use ¹⁄₄, ¹⁄₂, or ³⁄₄ of his company according to the requirements of the situation, while the three-unit company affords less favorable combinations, permitting only an employment of ¹⁄₃ or ²⁄₃ of its strength.

These advantages can also be obtained in the German company by the employment of sections (¹⁄₆, ¹⁄₃, ¹⁄₂, ²⁄₃, ⁵⁄₆) so that the objections to the three-unit company would appear to be groundless.

The platoons (in Italy called plotone, in France, section) are subdivided into sections (demi-sections, Halbzüge), in Austria into two skirmish groups (Schwärme) of 4-7 files each, and, when consisting of 16 files, into four skirmish groups (in Italy this is also done, the groups being called squadriglio). In Germany the platoons are divided into[53] groups or squads of four files each, and in Russia the platoons are divided into sections of 8-15 files each and these again into groups or squads of 4-6 men each. If the squad is to have any importance at all in action, it must have a leader, and it might easily happen that a mobilized company lacks the number of leaders necessary to provide one for each group. The withdrawal from the line of a number of good shots for duty as squad leaders is compensated for, in our opinion, by the more thorough supervision over the men. This consideration has, however, apparently caused other states (Austria and France) not to count on the activity of the squad leaders in a fire action to the same extent as is the case in Germany.

4. LENGTH OF PACE AND MARCHING.

An extended, swinging step, without haste and without unduly taxing the lungs, is advantageous in all movements. When accustomed to this pace on the drill ground, the men will march with practically the same step on varied ground, and this appears more desirable than to shorten the step, while at the same time increasing the distance to be covered in a given time. The length of the pace depends largely upon the height of the individual, but even small men can maintain a step of 0.80 m. without undue exertion.[71] In Switzerland the cadence has been fixed at 116-120 steps per minute “with a view of suiting the peculiarities and the varying degree of mobility which characterize the inhabitants of the different cantons.”(!) For purely practical reasons it is advisable to fix upon some even number of paces in order[54] that the cadence may be tested with the watch. (Austria excepted). The longest pace in conjunction with the highest cadence (Bersaglieri, whose march is almost a double time, excepted) is found in England and Switzerland. Such a performance could not be kept up by a fully equipped man without impairing health.

[55]

In general, double time is considered of little value. In Austria double time is to be maintained for periods of two minutes, quick time of five minutes duration alternating, up to sixteen minutes, i.e., until a distance of 1,726 m. has been covered. In Germany, an alternating quick and double time march in heavy marching order is prescribed. A different practice prevails in Italy. According to the Italian Regulations all troops are to be trained to march in double time without rest and without knapsacks for 2 kilometers (with knapsacks, 1 km.); Bersaglieri without knapsacks, 3 km. (with knapsacks, 1¹⁄₂ km.), also without rest (i.e., 13 and 16.8 minutes respectively). When we consider that in double time with the necessary alternating step, 2,000 m. can be covered in 17 minutes, and in accelerated step, in 19-20 minutes, the time gained is unimportant when compared to the fatigue of the men and the exertion of the lungs, which interferes with deliberate, accurate firing. During an Austrian firing test the number of hits fell from 76.5%, attained while advancing in quick time, to 51% after a period of double time.

The run, without keeping step (Marsch! Marsch!) is employed in rapidly crossing short, fire-swept spaces, in changing quickly from one formation to another, and in the charge.

[56]

5. MOVEMENTS OF THE COMPANY IN LINE.

The commander of the center platoon is the guide.

A change of direction is effected by inclining toward the new direction (at the command: “Half right, march!” when the angular change of direction is less than 45 degrees), by indicating a new point to march on, or by executing a turn.

6. THE COLUMNS OF THE COMPANY; MOVEMENTS IN COLUMN; FORMATION OF LINE.

Column of Twos.[73]

Column of twos is formed by facing in the indicated direction. Marching at attention the depth of an organization in column of twos is equal to its front when in line. The column of twos is used in marching by the flank for short distances only, as the march at attention in this formation unduly fatigues the men. In addition, this formation may be used, in exceptional cases, on narrow roads; but the column becomes considerably elongated (as much as 165%), when marching at route step. Line is formed from column of twos either by facing, or by executing front into line.

[57]

Column of Squads.

This is an open column formed (the company being in line at a halt or in motion) by each squad executing a turn of 90 degrees. It may also be formed from line at a halt by the squad on the designated flank moving straight to the front, the others executing a turn of 90 degrees toward the proper flank, then following the leading squad.[74] Column of squads may also be formed by executing “Squads right (left), column right (left).” Line is formed by each squad executing a turn of 90 degrees or by executing front into line (without regard to the original front).

Column of Squads.

Route Column.

Route column is formed from column of squads by the squads in each section closing to facing distance, the file closers, musicians, and hospital corps men forming ranks of four men, in the gaps thus[58] created. (Par. 91 German I. D. R.) With the exception of Russia, which employs a section column, of Switzerland, which uses a column of squads, and of France, which has adopted a wheel by fours like that of the cavalry, all other armies employ the column of fours[75] as their march formation.

Column of fours is, as a rule, formed as follows:

The even numbered men place themselves on the right or left of the odd numbered men by making an appropriate turn, thus forming a column of fours whose length is equal to the front of the company in line. In the plate below let the Roman numerals represent front rank men, the Arabic numerals rear rank men, and the horizontal line the original front occupied; column of fours will then be formed to the right, in the different states, as shown:

Austria.

Russia, England, Belgium, Sweden, and Japan.

 

Italy. Netherlands.

[59]

For the purpose of increasing the front of the column, the double column of squads, having a width of 8 files, may be employed. This is formed in practice by placing the columns of two organizations (companies or battalions) side by side. In large bodies of troops, the depth of a column is reduced in this manner by one-half. A column of fours formed by closing on the center instead of by wheeling to a flank, is employed in Italy and Russia for the purpose of reducing the front of an organization.

Comparison of Column of Fours with Column of Squads.

The column of fours has the advantage over our column of squads in that it can be more quickly and easily formed; that the front rank men must make a turn, while, at the same time, observing the march direction, can scarcely be considered a disadvantage.

The column of fours and the column of squads have the same depth. The Austrians consider movements made in column of fours on the battlefield more clumsy and fatiguing than when made in column of squads, because checks are transmitted to the whole column of fours owing to its rigidity, while in column of squads the march is easier, more rapid and more orderly. The squad organization, moreover, facilitates the employment of small parties in the service of security and increases the importance of the squad leader in fire action. For the last named reason we should not like to dispense with the column of squads.

The Employment of the Column of Squads.

The route column is suitable for movements under frontal artillery fire, as the cone of dispersion of bursting time shrapnel combines small lateral spread with great effect in the direction of depth, and as it is very difficult for the opponent to observe whether a shot falls short or goes over, unless it strikes just in front of the column. When artillery can bring a flanking fire to bear on the column it becomes[60] necessary to neutralize this by placing the platoons side by side so as not to present an easily observed target to the enemy.

Movements by the flank and changes of front are easily made in column of squads, and after some practice the deployment into line of skirmishers from this formation offers no difficulties. This column is best adapted for movements over varied ground. In column of squads difficult terrain can be crossed and advantage can be taken of the most insignificant cover. In addition, it is difficult for an enemy to observe a force moving in column of squads along the edge of woods and rows of trees, and such a column entails the least expenditure of energy on the part of the men. The leaders must insist, however, that the men cover in file, and that elongation of the column does not take place. The column of squads or the route column is therefore to be employed on the battlefield as long as possible.

A column of squads or route column may be shortened by placing the platoons, each in column of twos or squads, side by side. By this means the Company Column (Kompagniekolonne) is formed.

The normal interval between platoons in this formation, measured from the leading guide of one platoon to the leading guide of the next in line, is nine paces. This interval may be increased as required by the nature of the ground and the intended deployment for action (deployment on a broader front). Movements in company column are facilitated by the fact that platoon commanders are posted four paces in front of the center of their respective platoons. The leading squad follows the platoon leader, the guide of that squad moving directly in that officer’s tracks. Thus,[61] small, unimportant deviations, unavoidable on varied ground, can easily be adjusted, while too definite rules would tend to restrict the mobility of the platoon commanders in front of their platoons. The principal thing is that the platoon follow its leader who guides it without command.

The musicians distribute themselves in rear of the platoons in readiness for their subsequent duty in action—that of maintaining communication between the several parts of the company. The intervals of nine paces between platoons are not rigid, but rather the reverse. The flexibility of the formation considerably facilitates movements in difficult country. This “meandering” of the company over the terrain requires special training. The old, historic company column, in which the platoons were formed in line one in rear of the other at a distance of nine paces (Russia 5 paces = 3.55 m., Austria, Italy, France, 6 paces = 4.50 m., and Japan, 8 paces = 6 m.), their commanders on their respective right flanks, is now called the

Column of Platoons.

Austria, France, and Italy have retained the old designation.

The front of the column of platoons may be decreased by forming column of sections. The column of sections is suitable as a route formation on broad roads; the transition from column of sections to column of squads is not difficult, and for the purpose of passing through occasional narrow stretches of road, the files on the flanks may be removed. In most cases it is, however, more desirable to place several columns abreast than to employ column of sections, because deployment is facilitated in the former case.

[62]

Company in Column of Platoons.

Germany.

Russia.

 

Austria.

[63]

Posts of Platoon Commanders.

In Switzerland, in Russia, and in Germany, the post of platoon commanders is on the flanks of their respective platoons when the company is in column of platoons. In England and Austria platoon commanders are posted in rear of their platoons, with the exception of the commander of the leading platoon, who is posted beside his guide. In all other states platoon commanders are posted in front of their platoons. Officers are posted in front of their platoons so as to facilitate observation on their part, and so that their platoons can follow them. This position becomes a necessity when the regulations require that all movements of the company be executed at commands given by platoon commanders. When they are posted in front of their platoons, they cannot supervise their men unless they turn around to do so.

The column of platoons is a close column from which line cannot be formed directly. It has not been found necessary in Germany to provide an open column permitting prompt deployment toward a flank. The column of platoons unites the company on the smallest space and facilitates supervision, but in companies at full war strength it is not well adapted for executing changes of front and for taking advantage of cover, on account of the size of the platoons (40[64] files each). In platoons at war strength the men look more toward the point upon which they are to march than upon the enemy, and the deployment of the rear platoons offers difficulties which occur principally when a deployment in an oblique direction or one by the whole company becomes necessary.

The column of platoons is formed by the flank platoons placing themselves in rear of the center platoon. Line is again formed by rear platoons moving to right and left and abreast of the leading platoon.

The German company column is much more flexible, and the advantage of a prompt deployment for action, made possible by the fact that all platoon commanders and the heads of platoons are in the lead and therefore can see the objective, should not be underestimated. The company column is formed from line by the center platoon forming column of squads to the front (or rear), the flank platoons, each in column of squads, closing on the center platoon, heads of the three columns on the same line. Company column is formed as follows from column of platoons: the leading platoon executes squads right (left), column left (right), the two rear platoons execute squads right (left), and are led to a position abreast of the leading platoon. Company column from column of squads is formed by rear platoons moving to the right and left respectively, and abreast of the leading platoon.

When line is to be formed from company column, the flank platoons have to incline to the right and left respectively in order to gain sufficient interval.

Movements in Column.

For marching short distances to a flank, column of twos may be employed; for longer distances, column of squads (or fours); and the march direction may be changed by inclining in the proper direction.

[65]

Since March 1904, experiments, which deserve to be mentioned here, have been made in France under the direction of Colonel Fumet, having for their object the simplification of the drill regulations. In the experiments a four-rank formation is being considered. In this proposed scheme the platoon is formed so as to place the four single-rank squads (escouades) in rear of each other at the very close facing distance of 0.50 m., the leaders of the escouades taking post on the right flank, a first class private being posted on each flank and in the center of each escouade.

Forming Double Rank from the Four-Rank Formation and the Reverse Movement.

Deployment of a Half-Platoon formed in Four Ranks into Two Half-Platoons formed in Double Rank.

The Platoon (section) in Line.

[66]

Deployment of a Half-Platoon Into Line of Skirmishers.

The Company.

The platoon at war strength (50 men) has a front of 8-10 m. and a depth of 3 m. The movements are very simple. Route column is formed by simply facing to flank, without first dividing the platoon into squads. Double rank line may be formed from column of fours, by executing right and left front into line. The double rank line may be deployed into half-platoons. Furthermore, a single rank line may be formed by the men of the rear rank stepping up into the front rank. One drawback of this scheme is, that, in forming route column, facing distance of 0.80 m. between ranks is to be gradually gained after stepping off. The deployment of half-platoons into line of skirmishers offers no difficulties. It is otherwise, however, when the platoon is formed in four ranks and marching in platoon front, for then line of skirmishers can be formed only by deploying each rank in turn. The depth of the column may be decreased by placing platoons (formed in column of twos or fours) abreast, this expedient affording a suitable route formation on broad roads. The company is formed by placing the platoons on a line and abreast of each other at intervals of 2 m. In the battalion, column of platoons and “mass” are the only formations considered. In the “mass” formation the companies, each in line, are in rear of each other.

[67]

7. THE BATTALION.

The movements of the battalion have been considerably simplified in all armies. Battalion drill is, however, necessary, since, as shown by the advance of the IInd Army on the morning of August 18th, 1870, simultaneous movements of large masses across country will be unavoidable in future wars on account of the great size of modern armies.[76]

Normal Formation of the German Battalion.

The four columns of platoons, or the company columns of a battalion, may be placed, as dictated by space or purpose, abreast of each other as a broad column (Breitkolonne), or in rear of each other as a deep column (Tiefkolonne). The numerical order of companies is immaterial.

Deep Column.

Broad Column.

 

[68]

The deep column is employed for assembling troops if the terrain necessitates a formation on a narrow front. If sufficient distance is allowed between companies, line may be formed to a flank, but this increases the depth of the column to such an extent that movements at attention are impossible. The deep column may be used as a route formation in addition to the column of squads. During the change from route formation to that of action, the deep column formation may be retained so long as the depth of the whole column does not have to be further reduced. When necessary, the deep column may be replaced by a formation in which the four companies, each in route column, are placed abreast of each other.

The broad column finds proper employment, aside from parades, in cases where the terrain or the contemplated deployment requires more front than depth. It is also advisable to assemble the widely scattered troops in a broad column after an action. The broad column does not lend itself, however, to the execution of changes of front by battalion; but should such changes of front become necessary, they are always to be executed by company.

The color is posted between the right and left center companies, in broad column, and on the right flank of the third company, in deep column. In action the color remains with the company with which it happens to be at the moment.[77] Should this company also join the firing line, the color accompanies it; but under all circumstances one squad must remain with the color. (Par. 236 German I. D. R.). It has been contended that this is a disadvantage, as the enemy can direct his fire on the color and the men in its vicinity. If the colors, upon which the soldiers have been sworn, are taken into the field, it is always better to endure the unavoidable losses incidental to carrying them, and even to expose them to capture, than to send them back to a[69] safe place under escort.[78] At the Albrechtshaus farm (Wörth) the colors served as rallying points around which the disordered skirmishers rapidly assembled.[79]

The figures given on pages 72 and 73 of the German Infantry Drill Regulations illustrate formations with organizations at peace strength. The approximate dimensions of broad and deep columns at war strength are as follows:

The line. In this formation the companies, each in line, are placed abreast of each other at intervals of three paces.

The column. In this formation the companies are placed in rear of each other, each either in line or in column, with distances of nine paces[70] between companies. The companies are numbered 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc., from head to rear, if in column, and from right to left, if in line.

Italy. The formations are like those of Austria, but the double column has been retained.

Japan. The only formations prescribed are the broad and deep column.

France. The companies are formed in column or in ligne de sections par quatre, intervals and distances being 10 paces. Distances and intervals may be increased when required. The battalion in line in which the companies are formed in line in numerical order, abreast of each other at intervals of six paces, is only retained as a parade formation.

Line of company columns (ligne de colonnes). Companies abreast with intervals of six paces.

Deep column (colonne de bataillon). The companies in normal formation in rear of each other at distances of 10 paces.

Double column (colonne double). Intervals and distances 10 paces.

The formation in which the companies are abreast of each other, each in column of fours at deploying intervals, is employed in marching across country and also under artillery fire. Only the regiment carries a color, the battalion a guidon (fanion).

Deep Column
(colonne de bataillon).

The companies in line of platoons in column of fours (ligne de sections par quatre).

Double Column
(colonne double).

Deep Column
(colonne de bataillon).

 

Line of Company Columns
(ligne de colonnes).

Double Column
(colonne double).

The companies in line of platoons in column of fours (ligne de sections par quatre).

 

[71]

Opinions are divided as to the value of the double column. Formerly, when the double column was still the column of attack from which deployment for fire action had to be made, a discussion of its merits was of special importance. While Austria abandoned the double column formation in 1881 and Germany in 1905, Switzerland replaced it by a column having a front of two platoons (Plotonkolonne), and Russia readopted it again recently. All other states utilize it as of equal value with the deep column in making movements beyond range of artillery fire and as an assembly formation in addition to the deep column. The change from double column to any company column formation is easier than a like change from the Swiss “Ploton column” (double column of platoons), which has the same front, since in the double column two companies can be deployed at the same time toward both flanks.

The deep column appears to be better adapted for making movements and for advancing under cover, and, on account of its narrow front, a force in this formation is better able to adapt itself to the forms of the ground in hilly or close country than a body of troops in double column of twice the width of front.

[72]

The Battalion in Route Column.
(Par. 316 German F. S. R.).

The companies are formed in route column and follow each other at distances of 8 m. Mounted officers, musicians,[81] led horses and vehicles are to be included in actual depths of columns given and not in the distances. A permanent extension of distances for the purpose of restricting checks of the march to a single organization is as little permissible as the permanent elimination or reduction of distances; distances may be dispensed with temporarily only. The reduction of the depth of a column, obtained by eliminating distances between elements entirely, is so small that the rapidity of deployment gained does not, by any means, compensate for the increased exertion of the troops.[82]

During the march the company commander goes wherever his presence may be necessary for the proper supervision of his company. Neither are platoon commanders tied to a fixed place; one officer is, however, required to march in rear of the company. The company ammunition wagons follow in rear of their respective companies, or, assembled, in rear of the battalion. In marches in campaign the field train marches separately.

The depth of the battalion on the march, without field train, is 400 m., and the depth of the field train is 100 m.

8. THE REGIMENT AND THE BRIGADE.

For a discussion of the importance of the regiment and of the brigade see page 37 supra. All movements must be executed in an orderly manner by regiment and brigade, in any formation, without breaking up tactical units, and the entity of the whole body must be preserved at the same time by a skillful use of the terrain. If necessary, a base battalion may be designated.

When regiments or brigades are assembled, the formation, disposition, intervals and distances of the tactical units depend upon the terrain and the intentions of the commander. Frequently the tactical units (battalions and regiments) are assembled in separate groups.

When considerations of the enemy and the terrain do not dictate otherwise, the battalions, each, as a rule, in deep column, are posted in one or more lines, at 30-pace intervals and distances, rear battalions covering those in front or the gaps between them. An appropriate formation will frequently be that in which route columns are placed abreast and on the same line.

In the brigade, when assembled or deployed, the regiments may be placed abreast of each other, on the same line, or in rear of each other, i.e., in line or in echelon. When[74] the regiments are formed side by side, two adjacent independent sections are created, each commanded by a regimental commander; this insures better supervision, better control, and a more energetic conduct of the action, since the first line can be reinforced by troops belonging to the same organization. This formation, moreover, facilitates tactical combinations. It may, however, be a disadvantage that the first line is not subject to the orders of a single commander; that it is difficult to employ the reserve battalions in one body; and that the brigade commander can influence the action only by withdrawing units from the regiments for the purpose of forming a reserve.[83] The echelon formation, each echelon consisting of a regiment, is frequently used in rencontres, because troops are thrown into action directly from route column. The regimental commanders then become leaders of echelons, the first line cannot be reinforced by its own troops, and the organizations of different regiments finally become mixed. The echelon formation is proper only when the second line is intended to be used independently abreast of the first in the course of the action; for example, on a flank, for the purpose of making or warding off a flank attack.[84] When part of a larger force, the most suitable combat formation for troops is usually the one in which the regiments are formed side by side.

The disadvantages of the echelon formation, when taken up from route column, can be obviated by deploying the second regiment in rear of a flank of the first. It should be kept intact in that position until the decisive moment, although[75] the state of the fight may, at the outset, invite a more rapid extension of front.

9. EXTENDED ORDER.

Combats are begun and carried out in extended order. The defender can be induced to disclose his dispositions, to occupy his position, and to open fire, only by the advance upon him of a skirmish line. The deployment of a thin firing line will frequently suffice to furnish the commander of the attacking force with a clue to the strength of the force holding the hostile position. In close country, skirmishers are pushed forward primarily to guard against surprise the force which sends them out, but when thrown forward only a few hundred meters in open country, such skirmishers are unable to furnish protection. The strength and density of a firing line (by means of which the fight is sustained) depend upon marksmanship, upon the purpose of the action, and upon the terrain. The poorer the marksmanship or the weapon, or the more unfavorable the field of fire, the greater the number of skirmishers needed (i.e., the denser the firing line).[85] If the enemy is merely to be kept at a distance, less skirmishers (i.e., a thinner firing line furnished with plenty of ammunition) will be required, than if the action is to be carried to a decisive conclusion.

Cohesion and order are best maintained, and the least time is lost in action, if efficient, dense firing lines are led forward as units up to the moment of opening fire. (Pars. 169, 321, 334 and 413 German I. D. R.). But on open terrain such dense firing lines would begin to suffer too great a loss at ranges at which they could not reply to the fire. Nothing remains then but to cover the available front with a very[76] thin firing line, followed at irregular distances by thin skirmish lines which ploy for the purpose of utilizing cover or for opening fire. Skirmish lines of this description will hardly justify the opponent’s expenditure of ammunition, as he can only cover broad spaces with volley fire. On the other hand, these skirmish lines are in themselves too weak to facilitate the approach of the following echelons by their fire. Besides, it must not be overlooked that the soldier, separated by a considerable interval from his comrades in line during the advance, and withdrawn from the influence of his officers, succumbs more easily to temporary spells of weakness and is more apt to remain behind than the skirmisher in a dense firing line. The advance in several successive, thin skirmish lines is therefore only an expedient. In each case the leaders will have to decide whether, in view of the close proximity of the enemy, a united advance with dense, powerful skirmish lines is possible or advisable (for instance, when entering at once upon the decisive stage of the action). Before opening fire the firing lines must be sufficiently reinforced. (Par. 334 German I. D. R.).

This advance in thin skirmish lines stood the test both in the Boer war and in the Russo-Japanese war,[86] but we must not forget that thin skirmish lines are only maneuver formations in an attack that is to be pushed home, and that the mistake made by the British of attempting to make an attack with such weak skirmish lines should not be imitated. The Japanese also used this formation after they had once opened fire with a dense skirmish line.[87]

[77]

It might be well to mention here that thin and dense skirmish lines, when under fire, lose an equal number of men in proportion to their strength, provided the front occupied by them is the same.

RESULTS OF A FIRING TEST AGAINST THIN AND DENSE SKIRMISH LINES.

The superior effect of fire on the dense skirmish line, as expressed by the greater number of hits, and in consequence thereof, by the gradually growing number of figures hit, is apparent. It is worthy of note and at first glance strange that, presupposing the two lines considered occupy an equal front, the percentage of figures hit is the same. The explanation of this lies in the fact that in correctly distributed fire any specified front space is equally covered with hits so that it is immaterial for the relative proportion of figures hit whether an equal number of figures is removed[78] or added. While, however, the dense skirmish line still has 131 effectives, the weaker line has only 63 left. The casualties are therefore far more perceptible in the smaller force.

(a) The Formation of the Skirmish Line.

Skirmish line with intervals of two paces between the men is formed at the command, “As Skirmishers.” (Pars. 142 and 174-180 German I. D. R.). The skirmish line may be deployed from any formation, in any direction, either with or without first changing front. (Par. 177 German I. D. R.). A greater interval than two paces must be specifically ordered. Squad leaders hasten in front of their squads and form the framework of the skirmish line. The men follow their squad leaders absolutely. When the terrain requires it, squad leaders may increase or diminish intervals without command. In other armies (for instance, in those of Italy, France, and England) the desire to keep the skirmishers under control as long as possible, has led to advancing the platoons designated for the firing line at first in close order, the deployment being made only when the state of the action requires it. In France, the intervals between files may be increased, or a single rank line may be formed before the force is deployed as skirmishers. During an advance it will often happen that intervals are increased or diminished in accordance with the peculiarities of the terrain. The advance is continued until the command or signal “Halt” is given. If line of skirmishers is to be formed when marching to the rear, the command is first faced to the front and then deployed on the line then occupied. (Rallying position, par. 180 German I. D. R.). On varied ground, deployments will be made under cover whenever possible in order to allow of an immediate advance in skirmish line from that point. The number of platoons to be[79] deployed depends upon the tactical situation. When three deployed platoons are formed abreast, it is difficult for the company commander to control them; but this formation is an appropriate one if a company is surprised or enters immediately into decisive action, or in cases where the battalion acting alone requires complete units in reserve for additional tasks. (Pars. 462, 463 and 469 German I. D. R.). When the battalion is engaged as part of a larger force, it is a good plan to occupy all the available front space at once with skirmishers and to maintain the intensity of fire of the firing line by constantly reinforcing it. The losses are less in this case than when the men crowd together in groups. (Italy).

Platoon and squad leaders are posted on the side of their commands facing the enemy while advancing; in moving to the rear, squad leaders are posted on the side away from the enemy, their duty being to maintain the march direction, and the platoon commanders remain in rear of their platoons (i.e., on the side toward the enemy). Russia is the only country where the leaders of a firing line are posted in the rear. In Austria one non-commissioned officer in each platoon is designated to march in rear of the advancing firing line for the purpose of supervising the skirmishers. As this non-commissioned officer is to prevent straggling, he should be selected with great care.

The platoon commander indicates the march direction to the leader of the base squad, and, accompanied by the range finders and the musicians, moves to a point at least ten paces in front of the line of his squad leaders, as a rule, opposite the center of his platoon; but he is not restricted to this position. He must possess mobility if he desires to lead his platoon skillfully on varied ground, if he expects to avoid interfering with neighboring platoons, and if he wishes to observe the enemy at the same time. The musician keeps the company commander constantly in view. (Par. 221[80] German I. D. R.). The range finders observe the battlefield, estimate the range to any targets appearing in view, without being specifically told to do so, communicate the range found to the platoon commander (this should not be done by shouting, as misunderstandings might result therefrom), and observe the effect of the fire. (Par. 173 German I. D. R.).

Whenever the flanks of a skirmish line are not protected by other troops or by natural obstacles, a few men under a prudent leader should always be sent out as combat patrols to the flank, or better still, to the right or left front. The patrol should under no circumstances lose connection with the command which it is to protect, but, on the other hand, should not stick so close to it that the file on the exposed flank is in a position to see as much as the combat patrol itself. As a report from a combat patrol frequently arrives too late, or cannot be made at all on account of hostile fire, signals should be agreed upon and the leader of the squad on the exposed flank of the line should keep the combat patrol constantly in view. Signal flags may also be employed advantageously in such cases.

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(b) Movements in Skirmish Line.

Fire action requires steady breathing, and, on this account, all movements to the position at which the fire fight is to be taken up, should be made, as long as possible, in a free swinging stride. A careful observation of alignment or of intervals cannot be insisted upon. Cover found within the allotted front should be utilized by ploying, but this must neither interfere with the harmonious advance of the entire force nor cause a loss of the march direction. Considerations of cover for individual men should not interfere with the spontaneous progress of the movement. Orderly movements in long skirmish lines are best made by designating a certain element as the base, whose leader is far in advance of it; all neighboring leaders maintain their intervals from, and endeavor to remain approximately on line with him. This has the advantage of relieving the commander of the whole line from looking after these details and leaves him free to concentrate all his attention on the enemy. Minor changes of the march direction are executed by inclining to the right or left or by designating a new objective. More extended movements by the flank, within range of hostile fire, are possible only under cover. Changes of direction are executed like a gradual front into line, in which a temporary echeloning of the elements, or one which can be adjusted by degrees, is unavoidable. (Par. 185 German I. D. R.).

In the absence of cover, an advance in quick time will be possible only at long ranges unless the hostile fire can be kept down by fire from enfilading or commanding positions. Skirmish lines advancing without fire support over ground devoid of cover, begin to suffer appreciable losses at 1000 m. The more effective the hostile fire, the more pressing the necessity of diminishing, as far as this is possible, the periods of time during which the skirmishers present their whole[82] bodies as targets to the enemy. This leads in itself[88] to an advance by rushes, since the whole distance separating the advancing line from the enemy cannot be covered in one rush. Double time may be employed by a skirmish line when it becomes necessary to reinforce an advancing firing line quickly, to forestall the enemy in reaching a certain point, or in moving under fire, from the covered fire position occupied, to another position. It is impossible to prescribe definitely and for all cases at what ranges the advance by rushes should be taken up and when fire should be opened in advancing by rushes, since it depends upon the intensity of the hostile fire.

The assailant will, in the first place, endeavor to advance without firing, in order to reach those ranges quickly at which his fire will begin to be effective against the well-covered targets of the defender. The skirmishers advance in strong detachments, by rushes of the greatest possible length, taking short breathing spells at each halt. Very soon, however, the hostile fire makes this advance impossible. A fire fight of variable duration must first make a further advance possible by silencing the fire of the defender. In a serious infantry engagement every step forward must be purchased by the fire of the attacking infantry. The attacker will, in exceptional cases only, continue his advance in long lines, although this must appear desirable to him, for almost invariably only a part of his force will still be able to gain ground to the front when supported by the fire of neighboring detachments. Favorable local conditions, insignificant losses, and, above all, the personality of the commander will embue a force with the determination to advance.

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Time Required for Making a Rush. Strength of the Force Making the Rush.

The squad requires 5-6, the platoon at war strength about 10-15 seconds preparation for making a rush.

While the attacker covers a distance of 80 m., the defender, if in readiness, can fire 4-5 shots. This proves very clearly that, in order to be able to make such a rush, a certain superiority of fire is absolutely essential. These figures change radically as soon as the troops are seriously engaged with the enemy and come under his fire at short ranges. At short ranges, aside from the size of the target offered, attempts to advance by rushes with entire companies must very soon cease of their own accord.

The character of the terrain and the fire of the enemy play a decisive role here.

The strength of the force making the rush is intimately connected with the length of the rushes. A small, isolated force would run the risk of being fired on by its own neighboring detachments. Besides, confidence and moral courage are difficult to find in a small force. It is difficult to carry forward long lines as units. The use of long lines necessitates, as a rule, an almost complete cessation of fire, and, in addition, mutual fire support suffers. Long lines should therefore be employed only when the attacker possesses a very marked superiority of fire. In practice it has been found advantageous to make the rush with the smallest fraction led by an officer, i.e., with a platoon.

The severest test of discipline is for a skirmish line to rise and rush forward under an effective hostile fire. This movement had best be executed with precision and energy even during peace exercises. The formation and manner of execution must become second nature to the soldier, like a movement of the manual of arms, which he retains during his entire military service, and a knowledge of which he brings with him when called to the colors during mobilization. The example set by advancing leaders and the arrival of reinforcements, which move forward through the firing line, have been found to be the most effective means of carrying a skirmish line forward.

The critical moment occurs when the men rise and prepare to rush forward, for an unsubdued enemy will be desirous to prevent, by increasing his fire, any attempt to advance. The fire support afforded by neighboring detachments would seem to have a conditional value only; for, being themselves under fire, the skirmishers of these detachments cannot be expected to divert their fire from the opponent previously fired upon, to an enemy by whom they themselves are not threatened. In oblique fire, the rifles, on account of their short barrel, interfere with neighboring ones, and, in addition, expose the men advancing on the flanks to the danger of being hit by the fire of their comrades. The fire support is, therefore, restricted to hindering the hostile skirmishers directly opposite from firing on the advancing[85] unit. When the terrain is favorable, infantry and machine guns should not hesitate to fire over the heads of their own skirmishers. The coöperation of artillery will, in any case, be of great value, and infantry will have to select those moments for advancing when the defender is driven under cover by the hail of shot.

The advance by rushes, consuming time and energy, is an expedient to which the enemy compels us to resort as the only means of gaining ground to the front. The firm determination to close with the enemy and the ever-increasing difficulty of inducing the men to advance from cover, require that long rushes be made. Short rushes are neither consonant with the nature of the attack, nor with the desire to close with the enemy. “Many halts during an advance are fatal to the offensive.” (Hönig). The powers of endurance of the men, the character of the ground, and the hostile fire, as well as the support afforded by infantry and artillery fire, influence the length of the rush. If the leader has already caused the skirmishers to rise, it is best to let them run forward so long as the physical powers of the men and the hostile fire permit. The only danger is that the men will throw themselves down prematurely, and without orders. It is rather an advantage that during the rapid advance, increasing both muscular and nervous activity, the men do not think of danger and have no time to pay attention to their fallen comrades. One fact is, however, worthy of special attention: If we train a soldier to make long rushes in time of peace, he will be able to make them in time of war, and it is easier for a leader to decrease than to increase the length of rushes in the field.

The short rushes are considered advantageous because they take the enemy by surprise, in consequence of which he is not in a condition to direct his fire on the advancing unit. Rushes should be made with startling suddenness. They should[86] not be made in step at double time, but, on the contrary, as rapidly as possible (by rushing); by the time the enemy directs his fire on them, the skirmishers should already have thrown themselves down. Stragglers should also throw themselves down, when the men in the lead drop down behind cover, and should then endeavor to reach the firing line by crawling.

The enemy will concentrate his fire on the unit which advanced first. The fire of this unit will at the start be rather weak, getting stronger gradually. If this unit is left in its advanced position for some time there is danger of its being thrown back; all neighboring units must therefore endeavor to rejoin it as soon as possible.

The greater the superiority of our fire, i.e., the marksmanship which compels the enemy to keep under cover, the greater the length of the rushes and the rapidity with which they follow upon each other.

Short rushes with small units occur quite naturally, because the platoon leader no longer succeeds in inducing his whole platoon to rise, since his influence extends only to the men nearest him, and because the flank squads at first remain behind and only gradually try to rejoin the leading skirmishers. If only a part of the skirmishers have jumped up, it is quite natural for them not to make a long rush, but to throw themselves down before reaching the new position, because of the feeling that they have been abandoned by their comrades and the fear of running into their field of fire. Thus, in spite of the best intentions of the leader, the short rush by small units occurs. In time of peace, however, we should retain the long rush by platoons and not endeavor to give human weaknesses the force of regulations.

When once compelled to employ short rushes the following question presents itself: Is the advantage of such a small gain of ground worth the trouble of inducing the soldier to rise for making an advance by rushes? Would it, therefore, not be more profitable to crawl forward? A man[87] crawling on his belly presents a vulnerable surface of approximately the size of a breast plate 50 cm. high. In an advance made by a large unit, or over covered terrain (fields of standing grain) crawling would be difficult (difficulty of maintaining the direction of march and reduction of the rate of advance); it would also be difficult to get men to advance to the charge after they have crawled along in this fashion for some time. The supervision of a unit crawling forward would also be exceedingly difficult. The following results were obtained in experiments made under favorable conditions: A distance of 500 m. was covered by crawling in about 10 minutes; crawling tired the men, increased the activity of the lungs to such an extent that deliberate aiming and firing was out of the question and the motion produced a noticeable swelling of arms, hands and knees.[89] The Boers occasionally used the following method: One man crept forward once or twice his own length, raising his body slightly, while the man next to him fired; then they exchanged roles and this procedure was repeated uninterruptedly. In any case, troops ought to be able to execute both the advance by rushes and the advance by crawling with or without firing. On terrain devoid of cover a skirmish line will frequently be able to advance only by crawling.

Lessons of the Boer War

: “The rushes * * * were of variable length, according to the intensity of the hostile fire; they varied from 30 to 80 m. According to the opinion of many British officers it was exceedingly difficult to induce skirmishers to rise and rush forward under hostile fire; but that once upon their feet, it became necessary to[89] push the attack forward as far as possible regardless of the increased losses entailed by the longer rushes.”[92]

One who fought on the Boer side reports as follows in regard to the British advance by rushes: “The men rose gradually and hesitatingly. This gave the attentively watching enemy time to pour a well directed fire upon the last men who arose. Thus even short rushes made by long lines became generally too costly to be executed. Smaller groups, on the other hand, were able to move with startling rapidity. * * * Every sudden interruption of the firing that might attract the enemy’s attention should therefore be carefully avoided, but, as a rule, this is possible only when the advancing units are small.”

The British Regulations of 1896 prescribe rushes of 30-40 m., and those published immediately after the war (1902) prescribe rushes of 70-90 m., but the rush is to continue only while the surprise of the enemy lasts.

Russo-Japanese War.

In the Japanese army, the 5th Infantry Division employed short, and very short, rushes by preference, while other divisions of the 1st Army as a rule preferred long rushes. From an English work we obtain the following data in regard to the length of rushes and the expenditure of ammunition per rifle during halts between consecutive rushes in the engagement on the Shiliho on October 12th, 1904, at ranges beginning with 1,000 m.

From the table it appears that after gaining the superiority of fire, beginning with the fifth rush, at about 625 m. from the enemy, the length of the rushes increased; the last 400 m. were covered in one rush as the enemy withdrew from his position.

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If we assume that three shots per minute were fired from each rifle, it follows that the attack consumed approximately 40-45 minutes.

Provisions of the Various Regulations Relative to the Advance by Rushes.

Frequently, when the men are very much fatigued, when advancing over plowed ground and through extensive grain fields, an advance by rushes will be impossible. Whether[92] fire while in motion ought to be employed in this case should be determined. A preliminary condition for its employment is, however, that the enemy’s fire has been subdued or that he has been forced under cover. To advance against an unshaken enemy with fire while in motion must lead to the annihilation of the attacking force. While the defender scores only 12.8% hits against advancing skirmishers at 700 m., the attacker scores only 1.6% to 3.5% hits against head and breast targets. With such a discrepancy in fire effect, the attack, if employing fire while in motion, is bound to collapse, unless it has already gained a superiority of fire prior to the advance. It is unfortunate that fire while in motion is frequently employed when inappropriate during drills. The danger of men wounding each other and of the advance hesitating because the officers are not in front of the line is not to be underestimated. On the other hand, the advantages of eliminating the difficulties of inducing the men to rise, of the troops leaving their losses behind, of stragglers being more easily detected, and of keeping the entire hostile line under fire, cannot be denied. In war this method of advance will frequently result without orders while advancing to the charge after the defender has been driven under cover. (In Russia this mode of advance is prescribed).

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There is no model advance within the zone of effective infantry fire. All expedients, whether they be sneaking or crawling, long or short rushes, or fire while in motion, are of equal value, if the force, kept well in hand by the leader, is thereby brought closer to the enemy. Every opportunity to gain a foot of ground to the front, offered by flanking fire or fire directed at the enemy over the heads of the advancing force, must be utilized. The effect of our own artillery fire should also be attentively followed with a view to advancing when the hostile skirmishers have sought refuge under cover to escape our shrapnel.

Examples of the Employment of Fire While in Motion.

Examples of the Employment of Rushes.

In contrast with these examples of long rushes, almost every obstinate engagement with an unshaken enemy showed that “every step forward” had to be literally gained by the impulse imparted by the arrival of small, fresh detachments, that the rushes often faltered after only 20-30 paces, and that frequently nothing remained but to work forward individually. (See pp. 76 and 87 supra.)

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(c) Reinforcing the Firing Line.

If the fire power of the firing line is to be maintained after heavy losses, or the intensity of its fire is to be augmented, or when it finally is to receive the impulse for making a further advance, it must be reinforced. (Pars. 226, 227 and 341 German I. D. R.). This may be done by prolonging the line (platoons abreast at well defined intervals), or, when space is lacking and after losses have occurred, by putting men in the intervals (i.e., increasing the density of the line and filling it up). When the firing line is prolonged, tactical units are not broken up, and this facilitates fire control. Whenever practicable, the firing line should be reinforced by prolonging it, although the other method, that of placing men in the intervals and gaps of the firing line, is more frequently used and more practical because the arrival of fresh men and the replacement of incapacitated officers occasioned thereby renews the strength of the firing line (replenishment of ammunition). The breaking up of platoons is unavoidable, and on that account platoon and squad leaders should be trained in time of peace to form new units at once so that control is not lost. In order to prevent the mixing of units, so far as this is possible, and to keep the firing line filled up with skirmishers, even during an engagement entailing heavy losses, it is indispensable that the fighting front should be limited, that of a company in attack to 150, in defense to about 200 m. The unit designated to reinforce the firing line endeavors to approach that line under cover, forms skirmish line at any rate before leaving the last cover and advances by rushes, or, if directly in rear of the firing line and under a heavy fire, even by crawling.

(d) Closing Up. Assembling. Re-Forming.
(Pars. 211-214 and 230-232 German I. D. R.).

The most effective method of preventing a mixing of organizations in action is for all units constantly to endeavor to close in toward their leaders, filling gaps as soon as casualties have occurred. Squads which have sustained heavy losses unite with adjoining ones under a common leader. This closing in can, as a rule, be executed only while in motion. It must be effected gradually and the intervals ordered should be maintained. Crowding of every description increases losses and causes dangerous gaps along the entire front.

If in the course of an engagement, the purpose of the action and the situation make it no longer desirable to retain an extended order formation, each leader, from the squad leader upward, must assemble his unit at once and place himself and it at the disposal of the commander of the next higher unit. Formed bodies must be created quickly and held well in hand by their leaders, without awaiting specific orders to that effect.

The troops must be assembled very quietly and always facing the enemy.

The original organizations are not re-formed until the command “Fall in” is given. (Pars. 214 and 232 German I. D. R.).

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10. SUPPORTS.
(Pars. 222-228 and 341 German I. D. R.).

The limited front assigned to an organization necessitates, in the first place, a division into firing line and retained fractions. At the decisive stage of a fight every available man must, without question, be in the first line.

Italy. Supports are not to be used when they cannot be maintained at a less distance from the firing line than that separating the latter from the enemy.

It is the duty of supports to reinforce and extend the firing line, to cover the flanks (par. 222 German I. D. R.), to act as a reserve, and, in case of necessity, as a rallying force upon which the firing line can fall back. The presence of supports increases confidence in attack, and the power of resistance in defense. Supports enable a leader to influence the action, to give a firing line that has been checked the impetus necessary to carry it forward, and to affect the action by sending reinforcements to points where he wishes to gain an advantage. The support follows that part of the firing line which, in all probability, will need its assistance; if part of the same organization as the firing line, it follows in rear of the center, otherwise in rear of a wing. In a company advancing alone over covered terrain, it will sometimes be necessary to place small supports in rear of both flanks. Firing lines can perhaps advance for some time under hostile fire, whether they move by twos, by squads, or by platoons, but the power necessary for pushing home the attack must be imparted to them from the rear; otherwise the energy of the attack will spend itself. The necessity of having supports in rear of the firing line is clearly illustrated in the very instructive engagement at Wagon Hill in front of Ladysmith (6th January 1900). In this fight all attempts to push the firing line forward failed, and the necessary[99] impetus for the decisive advance was not given until fresh supports were fed into the firing line.[100]

In hilly country the supports can fire over the heads of the skirmishers in front of them without neglecting their proper functions. (Switzerland and England). Such opportunities should not be overlooked, as they increase the volume of fire.

Distances depend upon the object to be attained by the action and upon the terrain.

When a decision is sought, distances should be decreased in the course of the action. When this is the case, the leaders of all grades should be animated by but one desire, that of being in front in order to participate in gaining the victory. The duration of the crisis of an action is usually brief, and in a very few rapidly passing moments the leader must decide what to do with the troops remaining available.

When an immediate decision is not sought, it is advisable to increase distances in order to keep the echelons held back in rear from coming under fire. In any case, the distance between supports and firing line should be less than the distance between firing line and enemy. In an attack, supports should be close enough to the firing line to prevent, by timely interference, a retrograde movement of the latter. On the defensive, on account of the difficulty of bringing up supports for the purpose of repulsing an assault, they will usually be placed a short distance immediately in rear of or within the firing line (intrenched) at the points where they are to be employed.

During an attack, whenever the lines in rear cannot be kept out of hostile fire, care must nevertheless be taken that two echelons be not simultaneously struck by a cone of infantry fire or by one and the same shrapnel. The distance between echelons is therefore increased to more than 300[100] m., and should not be reduced until the decisive stage of the combat approaches.

In open country, supports held too close to the firing line will soon cease to exist as such. When kept in close order, their losses would be so great that the boldest men would join the firing line and the less courageous would hunt cover. Everything depends upon the manner in which supports are led forward, especially during that part of the advance immediately preceding their junction with the firing line. In this lies the whole art of fighting in deep formations. Covered terrain permits distances to be reduced. The commander should be particularly careful not to let this advantage escape him, since on such terrain it is more frequently necessary promptly to reinforce the firing line.

The commander of the support must constantly observe the movements and successes of the firing line in order that he may be able to reinforce it in the most advantageous manner. Whenever he is obliged to split up his command during a movement to the front, he should endeavor to reunite it at the first opportunity.

The support should closely adapt its movements to those of the firing line. When a part of the firing line makes a rush, the support halts for the moment, and then runs forward to the next cover, simultaneously with the next advancing unit of the firing line, and covered by the fire of the skirmishers in front. “To make a rush at the same time as the firing line was impossible, because, as soon as the latter rose, the Turks opened a murderous fire. Whenever the firing line threw itself down and returned the fire, that of the enemy became noticeably weaker.”[101]

The supports follow the firing line in single or double rank, in column of twos or squads, in skirmish line or in line of squads, in quick time or by rushes; it may also be advisable to deviate temporarily from the direction of advance.[101] Columns having a narrow front, so long as they are not open to attack from a flank, are able to withstand long range infantry fire. (Par. 224 German I. D. R.). On coming to a halt, it is advisable to return to close order formation; at any rate, the leader must get his command again entirely under control.

Supports in Rear of the Firing Line or Not?

Up to a few years ago (1894), the French battalion was divided into firing line and companies of the second line. The Japanese, also, often placed entire companies in the firing line, which could not be quickly enough reinforced by the companies of the second line, because these were held too far in rear. At any rate, supports are of advantage during the first deployment before the situation is clear.

The following arguments are advanced against the employment of supports:

1. The supports following the firing line suffer losses, without, as a rule, being able to participate in the action. This argument is not well founded, since the criticism made with reference to supports is equally applicable to companies in the second line. That supports threw themselves into the firing line in the Franco-German war, in the belief that they were needlessly suffering losses, was due to the fact that they followed the firing line too closely.

Supports following the firing line closely (250-300 m.) can reach the firing line quickly and can easily find cover on account of the small angle of fall of modern bullets. Besides, the knowledge that supports are immediately in rear, the moral factor, should not be underestimated.

2. The supports may be commanded by inexperienced leaders, who will not always act with the good judgment the situation demands and will fail to seize the right moment for advancing. (This can perhaps never be avoided).

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3. Pushing the supports into the firing line tends to mix units, makes control more difficult, and impairs the efficacy of fire. These criticisms are not applicable to a company, for it is in any case impossible for the company commander to control the fire; this is the business of platoon commanders.

The advantages of supports are, that they increase the number of targets offered the hostile artillery; that, by reason of their small size, they can utilize every accident of the ground; that they can be kept close enough to the firing line to reinforce it in case of sudden emergency; and that they allow companies in the second line to be kept farther to the rear. A battalion, when part of a larger force, need not keep formed bodies as supports; but a few platoons, following the firing line in close order on the flanks, are an advantage. The drawbacks of the petits paquets would appear only if every company were to preserve a support up to the decisive stage of the action.

11. COMPARISON BETWEEN CLOSE AND EXTENDED ORDER.

In close order the men are placed so close together that they can be led by word of command and directly influenced by their officers. The position of the individual soldier is fixed; the men on either side of him interfere with his utilizing cover or his weapon. On terrain devoid of cover, close order formations present such large targets to infantry fire, that their employment, when exposed to the unsubdued fire of the enemy, is impossible and must lead to annihilation. Thus the hostile fire compels the most extended deployment.[102]

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In extended order the soldier’s position is not definitely fixed; he is not required to keep his body in a prescribed position, nor is he expected to handle his rifle by the numbers as in the manual. Instead, judgment, agility, courage, confidence in himself, skill in handling his weapon and in taking full advantage of the accidents of the ground, as well as unremitting attention to his leader, are demanded of the skirmisher.

The difficulties of troop leading are, moreover, increased by the noise and other disorganizing influences of the fight, especially in broken or wooded country. Whether an organization is thoroughly trained and disciplined is best shown in extended order fighting, for, as the direct control of the leader on his command decreases, the demands made on the initiative of the individual soldier increase out of all proportion. It is at any rate more practical to develop this initiative than to try to prevent the disorganizing effect of combat by restricting the personal freedom of the individual soldier.

In order to keep troops well in hand and to deploy them quickly in any direction, it is requisite that close order formations be retained as long as the terrain and the hostile fire permit. After an action, in order to make a renewed employment of the troops possible, they must be assembled[104] in close order without regard to the previously existing organization.

In night combats, in actions against cavalry not supported by other arms, in putting down rebellions, and frequently in colonial wars[103] as well, the importance of close order formations increases when the troops show a disposition to get out of hand.

In extended order, infantry can most easily surmount obstacles, cross difficult terrain, and take the fullest advantage of the accidents of the ground, as cover against hostile fire and as rifle rests. In extended order, infantry is, moreover, able to develop its fire power most effectively, while at the same time offering the smallest possible targets to the hostile projectiles. Thus the skirmish line is the principal combat formation of infantry; by means of it a combat is initiated and carried through to the end.

Close order is best adapted for establishing discipline in the simplest and most rapid manner by means of drill. At Jena the Prussian battalions were not defeated because of their drill, but because they were poorly led. What function drill had fulfilled at that time is pretty well illustrated by the heavy losses sustained by the Prussian infantry and by the fact that, although placed in a situation to which they were entirely unaccustomed, the troops retained their steadiness. No properly led army has been able to dispense with drill in developing its discipline. In the days of linear and column tactics the ultimate object of training was the leading of battalions in close order, in magnificent array, against the enemy. By means of drill a passive discipline was to be created in which intelligence played no part whatever. We know with what energy the army of the First Napoleon was drilled according to the wholly superannuated regulations of linear tactics in the camp at Boulogne and[105] during the brief pauses between campaigns. A well drilled organization has ever, when well led, proved equal to the occasion.[104] The electrifying word of command is an important factor in assisting an organization accustomed to it to overcome difficult situations. No leader will voluntarily dispense with this aid. When Austrian shells struck the company of Count Finkenstein during the advance against the Shipwald, that officer halted his command, brought it to shoulder arms and did not continue the movement until order had been completely restored.

General v. Blume considers drill and skirmish training two distinct methods by means of which efficient soldiers may be created. To quote: “In this connection the most perfect results would undoubtedly be attained by efficient drill and thorough skirmish training.” Where both these methods cannot be coördinated, training in extended order fighting should take precedence. General v. d. Goltz raises the objection that this might perhaps produce skirmishers, but not soldiers, i.e., men whose devotion to duty surpasses their fear of death. General v. d. Goltz is right in demanding combat drill. In this term he includes the painstaking execution of all those accomplishments which the skirmisher needs in action and which he should be able to use correctly and quickly without lengthy deliberation. To this category belong rapid loading and setting of the sight, good pointing in any position, accurate aiming, cool firing, quick locking of the piece, prompt jumping up for the advance, taking advantage of accidents of the ground in lying down for the purpose of heightening the fire effect, crawling forward with or without firing, etc., etc. Since all these things must be practiced individually, and since many of them do not permit of simultaneous execution by an entire unit, we usually speak of combat training instead of combat drill, without, however, intending any other meaning.

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“Drill is always mechanical. The instructor can make the skirmisher load quickly and carefully, can cause him to take the position of aim, just as he drills the correct execution of present arms and the rise preparatory to advancing by rushes. Training is directed at the mentality of the man, it makes him independent and allows him to exercise initiative, even when he is no longer directly under his superior officers’ influence, and when, in a critical hour, he is no longer able to follow their example.

“Drill and training are both justified, each in its appropriate sphere; the scope of both is closely defined and neither one could be dispensed with. ‘Drill’ assists in creating the ‘soldier,’ because it develops the characteristics which must be required of a ‘soldier’: Endurance in surmounting hardships and dangers, unquestioning subordination of his will to that of the leader, tenacity and trustworthiness, skill in handling his weapon and in utilizing the ground. The addition of training will, of course, increase the value of this ‘soldier’ very considerably.

“Training alone will never attain this object. To arouse and develop the man’s intellect may make him a good skirmisher, a skillful member of a patrol, but for battle he remains incomplete, since his awakened mental powers have not been made available by the disciplining drill. His energies are not governed by a higher will. Nothing can give us the assurance that he may not fail at the most decisive moment. He is no soldier.”[105]

The French, for reasons inherent in their character, discard this drill and seek to replace it by developing the moral factors: “Moral powers are the mightiest pillars of success. Honor and patriotism fill troops with the noblest devotion. The spirit of self-sacrifice and the determination to win ensure success; discipline and steadiness guarantee the influence of the leaders and the coöperation of all the elements.”[106]

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For enthusiasm, we would substitute faithful, unselfish performance of duty, and unquestioning subordination of the will of the individual to that of the leader. To be sure, on days of success enthusiasm will suffice, but not when everything around us begins to waver and to yield. The importance of drill, which cannot be replaced by anything else, does not become apparent until all enthusiasm disappears, until the leader becomes conscious of the specter of panic which stalks by the side of enthusiasm.

“Discipline,” says Archduke John in his well-known work Drill or Training, “must not be confounded with the snappy drill of troops, and can, moreover, not be attained by means of it. The straightjacket has never yet cured one insane person; the soul cannot be disciplined through the body. One must work from the inside and not from the outside. It is of little value if the outer annular rings of a tree are beautiful and regular; it will rot and die in spite of its deceptive appearance; if its heart is not healthy, the first storm may bring it down. The inner man must look beautiful; firmness and steadiness are needed within; the marching tread of feet on the drill ground plain are of no moment; the beat of the heart filled with the spirit of self-sacrifice is the important factor.”

It is well known that Emperor William I. changed the title of the brochure Drill or Training, written by Archduke[108] John, to Drill and Training. Training necessitates a good corps of instructors and a great deal of time, whereas drill will accomplish in a shorter time results which are not so enduring. It is again presupposed that the recruits are willing to be trained, otherwise all efforts are unavailing. The question whether the individual man can be influenced sufficiently in a two years’ service period to overcome even sentiments inimical to the state, instilled in him by friends or relatives, can only be answered by the next war. To answer this question at the present time would be premature; but one thing is certain: the sharp word of command, the whole influence of a well-organized body of troops, will sweep along even the reluctant in the hour of danger.

The importance of the tactical formations which at one time constituted minor tactics has doubtlessly decreased; unfavorable formations, in so far as they increase or reduce losses, increase or restrict one’s fire effect, can be offset by the fighting efficiency of the soldier and by proper leading. The unfortunate termination of the battle of Jena for the Prussian arms, as already mentioned, bears no relation to drill as such. The formations in themselves were not at fault, for linear tactics scored the greatest successes in the Peninsular war and at Waterloo; and at the Katzbach, Prussian battalions of Borke’s Brigade in line overran the French columns. Within certain limits, numerical inferiority and lack of fighting efficiency can be offset by leadership. But numbers and fighting efficiency will always remain the decisive factors for success.

The victory of Spicheren was due primarily to the troops and not to leadership. This is likewise true of Wörth. The lion’s share in the victory of Vionville is certainly due to the fighting efficiency of the gallant Brandenburgers. Finally, at St. Privat, the crisis produced by the commanders was successfully overcome only by the tenacity of the troops, who maintained their positions for hours under the most destructive hostile fire.

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Increased demands must at present be made upon the combat training of the soldier. The combat requires enterprising, self-sacrificing, cold-blooded men who are imbued with the spirit of the reckless offensive. “The combat requires thinking leaders, trained to rely upon themselves, and skirmishers having initiative.” (Par. 2 German I. D. R.). “Judgment, self-confidence and boldness must be aroused and continually developed in the young soldier.” (Par. 144 German I. D. R.). “The aim of all exercises should be to develop the soldier into a self-thinking and conscientiously working skirmisher.” (Par. 158 German I. D. R.). “All training should be directed toward producing self-reliance in leaders and in the individual skirmisher.” (Par. 251 German I. D. R.). “The infantry must nourish the desire for taking the offensive; its actions must be guided by the one thought, forward, at the enemy, no matter what the cost.” (Par. 265 German I. D. R.). “The continuous desire to press forward and the endeavor to surpass all other units must animate all parts of the attacking force.” (Par. 327 German I. D. R.). “It should be a point of honor with skirmishers not to allow the supports to overtake them earlier than the moment of penetrating the enemy’s position.” (Par. 348 German I. D. R.). “Those who fall must be left behind. These sacrifices should not lead to an abatement of the pursuit any more than the losses sustained in the previous fight caused the renunciation of the purpose of the combat.” (Par. 424 German I. D. R.). “A commander who is ever willing to shoulder responsibility will not shrink from throwing troops into the fight regardless of consequences even when the outcome of the battle is doubtful.” (Par. 304 German I. D. R.).

If love of life and fear of death are overcome in a soldier by discipline, in an officer this must be brought about by a higher sense of duty and honor. On the battlefield the desire to live does not appear in a cultured person, as a rule, in its ordinary, undisguised form; it makes itself felt rather[110] in the shape of tactical scruples, whether the leader would be justified in leading his subordinates to certain death, whether it would not be his duty to preserve the force entrusted to him for more important duty in the service of the fatherland, instead of sacrificing it uselessly. If, in addition, an officer has been allowed, in time of peace, to criticise, from the start, an order of his superior with reference to its feasibility, it may easily happen in the stern reality of actual war that a subordinate leader, neither especially courageous nor ambitious, succumbs to the seductive whisperings of his senses on the approach of danger and sees in caution the better part of valor. It is always suspicious if troops have become accustomed to consider insignificant losses, common to colonial wars, accompanied by great physical exertions, as indications of good leadership.[107] Great victories are, as a rule, invariably accompanied by great losses.

A. THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.

1. THE FIELD GUN.

The field artillery of all the states that need be considered is armed with a rapid-fire gun provided with shields and capable under peace conditions of firing as many as twenty shots per minute. Its caliber varies from 7.5 to 8.38 cm. (Germany, 7.7; France, 7.5; Russia, 7.62, and England, 8.38 cm., the last-named being an 18 pdr.). The German gun fires shrapnel weighing 6.85 kg. (the Russian, 6.5, and the French 7.25 kg.) and high explosive shell of approximately the same weight, with an initial velocity of 465 m. (the Russian 588 and the French 530 m.). The projectiles are burst through the action of combination fuzes (in Germany graduated to 5000, in France and Russia to 5500 m.). The projectiles have a maximum range of 8000 m., when percussion fuze is used. Canister has been replaced by shrapnel, which bursts approximately 200 m. in front of the gun when the fuze is set at zero. The German field artillery is also equipped with a light field howitzer, cal. 10.5 cm., which fires shrapnel weighing 12.8 kg. (time fuze ranging from 300 to 5600 m.) and shell weighing 15.7 kg. (time fuze ranging from 500 to 5600 m.). The Germans use heavy field howitzers (cal. 14.91 cm., firing shell that has an extreme range of 6870 m.) in the heavy artillery of the field army. France uses the 15.5 cm. Rimailho howitzer, England a 12.7 cm. howitzer and another long piece of 12 cm. caliber.

Percussion shrapnel

is used for defense at short range, and in fire for adjustment; its effect depends upon the range[112] and the nature of the ground. It is effective against troops lodged in tall timber. Masks, branches of trees, etc., frequently cause the premature burst of the projectiles.[108]

Percussion shrapnel is effective only when bursting immediately in front of the target (5-25 m. in front of it, depending upon the range). However, even in this case, the bullets often pass over low targets, such as skirmishers lying down, and low parapets afford sufficient protection. An adequate effect can be obtained only when the fire is directed on vertical targets. Soft ground, newly ploughed fields, terrain covered with snow or underbrush, small folds of the ground, or a rising slope, diminish the fire effect. When the angle of fall is 10 degrees or more (with the German piece at ranges of 3300 m. and over) half of the bullets penetrate the ground, the remainder ricochet and pass on at a greatly reduced velocity. The explosive or incendiary effect of shrapnel is insignificant owing to the smallness of the bursting charge. However, some incendiary effect is possible if the projectile strikes an easily inflammable target.[109]

Percussion Shrapnel.

Time shrapnel

(used in Germany up to 5000 m.) is fairly independent of the terrain, the burst being[113] easily observed since the bullets are embedded in a “smoke-producing composition.” The extreme range at which this projectile can be employed is fixed by the facility of observing the fire and by the remaining velocity of the shrapnel bullets, both of which diminish as the range increases. Field guns, model ’96, may be effectively employed up to a range of 4000 m.; under 3000 m. their fire is so annihilating that decisive results are produced in a short time. (Par. 630 German F. S. R.). The use of the combination fuze, on account of its certainty of burst, either by time or percussion, permits the trajectory to be accurately determined in every case. This fuze also makes it possible to employ shrapnel against rapidly advancing targets, and in warding off a sudden attack at short range. The French Regulations give the width of the beaten zone of a single shrapnel as 20, that of two from the same piece as 25 m. The maximum depth of the beaten zone is 300 m. The angle of the cone of dispersion of the German shrapnel, model ’96, is 16 degrees at 2000 m. German shrapnel (model ’91) fired at a line of infantry did not strike lines following 250 m. in rear of the first, whereas in case of base charge shrapnel these lines would be safe only at 350-400 m. from the first line. The German shrapnel gives very good results when set to burst 30 to 150 m. in front of the target, the height of burst being regulated accordingly (approximately ¹⁄₃ of the whole number of hundreds of meters of the range). At ranges under 1500 m., an adequate fire effect may, however, be expected even when the fuze is set to burst the projectile 300 m. in front of the target. (Par. 30 German F. A. F. R.).

Shrapnel is most effective against skirmishers lying down from 1000 to 3000 m. when burst 28 to 22 m. short, and against standing skirmishers at the same ranges when burst 56 to 45 m. short. The two tables given below, borrowed from the work of Lieutenant-General Rohne on artillery tactics,[110][114] give an idea of the effect of a single time shrapnel, and of the effect per minute of shrapnel fire after adjusting upon the target:

More than 80% of the men struck by fragments and bullets from shrapnel bursting within 100 m. are disabled. The penetration of shrapnel bullets is so great, at ranges under 2000 m., that when they strike bones or vital organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity for action. This is especially true when the interval of burst is less than 100 m. The effect of shrapnel directed against batteries provided with shields is insignificant. Time shrapnel is the principal projectile employed[115] by artillery against animate objects, provided these are not located immediately in rear of parapets, within tall timber, or under bomb-proofs. This projectile is ineffective against such cover on account of the flatness of the trajectory and the sensitiveness of the fuze.

Shrapnel is to be supplemented by shell filled with explosive charge, model ’88, which has a great explosive effect at extreme ranges and in tall timber. (See pars. 159-160 German F. A. F. R., in regard to action against shielded batteries).

Percussion Shell, Model ’96.

Targets located immediately in rear of parapets or under light splinter proofs may be reached with time shell burst directly over or close in front of them. The depth of the beaten zone of this projectile is small, seldom exceeding 50 m., even when the fire is directed against targets in the open. About 75% of all the fragments are capable of inflicting disabling wounds when the interval of burst is short. The peculiar character of the projectile necessitates a very careful adjustment in range and in height of burst. The French obus allongé, a high explosive percussion shell (melinite charge; angle of the cone of dispersion exceeds 100 degrees) is employed only for the destruction of material objects.[111]

[116]

The French projectile, on account of the fuze used, bursts only after it has pierced thin walls or shields.

Time Shell, Model ’96.

2. THE LIGHT FIELD HOWITZER.

The realization that the power of resistance of a defender lodged in deep trenches, could not be broken by the fire of guns having a flat trajectory, led to the re-adoption of a gun capable of high angle fire, which had been eliminated from the field artillery upon the advent of rifled cannon.[112]

For both flat trajectory and high angle fire, the light field howitzer, model ’98, employs shrapnel weighing 12.8 kg. (500 jacketed bullets, @ 10 g.; time fuze graduated from 300 to 5600 m.) and shell weighing 15.7 kg. (0.37 kg. explosive charge, model ’88; time fuze graduated from 500 to 5600 m.). As delay action fuzes are used, it is possible to utilize to the fullest extent the power of penetration of the projectile before it bursts.

A single shrapnel from a light field howitzer produces a greater number of hits, when the point of burst is favorably[117] situated, than one fired from a field gun. However, the projectiles fired from the latter have a deeper beaten zone on account of the flatter trajectory of the piece, and a greater penetration owing to their greater remaining velocity. The German Artillery Firing Regulations (par. 30) consider the effect of both projectiles “very good” and of equal value at the principal ranges, when burst at a moderate distance (30 to 150 m.) from the target. The effect of shrapnel from the field gun and from the light field howitzer is considered adequate at ranges under 1500 m., when bursts are regulated to occur within 300 and 200 m., respectively, in front of the target. The superiority of the shrapnel fired from a field gun is due to the greater penetration of the jacketed bullets (a result of greater velocity of the projectile itself at the point of burst). But in this connection it is to be borne in mind that the effect of single shots only is here considered. The shrapnel fire of the field gun is considerably superior to that of the howitzer. This is due to the fact that the howitzer fires more slowly than the field gun and must expend twice the weight of ammunition to produce the same results. If, in addition, it is remembered that the field battery carries approximately 2¹⁄₂ times as many shrapnel as the light field howitzer battery, it is obvious that the fire of the former will be 2¹⁄₂ times as effective, against targets in the open, as that of the latter.

The superiority of the heavier projectile asserts itself when it becomes necessary to destroy material objects.

The shell fired from pieces having a flat trajectory is employed against troops immediately behind cover. The shell is burst immediately in front of, over, or in rear of the target, which is thus struck by splinters from above. The more nearly perpendicular the splinters strike the target, and the greater their number and weight, the greater will be the effect produced. The angle of the cone of dispersion is about 200 degrees; with appropriate points of burst, fragments weighing 15 g. (80%) incapacitate for action. In curved fire, at ranges[118] beyond 2100 m., shell with delay action fuze is capable of penetrating the splinter proof cover usually employed in the field. At ranges under 2100 m. its angle of fall is too small to make an adequate effect certain.

Time Shell, Model ’98.

3. THE HEAVY FIELD HOWITZER.

The heavy field howitzer employs shell weighing 39.5 kg., containing an explosive charge of 0.85 g., and fitted with a percussion fuze either with or without delay action. This shell is designed to penetrate the roofs of splinter proofs. An earth covering 5-6 m. thick is necessary to afford protection against these projectiles. At 3000 m. a 15 cm. shell produces a crater 1 m. deep and 2.4 to 3.6 m. in diameter, i.e., 2 cu. m. (in made ground this crater is three times this size). The heavy field howitzer is a very effective weapon against shielded batteries. A single shell, owing to its lateral explosive effect, is capable of placing a whole battery temporarily out of action.

4. EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING THE EFFECT OF FIRE.

Movements of infantry under artillery fire are unavoidable when firing lines are to be reinforced and when troops intended for the decisive attack are to be pushed closer to the enemy. Formations calculated to minimize the effect of the[119] hostile fire must be taken up in time, since it is not always possible to make use of cover. The efficacy of the fire depends upon the accurate determination of the range and height of burst (fire for adjustment) and upon the careful observation of the subsequent fire (fire for effect).[113] The effect of this fire is considerably increased when the opponent’s infantry, against whom the fire is directed, takes up unsuitable formations (particularly broad line formations). Infantry has frequently found it advantageous to advance in small detachments moving rapidly at irregular intervals in extended order.

(a) Increasing the Difficulties in the Adjustment of the Hostile Fire.

A battery requires about 0.8 minutes (5 to 6 rounds with percussion fuze) to secure adjustment at ranges up to 750 m. The time required for securing adjustment at the longer ranges is as follows:

Narrow columns moving to their right or left front are very unfavorable targets for artillery, as it is very difficult for a battery commander to determine the relative position of bursts on the flank of a column with respect to the leading element thereof. Such shots are frequently considered as over. Numerous small columns, which make it difficult to designate a target, increase the time required by the hostile artillery to secure adjustment.

Troops should not be posted in the vicinity of conspicuous[120] objects, as, for example, trees, visible at a great distance.[114] Intrenchments that have just been thrown up should be made to look as nearly as possible like the surrounding country by covering them with snow, sod, or brush. It is made more difficult for the hostile artillery to secure adjustment, if our infantry changes position to the front or to a flank, if it moves rapidly or advances by rushes.

It is easy, as a rule, for the artillery to adjust its fire upon masks, but difficult to determine the distance between mask and target. It is an advantage when masks are situated obliquely to a position. As masks (rows of trees) may cause the premature burst of projectiles having percussion fuzes, they should be at least 200 m. from the troops they are to screen.[115] When so situated they frequently afford better protection than actual intrenchments.

(b) Minimizing the Effect of Fire.

Formations that increase the effect of artillery fire, as for example lines and columns, and positions in which a flank is refused, should be avoided. It is a good plan to increase[121] the number of targets and to employ narrow columns (column of twos) that are not too deep. Supports must be far enough in rear (300-400 m.) to prevent two targets being struck by one and the same shrapnel.

Of the close order formations used in the Russo-Japanese war, platoons or sections in columns of squads or twos,[116] separated by a maximum interval of 50 paces, were indeed found more suitable under fire than line formations, but the losses were nevertheless very serious except where cover screened the advancing troops from view or afforded them actual protection.

During the Franco-German war, line of platoons in columns of twos was found advantageous on several occasions.[117] This formation has the following disadvantages, however: it is very susceptible to flanking fire; the influence of the officers is principally restricted to the leading elements; intervals are easily lost and on that account it becomes more difficult to form line. It would seem to be better, therefore, to advance in line of platoons (or sections) in columns of squads, or, under flanking fire, in line of squads in columns of twos or files. In the last-named formation the intervals between squads are easily lost, however, and the company then becomes a dense skirmish line of from four to six ranks. To echelon the platoons slightly has very little value on account of the depth of the beaten zone of modern shrapnel.

In attacks made during the latter part of the Russo-Japanese war, both belligerents finally made use of thin successive skirmish lines for advancing; these lines followed each other at 200-300 m. and united again on reaching cover.

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5. THE RESULTS OBTAINED BY ARTILLERY AGAINST VARIOUS TARGETS.

Germany. According to computations made by Lieutenant-General Rohne,[118] the following hits may be expected from every time shrapnel, model ’96, when burst an average of 50 m. short of the targets named:

The number of hits per minute obtained by a battery firing 50 shots at 500 m., 30 at 1000 m., 20 at 2000 m., 10 at 3000 m., and 4 at 4000 m., is as follows:

[123]

France.[121] According to the French Field Artillery Regulations (footnote to par. 277), a gun firing time shrapnel covers effectively a front of 25 m., and a battery of four pieces, a front of 100 m. This intensity of fire, which is obtained when each piece fires one shot with proper corrector and range settings (the battery four shots) Aubrat calls “Density 4.” When rafale fire (two shots per piece) is employed against a front of 100 m., with proper corrector setting, density 8 is obtained. When the front exceeds 100 m., the deflection of the pieces must be changed between successive shots (tir avec fauchage). To obtain density 8 against a front of 150 m., each piece must fire three shots, as prescribed in the regulations. When progressive fire (tir progressif) is employed, four different ranges are given, of which only one can be considered effective. When not sweeping, in this fire, each piece fires two shots, thus also obtaining a density of 8. A density of 1 always corresponds, therefore, to one round, fired, with proper corrector and range settings, against a front of 100 m. When a battery (four pieces) fires one salvo against a target having a front of 50 m., density 8 is obtained; by firing two salvos, density 16 is obtained.

The Commission d’études pratiques du tir has made a thorough investigation into the effect produced by shrapnel fire. The following table gives a general idea of the effect to be expected when firing against service targets (i.e., the percentage of figures one may expect to hit when employing fire of varying density):

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A skirmish line 100 m. long, and lying down, would suffer a loss of 15% irrespective of its strength, from progressive fire (tir progressif; 32 rounds, density 8). If the interval between skirmishers in the open amounts to 1¹⁄₂ paces, for instance, the front would contain 62 skirmishers, and the resulting loss would amount to 9 men. If the men have placed their knapsacks in front of them, the loss would be reduced by half. A line of skirmishers of the same length and strength as the one considered above, would suffer a loss of 40%, or 25 men, when standing up or advancing. About 1¹⁄₂ minutes are required to fire one tir progressif, after adjustment has been secured. The same effect could be obtained in about 20 seconds by firing a rafale of eight rounds, provided the battery has accurately adjusted its fire.

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6. THE EFFECT OF SHRAPNEL BULLETS ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[122]

The wounds produced by shrapnel bullets are similar to those caused by the lead bullets of the infantry weapons of the past. When the bullet strikes normally to the surface, it produces a wound circular at the point of impact and considerably enlarged at the point of exit; bones are frequently shattered; and the most serious effect is the introduction of foreign substances, such as pieces of cloth, particles of earth or sand, or of the material in which the bullet is embedded.

The effect of shrapnel bullets on animate targets depends upon the striking energy of the bullets (expressed by kgm.) and on their density, those of smaller cross-section having the greater penetration. The closer the point of burst is to the target, the greater the velocity, and, naturally, the effect.

Opinions differ as to the amount of “striking energy” necessary to put animate targets out of action. In France, an energy of at least 4.8 kgm. is considered necessary to disable human beings, and for horses an average of 19 kgm., while in Germany, an average energy of 8 kgm. is deemed sufficient. The 10 g. hardened lead bullet, having a diameter of 12.3 mm., retains this energy until its remaining velocity is only 120 m. At ranges up to 1500 m., over 80% of the men struck by fragments and bullets from shrapnel, bursting within 300 m. (and beyond this range from shrapnel bursting within 150 m.) are put out of action. (Par. 30 German F. A. F. R.). In comparison, artillery projectiles produce a greater number of fatal wounds than infantry projectiles.

It is worthy of note that the packed knapsack affords[126] protection against all shrapnel bullets having a velocity of 100 m. and against half of those having a velocity of 200 m. The overcoat roll stops shrapnel bullets having a velocity of less than 250 m. The penetration of these bullets is so great, at ranges under 2000 m., that when they strike bones or vital organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity for action. This is especially true when the interval of burst is less than 100 m.

B. INFANTRY FIRE.[123]

The modern infantry rifle, cal. 6.5 to 8. mm., is a magazine arm employing steel jacketed, pointed bullets, arranged in clips. The adoption of automatic rifles is contemplated. In these rifles the recoil energy is utilized for throwing out empty shells and for placing a fresh cartridge into the chamber at the same time. The objections made to the adoption of such a rifle (complexity of the mechanism, danger of wasting ammunition) are similar to the reasons advanced against the adoption of breech-loading and magazine rifles. In addition to the increased rate of fire, the advantage of eliminating the effect of the recoil on the skirmisher must not be underestimated. Moreover, the elimination of the recoil makes a further increase in the initial velocity of the projectile possible.

The effect of infantry fire may be considered from two points of view, viz.: the effect on the enemy of a single projectile, and the effective hit in itself.

1. THE EFFECT OF A SINGLE PROJECTILE ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[124]

During the Russo-Japanese war the contending parties used the following small arms and projectiles:

[127]

The ballistic qualities of the Arisaka rifle were superior to those of the Russian arm, but the maiming effect of the two rifles was about equal. The striking energy of the projectiles was not sufficient in every case, however, to put a man out of action. The explosive effect produced by bullets striking interior organs and bones at short ranges (within 500 m.) was more evident in wounds made by the 8. mm. than by the Arisaka rifle.[125]

At mid ranges the wounds were generally of a mild character, unless produced by tumbling bullets.[126]

Experiments prove that a projectile will tumble if it encounters varying resistance (for example, if the projectile strikes an obstacle, even if that be only a twig) or if it penetrates materials of different density (for instance, if, in penetrating a body, it strikes first upon a fleshy part, then upon bones). In the last mentioned case the bullet will frequently tumble in the body. If a projectile be fired through a series[128] of boards, placed at intervals, it will tumble in the second board, or if not there, then certainly in the third board. Projectiles which ricochet on the ground before penetrating a human body change their form more or less, according to the character of the ground on which they ricochet. As the jacket is frequently torn, thus exposing the leaden kernel, wounds may be produced which will equal those made by explosive bullets.

The striking energy of the projectile is sufficient to perforate two men at 1200 m. From experiments made with the Lebel rifle on corpses, it appeared that the projectile passed clear through 5 bodies at 100 m., through 4 bodies at 400 m. (even when large bones were struck) and through 2 bodies at 1200 m.

In the Russo-Japanese war wounds were distributed as follows, on a basis of 100 hits: lower limbs, 39.5; upper limbs, 25.4; abdominal region, 16.5; chest, 15.5; spinal column, 15, and head, 11. Flesh wounds are generally slight. This is due to the fact that the hole made by the bullet is small, that the exterior flow of blood is insignificant, and that the wound rarely becomes infected. Projectiles remain in the body now much more rarely than in the past.

The central portion of marrow bones is frequently splintered by projectiles, while thicker flat bones (shoulder blades) are cleanly perforated.

Unless a tumbling bullet or a splinter of a bone penetrates the lungs, chest wounds appear in much more favorable forms than in past wars.[127]

According to observations made in the Russo-Japanese war, wounds in joints healed without suppuration, the joint[129] and its mobility being saved. Amputations were extremely rare, and the surgeon’s skill was, as a rule, seldom necessary in the treatment of shot wounds. Chest wounds were slight, and often many men walked a few versts to the dressing station, some of them complaining of difficulty in breathing. As a rule, such wounds healed in fourteen days. Chest wounds were more serious when the heart or the large blood vessels were injured; but even in these cases cures were effected. Abdominal wounds were not so serious as in the past. Contrary to past experience, skull wounds, in which the projectile had passed entirely through the brain, were treated with fair success.

The campaigns in South Africa and Manchuria have amply demonstrated that wounds produced by jacketed bullets of small caliber are not so serious as those caused by 11 mm. projectiles. In addition, these campaigns have shown that a further decrease in caliber is undesirable from the tactician’s point of view, for a hit by no means affords the certainty, in every case, of putting a man, much less a horse, out of action.

Moreover, the wounded man is cured so quickly that in a short time he can again participate in action. The British report of losses for the battle of Paardeberg, on February 18th, 1900, contains the names of a great many men who were wounded at Magersfontain on December 11th, 1899. According to British statements, 40 men out of every 100, seriously wounded by steel jacketed bullets, could be returned to duty after 36 days of surgical treatment. Dr. Küttner estimates that of 154 men hit in the chest, 73 were able to return to duty with their organizations; while, out of 92 men wounded in the knee, only 28 could be sent back to duty. Wounds produced by the small caliber Arisaka rifle during the Russo-Japanese war healed more rapidly than those caused by the Russian weapon. Flesh wounds of Japanese soldiers, for example, healed in ten days, those of Russian soldiers in four. The following observations were made on wounds produced by the Russian rifle: Within a week slight wounds were covered by[130] a scab; after three weeks they were covered by fresh skin and a part of the wounded were then able to return to the front. The remainder, irrespective of the number of wounds received by any one individual, were ready for duty in seven months. Wounds in which bones were perforated without splintering, healed in four to six weeks, so that the men could return to duty within four or five months after receiving the wound. When bones were splintered the cure was, of course, considerably retarded.

The ballistic advantages of a small-caliber projectile (undesirable from the military surgeon’s point of view) have been obtained by the adoption of a pointed-nose bullet (called the “S” bullet in Germany and the “D” bullet in France).[128]

A further advantage of these bullets is that they produce serious wounds on account of their tendency to tumble. These wounds, while not inhuman, instantly disable the man struck, or, at any rate, postpone his recovery indefinitely.

The Effect of “S” Bullets on Corpses.

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2. THE EFFECT OF “S” BULLETS ON MATERIALS.

The following thicknesses of dry pine are pierced by the “S” bullet (rifle model ’98) at the ranges given:

In sand and earth the penetration of the “S” bullet amounts to 90 cm. According to experiments, 3 mm. steel plates were pierced at 350 m., while hay stacks afforded protection when 4 m. thick; when of less thickness, the latter caused bullets to tumble. Embankments of frozen snow 1 m. thick, of packed snow 2 m. thick, and of loose snow 3 m. thick, were not pierced even at 250 m.

Infantry fire may produce either a stunning and paralyzing effect on the hostile forces, or it may gradually exhaust, wear out, and consume them. The fire will have a stunning and paralyzing effect when it is suddenly concentrated upon a narrow front, thereby producing fear and terror, provided actual losses are added to this moral effect.

On the other hand, the fire will gradually exhaust, wear out, and destroy the hostile forces when it is distributed for a prolonged period over an extended front. In this case the material losses suffered and the exhaustion of his physical energies may force the conviction on the enemy that he has no longer a chance to gain the victory. This conviction will cause a suspension of all his energies and consequently of his determination to fight.

In order that such a fire effect may be obtained, it is necessary that the individual soldier combine coolness and presence of mind with good marksmanship, and that company, platoon and squad leaders maintain fire control and fire direction.

1. FIRE DISCIPLINE.

Fire discipline is indispensable to fire control and fire direction. It embraces the conscientious execution of all orders and signals, as well as the scrupulous observation of all regulations bearing on the handling of the rifle and on combat in general. Fire discipline must be maintained even though the fire control and fire direction exercised by the leaders is imperfect or ceases entirely in the course of the action.

Fire discipline requires:

Perseverance under hostile fire, even when that fire cannot be returned; constant attention to the orders of the leaders, and careful observation of the enemy. It requires further, taking advantage of the ground; care in setting the sight and in delivery of fire; an increase of fire by individuals whenever the targets become more favorable, and a cessation of fire when the enemy disappears; finally, economy of ammunition.

The decision is prepared by the fire of infantry, supported by machine guns, field, and heavy artillery. The fire of troops pushed to within short range of the hostile position will in many cases suffice to induce the enemy to give way, so that the assault encounters nothing but evacuated or feebly defended works. The Boer war and the Russo-Japanese war[134] demonstrate that determined troops will hold a position until the attacker has massed sufficient troops to charge, or at least until he threatens to attack with the bayonet. Examples: Terrayama, on October 11th, 1904. Assault made by the 2nd Division on March 1st, 1905, at Mukden, on Redouts 17 and 18.

Training in bayonet fencing has by no means lost importance, irrespective of the fact as to whether or not bayonets will ever be crossed in future. “Bayonet fencing is one of the most important means of strengthening the moral force of the individual soldier; of developing in him energy, initiative, and courage for making a dashing advance.”[130]

Since the armament of the different armies is almost the same, good individual marksmanship, coolness, fire control and fire direction, and firmly rooted fire discipline, are the deciding factors in an action in which two equal skirmish lines contend for the superiority of fire.

2. FIRE CONTROL AND FIRE DIRECTION.

The principal object of fire control and fire direction is to bring about a superiority of fire at the decisive point by suddenly concentrating the fire of a large number of rifles upon it. This is the only way in which a moral effect may be produced on the troops against whom the fire is directed, while, at the same time, their losses attain such proportions as to become unbearable. At mid and long ranges, the efficacy of fire depends more on fire control and fire direction than upon good individual marksmanship.[131] Whenever the appropriate rear[135] sight elevation is not used, the densest portion of the cone of dispersion will not strike the target, and the chances of its hitting the target diminish as the error in estimating the range and the standard of excellence of the marksmanship increase.

Fire control and fire direction lie in the hands of platoon commanders,[132] who regulate the fire as their judgment dictates. Fire control and direction embrace: the opening and cessation of fire; the designation of a target and of the elevation to be used; the kind of fire and its distribution; the number of rounds to be fired, and the observation of the effect of the fire. As a rule, the fire will be distributed over the whole front, but portions of the hostile line that are not clearly visible should by no means be neglected (distribution of fire). Regulations prescribing the scope of authority of individual leaders are not considered desirable. The platoon commander possesses in his squad leaders a medium for communicating with his platoon. (Pars. 162-165 German I. D. R.). The movements of the skirmishers, the correct comprehension of the target, the distribution of fire, the rate of fire, and the employment of the terrain to the best advantage, are regulated through the squad leaders. The lack of thoroughly drilled coöperation on the part of squad leaders inevitably results, as might be expected, in a so-called “skirmish mob.” The platoon commander cannot communicate directly with every individual man of his platoon, but he can control his platoon through his eight squad leaders, who, by reason of their position in the line, can exert the proper influence on their skirmishers.[133]

[136]

The squad leaders are charged with constantly supervising the setting of sights; the distribution, the careful delivery, and the rate of fire; and the expenditure of ammunition.

The squad leaders participate in the firing only when their duties as leaders permit; and this will frequently be the case in a prolonged engagement in the same position, especially at short ranges. These remarks apply also to the range finders.

In Italy and Switzerland the squad leaders participate in the firing when the whole platoon is engaged in a fire fight. The advantage of thus gaining a few better shots for the firing line is more than offset by the more careful supervision of the skirmishers as is required in Germany, France and Austria. The platoon leader unaided is in no position to supervise the proper use of the rifle and the expenditure of ammunition; his subordinates must assist him. It is also desirable to relieve the company commander from the actual duty of fire direction and fire control. The company commander is responsible for leading the company on the battlefield; this does not preclude his thoroughly supervising his platoons and observing the effect of their fire.

“Whenever the company commander is in the firing line, he selects and designates the target and gives orders for opening fire. He announces the range found by the range finders and observes the effect of the fire. Aside from this, he leaves fire control and fire direction to his platoon commanders, and interferes only when he desires to concentrate the fire of several platoons, or of the whole company, on a certain target, or when he observes something that has escaped the notice of the platoon commanders.” (Par. 216 German I. D. R.).

In the course of an action, fire control and fire direction will frequently be imperfect, whether this be due to the loss of the leaders, or to the difficulty of hearing commands in the noise of the combat. To provide for such contingencies,[137] the skirmishers must be taught that, in the absence of fire control and fire direction, they may fire (not that they must fire) at all targets within 600 m.; that between 600 and 1200 m., they should fire at tall and wide targets only; and that, at ranges over 1000 m., as a rule, they should not fire at all.

3. SELECTION OF THE LINE TO BE OCCUPIED.

While a good field of fire is indispensable for reaping the maximum benefit from the power of our rifles, the tactical situation is the determining factor in the choice of a position. The requirements as to a field of fire and the use to be made of it will vary, depending upon whether it is desired to avoid an engagement at short range (delaying action) or whether a decision is to be sought (decisive action). In the first case a free field of fire at short ranges may be dispensed with.

Cover may be used only to the extent that it does not interfere with constant observation of the enemy. It is not permissible to hide entirely behind cover, unless expressly ordered in each case. To rise from behind cover, for the purpose of firing, and to disappear subsequently behind that cover for loading, is out of the question in the firing line. This is physically impossible and much less attainable for psychological reasons; in addition, the skirmisher will present a much larger target than when lying down. When portions of the firing line cannot see the target during an attack, the[139] platoon commander should consider this a hint, either to gain a better position farther to the front, or to suspend his fire temporarily. (Par. 190 German I. D. R.). In defense, in a similar case, cross fire would frequently be the proper expedient. The attacker will often see nothing except the heads of the skirmishers who must fire kneeling in order to sweep the foreground, while these men will present targets of half a man’s height to his bullets. Since smokeless powder is employed, it is important to select positions that cannot easily be found by the enemy. Positions in which the skirmishers are silhouetted against the sky line should be avoided whenever possible. Faintly illuminated targets, or those lying in the shade, are not fired on at all, according to all experience, while the fire is above all else directed against sharply outlined targets. The leaders must take to cover also, for in many cases single officers standing upright draw attention to the position. The extent of the position must be commensurate with the strength of the force; too dense a line reduces the efficacy of fire and increases the losses, while, on the other hand, too dispersed a force increases the difficulties of fire control and fire direction.

4. THE STRENGTH OF THE FIRING LINE.

This depends upon the purpose of the action. Although a thin firing line may be employed when the situation is still in doubt (protection against surprise), it must be strong when the superiority of fire is to be attained. If the firing line is made too weak, we are condemned to fight a superior force continuously with an inferior one because we have voluntarily sacrificed the advantage of our numerical superiority. On the defensive, as soon as the direction of the hostile attack develops, the firing line is made as strong as seems necessary for holding the position. In a delaying action, however, we should endeavor to place as few men in action as possible; and to compensate for the lack of rifles by an increased expenditure of ammunition. All firing is done from the prone position, in so far as the ground permits. The French attempt[140] to regulate the volume of fire by prescribing the number of rifles to be employed instead of designating the kind of fire to be used.

In Switzerland and England,[134] it is recommended that supports use “Fire of position” where the terrain is suitable (hilly country). The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 340) contain a similar provision. When the supports cannot see the firing line on account of the conformation of the ground, this fire is not likely to endanger the latter.

5. ASCERTAINING RANGES.
(Pars. 78-98, 190 and 191 German I. F. R.).

Efficacy of fire depends upon a knowledge of the range. An imperfect knowledge of the range may be compensated for by the flatness of the trajectory of the individual rifle and by the favorable conformation of the ground in respect to the cone of dispersion. In collective fire, at mid and long ranges, each rear sight graduation commands a beaten zone approximately 100 m. deep—good aim, proper elevation, and careful firing being presupposed. The nearer the target is to the densest portion of the cone of dispersion, the greater the efficacy of the fire.

The following results were obtained in Italian firing tests in which 100 skirmishers fired at a plate 1 m. high and 30 m. wide with the 6.5 mm. rifle:

[141]

Beyond 600 m., an error in the range exerts a greater influence upon the efficacy of fire than does the marksmanship of the skirmishers.[136] When an improper elevation has been selected, the efficacy of the fire decreases as the compactness of the “cone of dispersion” increases; in other words, the efficacy of the fire decreases as the excellence of the marksmanship of the men and their coolness in the face of the enemy increase. (See pp. 170 and 171, infra).

The following expedients for ascertaining ranges may be mentioned:

(a) Pacing and galloping;

(b) Estimating distances on the ground by eye (by comparison with known distances; by estimating part of the distance);

(c) Firing trial volleys (ranging);

(d) Taking the range from a map of large scale or obtaining it directly from infantry or artillery already engaged;

(e) Measuring the range directly on the ground.

In estimates made by individual men, the error amounts[142] approximately to one-eighth (12.5%) of the range;[138] this may be corrected by taking the mean of a considerable number of estimates, or by employing combined sights at ranges over 1000 m. (the difference between rear sight elevations being 100 to 200 m.), thus increasing the depth of the beaten zone. The accuracy of the resulting fire is influenced by local and atmospheric conditions. (Par. 80 German I. F. R.). Estimates usually fall short of the correct distance when made in bright sunlight; in clear atmosphere; when the sun is in rear of the man estimating; when made over uniform surfaces; over water; when the target is set off by a bright background; when made over rolling ground, especially when the several depressions cannot be seen. On the other hand, estimates frequently exceed the correct range when made in a flickering light; against a dark background; against the sun; when the sky is overcast; during foggy weather; in the dusk; in woods; and against an enemy who is only partially visible. According to the Swiss Firing Regulations (1906) estimates made from a height downward are usually too short, and those made from low ground up, too great.

In action, under the influence of danger, estimates are usually short.[139] Peace training proves that the skill of the[143] majority of soldiers in estimating distances can be improved only up to a certain point.

To memorize distinguishing marks on the enemy as an aid in arriving at a correct estimate of the range, is not considered as simulating actual service conditions, since the power of vision of the men differs. Furthermore, one sees the enemy mostly in a prone position in action, and it is not to be expected that the men will remember the various rules for determining the range by the appearance of the enemy’s skirmishers. The same is true of the regulation which prescribes that the soldier estimating the range is to judge the effect which the target makes upon him. (England and Austria).

It will rarely be practicable for infantry to scale the range directly from a map. Infantry ranges are usually so short, in comparison to the scale of most of the maps, especially those available in the field, that it is difficult to take them between the points of a pair of dividers. Moreover, in an infantry action conspicuous objects are not likely to be located often enough near the position of the skirmishers to make it practicable to find them quickly even on the most accurate maps. The artillery is much better off in this direction; its ranges are longer and therefore more easily scaled from a[145] map. Moreover, artillery is generally posted on or near prominent points, which may be found on almost any map. It should be remembered that a map is a horizontal projection, that any range scaled from a map is the base of a right triangle, and that the line of sight of a rifle, when firing uphill, follows the hypotenuse of that triangle.

An accurate knowledge of the range to within a meter is not necessary, as meteorological conditions,[140] especially temperature and illumination (degree of humidity of the atmosphere) affect the range of the projectile. Meteorological conditions may necessitate sight corrections amounting to 100 m. at mid ranges and to 150 m. at long ranges. According to the French Firing Regulations a difference of temperature of ±10 degrees C., changes the range of the Lebel rifle by 18 m. at 1000 m. The altitude of the terrain increases the range on account of reduced barometric pressure; this becomes a factor in the selection of a rear sight elevation at an altitude of approximately 1000 m. According to the French Firing Regulations, the range of their rifle at 1000 m. is increased as follows: At an altitude of 500 m. by 18; at 1000 m. by 42; at 1500 m. by 63; and at 2100 m. by 89 m.

These meteorological influences can be eliminated by obtaining the range from troops already engaged (artillery) or by determining the proper rear sight elevation (not the range) by trial volleys (pars. 190 and 191 German I. F. R.) or by an animated fire at will (Switzerland: fire at will, one round).

To ascertain the range by firing trial volleys is, however, practicable only when the terrain near the target is visible; when the target itself is stationary; when the ground is such that the strike of the bullets can be observed; when the firing party is not under fire; and, finally, when the necessary time is available. Since all of these preliminary conditions will[146] rarely be fulfilled, it will only in exceptional cases be possible to determine the proper elevation by this method.

This “ranging” by trial volleys promises no result, however, if any one of the above-mentioned preliminary conditions is not fulfilled. It is advantageous to establish a bracket by firing volleys, as is done by artillery, but even with a good glass it is very difficult to observe the strike of small caliber bullets. Whether it would be advisable to adopt for this ranging a specially designed weapon, firing thin-walled shell weighing about 400 g., is a question.[141]

The older range finding instruments depend upon angle measurements at both ends of a line (up to 25 m. long). The large range finder (Hahn) has been adopted in the German army. (Pars. 88-98 German I. F. R.). This apparatus permits a range to be measured from one point, up to 1200 m. on low targets, and on taller targets, such as skirmishers standing, up to 1600 m. Measurements are considered sufficiently accurate when the error amounts to

On the defensive the large range finders will find employment before and during the action. The men charged with the measurement of the range should be careful not to betray the position by their activity, before fire is opened. The utility of these instruments is much more restricted in an attack. However, it will often be possible, before the fire[147] fight begins, to ascertain the range from the point selected for the first firing position, to the position to be attacked. According to Soloviev range finders failed completely in action in Manchuria. (See p. 137 supra).

6. SELECTION OF A TARGET AND TIME FOR OPENING FIRE.

In selecting a target and opening fire it must be remembered that the fire cannot have a decisive effect unless the target is well within effective range. The leader should ask himself whether the result to be expected is properly commensurate with the probable expenditure of ammunition entailed, and whether this expenditure is warranted in view of the total amount available. But the decision to fire upon a target once made, the ammunition necessary for the attainment of the object of the fight must be expended without stinting, since all experience teaches us that an ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own troops, while it raises that of the enemy.

In the selection of a target, its tactical importance is the principal determining factor. The fire is first directed upon the most dangerous, generally the nearest target, or the one which is soon to become the most dangerous. Subsequently the fire should be directed upon targets which, owing to their height, width, depth, and density, promise the greatest number of effective hits.

Infantry will, as a rule, offer the most important and promising target, and the fire should be directed against the firing line, since the troops following it in close order will in any event come within range during their advance. In Italy, when two targets are available, the fire is to be directed on the one promising the best results.

Ballistic and tactical considerations determine whether fire should be opened at long or at short ranges.

Adequate results may be expected when the fire is directed against low targets at ranges of 800-1200 m., but at ranges[148] over 1200 m. a decisive effect is only attainable by the expenditure of a large amount of ammunition. Skirmishers standing may be fired on with good effect even at ranges over 1200 m. (long ranges).

When the fire is properly controlled and directed, it will be effective against tall and deep targets within ranges corresponding to the highest graduations of the rear sight leaves. However, when the targets are narrow, a side wind is very apt to throw the cone of dispersion off the target.

The idea of using our accurate, long range rifle at long ranges in defense, thus bringing it into effective play, at a time when the danger to our own troops is still very small, is, at first glance, very tempting. Military history shows that such fire was successful here and there, especially where one of the contending parties was armed with a much superior weapon, or where the enemy failed to apply the proper remedy. But even in these cases it was successful only up to a certain point. There is this to be said against employing long range fire: Its effect is insignificant when compared with the expenditure of ammunition entailed; it is difficult to replenish ammunition and it tires the eye and the arm of the skirmisher. Poorly trained troops finally do not raise their rifles at all, but blaze away without aiming. To be sure, fire opened at an early moment annoys the advance of the enemy, but it cannot seriously retard it. Once the fire is opened, we want it to be effective; we don’t want to injure the enemy—we want to annihilate him.

Although we fully appreciate the good results obtained at long ranges on the target range, we prefer to utilize the entire staggering fire effect of our weapons at short and mid ranges, wholly for the purpose of annihilating the enemy.

Since only small targets, often scarcely discernible by the naked eye, present themselves to the attacker, the fire of the defender should not be returned at once. The forward movement should be continued by utilizing every expedient[149] (rushes with breathing spells, and cover) until serious losses are sustained and the leader has reason to fear that his men will lose their morale and throw themselves down without orders. Frequently several groups will open fire while the others continue to advance. The endeavor should be to open fire only when the attacking force has gotten as close as possible to the lower limit of mid combat range (800-1200 m.).[142]

Errors in estimating the range are offset by the flat trajectory of the rifle only at short ranges, and only at these ranges can there be any question of an effective preparation of the attack by fire. These views are expressed in the German regulations.

Recent wars demonstrate that, whenever the attacker opened fire at long ranges, the attack finally came to a standstill, that the troops in many cases fired away all their ammunition, and that the whole attack failed.

The British infantry, armed with a long range rifle equipped with an excellent rear sight arrangement, allowed itself to be enticed, by the long range fire of the Boers, into opening fire at 1200 and 1300 m. (Guard at Modder River) and even at 1600 and 1700 m. (6th Division at Paardeberg) against an enemy whose position was not discernible even through the most powerful glasses. The losses were small and not to be compared with those which our Guard suffered without firing, during their advance on St. Privat. The advance of the Gordon Highlanders at Doornkop (29th May, 1900) to within short range of the hostile position, without firing a shot, although they themselves were under fire from 2000 m. on, was splendid.[143]

Since the assailant presents larger targets than the defender, and the latter can make preparations for firing, ascertain ranges, construct rifle-rests, and replenish ammunition without difficulty, it is proper in defense to open fire at long ranges, especially in delaying actions, for then fighting at short ranges is to be avoided in any case. It is absolutely correct for the defender to make the most of the advantages above mentioned. While everything is orderly and in readiness in the defender’s firing line, the attacker’s line is still in the process of forming. Should the defender wait until the hostile firing line has systematically deployed and has made a lodgment within short range of his position, or should he produce losses and create confusion in its ranks by suddenly opening fire?

The employment of long range fire on the defensive is justified when sufficient ammunition is available, when artillery is not present, and when the hostile infantry pursues the tactics of advancing to short range without firing. “Infantry[151] should never attempt to take the place of artillery at long ranges or compete with the fire of that arm.” If it is important for the attacker to reach the extreme limit of mid ranges with as little firing as possible, the defender should in the first place fire on him with artillery, and, when this does not suffice or is not available, with infantry, so as to prevent him from accomplishing his object.

At mid ranges the efficacy of the defender’s fire is so great, when directed upon an infantry line advancing without fire support, that it becomes an important factor. At ranges from 1000 to 600 m., 8 to 25% hits can be counted on when the fire is directed against advancing skirmishers; and even assuming an error of ¹⁄₈ in the estimated range, 3 to 12% hits may still be expected. (Par. 623, p. 196, German I. F. R.).

If the attacker is unable to hide from the defender’s fire by using cover, his losses will increase until they become unbearable; his attack will hesitate, and he will commence firing. Fresh troops are necessary to carry the attacking line forward anew. The success of the defense is assured, if the defender is able to prevent the attacking force from getting within short range of the position. The defender’s chance of making a successful counter-attack disappears, however, as soon as the attacking force makes a lodgment within short range of the position; for the closer the defender is pressed, the closer will he be tied to his position. While the superiority of fire enjoyed by the defender at mid ranges allows him perfect freedom of action, at short ranges the attacker’s fire imposes conditions upon the defense which make the growing power of the attack sensibly felt. The moment the defender begins firing, however, he becomes at once a favorable target for the artillery of the attacking force. The defender frequently betrays his position prematurely by opening fire.

The moral effect of withholding the fire (fire surprise) is very great.[144] A strong fire will be actually annihilating if[152] suddenly directed upon the enemy at short ranges, especially if he is still in unsuitable formations, owing to his ignorance of the defender’s position. (Example: The British brigade under Hart at Colenso, 15th Dec., 1899, and the Highland Brigade at Magersfontain, 11th Dec., 1899) or if the morale of his troops is questionable.[145] What good troops should do in such a situation (employ rapid fire and then advance to the assault) is shown by the conduct of the IInd Battalion of the 20th Infantry at Coulomiers.[146] Steady nerves and iron discipline are, however, prerequisites for the execution of a fire surprise by the defender.

Long range fire was employed with success on the defensive by the French at St. Privat (the Germans suffered the most serious losses at ranges from 1200 to 1000 m.) and by the Turks at Plevna. At 1500 m. the Russian losses were such that they were obliged to begin advancing by rushes. The losses decreased as the enemy’s position was approached. The long range fire had produced a retarding but by no means an annihilating effect. On the other hand, the fire of the defender, at extremely short ranges, had a telling effect at[153] Beaune la Rolande; in the defense of Chagey on the Lisaine;[147] in the defense of Shipka Pass (200 to 300 paces) by the Russians, and in the engagement at Gorni Bugarov (1st Jan., 1878). Whenever the attacker enters the short range zone while still in unsuitable formations, his losses increase until they become annihilating. (Example: The bayonet attacks made by the Austrians at Nachod and Trautenau).[148]

Provisions of Various Regulations.

From what has been said in the preceding pages as to the time when infantry should open fire, we may deduce the following General Rules:—

[155]

It is permissible to open fire at an early moment only in exceptional cases when the situation requires it; good preparation, which assures the efficacy of fire and a high moral effect from the very beginning, is of greater importance.

(a) IN ATTACK.

The attacker should advance without firing to ranges at which an adequate fire effect against the low targets presented by the defender may be expected. To open fire at an earlier moment is permissible only when the defender’s fire is so strong that effective ranges cannot be reached without firing. Long range fire is only a means to an end. In a pursuit long range fire will, however, be employed for the purpose of annoying the enemy.

(b) IN DEFENSE.[150]

Fire may be opened at long ranges when sufficient ammunition is available, only when the object is to gain time, and in decisive actions, when the enemy presents favorable targets and we have no artillery. Unless other reasons prevent, fire is opened as soon as targets are clearly discernible and easily brought into line with the sights. It is advisable to withhold the fire when the hostile artillery is superior, when the opponent’s troops are of poor quality, and when it is impossible to surprise the enemy with our fire while he is in unsuitable formations. In defense, as in attack, the decision must be sought by the employment of rapid fire at short range.

7. PAUSES IN THE FIRE.[151]

The efficacy of fire depends upon its accuracy, its direction with reference to the target, and its volume. In the past, pauses in the fire were necessary to allow the powder smoke to clear away; at present they are of advantage because they give the men a breathing spell; rest eyes and nerves; enable ammunition to be distributed, and allow preparations to be made for concerted action. In making use of such pauses good cover, good observation of the enemy and instant readiness for resuming the fire are essential. In a serious engagement the men either maintain a vigorous, animated fire or they rest. If the advancing enemy takes to cover, the fire must cease, only to be resumed with full vigor when favorable targets appear. The attacker (like the British in South Africa advancing against the Boers) will in many cases—especially at the beginning of a campaign—be deceived into believing that the defender has withdrawn; should the attacker now advance, the defender, by suddenly resuming his fire, will surprise him to such an extent that he may be repulsed.[152] Pauses in the fire are a practical expedient for maintaining fire discipline and enable the leader to keep his troops in hand. An organization is capable of performing its duty well, so long as it obeys the command “cease firing.” It might be well at this point to determine when the defender should change his rear sight elevations if the attacker advances by rushes. At mid ranges it might be advisable to stop firing, so as to present no target to the enemy when his line throws itself down after a rush, and to utilize this interruption for[157] changing the rear sight elevation. When this is done during a forward rush of the enemy, the rapidity of fire will suffer at the most favorable moment for bringing an effective fire to bear upon the enemy.

8. KINDS OF FIRE.

In the days of slow loading rifles of limited range, the importance of the volley was due to the fact that it enabled the leader to develop the greatest volume of fire in tactically favorable moments, or, in other words, when large targets were visible for a short time. Modern combat is conducted under different conditions. When black powder was used the volley had the advantage of permitting the powder smoke to clear away during the pauses. This advantage has now also disappeared.

In the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese used “fire at will” almost exclusively. Volleys were used by them only at long ranges; by troops held in rear and, after an assault, to get the men in hand. These views are not changed in the new regulations, but immediately after firing a volley the men are to re-load without command. Rapid fire is retained. The Russians placed their faith principally in volley fire,[153] but were soon forced to resort to fire at will. The Russian regulations recommended volley fire up to the decisive firing position, not so much because of a belief in the superior efficacy of this kind of fire, but out of distrust of the individual training of their men; certainly an admission of the deficiency of that kind of training in their army. It was feared that fire at will would impair fire discipline and cause waste of ammunition, and it was believed that the immediate influence of superiors could not be dispensed with. Even the new provisional regulations have not discarded volley fire, which may[158] be employed by section or by platoon. Fire at will may be divided into slow fire (one shot from each squad) and lively fire with counted cartridges.

Germany. Volleys (pars. 106-108 German I. F. R.) are to be employed by platoons or companies when in close order; in skirmish line (par. 193 German I. F. R.) only when the enemy is surprised or the organization is to be kept firmly in hand. Volleys, however, can be used only when the troops themselves are not exposed to an effective fire. An organization will be able to ascertain the range by means of trial volleys only in exceptional cases.

“The highest attainable rate of fire—the word rapid fire has been elided—is to be used in attack during the preparation for the assault; in defense to repulse a hostile assault; in warding off a cavalry charge; in all combat situations in which a sudden or immediate collision with the enemy occurs; and, finally, in pursuit.” (Par. 208 German I. F. R.).

Fire at will is used both in extended and close order.

The Rate of Fire.

As regards its rate, fire may be divided into three classes, viz., slow fire, accelerated fire, and rapid fire. The command “fire more slowly” (or more rapidly) serves only the purpose of diminishing (or increasing) the rate of fire.

The rate of fire depends upon the purpose of action, the character of the target, and the available ammunition. Unfavorable illumination and the difficulty of clearly distinguishing the target at long ranges will reduce the rate of fire. The aiming position (i.e., whether the rifle is fired from a prone position or from a rest) also affects the rate of fire. A well trained company at peace strength will, moreover, be able to fire more rapidly than one on a war footing.

Hurried firing should unquestionably be condemned. The rapidity with which our rifles can be loaded enables us to produce the maximum fire effect in the minimum time against narrow targets. The desire of the soldier to make every shot a hit, carefully inculcated in time of peace, will of itself regulate the rate of fire. As the rate of fire depends upon the distinctness with which the target can be seen, it will naturally increase as the range decreases, thus generally corresponding to the requirements of the tactical situation. Moreover, as it is easier to aim at tall targets than at head targets, this also exercises either an accelerating or a retarding effect, as the[161] case may be. Lieutenant-General Rohne has done a great deal to bring about a correct appreciation of the rate of fire. He states: “The opposition to an increased rate of fire is perhaps due to the belief that it is invariably coupled with a reduction in accuracy. This is not the case, however, and even if it were true to a certain extent, it need not necessarily be harmful. To be sure, when a high rate of fire is solely due to the excitement of the skirmishers, it is unquestionably to be condemned because no attempt is made at aiming; but when it is the product of systematic peace training, it need not necessarily preclude good aiming. It is entirely consistent with a high rate of fire to load and point quickly, to keep the target constantly in view, and, at the same time, to aim accurately and to pull the trigger without flinching.

“The leader who reduces the rapidity of fire in battle in order to save ammunition, wastes lives and time, both more valuable than ammunition. Disabled soldiers are more difficult to replace than ammunition, and lost time cannot be replaced at all.”[155]

A high rate of fire need by no means be synonymous with waste of ammunition. Ammunition would unquestionably be wasted if fire were delivered for hours at the same high rate. It is very probable, however, that in the battles of the future the fire will be moderate for some time, or, better still, cease entirely, only to break forth like a thunderstorm over the enemy when opportunity offers or necessity demands. The slower the troops fire the longer they will present a target to the enemy. The coolness shown in firing individual shots at the commencement of an action will disappear owing to the impression produced by losses. This is apparent even in field firing. Lieutenant-General Rohne arrives at the following average results:

[162]

Troops going into action for the first time are inclined to fire entirely too fast, due to their desire to overcome their nervousness. Veteran troops seek to attain the same result, not through rapidity of fire, but through accuracy. Only the determination to make hits is calculated to overcome nervousness. Wherever this determination is lacking, wild firing (fire panic), which is in any case difficult to prevent, will surely result. Fire delivered hurriedly during unexpected rencontres is almost invariably ineffective.[156] For this reason most of the firing regulations have eliminated the command “Rapid Fire,” which is only calculated to produce confusion.

The Italian Firing Regulations contain the following statement in regard to the effect of accelerated fire (see p. 140 supra).[157]

1. When the appropriate elevation is used, two-thirds of the percentage of hits obtained by firing 5-6 rounds from each rifle per minute, may be expected when firing at the rate of 12-14 rounds per minute.

2. When the elevation selected is too great or too small by 100 m., rapid fire produces almost the same percentage of hits as ordinary fire at will.

3. When the elevation selected is in error by 200 m., rapid fire produces almost twice as great a percentage of hits as fire at will.

[163]

From the above it follows that, when the appropriate elevation is not used, accelerated fire will inflict greater losses upon the enemy than ordinary fire at will in the same length of time. Within equal periods of time the actual number of hits will be greater in animated fire at will than in slow fire; but in the latter the percentage of hits will be higher.

Of all the different kinds of fire, the volley is best adapted to meet the requirement of keeping the troops in hand, of concentrating the fire, and thereby producing great moral effect. Volleys are of value to troops in ambush, in repulsing cavalry attacks, and in preventing premature firing against the wishes of the commander. They should be used against staffs which would be able to seek cover or spread out when exposed to fire at will.

As the men are, however, not equally skilled in loading their pieces, the rate of fire is very little increased by the use of volleys. The command “Fire” can only be given when the pieces of the entire unit are directed upon the target. The length of the pause between preliminary command and command of execution varies, depending upon the distinctness with which the target can be seen, the range, and the aiming position. When the fire is delivered from a prone position it will be difficult to determine when the command of execution should properly be given. Moreover, as fire from a standing or kneeling position will be the exception, this has contributed to eliminate volley firing on the battlefield, because the troops lack coolness—mental as well as physical—which is indispensable in every volley.

The material and moral effect of a volley is doubtless very considerable, but who could possibly make his voice heard when a deployed platoon of sixty men is firing? How about the efficacy of the fire when the men revert of their own accord from volleys to fire at will, which they will do when their[164] officers are either killed or wounded and they themselves are exposed to fire?[158]

If we use squad volleys (Russia), we approximate fire at will without any of its advantages, besides which, commands, given by so many leaders, tend to confuse the men. Moreover, it is very difficult to handle the platoon, to stop firing, to change target, and to initiate movements. Volley firing is therefore confined to the preparatory stage of combat and to rare moments in which the troops firing are not themselves under effective fire. In the defense of fortified positions many opportunities will be found for the employment of volley fire. The use of trial volleys for the purpose of testing the rear sight elevation will be confined to a few favorable cases, and it may be remarked that animated fire at will concentrated on some definite point produces the same results.

The French, who retained volleys longer than the other powers (to keep the men in hand, to regulate the expenditure of ammunition, and to direct a concentrated collective fire upon the most important target according to the will of the leader), found a substitute in the fire with counted cartridges,[159] the “burst of fire” (rafale).[160] This was also adopted by their artillery. In Germany, the importance of the sudden effect produced by these “bursts of fire” is recognized, but the same object is sought to be attained by training alone; while[165] in Russia, fire with counted cartridges has been adopted, not for the purpose of obtaining rafale fire effect, but for keeping the men in hand. Rafale fire has the disadvantage that pauses in the fire are regulated formally, and that these pauses occur frequently at the very moment when a favorable target is still visible. Will the individual soldier remain cool in the excitement of battle and carefully count the three or five cartridges which he is to fire? In defense, rafale fire is proper, because the skirmisher in the defensive line is completely hidden during the pauses, while the attacker presents favorable targets only temporarily, thus justifying an increased expenditure of ammunition. In attack, suitable targets are rarely available for rafale fire, and a substitute for this fire must be sought in well directed, steadily delivered fire at will, interrupted by rushes to the front. During an attack, rafale fire might degenerate into wild, uncontrolled fire at will, the rapidity of which decreases only when the ammunition runs short. The employment of this class of fire might sometimes be advisable in action when it becomes necessary to hold the enemy, that is, in defensive situations. In this connection, one who is thoroughly familiar with the French army aptly says: “Rafale fire may be likened to the wild passes made by a man, backed up against a wall, for the purpose of warding off an adversary who is able to decide the controversy with one well-aimed blow.”

9. REAR SIGHT ELEVATIONS AND POINTS OF AIM.

In Switzerland and Italy the employment of a single rear sight elevation, less than the actual range, is preferred, even when the range is not accurately known. The French regulations are silent on this subject. In Germany one rear sight elevation is used, as a general rule, up to 1,000 m.; beyond[166] that range combined sights may be used in which the two rear sight elevations differ from each other by 100 or 50 m.[161]

“Rapidly approaching or receding targets are followed by making proper sight corrections, rear sight elevations being less than the range when the fire is delivered against advancing targets and greater than the range when the fire is delivered against receding targets. At short ranges the same result may be obtained by aiming lower or higher. It should be noted that, when firing on cavalry making a mounted attack, the danger space is continuous when the sights are raised to 700 m.” (Par. 192 German I. F. R.). As a general rule, the proper aiming point is the lowest line of the target. When it becomes necessary to aim at the center, to one side of or below a target, its dimensions will serve as a guide. A change in the rear sight elevation is necessary at medium and long ranges to raise or lower the sheaf of fire; at short ranges it is practicable to point higher only when the target is tall. When the velocity of a side wind cannot be estimated, it is advisable to distribute the fire over a broader front. At short ranges the selection of an aiming point may, under favorable circumstances, be left to the discretion of the individual skirmishers.

10. COMMANDS.

In recounting the several commands to be given for firing, the regulations take into consideration the logical sequence of the tasks devolving upon the skirmisher. Thus the first command draws the skirmisher’s attention to the target; the second indicates the range; the third directs him to open fire.

[167]

11. THE OBSERVATION OF THE FIRE.

The actions of the enemy are usually the only reliable indication of the location of the sheaf of fire directed against him; the observed strike of bullets is seldom so good an indication. It is especially difficult to judge of the distribution of projectiles from their strike in front and in rear of the target. Suggestions from the subordinate leaders, whose view of the target is generally restricted, are often more confusing than valuable.

12. THE EFFECT OF FIRE.

COMPARISON BETWEEN LOSSES PRODUCED BY INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY FIRE.

In 1866 the Austrian artillery inflicted 16% of our losses. In 1870-71 the French artillery inflicted 8% of our losses. Up to the battle of Liao Yang the 1st Japanese Army suffered the following losses:

The figures given above under the captions “serious” (including killed), “slight,” and “very slight” wounds have, of course, only a relative value. The following figures express the average losses of Russians and Japanese:

[168]

Modern fire tactics count upon a prolonged fire for the purpose of gradually exhausting the enemy, and upon rapid fire, suddenly delivered, for annihilating him.

While a statement of the percentage of hits[162] throws some light upon the effect of the fire of an organization, under normal conditions, the number of figures placed out of action affords a standard of comparison by means of which tactical success may be measured, and aids in deciding how to distribute the fire. Differences in fire effect on like targets are best determined by comparing the number of figures hit per minute by 100 marksmen, as a great number of hits is presupposed, which is not the case when the percentage of hits is taken.

(a) Influence of Training.

Individual skill in marksmanship is of decisive importance when firing at targets of appropriate size at the short ranges. A good marksman, firing at will, may (not must) expect a hit from each round fired, at any target within 250 m., at a single kneeling opponent within 350 m., at a kneeling file within 500 m., and at a standing file within 600 m. At ranges beyond this, influences, due to the imperfections of the rifle, make themselves felt; and these influences grow to such an extent that the best marksmanship training is unable to eliminate them. A considerable number of rifles must fire in order to produce an effect; for, as some of the pieces fire short[169] and others over, the hits are thus distributed over a greater area. But even here skill in marksmanship is apparent in that the cone of dispersion of the excellent shots produces a shot group of small diameter, that of the poorer shots one of very large diameter. Lieutenant-General Rohne computed (Schieszlehre für die Infanterie, p. 84) that when firing rifle model ’98 with the appropriate elevation at a target 1 m. high, the marksmen named in the following table would obtain the number of hits given at the ranges indicated:

This ratio changes, however, very seriously to the disadvantage of the excellent marksmen when the appropriate elevation is not used. The figure given below, in which the curves of hits are traced, shows that even poor shots may obtain better results in this case.

From this may be deduced the great importance of quickly and accurately ascertaining the range. The excellent ballistic qualities of our rifle and our thorough marksmanship training can assert themselves fully only when the range has been accurately determined. At ranges over 800 m. too great an accuracy in collective fire may be actually detrimental. In this case individual accuracy matters little; the important thing is to direct the densest portion of the sheaf of fire, with some degree of accuracy, on a target the range to which is known only in a general way. The importance of training soldiers in precise marksmanship is ethical rather than practical, for a good target shot need not necessarily be a battle marksman. For the latter a cool head is of more value than all the marksmanship skill of the target range.

[170]

(b) Influence of the Error in Estimating the Range.

At short ranges an error of estimation is offset by the flatness of the trajectory. Lieutenant-General Rohne used a probable error in estimation of ¹⁄₈ (12.5%) of the range in his computations. The Swiss Firing Regulations of 1905 count on an error of 100 m. at 500 m., 200 m. at 500 to 1,000 m., 300 m. at ranges over 1,000 m., and the average is taken to be ¹⁄₅ of the range, or 20%. For measurements with range finding instruments see p. 146, supra.

[171]

In the following table, the number of hits per 100 rounds fired, at a target 1 m. high, by the marksmen named, is shown under—

“a” When the fire is controlled and the appropriate elevation is used;

“b” When each skirmisher has selected the elevation corresponding to his estimate of the range. In this case it is presumed, however, that the ranges are generally estimated correctly. (Rohne, Schieszlehre für die Infanterie, 2nd Edition, p. 102).

The above table shows that when the elevation selected is in error, the number of hits decreases more rapidly the greater the skill of the marksman; and that an error in estimation is of less importance than marksmanship only at ranges under 800 m.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “a” AND “b.”

[172]

(c) Fire Effect as Regards Time. Number of Rounds to be Expended.

The greater the losses inflicted within a short period of time in a limited space, the greater the moral effect of the fire. It should therefore be the aim of the officer charged with fire direction to bring about a decisive effect within the shortest possible time. The leaders must bear in mind from the beginning of the fire fight that the ammunition carried is limited and that the expenditure of a certain amount is equivalent to a loss of power, and this is permissible only where commensurate results would be achieved. When once a decision has been formed to fire on a target, the ammunition necessary to accomplish the object of the fight must be expended without stinting, since ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises that of the enemy.

When the enemy is approximately equal to us in numbers, and is deployed in line at one man per meter of front, presenting breast targets only, the number of rounds per rifle, given in round figures in the following table, will be required to place about one-third of the enemy’s force out of action:[163]

[173]

In the above table it is assumed that an error of estimation of 7.5% was made and that at ranges over 1000 m. two elevations were used. Against head targets, approximately twice the number of rounds indicated above must be expended; and against exposed skirmishers, visible at full height, about half of the number of rounds given. The efficacy is increased when the fire comes from a flank. The following data are taken from an extended firing test: At 600-700 m., 200 skirmishers, firing 5000 rounds against 200 body targets, obtained 4.3% hits and placed 43% of the figures out of action; under the enfilading fire delivered by one platoon, the percentage of hits rose to 10.5%, and the number of incapacitated figures to 80%.

(d) Additional Influences Affecting Accuracy of Fire.

Errors in setting the sight, in pointing, aiming, and pulling the trigger, increase the area of the beaten zone at the expense of fire effect on the actual target selected. When we consider the excitement of men in action, and the numerous sources of error in setting the sights, in pointing and firing, it is clear that we have to reckon with the effect of misses on the field of battle more than with the really well aimed and well delivered collective fire of a considerable number of marksmen. Lieutenant Colonel Wolozkoi, late of the Russian Army,[164] attempted to obtain an approximate standard of measurement for the errors in firing made by marksmen. He bases his deductions upon the opinion that the efficacy of rifle fire in action depends entirely upon the mental and physical condition of the individual soldier at the moment; that in serious engagements this condition is such that accurate aiming cannot be expected; and finally that every skirmisher, according to the degree of his excitement or fatigue, will fire his piece at varying angles of elevation. He argues that this produces a rigid cone of dispersion, whose limits correspond to certain[174] extreme angles of error, and whose axis (center trajectory) corresponds to a mean angle of error; that, for each class of rifles, the depth of the resulting beaten zone is constant; and that the depth of this zone increases with the range corresponding to the angles of error. It follows that the depth of this beaten zone is greater in modern rifles than in those of older pattern.

He believes that peace training will have fulfilled its mission if the skirmisher, while firing, holds his piece in the position to which he has become habituated through years of practice. This position can be none other than that in which the piece is horizontal.

Although the theory of the Rigid, Constant Cone of Misses, is not tenable in this form, because there will always be a reasonably compact core of hits (the dimensions of which depend upon the conditions indicated in the firing regulations) at the center of the cone of fire, the views of Colonel Wolozkoi have, nevertheless, a certain value for us, and find application in large, hotly contested battles, especially when the firing line has been exposed to the material and moral influences of hostile fire for a considerable length of time. At the commencement of every combat we can, at any rate, count on “aimed fire”; but instead of reckoning at all times with a 75% core of hits, 100 m. in diameter, we must become used to reckoning with a 30 and 40% core of hits, of the same diameter, produced by greater dispersion of the bullets.

According to experiments made by Colonel Wolozkoi, a good shot makes a mean angular error of ±8 minutes, when using the horizontal aiming position; a poor shot, one of ±40 minutes; the average error being ±25 minutes. In this, however, the sources of error, due to excitement on the part of the marksmen, are not considered. “The principal angular errors can be traced to the nervousness of the marksmen; and this is directly proportional to the magnitude of the danger[175] and the suddenness of its appearance. The soldier judges the magnitude of danger by the number of hostile projectiles and by their effect. Therefore, the livelier the hostile fire, and the longer it continues, the greater the danger appears to him; while the less the effect of that fire, and the better he is sheltered from it, the less he will think himself endangered. On this account, the nervous tension of the individual soldier will reach different degrees of intensity according to the magnitude of the danger.

“Now there are combat situations where the danger is insignificant, and entire engagements in which the impression produced by danger may be called moderate; moreover, even in lively actions phases may occur in which this is equally true. The circumstances of each particular case will, therefore, determine how long it is possible to fire as prescribed in the firing regulations, and from what moment a reduction of efficacy, according to Colonel Wolozkoi’s theory, is unavoidable.

“The arrival of this moment will be postponed more or less by better discipline and training; and, in addition, at the commencement of an action, we may count on the men putting into practice, to a certain extent, what they have been taught in time of peace. However, the efficacy of rifle fire will deteriorate gradually, as the danger and the intensity of the fight increase, until it reaches the stage which Wolozkoi considers peculiar to all of the more serious actions.

“When discipline is still further reduced, the efforts of the men to keep under cover may lead them to duck even their heads and to fire their rifles at high angles. In this case the decisive short ranges would not be swept by fire, making it possible for the more determined of the two opponents to advance to the assault.

“This reduction of the efficacy of fire (i.e., the delivery of fire at high angles) may also take place when troops are surprised and, in consequence thereof, fire hurriedly. This explains[176] why the enemy’s fire passes entirely over a body of troops which has gotten quite close to his position—by no means an unusual phenomenon in surprises.”[165]

Wolozkoi assumes that the core of hits of his constant cone is formed by projectiles fired at a mean angle of departure of less than 4 degrees, while the lower trajectories of the whole cone of fire correspond to an angle of 1 degree and 30 minutes, and the upper trajectories to one of 14 degrees and 30 minutes. If we apply these figures to a particular rifle we obtain a beaten zone containing 50% of the hits (central zone) at 560-1500 m. for the Chassepot rifle; at 1000-2000 m. for the 8 mm. rifle, and at 1200-3000 m. for the 6.5 mm. rifle. It should once more be emphasized that these figures are applicable in combat phases in which the men themselves are under fire, while firing, or deliver their fire hurriedly or with bad aim.

It must be the endeavor of peace training to prevent the occurrence of unaimed firing in battle. This necessitates careful supervision by squad and platoon leaders over the individual soldier in the firing line, and the severe punishment of every act of carelessness in pointing, aiming, and setting of the sight, in peace time. In war one must constantly endeavor to avoid opening fire prematurely, as it tires the eye and the arm of the soldier, to check any unjustifiable rapidity of fire, and to hold the men down to a steady and slow fire. This includes, in addition, the avoidance, by the leader, of haste in giving directions for firing. In defense, one will have to make every effort to withdraw one’s men from the moral effect of the attacker’s fire preparation, and to keep them in proper condition to repulse the assault. This requires the construction of splinter proofs, head cover, and, in case the hostile fire becomes too deadly, a cessation of fire, which is again resumed when the enemy attempts to advance. To carry this out properly, covered observation stations should be built, and the men instructed to line the parapet and to open fire at a signal previously agreed upon, sights having been set and ammunition replenished before they leave cover. A body of troops is not unfit to resist an assault simply because it has suffered a certain percentage of losses, but because each individual soldier is so mastered by the feeling that he is in danger of losing his life that he fires his piece without raising his head above the parapet. A body of troops in such a state will fire its projectiles in Wolozkoi’s “constant cone.”

[178]

A mobilized organization, thoroughly trained in time of peace, will still fire a by no means inconsiderable fraction of its projectiles with good aim and with the proper rear sight elevation, provided its officers are equal to their task.

(e) The Influence of Rifle-Rests in Firing.

Freehand firing increases the rate of fire. Whether the skirmisher fires freehand or from a rest is of influence on the accuracy of the single shot at short ranges. The Belgian, Dutch, and Italian regulations authorize the bayonet, in the absence of other expedients, to be stuck into the ground as a rifle-rest, while this is forbidden in Germany. Collective fire of short duration delivered at mid ranges has not been found superior because of the use of rifle-rests. Fire delivered from a rest is undoubtedly superior, however, when the barrel of the piece is heated by continued firing (position of the left hand supporting the piece when firing standing, prone, or kneeling) and when the arm of the skirmisher gets tired. When firing from a rest, high shots result from vibrations of the barrel;[166] and there is also danger, when under fire, that the men will not raise their heads over the parapet, but will fire their pieces into the air. This, as corroborated by the more recent campaigns, is why a fire fight at short range is by no means decided in so short a time as the peace performances of modern rifles lead one to suppose, for great losses do not take place until skirmishers, who have heretofore hugged the ground, rise. At Spionskop, the two opposing firing lines remained stationary for hours at 250 m. from each other.[167] The[179] Japanese found in their attacks that at ranges from 150 to 75 paces the hostile fire had no effect.

(f) Influence of the Ground.[168]

So far we have considered only the effect of infantry fire on level ground. The efficacy of fire is, however, greatly influenced by the inclination of the ground upon which the cone of dispersion falls. Where the ground rises in respect to the line of sight, the depth of the beaten zone is decreased; where it falls in respect to the line of sight, the depth of the beaten zone is increased.[169]

[180]

Let A B B¹, in the accompanying figure, represent a horizontal plane pierced by trajectories C B and C¹ B¹, at an angle α, forming the beaten zone B B¹. If now the ground falls from B in the direction B D, it is obvious from the figure, that the angle of fall β decreases and the beaten zone B D increases. The limit of this increase is reached when the angle of slope is greater than the angle of fall of the projectile. In this case there is a dead angle beyond B and toward D. If, on the other hand, the ground be rising, the angle of fall will be C¹ D¹ B and the beaten zone[170] decreases to B D¹. The smaller the angle of fall of the projectile the greater the influence of the ground.

From this it follows that when fire direction is in competent hands the appearance of the enemy on the terrain as at B D will be fully taken advantage of, while firing on slope like B D¹ should be avoided. Troops will, however, rarely be in a position from which they can see a target on the slope B D. The efficacy of the fire will in such a case be more or less[181] a matter of accident. A body of troops in broad formation will in this case receive a greater number of hits than a column, since each meter of front of the crest line receives a certain number of projectiles. It is otherwise, however, where the slope rises in respect to the line of sight. A line is more easily missed than a column of considerable depth on the march.

[183]

D = 15.H + 500.

[184]

[185]

It remains to mention briefly the effect of ricochets which, as a rule, tumble[174] after striking. Their range upon rebounding is short. Bullets ricochet most frequently on water, on rocky and hard ground, more rarely on wet meadows, and on tilled soil, but they do not ricochet at all on sandy soil. Ploughed fields, in which the furrows run obliquely to the line of fire, eliminate the effect of ricochets almost entirely. When jacketed bullets (but not the massive French “D” projectiles) strike upon rocky ground, they have a tendency to alter their form materially, or to tear the jacket, thereby considerably increasing the severity of the wound which is produced. The range of ricochets upon rebounding depends mainly upon the angle at which they are deflected. When the lateral deflection is 30 degrees their range may amount to about 1300 m. The nearer a bullet strikes to the skirmisher firing it, and the smaller the angle of deflection of the consequent ricochet, the greater its range; under favorable conditions this may amount to 2500 m. According to French experiments, in firing at a range of 800 m., 4% ricochet hits struck a target, the height of a man, at 1400 m., and 1% ricochet hits a similar target at 1850 m. from the skirmisher who did the firing.

13. LOSSES IN ACTION.[175]

An attempt to move troops in close order formations within the zone of uninterrupted infantry fire at ranges under 1500 m. when the enemy is still in condition to direct his fire on them, is bound to lead to losses which make the further tactical employment of these troops impossible.

Bodies of troops following the firing lines will also have to deploy when the hostile fire reaches them, unless they can find cover. It is a disadvantage for them to deploy, and every opportunity to return to close order formation must be utilized.

[186]

Troops in rear, not directly fired upon and exposed only to accidental shots, should employ narrow rather than broad formations. It might therefore seem advisable to remain in route column so long as no flanking fire is received. The Italian Firing Regulations contain the following figure showing the effect of fire directed on troops in the formations indicated.

Vertical axis: Percentage of hits to be expected. Horizontal axis: Range in meters.

Dash-dot curve: Company Column.[176]
Dotted curve: Line of platoons.[177]
Solid curve: Line of skirmishers.
Dashed curve: Line of platoons in columns of fours, at 15-pace intervals.

According to the figure, the Italian Company Column (German Column of Platoons) suffers the greatest losses; the least losses are sustained by the company formed in line of platoons, each in route column, at intervals of 15 paces. According to French experiments, this formation is said to be no longer suitable when subjected to infantry fire at ranges under 1300 m.

According to French firing tests made in Châlons,[178] the following percentages of hits may be expected when using the Lebel rifle firing old model steel jacketed bullets:

[187]

Lieutenant-General Rohne, in his work, Schieszlehre für die Infanterie, p. 117, computes values for the relative vulnerability of the several formations. At a range of 1200 m., purely frontal fire only being considered, we obtain with every 1000 rounds fired with the appropriate elevation, the following number of hits against—

And against a company deployed in line of platoons:

[188]

The company deployed in line of sections in columns of twos would thus seem to be the most favorable formation for movements, and the line lying prone is especially well suited for halts. For movements under purely frontal, concentrated fire, the line is the least favorable formation, while the route column offers the narrowest target. In this, the character of the terrain plays a decisive role. In firing on targets consisting of columns, it has been assumed that a single projectile will place only one man out of action. Under shrapnel fire the formations are similarly arranged as regards their vulnerability, the line formation being less favorable than the column of platoons, since the former receives all bullets deflected laterally.

The total losses in battles and more serious engagements amount to from 10 to 20% of the participating troops. In some organizations the losses in killed and wounded may amount to as much as 50-60%. The loss that an organization will endure is directly proportional to its efficiency. Good troops, which unexpectedly get into a difficult situation (as, for example, the British Brigade of Highlanders at Magersfontain), and which have been trained to look upon heavy losses as unavoidable, will be capable of enduring a loss of 25% in the course of a battle without going to pieces and without discontinuing the attack.[179]

Spionskop (Jan. 24th, 1900):

The losses among officers are especially heavy. This is by no means due to the attempt of the hostile skirmishers to pick off the leaders in the combat at short range, but to the fact that, in order to lead their men, officers must expose themselves. This becomes more and more necessary the greater the moral effect of the combat on the nervous systems of the men,[190] and the poorer the troops. According to past experience, the casualties among officers are especially heavy in the early stages of a war.[182]

[191]

14. THE MORAL EFFECT OF FIRE.

The moral effect may make itself felt in a two-fold way: as the sum of the impressions influencing the soldier at all times in action, and as the momentary general impression produced by a sudden considerable increase in the losses. The great material effect of fire creates such a consciousness of danger in men’s minds that in a defeated force more than half of its numbers succumb to this moral effect of the fire.

“Troops do not retreat because they are unable to maintain themselves owing to their numerical inferiority, but because they fear the losses which they would suffer if they advanced further. The determination to conquer has been overcome by the desire to live. The confusion of impressions increases with the size of the force. Taken individually, the men might behave quite sensibly, but in a crowd they are claimed either by insanity or lethargy. The activity of the mind is completely replaced by imagination; everything is believed; nothing is appraised; exaggeration prevails everywhere; and precipitation produces unthought of results. When the men come to their senses, it is as if they were awakened from a stupor; they are unable to understand how fear could have induced them to do the very opposite from that which would, most surely, have saved them from destruction.”[184]

In the midst of the impressions of the battle of St. Privat, General von Kessel wrote: “The men appear to be either extraordinarily excited or stupefied. Their faces are distorted and only a few still retain firm will power.”

General Bonnal describes his first impressions at the battle of Wörth as follows: “Since half-past seven our battalion was lying, facing eastward, in the neighborhood of the wood of Fröschweiler. The shrieking of the Prussian shells, but especially the noise of the shells bursting in the[192] midst of the batteries of the 3rd Division in position in our rear, made a considerable impression on our men. Their joking ceased, and nervousness was plainly visible in their pale faces. Men to whom tobacco was offered declined it; they had no desire to smoke. All eyes were focused upon the officers. The latter were congregated here and there in small groups; a few were trying hard to joke, others were walking up and down, with a cigarette between their lips, making convulsive efforts to appear at ease; a small number were entirely calm as if no danger was present.... The first batch of wounded made a strong impression. The battalion was to reinforce the Turcos in the edge of the wood of Fröschweiler. The fire of the Turcos drowned all other sounds. There was nothing to indicate that the enemy was also concentrating a heavy fire upon the wood. We deployed into line to the right. The deployment began, but scarcely ten men had reached the edge of the wood when a terrible cracking and rattling commenced. It was a mitrailleuse battery which fired a volley directly under our very noses. At this moment our men lost their heads. They blazed away like mad, crowded in three, four, and five ranks at the foot of the downward slope. The men in front had thrown themselves to the ground, the others fired kneeling or standing, leaning against trees. Since all of the men fired without aiming, enveloped moreover by a dense, impenetrable cloud of smoke, the advanced lines were in greater danger of being hit by French bullets than by those of the enemy. We had to throw ourselves to the ground to avoid being shot down by the lines in rear. On the hill opposite to us, at a range of 300 to 400 m., there rested a white smoke cloud, and we could indistinctly discern the enemy, who was keeping up a lively fire. The powder smoke enveloping us was so dense that we literally could not breathe.” This excitement gradually subsided and the leaders were able to get the troops again under control.

The numerous surrenders of British troops in the engagements of the Boer War were due to the peculiar conditions[193] existing in the theater of war. Besides, Boer and Briton spoke the same language. During the first few days of the campaign, surrenders of detachments of considerable strength took place. These were not punished with sufficient severity. One almost gains the impression that the men considered the surrenders justifiable in order to escape from a difficult situation.

On the South African battlefields, devoid of cover and swept for great distances by the hostile fire, it was indeed very difficult to penetrate the hostile position, and retrograde movements were undoubtedly attended with heavy losses. To this may be added the fact that it was easy for the Boers, who were mounted, to bar the way to isolated British forces. It must be remembered, moreover, that the operations took place during the hottest season and in a country where water is scarce; and that the men felt they had arrived at the limit of their powers of physical endurance at an earlier moment than would have been the case under different conditions. Thus, the surrender at Stromberg of troops exhausted from a night march, is perhaps excusable; not so, however, the surrender of Colonel Carleton’s detachment, which laid down its arms at Nicholson’s Neck after offering a feeble resistance. In the last-mentioned case, it is true, several Englishmen, who had already laid down their arms, stood among the Boers so that the commander of the British force did not really know just what action to take in this situation. His hesitation decided his fate. The demand must unquestionably be made in future also,[185] that troops surrounded in the field make a serious attempt to cut their way out before permitting thoughts of surrender to enter their minds.

It is impossible to determine theoretically what losses troops are able to endure. After the Franco-German War it[194] was believed that troops had reached the limit of endurance after losing one-third to one-fourth of their strength. Nowadays this limit would appear to be reached much sooner. It may be pointed out, however, that the neglect of continuing the attack at Colenso (loss 5.8%), and at Spionskop (loss 7.2%), may, in part, be charged to lack of energy in the commander; and that the Brigade of Highlanders, consisting of 2000 rifles and deployed on a front of about 4000 m., in the engagement at Paardeberg (loss 13.4%), lacked the necessary depth to continue the attack. The greater the degree of efficiency and freshness of troops, and the less the degree of suddenness with which they enter a difficult situation, the greater the losses which they will be capable of enduring. Furthermore, we should not forget that our modern personnel has become much more susceptible to the impressions of battle. The steadily improving standards of living tend to increase the instinct of self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice. The spirit of the times looks upon war as an avoidable evil, and this militates directly against that courage which has a contempt for death. The fast manner of living at the present day undermines the nervous system,[186] the fanaticism and the religious and national enthusiasm of a bygone age are lacking, and, finally, the physical powers of the human species are also partly diminishing. The influence exerted by officers on the firing line is nowadays, however, considerably smaller than in the past, so much so that they can actually control only the nearest skirmishers. In addition, the nerve-racking impressions on the battlefield are much greater at present than in the past. The “void of the battlefield”[187] has become especially pronounced[195] since the introduction of smokeless powder. “The invisibility of the enemy directly affects the morale of the soldier, the sources of his energy and his courage. The soldier who cannot see his enemy, is inclined to see him everywhere. It is but a step from this impression to hesitancy and then to fear. The inertia of the troops for whole days at Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than 800 m. from the enemy, was not produced by their losses, but by the moral depression which is caused within the effective zone of rifle fire.” (General Négrier.)[188]

The effect of danger on the battlefield is indicated by—

1. Derangement of tactical units;

2. The mixing of men of the different units during the action; and

3. The dissolution of units into disorderly masses.