*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 74102 ***





  HISTORY
  OF
  MERCHANT SHIPPING
  AND
  ANCIENT COMMERCE.

  BY
  W. S. LINDSAY.

  _IN FOUR VOLUMES._
  VOL. III.

  With numerous Illustrations.

  LONDON:
  SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, LOW, AND SEARLE.
  CROWN BUILDINGS, 188 FLEET STREET.
  1876.

  [_All Rights reserved._]




  LONDON:
  PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,
  STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.




PREFACE.


On publishing the first two volumes of this work, it was not my
intention that the following volumes should be preceded by any preface.
I have, however, been induced to reconsider this resolution, in order
to acknowledge the ready assistance I have received from men of great
experience, not only of this but of foreign countries. My first volume
treats more especially of the antiquities of the mercantile marine,
and closes with the sixteenth century. In the second, I trace the
progress of maritime commerce down to about the close of the great
French War (1815), when a new era dawned and a new state of things
was inaugurated. Details, relating in an especial manner to this
period, form the subject of my last two volumes—in one I treat of
the Navigation Laws of Cromwell and of the causes which led to their
abolition, together with the effects of their abolition; while the
other is devoted, entirely, to the rise and progress of steam-ships and
to the different branches of commerce in which they are engaged.

In order to render this portion of my labours valuable for the purpose
of reference, I have sought the aid of those best able to afford me
trustworthy information, and to supply me with documents and tables of
unquestionable authenticity.

To none am I more deeply indebted in this respect than to Mr. Farrer
and others, of the Board of Trade, whose kindly promptitude I again
acknowledge. For that part relating to France I have profited by the
valuable aid of Mr. Michael Chevalier, who has not grudged the pains
of carefully and critically revising the proofs of that portion of the
work, and making many interesting additions to it.

Nor must I omit to record the readiness exhibited by Mr. R. B. Forbes,
of Boston, United States, by Commodore Prebble, Commandant of the
Philadelphia Dockyard, and by the Presidents of the New York and other
American Chambers of Commerce, and to the United States authorities
generally, in supplying me with official data with reference to the
development of the maritime commerce of the United States.

To my own countrymen, whether Shipowners, Merchants, Shipbuilders, or
Underwriters, my thanks are heartily due, and to the Directors and
Managers of those large Shipping Companies which arose in the middle
of the present century, both at home and abroad. And, in an especial
manner I have to thank Mr. John Burns, of Glasgow (Cunard Company),
Mr. Alfred Holt, of Liverpool, and Mr. B. Waymouth, the Secretary to
‘Lloyd’s Register.’

To enumerate all those who have so courteously and generously striven
to forward the views of an historian whose only object has been to
chronicle facts and events, would be to give an undue extension to
these prefatory remarks. I have, therefore, contented myself with
acknowledging the sources of my information in foot-notes throughout my
work; and I trust they will accept my thanks in the sense in which they
are tendered.

In conclusion, I must refer to the kind attention paid to my request by
Earl Russell, in revising that portion of my work which refers to the
repeal of the Navigation Laws when he was First Minister of the Crown;
and to other eminent Statesmen (two of whom have gone through the whole
of the sheets of both volumes, making many valuable suggestions) for
the approval expressed by them of the manner in which I have compressed
the debates on these Laws which have now passed into the domain of
history.

                                                         W. S. LINDSAY.

  SHEPPERTON MANOR,
  _18th January, 1876_.




CONTENTS.


  CHAPTER I.                                                 Pages 1-26

Progress of the United States of America—Their resources—Discriminating
duties levied by France, 1820, against American ships—Rapid rise of
New Orleans, and of New York—Boston ships extend their trade to India
and China—Stephen Girard, the rich and eccentric American shipowner,
_note_—Mercantile marine laws of the United States—Duties of master and
mate—Provision for Seamen—Special Acts relating to them—Power given
to American consuls to deal with seamen on their ships—Superiority of
native American seamen, owing to their education—Excellent schools
and early training for them—Spirit and character of the “Shipping
Articles” as affecting the seamen—the owners—and the master or
consignee—Conditions of wages, and remedies for their non-payment; and
other securities for seamen—Power of Appeal by them to the Admiralty
Courts—Laws with reference to pilots—Character of American seamen, and
especially of the New Englanders.


  CHAPTER II.                                                     27-52

Necessity of proper education for merchant seamen—Practice in
Denmark—In Norway and Sweden—Russia and Prussia—France—Remarkable
care of seamen in Venice, Scuola di San Nicolo—Character of
this institution, and general working—Variously modified since
first creation—State since 1814—Qualifications of Venetian
shipmasters—Present regulations of Austria—Great Britain—Need of
a public institution for merchant seamen—The “Belvidere” or Royal
Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution, _note_—Mr. Williams, observations
by, on the advantage of a general Seaman’s Fund, _note_—Institution
in Norway—Foreign Office circular of July 1, 1843—Its value, though
unfair and one-sided—Replies to circular—Mr. Consul Booker—Mr. Consul
Baker—Mr. Consul Yeames—The Consul at Dantzig—The Consuls of Genoa,
Ancona, and Naples—Mr. Consul Sherrard—Mr. Consul MacTavish—Mr. Consul
Hesketh—Reports from the Consuls in South America—General conclusions
of Mr. Murray, Nov. 22, 1847, and suggestions for remedies—Board of
Trade Commission, May 17, 1847—Its results—Shipowners condemned for the
character of their ships and officers—Views of Government—Necessity of
a competent Marine Department.


  CHAPTER III.                                                    53-80

High estimate abroad of English Navigation Laws—Change necessary,
owing to the Independence of America—Other nations at first
Protectionist—Mr. Pitt’s proposals with reference to trade with
America—Mr. Pitt resigns, and a temporary Act ensues—Shipowners and
loyalists in America successfully resist his scheme—Congress the
first to retaliate—Restrictions injurious, alike, to England and her
Colonies—Commercial treaties with America between 1794 and 1817—Acts
of 1822 and 1823, and further irritation in America—Order in Council,
July 1826—Conciliatory steps of the Americans in 1830—Foreigners
look with suspicion on any change in the Navigation Laws—Reciprocity
treaties of 1824-6—Value of treaties in early times, but inadequate
for the regulation of commercial intercourse, and liable to unfair
diplomacy—Reciprocity treaties only, partially, of value, and do not
check the anomalies of Protection—Committee of 1844-5 promoted by the
Shipowners, who seek protection against Colonial shipping—Reciprocity
must lead to free navigation—New class of Statesmen, well supported
by the People—Exertions of Lord John Russell, who leads the way
against Protection—Richard Cobden and the Anti-Corn-Law League—John
Bright—Effect of the Irish famine, 1845-6—Sir Robert Peel carries the
Repeal of the Corn Laws, and resigns.


  CHAPTER IV.                                                    81-109

Lord John Russell’s first steps as Prime Minister: the Equalization
of the Sugar Duties—He suspends the Navigation Laws, January 1847—Mr.
Ricardo’s motion, February 1847—Reply of Mr. Liddell—Mr. Ricardo’s
motion carried—Committee appointed, February 1847—Meeting of the
shipowners, August 12, 1847—Their arguments—What constitutes “British
ships”—State of Navigation Laws in 1847—Rules in force in the
Plantation Trade—Their rigorous character—Their history from 1660 to
1847—First infringement of the principle of confining the American
trade to British vessels—Absurdity and impotency of these laws—State
of the law before the Declaration of American Independence—Trade with
Europe—Modifications of the law—East India Trade and Shipping—Trade
with India in foreign and in United States ships even from English
ports—Coasting trade—Summary of the Navigation Laws.


  CHAPTER V.                                                    110-135

Progress of the changes in the Navigation Laws—Reciprocity
Treaties—Austria, July 1838—Zollverein States, August 1841—Russia,
1843—Various anomalies, &c., then in existence—Curious effects of
Registry Laws, as regarded individuals or corporate bodies—Ship
_Equador_—Decision of the Queen’s Bench, December 1846—Further
details: owner to reside in the United Kingdom—Naturalisation of goods
brought to Europe—Waste of capital caused thereby; and obstructions
to trade—Story of the cochineal—But the Navigation Laws not always
to blame—Special views of the Canadians—Montreal, its shipping and
trade—Navigation of the St. Lawrence—Free-trade with the United States
desired by the farmers of Canada—Negotiations proposed—Canadians
urge the abolition of Protection—Views of Western Canada—Canadians,
really, only for partial Free-trade—Improvements of their internal
navigation—Welland Canal—Cost of freight the real question—Loss to
Canada by New York line—General summary of results as to Canada—West
Indians for Free-trade as well as Canadians—Divergent views of
capitalists at home—Liverpool and Manchester opposed.


  CHAPTER VI.                                                   136-160

Witnesses examined by Mr. Ricardo’s Committee: Mr. J. S. Lefevre,
Mr. Macgregor, Mr. G. R. Porter—Their extreme views not conclusive
to the Committee—Evidence adduced by the Shipowners—Ships built
more cheaply abroad—Evidence of Mr. G. F. Young, and his general
conclusions—Mr. Richmond’s evidence—Asserts that shipping is a
losing trade—Replies to the charges against Shipowners—Views as
to captains of merchant ships—Praises their nautical skill and
capacity—His character of common seamen—Attacks Mr. Porter—Offers
valuable details of ship-building—Is prepared to go all lengths in
favour of Protection—His jealousy of the Northern Powers—Evidence
of Mr. Braysher, Collector of Customs in London—General effect of
the Navigation Laws on the Customs—With the Northern Ports and
America—Difficulty about “manufactured” articles—Anomalies of the
coasting and internal trade—Committee’s last meeting, July 17—General
dissatisfaction with the results of the inquiry—Commercial panic and
distress of 1847—Suspension of Bank Charter Act.


  CHAPTER VII.                                                  161-190

New Parliament, November 18, 1847—Speech from Throne—Mr. Robinson
and Shipowners deceived—Conversation between Mr. Bancroft and Lord
Palmerston—Mr. Bancroft’s declaration—Official letter from Mr. Bancroft
to Lord Palmerston, November 3, 1847—Lord Palmerston’s reply, November
17, practically giving prior information to the Americans—Lord
Clarendon tells the Shipowners’ Society that the laws will not be
altered, December 26, 1846; and repeats this assurance, March 15,
1847—Interview between Lord Palmerston and Mr. Bancroft, published in
‘Washington Union’—Excites great indignation when known in England,
January 1848—Parliament re-assembles, February 3, 1848—Lord Palmerston
admits the correspondence with America—The Earl of Hardwicke’s
proposal, February 25, 1848—Earl Grey grants a Committee—Evidence of
the Shipowners before the Lords’ Committee—Mr. Young proposes some
modifications, the first concessions of the Anti-Repeal Party—Claim in
favour of direct voyages—Government insists on Total Repeal—Detailed
views of Admiral Sir George Byam Martin—Importance of keeping up the
merchant navy—Arguments from his personal experience as to its value
as a nursery for seamen—Working of the system of apprenticeship,
and of impressment—Evidence of Admiral Berkeley, and of Mr. R. B.
Minturn—Details about American ships—Reciprocity treaties so far as
they affect Americans—Their whale fishery.


  CHAPTER VIII.                                                 191-229

Motion of Mr. Herries, 1848—Protectionist principles stated—Extent
of shipping trade—National defences endangered—Mr. Labouchere’s
reply—Alderman Thompson—Mr. Gladstone’s views—Mr. Hudson—Lord George
Bentinck—Mr. Hume—Mr. Cobden—Mr. Disraeli—Sir Robert Peel—The
resolution carried by 117, but abandoned for a time—Temper of the
Shipowners—Efforts of Ministers to obtain reciprocity by a circular
from the Foreign Office—Reply thereto of America—Mr. Buchanan’s
letter—Reply of other Powers—Progress of Free-trade views—Parliament
of 1849—Death of Lord George Bentinck, September 21, 1848—Mr.
Labouchere’s new resolution, February 14, 1849—Proposed change in
coasting trade—Mr. Bancroft recalcitrates—Hence, withdrawal of the
coasting clauses—The debate—Alderman Thompson, &c.—Mr. Ricardo—Meeting
of Shipowners’ Society—Their report—The manning-clause grievance—Policy
proposed—Agitation in the country.


  CHAPTER IX.                                                   230-263

The debate, March 1849—Speech of Mr. Herries—Mr. J. Wilson—Question
of reciprocity—Doubtful even in the case of shipping—Difficulty of
the “Favoured-nation” clause—Marquess of Granby—Mr. Cardwell—Mr.
Henley—Mr. Gladstone—Burdens to be removed from Shipowners—Conditional
legislation recommended—Views on the subject of the coasting
trade—Americans not Free-traders—Smuggling in the coasting trade—Mr.
Robinson—Mr. Clay—Mr. T. A. Mitchell—Mr. Hildyard—Mr. Ricardo—Mr. H.
Drummond—Mr. Labouchere’s reply—Majority of 56 for Bill—Committee on
the Bill—Coasting clauses withdrawn—Mr. Bouverie’s amendment opposed
by Shipowners’ Committee—Mr. Gladstone’s scheme also opposed by the
Shipowners—Questions of reciprocity, conditional legislation, and
retaliation—Details of American Law—Mr. Bouverie’s plan rejected—Mr.
Disraeli’s speech—Third reading of Bill—Mr. Herries’ speech—Mr.
Robinson—Mr. Walpole—Sir James Graham—Mr. T. Baring—Lord J. Russell—Mr.
Disraeli—Majority for Bill, 61.


  CHAPTER X.                                                    264-286

Debate in the Lords, May 7, 1849, on second reading—Speech of
the Marquess of Lansdowne—Lord Brougham—Condemnation of Mr.
Porter’s statistics—Protected and unprotected Trade—Voyages to the
Continent—Napoleon’s desire for ships, colonies, and commerce—Earl
Granville—Earl of Ellenborough—Increase of foreign peace
establishments—Earl of Harrowby—Earl Grey—Lord Stanley—Admits need of
modifications—Canada not our only colony—Majority for the Bill, 10—Duke
of Wellington votes for it—Proceedings and debate in Committee—Lord
Stanley’s amendment—Rejected by 13—Earl of Ellenborough’s
amendment—Claims of Shipowners, and fear of competition—Amendment
rejected by a majority of 12—Bill read a third time—Timber duties, &c.,
admitted to be grievances—Lord Stanley’s protest—Royal assent given,
June 26—Coasting trade thrown open, 1854—Americans, October 1849, throw
open all except their coasting trade.


  CHAPTER XI.                                                   287-321

Despondency of many shipowners after the repeal of the Navigation
Laws—Advantage naturally taken by foreigners, and especially by
the Americans—Jardine and Co. build vessels to compete with the
Americans—Aberdeen “clippers”—Shipowners demand the enforcement
on foreign nations of reciprocity—Return of prosperity to the
Shipowners—Act of 1850 for the improvement of the condition of
seamen—Valuable services of Mr. T. H. Farrer—Chief conditions of
the Act of 1850—Certificates of examination—Appointment of local
marine boards, and their duties—Further provisions of the Act of
1850—Institution of Naval Courts abroad—Special inspectors to be
appointed by the Board of Trade, if need be—Act of 1851, regulating
Merchant Seaman’s Fund, &c.—Merchant Shipping Act, 1854—New measurement
of ships—Registration of ships—The “Rule of the Sea”—Pilots and
pilotage—Existing Mercantile Marine Fund—Wrecks—Limitation of the
liability of Shipowners—Various miscellaneous provisions—Act of 1855.


  CHAPTER XII.                                                  322-351

Parliamentary inquiry, 1854-5, on Passenger ships—Heavy losses at sea
previously, and especially in 1854—Emigration system—Frauds practised
on emigrants—Runners and crimps—Remedies proposed—Average price, then,
of passages—Emigration officer—Medical inspection—American emigration
law—Dietary, then, required—Disgraceful state of emigrant ships at that
time—Act of 1852—Resolution of New York Legislature, 1854—Evidence as
to iron cargoes—Various attempts at improvement—Legislation in the
United States, 1855—Uniformity of action impossible—English Passenger
Act, 1855—Attempt to check issue of fraudulent tickets—General
improvements—Merchant Shipping Act discussed—Extent of owner’s
liability—Unnecessary outcry of the Shipowners—Question of limited
liability—Value of life—Powers given to the Board of Trade—Mode of
procedure in inquiries about loss of life—Further complaints of the
Shipowners, who think too much discretion has been given to the
Emigration officer—Though slightly modified since, the principle
of the Passenger Act remains the same—the “Rule of the road at
sea”—Examination now required for engineers as well as masters of
steam vessels—Injurious action of the crimps—Savings-banks for seamen
instituted, and, somewhat later, money-order offices.


  CHAPTER XIII.                                                 352-385

Scarcity of shipping at the commencement of the Crimean War—Repeal of
the manning clause—Government refuses to issue letters of marque—Great
increase of ship-building and high freights—Reaction—Transport
service (_notes_)—Depression in the United States—The _Great
Republic_—Disastrous years of 1857 and 1858—Many banks stop
payment—Shipowners’ Society still attribute their disasters to
the repeal of the Navigation Laws—Meeting of Shipowners, December
15th, 1858—Their proposal—Resolution moved by Mr. G. F. Young—Mr.
Lindsay moves for Committee of Inquiry—Well-drawn petition of
the Shipowners—Foreign governments and the amount of their
reciprocity—French trade—Spanish trade—Portuguese trade—Belgian
trade—British ships in French and Spanish ports—Coasting
trade—Non-reciprocating countries—Presumed advantage of the Panama
route—Question discussed—Was the depression due to the withdrawal
of Protection?—Board of Trade report and returns—English and
foreign tonnage—Sailing vessels and steamers in home and foreign
trades—Shipping accounts, 1858—Foreign and Colonial trades—Probable
causes of the depression in England and America—American jealousy
and competition—Inconclusive reasoning of Board of Trade—Government
proposes to remove burdens on British shipping—Compulsory reciprocity
no longer obtainable—Real value of the Coasting trade of the United
States—Magnanimity of England in throwing open her Coasting trade
unconditionally not appreciated by the Americans.


  CHAPTER XIV.                                                  386-421

Further returns of the Board of Trade, and address of the Shipowners’
Society to the electors, 13th April, 1859—Shipowners’ meeting in
London—Character of the speeches at it—Mr. Lindsay proposes an
amendment—Effect of the war between France and Austria—Mr. Lindsay
moves for an inquiry into the burdens on the Shipping Interest, 31st
January, 1860—Report of the Committee thereon—Views with regard
to foreign countries—The Netherlands—The United States—Generally
unsatisfactory state of the intercourse with foreign nations—The
present depression beyond the influence of Government—General results
of Steamers _versus_ Sailing Vessels—The Committee resists the plan
of re-imposing restrictions on the Colonial Trade—Difficulty of
_enforcing_ reciprocity—Want of energy on the part of the English
Foreign Office—Rights of belligerents—Privateering abolished in Europe;
America, however, declining to accept this proposal—Views of the
Committee thereon, and on the liability of Merchant Shipping—Burden of
light dues—Pilotage Charges made by local authorities now, generally,
abolished, as well as those of the Stade dues—The report of 1860,
generally, accepted by the Mercantile Marine—Magnificent English
Merchant Sailing vessels, 1859-1872—The _Thermopylæ_—_Sir Lancelot_ and
others—Americans completely outstripped—Equal increase in the number as
well as the excellence of English shipping—Results of the Free-trade
policy.


  CHAPTER XV.                                                   422-462

First Navigation Law in France, A.D. 1560—Law of Louis XIV., 1643,
revised by Colbert, 1661—Its chief conditions—Regulations for the
French Colonial trade—Slightly modified by the Treaties of Utrecht,
1713, and of 1763, in favour of England—Provisions of 1791 and
1793—Amount of charges enforced—French and English Navigation Laws
equally worthless—“_Surtaxes de Pavillon_” and “_d’Entrepôt_”—“_Droits
de Tonnage_”—Special exemption of Marseilles—French Colonial system
preserved under all its Governments, but greatly to the injury of
her people—English Exhibition of 1851—Messrs. Cobden and Chevalier
meet first there, and ultimately, in 1860, carry the Commercial
Treaty—The French, heavy losers by maintaining their Navigation
Laws—Decline of French shipping—Mr. Lindsay visits France, and has
various interviews with the Emperor, Messrs. Rouher and Chevalier
on this subject—Commission of Inquiry appointed, and Law ultimately
passed May 1866—Its conditions—Repeal Act unsatisfactory to the French
Shipowners—Another Commission of Inquiry appointed, 1870—Views of rival
parties—M. de Coninck—M. Bergasse—M. Siegfried—M. Thiers and Protection
carry the day, and reverse, in 1872, much of the law of 1866—Just views
of the Duke Decazes—Abolition for the second time of the “_Surtaxes de
Pavillon_,” July 1873.


  CHAPTER XVI.                                                  463-501

Recent legislation relating to the loss of life and property at sea in
British vessels—Committee on shipwrecks, 1836—Estimated loss of life at
sea between 1818 and 1836—Recommendations of the Committee—Committee
of 1843, loss of lives and ships at that period—First official return
of wrecks, 1856—Loss of lives and ships, 1862 and 1873—Further
recommendations—Various laws for the protection of seamen, 1846 to
1854—Agitation about “unseaworthy ships,” 1855—Further provisions
for the benefit of seamen, 1867-69-70—Mr. Samuel Plimsoll, M.P.—His
first resolution, 1870—Introduces a Bill, 1871—Government measure
of that year—Mr. Plimsoll publishes a book, ‘Our Seamen,’ 1873—An
extension of the principle applied to testing chain-cables strongly
urged—Mr. Plimsoll moves an Address for a Commission of Inquiry,
which was unanimously granted—Royal Commission on unseaworthy
ships 1873-74—Its members—Their order of reference—And mode of
thorough investigation—Their reports—Load-line—Deck loads—Government
survey—Its extension undesirable—Shipowners already harassed by
over-legislation—Mode of inquiry into losses at sea, examined and
condemned—Recommendations—Examination of masters and mates, and
shipping officers approved—Power of masters—Scheme for training boys
for sea—Marine Insurances—Report as a whole most valuable.


  CHAPTER XVII.                                                 502-559

Loose statements with regard to the loss of life at sea, and other
matters—“Coffin ships”—Great improvement of our ships and officers in
recent years—Duties of the Board of Trade with regard to wrecks—Return
of lives lost and saved between 1855 and 1873, _note_—Wreck
chart; but the extent of loss not sufficiently examined—Danger of
too much Government interference—Loss of life in proportion to
vessels afloat—Causes of loss—More details required—Improvement in
lighthouses, buoys, and beacons—Harbours of Refuge—Extraordinary
scene in the House of Commons on the withdrawal of the Merchant
Shipping Bill, 1875—Another Bill introduced by Government—Its
conditions—Unusual _personal_ power granted to Surveyors—Propriety or
not, of further legislation considered—Compulsory load-line—Mr. J.
W. A. Harper’s evidence—Mr. W. J. Lamport and others—Opinion of the
Commissioners—Voluntary load-line—Its value questionable—All ships
should be certified as seaworthy—How can this be accomplished?—Opinion
of Mr. Charles McIver, _note_—Registration Associations—Lloyd’s
Register, its great importance—Improvement of seamen by better
education—Evil effects of advance notes, confirmed by the opinion of
the Commissioners—Over-insurance—Views of Mr. T. H. Farrer—Evidence
of other witnesses—Opinion of the Commissioners—Too much legislation
already—The necessity of a Mercantile Marine Code, and more prompt
punishment in criminal cases—Concluding remarks on the extraordinary
progress of British shipping, and the dangers of over-legislation.




  APPENDICES.


                       PAGE

  APPENDIX  No.  1      563

  ”         No.  2      567

  ”         No.  3      571

  ”         No.  4      582

  ”         No.  5      590

  ”         No.  6      596

  ”         No.  7      600

  ”         No.  8      611

  ”         No.  9      613

  ”         No. 10      618

  ”         No. 11      620

  ”         No. 12      624

  ”         No. 13      634

  ”         No. 14      637


  INDEX                 639




  ILLUSTRATIONS.

                                                        PAGE

  WRECK CHART, SHOWING WHERE TOTAL, WHERE PARTIAL, AND
  WHERE LOSS OF LIFE OCCURRED                  _Frontispiece_

  THE UNITED STATES SAILING CLIPPER “GREAT REPUBLIC”      360

  THE TRANSVERSE MIDSHIP SECTION OF BRITISH SAILING SHIP,
  “THERMOPYLÆ”                                            415

  DRAWING OF THIS SHIP UNDER FULL SAIL                    416




  [Illustration:

  CHART
  OF THE
  BRITISH ISLES
  SHEWING THE
  WRECKS AND CASUALTIES
  DURING THE YEAR 1873-4,
  distinguishing those attended with
  Loss of Life
  ]




MERCHANT SHIPPING.




CHAPTER I.

     Progress of the United States of America—Their
     resources—Discriminating duties levied by France, 1820, against
     American ships—Rapid rise of New Orleans, and of New York—Boston
     ships extend their trade to India and China—Stephen Girard, the
     rich and eccentric American shipowner, _note_—Mercantile
     marine laws of the United States—Duties of master and
     mate—Provision for Seamen—Special Acts relating to them—Power
     given to American consuls to deal with seamen on their
     ships—Superiority of native American seamen, owing to their
     education—Excellent schools and early training for them—Spirit
     and character of the “Shipping Articles” as affecting the
     seamen—the owners—and the master or consignee—Conditions of wages,
     and remedies for their non-payment; and other securities for
     seamen—Power of Appeal by them to the Admiralty Courts—Laws with
     reference to pilots—Character of American seamen, and especially
     of the New Englanders.


[Sidenote: Progress of the United States of America.]

Perhaps no nation, in either ancient or modern times, ever made such
prodigious strides in wealth, population, and power, and, necessarily,
in commerce and navigation, as have the United States of America
during the first half of the present century. Nor is this a matter
for surprise. Practically, the American people had during that period
started in life with the singular advantage, that they commenced their
career with the accumulated wisdom of a long ancestry, with whom,
unlike the nations of ancient times, they have continued to have the
means of easy communication. Therefore, they had the capability of
assuming, almost at once, an important position in the world, and of
exercising no mean influence over its affairs, having few of those
difficulties to encounter, which European nations, in their slow
emergence from a state of political and intellectual darkness, have
taken centuries to surmount.

[Sidenote: Their resources.]

Finding themselves in a safe geographical position, with the most
magnificent harbours on every part of their coast, already prepared by
the hand of nature for their use, with the greatest navigable rivers in
the world, with lakes which are inland seas, and with boundless virgin
soil at their disposal: wanting nothing, in short, but wise laws and
abundant labour, they speedily discovered their strength, and, in their
earlier debates, in Congress gravely discussed the question whether
they should not style themselves the most enlightened people in the
world.[1] Nor, indeed, was this boast altogether vain and baseless,
for the Americans were in a position to adopt, as they might choose,
the whole sum of human knowledge, with the power, at the same time, of
applying this knowledge to the satisfaction of their varying wants.

Their capacity for government, in its application to commerce and
navigation, equalled, if it did not surpass, that of the race whence
they descended; and their system of education, the only true basis
of a nation’s greatness, far surpassed that of Great Britain; hence,
in all diplomatic negotiations, relating either to their political
independence or to their material interests, they have generally
exhibited such marked tact, ability, and acuteness, as has enabled them
frequently to obtain ample redress from foreign nations, and often,
too, without that formal demand which, if not complied with, leads to
war: from their example a few of our diplomatists, who reside abroad,
would do well to take a lesson.

With these elements of knowledge, wealth, and national power, combined
with a martial spirit, readily kindled into action whenever the
necessity arose, the Americans, under an extremely liberal government,
have rapidly and deservedly assumed a proud position among nations.
Not the least interesting and instructive cause of their rise was
the promptitude with which they developed, by the then best known
means, their great natural resources, and none more so than their
maritime commerce, for, within eighty years from their Declaration of
Independence, they rivalled, and, indeed, surpassed in the amount of
their merchant shipping, all other nations.[2]

[Sidenote: Discriminating duties levied by France, 1820, against
American ships.]

Nor was that high position reached without innumerable difficulties
in the shape of laws adverse to her interests. Great Britain excluded
her ships from all her colonies; and, though France had ceded to her
by treaty in 1803, for the sum of fifteen million dollars, the State
of Louisiana, that country for many years afterwards continued to levy
heavy differential duties on all goods imported into France in American
bottoms, while American shipowners had to contend at their port of
export against the predominant interests of a country whose settlers
for a long time greatly outnumbered the native Americans resident in
New Orleans. Indeed, so late as 1820, a long memorial[3] was presented
to Congress from twenty-four captains of American vessels then lying
at New Orleans, stating that they “cannot earn a competent livelihood,
owing to the fatal discriminating duties established in France in
favour of its own vessels in the exclusive importation there of the
staples of the United States.” The memorialists[4] further alleged that
on some articles the duty was “ten times” in favour of French vessels,
and that the “aggregate importation in French vessels at the port of
New Orleans exceeded very much in _quantity_ the amount imported
by American vessels;” being in the proportion of “nearly four to one.”
In confirmation of these statements the memorialists furnished a return
from the Customs which demonstrated that the carrying trade between New
Orleans and France was being then rapidly transferred from American to
French vessels; and they stated that the only reason why the French
did not absorb the whole trade, was that they had not a sufficient
number of vessels to undertake it. The petitioners further insisted
that nothing but “a positive tonnage duty,” graduated according to
the amount of the differential duties levied in France on the chief
American staples, would avail to keep their trade in their own hands.

[Sidenote: Rapid rise of New Orleans]

Nevertheless, in spite of these hostile tariffs, and the war of
retaliating duties which was for some time waged, New Orleans, from
being the natural emporium of the vast tracts of country traversed by
the Mississippi, Missouri, and their tributary streams, and enjoying,
as it does, a greater command of internal navigation than any other
city in either the Old or New World, has made since 1820 the most
astounding strides in its maritime commerce.[5]

[Sidenote: and of New York.]

But in the face of equal difficulties as regards hostile tariffs, New
York, through the great natural resources at her command, and other
causes, surpassed New Orleans in the rapidity of its early commercial
and maritime progress. Although its advancement during the first decade
of the present century was scarcely equal to that of the preceding ten
years, during which it enjoyed unexceptionable prosperity (no other
city in the United States having profited so much, during the earlier
periods, by the war in Europe), its merchants and shipowners suffered
severely between 1806 and 1815 from the disastrous effects of captures,
condemnations, and embargoes. Nor was it until 1825 that New York began
to assume the importance which she has continued to maintain among
the other commercial cities of the Union. In that year an internal
element of prosperity was brought into operation by the construction
of the Erie Canal, which opened for trade the agricultural products
of the fertile valley of the Tennessee, and the whole coasts of the
northern lakes. The introduction of steam-navigation, to which I shall
fully refer hereafter, affording greatly increased facilities for the
conveyance of merchandise to and from New York by means of the numerous
navigable rivers which intersected that and the neighbouring States,
naturally gave an enormous impulse to its navigation, while the coal
from the great Pennsylvania coal basin contributed essentially to its
prosperity.[6]

[Sidenote: Boston ships extend their trade to India and China.]

Nor was the prosperity confined to New York. It extended for many years
to all the ports of the Union. Boston, which, twenty years before the
Declaration of Independence, was only a village containing about twenty
houses, and, so late as 1822, was still governed by a body of “select
men,” according to the custom of New England [the people, till then,
declining to adopt a municipal government], vied with New York in
the Foreign Trade which had arisen, and early in the present century
despatched their vessels on the most distant voyages. Indeed, so early
as 1789, the merchants of Boston and Salem sent various ships direct to
the East Indies and China, and, many years before the “Free Traders”
of Great Britain could enter upon this trade, then monopolised by the
ships of the East India Company, so far as regards Great Britain, the
merchants[7] of Massachusetts supplied, not merely their own people
with the bulk of the teas, spices, silks, sugar and coffee from the
East as well as with nankeens and other cotton clothes, but reshipped
them from Boston to Hamburg and the Northern ports of Europe in
their own vessels, thus deriving large profits from a trade with our
possessions, from which the great bulk of our ships were long excluded
by the stringent restrictions of a pernicious monopoly.[8]

[Sidenote: Mercantile marine laws of the United States.]

We have thus seen with what rapidity the Americans, in their early
career, covered almost every ocean with their ships. As in other
matters, so in the rules and regulations drawn up for the internal
management of their marine, they were able, at the commencement of
their independence, to adopt from other nations such laws, even to
their most minute details, as appeared to them the best fitted for
their position. Thus, one of their earliest Acts, that of 1790,
provides: that, “if a seaman is engaged without the execution of the
shipping paper, the master or mariner shall pay to the seaman the
highest wages that have been given within the three months next before
the time of such shipping;” and the principle of this law has been long
maintained, for the Act of 1840 declares that “any seaman so shipped
may, at any time, leave the service, and demand the highest rate of
wages given to any seaman shipped for the voyage.” In the Bank and
Cod-fisheries, the contract of seamen with the masters and owners is
required to be in writing, expressing the general terms of the voyage;
and in the Whale-fishery, though the shipping paper is not absolutely
required by the law, there is still a regular engagement, generally in
writing, stipulating, among other things, the terms of the voyage, and
the shares or “lays” of each officer and seaman on board the ship.

[Sidenote: Duties of master and mate.]

The several modes in which seamen’s contracts are executed, are the
hiring by the month or by the voyage so long as it shall continue,
or for a share of the profits, or of the freight earned in certain
voyages. The American law invests the master with the sole government
of his ship and the absolute right of direction, subject to the
legal consequences of any abuse of his powers. He may enforce his
authority by the infliction of punishment upon the crew, but, should
he exceed these limits, he is liable, by a Statute of the United
States, to an action for damages in the Civil Courts, and to a criminal
prosecution. The measure of punishment proportioned to the offence is
to be ascertained by the special circumstances of the case; but all
punishments must be inflicted with proper instruments. Hence, while
the master has power to punish a seaman and to imprison him on board,
to prevent a violation of the order and peace of the ship, he must be
prepared to show that such measures were necessary.

The duties of mate, as laid down by the United States, resemble those
of other countries. In the absence or death of the master he takes his
place, exercising a general superintendence over the affairs of the
ship. But his ordinary duties are confined to calling the attention
of the master to everything requiring his notice, to the receipt and
stowage of cargo, and to whatever is necessary for the proper equipment
and sailing of the vessel while at sea. The mate is also required
to keep the log-book, wherein he is bound to enter every matter of
importance, such as the courses steered, the winds, and state of the
weather, with many other minute details connected with the navigation
of the ship. If he is guilty of such negligence as to involve the loss
of his cargo, he alone is responsible; and if he interferes with the
responsibility, of others he renders himself responsible. Thus, if he
undertakes, while in harbour, the removal of any merchandise, resulting
in loss, the amount may be deducted from his wages, it being the rule,
that the wharfinger is responsible for the safe delivery of all goods
on board the vessel.

[Sidenote: Provision for seamen.]

The American law has, also, provided for the proper sustenance of
seamen, by requiring that a certain amount of the provisions shipped be
set apart for this purpose, and, further, that they shall be provided
for during _bonâ fide_ sicknesses occurring during the service of
the ship, and not from the seamen’s own fault, when absent occasionally
or without express permission. All vessels bound for any ports beyond
the limits of the United States are to be provided with a medicine
chest. Provision, moreover, is made for sick and disabled seamen on
shore, the law enjoining on the master or owner of every vessel the
payment towards the maintenance of hospitals on shore, into the hands
of the Collector of Customs of 20 cents per month for every seaman in
their employ. This sum is deducted from the wages of the seamen, and
is required from all seamen alike, whether in the coasting or oversea
trades.

Barratry committed by the master or mariner is treated as in England.
Running away with or destroying the ship, mutiny, piracy, piratical
confederacy, endeavouring to create a revolt, desertion, embezzlement,
negligence, drunkenness, and disobedience, are all regarded as grave
offences, and punished in a greater or less degree.

[Sidenote: Special Acts relating to them.]

By the Act of the 20th February, 1803, it was provided that the master
of any merchant vessel, clearing for a foreign port, should enter into
a bond in the sum of 400_l._ for the production of his crew at
the first port at which he should arrive on his return to the United
States, unless any one or more of the crew had been discharged in a
foreign country, with the consent of the American consul or commercial
agent of the United States, except in the case of death, of absconding,
or of forcible impressment into some other service. This Act, likewise,
provided that, when a vessel was sold abroad, and the crew discharged
by mutual consent, the master should pay to the consul for any seaman
thus discharged three months’ wages over and above those he had earned
up to the time of his discharge; two-thirds thereof to be paid to the
seaman himself, on his engagement to return to the United States, and
the remaining third to be retained towards a fund for the payment
of the passages for seamen, citizens of the United States, who may
be desirous of returning home; and for the maintenance of destitute
American seamen resident at the port of discharge.

[Sidenote: Power given to American consuls]

Although many persons were of opinion that the Act of 1803, requiring,
under the circumstances named, a payment of three months’ extra wages,
and empowering consuls to send seamen home, disabled or otherwise, “in
the most reasonable manner,” frequently led to improper expenditure,
and that a more strict accountability, than then existed, ought to
be enforced, these clauses remained unaltered until 1840, when their
features were changed; consuls and commercial agents of the United
States being by the Act of the 20th July of that year invested with
the power to discharge, when they thought it “expedient,” any seaman,
on the joint application of the master of the ship and the seaman
himself, without requiring payment of any sum beyond the wages due at
the time of discharge.

The Act, however, of 1840 created so many objections of another
kind, that it became necessary, shortly afterwards, to make various
alterations. It was felt that the discretion given to the consuls was
likely to operate unfortunately for all parties concerned. Acting,
as the consuls then very frequently did, in the double capacity of
agent for the United States and consignee of the vessel, they were
too often induced to gratify the wishes of the owner and master to
the injury of the seaman. Consequently, either the American consular
establishments had to be re-organised upon a more independent system,
or the “expediency” clauses had to be abolished. But other and still
more weighty reasons suggested the desirability of adopting the
former course. While, at a later period, the discretionary power
was abolished, except in cases of sickness and insubordination,
arrangements were made to disconnect Government agencies entirely
from commercial operations. Now, all consuls, who must be exclusively
American citizens, are remunerated by fixed salaries, instead of fees
as formerly, and are removed from the possibility of all interested
connexion with shipowners and shipmasters; by being, in nearly every
instance, as is now the case with the consuls of Great Britain,
prohibited from carrying on business on their own account—at least
such business as can in any way interfere with their duties as consul.

[Sidenote: to deal with seamen on their ships.]

But it has been necessary also to make several other material
alterations in the maritime laws. By the Act of 1790, it was provided
that if any seaman deserted, or even absented himself for forty-eight
hours without leave from his ship, he forfeited to the master or owner
of the vessel all the wages due to him, and all his goods and chattels
on board, or in any store where they were deposited at the time of such
desertion or absence, besides other penalties. This forfeiture might be
necessary or proper to check desertion; but it was easy to see, that
it was in the highest degree unwise, that it should be given for the
use of the master or owner of the ship. It tended, indeed, to produce
the very effect and mischief it was intended to prevent. Masters of
American vessels, when nearing a port where a new crew could be shipped
at reduced wages, and when in arrears to their seamen (a fact which
often occurs in long whaling voyages), were apt to adopt a course of
tyrannical conduct, with the desire of compelling desertion; and, on
their arrival, to permit their sailors a temporary absence from the
ship, and then to leave them, under the plea of desertion, as a charge
on the hands of the consul.

One flagrant instance was mentioned by the consul at Lima, of a
supercargo of a vessel, who stated that he had saved in one voyage
alone more than 1000 dollars by the desertion of his hands, as if this
were a fair source of profit to either owner or master.

The simple entry in the log-book of the fact of absence or desertion
was, then, deemed conclusive against the seaman. Hence a very large
sum was necessarily expended by the American Government in providing
for destitute seamen. But this was partly attributable to the general
increase of the United States commerce, and not altogether to the
defective working of the law. While the aggregate amount of the
registered tonnage of the United States in 1830 was about 576,000 tons,
it had reached in 1840, 899,000, showing an increase of 323,000 in ten
years,[9] but the increase of seamen applying for relief at distant
consulates had at that time, it would seem, gone far beyond the general
increase in the amount of shipping.

The whole question of the relations between the men and their
employers, as they existed in the United States, is too wide a subject
to be embraced in the present work. There are, however, some general,
as well as special, points, both as regards the mariners and the law
regulating their conduct, which deserve attention. During the first
half of this century the masters of American vessels were, as a rule,
greatly superior to those who held similar positions in English ships,
arising in some measure from the limited education of the latter,
which was not sufficient to qualify them for the higher grades of the
merchant service. American shipowners required of their masters not
merely a knowledge of navigation and seamanship, but of commercial
pursuits, the nature of exchanges, the art of correspondence, and a
sufficient knowledge of business to qualify them to represent the
interests of their employers to advantage with merchants abroad. On
all such matters the commanders of English ships, with the exception of
the East India Company’s, were at this period greatly inferior to the
commanders of the United States vessels.

“Education,” remarks Mr. Joseph T. Sherwood,[10] “is much prized by
the citizens; many vessels, therefore, are commanded by gentlemen with
a college education, and by those educated in high schools, who, on
leaving those institutions, enter a merchant’s counting-room for a
limited time before they go to sea for practical seamanship, &c., or
are entrusted by their parents, guardians, or friends, with the command
of vessels.”

[Sidenote: Superiority of native American seamen, owing to their
education.]

In confirmation of this opinion, Mr. Consul Peter, of Philadelphia,
states[11]: “A lad intended for the higher grades of the merchant
service in this country, after having been at school for some years and
acquired (in addition to the ordinary branches of school learning) a
competent knowledge of Mathematics, Navigation, Ships’ husbandry, and
perhaps French, is generally apprenticed to some respectable merchant,
in whose counting-house he remains two or three years, or at least
until he becomes familiar with exchanges and such other commercial
matters as may best qualify him to represent his principal in foreign
countries. He is then sent to sea, generally in the capacity of second
mate, from which he gradually rises to that of captain.”

Besides this, however, it must be remembered that American shipowners
offered greater inducements than the English then did to young men of
talent and education to enter the merchant service, as the amount of
wages, alone, was two- and three-fold greater in the former than in the
latter. Again, the American shipmasters were, also, almost invariably
admitted, nay frequently solicited by the managing owners, to take some
shares in the ships placed under their command; and, in cases, where
the master had no capital, the owner often conveyed to him a share of
one-sixth, and sometimes even one quarter, to be paid for out of his
wages and the profits of the ships. Thus young men of good position and
talent were led to enter the American merchant service, and had much
greater inducements than they would then have had in Great Britain to
take a zealous interest in the economy, discipline, and success of the
ship they commanded; and this, not merely from the fact that they were
well recommended, but from the confidential and courteous treatment
they received from their employers. Captains of the larger class of
packets or merchant-ships, therefore, could not only afford to live as
gentlemen, but, if men of good character and fair manners (which they
generally were), they were received into the best mercantile circles on
shore. They were also allowed, besides their fixed salary, a percentage
(usually 2½ per cent.) on all freights, and by various other privileges
(particularly in relation to passengers) they were thus enabled to
save money and to become, in time, merchants and shipowners on their
own account, a custom which prevailed, to a large extent, in the New
England States.

[Sidenote: Excellent schools and early training for them.]

Nor were the interests of the common seamen overlooked. Boys of all
classes, when fit, had the privilege of entering the higher free
schools, in which they could be educated for almost every profession.
An ignorant American native seaman was, therefore, scarcely to be
found; they all, with few exceptions, knew how to read, write, and
cypher. Although, in all nations, a mariner is considered a citizen
of the world, whose home is on the sea, and, as such, can enforce
compensation for his labour in the Courts of any country, his contract
being recognised by general jurisprudence, the cases of disputes
between _native-born_ Americans and their captains have ever
been less frequent both in this country and abroad than between
British masters and seamen, owing, in a great measure, to the superior
education and the more rigorous discipline on board American vessels.
In the United States, the master of the ship was, and is still, usually
employed to hire the seamen; and although, in hiring, he is the agent
of the owners (and they have co-ordinate power), still if they do not
dissent, the engagement entered into by the master with the seamen is
binding on the owners also. The contract is, however, not made with
the person of the master, but with the shipowners; therefore, if there
is no master, the seamen contract to sail under any master who may be
appointed. Thus, on the one side of the contract is the seaman, and, on
the other, the master or owner—the master acting as the owner’s agent,
under ordinary circumstances, although the owner, from his holding the
property in the ship, is more directly affected by the contract.

[Sidenote: Spirit and character of the “Shipping Articles,”]

The master and owner, on their side, agree by the contract, technically
termed “Shipping Articles,” which, if drawn up in the prescribed form
and signed by all the seamen, expresses the conditions of the voyage,
with a promise to pay to the mariners their stipulated wages. It is,
also, implied in it that the voyage shall be legal, and the vessel
provided with the various requisites for navigation; and, further, that
it shall be within defined limits and without deviation, except such
as may be absolutely necessary for the safety of the crew, vessel,
or cargo. It is also a part of the contract that the seamen shall be
treated with humanity, and be provided with subsistence according to
the laws of their country; unless there is in it an express provision
to the contrary, or a condition to conform with the usages of a
particular trade.

[Sidenote: as affecting the seamen;]

The seaman, on his side, by the act of signing the “Shipping Articles,”
contracts to do all in his power for the welfare of the ship; engages
that he has competent knowledge for the performance of the duties of
the station for which he contracts; to be on board at the precise time
which, by American law, constitutes a part of the articles; and to
remain in the service of the ship till the voyage has been completed.
If he does not so report himself on board the vessel, he may be
apprehended and committed to the custody of the law till the ship is
ready to sail. He contracts also to obey all the lawful commands of
the master; to preserve order and discipline aboard, and to submit,
as a child to its parent, for the purpose of securing such order and
discipline during the voyage.[12]

[Sidenote: the owners;]

As in England, the owners have the right of removing a master, who
is part owner of a vessel; but, if he is removed without good cause,
and while at the same time specially engaged, they are liable to him
for damages. Where, however, he has only a general engagement with
a vessel, his relation to the owners is scarcely more than a mere
agency, revocable at any time. On the other hand, the master cannot
leave the ship in which he has contracted to sail without being himself
answerable to the owners.

The authority of a master over his ship is in all essential particulars
the same as that prescribed by British law. With regard to letting the
ship, the same principles prevail on both sides of the Atlantic.[13]

In general the owners are responsible for injuries committed by
the master in that capacity, as in cases of collision, discharges
of mariners, damages to cargo from want of ordinary care, and
embezzlement. The master is answerable for all contracts made by him
in connexion with the navigation of a ship, as also for all damages
arising from his want of skill or care, and for repairs and supplies,
except when furnished on the exclusive credit of the owner.

[Sidenote: and the masters or consignees.]

If the master of a ship is at the same time commander and consignee,
he stands in the twofold relation of agent of the owner and consignor,
and is invested with appropriate duties in both capacities. Inasmuch
as the master and owner are in the eyes of the American law common
carriers, it is the master’s duty to see that his vessel is seaworthy
and provided with a proper crew, to take a pilot, where required by
custom or law, to stow the goods properly, to set sail in fair weather,
to transport the cargo with care, and to provide against all but
inevitable mishaps. In other respects, American and English laws are
almost identical; the admirable decisions of Judge Story, Chancellor
Kent, and Chief Justice Marshall having, however, made some refined
distinctions.

[Sidenote: Conditions of wages,]

[Sidenote: and remedies for their non-payment; and the other securities
for seamen.]

As it was considered the duty of sailors to remain by their vessel
till the cargo was discharged, they had no claim to their wages till
then, but, if these were not paid within ten days after such discharge,
they had a right to an admiralty process against the vessel. Only
one-third of the wages earned can be demanded by the mariner at any
port of delivery during the voyage. There may be on this subject a
special stipulation; but, if the ship be lost or captured, wages earned
up to the last port of delivery may be recovered by the mariner,
on his return home, to the place to which the vessel has carried
freight; freight being by the laws of all nations “the Mother of
Wages:” inasmuch, however, as they depend upon the vessel’s safety
and the earning of the freight, they cannot be insured. In all cases
of capture, the seamen lose their wages, unless the ship is restored.
In cases of rescue, recapture, and ransom, the wages of mariners are
subject to a general average, but in no other case are they liable to
contribute. In cases of shipwreck the rule prevails, as elsewhere,
that, if parts of the ship be saved by the exertions of the seamen,
they hold a lien on those parts for some kind of compensation, but this
is viewed somewhat in the light of salvage. When a seaman dies on
board ship, wages are usually allowed up to the time of his decease,
if the cause of death occurred during the term of his engagement,
and otherwise than by his own fault. In the whale-fishery, the
representatives of a deceased mariner are entitled to that share of
the profits which the term of his service bore to the whole voyage,
according to his contract. If a voyage is broken up by the fault of
the master or owner, full compensation must be given to the seaman;
so also, in cases of wrongful discharge, the seaman usually recovers
full indemnification in American Courts of law. Indeed they have more
effectual remedies for the recovery of their wages than the seamen of
most other countries, from the fact that Americans have followed the
ancient laws already quoted: moreover, they have their remedy against
the master, and can recover their wages from him personally, or from
the owner or owners of the vessel, or from the person who appointed the
master and gave him his authority.

For personal injuries inflicted by the master upon the seamen, such
as assaults, batteries, or imprisonments, the seaman in the United
States has his remedy by an action at common law, or by a libel in
the Admiralty Courts, in what is technically denominated “a cause of
damage.” So, also, in a wrongful discharge, an action would be not only
on the special tort committed, but also for the wages on the original
contract of hiring, the wrongful discharge being void.

[Sidenote: Power of appeal by them to the Admiralty Courts.]

In order to institute suits in the Courts of Admiralty in the United
States it is necessary that the voyage should be on tidal waters, and
that the service on which suit is brought should be connected with
commerce and navigation. The jurisdiction of those Courts in America
extends to personal suits, and includes claims founded in contract and
in wrong, and also those cases where claims, founded in a hypothecary
interest of the nature of a lien, are urged and adjudicated upon.
Their jurisdiction extends, moreover, to those cases in which shares
of fish, taken on the Bank and other Cod-fisheries, and of oil in the
Whale-fishery, are claimed; and, as in English Courts, the seaman may
unite his claims, though founded on distinct contracts, in one suit,
but this only when demanding wages. The Courts of Common Law in the
United States also take cognizance of mariners’ contracts, but they are
not competent to give a remedy so as to enforce the mariner’s lien on
the vessel; hence, they confine their jurisdiction to personal suits
against the master or owner, in accordance with the contract made with
the seaman; but, in cases of tort committed on the high seas, and where
the form of action is trespass, or a special action, the common law has
concurrent jurisdiction.

The laws of the United States[14] expressly provide that the crews of
merchant vessels shall have the fullest liberty to lay their complaints
before their consuls abroad, and shall in no respect be restrained
therein by any master or officer, unless some sufficient and valid
objection exist against their landing, in which case it is the duty of
the master to apprize the consul forthwith, stating the reason why the
seaman is not permitted to land; whereupon, the consul must proceed on
board, and act as the law directs. In all cases where deserters are
apprehended the consul is required to investigate the facts, and, if
satisfied that the desertion was caused by unusual or cruel treatment,
the mariner shall be, in such case, not merely discharged, but shall
receive, in addition to his wages, three months’ pay, and the whole act
is required to be entered upon the crew-list and shipping articles,
with full particulars of the nature of this treatment. Any consul or
commercial agent of the United States neglecting or omitting to perform
his duties, or guilty of malversation or abuse of power, is liable
to an action from the parties aggrieved; and, for corrupt conduct in
office, he is liable to indictment, and on conviction may be fined from
one to ten thousand dollars, and be imprisoned not less than one, or
more than five, years.

[Sidenote: Laws with reference to pilots.]

Although Congress possesses the power to make the laws necessary for
the regulation of _Pilots_, and the whole business of pilotage
is within its authority, there is no general law for these purposes,
and the superintendence of pilots is left to the legislation of the
individual States. By the _Act of 7 August, 1789_, it was enacted
that all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbours, and ports of
the United States should continue to be regulated by the existing laws
of the States respectively, until further legislative proceeding by
Congress. The licensing of pilots and fixing rates of pilotage were
therefore thus arranged at first; but, as some difficulties arose, it
was enacted by the Act 2 March, 1837, that it was lawful for the master
or commander of any vessel coming into, or going out of, any port
situate upon waters forming the boundaries of any two States to employ
any duly licensed or authorised pilot of either State.[15]

[Sidenote: Character of American seamen, especially, of the New
Englanders.]

The native-born American seamen are bold, adventurous, and brave. In
their merchant vessels the proportion of native seamen is estimated
at about one-third, while it was a common remark that “the rest are
rascally Spaniards, surly John Bulls, Zealanders, Malays, anything of
any country.” The American native-born seaman is frequently promoted
to be an officer, and, sometimes, to the command of large ships, but
there are perpetual complaints that the people of the United States
do not “take to the sea” with alacrity. Indeed, it is only in the New
England States that the sailor’s life may be said to belong to the soil
itself, and even the natives of that comparatively barren soil and
rigorous climate become sailors, perhaps less from love of adventure
and from their natural hardiness, than from necessity. When boys
they had, perhaps, widowed mothers to support, younger brothers and
sisters to care for, and, there being no other congenial occupation,
they “go to sea.” When complaining of his “dog’s life,” the American
sailor sits by the hour whittling a stick, and building little boats
for his child, recounting at the same time the perils and hardships
of the sea. Like British seamen, he has always his pet ship, in which
most of his experience has been acquired, and the name of that ship is
oftenest on his lips. It is associated with the story of his loves,
with the memory of his friendships, and he dates all eras from his
several voyages in the vessel of the “one loved name.” As New England
was the great storehouse of American seamen, there the best specimens
of their seafaring population were to be found. We have seen, even
in our time, the puritanical, weather-beaten, Boston skipper—once so
famous—sharp as a north-easter, dressed in knee-breeches and buckles,
with a three-cornered cocked-hat, not forgetting the pigtail, the very
personification of our Commodore Trunnion and Piper of a century ago.
But, though they may have degenerated since then, the seamen engaged in
the deep-sea fisheries are still a remarkably hardy, robust race, and,
hence, have succeeded in that branch of maritime enterprise far more
than our own adventurers of late years.


FOOTNOTES:

[1] _See_ Alexander Baring’s pamphlet, 1808.

[2] In 1860, the United States owned a larger amount of tonnage,
including lake and river steamers, than the United Kingdom, and nearly
as much as Great Britain and all her colonies and possessions combined.

[3] State papers, America, ‘Commerce and Navigation,’ vol. ii. p. 413.

[4] The names appended to the petition are nearly all Anglo-Saxon, such
as Rogers, Jones, Howard, &c.

[5] In 1818, the whole of the exports from New Orleans was only in
value a little more than three million sterling; in 1850 it had reached
thirty millions; the shipments of raw cotton alone in that year being
1,600,000 bales. During the year ending June 30, 1874, the exports of
that article to _foreign countries_ were 2,883,785 bales from the
port of New Orleans alone.

[6] In the year ending 30th September, 1822, the tonnage of American
vessels entered inwards at New York was 217,538 tons, cleared 185,666,
against 22,478, and 17,784 tons foreign vessels, respectively. But for
the year ending June 30, 1874, the proportion of entrances at the Port
of New York was: American vessels, 1,124,055 tons; foreign vessels,
3,925,563. The clearances were in somewhat the same proportion.
The chief causes of these extraordinary changes will appear in the
course of this work. In 1850, 2,632,788 tons of American shipping,
and 1,728,214 tons of foreign shipping cleared from the ports of the
United States. In 1860, the relative proportions were, native vessels,
6,165,924 tons: foreign, 2,624,005; but in 1871, while the clearances
of American vessels had fallen to 3,982,852 tons, the clearances of
foreign vessels from the ports of the United States had risen to
9,207,396 tons! I take these startling figures, which I wish my readers
to bear in mind, from the United States’ official reports, for history
is of little value unless it teaches useful lessons.

[7] Among the leading merchants of Boston and Salem then engaged in
this lucrative trade may be mentioned the names of Russell, Derby,
Cabot, Thorndike, Barrell, Brown, Perkins, Bryant, Sturgis, Higginson,
Shaw, Lloyd, Lee, Preble, Peabody, Mason, Jones, and Gray. From 1786 to
1798, Thomas Russell was one of the most enterprising and successful
merchants of Boston. His charities were extensive; he was a warm friend
to the clergy, and a liberal supporter of all religious institutions.
Curiously enough, a member of the families (by the father and mother’s
side), of Perkins and of Bryant and Sturgis (Russell Sturgis), now
fills the place which Joshua Bates so long occupied as a leading
partner in the house of Baring Brothers and Co., of London; Joshua
Bates himself having first come to London as agent for Gray, the last
name on the list I have given. Towards the close, however, of last
century, Brown and Ives of Providence, Peabody of Salem, and T. H.
Smith of New York, with Perkins and Co., and Bryant and Sturgis of
Boston, carried on nearly all the trade with China.

[8]

[Sidenote: Stephen Girard, the rich and eccentric American shipowner.]

Though altogether unlike Mr. Russell and the other shipowners and
merchants of Boston I have just named, I cannot omit to mention, in
connexion with the early history of the Merchant Shipping of the United
States, the name of Stephen Girard, one of the most prosperous and
eccentric of men, who was long known as the “rich shipowner and banker
of Philadelphia.” Born near Bordeaux, in 1750, of obscure parents, he,
at the age of ten or twelve years, embarked as a cabin boy, with only
a very limited knowledge of the elements of reading and writing, on
a vessel bound for the West Indies. Thence he sailed in the service
of an American shipmaster, to whom he had engaged himself, as an
apprentice, for New York. He soon rose to be mate and master, and,
after making a little money, he opened a small store in Philadelphia,
and also carried on a shipping business with New Orleans and St.
Domingo. At the latter place a tragical circumstance occurred strongly
illustrative of the troubles of the time, but which contributed
materially to swell Girard’s fortune. It chanced that at the moment
of the insurrection of St. Domingo, Girard had two vessels lying near
the wharf in one of the ports of that island. On the sudden outbreak,
the planters, instinctively rushed to the harbour and deposited their
most valuable treasures in the ships then there for the purpose of
safety; but returned themselves in order to collect more property. As
the greater part of them were massacred, few remained to claim the
property, and as a large portion of it had been deposited in Girard’s
vessels, for which no claims were made, he thus became its owner. In
1791 he commenced building a class of beautiful ships, long the pride
of Philadelphia, for the trade with Calcutta and China—their names,
however,—the _Montesquieu_, _Helvetius_, _Voltaire_, and _Rousseau_—too
conspicuously reveal the religious dogmas of their owner. By judicious
and successful operations in banking, combined with shipowning, Girard
made so large a fortune that, in 1813, he was considered the wealthiest
trader in the United States. It is told of him that when, in that
year, one of his vessels with a cargo consisting of teas, nankeens,
and silks from China, was seized on entering the Delaware, he ransomed
her from the captors on the spot by a payment of $93,000, paid in
doubloons, and by this transaction added half a million of dollars to
his fortune! But Girard, with all his wealth, ended his career without
a friend or relative to soothe his declining years and close his eyes
in death. His legacies were large and numerous, while the largest of
them were characteristic of the man. Among these may be named his
bequest of 208,000 acres of land and thirty slaves to the city of New
Orleans, and other large tracts of land in Louisiana to the Corporation
of Philadelphia. To the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania he gave $30,000
for internal improvements; but the most extraordinary of his bequests
was $2,000,000, which he left for the erection of an orphan college
at Philadelphia—a magnificent building—and the endowment of suitable
instructors, requiring and enjoining, however, by his will, “that no
ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever shall ever
hold or exercise any station or duty whatever in the said college;
nor shall any such person ever be admitted for any purpose, or as a
visitor, within the premises appropriated to the purposes of the said
college.” Such was Stephen Girard, master and mariner.

[9] _Vide_ Mr. Calhoun’s report, ‘Executive Documents,’ 2nd
Session, 28th Congress, Document No. 95. 1844-45.

[10] Letter addressed by Mr. Sherwood, British Consul for Maine and
New Hampshire, U.S., to Foreign Office, July 23, 1847, see Par. Paper,
‘Commercial Marine of Great Britain, 1848,’ p. 382.

[11] Papers relating to the Commercial Marine of Great Britain, 1848,
p. 388.

[12] Act of 20th July, 1840, section 3, U.S. Acts, Boston Ed., vol. v.
p. 394.

[13] For some very nice points of distinction, the reader may consult
‘Arnold’s Marine Insurance,’ Ed. 1857, where the decisions of Judge
Story and Chancellor Kent are laid down with profound learning and
judgment.

[14] Act 20th July, 1840, 16th and 17th sections.

[15] In a note to this Act (Statutes at Large U.S., Boston, 1850) will
be found an admirable exposition of some decisions of the American
Courts respecting the scope of a pilot’s duties. They are excellent,
but too long to insert here.




CHAPTER II.

     Necessity of proper education for merchant seamen—Practice in
     Denmark—In Norway and Sweden—Russia and Prussia—France—Remarkable
     care of seamen in Venice, Scuola di San Nicolo—Character of
     this institution, and general working—Variously modified since
     first creation—State since 1814—Qualifications of Venetian
     shipmasters—Present regulations of Austria—Great Britain—Need
     of a public institution for merchant seamen—The “Belvidere” or
     Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution, _note_—Mr. Williams,
     observations by, on the advantage of a general Seaman’s Fund,
     _note_—Institution in Norway—Foreign Office circular of
     July 1, 1843—Its value, though unfair and one-sided—Replies to
     circular—Mr. Consul Booker—Mr. Consul Baker—Mr. Consul Yeames—The
     Consul at Dantzig—The Consuls of Genoa, Ancona, and Naples—Mr.
     Consul Sherrard—Mr. Consul MacTavish—Mr. Consul Hesketh—Reports
     from the Consuls in South America—General conclusions of Mr.
     Murray, Nov. 22, 1847, and suggestions for remedies—Board
     of Trade Commission, May 17, 1847—Its results—Shipowners
     condemned for the character of their ships and officers—Views of
     Government—Necessity of a competent Marine Department.


[Sidenote: Necessity of proper education for merchant seamen.]

Although it can scarcely be said that the character of British seamen
degenerated from the time America declared her independence till
towards the close of the first half of the present century, there is no
doubt that those of other nations were making rapid strides in advance
of them. Indeed, many causes had combined to raise, alike, the position
of the shipowners and seamen of foreign nations, not the least of these
being the protection afforded to our shipowners by the Navigation
Laws, as under that protective system they felt it less necessary to
exert themselves to contend with the foreigner as keenly as, under
other circumstances, they would surely have done. Most foreign nations
had also directed their attention, long before we did, to the necessity
of thorough education for their seafaring population—a policy they have
since maintained. With that object in view, schools were established
at all their principal seaports, where not merely the rudiments of
navigation were taught the youths, but considerable attention was also
devoted to their moral and intellectual improvement.

[Sidenote: Practice in Denmark.]

In Denmark, for instance, the system of education for the higher
grades of the merchant service was particularly strict and effective.
No Danish subject was allowed to act as master of a merchant vessel
unless he had previously made two voyages in the capacity of mate,
while the mates themselves had, and still have, to submit to a general
examination, embracing (1st) a knowledge of dead-reckoning, the nature
and use of logarithms, and the first rudiments of geometry; (2nd) the
nature and use of the compass and log; and (3rd) the form and motions
of the earth, and the geographical lines projected on its surface,
so as to be able to determine the position of different places. It
was also expected that he should understand the nature of Mercator’s
charts, and the mode of laying down the ship’s course on them, together
with such calculations as may be necessary for this purpose. Expertness
in keeping a journal, in the use of the quadrant, and in making the
necessary allowances for currents, lee-way, and the variations of the
compass, were all required, together with some idea of the daily motion
of the celestial bodies, of the sun’s proper motion, and the meaning
of the words “horizon,” “refraction,” “semi-diameter,” “radius,” and
“parallax.” He was also required to know how to use the instruments
for calculating the elevation of the sun and stars, and the distance
between objects on shore! Nor, indeed, was his examination limited to
the more ordinary details of a navigator’s duty. He was expected to be
expert in ascertaining what star enters the meridian at a given time
at the highest and the lowest elevations, as well as in finding the
latitude, both by means of the meridian height of the sun or of a star,
and in determining the time for high and low water. He was further
expected to understand the mode of calculating the time of sunrise and
sunset, and of ascertaining the variations of the compass by means of
one or more bearings in the horizon, and by the azimuth.

[Sidenote: In Norway and Sweden.]

In Norway and Sweden, mates of ships had to undergo a similar
examination before being allowed to act in that capacity, and a still
more rigid examination both as regards seamanship, navigation, and the
general knowledge of business relating to shipping affairs, before
they could command a vessel, together with a knowledge of the Customs
and Navigation Laws, and of the usual averages and exchange. They had
likewise to know something of the elements of shipbuilding, and of the
mode of measuring a ship’s capacity.

[Sidenote: Russia and Prussia.]

In Russia and Prussia the mates and masters of merchant vessels,
besides the qualifications above referred to, were required not merely
to read and write their own language with accuracy, but to have some
knowledge also of English and French.

So early as 1806 a school was founded in Nicolaieff to train masters
and pilots for the commercial marine, which, in 1832, was enlarged and
removed to Cherson, while another and similar establishment was at
the same time founded in St. Petersburg. All coasting vessels are now
bound to have masters who have left these schools with certificates
of competency. But the most important measure for the encouragement
of seamen in Russia, whether employed in river or sea navigation, was
enacted in 1826; families devoted to navigation being then for the
first time incorporated in certain towns along the sea coasts and great
rivers under the designation of “Corporations of Free Mariners.” These
corporations were exempted from the capitation and land taxes, and from
the conscription and quartering of troops, on condition that they sent
their young men to serve for five years as apprentices in the Imperial
fleet.

[Sidenote: France.]

The system, however, of combining the services of seamen for the navy
and the mercantile marine alike has been more thoroughly organised
in France than in any other country. There the State and Commercial
Navy are under the same code of regulations, the members of each being
equally entitled to a pension after a certain length of service: in
fact, all seamen in France are held to be in Government employ; their
names are registered in the office of the Marine Commissioners of the
port to which they belong, and, from the age of eighteen to fifty, they
are liable to be ordered at any time on board a Government ship, to
serve as long as necessary. Hence it is that almost every seaman or
fisherman of France has served in the navy for at least three years. At
the age of fifty, and on the completion of a service at sea of three
hundred months in either the navy or the merchant marine, a seaman
receives a pension according to a certain scale, whereby, however, he
cannot get more than six hundred francs, or less than ninety-six francs
per annum. But these pensions are not really paid by the State, as a
deduction of three per cent. is made from the monthly pay of every
seaman in either service, so as to provide a fund for their payment.

France also provides for her seafaring classes more liberal and
effective means of education than are, perhaps, to be found in any
other country. A professor, paid by Government, resides in each of
its principal ports, who affords to all, seeking to be commanders in
the merchant service, instruction, free of charge, on the different
subjects connected with their profession.[16]

[Sidenote: Remarkable care of seamen in Venice; Scuola di San Nicolo.]

Seaman’s funds, somewhat similar to those in France, have been
established by all other European nations, though the objects in view
have differed. That in England, well known as the Merchant Seaman’s
Fund, was instituted during the early part of the present century,
for the benefit solely of merchant seamen, who were not under any
obligation to serve in ships of war, though, during the great war, they
were too frequently pressed into the service. All these associations
appear to have had their origin with the Italian Republics, and that
of Venice is of considerable historical importance, forming as it did
the basis on which nearly all the others have been engrafted. This
institution, called the _Scuola di San Nicolo_, was originally
founded at that city in the year 1476, in commemoration of the
successful defence of Scutari by the Venetians against the Turks.
Greenwich Hospital, in some respects, resembles it, but the Venetian
institution had attached to it a Merchant Seaman’s Fund, distinctly
intended for the relief of the old and infirm sailors of that service.
The building itself was destroyed in 1806, but the institution still
survives.

[Sidenote: Character of this institution;]

In 1786, the laws relating to this excellent institution having been
carefully revised, required that all seamen, whether Venetians or
foreigners, as a condition of their employment in the Venetian merchant
service, should inscribe their names at the Scuola di San Nicolo.
Foreigners domiciled, who had been employed in the sea service of
Venice for the space of five years, were also entitled to the benefits
of the institution to the same extent as natives.

On the first inscription, each man had to pay three Venetian livres
and two soldi (about 2_s._ 1_d._) as entrance money, and,
subsequently, an annual contribution of one livre and eleven soldi
(1_s._ 1½_d._). In addition to the above, every sailor or
other person of the crew of a vessel was bound to pay twenty soldi
(10_d._) for each voyage out and home.

All who had been inscribed two years, and had punctually paid their
contributions, were entitled to the benefits of the institution, that
is, to medical attendance and lodging in the Hospital of Invalids,
when advanced in years or infirm. Children, it would seem, were only
eligible in cases where the fathers had sailed for ten years beyond the
limits of the Gulf of Venice, or along the Dalmatian coast.

[Sidenote: and general working.]

[Sidenote: Variously modified since first creation.]

The “Scuola di San Nicolo,” as above described, was preserved with all
its laws and rules during the first occupation of the Austrians, from
1797 to 1806, after which it was suppressed by the then Government
of Italy. An invalid fund was then established, which may be called
an institution for the relief of invalid sailors. One-sixtieth was
deducted from all payments made on account of the navy, and assigned
to it; it thus becoming, in reality, a military institution, under
the protection of the Royal Navy. Subsequently additional funds were
assigned to it, in the shape of a percentage on all prizes, the
proportion given depending on whether the prize or its captor were a
ship of war, a privateer, or a merchant vessel.

By a decree of 1811, the endowment of the institution was further
augmented, and the means of giving relief were consequently increased.
Three per cent., instead of one-sixtieth, was granted out of the pay of
the Royal Navy; and merchant seamen were likewise obliged to contribute
their respective shares of pay or prize money. Finally, in addition to
the percentage on prizes, the following casual sources of emolument
were set aside for this institution:—The proceeds of wrecked vessels,
if not claimed within a certain time; the pay due to sailors or others,
who had deserted from vessels in the service of the State; half of the
pay due to deserters from the merchant service; and the amount due on
account of pay, prize-money, &c., to sailors or others dying at sea,
if not claimed within a certain time. The immediate direction of the
establishment was vested in the Comptroller of the Marine, under the
supervision of the Royal Navy Board.

[Sidenote: State since 1814.]

After the return of the Austrian government in 1814, the civil and
military establishment and their administration were separated. Invalid
sailors of the navy were placed on the same footing as soldiers, and
the institution was then kept up and applied solely to the benefit of
the commercial marine, under the title of “The Charitable Institution
for Invalids of the Venetian Commercial Navy.” The administration of
this establishment was vested in the office of Captain of the Port,
under the control of the Government.

Merchant seamen sailing in vessels entered on the registers of the
Venetian provinces contribute to its support at the rate of three per
cent. on their pay, whether captains, officers, or men; this sum to be
paid at the office of the Captain of the Port by the captain or owner
of the vessel, according to the muster-roll of the crew. Instead of the
casual sources of revenue granted by the decree of 1811, above quoted,
this institution is now endowed, in lieu of the moiety of the unclaimed
pay of deserters from the merchant service, with an equivalent sum
together with the amount of all fines levied on seafaring persons
for infringement of the naval laws and regulations. The capital thus
accruing is invested in the public funds, and the interest applied to
the relief of the deserving, according to the following scale:—Captain,
one Austrian livre (about 8_d._ sterling) daily; an officer,
eighty centimes daily; and a sailor, about seventy centimes daily;
their widows receiving respectively one-half the above sums. In
making selections from the candidates for relief, regard is had to
the most aged and infirm. There is no building now appropriated for
the reception of the aged and infirm, but the sick are admitted, on
application, to the Civil Hospital in Venice. Orphan children are not
entitled under the rules to relief: indeed these regulations, like
others of a similar character, seem but provisional; but, as they
embrace the general features of the Austrian and French systems, they
merit attention.

[Sidenote: Qualifications of Venetian shipmasters.]

The law of the Venetian Republic of 1786, relative to the merchant
service, shows the pains taken in former times by the Republic to
secure efficient and well-educated men for the command of their
merchant vessels. It may be inferred that no conditions were imposed
on persons desirous of commanding merchant vessels previously to
this law, as, by one of its provisions, it was not to affect persons
then in employment as captains or masters—a principle adopted by
Great Britain in her recent Mercantile Marine Acts. Those desirous of
becoming captains or masters were required to prove that they were
Venetian subjects; or if foreigners, that they had been naturalised and
had resided in the State without intermission, or had been employed
in the Venetian sea service for fifteen years. In addition to this
it was requisite for the candidates to give proof of being at least
twenty-four years of age; of having served at sea for eight years,
either in a private ship or in one belonging to the State, before they
could command a ship. Every one, too, besides being able to read and
write, was required to satisfy competent examiners that he was versed
in the theory and practice of navigation. A Venetian subject, having an
interest or share in a vessel and being duly qualified, was, however,
entitled to command in preference to any other master.

[Sidenote: Present regulations of Austria.]

The Austrians, following the example of their provinces, now require
candidates for the command of merchant vessels to show that they are
twenty-one years of age, and are domiciled in the Austrian dominions:
that they have served not less than five years in national vessels
other than coasting vessels, and that their general conduct has been
good. They are required to undergo a severe examination before a
commission, consisting of the officer of government charged with the
affairs of navigation and trade, the Professor of mathematics in the
Naval College, the Captain of the port, one member of the Chamber
of Commerce, and two experienced merchant captains. Candidates are
required to answer theoretical and practical nautical questions; to
solve such problems as are set before them, and show that they are
acquainted with naval laws and discipline, before they can take the
command of merchant ships.

[Sidenote: Great Britain.]

Strange to say, Great Britain, the greatest of all maritime nations,
has only, at a comparatively recent period, established a system, to
which I shall hereafter refer, whereby all masters and mates in her
service are now required to undergo an examination: unlike France,
however, she still leaves whatever may be the expense of gaining the
previous and fundamental knowledge to be borne by themselves.

[Sidenote: Need of a public institution for merchant seamen.]

It would weary my readers were I to give further details of the
different modes established in other nations for securing the due
qualifications of masters and seamen, or for providing institutions for
their benefit in sickness and old age. With the exception of Greenwich
Hospital, created for the benefit of seamen serving in the Royal Navy,
England possesses no State institution appropriated exclusively for the
education of our merchant seamen, or for their benefit in sickness or
old age. The Merchant Seaman’s Fund was abolished[17] in 1851; and I
know of no institution in this country where the aged seaman can find
refuge, except one which was recently established, and is maintained by
voluntary subscriptions.[18] There are, of course, numerous charitable
institutions—far more than in any other country—where seamen, as well
as all other classes of the community, are to some extent provided
for. But it is to be regretted that, when the Merchant Seaman’s Fund
was abolished, some great institution, under the authority of the
State, to be supported mainly by the seamen, as well as by voluntary
contributions and otherwise, was not then attempted for their special
use, so as to afford them some certainty that they would receive either
outdoor or indoor relief (the former is preferable) when no longer able
to provide for themselves.[19]

[Sidenote: Institution in Norway.]

One of the best of these institutions was formed in Norway, in
conformity with the royal rescript of the 23rd December, 1834. It is
maintained, by voluntary contributions from seamen and others, by
penalties arising from offences of seamen, and, in some measure, by
Government aid. The claimants on this society are those seamen who,
while employed, contribute regularly to its funds. Its affairs are
managed by directors consisting chiefly of shipmasters. Seamen who, on
foreign voyages, leave their vessels without permission of the master,
lose any rights they may have acquired; while such of them as are
entitled to claim, or their relicts, must prove to the satisfaction of
the directors that they stand in need of aid. Shipwrecked seamen also
receive aid from this society.

Institutions like these, combined with the course of examination
required from all men holding responsible positions on board ship, tend
materially to improve the condition of foreign seamen, and to give
them advantages too long withheld from the British. These advantages,
combined with the unwise protection afforded by the Navigation Laws
to the shipowners and seamen of Great Britain, gave foreign nations,
for a time, a decided superiority over them. Indeed, it was found that
during the first half of the present century neither the ships nor
their crews kept pace with those of other maritime nations, till at
length it became _necessary_ to adopt measures, not merely for the
improvement of the condition of our ships, but likewise for raising our
seafaring population, by means of a sound education, to such a position
as would enable them to compete successfully under all circumstances
with the ships and seamen of other states.

[Sidenote: Foreign Office circular of July 1, 1843.]

[Sidenote: Its value, though unfair and one-sided.]

With that important object in view, the English Foreign Office issued a
circular on the 1st July, 1843, to all our consuls abroad, requesting
information respecting the conduct and character of British shipmasters
and seamen frequenting foreign ports; the replies to which produced
a large mass of valuable information, presented to Parliament in
1848.[20] But this information would have been still more valuable
had it been obtained in a less one-sided and invidious manner. “I am
particularly desirous,” remarks the writer of the circular, Mr. James
Murray, “of gaining information in regard to instances which have come
under your observation of the _incompetency of British shipmasters
to manage their vessels and their crews_, whether arising from
deficiency of knowledge of practical navigation and seamanship, or of
moral character, particularly want of sobriety.... My object is to show
the necessity for more authoritative steps on the part of Her Majesty’s
Government to remedy what appears to be an evil, detrimental to, and
seriously affecting the character of, our commercial marine, and
therefore advantageous to foreign rivals, whose merchant vessels are
said to be exceedingly well manned and navigated.”

[Sidenote: Replies to circular.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Consul Booker.]

With this assumption, that British ships and seamen did exhibit the
inferiority suggested by the writer of the circular, it was but natural
that the answers to it should, as a rule, be in conformity with the
prejudged and premature opinions expressed in it. Voluminous documents
poured in from the different consulates, and, certainly, some of them
contained charges of the gravest character against the owners and crews
of our merchant fleet. The first is a letter (11th July, 1843) from
Vice-Consul Booker, at Cronstadt, who seems to have ransacked his
archives, containing, as these did, the results of an experience of
fifty-nine years—to discover materials whereon he could ground a charge
against the British sailors; but, while admitting that drunkenness was
their principal failing, and that it was “a rare circumstance that
a master is unfit to clear his ship either inwards or outwards,” he
added: “It does not happen above two or three times in the year, in
which case I get hold of the mate, and no stoppage ensues; and, in
the intermediate time, when the ship is loading, the master, if the
worse for liquor, avoids the office.” Of the seamen he remarked: “The
crews behave like too many common Englishmen; take their glass freely
when they can get it, and sell or pawn their clothes when they have no
money; get into scrapes on a Sunday night, and are brought before me on
a Monday, lectured, and discharged.”

[Sidenote: Mr. Consul Baker.]

Consul Baker, of Riga, was more pointed in his charges. He remarked:
“I am sorry to state that, in my opinion, the British commercial
marine is at present in a worse condition than that of any other
nation. Foreign shipmasters are generally a more respectable and sober
class of men than the British. I have always been convinced that,
while British shipowners gain by the more economical manner in which
their vessels are navigated, they are great losers from the serious
delays occasioned, while on the voyage, and discharging and taking
in cargoes, growing out of the incapacity of their shipmasters, and
their intemperate habits. I have had occasion to remark, while consul
in the United States, that American vessels, in particular, will
make three voyages to two of a British vessel, in this way having an
immense advantage over their competitor; and also from the superior
education, and consequent business habits, obtaining better freights
and employment for their vessels on foreign exchanges.” He further
remarked, that, in several instances, he had been compelled, on the
representations of the consignees, to take from shipmasters the command
of their vessels in a foreign port, and to appoint others for the
return voyage; their constant state of intoxication rendering them
wholly “unfit to carry on their duties.”

[Sidenote: Mr. Consul Yeames.]

Consul-General Yeames, writing from Odessa on the 1st December, 1843,
stated, that though in his experience he had known many unexceptionable
and respectable persons in command of British vessels, they, as a rule,
fell very far below the character of commanders of foreign vessels,
more especially those of Austria. He attributed this inferiority in a
great measure to the want of education and an absence of discipline.
“Some of these shipmasters,” he added, “are shamefully illiterate, and
are not qualified to do justice to the interest of owners in common
transactions that occur in this port. There is, too, an impression
here (and certainly among all the foreign merchants) that British
shipmasters are indifferent to the condition of their cargoes, and
careless of their preservation, which is prejudicial at least to our
interests in the carrying trade.”

[Sidenote: The Consul of Dantzig.]

Somewhat similar accounts were received from Gottenburg, and numerous
other ports. “Taken as a whole,” remarked the consul at Dantzig, “there
is not—and I say it with regret—a more troublesome and thoughtless
set of men, to use the mildest term, to be met with than British
merchant-seamen. Only very lately, a master left his vessel, which
was loaded with a valuable cargo and ready for sea, and was, after
several days’ search, found in a house of ill-fame; his mate was very
little better than himself; and his people, following this example, a
set of drunkards.” He added, that occurrences nearly as bad as these
were by no means rare, and that a Prussian vessel was sure to obtain a
preference when freights were remunerative.

[Sidenote: The Consuls of Genoa, Ancona, and Naples.]

From the Mediterranean ports the accounts received were hardly more
favourable to the character of British seamen. The consul at Genoa
stated that it was quite common for captains of vessels at that port
to take up their abode at a tavern; leaving the entire charge of
the vessel in the hands of an ignorant mate, whose whole learning
was not a whit superior to that of a man before the mast, and whose
quarrels with the men or those among themselves were forced upon the
consul for adjustment. At Ancona, the greater part of the masters who
frequented the port were considered by the consul there to be unequal
to the responsible trust imposed in them, not so much from the want of
nautical skill as of sobriety. Out of the shipwrecks which had occurred
during his residence at that port, he considered one to have arisen
from incompetency, one from the inebriety of the master, and one from
causes beyond control. At Naples, the consul spoke of the masters of
British vessels being, on the average, ignorant and uneducated—“little
superior in mental or literary acquirements to the seamen they are
placed over;” and though, on the whole, good seamen, “few of them
understand navigation beyond the mere power of keeping the ship’s
reckoning. Nothing,” he added, “could be more truly disgraceful or
discreditable than the manner of keeping the log-books of the vessels
that resort to this port.”

[Sidenote: Mr. Consul Sherrard.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Consul MacTavish.]

From Trieste, Constantinople, and Alexandria, reports nearly the
same were sent in. Nor were those from our consuls resident in the
United States of a more favourable character. “It was but last week,”
remarked Mr. Sherrard, writing from Portland, 27th July, 1843, “that
I had occasion to take upon myself the risk of sending back to New
Brunswick a vessel, whose master, after disposing of her cargo and
receiving the proceeds, squandered the whole in liquor, leaving his
crew without their wages and the vessel without sea stores.” He
mentioned, also, the instance of another, a British barque, from
England for St. John’s, Newfoundland, which was boarded by a revenue
cutter, the whole crew, including master and mate, being in a helpless
state of intoxication, and the vessel drifting about embayed in a
dangerous place near Mount Desert. From Baltimore the consul, Mr.
MacTavish, wrote that, with few exceptions, “almost all the masters of
English merchantmen which have arrived here from British ports in my
time appear to me incompetent, arising chiefly from inebriety; but,
with regard to colonial vessels, I am happy to say that my experience
has been the reverse of the foregoing; the temperance principle is
becoming very general on board of them, and a manifest improvement is
in progress from that cause;” he added, in reply to questions about
the conduct of masters of Hanseatic ships frequenting Baltimore, that,
in his thirteen years’ experience, he had heard of but one master of
a vessel being a drunkard, and he was at once removed. “They are,” he
said, “invariably competent navigators and good scholars, many of them
belonging to respectable families in Bremen; and most abstemious, the
principal beverage used in the cabin being light-bodied claret and vin
de grave.” Of the British shipmasters frequenting Baltimore he wrote in
very disparaging terms, asserting them to be, in point of intelligence,
address, and conduct, greatly inferior to the shipmasters of either
Bremen or America.

[Sidenote: Mr. Consul Hesketh.]

Mr. Hesketh, writing from Rio de Janeiro, states that, during an
active service of more than thirty years as consul at that port, he
had experienced unwearied trouble and much anxiety, in consequence of
the intemperate habits of the masters and crews of British merchant
vessels, and that cases were not uncommon in which it had been found
absolutely necessary to take from on board all intoxicating liquors.
With regard to their competency in other respects, he said: “I have
come to the conclusion that British shipmasters are frequently
entrusted with commands on voyages requiring more knowledge of the
scientific department of navigation than they possess;” he added,
however, that the masters of large or first-class merchant vessels were
generally fully competent for their duties.

[Sidenote: Reports from the Consuls in South America.]

Similar reports came from the consuls of Bahia, Pernambuco, and
Paraguay; the consul at the last-named port remarking, “shippers now
give such a decided preference to the merchant vessels of Sweden,
Denmark, Sardinia, Hamburg, and Austria, that they are rapidly
engrossing the carrying trade of Brazil; and this alarming fact is
attributed by the most intelligent British merchants and shipmasters,
with whom I have conversed on the subject, to the greater care taken by
foreign masters, and enforced by them on their crews, in the reception
and stowage of their cargoes, which they consequently deliver in
much better order than do British vessels, the masters of which are
in general said to be exceedingly careless and inattentive in this
respect,” an opinion confirmed by Mr. Ellis in his despatch to the
Foreign Office from Rio, 10th December, 1842.

Although, for the reasons I have named, these voluminous reports are
not so impartial as they otherwise might have been, had Mr. Murray,
in his circular-note, merely expressed his desire to ascertain the
facts without expressing any opinion of his own, there is too much
reason for believing that the character of British ships and the
conduct of British crews were then greatly inferior to those of other
nations; hence Mr. Murray’s subsequent memorandum of the 22nd November,
1847, contains unquestionably many valuable suggestions for their
improvement, while his conclusions could hardly be questioned when he
stated:—

[Sidenote: General conclusions of Mr. Murray, Nov. 22, 1847,]

“1st. That the character of British shipping has declined, and that the
character of foreign shipping has improved.

“2nd. That there was not sufficient control over British shipmasters
and seamen, either at home or abroad, while foreign vessels were
subject to considerable control.

“3rd. That there was no system of regular education for the merchant
service of Great Britain, but that, in foreign countries, this matter
was much attended to.

“4th. That the sort of education which a British subject receives, when
training for the higher grades of the merchant sea service, does not
suffice to qualify him to represent with advantage to the merchant by
whom he may be employed that merchant’s interest; and that he may often
neglect those interests and the merchant not be aware of the fact.”

“What was wanted,” Mr. Murray continued, “was not merely a study
of navigation and seamanship, but a thorough knowledge of ship’s
husbandry, and a thorough knowledge of stowage of cargo, of exchanges,
and other commercial information which would qualify a master to act,
if necessary, as the representative of his employer in the character
of merchant; the commander of a ship being in law considered the
representative of the owners of the property on board. It was further
urged that a merchant had no means of accurately ascertaining the
character and capability of shipmasters or of seamen, and really
depended for the safety of his property upon his insurances.”

[Sidenote: and suggestions for remedies]

For these reasons, with a view to maintain the supremacy of Great
Britain in commercial navigation and enterprise, Mr. Murray proposed to
establish “_a Board or Department of Commercial Marine_,” at the
same time pointing out that the want of such a department was greatly
felt in the preparation of any new law, and still more so in the
subsequent process of acting upon it. Nine departments, he explained,
were concerned in the Merchant Sea Service Laws; and there was no
central board to point out to each department how each could best act
for the success of the whole; each department being left to look merely
to those interests committed to its charge, and to its own convenience.
The Board of Trade was indicated as the department to which the
community would naturally look with regard to everything relating to
commerce, whether at sea or on shore.

[Sidenote: Board of Trade Commission, May 17, 1847.]

[Sidenote: Its results.]

Previously to the issue of Mr. Murray’s ‘Memorandum,’ that Board had,
on the 17th May, 1847,[21] announced the intention of Government to
issue a commission without delay to examine into certain matters
relating to the commercial marine. This inquiry confirmed in all
material respects the information previously received by Mr. Murray.
Indeed, three only out of seventy-five reports from consuls stated that
the condition of British shipping had improved rather than declined;
and, in these cases, it was shown that, from the nature of the trade in
which the vessels were engaged—the fruit trade of Greece, and from the
perishable character of their cargoes—the greatest care had to be taken
in selecting the best ships.

There can be no doubt that, as early as 1843, when Mr. Murray issued
his circular letter to the consuls, and more especially in 1847, when
Lord Palmerston ordered further inquiry to be made by means of this
commission, Government saw the time was approaching when great changes
would be demanded, not merely with regard to the Navigation Act, but
likewise in the laws affecting our ships and seamen; and that it would,
ere long, be essential for our own interests to follow the example set
us by foreigners in the education of our seamen, as well as in the
application of public tests to prove the competency of the masters and
officers of British merchant vessels.

[Sidenote: Shipowners condemned for the character of their ships and
officers.]

Strong objections were, however, raised by the shipowners against
any Government interference, on the ground that it would be partial,
and consequently so far unjust, these objections being naturally
strengthened by the manner in which Mr. Murray had set about the
enquiry of 1843. It was, nevertheless, but too evident that, however
much British shipowners might deprecate the assistance or interference
of Government, a large proportion of their ships were commanded
and navigated in a manner reflecting discredit on our national
intelligence, and injurious to the interests of Great Britain; that the
persons placed in command of them were too frequently unfit for their
duties; and that, while many of them were so habitually addicted to
drunkenness as to be altogether incompetent for their position, not a
few of them were almost without education.[22]

Nor in too many instances were the ships much better than their
masters; and hence foreign vessels were frequently chartered in
preference to British, not because, as ships, they were superior
in quality, but on account of the greater care foreign shipmasters
bestowed on the stowage and transport of their cargoes, and from the
fact that being generally educated, sober, intelligent, and capable of
commanding respect and maintaining discipline, the seamen themselves
were consequently more orderly.

[Sidenote: Views of Government.]

For these and numerous other reasons, Government naturally asked
whether it was justifiable that the lives of thousands of persons
should be constantly jeopardised, because shipowners had the power of
placing incompetent persons in charge of their vessels; and whether
it was proper for the State to allow its seafaring population to be
left in ignorance and disorder, and exposed to the evil example of
illiterate and intemperate masters. Many thoughtful men out of doors
also began to enquire if it was right that these men, by sheltering
themselves under the Navigation Laws, should be thus allowed to
encourage the growth and employment of foreign in preference to British
shipping, to the injury of the national interests.

[Sidenote: Necessity of a competent Marine Department.]

Even had it not become apparent that the time had arrived for great
changes in the commercial policy of England, the condition of our
seamen and the state altogether of our merchant service required the
exclusive attention of some such public department as Mr. Murray had
recommended. But such matters, however important, being subsidiary to
the question of the Navigation Laws and their effect upon maritime
commerce, were left in abeyance till these had been fully considered.


FOOTNOTES:

[16] See papers relating to the Commercial Marine of Great Britain,
1846, p. 235.

[17] The “Winding-up Act, 1851,” enacted that compulsory contributions
should cease from that date; that those who had paid up till then,
should have the option of continuing these payments, but those
seamen who had not contributed before 1851 should not be admitted.
Thus the fund was practically “abolished,” and is now only in
operation for the purpose, as the Act names, of “winding-up.” This
well-intended Institution had become hopelessly insolvent through the
grossest mismanagement. Its administration was vested in different
irresponsible bodies at the different ports, and while the Legislature
_compelled_ contributions, it took no security for the just
appropriation of these funds, and no security for solvency! The
Winding-up Act of 1851 transferred its affairs to the Board of Trade
for the purpose of paying all existing pensions, and to allow the then
existing contributors to continue their annual payment should they wish
to do so. It has cost the country upwards of 1,000,000_l._, and
will probably cost 500,000_l._ more before all claims have been
satisfied. The pensions granted by the Board of Trade until now (1875)
have been 7528_l._ to masters and seamen, and 14,972_l._ to
widows and children.

[18]

[Sidenote: The “Belvidere,” or “Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s
Institution.”]

The “Belvidere,” known as the “Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution,”
was established, soon after the abolition of the “Merchant Seaman’s
Fund,” mainly through the exertions of the late Mr. William Phillipps,
Mr. George Marshall, and other philanthropic shipowners. The laudable
object of this excellent institution is to provide for the “relief
of aged and worn out merchant seamen of the United Kingdom.” It was
started by a grant of 5000_l._ from the Shipwrecked Mariners’
Society, and is now maintained entirely by legacies, donations, and
annual subscriptions from charitable persons. These amounted, in
1874, to somewhere about 7600_l._, though, out of this sum, the
annual subscriptions were only 1600_l._ Its inmates were then 105
decayed seamen, whose ages ranged from 63 to 85. There were, besides,
in that year 110 persons receiving from its funds 12_l._ per
annum in out-door pensions. The inmates are provided with comfortable
cabins, clothed, a good mess, and have every comfort, with pleasant
grounds for exercise, overlooking the River Thames. All their
physical and spiritual wants are well supplied; and, so far as its
limited funds permit, it has proved of great service, being well and
economically managed. When its claims on the public—I might say on
the country—become better known, its means of doing good will thus, I
hope, be largely extended. Indeed, the Board of Trade having now in
hand upwards of 200,000_l._, arising from the unclaimed wages
and effects of deceased merchant seamen, from the surplus fees of the
mercantile marine, and other similar sources, the question suggests
itself if a portion of these surplus funds could not be appropriated to
the benevolent purposes of the Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution?

[19] In 1859, when a member of the Royal Commission on manning the
Royal Navy, I proposed to my colleagues the establishment of a merchant
seamen’s fund, under Government supervision, as a means of raising
a large portion of the reserves of seamen we were then considering.
Though my views on this and other points were not adopted, they were
published by order of the House of Commons, and accompanied the report;
and as the question is still one of much public importance and still
requires solution, I furnish extracts from these “remarks”:—

[Sidenote: Mr. Williams, observations by, on the advantage of general
Seaman’s Fund.]

“‘Experience has shown,’ says Mr. H. R. Williams, of the Board of
Trade, in his sensible paper on the subject, ‘that any attempt to
establish a merchant seamen’s fund upon the principle of voluntary
payments would not be supported by a large body of seamen. The working
of the Seamen’s Fund Winding-up Act has proved that seamen generally,
whatever advantages may be offered to them, will not voluntarily
contribute to a fund. However great may be the objections, therefore,
to compulsory payments, there is no probability that a fund can be
established with any chance of success upon any other principle.’

“I admit that there is something repugnant to the feelings of the
sailor, and, in fact, to all Englishmen, in the word ‘compulsory,’ when
applied to the management of his own affairs; but, in general practice,
that which would be termed compulsion, if sanctioned and regulated
by the Legislature, is already a voluntary act cheerfully undertaken
by large masses of the people. There is scarcely a handicraft trade
in the kingdom the members of which have not formed themselves
into a society, the object of which is, by means of periodical
subscriptions, to secure a pension or payment in sickness or old age.
Both individually and nationally, every such institution is in the
highest degree commendable. If, therefore, these benefit societies
deserve encouragement and support, when formed for artisans and others
whose occupations are on shore, they merit encouragement and support
still more when their object is to relieve those whose occupation is
at sea. Seamen have no means of forming such associations, as they are
scattered over the whole world, having no organization, no central
power, and no machinery to put such a system into operation. Whatever
incentives they may have to combine together for such a purpose, they
have not the means of carrying into effect their wishes. This appears
to be generally conceded; and we have arrived at the conclusion that it
is the duty of Government to step forward to aid those who, from their
peculiar calling, are incapable of acting themselves.

“Commander Brown, the Registrar, Mr. Baker and Mr. Williams, of the
Board of Trade, together with Captain Pierce, of the Liverpool Sailors’
Home, all concur in the opinion that the time has arrived when a
new seamen’s fund should be established on sound principles under
Government supervision, and upon such a basis as shall offer to the
seaman a strong and powerful inducement to preserve that test which
secures to him substantial maintenance in old age, or when prematurely
worn out. The whole of the machinery necessary to effect this object
is now established at the shipping offices, and in the existing
departments of the Board of Trade, and already in operation upon
12,000 masters and seamen who have contributed to the fund under the
Winding-up Act of 1851.

“... I am of opinion that such an institution would be highly popular,
even with the shipping interest. I say this, with the knowledge that a
seaman may calculate his wages at only 2_l._ 9_s._ instead
of 2_l._ 10_s._ per month; and with the possibility, that
the difference of 1_s._ per month may fall upon the shipowner,
to which class I belong. But if the incidence of this extra shilling
should, in point of fact, fall absolutely upon the shipowners, they
would be gainers thereby, as it is of the highest importance to them
that the seaman should have some substantial tie to bind him to this
country. At present no such tie exists. The British-born seamen become
citizens of the world, and find themselves quite as much at home in
the United States as in their native country. The higher rate of wages
paid in the American ships presents a temptation to them to enter
that service in preference to that of England. Now if some special
inducement were offered to them to remain at home, it would operate to
diminish the number of British seamen in the service of foreign states.
The sailor would thus have also ‘his stake in the public hedge.’ At
present, the exceptional use of savings banks furnishes almost the only
link, for the beneficial use of money-order offices, however great
their advantages, is rather a ready facility given than a permanent
benefit enjoyed.

“With those views, I should propose to make a seamen’s fund the basis
of raising the remaining 18,000 men for a reserve. I think that the
fund should be a general one, to which both seamen in the Royal Navy
and in the mercantile marine should be called upon to subscribe. I
think it would be desirable to break through the line of demarcation
which has so long existed between the two services, and this would
be one step towards effecting that object. I would give seamen of
all classes a common interest in this one great fund, which might be
designated as National.

“I am aware that objections will be raised to any compulsory fund.
I would much prefer to have it a voluntary one; but knowing the
character of the seamen as I do, I am thoroughly convinced that any
fund established even under the auspices and with the guarantee of the
Government, on the voluntary principle, would be a failure.

“... So far as the nation was concerned, the salutary effects of such a
fund would operate in three different ways: it would prevent the seamen
from being objects of charity or claimants upon the poor rates during
their old age; it would be a permanent tie to bind them to their native
country, founded upon a common bond of self-interest; while it would
form the groundwork of a system whereby the reserve of 18,000, still
wanting, might be raised.”

[20] Papers relating to Commercial Marine of Great Britain.

[21] See Sir John Shaw Lefevre’s letter, page 144, part ii., Parl.
Papers relating to Mercantile Marine.

[22] In my own time, I remember a shipowner saying to me that he never
would have a “scholar” in command of any of his vessels, _because_
education taught him how to make up false accounts and the art of
cheating; while another whom I knew, only retained one “educated”
master in his service, because he was flattered by being invariably
addressed by him as “Mr. Joseph Perkins, Esquire.”




CHAPTER III.

     High estimate abroad of English Navigation Laws—Change necessary,
     owing to the Independence of America—Other nations at first
     Protectionist—Mr. Pitt’s proposals with reference to trade with
     America—Mr. Pitt resigns, and a temporary Act ensues—Shipowners
     and loyalists in America successfully resist his scheme—Congress
     the first to retaliate—Restrictions injurious, alike, to England
     and her Colonies—Commercial treaties with America between 1794
     and 1817—Acts of 1822 and 1823, and further irritation in
     America—Order in Council, July 1826—Conciliatory steps of the
     Americans in 1830—Foreigners look with suspicion on any change
     in the Navigation Laws—Reciprocity treaties of 1824-6—Value of
     treaties in early times, but inadequate for the regulation of
     commercial intercourse, and liable to unfair diplomacy—Reciprocity
     treaties only, partially, of value, and do not check the anomalies
     of Protection—Committee of 1844-5 promoted by the Shipowners, who
     seek protection against Colonial shipping—Reciprocity must lead
     to free navigation—New class of Statesmen, well supported by the
     People—Exertions of Lord John Russell, who leads the way against
     Protection—Richard Cobden and the Anti-Corn-Law League—John
     Bright—Effect of the Irish famine, 1845-6—Sir Robert Peel carries
     the Repeal of the Corn Laws, and resigns.


In proceeding to consider the great alterations in the ancient
commercial system of England which have ultimately led to the entire
abrogation of the Navigation Laws, it is advisable to trace their
remarkable history under several distinct heads, premising, however,
that, previously to 1844, their complete repeal had probably not
suggested itself to any of the statesmen who, at various periods, had
held the chief power in England.

[Sidenote: High estimate abroad of English Navigation Laws.]

For nearly two centuries an opinion had prevailed in England, as
well as in all foreign countries carrying on maritime commerce, that
the English Navigation Laws, created originally to check, if not to
annihilate, the maritime power of Holland, had been the means of
raising Great Britain to her unquestioned superiority on the ocean. But
this opinion is best answered by the fact that, long after the creation
of these laws, the Dutch still remained more powerful at sea than any
other nation;[23] while, on the other hand, the shipping of England,
under a different policy, has become much more prosperous than it ever
was at any period during which the laws of Cromwell were enforced.

[Sidenote: Change necessary,]

Other nations, however, could not fail to see that English shipowners
upheld these laws with much tenacity; hence when, on the cessation of
the wars of Napoleon, they had more time to devote their attention to
individual pursuits, they asked themselves two questions: (1st) if
protective laws had been beneficial to English ships, why should they
not follow the example of that country and enact for themselves similar
laws? and (2nd) if England persisted in excluding their ships from
her ports, why should they not treat her vessels in the same manner?
In other words, they were already prepared to act on the principle
of retaliation, and adopt the course pursued by the United States of
America in 1817, when Congress passed a law, the counterpart, if not
the copy, of that in the English Statute-book, which was adopted with
the declared intention of retaliating on Great Britain.

[Sidenote: owing to the Independence of America.]

In the case of the American States, so long as they were dependencies
of the British Crown, their ships could trade with all British
dependencies on the same footing as our own; but, when they became
independent, their ships, like those of any other foreign Power,
were excluded from every port where our laws prohibited the entry of
such vessels. Previously they could freely trade with the British
possessions in America and with the West Indies, with which they had
hitherto carried on a profitable intercourse, supplying them with
lumber for their houses, staves for their casks, corn, fish, and other
provisions, together with horses and cattle for their plantations,
besides affording our people there a sure market for their surplus
produce of coffee, sugar, and rum.

[Sidenote: Other nations at first Protectionist.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Pitt’s proposals with reference to trade with America.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Pitt resigns, and a temporary Act ensues.]

Up to this period the practice of foreign nations had not very
materially complicated our navigation system. If Great Britain, on her
part, persisted in refusing to receive, for instance, the produce of
the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in any but British ships, Spain and
Portugal, on their side, declined to send their goods to England in
any ships but their own. So that our law in such cases, rigorous as it
was, did nothing but determine how a trade, in which we had never had a
share, must be carried on, should we be permitted to enter it. But the
case of the United States was attended with much greater difficulty.
Here was an extensive and flourishing maritime commerce, averaging
nearly 3,500,000_l._ yearly, which had hitherto been open to
English and American vessels, indifferently, but which was now, by the
operation of our Navigation Laws, confined entirely to the former.[24]
It was then that the strength and elasticity of our exclusive system
were first severely tested. Mr. Pitt foresaw this serious difficulty so
early as 1783 when Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the necessity of
immediately introducing a temporary measure to regulate the commercial
intercourse with the now independent States of North America. The
Bill then actually introduced by Mr. Pitt proposed to allow American
vessels to import into our colonies any articles whatever of the
growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, and to export any
articles from our colonies to the United States. But, unfortunately,
while this wise measure was under the consideration of the House of
Commons, the ministry to which Mr. Pitt belonged resigned, and their
successors, to save themselves the trouble of passing a Bill of this
prudent and necessary character, passed a temporary Act, afterwards
renewed from time to time, vesting in the Crown alone the power of
regulating the trade with America.

[Sidenote: The shipowners and loyalists in America successfully resist
Mr. Pitt’s scheme.]

As might have been anticipated, considerable discussion immediately
arose with regard to the manner in which this power of the Crown
should be exercised. The West Indians, on the one hand, represented the
ruinous position in which they would be placed if they were forbidden
to trade with the United States: while, on the other, the loyalists
of the remaining North American Colonies pleaded that they were quite
able to supply the people of the West Indies with all they required,
and prayed that the monopoly the war had given them should not be
abrogated. These views were maintained by the shipowners of Great
Britain, on the plea that, if American vessels were allowed to export
West Indian produce, they would convey it to foreign countries as well
as to the United States, thus securing a materially improved position
as carriers by sea; and, after this case had been fully argued before
the Board of Trade, the shipowners and the loyalists unfortunately won
the day.

[Sidenote: Congress the first to retaliate.]

Exasperated by such conduct, three of the American States made a
requisition to Congress to prohibit all commercial intercourse with
the British colonies;[25] and, before Congress met in 1789, no less
than nine of these States had demanded retaliatory measures on British
commerce and navigation. The result was that two Acts of Congress were
immediately passed: one imposing a tonnage duty of six cents on all
American built and American owned vessels, of thirty cents on vessels
built in the United States but owned by foreigners, and of forty
cents on foreign vessels; while the other imposed a tariff of duties
in the ordinary form, and provided for the remission of 10 per cent.
of such duties in case the goods were imported in American ships.
The Americans thus paid us off in our own coin, and continued this
retaliatory system till 1817, when they passed the Navigation Act to
which I have just referred, in all respects analogous to our own. Nor,
indeed, can there be any question but that they were fully justified
in these retaliatory measures. If one nation insists on excluding the
vessels of other nations from their trade, they must naturally expect
that the legislators of the countries, whose vessels are thus excluded,
will take similar steps, even to the injury of their own people; in
fact, this is just what England did when she prohibited her people from
obtaining from other countries, at the lowest cost, the produce or
manufactures essential for their existence.

[Sidenote: These restrictions injurious, alike, to England and her
Colonies.]

But besides this, these restrictive measures on the part of Great
Britain, had in more than one instance, proved, in many other respects,
most injurious to her own people, while inflicting the greatest
hardships and most lamentable sufferings on her own West Indian
colonies. Thus, between 1780 and 1787 no less than 15,000 slaves
perished from starvation, having been unable to obtain the requisite
supplies of food from the North American colonies at a period, when the
home-grown portion of their sustenance had been destroyed by several
hurricanes. Yet, notwithstanding this terrible calamity, the British
Parliament persevered in the system it adopted, and ultimately passed
an Act (28 Geo. III., cap. 6) whereby no goods could be imported into
the West Indies from the United States, even in British ships, except
about thirty enumerated articles, the produce of these States. Indeed,
the Act went so far as to prohibit the importation of even these
articles from any of the _foreign_ West Indian Islands, except in
cases of public emergency, when the governors of individual colonies
were allowed to relax this prohibition. Similar laws were also passed
to prohibit the importation of goods into our North American colonies
from the United States, except for similar reasons.

[Sidenote: Commercial treaties with America between 1794 and 1817.]

The injurious consequences of such policy, especially in the
provocation it gave to the Americans, led to the conclusion, in 1794,
of the treaty to which I have already incidentally referred[26]
(though, strange to say, even this was disapproved of by many persons
in England), whereby American vessels, not exceeding seventy tons
burden, were allowed admission into the British West Indies with such
articles of United States produce as were not generally prohibited,
and, at the same time, permitted to export therefrom to the United
States any produce of the West Indies legally exportable thereto in
British vessels. Curiously enough, the following proviso was appended
to this clause:—“That this liberty only extends to a direct intercourse
between the British West Indies and the ports of the United States, and
the United States engage to prohibit the carriage of molasses, sugar,
coffee, cocoa, or cotton in American vessels, either from his Majesty’s
dominions or from the United States to any other part of the world.”
The treaty also provided for placing the trade between Great Britain
and the United States on a permanent footing, it having till then been
regulated by Orders in Council. This treaty, which gave even greater
dissatisfaction in the United States than in England, was not ratified
by Congress till 1796; nor was the Act for giving effect to it in Great
Britain passed till the following year.

This Act, however, made no provision for the admission of American
vessels generally into our colonies. It simply provided that American
ships were at liberty to import into Great Britain such produce of
their own States as was admissible in British vessels; it moreover
imposed a tonnage duty on the ships, and a discriminating duty on the
goods imported by them, in order to countervail any duties levied on
goods imported into the United States by British ships. The provisions
of the treaty as to opening the trade of the West Indies appear to
have fallen to the ground. An additional article to the treaty of
1794 stipulated that the article containing those provisions shall be
suspended; while a later treaty (1806) contained a recital that the two
high contracting parties had been unable to arrange the terms on which
the commerce between the United States and the West Indies was to be
carried on. In fact, they came to no definite arrangements till the
United States passed their retaliatory Acts in 1817 and 1820, and, even
then, it took more than ten years to settle the differences between
them on almost any one question. Indeed, the only alterations of any
importance made between 1806 and the passing of the American Navigation
Act, in 1817, were the opening of the trade between the United States
and our North American colonies, in 1807, and the conclusion of a
treaty in 1815 abolishing the differential duties levied by the two
countries on the ships of each other in respect of direct voyages
between them.[27]

In 1808, and more fully in 1810, similar privileges were granted to
the Portuguese dominions in South America; and, in 1822, these were
extended to all countries in America, being, or having been, under the
dominion of Spain. When the Customs Laws were first consolidated in
1825, the exceptions became the rule, and importations from Asia and
Africa were placed on a similar footing to those from America. Thus our
original rule as to importations from Asia and Africa, as well as from
America, was broken down.

[Sidenote: Acts of 1822 and 1823, and further irritation in America.]

Though the Act of 1822 allowed a considerable number of articles to
be imported into the free ports of the West Indies from any foreign
country in America in ships of such country, it contained a clause
reserving to the King the power of prohibiting such intercourse with
any foreign country not treating British shipping with equal favour.
The President of the United States, having been previously empowered
by Congress to open the ports of that country to British vessels on
the same terms as were required from United States vessels when coming
from any British port in the West Indies, passed on the 21st March,
1823, an Act to regulate “the commercial intercourse between the United
States and certain British ports.” By this Act the ports of the United
States became open to British vessels coming from the free ports of
the British North American and West Indian possessions, while power
was given to the President to remove the differential duties levied on
goods so imported, on receiving information that similar privileges
had been conceded in such British colonial ports to the vessels of the
United States. The Act, however, required all goods so imported to be
the produce of the colony whence they came and to have been imported
thence direct. It further enacted that such British ships might take
back produce of the United States, provided they gave bonds to land it
directly at the port for which they cleared out. As the provisions of
this Act were, however, to depend on the continuance of those enacted
by the British Legislature in 1822 (3rd Geo. IV., cap. 44), and, as
the vessels of the United States were not placed on precisely the
same footing in the ports of the West Indies as British ships, this
power of the President was never exercised, and a British Order in
Council in opposition to it was subsequently issued on the 21st July,
1823. Here again arose another war of tariffs, for this Order levied
countervailing duties on vessels of the United States and their cargoes
in the ports of the British North American and West Indian possessions
from the ports in the United States to the extent of 4_s._
3_d._ per ton, as well as a discriminating duty of 10 per cent. on
imported articles.

[Sidenote: Order in Council, July, 1826.]

In 1825, when the consolidation of the Customs Laws was under
consideration, as well as the extension of treaties with other
countries, negotiations were again renewed with the United States, but
they were not successful, and another Order in Council was issued on
the 27th July, 1826, reciting that the conditions laid down by the
Possessions Act, 6 Geo. IV., cap. 114, had not been fulfilled, that
is to say, that the United States had not reciprocated the privileges
Great Britain had granted to American ships, and that, therefore, the
privileges possessed by American vessels of importing the produce of
their country into British possessions abroad, and of exporting the
produce of those possessions to any foreign country whatever, would
cease on certain dates fixed in the following year. As might have
been anticipated, the President issued, on the 17th March, 1827, a
proclamation prohibiting the trade and intercourse with the British
possessions authorised by the Act of Congress of 1st March, 1823.

[Sidenote: Conciliatory steps of the Americans, 1830.]

Happily, however, these retaliatory measures did not remain long in
force; and, after various negotiations, it was enacted by the American
Congress on the 29th May, 1830, that, whenever the President should
have evidence that Great Britain would open the ports of her colonial
possessions in the West Indies, South America, and the Bermudas, for
a limited or indefinite time to United States ships, at the same rate
of impost and tonnage and with the same cargoes as British vessels,
and that they would be allowed to export from such British possessions
to any country whatever any article which could be exported in
British vessels, leaving any other intercourse with Great Britain in
other respects as it then was, he might grant similar privileges to
British vessels coming from the said possessions to the United States.
This conciliatory measure was followed on October 5th, 1830, by a
proclamation from the President, extending the provisions of the Act
to the British colonies therein specified, and which had been opened
to American vessels. Finally, a British Order in Council of the 5th
November of that year, repealing the various Orders passed between
1823 and 1827, was issued, authorising vessels of the United States to
import into British possessions abroad any produce of the United States
from those States, and to export goods from the British possessions
abroad to any foreign countries whatever.

[Sidenote: Foreigners look with suspicion on any change in the
Navigation Laws.]

Subsequently to the failure of Mr. Pitt’s measure respecting the trade
of the United States, no great effort was made for many years to modify
grievances with other nations, which every one felt were caused by
the Navigation Laws. Protection had become so thoroughly engrafted
on the whole policy of the nation, that the question of the repeal
of these laws could only be approached by degrees, the country being
so impressed with their necessity, that any attempt during the first
quarter of this century to sweep them away would have proved a signal
failure. Indeed, at the close of the French war, when modifications
were offered, conditionally, to other countries, it is not surprising
that such foreign nations as believed the prosperity of England to
be due to her protective system were not satisfied of the honesty
of her intentions: most of them, in fact, looked with suspicion on
proposals which, in the dawn of sound commercial knowledge, were not
unnaturally thought by them inimical to the interests of England.
Foreign nations were slow to recognise that the comparative freedom of
her constitution, her vast mineral resources, the skill and energy of
her people, the security of property, and the equality of taxation,
could secure for England either her commercial or her manufacturing
superiority; and, still less, could they comprehend how much such
causes as these had to do with her maritime supremacy. They were
equally unable to discover to how great an extent the prosperity of
these interests and of shipping were mutually dependent on each other,
ships being really the adjuncts only of commerce, as without it there
would be no reason for their existence.

[Sidenote: Reciprocity Treaties of 1824-6.]

But after much discussion reciprocity treaties were concluded by Mr.
Canning and Mr. Huskisson with several Continental Powers, the object
of these statesmen being to hold out the right hand of fellowship to
other nations, and to surrender in exchange for some concession on
their part the more stringent conditions of our Navigation Laws. The
earliest of these treaties was with Prussia, on the 2nd April, 1824:
on the 16th June, we made another with Denmark; on the 29th September,
1825, with the Hanseatic Republics of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg; on
the 16th January, 1826, with France, and on the 26th December, of the
same year, with Mexico. Various other treaties followed; opening, on
certain terms of reciprocity, the ports of Great Britain to the ships
of the nations with whom they were made; but reserving to her own
ships, as a rule and with jealous care, her colonial ports.

[Sidenote: Value of treaties in early times,]

During the Middle Ages, when foreigners were too frequently subjected
to unjust treatment, treaties were, no doubt, necessary for their
protection. For instance, at one time, all foreigners residing in
England were held liable for the debts and even for the crimes of
each other. Shipwrecks, though attended with less of the barbarity
of earlier times, were regarded in most countries as fortunate
opportunities for plunder; while tolls and local charges of the most
arbitrary description were levied on aliens by states, princes,
corporations, and the lords of manors. There were also many other
matters scarcely less oppressive and unjust which could only be
redressed by negotiations.

[Sidenote: but inadequate for the regulation of commercial intercourse,
and liable to unfair diplomacy.]

Under such circumstances it was necessary for commercial States to
secure, by treaties, that protection and security for the person
and property of their subjects abroad against the injustice they
were liable to, and which they could not obtain from the laws of
the countries where they might happen to be. Treaties were also
required for the regulation of neutral commerce during war, and for
defining clearly what goods could not be carried by neutrals for
the belligerents. For all such purposes treaties were, of course,
essential; but, when they came to be used, with the further object
of teaching different nations how to conduct their own business,
a practice arose which, however useful at the time in assisting a
change of system, could not long endure. Regulations as to the duties
chargeable on certain articles, or for the privileges of certain
ships, according as they were built by, or belonged to, particular
countries, inducing constant misrepresentation and tending to create
grave differences between nations, were soon found to be neither
the best nor the wisest means for producing economic or friendly
commerce. Moreover, the whole system of treaties so constructed was
attended with a mode of bargaining, in which the clever diplomatist
might frequently gain unfair advantages for the people he represented.
Such a course of action was so obviously undignified in the conduct
of national affairs, that all merchants of high standing in different
countries at length protested against it. Statesmen, also, began to
discover that, as a rule, it was better for commerce to flow on with
no interference from treaties or other legislation—that, as a matter
of fact, it prospers best unaided; and, further, that such a state of
things, while unsatisfactory so far as the intercourse between nations
is concerned, was also discreditable, alike to the nations entertaining
such propositions, and to the ministers or officers by whom they were
proposed.

As the whole of the treaties, with their numerous protocols and
appendices, their labyrinths of “clever clauses” and mysterious
paragraphs, have been published,[28] and can be examined by those
of my readers who are interested in such diplomatic intricacies, it
is only necessary to give here the general purport of them, as I
shall have occasion to notice, hereafter, in reviewing the progress
of merchant shipping, those more directly affecting that interest;
but, that my readers may understand more clearly the nature of these
treaties, I furnish the text of that with France.[29] It gives the
general conditions embodied in such documents, and the extent of the
concessions England was prepared to make with those countries which
were willing to reciprocate with her.

[Sidenote: Reciprocity treaties only, partially, of value,]

The results of these “Reciprocity Treaties,” however, as shown in
the note,[30] were, for the time, satisfactory to both countries, in
so far as they materially tended to increase intercourse, while they,
certainly, proved advantageous, in the long run, to the shipowners
of England. But they were full of inconsistencies, and, as the trade
between nations increased, it became simply impossible to carry them
out satisfactorily.

Nor was it, indeed, likely that people of different nations, who
had been thus far “educated” to the advantages derivable from free
intercourse, would continue to endure the absurd clauses of treaties
prohibiting them from using corn, cotton, sugar, and numerous other
necessaries of life, piled in heaps as these often were in their stores
and warehouses, merely because they had been imported in other ships
than those of Great Britain, or of the countries where they had been
produced.

[Sidenote: and do not check the anomalies of Protection.]

The fact was, that while these treaties did create a sort of uniformity
before unknown, and so far increased the facilities of intercourse,
they did not obviate the most glaring hardships and inconveniences of
the previous system of protection. An American vessel, for instance,
might bring American cotton to England direct; but if this cotton had
been landed at any foreign port, neither the ships of that country nor
of any other could have conveyed it thence to our shores; while the
corn of Russia, if landed in Prussia, or in the ports of any other
nation, was prohibited in England, however great might be the demand
for it at the time.

Nevertheless, when it was first proposed in 1821 to allow British ships
to import non-prohibited articles from any part of the world, the
proposal was, for the time, effectually resisted by our shipowners,
on the plea that the cheaply built and navigated vessels of other
countries would carry the produce of America and Asia into continental
ports, and leave to British ships only the small profit to be derived
from its conveyance across the English Channel!

[Sidenote: Committee of 1844-5 promoted by the Shipowners, who seek
protection against Colonial shipping.]

But though it was abundantly clear that great changes were necessary
beyond the treaties which had been effected (an enlightened class of
merchants and manufacturers having now arisen who required that they
should be entirely unfettered in the conduct of their own affairs, and
that they should be at liberty to import and export whence, whither,
and how they pleased) it was no easy thing to induce Government even
to consider the advisability of taking a further step in advance and
repealing laws so long in force. No important changes were, therefore,
contemplated until 1844, when a Committee of the House of Commons
was appointed to inquire into the working of those treaties and
the condition of the commercial marine of the country: indeed, the
appointment of even this Committee appears to have originated from
complaints preferred by our shipowners, as one of the duties imposed
upon it was the consideration of the best mode of encouraging and
extending the employment of British shipping. Curiously enough, the
chief complaint of the shipowners, in this instance, was against the
privileges granted to colonial-built ships, the owners of which were,
of course, on the same footing as those of vessels built in the United
Kingdom. It was alleged that the latter, as costing a great deal more,
were unable to compete successfully with the less costly ships of North
America, and, therefore, legislative protection was sought, on the
ground that the competition of these ships had materially lowered the
rates of freight.

The Committee of 1844 was appointed at the instance of Mr. Lyall,
a shipowner, and one of the Members for London; and, although it
sat during the whole Session, it reported that, from unforeseen
circumstances, it had been prevented from going fully into the matter,
and requested re-appointment in the following Session, which was
acceded to. But, as about this time, after a long period of depression,
prosperity returned to the shipping interest, employment for ships
having become better, while, in many important trades, the rates
of freight had advanced, the inquiry by the Committee, under such
auspicious circumstances, was allowed to drop. It was, however, plain
enough from the temper of Parliament, that no recurrence would be
permitted to anti-colonial protective measures.

[Sidenote: Reciprocity must lead to free navigation.]

The General Shipowners’ Society[31] attributed this prosperity to the
guano trade, which had recently arisen on the coast of Africa; but
other and _far_ more influential causes had been at work. The
treaties of reciprocity had, with all their imperfections, no doubt,
tended materially to increase our intercourse with foreign nations,
while the admission of their ships to our own ports, strange as it may
appear, had greatly increased the employment for our own. Though our
shipowners resolutely denied that these measures had anything whatever
to do with the increased prosperity, more enlightened men had arrived
at entirely different conclusions, and were convinced that the policy
of reciprocity, however unsatisfactory in many respects, was not
merely a step in the right direction, but was the best, and perhaps
then the only, mode of breaking down, bit by bit, the huge fabric of
protection, the growth of more than two centuries: indeed, it was clear
that the “Great Maritime Charter of England,” as the Act of Cromwell
had been somewhat ostentatiously denominated, could only be destroyed
by degrees. This vast tree, if it may be so described, had taken too
deep root in the soil of England to be overthrown at one blow; and the
Reciprocity Treaties undoubtedly served as wedges for its destruction.

In the meantime, Sir Robert Peel had made great changes in the Tariff.
Commencing with the coarser sorts of manufactures, he had relinquished
all duties on the importation of wool, linen, and cotton, and had
reduced the duties on the finer qualities of the same goods from twenty
to ten per cent., and on manufactured silks from thirty to fifteen per
cent., making equally important reductions in the duties imposed on
various other articles.

[Sidenote: New Class of Statesmen, well supported by the People
outside.]

But a new class of men had now arisen to extend the principles of
Free-trade, and to force home the wedges of unfettered commerce with
heavier blows than Canning, Huskisson, or even Peel, had ever done.
The people, led in this instance by men from among themselves, of
the industrial classes; and, guided by the voice of Wisdom, were now
trumpet-tongued proclaiming their rights and demanding justice, on
conditions which, however large, were yet so unanswerable, that, before
long, the proudest of our aristocracy and the most exalted of our
statesmen paid their homage to the “unadorned eloquence” resounding
throughout the land.

[Sidenote: Exertions of Lord John Russell,]

Though Lord John Russell, an honest adherent from his youth to the
enlightened policy of Charles James Fox, followed in their footsteps,
and struggled onwards amid innumerable difficulties, it was impossible
for him to force his way, almost alone against the class to which
he belonged, and through the rank grass and tangled brushwood which
surrounded this huge old tree. Indeed, almost every member of the
ancient aristocracy except himself was opposed to the course he had
resolved to pursue; and although the Parliamentary Reform Bill of
1832 carried on his motion, and, in a great measure, by his early and
unwearied exertions, had returned to the House of Commons many men
ready to render him every assistance, the power of that House was still
insufficient to effect, to anything like the extent he had in view,
the laudable and, indeed, noble object of his ambition, a thoroughly
unfettered commerce. On the people, however, he could fully rely:
they were now inquiring more earnestly than they had ever done how it
was that the food necessary for their existence was so heavily taxed,
and why they were not allowed to buy that food where they pleased,
and to import it on the most economical terms. If their knowledge of
geography, as they were sometimes sneeringly told, extended no further
than what they had learned from the Sacred writings, that grand old
historical record taught them, that Egypt produced grain at less cost
and in far greater abundance, than England; so great, indeed, that its
granaries had once supplied the wants of Rome and of the Ancient World.
When, therefore, they learned that that grain could not be had, because
a comparatively small number of men—landowners and shipowners—who,
from their wealth, exercising great influence in Parliament, were of
opinion that the importation of food from other and cheaper countries
meant ruin to them, the people, in mass, unequivocally desired to
know, in a more detailed and more satisfactory manner than they had
hitherto been told, “_the reasons Why_.” The question they had
now asked, through their leaders, was one which demanded an answer.
First promulgated in the workshops of Lancashire, it spread in all
directions. It was whispered in Belgravia; loudly proclaimed by the
toiling millions; talked about by the cottagers in every valley and by
the shepherds on every hillside; till, at length, it was adopted, in
the most earnest manner, by the middle classes, the bone and sinew of
Great Britain.

[Sidenote: who leads the way against Protection.]

With such overwhelming aid, Lord Russell and his exploring party were
enabled to penetrate the dense forest of protection, and reach the
roots of the huge and rank old tree, which not merely overshadowed the
rich soil of their native land, but spread its branches over their
seaports, so as to prevent the importation from other lands of articles
necessary for their existence. They saw that, under its shadow, no
herbs grew except such as, from their position, were favoured by a ray
of the hazy sunlight of protection; healthy shrubs, luxuriant in their
nature, withered and decayed wherever its branches extended.

[Sidenote: Richard Cobden and the Anti-Corn-Law League]

The chief of the new class of politicians, who had arisen was no common
man: he was one whose clear judgment, while it embraced existing wants,
penetrated far into the future. Richard Cobden, the son of a Sussex
yeoman, and, practically, one of themselves, who had been trained to
commerce,[32] saw perhaps more clearly than any one else the pernicious
effects of all protective laws. Supported by an overwhelming array of
facts, he arranged them in a manner so clear, and made them known in
so pleasing and homely a style of eloquence, as to command attention
and carry conviction to every man who was open to reason. In a word,
he was the first to thoroughly convince the people of Great Britain
that they had a _right_ to be allowed to purchase the necessaries
of life wherever they could obtain them, and to dispose of their
manufactures wherever they could sell them, on the most advantageous
terms.

[Sidenote: John Bright.]

In directing the attention of the masses to this all-important question
he sought the aid of men who had sprung from the people and had
been trained to commerce; and he found many able and truly earnest
colleagues, but none more so than John Bright, a man of greater, though
perhaps not more convincing eloquence than his own, who like himself
had no object in view, as the whole experience of his life has proved,
than the good of his country. While Cobden and Bright proclaimed, with
overwhelming force, the policy of Charles James Fox, which Huskisson
and Canning had first practically put in operation, and which Lord John
Russell was now zealously pursuing in Parliament,[33] an Association,
under their leadership, was being formed out of doors destined to give
the fullest freedom to commerce. The first object of the Anti-Corn-Law
League was to lower the price of bread, which with every deficient
harvest approached a famine price, and thus enable the working classes
of every grade to compete with greater prospects of success and to the
best advantage, in the production of those articles most in demand in
their own and other countries, and, at the same time, to secure them
more steady employment and a higher rate of wages. With this object,
its members set themselves heartily to work, proclaiming their views
at public meetings in almost every city and town in Great Britain,
and, in the course of their labours, making many converts to their
policy among the higher classes, among whom Charles Villiers ought to
take high rank, for he was unwearied in his exertions on behalf of the
people. Nor did they lack some associates among even the shipowners
of England, who, seeing that the free importation of corn from other
countries would afford greatly increased employment for their ships,
readily joined the league. It is certain, however, that many of this
class did not at the time perceive that, though the immediate object
of the association was to cut down the chief branch of the huge old
tree of protection, other branches, such as those interfering with free
navigation, must likewise be pulled down as the supplement to free
importation of corn: probably they did not reflect that, should the
Free-traders abolish the protection then afforded to the proprietors
of land, a protective system for the maritime interest alone could no
longer be maintained.

[Sidenote: Effect of the Irish famine, 1845-6.]

But an event happened which, although in itself a grievous national
misfortune, brought about, at an earlier period than might otherwise
have been the case, the abolition of the Corn Laws, as well as the
suspension, for a time, of the Navigation Laws. This calamity was the
failure of the potato crop in Ireland in 1845 by “a pestilence so
minute that it eluded the power of the finest microscope, so mysterious
that it defied the researches of the most searching philosophy,
but strong enough to overturn governments, general enough to alter
established commerce, powerful enough to cause the migration of
nations.”[34]

The whole crop of potatoes in Ireland having been destroyed, the price
of grain rose at one bound from 45_s._ 9_d._ to 60_s._ the quarter,
and Cabinet Councils assembled in November to consider the propriety
of throwing open the ports of the United Kingdom. As the Cabinet was
divided on the subject, Sir Robert Peel, impressed with the dangers of
the approaching crisis, resigned office, and Lord John Russell, whose
celebrated letter on that occasion must long be remembered, was called
upon to form a new Administration; but personal jealousy among the
Whigs[35]—a jealousy which lasted many years—prevented the formation of
a ministry by the opposition party. Nor was Lord Stanley, who had been
a member of Sir Robert Peel’s Cabinet, more successful in a similar
attempt: hence, with the exception of his Lordship, the members of that
Cabinet resumed their former places.

On the 4th December, 1845, it was intimated through the ‘Times’
newspaper, which had for some months previously avoided the question of
total repeal, that Sir Robert Peel would propose the entire abolition
of the Corn Laws. The Queen’s speech, as well as the speech of Sir
Robert Peel on the Address, more distinctly announced the policy of
the reconstructed Administration, and, having called attention to
the measures of commercial reform already adopted, which had tended
so materially to the greatness of this country and the welfare and
happiness of its inhabitants,[36] he called on the agriculturists to
submit to some sacrifice on their part, proposing a sliding-scale of
duties on corn until February 1849, with the condition, however, that
wheat and other cereal produce should, after that date, be imported
from foreign countries at a duty of 1_s._ a quarter.

[Sidenote: Sir Robert Peel carries the Repeal of the Corn Laws, and
resigns.]

It is not the province of this work to describe the struggles of
parties during this momentous period, and it is therefore sufficient
to state that the measures of Sir Robert Peel, supported as they were
out of doors by the vigorous action of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and
in Parliament by the Liberal party, were carried by large majorities
through the Commons and were, ultimately, passed by the Lords. But,
meantime the Irish Arms Bill had furnished the Opposition with a
temporary accession of members to defeat that measure, and consequently
with the means of overthrowing Sir Robert’s Administration, so that
the night of his triumph on the great question of the repeal of the
Corn Laws was a witness also of his downfall; and, in the records of
the debates of that ever-memorable evening, may be read the words now
so familiar to our ears:—“It may be,” he remarked, in his concluding
speech, “that I shall be sometimes remembered with good-will in those
places which are the abodes of men whose lot it is to labour and earn
their daily bread by the sweat of their brow; in such places, perhaps,
my name may be remembered with expressions of good-will, when those
who inhabit them recruit their exhausted strength with abundant and
untaxed food, the sweeter because no longer leavened with the spirit of
injustice.”


FOOTNOTES:

[23] In a little book, ‘Political Arithmetic,’ by Sir William Petty,
written about 1675, and published in 1691, the author of it remarks,
“The extent of the shipping of Europe being about two millions of tons,
I suppose the English have five hundred thousand—_the Dutch nine
hundred thousand_, the French an hundred thousand, the Hamburgers
and the subjects of Dantzic two hundred and fifty, and Spain, Portugal,
Italy, &c., two hundred and fifty thousand!” the value of which the
author reckoned “at 8_l._ per tun” (ton).

[24] See a review of the ‘History of the Navigation Laws of England
from the Earliest Times,’ by a Barrister, a most able exposition, from
the pen (I understand) of Sir Stafford H. Northcote, Bart., now (1875)
Chancellor of the Exchequer, published by Ridgway, London, 1849.

[25] McPherson’s ‘Annals of Commerce,’ vol. iv. p. 26.

[26] See _ante_, vol. ii. p. 354.

[27] See Mr. Huskisson’s Speech on Colonial Policy, March 21, 1825.

[28] Hertslet’s Treaties.

[29] Appendix, No. I., p. 563.

[30] In 1814 there were entered inwards 1,290,248 tons of British
shipping, and 599,287 tons of foreign shipping.

In 1824 there were entered inwards 1,797,320 tons of British shipping,
and 759,441 tons of foreign shipping.

In 1846 there were entered inwards 4,294,733 tons of British shipping,
and 1,806,282 tons of foreign shipping.

The clearances at the respective dates were about the same in amount
and proportion.

[31] See these Reports of 16th July, 1845.

[32] I first became intimate with Cobden in 1852, and our friendship
continued unbroken until his untimely death in 1865. He was the most
agreeable companion, and the most convincing reasoner I ever met.
Though his name has long been a household word, yet as his life has
not been written (I hope it may soon be given to the world), many of
my readers may not be aware of his _career as a man of business_.
He was often my companion for days together where I now pen these
notes, and, though I possess many pleasing reminiscences in connexion
with his most useful life and numerous letters from him, for he had
the pen of a ready writer, I prefer leaving these to be dealt with
by his biographer, when his executors consider that the time has
arrived to publish his life. But I think I ought not to withhold from
my readers the account he gave me of his commercial career, more
especially as an erroneous impression prevails in public that, though
great as a statesman, he was unsuccessful as a man of business. This
letter referred to the question of Limited Liability which we had
frequently discussed. It is written in his happiest style; and if I
could to advantage (but I cannot), I would not alter a single word.
“It is singular,” he remarks in another letter of his now before me,
approving of some comments I had made, “how much better we all write
when we are expressing ourselves with unrestrained freedom to a friend,
than when we are polishing off our sentences for the great public. I
find it always in my own case, and the reason is simply that we are
more _natural_, and therefore kindle a warmer sympathy in the
breast of the reader. It is this which makes the private memoirs and
correspondence of great men much more interesting than their public
performances.” For these reasons, I venture to give to the public the
letter he writes about himself and his business career unaltered,
except where I have omitted the names of two noble Lords still living.


                                            “Midhurst, 24th March, 1856.

  “MY DEAR LINDSAY,

     “I can see no flaw in your indictment, and do not think there
     is a shade of difference in our views upon partnership matters.
     But I would rather talk than write to you on the subject. It
     has always appeared to me that the fundamental fallacy which
     overrules all the objections to limited liability is the fear
     that capitalists will not be able to take care of their money
     without a little help from Parliament. I think they may be
     safely trusted. You and I agree also in the practical view of
     the question—that legislators and theorists overrate the extent
     to which the actual possession of capital affords a guarantee to
     the creditor. It is the character, experience, and connexions
     of the man wanting credit, his knowledge of his business, and
     opportunities of making it available in the struggle of life,
     that weigh with the shrewd capitalists far more than the actual
     command of a few thousands more or less of money in hand. I began
     business in partnership with two other young men, and we only
     mustered a thousand pounds amongst us, and more than half of it
     was borrowed. We all got on the ‘Peveril of the Peak’ coach, and
     went from London to Manchester in the, at that day, marvellously
     short space of twenty hours. We were literally so ignorant of
     Manchester houses that we called for a directory at the hotel, and
     turned to the list of ‘calico printers,’ theirs being the business
     with which we were acquainted, and they being the people from
     whom we felt confident we could obtain credit. And why? Because
     we knew we should be able to satisfy them that we had advantages
     from our large connexions, our knowledge of the best branch of
     the business in London, and our superior taste in design, which
     would insure success. We introduced ourselves to Fort Brothers
     and Co., a rich house, and told our tale, honestly concealing
     nothing. In less than two years from 1830 we owed them forty
     thousand pounds for goods which they had sent to us in Watling
     Street, upon no other security than our characters and knowledge
     of our business. I frequently talked with them in later times upon
     the great confidence they showed in men who avowed that they were
     not possessed of 200_l._ each. Their answer was that they
     would always prefer to trust young men with connexions and with a
     knowledge of their trade, if they knew them to possess character
     and ability, to those who started with capital without these
     advantages, and that they had acted on this principle successfully
     _in all parts of the world_. We did not disappoint them or
     ourselves. In 1834-1835 our stock takings showed a net balance of
     20,000_l._ a year profit. Then I began to write pamphlets
     and to talk politics, and from that moment I ceased to make
     money, and in 1846, when the League finished its labours, my
     children must have been beggars, had not my neighbours, who knew
     my circumstances, originated the subscription which restored me
     independence. I took the money without shame, because I had earned
     it. If money had been my sole object in life I should have been a
     more successful man by sticking to my calicoes, for my partners
     have grown richer than I by doing so, and young men taken into
     the concern since I left have made fortunes. I may add that the
     original formation of the partnership, and the whole scheme of the
     business, sprung exclusively from myself. But what has this to do
     with your bill? I never detect myself falling into a twaddle about
     things personal and past without suspecting that I am growing
     old and garrulous. I doubt the policy of your presenting a bill
     to the House. Your strength lies in your principle—_perfect
     freedom_—which you can argue with more force when not compelled
     to enter upon details. If you have any suggestions as to the
     clauses of the Bill, would it not be better to do as you did
     with the Shipping Bill by giving the Board of Trade the benefit
     of your hints? It may be necessary to concede something for the
     sake of carrying any measure, but I doubt whether any concession,
     beyond a registration, which may be shown to be a convenience
     to all parties, will not be unsoundness. If it be necessary to
     tamper with sound principles for the sake of pleasing the Lords,
     let the proposal come from their party. I suspect we shall be
     weaker in both Houses in dealing with the question of private
     partnership upon free-trade principles than with that of Joint
     Stock Associations. Upon the latter question, people of the —— and
     —— school of political economy, whose principles are, if pushed
     home, a little socialistic, took a great interest, because they
     have an amiable faith in the power of association amongst the
     working classes. But I doubt whether they will throw much zeal
     into the question of private partnership. By the way, don’t put
     the question in the House in the form of a problem A. B. C. D.
     &c. It does in a written argument, and even then demands a severe
     attention; but I find that that mode of stating the case in the
     House does not succeed.

     “I shall be happy to renew the discussion when we meet, and remain
     very sincerely yours,

                                                          “RD. COBDEN.”

[33] Though not within the province of this work, it should be
remembered that Fox stoutly opposed Pitt’s great Free-trade Treaty
with France, in 1756, and that Lord John Russell did not come out as a
thorough and earnest Free-trader until 1840-41.

[34] Alison’s ‘History of Europe,’ vol. vii. p. 168.

[35] This difference reached its climax in 1845, when Lord Grey wished
to exclude Lord Palmerston from the Foreign Office, and Lord Russell
insisted on his being nominated for that department.

[36] The exports of Great Britain rose from 47,000,000_l._ in 1842
to 60,000,000_l._ in 1845, and the imports from 65,000,000_l._ to
85,000,000_l._, and, in the same period, the entries of British
mercantile shipping rose from 4,627,440 tons to 6,031,557 tons. (See
Porter’s ‘Progress of the Nation.’)




CHAPTER IV.

     Lord John Russell’s first steps as Prime Minister: the
     Equalization of the Sugar Duties—He suspends the Navigation
     Laws, January 1847—Mr. Ricardo’s motion, February 1847—Reply of
     Mr. Liddell—Mr. Ricardo’s motion carried—Committee appointed,
     February 1847—Meeting of the shipowners, August 12, 1847—Their
     arguments—What constitutes “British ships”—State of Navigation
     Laws in 1847—Rules in force in the Plantation Trade—Their
     rigorous character—Their history from 1660 to 1847—First
     infringement of the principle of confining the American trade to
     British vessels—Absurdity and impotency of these laws—State of
     the law before the Declaration of American Independence—Trade
     with Europe—Modifications of the law—East India Trade and
     shipping—Trade with India in foreign and in United States ships
     even from English ports—Coasting trade—Summary of the Navigation
     Laws.


[Sidenote: Lord John Russell’s first steps as Prime Minister: the
Equalization of the Sugar Duties.]

[Sidenote: Suspends the Navigation Laws, January 1847.]

The first measure introduced by Lord John Russell, when he succeeded
Sir Robert Peel as Prime Minister,—the equalization of the Sugar
Duties—was one almost as important to the interests of merchant
shipping as the repeal of the Corn Laws. A change so great, affecting,
indirectly, the general as well as the fiscal policy of the empire,
was even more remarkable than the abolition of the Corn Laws. It was
strenuously opposed by the Protectionist party, but Sir Robert Peel,
having given his support to Government, the Bill was carried by a large
majority. This measure in itself afforded much additional employment
to shipping; and in the course of the debate upon it, Lord John Russell
made the memorable declaration that he “did not propose in any respect
to alter the existing Navigation Laws.”[37] He was, however, obliged
immediately afterwards to suspend the operation of these Laws till
the 1st September following, so as to facilitate the importation of
grain and flour. Indeed, some such measure was absolutely necessary,
as the crops of Germany and France had in many instances failed, and
the French Government had also been compelled to suspend for a time
their Navigation Laws, in order to obtain supplies of food from other
countries.

As the necessity of increasing, at all events for a limited period, the
facilities for importing grain from foreign countries and the admission
of sugar more freely into breweries and distilleries, so as to augment
the supply of food, had been pointed out in the Royal Speech, no
opposition was offered to this temporary suspension of the Navigation
Laws; but it was stoutly maintained by the Protectionists that the
suspension must be limited to the period fixed in the Bill. The
Free-traders, however, on the other hand, could not see the necessity
of any limitation, and, though the Ministry did not feel strong enough
to undertake the task of a total abolition of the Navigation Laws, one
of its principal supporters gave notice that, on an early day, he would
formally call the attention of Parliament to this important subject.

[Sidenote: Mr. Ricardo’s motion, February 1847.]

Accordingly, on the 9th February, 1847, Mr. John Lewis Ricardo
brought forward his motion,[38] “That a Select Committee be appointed
to inquire into the operation and policy of the Navigation Laws.”
Intense interest was excited among shipowners; the fact of Mr. Ricardo
proposing the motion was deemed highly ominous, as he was known to
hold very advanced opinions on Free-trade, and to be prepared to
go further in that direction than perhaps any other member of the
House. He was, indeed, at that time, one of the most formidable
exponents of the Free-trade doctrines. His speech,[39] delivered in
a tone of much confidence, propounded, as indisputable facts, what
were then rather startling assertions. After briefly recapitulating
the history of the Navigation Act, which had been held to be perfect
till 1821-22, he pointed out that Mr. Wallace in those years, and
Mr. Huskisson in 1824-25, had broken into the exclusive principle on
which the Navigation Act rested. He then referred, at great length, to
the labours of the Committee on British Shipping in 1844, and boldly
asserted that that inquiry was instituted by the shipowners to prove
the efficacy of the existing laws, and was allowed to drop because they
had no case for further encouragement. He specially singled out the
opinions of the late Mr. Joseph Somes, one of the largest shipowners of
that time, who went so far as to demand a tax on Colonial shipping; and
he successfully combatted this by contending that the colonists already
suffered severely by the Navigation Laws. Millions upon millions, he
said, were spent upon internal communications;[40] Parliament was
looking with great jealousy lest a half-penny or a penny too much
should be charged for inland transit; yet, when goods arrived by sea,
there was a law which increased the cost of carriage over the greater
part of their journey. He then referred to the opinions expressed by
Mr. G. F. Young, one of the leading opponents of any change in the
laws of shipping, who had also advocated a tax on Colonial vessels,
stating, in his evidence in 1844-45, that he “considered the whole
system of Navigation Laws as relating more to the encouragement of
maritime commerce than to any other object, and that, therefore, many
sacrifices of pecuniary interests ought to be made for it,” adding, “I
have no doubt that private interests ought to be sacrificed for the
general interests of the country. If the Legislature should decide that
it was no longer necessary to keep up the Navigation Laws as a means
of national security, no doubt the consumers of foreign articles could
purchase at a cheaper rate, since this would be the natural consequence
of admitting imports in the ships of foreign nations.”

Fortified by these quotations from his opponent’s evidence, Mr. Ricardo
boldly came to the point by asserting it must be clear that, by every
ton of shipping driven from the ports of England, there was lost
the benefit of the sale of an equivalent amount of our merchandise,
and that, thereby, our workmen were deprived of their wages, our
manufacturers of their profit, and our Government of revenue. If the
Spaniards wanted earthenware, the French sugar, and we wine, “why on
earth,” he exclaimed, “should we forbid the natural course of the
transaction!” He pointed out the roundabout and expensive way whereby
such exchanges of produce must be carried,[41] instancing a case where
American hides brought from Marseilles to Rotterdam, not finding a
market there, were taken back to Marseilles; and when sent thence to
Liverpool, were seized as imported in a French bottom, and released
only on the condition that they should be sent back to New York! Such
interruptions of commerce, Mr. Ricardo rightly contended, were alike
inconvenient and wasteful. He next pointed out discrepancies in the
working of the Act, with the various Orders in Council made under it,
asserting, at the same time, that freights were artificially enhanced
by protection. He espoused, too, the cause of the colonists, who now
demanded as a matter of justice, that trade should be as free in
shipping as it was in sugar. Could, Mr. Ricardo demanded, any ground
of political expediency or any national advantage be shown to justify
the retention of these laws? He admitted that the authority of Adam
Smith would be adduced against him,[44] but denied that Adam Smith
had brought forward evidence to support his argument. He allowed that
a defensive navy was of the first importance for the welfare of the
country, and that the commercial marine was the nucleus and nursery of
that branch of the public service; but he emphatically contended that
the way to encourage the commercial navy was to free the commerce of
the country from all restrictions, impediments, and obstructions. He
held that England could compete successfully with the United States
and all the world in building ships, and he produced a variety of
statistical statements showing the difference between protected and
unprotected tonnage, one of which is especially worthy of notice.[45]
“These facts,” added Mr. Ricardo, “speak for themselves, showing the
unprotected tonnage has just doubled the increase of the protected
tonnage.” He concluded by remarking that commerce was the parent of the
merchant marine, and that if the parent were nourished the child would
flourish.

[Sidenote: Reply of Mr. Liddell.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Ricardo’s motion carried.]

Mr. Thomas Milner Gibson, then Vice-President of the Board of Trade,
with whose concurrence the motion had been made, gave the Government’s
sanction to the motion, and recommended on their part that the
Committee should be appointed. His proposal, however, was strongly
opposed by the Hon. H. T. Liddell (now Earl Ravensworth), who asked
what could be gained by a Committee, as the Navigation Laws were
already suspended until the 1st of September next. He quoted the
opinion of Mr. Huskisson,[46] who, in making certain recommendations
with relation to the reciprocity treaties, had said: “The object of
the Navigation Laws was twofold: first, to create and maintain the
great commercial marine of this country for the purposes of national
defence; and secondly, an object not less important in the eyes of
statesmen, to prevent any one other nation from engrossing too large
a portion of the navigation of the world.” Mr. Huskisson, he stated,
held that, in those two branches of our maritime system, the fisheries
and the coasting trade, there appeared no motive for alteration, and
that the laws referring to them must remain unchanged, so long as we
were desirous of upholding our great commercial marine. With reference
to the European trade, he also declared that the altered state of the
world compelled England to enter into some new treaties; that, in so
far as exclusion was within their reach, they were bound to grant and
enforce a monopoly in favour of the British shipowner—not, indeed,
for his especial advantage, but because the commercial marine was
the foundation of our naval power, and the maintenance of that power
the paramount duty of all governments. It was Mr. Liddell’s opinion,
however, that the reciprocity treaties had ever been distasteful to
British shipowners, and, that they had suffered in their carrying
trade from unequal competition with other countries; but that it was
now too late to think of giving them up or of altering a policy to
which the country had pledged itself. With regard to the comparative
expenses of British and foreign ships, it suited, he said, the case
of the Repealers to make this comparison of expenses with the ships
of the United States alone; but why not look to the Baltic States,
with the trade of which the whole of the eastern parts of this island
were directly connected? It was proved, he urged, before a Committee
of the House, that the relative cost of a British and Russian ship,
both as regards construction and current expenses, was much in favour
of the latter, and he called, therefore, on the House not to fritter
away the great interests committed to its charge. He, in a long and
closely-reasoned speech, strenuously opposed the appointment of the
Committee. The motion was supported by Mr. Hume, Mr. Bright, Mr.
Labouchere, Lord Sandon, and Mr. Mitchell, and opposed by Lord G.
Bentinck, Alderman Thompson, Captain Harris, Mr. Hudson, and Mr.
Disraeli; but, Sir Robert Peel having given a very decided opinion in
favour of inquiry, and Lord John Russell having supported the proposal
on the part of the Government, Mr. Ricardo’s motion was carried by 155
to 61.

[Sidenote: Committee appointed, February 1847.]

[Sidenote: Meeting of Shipowners’ Society, August 12, 1847.]

This was the first blow aimed with serious effect against the existence
of the Navigation Laws; and, though the Free-trade party affected
slightly to disguise their intentions by only asking for inquiry, their
zealous partisans out of doors made no scruple in avowing that the
total abolition of the Navigation Laws was the real object of their
agitation. Circumstances connected with this inquiry led the General
Body of Shipowners to hold a special meeting on the 12th August, 1847,
but, curiously enough, they did not advance a single remark on the
increasing activity of their own business, brought about as this had
been in a great measure by the legislation to which I have referred. It
cannot be questioned that, if British shipowners had suffered severely
in previous years, the reductions in the tariff since 1842, together
with the demand for shipping to bring supplies of food for the starving
populace of Ireland, had greatly increased their actual business and
their future prospects. Nor were other causes wanting to enhance and to
ensure this prosperity. A new trade had been developed by the discovery
of vast deposits of guano in the islands of the Pacific (of far greater
importance than those on the coasts of Africa), and this alone required
a large amount of tonnage; while the rapidly increasing consumption
of sea-borne coals secured for them another source of remunerative
employment. In spite of these obvious advantages, shipowners, however,
expressed no feelings of satisfaction, though these new channels
of trade afforded them a profitable employment for their vessels:
they probably feared that by so doing the Free-traders would at once
introduce a measure for the repeal of the Navigation Laws. Nor were
their fears groundless. Parliament having thrown out the idea that
protection as a principle could not be maintained, the shipowner had to
show that his case, as the advocate of maritime commerce generally, was
an exception to this rule.

[Sidenote: Their arguments.]

The Shipowners’ Society of London alleged, with no mean tact and
ability, that their members, as a section of the community, advanced
no claim to special privileges, and demanded no exemption on abstract
grounds, from any burdens to which other interests were subjected. But
they argued that, if for objects of supposed national benefit wherein
they had no special advantage, the State imposed on them burdens and
restrictions, common justice prescribed that they should be protected
from the competition of those who were not so tied down, otherwise they
would not be able to compete with the shipowners of foreign nations.
They further argued, and not without reason, that, by the Registry
Laws they were compelled to use the most costly ships in the world;
by the Navigation Laws to employ exclusively the highest paid and
most expensively fed seamen, those of native birth; and, by a variety
of laws, presumed, also, to be of essential importance, they were
specially taxed, and, at the same time, were prevented from conducting
their pursuits in the way most conducive to their own profit. Clinging,
however, tenaciously as they did to the principle of the Navigation
Laws, they could hardly expect that their view in favour of protection
to their own interest would be entertained; and this, too, at a period
when every vessel at their command was fully employed; when they were
realizing large profits, and when, indeed, ships could scarcely be
found to convey from other countries sufficient food to meet the wants
of the people.

The Committee[47] who were appointed on Mr. Ricardo’s motion had
examined during the session a great number of witnesses, and in the
course of their inquiry made no less than five reports, limiting
themselves, however, to the evidence taken, the substance of which I
shall hereafter lay before my readers.

[Sidenote: What constitutes “British Ships.”]

But before I do so, it is necessary, even at the risk of wearying
my readers, that I should give the meaning which has been usually
attached to “British ships,” especially as this has varied in different
trades and, from time to time, in the same trade, and explain, in as
condensed a manner as possible, the more important changes in the
old Navigation Laws, not already noticed or sufficiently described.
Originally, a “British ship” was held to be one owned by the people
of England, Ireland, &c., or, if built in the Plantations, owned by
the people thereof, being British subjects. In 1786, an Act was passed
(26 Geo. III., c. 60), by which it was provided for the future that
no ships should be entitled to the privilege of “British ships” but
such as were British built as well as British owned and navigated;
exceptions, however, being made in favour of foreign ships built before
May, 1786, and belonging, at that date, to English owners. Ships of
this class might engage in all such voyages as were previously open
to British-owned ships though not necessarily of British build. From
the time that these ships of 1786, or of older date, became worn out,
the term “British ship” acquired the sense in which it was used, up
to 1847, except as regards the coasting trade, for which this further
provision was made, that no foreigner was permitted to serve in her as
a seaman.

It is also necessary to notice the effect of some clauses in the Act
of 34 Geo. III., cap. 68, which provided that no ship, registered or
required to be registered as a British ship, could import or export any
articles whatsoever, unless duly navigated by British subjects. Thus
a restriction, previously unknown, was placed on our export trade to
foreign parts, and on the import from Europe of other articles than
those enumerated in the Act of Navigation.

On further examination of the Navigation Act, it will be seen that
exceptions from its general rules occur in two instances (Levant and
East India goods) in favour of certain imports in British-_built_
ships; while, in two other instances (Spanish and Portuguese colonial
goods, bullion and prize goods), they were in favour of importations in
British-_owned_ shipping.

Lastly, provision was made in the 10th and 11th sections of the “Act
for the Prevention of Frauds” (13 & 14 Car. II., cap. 2) with reference
to the purchase of foreign-built ships, and for securing that such
ships should be wholly owned by English persons, before they could
avail themselves of the privileges conferred by the Act on such ships.

Such were the leading conditions of the “Act of Navigation” so far as
regards “British ships;” but the “Statute of Frauds” further enacted
(sect. 6, par. 2) that no foreign-built ship (that is to say, no ship
built anywhere except in England, &c., or in his Majesty’s dominions in
Asia, Africa, or America), except ships purchased before a given day
and prize ships, should enjoy the privilege of a “British ship,” though
owned and manned by “British subjects”; and such ships were deemed as
aliens’ ships, and were liable therefore to all duties applicable to
this class of vessels.

By a subsequent Act (15 Car. II., cap. 7, sect. 6) no goods from
Europe were to be imported into the British possessions except in
British-built shipping; and, by the Plantation Act (7 & 8 Will. III.,
cap. 22, sect. 2) all importations into, and exportations from,
these possessions must be in British-owned, and British-built, and
British-navigated vessels. Prize ships, if British owned, were, and
always have been, entitled to the privileges of British vessels; the
system of registering vessels having been first prescribed by the
last-named Act.

Having thus stated the principles regulating “British ships,” I must
now proceed to notice in some detail the more important changes in the
Navigation Laws.

[Sidenote: State of Navigation Laws in 1847. Rules in force in the
Plantation Trade.]

These Laws, in 1847, resting as they did on the Act of Parliament
then in force, so far as regards _The Plantation Trade_ provided
(_Rule 1_) that “No goods shall be _exported_ from the United
Kingdom to any British possession in Asia, Africa, or America, nor to
the islands of Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, or Sark, except in British
ships” (8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect. 7). But vessels belonging to the
United States may carry goods from this country to the principal
British settlements in the East Indies (59 Geo. III., cap. 54, sect.
6). The Sovereign had the power to conclude treaties, allowing the
same privilege to the ships of other foreign countries, and some such
treaties were actually concluded: _e.g._ with Austria and in fact
Russia (see 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 90, sect. 9).

_Rule 2._ “No goods shall be carried from any British possession
in Asia, Africa, or America, to any other of such possessions, nor from
one part of such possessions to another part of the same, except in
British ships” (8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect. 10).

_Rule 3._ “No goods shall be _imported_ into any British
possession in Asia, Africa, or America, in any foreign ships, unless
they be ships of the country producing these goods, and from which
they are usually imported”[48] (8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect. 11). But
an Order in Council might declare that goods, &c., the growth of any
foreign country, might be imported into Hong Kong from the same or any
other foreign country, in vessels belonging to the same or any other
foreign country, and however navigated (see 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect.
12).

Her Majesty might also, by Order in Council, declare that goods of any
sort, or the produce of any place, not otherwise prohibited by the Law
of Navigation, might be imported into any port or ports of the British
possessions abroad, to be named in such Order, from any place, _in a
British ship_, and from any place not being a part of the British
dominions, in a foreign ship of any country, and however navigated, to
be warehoused for _exportation_ only (8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect.
23).

[Sidenote: Their rigorous character.]

_Rule 4._ The privileges of trading allowed to foreign ships under
_Rule 3_ were limited to the ships of those countries which,
_having colonial possessions_, should grant the like privileges of
trading with those possessions to British ships, or which, not having
colonial possessions, “shall place the commerce and navigation of this
country, and of its possessions abroad, on the footing of the ‘most
favoured nation’: unless her Majesty, by Order in Council, shall in any
case deem it expedient to grant the whole, or any of such privileges,
to the ships of any foreign country, although the conditions aforesaid
shall not in all respects be fulfilled by such foreign country” (8 & 9
Vict., cap. 93, sect. 4).

_Rule 5._ “No goods shall be _imported_ into, nor shall any goods
(except the produce of the fisheries, in British ships) be _exported_,
from any of the British possessions in America by sea, from or to any
place other than the United Kingdom, or some other of such possessions,
except into or from the several ports in such possessions called ‘Free
Ports.’” (See 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 93, sect. 2.) The 62nd section of
the Act applied this principle to the Mauritius, as well as to the
American possessions; while, under the 90th section, the trade of other
colonies was regulated by the Queen. Goods could be imported by inland
navigation into any place where there was a custom-house. The rule was
not to extend “to prohibit the importation or exportation of goods into
or from any ports or places in Newfoundland, or Labrador, in British
ships;” and by the 2nd section, certain articles might be imported
from Guernsey and Jersey into places where the fishery was carried on,
though the same were not free ports. These five rules comprise the Law
as it stood in 1847. But it is also as well to give some account of its
previous history and its various modifications.

[Sidenote: Their history from 1660 to 1847.]

The Act of 1660 established two rules applicable to the Plantation
trade, which were deemed of the highest importance to the country:
first, that the whole trade of the Plantations should be carried on
in “British” ships only; and secondly, that the principal productions
of these Plantations should be allowed to be exported only to the
mother country, or some other Plantation. A third general rule was
introduced, a year or two later, by the Act of 15 Car. II., cap.
7, sect. 6, viz., that no goods of the produce of Europe should be
imported into any of the Plantations in Asia, Africa, or America
(except Tangier[49]), in any vessels whatsoever, but such as were
_bonâ fide_ and without fraud laden and shipped in England, Wales,
or the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, in English-built vessels.[50]

In the year 1825, on the general consolidation of the Customs Laws, the
above limitations of the right of exportation were removed, and the law
with regard to the _Plantation trade_ was placed nearly on the
footing on which it stood in 1847. In fact, the further consolidations
of 1833 and 1845 made little change in the previous regulations. With
regard to _Rule 3_, viz., that goods, the produce of Europe, were
only to be imported into the colonies from the United Kingdom, this was
subject, originally, to a few exceptions: thus, salt might be taken to
the fisheries from any port of Europe; and wines of Madeira and the
Azores might be imported thence, &c. A relaxation of the rule was first
made in favour of Irish linens, various subsequent alterations having
been introduced, till at length, in 1825, the law with reference to
such importations was placed on nearly the same footing as prevailed in
1847; that is to say, the importation and exportation of all classes
of goods into or from the “Free Ports” in different colonies were,
generally, legalised, subject to certain prohibitions against the
importation of particular articles, some of which were afterwards
removed, while others (_e.g._ those against pirated books,
counterfeit coin, &c., and the restrictions on gunpowder, arms, &c.)
remained. A tariff of differential duties on foreign goods, of which
duties one-tenth (subsequently increased to one-fourth) was to be
remitted, when the goods were imported through an English warehouse,
was, at the same date, enforced.

The principle of this tariff and of the practice of remission were
retained; but legislation was constantly effecting small changes, to
meet the wishes or, rather, the demands of colonial legislatures which
perhaps, naturally, looked only to their own interests.

Such may be taken as the intermediate history of the Navigation Law as
it affected the Plantation or Colonial trade.

[Sidenote: First infringement of the principle of confining the
American trade to British vessels.]

The first decided infringement of the general principle of confining
the trade to British ships took place on the conclusion of the treaty
with America, the effect of which has been described.

In 1808, when the King of Portugal emigrated to Brazil, the same
privileges, as had been granted to the United States, were extended
to the inhabitants of the Portuguese possessions in South America, by
the Act (48 Geo. III., cap. 11) which allowed the produce of those
territories to be imported thence into Great Britain and Ireland in
vessels built in those territories, or made prize by Portuguese ships,
and owned and navigated by Portuguese subjects resident in the said
territories. After the conclusion of the treaty with Portugal in 1810,
a further Act (51 Geo. III., cap. 47) extended the above facilities
to all Portuguese-built vessels or prizes owned and navigated by
Portuguese subjects, without requiring that they should be residents in
America.

[Sidenote: Absurdity and impotency of these laws.]

On the revision of the Customs Laws in 1822 (3 Geo. IV., cap. 43,
sect. 3), the principle and the above exceptions in favour of the
United States and Portuguese colonies were preserved, and were further
extended to countries in America or the West Indies, being, or having
been, under the dominion of Spain. It must be remembered that, as
respects the principle that the produce of Asia, Africa, and America
was only to be imported into England from the place of its origin, the
old law recognised the doctrine of the 5th section of the Navigation
Act, that goods _manufactured_ in any country should be held to
be _the produce of that country_, even though made from materials
produced elsewhere.

[Sidenote: State of the law before the Declaration of American
Independence.]

At the commencement of the American War of Independence, the chief
regulations as to trade, the operations of which have been already
described, were that the Americans could neither import nor export in
any but British ships; they could not carry important articles of their
own produce to any part of Europe other than Great Britain; and they
could not import any goods from any part of Europe other than Great
Britain.[51]

[Sidenote: Trade with Europe.]

With regard to the _trade with Europe_, the law in 1847 declared
that the several sorts of goods hereinafter enumerated, being the
produce of Europe, viz., masts, timber, boards, tar, tallow, hemp,
flax, currants, raisins, figs, prunes, olive-oil, corn or grain,
wine, brandy, tobacco, wool, shumach, madders, madder-roots, barilla,
brimstone, bark of oak, cork, oranges, lemons, linseed, rape-seed and
clover-seed, could not be imported into the United Kingdom, _to be
used therein_, except in British ships, or in ships of the country
of which the goods were the produce, or in ships of the country from
which they were usually imported, 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect. 2. But
such goods, not being otherwise prohibited, might, by the 22nd section
of that Act, be warehoused for exportation, though brought in other
ships; a privilege confirmed by the 3 & 4 Vict., cap. 95.

[Sidenote: Modifications of the law.]

Some embarrassing questions having, from time to time, arisen as to the
right of importing the produce of particular European States in ships
built in countries incorporated into those States subsequent to the
passing of the Navigation Act, as, for instance, the question whether
Prussian produce might be imported in ships built in East Friesland, it
was enacted, 22 Geo. III., cap. 78, that the enumerated articles might
be imported in ships, the property of subjects under the same sovereign
as the country of which goods were the produce, although the country
or place where such ship was built or to which it belonged, was not
under the dominion of such sovereign at the time of the passing of the
Navigation Act. It will be observed that this statute not only effected
its immediate purpose of putting the dominions and sovereign of any
one country on the same footing in respect to the Navigation Law, but
also extended the right of importing, originally confined to ships
“built in” the country of export, to ships “belonging to” such country.
Several alterations of an unimportant character were made, bearing
upon these points; but, in the consolidation of 1825, the proviso was
introduced into the Navigation Act, and still retained in 1847, “that
the country of every ship shall be deemed to include all places which
are under the same dominion as the place to which such ship belongs.”

In the meantime, however, the Act of 1822 (3 Geo. IV., cap. 43,
sect. 6) had made an important alteration in the law, by allowing
importations of the enumerated goods, either in ships of the country
of which the goods were the produce, or in ships of the country whence
these goods were usually imported. At the same time, the prohibitions
against the importation of articles from the Netherlands, Germany,
Turkey, and Russia were taken off.[52]

In 1822 tallow and tobacco were also added to the list of enumerated
articles: and, since that time, wool, shumach, madder, barilla,
brimstone, bark, cork, oranges, lemons, linseed, rape-seed, and
clover-seed have likewise been added; while salt, pitch, rosin,
potashes, wine, and sugar were struck out.

The only alteration of any consequence in the European trade, since the
consolidation of 1825, was that made to carry out the Austrian Treaty
of 1838, which will be noticed hereafter.

[Sidenote: East India trade and shipping.]

The trade, however, with the East Indies has always been exceptional,
and deserves special notice, as the exclusive right of trading within
certain limits, long enjoyed by the Company, together with the peculiar
nature of the Company’s jurisdiction, produced some anomalies.

The two points most worthy of notice are, first, the concession of
the rights of British ships to ships not fulfilling all the usual
requisites of the law; and secondly, the admission of certain foreign
ships to an equality in some respects with British ships.

On the first point, the statute 21 Geo. III., cap. 65, sect. 33,
provided that ships belonging to the East India Company should be
held to be British owned, although the Stock of the Company was held
by a considerable number of foreigners. Other statutes (35 Geo. III.,
cap. 118; 42 Geo. III., cap. 20) allowed to ships built within the
territories of the Company, or in places in the East Indies under
British protection and owned by the Company, the privileges of British
ships in trade with India, though such ships were neither British built
nor duly registered. When the exclusive privileges of the Company
were broken in upon (53 Geo. III., cap. 155) the same privilege was
extended to similarly circumstanced vessels, the property of private
individuals, by Order in Council. But when the Registry Laws were
extended to India, from this time nothing but British-built ships were
to be entitled to the privileges of British vessels (54 Geo. III.,
cap. 35; 53 Geo. III., cap. 116). Exceptions were made in favour of
ships under 350 tons burden, and of others, the property of British
subjects, and built or building before 1st January, 1816: but these
classes of ships were only to be employed in trade within the limits
of the Company’s Charter. Subsequent changes were made; and, by the
Act 3 & 4 Vict., cap. 56, in force in 1847, the Governor-General in
Council had power given him to declare all ships built within the
limits of the Charter, and owned by those of Her Majesty’s subjects for
whom he had power to legislate, entitled to the privileges of British
ships within those limits. By the fourth section of the same Act, the
Governor-General had, also, the power of conferring the same privileges
on ships belonging to States in subordinate alliance, or having
subsidiary treaties with the East India Company.

[Sidenote: Trade with India, in Foreign and United States Ships,]

With regard to the navigation of East India ships, it is sufficient
to notice, that, by the 20th section of 4 Geo. IV., cap. 80 (still in
force in 1847), as well as by the 17th section of the Navigation Act (8
& 9 Vict., cap. 88), Lascars and other natives of Asia were not to be
deemed British seamen. But by section 21 of the same Act, any number of
Lascars might be employed; provided only that there were four British
seamen to every hundred tons of the vessel’s burden: by section 23,
however, it appears that British seamen need not be employed in certain
voyages within the limits of the Charter.

On the subject of privileges granted to vessels of foreign countries
in the trade with India, reference must be made to Act 37 Geo. III.,
cap. 117 (still unrepealed in 1847), which authorised the Directors
of the East India Company, subject to the approval of the Board of
Control, to make such regulations as they thought fit with respect to
the trade to be carried on in ships of countries on friendly terms with
England. The case, however, of America was peculiar, in this sense,
that her ships were enabled to clear out from English ports to China,
while English merchants could not send a British ship to that country!
Thus, the Act of 59 Geo. III., cap. 54, sect. 6, allowed United
States ships “to clear out from any port of the United Kingdom for
the principal settlements of the _British_ dominions in the East
Indies,—_videlicet_, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Prince of Wales
Island,—with any articles which could be legally exported from the
United Kingdom to the said settlements in British-built ships, subject
to the same regulations, &c., as applied to British-built ships.”

[Sidenote: even from English ports.]

It was under the security of this clause that the traders of the United
States sent their vessels to the port of London, to clear out, not
for the special ports mentioned in the above Act, but for China, the
only exclusive trade at that time retained by the East India Company.
Whether the omission of the word China in the Act was an inadvertence,
or whether it was, in fact, a violation of the law for United States
vessels to go to Canton as well as to the other places within the
limits of the Company’s Charter detailed in this Act, the authorities
of the Board of Trade did not care to distinguish.[53]

[Sidenote: Coasting Trade.]

As regards the COASTING TRADE, the law—8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88,
sect. 8—in force in 1847, declared that no goods nor passengers could
be carried coastwise from one part of the United Kingdom to another,
or from the United Kingdom to the Isle of Man, and _vice versâ_,
except in British ships, although the original Navigation Act of 1660
did not prevent foreign-built vessels from engaging in the coasting
trade. The prohibition in the ancient Act extended only to such as
were _foreign owned_, 12 Car. II., cap. 18, sect. 8. By the Act
of 1 James, cap. 18, an extra duty of 5_s._ per ton for every
voyage was laid upon all foreign-built ships engaged in this trade.
Subsequently, by 34 Geo. III., cap. 68 (extended to Irish ships by
42 Geo. III., cap. 61), it was enacted, that vessels engaged in the
coasting trade should be wholly navigated by British subjects; and
this provision was still in force in 1847 by virtue of the definition
of a “British ship,” given in the 12th section of the Act of 8 & 9
Vict., cap. 88. The absolute restriction of the coasting trade to
British-built ships was not introduced till the consolidation in 1825.
The trade of the Isle of Man was put on the footing of a coasting trade
in 1844.

Such is an abridged history of the law of Navigation during the
intermediate period between 1660 and 1847, comprising the four great
divisions of the trade and navigation of the United Kingdom.

No one can rise from a study of these laws without a feeling of
amazement at the trouble our ancestors gave themselves “to beggar their
neighbours,” under the erroneous impression which too long prevailed,
that, by their ruin, our own prosperity could be most effectively
achieved. It is, therefore, not surprising that, under such legislative
measures, maritime commerce was for centuries slow in growth, and that
British merchants and shipowners frequently suffered quite as much
through the instrumentality of laws meant for their protection as their
foreign competitors, against whom these regulations were levelled.

[Sidenote: Summary of the Navigation Laws.]

For the convenience of reference it may be useful to give before
closing this chapter a condensed recapitulation of the principles of
these extraordinary laws, as they stood in 1847, so that my readers
may more clearly understand the discussions in the Lords and Commons
preceding their repeal:—

1st. Certain enumerated articles of European produce could only be
imported into the United Kingdom, for consumption, in British ships,
or in ships of the country of which the goods were the produce, or in
ships of the country from which they were usually imported.

2ndly. No produce of Asia, Africa, or America could be imported for
consumption into the United Kingdom from _Europe_ in any ships;
and such produce could only be imported from any other place in British
ships, or in ships of the country of which the goods were the produce
and from which they were usually imported.

3rdly. No goods could be carried coastwise from one part of the United
Kingdom to another in any but British ships.

4thly. No goods could be exported from the United Kingdom to any of the
British possessions in Asia, Africa, or America (with some exceptions
with regard to India), in any but British ships.

5thly. No goods could be carried from any one British possession
in Asia, Africa, or America to another, nor from one part of such
possession to another part of the same in any but British ships.

6thly. No goods could be imported into any British possession in Asia,
Africa, or America, in any but British ships, or in ships of the
country of which the goods were the produce, provided, also, in such
case, that such ships brought the goods from that country.

7thly. No foreign ships were allowed to trade with any of the British
possessions unless they had been specially authorised to do so by Order
in Council; and

8thly. Powers were given to the Queen in Council which enabled her
to impose differential duties on the ships of any foreign country
which did the same with reference to British ships; and also to place
restrictions on importations from any foreign countries which placed
restrictions on British importations into such countries.

It will be remarked, that in the regulations respecting the trade of
Europe the restrictions only applied to _imports_. Exports were
not affected; in fact, so far as the Navigation Act was concerned,
foreign ships might export any goods from this country. British
manufacturers had naturally required that no impediment should be
placed upon the exportation of British goods. This was perhaps the only
sensible clause in the whole paraphernalia of these laws.[54]


FOOTNOTES:

[37] I daresay at that time Lord Russell had not studied the question
sufficiently. I arrive at this conclusion from a note I received from
his Lordship in the present year (1875), in which he says, referring to
the repeal of the Navigation Laws:—“I felt convinced by the reasoning
of all writers, of whom the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir
Stafford Northcote, was one of the most able, that the Navigation Laws
ought to be repealed. I was not frightened by Lord Derby’s sinister
predictions, and events have proved me right.” Sir Stafford Northcote
at the time was, I think, private secretary to Mr. Labouchere,
the President of the Board of Trade under Lord John Russell’s
Administration, and it is curious to learn that his Lordship, then the
Prime Minister and leader of the great Whig party, should have been
made a convert to the necessity of _further_ progress by the young
Conservative. Of course these writings could not have been read by Lord
Russell at the time when he made the “declaration” to which I refer in
the text.

[38] It seems worth while to give here in a note the dates of the
several steps taken in the repeal of the Navigation Laws, with the
references to _Hansard_, where the several speeches can be
consulted:—

1. Committee moved for by Mr. Ricardo, February 9, 1847. (Hansard,
lxxxix. p. 1007.) Carried by 155 to 94. Committee appointed February
16. 2. Lord John Russell proposes to suspend Navigation Laws with
reference to the importation of corn, June 14. (Ibid., xciii. p. 472.)
3. Discussion on Navigation Bill, July 2. (Ibid., p. 1138.) 4. Motion
of the Earl of Hardwicke for a Committee, February 25, 1848. (Ibid.,
xcvi. p. 1313.) 5. Committee of whole House on Navigation Bill, May 15,
1848. (Ibid., xcviii. p. 988.) 6. Motion of Mr. Herries in reply to Mr.
Labouchere, May 29, 1848. (Ibid., xcix. p. 9.) 7. After five nights’
debate Mr. Labouchere’s motion is carried by 299 to 177, June 9, 1848.
(Ibid., p. 664.) 8. Mr. Labouchere moves resolution for Navigation
Bill, February 14, 1849 (Ibid., cii. p. 682), which is agreed to
(Ibid., p. 741). The Bill is read a first time, February 16. (Ibid., p.
759.) 9. Second reading, March 9, 1849 (Ibid., cii. p. 464), which is
carried, March 12, by 266 to 210. (Ibid., p. 625.) 10. Third reading,
April 23 (Ibid., civ. p. 622), and Bill carried by 275 to 214 (Ibid.,
p. 702). 11. Bill introduced into the House of Lords, May 7. (Ibid., p.
1316.) Carried May 9, by 173 to 163. (Ibid., cv. p. 83.)

[39] Hansard, February 9, 1847, p. 1007.

[40] The preceding eighteen months had seen the height of the railway
mania.

[41] The Spaniard, he said, would take in a cargo of sugar at Cuba
which he would deliver at a _French_ port, and take in wine for
us; but _we_ had so arranged that when he arrived at our ports
he would be met by a custom-house officer, who would tell him that he
could not be permitted to land his cargo. “Why?” the Spaniard would
inquire. “I understood you wanted wine.” “So we do,” the officer would
reply. Then the Spaniard would say, “I will exchange my wine for your
earthenware.” “That will not do,” replies the officer. “It must be
brought by Frenchmen on a French ship.” “But the French do not want
your earthenware”[42]. “We cannot help that; we must not let you
violate our Navigation Laws”[43].

[42] They did very much; for Mr. Garratt, the partner of Alderman
Copeland, said at the time to a friend of mine, that he would ruin
every earthenware potter in France if they would allow British
earthenware to be admitted free of duty.

[43] The Spaniard was no doubt under a misapprehension. The _French
wines_ could _not_ have been brought into our ports in a
_Spanish_ ship; wine being an enumerated article which was
excluded, “except in _British ships_, or ships of the country of
which the goods are the produce.” (8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, s. 2.)

[44] We give the words of Adam Smith, p. 203 _et seq._ of his
‘Wealth of Nations,’ by McCulloch. _Ed._ 1850. “There seem to be
two cases in which it will be advantageous to lay some burden upon
foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry. The first is, when
some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defence of the
country. The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends very much
upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The Act of Navigation,
therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and shipping of
Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country, in some
cases by absolute prohibition, and in others by heavy burdens upon the
shipping of foreign countries.” Adam Smith, at great length, expounds
the principle of the Navigation Laws, admitting at the same time that
they are not favourable to the growth of the opulence arising from
foreign commerce. “As defence, however,” he adds, “is of much more
importance than opulence, the Act of Navigation is perhaps the wisest
of all the commercial regulations of England.”

In another passage, Adam Smith says: “To expect, indeed, that freedom
of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain, is as
absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established
in it.” P. 207. Same Edition.

[45] The first return of vessels engaged in the colonial trade refers
to a year when protection (with the exception of the few Reciprocity
Treaties then in force) was at its height; and the second to a year
when it had been greatly relaxed. It ran thus:—

                          Inward        Outward
                           Tons.          Tons.
  1826  Protected         939,321        839,558
        Unprotected     1,011,309        897,867
                        ---------      ---------
              Total     1,950,630      1,737,425
                        ---------      ---------

  1844  Protected       1,460,882      1,551,251
        Unprotected     2,186,581      2,301,571
                        ---------      ---------
              Total     3,647,463      3,852,822
                        ---------      ---------

  In 1826 the total amount inwards and outwards, } 1,778,879
    protected, was                               }
  In 1844       Ditto           ditto              3,012,133

      Showing an increase of 1,233,254 tons, or 69·32 per cent.

  In 1826 the total amount inwards and outwards, } 1,909,176
    unprotected, was                             }
  In 1844       Ditto           ditto              4,448,152

      Showing an increase of 2,578,976 tons, or 135·07 per cent.


[46] The speech in question (an admirable one) was delivered _12th
May, 1826_. _Vide_ Hansard, ‘Navigation Laws,’ vol. xv. p. 1144.

[47] The Committee consisted of Mr. Ricardo, Sir Robert Peel, Mr.
Mitchell, Mr. Alderman Thompson, Mr. Villiers, Sir Howard Douglas,
Admiral Dundas, Mr. Lyall, Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Thomas Baring, Mr. Hume,
Mr. Liddell, Sir George Clerk, and Mr. Milner Gibson.

[48] This section was originally specially aimed at the Dutch, who had
few native productions of their own.

[49] Tangier, opposite Gibraltar, was at that time an important British
possession.

[50] Our space only admits of an abridgment, but the reader will find
all details about the Navigation Law in a paper by Mr. J. S. (now Sir
John Shaw) Lefevre, published in the Appendix to the Report of the
Committee of the House of Commons appointed in 1847.

[51] Those of my readers who are curious to study the laws whereby we
hoped to bring the “rebellious colonies to order,”—vain hope!—or who
may desire to know how the parent treated its own offspring when the
children felt themselves strong enough to do for themselves, may read,
as I have done, though perhaps not to much advantage, 14 Geo. III.,
cap. 19; 15 Geo. III., cap. 18; and 16 Geo. III., cap. 5: all passed
in rapid succession under the melancholy delusion that they would have
the effect of a Pope’s Bull!—and that, too, on an enlightened but
oppressed people, who had resolved to govern themselves! My readers
may then turn to 23 Geo. III., cap. 26, and 23 Geo. III., cap. 39,
where an attempt was made to mend matters by some sort of regulation
of trade between the two countries, whereby Great Britain resolved to
have the lion’s share; and then to 25 Geo. III., cap. 1; 27 Geo. III.,
cap. 7; and 28 Geo. III., cap. 6, where certain modifications were
made, or rather could be made by “Order in Council,” and where “thirty
enumerated articles” the “growth, produce, or manufactures of the
States,” might be “carried into the British West Indies from the United
States,” but then “_only_ by British subjects in British ships”!
If my readers are disposed to go further—though I cannot recommend the
research—into this wretched system of legislation, they may refer to 31
Geo. III. cap. 38, where the Governors of the West India Islands were
allowed to relax certain prohibitions “in case of public emergency;”
and to 51 Geo. III., cap. 47, sect. 6, and 58 Geo. III., cap. 27,
where we seem to have gained a little more wisdom by extending certain
“privileges”!—_rights_ (?)—to an independent and industrious
people.

[52] The grounds of these important modifications of our Navigation
System were stated in Mr. Huskisson’s Speech, 12th May, 1826.

[53] The Americans acted on the section of the Act, which says, “any
articles which may be legally exported from the United Kingdom to the
said settlements.” Thus Canton was deemed a foreign place with regard
to the American Trade; but, in that it was included within the limits
of the East India Company’s Charter, American vessels could trade there
though English vessels could not!

[54] Mr. Lefevre, of the Board of Trade, said he did not know the
reason of this; but as a matter of fact, Venice, Spain, France, and the
Hanseatic League had Navigation Laws _before_ we had, and would
not have our goods _except in their own ships_. So necessity, not
wisdom, compelled us to make this allowance.




CHAPTER V.

     Progress of the changes in the Navigation Laws—Reciprocity
     Treaties—Austria, July 1838—Zollverein States, August 1841—Russia,
     1843—Various anomalies, &c., then in existence—Curious effects
     of Registry Laws, as regarded individuals or corporate
     bodies—Ship _Equador_—Decision of the Queen’s Bench,
     December 1846—Further details: owner to reside in the United
     Kingdom—Naturalisation of goods brought to Europe—Waste of
     capital caused thereby; and obstructions to trade—Story of the
     cochineal—But the Navigation Laws not always to blame—Special
     views of the Canadians—Montreal, its shipping and trade—Navigation
     of the St. Lawrence—Free-trade with the United States desired
     by the farmers of Canada—Negotiations proposed—Canadians urge
     the abolition of Protection—Views of Western Canada—Canadians,
     really, only for partial Free-trade—Improvements of their internal
     navigation—Welland Canal—Cost of freight the real question—Loss
     to Canada by New York line—General summary of results as to
     Canada—West Indians for Free-trade as well as Canadians—Divergent
     views of capitalists at home—Liverpool and Manchester opposed.


[Sidenote: Progress of the changes in the Navigation Laws.]

[Sidenote: Reciprocity Treaties.]

[Sidenote: Austria, July 1838.]

The first instance of privileges being granted to ships of certain
countries to import goods from ports in other countries was in the
case of Austrian ships. The 4th clause of the treaty of 1838 between
Austria and England provided, that all Austrian vessels from ports of
the Danube, as far as Galatz inclusive, should, with their cargoes, be
admitted into the ports of the United Kingdom and into all possessions
of Her Britannic Majesty, exactly in the same manner as if the said
vessels had come direct from ports strictly Austrian, with all the
privileges and immunities granted under the Treaty of Navigation
and Commerce. In August 1840, an Act was passed to give effect to
this treaty, the 3rd clause of which, running as follows, was very
important:—“And whereas, by the application of _steam_ power[55]
to inland navigation, and the facility thereby afforded of ascending
rivers in suitable vessels with imported goods, new prospects of
commercial adventure are opened up to many States situate wholly or
chiefly in the interior of Europe, and whose most convenient ports
are not within their own dominions; and, consequently, the trade of
this country with such States might be greatly extended if the ships
of such States were permitted to use, for the purposes of such trade,
some ports of other States, in like manner as if such ports were
within their own dominions; and, accordingly, treaties of commerce
and navigation beneficial to the shipping and trade of this country
might be made with such States if Her Majesty were enabled to carry
such treaties into effect. Be it therefore enacted, notwithstanding
the Navigation Act, that it shall be lawful for Her Majesty from
time to time to declare, by the Order in Council, to be published as
aforesaid, that any port or ports to be named in such order, being the
most convenient port or ports for shipping the produce of any State,
to be also named in such order, shall, although not situated within the
dominions of such State, be port or ports for the use of such State in
the trade of such ships with all ports of the British dominions, &c.,
in as full and ample a manner as if such port or ports were within
the dominions of such State, &c.; and so long as such order shall be
declared to be in force, it shall be lawful to import, &c., any goods
in the ships of such State, which, by the laws in force at the time of
such importation, might then be imported in such ships from a port of
the country to which they belonged, and so to import such goods upon
the like terms as the same could there be imported from the national
ports of such ships.” Subsequently to this Act, several Conventions
of Navigation, to some of which I have already briefly referred, were
carried out, whereby the privileges just described were granted to
various other nations.

[Sidenote: Zollverein States, August 1841.]

[Sidenote: Russia, 1843.]

The first was with Prussia, on behalf of the Zollverein States,[56]
whereby the mouths of the Meuse, Elbe, Weser, and Ems, and those of all
the navigable rivers between the Elbe and the Meuse were made free;
thus offering means of communication between the sea and the territory
of any of the Zollverein States thus opened as ports for ships of the
Zollverein, so far as relates to trade with the United Kingdom or
the British possessions. A little later, in 1843, a similar treaty
was made with Russia, by which Russian vessels, arriving from the
mouth of the Vistula or Niemen, or any other river, the outlet of any
navigable stream, having its source in Russia and passing through the
Czar’s dominions, were admitted, as if coming from Russian or Finnish
ports. With Oldenburg there was also a treaty relating to the Elbe,
Ems, Weser, and Meuse, and also with Mecklenburg-Schwerin. Lastly,
like arrangements were made with Hanover, giving very nearly the same
privileges as those to Mecklenburg-Schwerin. At a later period, orders
were given to allow the same indulgence to ships of Oldenburg, the
Hanse Towns, and Holland, as had been given to Hanover; so that, at
this time, England had relaxed her Navigation Laws to the extent of
calling ports, places not geographically belonging to Austria, Russia,
Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, the Zollverein, Hanover, or the Hanse Towns;
a concession of vast importance, especially as regarded the import of
corn.

[Sidenote: Various anomalies, &c., then in existence.]

In fact, the Navigation Laws, as they stood in 1847, were full of
anomalies, and were altogether unsuited for the state of things at
which nations had now arrived. The 7th clause of the Act 7 & 8 Vict.,
cap. 88, directed, that “no goods shall be _exported_ from the
United Kingdom to any _British possession_ in _Asia_, Africa,
or America, nor to the islands of Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, or Sark,
except in British ships.” Goods, the produce of colonies in Asia,
Africa, and America, could, however, be brought in vessels of any flag
to the Channel Islands, but, from these, they must be brought in a
British ship; and there was also the further anomaly, as we have shown,
of United States vessels being allowed to clear out with produce and
manufactures of the United Kingdom to the East Indies.

[Sidenote: Curious effects of the Registry Laws]

[Sidenote: as regarded individuals or corporate bodies.]

Power was then, also, granted to the Queen in Council to allow any
foreign nation to trade with British colonies; and this privilege was
granted to a considerable number. To some it was accorded without
restriction; to others, such as France and Spain, who were rivals,
restricted powers were given; while the privilege, granted to the
United States of trading with British colonies, was afterwards
accorded to Columbia, Rio de la Plata (including the States since
formed), Mexico, Hayti, Chili, France to a limited extent, and the
Spanish Colonies; and, further, all countries within what were called
the limits of the East India Company’s Charter, that is, all foreign
countries west of Cape Horn, and east of the Cape of Good Hope, had
liberty to trade with the British possessions within the same limits.
(Order in Council, 16 July, 1827.) French ships under this order were,
however, only allowed to import into British colonies such goods, the
produce of France, as were enumerated in the table annexed to the order
(Orders, 1 June, 1826; 16 Dec., 1826), this order not including wine,
the staple of France, a distinction deliberately adopted and confirmed.
But, besides these perplexing anomalies, and others to which I shall
presently call attention, the execution of the Navigation Law, as it
was in 1847, was full of difficulties arising from the Registry Law,
and the naturalisation of goods brought to Europe, &c. With respect
to the Registry Law, there was a clause (the 13th) of the Navigation
Act which stated “that no ship shall be admitted to be a British
ship unless duly registered;” and that this might be properly done,
the owner had to declare “that no foreigner has any right, share, or
interest in the ship.” The following remarkable case will show how
completely the spirit of this old law was neutralised in the case of
Joint-Stock Companies.

[Sidenote: Ship _Equador_.]

[Sidenote: Decision of Queen’s Bench, December 1846.]

An application was made to the Collector at Liverpool for the registry
of a ship called the _Equador_, belonging to the Pacific Steam
Navigation Company. In the first instance, the Company required
registry as a Joint-Stock Company, and three members, who had been
duly elected and appointed trustees, attended at the Custom-House,
Liverpool, to subscribe the requisite declaration of registry, in
conformity with the provisions of the 13th and 36th sections of the
Act 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 89 (the Registry Act). By the 13th section, the
trustees of a Joint-Stock Company, in common with all other owners
of British ships (_excepting those owned by corporate bodies_),
were required to declare “that no foreigner, directly or indirectly,
hath any share or part interest in the said ship or vessel.” The
trustees in question stated that they could not make that declaration,
because, in point of fact, foreigners did hold shares in that ship,
and also in the other vessels belonging to the said Company; and they
requested the Collector and Controller at Liverpool to expunge from
the declaration the words above recited; but those officers, having
no legal authority to comply with this request, refused to make this
alteration. The Company then addressed the Board of Customs, requesting
that they would direct their officers at Liverpool to expunge from
the declaration the words above recited; but the Board, acting under
advice, refused compliance with the request. The Company’s secretary
then demanded registry on behalf of the Company as a “corporate body,”
and claimed to make the declaration, contained in the 13th section of
the Act aforesaid, which applies to corporate bodies. That declaration
does not, like the other declaration, exclude foreign interest; and
if, in the first instance, the Company had claimed registry as a
corporate body, the probability is, that it would have been granted as
a matter of course, without raising the question of foreign interest.
But the Collector and Controller at Liverpool, with a full knowledge
that foreigners were proprietors of the vessel, and adverting to the
13th and other sections of the Registry Act, refused registry; and
the Commissioners of Customs, acting upon their solicitor’s opinion,
supported the Liverpool officers in their refusal to grant the
registry. The Company then moved for a mandamus in the Court of Queen’s
Bench; and, after the usual proceedings in such cases, it was decided
by the Court that as the Company applied for registration in its
corporate capacity, the Court could not take notice of its constituent
members, whether they were actually foreigners or not; or, in other
words, that an English Incorporated Company was a British subject for
the purposes of the Registry Act.

[Sidenote: Further details: owner to reside in the United Kingdom.]

The result of this remarkable decision was that foreigners, when
incorporated, could own a ship, but not individually. In an extreme
case, a ship might, ultimately, become the sole property of foreigners
exclusively, and yet be entitled to be registered as a British ship,
as a corporate body remains permanently. So that the law created the
curious anomaly that a foreigner could not have a share in a British
vessel, but might be the owner of all the shares of a corporate body
which owned, for instance, the _Great Eastern_. Another difficulty
arose with reference to the residence in or out of England of the
owner of a ship. The Free-trade party contended that if a foreigner
were disposed to come here and build a ship, there was no disadvantage
either to British shipbuilders or British shipowners, or British
sailors, especially as he could hold all the shares of a ship. On
the other hand, it was contended that this was an extreme case, not
likely often to occur, and the principle, if acted upon, of allowing
individual ownership, might give considerable power to foreigners to
the prejudice of British subjects; in fact, that the violation of this
principle went to the very basis of the Navigation Law, which it would
destroy. To such a point was real British ownership carried out, that,
as the Act required owners of British ships to reside in the United
Kingdom, the owner of a British registered ship, if he resided at
Paris,[57] would lose his privileges as such.

Other difficulties arose from the indefinite character of the law:
thus, gin could be brought into England, but brandy could not, in
_any_ foreign ships. American vessels could not bring corn
from Holland; while, on the other hand, American corn landed in
Holland could not be brought to England in a Bremen ship; and these
difficulties were, in the case of corn, considerably increased by
the difficulty of pronouncing upon the actual origin of the corn, as
none but the most experienced dealers in grain could decide such a
question, and, even with them, it must often have been mere guess work.
A case occurred in which timber from Memel was sent to British North
America, and, afterwards, brought to England at the low differential
duty then existing. The law, at that time, permitted the produce of
British possessions abroad to be imported, without its being described
as _the produce_ of those possessions; a tolerated evasion, it
is clear, of the Navigation Law. But in the case of a ship arriving
from Hayti, bringing a cargo of Haytian produce, the master described
his ship as a Swedish ship, there being, in point of fact, no Haytian
ships. In this case, the goods were liable to forfeiture; but they were
allowed to be warehoused for exportation, and the vessel was permitted
to depart. A Swedish ship was clearly inadmissible under the 16th
Section of the Navigation Act.

[Sidenote: Naturalisation of goods brought to Europe.]

Perhaps one of the greatest absurdities attending the practical working
of the Navigation Law was that which related to the “naturalisation”
of goods, the produce of Asia, Africa, and America, which, when once
landed in Europe, were, by this Act, not admissible into the ports of
Great Britain, even in British ships, for home consumption.

Two remarkable cases came under my own experience, so curiously
illustrative of the laxity and stringency of the law respectively, as
to deserve especial notice. In the first case, thirty-five casks of
annatto, the produce of Cayenne, a French colony, were in course of
transit in a French ship to Bordeaux. This valuable dye could have
been brought _direct_ from Cayenne in a British ship for home
consumption to England; but, if once brought from the French colony in
a French ship, and _landed_ in Europe, it was clearly inadmissible
under the clause, “that goods, the produce of Asia, Africa, and
America, shall not be imported from Europe into the United Kingdom to
be used therein.”

The value of annatto is apt to fluctuate suddenly from very low to
enormously high prices, just as the fashion for the colour varies.
Annatto on this occasion rose to a high price; and a London agent,
knowing that thirty-five casks of it were on their way to Europe, set
his wits to work to bring this French colonial produce into a port in
England, in spite of the Navigation Laws. The agent was thoroughly
acquainted with every branch of the law, and asked himself what
constituted _a landing in_ Europe? Having satisfied himself on
this point, he arranged with an eminent house at Bordeaux to purchase
the annatto for arrival, land the cotton, which constituted the chief
part of the cargo, and charter a small vessel, and send on the annatto
to London in this _British ship_. This was done; and, when the
vessel was on the point of arrival, he sought the Commissioners of
Customs, and frankly avowed his proceedings. Mr. Dean, one of the
chief officers, admitted that, many years previously, especially
during the war in 1810, similar transhipments had been allowed, under
the authority of the officers of the Crown,—a mere transhipment, and
certain formalities performed at the French Customs, not being “a
landing in Europe,”—and the thirty-five casks of annatto were admitted
at a profit to the partners of nearly 3000_l._[58]

[Sidenote: Waste of capital caused thereby,]

In the second case, the rigour of the law led to the greatest
absurdity. About the year 1839, the price of coffee was very high in
the London market, while large quantities of the finest Java and Dutch
colonial coffee were warehoused in store in Amsterdam. This produce
was clearly inadmissible under the clause already quoted, having
been, beyond all dispute, “landed in Europe.” In what way could this
coffee be brought into the London market in the teeth of the existing
stringent Navigation Laws? The same agent, who represented one of the
oldest Dutch houses, contracted to deliver a cargo of Dutch coffee at
a given price at a distant period. He then chartered a British ship,
which he sent to Amsterdam, took in a cargo of coffee, and the ship
thus laden with Dutch colonial produce was sent to the Cape of Good
Hope. At that colony the coffee was landed, or, at all events, was
supposed to be landed, fresh papers were made out, and the coffee
consigned to London as “naturalised” produce, and, coming direct
from a British colony in a British ship, was, of course, admissible
for home consumption. To despatch many thousand tons of coffee and
other produce half across the globe from Europe, for no other purpose
than to be brought back again, in order to comply with the rigorous
provisions of the old Navigation Laws, which, in point of fact, were
nullified as regards goods, while the shipowners alone reaped the
advantage of this useless and protracted voyage, was surely a climax
of absurdity! Nevertheless, it is within my own personal experience
that a large amount of business was transacted in this way, all the
expenses incurred being, in an economical point of view, a total waste
of capital.

[Sidenote: and obstructions to trade.]

[Sidenote: Story of the cochineal.]

Again, on the part of the old law, the want of adaptability to
the changing conditions of different markets was often a serious
difficulty. Thus, it often happened that the state of these markets in
different parts of the world presented favourable mercantile prospects;
but no suitable vessel could be found to carry the goods to the market
where they were required. For instance, hostilities being about to
break out between France and the United States in 1834, the price of
French brandy rose enormously in America, while, at the same time, the
large quantities of that article then in England rendered it unsaleable
in the London market. At the time there was not an American vessel to
be chartered in the Thames, and the American Navigation Laws precluded
the brandy from being carried in a British vessel. On the other hand,
palm-oil, at times, could not be brought from the United States, there
being no British vessel available for charter on the spot. In such
cases, the merchants complained in their letters in doleful terms,
“I have lost my commission, and some British vessel the freight.”
Instances of such occurrences were multiplied from all parts of the
world. Much was said at the time about the difficulty of bringing
cochineal from the Canary Islands, where the cactus, on which it feeds,
had recently been cultivated for this purpose. Though it might be
absurd to raise such complaints, as the smallest possible inconvenience
resulted from the state of the law as it affected this particular
article, the principle applied to the whole colonial system; and, as
Spain refused to allow British ships to carry British goods to the
Canaries, it was urged that our colonial system ought to be altered, so
as to induce Spain to modify hers. Cochineal produced in the Canaries,
and landed at Cadiz in Europe, like other articles, had to be sent
elsewhere out of Europe to be naturalised, in order to come in for home
consumption.

[Sidenote: But the Navigation Laws not always to blame.]

Perhaps, practically, these anomalies did not, to any large extent,
occasion impediments to business beyond retarding its extension,
because every merchant was so well acquainted with the provisions of
the Navigation Laws (which were as much studied for their evasion as
otherwise), that less inconvenience resulted[59] than might have been
expected. The law, however, assumed so many complex forms with time,
new discoveries, treaty obligations, and perpetual minor alterations,
that, irrespectively of the advantages or disadvantages of a total
change, arguments could be raised for a complete abrogation of every
existing Act, if it were only to commence anew and remodel the law, so
as to avoid the habitual and vexatious discussions and disputes with
the Customs to which the system gave rise.

[Sidenote: Special views of the Canadians.]

As regarded the operation of the Navigation Laws with reference
to Canada, it was far more complicated than even that between the
mother-country, her colonies in the West Indies, and the United States.
While some of the shipowners of England had, as we have seen, gone
so far as even to demand protection against the shipping of English
colonists, the Canadians were busily occupied with efforts in an
entirely opposite direction. They were not inclined, by a system of
protection, to force their trade in any particular channel: for, so far
as regarded the carrying-trade of the North-Western American States,
the Canadians obviously could only secure its passage through their
territory by holding out superior advantages in the way of cheapness
of transit. For this purpose they had already done everything that
great enterprise and expenditure could accomplish. They succeeded as
far as possible; and, at length, possessed a line of communication at
once more rapid and more cheap from the interior to the sea than any
existing in the United States. The whole question then was confined
to the comparative advantages of shipment from Quebec or Montreal, or
from New York. If those ports could be nearly equalised in respect
to freights to England, Canada would succeed in her object; if the
disparity continued as it did then, all her efforts would have been
unavailing.

[Sidenote: Montreal, its shipping and trade.]

It was, generally, represented that the high rate of freight between
Montreal and the United Kingdom was owing to the limited number of
ships employed in the import trade of Canada. In the spring and latter
end of the summer, ships, composing what was called the spring and fall
fleet, arrived; and, so long as they were in port wanting freight, the
rate was comparatively moderate; but in the interval, being the middle
of summer, when most of the western produce arrived for shipment,
an inferior class of ships only were at hand, which delivered their
cargoes in bad condition, and, at the same time, charged exorbitant
rates, according to the quantity of produce for shipment. The rate of
freight is said to have fluctuated in Montreal in one and the same
season between 3_s._ 6_d._ and 7_s._ 6_d._ per barrel; and it is stated
that the higher rate, from 6_s._ to 7_s._ 6_d._ per barrel, had been
paid in Montreal, while freights were offered in foreign ships at New
York as low as 1_s._ and 1_s._ 6_d._ per barrel; indeed, at this time,
an offer of 1_s._ 6_d._ per barrel extra would have brought any number
of ships round from the American sea-ports, but the Navigation Laws
interposed. It was clearly seen that such fluctuations in the rates
of freight, together with the employment of inferior vessels, could
not have occurred were the Canadian merchants able to select in the
American ports such ships as were seeking freight to Europe.

During the temporary suspension of the Navigation Laws in 1847,
twenty-two ships arrived from Bremen at the port of Montreal laden with
emigrants intended for the United States, that route being chosen as
easier and cheaper. These ships on their return took cargoes for the
United Kingdom; and it was evident that, if the same facilities were
continued, the great German emigration to the United States would to
some extent pass through Canada. This was but one instance of many
which might be reasonably expected, if foreign vessels could resort to
the Canadian ports. These ships were well fitted for the carriage of
wheat and flour; and the competition produced by their presence would
not only tend to reduce the freight from Canada to an equality with
those from the States, but the good condition of the cargoes delivered
would be assured; the shippers would, in this way, be saved from the
use of inferior vessels, the damage caused by which was thought not to
be over-estimated at an average of five per cent. on such shipments.

[Sidenote: Navigation of the St. Lawrence.]

Again: the American merchants of the West were anxious to avail
themselves of the facilities afforded by the River St. Lawrence.
Thus, if their vessels were permitted to come down to Montreal and
Quebec, there to meet American or foreign ships to take their cargoes
on freight to Europe or elsewhere, it was naturally thought that an
extensive and profitable commerce through Canada would immediately
follow; the lower ports, by these means, at once assuming the position,
as commercial depôts, to which their geographical position on that
great river outlet of Northern America seemed to entitle them.

[Sidenote: Free-trade with the United States desired by the farmers of
Canada.]

Connected with this important subject of the free navigation of the
St. Lawrence west of Quebec, which the Americans were desirous of
procuring, a corresponding desire prevailed on the part of the Canadian
farmers to avail themselves of the American home market, whenever it
offered superior prices to those derived from exportation to Europe.
The price of wheat and flour in the Eastern States, required for
home consumption, was often much higher than the price in Canada for
exportation, and when this happened, it would obviously have been
greatly to the advantage of the Canadian agriculturist if he could
have exported his produce to the United States. This he was prevented
from doing by a protective duty of a quarter of a dollar per bushel
upon wheat. Efforts had been made in the United States to abolish this
duty; but the advocates of its abolition were constantly defeated by
the Protection cries of the American farmers, or by a difficulty as to
the “most favoured” nation-clause in treaties with Foreign Powers, the
more so, as a relaxation in favour of Canada was, naturally, capable of
extension to any or all nations with whom the United States had such
treaties subsisting. Here is a clear instance how commercial treaties,
even of a liberal character, become as much “entangling alliances” as
the political conventions of “amity and friendship” have so frequently
been. Indeed, the “favoured” nation-clause, however well intended and
beneficial in the highest degree in certain cases, has often been a
source of dispute to those States who either have accepted or enforced
it, and, even more so, to those countries which have been compelled
to adopt it. The interests of great nations vary so much at different
periods that inflexible rules in politics or commerce must frequently
operate very prejudicially, and cannot be maintained with entire
consistency for the true interests of the commonwealth.

[Sidenote: Negotiations proposed.]

It was thought that if the free navigation of the St. Lawrence were
offered to the American Government in return for the abolition of the
protecting duty, one measure to be co-existent with the other, Congress
would be inclined to abolish the protective duty; while the abolition,
being a matter of reciprocal arrangement, all difficulty arising from
the commercial relations of the United States with foreign countries
might thus be avoided.

[Sidenote: Canadians urge the abolition of Protection.]

The more advanced section of the Free-trade party of Canada pressed
this proposal on the executive government, together with the abolition
of all protection conferred by the Navigation Laws, which it was
asserted was, after all, purely nominal, and only to secure other
advantages. They pronounced the so-called Protection to be in its
effects upon Canada practically mischievous, contending that, if
the trade was nearer from Canadian waters to the canals and ports
of the United States, British shipowners would have to compete with
foreigners in the ports of that country; that, if they could do this
successfully there, they could do so in the Canadian ports; but if
not, under existing circumstances, the trade of Canada could not
afford to maintain a mere legal monopoly: moreover, if the supposed
Protection only led to the desertion of the cities and sea-ports of
Canada, without subserving the interests of British shipowners, it was
hoped that useless restrictions, irreconcilable with the withdrawal of
protective duties in the United States in favour of Canadian produce,
would be at once removed.

[Sidenote: Views of Western Canada.]

The Canadians could not indeed fail to perceive, when the question was
raised in the mother-country, that a great portion of the exportable
produce of Western Canada, probably by far the greater part, was at
that very moment on its way to ports in the United States; that little
was expected at Montreal; that the canals constructed on the St.
Lawrence were almost idle; that importing ships coming to Montreal
were without their usual full freight; that the principal importations
into Western Canada were effected through the United States; and
that the trade of the city of Montreal was in consequence rapidly
decreasing. On the other hand, they observed the greatly-increasing
consumption and importation into their country of articles formerly
imported wholly through that port. Hence they inferred, that the
opening of Canadian sea-ports to vessels of all nations, with
permission to send colonial produce to England in any vessels, as
well as the opening the River St. Lawrence above Quebec to Americans,
would probably restore trade to its original channel, and increase the
commerce and revenues of Canada beyond precedent.

[Sidenote: Canadians really only for partial Free-trade.]

Such were the hopes entertained by the Canadians of a modification in
the restrictive system. But even the boldest of their Free-traders
shrunk for a time from the notion of an unconditional surrender of the
natural advantages the navigation of the St. Lawrence conferred upon
Canada. Hence they proposed to themselves to reserve their full rights,
and confined their advocacy to such changes in the law relating to
navigating the St. Lawrence above Quebec as would enable them to make
terms with the Americans. They had then no idea of throwing open to
foreigners generally the use of their great rivers without an ample
equivalent: they contented themselves with asking for powers from the
Imperial Legislature to enable them to negotiate from time to time on
the subject, and to make the navigation of the river a matter of treaty
and regulation; preserving their own sovereignty, with power to resume
the exclusive use of it at the conclusion of any agreement.

[Sidenote: Improvements of their internal navigation.]

Hitherto the enterprise and energies of the colonies had been almost
exclusively directed to the important objects of improving the internal
navigation of the St. Lawrence from Lake Erie to Quebec, so as to place
it in such a state of cheapness and efficiency as would make that route
more advantageous as a port of embarkation for a sea voyage than any
route through the United States.

[Sidenote: Welland Canal.]

In the case of the Welland Canal, Canadians could not fail to perceive
that the passage of American vessels down and up had contributed to
render it profitable. Indeed, the Welland Canal was used extensively
by American vessels, as it was a short communication between the two
great lakes, and, at the same time, admitted of the passage of large
vessels, which, instead of entering the American Erie Canal at Buffalo,
proceeded down Lake Ontario to Oswego, where goods are transferred to
the canal-boats for transport to New York. In this way a large portion
of the revenue from the Welland Canal was derived from the American
trade, arising from the free navigation of a part of the internal
waters of Canada, and thus Western Canada enjoyed the benefit of a
navigation supported to a considerable extent by foreign commerce.

[Sidenote: Cost of freight the real question.]

It was observed, further, that, if products from the Western States
could be transported to the sea more cheaply through Canada than
through America, the Canadian route would of course be preferred,
and thus the Canadian canals would engross the carrying trade of
the North-Western States of America. But if, on the other hand,
the advantage of the perfect inland navigation was more than
counterbalanced by the rates of freight from Quebec and Montreal to
Europe, the people of Western Canada, having no protection in the
English markets by using the Canadian lines of communication, would
send the whole of their produce by way of New York, and import such
articles of foreign consumption as they required by the same route.

So long as the colony enjoyed Protection in the British market
no injury to its commerce could arise, because the extent of the
protection was generally sufficient to prevent the owners from
divesting the Canadian produce of its British character, and it could
not become available for the home market of America, unless on the
payment of a heavy duty. Even with regard to American produce, the
provision in the old Corn Law giving to American wheat and flour the
same protection as Canadian if exported through Canada, with the
payment of 3_s._ per quarter duty in the province, was, at most
times, a sufficient inducement for many Americans to make shipments to
Montreal, as well as for the Canadians to make purchases in the United
States. When, however, by the repeal of the Corn Laws all protection
was removed, the question became one of mere cheapness of transport;
and taking an average of the preceding four years, the difference in
freight was no less than 3_s._ per barrel of flour in favour of
New York over Montreal.[60] Even when the benefits enjoyed by Canada
in her internal navigation, estimated at 1_s._ 6_d._ per
barrel, were deducted, there would still remain in favour of New York,
1_s._ 6_d._ on each barrel of flour—an advantage quite sufficient to
turn the whole export trade into that channel.

[Sidenote: Loss to Canada by New York line.]

As the United States then admitted the transit of Canadian produce
through their territory, the loss it encountered at New York arose from
the necessity of complying with the Navigation Laws, which forbade
its being imported into England in foreign ships (8 & 9 Vict., cap.
88, sect. 4). At the same time, it must, also, be noticed that, as
freight in British ships from New York to England was no higher than
the freight in American ships, this restriction, confessedly, had no
appreciable influence on the question of transmission through Canada or
the United States.

For some time, previously, the import trade of Western Canada, which,
by means of protecting duties in favour of British ships and British
goods, was forced to come by the St. Lawrence, had been changing its
direction, and Montreal, which supplied the whole western country,
was becoming deserted by the western merchants. The new Customs Law
of that province, while it equalised duties, enabled the consumer
to purchase in the cheapest market, and, thus, vastly increased the
evil to former importing cities; hence, a very large proportion of
the export trade also of Canada had now taken the direction of New
York. There was, therefore, naturally a serious apprehension, lest the
great public works of the St. Lawrence would cease to be useful and
profitable, and, that the commercial connection so many years existing
between Western and Eastern Canada would thus be altogether cut off.

It has been unnecessary to refer to the export trade in timber from
Canada, as this stood on exceptional grounds. Indeed, a general
opinion prevailed that the export of timber from Quebec would probably
be carried on, under any circumstances, in British ships specially
employed in that branch of trade.

[Sidenote: General summary of results as to Canada.]

From these important considerations it was concluded:—

1st. That, as Canada then enjoyed but a remnant of Protection in
England, she ought to be released from any restrictions _for the
benefit of the shipowner_.

2nd. That, without the free navigation of the St. Lawrence and a repeal
of the Navigation Laws so far as British North American Colonies were
concerned, there was reason to apprehend that New York would become the
emporium of the trade of Canada, and further, that, thus, a community
of interests, commercial and political, would be created with the
United States.

3rd. That, in such a case, the repeal of these laws would not
materially injure the British shipowner, the question simply being
whether competition for trade should take place in the harbours of the
United States or in the River St. Lawrence.

Lastly, That the repeal of these laws would have a tendency to
perpetuate, and not to destroy, the relations existing between Canada
and the mother-country.

[Sidenote: West Indians for Free-trade as well as Canadians.]

[Sidenote: Divergent views of capitalists at home.]

For these reasons, an organisation of merchants in Montreal, and in
various towns in Canada, who had leagued themselves as Free-traders
and had been very active in disseminating their views, as well as in
enforcing them, with all the influence they could command, on the
colonial Governor, and on the English Executive and both Houses of
Parliament, now demanded the total repeal of the British Navigation
Laws. They did not, however, stand alone in their desire for
unrestricted navigation. The West Indies, as soon as they found that
the British Parliament had taken away the protection afforded to them
by the differential duties, were as loud in their complaints as the
Canadians, the more so, as having been deprived of all protection on
their sugars by Lord John Russell’s Equalization Act of 1847, it became
indispensable to get their produce conveyed to market at the cheapest
possible rate of freight, so as to compete, with any chance of success,
with their foreign rivals. They therefore denounced the Navigation Laws
in no measured terms; and when Montreal petitioned that its corn should
be admitted into the ports of Great Britain in ships of any nation
their merchants thought proper to charter, the West Indians preferred
the same request, in order to secure the lowest cost of transport for
their sugar. While, therefore, the colonists were urging the adoption
of the principle of an entire free trade with the colonies, many
capitalists of England, and, especially, the shipowners, viewed with
great alarm the total abandonment of what was known as our “colonial
system,” and declared their apprehension that such a change would
throw the carrying trade into the hands of the United States. Clinging
to Protection, they said, in their memorials to Parliament, “that
the only remaining thing connected with our whole important and most
magnificent colonial system, which enabled us to baffle the efforts
of the whole world united against us, was that part of the system
under which the produce of the colonies was obliged to be brought to
this country in British ships.” These alarmists declared that such a
relaxation as the colonists now demanded would ruin them inevitably.
Regarding every concession which had been made to the Americans during
the preceding half century, having as it had for its object increased
intercourse with the West Indies, as a pernicious policy, tending to
injure British colonies and to encourage American trade, they alleged
that the protection of the colonies had not been carried far enough;
that British shipowners could not exist without Protection; that
the uncertainty prevailing with respect to the Navigation Laws was
productive of injury to the country, as no persons would embark capital
in shipping; and, further, that, as regarded the West Indies, it was
not the _general_ wish of the colonists that the Navigation Laws
should be repealed.

[Sidenote: Views of Manchester and Liverpool.]

In this controversy, the important cities of Manchester and Liverpool
each took also a very different view. The great Free-traders of the
former desired the unconditional repeal of the Navigation Laws,
feeling convinced that their cotton and corn would then be brought
to them at cheaper rates, and that they would be able to deliver
to much greater advantage in distant markets the products of their
manufacturers; but the shipowners of Liverpool, almost as a body
(though there were a few important exceptions), were exceedingly
adverse to any material change in these laws, as they regarded with
great and natural jealousy the then triumphant progress of American
shipping.


FOOTNOTES:

[55] I give this clause at length, because it is about the first step
towards a change in our Navigation Laws, which had become necessary
to render them practicable, after steam had been introduced for the
propulsion of our ships. This mighty instrument of civilisation, about
which I shall have a great deal to say hereafter, drove itself through
numerous Acts of Parliament, and showed how vain were legislative
measures when opposed to the progress of science.

[56] The Zollverein States are, Prussia at the head: Anhalt-Bernburg,
Anhalt-Dessau, Anhalt-Kothen, Baden, Bavaria, Brunswick,
Frankfort, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Homburg,
Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Lippe-Detmold,
Luxemburg with Limburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Nassau, Oldenburg and
Kniphausen, Reuss (Old line), Reuss (New line), Saxony, Saxe-Altenburg,
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Weimar, Eisenach, Schwarzburg,
Rudolfstadt-Schwarzburg, Sonderhausen, Waldeck, Wurtemburg. The
Zollverein embraces an area of 131,615 geographical square miles, with
a population of 28½ millions, being 63·08 per cent. of the whole area
of Germany as it then existed, and 64·35 per cent. of its population.
The several States entered voluntarily into the regulation.

[57] An exception existed for a person who resided abroad in a foreign
factory.

[58] The opinion of the Attorney- and the Solicitor-General were taken
upon the point, and they admitted the article for consumption.

[59] Merchants were sometimes, however, misled. An American, who had a
smart U.S. brig, once showed a friend of mine his invoice of a cargo of
Peruvian cotton, which had reached Gibraltar from Peru. Counting his
profits on a sale in England, where he had ordered her to come, he was
wofully disappointed when told of the unlucky _third section_,
which forbade its importation. The fortune he had counted upon
realising melted away at once.

[60] Mr. Burton of Montreal, a merchant of great experience, gave it in
evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons of 1844 that the
difference of rates were as follows:—

                           Per barrel.                     Per barrel.
  In 1844, from Montreal, 4_s._ 6_d._      From New York, 1_s._ 8_d._
  In 1845,       ”        4_s._ 8_d._        ”     ”      2_s._ 0_d._
  In 1846,       ”        5_s._ 1½_d._       ”     ”      2_s._ 6½_d._
  In 1847,       ”        6_s._ 0_d._        ”     ”      2_s._ 0_d._
                          ------------                    ------------
          Average         5_s._ 1_d._                     2_s._ 1_d._
                          ------------                    ------------




CHAPTER VI.

     Witnesses examined by Mr. Ricardo’s Committee: Mr. J. S. Lefevre,
     Mr. Macgregor, Mr. G. R. Porter—Their extreme views not conclusive
     to the Committee—Evidence adduced by the shipowners—Ships built
     more cheaply abroad—Evidence of Mr. G. F. Young, and his general
     conclusions—Mr. Richmond’s evidence—Asserts that shipping is a
     losing trade—Replies to the charges against shipowners—Views
     as to captains of merchant ships—Praises their nautical skill
     and capacity—His character of common seamen—Attacks Mr.
     Porter—Offers valuable details of ship-building—Is prepared
     to go all lengths in favour of Protection—His jealousy of the
     Northern Powers—Evidence of Mr. Braysher, Collector of Customs in
     London—General effect of the Navigation Laws on the Customs—With
     the Northern Ports and America—Difficulty about “manufactured”
     articles—Anomalies of the coasting and internal trade—Committee’s
     last meeting, July 17—General dissatisfaction with the results of
     the inquiry—Commercial panic and distress of 1847—Suspension of
     Bank Charter Act.


[Sidenote: Witnesses examined by Mr. Ricardo’s Committee.]

Having now laid before my readers the substance of the state of the
Navigation Laws at the time of the appointment of Mr. Ricardo’s
Committee in February 1847, I shall proceed to state generally the
principal facts put forth by the leading witnesses on the side of the
Free-traders and of the Protectionists respectively.

[Sidenote: Mr. J. S. Lefevre.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Macgregor.]

On the side of the former, Mr. John S. Lefevre, Mr. Macgregor, and
Mr. G. R. Porter, officers of the Board of Trade, and decidedly
inclined to the total repeal of the Navigation Laws, were the chief
witnesses brought forward to make out a case against the existing
system. Of these, the first—a distinguished mathematician as well as a
lawyer of sound learning—was eminently fitted to work out, calmly and
dispassionately, the intricate points connected with the complex system
then prevalent. The other two were strong partisans. Mr. Macgregor,
a somewhat superficial person, gave the most off-hand answers to
questions, though profoundly ignorant of their tendency, therein
committing the most egregious blunders, and urging many inaccuracies
about the Reciprocity Treaties, their effect on commerce, and the
injury Great Britain had sustained through her ancient Navigation Laws.
On the question of the maritime relations between this country and the
United States, Mr. Macgregor gave evidence, also, at great length, a
considerable portion of which was, however, erroneous as to matters of
fact, while many of his conclusions were fallacious.

[Sidenote: Mr. G. R. Porter.]

Mr. G. R. Porter, Secretary of the Statistical Department, and well
known as entertaining the strongest convictions that the Navigation
Laws were as injurious to the shipowners themselves as they had been
to the nation, was an industrious hard-working man, but he was at
the same time committed by many previous publications to the most
extreme opinions on Free-trade: of real practical commerce he had
no experience. Mr. Porter had, however, studied the whole question
with care, and, while enthusiastic in favour of an entire change,
and sanguine with regard to the beneficial results to follow from
the repeal of these laws, he gave strong and valid reasons for his
bold opinions. Their repeal, he showed, would tend, materially, to
develop and increase the warehousing system of Great Britain, making
it, in fact, a vast depôt for supplying the wants of the people of
all nations. Not that the existing laws presented any impediment to
warehousing goods, but that facilities would be afforded for making
advances on foreign produce by the removal of restrictions. In answer
to numerous and varied questions from those members of the Committee
who were opposed to his views, he gave a clear and decided opinion
that the trade of England had not been benefited in any one of its
branches, shipowning included, by the Navigation Laws: and he could not
for a moment admit that these laws had operated beneficially even for
the “encouragement of a commercial marine.” He rested his arguments on
the economical principle that the shipping trade of this country, as
a trade, could be conducted on no other principles than those whereby
trade, generally, was carried on; he contended that no more ships
would be built than it was expected would be required, so as to yield
a profit to the persons who built them; that, in the long run, there
could be no larger amount of profit derived from shipowning than from
any other trade, as other persons would, of course, come in to share
the profit with the existing shipowners; and that, unless shipping
yielded the ordinary rate of profit to be derived from the commerce
of the country, deficiencies in shipping from losses would not be,
from time to time, supplied. It was well known, he remarked, that
the trade of the country had gone on increasing; that, from year to
year, more ships had been built; and, further, that, though shipowners
had certainly been at times loud in their complaints and fears as to
their future prospects, they had still continually added to the amount
of their tonnage. Mr. Porter then put in the strongest light the
groundless fears they had so long entertained by quoting their Report
for 1833,[61] wherein they state that “the long-continued and still
existing depression of the shipping interest, the partial production,
and great aggravation of distress caused by continual changes in
our navigation system; the utter impossibility of the successful
maintenance of an unrestricted competition with foreign navigation; the
gross injustice of the imposition of peculiar and exclusive burdens on
maritime commerce for purposes purely national, while exposed to that
competition; the declining quality and estimation of British tonnage;
the embarrassment, decay, and ruin of the British shipowner, may now
be viewed as incontrovertible positions.” In reply to this desponding
statement, Mr. Porter directed attention to the official returns,
showing that in 1833 the amount of British tonnage on the register was
2,634,577 tons, whereas in 1846 it was no less than 3,817,112 tons,
an increase of 1,182,535 tons. So that, to the melancholy “facts” of
the shipowners in 1833, Mr. Porter opposed his prosperous “figures” of
1846. Such discordant views could not by any means be reconciled; but
shipowners of all countries and in all ages have ever had the most evil
forebodings on the subject of the withdrawal of protection.

Mr. Porter did not fail to hold out the threat that Prussia, at the
head of the Zollverein States of Germany, would still further carry out
its restrictive principles, and impose differential duties on foreign
shipping; and that Hamburg and Bremen were, at that time, deliberating
whether they should join the Zollverein under one flag, as far as
concerned shipping. He, nevertheless, expressed the most sanguine hopes
that, when foreign nations discovered beyond all doubt, that England
was advancing in the path of Free-trade, they would gladly follow her
example, and that commerce throughout the whole of Europe and the world
would be unshackled.

It appeared, further, from his evidence, that Mr. Porter was for
a complete abrogation of the English Navigation Laws, without any
reservations as to reciprocity, and that, from the general conviction
that these restrictive laws were rather injurious than beneficial to
us, independently of the policy of other nations.

[Sidenote: Their extreme views not conclusive to the Committee.]

It cannot, however, be said that, in 1847, the repeal party had
succeeded in convincing the majority of even the Committee of the
soundness of their opinions. The shipowners, as a body, endeavoured to
controvert, and with considerable show of success for the time, the
theories propounded by the Free-trade party, so strenuously supported
by the officers of the Board of Trade. The cold imperturbable evidence
of Mr. (now Sir) John Shaw Lefevre, who was intimately connected with
the Free-trade party, contrasted strikingly with the impetuosity of
such men as Mr. Macgregor, and even with the testimony of Mr. Porter.

[Sidenote: Evidence adduced by the shipowners.]

The shipowners, on the other hand, put forward their most practical and
intelligent witnesses[62] to prove that the repeal of the Navigation
Laws would cause an immediate depreciation of thirty per cent. in the
value of their property, and of shipping, generally, throughout the
United Kingdom; that, if the British shipowner were deprived of his
privileges, already greatly curtailed by the system of reciprocity,
it would be decidedly to his advantage to invest his capital in
foreign ships, and to navigate them by foreign seamen: Englishmen,
they alleged, would own, in conjunction with foreigners (if possible),
foreign ships, in order to secure the privileges still attaching to
foreign flags, since British ships would still be excluded from many
foreign ports, even though the Navigation Laws were abrogated. It was
shown, as they conceived incontestably, that a ship could be built
at Dantzig at a much less cost than in England,[63] and that, if the
foreign trade were thrown open without restriction, no one would think
of building British ships; the result being, that a great number of
persons dependent on shipping—shipwrights and others—must be thrown out
of employment, with great general distress ensuing. The difficulty of
manning the Royal Navy, under such untoward circumstances (a standard
argument), was, of course, dwelt on with great force as an unmitigated
national evil. It was further urged, that the relaxation of the laws,
so far as to allow Asiatic and African produce to be admitted to Great
Britain for home consumption from ports in Europe, in all bottoms,
must deprive the British shipowner of his most valuable privilege, and
destroy the very essence of the ancient law.

[Sidenote: Ships built more cheaply abroad.]

The argument, that these laws ought to be abrogated in the interests of
the consumer was met by the counter-assertion, that any difference of
freight, if such indeed existed, would make no appreciable difference
in the price of consumable articles. Even the excessively high freight
of 8_s._ per barrel from the United States, which had been paid
on an emergency, would, they held, amount to only one halfpenny per
pound on the flour, so that when freight was reduced to its usual rate,
a very slight increase of value was the consequence. The witnesses
against repeal spoke of various other articles[64] in a similar manner,
arguing that the reduction would be so small that it could never reach
the consumer.

[Sidenote: Evidence of Mr. G. F. Young,]

Of all the witnesses examined before the Committee, no one was more
opposed to the repeal than Mr. George Frederick Young, a shipbuilder
and shipowner in the port of London. He was quite as strong a partisan
in favour of leaving things as they were as Mr. Ricardo and Mr. Porter
were in favour of Free-trade. He would admit no further innovations of
any kind, contending, that, even the reciprocity system had been in the
highest degree detrimental to the interests of the British shipowners:
indeed, he asserted that if the Navigation Laws were repealed, it
would be seen that the interests of the merchants would be quite as
much compromised as those of shipowners, as it was under the operation
of these laws that importations were so largely directed into the
emporium of England. He apprehended that this repeal would substitute
certain conveniently-located foreign ports as depôts for imported
produce for the supply of England, in lieu of British ports. He
fortified this opinion by elaborate calculations, showing an enormous
difference in the warehousing charges at Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and
Hamburg, leading, as he apprehended, to this inevitable conclusion,
that a British merchant would find it more to his interest to establish
depôts at those places, than to import commodities for the supply of
his own country, to be lodged in the St. Katherine or West India Docks,
or in other similar establishments.

With regard to the subject of the Whale Fisheries, and the way in which
they might be affected by a repeal of the Navigation Laws, Mr. Young
pointed out that the trade of the northern and southern fisheries
had been for many years past a declining one: but this decline, he
said, though in a great degree traceable to other causes, received
an accelerated impetus from the course pursued by the Legislature in
discouraging these trades, while the Americans, on the other hand,
had received from their Legislature every possible support. So far
as regards the relative cost of navigating British ships, Mr. Young
brought forward a mass of figures[65] for the purpose of showing that
the difference in every case was in favour of foreign shipowners, but
more especially in the case of those of the United States, Holland, the
Hanse Towns, Sweden, and Prussia.

[Sidenote: and his general conclusions.]

By the various reciprocity treaties Mr. Young considered the Navigation
Laws were virtually repealed with regard to those countries with whom
we had concluded such conventions: but, while maintaining that these
treaties had proved highly prejudicial to Great Britain, he did not
recommend a retrograde policy; and we gladly admit that, whatever
opinions might be entertained of the ardent Protectionist principles
he propounded, his political adversaries bore full testimony to the
ability with which he advocated his cause during the days he was under
examination, and to the large amount of practical knowledge he brought
to bear on the subject. He displayed, too, great tact, and, I must add,
great patriotism, viewing the contemplated change in the light he did,
when he wound up his evidence by asserting, unequivocally, that the
Navigation Laws were framed for the paramount and political purpose of
assisting in the defence of this country, as well as for encouraging
maritime commerce; that these objects, in his judgment, could never
have been obtained and maintained without these great Acts; and that
he fully and completely declared his concurrence in the opinion given
by Adam Smith, which we have already quoted. “I have no hesitation in
declaring,” remarked Mr. Young, in concluding his evidence, “my perfect
conviction, that it has been, through the operation of our navigation
system entirely, that the maritime power of this country has been
raised to its present height, that the country has been defended, and
all the evils which would have resulted from its being made the seat of
war have been providentially averted.”

[Sidenote: Mr. Richmond’s evidence.]

[Sidenote: Asserts that shipping is a losing trade.]

As considerable uneasiness had been felt by those who advocated the
policy of Protection with reference to the competition which might be
anticipated from the shipping of the three Hanse Towns—Lubeck, Bremen,
and Hamburg—although on inquiry it was shown that the whole tonnage
of sea-going ships belonging to these ports was only about 150,000
tons register, it is advisable here to refer to the testimony of Mr.
William Richmond, who was deputed by the shipowners of the borough
of Tynemouth to appear before the Committee.[66] This gentleman had
been a shipowner for nearly fifty years, and, at his advanced age,
was reluctant to appear: but zeal for a cause to which he had devoted
great energy during a long life, together with the importance of the
subject, induced him to come forward to rescue, so far as he could, the
shipowners from “impending destruction.” It is unnecessary, however,
here to follow him through his elaborate history of the Navigation
Laws, but, as an exponent of the views of many shipowners in the
north of England, the points he urged most strongly ought not to be
overlooked. Strange, however, to say, his first contention was that,
for the preceding twenty-five years, the shipping trade had been a
losing one, those employed in the Baltic during the whole of that
time having made no money whatever. When, naturally, he was asked
to explain how it had come to pass that a losing trade should be so
long maintained, Mr. Richmond entered into details, which, though not
satisfying the Committee as to the whole force of his assertion, threw
considerable light on the actual state of the merchant shipping at that
period.[67]

[Sidenote: Replies to charges against the ship owners.]

It had been charged against shipowners, as we have seen,[68] that
their ships were unseaworthy, while the masters had been condemned
in no measured terms. These accusations he indignantly repelled; his
explanation as to the permanence of a losing trade being substantially
this—that a distinct class of men existed who were shipowners, and
not merchants, whose fathers had been shipowners for successive
generations, and had left them ships as their only inheritance; and
that, as they could not readily divest themselves of this property, and
had no means of buying ships of an improved description fit to compete
with vessels of more modern date,[69] their commercial career generally
ended with the Gazette.

[Sidenote: Views as to captains of merchant ships.]

With regard to the qualifications of captains of merchant vessels, Mr.
Richmond said that sixty years ago, when he went to sea, very young
in life, it was customary for respectable and even wealthy people,
in the maritime districts, to send their children to sea: indeed,
no matter whether they were shipowners or merchants, agriculturists
or manufacturers, one of the family was sent to sea, because it was
considered a line in which there was a fair chance of prospering. “But
no respectable people send their children to sea now,” he exclaimed,
“as it is a profession which, in all probability, would lead them to
beggary.”

[Sidenote: Praises their nautical skill and capacity.]

In nautical skill, Mr. Richmond held the British captain of the present
day fully equal to the captain of former days; while he, also, thought,
that the ruder the man, on his admission into the hardy profession he
was to adopt, the more advantageous it might be to him, at least in
the discharge of the rougher part of his professional duties. In the
pursuit of freights abroad, on the “seeking system,” these captains,
he admitted, might be inferior to some continental captains; but the
business of chartering a ship belonged more strictly to the shipbroker;
the captain, in his opinion, being in a relation not unlike that of the
driver of a coach.

[Sidenote: His character of common seamen.]

With regard to British seamen, he considered that they, like all other
classes, had become more temperate of late years, but were always less
a spirit-drinking people than the Germans. The bad accommodation for
the common sailor on board merchant ships might destroy his comforts,
but not his morals; and honourable testimony had been given by an
American captain,[70] that he would prefer the English seaman to any
in the world, even to Americans. Every person, he thought, must concur
with him in the opinion that our seamen were, what they had ever been,
“a danger-defying, skilful, thoughtless, improvident, and perhaps a
turbulent race:” and Mr. Richmond appealed confidently to Admiral
Dundas, who sat on the Committee, whether he would not rather go into
action with 100 British seamen than 200 seamen of any other nation?

[Sidenote: Attacks Mr. Porter.]

It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the elaborate and
curious tables[71] Mr. Richmond prepared to show that there were as
many ships as formerly, and that their increase had kept pace with the
population between 1816 and 1846. Having explained these tables, he
then, in no very measured terms, charged Mr. Porter with “cushioning,”
or covering up for an unfair comparison, the merchant navies of
surrounding nations, and especially that of the United States. He
accused that gentleman distinctly of giving unfairly all the ships
engaged in the foreign, coasting, and colonial trade of England, in
his return of British tonnage; while the ships of the United States,
engaged in the foreign trade _only_, were given in that of the
American tonnage. By these means, an attempt was made to prove that a
large mass of tonnage of foreign nations was “cushioned” up, or kept
out of sight of the English people, because it would alarm them, if
they were to see such an immense tonnage of foreign vessels rising
around them, “as the day would come when they would knock at our doors.”

[Sidenote: Offers valuable details of ship-building.]

Elaborate tables of the prices of articles used in ship-building,
furnished by Mr. Richmond, on the authority of the most competent
persons engaged in the respective branches of this trade, will be found
in his evidence; and, here it may be desirable, as a record of facts,
to give an extract from a communication from the principal agent of
Lloyd’s, which Mr. Richmond read to the Committee, in reply to a query
with reference to the cost of new first-class ships, as it appears
that sales were effected at the prices therein named.[72]

The price per ton declined 1_l._ per ton, according to the years
for which the vessel was classed; and according to the North Country
Club Rules, 3_l._ 10_s._ per ton may be added to these prices
for a Baltic outfit—that is, for a ship when ready for a Baltic voyage.
As a corollary to these prices, which were, indeed, much lower than the
London rates (bad as well as good ships being built in Sunderland),
a list was given of the shipbuilders who had failed in Sunderland
within the short period from 1841 down to 1847. The list comprised no
less than 40 names—a melancholy catalogue—many of them were men whose
fathers and grandfathers had moved in good circles: yet these men had
all failed owing to the depression of business then prevalent.

[Sidenote: Is prepared to go all lengths in favour of Protection.]

On the question of _Reciprocity_, about which there was,
subsequently, so much discussion, Mr. Richmond declared, that there
could be no prosperity in England till the Reciprocity Treaties,
as well as all the Orders in Council enforcing them, were totally
repealed. He looked with extreme jealousy at the beautiful and
well-appointed ships frequenting Newcastle from Russian and Swedish
Finland: but, he saw that no fairer class of merchant ships came to
any port; their dimensions, their rigging, everything about them
was admirable; while their commanders and officers inspired respect
from their general competency. Their log-books were beautifully kept
in English: and, from the education the younger population, who were
destined for the sea, received, no better disciplined nor more orderly
or sedate crews could be seen than on board these ships.

[Sidenote: His jealousy of the Northern Powers.]

No doubt, these northern maritime countries could be regarded in no
other light than that of formidable rivals. Therefore Mr. Richmond and
his fellow-shipowners saw with alarm any efforts made to throw open
the trade of the Empire, as the increasing success of these foreign
rivals must obviously dispossess English shipowners of an immense
portion of the carrying trade. Mr. Richmond, therefore, demanded, that
not only the Reciprocity Treaties should be annulled, but that the
law of Charles II. should be adopted, which enacted that “no goods
or commodities whatsoever of the growth, production, or manufacture
of Africa, Asia, or America, or of any part thereof, or which are
described, or laid down, in the usual maps or cards of those places,
be imported into England, Ireland, or Wales, the islands of Guernsey,
Jersey, or the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, _in any other ship or
ships_, but in such as do truly, and without fraud, belong only to
the people of England,” &c.

Such were the extreme views promulgated by many of the advocates of
Protection. Indeed, the majority of the shipowners, especially of the
eastern ports, would not have hesitated to retaliate on the vessels of
the northern nations with hostile tonnage duties. Nor was their feeling
less hostile against France, though the trade with that country was
insignificant except for the conveyance of coals; as, in all the French
contracts, it was stipulated that coal should be transported thither in
either French or English vessels. The extreme Protectionists asserted
that the Spaniards and Italians were monopolising a large portion of
the trade from Liverpool; and that American merchants, in sending an
order for goods to be executed in England, “gave special orders that
they should be shipped on board an American liner.”

[Sidenote: Evidence of Mr. Braysher, Collector of Customs in London.]

As, however, the object of this work is rather to show the practical
working of the old Navigation Laws than to dwell on the political
opinions propounded in this controversy, it is desirable to allude
to the evidence given by Mr. Braysher, at that time the Collector of
Customs in London,[73] who stated that in the discharge of his duties
it was requisite to see that the Navigation Act was duly enforced.

[Sidenote: General effect of the Navigation Laws on the Customs.]

[Sidenote: With the Northern ports,]

Some curious results were developed in the course of his evidence
with regard to the working of these laws. Thus the second clause of
the Act relating to the trade between Europe and England gave certain
privileges in the carrying of twenty-nine “enumerated” articles, all
of which, with two exceptions, were raw materials, and, therefore,
only importable from Europe in British ships. The intention of the law
had been, originally, to permit the importation of raw materials only;
and, till recently, all manufactured goods were either positively or
virtually prohibited by the imposition of the high duties. It appeared,
however, that butter and cheese, and also the spirit named geneva,
could be imported in foreign ships, but no advantage was taken of
this privilege. The timber trade differed, as that article could be
imported in a ship of the country where it grew, or in a ship of the
country from which it was usually brought, but this privilege, with
these exceptions, was given entirely to British vessels. Nevertheless,
British ships did not generally bring timber from the Baltic ports to
England; while in the unprotected trade of butter and cheese, which was
considerable, British shipowners, by means of steamers, monopolised the
chief part of it.[74] The inference from these circumstances was drawn
that Protection had very little to do in controlling the course of
this trade. Russia was, however, an exception, as the vast proportion
of that trade was carried on by British ships; and this, necessarily,
arose from the provisions of the second clause of the Navigation Act,
because tallow, hemp, flax and pitch, the chief produce of Russia,
could only be brought in British or Russian ships; and, as there was
not a sufficient Russian mercantile marine to maintain the trade,
a virtual monopoly of it fell to British ships, partly through the
Navigation Law and partly through the relative circumstances of the
merchant marine of the two countries.

[Sidenote: and America.]

Much stress was laid on the fact that goods, the produce of “America,”
could not be brought from Europe; thus, by this clause, American cotton
once landed at Havre[76] could not be brought over for the consumption
of the manufacturers, whatever demand might exist for the article. It
was, however, proved that this clause was framed long prior to the
American independence, and, hence, had no special reference to cotton,
nor, indeed, any political tendency.

[Sidenote: Difficulty about “manufactured” articles.]

It appeared, however, unquestionable, taking the two Navigation Laws
together, the American Law and that of England, so far as the trade
between the United States and Great Britain was concerned, that we had
decidedly the worst of it. Again: the fifth clause of the Navigation
Act was the cause of much question at the Customs, and occasioned
great inconvenience; this clause ran thus: that all “manufactured”
goods shall be deemed to be the produce of the country of which they
are the “manufacture.” Thus, coffee imported at Hamburg from its place
of growth in Asia or America was roasted and ground there; but,
when merchants attempted to bring it into England as a manufactured
article, the claim was refused by the law officers of the Crown.
Again, mahogany, cut into veneers, was at first not allowed to be a
manufactured article; but this decision was afterwards reversed, and
veneers were deemed manufactures. In like manner, ostrich feathers,
brought from Africa and manufactured in France, offered a very doubtful
case, and was, in fact, left undecided, though the impression was,
on the whole, adverse to their admission. Refined sugar was deemed a
manufacture; and, thus, while _raw_ sugar, the growth of Brazil
or Cuba, could not come in from Holland, it could, when refined, be
imported. A recent Act required that refined sugar should not only be
the produce, but the growth of the country from which it was imported,
thereby causing a new difficulty, and showing that the law discouraged
the refining of sugar in Holland, and discouraged it at the place of
growth.

[Sidenote: Anomalies of coasting and internal trade.]

Again: it was shown that, from the earliest period, foreign ships which
could not carry goods from London to Plymouth, could, nevertheless,
carry passengers, as such a trade was not considered by the Customs
authorities to be trading _coastwise_. Nay, it further appeared
that foreign vessels could have engaged in the internal trade of the
country, there being no legal impediment to prevent a Dutch vessel from
plying, either with goods or passengers, between London and Gravesend.
The like principle might have prevailed on any of the rivers of the
kingdom; but a foreign vessel would not have been allowed to carry
goods from one _port_ to another. The interdiction against foreign
vessels carrying “passengers” was only inserted for the first time in
the 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88 (1845), and, previously to this period, there
was no law to prevent a foreign steamer carrying passengers between
two English ports; while, even in 1847, a vessel built in Norway could
have plied in the Thames. Foreigners, however, either were ignorant of
the law, or did not avail themselves of it, considering it a barren
advantage.

With Mr. Braysher’s evidence may be brought to a close the extracts
necessary to be given from the mass of conflicting statements and
documents laid before Mr. Ricardo’s Committee, and I may now proceed
with the general history of the measures pursued and subsequently
adopted.

[Sidenote: Committee’s last meeting, July 17.]

[Sidenote: General dissatisfaction with the results of the inquiry.]

On the 17th of July, the Committee of the House of Commons held its
last sitting; and as a dissolution of Parliament was impending, the
Committee, after having published four successive reports, strictly
confined to the minutes of the evidence taken before them, came to
the conclusion of closing the inquiry. The Protectionist shipowners
complained that this abrupt termination of the inquiry was brought
about with the view of suppressing the evidence of Mr. D. C. Aylwin,
an intelligent merchant connected with the Calcutta trade, who was
in attendance to give counter-testimony to many of the Free-trade
witnesses. It was also patent that, during the investigation, while
twenty-five witnesses had been examined in favour of the repeal of the
Navigation Laws, on the other hand, for their defence and maintenance,
only nine persons had been called to give their testimony. It was
therefore urged that the proceedings of the Committee and the abrupt
termination of the inquiry were anything but fair, the more so that no
practical results had been obtained, though the evidence procured was,
ultimately, of considerable importance.

Thus ended this important inquiry in a manner scarcely satisfactory
to either party; nor was the investigation again revived in the
committee-rooms of the House of Commons, the scene of the contest
being transferred elsewhere. On the 23rd July, 1847, Parliament was
dissolved; and at the subsequent general election the Free-trade
party was triumphant everywhere, Mr. Cardwell gaining his election at
Liverpool, while Mr. Cobden was returned in his absence for the West
Riding of Yorkshire, as well as for Stockport; Mr. C. P. Villiers,
on whose motion the Corn Laws had been repealed, being also doubly
returned for South Lancashire and Wolverhampton, both these elections
affording thereby unmistakable evidences of the feeling of the
country in favour of unfettered commerce. With so great an accession
of strength to the Whig Government, further progress in Free-trade
measures became inevitable, and the greatest uneasiness prevailed among
shipowners as to their future destiny.

[Sidenote: Commercial panic]

Though events of a calamitous character to general commerce intervened,
the shipping interest escaped, and, indeed, flourished. Beyond the
large quantities of corn necessary to import, so as to meet the urgent
wants of the famishing people of Ireland, it was found by the end of
December, 1846, that the deficiency of grain in France, Belgium, and
Germany, as well as in the south of Europe, was greater than had been
apprehended, and, consequently, prices rose throughout the Continent,
the average reaching 75_s._ per quarter in England.[77] Suddenly,
large quantities of shipping were again required to execute orders
received from France and Belgium for purchases made at advanced prices.
The alarm lest the scarcity should still further increase became
general; and, in consequence of this, together with apprehensions for
the home crops, the average price of wheat rose in May (29th), 1847,
to 102_s._ 5_d._[78] Such prices naturally led to great speculation;
while the efforts made to bring corn from the most distant regions
gave an enormous impulse to the carrying trade, both in Europe and
elsewhere.[79]

[Sidenote: and distress of 1847.]

[Sidenote: Suspension of Bank Charter Act.]

But a frightful reaction soon followed. Corn was poured into the ports
of Great Britain from all parts of the world with astonishing rapidity.
The docks of Liverpool exhibited a quantity of flour that, perhaps,
had never been, at any previous period or in any country, imported by
merchant vessels to one market. Prices fell to 56_s._ per quarter
for wheat, and heavy commercial disasters ensued. Money advanced in
value; in August and December the pressure for it increased to a
panic. The Bank rate of interest rose to 10 per cent.; and the discount
of the best paper became almost impossible. Numerous failures followed;
and as representations were made that the credit of the country itself
was seriously threatened, Government, on the 25th October, reluctantly
stepped forward to arrest further disasters, and took upon themselves
the responsibility of risking the violation of the provisions of the
Bank Charter Act of 1844; Lord Russell, as First Lord of the Treasury,
and Sir Charles Wood, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, advising the
Bank to enlarge the amount of its discounts and advances to a minimum
of 8 per cent., promising if any infringement of the law should result
that Government would secure a Bill of indemnity for the Bank on the
meeting of Parliament.

The measures taken by Government produced a salutary effect on
commercial circles; and as no actual infringement of the Bank Act of
1844 had occurred, Ministers, considering the purpose they had in view
by their letter of October 25th fully answered, intimated that it was
unnecessary any longer to continue in force this letter of relief and
indemnity.


FOOTNOTES:

[61] See ‘Report of the London Shipowners’ Society, 1833.’

[62] The chief of these was Mr. G. F. Young, who, it must be admitted,
made out a very startling, and, at the time, apparently a very strong
case against repeal, or even reciprocity; while Mr. Richmond, Mr.
W. Philippe, Mr. W. Imrie of Liverpool, Mr. Duncan Dunbar, Mr. J.
Macqueen, and others, brought forward an immense array of facts in
support of their allegations.

[63] It was stated that a vessel built in Dantzig, according to the
following detailed specification, would cost 10_l._ 17_s._ 6_d._ per
ton, and in the United States 12_l._ per ton; but that a similar vessel
could not be produced in any part of Great Britain under 15_l._ per
ton. Say 757 tons, and first class: length on deck, 140 feet; length
of keel, 129 feet; breadth of beam, 32 feet; depth of hold, 22 feet;
height of ’tween decks laid, 7 feet; the frame to be of oak; bottom
planking to the bilge, elm; topsides, wales, &c., pine; ceiling, pine;
to have a top-gallant forecastle, fitted for the accommodation of the
crew; round house aft, fitted for the accommodation of the captain and
officers; the deck otherwise flush; single bulwarks and monkey-rail;
patent windlass; caboose fitted with cooking stove; small capstan in
the forecastle; a small capstan abaft the mainmast; three anchors; two
chain cables of 120 fathoms each; masts, spars, studding-sail booms,
and spare spars complete; patent fids and tressels; roller blocks;
one long boat; one cutter; one gig with oars, &c., complete, copper
fastened to the wales; ship rigged; cordage standing and running
rigging complete; two hawsers; two suits of sails complete; the ship
to be fastened with iron hanging-knees from the upper deck, and with
diagonal iron knees from lower-deck beams to the bilge; patent pumps on
deck, and also bilge pumps; all the timber, cordage, sail-cloth, and
ironwork, to be of the best materials.

[64] It was contended that as the whole freight of sugar was only
3_l._ per ton from the West Indies or Cuba, equal to one-third
of a penny per lb., while the duty was 14_s._ per cwt., or
1½_d._ per lb., any reduction in the freight could not reach
the consumer. Such was, also, the case with other articles of large
consumption. The average freight of tea was 4_l._ 15_s._
per ton, of 50 cubic feet, equal to 1-5/10_d._ per lb., the duty
2_s._ 2_d._ per lb. The average freight on tobacco from New
Orleans had been 50_s._ per hogshead, or equal to 7/15ths of a
penny per lb.; from Virginia, 35_s._ per hogshead, or one-third
of a penny per lb.; the duty being 3_s._ per lb. Taking flour
from the United States at 4_s._ per barrel, freight would be a
farthing a lb. The freight upon indigo at 4_l._ 15_s._ per
ton, of 50 cubic feet, would be equal to 11/16 a lb. The freight on
coffee at 4_l._ per ton is equal to about one-third of a penny
per lb., the duty on foreign being 6_d._, and on coffee from
the British possessions 4_d._ per lb. On cotton the average
freight for the previous ten years from Bombay, 3_l._ 5_s._
4_d._ per ton, of 50 cubic feet, which is equivalent to 7/16ths
of a penny per lb.; from the United States it was estimated at 5/8ths
of a penny per lb. At these rates, it was urged that it would require
a microscopic coinage to secure it to the consumer; it would all be
absorbed. Supposing the freight to be reduced one-third, below which
no British shipowner could live, leaving a fair freight to pay for the
expenses of the ship, and a small profit, and supposing the freight to
be so reduced from the foreigner sailing cheaper than we could, it was
contended that no benefit could result to the consumer: on the other
hand, by its retention, you retain, also, that which it is of the most
vital interest for any country to retain, its national defences.

[65] Taking a hypothetical calculation of the result of a voyage of
twelve months’ duration of a British ship of 500 tons, and of a ship of
equal tonnage of the above-mentioned nations respectively, and taking
the items of wages, insurance, interest on capital, calculated at 5
per cent., and depreciation of the property, which experience warrants
at 10 per cent. per annum, the total amount of those items, on a ship
of 500 tons built in England, and costing 8750_l._, would be
2623_l._ 10_s._ on such a voyage; on a ship of the United
States, costing, as estimated, 7250_l._, it would be 2191_l._
10_s._; that on a Dutch ship, costing 7000_l._, it would be
2110_l._; that on a Bremen ship, costing 5500_l._, it would
be 1626_l._; that on a Swedish ship, costing the same amount,
it would be 1550_l._; and that on a Prussian ship, costing
4720_l._, it would be 1329_l._; making a difference in favour
of an American ship of 432_l._; of a Dutch ship of 513_l._ 10_s._; of
a Bremen ship of 997_l._ 10_s._; of a Swedish ship of 1073_l._ 10_s._;
and of a Prussian ship of 1294_l._ 10_s._ These gross disbursements
resolved into their elements, as regards wages, stood thus. The
wages on a British ship were calculated at 786_l._; the wages of an
American ship of the same size, viz., 500 tons, 669_l._; in a Dutch
ship, 640_l._; in a Bremen ship, 471_l._; in a Swedish ship, 395_l._;
and in a Prussian ship, 331_l._ 10_s._ The items of these wages, as
regards British ships, were, an English captain, 10_l._ a month [that
is the amount of wages, but the emoluments of a British captain would
be very much more than that]; chief mate, 6_l._ per month; second
mate, 4_l._ per month; boatswain, 3_l._ 10_s._ per month; carpenter,
5_l._ per month; cook, 2_l._ 10_s._; nine able seamen, at 45_s._ each,
20_l._ 5_s._; eight ordinary seamen, at 30_s._ each, 12_l._; and three
apprentices, at 15_s._ each, 2_l._ 5_s._; making a monthly amount of
65_l._ 10_s._, which multiplied by 12, gives the amount stated, 786_l._

[66] Mr. Colquhoun, now Sir Patrick Colquhoun, Q.C., at one time
Plenipotentiary of the Hanse Towns at Constantinople, also gave
evidence (see 3980, &c.); but, from a point of view entirely different
from that of Mr. Richmond. The Hanse Towns, as carriers for the
large continent of Germany, were naturally opposed to a system which
circumvented their sphere of action, while Holland took the opposite
view.

[67] Mr. Richmond was one of my constituents when I represented the
Borough of Tynemouth, and, though he strongly opposed my return to
Parliament, I have a pleasing recollection of him as a courteous man,
and a fine specimen of the old school of Protectionists. In reply to
a question of how it was that, in spite of such gloom and ruin, the
shipowners of that borough continued to build more vessels, he replied,
“Sir, do not you know that _Hope_ is the last thing that forsakes
the human breast?”

[68] See _ante_, p. 42-8, Reports from their Consuls.

[69] Evidence of Captain Briggs.

[70] Evidence of Captain Briggs.

[71] These tables occupy much space. _Vide_ ‘Report,’ p. 690.
House of Commons Inquiry.

[72]

                                                    Per Ton.
                                                      £  _s._
  A ship 12 years, A 1 Class, 300 tons old measure, }
    built complete, sold for                        } 12  12
    ”     10   ”   A 1 Class,     ditto    ditto      10  10
    ”      9   ”   A 1 Class,     ditto    ditto       9   0
    ”      8   ”   A 1 Class,     ditto    ditto       8   0
    ”      7   ”   A 1 Class,     ditto    ditto       7   0
    ”      6   ”   A 1 Class,     ditto    ditto       6   0


[73] _Vide_ Evidence of Mr. Braysher, 2297.

[74] It followed from the system, that there was coincidently a
protected trade and an unprotected trade. The _protected_ trade
included in 1847 the whole coast of Africa and Cape of Good Hope, St.
Helena and Ascension, Mauritius, British India, the British North
American Colonies, the Australian Colonies, the British West Indies,
the Fisheries, and the Channel Islands. The _unprotected_ trade
included Russia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Prussia, Germany, Holland,
Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Gibraltar and Malta[75],
Turkey, the Morea and Egypt, Tripoli, Barbary and Marocco, China,
Sumatra and Java, the foreign West Indies, the United States of
America, Mexico and the States of South America, the Ionian Islands,
the Cape de Verde and the South Sea Islands. In these two categories,
protected and unprotected, the whole of the British trade was then
comprehended.

[75] Gibraltar and Malta, although colonies of the British Crown, were
considered as not in Europe, or foreign countries, with reference to
the Navigation Laws, and our Customs Regulations.

[76] On April 3, 1848, Mr. Bright urged on Mr. Labouchere the propriety
of importing cotton from Havre, then abundant there; but he replied
that the Minister could not abrogate the Navigation Laws; Hansard, vol.
xvii. p. 1202.

[77] See Tooke’s ‘History of Prices,’ vol. v. p. 95.

[78] Mr. Tooke says in a note that the highest price in Mark Lane had
been reached on the 17th May, when 115_s._ per quarter was paid
for wheat; a very fine parcel was sold in the Uxbridge Market, at
125_s._

[79] The total quantity of grain imported of all kinds into this
country was 3,790,957 quarters in 1846; but the total imports in
1847 reached 9,436,677 quarters, while the imports of meal and
flour in these two years amounted to 3,347,565, and 8,633,991 cwts.
respectively. That year my firm alone (W. S. Lindsay and Co.)
chartered, in their capacity as shipbrokers, vessels to bring from
the Black Sea, Egypt, America, and elsewhere, no less than 1,250,000
quarters of grain of different sorts.




CHAPTER VII.

     New Parliament, November 18, 1847—Speech from Throne—Mr. Robinson
     and Shipowners deceived—Conversation between Mr. Bancroft and Lord
     Palmerston—Mr. Bancroft’s declaration—Official letter from Mr.
     Bancroft to Lord Palmerston, November 3, 1847—Lord Palmerston’s
     reply, November 17, practically giving prior information to the
     Americans—Lord Clarendon tells the Shipowners’ Society that the
     laws will not be altered, December 26, 1846; and repeats this
     assurance, March 15, 1847—Interview between Lord Palmerston and
     Mr. Bancroft, published in ‘Washington Union’—Excites great
     indignation when known in England, January 1848—Parliament
     re-assembles, February 3, 1848—Lord Palmerston admits the
     correspondence with America—The Earl of Hardwicke’s proposal,
     February 25, 1848—Earl Grey grants a Committee—Evidence of
     the Shipowners before the Lords’ Committee—Mr. Young proposes
     some modifications, the first concessions of the Anti-Repeal
     Party—Claim in favour of direct voyages—Government insists
     on Total Repeal—Detailed views of Admiral Sir George Byam
     Martin—Importance of keeping up the merchant navy—Arguments
     from his personal experience as to its value as a nursery
     for seamen—Working of the system of apprenticeship, and of
     impressment—Evidence of Admiral Berkeley, and of Mr. R. B.
     Minturn—Details about American ships—Reciprocity treaties so far
     as they affect Americans—Their whale fishery.


[Sidenote: New Parliament, November 18, 1847.]

On the 18th of November, 1847, the new Parliament was opened by
commission. It had been thus early called together to consider the
distress caused by the recent commercial embarrassments and the severe
pressure still prevailing in Ireland, notwithstanding an abundant
harvest, together with the importation of an unprecedented quantity of
grain, flour, and provisions.

[Sidenote: Speech from Throne.]

The Speaker having been chosen, the Speech from the Throne, delivered
by the Marquess of Lansdowne, contained the following important
paragraph:—“Her Majesty recommends to the consideration of Parliament
the laws which regulate the navigation of the United Kingdom, with a
view to ascertain whether any changes can be adopted which, without
danger to our maritime strength, may promote the commercial and
colonial interests of the empire.”

[Sidenote: Mr. Robinson and Shipowners deceived.]

The guarded terms in which this paragraph was couched lulled the
suspicions of some of the leaders of the Protectionist party. Mr.
Robinson, a merchant connected with the Newfoundland trade, and an
influential member of Lloyd’s, was, at that time, in Parliament for the
borough of Poole. On the debate on the Address, he said, “_that with
respect to the Navigation Laws, he had looked with much attention to
the precise words in her Majesty’s Speech on this subject, and he did
not object to them_. He did not object to inquiry into those laws,
with a view to consider any or what relaxation or modification might be
made applicable to the existing state of things, and the maintenance of
the maritime interests of Great Britain and her dependencies.”

[Sidenote: Conversation between Mr. Bancroft and Lord Palmerston.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Bancroft’s declaration.]

But though Mr. Robinson and the party of whose views he was then the
exponent may have deluded themselves into a belief that Government
had no intention of bringing any measure into Parliament for the
abrogation of the Navigation Laws, it is, now, beyond doubt that
the administration of Lord Russell, whatever might have been his
Lordship’s individual opinions, had resolved to introduce and support,
with all its power, a very sweeping measure. In the autumn of 1847 the
American Minister put himself in communication and had interviews with
Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at which Mr.
Labouchere was present.[80] On one of these occasions, Mr. Bancroft
informed them that the American Government, believing it was the
disposition of Parliament to make a large and liberal alteration in the
Navigation Laws, was anxious to co-operate with the English Ministers
in that great work, and, in conjunction with them, to set an example
which he hoped would be productive of important and salutary effects.
Mr. Bancroft’s language was singularly expressive and emphatic. In one
of the interviews he said to the English Ministers: “We are ready to
do anything you like; if you can do but little, we must do little; if
you can do much, we will do much; IF YOU SHALL DO ALL, WE SHALL DO
ALL.”[81]

This important declaration (whether or not Mr. Bancroft had any
authority for making it in all its fulness) became at a future period
the subject of incessant comment and controversy. It is important,
therefore, that the facts, as they occurred, should be clearly
stated. There can be no doubt that this conversation took place in
the month of October 1847, but what Mr. Bancroft meant must probably
ever remain a matter of conjecture. If, however, language is of any
value in conveying the views or intention of the person who speaks,
it may fairly be presumed that the _positive_ expression “little”
had reference to the carriage of European produce, indifferently, in
either American or British ships to the ports of the United States,
and the general produce of the world from American ports in the like
manner to ports of Great Britain. The equivalent the Americans could
give in return for the _comparative_ “much,” presuming this to mean
unrestricted trade with British colonies, is difficult to conjecture;
seeing that the Americans have no colonies, and, in point of fact, no
equivalent whatever to give. As regards the _superlative_ “_all_, in
return for _all_,” it could only have had reference to the coasting
trade so jealously guarded at that time by _both_ countries; and,
in the sequel, it will be evident how far this magnanimous offer
corresponded with the tenacious policy then and to this day adhered to
by the United States Government.

Lord Palmerston, entertaining a strong feeling in favour of the repeal
of the Navigation Laws, at once perceived what use could be made of the
concurrence of the United States Government in a LARGE measure
of reform. He accordingly requested Mr. Bancroft to put his views in a
formal communication, which was done as follows:—

[Sidenote: Official letter from Mr. Bancroft to Lord Palmerston,
November 3, 1847.]

                                 “American Legation, 3rd November, 1847.

     “The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
     of the United States of America, has the honour to inquire of
     Viscount Palmerston, her British Majesty’s Principal Secretary of
     State for Foreign Affairs, if her Majesty’s Government is inclined
     to remove existing restrictions on international commerce.

     “_Universal reciprocity, in the widest sense_, is held by
     the American Government as the only thoroughly appropriate basis
     for intercourse between two great nations. The prohibition of the
     indirect trade has but restrained enterprise: it has done good to
     neither country. To abrogate it would at once set free dormant
     commercial wealth without injuring any one.

     “Should her Majesty’s Government entertain similar views, the
     undersigned is prepared on the part of the American Government to
     propose that British ships may trade from any port of the world to
     any port in the United States, and be received, protected, and,
     in respect to charges and duties, be treated like American ships,
     if, reciprocally, American ships may in like manner trade from any
     port in the world to any port under the dominion of her British
     Majesty.

     “The removal of commercial restrictions, while it would be of
     mutual advantage to the material interests of both countries,
     could not but give openings to still further relations of amity
     between them, and, by its influence on the intercourse of nations,
     create new guarantees for the peace of the world.

                                                  “The undersigned, &c.

                                            (Signed) “GEORGE BANCROFT.”

The following reply was given by Lord Palmerston:—

[Sidenote: Lord Palmerston’s reply, November 17,]

                                   “Foreign Office, 17th November, 1847.

  “SIR,

     “I have lost no time in communicating to my colleagues your note
     of the 3rd inst. on the subject of the Navigation Laws which
     regulate the commerce of the British Empire and that of the United
     States with each other.

     “This question has already engaged the serious attention of
     her Majesty’s Ministers, and we observe with pleasure that the
     sentiments we entertain with regard to it are shared by the
     Government of a country, with which we are so closely united by
     the ties of an extensive commerce and of a common origin.

     “We do not, however, think that we should be justified in advising
     the Crown to enter into an engagement which would be at variance
     with some of the most important principles of the existing
     Navigation Law without the previous sanction of Parliament; but
     it is our intention to propose to Parliament, without unnecessary
     delay, measures which would enable us to place our commercial
     intercourse in regard to the matters to which your note refers
     on the most liberal and comprehensive basis with respect to all
     countries which shall be willing to act in a corresponding spirit
     towards us.

                                             (Signed) “PALMERSTON.”[82]

[Sidenote: practically giving prior information to the Americans.]

[Sidenote: Lord Clarendon tells Shipowners’ Society that the laws will
not be altered, December 26, 1846, and repeats this assurance, March
15, 1847.]

It thus appears that the English Ministers communicated their
intentions formally and explicitly to the American Government, and,
through that Government to the American people, a day before they
chose to inform the English Parliament and the nation, somewhat
vaguely, in the Queen’s Speech, of the course they might, eventually,
be led to pursue. A year previously, on the 21st of December, 1846,
the Shipowners’ Society of London had had an interview with Lord
Clarendon at the Board of Trade. On that occasion, as appears from the
Minutes of the Society, they were graciously received, and assured in
distinct language, that no intention was entertained on the part of
her Majesty’s Government of making any alteration in these laws. Three
months later, on the 15th March, 1847, these gentlemen, entertaining
a feeling of mistrust in the then governing powers, went again to the
Board of Trade and asked the same question, and were once more assured
that there was no intention on the part of Government to interfere with
the fundamental principles of the Navigation Laws; that an individual
member, Mr. Ricardo, had indeed mooted the subject of a committee,
which Government could not refuse, but that the committee should be
a fair one, with Mr. Milner Gibson[83] as chairman, as they were
desirous to give satisfaction to all parties interested. So far no
intention was expressed of tampering with these laws; and we have seen
that Mr. Robinson, on scrutinising the terms of the Queen’s Speech in
November, acquiesced in its propriety, no suspicion having entered his
mind, that, already, these laws were foredoomed by Ministers, still
less that, the very day before Parliament met, they had communicated
their intentions to a foreign maritime Power—a nation, too, which, at
that moment, was straining every nerve to wrest from us the supremacy
of the ocean. Under such circumstances as these, the following article,
first published in the ‘Washington Union,’[84] created intense
astonishment. Nor is it surprising that it should have done so:—

[Sidenote: Interview between Lord Palmerston and Mr. Bancroft published
in ‘Washington Union.’]

“_Repeal of the Navigation Laws._—A correspondence has taken place
between the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs and our Minister
at that Court relative to the repeal of the Navigation Laws of Great
Britain. Mr. Bancroft applied to Viscount Palmerston early in November
to learn whether Ministers would consent to establish with the United
States a perfect system of reciprocity, in making all vessels of
either country, fitting out from any port of the world, free to trade
to any port of the other nation, whether home or colonial. Viscount
Palmerston, after the lapse of some weeks (_it was just fourteen
days_), replied that, although her Majesty’s Ministers did not feel
at liberty to advise her Majesty at once to make such a change in the
commercial system as was asked by Mr. Bancroft without the consent of
Parliament, yet as soon as that body should meet, a measure would be
introduced which would embrace all the views put forth by Mr. Bancroft
in his note. It is not doubted that Parliament will at once act
favourably on the Bill. The importance to the United States of such a
measure can scarcely be exaggerated. The British colonial system has
been a most grievous restriction on our commerce, and its annihilation,
as promised by Lord Palmerston, will open to our enterprising merchants
the lucrative trade of the East and West Indies, and of the other
British settlements from which they have been hitherto debarred.
This will be the greatest stride yet taken by Free-trade: and it is
_not to be doubted that all Europe will follow the example of Great
Britain_! The liberal commercial treaty made by Hanover with the
United States has been in no small degree instrumental in disposing
the British Government to this wise measure. The Rhine provinces have
recently imitated the example of Hanover towards the United States; and
everywhere silently but steadily our commercial relations are being put
upon the most advantageous footing. The repeal by Great Britain of the
laws restricting the trade of the United States with her colonies will
be far more beneficial to this country than any commercial treaty ever
made by our Government.”

Such was the announcement put forth in the American journals
semi-officially, and the reader will judge how far this “puff direct”
of the American executive was borne out by facts, or the dates and
tenor of the correspondence given between the American Minister in
England and the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The
spirit of the most perfect liberality, and, I must add, _complete
reciprocity_, seemed to pervade all Mr. Bancroft’s professions
when communicating with Lord Palmerston and Mr. Labouchere, promising
“little, much, and all,” according as the same could be obtained from
Parliament. In his special despatch, he described the concessions his
Government was prepared to grant, as universal reciprocity in its
widest sense, which, if it meant anything at all, meant the opening to
our ships of their extensive coasting trade in return for the opening
of our still more extensive colonial trade to the ships of the United
States; or, if such was not his meaning, it meant that, _when_ we
opened our coasting trade, they would do so likewise. But the latter
portion of his despatch, and the semi-official announcement in the
‘Washington Union,’ contain, in other respects, many vague generalities
and, as subsequently appeared, the Government of the United States
never had any intention of opening its coasting trade to the ships of
Great Britain.

[Sidenote: Excites great indignation when known in England, January
1848.]

When the correspondence transpired in January 1848, it created great
astonishment, if not alarm and indignation, throughout the country,
especially among shipowners and all persons who considered that their
best interests were interwoven with the maintenance of the Navigation
Laws. The Conservative press loudly reproached Lord Palmerston for
having made known the intentions of Government with regard to this
important measure to the American Minister before communicating them to
Parliament; nor could the Liberals approve of the course that had been
adopted.

[Sidenote: Parliament re-assembles on February 3, 1848.]

[Sidenote: Lord Palmerston admits the correspondence with. America.]

On the evening of the 3rd February, 1848, the day of the re-assembling
of Parliament, there was considerable excitement in the House of
Commons, and, amidst it, Mr. Robinson asked the Foreign Minister
whether any correspondence or communication had taken place between him
and the Minister of the United States about the Navigation Laws; and,
if so, whether he would lay it upon the table? Lord Palmerston, with
the ready tact for which he was distinguished, and with the smiling
coolness so characteristic of him, especially in times of excitement,
at once and frankly avowed that there had been such a correspondence;
looking, with a twinkle in his eye and a smile on his lip, at Mr.
Robinson, as if to inquire in turn, and “if there has been, what is
there to make such a fuss about?” adding that the correspondence would,
at once, be laid on the table.

This announcement, perhaps more from the manner in which it was made
than from the fact accompanying it, that Ministers intended immediately
to submit to Parliament a proposition on the subject, quieted the
House, but, at the same time, awakened the shipowners out of doors to
what they considered their dangerous situation. They felt conscious
that, in the House of Commons, a Free-trade majority would sanction any
measure the Government might have the courage to propose. On the other
hand, in the House of Lords, where popular passions prevailed less,
they hoped to find a less prejudiced tribunal; hence, they prudently
resolved to change the “venue,” and to appeal to the Upper House for
the perpetuation of Protection. With this view they selected Lord
Hardwicke as their mouthpiece and champion; and, in order to complete
the inquiry commenced by the Lower House in the preceding session,
resolved to move the appointment of a Committee of the Lords to inquire
into the policy and operation of the Navigation Laws; the shipowners
being sanguine that there, at least, they would be able to make out a
satisfactory case, and counteract the one-sided evidence they conceived
had been given by the repeal party before the Committee of the Commons.

[Sidenote: The Earl of Hardwicke’s proposal, February 25, 1848.]

Accordingly Lord Hardwicke on the 25th February, pursuant to notice,
moved the appointment of a Select Committee of the Lords.[85]
Recapitulating in his speech the events of the preceding year, and,
dwelling in terms of indignation on the dissimulation which, he said,
had been practised, he charged Ministers with having deceived the
country; and stigmatised the whole evidence before the Committee of the
Commons as one-sided and unfair. He complained that a distinguished
officer of the Royal Navy, Sir James Stirling, had given his evidence
in favour of the abolition of the Navigation Laws; but that, before he
could be cross-examined, the Committee were informed, that the duty of
the gallant officer required his absence, and that he had sailed from
England. His Lordship then entered into numerous details, pronouncing
Mr. Porter’s evidence to be false; he, and the statistical officers of
the Board of Trade, “being learned in that description of theory which
was so popular now-a-days;” whereby forty-seven vessels of 7101 tons,
which had, in 1846, entered inwards from French ports, were converted,
by multiplying the number of entries inwards, into 228,186 tons, and
by treating the clearances outwards in a similar manner magnified to
such an extent that they represented 556,824 tons; while the _Prince
Ernest_, a passenger and mail boat, employed between Calais and
Dover, of 145 tons, figured in the Custom House returns as 24,215 tons
of British shipping![86]

[Sidenote: Earl Grey grants a Committee.]

Earl Grey, in granting the committee, took care to express an opinion,
that no further inquiry was necessary. He defended the course taken by
his colleague, Lord Palmerston, contending that no understanding had
been come to with the Government of the United States with regard to
the repeal of the Navigation Laws, and that the correspondence implied
nothing more, than that a mutual relaxation of existing restrictions
would be beneficial to the maritime commerce of both countries: he
concluded by defending Mr. Porter’s returns, and added, that “their
Lordships would find that, on strict examination, the allegations of
falseness would vanish altogether.”

[Sidenote: Evidence of the Shipowners before the Lords’ Committee.]

The contest being thus transferred for the time to a Committee of the
Lords, the shipowners feeling sure of success before this tribunal,
brought forward a large amount of evidence, much of which was
instructive, though somewhat conflicting. Mr. G. F. Young, who again
took the leading part, insisted that if foreign ships were allowed to
trade indiscriminately with British possessions, and took part in the
indirect trade with foreign countries, it would be impossible that
British ships could obtain an equivalent, because by far the greater
proportion of foreign States do not possess any colonies. But, even
if they had anything to offer in return, he had little faith in
“reciprocity;” because every nation, _except England_, appears
to exhibit, with respect to its maritime commerce, an intense feeling
of nationality, and a fixed determination to support its commercial
marine. Sweden, he said, admits any article used in the construction
and equipment of Swedish-built ships duty free, and remits to such
vessels, for the first year after they are built, the export duties on
goods charged to others. Russia adopted a somewhat similar policy by
exempting all vessels built in that country from the payment of her
port-charges, for the first three years after they were launched. But
Mr. Young failed to see that, while all such concessions as these must
be made good by extra taxes on the people of the respective countries,
they were at the same time prejudicial to their own shipping, in that
they encouraged the production of cheap and inferior vessels.

Numerous arguments of a similar character were adduced, some based on
facts, others on conjectures; and not a few adverted to heavy losses
the British shipowner contemplated from causes which never had and
never could have any real existence. Prussia, for instance, he said,
confines the trade in the importation of salt to her own ships, which
was true; America, invariably, gave the preference to her own ships, a
statement either conjectural or, in some degree, supported by the fact
that her merchants often found it to their interest as traders, and,
not through any feeling of “intense nationality,” to employ on certain
trades their own ships in preference to those of any other nation.
He further alleged that British shipowners would be irretrievably
ruined by the admission of foreign ships, an assertion, of course,
speculative, or purely imaginary. While maintaining that the evils
of the Navigation Laws had been greatly overrated, he thought the
advantages of these restrictive laws were equally exaggerated. He,
however, attached the very greatest importance to the “Long Voyage
clause,” considering that it was far from clear that the interests of
the country required its repeal, or that it could be safely repealed
without the most injurious consequences to British navigation; in a
word, he thought no other clause in the Navigation Act so essential to
the maintenance of British navigation.

[Sidenote: Mr. Young proposes some modifications,]

He could not, however, fail to see that the impossibility of bringing
American cotton from Havre, cochineal from Teneriffe, or hides from
Buenos Ayres (about which great complaints had been raised), occasioned
great inconvenience. The cochineal from Teneriffe was no doubt, as
explained elsewhere, absurdly exaggerated as a grievance, but it
involved other articles, and could not be maintained on principle.
Mr. Young, therefore, to remedy this evil, suggested a modification
of the third clause of the Navigation Act, by introducing some words
with respect to the produce of distant quarters of the world, as that
which regulated by the second clause the importations from Europe;
namely, by the limitation of the restriction to certain articles to
be specifically enumerated; the enumerated articles being made to
comprise all those bulky commodities, the retention of the importation
of which to British shipping was of the last importance, while
the surrender of the remainder would not materially affect British
maritime commerce, and ought therefore, in his opinion, to be conceded
to general convenience. The effect of this would be to exclude from
the restriction such minor articles as are not the staple produce of
those countries, and which, though not entering largely into British
consumption, might occasionally be required as part of assorted
cargoes. Another relaxation Mr. Young proposed, guarding himself,
however, by stating that he had no authority to do so from any
constituted body of shipowners, was to introduce in like manner, in
perfect accordance with the general principle of the Navigation Laws,
a permission to import the produce of Asia, Africa, and America, not
only from the country of production, but, from the country within those
distant parts of the world in which the produce might be found. Under
such a regulation, he explained that if it should happen that the hides
of Buenos Ayres were found at New York, it would enable those hides to
be imported into England either in British ships or in American ships;
and it would enable tea, the produce of China, in like manner to be
imported from New York, or any part of Asia, Africa, or America.

[Sidenote: the first concessions of the Anti-Repeal party.]

This was, perhaps, the first concession which the anti-repeal party
had made with regard to the Navigation Laws. They vainly thought it
would tend to settle the whole question. They saw that the relaxation
proposed, if fully carried out, while meeting many of the cases of real
grievance complained of by commission merchants, would practically
retain most important advantages they would never consent to
relinquish, but which they would as certainly lose if they were to
allow the importation of goods, the produce of distant quarters of the
globe, in foreign ships direct into Great Britain from the place of
production.

This modification of the Navigation Laws was, doubtless, important, and
was said to be in strict harmony with the principle then regulating the
importation of goods from the various countries of Europe, which, in
1825, was permitted by Mr. Huskisson to be made from the place where
found, the earlier restriction having been that the importation must be
from the place of production.

The shipowners would still have retained to British shipping the
advantage of the direct voyage, which was, after all, their great
point. In consenting to the plan, they urged that, in the end, the
interest of the consumer would be equally secured with that of the
shipowner, by giving that encouragement afforded by the Navigation Act
to direct rather than indirect importation. The opponents of repeal
exhibited great alarm lest, if indirect importations were permitted,
these would take place from distant ports of the world into the nearer
ports of Europe, and be there warehoused: and they expressed the
fear that the people of this country would then consume considerable
proportions of the productions of tropical climates, burdened with
the expenses of previous importation into the ports of continental
nations, in addition to what was then paid under the limited direct
importation!! It was only, he said, with the view of remedying palpable
absurdities, such as that of the hides brought from Buenos Ayres to
Hamburg, that Mr. Young suggested a modification of the existing law,
which he thought would not merely meet that case, but also remove the
greater part of the inconveniences complained of arising from the
operation of the Navigation Laws.

[Sidenote: Government insists on Total Repeal.]

But these concessions were not sufficient for the requirements of
Government. They, or rather the Free-trade party, which had by this
time greatly increased in power and influence, had long felt that
the principle on which the Navigation Laws were framed was entirely
wrong, and consequently, that they could not accept any modification
short of total and unconditional repeal. But they knew, also, they
had still a powerful party to contend against, and that it was
necessary to fortify their opinions by as strong an array of facts
as could be collected. These were not, however, easily obtainable;
nor could the advantages derivable from free navigation be proved by
experience. No nation as yet had put this to the test; and, in fact,
experience would hitherto have shown that the experiment of throwing
open British ports to vessels of all nations, so that they might
enter and depart, unconditionally, would have been alike unwise and
dangerous. Nevertheless, Government felt its views to be sound, and
that the change contemplated would benefit shipowners as well as the
nation, but, in the absence of facts, experience alone could support
the opinions thus formed and used as arguments in favour of the
Government policy. The inferiority, in many respects, of the masters
of our merchant ships, compared with those of other nations, which
competition, they said, would improve, as well as the vessels under
their charge, was one of their strongest points.

But Government had to meet many other arguments on which no experience
existed; and, not the least of these was the question of manning the
navy, embracing the all-important one of the maintenance of the British
fleet.

[Sidenote: Detailed views of Admiral Sir George Byam Martin.]

Among other witnesses who came before the Lords’ Committee, Admiral Sir
George Byam Martin was a stout advocate for upholding the Navigation
Laws. He contended that these laws gave encouragement to the British
shipowner by exclusive advantages in the colonial and coasting trade,
which he regarded as a compensation for the obligation of building
his ships in some parts of the Queen’s dominions, and of employing a
certain number of apprentices. If manufacturers really felt that these
laws in any degree cramped their commercial enterprise, they ought
also, he thought, to be content to yield somewhat for the maintenance
of a service to which they all owed their protection and safety. The
Admiral held that the Navigation Laws gave protection to British
seamen, by securing to them employment in a calling for which they
qualified themselves by a long and severe apprenticeship. There were
only, he said, four main objects presented to the shipowner to give him
hope of a satisfactory competition with the cheap carriers of other
countries:

1st. That by the abrogation of the Navigation Laws he would be left at
liberty to build his ships in cheap foreign countries.

2ndly. That he would be allowed to take foreign seamen, without
limitation of number.

3rdly. That he would no longer be compelled to take apprentices; and

4thly. As a further temptation to the shipowner to be reconciled to the
change, his men would no longer be liable to impressment.

None, however, of these points could, in the opinion of Admiral Martin,
be conceded without loss to the public service.

If the abrogation of the Navigation Laws left the shipowner at liberty
to build his ships in foreign countries, and he availed himself of
that licence, it would inevitably diminish the shipwright class in
this kingdom; yet on this class, the admiral argued, the safety of
England had greatly depended during the late and former wars, and this
he thought would be even more the case in any future wars in which the
country may be plunged.

“During the war which ended in 1815, we had,” remarked the admiral,
“800 pennants flying, and even so many as 900 ships were in commission
for a considerable time. Great exertions were necessary on the part of
the shipwrights to keep up the repairs of such a fleet, and to build
new ships to supply the decay and the casualties constantly going on.
But numerous as our fleet was then, it was likely to be on a much
larger scale hereafter; for, in addition to our usual fleets, there
must, of necessity, be an immense number of steamers in a great measure
as an addition, though not as a substitute for sailing ships.”[87]

The number of shipwrights in the King’s yards throughout the war, he
estimated, might be taken at an average of 3714 and 875 apprentices,
making a total of 4589 working shipwrights, besides 550 in the
colonial yards. Notwithstanding this great shipwright strength, and
the efforts exacted from them, the Admiralty was obliged to seek every
possible assistance from the private shipbuilders,[88] and to these
persons Admiral Martin maintained protection was due, considering how
much they had done for the country when we had enemies to deal with in
every quarter.

I need not dwell upon all the other points of Admiral Martin’s
evidence; but that which relates to the merchant service and manning
the navy must not be omitted.

[Sidenote: Importance of keeping up the merchant navy.]

[Sidenote: Arguments from his personal experience as to its value as a
nursery for seamen.]

If the Navigation Laws were done away, Admiral Martin believed, the
shipowner who would go to foreign countries for cheap ships would,
from the same motive, take foreign seamen, such as Danes, Swedes,
Norwegians, or Dutchmen, who would be content with small wages and a
cheap scale of dietary. In this way, a large number of British seamen
would be deprived of the employment they now enjoyed owing mainly
to the Navigation Laws; and, in such a case, the naval service must
suffer in proportion, especially, when, in time of war, seamen are
most urgently required. It had been said, and it was a “marvellous
assertion,” that the merchant service contributes so little towards the
supply of the navy—that, so far as concerned this point, there need be
no hesitation in abandoning the Navigation Laws. An assertion more
completely contradicted by all experience, Admiral Martin confidently
stated, had never been uttered. The merchant service, he held, was
everything to the navy, while the navy, he was convinced, could not
exist without it. He was unable, adequately, to express his surprise at
these loose assertions, for every person who remembered the muster of
the navy immediately preceding the war in 1793, could not fail to know
that the glorious victory of the 1st of June, 1794, under Lord Howe,
was gained by the merchant seamen of the kingdom. We had not then, he
said, 20,000 men, and these were scattered over the globe when the
war broke out; it was, therefore, the merchant service that enabled
us rapidly to man some sixty sail of the line, and double that number
of frigates and smaller vessels. By promptly bringing together about
35,000 or 40,000 seamen of the mercantile marine, Admiral Gardner was
able at once to proceed to the West Indies with seven sail of the line,
nine frigates and sloops of war; Lord Hood to man twenty-two sail of
the line, and a large number of frigates and sloops, with which he
occupied Toulon and took Corsica; while, by its aid, other squadrons
were sent to America and to the East Indies to protect our interests
in those quarters. The command of seamen from the merchant service
also enabled Lord Howe to occupy the Channel with twenty-seven sail
of the line and numerous frigates, thereby affording security to our
own homes, and the means of protecting our colonies and commerce by
detached squadrons.

[Sidenote: Working of the system of apprenticeship,]

Notwithstanding these proofs of naval energy on the first outburst
of the late war, and of the important help derived from the merchant
service, the number of men obtained was, after all, inadequate to
the wants of the country. The merchant service, suddenly drained
of so many thousands, could, afterwards, give only a comparatively
small and occasional supply as ships arrived from foreign ports, or
as apprentices grew out of their time. Now this continued, though
insufficient succour to the navy, Admiral Martin thought, could never
have been maintained throughout so long a war but for the provident
provisions of the Navigation Laws in making it compulsory on shipowners
to take a certain number of apprentices, and thus to keep up a constant
replenishment of seafaring men.[89]

He expressed himself of quite a different opinion to those who were
sanguine in believing the abrogation of the Navigation Laws would
increase our shipping; and stoutly combated the notion that we could
retain the same quantity of tonnage after we had entered on a system
of rivalry with foreign countries in cheap carrying. But, assuming
that we retained 4,000,000 tons[90] of shipping, it might be well to
see how the comparison stood with respect to the supply of men derived
from the 1,500,000 in 1793, and what might be expected from the present
4,000,000 tons. In 1793, and up to 1835, the Act of Queen Anne secured
a replenishment of seafaring men by apprentices of more than double
the number, when we had only 1,500,000, to what the Act of 1835 did in
1848 with 4,000,000. Consequently, in that respect, nothing was gained
by the increased tonnage. By the Act of Queen Anne, vessels of 30 tons
were obliged to take an apprentice; whereas under the Act of 1835 a
vessel of 200 tons takes only one apprentice. Under the Act of Queen
Anne, vessels of 400 tons took five apprentices; under the Act of 1835,
only two. Formerly ships of 1400 tons were obliged to take fifteen
apprentices; whereas, under the present Act, the largest ship built was
only required to take five: so that the lesser amount of tonnage in
1793 gave a larger supply of fresh hands than the 4,000,000 tons.

The admiral did not fail to point out, in comparing the two periods,
that the increase to 4,000,000 exhibited a noble proof of our
commercial growth under the protection of the Navigation Laws, and
seemed to warn us of what we hazarded in giving up 4,000,000 of
shipping tonnage to be scrambled for by all the nations of the world.

[Sidenote: and of impressment.]

A more important and alarming view of the subject was the
encouragement held out to the shipowner to believe that, among
other changes contemplated, his men would be no longer subject to
impressment. If that were to be the case, asked, pertinently, Admiral
Martin, what was the use of increased numbers, the presumed result of
increased tonnage, if the men were locked up, and, thus, were not at
once available for the navy?[91]

It is unnecessary to repeat Admiral Martin’s further remarks
concerning apprentices. I may, however, state that he considered
the complaints against them but a “plausible grievance” of a few
shipowners. Apprentices, he held, were not much expense, for though
they ate as much as men, they soon became active and useful in the
ship, performing a man’s duty without wages. They were, besides, the
cheapest people to shipowners, who in war time were glad enough to have
their full number of them, because, as apprentices, they were in fact
so many hands protected from impressment. The number of fresh hands
required to keep up the stock of seamen was very considerable; for the
hard life of sailors tells early on human strength, and the perils
of their pursuit contributes much to the waste of life. The Admiral,
therefore, held that law which compelled shipowners to take apprentices
was a most valuable part of the Navigation Laws, and ought not on any
account to be given up: and that a constant influx of young blood into
the sea service was essential to the interests of a naval country, and
any diminution of the present number of apprentices in proportion to
the existing tonnage would, in his opinion, be detrimental to the navy,
and hazardous to our national security.

With regard to the quality of the supply from the commercial to the
military navy of this country, and to the comparative value of those
who had been brought up in the merchant service, or of those who
entered the navy for the first time, Admiral Martin unhesitatingly
said, that the real practical seaman was the north country sailor; but
that the coasting sailor and the South Sea-fishery sailor were now
very scarce, if we had not lost the latter altogether.

[Sidenote: Evidence of Admiral Berkeley,]

Captain Maurice Frederick Fitzhardinge Berkeley, R.N., who also gave
evidence, entered into various explanations concerning the effect of
bounties, and of the impressment of seamen, and approved the practice
by which seamen in foreign parts could enter her Majesty’s ships
without being deemed deserters: he admitted, however, that if he were a
captain in a merchant vessel “he might probably think it a hard case.”
He took care to remark that “the fault was not always with the men;”
and, at the same time, gave a different testimony to that of Sir James
Stirling about the proportion of merchant seamen who served on board
men-of-war. In his opinion, two-fifths of the navy had been brought
up in the merchant service; while a good many who had commenced life
in it as boys, had subsequently gone into the merchant service. With
respect to the registry system, he remarked that in the Jews’ shops at
Shadwell, and in similar places at Bristol, sailors could purchase as
many register-tickets as they wanted, and, for half the amount of the
fine, that would be asked of them if they went to the Custom House.[93]

[Sidenote: and of Mr. R. B. Minturn.]

Mr. Robert B. Minturn, an eminent merchant and shipowner of New
York, was the last witness examined before the Committee of the
Lords. He was owner of portions of many ships, and part owner in
the lines of packets between New York and London, and between New
York and Liverpool. He traded also with India and China, and was
also owner of whalers which went to the South Seas. Like most others
of the high-class merchants trading to foreign countries, he was
neither concerned in the inland trade of the United States nor the
coasting trade. Having furnished evidence as to the progress of
American tonnage, he stated that the New York packets, which were
universally acknowledged to be the best description of ships built in
the United States, having all of them a portion of live oak in them,
cost, exclusively of their cabins, about $70 per ton, equal to about
14_l._ 10_s._ per ton, sterling. In this estimate it must be
remarked that the American tonnage differs from our own.[94]

[Sidenote: Details about American ships.]

The American classification of ships also differs from that at
Lloyd’s. There the rating depends on the age, the material, its
quality, together with the quantity of the fastenings, whether copper
or iron, and the mode of workmanship. The oak used in New York comes
principally from Virginia, the live oak entirely from Florida; and the
sheathing-copper and iron are those supplied from England, iron from
other countries then paid a duty of 30 per cent.: sheathing-copper was
free of duty, but cake or pig-copper, from which bolts are manufactured
in America, paid 5 per cent. Sails were, till recently, brought from
England, Holland, and Russia; but hemp-canvas was then being made
in America. Cotton sail-cloth had for a long time been used to a
considerable extent.

Shipwrights’ wages in the United States were then $2½ a day, about
10_s._ 6_d._ sterling. In New York, these artificers work
only ten hours per day on new work, and nine hours on old work; but
repairs of ships were more expensive in England than in the United
States. In the equipment, as we have seen, of American ships, great
attention was paid to lessening manual labour by capstans, winches,
and other contrivances; and as they were much more lightly rigged in
proportion to their tonnage, they were sailed with fewer men; the
average number being about two and a half sailors to every 100 tons in
a packet ship ranging from 900 to 1200 tons; but in a common American
freighting ship, where despatch was of less importance, the proportion
is even smaller. For instance, the _Henry Clay_, already
mentioned, 1207 tons, American, and 1467 tons, English, had thirty
seamen, two boys, and a carpenter, besides the captain, four mates,
cook, and steward: 40 all told.

With regard to the payment of the American captains, it is not the
practice to pay them by time, but by some advantage in the voyage. In
foreign freighting voyages the captains depend chiefly on the primage,
which is 5 per cent. upon the amount of the freight. That is usually
their chief source of emolument; but they, generally, receive also $30
a month wages. This, of course, gives them an interest in prosecuting
the voyage successfully, and in stimulating their men to exertion;
but, with great good taste, Mr. Minturn excused himself from making a
comparison between American and other ships; he strenuously, however,
denied that any national feeling influenced the merchants in the least
degree with respect to the freighting their goods from England in
American bottoms.

[Sidenote: Reciprocity treaties]

[Sidenote: so far as they affect Americans.]

With regard to the effect on America of the reciprocity treaties to
which I have already alluded, and which came into operation shortly
prior to 1830, it would appear that though the Government of the United
States proposed to all foreign nations that, if they would open their
ports to American shipping, they might enjoy all the benefits of their
foreign trade, the shipowners were distrustful of the operation of
this Free-trade system, as it was chiefly embraced by the States of
the north of Europe, which had no commerce to offer in return. Hence
efforts were continually made to rescind these treaties; but the
experience of their operation has been that the American commerce has
increased in a much greater ratio since that period than it had done
before. The reciprocity treaties have not, indeed, promoted the growth
of American tonnage; but, on the other hand, they have not retarded it;
and if the shipowners in the United States do not avow their error,
at all events their opposition has now ceased. Mr. Minturn was far
from acknowledging that the Americans had gained by these treaties;
indeed, he gave a positive opinion that they had nothing to do with the
increase of United States shipping. No new markets had been opened,
but commerce with all the world had increased, and probably nowhere so
much as with England. The chief extension of the commerce of the United
States with South America was with the Brazils, which was enhanced
owing to the consumption of coffee, the duty on which had been taken
off, the result being that the American consumption had doubled within
ten years.

The temperance system adopted on board the American vessels had
resulted in the greatest possible advantage, both in the efficiency
and discipline of the crews; and, with these, in the increased safety
of the ship and consequent diminution in the rates of insurance.
Indeed, Mr. Minturn stated that American underwriters attached so
much importance to it, that at the commencement of this reform they
encouraged it by offering to return 10 per cent. on the premium, on all
vessels that performed a voyage without the use of ardent spirits.

Such are a few of the leading points of evidence furnished to the
Lords’ Committee, who adjourned _sine die_ on the 6th July, 1848.


FOOTNOTES:

[80] I take this from Mr. Labouchere’s account given many months
afterwards. See Hansard, vol. xcviii. p. 1008.

[81] These are the exact words given by Mr. Labouchere in his speech,
May 15, 1848.

[82] _Vide_ ‘Parliamentary Papers,’ vol. lix., 1847-8, p. 33.

[83] Vice-President of the Board of Trade.

[84] This paper was the Government organ.

[85] See Hansard, vol. xcvi. p. 1313.

[86] ‘Parliamentary Paper, 1847,’ No. 28.

[87] How completely this prediction has been falsified by the
substitution of steam vessels for all the old sailing line-of-battle
ships!

[88] The first ship of the line built by contract was in 1755, when
Messrs. Wells built the _Elizabeth_, of 74 guns; and, since that
time, private shipbuilders have contributed greatly to the public
wants. They built and repaired (chiefly in the last war) 93 sail of
line-of-battle ships, and 466 frigates and smaller vessels, making
a total of 559 vessels of war. In the last war Napoleon I. had as
building ports, Venice, Genoa, Toulon, Rochefort, L’Orient, Cherbourg,
Antwerp, and, practically also, all the ports of Holland.

[89] One of the most remarkable incidents of the manning of a ship of
war is that of Sir Edward Pellew and H.M.S. _Nymphe_. When war was
declared by the French in February, 1793, it was unexpected; and the
navy was on a peace establishment of only 16,000 sailors and marines.
It was necessary at once to increase this number to 60,000. Pellew,
finding it impossible to get seamen for his frigate, at once put eighty
Cornish miners on board his ship, and a few months later fought and
won the celebrated action with the _Cleopatra_—most of his crew
never having seen a shot fired before. (See Osler’s ‘Life of Viscount
Exmouth.’)

[90] There belonged, in round numbers, to the United Kingdom and her
colonies and possessions on the 1st January, 1875, 7,500,000 tons of
merchant vessels: of these about 2,000,000 tons were steam vessels; and
as each of these will perform the work of four sailing vessels, it may
be said that we now possess in our merchant service an equivalent to
13,500,000 registered tons of sailing shipping, so that in twenty-five
years we have more than trebled Admiral Martin’s highest estimate.

[91] The question of impressment is too important to be passed over
without any notice. Every well-constituted mind holds the principle
of impressment in abhorrence; but every reflecting statesman is
aware of the immense importance of such a power, especially as it
is never brought into use but when the country is in actual peril.
Admiral Martin, in his evidence, furnished his experience of what
impressment had practically done for us in times past, he having been
in three armaments, 1787, 1790, and 1791, on all of which occasions
the equipment of the fleet was like magic[92], and the effect of the
prompt display of the gigantic naval strength of this country in each
case saved the expenditure of thousands of lives and millions of
money. If these objects be worthy of national regard, we must submit
to the mortification of sanctioning even so great a trespass on the
liberty of the subject. The event of 1790, Admiral Martin thought,
deserves especial mention as showing distinctly what the nation gained
by impressment, and the results of a great naval demonstration. A
quarrel had at that time arisen, though, perhaps, from an insignificant
cause, with the Court of Spain; it became, however, of the greatest
importance, owing to the threatened alliance of France, then under the
control of the National Assembly, with the Court of the Escurial. On
the 2nd of May, the King in Council authorized the issue of warrants
of impressment of seafaring men, and, in the middle of June, Admiral
Barrington put to sea with a large division of the fleet. It was
insisted that this could never have been accomplished except by the
power of impressment; and Admiral Martin, doubtless, expressed the
general opinion of his profession in stating as his sincere belief that
“if we lost the power of impressment we should lose the country.” Yet,
while urging the necessity of preserving the power of impressment, he
also maintained that nothing should be left undone which could tend to
render the practice as infrequent as possible, and that every exertion
should be made to render the service itself attractive to the seamen.

[92] In 1787, we equipped a fleet to support the Stadtholder. In 1790,
we had a misunderstanding with Spain about Nootka Sound; and in 1791,
we raised a naval armament to check the ambition of Russia.

[93] By the law then in force every seaman, before he could be employed
on board a merchant ship, was required to produce a certificate from
the officer of the Registrar of Seamen, called a register-ticket,
showing that he was duly qualified for his duties, either as able or
ordinary seaman; but the system was found to be impracticable, and was
so grossly abused that it has since been abolished.

[94] In the United States the old English measurement is still adhered
to, and the poops of ships are not measured, which accounts for much of
the difference observable in the measurement of British and American
ships. For example, the _Henry Clay_, of 1207 tons American
measurement, where the poop was not included, measured 1467 tons by the
new English mode, on which light, dock, and other dues are charged. The
ship _Queen of the West_, 1106 tons American, measured for light
dues in Liverpool, 1270 tons English. The effect of this would be that
the calculation of $70 per ton would be diminished in a corresponding
ratio if taken in English tonnage, and with the poops included. The
estimate of $70 per ton, that is, American measurement, applies to
the cost of a ship with her spars and sails, rigging, and everything
complete ready to receive a cargo, but without her sea stores.




CHAPTER VIII.

     Motion of Mr. Herries, 1848—Protectionist principles stated—Extent
     of shipping trade—National defences endangered—Mr. Labouchere’s
     reply—Alderman Thompson—Mr. Gladstone’s views—Mr. Hudson—Lord
     George Bentinck—Mr. Hume—Mr. Cobden—Mr. Disraeli—Sir Robert
     Peel—The resolution carried by 117, but abandoned for a
     time—Temper of the Shipowners—Efforts of Ministers to obtain
     reciprocity by a circular from the Foreign Office—Reply thereto
     of America—Mr. Buchanan’s letter—Reply of other Powers—Progress
     of Free-trade views—Parliament of 1849—Death of Lord George
     Bentinck, September 21, 1848—Mr. Labouchere’s new resolution,
     February 14, 1849—Proposed change in coasting trade—Mr. Bancroft
     recalcitrates—Hence, withdrawal of the coasting clauses—The
     debate—Alderman Thompson, &c.—Mr. Ricardo—Meeting of Shipowners’
     Society—Their report—The manning-clause grievance—Policy
     proposed—Agitation in the country.


Although the shipowners appear to have placed much confidence in the
House of Lords, they saw that unless they could convince the Commons
that the repeal of the Navigation Laws would be prejudicial to the
interests of England, they would have no hope of maintaining the
_status quo_: and, further, that no modification would satisfy
the demands of the Free-traders, who, strong in their principles,
consequently repudiated all compromise with Protectionists.

[Sidenote: Motion of Mr. Herries, 1848.]

One of the most earnest leaders of the latter class had just
re-entered the House of Commons after a long absence from it. Mr.
Herries had been Chancellor of the Exchequer so long before as 1828.
He was an able and honest Conservative; sound in his principles
and earnest in everything he undertook. To him, therefore, the
Protectionist shipowners in their hour of trial appealed for aid; nor
did they appeal in vain. Mr. Herries was heart and soul with them. He
saw nothing but ruin and desolation in the abolition of these ancient
laws. They had, in his judgment, been tampered with and weakened by
Huskisson, and now they were about to be destroyed by such men as
Cobden, Bright, Ricardo, and Milner Gibson, backed, alas! “by his old
friend and colleague, Sir Robert Peel.” No wonder, therefore, that
he buckled on his armour with vigour for the fight; and, soon after
the debate on the resolution of the Government, he submitted, though
on a separate occasion, the following counter-resolution:—“That it
is essential to the national interests of the country to maintain
the fundamental principles of the existing Navigation Laws, subject
to such modifications as may be best calculated to obviate any
proved inconvenience to the commerce of the United Kingdom and its
dependencies without danger to our national strength.”

This resolution had been framed with great care. It had been the
subject of unusual consideration by the Shipowners’ Society of London,
then the oracle of all the other Protectionist societies in England,
whose object was the maintenance of the Navigation Laws; and, in their
opinion, the maritime greatness of England depended upon its success.
If defeated, “Rule Britannia” would for ever be expunged from our
national songs; the glories of Duncan and Nelson would “wither like the
aspen-leaf, and fade like the Tyrian dye;” and, as none but “Yankees,
Swedes, Danes, and Norwegian sailors would be found in our ports, who,
they demanded, would there be to fight our battles and defend our
sea-girt shores?” These were, then, no mere words of course; they were
the honest expressions of the thoughts of earnest men, who, however
mistaken in their views, or perhaps in some instances blinded by what
they conceived to be self-interest, firmly believed that the power and
greatness of their native land depended on the preservation of the
Navigation Laws.

The counter-declaration of Mr. Herries was therefore introduced
with the sole object of getting rid of the Ministerial measure,
failing that, of modifying it in such a manner as not to abrogate
the principle of these laws. Hence he embodied in his speech all the
leading arguments of the advocates of a restrictive policy. Thus,
after alluding to the proceedings of the committee of the previous
year, Mr. Herries found fault with Government for having, without
further inquiry, announced in the Speech from the Throne their evident
intentions, however vaguely worded, of making an entire change in the
maritime policy of Great Britain. Six months had elapsed and Ministers
had proposed no measure; while the House of Lords, acting more wisely,
had instituted the further inquiry then going on, a portion of the
evidence taken having been already laid before the House of Commons.
If, argued Mr. Herries, the Lords should, from the evidence taken
before them, resolve on the maintenance of those laws and on the
rejection of the Government measure, such a course might occasion
embarrassment. He complained that while the British shipowner would
be exposed to foreign competition by the removal of all protection,
the heavy burden of being required to man his ship agreeably with
the rules of the Navigation Laws was still retained. Criticising in
succession the various pleas in behalf of Prussia, America, and our
West Indian Colonies, for the repeal or modification of the present
code, he remarked that Prussia had nothing to give us in return for
the concessions she sought, and that her warnings and threats of
withdrawing such advantages as she had already conceded were of trivial
moment. America, in the most friendly way, no doubt, requested to
participate in our foreign and colonial trade, in return for reciprocal
concessions to be made to us: but America had no colonies; and it was
wholly out of her power to give us any equivalent for the advantages
she would be sure to acquire by the abolition of our Navigation Laws.
“Why did not ‘free’ America,” he exclaimed, “show us an example, and
abolish her laws, which were quite as stringent as ours?”

[Sidenote: Protectionist principles stated.]

As to the West Indies, Mr. Herries gave many details in proof of
his assertion that the petition against the Navigation Laws from
the Jamaica House of Assembly but imperfectly represented the real
sentiments of either that body or of the island at large. Had its
promoters been aware that, by the abrogation of these laws, freights
from the foreign islands (whence sugar was brought to England, as
well as from the British Islands) would be materially lowered, they
never would have assented to it. To facilitate importations from Cuba
by an alteration of the Navigation Laws would only aggravate the
disadvantages from which they were at present suffering. Relying on
the authority of Mr. Huskisson, he quoted him for a definition of that
Protective principle he was willing to stand by; a principle which
would reserve our colonial, coasting, and fishing trade wholly to
ourselves, while protecting our foreign trade, so far as was consistent
with our relations and engagements with foreign countries. If the
House were agreed on the general principle of protecting our marine,
Mr. Herries argued that it might, in committee, remove those anomalies
which in some quarters were so much the object of censure and ridicule.

[Sidenote: Extent of the shipping trade.]

He reminded the House that the tonnage of the vessels belonging to this
kingdom and her colonies then amounted to 3,900,000 tons; the number of
sailors employed in our mercantile marine, to 230,000; and the capital
embarked in shipping, to little less than 40,000,000_l._; while
the trades immediately connected therewith, or subservient to the
shipping interest, employed a capital of from 16,000,000_l._ to
17,000,000_l._ In this way there was between 50,000,000_l._
and 60,000,000_l._ of property which would be immediately affected
by the proposed change. In this branch of national industry about
50,000 artisans, whose wages amounted to 5,000,000_l._ a-year,
were employed; while the cost of victualling the ships he estimated at
9,000,000_l._, and the freights the mercantile marine earned per
annum at nearly 30,000,000_l._[95]

[Sidenote: National defences endangered.]

These were enormous interests, he exclaimed, and ought not to be dealt
with lightly; but when, in addition to all this, it was considered that
the existence of these interests lay at the foundation of our national
defences, and, that without these defences, we could not maintain our
present position as a nation, surely there were ample reasons, if
not for resisting all change, at least for adopting such changes as
appeared necessary, not in the reckless way now proposed, by a sweeping
resolution for the entire abolition of the Navigation Laws, but by
improving, altering, and modifying them in such a manner as would be
consistent with the great interest they were framed to protect. He
therefore prayed the House not to assent to experimental changes, which
might impair the strength of the right arm this nation had hitherto
put forth to awe and control the world, and convert it into a palsied
limb, with which the meanest of our rivals might successfully grapple.

[Sidenote: Mr. Labouchere’s reply.]

Mr. Labouchere followed in an elaborate speech, in general support of
the Ministerial measure, but at the same time admitting that the real
point for the decision of the House was fairly raised by Mr. Herries’
resolution. “Would they, however,” he asked, “be content with patchwork
legislation? Was it in fact right to maintain the principle of the
Navigation Laws? or were they prepared to consider the propriety of
departing from those principles, so as to conciliate the wants of
commerce and the exigencies of the case before them, with a view of
adapting them to the spirit of the times, and of meeting the just
demands of other countries, the wishes of our own colonies, and the
interests of our expanding trade?” Of course, if Mr. Herries carried
his resolution, it would be fatal to the measure of the Government.

[Sidenote: Alderman Thompson.]

Alderman Thompson, an opulent merchant extensively engaged in the
iron trade, supported the Protectionist view of the question. He
ridiculed the plan submitted by Sir James Stirling for manning the
navy as “Utopian,” proposing as this plan did to train up a race of
seamen exclusively for the navy, and, therefore irrespectively of the
commercial marine. “Would Mr. Hume,” he asked, directing his remarks
towards that gentleman, “sanction a vote for 120,000 men during peace?”
He warned the House against the effect on our colonial shipping trade
should it be thus thrown open to the Americans, whose ships, he said,
already supplied our West Indian settlements with the whole of the
lumber required by them, though under the disadvantage of returning
from their ports in ballast. Various speakers on both sides followed
during several adjourned debates: Dr. Bowring, Mr. Moffatt, Mr.
Mitchell, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Milner Gibson, on the side of repeal; Mr.
H. J. Baillie, Mr. Scott, Mr. Robinson, the Marquess of Granby, and Mr.
Henley on that of Protection.

[Sidenote: Mr. Gladstone’s views.]

On the 2nd June, Mr. Gladstone, then sitting with Sir Robert Peel on
the cross-benches, resumed the debate in a most exhaustive speech. His
views were not in exact accordance with either party in the debate,
but he took the affirmative side on the broad question of repeal as a
matter of reasonable expediency, although, on the specific scheme of
Government he gave only a qualified opinion, as he would have preferred
a more gradual measure. He wished Government had adhered to the uniform
course of precedents, making large concessions conditional upon
reciprocal action by other Powers. He objected to the discretionary
power of the Queen in Council, with a view of extorting reciprocity,
a discretion at once too large and too delicate: if it were really
intended that this power should be a living and practical one, to
be put in force in case of need, he thought it would be wiser and
safer to undo, bit by bit, the system we have got, than to sweep it
away in order to reconstruct it piecemeal; and then, perhaps shortly
afterwards, to pull it down again. With that keen foresight for which
he has ever been distinguished, he particularly censured that part
of the plan which reserved the coasting trade. He contended that the
American coasting trade was of the highest value, and equivalent to
a colonial trade. “Let us give her our coasting trade, and we are
entitled, not merely in policy but in justice, to ask her for her
coasting trade. But let us give her the colonial trade without the
coasting trade, and we give her the valuable boon, while we withhold
the worthless; but we cannot say to her, ‘Give us all, for we have
given you all.’” Mr. Gladstone relied on the sincerity of the American
diplomatist, and therefore, urged this point as one of the highest
importance, Mr. Bancroft’s offer appearing to him a forcible argument
for including the coasting trade in any future arrangement. In
conclusion, he expressed the hope that when England and America had
concurred in setting an example to the world of free navigation, other
nations would be induced to imitate it by a moral force it would be
difficult to resist; and that we should live to see the ocean, that
great highway of nations, as free as the ships that traverse its bosom,
or the winds that blow over it.

Though Mr. Gladstone would have preferred securing such reciprocal
privileges as other nations had power to confer before throwing
open our ports to their ships, his speech was in effect a splendid
declamation in favour of Free-trade principles, as applied to
navigation; and his argument pointed to the conclusion that, even if
other nations were not prepared for reciprocity, it would still be for
the interests of Great Britain to repeal her restrictive laws.

[Sidenote: Mr. Hudson.]

Mr. Hudson, as the representative of Sunderland, apart from his own
Conservative principles, made an earnest appeal to the House against
Free-trade in navigation, and hoped it would not be led away by any
fanciful notions. Captain Berkeley, on the other hand, expressed an
opinion rather favourable to the Government measure, though, should
it become law, he feared, with most of his brother naval officers,
that there would be a difficulty in manning the Royal Navy. But Mr. J.
Clay, though an extreme Free-trader, refused to support the Government
till all restrictions on shipowners, who had great influence at Hull,
which he so long represented, were removed. Mr. Newdegate opposed the
Government scheme in an elaborate speech; and the then member for South
Shields, though sitting opposite, followed in the same line with a
brief but argumentative address. Lord Ingestrie and Mr. R. Hildyard
likewise denounced the measure; while Lord John Hay predicted eventual
success by its adoption. A division was then taken, after three nights’
debate (May 29th, June 1st and 2nd), on the question that the debate be
now adjourned, which was carried by a majority of 163—the numbers being
236 to 73.

On the 8th of June the debate was resumed by Sir J. Walsh, who had
carried the adjournment, when Mr. Miles and Sir Charles Burrell spoke
on the same side against repeal. The most prominent speakers on the
Free-trade side were Mr. Cardwell, Sir George Clerk, and Sir Charles
Wood; Mr. Cardwell thinking the time had arrived for a judicious
relaxation of the Navigation Laws, and Sir Charles Wood noticing the
very general concurrence in favour of some change. The debate, however,
did not close, though the subject seemed exhausted, but was adjourned
for the fourth time, and the last night called forth some of the most
powerful speeches which had yet been delivered on the question.

[Sidenote: Lord George Bentinck.]

Lord George Bentinck resumed the debate on the 9th of June, and
defended the shipmasters against the aspersions cast upon them by Mr.
James Wilson, who had described them as unable to obtain freights from
Rio Janeiro, on account of the bad character they bore for carelessness
in the carriage or delivery of goods entrusted to their charge, and
concluded one of the best speeches he ever delivered by pointing out
the danger of repeal, as the seamen could not in future be pressed into
our service when the day of difficulty and danger might arise. “Let us
cherish our brave seamen,” exclaimed the noble Lord; “show them that,
alike in peace and in war, we will provide for them; that we scorn to
weigh in the balance with the comforts, the prosperity, and happiness
of our gallant defenders, the miserable saving of 2_s._ 6_d._
per ton upon the freight of our shipping, and the eighteenth part of
a farthing per pound on our sugar and coffee, and then we may again,
as heretofore, boldly challenge and safely defy all the nations of the
earth.”

[Sidenote: Mr. Hume.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Cobden.]

Mr. Hume supported the Ministerial measure, and pressed upon the
Government the necessity of removing every burden on British ships to
which foreigners were not liable. Admiral Bowles spoke on the opposite
side; and Mr. Cobden, following, asked, why should not the sailor in
his ship, as well as the workman in his factory, or the labourer on
his farm, be able to compete with foreigners? He then appealed to the
evidence, showing, as this did, that we could build better ships than
foreign nations, and at as cheap a rate, quality considered; sail
them as well; take greater care of their cargoes; and secure greater
punctuality and despatch; adding, that our sailors had the greatest
natural aptitude for the sea of any in the world. The only drawbacks,
he continued, were of a moral kind, insubordination and drunkenness;
but these would yield to better culture. We heard a great outcry about
the burdens of the landowner, such as county-rates, highway-rates,
poor-rates, and church-rates; but the shipowner paid none of these,
being exempted from any such burdens. Therefore, on the score of
taxation, the shipowner and the sailor were infinitely better able to
compete with the foreigner than any other class of the community. Mr.
Cobden then reviewed the position of the shipbuilder, the shipowner,
and the sailor, and contended that they had no need to fear competition
with the foreigner. He regretted that the power of retaliation should
be given to the Queen in Council, not that he believed it would ever be
acted upon, and, after repudiating the boastful language so frequently
held respecting England’s naval supremacy, he asked, “was this a
time to be always singing ‘Rule Britannia’?” concluding his remarks
by stating, with great wisdom, that constant assertion of maritime
supremacy was calculated to provoke kindred passions in other nations;
whereas, if Great Britain enunciated the doctrines of peace, she would
invoke similar sentiments from the rest of the world.

[Sidenote: Mr. Disraeli.]

Mr. Disraeli, at that time exhibiting no mean promise of future
distinction, delivered an eloquent speech, illustrated with that
brilliant rhetoric, sarcastic humour and point, for which he has been
ever famous in debate. There was nothing, he said, more fatal to
national interests than the recklessness of ignorance. He would not,
indeed, sing “Rule Britannia,” for fear of distressing Mr. Cobden,
but he did not think the House would _encore_ “Yankee Doodle.”
Mr. Labouchere had described this as the age of “commerce, peace, and
internal improvement;” on the contrary, it was, in his opinion, the age
of no trade, of intended war, and of communists tearing up railways.
Naples is in a state of siege, he exclaimed; Paris in insurrection;
Vienna in revolt; Berlin barricaded; four pitched battles have been
fought in Europe in eight weeks, and the Baltic and the Adriatic are
alike blockaded, so that Mr. Cobden himself could scarcely be so devout
a believer as he pretended in the quiet of nations without arms. “At
least,” concluded Mr. Disraeli, “I will not incur the responsibility
by my vote of endangering that empire gained by so much valour,
and guarded by so much vigilance—that empire broader than both the
Americas, and richer than the farthest Ind, which was foreshadowed
in its infancy by the genius of a Blake, and consecrated in its
culminating glory by the blood of a Nelson—the empire of the seas.”

[Sidenote: Sir Robert Peel.]

At this stage of the debate Sir Robert Peel, who had been silently
waiting to express his opinions, rose to address the House. On rising
he had to encounter an unusual demonstration of hostility from the
Protectionist benches; and for the first few sentences these unseemly
interruptions continued; but he soon imposed silence upon his opponents
by turning round disdainfully and saying, “this is not a matter to
be disposed of by clamour, but by deliberate reason. It is possible
the opinions I avow may be erroneous, but, depend on it, you show no
confidence in the strength of your own if you have no better answer
to give me than boisterous clamour.” This appeal to be answered by
arguments alone secured the ex-minister a hearing. His speech, however,
was not one of his happiest efforts. He went over the same ground as
preceding speakers, referring to many parts of the evidence, produced
mainly to show that England need not fear competition even with the
Americans; he warned the House that the claims of Canada could not be
long resisted, remarking that it will benefit Parliament to examine
into the state of the Navigation Laws, with a view to an extensive
alteration of them. He, however, avoided giving a direct opinion on
many essential points; and, with respect to the policy of opening the
coasting trade or continuing the restriction, he reserved his views for
the present. Nor did he offer any opinion as to the policy of requiring
for every “British ship” that three-fourths of the crew should be
British seamen. He also reserved his judgment as to the mode by which
Government proposed to make the alterations: his first impression
being to proceed by reciprocity treaties, and to make concessions to
such Powers as were willing to make equivalent concessions to us. On
the other hand, it did not escape him that these reciprocity treaties
were themselves sources of constant trouble. The “favoured-nation
clause,” he added, seems simple enough, but when you come to act on it,
practically, these treaties involve us in great difficulties. There
was, he said, an admitted difference between the case of differential
duties on navigation and on the imports of goods under a tariff. And he
felt that it was most difficult to determine whether the concessions
any given country is willing to make, or has the power to make, are
equivalent to those made by some other, the commercial demands and
commercial produce of which may be of a totally different nature.
Again, with regard to reciprocity treaties, great difficulty he thought
might ensue in the event of war; and the power Government proposed to
retain of re-imposing restrictive duties would be found very difficult
to exercise. It would in his judgment invert the relations between the
Crown and the Parliament. The House of Commons would be favourable,
and relax, the Crown would restrain. The House of Commons would give
universal privileges, and in the course of four or five years the
invidious duty would be thrown upon the Crown of withdrawing privileges
the House of Commons had granted. Sir Robert, to avoid this ungracious
duty, threw out the hint that the Act should be made limited in
duration, so as to come again before Parliament. Suppose, he suggested,
the trade were to be opened for five years; at the end of that period
the privileges given would necessarily expire, and every country would
have notice that they had the means of averting the re-establishment
of restrictions by entering into some further arrangement with this
country. He preferred to see the object effected in that way rather
than by new reciprocity treaties; in short, that America, as well as
other nations, should do what she had proposed by legislation rather
than by treaty.

There was some renewal of hostile interruption at the conclusion of Sir
Robert’s speech; but it seemed clear that he felt by no means disposed
to run at once a race with the Whigs in a Free-trade policy as regarded
navigation; at least, it was evident from his speech that his mind was
not then made up on many essential points, and, further, that he had
doubts as to the wisdom or expediency of immediate and unconditional
repeal.

[Sidenote: The resolution carried by 117,]

This important and remarkable debate was closed by a short speech from
Lord John Russell, who apparently did not then take that interest in
the question which might have been expected from his position as Prime
Minister, and considering the views he had long entertained on all the
great questions of progress. The House then went to a division on Mr.
Herries’ amendment, or rather on the previous question, when there
appeared, Ayes 294, Noes 177, being a majority of 117 in favour of
going into committee upon the Navigation Laws.

[Sidenote: but abandoned for a time.]

By this decision the ground was cleared for the Ministerial measure;
but as the above result was not arrived at until the 9th June, it
was manifestly hopeless to expect that any Bill could be carried
through both Houses of Parliament during that session; the more so
as the Committee of the House of Lords was still sitting. Hence
many who were anxious for a settlement, seeing the great majority
by which the resolution was carried, censured Government for having
delayed the measure until so late a period of the session. During
the ensuing month, however, the subject was avoided on both sides;
the Lords’ Committee adjourned _sine die_, with no other result
than the printing of the evidence; and on the 10th August, when Mr.
Labouchere laid his resolution in form upon the table, he announced
the intention of Ministers to abandon the measure for the present
session, hoping to re-introduce the subject at an early period the
following year. In fact, a tacit understanding had been come to by all
parties that the struggle should be deferred, and, in this spirit, Mr.
Labouchere carefully avoided any remark that might lead to discussion.
He, however, announced his intention of bringing in a Bill _pro
formâ_, as preferable to making any further official statement. The
original resolution was then laid on the table unopposed, although Mr.
Gladstone criticised its form, and Mr. Robinson denied that the House
had affirmed the principle of the Government measure; they had, he
said, only negatived the counter-resolution proposed by Mr. Herries.
So jealous, indeed, were the Protectionists, that they would not allow
the resolution to be laid upon the table till the Minister had given
his assurance that no evasion should be practised, and that the Bill
should be exactly in conformity with Mr. Labouchere’s resolution.
The original Bill bears date 16th August, 1848, and was prepared and
brought in by Mr. Bernal, Mr. Labouchere, and Lord John Russell. It was
entitled “A Bill to amend the laws in force for the Encouragement of
British Shipping and Navigation.”[96] Its provisions were strictly in
accordance with Mr. Labouchere’s statement and resolution, and reserved
the coasting and colonial coasting trade, with power of retaliation
against foreigners who might decline to reciprocate.

[Sidenote: Temper of Shipowners.]

Thus ended the first great Parliamentary struggle of 1848. The
shipowners had so far succeeded that they had staved off, for a while,
the impending danger; but the great majority in the Commons declaring
it expedient to revise the existing laws, left no doubt on any
reasonable mind that a sweeping change would be effected in the ensuing
session.

It will have been noticed that the main question in any proposed
alteration of the Navigation Laws was, whether foreign countries, and
especially the United States, would respond to our liberal policy, and,
in a spirit of fairness, make such alterations in their navigation
laws, tonnage dues, and tariff, as would promote increased commercial
intercourse on the footing of an honourable competition. Of course the
Protectionists did not assent to all this; but the temper of the House
of Commons plainly indicated that a great relaxation of restriction was
inevitable, the only real doubt being as to the best mode of securing
reciprocity. The Ministers of the Crown saw clearly that the shipowners
were alarmed at the vast change threatened, while the periodical press,
during the autumn of 1848, teemed with the most alarming statements of
impending ruin to all classes connected with ships and navigation. The
Shipowners’ Society gave extensive circulation to a variety of fugitive
publications, all advocating the defence of the national interests and
condemning indiscriminate repeal. On the other hand, there were many
whose authors were strongly in favour of reciprocity;[97] the number
in favour of total and unconditional repeal being comparatively few.
But as “Repeal,” or “No Repeal,” was the popular cry, it became more
and more manifest that unless some pledge were given that foreign
nations would reciprocate our concessions, it would be difficult, with
all the influence of the Free-trade party, to carry the Bill through
Parliament, and especially through the Upper House.

[Sidenote: Efforts of ministers to obtain reciprocity by a circular
from the Foreign Office.]

It became, therefore, of the utmost importance to extract from Foreign
Powers some intimation of their intentions. Hence Lord Palmerston,
in his own name, addressed a circular from the Foreign Office, dated
22nd December, 1848, to her Majesty’s diplomatic agents in various
countries, requesting information on those points.

In this circular, Lord Palmerston informed his agents that the
measure for modifying the Navigation Laws would be again submitted
to Parliament on its re-assembling; and, as the principle of some
modification had been practically accepted, there was no doubt that
many extensive measures would receive the sanction of Parliament. These
diplomatic agents were furnished with a statement of the existing
Navigation Laws, and of the Registry Acts, together with a notice
of the changes proposed; these being the sweeping away all existing
restrictions, with the exception of those directly relating to the
coasting trade of Great Britain and of the British possessions abroad,
all other trades being thus opened to vessels of all nations. The Bill
had, in fact, left to all foreign British possessions power either to
open their own coasting trade, if they should think fit, or to regulate
that trade with the consent of the Queen in Council. It also gave them
power to deal in like manner with the trade between one colony and
another.

It was likewise explained that ample powers were reserved by the
Crown for the imposition of differential duties, prohibitions, and
restrictions, on ships of such countries as should still subject
British ships to various duties, restrictions, or prohibitions. It was
further intended that the Bill should not come into operation for some
months after the day on which it was passed, in order that Government
might have time to ascertain the dispositions of Foreign Powers, and
be able to frame proper orders for such differential duties as might
be required whenever the intended relaxations should take effect
towards ships of such nations as were willing to adopt the principle of
reciprocity.

Finally, it was pointed out that, on the one hand, the definition
of a “British ship” was no longer to signify one of British build;
but only that she should be owned by a British subject, and be
navigated by a crew whereof three-fourths were British subjects; the
definition foreign ship being purposely omitted, in order that any ship
acknowledged by the law of a particular country to be a ship of such
country should be also recognised as a ship of that country by British
law.

With this view, Lord Palmerston desired the diplomatic agents to inform
him what restrictions were actually in force against British vessels
at such countries where they were resident, what voyages they might
engage in (with the goods they might carry), and what differential
duties or charges, direct or indirect, they were liable to, from which
the national vessels were exempt, and, above all, whether any further
restrictions or differential duties were then contemplated.

In this circular Lord Palmerston disclosed the intended policy of
the British Government, in that, while not attempting to make the
alteration in its law strictly dependent on the legislation of other
countries, it was yet prepared to consider the general policy of each
State. His agents were, therefore, instructed to ascertain whether the
Governments to which they were accredited would accept advances on
the part of Great Britain, with the object of placing their ships on
a footing of equality; the only reservation being the coasting trade;
or whether they would require any particular privileges or exemptions
for their national vessels, thereby rendering “it impossible for this
country to concede to their shipping the whole of the advantages which
would, under the contemplated measure, attach to the shipping of such
States as may place British and national vessels on a footing of more
perfect equality.”

Practically, Lord Palmerston offered, on the part of the British
Government, to remove nearly all the restrictions of the British
Navigation Law, whenever such a proposal was met in a spirit of
corresponding liberality, at the same time, however, reserving the
right to take such course as Government might deem necessary where no
such reciprocal feeling was shown.

[Sidenote: Reply thereto of America.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Buchanan’s letter.]

It is unnecessary to enter at great length into the explanations
given in reply by foreign Governments. Some of these are, however,
too important to be omitted in a work of this kind. Pre-eminently the
disposition of the United States, or rather the opinion of Congress,
as well as of the Executive, was essentially necessary to be known
on this side of the Atlantic. Consequently Mr. John F. Crampton, our
Envoy at Washington, lost no time in bringing the question before the
then American Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan.[98] That gentleman in
reply said, that the most satisfactory answer he could give was to
furnish a copy of the first section of the Act of Congress, approved
on the _24th May, 1828_, intituled “An Act, in addition to an
Act intituled, ‘an Act concerning discriminating Duties of Tonnage
and Import, and to equalise the duties on Prussian Vessels and their
Cargoes.’” The substance of this law will be found in another part of
this work,[99] and it will be remembered that it conferred a power on
the American President to reciprocate by proclamation any abolition of
discriminating duties of tonnage or imports made by foreign nations.
Mr. Buchanan pointed out with just pride that Congress twenty years
previously had offered reciprocity of trade to all the world, and that
England might, by complying with the fair and equitable conditions of
that Act, have at any moment placed her vessels and their cargoes,
both in our direct and indirect foreign trade, on the same footing
with those of America. Mr. Buchanan added that, previously to 1828,
reciprocity in commerce and navigation had been practically adopted by
his Government in specific treaties with Denmark, Sweden, the Hanseatic
Republics, and Prussia, and had since been carried out in other
treaties concluded with Austria, Russia, &c., all of these being still
in force.

But the following remarkable observation made by Mr. Buchanan at the
close of his letter, gives conclusive testimony that when Mr. Bancroft
offered “to give us all,” _i.e._ the coasting trade, this offer
was wholly unauthorized by the American Government.[100] The words of
Mr. Buchanan were: “I might add that the President, in accordance with
the spirit of this Act (of 1828) has already made a specific proposal
to Great Britain through Mr. Bancroft to Lord Palmerston, dated 3rd
November, 1847, to conclude a treaty providing that “British ships may
trade from any port in the world to any port in the United States,
and be received, protected, and, in respect to charges and duties,
treated like American ships, if, reciprocally, American ships may in
like manner trade from any port of the world to any port under the
dominion of her Britannic Majesty”: but _of course, this proposal was
not intended to embrace the coasting trade of either country_.”[101]
Mr. Buchanan did not confine himself merely to this honest, frank
disclaimer. While his own opinions, as well as those of the highly
liberal and intelligent Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. R. J. Walker,
whose admirable report was published at the same time, were decidedly
in favour of meeting the change proposed by reciprocal legislation, he
did not conceal from Mr. Crampton that it was probable some difference
of opinion would manifest itself in Congress upon this question, from
the unwillingness felt in some quarters to throw open the ship-building
business in the United States to the formidable competition of British
shipbuilders, and more particularly to that of the shipbuilders of the
British North American colonies.

Many persons in England shared the apprehensions expressed by Mr.
Buchanan, especially those who, having watched throughout the progress
of the agitation for the repeal of the Navigation Laws, were aware
of the strong Protectionist feelings then and still prevalent on the
seaboard of the States, though not shared to the same extent by the
non-navigating classes: they did not, therefore, believe that Congress
would allow the President to put even the Act for 1828 in force without
a serious struggle. However, though no opposition was offered, the
expressions of Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Crampton warranted a reasonable
doubt lest, when it came to the point, whether reciprocity would be
granted to the ships of Great Britain. That no difficulty was started
on the other side was mainly due to the meritorious reports of Mr.
Walker, whose zeal in the cause of freedom of commerce and navigation
deserves the highest encomium.

[Sidenote: Reply of other Powers.]

The application made to France with a view of ascertaining the
disposition of the Republic to enter into a course of mutual
Free-trade had no result. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in a letter dated 31st
January, 1849, (misdated 1848, see p. 209), complained of our partial
non-execution of the clauses of the Convention of 1826; but, as
regarded future legislation, he said in substance that, as in England
the question was being subjected to the gravest consideration, so in
France, now that her mission was to march in the way of liberality, the
greatest circumspection was necessary. The subject was referred to
the competent authorities, and a few vague words about a desire on the
part of the Republic to follow the principles of reciprocity closed the
despatch, for whatever the opinions of the President may have been, the
people of France were not then prepared to recognise the principles of
Free-trade.

Sardinia expressed a very honourable desire to meet us on the
basis of reciprocity. With Russia a practical reciprocity already
existed. In Austria no differential duties existed between national
and English vessels. The answer, however, given by Count Bülow on
the part of Prussia was by no means satisfactory, inasmuch as he
could give no pledge as to future legislation, the policy of Prussia
being bound up with the Zollverein States. The answer from Belgium
presented difficulties. That from Portugal intimated general, but
very equivocating and undecided, Free-trade principles, to the effect
that, as the peculiarities of the commerce of the different nations of
Europe were so various, the Minister of Portugal “could not believe in
the complete acquiescence of those same nations with the plan which
England proposed to follow.” A glance was directed to the benefits
of Free-trade, and Viscount de Castro added: “But if this is not the
time for restrictions, neither can it be for Portugal that of reducing
the few that exist, as that would be the means of entirely destroying
the mercantile navy.” Lord Palmerston was, however, consoled for the
unfavourable answer by the assurance of the Portuguese Government
that whatever were the facilities the nations of Europe might adopt
in correspondence with the Bill then under discussion in the British
Parliament, England would not obtain from any of those nations the
almost entire monopoly she then enjoyed in her maritime intercourse
with Portugal. The Viscount de Castro hoped, therefore, that “in
Council” no exception would be made to injure the trade of Portugal.

In spite of the want of success (and they received but scanty
support) Ministers met in their applications to foreign countries for
reciprocity, they resolutely persevered in their policy, resting for
their chief support almost wholly on the Free-trade party in the House
of Commons. The principles of Free-trade had become the established
and predominant policy of the nation, and navigation alone was the
exceptional branch which, until then, had successfully resisted
innovation.

[Sidenote: Progress of Free-trade views.]

It was very remarkable, that in the celebrated Petition of the London
merchants to the House of Commons, so far back as 1820,[102] from
which the Free-trade movement may be dated, no mention is made of the
Navigation Laws. Mr. Tooke, who drew the petition, directed chiefly
attention to the then unacknowledged fact that freedom from restraint
was calculated to give the utmost extension to foreign trade, and the
best direction to the capital and industry of the country. That the
maxim of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest, the
rule of every merchant in his individual dealings, was as strictly
applicable to the trade of the nation; but had Mr. Tooke at that time
hinted anything about navigation, or the abrogation of the existing
Navigation Laws, he would have exposed himself almost to personal
danger. The success, however, of the Free-trade measures which had
been adopted since 1842 had totally changed the current of public
opinion, and it was now only the shipowners, and the still powerful
Protectionist party in Parliament, which resisted this last crowning
measure of Free-trade. The opposition of the shipowners arose from a
deep-seated conviction that utter and inevitable ruin to their class
would result from the abrogation of the Navigation Laws.

[Sidenote: Parliament of 1849.]

Parliament assembled on the 2nd of February, 1849. The commercial and
manufacturing interests were rallying, but had not as yet effectually
revived from the prostration occasioned by the commercial crisis of
1847, and the general want of confidence resulting from the shock of
the foreign revolutions in 1848. The shipping trade was in a state
of transition, as it was not until some time later that the gold
discoveries in Australia gave a fresh impulse to the “long voyage”
trade, and that towards a region of the globe which promised but a
slow, however certain, future development of wealth and navigation. The
shipowners were, in fact, still suffering a periodical depression of
trade after two or three very prosperous years.

In the Speech from the Throne delivered by her Majesty in person, she
said: “I again commend to your attention the restrictions imposed on
commerce by the Navigation Laws. If you shall find that these laws are,
in whole or in part, unnecessary for the maintenance of our maritime
power while they fetter trade and industry, you will no doubt deem it
right to repeal or modify their provisions.”

[Sidenote: Death of Lord George Bentinck, 21st September, 1848.]

When the House of Commons assembled, a great void was felt in the
absence of Lord George Bentinck, who, during the recess, had been
snatched away by death in the very pride of manhood. His devotion to
the cause of the shipowners and Protectionist principles rendered his
loss deeply felt by many classes. On the day of his interment, which
was dark, cold, and drizzling, this feeling of respect was paid in
a manner almost reverential. From nine till eleven o’clock that day
all the British shipping in the docks and in the river, from London
Bridge to Gravesend, hoisted flags half-mast high, and minute guns
were fired from appointed stations along the Thames. The same mournful
ceremony was observed in all the ports of the United Kingdom; and
not only in these, for the flag was half-mast high on every British
ship at Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Havre.[103] Whatever may have been
the political errors of Lord George Bentinck, he was eminently the
friend and champion of the shipowners. Shortly before his death he had
renounced the leadership of his party in the House of Commons, and Mr.
Disraeli had succeeded him. In the House of Lords the re-appointment of
the committee of the preceding year was slightly mentioned; but upon
an intimation from the Marquess of Lansdowne that the measure to be
introduced by Government would not be delayed for the report of this
committee, the shipowners abandoned whatever designs some of them may
have had to prolong the inquiry.

[Sidenote: Mr. Labouchere’s new resolution, February 14, 1849.]

On the 14th February Mr. Labouchere, still President of the Board of
Trade, moved a fresh resolution almost in the identical terms employed
in the preceding year. He recapitulated at great length the arguments
in favour of repeal which he had employed in the previous session. It
will be unnecessary to dwell upon these here; but his new light with
regard to the coasting trade deserves a place in tracing the progress
of our mercantile marine: on this branch of the subject he seemed to
tremble before the superior abilities of Mr. Gladstone; and the remarks
of that gentleman intimating a strong desire to surrender the coasting
trade, with a view to obtain in return that of the United States,
evidently made considerable impression upon his mind, so that he
scarcely knew what to grant or refuse. Mr. Gladstone asked, not merely
that we should give colonial trade for colonial trade, but our coasting
trade for theirs. It was asserted that the American trade, say from New
York to California, was a foreign, or colonial, rather than a coasting
traffic. But to argue that a voyage from London to Malta was to be held
part of a colonial trade, while a voyage from California to New York
was to be considered part of a coasting trade, was preposterous, and
Mr. Labouchere affected to believe that the United States would not
persist in a policy so contrary to the dictates of justice and common
sense.[104]

[Sidenote: Proposed change in the coasting trade.]

The fresh consideration which Mr. Labouchere had given to his measure
enabled him now to propose a plan which, while it did not imply a total
abolition of all restrictions, would effect a considerable modification
of them, and at the same time enable us, as he conceived, to get,
_without cavil or hesitation_, such a measure from America as
the important interests of this country demanded, without exposing
our revenue to danger, or exciting alarm among those engaged in the
coasting trade of this country.[105] Such were the sanguine but vain
expectations of Mr. Labouchere. He tried to make it appear that there
were two branches of the coasting trade, which, although they went by
the same name, were yet essentially distinct from each other. There
was the trade, conducted principally either by steamboats or small
vessels, consisting in the carrying of goods and passengers to and fro,
and depending on local connection with the places between which the
trade was conducted. With that trade foreigners could not compete; and,
consequently, he illogically argued that it was not intended to disturb
that trade or throw it open to foreign competition; so that he proposed
to keep the coasting trade, which consisted of passing from one port to
another of the United Kingdom, on its present footing. Government had,
however, he said, resolved to abolish restrictions which prevented the
combination of a coasting with a foreign voyage. It was not proposed
that either a foreign vessel or an English vessel foreign bound should
be allowed to proceed from port to port in England and then return; but
that sailing from a British port, and being bound for a foreign port,
they should be permitted to carry from one British port to another, and
then clear out and proceed on their voyage. The Customs’ authorities
reported that this could be done consistently with safety to the
revenue, provided there was a restriction that the cargoes should
not be carried in vessels under 100 tons burden, so as to prevent
smuggling, although, as a matter of fact, the light dues and other
charges must effectually prevent such a trade. Such was the bungling
scheme respecting the coasting trade proposed by Mr. Labouchere,
whereby he attempted to satisfy all parties, and bring the Americans to
terms.

[Sidenote: Mr. Bancroft recalcitrates.]

[Sidenote: Hence withdrawal of the coasting clauses.]

When Alderman Thompson asked whether any intimation had been received
from the American Government as to any convention with respect to the
coasting trade, Mr. Labouchere answered, that in a recent interview he
had had with Mr. Bancroft, that gentleman said, “he should be willing
the next day to sign any convention which should include the coasting
trade”, and Mr. Labouchere believed him to be sincere;[106] though, by
Mr. Buchanan’s letter of the 9th February (which had not yet reached
England), the American Secretary of State had expressly said, “_the
coasting trade is of course reserved_.” As a matter of course, when
Mr. Buchanan’s letter reached England all Mr. Labouchere’s visions of
reciprocity in the coasting trade vanished. At a subsequent period Mr.
Labouchere, curiously enough, entered into a defence of Mr. Bancroft,
“who was a most honourable and straightforward man.” Be that, however,
as it may, he certainly deceived Mr. Labouchere; and, indeed, Lord
Palmerston also, who up to the 5th March, expressed himself in the
strongest manner that the reply of the American Government would fully
bear out Mr. Bancroft’s pledges. Such was the ignominious rejection
of these clauses relating to the coasting trade, which had been
inserted in the Bill of 1849 to meet “the conciliatory disposition”
of Mr. Bancroft, but which his superiors at Washington sternly and
unequivocally repudiated.

[Sidenote: The debate.]

[Sidenote: Alderman Thompson, &c.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Ricardo.]

The debate on Mr. Labouchere’s resolution brought out again all Mr.
Herries’ arguments and adverse predictions about repeal. Alderman
Thompson complained that the United States minister was recalled with
every change of Presidency, and that Mr. Bancroft was notoriously
more liberal than President Taylor, who had been elected upon the
principle of Protection to native industry. Mr. Banks, Mr. Hildyard,
Sir John Tyrrell, and the Marquess of Granby followed Mr. Herries and
Alderman Thompson in the same line of objection; whilst Mr. Hume,
Colonel Thompson, Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. John Williams, maintained the
Free-trade line of argument. Mr. J. L. Ricardo vehemently supported the
extreme views of Free-trade, and said emphatically to the shipowners:
“Depend upon yourselves—depend upon your energies as Englishmen—depend
upon the resources of this country and the wealth which commands the
resources of the world, and do not trust to Acts of Parliament. It
would be better to send forth our ships free as the winds which filled
their sails, with liberty to go where they would, and come from where
it suited them, than to start them from our ports encumbered with the
8 & 9 Vict. cap. 88, and ballasted with twelve volumes of Hertslet’s
‘Commercial Treaties.’” The resolution was agreed to without a trial of
strength, and the Bill was brought in.[107] It contained twenty-three
clauses.

[Sidenote: Meeting of the Shipowners’ Society.]

Upon the 2nd March, the second reading of the Bill having been fixed
for the 9th March, the General Shipowners’ Society held their annual
meeting at the London Tavern. Their accustomed comments upon lights,
harbours, and pilotage; discriminating duties in foreign ports; the
East Indian salt monopoly; the Merchant Seamen’s Act; the Passengers’
Act; the Merchant Seamen’s Fund, and a variety of other points, which,
at ordinary times, usually occupied a large share of their attention
and space in their report—were on this occasion all subordinate to the
one question of all-absorbing consequence, the threatened impending
repeal of the Navigation Laws. To discuss special regulations affecting
maritime commerce, while the whole question of general policy trembled
in the balance, was both inconvenient and embarrassing.

[Sidenote: Their report.]

The committee narrated at great length the various steps taken by
Government since 1846 with regard to the Navigation Laws. In reviewing
the evidence taken before both Houses, the shipowners made it
appear that they were completely triumphant in establishing all the
various points on which they took their ground; viz., that no evil
susceptible of any remedy had been or could be proved, arising from
the practical operation of the Navigation Laws: that the maintenance
of the Protective principle on which those laws were founded was
indispensable to the maintenance of an extensive mercantile marine:
that the preservation of such a mercantile marine was equally necessary
for the existence of a powerful navy: and that, hence, the repeal of
the Navigation Laws would involve danger to the basis of our national
defence.

Having proclaimed their own triumph, they next turned their attention
to the Bill then before the public, and, pointing out the unsparing
criticism it had provoked, demanded the strenuous and uncompromising
resistance, not only of every shipowner, but of every friend to his
country. They accordingly denounced it “as fraught with consequences
destructive to the shipping interest, and dangerous to the welfare and
safety of the country;” in short, as one of the most unjust measures
ever submitted to Parliament.

The Committee next proceeded to analyse the Bill, justifying their
censure of its provisions. It was said to be a concession to the
demands of the West Indies and Canada. The demand having been made
under an official stimulant, the West Indian interest, perceiving their
error, they alleged, has now disclaimed it, and publicly declared
that they have no desire for the repeal. Canada, with selfish and
precipitate incaution, had put forward a similar demand; but the
demand for free navigation was coupled in the same document with an
inconsistent claim for the re-enactment of a Protective duty in favour
of her agricultural produce. The expectation of benefit entertained
by the Canadians from the repeal of the Navigation Laws had, in the
opinion of the shipowners, as little real foundation as those the
West Indians had first entertained, but subsequently abandoned. Their
Committee expressed doubt of any beneficial reciprocity from the United
States, especially as any commercial treaty must be controlled by
two-thirds of the Senate.[108] They treated the power of re-imposing
restrictions as in principle opposed to every prudent rule of State
policy. The coasting-trade clauses, of course, met with condemnation.
If, they asserted, the censure cast upon shipmasters was deserved, the
injustice to the owner was flagrant. If unmerited, the measure was
sustained by cruel calumny.

[Sidenote: The manning-clause grievance.]

But the most notorious as well as the most important and disqualifying
inconsistency was the compulsion on a British shipowner to man his ship
with British seamen. This was magnified into a stupendous grievance. It
was said to force the shipowner to conduct his affairs contrary to his
conviction of his own interest, and according to the arbitrary dictates
of an inconsistent and tyrannical Act of Parliament. The Committee,
kindling with indignation at the mere recital of their grievances,
averred that if the Navigation Laws were repealed, a British registry
must be regarded as a badge of slavery, and an instrument of
oppressive interference; nor did they doubt that to escape its bonds,
unaccompanied as it then would be by any benefit whatsoever, British
capital would to a great extent be invested in foreign shipping, to be
engaged in the British carrying trade.

[Sidenote: Policy proposed.]

With these views, they enjoined union among themselves. They trusted
that shipowners would abstain from promulgating separate opinions, or
allow themselves to be drawn into controversy and disunion, as, by
these means, successful resistance would be impossible. They called on
the shipowners at the several outports to send deputies to the “central
committee in London for upholding the principles of the Navigation
Laws.”

By these means, they argued that there would be an opportunity for
a careful consideration of the future steps to be taken during the
progress of the Bill through the House of Commons. They further
suggested, that every possible endeavour should be made to enlist
the sympathy and engage the support of other powerful interests. The
principle they proposed was the disclaiming all desire for monopoly,
and the advocacy of such moderate and just protection to all interests
as would admit of foreign competition, so far as might be sufficient
to stimulate to the utmost domestic energies, but, at the same time,
would limit this competition within such bounds as to prevent domestic
energies from being crushed in the struggle. They concluded by
reminding the shipowners that “Union is Strength,” and by expressing
a fervent hope that this contest, which their enemies had insultingly
designated as a struggle “for the last rag of Protection,” would, in
its results, roll back the tide on their opponents, thus leading to the
universal application of the principles of just and moderate protection
to domestic interests, and superseding for ever the rash and delusive
theories which, in recent legislation, had successively involved every
interest of the State in difficulty, distress, and ruin.

[Sidenote: Agitation in the country.]

The agitation thus invoked by the central body of shipowners in
London was responded to by their fellow-shipowners throughout
the country. Meetings were held at Belfast, Bristol, Dartmouth,
Devonport, Dunfermline, Dundee, Exeter, Exmouth, Fleetwood, Glasgow,
Gateshead, Hull, Hartlepool, London, Liverpool, Leith, Lynn, Montrose,
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Portsmouth, Penzance, Perth, Sunderland, Shields,
St. Andrews, Swansea, Saltash, Tynemouth, Weymouth, and Yarmouth.
The petition from London was signed by 27,000 persons of the most
respectable classes; while that from Liverpool comprised 24,700 names,
not shipowners exclusively. This petition, eloquently drawn up,
expressed alarm at the progress of a measure which proposed to take
away from this country advantages it had so long and so successfully
enjoyed, and to invite, unwisely, foreign nations to share those
advantages with us; nations, too, utterly unable, even if willing,
to confer on us any adequate equivalent in return. It pointed at the
evident result of the substitution, to a great extent, of foreign for
British and colonial shipping, the employment of foreign labour and
capital in lieu of our own, and the creation of new relations between
foreign nations and our own colonies; thereby weakening the ties which
bind the latter to the mother-country, and diminishing British power
and influence throughout the world. They did not fail to show, above
all, the consequences the measure would have on the supply of seamen to
the Royal Navy.

The second reading of the Bill was fixed for the 9th March, when each
party mustered all its forces. The shipowners throughout the kingdom
were in a state of great excitement. It was true that among them were
many who were ready to accept the measure as proposed by Government,
if other nations would only reciprocate; and there were even a few who
were so extreme in their views of Free-trade as to desire that the
Bill should be carried as it stood, but the majority were vehemently
opposed to repeal; and, though some fears were entertained that the
second reading of the Bill would be carried in the House of Commons, it
was confidently anticipated that a considerable majority in the Lords
would, under the brilliant leadership of Lord Stanley (Lord Derby), who
had warmly espoused their cause, defeat its progress and throw out the
Whig administration.


FOOTNOTES:

[95] All these figures may now (1875) be at least doubled, except the
number of men, as the improvements in mechanical contrivances have
materially reduced manual labour since the repeal of the Navigation
Laws. In the case of steam ships to nearly one-half. See following
table:—

  -------+----------------------------------+--------------------------------
         |          Sailing Ships.          |         Steam Vessels.
         +-----------+---------+------------+-----------+--------+-----------
  Years. |           |         | Proportion |           |        | Proportion
         |   Tons.   |   Men.  |  of Men to |   Tons.   |  Men.  |  of Men to
         |           |         |  100 Tons. |           |        |  100 Tons.
  -------+-----------+---------+------------+-----------+--------+-----------
   1852  | 3,215,665 | 146,286 |   4·55     |   165,219 | 13,277 |   8·04
   1854  | 3,516,456 | 146,522 |   4·17     |   212,637 | 15,894 |   7·47
   1869  | 4,677,275 | 152,186 |   3·25     |   880,028 | 43,304 |   4·92
   1870  | 4,519,141 | 147,207 |   3·25     | 1,039,969 | 48,755 |   4·69
   1871  | 4,343,558 | 141,035 |   3·25     | 1,290,003 | 58,703 |   4·55
   1872  | 4,245,904 | 137,101 |   3·23     | 1,515,704 | 66,619 |   4·40
   1873  | 4,067,144 | 130,877 |   3·22     | 1,680,953 | 71,362 |   4·24
   1874  | 4,037,564 | 128,733 |   3·19     | 1,827,024 | 74,873 |   4·10
  -------+-----------+---------+------------+-----------+--------+-----------

[96] The original Bill will be found in vol. iv., Session 1847-8, p.
495.

[97] It was on this occasion that I first appeared before the public
as a politician. Following in the wake, but a long way astern, of
Sir Robert Peel and Mr. Gladstone, I addressed a number of letters
to Lord John Russell, which appeared in the ‘Morning Herald,’ and
were afterwards republished in a pamphlet. They had a very large
circulation, and caused considerable excitement among shipowners at
the time. They were written in a homely style, commencing, “I am a
plain man of business, daily to be found at my office in one of the
City lanes, in the midst of my clerks, in the centre of a large dingy
room. Business is my politics, not politics my business. If I have
a leaning it is towards Free-trade principles,” and so forth. But I
soon learned that my “principles,” as I laid them down, were, however
plausible, fundamentally and radically wrong. Sound enough they no
doubt were, _if all nations had been prepared to adopt them_; and
if they could have been applied to the world at large, no system could
have been more perfect. But, unfortunately, Foreign States were not
prepared to adopt Free-trade; and if we adopted retaliation against
those which did not, we reverted to Protection in its most pernicious
form. Consequently we pursued the policy most likely to suit our own
interests, and very wisely did not attempt to enforce it on other
nations. Therein Government was right and I was wrong.

[98] See ‘Parliamentary Papers,’ vol. li., 1849, p. 237, _et seq._

[99] _Ante_, p. 63.

[100] In truth, the policy of the American Government, since that
country became an independent nation, has with few exceptions been
throughout in favour of Protection. When Congress was first inaugurated
in 1789, one of the measures of that year (4th July) was “An Act for
levying Duty on Goods,” &c., and another (20th July, 1789) was passed,
entitled “An Act imposing Duties on Tonnage.” Indeed, so thoroughly
Protectionist were the great founders of the Republic, that Mr. Adams,
writing to Mr. Jay in Paris on the 26th February, 1786, says: “If the
United States would come to the resolution to prevent all foreign
vessels from coming to their ports, and confine all exports and
imports to their own ships and seamen, _they would do for anything
that I know the wisest thing which human prudence could dictate_.”
Further he says: “On the other hand, if the United States would adopt
the principle of the French economists, and allow the ships and
merchants of all nations equal privileges with their own citizens, the
consequence would be the sudden annihilation of their manufactures
and navigation.” And this has been in a great measure the opinion
entertained by the Americans throughout, no doubt under the impression
that, with so vast a territory, where they had within themselves almost
everything they required, they could do without foreign nations. They
have not yet seen the advantages they would derive by being allowed to
purchase in the cheapest market, wherever that market may be,—home or
abroad.

[101] See Mr. Buchanan’s letter in full, vol. li., ‘Parliamentary
Papers,’ p. 239.

[102] It was presented on the 8th May, 1820, by Mr. Alexander Baring,
afterwards Lord Ashburton. The whole case is reported in Tooke’s
‘History of Prices.’ Appendix, p. 332.

[103] Vide ‘Lord George Bentinck: a Political Biography.’ By the Right
Hon. B. Disraeli. Pp. 421, 422. See also p. 409, a curious story of the
marine picture in the Miracle Room at the cathedral of Antwerp.

[104] The Americans have, however, persisted in this policy to this
day; a fact which cannot be too often repeated.

[105] It may be said that the reason for maintaining the coasting trade
was not so much the fear of injuring the shipowners employed in it as
destroying “the nursery for our seamen.”

[106] See ‘Hansard,’ March 23, 1849, vol. ciii. p. 1229.

[107] The original Bill, and the Bill as amended in Committee, will be
found in vol. iv., 1849, pp. 331 and 347.

[108] In the first draft of the Constitution of the United States,
the power of Congress was limited by a special provision that “No
Navigation Acts should be passed without the assent of two-thirds of
the members present in each House.” See Pitkin’s ‘Political and Civil
History of the United States;’ and, though this proposal was afterwards
reported against, it remains in force to the present day.




CHAPTER IX.

     The debate, March 1849—Speech of Mr. Herries—Mr. J.
     Wilson—Question of reciprocity—Doubtful even in the case of
     shipping—Difficulty of the “Favoured-nation” clause—Marquess of
     Granby—Mr. Cardwell—Mr. Henley—Mr. Gladstone—Burdens to be removed
     from Shipowners—Conditional legislation recommended—Views on the
     subject of the coasting trade—Americans not Free-traders—Smuggling
     in the coasting trade—Mr. Robinson—Mr. Clay—Mr. T. A. Mitchell—Mr.
     Hildyard—Mr. Ricardo—Mr. H. Drummond—Mr. Labouchere’s
     reply—Majority of 56 for Bill—Committee on the Bill—Coasting
     clauses withdrawn—Mr. Bouverie’s amendment opposed by
     Shipowners’ Committee—Mr. Gladstone’s scheme also opposed by the
     Shipowners—Questions of reciprocity, conditional legislation,
     and retaliation—Details of American Law—Mr. Bouverie’s plan
     rejected—Mr. Disraeli’s speech—Third reading of Bill—Mr.
     Herries’ speech—Mr. Robinson—Mr. Walpole—Sir James Graham—Mr. T.
     Baring—Lord J. Russell—Mr. Disraeli—Majority for Bill, 61.


[Sidenote: The Debate, March 1849.]

The House of Commons, though seldom much interested in maritime and,
as was conceived, in intricate questions, was, on this occasion, full
to the overflowing. The subject was, indeed, one of crowning interest.
The repeal of the Navigation Laws would, as the extreme Free-traders
had remarked, sweep away “the last rag of Protection;” as others more
pompously had expressed it, would form the “capital of that majestic
column of unfettered commerce which their own hands had reared.”
The Protectionists, on the other hand, looked on the measure as the
final overthrow of our naval power and the destruction of our maritime
commerce. The shipowners mustered in great numbers about the Commons;
and the author, who had not, at that time, found a seat in the body of
the House, was favoured with one in the reporters’ gallery.

[Sidenote: Speech of Mr. Herries.]

Mr. Herries was once more selected as the champion of the shipping
interest; and, on the question being put that “this Bill be _now_
read a second time,” moved an amendment that it “be read a second
time that day six months.” If Mr. Herries was not gifted with great
eloquence, he possessed at least great experience, and a thorough
knowledge of his subject. His speech in opposition to the Bill was of
the most elaborate character. He insisted, that the more the measure
was examined, the more the shipowners and the public were adverse to
its passing. He examined at great length the correspondence from our
colonies and from Foreign Powers, contending that that from Canada
was useless, if not repugnant. In point of fact, he said, taking
his text from the report of the Shipowners’ Society, the opinion of
the Canadians had changed, and the public sentiment there appeared
decidedly adverse to repeal. A similar change of feeling seemed to
have come over the West India colonists, and they had shifted their
ground. Germany would do nothing until the central German government
was appointed, which, in his opinion, would probably be about the
Greek Kalends! The United States pointed out the existing law, but
could not answer us till Congress had been consulted. The replies
from other nations were gone over _seriatim_, and the conduct of
Belgium in adhering to what was thought best for Belgian interests was
applauded as a wise and liberal course. No foreign Government had given
a distinct answer except Belgium, and that was not a favourable one.
We had abandoned, he said, some of our restrictive laws in relation
to European navigation, and wisely abandoned them, because we could
not maintain them any longer. That was the ground of Mr. Huskisson’s
modifications: but we ought, at present, to hold what we could, and
to concede only what we must, in matters of navigation. He admitted,
amidst the derisive cheers of the repeal party, that the Navigation
Laws imposed restraints on commerce, and so far operated unfavourably;
but the question to be considered was whether the gain to be derived
from the abolition of these laws was a sufficient inducement for
running the risk of the loss to which this abolition must lead. All
prudence and sound judgment was opposed to repeal. The voice now rising
from every quarter would soon reach those in whose hands the government
was placed, and they would learn that their first duty was to uphold
British interests, maintain British commerce, and promote British
enterprise.

[Sidenote: Mr. J. Wilson.]

Mr. James Wilson, who replied at great length to Mr. Herries, had a
few years previously started a Free-trade journal, the ‘Economist,’
and, having obtained a seat in the House of Commons, became a staunch
and formidable advocate of an extreme Free-trade policy. He was a
master in statistics, and, as figures were the rage at the time, he
happily seized the moment which led to a political fortune, and,
using his knowledge of them to the best advantage became a valuable
adjunct to the ministry of the day. His speech on the present
occasion showed the beneficial action of Free-trade in the removal
of needless restrictions, and, further, that, though our merchants
had been exposed to great competition, the aggregate commerce of the
country had been proportionally augmented; he therefore asked why
the shipping interest should be exempted from a rivalry which other
interests had successfully encountered. He then demonstrated the
little real advantage the Navigation Laws gave to British shipowners,
who, by the very policy of those laws, were exposed to competition in
the long-voyage trade in the very places where competition was most
injurious to them; and, further, that all the tests fairly applied to
the question proved the ability of British shipowners to compete with
the foreigner. In some cases, too, he held that the Navigation Laws
acted as a protection to foreign at the expense of British ships; and
while, practically, of little benefit to the shipowner, there could be
no doubt that these restrictions operated injuriously, especially in
emergencies, on consumers, and, ultimately of course, on shipowners
themselves. If a commercial marine was necessary to support our navy,
Free-trade had increased and would increase that marine.

[Sidenote: Question of reciprocity.]

But perhaps the most important part of Mr. Wilson’s speech was that
relating to the question of reciprocity. The general question was,
indeed, beginning to resolve itself into three points. All parties
had come to the conclusion that some change was necessary; but it
remained to be decided whether reciprocity, conditional legislation
and retaliation, should be the principle of the measure. Mr. Gladstone
last year had strongly urged the principle of reciprocity in some cases
by special treaties. Mr. Wilson very strongly combated this principle.
Nothing he thought would be more prejudicial to the spread of
Free-trade principles among continental nations than that this country
should sanction the notion entertained by foreign Governments, that the
British Government was willing to make concessions not so much for the
general benefit of commerce, as for the sake of other concessions, to
be thus obtained from foreign countries in favour of England. Foreign
nations considered England as an old and wealthy nation, and expected
to be overreached in forming commercial treaties.

He objected, therefore, to the principle of reciprocity, as it would
actually throw difficulties in the way of those who were willing to
meet us. On any principle of reciprocity they must adopt that of
equivalents, and this was impossible. Other countries had no colonies,
and had, consequently, no equivalent advantages to offer in return
for those conferred by England. He admitted, however, that there was
a great distinction between reciprocity in produce and reciprocity in
shipping. If they imposed retaliatory duties on the produce of various
countries, for the purpose of meeting duties imposed on their own
goods, they did not visit the same interests with this retaliation. For
example, cotton and woollen goods were sent to Prussia: we received
from Prussia, corn, timber, and wool. If Prussia imposed high duties
on cotton and woollen goods, we could only retaliate by putting high
duties on the corn, timber, and wool of Prussia when imported into
England. The Prussian Government punished the woollen manufacturer
and the cotton manufacturer of England by imposing high duties on
their goods; and, then, the English Legislature punished them again
by imposing high duties on the raw material from which those goods
were manufactured. Nothing could be more monstrous than such a course
of proceeding. If we acted on the principle of reciprocity, we ought
to give perfect freedom of trade to those who gave perfect freedom of
trade to us. If the United States admitted our goods duty free, we
could not do less than admit the corn of the United States free.

[Sidenote: Doubtful even in the case of shipping.]

[Sidenote: Difficulty of the “Favoured-nation” clause.]

Suppose, again, Russia, on the Black Sea, imposed a duty of 50 per
cent. on manufactures, we must retaliate by a duty of 50 per cent.
on Russian corn and timber. We must, in fact, have distinct treaties
and distinct tariffs, and there would hence result a most complicated
system of international commerce. Reciprocity meant that or nothing.
But, after thus stating his views on reciprocity of produce, Mr. Wilson
admitted that by imposing restrictions on foreign ships corresponding
with those imposed on our own, we should have the advantage of dealing
with the same interest, and the weapon would be more likely to be
effectual, in that those, for whose sake duties were imposed abroad,
would be subject to corresponding disadvantages in this country. But he
was wholly opposed to reciprocity even in shipping. He had shown what
variety of treaties would be required if the principle of reciprocity
was adopted with regard to manufactures and produce; and he felt
convinced that a corresponding or analogous difficulty would arise from
adopting that principle in the case of shipping. Very intricate and
complicated regulations would be required. Thus, supposing we found a
country disposed to give all, we ourselves would be obliged to give
all. But then it must be borne in mind that there were twenty countries
with whom we had already treaties, and to whom we were bound to extend
the advantages obtainable by the most favoured nations: and, therefore,
if, now, we gave privileges to any one country, we must extend the same
to all the other countries which stood in the same position.

Suppose, he said, that Hamburg were to give this country all that
it required, and that, in return, its ships were placed on the same
footing as British ships; what guarantee should we have that a third
country, which had given us nothing, would not derive the same
advantages as the shipowners of Hamburg, or that the sugar of Java,
and the coffee of South America, would not be brought to this country
in their ships? There would be no end of evasion. The United States
would reciprocate; Prussia would do the same; Russia and the ports of
the Hanseatic League would follow their example: what, therefore, had
this country to fear? It was admitted that we should not expect the
same reciprocity from France, Spain, or Belgium; but, in these cases,
should we be really worse off than we are now? At this moment France
and Spain had great privileges in this country. France had the right,
not according to treaty, but from the general policy of our Navigation
Laws, to send her produce direct to this country in her own ships.
She, however, availed herself to a very small extent of this privilege.
Nine-tenths of the importations of Spanish colonial sugars came
likewise in British bottoms. As far as regards the reservations at the
discretion of the Queen in Council, Free-trade unrestricted would most
assuredly be the rule and restriction the exception.

[Sidenote: Marquess of Granby.]

The Marquess of Granby followed on the side of Protection, urging the
mischief that would result from the great number of persons thrown out
of employment; he pointed out how uncertain were the advantages to be
derived, and the reality of its evils; but despite of disadvantages,
if Englishmen were but true to themselves and their country, he felt
that we should be able to weather the impending storm, and retain the
command of that “glorious element” which was our natural protector, so
that the flag of England might still for years to come “wave triumphant
over every sea.”

[Sidenote: Mr. Cardwell.]

Mr. Cardwell, although he could not share in the gloomy apprehensions
of Mr. Herries or the eloquent doubts of the Marquess of Granby, felt
the importance of this question and its bearing on the mercantile
interests of England and her colonies. He warned the House of the
danger of not taking timely steps with regard to what was called the
“long-voyage” clause, which some of the witnesses before the Lords’
Committee regarded as a fundamental principle of the Navigation Laws;
and he showed that the effect of maintaining this clause would be to
defeat the policy of the warehousing system, and rob us of a large
share of the commerce of the world. There was nothing more important
than that great interest known by the denomination of the “warehousing
system,” which had been the growth of comparatively recent years and
was the offspring of a judicious relaxation in the Navigation Laws:
this system he held had made this country the entrepôt between regions
furnishing tropical produce and the great consuming countries of
Europe. Mr. Cardwell then urged the importance of the Canadian claims,
and described the keen competition going on between Canada and the
United States.

[Sidenote: Mr. Henley]

Mr. Henley went into a long argument against the Bill, especially
animadverting upon Mr. Wilson’s having derided reciprocity, while
nevertheless the Bill legislated for it, and Government had been in
correspondence with foreign Governments for the purpose of securing
it. “What did the Government intend to do,” he asked, “on the subject
of impressment? If the masters were to be taken from a superior class,
were they still liable to be impressed?”[109] The experiment of
Free-trade had not in Mr. Henley’s opinion been sufficiently tried to
justify the application of that principle to another great interest. If
the country were polled, every man, he was sure, would cheerfully pay
the hardly-appreciable advance in prices, rather than run the risk of
a failure in an experiment so dangerous. No one had attempted to deny
that obstruction was here, and inconvenience there; but when you came
to balance the possible risk with the possible gain, no one would be
disposed to run that risk, which he for one feared must take place if
the measure were carried. It was a great interest to tamper with, and
involved not only capital and industry, but the national defences.

[Sidenote: Mr. Gladstone.]

[Sidenote: Burdens to be removed from Shipowners.]

The debate was adjourned to the 13th of March, when it was resumed
by Mr. Gladstone, with his usual ability, in an elaborate speech.
He supported the second reading of the Bill, as furnishing the
only opportunity of inducing the House to agree to a change in the
Navigation Laws. He denied that this change would be the destruction
of the shipping interests, and thought it was a fitting time for
effecting numerous alterations. Mr. Gladstone, however, differed from
many who supported the measure. His doctrine was still that they should
not abandon the path of experience. In his opinion, it was only on
principles analogous to those of Mr. Huskisson that we could safely
depart from the system of navigation we had so long pursued, interwoven
as this had been, for centuries, with our national policy. There were
several demands the shipowner might fairly make upon the Legislature
when about to be deprived of protection. He was entitled to the removal
of every peculiar burden by which he was now hampered. If we exposed
him to unrestricted competition with foreigners, we should give him a
drawback, or a remission of the duties on the timber he required for
the construction of his ships. He should also be relieved from the
restraint with respect to the manning of his ships. There was another
compensation to which the shipowner was entitled. By repealing the
Navigation Laws, he would have to undergo competition from the Baltic,
sharp as far as it went, and from the United States, all over the
world. He was therefore entitled to ask that he should be admitted
to those fields of employment from which he was then excluded. The
policy pointed out by experience, Mr. Gladstone contended, was that of
_conditional_ relaxation. He had never entertained the notion that
we should proceed by treaties of reciprocity with foreign Powers. There
were difficulties in the way of doing so which a wise Legislature would
avoid. The American system, so far as it went, should be our model.
By adopting it, he considered that difficulties inseparable from the
system of reciprocity treaties would be avoided.

[Sidenote: Conditional legislation recommended.]

The immediate effect of conditional relaxation would be to give vessels
of such States as conferred privileges on our shipping corresponding
advantages in our ports. Such a course would be in accordance with
precedent and experience; was demanded by justice, and would be
found easier of execution than the plan proposed by the Queen’s
Government. There was in his mind an insuperable objection to any form
of retaliation. Every word urged against the system of reciprocity
told with augmented force against that of retaliation. He would join
in opposing that feature of the plan, regarding it, as he did, as a
material defect. But if Government would not consent to legislate on
the subject, conditionally, he would advise it to do so directly,
without the accompaniment of retaliation. In fact, the conditional
system was that on which we now, practically, acted with regard to many
of the maritime nations of the world.

[Sidenote: Views on the subject of the coasting trade.]

[Sidenote: Americans not Free-traders.]

[Sidenote: Smuggling in the coasting trade.]

There was another feature in the Government proposition Mr. Gladstone
regarded as defective. He was of opinion that the mode in which it
proposed to deal with the coasting trade would be found ineffectual.
Before we could expect to get the advantage of the American coasting
trade we must throw our own unreservedly open to that country.[110] Any
chance we could have of getting from America a share of her coasting
trade must depend upon our offering her our entire coasting trade,
leaving her perfectly free to accept it or not, under the regulations
now affecting British ships engaged in it. But we must not expect of
America that she would fetter herself towards other countries by those
particular regulations which it was proposed to lay down, and which do
not give up the whole coasting trade, but only portions of it; to any
such regulations we could not expect that America would agree. “If we
proceed by _un_conditional legislation, and offer up our colonial
trade instead of giving up our coasting trade, I believe she will get
our colonial trade, and may then be ready to give up some comparatively
insignificant advantages in return; _but America is not a lover of
Free-trade in the abstract_. The Protectionist principle is very
strong in America,” he continued, “although it is not so strong with
reference to shipping as to manufactures.”[111] For these and other
reasons Mr. Gladstone insisted on the expediency of throwing open
the coasting trade to the foreigner, “if he could find his way into
it.”[112] At present the uniform and invariable rule, he added, is to
insist on the strictest possible separation between the outward and
inward-bound goods, between foreign trade goods and goods coastwise;
and, in point of fact, with a system of drawbacks and high duty goods,
there would be the greatest danger to the revenue, or we must undergo
the most enormous expense, if we do not insist on the separation
of cargoes. But if a vessel is allowed to take in goods to carry
coastwise, duty paid, she might be taking in tobacco in Liverpool, duty
paid, to carry it coastwise, while at the same time she was discharging
tobacco at Liverpool, not duty paid. This would be fraught with great
danger. Mr. Gladstone then pointed out the conflicting interests of
various colonies; and that the only way to render justice to all was by
conditional legislation.

[Sidenote: Mr. Robinson.]

The substance of the speech of Mr. Robinson, Chairman of Lloyd’s, who
followed Mr. Gladstone, was, in the event of the Bill passing, to claim
indemnity for the shipowner. Would Government, he asked, take the duty
off timber; the duty on the timber for a vessel of 200 tons being
300_l._? There was also the duty on marine _assurances_; and,
indeed, all the taxes now pressing on the British shipowner, but from
which the foreigner was free. Would Government relieve the shipowner
from the apprenticeship restrictions, and allow him to man his ship
with foreign seamen? Government, he felt sure, could not give any such
assurance, and if they did and the promise was realised, Mr. Robinson
doubted if, even then, the British shipowner could compete successfully
with the foreigner.

[Sidenote: Mr. Clay.]

Mr. Clay, the extreme Liberal member for Hull, who would perhaps have
lost his seat had he voted for repeal, made a Free-trade speech, but
ended by voting against the Government measure. The position he took
was that as long as the burdens of the shipowner remained, protection
must be conceded to him. Mr. Hornby, who represented another of the
outports, recommended that concessions should only be made _pari
passu_, and that we ought not to give up the all-important maritime
advantages we possess.

[Sidenote: Mr. T. A. Mitchell.]

Mr. T. A. Mitchell reproached Free-traders like Mr. Hornby for voting
against repeal, and especially animadverted on Mr. Gladstone’s
procedure, whose speech in its general effect was surprising, as coming
from an advocate of Free-trade. A more effectual mode, in his judgment,
could not have been taken to damage the whole scheme. Mr. Mitchell
ardently supported repeal, not believing the average rate of freights
would decline in consequence; moreover, the repeal, he thought, would
enable us to escape the inordinately high freights which, in times of
sudden emergency we were now called upon to pay.

[Sidenote: Mr. Hildyard.]

Mr. Hildyard urged very strongly the importance of the coasting trade
of the United States, and the necessity of securing it. He admitted
that the coast of England was a difficult and dangerous one, and
that there was not much chance of America competing with us in that
trade. On the other hand, the coasting trade of America was of great
importance. An United States committee on harbours and rivers,
during the preceding year, had shown that no fewer than eight States
were mainly dependent upon seven great lakes for their commercial
intercourse; and that the line of coast of these eight States was not
less than 3000 miles; while, on the Mississippi and its tributaries,
fourteen States in 1846, with a population of 6,500,000, relied for
their easiest means of intercommunication. The sea-board of Maine
was more valuable still; so that it was of very great importance, if
concessions were to be made, that we should participate in the coasting
trade of America.

[Sidenote: Mr. Ricardo.]

Mr. Ricardo, while supporting the propriety of freeing the shipowners
from many of the burdens imposed on them, argued that the retaliatory
clause could not possibly be maintained, and that the proposed
reciprocity system was equally untenable.

[Sidenote: Mr. H. Drummond.]

Mr. H. Drummond, in one of his witty, splenetic speeches, opposed the
Bill. The object, he said, of every statesman in past times had been
to prevent capital from going out of the country, on the ground that,
if capital went out of the country, the labour of the country would
not be employed. Now every successive minister had to get up, and,
on every question brought forward, to go against every principle he
had previously defended, and so to take the opposite side of every
view he had before maintained. There were Fates presiding from which
no minister could liberate himself; while, as for the House itself,
there would appear to be a spell over them, rendering them passive
and helpless; while every successive Chancellor of the Exchequer
picked away at their livers _ad libitum_. The most celebrated
statesman of antiquity said: “There is in maritime States a corruption
and instability of morals, for they import not only merchandise but
morals, so that nothing can remain entire in the institutions of
their country.” The only quarrel, Mr. Drummond added, he had with the
Free-traders was with respect to Adam Smith, that they never would read
beyond one page of him. And yet, it was by men actuated by similarly
interested motives, that the House was now guided. The manufacturer
sent out to Africa for cotton; he employed African labourers in its
cultivation; he brought it home in an American ship; he spun it
into yarn by his machinery, and then sent it in a French vessel to
be exchanged for French cloth or silks, or other articles of French
manufacture. So that the whole process might be perfected without the
employment of a single English labourer. The poet exclaimed:—

     “Lives there a man with soul so dead,
     Who never to himself has said,
     This is my own, my native land?”

Yes! at Manchester there were a thousand such. Not content with
bringing accusations against the English sailors, not content with
slighting the opinions of their officers, they now said this country
had a superstitious reverence for the navy. He would not deny that they
might have had such a feeling, for there was a time when they had a
national faith; there was a time when they venerated, worshipped even,
the statesman who guided safely the destinies of the country; when
they reverenced the magistrates who presided over the administration
of their laws; when they gloried in the soldiers and the sailors who
maintained the greatness of the nation throughout the world; when the
noblest _credo_ that they had was “Rule Britannia!” and when the
finest anthem in their ritual was “God save the Queen!”

[Sidenote: Mr. Labouchere’s reply.]

After this protracted debate, Mr. Labouchere rose to reply. He went
over the chief points urged against repeal, and asked for no vote in
favour of it but from those who admitted the propriety of a departure
from the system of the Navigation Laws. He was ready to consider any
suggestions, in reference to the details, provided they were not
inconsistent with the principle of the Bill. He saw no reason why
the _present_ retention of the timber duties should operate as
a bar to the immediate repeal of the Navigation Laws. He opposed Mr.
Gladstone’s views as narrow and erroneous, and contrary to the true
policy of the country. Our commercial policy should not be made to
depend upon the views and caprices of foreign States.

[Sidenote: Majority of 56 for Bill.]

  The House at length divided, when there appeared
  for Mr. Herries’ amendment (that the Bill be read a
  second time that day six months)     210
                       Against it      266
                                      ----
      Majority in favour of the Bill    56
                                      ----

It will be remembered that the opinion of the House in favour of an
extensive change in the Navigation Laws was carried in a House of
only 411 members by a majority of 117 members. Now, after a year’s
reflection, we find that in a House of 476 members, the majority of
117 had dwindled down to 56! This great diminution of the apparent
power of Free-traders resulted partly from a general depression of the
shipping interests, but, principally, from the great exertions the
Shipowners were making to agitate the country in their favour. The
announcement of the diminished majority was hailed by the opponents of
the measure with loud and prolonged cheering. Every vote was scanned
with the most hostile criticism, and Mr. Cardwell, the newly-elected
member for Liverpool, was especially censured for voting against the
interests of that great maritime port. The Shipowners now took fresh
courage, and issued fresh denunciations against the measure, and
against the whole of the Free-trade journals—ministerial, Peel, and
Cobdenite—which had joined in full cry for the repeal of the Navigation
Laws. The agitation against repeal was renewed with fresh vigour on
the part of the Shipowners’ Society. It was now fondly hoped that,
by agitation, the majority in the House of Commons would diminish
in future stages of the Bill, in which case there could be no doubt
that the House of Lords would throw it out, and perhaps compel the
resignation of Ministers.[113]

[Sidenote: Committee on the Bill.]

[Sidenote: Coasting clauses withdrawn.]

On the 23rd March, the motion for going into Committee on the Bill gave
Mr. Labouchere an opportunity of withdrawing the “Coasting clauses”
he had previously paraded as an important feature of it. The tone and
manner of the right honourable gentleman betrayed the humiliation
he was doomed to undergo. He discreetly, however, held his tongue
respecting the flat refusal he had received from the United States
with respect to their expected reciprocation of the coasting trade,
expatiating, instead, at great length, on certain conferences he had
had with Sir T. Fremantle, the head of the Board of Customs, the
upshot being, that whereas Sir T. Fremantle had previously said that
the new proposed regulations regarding the Coasting trade would not
endanger the revenue he had now changed his opinion, and, with the
officials under him, had come to the conclusion that, if not absolutely
impossible, it would be extremely difficult to frame any regulations
which should not leave the revenue of the country exposed to great
danger if the distinction were done away with between the coasting and
general trade of the country—that is, if a foreign or a British ship
were allowed to combine a coasting with a foreign voyage.

Mr. Hume saw at once that if the trade were entirely laid open this
difficulty would be removed; but, although this was admitted, Mr.
Labouchere plausibly answered that to say to an American, “You may
come here and carry coals in our coasting trade, but you must not
combine that with a foreign voyage,” would be quite illusory. To
open the coasting trade in this manner, it was urged, would excite a
great deal of unnecessary alarm among the shipping classes; and, so,
the coasting clauses were hastily withdrawn. Of course, the refusal
of the American Government to reciprocate in the coasting trade
did not escape the sagacity of Mr. Herries, who, delighted at the
withdrawal of the obnoxious clauses, declared the excuse made about
the revenue to be wholly unsatisfactory; moreover, that it was made
known, unfortunately, just after the communication from the American
Government, so long delayed, had been laid on the table, by which it
appeared that Government was not, otherwise, prepared to make the
proposed concessions on the subject of this trade.

[Sidenote: Mr. Bouverie’s amendment opposed by Shipowners’ Committee.]

However, in the meantime, Mr. Bouverie, member for Kilmarnock, a
Free-trader, had given notice of a long amendment[114] to the first
clause of the Bill, which was, substantially, to the effect that the
several restrictions and prohibitions contained in the Acts recited
in the _1st Clause_ (i.e. the old Navigation Laws), with certain
exceptions, should continue in full force, till it should be shown
that British ships were not subjected in foreign countries to the like
restrictions and prohibitions. It might have been supposed that the
Shipowners would have consented to such a compromise: but they showed
no disposition to accept this proposal. Indeed, their hostility to any
alteration mainly led to their ultimate discomfiture. At a meeting of
the Central Committee for upholding the principle of the Navigation
Laws, it was unanimously resolved, “That the fatal consequences of
the repealing Clause, _No. 1_, in the Navigation Law Amendment
Bill, would not be removed by the amendment of which Mr. Bouverie had
given notice; and, as they were convinced that this clause would still
prove destructive to British navigation, they trusted it would not in
any form receive the sanction of friends to the shipping interest in
Parliament.”

[Sidenote: Mr. Gladstone’s scheme]

This was, perhaps, the last chance offered to the Shipowners: they,
however, relied upon throwing out the Bill, and rejected every offer at
modification, or conditional relaxation of the existing law, their aim
being to uphold those laws in their integrity. Mr. Gladstone’s views,
on the other hand, favoured the adoption of conditional legislation,
but not exactly in the way proposed by Mr. Bouverie. He proposed to
divide the whole trade of the empire into two divisions only: the
first of them relating to domestic or British trade; including under
that head the trade coastwise and the colonial trade. He proposed to
enact a law, not dependent on the discretion of the ministers of the
Crown, otherwise than that it would be their business to ascertain
when any country was disposed to give Great Britain perfect freedom
in its foreign trade, and to provide in such a case that it should
receive in return her foreign trade. Whenever any nation would propose
perfect freedom in all maritime trade, both foreign and domestic, it
would be placed on equal terms with British vessels in all ports,
foreign, colonial, and coasting. Mr. Gladstone, however, contemplated
a provision for the foreign trade of the colonies by dealing with that
trade irrespectively of the conduct of other countries. He suggested
the repeal of every direct restraint on the importation of tropical
produce—or non-European produce—from Europe, that being a restraint
which, according to the actual law, affected British ships as well as
those of foreign countries. He was also for the repeal of all fiscal
restraints, and of every restraint of the nature of a tax on the
British Shipowner. He would have set him free, alike with respect to
the command and the manning of his ship; he would also have allowed a
drawback on the timber used in the construction of ships.

[Sidenote: also opposed by the Shipowners.]

Such were Mr. Gladstone’s views, which he was sanguine enough to
imagine would have been acceptable to the shipping interests, had he
proposed a scheme embodying his opinions, and invited the Legislature
to make the necessary fiscal alterations. But when Mr. Gladstone
saw that both the Government and Shipowners rejected Mr. Bouverie’s
proposal, a form as it unquestionably was of conditional legislation,
he relinquished his intention of bringing his plan before the House, as
it had in fact no chance of being accepted by either party.

Such was the temper of all parties when the Bill went into committee on
the 23rd March, 1849; Mr. Herries, before the Speaker left the chair,
having intimated his intention of opposing the Bill during all its
stages, believing that it could not be rendered a good Bill, whatever
alterations might be made in it.

Upon going into committee, Mr. Bouverie brought forward his amendment.
He disclaimed any desire to defeat the measure, which he had supported
by his vote, still less did he hanker after Protection, for it was
strictly in the sense of Free-trade that he proposed it. He only
differed with Ministers as to the mode by which the changes proposed
should be effected. They had entered into reciprocal relations with
almost every other maritime nation. The United States had a complete
system of reciprocity: it was the foundation of their navigation
system, and it was an example it would be well to follow. The clause
he proposed would supersede the necessity of tedious and vexatious
negotiations. Out of a score of reciprocity treaties to which England
was a party, there were only four which contained the “favoured-nation”
clause; and it was idle to expect that, through the instrumentality
of any such compacts, genuine or extensively reciprocal advantages
could be established as between England and the other nations of the
world. It might be difficult, if not wholly impracticable, to realise
the principle of reciprocity in the case of tariffs, but it was not so
difficult to apply the principle to shipping. Nothing was so easy as to
say, we will relax our Navigation Laws, and make certain arrangements
with respect to our shipping interests, on the express condition that
other countries will adopt similar arrangements and similar relaxations
in our regard.

[Sidenote: Questions of reciprocity, conditional legislation, and
retaliation.]

If these views were unsatisfactory to the Shipowners, it is certain
they were still more so to the extreme Free-trade party. The question
had now resolved itself into the expediency of reciprocity, conditional
legislation, and retaliation. The extreme Free-traders demanded liberty
of navigation without any legislative restriction whatever, and the
plan of Government conferring a power of retaliation, though one little
likely to be resorted to, was of course the plan least objectionable
to the Free-traders. They contended that the Bill as it stood enabled
the country to receive concessions from foreign countries by making
concessions to them; but, if Mr. Bouverie’s motion was carried, they
asserted that, retaining in our hands the power of retaliation, we
should be compelled to resort to such measures whenever equality was
disturbed.

[Sidenote: Details of American law.]

Both parties in truth exaggerated the difficulties of their opponent’s
scheme, being attached to their own. The real question at issue was,
which country should take the initiative in a Free-trade policy. Mr.
Wilson, as an extreme Free-trader, insisted that the law of America
sanctioned reciprocity on their part, without having recourse to
Congress, which the members of the Shipowners’ Society controverted.
There can be no doubt that the American Law of 1828 did so authorize
the President to reciprocate any relaxation of the Navigation Laws we
might on our part resolve on. But when Mr. Buchanan had so recently
reserved the American coasting trade, repudiating the unauthorized
pledge previously given by the American envoy, and had further frankly
stated to Mr. Crampton,[115] that “it was probable some difference
of opinion would manifest itself in Congress upon this question,
from the unwillingness felt in some quarters to throw open the
ship-building business in the United States to the competition of
British shipbuilders, and more particularly to that of the shipbuilders
of the British North American colonies;” we might have been quite sure
that Congress would, if necessary, interfere, and, by some special law,
annul the liberal principle of the American Law of 1828.

Mr. Wilson and the Free-traders, affecting to be better informed on
the state of American law than the Shipowners, went into the opposite
extreme, and expressed their entire confidence in the complete
reciprocity of the Americans; asserting further, that without going
to Congress, the Executive could extend to every country similar
concessions as were extended to them. Such was the impression on both
the contending parties. As to Mr. Bouverie’s amendment, though it, in
some degree, resembled Mr. Gladstone’s views, that gentleman complained
“that his scheme had been withered by an unkind shadow cast over it by
the member for Kilmarnock,” at the same time, refusing to discuss a
plan not dissimilar to his own, and adhering to his opinion, that, as
foreign countries were in the habit of adopting measures to meet their
own wants, England ought to be allowed to do the same, but only on the
principle of reciprocity.

[Sidenote: Mr. Bouverie’s plan rejected.]

It is unnecessary to pursue this point any further. A long debate
ensued on it, in which Mr. Milner Gibson and Mr. Bright delivered, with
their usual force, their extreme, but then unpalatable, Free-trade
opinions, while Mr. Roundell Palmer opposed any change hostile to the
principles of the Navigation Laws. It appeared from the general feeling
of the committee, that Mr. Bouverie’s amendment had not the slightest
chance of being adopted, and he was desirous of withdrawing it. Mr.
Wawn, however, insisted upon a division; and when a division was taken,
only fifteen members voted in favour of Mr. Bouverie’s scheme of
conditional legislation, while 132 voted against it.

[Sidenote: Mr. Disraeli’s speech.]

Various other divisions took place on the consideration of the Bill
in committee, and numerous important alterations were then made, so
that only eighteen clauses were carried up to the sitting of the
23rd March. On the motion to report progress, Mr. Disraeli protested
against the whole Bill, which, by the withdrawal of ten clauses and
the modification of four more, had received that night a serious check.
He compared the proceedings to those during the French Revolution, on
the day when the nobles and prelates vied with each other in throwing
mitres and coronets to the dust as useless appendages. That day was
still called “the day of dupes;” and, remarked Mr. Disraeli, “the
same appellation might be applied when referring to the events of
that evening. We have had,” he continued, “two years of protracted
legislation against the Shipowners of England.” The course Ministers
had pursued during those two years formed no exception to the rash
policy which had characterised their proceedings with regard to the
agricultural and colonial interests. “Have your deliberations been
graver or more thoughtful? This” (holding up the Bill), “this,”
exclaimed Mr. Disraeli, “is my answer. Ministers acting in this
manner,” he continued, “did more than injure and destroy the material
interests of the nation; they laid the foundation of a stock of
political discontent, which would not merely diminish the revenues
of the kingdom and the fortunes of its subjects, but would shake the
institutions of the country to its centre.” After Mr. Gladstone and Mr.
Labouchere had spoken in reply, the committee reported progress.

When the committee resumed its sittings on the 26th March, the
Retaliatory Clause (19) became a subject of discussion. The several
leaders again delivered their opinions on this much-controverted
point, the Free-traders wishing to omit the clause altogether; while
Mr. G. Sanders intimated an intention of making the Bill operate
for a limited term, so as to ascertain whether Foreign Powers would
reciprocate or not. The clause, however, was finally carried without a
division; but Clause 22, enabling the Queen to reduce the differential
duties in certain cases, opened the wide question of dock dues and
light dues, in which public and private rights were so confusedly
intermingled that it was ultimately withdrawn. The remaining clauses
passed with some opposition, the preamble, however, being agreed
to. Thus this celebrated Bill now assumed a formal shape; but its
opponents, conscious of their power in the House of Lords, gave notice
of a last trial of strength upon the third reading.

On the 19th April, Captain Harris made an ineffectual attempt to
carry a clause, on the consideration of the Report, enforcing the
apprenticeship laws, and Mr. Gladstone obtained a modification of the
Bill with regard to the mode of finally adjusting the intercolonial
trade by the colonial legislatures.

[Sidenote: Third reading of Bill.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Herries’ speech.]

During the Easter recess, meetings of the shipping interests had been
held in various outports, and the whole power of the Shipowners had
been put forth to defeat the Bill. On the 23rd April the Bill stood for
the third reading, and the venerable Mr. Herries once more headed the
party of Anti-Repealers to make a last effort in the House of Commons
to reject the Bill. His speech was well prepared, and suitable to the
occasion. He very briefly alluded to the points already decided, but
dwelt with great force on the Bancroft letter, asserting that nothing
had passed relative to the United States, which ought for a moment to
weigh with Parliament, in changing its determination to maintain the
Navigation Laws. “Let English commerce now speak!” he exclaimed. “Look
at the petitions against the Bill, comprising the greatest names in the
City.[116] In Liverpool 47,000 persons had signed petitions against
the Bill; and among these were 1000 mercantile firms of great note and
respectability. This was without precedent in the history of petitions;
whilst a counter-petition contained but 1400 names, among which were
not found 100 trading firms.” Mr. Herries denied that the subject had
any necessary connection with Free-trade. The experiment might be
continued, and yet, with perfect consistency, while abstaining from any
interference with the main structure and fundamental principles of the
Navigation Laws. These laws had always, he alleged, been considered
an exception to the general laws affecting trade. After an elaborate
speech, Mr. Herries concluded by moving that the Bill be read a third
time that day six months. Alderman Thompson seconded the amendment.

[Sidenote: Mr. Robinson.]

A very animated discussion ensued. Mr. Robinson went over the old
topics, and said that the new republican Government of France had
advertised for the importation of 38,000 tons of coals into France, one
of the conditions being that they should be imported exclusively in
French vessels. So much for the Navigation Laws of France. The National
Assembly had also introduced another measure by which the importation
of salt in French vessels subjected to a duty only of 75c., while that
imported in British vessels was required to pay a duty of 2f. 75c. So
much for Free-trade with France. He trusted the majority in favour of
the ministry would be so small as to induce the Government to pause in
their career.

Mr. Macgregor, in a very long speech, supported the Bill, though he
wished it had been a more complete measure.

[Sidenote: Mr. Walpole.]

He was followed by Mr. Walpole against the Bill, who quoted the
Venetian proverb,[117] and said—“Let us first be Englishmen, and
then economists.” He considered the Navigation Law the wisest of our
regulations. It had given us safety and independence at home; it had
afforded security to our colonies abroad; it had protected our trade
in every part of the world, and it would protect it, if the laws were
not repealed, against all chances of war; and, while it had done
this effectually and completely, it had also preserved for them the
supremacy on the ocean, by which more than once they had been able to
bid defiance to the whole world, when our honour and interests were
assailed. Mr. Walpole concluded by borrowing the splendid peroration of
Mr. Disraeli in that gentleman’s speech at the second reading.

[Sidenote: Sir James Graham.]

Sir James Graham next rose, and, differing much on some points from
the supporters of the Bill, intimated, in an exhaustive speech, his
intention of voting for the third reading. Pointing to Sir Francis T.
Baring, who sat on the Treasury Bench as First Lord of the Admiralty,
the head of the house of Baring, he expressed his disbelief that he
would be an assenting party to a measure which, in his conscience,
he felt would be injurious to the character and welfare of that
commercial navy, to which he and his family for generations had been
so much indebted, or that he would give the weight of his influence to
a measure which, in his judgment, risked the power and greatness of
the Royal Navy, more especially confided by her Majesty to his care.
Liverpool had been mentioned. Why, the two members for Liverpool have
voted for the Bill.[118] So also did the two members for Newcastle and
Glasgow.

Sir James Graham added, that, however valuable reciprocity might have
been, when Mr. Huskisson considered the question in the abstract, he,
Sir James, was not much attached to it now. It might have been wise
and politic at the time; but he could not help thinking that it made
the interest of others the measure of our interest, he had almost said
it made the folly of others the limit of our wisdom. With respect to
reciprocity and to retaliation, which is reciprocity in another shape,
as a general rule he would rather leave the Navigation Laws as they
were than adopt that principle. What is retaliation? he asked. It is
this: because some foreign nation does that which is more injurious
to herself than it is to ourselves, we, in the spirit of blind,
vindictive passion, proceed to do that which is more injurious to
ourselves than to our rivals. To reciprocity and to retaliation, as a
rule, Sir James was opposed; but he supported the Bill, on the whole,
because without having recourse to either the one or the other, and
considering the character of the people of this country, their capital,
their undaunted courage, and the advantages they possessed in the race
they had already run, he was satisfied that any measure throwing open
the trade of the world would greatly increase commerce, and that the
lion’s share of the addition would fall to our lot. Every reason, he
argued, existing, in the days of Mr. Huskisson, for the relaxation of
the system existed in a yet stronger degree at the present moment; and,
quoting the expression employed by Lord Stanley, _Vestigia nulla
retrorsum_,[119] as applicable to the recent Free-trade policy, he
concluded a highly elaborate speech by remarking that Protection or
no Protection was the question at issue; and, as the present measure
would crown the work they had already accomplished, he was opposed
to reaction, and favourable to progress tempered by prudence and
discretion. Upon these grounds he supported the third reading.

[Sidenote: Mr. T. Baring.]

Mr. Thomas Baring avowed his opinion that, as a general principle,
restriction must be an injury to trade. If the whole community were to
be regarded as a community of merchants, certainly it was desirable to
allow the importers to get their wants supplied, and ship their goods
where and whence they pleased. If we were, like the inhabitants of the
Hanseatic Towns, mere receivers and distributors, then we might say,
let every other consideration be disregarded. But the real grievances
of the merchants might fairly be taken from their representations,
and, if they had sustained such grievances as had been represented,
surely they would not have been either indifferent or adverse to the
removal of those laws. If he understood the Bill rightly, it was framed
on the principle of removing all restrictions on foreigners, and of
maintaining restrictions on Englishmen. Let the House mark, he said,
that Government which, after great research and trouble in obtaining
information, had told us that there was an inferiority on the part of
our captains and sailors, now told the Shipowners that they were to
compete with those, who had the power of employing better workmen. The
only facility given by the Bill to Shipowners was the privilege of
building ships abroad; on this he would make one remark, that every
person knew the difficulty of recovering a manufacture once lost.

With respect to conditional legislation, suggested by Mr. Gladstone,
public opinion was divided on it in the United States. Sweden, in such
a case, had nothing to give. Holland could only give one-third, as the
Dutch Commercial Company carried on the other two-thirds of the Dutch
trade by contract in Dutch vessels. As regards the United States, he
was satisfied Mr. Bancroft did not intend to practise a deception.
The navigation of the United States offered advantages which might be
of account; yet there the favoured-nation clause came in to create
difficulties, and it might be that we would feel compelled to abandon
the Navigation Laws with respect to those States, or relinquish the
advantages which were offered prospectively. We ought to adhere to
the main principles of the Navigation Laws in all instances, and make
such concessions to each country as our interests might dictate as
expedient. The principles of Free-trade ought to be applied to each
measure under discussion, according as our particular interests were
affected thereby. Sir James Graham had put the question as one decisive
between retreat and progress. Reaction was as much to be feared as a
rash progress, for reaction might be fraught with suffering to the
people, as dangerous to the interests of the country as the proposed
change was ominous of evil.

[Sidenote: Lord J. Russell.]

Lord John Russell as Chief Minister of the Crown wound up the debate
on his side. He was aware that the law had been almost worshipped as
the _charta maritima_ of this country, and that, much of our
prosperity and commerce having been attributed to this law, it had
been thought profanation to alter it. He thought this was an opinion
founded in error, and that, at no time, had this law been essentially
advantageous to this country. He then went over the history of the
Navigation Laws, quoting authors of various times who wrote of the
fluctuations in trade and public policy, and having reviewed the
several points of the question, came to the conclusion that with
respect to the greater part of the nations of Europe and of the world,
we would obtain fair and equal terms of navigation, provided we were
ready to give the same terms to them. He went farther; he boldly
said that nobody could doubt that in the case of the United States
of America, or in those of Prussia, Russia, or Austria, the fullest
reciprocity would be conceded. The nations which would not give equal
terms were, at the most, only three or four—France, Spain, and
Belgium, and perhaps one other.

[Sidenote: Mr. Disraeli.]

[Sidenote: Majority for Bill, 61.]

Mr. Disraeli assumed the privilege of the last word, and, in reply,
quoted the last report of the Shipowners’ Society, which has been
already given, intimating their readiness to discuss the policy of
amending the Navigation Laws on all points not involving fundamental
principles. He next took a rapid review of the effects of repeal on
the Australian and other colonies, arguing that, if Canada had not a
Protective duty on corn restored to it, as demanded by the Legislative
Assembly, Canada would be lost to the British Crown. “Woe to those
statesmen and to the policy which plucked this jewel from the Crown of
England! No shuffling change in the Navigation Law could compensate
the people of Canada for what they had lost, and which they felt so
acutely.” Mr. Disraeli then referred to the papers from foreign Powers,
arguing that they were valueless, and, especially, that everything
respecting the United States was a _tabula rasa_, all that we had
heard last year having been obliterated as an element of consideration.
The last division on this famous Bill now took place upon the third
reading, when the Ayes were 275; Noes, 214; Majority, 61.


FOOTNOTES:

[109] This may appear unintelligible: while actually masters they could
not, it is true, be taken; but Mr. Henley said they might be, while
changing from one ship to another, and that he knew of instances in
which mates had been impressed, placed on board a man-of-war, and kept
there for seven years.

[110] While the second reading was under discussion, ministers did not
present the papers from the United States, in which the coasting trade
was reserved. They discreetly kept the secret up to the last moment
before the division. Had the Bill thrown open the whole coasting trade,
we now know the Americans would have declined to reciprocate.

[111] This is quite true, but the reader has had this fully accounted
for by the antagonistic interests of the non-navigating and navigating
States. The opposite feeling was disclosed in the very first debates of
the Republic.

[112] The entries and clearances of foreign vessels in the coasting
trade of the United Kingdom are quite insignificant.

[113] In the ‘Shipping Gazette,’ March 17, 1849, there is a list of the
51 members of seaport towns in the United Kingdom who voted in favour
of the Bill. Mr. Hudson, Sunderland; Mr. Barnard, Greenwich; Lord J.
Stuart, Ayr; and Lord J. Chichester, Belfast, were absent.

[114] The Amendment would occupy two pages; it will be found in
‘Hansard,’ vol. ciii. p. 1206.

[115] _Vide_ Letter of Mr. Crampton, 18th February, already
referred to.

[116] At the head of the London petition were the names of Thomas
Baring; Charles Baring Young; Fred. Huth and Co.; Ransom, Norton, and
Co.; Palmer, McKillop, and Co.; H. Davidson; Masterman, Peters, and
Co.; Spooner, Atwood, and Co.; Fletcher, Alexander, and Co.; Bosanquet
and Co., &c.

[117] “Let us be first Venetians, and then Christians.”

[118] Yes! But they lost their seats by it.

[119] Literally, “You can’t retrace your steps.”




CHAPTER X.

     Debate in the Lords, May 7, 1849, on second reading—Speech of
     the Marquess of Lansdowne—Lord Brougham—Condemnation of Mr.
     Porter’s statistics—Protected and unprotected Trade—Voyages to the
     continent—Napoleon’s desire for ships, colonies, and commerce—Earl
     Granville—Earl of Ellenborough—Increase of foreign peace
     establishments—Earl of Harrowby—Earl Grey—Lord Stanley—Admits
     need of modifications—Canada not our only colony—Majority for
     the Bill, 10—Duke of Wellington votes for it—Proceedings and
     debate in Committee—Lord Stanley’s amendment—Rejected by 13—Earl
     of Ellenborough’s amendment—Claims of Shipowners, and fear of
     competition—Amendment rejected by a majority of 12—Bill read a
     third time—Timber duties, &c., admitted to be grievances—Lord
     Stanley’s protest—Royal assent given, June 26—Coasting trade
     thrown open, 1854—Americans, October 1849, throw open all except
     their coasting trade.


[Sidenote: Debate in the Lords, 7th May, 1849, on the second reading.]

[Sidenote: Speech of the Marquess of Lansdowne.]

Although the majority in favour of the Bill had slightly increased
since the division had been taken on the second reading in the House
of Commons, the Shipowners were not discouraged, believing it would be
thrown out by the Lords. They knew that the ministry had staked their
reputation upon it, and that the fate of the Government depended on
the result, but they confidently believed that the Upper House would
reject “so pernicious a measure.” The Bill was at once carried up to
the Lords, and read a first time on Tuesday, 24th April; and on Monday,
7th May, the Marquess of Lansdowne moved the second reading in a long
and elaborate speech. He contended that the origin of the Navigation
Laws during the Protectorate of Cromwell did not arise so much from a
commercial or political want as from a desire to punish the Dutch for
their loyal support to Charles I.[120] He admitted, however, that there
were then good grounds for trying the experiment how far the national
arm could be strengthened by restriction, and how far the naval force
of the country could be thus increased. The noble Marquess next traced
at length the changes contemplated by Mr. Pitt, and the incidents of
the war with Napoleon, contending that the law, by successive changes,
had ceased to be a suit of impenetrable armour, and was now only an
imperfect garment of shreds and patches, manufactured out of parchments
from statute books. He, further, showed the increase of our shipping
since the relaxation of the shipping laws, maintaining that the dread
of foreign competition was altogether irrational, and demonstrating, by
statistics, the large share of the American direct and carrying trade
we had already secured in open competition with American ships hence,
and with foreign ships from their own ports to American shores; while
we were, at the same time, able to bear off the chief share of the
Russian trade from the Baltic ships even within the heart of their own
country. He briefly referred to the colonial bearing of the question,
and said that the West Indies were subject to great troubles, and
Canada engaged in a difficult competition with the United States, the
whole trade of the St. Lawrence depending on the repeal of that part
of the Navigation Laws still in operation, the complete opening of
that river alone, he thought, being sufficient to enable her to retain
the trade now fast passing through the United States. The Marquess
quoted Bonaparte, whose aim, when at the summit of his power, had been
to obtain ships, colonies, and commerce. Bonaparte conquered one-half
of Europe; the other half he seduced or entrapped into negotiations.
He could create monopolies everywhere, and did so unscrupulously;
but the genius of English commerce overcame those monopolies. Ships
he could not get; colonies he could not acquire; commerce he could
not establish; and was this, he asked, a consequence of the British
Navigation Laws? No; it was British commerce and enterprise, which, in
spite of restrictions in all parts of the world, secured a footing;
and, in spite of edicts enforced by a million of bayonets, was
established and conducted successfully. The Marquess then explained
that the Administration depended upon this question, and were prepared
for all the consequences of a hostile vote.

[Sidenote: Lord Brougham.]

To the astonishment of the country, Lord Brougham, in one of the
ablest, or at least the most rhetorical speeches[121] he perhaps
ever delivered even in his best days, opposed the second reading of
the Bill. His Lordship had supported the other great measures of
Free-trade, and now did not escape the charge of inconsistency, which
he most eloquently denied. “I will only say,” he exclaimed, “that I
glory in what forms the subject matter of this taunt. I glory in having
obtained those immortal victories over antiquated error; in having made
to triumph the soundest principles of political philosophy, sweeping
away the groundless prejudices by which its progress was obstructed
heretofore. But if there is one passage of my political life dearer
than another to my remembrance, and any drop in the cup of exultation
more particularly sweet to my palate, it is the recollection of those
worthy, eminent persons, leaders of the revilers, the distinguished
statesmen whose support I enjoyed after passing a long life in
opposition to them on this very question, and who crowned themselves
with honour by abandoning their own errors in vindicating the truth.
But it is not now with them as with me. I make no change in my
opinions.” The noble Lord then plunged into the Orders of Council[122]
during the war, in the discussion of which he took such a conspicuous
part.

[Sidenote: Condemnation of Mr. Porter’s statistics.]

In speaking of the tables from the Board of Trade and Customs, he said
a lively impression prevailed on all sides, that they could prove
anything and everything. Indeed, it had been remarked, give me half an
hour, and the run of the multiplication table, and I’ll engage to pay
off the National Debt. In statistics it is easy to add a little here,
and subtract a little there, quietly to slip in a figure—it may be a
cypher among your data—slyly to make what seems a reasonable postulate
in your premises, but which turns out to be a begging of the question;
and, behold, you gain your point and triumph; until, it is found
that your adversary, having access to the same stores of arithmetic,
proves his case, and refutes yours, with the same facility. Such are
statistics when severed from sound principle and plain reasoning. But
how little are these to be relied on when prepared by those in the
employ of one party? To trust oneself among such details would be
perilous in the extreme. “My noble friend has fared forth into the
labyrinth with such bad success, that his fate seems to warn me how I
venture to follow his perilous course. But there remains to deter me,
like a beacon on the same coast, the sad wreck of another adventurer,
the good ship _Board of Trade_, G. R. Porter, Master, cast away
on the shoals of these faithless waters.” The noble Lord then assailed
Mr. Porter with the whole force of his sarcasm. He said: “Mr. Porter,
showing the comparative progress of English and American tonnage, takes
the whole of one part and only part of the other, and thus makes out
the result which suits his argument. Lord Hardwicke, the chairman, put
this question to the witness, after stating the entire difference of
the two returns, the difference being total in one case and partial
in the other. ‘Then, consequently, these returns are not to be taken
compared together, as showing in any degree the comparative value of
British and American tonnage?’ Mark the answer of the hapless Mr.
Porter. ‘Certainly not.’” The noble Lord then went on tearing, in the
opinion of the opponents of the Bill, Mr. Porter’s evidence to shreds.
“I am reminded,” said his Lordship, “of the cooking of the returns.
But here we had called up the chief cook to examine him. We asked,
‘Is this dish pure?’ ‘Not at all,’ he answered. ‘Is it nutritive?’
‘Nothing of the kind.’ ‘Is it safe and wholesome to eat?’ ‘Certainly
not?’ ‘Have you any means of correcting its poison by an antidote?’ ‘I
am not sure; I rather think I have; but I am not certain.’” The noble
Lord then referred to the reciprocity treaties; the fact being that
these treaties were all respecting differential duties; all of them
were grounded on the comparatively sound principle of only relaxing our
monopoly in favour of those States who agreed to give us the _quid
pro quo_; whereas the present scheme was to give the _quid_
without the _quo_; to sweep away all restriction at once with
every country before we secured an equivalent from any one; and so far
from proportioning our sacrifice to our gain, to sacrifice everything
before we gained anything.

[Sidenote: Protected and unprotected trade.]

“On the statistics of the protected and unprotected trades,” continued
his Lordship, “it is, that the greatest errors have been committed. It
was among these shoals that Mr. Porter had left a wreck, as a beacon
to warn us how we follow his course. He, no doubt, had steered to the
best of his ability, and quite unconsciously had been cast away; but,
that he acted under the bias of a strong prejudice in favour of his
ally and relative, the author of the present Bill, is very much to be
suspected, for we all know that the Bill is really Mr. Ricardo’s, who,
in 1847, moved the Committee on the Navigation Laws, the Government
being afterwards pushed on by their supporters, impatient at seeing
them hold their places and do nothing.” After dissecting these tables
with a ruthless hand, Lord Brougham asked how any rational man could
place reliance upon tables thus framed, and thus abounding on their
face with errors the most fatal. Their great concoctor is asked about
these errors, and he cannot deny them, so he says the heading of the
return is wrong, and that instead of “unprotected,” it should have been
“less protected.” Indeed! But that is just giving up the whole value of
the table, and making it utterly useless—utterly unfit to be the ground
of any inference whatever—utterly foreign to the present question. For,
observe, we can understand what is meant by a trade unprotected by the
Navigation Laws, and compare it with one that is protected; but a trade
“less protected,” how is that to be defined? Less protected than what?
What does this tell us? What makes more, what less? How can we compare
them together? All depends upon how much more and how much less, and
this Mr. Porter does not affect to show.

[Sidenote: Voyages to the continent.]

“But,” exclaimed his Lordship, “this is not the worst of it by a great
deal!” He then sifted the whole returns about the voyages to the
continent, to which I have already referred. “My Lords, I will readily
give a large licence for exaggeration to that lively class of persons
who contribute to our amusement by their powers of imagination, drawing
upon their fancy for their facts, and on their memory for their jests.
To these men I render all grateful homage, as among the gayest of
our sad species; so far as fourfold, or even tenfold, I am willing
to extend my licence. But what shall we say of a hundredfold, nay, a
hundred-and-fiftyfold, and that, not by the lively wit, but by the
plodding dealer in returns, tables, and trade and shipping statistics.
I must really send them away to bury themselves and their errors in
the recesses of the trade department, and no longer hope to obtain any
faith here. I have done with such food, such dry food even when it is
honestly prepared and fairly served up.”

Lord Brougham then entered fully into the merits of the general
question, calling upon their Lordships not to part rashly with what
had been called the miserable remnants, the fragments of a worn-out
system. “Fragments, indeed! They are of gigantic size; they are the
splendid remains of a mighty system; they are the pillars of our navy;
the props of our maritime defence.” He showed that there remained the
almost entire monopoly of our home trade, and the perfectly rigorous
monopoly of our colonial trade, employing above a million and a half
of shipping, and 20,000 seamen, with a capital that gave export and
import to between fifteen and sixteen millions sterling in the year. He
further insisted that the restrictions affecting Canada could be easily
removed without unsettling our whole policy.

The policy of the Navigation Laws rested, in his opinion, on the
position that, without such a partial monopoly as they gave to British
shipping, we never could maintain a sufficiently ample nursery for our
navy, an object of primary importance to every insular empire, and,
therefore, to be sought at a considerable sacrifice of the wealth
unfettered commerce might more rapidly accumulate.

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s desire for ships, colonies, and commerce.]

The Emperor Napoleon I. has been cited as having wished “for ships,
colonies, and commerce.” The quotation is not quite accurate.[123]
He inveighed against “the ships, colonies, and commerce of England,”
and mentioned these as the object of his hostility; whence Mr. Pitt,
at a Guildhall festival, gave as a retaliatory toast, “the ships,
colonies, and commerce of England,” a retort which derived its point
from the French Emperor’s hostility against these special objects. Lord
Brougham, in his splendid declamatory style, showed how Napoleon must
have wished in vain—for we had swept the seas of his navy, captured all
his colours—because we had created our own marine, which, he argued,
owed its existence entirely to the encouragement the Navigation Laws
gave to ship-building, and the facilities lent by the same laws to the
manning our fleets, which that encouragement had created. For nearly
two hundred years, he continued, we had abided by that policy; and
holding steadily our course, neither swerving to the right nor to the
left, never abandoning it, only adapting it to varying events which
have altered the distribution of dominion in other regions, we have
upheld the system which has made our navy the envy of our rivals, the
terror of our enemies, and the admiration of the world. “Are you,”
exclaimed his Lordship, with one of those bursts of ready eloquence for
which he was so conspicuous in debate, “prepared to abandon a system
to which you owe so precious a possession, not only the foundation of
your glory, the bulwark of your strength, but the protection of your
very existence as a nation?”

“The Bill,” continued Lord Brougham, “contained the seeds of fresh
agitation and new demand.” The coasting trade, as well as the manning
clauses, “would excite new agitation by other Ricardos and other
Cobdens.” In framing his judgment on this great question he had
listened but to one voice, the voice of public duty, sinking all party,
all personal considerations. He did not on any account, personal or
public, desire any change in the government. But he was prepared to
encounter that, rather than see the highest interests of the empire
exposed to ruin. This measure he could not bear, because our national
defence could not bear it. To sweeten the bitter cup which it would
fill, we are told, and he firmly believed it, that it would encourage
slavery and stimulate the infernal slave-trade; since, whatever
cheapened navigation between this country and the mart for slave-grown
sugar—whatever lets in the Americans, the Swedes, the Danes, the Dutch,
to bring over the sugars of Cuba and the Brazils—must of necessity
increase the African slave-trade, by which the increase of those
sugars was promoted. “When this new ingredient is poured into the
chalice commended to my lips to-night I can no longer hesitate, even
if I felt doubts before. All lesser considerations of party policy
or Parliamentary tactics at once give way; and I have a question
before me on which I cannot pause or falter, or treat or compromise;
and, regardless of the comfort in any quarter, careless with what
arrangements of any individuals my voice may interfere, I know my
duty, and will perform it: as an honest man, an Englishman, a Peer of
Parliament, I will lift that voice to resist the further progress of
the Bill.”

[Sidenote: Earl Granville]

Earl Granville, in replying to Lord Brougham’s speech, defended Mr.
Porter, and especially his statistics; but, as the reasons he and
his party gave in support of the measure have in a great degree been
confirmed by events, and by the success of the change they then so
boldly advocated, it is more desirable to record at greater length
the opinions of the opponents to the Bill. From these a lesson may be
taught to other nations, which still cling to a policy in favour of
which no more powerful arguments could be adduced than those urged
by some of the ablest men of the period, arguments, however, which
experience has shown, in almost every instance, to have been fallacious.

[Sidenote: Earl of Ellenborough.]

Lord Ellenborough[124] was unwilling, under existing circumstances, to
diminish our marine by one ship, or our seamen by one man, and this
Bill would tend to undermine the strength of our navy, both in ships
and men. He contended that, as there had been a much larger increase
in the British tonnage employed in the trade with the British North
American colonies than in that of all the rest of the trade with
America, fragmentary as the system might be, it evidently produced the
effect it was intended to produce, the maintenance and increase of
British navigation, and, therein, the security of this country. The
noble Lord then drew a picture of our colonial empire, and pointed
out the great and increasing demand on our naval resources for purpose
of defence. He next directed attention to the well-appointed navy
of the United States, of Russia, France, Austria, Naples, and other
Continental Powers; and said we should do wrong if we did not consider
the present state of the navies of foreign Powers in conjunction with
the changes which have taken place in their military position. The
military peace establishments of foreign Powers were now equal to
their war establishments of former times; while the substitution of
railways in the place of ordinary roads will enable States to bring a
preponderating force, suddenly, from the most distant quarters to the
port of embarkation, and then they will find “a steam bridge” from the
continent to these islands.

Lord Harrowby, in an exhaustive speech, argued that wherever the
“interests of commerce and navigation were at variance” those of
navigation must predominate, as essential to the defence and security
of the empire; but his Lordship, and all other speakers, entirely
failed to prove that they ever were at variance. Nor can they be so.
They rise and fall with each other; and are essentially one and the
same. Indeed, if closely scrutinised, they will be found to have no
antagonistic principles; and further, that whatever antagonism existed
was caused by the operation of the Navigation Laws. Lord Grey, who
followed Lord Harrowby, clearly showed that while these laws were of no
advantage to the Shipowner, they were, from their practical working,
serious drawbacks to his success, and that, instead of affording him
any real protection, they were detrimental to his best interests.
He further showed that the Navigation Laws were unfavourable to the
development of the warehousing system; and, afterwards, dwelt at great
length on the colonial part of the question and on the claims of
Canada; asserting, also, that we could only perpetuate the connection
between the mother-country and the North American colonies by engaging
the confidence and participating in the affections of their people.
The Navigation Laws were, he remarked, among the proximate causes of
the revolutionary struggle which had ended in the independence of the
United States. He concluded with an impressive appeal to the House not
to peril the interests of the country by rejecting the Bill.

[Sidenote: Lord Stanley.]

[Sidenote: Admits need of modifications.]

Lord Stanley,[125] on the second night of the debate, rose at a
quarter-past one o’clock, to answer Earl Grey, then Colonial Minister.
After alluding to the recent Free-trade policy, with which this
question was not connected, his Lordship asked whether they were
prepared to abolish a system which, for two centuries at least, had
formed the basis of our national greatness and the foundation of our
naval strength. He had no objection to the modifications the Navigation
Laws had undergone, nor might he object to some further modifications
now. But it was not on the modification of these laws that the House
had now to decide, but upon the momentous question of their entire
abolition. Were they prepared for such a step, when it was admitted
that, if taken, it must be irrevocable? Earl Grey, he said, treated
the Navigation Laws as disadvantageous to the mercantile interests
of the country. The merchants had not made this discovery, but the
Queen’s Government had made it for them. The whole case, as based
on its assumed benefits to the commercial marine, therefore fell to
the ground; and the objection to the Bill, founded on its injurious
tendency, so far as the navy was concerned, remained unchallenged and
unrefuted.

[Sidenote: Canada not our only colony.]

[Sidenote: Majority for Bill, 10.]

In Canada, as in all other colonies, the withdrawal of Protection was
regarded as a great grievance, hence the repeal of the Navigation Laws
was demanded by them only as a consequence of that event. But our
North American colonies were not confined to Canada. The shipbuilding
colonies of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were opposed to repeal. The
exceptional case of Canada might be met without entirely abrogating
these laws. Having severely condemned Lord Palmerston for his circular,
Lord Stanley then endeavoured to show that the warehousing system
owed its origin to existing prohibitions, and that its increase or
permanence depended upon their maintenance. He strongly objected to the
proposal of admitting a foreign-built ship to British registry. It was
essential, he maintained, to keep up the number and efficiency of our
private building-yards, which would speedily decrease in number were
such a proposal adopted. The question, indeed, could not be decided by
one vote. The British merchants, the British Shipowners, the British
seamen, and the British mechanics would not be satisfied with a Bill
passed by a bare majority of the House, under pressure never heard of
before, and with menaces such as had been thrown out. The people of
this country will never know when they are beaten. The Marquess of
Lansdowne having replied, repelling in indignant language the charge
of having used menaces, the House went to a division at half-past four
o’clock on the morning of the 10th May, on the question that “now”
stand part of the motion. There appeared, Contents, present, 105;
Proxies, 68; Total, 173: Non-contents, present, 119; Proxies, 44:
Total, 163: Majority, 10!

[Sidenote: Duke of Wellington votes for it.]

This division was regarded at the time as of great political
importance. Much uncertainty and speculation had before prevailed as to
the relative state of parties upon the question in the House of Lords,
and the fate of the Administration was generally supposed to depend on
the decision as to the second reading of the Bill. The Shipowners were
in the highest degree exasperated that they should be defeated by that
which they called a pocket majority of proxies, as they had actually
a majority of the Peers present adverse to the Bill. Perhaps that
which occasioned the deepest mortification to them was that the Duke
of Wellington, who had recently called attention to the state of the
national defences, voted with the majority. With so narrow a majority
as ten against them, the Shipowners resolved to make fresh efforts to
obtain another division in committee, when, as proxies could not be
accepted, it was anticipated that the obnoxious measure would be so
altered, as to deprive it of its most objectionable features.

Accordingly Lord Stanley on the 18th May gave notice that he intended
to propose the rejection of all the repealing clauses, _i.e._ the
first and second, and, in point of fact, make the principle of the Bill
one of conditional legislation. He proposed, farther, to enable British
ships to bring the produce of Asia, Africa, and America indirectly,
and to modify in the same spirit the clauses relating to the European
trade. It should be remarked that the alarming news of an extensive
rebellion in Canada had reached England since the day of the second
reading, and a growing desire was felt that this great question of
repeal should be finally settled one way or the other.

[Sidenote: Proceedings and debate in committee.]

[Sidenote: Lord Stanley’s amendment.]

In committee on the Bill (21st May), Lord Stanley brought forward his
amendment, Lord Wharncliffe having given notice of one of the same
or nearly similar tendency. The object of Lord Wharncliffe’s[126]
amendment was that, until her Majesty should be fully satisfied that
foreign countries would grant full reciprocity and commerce to this
country, her Majesty should have no power to abrogate or repeal the
Navigation Laws, so far as they affected the ships and commerce of
those countries. Lord Stanley’s aimed at the same object. His Lordship
said the distinction between his measure and that of the Government
assumed this shape. Should we proceed to repeal, and then to re-enact
a small portion, yet a portion, of the Navigation Laws which was the
most burdensome to the British owner and the least advantageous to
British commerce? or should the repeal be made conditional, by an
enabling clause which conferred on the Queen the requisite power, when
satisfied that reciprocity was accorded to us?

[Sidenote: Rejected by 13.]

The question gave rise to a very long and animated discussion, in which
Earl Grey, the Earl of Harrowby, Earl Granville, Lord Colchester, the
Marquess of Clanricarde, Lord Brougham, Lord Fitzwilliam, and the
Marquess of Lansdowne took part; Lord Wharncliffe severing himself from
Lord Stanley, and, in fact, voting against his amendment. The division
which terminated this discussion was decisive of the fate of the Bill.
On the question of Lord Stanley’s amendment there appeared, Contents,
103; Non-contents, 116: Majority against the amendment, 13! As no
proxies in this division influenced the result, Lord Stanley at once
withdrew all opposition to the repeal of the 8 & 9 Vict. cap. 88, which
he only wished amended.

[Sidenote: Earl of Ellenborough’s amendment.]

[Sidenote: Claims of Shipowners,]

[Sidenote: and fear of competition.]

The Committee of the Lords sat again on the 24th May, when Lord
Ellenborough moved an amendment that instead of the Bill coming into
operation on the 1st January, 1850, it should come into operation on
the 1st January, 1851. This amendment was in accordance with the prayer
of a petition from the General Shipowners’ Society, urging various
reasons for delay. It was admitted, his Lordship said, that one of the
chief objects of the measure was to diminish the rates of freight; and
it was contended that the greater the competition between the shipping
of foreign States and the shipping of this country the greater would
be the diminution of the rate of freight generally; but, added his
Lordship, British Shipowners have not the means of diminishing their
expenditure at once, so as to enable them to compete with foreign
shipowners upon equal terms, before the Act came into operation. The
time allowed for preparation, he continued, was only seven months;
but, during that period, a large number of British vessels would not
have arrived from distant places abroad, and, therefore, there would
be no means of making changes in the modes of sailing and manning
them. The contemplated reduction of men required to be made by the
owners of ships to enable them to compete with the foreign owners was
held to be of great importance. It was computed that five men were
employed in every British vessel to every 100 tons; while, in foreign
vessels, only three or four men were required for the same amount of
tonnage. Assuming 230,000 as the number of seamen employed by British
shipowners, there must be a reduction of one-fifth; in other words,
47,500 British sailors must be thrown out of employment.

[Sidenote: Amendment rejected by a majority of 12.]

In mercy, therefore, exclaimed his Lordship, to all parties interested,
a sufficiently long time ought to be given for preparation. There was
not less, it was said, than 200,000 tons of American[127] shipping in
California, which might return by the port of Calcutta, and then be
brought into competition with the tonnage of this country. The effect
of the sudden competition from the Americans in the freight-market
of India on the trade of Australia would, in his opinion, be most
detrimental. Our own vessels carried out emigrants to that dependency,
and they could only find return cargoes by going to the ports of India;
but there, again, they would meet American tonnage from California,
and be disappointed of freights. Seven months was not sufficient
time to frame treaties with foreign Powers. The timber duties ought
to be taken off, and this could not be done in time. His Lordship
recapitulated many other objections to such precipitancy, but all were
unavailing. The Ministers resolutely persevered in their measure, and
opposed delay, and, indeed, every other amendment proposed. In fact,
it was believed that they were afraid, if the delay of eighteen months
were conceded, that a change of ministry or of public opinion might
defeat the measure entirely, and this was the more to be dreaded as all
parties admitted that immediate distress to the Shipowner must follow
the first passing of the Bill. However, the throwing open the trade of
the St. Lawrence was made the ostensible ground of resisting delay,
and upon a division only 40 Contents appeared for Lord Ellenborough’s
amendment; Non-contents, 56; Majority, 12.

Earl Waldegrave next moved a very long amendment,[128] the general
effect of which was to prevent foreign ships from receiving British
registration. On a division there were, Contents, 37; Non-contents, 49:
Majority, 12.

After this division Lord Stanley relinquished all further opposition
to the Bill in committee. He withdrew an amendment which had for
its object to meet the complaint of Canada, that there were greater
facilities for the transmission of their produce by the way of New
York than by the St. Lawrence, because, at New York, the Canadians
had the choice of an American or a British ship, while, from Montreal
or Quebec, they could only send their produce in a British ship.
Lord Stanley proposed to effect the object, not by enabling ships of
all countries to enter the St. Lawrence, but by enabling British or
American shipping to convey from either outlet the produce of Canada
or of the United States. His Lordship seemed to feel himself that
this was, if not an impracticable, at least a very imperfect scheme,
as it did not legislate for other colonies, and so he relinquished it
together with his general opposition. Lord Wharncliffe, finding Lord
Stanley did not support him, withdrew his amendment also, leaving
conditional legislation to the discretion of the Crown; that is,
leaving the Queen’s Government to judge of the expediency of asking for
restrictions in particular cases. The remaining clauses were agreed to.

[Sidenote: Bill read a third time.]

All effectual opposition to the Bill was now hopeless. But, on the
third reading, Lord Ellenborough took the opportunity of observing
that he could not refrain from touching upon the measures which it
would be absolutely necessary to adopt for the security of British
shipping under the new system. It was only fair that the Shipowner,
among various other burdens which he named, should be relieved from
all duties on timber. Government should promptly introduce measures
for the examination of masters and mates before their appointments,
and for their trial upon the loss of ships; also for the establishment
of a fund for the support of worn-out seamen, similar in principle
though not in extent to that existing for the seamen of the Royal Navy
at Greenwich Hospital; also a measure for the registry of ships, the
present system being altogether erroneous and deceptive.

[Sidenote: Timber duties, &c., admitted to be grievances.]

Earl Granville agreed with Lord Ellenborough as to the reduction of the
timber duty; and, as to the new registration, he was not prepared to
say that he saw any great objection to it. With regard to the Merchant
Seaman’s Fund, the attempt to restore it made last year, he must remind
their Lordships, was opposed and defeated by the Shipowners themselves;
the subject was, nevertheless, deserving of the best consideration. It
was intended, he added, to bring in a Bill to improve the discipline of
the mercantile navy.

Lord Winchelsea, a staunch Conservative, complained that the measure
had been carried by the votes of the bishops; and warned them of the
danger of carrying secular matters injurious to the best interests
of the country by their votes, as in that case England would wish to
see Convocation restored, and the bishops represented by a few of
their body. Lord Stanley and Lord Brougham satisfied themselves with
saying, “Non-content,” and inveighing against the Bill to the last. The
Marquess of Lansdowne replied; and the opposition Peers now withdrew in
a body, and the Bill was read a third time.

On the question “that the Bill do now pass,” the Bishop of Oxford
proposed to add a clause by way of rider declaring that “the said
privileges” should not extend to the ships of Spain or Brazil, or to
the ships of any foreign country, until the Queen should declare by
Order in Council that such governments had given full satisfaction
as to the fulfilment of the treaties respecting the suppression of
the slave-trade. The motion was resisted by Lord Howden in a very
argumentative speech, and rejected upon a division by—Non-contents, 23;
Contents, 9.

[Sidenote: Lord Stanley’s protest.]

The various reasons urged against the Bill for the repeal of the
Navigation Laws were briefly summed up by Lord Stanley in a protest
which he entered on the Journals of the House against the third
reading.[129] In this protest the great advantages we surrendered,
without any equivalent, were fully recited; and a dissent expressed,
because the Royal Navy was mainly dependent for its efficiency upon
the commercial marine, and the classes of the community connected
therewith. This Bill, he urged, by discouraging the employment of
British shipbuilders, ships, and seamen, tended directly to the
reduction of the commercial marine, and, thereby, to the diminution of
that naval strength which was the main foundation of the greatness of
this country, and the surest defence of its independence.

[Sidenote: Royal assent given June 26.]

But all remonstrances, denunciations, petitions, and protests were
disregarded. The Bill passed the House of Lords on the 12th June; and,
although a petition from the Shipowners[130] was presented to the Queen
by Sir George Grey praying her Majesty to withhold her approval of the
Bill, the Royal assent was given on the 26th of that month, and thus
the Navigation Laws of Great Britain, which had endured practically
unchallenged during two centuries, were almost utterly abrogated.

[Sidenote: Coasting trade thrown open, 1854.]

It may be convenient here to dispose of the question of the Coasting
clauses, which it will be remembered were withdrawn from the Bill of
1849. Notwithstanding the opposition brought to bear against this
portion of the measure, and the continued reluctance of foreign Powers
to reciprocate, the Coasting trade of the kingdom was, in 1854,
unconditionally thrown open to vessels of all nations without any
opposition from our Shipowners, indeed, some of them then expressed
deep regret that this trade had not been opened to foreign shipping in
1849.

[Sidenote: Americans, Oct. 1849, throw open all but their coasting
trade.]

The actual repeal of the Navigation Laws having, in the summer of
1849, become an accomplished fact, the consternation among all classes
connected with British shipping was almost universal, mingled with
feelings of curiosity and doubt as to the course which the Americans
would now adopt. These doubts were, however, soon removed by a prompt
notification of the Government of the United States,[131] issued on
the 15th October, 1849, honestly and boldly putting the law of 1828 in
motion, but _retaining the coasting trade of that country in all its
integrity_; and, to this day they decline, on alleged constitutional
grounds, to consider the voyage from New York to California as in any
respect different from the voyage between New York and Baltimore, or
as in any way resembling the trade between London and the Cape of Good
Hope or Australia, though, in both cases alike, the voyage can only be
made by passing the coasts of foreign nations!


FOOTNOTES:

[120] A much more likely reason has been already assigned for English
hostility to the Dutch in and about 1652; and that is, their perceiving
that the Dutch were gradually engrossing all the foreign trade,
especially that on the other side the line.

[121] The speech was published by Ridgway. Our space allows but a brief
epitome of it.

[122] I have referred to these in numberless places in the second
volume of this work.

[123] The particular quotation may not be strictly exact; but the
ambition of Napoleon to possess ships, colonies, and commerce, cannot
be for a moment doubted after the able exposition of M. Thiers.

[124] This speech was also published by Ridgway.

[125] The late (1875) Earl of Derby had been called up to the House of
Peers during his father’s life, and sat as Lord Stanley. His speech was
also published by Ridgway.

[126] It occupies a whole column of ‘Hansard.’

[127] The discovery of large quantities of gold in California had
attracted the enormous quantity of tonnage to that region.

[128] _Vide_ ‘Hansard,’ vol. cv. pp. 883-5. It occupies two
closely printed columns.

[129] See ‘Hansard,’ vol. cvi. p. 48.

[130] The Petition at length will be found in the ‘Shipping Gazette,’
13th June, 1849.

[131] See Hertslet’s ‘Treaties,’ &c., vol. viii. p. 968.




CHAPTER XI.

     Despondency of many shipowners after the repeal of the Navigation
     Laws—Advantage naturally taken by foreigners, and especially by
     the Americans—Jardine and Co. build vessels to compete with the
     Americans—Aberdeen “clippers”—Shipowners demand the enforcement
     on foreign nations of reciprocity—Return of prosperity to the
     Shipowners—Act of 1850 for the improvement of the condition of
     seamen—Valuable services of Mr. T. H. Farrer—Chief conditions of
     the Act of 1850—Certificates of examination—Appointment of local
     marine boards, and their duties—Further provisions of the Act
     of 1850—Institution of Naval Courts abroad—Special inspectors
     to be appointed by the Board of Trade, if need be—Act of 1851,
     regulating Merchant Seaman’s Fund, &c.—Merchant Shipping Act,
     1854—New measurement of ships—Registration of ships—The “Rule
     of the Sea”—Pilots and pilotage—Existing Mercantile Marine
     Fund—Wrecks—Limitation of the liability of Shipowners—Various
     miscellaneous provisions—Act of 1855.


[Sidenote: Despondency of many shipowners after the repeal of the
Navigation Laws.]

Considering the violent opposition offered by the great majority of
shipowners to the repeal of the Navigation Laws, it is not surprising
that their despondency, when the Act came into operation, knew no
bounds. Many of them resolved—and a few acted upon the resolution—to
dispose of their ships at whatever price they would fetch, others
determined to register them under a foreign flag; but few, if any,
carried out their determination in this respect. On the other hand, as
might have been expected, foreign nations, and especially the United
States, made extraordinary efforts to secure for their shipowners the
more valuable portion of the trade thrown open by the repeal of these
laws. Hitherto the vessels of that country had more than rivalled
British ships in the China trade; and, ever since the first Chinese
war in 1842, when great expectations were entertained of an enormous
increase of trade with that country, the Americans had made very
considerable efforts to secure the larger proportion of it. To meet
these efforts we had, before we were roused from our apathy by the
repeal of the Navigation Laws, built various vessels of an improved
description, such as the _Alexander Baring_, _John o’Gaunt_,
_Euphrates_, _Monarch_, and _Foam_, which were equal to any American
vessels then engaged in the trade with China. But, in 1845, various
vessels were despatched from New York and Boston to Wampoa, of a novel
form, which surpassed ours in speed, having low hulls, great beam, very
fine lines, and with yards so square as to spread a far larger amount
of canvas in proportion to their tonnage than any vessels hitherto
afloat. To rival these we, in 1846, first directed our attention to
the construction of “clipper vessels,” and as a test of these, Messrs.
Alexander Hall and Co. of Aberdeen, sent forth a schooner named the
_Torrington_, to compete with the Americans then engaged in the
coasting trade of China, and in the still more lucrative opium trade.
As this vessel proved a success, others of greater dimensions soon
followed.

But in 1848, the Americans had found out a trade exclusively their
own, which led to the construction of larger and still faster vessels
than any they had hitherto employed in the trade with China. The
discovery of the gold mines in California gave an impetus to their
shipbuilding hitherto unknown; and, for that trade, they brought
out a class of ships such as the world had then never seen; their
dimensions in tonnage being as great as the largest of our old East
Indiamen, with a capacity for cargo far greater, and with lines as
sharp and fine as almost any Baltimore clipper. The voyage of the first
of these celebrated vessels was limited to San Francisco, from which
she returned in ballast to New York, having earned sufficient freight
on her outward passage alone to amply remunerate her enterprising
owners. The others, however, which followed, continued their voyage
from California to China, and having the peculiar advantage of their
own “coasting trade,” from which the vessels of all other nations were
excluded, they obtained an immense advantage over all competitors.

Freights from New York to California, which, at first, were
exorbitantly high, still averaged somewhere about 5_l._ per
ton: thence, these ships proceeded to China, and there, were able to
load cargoes of tea and other produce direct for London or New York,
thus securing on the round voyage from 8_l._ to 10_l._ per
ton freight, while our ships, engaged in the direct trade between
London and China, a voyage nearly as long, could only earn out and
home little more than half that rate per ton. It was not therefore,
surprising, that loud complaints were made by British Shipowners of the
disadvantage in which their vessels were placed, when competing with
those of the United States.

[Sidenote: Advantage naturally taken by foreigners, and especially by
the Americans.]

Encouraged by this special advantage, the Americans constructed for
the California and China trades, vessels of still greater dimensions,
and of a still finer description, in which, for a time, they
practically monopolised not merely the trade between New York and San
Francisco, but also that between China and Great Britain. Attributing
the depression from which they were suffering to the repeal of the
Navigation Laws, as every branch of trade was then greatly depressed,
our Shipowners naturally viewed, with great alarm, the rapid strides
made by American shipping. Nor were their fears allayed by a reference
to the Board of Trade returns; wherein it appeared that, while the
increase of British shipping had, in the year previously to the repeal
been 393,955 tons, there had been a decrease in the year after the
repeal of 180,576 tons; while, concurrently with the falling off of
British shipping, it was also shown that foreign vessels, entering
inwards from foreign ports, had increased from 75,278 tons to 364,587
tons. Our position appeared, therefore, critical; and, had it not been
for the resources we held within ourselves, and the indomitable energy
of our people, foreign shipping might then have gained an ascendency
which might not afterwards have been easily overcome.

American shipping, above that of all other nations, had, hitherto,
been moving onward with such rapid strides that though, in 1815, at
the close of the war, the tonnage of the United States was not more
than one-half that of Great Britain, it had risen by 1850 to 3,535,454
tons (including river and lake steamers), against 4,232,960 tons of
British shipping, and bade fair, with the special advantages they now
possessed, to surpass it in amount ere many years had elapsed. Under
such circumstances, unusual efforts were necessary to maintain our
position as the first of maritime nations.[132] We had, however, one
advantage which our great American competitors did not possess. We had
iron in abundance; and, about this period, we were specially directing
our attention to the construction of iron ships to be propelled by the
screw.

Various of these vessels, to which I shall hereafter fully refer,
were launched about the year 1850, and placed in competition with the
American liners, which had long, all but monopolised the trade between
the United States and Europe. Even if we could not build wooden ships,
as was then feared, at as low a cost as the Americans, we had the
advantage in labour, in the cost of equipment, and in being able to
produce a superior class of vessels suited for the China and other
distant trades, from our English oak.[133]

[Sidenote: Jardine and Co. build vessels to compete with the
Americans.]

[Sidenote: Aberdeen “clippers.”]

There is, however, no doubt that at this period there were few ships
afloat which could rival in speed the _Oriental_, _Challenge_, _Sea
Witch_, _Flying Cloud_, and various similar vessels the Americans had
sent forth to compete with us in the trade from China, for, at that
time, iron ships propelled by steam could not be profitably employed
in so distant a trade. It seemed almost hopeless[134] to expect that
we could construct sailing vessels which would enable us to cope
successfully with these celebrated ships. But, though great in speed,
it was soon discovered that they were inferior in strength; and, as
some of them had landed their cargoes in a damaged state, the shippers
of tea and other valuable produce from China encouraged the building of
vessels of superior strength, hoping, at the same time, to obtain by
improved models an increased speed, even if this speed did not surpass
that of these famous American vessels. Accordingly, Messrs. Jardine,
Matheson and Co. commissioned Messrs. Hall and Co., of Aberdeen,
to construct for them a ship, with lines as sharp as those of any
American, but of superior strength. The _Stornoway_, commanded by
Captain Robinson, formerly of the _John of Gaunt_, was the first of the
“Aberdeen clippers.” The _Chrysolite_, commanded by Captain Enright,
followed. But, though these vessels proved very fast for their size,
they were still no match for the Americans, which were double their
dimensions. However, the _Cairngorm_, also built by Hall for Messrs.
Jardine, proved equal in speed to any of her foreign competitors, and,
by delivering her cargo in superior order, obtained a preference.

It was not, however, until 1856, when the _Lord of the Isles_,
built by Scott, of Greenock, and commanded by Captain Maxton, in
a celebrated race for the first delivery of the new teas from
Foo-choo-foo in London, beat two of the fastest American clippers,
though of nearly double her tonnage, delivering her cargo without one
spot of damage, that British ships regained their ascendency in a trade
which their American rivals bade fair to monopolise. From that time,
British sailing ships, as I shall hereafter show, gradually gained a
complete ascendency over the Americans in the China trade, and carried
all before them, until they, in turn, were supplanted by British
screw-steamers.

In the meantime, however, our Shipowners were suffering heavy losses
in the ordinary branches of commerce, with little prospect of any
permanent improvement. It was, therefore, not surprising that many of
them contemplated abandoning the business in which they, as well as
their forefathers for many generations, had been engaged. To obtain
a restoration of Protection was out of the question; while any
remission of burdens, or abrogation of restrictions, in the power of
the Legislature to grant, would not, they felt, enable them to compete
successfully with their foreign rivals. To these burdens I shall
hereafter refer.

[Sidenote: Shipowners demand the enforcement on foreign nations of
reciprocity.]

As regarded non-reciprocity on the part of foreign nations, they had
little expectation that any relief could be obtained. Every State
that had anything worth acceptance in the way of reciprocation had,
they were convinced, determined on adhering to a Protective policy;
and, though the retaliatory clause in the Navigation Act might afford
some power of compulsion, the Shipowners saw from the discussions
in Parliament that it was vain to hope that such powers would ever
actually be put in force. Nevertheless, under such gloomy political
prospects, every effort was made by the central body of the Shipowners’
Association in London to impress their views upon the representatives
of the maritime towns in Parliament. The outports were urged to secure
the return of members who would support a policy opposed to that of
the indiscriminate abolition of all Protective laws. The feeling thus
provoked exercised its influence during many succeeding years. They
who had the moral courage to advocate more enlightened principles were
made the victims of the exasperated Shipowners, and a good many members
lost their seats at the general election of 1852 because they could
not, conscientiously, support any measure restoring Protection to the
Shipowners, even in the modified form they now desired, the general
enforcement of the reciprocity on other nations.

[Sidenote: Return of prosperity to the Shipowners.]

Happily, however, for the Shipowners, the demand for their vessels
soon rose; and, though some of them may have severely suffered for the
first twelve months after the repeal of the Navigation Laws, they soon
recovered their losses, and their course ever since has been, apart
from the usual fluctuations in all branches of commerce, one of almost
continued prosperity. Mr. Thomas Tooke, in his well-known work,[135]
speaking of the annual state of trade at the close of 1853, states,
that the most satisfactory accounts of the year’s business were those
connected with shipping. Indeed, 1852, as well as 1853, were years of
prosperity to every class of persons connected with ships.

The enormous emigration of the former year, and the great increase
of imports and exports in 1853—caused unquestionably by our liberal
policy—created a sudden demand for freight, far beyond the resources
of vessels really available. British ships of the highest class rose
in price from 15_l._ to 21_l._ and 22_l._ per ton, and colonial from
6_l._ 10_s._ to 11_l._ per ton; freights, in many instances, advanced
more than 100 per cent.; and it was soon discovered that, though the
carrying trade of England had been opened to vessels of all nations,
English merchants could not find sufficient tonnage to supply the
orders pouring in on them from every part of the world: thus, while
the demand for Australia was still on the increase, new branches of
commerce were opening out also in other quarters. Freights from Odessa
rose from 65_s._ to 120_s._ per ton; the rates to and from the west
coast of South America, Brazil, and the West Indies were nearly
doubled; from America, both in timber and grain, freights advanced
in like proportion, as well as in the Baltic; and, even, in the coal
trade between Newcastle and London, the usual standard rate of 6_s._
per ton was more than doubled. The grain trade, beyond all others,
was characterised by extraordinary activity, the result of events it
was impossible to foresee; while the practical closing of some of the
most important granaries during the subsequent war between Russia and
Turkey, greatly enhanced the price of corn, and gave rise to large
importations of bread-stuffs from the United States and other more
distant parts of the world, necessitating, at the same time, a large
amount of tonnage for their transport. The surprising prosperity,
which had so suddenly succeeded a period of depression and adversity,
silenced for a time, though it did not extinguish, the complaints
of the already “old school” Shipowners against the repeal of the
Navigation Laws.

[Sidenote: Act of 1850, for the improvement of the condition of seamen.]

But, as British ships were now subjected to the competition of the
vessels of all nations, Government considered it their duty to afford
every facility as far as regards education and the means of obtaining
it to the men by whom they were manned, holding that they were bound
to secure for them every advantage in this respect possessed by those
of foreign nations. We have seen, by the reports from the various
Consuls abroad and from other sources, that, in the training of our
seamen for the work they have to do, we were far behind our foreign
competitors. Consequently, among the earliest measures of 1850, an Act
was passed which had for its object the improvement of the existing
condition of our seafaring population, especially as regards commanders
and officers, and for affording to Shipowners greater facilities than
they had hitherto possessed for engaging and regulating the conduct
of the crews of their ships. Hitherto, though our ships had been, by
some people, pompously, styled the “harbingers of peace, Christianity,
and civilisation,” they had more frequently carried with them to other
lands vices previously unknown there.

[Sidenote: Valuable services of Mr. T. H. Farrer.]

In point of fact, all other nations, except England, had a code of laws
to regulate the conduct and test the competency of those who navigated
their merchant ships; life and property with us being placed under
the charge of men without any security for their conduct, integrity,
or ability. Avaricious Shipowners, too, often bought labour in the
cheapest, and rarely, therefore, in the best market; while others,
with sons and brothers to provide for, placed them in charge of their
ships, or in other responsible positions, for which they were often
altogether incompetent. The seamen, themselves, were neglected, and, in
many instances, were, to a great extent, under the control of a class
of nefarious persons known as “crimps,” who procured them employment,
discounted their advance notes at usurious rates, and, too frequently,
plundered them of all they possessed at the termination of the voyage.
It, therefore, became the duty of Government to do what in them lay to
remedy these glaring evils. Happily there had just been appointed, as
Secretary to the new Marine Department of the Board of Trade, a young
gentleman of rare abilities, who had devoted considerable attention to
the state of our mercantile marine, and had accepted this office with
a fixed determination to remedy, as far as legislation could do, the
existing evils. To Mr. T. H. Farrer the country is greatly indebted for
most of the measures which have since been passed in connection with
our mercantile marine.[136]

[Sidenote: Chief conditions of the Act of 1850.]

[Sidenote: Certificates of examination.]

The first of these reform Acts, entitled, “An Act for Improving the
Condition of Masters, Mates, and Seamen, and Maintaining Discipline in
the Merchant Service,” received the Royal assent on the 14th August,
1850, and came into operation on the 1st January of the following year.
This Act contains 124 clauses, and places under the Board of Trade the
general superintendence of matters relating to the British mercantile
marine, with power to carry the Act into execution in all its details.
This valuable measure provides for the establishment of local marine
boards at the principal seaports in the kingdom. These boards
consist of from six to twelve members, comprised of the Mayor or the
stipendiary magistrate resident in the district, of two to four members
nominated by the Board of Trade, the remainder being elected by the
shipowners resident in the place. Two superior officers with various
subordinates were appointed to carry out the duties of the marine board
under the direction of its members. The first and most important of
these duties consisted in the examination of persons intending to
become masters or mates of foreign-going ships, who are now required to
give satisfactory evidence of their sobriety, experience, ability, and
general good conduct, before they are entitled to receive a certificate
of their competency.

[Sidenote: Appointment of local marine boards,]

[Sidenote: and their duties.]

Those persons who had previously been in command of ships, or who had
served as mates, were not required to undergo an examination, but
received a certificate of service, enabling them to accept appointments
similar to those they had held previously to the Act coming into
operation; so that, in this respect, the law was not retrospective, but
only required such persons to undergo examination who had not before
acted in the above capacities; power was, at the same time, given to
the board to cancel their certificates of service, or of competency,
provided those who held them were guilty of misconduct, or otherwise
found to be unfit for their duties. Penalties were inflicted for false
representations, for forging, or altering, or fraudulently using their
certificates. The local marine boards were required to establish
shipping offices, where all seamen are engaged; and to appoint, subject
to the approval of the Board of Trade, shipping-masters, whose duties
were to ascertain that engagements were made in proper form, to issue
the advance notes of the seamen, and to see that they joined the ships
for which they had engaged at the time fixed for departure. Their
duties, likewise, extended to the settlement of the seamen’s wages at
the termination of the voyage, and to the seeing that while the men
were justly dealt with, they received, also, a proper discharge. They
were, moreover, bound to keep a register of the names and character of
the seamen and apprentices, and to perform such duties, in relation to
the indentures of the latter, as had previously been performed by the
officers of Customs. All agreements were to be in a specified form, and
to state, as far as practicable, the nature and length of the voyage
on which the ship is to be employed, the time when each seaman was
to commence duty, the capacity in which he was engaged to serve, the
amount of wages he was to receive, the scale of the provisions to be
supplied, with such further regulations as might be necessary for his
conduct on board, and to inflict fines, short allowance of provisions,
or other lawful punishments for misconduct. These agreements the
shipping master is required to read over to the seamen, who, if they
approve, then sign them in his presence. No alterations are allowed to
be made, unless with the consent of all parties; and these agreements
must be produced by the master, before a clearance of the ship can be
obtained at the Customs. Similar agreements are required for vessels
engaged in the coasting trade; but, in this case, they need only be
entered into once in six months, and may be signed either on board
the vessel or at the shipping office. Penalties are inflicted on
masters for taking seamen to sea without such agreement, or for its
non-production if required by the British Consul abroad, or by the
shipping master, or Collector of Customs in the ports of Great Britain.

The masters and officers are examined in seamanship in its varied
branches, as well as in navigation; and the course of examination
very much resembles what, as I have already described, has long been
adopted in various foreign countries. It is of two grades—first and
second class—and has produced the most marked effect in the moral,
social, and intellectual improvement of the persons in charge of
the vessels of our now gigantic mercantile marine. However much our
ships have improved, in all respects, since the Navigation Laws were
repealed, and this improvement has been very remarkable, it is not
greater than what has taken place in the case of the men by whom they
are commanded and navigated.

Throughout the whole of this Act every consideration seems to have
been given to the wants of the seamen, with the exception of their
education, provision being made for the proper payment of their wages
and advance notes, and further facilities afforded for their more
prompt recovery.

[Sidenote: Further provisions of the Act of 1850.]

This Act further provides, that, in every ship, nine superficial feet
of space, measured upon the deck, is to be appropriated to each seaman,
either in the forecastle or in a suitable house on deck; such space
to be kept entirely free of stores of every kind, to be securely and
properly constructed, and to be well ventilated. The owner is also
bound to provide, for the use of all on board, a supply of medicines,
in accordance with a scale sanctioned by Government; with lime-juice in
certain cases, and fresh vegetables whenever they can be conveniently
obtained: the masters, also, of all ships are bound to keep weights
and measures on board, so that the seaman may be satisfied that he
has his full allowance of provision agreeably with the Act; while
heavy penalties are inflicted on owners who do not conform to these
conditions.

In the case of desertion, the masters or owners are authorized by this
Act to give or take in charge, without warrant, any seaman who had left
his ship without “leave,” or any seaman or apprentice who neglects
or refuses to join a ship in which he has engaged to serve. Though
this clause has since been frequently condemned, and might be limited
with advantage to within a certain time before the ship sails, it was
absolutely necessary to deal with such cases promptly, for deserting
seamen, more especially when in debt to the ship, readily found
employment, and would, in many cases, have sailed in other vessels
before it was possible to have obtained a formal warrant for their
apprehension.

Any misconduct endangering the ship, or life or limb, is considered
a misdemeanour; as also any wilful breach of duty, by reason of
drunkenness or any other cause, which might tend to the immediate loss,
destruction, or serious damage of the ship, or of the life or limbs of
any persons, engaged in her. Certain offences may be summarily punished
on arrival in port, such as wilfully damaging the ship, or embezzling
or wilfully damaging any of her stores or cargo, assaulting the master
or mate, wilful disobedience to lawful commands, or combining with any
other or others of the crew to disobey these commands, neglect duty, or
with impeding the navigation of the ship or the progress of the voyage.
All such matters may be summarily dealt with, by inflicting punishment
of from one to three months’ confinement with or without hard labour.

[Sidenote: Institution of Naval Courts abroad.]

Naval Courts are also instituted abroad, for hearing complaints with
regard to either seamen or masters, and for dealing with them in a
summary manner. These courts are constituted of from three to five
members, and consist of officers of her Majesty’s Navy, of rank not
below that of lieutenant, of a consular officer, and of the master of
a British ship; but, if there should happen to be no ships-of-war in
the harbour, the Consul has power to nominate any other disinterested
master or merchant to act as a member of such court.

Among the more important sections of the Act, I must not omit that
referring to the clause enjoining masters of ships to keep a log-book
of a prescribed form, known as the “official log.” In this book the
master is ordered to enter, not merely the daily course and position of
the ship, but all occurrences on board as to the conduct of the crew;
any disobedience of orders or neglect of duty; an entry is further
required to be made of the death, injury, or illness of any seaman
and of the time when he left the ship, should he have done so without
leave. This official log the master has to deliver, on his return to
port, to the Collector of Customs before an entry of his ship can be
obtained; and in the case of any ship being sold abroad, the master
or transferrer thereof must deliver or transmit it, duly made up to
the time of transfer, to the shipping master or Collector of Customs,
at the port to which the ship previously belonged. Penalties of from
5_l._ to 20_l._ are inflicted upon the master or owner for
not keeping the log in proper form, or for neglecting to make the
necessary entries.

When a seaman is discharged from a vessel by mutual consent, either
abroad or at the termination of the voyage, the master must give him a
certificate of character, in a form sanctioned by the Board of Trade,
specifying his qualifications; but in cases where the seaman has proved
incompetent or negligent in his duty, the master may decline to give
him this certificate, so far as regards his character.[137]

[Sidenote: Special inspectors to be appointed by the Board of Trade, if
need be.]

Power is further taken by the Board of Trade to institute a special
investigation, wherever there is reason to apprehend that any serious
accident, occasioning loss of life or property, has been sustained, or
that any of the provisions of the Act, or of any other Act relating
to merchant shipping or merchant sailors, has been grossly neglected
or disobeyed; and, for that purpose, to appoint local inspectors or
any other competent persons, to inquire into and report thereupon.
These inspectors have power to go on board and examine the ship and
any papers relating to the voyage, and may call for the production
of evidence; and penalties are inflicted for obstructing any of
them in the execution of this duty. Various other clauses, for the
protection alike of the owner, master, and seamen, are to be found in
the Act, which extends to all British possessions at home or abroad,
including India. A schedule is attached, regulating the scale of fees
to be charged for the examination of masters and mates, and for the
engagement and discharge of crews.[138]

[Sidenote: Act of 1851, regulating Merchant Seaman’s Fund, &c.]

I have frequently, in the course of this work, had occasion to refer
to the Merchant Seaman’s Fund, established by 20 Geo. II., cap. 38,
as also by 4 & 5 Will. IV., cap. 52, and by 6 Will. IV., cap. 15.
As this fund had been grossly mismanaged, an Act was passed in 1851
(8th August) to provide for the winding it up, and for its better
management in future. Consequently all the previous Acts relating to
it, together with various amending Acts, were swept away, and the
general supervision of the business of winding-up the fund was placed
in the hands of the Board of Trade, or of such persons as that Board
might appoint. By the previous Act all masters and mates of ships were
required to subscribe from 1_s._ 6_d._ to 2_s._, and all seamen 1_s._
per month toward the fund, of which 6_d._ went to Greenwich Hospital.
But the Act of 1851 rendered it no longer obligatory on their part
to do so. Those persons, however, who voluntarily continued their
subscriptions were to be entitled to pensions in old age, or when
otherwise rendered unfit for their duties; and provision was, likewise,
made for the widows and children of such persons. These subscriptions
the shipping masters appointed under the Mercantile Marine Act of 1850
are authorized to receive, and all moneys and properties forming part
of, or belonging to, the Merchant Seaman’s Fund are transferred to the
Board of Trade. No master or seaman who had not contributed to the fund
before the passing of this Act is allowed to contribute thereto, or to
establish any claim for pension or other relief for himself, or for
his wife or children; so that the benefits to be derived are confined,
exclusively, to those who had hitherto subscribed, and who voluntarily
continued their subscriptions after the passing of the Act of 1851;
the Commissioners of her Majesty’s Treasury are further authorized to
pay, out of the Consolidated Fund, such sums as may be necessary, in
addition to the voluntary subscriptions, for the necessary expenditure,
and to make good the deficiency; they are also to pay to this fund the
unclaimed wages and effects of deceased seamen; and all fines levied
for neglect of duty or otherwise are appropriated for the same purpose.

The Board of Trade is authorized to determine and regulate the
principles and conditions on which relief is to be granted under the
Act, and to make such regulations and by-laws as may be necessary
for the receipt and distribution of the fund. The Board has also
to render annually to Parliament an account of the receipts and
disbursements of the previous year, under several heads; the amount of
money in hand, and any sums which may be outstanding; the number of
pensioners—distinguishing between men, women, and children, and between
different scales of pensions, and the total amount of pensions in each
class, together with that of the salaries and expenses of management.

But, beyond these Acts, a great deal more was necessary for the proper
government of the merchant service. The vast multitude of Acts of
Parliament suspending, repealing, and altering parts of other Acts
had involved our commercial maritime law in almost inextricable
confusion, and had become most injurious to the public interest. No
persons but those well conversant with the subject can imagine to what
extent this abuse had sometimes been carried. When the Navigation Laws
were repealed no less than forty-eight separate and distinct Acts of
Parliament were in force relating directly to maritime affairs; some
of them, now before me, are in black-letter type of a very ancient
date. It, therefore, became necessary to deal with these Acts; and, for
that and other still more important objects, a Bill was introduced in
1854, which dealt in the most comprehensive manner with all questions
relating to merchant ships and their crews. In this great measure, the
two Acts to which I have just referred were embodied.

[Sidenote: Merchant Shipping Act, 1854.]

The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854[139] contains no less than five
hundred and forty-eight clauses, divided into eleven separate and
distinct parts or sections.

The first lays down the general functions of the Board of Trade; the
second relates to the ownership, registration, and measurement of
British ships; and the third is confined, exclusively, to matters
referring to the conduct and duties of masters and seamen, and embraces
the whole of the conditions of the Act of 1850, with various additions
and amendments.

[Sidenote: New measurement of ships.]

The measurement of ships embodied in part second of this Act is a great
improvement on all former modes of ascertaining the tonnage of a ship,
as it takes capacity for its basis; and thus, while proportioning
the dues payable by ships to their capabilities of carrying freight,
affords free scope to Shipowners to construct such vessels as are
best adapted to the trade in which they are to be employed.[140]
This admirable mode of admeasurement was also adopted, at a recent
congress, as the basis for ascertaining the tonnage on which ships of
any nation were to pay dues on passing through the Suez Canal.

[Sidenote: Registration of ships.]

In dealing with the question of registration, the second portion of the
Act of 1854, which contains ninety-one clauses, while it specifies in
detail what persons are qualified to become owners of British merchant
ships, likewise points out in what proportion of ownership the vessel
may be held, inflicts penalties for non-attendance to these rules,
and on builders for issuing false certificates. It also requires all
change of owners or masters to be endorsed on the register; specifies
the condition on which new certificates may be issued, and how they
are to be disposed of in the event of shipwreck; the mode of transfer
in case of sale, death, or bankruptcy is likewise clearly defined; as
also the registration of all mortgages in their priority of claim, the
mortgagee having power of sale without being held liable for any of the
responsibilities of ownership.[141]

[Sidenote: The “Rule of the Sea.”]

The fourth part of the Act is almost as important as the third, which
deals, as we have seen, with the qualifications and duties of masters,
officers, and seamen. It refers to the safety and prevention of
accidents, a subject which has created much controversy of late, and
to which reference will be made more fully hereafter. This important
section of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 requires all sea-going
vessels to be provided with a certain number of boats in proportion to
their tonnage and the trade in which they are engaged. It lays down
rules as to the meeting and passing of ships at sea, and the use of
lights and fog-signals—a regulation of daily increasing importance and
more completely carried out in 1863, from the vast number of vessels
now traversing the ocean, and especially the English and other great
channels of commerce.

Various necessary and excellent regulations are embodied for the
construction and equipment of steam-ships, without interfering with
their form, leaving their owners and builders every possible scope
for improvement, and compelling the fulfilment of certain conditions
necessary to insure safety without relieving their owners from their
just responsibility to the public. Vessels built of iron must be
separated into water-tight compartments, which has since been repealed,
and, in the case of steamers, the engine-room must be kept entirely
distinct from the hold and cabins; passenger ships (of which further
notice will hereafter be taken) are under special regulations with
regard to surveys and signals, the use of fire-engines, and the shelter
of all persons conveyed on deck.

[Sidenote: Pilots and pilotage.]

In the fifth part, the powers and general jurisdiction of pilots and
pilotage authorities are defined. Power is also given by this Act to
dispense with the use of pilots which had been enforced at certain
places, by the Acts of 1849 and 1853, and was subsequently extended to
all ports in the United Kingdom except London, Liverpool, and Bristol,
so as to permit “the master or mate of any ship” who “may, upon giving
due notice, and consenting to pay the usual expenses, apply to any
pilotage authority to be examined as to his capacity to pilot the ship
of which he is master or mate, or any one or more ships belonging
to the same owners,” and, if found qualified, to receive a pilotage
certificate.

The sixth part of the Act refers to the management of
lighthouses,[142] buoys, and beacons, whether under the immediate
control of the Ancient Trinity House of Deptford Strond, of the
“Commissioners of the Northern Lighthouses,” or of the Dublin “Ballast
Board.”[143] These separate authorities (subject to the control of
the Board of Trade) are hereby authorized to appoint persons to
inspect the lighthouses and levy dues for their maintenance (but with
revision by her Majesty in Council), and to regulate and alter such
dues. Accordingly, each of them may see the following works carried
out within its jurisdiction:—(1) Erect, remove, alter, or repair
lighthouses, with all other requisite works in connection with them;
(2) construct, place, or alter any buoys or beacons; (3) purchase
any land necessary either for the lighthouse or its approaches, with
residences for the light-keepers; and (4) vary the character of any
lighthouse or the mode of exhibiting any lights therein.

[Sidenote: Existing Mercantile Marine Fund.]

The seventh part deals with the existing Mercantile Marine Fund, which,
in some respects, but only to the very limited extent I have named,
supplies the place of the Merchant Seaman’s Fund, and directs the
Board of Trade to carry to this fund all fees and other sums received
under the provisions of the third and fourth sections of this Act;
all surplus light dues, when not appropriated to the reduction of the
charge levied on ships, all rates and moneys received by the Trinity
House under the Local Act (7 Vict., cap. 57) for the regulation of
lastage and ballastage in the River Thames, and various other fees.
It directs these funds to be applied to the cost of the examinations,
and of the shipping offices provided under the third part, and of
the survey of steam ships under the fourth part of this Act. The
remaining portions of this fund not required for the maintenance of
the lighthouses, &c., &c., is used for the purpose of establishing and
maintaining on the coast of the United Kingdom proper life-boats,[144]
and for rewarding the preservation of life in such cases as the Board
of Trade may direct, and for remunerating persons in connection with
wrecks, casualties, and salvage with which the eighth portion of the
Act specially deals.

[Sidenote: Wrecks.]

The inquiry into wrecks, though still requiring amendment, is not
the least important part of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854. It
has proved of immense value to the State, and combined with the new
law of admeasurement, and, of course, with that wholesome rivalry
free navigation has created, has done much to improve the quality and
equipment of the merchant vessels of Great Britain, and has, at the
same time, tended to the safety of life and property at sea. This part
of the Act provides, that whenever any ship is lost, abandoned, or
materially damaged, especially in cases where life has been sacrificed,
the Board of Trade _may_[145] institute an inquiry (I object to
the mode in which this is now carried out) into the cause of such
misfortune, and, for this purpose, appoint suitable persons to form a
court, able and competent to deal with all such questions.

Under the eighth part of the Act, the Board of Trade has intrusted
to it the general superintendence of all matters relating to wrecks
cast on shore, together with the appointment of receivers, who have
authority to summon all persons, promiscuously, to their aid, to
whatever number may be deemed necessary for the saving from plunder
or otherwise the property thus stranded, and to “demand the use of
any waggon, cart, or horses that may be near at hand;” “all persons
refusing, without reasonable cause, to comply with this summons are
liable to a penalty not exceeding 100_l._” The receiver can also
use force to suppress plunder, and “if any person is killed, maimed, or
otherwise hurt by reason of his resisting the receiver in the execution
of his duties, this officer is indemnified against all prosecutions
for such acts”—a power somewhat approaching the rigour of the ancient
laws, but still not too stringent to suppress the lawlessness even
now prevailing when wrecks take place on remote parts of our coasts.
Certain rules are laid down to be observed by persons finding or taking
possession of a wreck; for instance, he must give notice of it as soon
as possible to the receiver of the district, and, if he fails to do
so, is, thereby, subject to penalties for his neglect, as well as to
the loss of all salvage. Salvage is awarded to persons saving life or
property from the perils of the sea, and is regulated in amount by the
risk incurred and the extent of services rendered, the saving of life
having priority over all other claims.

Provision is, generously and very properly, now made, that no claim for
the use of any of her Majesty’s ships in saving life or property shall
be valid, and that no person on board of such ships shall be permitted
to make any demand on this behalf without the formal consent of the
Admiralty, the mode of procedure in all such cases, previously in many
ways objectionable, is now clearly established and defined. Nor does
the Act omit to deal, and with great propriety, with dealers in marine
stores and manufacturers of anchors. Subsequently, but on much more
debateable grounds,[146] an act was passed which dealt with the makers
of chain cables.

[Sidenote: Limitation of the liability of shipowners.]

The ninth part of the Merchant Shipping Act defines or limits the
liability of shipowners under certain circumstances; that is to say,
shipowners are not liable, so far as regards fire, loss of life or
personal injury, or loss of goods or merchandise, unless they have
rendered themselves personally responsible, “to an extent beyond
the value of their ship, and the freight due or to grow due in
respect of such ship during the voyage.” This liability was further
limited in 1862 by Mr. Milner Gibson when President of the Board of
Trade.[147] The mode of procedure is laid down at length and with great
perspicuity; but nothing in the Act is “to lessen or take away any
liability to which any master or seaman, being also owner or part owner
of the ship to which he belongs, is subject in his capacity of master
or seaman.”

[Sidenote: Various miscellaneous provisions.]

The tenth part of the Act refers to the mode of legal procedure
“in all cases where no particular country is mentioned within her
Majesty’s dominions;” while the eleventh and last part deals with
a few miscellaneous subjects, such as granting power to masters or
owners of ships to enter into contracts, under certain circumstances,
with Lascars or other natives of India for voyages to Great Britain,
Australia, or other parts of her Majesty’s dominions: to corporations
for the granting of sites for the erection of sailors’ homes: to the
legislative authority of any British possession for the repeal,
alteration or amendment of any provisions of the Act “relating to ships
registered in such possession:” and to the Commissioners of Customs to
recover from the Consolidated Fund, or from the Mercantile Marine Fund,
all expenses incurred by them in the conduct of suits or prosecutions
raised under the Act.

Such are the leading provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854,
one of the greatest, most useful, and salutary measures ever passed,
the repeal of the Navigation Laws excepted, in connection with the
mercantile marine of Great Britain.[148]

[Sidenote: Act of 1855.]

In the following year (1855) an Act, which may be taken as part of
the great Act of 1854, was passed to facilitate the erection and
maintenance of colonial lighthouses; to amend some of the clauses
referring to light dues; to specify more distinctly the conditions of
ownership and the nature of mortgages; and to exempt the owners of
pleasure yachts from having their names and the port to which they
belong painted on the stern, as in the case of merchant vessels.
Additional powers were also given by this Act to naval courts abroad,
in the case of misconduct of the master or crew: for the relief of
destitute Lascars, and for other matters of minor importance.


FOOTNOTES:

[132] At that moment our prospects were certainly very gloomy, and it
was not surprising that many of our shipowners were disposing of their
property. On the other hand, as most of our shipbuilders were idle, it
was a favourable moment to contract for the construction of ships. I,
therefore, embraced the opportunity, and contracted in one week for
six ships of an improved description, of about 1000 tons each. Two of
these I built at Sunderland, two at Maryport, one in Dundee, and one
in Jersey. Most of the old school of shipowners thought I had lost my
senses, and prophesied “ruin;” but others thought there was “method in
my madness,” and were thus encouraged to follow my example. Many of
my readers may remember the jeering paragraphs which appeared in the
Free-trade journals of the period, headed “Lindsay and more ruin,” “Not
so bad as they seem,” and so forth. But the fact had an astonishing
effect in rousing our shipowners from their dreams of despair, and I
never had any reason to regret my “daring speculation.”

[133] Mr. T. C. Cowper, of Aberdeen, himself a member of a well-known
shipbuilding firm in Aberdeen, who had spent some time in China at the
period to which I now refer, and to whom I am indebted for much of
the information connected with our struggles to maintain our position
in that trade, gives the following graphic description of his voyage
home in the _Ganges_, Captain Deas, belonging to Leith, one of
the vessels we had sent forth soon after the repeal of our Navigation
Laws, to compete with the Americans in that trade. “We landed,” he
says, “new teas at Wampoa, and sailed on the 1st September, 1851.
Two of the fastest American clippers, the _Flying Cloud_ and
_Bald Eagle_, sailed two or three days after us. A great deal of
excitement existed in China about the race, the American ships being
the favourites. The South-west monsoon being strong, the _Ganges_
made a rather long passage to Anger, but when we arrived there we found
that neither of our rivals had been reported as having passed. We
arrived in the English Channel on the evening of the 16th of December.
On the following morning at daylight we were off Portland, well in
shore and under short sail, light winds from north-east, and weather
rather thick. About 8 A.M. the wind freshened and the haze
cleared away, which showed two large and lofty ships two or three miles
to windward of us. They proved to be our American friends, having their
stripes and stars flying for a pilot. Captain Deas at once gave orders
to hoist his signals for a pilot also, and as, by this time, several
cutters were standing out from Weymouth, the _Ganges_ being
farthest in shore got her pilot first on board. I said that I would
land in the pilot boat and go to London by rail, and would report the
ship that night or next morning at Austin Friars.” (She was consigned
to my firm.) “The breeze had considerably freshened before I got on
board the pilot cutter, when the _Ganges_ filled away on the
port tack, and, contrary to his wont, for he was a very cautious man,
crowded on all small sails. The Americans lost no time and were after
him, and I had three hours’ view of as fine an ocean race as I can wish
to see; the wind being dead ahead, the ships were making short tacks.
The _Ganges_ showed herself to be the most weatherly of the three;
and the gain on every tack in shore was obvious, neither did she seem
to carry way behind in fore reaching. She arrived off Dungeness six
hours before the other two, and was in the London Docks twenty-four
hours before the first, and thirty-six hours before the last, of her
opponents.”

[134] All our shipowners had not, however, even then given way to
despair, and Mr. Farrer reminds me of a speech which, at the time, had
a considerable effect in rousing the drooping spirits of those who
were in doubt. He says, in a note I received from him the other day:
“Shortly after I joined the Board of Trade, in 1850, I went to dine
at some large dinner in the City (a dinner, I think, for one of the
great marine charities) at which a great number of the large London
shipowners were present. They were then in a state of great irritation
at the recent repeal of the Navigation Laws. Amongst those present was
the late Mr. Richard Green, who, as is well known, was one of the very
few shipowners who supported the Government on the repeal of these
laws. After dinner the usual speeches were made, and amongst them was
one by the Secretary to the American Legation, a young gentleman who
addressed us in the flowing style not uncommon with young Transatlantic
orators. After him came Mr. Richard Green—the contrast of style was
striking. ‘We have heard,’ he said, ‘a good deal to-night about the
dismal prospects of British shipping, and we hear, too, from another
quarter, a great deal about the British Lion and the American Eagle,
and the way in which they are going to lie down together. Now, I
don’t know anything about all that, but this I do know, that we, the
British shipowners, have at last sat down to play a fair and open game
with the Americans, and by Jove we will trump them!’ The feelings
of the other shipowners present may be conceived.” And I may add he
_did_ “trump them,” for shortly afterwards he built a ship called
the _Challenger_ to match their _Challenge_, which thoroughly
eclipsed her.

[135] See Tooke’s ‘History of Prices,’ vol. v. p. 303.

[136] Mr. Farrer’s connection with the Board of Trade commenced
in 1850, when he was employed by the late Lord Taunton, then Mr.
Labouchere, to draw up a Merchant Shipping Bill; and he has ever since
had important relations with that Board, more especially on all matters
connected with the Mercantile Marine, first, as Secretary to that
department, and now as permanent Chief Secretary to the Board.

[137] Perhaps if masters of ships were more particular, and instead
of inserting in the printed certificate of discharge, as they now
almost indiscriminately do, “V. G.” (very good), they would mark the
real character of the man, with “V. G.” or “G.” as the case might be,
or when necessary substitute “N. S.” (not satisfied), it might have
some effect in improving the character of seamen; and these documents,
which are now almost worthless, would then become of some service to
shipmasters themselves. Why should we not adopt the course which we
generally (but not always) do in the case of house servants? A house
servant without a character has not much chance of employment, even
now, when the demand is very great for them. To give a true and just
character is a duty we owe, not merely to ourselves, but to society,
and shipmasters should understand that, by granting a certificate of
“V. G.” or “G.,” when the character of the seaman does not deserve
either grade, may produce far more serious consequences on board ship
than would likely be the case in our households, where we can discharge
a bad servant at once, which we have no power to do at sea. One bad
seaman may not merely contaminate the whole crew, but may be the means
of the loss of the ship on which he sails, and of all on board.

[138] This portion of the Act was somewhat hastily framed, especially
as regards the extent of inquiry and the power of depriving masters
and officers of their certificates; and, although that power was
subsequently limited by the Acts of 1854 and 1862, the clauses
referring to the mode of inquiry and the power to punish might with
advantage be still materially modified.

[139] 17 & 18 Vict., cap. 84.

[140] The rule is to measure the length of the ship in a straight line
along the deck, deducting from the length what is due to the rake of
the bow, as also to the stern timber, and to divide the length thus
taken into from four to twelve equal parts, according to the size of
the ship. At each of these divisions the breadth is taken and the depth
at each point of the division, and by making certain allowances, which
the Act specifies in minute detail, the capacity of each section or
compartment is thus accurately obtained. When the products of these
are ascertained, the register tonnage is obtained by means of an easy
mode of calculation, alike applicable, and equitably applicable, I must
add, to ships of any size and every conceivable form. Of course this
tonnage is subject to additions or deductions (which have sometimes
been the cause of much controversy) for poops, top-gallant forecastles,
houses, and other enclosed spaces on deck, which are all additions to
the tonnage, while the large spaces occupied by engines, boilers, and
coal-bunkers in steamers are deductions from it. Altogether it would
not be easy to concoct a more just and wise mode of ascertaining the
register tonnage of merchant vessels than that which Mr. Moorson, a
man of remarkable genius, after years of labour, submitted for the
consideration of Government, and which, through the instrumentality
of Mr. Farrer, was in a great measure, adopted and embodied into the
Merchant Shipping Act of 1854. I look back, as one of the pleasing
reminiscences of my public life, to the hours I spent with Mr. Moorson
in going through the details of his scheme before it was submitted to
the public; but, though I may have ventured to offer an amendment here
and there, as others may have done, the merit of the scheme belongs
to him alone. It is now adopted by nearly all maritime nations. Mr.
Moorson was the most modest of men; and I have the greatest pleasure in
adding my humble testimony to the public labours of this most excellent
and unassuming man.

[141] This Act has been a _real_ success. A perfect title to
any ship—even to the _Great Eastern_—can now be obtained at the
nominal expense of only one shilling sterling! Why cannot we apply some
such principle to the sale and transfer of land? It may be vain to ask
such a question; but the reason may be explained by an anecdote: “When
in Parliament I was frequently required to accompany deputations from
my constituents, and other persons connected with shipping to the Board
of Trade. One occasion, when Mr. Henley was President to the Board, I
well remember. The deputation was from a great seaport on the eastern
coast, and its leading spokesman was an attorney of considerable local
influence and reputation. Among the various grievances brought under
the notice of Mr. Henley was one which I did not expect to hear, and
which has, certainly, never been conscientiously raised either before
or since. It related to the law of Ship Registry as settled by the
Act of 1854. One of the leading features of that law is, that the
Register shall contain nothing but the names of those persons who can
give an _absolute_ title to the ship, omitting altogether the
trusts and ramifying interests which make the transfer of a title
to land such a complicated and expensive matter. The attorney in
question, however, attempted to make out the omission to be a great
grievance, arguing that all sorts of complicated interests could not
be placed on the Register. Mr. Henley, whose shrewdness has now become
proverbial (for I do not remember any man in the House of Commons
who more readily discovered the flaws in Bills introduced for its
consideration), in reply, after dealing with other grievances, in his
usual pointed and clear manner, quietly remarked, ‘And now we come to
another grievance—that you cannot put trusts on the Register. Now, it
seems to me,’ he continued, ‘that we have been tolerably successful
in doing for ships what all the wise men are trying _in vain_
to do for land—that is, to save them from a long lawyer’s bill—there
_may_ be a grievance—I dare say _some one_ (looking hard
at the attorney) _has a grievance_, but I don’t think it is the
_shipowner_!’”

[142] In the Exhibition of 1851 the French exhibited some beautiful
specimens of coast-lights, in which they then excelled, but, since
then, (see papers read by Sir William Thompson and Mr. J. Hopkinson
before the British Association at Bristol) we have made remarkable
improvements in the forms of our lighthouse apparatus, and now produce
lights more powerful and brilliant than any other country. These are,
chiefly, manufactured by Messrs. Chance Brothers of Birmingham, and,
for the mode of arranging the glass reflectors, we are greatly indebted
to the genius of the late Professor Faraday and Sir William Thompson.
Lights are now constructed, which on a clear night can be seen at
a distance of twenty-five miles, perhaps more. But still greater
improvements have, since then, been made by arranging the colours, or
rather the variation, of lights along a line of coast, so that the
navigator may be able, at once, to distinguish one light from the
other. For instance, some are fixed, single or double, white, red, or
flash lights, or are revolving, displaying alternately these or other
colours. But it has been found that red glass absorbs nearly two-thirds
of the power of the light, and thus is to a very large extent deprived
of its usefulness. Indeed, it has been found that colour of any kind
used to distinguish one light from another materially lessens its
power. Consequently, we are now adopting other means to distinguish
one light from another on any given line of coast. That is, we make
eclipses of opaque shades revolving round the usual lighting apparatus,
and these we can vary so as to show 5, 10, 15, 20 or 30 seconds of
darkness with similar or greater intervals of bright light. We may
thus use altogether white or bright lights, which have the greatest
power to work in such a manner that one can be easily distinguished
from another. I may add that _electric_ light, instead of that
produced by oil or gas, has been tried within the last few years. One
of these lights was fixed in 1871 on Souter Point, coast of Durham.
The flashes were of 5 seconds’ duration, with dark intervals of 25
seconds. The apparatus producing this effect consisted of a dioptric of
the third order for fixed lights, around which there was an octagonal
drum of glass, consisting of panels of eight vertical lenses; by these
the divergent and continuous sheet of light from the fixed portion
of the apparatus was gathered up so as to form distinct beams which
successively reach the observer as the panels pass in succession before
him. The electricity for the production of the spark was generated
by one of Professor Holmes’ magnetic-electric machines, worked by a
steam-engine of four or five horse-power.

[143] It is to be regretted that the management of all the lights,
buoys, and beacons of the kingdom have not been placed under one head,
with a view to greater efficiency and economy.

[144] Apart from the aid thus rendered, there is a noble institution
for the saving of life from shipwreck on the coasts of the United
Kingdom, established in 1824, and maintained entirely by voluntary
subscriptions. It is not merely well known in this country, but
throughout the world, for no other nation of either ancient or modern
times has produced such a truly philanthropic society as the “Royal
National Lifeboat Institution of Great Britain.” It has now upwards
of 250 life-boats stationed on different parts of our coast. Since its
establishment it has expended on life-boats, and other means for saving
life from shipwreck, upwards of 356,000_l._; it has awarded 91
gold and 863 silver medals, and 45,200_l._ in coin to brave men as
rewards for saving life; while those who manage its affairs and provide
the necessary means, have for _their_ reward the inestimable
satisfaction of knowing, that the Institution has been the means
of extricating from a watery grave and restoring to their friends,
during the last half century, no less than 22,660 human beings, of
every kindred and of every tongue. How insignificant are the honours
conferred by monarchs compared with those which such labours of mercy
as these bestow! Its boats, as I have said, are stationed on every part
of the coast; and where the rocks are most rugged and the quicksands
most deceptive, there these noble craft are to be found with their
voluntary crews, the bravest of the brave, daring the rudest storms to
save the lives of their fellow-men, and too frequently placing their
own lives in the greatest peril. The boats are built expressly for
the purpose of encountering heavy storms. The medium, or thirty-feet
boat, to pull ten oars double-banked, is probably the best adapted for
the general purposes of a life-boat; but, on the Norfolk and Suffolk
coasts, and other places, some of the boats actually in use are from
forty to forty-five feet in length, weighing from four to five tons,
and fitted with lug-sails. These boats put to sea on their grand
mission of mercy during the most tempestuous weather.

I remember, a quarter of a century ago, attending, in conjunction
with its generous-hearted Chairman, the late Mr. Thomas Wilson, and
its present excellent Chief Secretary, Mr. Richard Lewis, and other
gentlemen, a meeting which had for its object the renovation of this
noble and truly national institution. Its annual income was then only
150_l._; its income is now upwards of 40,000_l._ per annum!
But it is only due to the foresight of Lord Cardwell to state that,
seeing, when President of the Board of Trade, in 1854, the value
that such an institution was likely to prove, he recommended a small
Government subsidy to aid it during its struggle for existence. His
approval, more than the money voted, was then of great advantage, and
he must now look back with no ordinary satisfaction to his thoughtful
and generous recommendation. Nor must I withhold from Government the
credit due to it for establishing that almost equally valuable and
useful contrivance, the Rocket Apparatus, managed by the Coast Guard,
under the directions of the Board of Trade, and supported from the
Mercantile Marine Fund.

[145] I have frequently thought it would be desirable to institute an
inquiry into _all_ losses at sea, where reliable evidence can be
obtained. I should have every loss recorded, with a brief notice of the
cause of loss, and this record should either be open to the inspection
of the public, or published annually by order of Parliament. It would
be instructive and valuable, and would, I think, tend to materially
lessen disasters at sea, by distinguishing those which arose from
unavoidable accidents and those which might have been avoided. Indeed,
so strong are my convictions on this subject that, if spared for a few
years longer (which I can hardly hope to be, as I am physically myself
a wreck), I hope to write another book, to be entitled the ‘Annals of
the Sea,’ giving an account of all disastrous shipwrecks, and calling
attention to those which would not have happened had ordinary prudence
been exercised.

[146] This Bill was introduced by Sir J. D. Elphinstone and Mr. Laird.
I opposed it on principle, as I felt that it was an unnecessary
interference with the duty of shipowners; and that, if chain cables
were to be tested by Government inspectors, we should be obliged to
appoint inspectors to examine and report on every article of a ship’s
equipment, thus as a matter of fact relieving shipowners from their
responsibility to the public. Besides, by subjecting chain cables to an
enormous and an unnecessary strain, the fibre of the iron was likely to
be destroyed or rendered more brittle, and, hence, less to be depended
on. All legislation in this direction should be narrowly watched, and
the line carefully drawn, as, in too many instances, it is likely to
do more harm than good. Indeed, I cannot too strongly impress upon the
minds of persons who have to deal with such questions the impolicy of
every measure which has for its object the performance by Government
officials of duties belonging to the shipowner, as every such measure
necessarily tends to relieve him from his responsibility to the public.

[147] 25 & 26 Vict., chap. 63. This Act altered the law of 1854 by
making the limit a sum dependent on the tonnage for 15_l._ per ton
in case of damage for loss of life, and 8_l._ per ton for loss of
goods. It was found that the law of 1854, by making the value of the
ship and freight in all cases the limit of damages, gave a premium to
bad, cheap, and ill-found ships, since the owner of the cheap ships
could recover against the owner of the valuable ship up to a large
limit, while the owner of the valuable ship could only recover against
the other a very small amount. It also encouraged the conveyance of
passengers in ships of an inferior description.

[148] I look back with great pleasure to the part I took, however
humble, in connection with this great measure. Though it was the Act
of Lord Aberdeen’s Government, its credit is mainly due to Mr. (now
Lord) Cardwell, then President of the Board of Trade, to Mr. (now Sir
Henry) Thring, by whom it was drawn with great ability and care, and to
Mr. T. H. Farrer, then Secretary of the Marine Department, whose clear
head, sound judgment, thorough knowledge of maritime law, and unwearied
exertions, were of the greatest value to the able minister under whom
he acted. Perhaps, in the whole history of Parliament, no Bill at all
approaching its dimensions and the multiplicity of subjects with which
it dealt, was ever carried through the House of Commons with so much
unanimity, and in so short a space of time, as the Merchant Shipping
Act of 1854; and, as the manner in which this was done may be useful to
the legislators of to-day and of the future, I shall endeavour to state
the mode of procedure. Mr. Cardwell, having made himself thoroughly
master of the subject by a careful study of the existing mercantile
marine laws of our own and other countries in all their details,
invited to the Board of Trade the representatives of all the leading
seaports in the kingdom, and having furnished them with an outline of
his views, wisely sought their aid in the construction of his great
measure. He courted discussion in every form, and, in no instance,
declined to receive a deputation from shipowners, sailors, and other
persons who could furnish him with useful information on the subject.
By such means he was able, not, however, without much labour, though
it was unseen and unknown, to complete and perfect a most difficult
and valuable legislative measure, the whole of the clauses of which
he carried through the House of Commons in one day’s sitting between
the hours of 12.30 and 5.45! No such legislative feat has ever been
performed before or since. Nor was it, indeed, a less perfect measure
than various others of one quarter its size, which had occupied the
attention of Parliament for as many days as the hours appropriated by
the House to its discussion.




CHAPTER XII.

     Parliamentary inquiry, 1854-5, on Passenger ships—Heavy
     losses at sea previously, and especially in 1854—Emigration
     system—Frauds practised on emigrants—Runners and crimps—Remedies
     proposed—Average price, then, of passages—Emigration
     officer—Medical inspection—American emigration law—Dietary, then,
     required—Disgraceful state of emigrant ships at that time—Act of
     1852—Resolution of New York Legislature, 1854—Evidence as to iron
     cargoes—Various attempts at improvement—Legislation in the United
     States, 1855—Uniformity of action impossible—English Passenger
     Act, 1855—Attempt to check issue of fraudulent tickets—General
     improvements—Merchant Shipping Act discussed—Extent of owner’s
     liability—Unnecessary outcry of the Shipowners—Question of
     limited liability—Value of life—Powers given to the Board of
     Trade—Mode of procedure in inquiries about loss of life—Further
     complaints of the Shipowners, who think too much discretion has
     been given to the Emigration officer—Though slightly modified
     since, the principle of the Passenger Act remains the same—The
     “Rule of the road at sea”—Examination now required for engineers
     as well as masters of steam vessels—Injurious action of the
     crimps—Savings-banks for seamen instituted, and, somewhat later,
     money-order offices.


[Sidenote: Parliamentary inquiry, 1854-5, on Passenger ships.]

Although by the Act of 1854,[149] as well as by previous Acts,[150] all
Passenger ships were to be surveyed, the impulse given to emigration
by the gold discoveries in Australia, and the increased demand for
labour in America, combined with other causes, induced Parliament, in
1854, to appoint another Committee of the House of Commons, besides the
one which sat in 1851, to inquire into this now important subject, and
to pass an Act, in the following year which is the chief Act now in
force (18 & 19 Vict. c. 119) exclusively directed to the conveyance of
passengers by sea, more especially of that class of persons known as
emigrants.

Between 1815 and 1854, inclusive, 4,116,958 passengers left the United
Kingdom, being upon an average 102,923 persons annually. But of this
vast number 2,446,802, or nearly three-fifths, emigrated during the
eight years previous to 1854, and 1,358,096 of them in the previous
four years. So great had the rage for emigration become, that in 1854,
no less a sum than 1,730,000_l._ was remitted by settlers in North
America to their relations and friends in the United Kingdom for the
express purpose of enabling those who had been left at home to join
them in their adopted country.[151]

[Sidenote: Heavy losses at sea previously, and especially in 1854.]

Yet these acts of generosity and self-denial, altogether unparalleled
in the history of the world (we have no record of any such acts in the
great tides of emigration from the East, and in those which peopled
Carthage from Phœœnicia), had been performed during many previous
years, the sums remitted for this purpose having varied from about
half a million sterling to more than a million and a half annually.
This rush for emigration having induced Shipowners, eager to reap
so rich a harvest, to place vessels in the trade, many of which
were altogether unsuited for it, with other causes, compelled the
Legislature to investigate the whole subject; the result being the
comprehensive Passenger Act of 1855, which was passed not one day too
soon. During the _seven_ years ending December 1853, no fewer than
_sixty-one_ ships were lost in this trade, with the further
lamentable loss of 1567 lives. In 1854, alone, _nine_ emigrant
ships were wrecked. Five of these were from Liverpool, including the
_Tayleur_, stranded on Lundy Island, when 330 persons perished,
and the _City of Glasgow_, having on board 430 souls, who, with
the ship, were never afterwards heard of. The _Black Hawk_
and _Winchester_ foundered at sea in the great storm of the
15th and 17th of April; the _City of Philadelphia_ steamer was
wrecked on Cape Race, Newfoundland, in August, as well as the ship
_Tottenham_, from Cork to Quebec, on Cape Breton, but, happily, in
these instances no lives were lost.

Such were the disastrous total losses of British ships in 1854;
and, although few or any of these losses can be attributed to
unseaworthiness, the loss of life was so appalling, that the
Legislature was led to bestow more than usual attention to the
subject. But besides these, several ships were so seriously injured
that they were compelled to return for repairs. One loss, that of the
_Powhattan_, was a singularly melancholy one. This vessel sailed
from Liverpool with German emigrants on board, and, after sustaining
much other damage, was, afterwards, wrecked at Barnagat, off the coast
by New Jersey, during the gale of the 16th April: although stranded
within eighty yards of low-water mark, and so near, indeed, that the
unfortunate people on board could hear and reply to the suggestions
made to them by persons on the land, not a single individual reached
the shore, though the vessel did not break up for twenty-four hours
after she struck.

[Sidenote: Emigration system.]

But other causes had long been at work to render necessary a revision
of the laws relating to passenger ships. The rate of passage being
generally higher from Ireland than from Liverpool, on account of the
difficulty of procuring cargo, most of the Irish emigrants were shipped
on the decks of the coasting steamers to that port; thence, they
either secured their passage through the Irish agents of the Liverpool
brokers, or they found their way to that port at their own expense, and
procured tickets for themselves. Others again, for they were nearly
all of the very poorest class of persons, many of them having no means
whatever after their passage and their little outfit were paid, acted
on orders sent home from New York, their passage-money having been
prepaid by their friends or relations in America.

[Sidenote: Frauds practised on emigrants.]

In the first case, instances occurred where emigrants had paid their
passage-money, or a part of it, to unauthorized or insolvent parties,
and, on arriving at Liverpool, found no ship, nor any broker liable
for the passage. In the case of orders remitted from America, the
emigrant was of course liable to a similar fraud, with the additional
aggravation that, the offence having been committed in a foreign
country, there was no chance of obtaining redress for the sufferer
or of punishment to the offender. When, however, Irish emigration
became so important, and such large sums were remitted from settlers
in America, the business became more systematic and fell into more
respectable hands.

[Sidenote: Runners and crimps.]

The moment, however, the emigrant set foot on the quay at Liverpool
he was beset by a crowd of runners and crimps, one of whom seized his
baggage and carried it to the lodging-house in the interest of which
he was acting. This runner, besides plundering the emigrant to the
extent, at least, of exorbitant charges for lodgings, received 7½ per
cent. on the passage-money from the passenger broker; and, indeed, at
one time, obtained this without any communication with the passenger.
Although a clause in a previous Act[152] had been inserted to check
so great an extortion, the system proved stronger than the law;
and, notwithstanding further steps were taken to remedy this evil,
the percentage was still demanded and paid, though the service was
performed without authority. The passenger broker reimbursed himself
for this tax by charging the exorbitant commission of 12½ per cent.
against the charterer or shipowner; the charge ultimately falling upon
the emigrant in the shape of an increased rate of passage.

The emigrant was further persuaded by the runner that it was necessary
to lay in a stock of provisions for the voyage, together with other
purchases, on all which the runner got a percentage. Great frauds were
also perpetrated in “dollaring,” that is, in exchanging money, in which
the emigrant was robbed at least 20 per cent.

[Sidenote: Remedies proposed.]

[Sidenote: Average price, then, of passages.]

Although various plans were suggested to the committee, with a view
of putting an end to the evils complained of, it is only necessary to
refer to that part of the question which affects the actual shipping
and conveyance of the passenger to his destination. It was generally
agreed that the existing regulations were not stringent enough, the
great object of the previous Acts having been to give as much security
as possible to the passengers; but it was found impossible to obtain
this without increasing the price of passage, which had fallen from
5_l._ in 1842 to 3_l._ 10_s._ in 1851, from Liverpool to
New York, and about 5_s._ less to Quebec, including provisions.
It is further to be noted that, though in 1842 the charge was higher,
there was less given for it, as the Shipowners supplied only two-thirds
of the amount of provisions provided at the latter period. While the
law, in fact, had obliged the Shipowner to supply a larger quantity
of provisions, restrictions as to the extent of the provisions added,
together with a superior dietary scale, the money price of the passage
had been materially diminished.

[Sidenote: Emigration officer.]

In 1864, the inspection of passenger ships and provisions was carried
on at Liverpool, for example, by an Emigration officer, and two
assistants who were lieutenants in the Royal Navy. The Emigration
officer had to satisfy himself of the seaworthiness of every ship
which came under the Act; to see that no greater number of passengers
were carried than her measured space would allow according to law;
that her boats were sufficient, and that she had the necessary stock
of provisions and water for the number of passengers to be carried,
and that they were of good quality. He had further to attend to the
complaints of the emigrants, and to procure redress for them where
necessary. The provisions were tested by the arbitrary selection of
some barrels of flour or oatmeal, which were bored through with an
auger, so that a fair sample might be brought up and tasted. Whenever
any suspicion existed, the inspection was more minute, and the duty of
tasting became very irksome.

[Sidenote: Medical inspection.]

The medical inspection of emigrants took place at Liverpool, not on
board the ship, but in an office adjoining the dock. The emigrant,
taking with him his contract ticket, proceeded to the medical office,
which he entered at one door, and, if approved on the inspection,
had his ticket stamped, and passed out at another. He was compelled
to produce his ticket on embarking. A system such as this naturally
opened a door to fraud and personation, while, not unfrequently, after
personal examination the emigrant contracted an infectious disorder,
the infection spreading before the diseased person could be removed
from the ship.

[Sidenote: American emigration law.]

By the United States Statute of the 22nd February, 1847, it was
provided that the space to be allowed to passengers should be fourteen
clear superficial feet of deck for each passenger, if such vessel did
not pass within the Tropics. By an Act of 1848 this was so far altered,
that when “the height between the decks is less than six feet, and more
than five feet, each passenger shall be allowed sixteen superficial
feet; but if the height between decks be less than five feet, then
twenty-two superficial feet; and for every passenger on the orlop
deck, thirty feet.” Under our Act, no ship could clear out that had not
six feet between the decks. In some cases the law of the United States
was but loosely observed; while other cases, doubtless, occurred where
English vessels sailed from Liverpool to New Orleans with a number
greatly exceeding what they could legitimately carry, but which they
had reason to expect would not be noticed on their arrival. Owing,
however, to some change of persons at the Custom House at New Orleans
an inspection was instituted; two vessels were heavily fined, and one
was confiscated. But it was found more difficult to provide against
the frauds practised by the Shipowners in supplying bad or unwholesome
provisions.

[Sidenote: Dietary, then, required.]

The amount of provision by the Parliamentary scale to each adult
passenger per week was, viz., water, 21 quarts; biscuit, 2½ lbs.;
wheaten flour, 1 lb.; oatmeal, 5 lbs.; rice, 2 lbs.; molasses, 2 lbs.,
to be issued in advance, at the interval of twice a week. Potatoes
might be given in lieu of oatmeal or rice, in the proportion of 5 lbs.
of potatoes for 1 lb. of oatmeal or rice; and, in vessels sailing from
Liverpool, or from Scotch or Irish ports, oatmeal might be substituted
in equal quantities for rice. The dietary was afterwards altered by
the Act of 1851, an alternative scale being promulgated, with the
substitution of beef or pork, preserved meat, salt fish, split peas,
&c., &c., for bread-stuffs. This more expensive scale was adopted in
the ports, whence English emigrants usually sailed; but, besides the
legal supply, nearly every emigrant took with him some additional
provision, such as bacon, eggs, &c., &c.

[Sidenote: Disgraceful state of emigrant ships at that time.]

The filthy state of these ships during the passage was, at that period,
worse than anything that could be imagined. It was scarcely possible
to induce the passengers to sweep the decks after their meals, or to
be decent with respect to the common wants of nature; in many cases,
in bad weather, they could not go on deck, their health suffered so
much that their strength was gone, and they had not the power to help
themselves.[153] Hence, “between decks” was like a loathsome dungeon.
When the hatchways were opened under which the people were stowed, the
steam rose, and the stench was like that from a pen of pigs. The few
beds they had were in a dreadful state, for the straw, once wet with
sea-water, soon rotted; besides which, they used the between decks for
all sorts of filthy purposes. Whenever vessels put back from distress,
all these miseries and sufferings were exhibited in the most aggravated
form. In one case, it appeared that the vessel, having experienced
rough weather, the people were unable to go on deck and cook their
provisions; the strongest maintained the upper hand over the weakest;
and it was even said that there were women, who died of starvation. The
passengers were then expected to cook for themselves (they no longer do
so), and, from being unable to do this, the greatest suffering arose.
It was at the commencement of the voyage, that this system, naturally,
produced its worst effects. The first days were those in which the
people suffered most from sea-sickness, and, under the prostration of
body thereby induced, were wholly incapacitated from cooking; the
absence of food, if it does not aggravate, at any rate preventing
recovery from sickness: and thus, even though the provisions might be
honestly and liberally issued—casks in some cases being opened and
placed on deck for every one to help himself—yet the passengers would
be half-starved. It was time that a system, so barbarous and withal so
unnecessary, should be altered.

[Sidenote: Act of 1852.]

[Sidenote: Resolution of New York Legislature, 1854.]

In 1852, various recommendations made were carried into effect by a
bill brought in by Mr. Frederick Peel; and, in 1855, the whole law was
consolidated and greatly improved by the Passengers Act of that year.
In fact, it cannot be denied that whatever improvements had taken place
through the operation of the laws of 1849 and 1852, the passengers
on board emigrant ships were still, as a rule, great sufferers. The
United States Legislatures bear convincing testimony on this point,
as, on the 6th January, 1854, that of the State of New York passed a
series of resolutions, calling the attention of Congress to the great
and increasing mortality on board vessels engaged in the business of
carrying emigrants _during the previous twelve months_, bringing
forward undoubted evidence that such suffering and death resulted
from insufficient ventilation, &c. The Senate, agreeing with the
prayer of these resolutions, concurred, also, in the propriety of
inquiry and further legislation. All intelligent, independent parties
admitted, indeed, the expediency of concerting an effective system
of co-operation between the two governments, so as to prevent an
infraction of the regulations mutually agreed upon.

[Sidenote: Evidence as to iron cargoes.]

In conformity with the evidence adduced, frequent disasters to
emigrant vessels were ascribed to the effects produced by cargoes of
iron; while the inconsiderate manner in which some owners, charterers,
or brokers, even against the remonstrances of the commanders and
officers, persisted in thus loading their vessels, was alleged to be
a fruitful source of disaster.[154] It is likely that the mortality
at sea was increased by such cargoes, as they made the ship labour
heavily, causing her at the same time to ship a great quantity of
water, with the further probability of producing leaks. The people,
too, had then to work at the pumps, were hard fagged and badly
fed. But the owners or charterers for a time resisted Government
intervention, asserting that the Legislature ought not to fetter
mercantile enterprise; and, further, that, if ships were restricted as
to cargo, the price of the passage must be raised. On the other hand,
it was proposed to give a larger discretionary power to the Emigration
officer, so as to prevent improper and dangerous stowage. The
insufficiency of existing measures of precautions for the preservation
of health; the dietaries, the quality of the ships taken up for
passengers, the runners, lodging, detention, &c., of emigrants, all
became subjects of consideration, and, especially, the number of boats
necessary to be carried.

[Sidenote: Various attempts at improvement.]

Accordingly, it appeared absolutely necessary that the authority of the
Emigration officers to control the stowage of heavy cargo should be
placed beyond doubt; that the number of passengers for whom a surgeon
should be required should be reduced from 500 to 300; that the Queen in
Council should have authority to make special regulations, in excess
of the law, for the prevention of sickness on board ship during the
prevalence of epidemics; that the space allowed under the existing
Act should be increased; that it should be obligatory to provide
water-closets in the “between decks” for women and children; that a
more ample dietary should be prescribed; that no ship should carry more
than 500 passengers; that the number of passengers necessary to bring
a ship under the Act should be reduced from one to twenty-five to one
to fifty tons; that the exemption of ships carrying mails should be
clearly defined; that runners should be required to wear badges; and,
finally, that the subsistence-money in case of detention should be
increased.

[Sidenote: Legislation in the United States, 1855.]

Concurrently with the proceedings taken on this side of the Atlantic,
the Senate of the United States also took the matter up, but they
relied, chiefly, on the answers given to a series of questions
framed and addressed to parties competent to give information. Their
recommendations, therefore, well deserve notice. Thus, they urged that
a space should be reserved on the upper deck for exercise in proportion
to the number carried; that a ship’s capacity should be limited by
tonnage as well as space; that, during the winter months, the number
allowed in proportion to tonnage should be reduced; that no passengers
should be carried on an orlop deck; that the number of privies should
be increased, with separate accommodation for females; that provisions
should be issued cooked; that rules should be established for the
maintenance of discipline; and, lastly, that the ship should be
made responsible to the extent of the passage-money in the case of
passengers dying at sea.[155]

The first Bill proposed in the United States did not pass. But, in
1855, a Passenger Act to regulate the carriage of passengers in
steam-ships and other vessels, was introduced and became law. This
latter Bill, though much less stringent than the Bill originally
proposed, and in respect to space even less so than the previously
existing law, introduced several new provisions of considerable value,
the chief of which was a more ample dietary scale, and a provision that
the master should, on his arrival, report every death on the voyage,
and pay on account of such death a fine of 10 dollars. The fines so
paid were made applicable to the care and protection of sick, indigent,
or destitute emigrants; and the object in imposing the fine was to
give the master of the ship a pecuniary interest in the health of his
passengers. It was thought by some, that if this could be effected, a
great step would be made towards improving their treatment on board.
There was, however, a risk that masters would, by insurance, neutralise
this interest, as was once attempted as respects the second moiety of
passage-money in the case of emigrants sent to Australia.

[Sidenote: Uniformity of action impossible.]

Of course it was in the highest degree desirable that the laws of the
United States and those of England with regard to passenger ships
should be assimilated.[156] Indeed, various committees of the House of
Commons and many eminent philanthropists had urged this assimilation,
the main protection for passengers being to be secured by an inquiry
as to their treatment by officers appointed at the place of arrival.
There can be no doubt that, with a view to a perfect system, the laws
on both sides the Atlantic ought to be identical; but the United
States government, apart from the necessary diversity of regulations
in various States of the Union, is placed in this further difficulty.
The United Kingdom is not the only, nor will it be, hereafter, the
principal source from which emigrants reach the United States. Large
multitudes depart from German, Belgian, and French ports, and in 1853
and 1854, many emigrants sailed from ports in Norway. The passenger
laws in each of these countries differ from each other, and even more
from the law of the United States. There was, therefore, an insuperable
difficulty in framing, on the other side of the Atlantic, a law so
general as to embrace the provisions of the several European laws,
without making it so vague as to be practically worthless.

[Sidenote: English Passenger Act, 1855.]

But our Passengers’ Amendment Act of 1855, which came into operation
on the 1st October of that year, made some important advances towards
the law of the United States. The principal alterations introduced by
this Act, beyond the regulations of 1852, were, that the number of
passengers was limited; the age of a “statute adult” reduced from
fourteen to twelve years; a distinction was made between the upper and
lower passenger deck; increase of space was allowed to passengers; mail
steamers were exempted under special rules; the dietary scale improved;
the amount of detention-money increased; and the emigrant runners
placed under more efficient control.

One chief provision of the Passengers’ Act required that an abstract
thereof and of the Orders in Council should be posted up in each
emigrant ship.[157] The Emigration Commissioners, in their report of
1857, give an opinion that the Act has worked satisfactorily; that the
changes introduced have tended, materially, to add to the comfort and
promote the health of emigrants, the returns of mortality in ships to
the United States attesting the same result.[158] On the other hand,
the reduction in the number a ship might carry, and the increase in
the dietary, necessarily added to the expenses of the passage, and,
to a certain extent, diminished for a time the amount of emigration.
Further, the Commissioners stated that the runners, at the ports of
departure, have been brought more effectually under control, so as to
prevent many of the abuses formerly prevalent.

[Sidenote: Attempt to check issue of fraudulent tickets.]

In the United States, also, and especially at New York, efforts have
been made to stop the frauds heretofore committed by this class on
emigrants. In that city, an establishment, under the control of the
Commissioners for Emigration, has been set on foot at Castle Garden, to
protect emigrants from runners, and from those who sell them fraudulent
or false inland passage-tickets. In consequence of a representation
from the United States Government, whereby it appeared that, the
suppression in the States, of frauds connected with the sale of inland
tickets had led to a system of selling the same description of tickets
in Europe or on board emigrant ships, an official notice of this
fact was given to emigrants, cautioning them that the safest course
was not to purchase an inland ticket in England, but to defer making
arrangements for the passage up the country, till their arrival at the
port of debarkation. This notice, however, applied to the United States
only; and it was stated, explicitly, that the through tickets given
by the Grand Trunk Railway of Canada to emigrants proceeding to the
St. Lawrence were not open to suspicion, and were, besides, of great
benefit to the emigrant.

[Sidenote: General improvements.]

Among the improvements in ships carried out by the Emigration
Commissioners, we should mention that they have introduced, of late
years, a more suitable dietary for young children, with the making
of fresh bread, two or three times a week, for the passengers. This
change has been also authorized in private ships. Several new systems
of ventilation have, also, been tried. In a sailing passenger ship,
especially during the calms which prevail on the Line, their proper
ventilation will always prove a matter of greater difficulty than is
the case with a steamer, whose own motion is sufficient to create
a current of air. Further experience on this point is, however,
necessary, though very considerable improvements have recently been
made.

[Sidenote: Merchant Shipping Act discussed.]

As great fault was found by the central committee of the General
Shipowners’ Society with the 504th section of the Merchant Shipping Act
(Part IX.), which lays down the measure of the owners’ liability, it
may be desirable to state the nature of the complaints. This section of
the Act provides:—

[Sidenote: Extent of owners’ liability.]

1st. Where any loss of life or personal injury is caused to any person
being carried in such ship:

2nd. Where any damage or loss is caused to any goods, merchandise, or
other things whatsoever on board any such ship:

3rd. Where any loss of life or personal injury is, by reason of the
improper navigation of such sea-going ship as aforesaid, caused to any
person carried in any other ship or boat:

4th. Where any loss or damage is, by reason of any such improper
navigation of such sea-going ships as aforesaid, caused by any other
ship or boat, or to any goods, merchandise, or other things whatsoever
on board any other ship or boat: No owner shall, in such cases where
the events occur without his knowledge or privity, be answerable in
damages to an extent beyond the value of his ship and the freight due,
or to grow due, in respect of such ship during the voyage which, at the
time of the happening of such event, as aforesaid, is in prosecution
or contracted for, subject to the following proviso, that is to say:
that, in no case, where any liability, as aforesaid, is incurred in
respect of loss of life or personal injury to the passenger, shall the
value of such ship and the freight thereof be taken to be less than
15_l._ per registered ton.

[Sidenote: Unnecessary outcry of the Shipowners.]

[Sidenote: Question of limited liability.]

The central body of Shipowners, while protesting[159] against the
injustice of this Act, forgot that, in point of fact, the limitation
of their liability was thereby secured, which it was not under the
common law of England. They further contended that the 511th clause
of the Merchant Shipping Act was inconsistent with the 504th clause,
as the former enacts that parties seeking compensation may refuse to
accept the indemnity awarded by the authorities constituted by the
Act,[160] and may bring an action against the Shipowner for damages, by
which he might be rendered liable to an amount in many cases involving
the whole of his capital. But the clause providing that any person
who is dissatisfied with the amount of statutory damages (30_l._
each person) may bring an action on his own account, enacts expressly
“that any damages recoverable by such person shall be payable only
out of the residue, _if any_, of the aggregate amount for which
the owner is liable, after deducting all sums paid to her Majesty’s
Paymaster-General in manner aforesaid; and, if the damages recovered
in such action do not exceed _double_ the statutory amount, such
person is liable to pay all the costs as between attorney and client.”

[Sidenote: Value of life.]

On the other hand, if, as was observed by way of illustration in the
course of discussion, a bishop were to fall a victim to an accident,
it might be considered that an assessment of 30_l._ would not
compensate the surviving members of the bishop’s family for such
loss. There can be no doubt that the framers of the present law, when
repealing the old laws, endeavoured to deal substantial justice.
They must have felt that, to exempt Shipowners from liability beyond
the value of the ship and freight would, in too many instances, be
an encouragement for unscrupulous persons to employ worn-out and
inadequately-manned vessels in the conveyance of passengers and
emigrants: and on the other hand, that to subject Shipowners, guilty of
no fault or default, to unlimited liability for such calamities would
induce men of property and character to withdraw their fortunes from so
great a hazard.

[Sidenote: Powers given to the Board of Trade.]

To prevent as far as possible either of these evils, and to insure
compensation for personal injury, or injury consequent from loss of
life, was one great object of the existing Acts; and fully to carry it
into effect, the Board of Trade has now power to require the sheriff to
summon a jury for the purpose of ascertaining the number, names, and
descriptions of all persons killed or injured by reason of any wrongful
act, neglect, or default.[161]

[Sidenote: Mode of procedure in inquiries about loss of life.]

At such an inquiry the Board of Trade is plaintiff, and the Shipowner
liable for the occurrence the defendant.[162] A special jury may be
called, and the usual precautions as to costs are adopted. The Board
of Trade may make any compromise it thinks fit as to damages, which
are, in each case of death or injury, to be assessed at the statutory
30_l._, and are made the first charge on the aggregate amount
for which the owner is liable. The Act regulates the proceedings, and
confers extensive powers on the Board of Trade in the distribution
of the funds. With regard to any dissatisfied person claiming more,
he is liable, if he does not recover damages to double the statutory
amount, to pay costs to the defendant Shipowner; and, even if he
obtains a verdict, the damages recoverable are still to be payable
out of the residue, if any, of the aggregate amount for which the
Shipowner is liable, after deducting all sums paid to Her Majesty’s
Paymaster-General. In cases, where several claims are made or
apprehended, against the Shipowner for loss of life, personal injury,
or loss or damage to ships, boats, or goods, he may appeal to the Court
of Chancery to determine the amount of his liability; the question of
liability or non-liability being left to another jurisdiction. But it
has been held that a Shipowner, who applies to a court of Equity in
order to obtain its assistance, must admit that he has incurred some
liability. Of course, all costs in relation to these matters may be
brought into account among the part-owners of the same ship, in the
same manner as any other moneys disbursed for the use thereof.

[Sidenote: Further complaints of the Shipowners,]

Some of the Shipowners complained of the reintroduction of a liability
nearly unlimited as set forth in the 511th clause,[163] urging that
foreign shipowners could not be rendered liable to its operation,
and that Shipowners are expressly exempted from liability for damage
caused by the negligence or misconduct of licensed pilots, on the
very ground that their competency has been tested and approved by
public authorities. This last argument is, however, wholly untenable,
unless a perfect immunity is to be accorded to every ship-master who
may have obtained a certificate of qualification. The municipal law
of one State can only bind those subjects who owe allegiance thereto;
but all civilised States frame regulations for the protection of life
and property. It would be very difficult to suggest any improvement in
the law. The provisions in the Merchant Shipping Act were the result
of profound consideration, and ought to be deemed to have effected
as reasonable an adjustment as is possible, between the owners of
sea-going ships and persons sustaining damage.

[Sidenote: who think too much discretion has been given to the
Emigration officer.]

With regard to the Passenger Act, the central body of Shipowners
further complained of the discretionary power exercised by the
Emigration officer; and, in recent reports, have called attention
to those provisions which “while they harass the Shipowner, do
not in the least tend to the advantage, comfort, or safety of the
passengers;” the consequence of so much being left to the discretion
of the Emigration officer leading, as they thought, to this, that the
mode of fitting out emigrant vessels depends mainly on his will, and
varies, therefore, with each port from which the vessel sails.[164] The
“fiend discretion,” as a well-known writer[165] has described it, is
no doubt ever abhorrent to Englishmen, who watch, with Constitutional
jealousy, the rights of property and of the subject. But it is, indeed,
the cardinal difficulty of administration. A hard and fast law stops
improvement, and reduces everything to a dead level. Discretion may
be tyranny. The experience, however, of the frauds, oppression, and
cruelties, practised in former years on the unprotected emigrant, will,
I doubt not, continue to operate on the Legislature, and will prevent
them from relaxing many portions of the present rigorous system, which
has at least produced various salutary improvements.

[Sidenote: Though slightly since modified, principle of Passenger Act
remains the same.]

Though modifications and alterations have been made in the Passenger
Act of 1855, the most important of which has been the transfer of its
management from the Emigration Commissioners to the Board of Trade,
its leading principles are still unchanged, and these, in their main
features, have now been adopted by nearly all other countries. The
changes most worthy of note are to be found (Clause 35, &c.) in the
Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment Act of 1862, which gives the owner
or master of any passenger ship power to reject, as a passenger, any
“drunken or disorderly” person; or to land such person, or others, as
“molest or continue to molest any passenger,” at any convenient port
in the United Kingdom. Power is also given in this Act to inflict a
penalty, not exceeding 20_l_., on any passenger who interferes
with the crew in the execution of their duty; or “who wilfully does, or
causes to be done, anything in such a manner as to obstruct or injure
any part of the machinery or tackle of such steamer.”

[Sidenote: The “rule of the road at sea.”]

The Act of 1862 also laid down more clear and distinct sailing rules;
and as these are of great importance, I furnish them at length in a
footnote.[166] For these rules the country is greatly indebted to the
exertions of Mr. Milner Gibson, when President of the Board of Trade,
without whose practical knowledge of the subject (as a first-class
yachtsman and navigator), and his patience and temper, the nautical
men connected with the Board of Trade and Trinity House, as well as
various naval officers, in office and out of doors, would never have
consented to them. Even now we frequently read in the daily press
letters opposed to these rules, just as we find writers on finance
who have their currency hobbies, and who are not, and never will be,
satisfied with Sir Robert Peel’s Bank Charter Act of 1844.

[Sidenote: Examination now required for engineers as well as masters of
steam-ships.]

By the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, the master and chief mate of
all sea-going vessels, whether sailing ships or steamers, are, as I
have already explained, required to possess a certificate of previous
servitude or of competency. The Act of 1862 extended, and to great
advantage, the principle of examination, also, to engineers engaged in
sea-going steamers, who, since then, have been required to undergo an
examination, and produce certificates of good conduct and sobriety.
Their certificates of competency are of two grades—first class and
second class. Any sea-going home-trade _passenger_ steamer, or any
foreign-going steam-ship of more than one hundred horse-power nominal,
must, therefore, now carry, at least, one engineer who possesses a
certificate of competency; and all steamers of greater power must
have, at least, two such engineers, one of whom may be of the second
class. But all engineers who had served as such in sea-going vessels,
previously to the 1st April, 1862, were entitled to a certificate of
service, and were not required to undergo an examination.

Though many owners of steam-ships were strongly opposed to any
legislative interference with the engineers whom they employed,
alleging, among other reasons, that they were thus frequently prevented
from promoting men in their service who had served them well and
faithfully—as for instance, those in an inferior capacity, such as the
head stoker—there can be no doubt that the effect of the law, enforcing
these examinations, has been as salutary in the case of engineers as it
has proved in the case of masters and mates. There may be exceptions to
the rule, but, on the whole, the requirements of the Act have tended,
materially, to improve the class of men now employed as engineers on
our merchant steamers, and have, as such, been generally accepted by
the men themselves.

[Sidenote: Injurious action of the crimps.]

But, before closing my remarks on the mercantile marine legislation
of the twelve years subsequent to the repeal of the Navigation Laws,
there is one measure, apparently trivial in itself, which has been a
great boon to our seamen. Before any of these Acts came into operation,
they, as I have endeavoured to show, were to a great extent under the
control of a class of men familiarly known as “crimps,” who were the
“sailor’s agents.”[167] They found him a ship, discounted his advance
note at usurious rates, assisted him to receive his wages at the end of
the voyage,[168] and _taught him how to spend them_. Previously
to the Act of 1850, seamen, on the termination of a voyage, were either
paid their wages on board ship, or at the office of the Shipowner or
his agents. In either case, the crimps, most of whom were keepers of
low lodging-houses or beer-shops, were in attendance upon the sailors,
and he, who had to receive the largest amount of pay, was attended by
the most numerous and obsequious of these vultures, each ready to prey
upon him. Suspecting no wrong, Jack was too frequently induced, after
he had received his wages, to partake, on the invitation of the crimps,
of a glass of grog or a pint of beer at the nearest public-house, and
this, apparently, friendly intercourse too often produced the most
lamentable results.

[Sidenote: Savings-banks for seamen instituted;]

To obviate, or rather to mitigate if possible, these evils, the
Commissioners for the reduction of the National Debt were empowered,
by the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, to establish Savings-Banks
for seamen; and, by the Seamen’s Savings-Bank Act of 1856, these
banks were placed under the control of the Board of Trade, which was
authorized to open “a central office in London, together with branch
savings-banks at such ports and places in the United Kingdom as they
may think expedient,” where “seamen, or the wives, widows and children
of seamen,” might make deposits, not exceeding at one time 200_l._

[Sidenote: and, somewhat later, money-order offices.]

Under this Act, the Board of Trade has opened at all the shipping
offices throughout the United Kingdom a department where the sailor,
on his discharge, may deposit the whole or any portion of his wages;
or may, by means of a money-order office, since added, remit them
to his relations or friends. The effect has been salutary, inasmuch
as the sailor is thus, to some extent (less than I could wish),
prevented from being plundered by depraved persons, whose chief
occupation consists in getting what they can out of him. Although Jack
may still desire to retain from his wages enough for the proverbial
“spree” or jollification after a long sea-voyage, too large a portion
of his earnings still go to crimps and other depraved persons; but
as a considerable amount is now either deposited at the savings-bank
or remitted home, the crimp has less inducement to offer his very
questionable services to the sailor than he had before this excellent
Act came into operation.[169]


FOOTNOTES:

[149] Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, clause 303, _et seq._

[150] The first separate Act for regulating passenger ships was the 43
Geo. III. chap. 56. The substance of this Act and of all subsequent
Acts will be found in the Appendix, No. 7, p. 600.

[151] See ‘Fifteenth Report of Emigration Commissioners,’ 1855, p. 1,
and ‘Sixteenth Report,’ 1856, p. 329.

[152] 12 & 13 Vict. chap. lxxxi.

[153] See evidence taken in 1851, more particularly questions 4244,
3878, 3879, &c.

[154] See Captain Beechey’s report on _Annie Jane_, pp. 61, 62.

[155] The United States Passenger Act, passed in 1855, will be found in
Appendix to ‘Fifteenth Report of Emigration Commissioners,’ pp. 106,
107, &c.

[156] Great exertions were made by this country to bring about so
necessary an arrangement, and in 1870, ’71, and ’72, it was nearly
effected; but a question of jurisdiction has since then delayed its
further progress. The pending United States election, and a question
connected with consular jurisdiction, combined with a few other matters
of less importance, now delay the settlement which I trust may soon
be brought about, for nothing can tend so much to the advantage of
two such great nations speaking the same language as free and easy
intercourse.

[157] An excellent compendium of the Act; and the Act itself will be
found in Willmore and Bidell’s ‘Mercantile and Maritime Guide,’ 1856,
223, _et seq._ The rules and Orders in Council are at pp. 244, 245.

[158] But the great cause of improvement was the introduction of steam
ships especially adapted for the purposes of emigration, to which I
shall refer very fully hereafter.

[159] See their annual reports.

[160] As the law is more especially applicable for emigrant ships, the
“statutory damages therein named” are 30_l._ for each person.

[161] This power has only once been put in operation, viz., in the case
of the _John_. Its real importance is only in the cases where
the sufferers are very numerous, and too poor to bring actions for
themselves. In these cases the Board of Trade acts for them.

But, in ordinary cases, the passengers’ relations proceed for
themselves. The owner pays the whole amount for which he is liable into
the Court of Chancery, and that Court distributes it among all who have
claims—whether in respect of life or of property.

The real defects in the Act of 1854 are well pointed out by the
Committee of 1860: viz., first, that the law does not apply to foreign
ships on the high seas, whether plaintiffs or defendants; and,
secondly, that “value of ship and freight” is a premium on bad ships.
These defects, as I have already pointed out, were remedied by the Act
of 1862.

[162] As to the laws of foreign countries, see Evidence before
Committee of 1860; also correspondence in Appendix, No. 3, pp. 571-82,
and correspondence between Mr. Burns and the Board of Trade, Parl.
Paper, No. 236, 19th May, 1871.

[163] The shipowners suggested that every passenger should set a value
on himself before he embarked!!

[164] Report, 23 June, 1858.

[165] Sir William Jones.

[166]

_Steering and Sailing Rules._

Art. 11. If two sailing vessels are meeting end on, or nearly end on,
so as to involve risk of collision, the helms of both shall be put to
port, so that each may pass on the port side of the other.

Art. 12. When two sailing ships are crossing, so as to involve risk of
collision, then, if they have the wind on different sides, the ship
with the wind on the port side shall keep out of the way of the ship
with the wind on the starboard side; except in the case, in which the
ship with the wind on the port side is close-hauled and the other ship
free, in which case, the latter ship shall keep out of the way; but,
if they have the wind on the same side, or if one of them has the wind
aft, the ship which is to windward shall keep out of the way of the
ship which is to leeward.

Art. 13. If two ships under steam are meeting end on, so as to involve
risk of collision, the helms of both shall be put to port, so that each
may pass on the port side of the other.

Art. 14. If two ships under steam are crossing so as to involve risk of
collision, the ship which has the other on her own starboard side shall
keep out of the way of the other.

Art. 15. If two ships, one of which is a sailing ship and the other a
steam-ship, are proceeding in such directions as to involve risk of
collision, _the steam-ship shall keep out of the way_, and pass
astern of the sailing ship.

Art. 16. Every steam-ship, when approaching another ship, so as to
involve risk of collision, shall slacken her speed, or, if necessary,
stop and reverse; and every steam-ship shall, _when in a fog, go at a
moderate speed_.

Art. 17. Every vessel overtaking any other vessel shall keep out of the
way of the said last-mentioned vessel.

Art. 18. Where, by the above rules, one of two ships is to keep out of
the way, the other shall keep her course, subject to the qualifications
contained in the following Article.

Art. 19. In obeying and construing these rules, due regard must be had
to all dangers of navigation; and due regard must also be had to any
special circumstances which may exist in any particular case rendering
a departure from the above rules necessary, in order to avoid immediate
danger.

Art. 20. Nothing, in these rules, shall exonerate any ship, or the
owner or master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect
to carry lights or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper
look-out, or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by
the ordinary practice of seamen or by the special circumstances of the
case.

Mr. Thomas Gray, one of the Assistant Secretaries to the Board of Trade
(Marine Department), feeling how important it would be to have these
rules impressed upon the minds of all navigators, and knowing what
effect rhyme has in bringing at once to recollection, for instance, the
number of days in each month, put with great tact and ingenuity these
rules into verse, thus:—

1. Two steam-ships meeting.

     “When both side-lights you see ahead,
     Port your helm, and show your _red_.”

2. Two steam-ships passing.

     “_Green_ to _green_, or _red_ to _red_,
     Perfect safety—go ahead.”

3. Two steam-ships crossing.

_Note._—This is the position of greatest danger; there is nothing
for it but _good look-out, caution, and judgment_.

     “If to your starboard _red_ appear,
     It is your duty to keep clear;
     To act as judgment says is proper—
     To port, or starboard, back, or stop her!

     “But when upon your port is seen
     A steamer’s starboard light of _green_,
     There’s not so much for you to do,
     For _green_ to port keeps clear of you.”

4. All ships must keep a good look-out, and steam-ships _must stop,
and go astern_, if necessary.

     “Both in safety and in doubt
     Always keep a good look-out;
     In danger, with no room to turn,
     Ease her—stop her—go astern!”

These appropriate but simple rhymes have been translated into various
languages, and, I doubt not, have been the means of preventing
numerous collisions and other accidents at sea. It may be amusing
and instructive to add that, when the question of lights for ships
and rules of the road at sea were under consideration, the French
Government wrote to our Government proposing a Maritime Congress to
settle them. We replied in substance, “No. A Maritime Congress of
sailors of different nations and languages will be a Babel. But we
will heartily co-operate with you; we will propose a draft of rules
and submit them to you. If France and England can agree on this,
other nations will probably join.” France adopted our proposal most
cordially, and we set to work. At that time we were fortunate enough
to have Mr. Milner Gibson at the Board of Trade, who united, as I
have explained in the text, what scarcely any other man would have
done, perfect knowledge of the subject, a clear, logical, and sensible
understanding, and a remarkable power of making other people agree. Not
without difficulty, a set of rules was, under his leadership, framed
by the Admiralty, the Trinity House and the Board of Trade acting
together. These rules were sent to the French Government. They approved
them, making some valuable criticisms, but, chiefly, criticisms of
detail. We then said, “Now let there be no question of national vanity;
no quarrel as to who originated these rules. Do you publish them in
your _Moniteur_ on a given day, and we will, on the same day,
publish them in our _Gazette_, merely stating that the rules
had been jointly settled by the two Governments.” This, as might have
been supposed, was agreed on. To the surprise, however, of every one
connected with the facts, the _Moniteur_ some time before the
day fixed, published a long story to the following effect:—“That the
French Minister of Marine had long been alive to the dangers to which
navigation was exposed for want of such rules; that he had communicated
his apprehensions to his colleague, the French Foreign Minister,
who sympathised with him; that he, the French Minister of Marine,
thereupon prepared a set of rules, which he sent to his colleague;
that the French Foreign Minister submitted these French rules to the
English Government; that that Government gave them its cordial and
grateful approval; and that both Governments then agreed to adopt them.
Therefore, they were to become law!”

[167] See evidence at great length on this subject before Merchant
Shipping Committee of 1860; and especially before Royal Commission on
unseaworthy ships of 1873-4.

[168] From having been myself trained in the forecastle of a ship, I
am familiar with the character and habits of sailors at sea. Though I
have found among them some worthless characters, as may be found in
all other branches of trade, and a few scheming and clever but bad
men, who were the leaders in all mischief, known frequently as “sea
lawyers,” the sailor at sea is usually an industrious, thrifty, and,
I may add, a sober man. You will find him in the “dog watches,” or
during the Saturday-afternoon holidays, making, mending, or washing
his clothes; his trousers, his chief garment, are cut out from a roll
of canvas stretched on deck, by means of his jack knife, and usually
consist of only two pieces ingeniously stitched together; being,
consequently, too flat behind, but having the highly-approved and
familiar straight legs. He takes a particular interest in his sea-chest
and its contents, and is often to be found arranging them and seeing
that they are all in good order. As he approaches home, after a long
voyage, you may see him figuring with a bit of chalk on the lid of his
chest the amount of wages he will have to receive, and frequently hear
him relating to his shipmates how he intends to dispose of them, and
his mental disposition of them is usually wise and generous. But, as
soon as he goes on shore, his character seems to change, and there he
too frequently throws his hard-earned wages away in drink, folly, and
vice. I had, when a youth, seen something of the sailor in his usual
rendezvous on shore as well as at sea, but nothing good or evil that
I remember worthy of note. Therefore, when changes relating to his
condition and welfare were contemplated, and when, as a member of the
House of Commons, it was likely that I should be expected to aid in
effecting those changes, I resolved to see more of Jack on shore than
I had ever done before. With that object, I frequently dressed in the
rough garb of a coasting skipper or mate. I might have saved myself the
trouble of changing my usual attire, for few knew me then in person,
and, at best, I never looked better than the character I assumed.
Thus attired, I made frequent nightly visits to the public-houses and
dancing saloons in Ratcliffe Highway, and in the vicinity of the London
and St. Katherine’s Docks, the usual haunts of sailors and of their
varied and very questionable “friends.” With my pipe and pint of beer,
I sat often for hours among them, and thoroughly made myself master of
“Jack on shore” and of his depraved companions. Poor fellow! he was,
so long as his money lasted, the victim of them all. Sometimes the
whole of his earnings were lost or stolen from him in the first night’s
debauch. As you entered these gaudy but wretched saloons, you could at
once distinguish in the throng the sailor who had just come on shore,
and the sailor out-of-elbows in search of another ship. I shall not
attempt to describe these places, of which there are still too many
in the East end of London; it is sufficient to state that vice in its
darkest forms, without one redeeming spark, held high revel there.
They were, indeed, loathsome “hells.” I gained from them, however, a
knowledge which I could not otherwise have obtained, and which I hope
proved of some service to the Board of Trade when they were framing
their excellent measures for the improvement of our mercantile marine.

[169] During the year ending 20th November, 1874, 50,182_l._ 15_s._
6_d._ was received at the Seaman’s Savings-banks, and 45,964_l._ 9_s._
10_d._ paid away, leaving to the credit of the seamen depositors, with
interest, 81,116_l._ 1_s_. Since the money-order offices were opened
in 1855, there has been received through these offices at ports in the
United Kingdom and ports abroad, up to the close of 1874, 4,827,093_l._
1_s._ 11_d._, and remitted to 804,208 persons the sum of 4,822,338_l._
14_s._ 8_d_. See Parl. Papers, Seaman’s Savings-banks and Money-orders,
161, 21st April, 1875. I most sincerely trust that Government will do
everything in its power to encourage and induce seamen to make more use
than they now do of these most valuable offices. These and education,
more than stringent legislative enactments, are the instruments whereby
the power of the crimp is to be crushed, and our seamen elevated to the
position of our mechanics.




CHAPTER XIII.

     Scarcity of shipping at the commencement of the Crimean
     War—Repeal of the manning clause—Government refuses to issue
     letters of marque—Great increase of ship-building and high
     freights—Reaction—Transport service (_notes_)—Depression
     in the United States—The _Great Republic_—Disastrous
     years of 1857 and 1858—Many banks stop payment—Shipowners’
     Society still attribute their disasters to the repeal of
     the Navigation Laws—Meeting of Shipowners, December 15th,
     1858—Their proposal—Resolution moved by Mr. G. F. Young—Mr.
     Lindsay moves for Committee of Inquiry—Well-drawn petition of
     the Shipowners—Foreign governments and the amount of their
     reciprocity—French trade—Spanish trade—Portuguese trade—Belgian
     trade—British ships in French and Spanish ports—Coasting
     trade—Non-reciprocating countries—Presumed advantage of
     the Panama route—Question discussed—Was the depression due
     to the withdrawal of Protection?—Board of Trade report and
     returns—English and foreign tonnage—Sailing vessels and steamers
     in home and foreign trades—Shipping accounts, 1858—Foreign and
     Colonial trades—Probable causes of the depression in England and
     America—American jealousy and competition—Inconclusive reasoning
     of Board of Trade—Government proposes to remove burdens on British
     shipping—Compulsory reciprocity no longer obtainable—Real value of
     the Coasting trade of the United States—Magnanimity of England in
     throwing open her Coasting trade unconditionally not appreciated
     by the Americans.


[Sidenote: Scarcity of shipping at the commencement of the Crimean War.]

[Sidenote: Repeal of the manning clause.]

The spring of 1852 ushered in the dawn of brighter days for the
disconsolate and “ruined” British shipowner: he could then, at least,
obtain, with prudent management, a moderate remuneration on his
capital, but there was no actual scarcity of tonnage until 1854.
Freights, as we have seen, had no doubt materially risen in the
interval, because we had hesitated to increase the number of our ships,
while foreigners, with the exception of the Americans, had refrained
from rushing into the trade we had opened for them to the alarming
extent anticipated. Consequently, there was, hardly, tonnage enough
to meet the requirements of commerce created by the abolition of our
Navigation Laws, still less to satisfy the sudden demands which arose
when, in March 1854, England and France declared war against Russia.
Suitable vessels could not then be found in sufficient numbers to
send forth, with the requisite despatch, the allied armies and their
supplies to the scene of action; nor, I must add, could British seamen
be obtained to man with expedition our ships of war. Government,
therefore, threw open our Coasting trade, and repealed the once famous
manning clause, which, however, neither increased, on the average,
the number of foreigners we had hitherto been allowed to employ in
our ships, nor deteriorated the number and quality of British seamen,
though aiding, at the time, the more expeditious equipment of our
fleets.

[Sidenote: Government refuses to issue letters of marque.]

But a much more important step affecting the interests of maritime
commerce and the progress of mankind was taken in 1854. On the
declaration of that unfortunate war, her Majesty in Council, in order
to preserve the commerce of neutrals from unnecessary obstruction,
waived the belligerent rights appertaining to the Crown by the law of
nations, by declining to issue letters of marque or by confiscating
neutral property on board of Russian ships, or neutral ships with
Russian property on board, provided such goods were not contraband
of war. She, however, reserved the right of blockade; a reservation
by which I may remind my readers, her Majesty’s subjects were,
commercially, by far the greatest sufferers.[170]

[Sidenote: Great increase of ship-building and high freights.]

The extraordinary demands for shipping on the outbreak of war led
to their production with still more extraordinary rapidity, and
furnished, at the same time, the most convincing proofs that we had
within ourselves resources far beyond all other nations for meeting
the emergency of war, without the necessity of keeping up a large and
expensive standing navy, especially as such a navy must always be in
a state of transition. The high rates of freight then offered for
transports, ranging from 20_s._ to 30_s._ a register-ton
per month for sailing vessels, and from 35_s._ to 65_s._
per gross register-ton for steamers,[171] produced not merely all the
vessels required for our own transport service,[172] but, also, for
the wants of France, whose armies without our aid could not have been
conveyed to the Crimea.[173]

With such rapidity, indeed, were sailing ships produced, that the
supply not merely soon overtook, but greatly exceeded the demand;
the consequence, of course, being a great reaction in prices.
Steam-vessels, in the construction of which there had been a large
amount of speculation, likewise felt ere long the depression, and
before the close of 1855 the rates for these had fallen to 40_s._
and 35_s._ per ton per month: the surplus steamers, however, found
their way, in the end, to the advantage of all concerned, into trades
formerly carried on by sailing vessels.

[Sidenote: Reaction.]

Although the Russian war had created at first an unusual demand for
vessels of every description, and had given an extraordinary impulse to
ship-building, prudent shipowners soon foresaw that so sudden a rush
of prosperity could not long endure without as sudden a revulsion, and
“that it was fallacious to suppose that the same demand would continue
even while the war lasted.”[174]

[Sidenote: Transport service.]

Nor was it less apparent that the number of vessels engaged by
Government exceeded what was _actually_ required for the prosecution
of the war, and that, if hostilities continued, the number would be
materially reduced as soon as something like an organised system had
been established.[175] Such, indeed, proved to be the case; for,
when a temporary Transport Board was appointed, various vessels were
discharged, and the rates of freight for sailing ships, which had
averaged 1_l._ 7_s._ 7_d._ per ton, fell to 15_s._ 10_d._ per ton.
Indeed, there can be no doubt that, had there been a well-organised
board in operation when war was declared, the sea transport service,
which cost this country 15,000,000_l._ sterling during that brief
and unhappy war, would have been far more efficiently conducted for
two-thirds that amount.[176]

Great and unusual depression naturally followed the cessation of
hostilities. Although wars and famines, however unfortunate and
disastrous to the nation, afford rich sources of emolument to
shipowners, the adverse reaction is frequently sudden and severe.
Before the close of 1857, our markets had become so overstocked with
vessels of every kind, that it was hardly possible to obtain for them,
in any branch of trade, remunerative freights.

[Sidenote: Depression in the United States.]

Nor were the Shipowners of the United States in any better position.
They, too, had overbuilt themselves. Their exclusive Californian trade
had offered so many inducements, and, in fact, such large fortunes
had been realised out of it, that many more vessels than could be
profitably employed were built in the Northern States between 1849 and
1854. Some of these were placed on the trade with Europe. A very large
amount of capital had been invested in the famous ships thus employed;
but even these, before the close of 1854, were becoming unremunerative,
owing to the competition of British iron screw-steamers, which I shall
very fully describe hereafter, as they were the main weapon, whereby we
bade defiance to the competition of all other nations, in the general
ocean race then just commenced. As these splendid iron ships soon
commanded all the passenger traffic, and, at the same time, secured
the preference by shippers of high-classed and valuable goods, which
could afford to pay the heaviest rates of freight, many of the American
clippers were obliged to seek employment elsewhere. As the _Great
Republic_[177] was one of the finest, as well as the largest of
these famous vessels—indeed, she was the largest _sailing_ vessel
in the world, I furnish an illustration of her at page 360. But though
this vessel and a large number of the American liners found temporary
employment in the French transport service, they on the cessation of
hostilities were obliged to seek employment elsewhere; and, so great
was the depression, that American shipowners, in 1857, suffered quite
as much as did the generality of those persons who owned sailing
vessels in Great Britain. Indeed, on the 1st January of the following
year, there was not a single vessel building on the stocks of New
York for the mercantile marine, and, for many months previously, the
shipbuilders throughout the United States had been at a complete
standstill.

  [Illustration: THE “GREAT REPUBLIC.”]

[Sidenote: Disastrous years of 1857 and 1858.]

But all branches of trade throughout the world were now suffering to
a greater or less extent, and 1857 and 1858 will long be remembered
as gloomy years. The outbreak of the mutiny in India, the consequent
suspension of remittances from the East, and the demand for specie,
together with an uninterrupted outflow of the precious metals to the
Continent, led to an alarming drain of the bullion in the Bank of
England.

[Sidenote: Many banks stop payment.]

After a long struggle to maintain cash payments without pressing unduly
on the mercantile classes, the rate of discount rose so high as to
render necessary, for the second time, the temporary suspension of the
Bank Charter Act of 1844. The effect of this twice-repeated measure
was disastrous to many merchants engaged in the trade of the United
States; not a few of whom were obliged to suspend payment. The stoppage
of the Northumberland and Durham district Bank, with liabilities
amounting to 3,000,000_l._ sterling; as well as those of the
Western Bank of Scotland, which had been engaged in wild speculations
in the United States and elsewhere, with liabilities to the extent
of 8,911,000_l._, and that also of the City of Glasgow Bank for
6,000,000_l._, tended materially to increase the depression.

The Liverpool Borough Bank, which had been previously drained by
the insolvency of various mushroom speculators in ships, failed
for 5,000,000_l._, and the Wolverhampton Bank followed for
1,000,000_l._ Many private mercantile firms, also, whose
liabilities alone were variously computed at a sum not far short of
20,000,000_l._, were, at the same period, obliged to suspend
payment.

[Sidenote: Shipowners’ Society still attribute their failures to the
repeal of the Navigation Laws.]

Through such overwhelming disasters, it was hardly to be expected that
the Shipowners of Great Britain would pass unscathed, especially after
the prosperity they had enjoyed during the Crimean War. Nevertheless,
the General Shipowners’ Society of London, in the report of the
annual meeting, held on the 25th June, 1858, does not appear to have
attributed the cause of the depression under which Shipowners were
suffering to the revulsion in commercial affairs. On the contrary, they
still held the strange delusion, that, so far as they were concerned,
the repeal of our Navigation Laws, together with the absence of
reciprocity on the part of foreign nations, were the main causes of
suffering: curiously enough, too, the report attributed some portion
of their misfortunes to the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, and the
Passenger Act of the following year.

Having thus, as they conceived, ample grounds for an appeal to
Government, they, like the frogs before Jupiter, made an effort to
induce Lord Derby, their great friend and patron, and then Prime
Minister, to relieve their depressed fortunes.

Nor was this agitation for relief confined to the Shipowners’ Society
of London. Aberdeen, Dundee, Newcastle, Shields, and various other
ports on the north-east coast, where, perhaps, foreign competition was
most severely felt, sent in petitions to Parliament; while numerous
pamphlets appeared in which the ostensible cause of the Shipowners’
suffering was duly set forth. We had the old stories retold of the huge
Yankee ships eating up all their profits in the Indian trade, told,
too, at a time when American shipowners were suffering quite as much as
themselves. Nor did the authors of these pamphlets fail to remind us of
our old hobgoblins, the Swedes and Norwegians, who, faring sumptuously
on “black-bread,” were carrying all before them in the Northern Seas
and in the Mediterranean, to the irretrievable ruin of the hapless
British shipowners.

Such tales of sorrow from the outports, including Liverpool, Glasgow,
and those on the west coast of Scotland, where not a few of these
“ruined” men had realised handsome fortunes during the Crimean War,
made a deep impression on the bosom of the General Shipowners’ Society
of London, whose hearts had been softened by their own “losses.”[178]
They, too, as we have seen, entirely coincided with their brethren
of the outports as to the cause of the depression: and, while it was
resolved to continue pouring in the petitions to Parliament expressive
of their views and praying for relief, and, also, to stir up an
agitation through the medium of pamphlets and that portion of the
press which entertained similar opinions to their own, it was likewise
considered desirable to make a combined effort by the means of a public
meeting to be held in London, so that their sufferings and their wrongs
might become generally known among all classes of the community.

[Sidenote: Meeting of Shipowners, December 15th, 1858.]

[Sidenote: Their proposal.]

This meeting was consequently held at the London Tavern on the 15th
December, 1858. The chairman, however, Mr. Duncan Dunbar, then one
of the greatest individual shipowners in the kingdom, in opening the
proceedings, declared that no idea was entertained of asking for
a reversal of recent legislation, the delegates from the outports
having previously come to the resolution to limit their demands to the
consideration of the question of reciprocity, praying the Crown at the
same time to put in motion the clauses of the Navigation Repeal Act,
which authorize the Queen to retaliate on such foreign Powers as should
refuse reciprocity, and to place the ships of these countries on, as
nearly as possible, the same footing as that in which British ships are
placed in the ports of such country.

Volumes of statistics were brought forward by Mr. George Frederick
Young, who appeared as chief spokesman, and, as heretofore, the
undaunted champion of his party, to show that, though British shipping
had increased since the repeal of the Navigation Laws, foreign vessels
frequenting our ports had done so in a far greater proportion. Mr.
Young repudiated the idea—the “delusion”—that consumers were benefited
by the reduction of freight to the full extent of the difference which
must exist between the sum paid to the English carrier and the rate of
freight paid to his foreign competitor; and concluded his remarks by a
resolution to the effect that the existing “most deplorable and ruinous
depression” had been partly caused, and was greatly aggravated by the
unequal competition to which British shipping was exposed by the repeal
of the Navigation Laws. Other speakers from Liverpool, Glasgow, Hull,
Shields, Montrose, Dundee, and Aberdeen described the state of affairs
in their several localities; and, finally, a petition to the Queen was
agreed on, recapitulating the progress of legislation on the Navigation
Laws, and alleging that the apprehensions entertained when that measure
passed were fully verified by the result.

Similar meetings were held in various other parts of the country,
including Tynemouth and North Shields, which I then represented, and
a wish was intimated to me from those places that I should bring the
state of the shipping interest under the notice of the House of Commons.

Although I entertained very different views to those expressed at
these meetings, I felt, nevertheless, that our Shipowners had many
just causes for complaint; and that, though it was now alike beyond
the power of the Legislature to control the rising destinies of other
and rival nations, or even confine their mercantile marine within the
narrow limits prescribed by our jealousy, so as to remove all dread
of foreign competition, there were yet many burdens from which they
ought to be relieved, and many restrictions, to which they would never
have been subjected by the State, had it not been considered that they
derived peculiar benefits from the laws so long enforced for their
supposed advantage.

[Sidenote: Mr. Lindsay moves for a Committee of Inquiry.]

Accordingly I moved for a committee “to inquire into the operation of
certain burdens specially affecting merchant shipping,” which after an
interesting debate the House was pleased to grant.

But the committee had scarcely assembled when Parliament was dissolved,
and it was not until a new Parliament had met, that the subject was
again brought under the notice of the House of Commons. In the meantime
the Shipowners’ Society of London had urged Government, in a letter
of the 22nd February, 1859, for a reply to their petition praying the
Queen to exercise the powers vested in her, and to put in force the
retaliatory clause of the Repeal Act of 1849.

[Sidenote: Well-drawn petition of the Shipowners.]

This petition, I must state, was short and exceedingly well drawn.
It gracefully avoided all matters of detail and controversy; the
petitioners approached her Majesty, “animated by the most profound
sentiments of loyalty,” for which, indeed, I must add the Shipowners of
the United Kingdom have ever been conspicuous; they represented “the
ruinous state of depression” into which their interest was “plunged,”
and they “implored” her Majesty “to be pleased to extend to that
important national interest such assistance and relief as her Majesty
was enabled to afford to it through the exercise of those powers which
were vested by law in the Crown.”[179]

The petition was signed by the chairman, Mr. Dunbar, as representative
of the meeting; by Mr. George Marshall, as chairman of the General
Shipowners’ Society; and by deputies from most of the leading seaports
of the kingdom. From the weight and high character of the persons who
had signed this petition, Government could not do otherwise than attach
considerable importance to it, however much they may have differed
from the mode of relief the memorialists prayed Her Majesty to adopt.
Indeed, the time had arrived when it was desirable for Government to
review the effects really produced by the repeal of the Navigation
Laws, and to inquire into the burdens and restrictions to which British
Shipowners were still subjected. Nor was it less necessary to direct
attention to the state of foreign legislation with regard to British
shipping, since the removal by us of all restrictions on the vessels
of foreign nations engaged in the trade of the United Kingdom and her
possessions. As the exposition of the bearing of these questions,
necessarily, furnishes a complete insight into the Merchant Shipping
of the country at that period, it is my duty to furnish the report of
Government, if not in detail, at least at greater length than I might
otherwise have done.

[Sidenote: Foreign Governments and the amount of their reciprocity.]

In this carefully considered document, it was, authoritatively,
announced that France, Spain, and Portugal, where partial restrictions
on the ships of other nations were still maintained, were the only
foreign Governments which had not extended complete reciprocity to
British ships so far as regards the foreign oversea carrying trade.

[Sidenote: French trade.]

In France, under the treaty of 1826, British and French ships were on a
footing of equality in the direct trade between the two countries; but,
in the indirect foreign trade, in the colonial, and in the coasting
trades of that country, British ships still laboured under serious
disabilities.

[Sidenote: Spanish trade.]

In Spain, British ships were placed on a footing of equality with
Spanish ships as regards all port and navigation dues, by a Royal
order of September, 1852, having been, previously, subjected to heavy
differential charges. But an excess of 20 per cent. was still levied
on goods imported in foreign ships in the indirect trade, and, to this
extent, British navigation was still unfairly treated there.

[Sidenote: Portuguese trade.]

[Sidenote: Belgian trade.]

Restrictions were also maintained in Portugal on foreign ships in the
indirect and colonial trades. In addition to the case of the above
three countries, it must be also mentioned that, in Belgium, there was
still charged a duty of 1_s._ 1¼_d._ per 100 kilogrammes on
salt, when imported in British vessels, while in Belgian and Sardinian
ships this article was free. But, in spite of this disability, the
total tonnage of the two countries, respectively, entered and cleared,
with cargoes or in ballast, in the direct trade, was, in 1857, only
143,341 tons, while the British shipping employed in it that year
amounted to upwards of 364,000 tons.

[Sidenote: British ships in French and Spanish ports.]

It was admitted that the pursuance of this restrictive policy would
fully justify retaliation, more especially in the case of France and
Spain; but the results exhibited in the appended Return[180] show
that the trade transferable, by any such measure, from foreign to
British ships was comparatively so small, as neither to operate as an
inducement to the countries in question to relax their present system,
nor to afford any material addition to British shipping. Another
Return,[181] also, showing the total amount of British tonnage which
entered and cleared in French and Spanish ports respectively in the
indirect trade in each year, from 1853 to 1857 inclusive, proves, to
how small an extent, the shipping of these countries engaged in the
indirect trade with the United Kingdom; the result being, that, in
spite of the unequal restrictions, there was a larger amount of British
tonnage employed in the indirect trade with those countries, than of
the tonnage of such countries, respectively, in the indirect trade
of the United Kingdom, to which they were admitted on equal terms
with British ships. Further, the accounts accessible in Portugal,
however imperfect, were sufficient to afford conclusive evidence that
the British flag in no respect suffered from the competition of that
country. Indeed, the total tonnage of Portuguese ships which entered
and cleared in the direct and indirect trades of the United Kingdom in
1857 was only 56,606 tons, whereas the British tonnage employed in the
direct trade alone with Portugal amounted in the same year to 234,423
tons.

If a comparison were made between the relative employment of British
and French tonnage in the whole trade of France and the United Kingdom,
respectively, direct as well as indirect, it would appear that, in
1857, the total amount of British tonnage in French ports was equal
to two-thirds of the French tonnage in its own ports; while, in the
same year, the total French tonnage in British ports was, of course,
in a very small proportion, indeed, to the amount of British tonnage
in British ports, and considerably less than one-half of the amount of
British tonnage at French ports. Similar results were shown in the
case of Spain.

[Sidenote: Coasting trade.]

Previously to the opening[182] of the coasting trade of the United
Kingdom, British ships were admitted on equal terms with the National
ships in the coasting trades of Hanover, Belgium, Oldenburg,
Mecklenburg, Holland, Turkey (except foreign steamers for the
Bosphorus), Monte Video, Paraguay, New Granada, and China. But, in
consequence of that measure, the coasting trades of Norway and Sweden,
Denmark, Prussia, Sardinia, and Tuscany were, likewise, opened to
British ships on the same footing as national vessels.

[Sidenote: Non-reciprocating countries.]

The coasting trade, however, of the following countries was still
withheld from British ships, and reserved for the national flag, viz.,
France, Papal States, Two Sicilies, Russia, Austria, Spain, Portugal,
Greece, United States of America (as regards goods), Mexico, Peru,
Chili, Brazil, La Plata, Venezuela, and Hayti.

As in the case of foreign trade, the Queen, in the exercise of the
powers vested in her, might, doubtless, with perfect justice, exclude
the shipping of these countries from the coasting trade of the United
Kingdom; but, in this branch of trade, even more than in that of
foreign trade, such a measure would have proved almost wholly valueless
to the shipping of the United Kingdom.

The tonnage of each foreign State, engaged in the coasting trade of the
United Kingdom in the year 1857 was absolutely insignificant, and, for
all practical purposes, is still virtually monopolised by
British shipping.[183] It will be observed that, both in the foreign
and in the coasting trades, the countries which have reciprocated
the liberal policy of the United Kingdom are those which have most
benefited by the repeal of our restrictions, while the countries which
continue to maintain unequal restrictions on British ships, and against
which, alone, any measure of retaliation could have been directed, are
those which have derived little or no advantage from the opening of
British trade.

There is one other case noticed in the Board of Trade Report to
which it is desirable again to advert, in considering the question
of reciprocity, as this case has been made the subject of frequent
complaint, viz., the exclusion of British ships from the trade between
the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the United States of America.

The Government of that country has reserved, as we have seen, this
trade to the national flag. In this report it is stated that they have
done so, on the ground of its being a Coasting trade; and that they
are supported, by analogy, in several other countries under similar
geographical conditions: for example, the trade between the Atlantic
and the Mediterranean coasts of France and Spain.[184] And, further,
that, with reference to the technical difficulty, it would not be
competent for the Queen, under the retaliatory clauses alluded to, to
exclude United States ships from any branch of British trade, except
the coasting trade of the United Kingdom; and it had been shown that
the share of this trade enjoyed by the United States was so small,
that such a measure could neither injure the United States nor benefit
British shipping.

[Sidenote: Presumed advantage of the Panama route.]

It was thought, moreover, that the value of this branch of trade on the
American coast had been greatly overrated. In the first place, it was
obvious that every year would diminish its importance if the surmise
was correct that the bulk of the trade between the two sea-boards
of the North American continent would shortly be carried across the
Isthmus of Panama, and would thus, be placed at the disposal of British
ships.[185]

[Sidenote: Question discussed.]

Whatever opinion may be formed concerning the validity of this
comparison, the Board of Trade assured the Shipowners that the Queen’s
Government had held on this question, that, although the inter-Oceanic
trade of the United States might, in a strictly technical sense, be
properly defined as a Coasting trade,[186] yet, on the broad ground of
international equity, it should rather be regarded as analogous to the
trade between the United Kingdom and her distant dependencies, and that
British ships were, therefore, fairly entitled to participate in the
former, in return for the complete assimilation of the United States to
the British flag in the latter field of profitable employment.

It should, however, be remarked that, with reference to this question,
the reservation of the coasting trade to national vessels does not
appear to apply to the carriage of passengers; so that, as far as
can be ascertained, foreign vessels lie under no disability in the
transport of passengers coastwise from port to port of the United
States of America.

[Sidenote: Was the depression due to the withdrawal of Protection?]

It remains now to inquire how far such depression can be, in truth,
attributed to the withdrawal of protection from British shipping, and
to the consequent unrestricted competition with the shipping of other
countries; for it is, only, by an examination into general results,
that any satisfactory conclusions upon this question can be arrived at.

Now it is inseparable from the nature of all great changes of system
that particular interests must, occasionally, suffer from causes which
contribute to the general good; it is, therefore, possible in this
instance, that particular trades may have been injuriously affected,
while the general interests of British shipping have been promoted.

The statistical accounts of British tonnage employed at any given
time afford a very imperfect test of the actual condition of the
shipping interest, the more so as shipping is often employed with very
inadequate remuneration; but this remark does not apply to periods
of time extending over several years; hence, the shipping returns of
the nine years since the repeal of the Navigation Laws may be fairly
held to supply sufficient evidence of the influence that measure has
exercised on the permanent interests of British shipping.

[Sidenote: Board of Trade report and returns.]

Consequently a table was prepared by the Board of Trade to show the
total aggregate tonnage of British and foreign vessels, respectively,
entered and cleared, with cargoes and in ballast, at ports of the
United Kingdom in each year from 1842 to 1857 inclusive, a period
comprehending eight years before and eight years after the repeal of
the Navigation Laws.[187]

[Sidenote: English and foreign tonnage.]

It will be seen from this table that during the first period British
tonnage advanced from 6,699,995 tons in 1842 to 9,669,638 in 1849,
being an increase of 2,969,643 tons.

In the second period it advanced from 9,442,544 tons in 1850 to
13,694,107 tons in 1857, being an increase of 4,251,563 tons.

In the same period the progress in the employment of foreign tonnage
in the trade of the United Kingdom has been from 1842, 2,457,479 tons;
to 1849, 4,334,750 tons; increase 1,877,271 tons. From 1850, 5,062,520
tons; to 1857, 9,484,685 tons; increase 4,422,165 tons.

It must be borne in mind, that these tables only show the state of
the trades before the repeal was completely carried out for British
and, partially so, to foreign ships, and that, in order to estimate the
full effect of the measure on British shipping, it is necessary, also,
to show the number of British ships built and registered during the
respective periods.[188]

There are two features in these returns deserving special notice.

1st. According to the opinion of the Board of Trade this account shows
a larger relative increase than that of the previous returns relating
to the employment of tonnage, while it, at the same time, confirms
the hypothesis that many British ships now find an employment in the
indirect trade of foreign countries, which, of course, does not appear
in the accounts rendered in England. Indeed, during the period of
protection, there was an actual decrease in the amount of tonnage built
and registered, while a large increase took place in the second period
of open competition.

[Sidenote: Sailing vessels and steamers in home and foreign trades.]

The next account shows the number and tonnage of registered sailing and
steam vessels of the United Kingdom employed in the home and foreign
trades respectively (_excluding repeated voyages_).[189]

On this return it is to be observed that there has been a greater
progress in the tonnage engaged in the foreign trade, where competition
exists, than in the home trade, where, although that competition is
also allowed by law, it is only carried out to a trifling extent in
practice, the latter having only advanced from 719,815 to 860,406 tons,
while the former has advanced from 2,089,037 to 3,168,105.

It now remains to consider the shipping accounts for 1858.[190] These
exhibited a decline as compared with those of the preceding years, and
to this extent gave indications of the depression of which Shipowners
so much complained.

The accounts of December 1858 and January 1859,[191] if taken
separately, showed that a favourable reaction had already commenced,
and that British shipping was, in the spring of 1859, recovering from
the depression it had suffered; and this fact was, naturally, much
dwelt on by the champions of repeal, confirming, as it was supposed to
do, the opinion expressed on the temporary and accidental character
of this depression. This account, also, illustrates the state of the
merchant shipping of England at a period preceding a continental war.

[Sidenote: Foreign and Colonial trades.]

It was pointed out with a certain degree of triumph, that these
three accounts, when taken together, afforded satisfactory evidence
that, down to the close of 1857, the progress of British shipping
had suffered no check nor reverse, and that the great development
of the foreign tonnage, employed in the trade of the United Kingdom
during recent years, was only partly attributable to the repeal of the
Navigation Laws in 1849, the progress of foreign shipping in British
trade having been nearly as rapid in the period of eight years prior to
1850 in consequence of the increasing requirements of British commerce.

The reason of the decline exhibited in the accounts for 1858 must,
therefore, be sought from other causes; and, probably, the commercial
history of the previous few years is amply sufficient to afford
the required explanation; moreover, any loss we might, thereby,
have sustained was more than counterbalanced by the extraordinary
development of the foreign and colonial trades of the United Kingdom
during the ten years preceding 1859.[192]

[Sidenote: Probable causes of the depression in England and America.]

The commercial crisis, however, which occurred on both sides of the
Atlantic, at the close of 1857, necessarily operated injuriously
upon the progress of English trade, and consequently on English
shipping. It must be also remembered that the Russian war, and,
subsequently, the disturbances in British India, created a large and
_abnormal_ demand for tonnage, which ceased with the termination
of those temporary causes; and, as tonnage employed exclusively in the
Government transport service, does not appear in the preceding account,
it is probable that, during 1858, there was a still greater check to
the demand for tonnage than is therein expressed.

The temporary depression was, however, by no means confined to the
shipping of the United Kingdom, as we have shown; similar symptoms had
manifested themselves in other maritime countries.[193]

[Sidenote: American jealousy and competition.]

Although the competition of British shipping in steam navigation had
been the subject of loud complaint in America, it will be found that
the decline in the building and employment of British shipping in 1858
was not so great in proportion as that which was indicated by the
annual accounts of the imports and exports of the United Kingdom for
that year.[194]

[Sidenote: Inconclusive reasoning of Board of Trade.]

The Board of Trade argued, but very inconclusively, with reference to
the free supply of foreign tonnage for the requirements of British
trade, that if, during the exceptional circumstances of recent years,
British commerce had been obliged to depend on British shipping alone
to the extent which was necessary before 1850, an artificial stimulus
would have been given to the demand for British ships, which could
not have been sustained, and that, therefore, the whole weight of the
reaction would have fallen upon British shipping, instead of being
diffused, as was the case, among the whole tonnage employed in British
trade.

Upon this preposterous conclusion no argument can be raised: as
well might it be said that a man ought not to be individually
prosperous, lest the revulsion of adversity should be too great for
him, especially if not diffused among his rivals in trade. At last,
Government arrived at this conclusion about the condition of merchant
shipping, that they could not attribute the actual depression of
British shipping to the effects of increased competition with foreign
shipping consequent on the repeal of the Navigation Laws; but that,
considering the importance of the shipping interest in a national point
of view, it was desirable that all partial and unequal burdens to which
the shipping interest was still subject should be removed as soon as
practicable. In this spirit, the repeal of the differential duty on
foreign timber as the raw material of shipbuilding, and the abolition
of passing tolls and other local burdens, which were still maintained
without any equivalent in the shape of services rendered to shipping,
were questions which deserved immediate consideration.

[Sidenote: Compulsory reciprocity no longer obtainable.]

[Sidenote: Government proposes to remove burdens on British shipping.]

It cannot be denied that this very elaborate exposition of the state
of merchant shipping completely cut the ground from under those
Shipowners who still advocated Protection. They, however, went on
cavilling “for a principle,” and contended that the Spanish and French
trades for instance might become valuable to the British Shipowner if
the Governments of France and Spain would adopt the liberal policy
pursued by England towards them in this respect; whereas, under the
existing restrictions, British Shipowners lost many valuable charters,
and were prevented from completing voyages otherwise profitable. The
Shipowners refused to allow the validity of the argument, that the
British Shipowner carried on a greater business in the indirect trade
with France and Spain than the French and Spanish Shipowners in the
indirect trade with England, and that, therefore, retaliation would
neither operate as an inducement to those countries to relax their
system, nor afford material addition to the field of employment of
British shipping. They contended that the commercial navy of this
country was larger than that of France and Spain combined; that,
therefore, the Shipowners of these countries had not the means of
engaging in an oversea trade to the same extent as the Shipowners of
England, and that, consequently, the superior energy of the British
Shipowner ought not be pleaded as a barrier to an act of justice.
Nor did it, in their opinion, follow that, because the engagement of
the Spaniard and Frenchman in the indirect trade with England was
not larger and more active than that of the British Shipowners in
the indirect trade with France and Spain, there was no inducement to
the Governments of those countries to relax the present restrictive
system, and no prospect, in the event of such relaxation, of increased
employment of British shipping in the direction indicated. In fact, the
London Shipowners thought the argument was entirely the other way, and
would not be convinced to the contrary, whatever relative prosperity
they might enjoy.

[Sidenote: Real value of the Coasting trade of the United States.]

With regard to the Coasting trade, all parties were agreed that the
Americans acted selfishly in denying to England the same reciprocity
for the coasting trade, which she had unrestrictedly conceded to them.
The Shipowners, however, by no means acquiesced in the opinion given
by the Board of Trade, that “the value of the American Coasting trade
had been greatly overestimated.” They said, and with reason, that it
was an error to imagine that because San Francisco formed the limit
of the United States’ coasting trade, the entrances and clearances at
that port exhibited the entire amount of the trade along the American
seaboard.

[Sidenote: Magnanimity of England in throwing open her Coasting trade
unconditionally not appreciated by the Americans.]

It was, indeed, an evasion to say that the American coasting trade,
meaning the western coast only, never afforded employment to more than
200,000 tons of American ships. The records of these pages afford
proofs to the contrary. All mention of the trade between the ports
of the Northern States and those of the Gulf of Mexico is, for some
reason or other, suppressed. All the vast and lucrative carrying trade
between New York and Boston, New Orleans and Mobile and Charleston, is
studiously kept out of view; trades far more valuable than that of San
Francisco and of the whole western coast, collectively. The argument,
therefore, set up by the Board of Trade, “that the participation
of the Californian trade, however desirable, cannot be regarded as
a circumstance which could exercise any important influence on the
shipping interests of Great Britain,” was altogether unsatisfactory.
Magnanimous as it was of the English Legislature to throw open the
foreign, as well as the colonial commerce and navigation of the Empire,
and the coasting trade afterwards, without imposing any previous
conditions, such a liberal policy has, evidently, been unappreciated by
the Americans, who seem resolved to monopolise all advantages resulting
from their geographical position.


FOOTNOTES:

[170] See _ante_, vol. ii. _note_, page 312.

[171] Timber freights from Quebec rose from 30_s._ per load, the
ordinary rate, to 55_s._ Coal freights to Constantinople advanced
from 20_l._ to 70_l._ per keel of twenty-one tons four cwt.;
and freights from India, which had previously ranged from 50_s._
to 80_s._, ran up as high as 180_s._ per ton.

[172] The new law of admeasurement, which came into operation on the
1st of January, 1855, while it produced great improvement in the
models of our ships, had the important advantage of creating very
little difference in the gross tonnage of the Empire, on which so
many dues are levied, and thus rendered unnecessary any change in the
long-established scale of charges, which in many cases would have been
altogether impracticable. For instance, 1100 vessels, large and small,
which were taken promiscuously, measuring under the old law 248,842
tons, were found under the new law to measure 231,277 tons, showing a
difference of only 7 per cent.

[173] My own firm had somewhere about 100,000 tons of shipping (a large
proportion of which consisted of steam-vessels) under our management
engaged as transports for the Government of France. It was then that I
for the first time met the Emperor. I had occasion to visit Marseilles
with regard to the fitting of some of these ships, and, on my return to
Paris, I had an interview with Marshal Vaillant, the then Minister of
War, which led to an audience with his Majesty. I daresay the Emperor
had sent for me to confirm, or otherwise, certain calculations of
his own which he had been making as to the number of ships requisite
to transport a given number of men, and so forth; for, after a long
audience, I remarked at parting, “Sire, you had no need to send for
me, as you know more about ships and their capacity than I do.” The
fact is, he was thoroughly master of the subject, and could tell me
to a man the number of troops to be placed on a given ship, and to an
animal the number of horses a ship of 1000 tons could or should carry
from Marseilles to Kaemish; the space required for each, and for their
fodder and water, the height of deck requisite to allow for the _toss
of the head_; and the important, but not generally known fact, that
though a horse must feel its own weight on its own legs at sea, it must
also be slung, for if it lie down the chances are that it will not be
able to get up again. At least, if the Emperor did not know all about
these things when I entered the Tuileries, he was the most apt scholar
I ever met, for he knew all about them before I left. I mention this
circumstance because this audience, subsequently, enabled me to render
some assistance in a matter of far greater importance to both France
and England and to mankind, to which I shall hereafter refer, viz.:
the change in the French navigation laws, which is more to the purpose
of this work, than the transport of troops and horses to a field of
slaughter.

[174] Annual circular of W. S. Lindsay & Co. for 1854, quoted in
Tooke’s ‘History of Prices.’

[175] When war was declared, the greater portion of the work of
engaging transports devolved upon the Civil Lord of the Admiralty;
and though, perhaps, few men could have been found more competent
for the duty than Captain (now Admiral Sir Alexander) Milne, who
then filled that office, it was impossible for any one man to get
through the work he was expected to do, especially with the system,
or rather want of all system, which then prevailed. From my knowledge
of what took place, I have no hesitation in saying that everything
relating to the engagement of the requisite number of ships, and to
the transport of troops and stores to the Crimea, was a huge chaos;
and I fear some serious disaster would have ensued had the pluck and
genius of the nation not come to the rescue in the mode of conducting
affairs at home, as well as, so far as I could ascertain, in the
field of action abroad. At home, there was certainly no organisation,
so far as regards the transport service, or, at best, it was of the
most imperfect description. Stores were shipped without bills of
parcels, and, frequently, without bills of lading; and the current
stories, at the time, of the shipload of boots and shoes which lay
at anchor in Balaclava harbour unknown to our authorities, while the
troops were bootless and shoeless; of the tops of mess tables sent
to the Crimea without the legs, and of the guns without carriages,
were no exaggerations. The Admiralty, it is true, were responsible
for the transport of the troops; but the Civil Lord, by whom it was
represented, had no control over shipments by either the Ordnance or
by the Medical Departments. A case came under my own knowledge which
would be ludicrous were it not melancholy. One day, when I had occasion
to visit a transport which lay at Woolwich, two gentlemen, when I
stepped on board, were wrangling over the main hatchway. One was from
the Ordnance, the other was evidently in charge of certain medical
stores which, with piles of shot and shell, lay on the wharf ready for
shipment. The shot and shell representative insisted on having his
goods in the centre compartment of the vessel because they were heavy;
the other gentleman was as determined to have his physic stored in
the same division of the ship because it was perishable. Each would
have his own way; and, as neither would give way, after an hour’s
altercation, they, to the amazement and horror of the mate of the
ship, came to a compromise by ordering the stores of both departments
to be stowed in this one favourite position! It is needless to state
the result; I may just, however, say that when the ship arrived at the
Crimea it was found that the shot and shell had played sad havoc with
the medicine cases, and that the floor of her centre compartment was
strewed with fragments of fragile cases, demolished physic bottles, and
countless numbers of squashed pill-boxes.

[176] When the war ceased, the Transport Board was abolished, and the
mode of conducting this important branch of the public service reverted
pretty much to what it had been previously. The Admiralty found ships
for the transport of troops at home and to our colonies abroad, but a
board at the India Office engaged vessels for all the troops and stores
to and from our possessions in the East, while other departments had
their own separate shipping offices; all of which, when vessels were
in demand, were _bidding against each other_, and also against
another department of the government, the Emigration Office. The rates
of freight were, of course, materially enhanced by this unnecessary
competition; and there would have been the same sad story to tell as in
the case of the Crimea, had we been unfortunately involved in another
war. Unable to obtain the necessary reform by any other means, I, on
the 5th of January, 1860, brought the existing state of affairs under
the notice of the House of Commons (see ‘Hansard,’ vol. clviii. pp.
2051-2061), when a committee was unanimously appointed on my motion,
“To inquire into the organisation and management of those branches of
the Admiralty, War Office, India Office, and Emigration Board, by which
the business of transporting, by means of shipping, troops, convicts,
emigrants, materials of war, stores, and any other similar services,
is now performed.” After a diligent inquiry which lasted the whole
session, the Committee did me the honour to almost as unanimously
adopt my report. But some time elapsed before a permanent Transport
Board was established, so numerous were the obstacles, or rather
prejudices, which had to be overcome. That board is now, or ought to
be, responsible for the conveyance of all troops and Government stores
from their embarkation until landed at their port of destination.

[177] The _Great Republic_ belonged to the well-known mercantile
firm of Messrs. A. A. Law & Co., of New York. When launched she
registered 4000 tons; but, having unfortunately been partially
destroyed by fire shortly after she was built, her upper deck was
removed, thus reducing her size to 3400 tons. Her dimensions were 305
feet in length, fifty-three feet extreme breadth, and thirty feet depth
of hold. She was fitted with double topsails, an American invention
then rare in this country, but now very common; she had on board a
steam-engine of eight horse-power for working ship, or loading and
discharging cargo. She brought 3000 tons of guano as “ballast” from New
York to London, and made the passage to the Scilly Islands in thirteen
days, beating up the English Channel thence against an easterly gale
in three days to the Downs. But, on her arrival in London, where she
was consigned to the care of my firm, I found she was much too large to
be employed, profitably, in any of the ordinary channels of commerce;
and, had not the French Government, then in want of transports for the
Crimean War, been induced, by the large space she afforded for the
conveyance of their troops, to engage her for this purpose, she must
have remained long after her arrival unemployed.

[178] When I was a member of the House of Commons, there was a great
brewer, a most excellent man, who sat close to me on the cross benches,
who frequently complained of the heavy “losses” he sustained in his
trade. I was under the impression that the brewing trade was a very
lucrative one, especially to persons like himself, who conducted it
on a gigantic scale, and I was puzzled to understand how, in the face
of such “losses,” he could continue adding _vat_ to _vat_,
and rearing fresh mountains of beer-barrels every year to his brewery
yard. Turning one night to a mutual friend who knew him more intimately
than I did, I asked, in the simplicity of my heart, if it _really_
was the case that the great establishment of which our friend was the
senior was a losing concern. “It is so,” he answered, “according to our
friend’s way of calculating; for every pound less than 75,000_l._
per annum, which is estimated as his share of the net profits, is
booked as _loss_!” Such must also have been the way in which some
of our large shipowners calculated their “losses” after the repeal of
the Navigation Laws.

[179] See ‘Copies of Address to the Queen from owners of British ships
and others interested in the prosperity of British navigation, and of
the subsequent correspondence relating thereto.’ Presented to both
Houses of Parliament, by command, 1859.

[180] Table showing the total amount of French and Spanish tonnage
which entered and cleared in the United Kingdom in the indirect trade,
viz., trade with other countries than France and Spain respectively in
each year, from 1853 to 1857 inclusive:—

  ---------------+----------+----------+--------
                 | Entered. | Cleared. | Total.
  ---------------+----------+----------+--------
  France    1853 |  23,554  |  85,052  | 108,606
    ”       1854 |  23,284  | 122,763  | 146,047
    ”       1855 |  24,094  |  55,164  |  79,258
    ”       1856 |  21,618  |  79,288  | 100,906
    ”       1857 |  36,401  | 125,775  | 162,176
                 |          |          |
  Spain     1853 |  11,606  |  20,085  |  31,691
    ”       1854 |  18,681  |  14,068  |  32,749
    ”       1855 |   6,180  |   8,883  |  15,063
    ”       1856 |   8,200  |   4,810  |  13,010
    ”       1857 |  12,720  |  10,373  |  23,093
  ---------------+----------+----------+--------

[181]

  ---------------+----------+----------+--------
                 | Entered. | Cleared. | Total.
  ---------------+----------+----------+--------
  France    1853 |  35,160  |  23,367  |  58,527
    ”       1854 |  33,955  |  47,709  |  81,664
    ”       1855 | 104,147  | 127,630  | 231,777
    ”       1856 | 198,842  | 152,919  | 351,761
    ”       1857 |  66,845  |  46,383  | 113,228
                 |          |          |
  Spain     1853 |  24,967  | 109,591  | 134,558
    ”       1854 |  67,051  | 123,373  | 190,424
    ”       1855 |  91,416  | 105,166  | 196,582
    ”       1856 |  52,030  | 102,663  | 154,693
    ”       1857 |          |          |
  ---------------+----------+----------+--------

[182] Act 18 and 19 Vict., chap. vii.

[183]

COASTING TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1857.

  -------------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------------------
                           |             ENTERED.             |            CLEARED.
                           +-----------------+----------------+-----------------+------------------
  Nationality of           |Sailing Vessels. | Steam Vessels. | Sailing Vessels.| Steam Vessels.
  Vessels.                 |                 |                |                 |
                           +--------+--------+---------+------+---------+-------+---------+--------
                           |Vessels.| Tons.  | Vessels.| Tons.| Vessels.| Tons. | Vessels.| Tons.
                           +--------+--------+---------+------+---------+-------+---------+--------
  Russian                  |      4 | 1,603  |         |      |       5 | 1,729 |         |
  Swedish                  |     22 | 3,755  |         |      |      22 | 3,630 |         |
  Norwegian                |     27 | 5,580  |         |      |      26 | 5,426 |         |
  Danish                   |     85 | 9,633  |         |      |      85 | 9,692 |         |
  Prussian                 |     50 | 9,953  |         |      |      44 | 9,043 |         |
  Mecklenburg-Schwerin     |     17 | 3,600  |         |      |      19 | 4,400 |         |
  Hanoverian               |     30 | 2,176  |         |      |      36 | 2,448 |         |
  Oldenburg and Knyphausen |      4 |   330  |         |      |       4 |   451 |         |
  Hamburg                  |      6 |   694  |         |      |       5 |   689 |       1 | 250
  Bremen                   |        |        |         |      |         |       |         |
  Lubeck                   |        |        |         |      |         |       |         |
  Dutch                    |      47| 4,535  |        2| 336  |      40 | 4,143 |         |
  Belgian                  |       4|   593  |         |      |       3 |   337 |       5 | 840
  French                   |       4|   507  |         |      |       9 |   854 |         |
  Spanish                  |       3|   572  |         |      |       2 |   401 |         |
  Portuguese               |        |        |         |      |       1 |    95 |         |
  Sardinian                |        |        |         |      |         |       |         |
  Tuscan                   |        |        |         |      |         |       |         |
  Papal                    |       2|   381  |         |      |         |       |         |
  Two Sicilies             |       3|   615  |         |      |       5 | 1,080 |         |
  Austrian                 |       1|   387  |         |      |       4 | 1,002 |         |
  Greek                    |       1|   312  |         |      |       2 |   532 |         |
  America, U.S.            |       7| 4,797  |         |      |      12 | 5,883 |         |
                           +--------+--------+---------+------+---------+-------+---------+--------
                           |    317 |50,023  |        2|  336 |      324| 51,835|       6 | 1090
                           |                                  |
                           |   Vessels, 319.                  |           Vessels, 330.
                           |   Tons, 50,359.                  |           Tons, 52,925.
  -------------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------------------

The Entrances and Clearances of British ships in the same year amounted
to upwards of 80,000,000 tons!!

[184] I have great doubt whether the Board of Trade was justified
in making this statement. The Royal Decree of 10th December, 1852,
refers to a Law 9th July, 1841, which I have before me; but, when
the differential tonnage duty was abolished, the Gibraltar merchants
presented addresses thanking the authorities for the _restoration_
of the flag. The ports between the Garonne and the Bidassoa are,
surely, not under similar geographical conditions as either the ports
or voyage between the Hudson and the Columbia.

[185] I really do not see it in that light. British ships would,
indeed, have a shorter voyage from England to California, but they
would still be precluded from going from New York to California
_viâ_ the Canal or passage at the Isthmus. The restriction would
continue and would prove even more vexatious, as might be shown in a
variety of ways.

[186] I deny this altogether. I cannot admit that a ship taking a cargo
from Cronstadt to Odessa, thus making almost the circumnavigation of
Europe, could be justly deemed to be making a _Coasting_ voyage,
however much Russian municipal law might declare it to be so.

[187] Table showing the total amount of tonnage of British and Foreign
Vessels respectively, with cargoes and in ballast, entered and cleared
in the United Kingdom in each year, from 1842 to 1857 inclusive.

  ---------+-------------+-------------+-------------
  Years.   |    British. |    Foreign. |    Total.
  ---------+-------------+-------------+-------------
           |     Tons.   |    Tons.    |    Tons.
  1842     |  6,669,995  |  2,457,479  |   9,127,474
  1843     |  7,181,179  |  2,643,383  |   9,824,562
  1844     |  7,500,285  |  2,846,484  |  10,346,769
  1845     |  8,546,090  |  3,531,215  |  12,077,305
  1846     |  8,688,148  |  3,727,438  |  12,415,586
  1847     |  9,712,464  |  4,566,732  |  14,279,196
  1848     |  9,289,560  |  4,017,066  |  13,306,626
  1849     |  9,669,638  |  4,334,750  |  14,004,388
  1850     |  9,442,544  |  5,062,520  |  14,505,064
  1851     |  9,820,876  |  6,159,322  |  15,980,198
  1852     |  9,985,969  |  6,144,180  |  16,130,149
  1853     | 10,268,323  |  8,121,887  |  18,390,210
  1854     | 10,744,849  |  7,924,238  |  18,669,087
  1855     | 10,919,732  |  7,569,738  |  18,489,470
  1856     | 12,945,771  |  8,643,278  |  21,589,049
  1857     | 13,694,107  |  9,484,685  |  23,178,792
  ---------+-------------+-------------+--------------

[188] Table showing the total number and tonnage of Sailing and Steam
Vessels built and registered in the United Kingdom in each year, from
1842 to 1857 inclusive.

  -------+----------+---------+--------+----------+---------
  Years. | Vessels. |  Tons.  | Years. | Vessels. |  Tons.
  -------+----------+---------+--------+----------+---------
   1842  |   914    | 129,929 |  1850  |    689   | 133,695
   1843  |   698    |  83,097 |  1851  |    672   | 149,637
   1844  |   689    |  94,995 |  1852  |    712   | 167,491
   1845  |   853    |  23,230 |  1853  |    798   | 203,171
   1846  |   809    | 125,350 |  1854  |    802   | 196,942
   1847  |   936    | 145,834 |  1855  |   1098   | 323,200
   1848  |   847    | 122,552 |  1856  |   1150   | 244,578
   1849  |   730    | 117,953 |  1857  |   1278   | 250,472
  -------+----------+---------+--------+----------+---------

From this it will be seen that the total of such tonnage was in--

  1842                          129,929
  1849                          117,953
                                -------
               Decrease          11,976

  1850                          133,695
  1857                          250,172
                                -------
               Increase         116,777


[189] Table showing the number and tonnage of registered SAILING and
STEAM VESSELS (exclusive of river steamers) of the United Kingdom
employed in the Home and Foreign Trade respectively in each year, from
1849 to 1857 inclusive.

  ----------------------------------++----------------------------------
     EMPLOYED IN THE HOME TRADE.    ||  EMPLOYED IN THE FOREIGN TRADE.
  ----------+-----------+-----------++----------+-----------+-----------
    Years.  | Vessels.  |  Tons.    ||  Years.  | Vessels.  |  Tons.
  ----------+-----------+-----------++----------+-----------+-----------
     1849   |   9,610   |  719,815  ||   1849   |   6,694   | 2,089,037
     1850   |   9,150   |  721,153  ||   1850   |   7,235   | 2,188,420
     1851   |   9,266   |  764,461  ||   1851   |   7,411   | 2,348,892
     1852   |   9,134   |  768,409  ||   1852   |   7,580   | 2,449,364
     1853   |   8,851   |  774,813  ||   1853   |   8,357   | 2,791,224
     1854   |   8,778   |  748,714  ||   1854   |   7,418   | 2,759,120
     1855   |   8,590   |  748,543  ||   1855   |   7,957   | 3,018,951
     1856   |   9,707   |  787,476  ||   1856   |   8,551   | 3,190,011
     1857   |  10,064   |  860,406  ||   1857   |   8,100   | 3,168,105
  ----------+-----------+-----------++----------+-----------+-----------
   EMPLOYED PARTLY IN THE HOME AND  ||      TOTAL NUMBER EMPLOYED.
     PARTLY IN THE FOREIGN TRADE.   ||
  ----------+-----------+-----------++----------+-----------+-----------
     1849   |   1,917   |  287,490  ||   1849   |  18,221   | 3,096,342
     1850   |   1,507   |  227,639  ||   1850   |  17,892   | 3,137,212
     1851   |   1,507   |  247,582  ||   1851   |  18,184   | 3,360,935
     1852   |   1,105   |  163,111  ||   1852   |  17,819   | 3,380,884
     1853   |     998   |  164,050  ||   1853   |  18,206   | 3,730,087
     1854   |   1,211   |  221,259  ||   1854   |  17,407   | 3,729,093
     1855   |   1,281   |  222,676  ||   1855   |  17,828   | 3,990,170
     1856   |   1,012   |  178,590  ||   1856   |  19,270   | 4,156,077
     1857   |   1,164   |  182,971  ||   1857   |  19,328   | 4,211,482
  ----------+-----------+-----------++----------+-----------+-----------

[190] Tonnage entered and cleared with cargoes and in ballast at ports
of the UNITED KINGDOM, in 1857 and 1858 respectively.

  -------+------------+-----------+------------
         |  British.  | Foreign.  |   Total.
  -------+------------+-----------+------------
   1857  | 13,691,107 | 9,484,685 | 23,178,792
   1858  | 12,891,405 | 9,418,576 | 22,309,981
  -------+------------+-----------+------------

Number and tonnage of SAILING and STEAM VESSELS built and registered in
the United Kingdom, in 1857 and 1858.

        +------+----------+----------+
        |      | Vessels. | Tonnage. |
        +------+----------+----------+
        | 1857 |   1278   | 250,472  |
        | 1858 |   1000   | 208,080  |
        +------+----------+----------+

[191] Total tonnage of BRITISH VESSELS entered and cleared
with cargoes (_including repeated voyages_) in the months of
December 1858, and January 1859, as compared with corresponding months
of 1856-7-8.

  ---------+---------+---------+---------+---------
           |  1856.  |  1857.  |  1858.  |  1859.
  ---------+---------+---------+---------+---------
  December | 848,762 | 853,619 | 970,174 |
  January  |         | 678,705 | 603,393 | 700,445
  ---------+---------+---------+---------+---------

[192] As an indication of this progress, it is enough to show how
vastly the exports of British produce had advanced in value in that
period. Thus the Foreign Trade rose from 39,163,407_l._ in
1847, to 85,039,991_l._ in 1857, and the Colonial Trade from
13,686,038_l._ in 1847, to 37,115,257_l._ in 1857.

[193] The shipping accounts of the United States of America for the
year ended 30th June, 1858, showed a corresponding decline in the
employment of United States tonnage.

The total tonnage entered and cleared of United States ships in the two
years 1856-7, and 1857-8, having been

  1856-7, 9,302,021 tons.
  1857-8, 8,885,675 tons; Decrease 416,346 tons.

[194]

  -------------------------------+-------------+--------------
                                 |    1857.    |    1858.
  -------------------------------+-------------+--------------
                                 |      £      |      £
  Imports                        | 135,051,444 | 115,218,811
  Exports                        | 122,066,107 | 116,614,331
                                 +-------------+--------------
                                 | 257,117,551 | 231,833,142
                                 | 231,833,012 |
                                 +-------------+ Decrease per
                                 |             |  cent. 9 4-5
          Decrease, 1858         |  25,284,409 |
  -------------------------------+-------------+--------------

Shipping (total entered and cleared in Cargo and Ballast).

  ----------+------------+------------
    Years.  |    Total.  | British.
  ----------+------------+------------
            |   Tons.    |   Tons.
     1857   | 23,178,792 | 13,694,107
     1858   | 22,309,981 | 12,891,405
  ----------+------------+------------




CHAPTER XIV.

     Further returns of the Board of Trade, and address of the
     Shipowners’ Society to the electors, 13th April, 1859—Shipowners’
     meeting in London—Character of the speeches at it—Mr. Lindsay
     proposes an amendment—Effect of the war between France and
     Austria—Mr. Lindsay moves for an inquiry into the burdens
     on the Shipping Interest, 31st January, 1860—Report of the
     Committee thereon—Views with regard to foreign countries—The
     Netherlands—The United States—Generally unsatisfactory state
     of the intercourse with foreign nations—The present depression
     beyond the influence of Government—General results of Steamers
     _versus_ Sailing Vessels—The Committee resists the plan
     of re-imposing restrictions on the Colonial Trade—Difficulty
     of _enforcing_ reciprocity—Want of energy on the part of
     the English Foreign Office—Rights of belligerents—Privateering
     abolished in Europe; America, however, declining to accept this
     proposal—Views of the Committee thereon, and on the liability
     of Merchant Shipping—Burden of light dues—Pilotage Charges made
     by local authorities now, generally, abolished, as well as
     those of the Stade dues—The report of 1860, generally, accepted
     by the Mercantile Marine—Magnificent English Merchant Sailing
     vessels, 1859-1872—The _Thermopylæ_—_Sir Lancelot_
     and others—Americans completely outstripped—Equal increase in the
     number as well as the excellence of English shipping—Results of
     the Free-trade policy.


Besides the statistical returns supplied by the Board of Trade on
their report on the memorial of the Shipowners to her Majesty, this
Board, on the 25th February, 1859, published further returns which were
seized upon by the Shipowners’ Association, and made the basis for an
energetic manifesto addressed to the constituencies of the United
Kingdom at the general election in the spring of 1859.[195]

[Sidenote: Further returns of the Board of Trade,]

[Sidenote: and address of the Shipowners’ Society to the electors,
April 13, 1859.]

The returns in question consisted of five statements, including the
period from 1834 to 1858. They are too voluminous to be given here,
but it was clear from them that, if the increase of the entrances and
clearances of British ships at the ports of the United Kingdom, since
the repeal of the Navigation Laws, had been 3,221,767, the increase of
foreign ships on the other hand amounted to 5,083,826 tons. To these
leading facts, the Shipowners’ Association, triumphantly, referred the
different constituencies, and, although British ships in the eight
years over which these returns extended, had increased to a far greater
extent than they had in any similar previous period, the Association
pointed to the still greater increase of foreign shipping, and implored
the electors of the leading maritime ports to send such representatives
to the new Parliament, who would be exponents of the opinions they
sought to perpetuate; and who would save British Shipowners from
the certain ruin in their opinion awaiting them, as was so clearly
demonstrated by the “appalling” number of foreign ships frequenting our
ports. Pertinaciously adhering in this celebrated manifesto to their
extreme Protectionist principles, they now reasserted with confidence,
and with a brazen front the more astonishing, after what they had
previously admitted, every doctrine that had proved to be fallacious,
every “fact” which had long since been shown to have had its origin in
the regions of fancy or fiction, every appeal to be saved from ruin
as baseless as the shepherd’s wolf cry, and every theory as visionary
as their own fears; by such means, hoping to revive a system, which
the Legislature and every class of the community, except themselves,
had pronounced to be neither wise, just, nor beneficial. But, with
these principles patent to the whole world, fully confirmed, too, as
they were, by the extraordinary success resulting from the repeal of
the Navigation Laws, they kept harping on the one string, that foreign
shipping entering and clearing from our ports had, since that period,
increased in a greater ratio than our own, and this one fact produced
to a large extent the desired effect on the maritime portions of the
constituencies.

It was vain to tell them that, under the new policy, we had increased
our shipping to an extent far beyond what had been hitherto
accomplished; or that the nation at large, by obtaining all it required
from foreign nations at materially reduced rates, was greatly and
proportionately benefited by the change. Nor was it of any use to show
that our exports and imports, and, consequently, the general wealth
of the country, had already increased far beyond the most sanguine
hopes of even the Free-traders. To attempt to prove to a maritime
constituency that the more intercourse we had with other countries
the better it would be for us, and that the impoverishment of our
neighbours by restrictive laws was not the best means of enriching
ourselves, was then a mere waste of time, and all such arguments
were, at too many of our seaports, only received with scorn and
ridicule. At all such places, the one fact I have named carried the
day. Among various other seaport representatives who held Free-trade
principles, I lost my seat for the Tynemouth boroughs; at least, I
found such a phalanx of Shipowners arrayed against me, that I should
have had a great struggle to retain it.[196] However, within a week,
I found another seat at Sunderland, and, though the bulk of the
Shipowners there, too, were opposed to my views, I was returned over
my Conservative opponent (the late George Hudson) by a very large
majority.[197] But it fared, otherwise, with many better men who lost
their seats and did not find others.

The one fact in the Shipowners’ manifesto, apparently, strengthened
their cause in Parliament. I say apparently, because though the new
men were pledged to vote for the removal of all “grievances” in the
shape of peculiar and special burdens and for “reciprocity,” whatever
that might mean, I question if any one of them would have voted for a
reversion of our policy. It was idle to talk about it. “Protection to
native industry” was gone, and gone for ever! England had adopted a
policy which can never be reversed. But the General Shipowners’ Society
of London, elated with success, resolved to make one more determined
effort to, at least, restore the Colonial trade to the vessels of Great
Britain, and to induce Parliament to recommend her Majesty in Council
to exclude from our carrying trade the vessels of those nations which
did not reciprocate.

[Sidenote: Shipowners’ meeting in London.]

With these objects in view, they invited to their aid delegates from
all the seaports in the kingdom, and every person of influence in and
out of Parliament likely to aid their cause. Another public meeting
was held in the London Tavern, at which Mr. R. W. Crawford, one of the
members for the City, took the chair. I had, unexpectedly, received
an invitation to attend, which I accepted, as the question to be
discussed, apart from my duty to my constituents, was one in which I
had a large personal interest. Knowing, however, that few persons in
the vast assembly which had been got together agreed with the view I
entertained, I took my seat, almost out of sight, in the rear of the
platform. The meeting was, indeed, one of a most influential character.
Many men were there whose cheque for 10,000_l._ would have passed
as freely as a 5_l._ note, and whose hale and ruddy countenances
did not at all betoken that they were on “the road to ruin.” Perhaps it
was malicious on the part of the ‘Times’ to describe the meeting “as
the largest collection of political and commercial fossils which could
be got together in these adverse days for political antiquarianism;”
but it is quite true that their views, generally, so far as they could
be comprehended, were certainly of an antiquarian character.

[Sidenote: Character of the speeches at it.]

Mr. Frederick Somes, the member for Hull, who moved the first
resolution, declared “that nothing but ruin could result to the
shipping interest,” if the existing policy was pursued; and Mr.
Bramley-Moore, who seconded it, stated that “the coasting trade was
gradually drifting into the hands of foreigners” (a very extraordinary
statement in the face of the official returns), while he argued that,
“we should have the right of selling to, as well as purchasing from,
the foreigner,” as if any person or any law prevented him from doing
so if he pleased. Mr. George Marshall, one of our largest and most
intelligent shipowners, spoke, from experience, of the depressed
state of British shipping, owing to the “inability to compete with
foreigners;” and Mr. Duncan Dunbar told the meeting, but not in a
doleful tone, for he was the jolliest of men, with the happiest of
countenances, “that the very property he had made by his industry and
hard labour was melting away like snow before the sun.”[198]

It was hopeless to expect that the Legislature would attempt to do
anything, even if they could, for a body of men who, representing
a great national interest, delivered such sentiments as these, and
had, evidently, assembled for the purpose of obliging other people to
make good any losses they might have sustained, if any there were,
during the two previous years, while pocketing in silence, for their
own special benefit, the large profits they had secured during the
Crimean war. What had Government to do with the profits and losses of
Shipowners any more than it had to do with those of any other branch
of trade? Invited, as I had been, to take part in these deliberations,
I felt that I should do wrong were I not, regardless of any insults to
myself, to step forward and attempt to expose the fallacy of the course
pursued by the meeting, especially, as the Shipowners had grievances
which really ought to be redressed, and to which the Legislature, I
felt sure, would readily listen, if properly appealed to. Shipowners
were then, unquestionably, subjected to various burdens which would
never have been imposed upon them had they not been a _protected
class_, and, as such, supposed to derive advantages from which other
classes of the community were excluded; burdens, too, I am bound and
willing to add, from which they ought to have been relieved when the
Navigation Laws were repealed.

[Sidenote: Mr. Lindsay proposes an amendment.]

Feeling, therefore, that the time of this large and important meeting
would be wasted in vain and useless resolutions, I stepped forward
to the front of the platform, resolved, at all hazards, to endure
every contumely, and, if I could not carry an amendment, which I saw
was altogether hopeless, to at least enter my protest as a British
Shipowner against such subservient and worthless appeals to the
Legislature of our country. My appearance on the front row was the
signal for a yell of derision; and my amendment, which I had hastily
written in pencil, “that a petition be presented to both Houses of
Parliament, praying for an inquiry into the actual condition of British
navigation, and for relief from all peculiar burdens and restrictions
that still fetter maritime enterprise,” was received with hisses and
the loudest and rudest demonstrations of dissatisfaction.

Although these events are matters for history, they are of too personal
a character to be pursued at length; however, that my readers may
form some idea of the feelings of a very large number of the most
influential Shipowners of the period, I furnish in a foot-note[199]
extracts from the report which appeared in the ‘Times’ and of other
journals of the proceedings of this great meeting.

[Sidenote: Effect of the war between France and Austria.]

But, even if the Legislature had been disposed to consider the wailings
of the Shipowners, or to listen to their unreasonable demands, an
event supervened which for a time changed the aspect of their affairs.
Critical questions arose in Europe. Political relations between France
and Austria had become most unsatisfactory. The Emperor of the French,
having recently, by a member of his family, contracted an alliance
with a Princess of the House of Savoy, welded another political link
with the King of Sardinia, and, on the 1st January, 1860, announced
an approaching rupture with Austria. “A cry of anguish” arose from
the provinces of Lombardy; and all the miseries the Italians, during
many years, had suffered from Austrian domination were suddenly and
ostentatiously paraded before the world. Free Europe witnessed with
astonishment the scene in which the despotic Emperor of the French
complained of the tyranny exercised by another despot in Austria, over
a portion of Austrian subjects, whilst the Emperor of Russia, more
despotic than either, joined in the strange and mysterious confederacy,
and affected sympathy for the down-trodden and oppressed Italians.

It was impossible for Great Britain to remain indifferent while events
so momentous were happening in rapid succession on the continent of
Europe; hence, when Austria summoned Sardinia to disarm, and the
French troops were put in motion to cross the Alps, the English
people, carried away by their sympathies for the oppressed Italians,
and forgetting to inquire “Can grapes come from thorns, or figs from
thistles?” were almost willing to join France and aid her in her real
object, the advancement of the eastern portion of the Empire towards
the Rhine. But, whatever the results of the short but great war then
publicly proclaimed by France and Sardinia against Austria, its effect,
by increasing the demand for shipping, combined with other causes,
proved very salutary to the fortunes of British Shipowners.

[Sidenote: Mr. Lindsay moves for an inquiry into the burdens on the
Shipping Interest, January 31, 1860.]

Though England had been startled by the proceedings on the Continent,
and had made preparations for any emergency, she happily kept clear of
“entanglement,” so that Parliament had time to direct its attention to
other less exciting, but to her more important subjects. Under these
circumstances, I consequently, on the 31st January, 1860, renewed my
motion,[200] for an inquiry into the state of our merchant shipping,
and the operations of the burdens and restrictions especially affecting
that interest. After a long and interesting discussion, the House was
pleased to adopt my motion, extending the inquiry into various Acts of
Parliament then in force;[201] and, on the 16th February of that year,
the Committee was appointed:[202] the whole of that session was devoted
to the inquiry, and to the complaints and suggestions of the Shipowners
and other persons interested, who were heard in detail: no less than
6813 questions were asked, and as many answers given in reply, and
voluminous appendices swelled the Report.

[Sidenote: Report of the Committee thereon.]

No Committee ever commenced its duty with a more fixed determination
to grant impartial justice and remedy any existing evils. I shall
not venture to offer an opinion on the Report, as it was drawn up by
myself, at the request of my colleagues. But I ought to state that the
Committee examined most carefully and anxiously, in all its bearings,
the great question with which it had to deal, and enabled me to prepare
a report which was strictly just and thoroughly exhaustive, and which
I hope has rendered unnecessary any further appeals, at least, on
similar grounds, for relief to the Legislature. In prosecution of their
inquiries the Committee examined numerous persons residing in London
and the outports connected with the shipping interests, many of whom
were extensively engaged in the home, colonial, and foreign trades.
They also examined several officers in various departments of her
Majesty’s Government, and others representing two of the corporations,
which exercise trading powers affecting shipping, so as to more fully
elucidate the subjects with which they were respectively acquainted.
They then reviewed in detail the various measures which had been
introduced during the previous quarter of a century affecting maritime
commerce, directing attention to that part of the evidence which stated
that the reason, why the Coasting trade was not thrown open until 1854,
was the assertion on the part of the officers of Customs that there
would be a difficulty in enforcing effectual regulations to guard the
revenue.

[Sidenote: Views with reference to foreign countries.]

[Sidenote: The Netherlands.]

Referring to existing treaties, the Committee remarked that, though the
Government of the Netherlands placed the ships of England, ostensibly,
on the same footing as Dutch vessels, English vessels, however, in
consequence of the regulations of the Dutch East India Company, were
practically prevented from trading with the valuable settlements of the
Dutch in the Eastern seas.

[Sidenote: The United States.]

When directing attention to the different nations who still withheld
from British ships the advantages of their coasting trade, they could
not fail to notice the often repeated fact, that the United States
of North America not only shut out British vessels from the carrying
of goods in the vast coasting trade of their Atlantic and Pacific
sea-boards, but that British vessels running between New York and
Aspinwall, and between Panama and San Francisco, were denied the
ordinary privileges enjoyed by the American national flag; and that,
thus, the indirect carrying trade between the eastern and western coast
of the United States was, practically, confined to American shipping,
as well as the coasting trade proper.

With regard to British colonial possessions the Committee stated that,
while the coasting trade had been thrown open to foreign vessels in the
British East Indies, Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, and Victoria, the
coasting trade of our North American colonies was still confined to
British vessels; foreign ships being, however, permitted to carry on
the inter-colonial trade with our various possessions.

[Sidenote: Generally unsatisfactory]

[Sidenote: state of the intercourse with foreign nations.]

The Committee, especially, noticed the entire unanimity of the
witnesses whom they had examined with regard to the unsatisfactory
state of the laws then regulating international intercourse, not merely
with the United States of America, but also with France, Spain, and
Portugal; nor could they fail to perceive that every witness viewed
with the greatest jealousy the restrictions still imposed by those
nations on our shipping, and further, that we had not been met by them
in that spirit of fairness and reciprocity we had a right to expect.

So far as regards the great question—the repeal of the Navigation
Laws—into which the Committee inquired minutely and impartially, I may
say that they were, unanimously, of opinion that it would be impossible
to reverse the established policy of Free-trade, and that, in fact, it
would not be to the interests of our Shipowners, if they had been able
to do so. Indeed, the representatives of the then most conservative
ports in the kingdom (Mr. Horsfall for Liverpool, and Mr. Liddell,
now Lord Eslington, one of the members for Northumberland) were
decidedly of opinion that any reversal of our policy would not merely
be prejudicial to the great trading interests of this country, but,
specially so, to those engaged in its maritime commerce; and, in fact,
though they felt the advantages derivable by reciprocal advantages from
foreign nations, they were not prepared to support an Order in Council
against the admission to our ports of the ships of those nations which
did not reciprocate.

[Sidenote: The present depression beyond the influence of Government.]

While admitting the depressed state of the shipping interest during
the previous two or three years, the Committee pointed out that this
depression had arisen in great measure from causes beyond the reach or
province of legislation. They remarked, for instance, with great force,
that as one-fourth part of the whole coasting trade was then carried
on by means of steam-vessels, while one steamer could accomplish as
much work as five sailing vessels, it must follow that the owners of
the latter would suffer; the result clearly showing that the depression
arose in the north of England ports to a great extent from causes no
government could control. Instancing Sunderland, they remarked that
while in 1852 there were no steamers whatever engaged in trade at that
port, the number of such vessels built there since that period (between
1852 and 1860) had displaced the enormous number of 4000 sailing ships,
each of 250 tons capacity. Hence, while the Committee could not but
regret the heavy loss thus entailed on one industrious class of men,
many of whom were, no doubt, totally ruined, it was impossible for
them to remedy a state of things brought about mainly by the progress
of science, and one, moreover, with which the change in our policy had
nothing whatever to do. Indeed, not one of the witnesses examined,
although many of them had been sufferers in this way, proposed to recur
to the absolutely restrictive system in vogue previously to 1850.

[Sidenote: General results of Steamers _versus_ Sailing vessels.]

When the figures brought forward by the opponents of repeal were
closely examined, it appeared that, while the increase of all the
sailing ships in the United Kingdom had for nine years previously to
the change in our Navigation Laws been only 23½ per cent., the increase
of steamers, during the same period, had been as much as 81 per cent.;
but that since then to the end of 1859, while the increase of sailing
ships had been 26½ per cent., steamers had increased no less than 184
per cent. These were transient evils against which no legislation could
provide; and it was, therefore, obvious that, instead of attempting
to render remunerative a class of vessels, now obsolete owing to the
improvements of the age, Shipowners would have done better to direct
their attention to the development of the new power, for which they
possessed in vast abundance the requisite materials of iron and coal:
in this way, there could be no doubt that they would be able to compete
successfully with all other nations. In how remarkable a manner these
words have been fulfilled I shall be able to show when I come to treat
of the progress of steam navigation in the Transatlantic trades. Nor
has our success been less remarkable in our competition with the Swedes
and Norwegians, with whom it was repeatedly alleged we were unable to
compete; for they, in 1859, had already become large buyers of ships
in our markets, and, I may add, are still frequently to be found
purchasers of British-built vessels.

[Sidenote: The Committee resists the plan of re-imposing restrictions
on the Colonial Trade.]

The question having now been narrowed to that of re-imposing the
monopoly of the carrying trade to and from our Colonial possessions,
the Committee soon arrived at the conclusion that the extent,
diversified interests, and increasing power of our possessions abroad,
offered insuperable obstacles to the re-imposition of restrictions on
that trade, while the daily increase of feelings of independence in
our Colonies naturally tended to resist a system which would place the
grower of British plantation sugar and coffee in the West Indies at
a greater disadvantage than then existed, especially when compared
with the producer of slave-grown sugar and coffee in Brazil and Cuba.
The Committee, therefore, looking to our relations with Canada, our
possessions in the East and West Indies, and, above all, in Australia,
considered it their duty, unhesitatingly, to declare that any proposal
having for its object the re-establishing an exclusive monopoly
of the carrying trade to and from our colonial possessions must,
both on political and commercial grounds, be rejected as altogether
impracticable. Moreover, that, while such a step would be unjust to our
fellow-subjects in the colonies, it would very likely embroil us with
those foreign Powers to whom we were bound by existing treaties.

[Sidenote: Difficulty of _enforcing_ reciprocity.]

The question, however, of the expediency of requiring foreign
Powers, having colonial possessions, to reciprocate every advantage
to us, which Great Britain had accorded unconditionally to them,
though, commercially, when compared with other branches of commerce,
unimportant, was one which demanded peculiar attention, as it was, and
still is, a source of great annoyance, in that it creates a feeling
that we have been very illiberally, if not unjustly, dealt with by
these Powers. British Shipowners who, carried on the restricted and
scarcely tolerated intercourse with the colonies of France, Spain,
and Portugal, found their ships placed at an immense disadvantage,
in the unequal competition they had to encounter, while they had the
mortification to see foreign ships resort to our own colonies and
secure much higher freights than our own ships when chartered to a port
in Europe.[203]

For instance, it was given in evidence that Spanish vessels were
chartered in English ports to Manilla at 3_l._ or 4_l._ per ton, while
the British vessel could not obtain 30_s._ per ton. From the Mauritius
to Europe a French ship, enjoying the option of both the British and
French markets, obtained a freight for sugar of 3_l._ 10_s._ per ton at
a time when English ships were obliged to accept 10_s._ per ton. Thus,
in all our colonies and possessions, French, Spanish, and Portuguese
vessels[204] could generally procure a freight greatly in excess of
that obtained by British ships, as the foreign national flag secured
for them, on arrival at a port of call in England, the advantage of
our markets, with the option of sending on the cargo to the respective
countries of Europe to which the national flag belonged, but from which
markets such produce was excluded by heavy differential duties, if
conveyed thither in British ships.

[Sidenote: Want of energy on the part of the English Foreign Office.]

The Committee naturally felt that a sense of justice demanded that
our Shipowners should, as far as practicable and consistent with the
interests of the community, be placed on equal terms in the race of
competition, and that, whatever difficulties might stand in the way of
having recourse to retaliatory measures, there had been, they regretted
to state, an apparent apathy on the part of the executive government,
in remonstrating with those nations which then excluded our vessels
from their trade; in other words, that the Foreign Office had not
employed the influence it might have exercised to secure, by diplomatic
negotiation, the advantages of reciprocity.

[Sidenote: Rights of belligerents.]

As the question of belligerent rights at sea was one which deeply
affected alike the British Shipowner in the prosecution of his business
and the general interests of Great Britain, the Committee devoted their
especial attention to the evidence advanced on this important question.

[Sidenote: Privateering abolished in Europe;]

In the recent war with Russia, England, as we have already incidentally
noticed, when she formed an alliance with France, agreed with that
country to waive her right to confiscate an enemy’s goods on board
neutral ships as also neutral goods found on board an enemy’s, so
long as they were not, in either case, contraband of war. This mutual
but provisional waiver of belligerent rights placed the allies in
harmonious action, and, practically, countenanced the principle that
“free ships make free goods.” Upon the return of peace, as I have
explained in a previous portion of this work, the declaration of Paris
of April, 1856, signed by Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia,
Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey gave a formal sanction to this principle.
Privateering was also abolished.

[Sidenote: America, however, declining to accept this proposal.]

[Sidenote: Views of the Committee thereon,]

America was invited to be a party to this general international
agreement, but demurred, and coupled at first her assent to the
abolition of privateering, with the condition that private property at
sea should no longer be subject to capture. Finally, she refused to be
a party to a convention, whereby she would be precluded from resorting
to her merchant marine for privateering purposes, in case she became
a belligerent. But this, in the opinion of the Committee, was not
surprising, as the United States had obtained the recognition of the
rights of neutrals, for which she contended throughout a long period of
hostilities, and Great Britain had surrendered those rights without any
equivalent from her. The Committee were therefore of opinion that our
Shipowners would thereby be placed at an immense disadvantage in the
event of a war breaking out with any important European Power. Indeed,
they went so far as to give it as their deliberate conviction that “the
whole of our carrying trade in the event of a great European war would
be inevitably transferred to American and other neutral bottoms.”

“We must therefore,” they continued, “either secure the general consent
of all nations to establish the immunity of merchant ships and their
cargoes from the depredations of both privateers and armed national
cruisers during hostilities, or we must revert to the maintenance of
our ancient rights, whereby, relying upon our maritime superiority, we
may not merely hope to guard unmolested our merchant shipping in the
prosecution of their business, but may capture enemy’s goods in neutral
ships, and thus prevent other nations from seizing the carrying trade
of this kingdom during a state of hostility.”

Looking at this important question in all its bearings, and considering
that we have at all times a much larger amount of property afloat than
any other nation, the Committee were of opinion, that, though grave
objections had been urged by high authorities against any further step
in advance, they could not close their remarks without expressing an
earnest hope, and, at the same time, giving it as a deliberate opinion,
that “in the progress of civilisation, and in the cause of humanity,
the time had arrived when all private property (not contraband of war)
should be exempt from capture at sea.”

[Sidenote: and on the liability of Merchant Shipping.]

Having reviewed the question of liability, of which many Shipowners had
complained, the Committee were of opinion that it was not advisable
to reduce that liability to any extent below the value of the ship
and freight, taking the value of the former at 15_l._ per ton.
For to confine it simply to the actual value of the ship “would,”
they urged, “be an encouragement to unprincipled persons to employ
inadequate and worn-out vessels in the conveyance of passengers, and
that, on the other hand, to subject shipowners to unlimited liability
might induce men of property and character to withdraw their fortunes
from so great a hazard.” The Committee could not, however, overlook
the additional liability to which Shipowners were exposed by the
operation of the municipal laws of foreign states, for, as the law
now stands, the liability of the foreign shipowner is not limited to
our courts, and the liability of the English shipowner by the same
rule, if it were applied in the United States, would not be limited
in their courts.[205] Therefore, although the English law may have
contemplated the limitation of the British shipowners’ liability, any
damage sustained by collision on the high seas between a British ship
and a foreign vessel, would not fall within the statutory limit, and,
practically, the liability of the British shipowner, in the event of
loss of life, would be unlimited, or at least co-extensive with the
loss, which a jury might assess according to the rank of life and the
injuries sustained by the relatives and families of the deceased. It
was further recommended that the practicability and desirability of an
international arrangement with maritime countries,[206] so as to arrive
at some uniform reciprocal principles, should be seriously considered
by Government.

[Sidenote: Burden of light dues.]

The incidence of the light dues paid by the Shipowners of the Empire,
necessarily received consideration from the Committee, more especially
as it was a serious burden on all merchant vessels. So far back as
1845, a Committee appointed specially to inquire into those dues,
recommended, “That all expenses for the erection of lighthouses,
floating-lights, buoys, and beacons, on the coast of the United
Kingdom, be henceforth defrayed out of the public revenue.”

Entirely agreeing with this resolution, the Committee of 1860, while
recommending Government to adopt that resolution, added: “That the
lighting of our shores is a high imperial duty which we owe, not merely
to ourselves, but to strangers, whom we invite to trade with us.”

They felt that the justice as well as the policy of such a course was
strengthened by the fact that the large debt of 1,250,000_l._,
the result of improvident grants, incurred under the authority of
Parliament for buying up the lighthouses held by private individuals,
had, since that period (1845), been paid out of light dues, raised out
of a tax upon shipping, and they had less hesitation in recommending
the adoption of this enlightened policy from the fact that the Congress
of the United States of America appropriates an annual vote for
lights throughout their whole territory, which is borne by the entire
federation, and that no charge for light dues is levied on foreign
vessels frequenting the ports of that country.

[Sidenote: Pilotage.]

The question of pilotage was also one which received every
consideration, the evidence showing that when a voluntary system
prevailed, even where the navigation was difficult and, at times,
dangerous, no inconvenience arose from the absence of legal compulsion
for the employment of a pilot. Many of the members of the committee
were of opinion that the whole pilotage of the kingdom should be
thrown open; but no decided recommendation was offered, as it had been
pretty clearly demonstrated in evidence that the compulsory system
of pilotage still exercised at London, Liverpool, and Bristol, had
worked in a manner satisfactory to those persons who were most directly
interested in this matter.

[Sidenote: Charges made by local authorities, now generally abolished;]

The charges levied by local authorities on ships and goods entering
or clearing from their ports, had so frequently been under the
consideration of Parliament, that the Committee could do little more
than refer to the various reports on this subject, and especially to
that of the Royal Commissions of 1854, with the expression of their
regret that not one of the recommendations of that commission had been
carried into effect.[207]

[Sidenote: as well as those of the Stade dues.]

The Committee, after inquiring into the management of the Trinity
Houses of Newcastle and Hull, and the nature of the charges levied by
the Russian Company and by the King of Hanover on shipping, under
the name of Stade dues, both of which have since then been happily
abolished, reviewed our mercantile marine legislation since 1835, and
were of opinion that, though, in many respects the measures adopted
had been judicious and beneficial, a few had been carried to excess
in matters of detail (an opinion very different to that which at
present prevails in the House of Commons); nor, indeed, could they have
arrived at any other conclusion, as various witnesses clearly showed
that, in some instances, a zealous wish to accomplish improvements,
and to protect the interests of the public, had led to the adoption
of legislative measures of a too minute and restrictive character,
and, above all, that any unnecessary interference as to how a ship
should be built, fitted, manned, and navigated, was frequently attended
with prejudicial consequences, while it had as frequently retarded
beneficial advance.

[Sidenote: The Report of 1860 generally accepted by the mercantile
marine.]

Such were the leading points of the report of the Merchant Shipping
Committee of 1860. It seems to have satisfied all parties as far
as anything could satisfy men whose policy had been ignored; at
least no further inquiry into the state of British shipping, or for
relief from oppressive and unjust burdens has since been considered
either expedient or necessary. Indeed, the great majority of the
recommendations have since been carried out by successive Governments.
The Local Charges Bill, which had been referred to a Select Committee
in 1856, was dealt with by separate inquiries; the important case
of Liverpool occupying the whole of the Session of 1857, ultimately
resulting in a reform of the Dock management, and in the transfer of
the Liverpool town dues to the Dock estate.

In 1861, Mr. Milner Gibson, then President of the Board of Trade,
introduced a Bill[208] by which most of the other grievances were
removed. All taxes on shipping, raised for the purpose of granting
pensions and other, so-called, charitable objects, were abolished;
local differential charges on foreign shipping were, to a large extent,
prohibited;[209] the passing tolls levied for the support of such
harbours as Ramsgate, Dover, and Bridlington were swept away, and power
(on the recommendation originally of the Harbours of Refuge Commission
of 1854) was given to the Public Works Loan Commissioners to lend money
for the improvement of trading harbours at a low rate of interest.[210]
France, to whose shipping laws I shall hereafter refer, abolished her
local charges and differential dues; Italy, in 1863, admitted British
ships to national treatment; and Austria also, by treaty, in 1868, has
followed her example.

Unfortunately, Shipowners are still taxed for the maintenance of
the National lights; but, although the recommendations of various
Committees have not in this respect been adopted, reductions in the
charges levied have been made to no less an extent than 75 per cent,
since 1853.[211] Great improvements have also been made since Mr.
(now Lord) Cardwell put in motion this scale of reduction, which has
proved so valuable in its results; since then no less than fifty-seven
new lighthouses have been built, and fifteen new light ships moored
on the coast, whilst thirty-seven old lighthouses have been rebuilt
and re-organised at an aggregate cost of more than one million pounds
sterling.

From 1860 the Shipowners of Great Britain, though they have
experienced in their trade, like all other branches of trade, periods
of depression, and rarely more so than at the present moment, have
never looked backwards. All special and peculiar burdens having
now been removed, their only present desire is, and it is not an
unreasonable one, that they should be interfered with as little as
possible—certainly not more so than is necessary for the protection of
the public—in the management of their own affairs, and that they should
have a fair and free field: they seek no favours.

What they have done since they have had free scope to their industry
and skill, and been relieved from all unfair taxation on the one hand,
and the swaddling-clothes of protection on the other, _is truly
astonishing_. Since then, no country has produced more magnificent
steam and sailing ships, the former having all but monopolised the
great Transatlantic carrying trade, to which I shall fully refer
hereafter, and the latter having driven the American clippers
entirely from the China trade.[212] Such are the effects of wholesome
competition.

[Sidenote: Magnificent English Merchant sailing ships, 1860-72.]

Perhaps no merchant ocean-going ships of any country or of any age have
equalled, certainly none have ever surpassed, the sailing clippers
launched from the yards of Great Britain between 1860 and 1872, vessels
far superior to those I have already named, including the _Falcon_, the
_Fiery Cross_, _Undine_, _Lahloo_, _Leander_, the _Isles of the South_,
_Min_, _Kelso_, _Serica_, _Taeping_, _Ariel_, _Titania_, _Spindrift_,
_Sir Lancelot_, and _Thermopylæ_. As the _Thermopylæ_ and the _Sir
Lancelot_ are the fastest sailing ships that ever traversed the
ocean,[213] I have given a representation of the former under full sail
at page 416, and the following drawing to scale of her midship section
may interest my nautical readers.

  [Illustration: TRANSVERSE MIDSHIP SECTION, “THERMOPYLÆ.”]

  [Illustration: THE “THERMOPYLÆ.”]

[Sidenote: The _Thermopylæ_.]


[Sidenote: _Sir Lancelot_ and others.]

[Sidenote: Americans completely outstripped.]

On her first voyage from London to Melbourne, starting in November
1868, the _Thermopylæ_ made the quickest passage on record between
those ports—viz. in sixty days from pilot to pilot. Nor was this a
mere chance passage, for on the next voyage from London to Melbourne
she accomplished the same distance in sixty-one days, still faster
than any other known passage between these ports; and, so far as I can
ascertain, these voyages have never since been equalled by any other
sailing vessels. On her first voyage, after leaving Melbourne she took
on board a cargo of coals at Newcastle (New South Wales) for Shanghai,
and accomplished the passage thence in twenty-eight days—the quickest
on record. Leaving Foo-chow-foo soon afterwards with a cargo of tea,
she made the passage thence to London in ninety-one days.[214] This
has never been surpassed, except by the _Sir Lancelot_, which in the
same year made the passage to London in ninety days[216] (her owner
states eighty-nine days). Indeed, so completely have we outstripped
the United States and all other nations, that instead of American
clippers bringing teas from China to supply the London market, English
clippers are frequently engaged to load the early teas from China to
New York.[217]

Nor have other trades than that of China been very far behind in this
great ocean race. Many of the sailing vessels now engaged in the
trade with Australia and India are remarkable for their swiftness and
increased capacity, combined with greatly reduced sailing expenses.
Superior in speed to any of the ships of the old East India Company,
they have double the space for cargo in proportion to their register
tonnage, and are manned and navigated by about one-third the number
of men. Among them and the China clippers are to be found some of the
handsomest vessels the world has ever seen. Marvellous specimens of
grace and beauty, not surpassed even by the finest yachts, and much
easier in their movements, when under full sail and at their greatest
speed, than any “thing of beauty” yet produced in either Great Britain
or the United States for the purposes of ocean navigation.

[Sidenote: Equal increase in the number as well as excellence of
English shipping.]

[Sidenote: Results of the Free-trade policy.]

But however great have been the strides in the improvement of the
merchant vessels of Great Britain, their rapid increase in number since
the repeal of the Navigation Laws has been equally astonishing; while
the freedom of our laws has given an impetus to maritime commerce far
beyond the most sanguine hopes of those who, a quarter of a century
ago, most strenuously advocated the policy of Free-trade. That my
readers may see how we stand, so far as our ships are concerned, in
comparison with other nations, I have had a table prepared, which will
be found in the Appendix,[218] showing the progress they have made
as compared with other countries, before and after the repeal of our
Navigation Laws. The figures are remarkable; and, though it is not
the province of this work to enter upon controversial questions, I
cannot refrain from directing the attention of my readers to the fact
that the nations which have adopted a liberal policy have made much
the greatest advance; while the United States of America, to which I
have so frequently referred, have, with all their natural advantages,
materially retrograded as a maritime people. Nor have continental
nations, like France, to which I shall presently refer, made any
progress worthy of note under the ancient commercial policy, to which
they still, in a large measure, and most unwisely, adhere.


FOOTNOTES:

[195] An Address of Shipowners to the Electors of the United Kingdom,
13th April, 1859.

[196] I had served my constituents, I thought, well and faithfully
for two Parliaments. I had fought to obtain reciprocity from foreign
nations, before we repealed our Navigation Laws, the only time when we
could have had any hope of obtaining it unless the statesmen of other
nations became as enlightened as our own; and, having been defeated, I
was then doing my utmost to assist in obtaining for them from our own
Legislature, relief from the unjust and oppressive burdens with which
they had been saddled during a period of protection; consequently, I
could not but feel keenly the determined opposition which they, the
Shipowners—men of my own class—for whom I had worked so strenuously,
had organised against my return to Parliament.

[197] The numbers were, Fenwick, 1527; Lindsay, 1292; Hudson, 790. The
contest was between Mr. Hudson and myself; but, though Mr. Hudson,
better known as the “Railway King” during the fleeting days of his
transitory power, was a strong Conservative, he had done so much for
Sunderland through the railways which he brought into the town, and
the magnificent docks constructed entirely through his influence,
that I felt regret, at having been the instrument of his political
expulsion from the representation of a port, where he had rendered such
marked and valuable services. But I fear it is too true, that popular
constituencies are sometimes as inconsistent as they are fickle. Henry
Fenwick, whom Sunderland on that occasion, and deservedly so, returned
at the head of the poll, and who was one of the best of members and the
manliest of men, soon afterwards lost his seat, because the Government
of the day, appreciating his many good qualities, had appointed him the
Civil Lord of the Admiralty.

[198] When Mr. Dunbar died four or six years afterwards, he left behind
him somewhere close upon one million and a half pounds sterling, the
larger portion of which was made since the Free-trade sun had been
allowed to shine upon his ships!

[199] “Had I,” continued Mr. Lindsay, “remained a silent spectator at
this meeting as I intended, I should have been an assenting party to a
resolution which asks us to reverse our policy. (‘No, no!’) But such
would have been the case, for the resolution says, ‘that the principal
cause of the depression has been the impolicy of the existing system
of maritime commerce.’ I hold that the establishment of a Free-trade
policy has nothing whatever to do with the existing depression in
the shipping interest (cries of ‘Oh, oh!’ and great disapprobation),
and therefore I come forward and offer my dissent. This resolution,
further, asks us to confirm a memorial which the Shipowners’ Society
of London, this time last year, addressed to her Majesty. I, for one,
cannot be a consenting party to that resolution or memorial, because
I believe that the opinions therein expressed are fallacious, and I
shall endeavour to show you how. What is the prayer of that memorial?
It urgently entreats, indeed implores her Majesty to issue an Order
in Council against those nations which have not reciprocated with us.
(‘Bravo!’ and cheers.) I am in favour of reciprocity—it is Free-trade
in its most extended sense—but I ask you to look at the difference
between reciprocity and the _enforcement_ of reciprocity by
the Legislature. Enforced reciprocity, as prayed for by you in this
memorial, is Protection in its worst and most pernicious form. (Cries
of ‘Shame,’ and hisses.) It is a renewal of the old war of tariffs;
therefore, it is the war of Protection. (Great uproar.) We must not
retrograde, our course is onward.” (Hisses and uproar.)

Mr. G. F. YOUNG: I rise to order. (Cheers, and a few cries
of “No, no!”) Sir, I will not so far depart from the usages of debate
as to introduce a speech on rising to order, but will submit that the
course of discussion is irregular and unfair. I have challenged the
hon. member to discuss this particular point with me publicly. He has
declined my challenge. (Great cheering.)

The CHAIRMAN: I think that my friend Mr. Young in calling my
hon. friend Mr. Lindsay to order has rather himself travelled a little
out of order. (“Hear, hear!” and a laugh.) I cannot think that Mr.
Lindsay is out of order; but it will rest with the meeting to decide
whether or not they will hear Mr. Lindsay in continuation. (“Hear,
hear!” and disapprobation.)

Mr. LINDSAY: Gentlemen, remember that we are in the city of
London, and that the eyes of England are upon us. We are assembled to
discuss a question of deep interest to its maritime interests, viz.,
what is the best course for the nation to pursue in the first place.

Mr. YOUNG: No, no; to inquire what should be done. (“Hear,
hear!”)

Mr. LINDSAY: Well, then, I suppose it is to discuss this, that
we have come here. Now, I say, we have to inquire what is the best
policy to be pursued for the nation at large (cheers); and, secondly,
for ourselves as shipowners. (Cheers.) The question before us is this,
whether the reversal of our Free-trade policy will be best for the
interest of the country at large. (“Hear, hear!” hisses and confusion.)

Mr. G. F. YOUNG: The Legislature will inquire into that.
(“Hear, hear!”)

Mr. LINDSAY: I say this resolution goes to the root of Free-trade, and
confirms the memorial sent by you last year to the Queen. (Cheers.)
Now, then, in reply to that memorial—and bear in mind that you received
that reply from a Protectionist Government, my Lord Derby’s through
whom you made this appeal. (“Hear,” cheers, hisses, and cries of
“Question, question!”) I am speaking to the question. Now, the answer
given to your memorial by the Board of Trade clearly and distinctly
proved that under a Free-trade policy the British shipping had
increased in a far greater ratio than it ever did under a Protectionist
policy. (“Hear, hear!” and a cry, “Prove it!”) It has been proved, and
let those deny it who can, that from 1842 to 1849 British shipping
built and registered during the period of reciprocity increased 843,000
tons; but from 1850 to 1857 it had increased 1,670,000 tons, or more
than double under Free-trade what it did under Protection. (Cries of
“Bosh!”) It has been proved further, that the entries inwards and
clearances outwards—(confusion, “Hear, hear!” and “No!”) It does not
suit, you to hear the truth—you Protectionist shipowners! (Confusion.)
I say it has been proved that the entries and clearances of British
shipping have increased (cries of “Hear!” “No!” “Turn him out!”) in a
ratio equally as great as the tonnage built and registered. (The hon.
gentleman was here met by a storm of indignant and discordant cries,
among which were heard: “Go to Sunderland!” “Rubbish!” “Bosh!” “Sit
down!”) When order was restored the hon. member resumed as follows:—Mr.
Bramley-Moore has referred to what he calls the advantages which Spain
and France have gained by their protective system. (Uproar.) It is
quite true that in the five years between 1853 and 1857 inclusive, no
less than 600,000 tons of Spanish shipping entered and cleared our
ports; but, on the other hand, it is equally true that, during the same
period, no less than 1,700,000 tons of British shipping entered and
cleared from Spanish ports. (“Hear, hear!”) What does Spain, therefore,
gain by her system of protection? (Confusion, and a voice, “We can see
all that in the ‘Times.’”) It is true that 3,900,000 tons of French
shipping cleared for the ports of England during a similar period; but
it is no less true that 10,000,000 tons of British shipping entered
and cleared from the French ports. (“Hear, hear!” and “Question!”) I
could go on with many more facts to prove my case. I can prove to you
by undeniable facts that the British shipping interest, however much
it may be distressed at the present time, has been a gainer by the
policy of Free-trade (shouts of disapprobation), and that it is not
for your interest as Shipowners to reverse that policy. (Uproar.) You,
no doubt, wish to confine your trade to your own possessions (“No,
no!”), but what, I ask, would England be if it were not for the vast
magnitude of her trade with foreign countries? (Cries of “Oh, oh!”
“Hear, hear!” and “No, no!”) On referring to the Customs’ entries and
clearances, it will be found that out of the 5,000,000 tons of British
shipping annually so entered, 2,000,000 came from our own colonies and
dependencies, but that no less than 3,000,000 of British shipping are
entered from foreign countries (“Hear, hear!” and confusion), thus
proving that our trade with foreign countries is much more valuable
to us than the trade with our own possessions (cries of “Question!”);
and thus proving, further, that our trade with foreign countries is
of greater advantage, even to the British Shipowner, than our trade
with our own colonies and dependencies. (“Question, question!”) If
instead of the resolution proposed you adopted such a resolution as
I have sketched out since I have been in the room it would have been
better for your interest. (Uproar, and cries of “Sit down!”) You may
not think it for your interest, but the day will come when you will
find it for your interest. (Disapprobation.) If instead of looking
after the shadow, you would follow and grasp at the substance it would
be better for you. (Uproar.) Have any of you looked at the existing
burdens on British shipping? I have done so; but I will not occupy the
time of the meeting by going into details. (Great cheering.) I must,
however, tell you that these burdens are a serious hindrance to our
onward progress; and I also tell you, and I tell you as a thinking
man, that you are vainly attempting to get what you call reciprocity
enforced. I say vainly, because you will never get it. (“Oh, oh!”) You
are losing a chance, a favourable opportunity of obtaining relief from
those burdens which still unjustly oppress the British shipowners. (A
Voice:—“What is the amount?”) I am asked what is the amount? The amount
of these burdens reaches nearly 1,000,000_l._ sterling. They are 2 per
cent. upon the amount of the capital invested. Tax any interest 2 per
cent., and what is the consequence? You will drive the capital employed
in that interest elsewhere. (“Hear, hear!”) While that real grievance
exists, you are following a shadow (“Oh, oh!”) How futile then are your
attempts! (Confusion.) You are allowing the opportunity to pass of
obtaining substantial relief while you are following this delusion of
Protection. (Great uproar.) The policy I have recommended is the policy
which is best for the interests of the British Shipowner, and it is as
a British Shipowner that I advocate it. It is, as the representative of
a large maritime constituency, that I have come forward regardless of
your insults to state my opinions frankly on the subject, and to enter
my solemn protest against the course of policy you vainly attempt to
restore. (Great disapprobation.)

Mr. DUNCAN DUNBAR rose to order. He said that they had not met
there to discuss what had brought the shipping interest to its present
state; for he thought the fact would be universally admitted that the
Shipowners were on the road to ruin. (“Hear, hear!”) The object of the
meeting, therefore, was not to discuss figures and tonnage, but simply
to agree to a petition to the Houses of Parliament, asking them to
appoint committees to hear the evidence of witnesses on the subject.
His friend Mr. Lindsay,—no, he would not call him his friend (cheers
and laughter), but the gentleman who spoke last went beside the mark
in talking about the increase or decrease of tonnage. All must admit
that the Shipowners were on the road to ruin. (“Hear, hear!”) The
very property he had made by his industry and hard labour was melting
away like snow before the sun. (“Hear!”) The man who called himself a
British Shipowner, and moved such an amendment as the present, was the
worst enemy the British Shipowner could have. (Cheers.)

[200] See ‘Hansard,’ vol. clvi. pp. 332 to 347, and p. 347 _et
seq._

[201] An Act for compensating the families of persons killed by
accident 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93; the Merchant Shipping Act 1854; the
Merchant Shipping Amendment Act (1855); the Passenger Act (1855); and
the Chinese Passenger Act (1855).

[202] The following were the Members of the Committee:—Mr. Milner
Gibson (then President of the Board of Trade), Lord Lovaine (now the
Duke of Northumberland), Mr. (now Lord) Cardwell, Mr. Thomas Baring,
Mr. Crawford, Mr. Francis Baring, Mr. Somes, Mr. Gore Langton, Mr.
George William Bentinck, Mr. Wilcox, Mr. Liddell (now Lord Eslington),
Mr. Francis Russell, Mr. Hugh Taylor, Mr. Alderman Salomons, and Mr.
Lindsay.

[203] Though the Foreign Office is admirably administered, and was
brought into a state of high perfection in all its details by Mr. (now
Lord) Hammond, there can be no doubt that it is very ineffective in
its dealings with foreign nations on nearly all commercial matters.
Perhaps, this would be remedied if the Diplomatic and Consular Service
were amalgamated, or even if it was permitted for gentlemen in the
Consular to rise to the Diplomatic Service. I was strongly impressed
with this idea when serving as a member on the Consular Committee
of 1856-57; but my colleagues on that Committee were generally of a
different opinion. Unquestionably our diplomatists are gentlemen in
every sense of that word, and, as a rule, distinguished scholars,
but they lack that description of knowledge which is expected from
the representatives of by far the greatest commercial and maritime
nation in the world. The time is fast approaching when this may prove
a serious obstacle to our further progress. As times now go, we are a
workshop or we are nothing. I respect rank and envy learning; but these
will not feed the rising and increasing generations, who are to fill
our vacant places.

[204] That Portugal gained nothing by her restrictive policy those of
my readers who care to know may see by referring to a letter which I
addressed by request of its President to the Commercial Association of
Lisbon, when there in 1863. See Appendix No. 6, p. 596.

[205] Since 1860 the law has been altered so far that the
responsibility of foreign ships in our courts is limited on the same
conditions, and to the same amount, as British ships, and these are now
limited in the States, as well as in the Federal Court of the United
States.

[206] When I visited the United States after Parliament rose that
session (1860), the question of responsibility was one, to which, with
others, I invited the attention of the Shipowners of that country at
various meetings, with their chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade,
which were frequently held in public. As the whole of these questions
refer directly to merchant shipping and seamen, I have given in the
Appendix of this work, No. 2, p. 567, a copy of a letter I addressed to
Lord Lyons on my arrival in Boston (U.S.), which embraces the whole of
them, as also a subsequent correspondence which I had in 1866 with our
Foreign Office (see Appendix No. 3, p. 571), on the subject of the then
unsatisfactory state of our relations with America, with regard to the
responsibility of British Shipowners when sued in their State Courts.
I have the less hesitation in giving this correspondence as it has not
hitherto been published, and as some of the questions in my letter to
Lord Lyons still wait solution.

[207] Since 1860 all passing tolls have been abolished, while most of
the local charges have either been modified or swept away, but not,
however, without a hard struggle, or without the payment of a large
grant of public money to compensate the persons, corporations, or
companies who held “vested interests”—a grant much greater, I think,
than they were entitled to receive.

I remember when Mr. Lowe, in his capacity as Vice-President of the
Board of Trade first brought in this measure, in the Session of 1856,
he exclaimed, in reply to demands of an exorbitant character which
were made on the ground of certain clauses in some very ancient deeds,
_What care I for your musty charters!_ or words to that effect.
You could almost see the hair raising the hats from the heads of a
number of old members who held all their property under musty charters.
But though Mr. Lowe was not very far wrong so far as regards some of
the monstrous claims made under ancient charters, and would I daresay,
if he had had his own way, not have paid the claimants one-half the
amounts they received, the expression was so appalling as coming from a
member of Government, that Lord Palmerston at once saw that, after what
Mr. Lowe had said, it would be impossible then to pass the Bill, and
with his usual tact referred it to a Select Committee, to which I shall
presently refer.

[208] 24 & 25 Vict., cap. 47.

[209] This was one of the most difficult and intricate questions any
minister ever had to deal with. And for that reason these charges, to
which I shall again refer, were not finally dealt with until 1867.

[210] By Parliamentary Papers, 176, 1871, no less than 1,846,400_l._
had been advanced up to that date, on loan for the improvement of trade
harbours, and since then, 350,000_l._, making in all about 2,200,000_l._

[211] The aggregate reductions since 1853 are estimated (see
Parliamentary Paper, No. 27, 1875) at more than 750,000_l._, or at the
rate of 237 per cent. on the present income of about 316,000_l._ per
annum. Nor has economy been consulted at the cost of efficiency during
the last twenty years, due in a great measure to the exertions of the
late Sir Frederick Arrow, Deputy-Chairman of the Trinity House.

[212] Passages of clippers from China, 1868 to 1872 inclusive, see
Appendix No. 8, p. 611.

[213] The log of this ship on her first voyage from London to
Melbourne, thence to Newcastle (N.S.W.), thence to China, and
thence home, will be found in the Appendix, No. 9, p. 613. She is a
“composite” vessel, that is, constructed with iron frames and wood
planking; she is 947 tons register, and her dimensions are 210 feet
in length; 36 feet width of beam, and 21 feet depth of hold. She was
designed by Mr. B. Waymouth, now Secretary to Lloyd’s Register. She
was built in 1868 by Messrs. Walter Hood and Co., of Aberdeen, for her
present owners, Messrs. George Thompson, Jun., and Co.

[214] This passage of the _Thermopylæ_, was eight days quicker than
those of the _Ariel_, _Taeping_, and _Serica_, in the great race of
1866[215], and six days quicker than the _Ariel_ and _Spindrift_ in
1868; the nearest competitor was the _Titania_ in 1871. By her log (see
Appendix No. 9, pp. 613-17) the _Thermopylæ_, in one day of twenty-four
hours, made a run of 330 nautical miles (about 380 statute miles), see
log, 3rd January 1870; or at the average rate of close upon 16 statute
miles per hour!!

[215] This race excited extraordinary interest at the time among all
persons interested in maritime affairs, five ships started for it, the
_Ariel_, _Taeping_, _Serica_, _Fiery Cross_, and _Tartsing_. The three
first left Foo-chow-foo on the same day, but lost sight of each other
for the whole voyage until they reached the English Channel, where they
again met, arriving in the Thames within a few hours of each other!!

[216] The _Sir Lancelot_ is also a composite vessel. She was
built by Mr. Steele, of Greenock, for her owner, Mr. James MacCunn, of
that place, and was commanded by Captain Richard Robinson, a native of
Maryport, who was brought up in the service of Messrs. Broklebanks, of
Liverpool, and who had, previously to being placed in command of the
_Sir Lancelot_, made very fast passages in the _Fiery Cross_.
She is 886 tons register; and her dimensions are—length, 197 feet 6
inches; breadth, 33 feet 7 inches, and depth, 21 feet. This celebrated
sailing ship, in her racing days, spread, when under full sail, 45,500
square or superficial feet of canvas. She was manned by 30 hands all
told, and delivered 1430 tons of tea (of 50 cubic feet to the ton), and
her draught of water, when thus laden, was 18 feet 7 inches forward,
and 18 feet 9 inches aft. In addition to about 200 tons shingle
ballast, there was 100 tons of iron kentledge (specially cast for the
purpose), stowed in the limbers—that is, between the ceiling and the
outer skin. This was fitted to the vacant spaces and distributed along
the keelson, tapering towards the foremast and mizen-mast. It gave
the ship great stability, and compensated for the immense height of
the masts, which, without the kentledge, would have made the ship too
tender. In the opinion of her owner, it contributed greatly to the
ship’s success. I may add that the bottom, which consists of teak, was
carefully planed before the metal was put on, and was quite as smooth
as the bottom of a yacht.

As everything relating to this famous sailing ship must prove
interesting and instructive to my nautical readers, I do not hesitate
to furnish the following details of her performances, courteously
supplied to me (4th October, 1875) by Mr. MacCunn. “The log,” he
says, “of the _Sir Lancelot_, I regret, is not by me, but I have
pleasure in handing you exact leading particulars of the celebrated
passage referred to (extracted by me at the time, with great
minuteness, from the log on board the ship, 14th October 1869).

“The particulars speak for themselves, and there is no parallel on so
distant a voyage in ocean clipper sailing:—

                                                    1869.

  Up anchor at Foochow, and left the anchorage }
  7 A.M.                                       }    17th July.

  White Dogs bore N.N.E. 15 miles                   18th  ”

  Anjer Light bore E.S.E. 10 ”                       7th August.

  Land about Buffalo River (Cape)                   28th  ”

  Signalled St. Helena                              11th September.

  Sighted Lizard                                    10th October.

  Passed Deal                                       13th  ”

  Berthed in West India Dock                        14th  ”

ANALYSIS.

  White Dogs to Lizard                   84 days.
  Foochow anchorage to St. Helena        56  ”
  Foochow anchorage to Deal              88  ”
  Foochow anchorage to West India Dock   89  ”

“The greatest day’s work of the _Sir Lancelot_ was crossing from
Anjer to the Cape, when she made, by observation, 354 miles in 24
hours. For 7 days (consecutive) she averaged on the same track, with
a beam wind, slightly over 300 miles per day; but I think the most
remarkable feature in the sailing of this ship was the maintenance of a
comparative high speed in light winds, and the great power she had to
beat dead to windward against a strong breeze.

“I may mention that after the racing premium was abolished, and with
it the sort of mania for China clipper sailing, I had 8 feet cut off
all the lower masts, and reduced the masts aloft and the yards in
proportion.

“Notwithstanding this the _Sir Lancelot_ is now arrived in London
after a voyage from London to Shanghai with general cargo, thence to
New York with a tea cargo, thence to London with a general cargo—all in
9 months and 2 days.

“I am afraid I am troubling you with too many details, but I feel proud
that this celebrated clipper, one of the very few China clippers left,
proves herself in the tenth year of her life as swift as ever.”

Mr. MacCunn may well be proud of his ship, and such pride is one of the
chief causes of our power and greatness as a maritime nation.

[217] Among those who took the lead in the production and improvement
of clipper ships at that time may be mentioned Captain Maxton, of the
_Titania_, who had formerly commanded the early iron clippers, _Lord of
the Isles_ and _Falcon_, and who has, with the assistance of Messrs.
Robert Steele and Son, brought out in successive years the _Ariel_
and _Titania_, vessels of great beauty. Nor must I overlook Captain
Bullock, who navigated the _Challenger_ through the most successful
and exciting part of her career; and Captain Rodger, who commanded the
_Kate Carnie_, and subsequently owned the _Taeping_, _Ellen Rodger_,
_Min_, and other well-known clippers. Among the builders, the name of
the late Mr. William Pile, of Sunderland, should not be overlooked: he
designed, built, and launched many famous clipper ships, such as the
_Spray of the Ocean_ and the _Crest of the Wave_, two of the handsomest
sailing vessels that ever floated. The latter vessel once left Shanghai
for London with the American clipper ship, _Sea Serpent_, a well-known
China trader, which was to receive 30s. per ton extra freight on her
cargo of young teas (which obtain the highest price in their relative
qualities), if she beat the _Crest of the Wave_. Both ships arrived
off the Isle of Wight the same day, but the captain of the American,
leaving his vessel in charge of the pilot, started by railway for
London, and reported the _Sea Serpent_ at the Custom House before his
own ship or the _Crest of the Wave_ had passed through the Downs.

[218] See Appendix No. 10, p. 618. See also No. 14, p. 637.




CHAPTER XV.

     First Navigation Law in France, A.D. 1560—Law
     of Louis XIV., 1643, revised by Colbert, 1661—Its chief
     conditions—Regulations for the French Colonial trade—Slightly
     modified by the Treaties of Utrecht, 1713, and of 1763,
     in favour of England—Provisions of 1791 and 1793—Amount
     of charges enforced—French and English Navigation Laws
     equally worthless—“_Surtaxes de Pavillon_” and
     “_d’Entrepôt_”—“_Droits de Tonnage_”—Special exemption
     of Marseilles—French Colonial system preserved under all its
     Governments, but greatly to the injury of her people—English
     Exhibition of 1851—Messrs. Cobden and Chevalier meet first
     there, and ultimately, in 1860, carry the Commercial Treaty—The
     French, heavy losers by maintaining their Navigation Laws—Decline
     of French shipping—Mr. Lindsay visits France, and has various
     interviews with the Emperor, Messrs. Rouher and Chevalier on this
     subject—Commission of Inquiry appointed, and Law ultimately passed
     May 1866—Its conditions—Repeal Act unsatisfactory to the French
     Shipowners—Another Commission of Inquiry appointed, 1870—Views of
     rival parties—M. de Coninck—M. Bergasse—M. Siegfried—M. Thiers and
     Protection carry the day, and reverse, in 1872, much of the law of
     1866—Just views of the Duke Decazes—Abolition for the second time
     of the “_Surtaxes de Pavillon_,” July 1873.


[Sidenote: First Navigation Law in France, A.D. 1560.]

The first appearance of anything in the shape of a Navigation Law
which can be traced in the history of the French nation is to be found
about A.D. 1560, during the reign of Charles IX., or rather
during that of his mother, Catherine of Medicis, when Regent. It is
of the most absurdly stringent character, forbidding French subjects,
under any circumstances, to freight foreign vessels in the ports of
his realm. Nor would he allow such vessels to carry from his ports any
kind of merchandise: but, like most other laws of a similarly rigorous
character, they were very imperfectly carried out, and so seldom
enforced that, by degrees, they fell into desuetude.

[Sidenote: Law of Louis XIV., 1643, revised by Colbert, 1661.]

It was not, however, until the reign of Louis XIV. (A.D.
1643) that anything like a regular system of Navigation Laws was
adopted; and this would seem to have been copied from the laws of
England of that period, inasmuch as it had for its object that which
England had proposed with regard to her own ships—the protection
and the development of the French mercantile marine. But Colbert,
the celebrated finance minister, in 1661, appears to have devoted
considerable attention to this question, and, though he framed a law,
at first as protective in its character as any of the maritime laws
promulgated in England, it was, soon afterwards, moderately relaxed by
his wisdom, in favour of the ships of other nations.

[Sidenote: Its chief conditions,]

In the reign of Louis XIV., as also in that of Louis XV., various
ordinances and regulations were likewise issued for the purpose of
determining the conditions necessary to entitle a vessel to the
privileges of a French ship. Thus in the regulation bearing date
24th October, 1681, and, in several letters as well as in various
ordinances, it was provided that no vessel should be allowed the
privilege of hoisting the French flag, unless she were entirely owned
by the subjects of that country, and unless the names of all the
owners were duly registered. For every offence, or any deviation from
this law, a fine of 1000 livres was inflicted; and, in case of any
repetition of the offence, corporal punishments were ordained against
all captains who navigated, under the French flag, any vessel of alien
ownership. There was, however, no prohibition against the acquisition
of vessels of foreign build. French subjects were allowed to confer
on such vessels the French character by certain declarations, such
as dimensions, where and by whom constructed, and by registering the
names of the owners, and the contract of sale. No alien was, however,
permitted to command a French vessel; nor, by the ordinance of 27th
October, 1727, could even a French subject do so _who had married an
alien_.

Foreigners were also excluded from any functions of authority; and,
as in the case of the English Navigation Laws, it was ordained that
every vessel should be manned by a crew of which two-thirds, at least,
were French subjects. Indeed, in 1710, French subjects were forbidden,
agreeably with their most ancient Navigation Law, to import goods
from England in any but French bottoms—a law, at that time, levelled
exclusively against this country, as it did not embrace other nations.
This law was, however, abolished, three years afterwards, by the treaty
of Utrecht, though again enforced when war, subsequently, broke out
between the two countries. Besides this, the duty known by the name of
“Droit de tonnage” (tonnage dues), for the protection of the French
mercantile marine, was levied on all foreign vessels; and, though
England obtained a temporary exemption from it also by the treaty
of Utrecht, this duty remained practically in force till replaced
by another tonnage duty in 1793. Indeed, for a long time, absolute
prohibition had existed against all foreign vessels engaging in the
carrying trade between the ports of France, except those of Spain,
which in 1768 (January 2nd), by a treaty, known by the name of “Pacte
de famille,” signed by the Kings of France, Spain, the Two Sicilies,
and the Duke of Parma, as members of the reigning Bourbon family, made
the Spaniards free of the existing French trade, and placed them in all
respects on a similar footing, so far as that treaty was concerned,
with the subjects of France. This privilege, though suspended by the
Revolution, was restored by the Convention of 20th July, 1814, and
still remains in force, on the part of France.

[Sidenote: Regulations for the French Colonial trade.]

The most important element, however, of the ancient Navigation Laws
of France was the system of regulations for the purpose of increasing
the trade with the French colonies. In its main features, it has been
preserved by all the Governments, Revolutionary and Constitutional,
which have, successively, presided over the destinies of that country,
continuing almost unaltered far into the present century, when it was
materially modified, though not entirely abolished, by the economical
reforms of Napoleon III.

[Sidenote: Slightly modified by the Treaties of Utrecht, 1713, and of
1763, in favour of England.]

That system, known among French economists and lawyers under the name
of the “_Pacte colonial_,” from the implied contract supposed to
have been entered into between each colony on its foundation and the
mother-country was, so far as the rights of the latter were concerned,
characterised by three principles, which dictated, as far as expediency
allowed, all the laws and measures of the various Governments
previously to the Second Empire.

These may be briefly stated as follows:—First, no goods, the growth,
produce, or manufacture of the colonies, were to be carried to any
but a French market. Secondly, the colonial market was to be reserved
for the commodities and produce of the mother-country. Thirdly, the
carrying of all goods between the colonies and the mother-country was
to be reserved for the shipping of France.

These rules, which embodied the spirit and policy of France with regard
to her maritime dealings with her colonies, though undergoing from time
to time various modifications necessitated by circumstances, have,
as far as possible, been upheld and enforced, and in many cases with
considerable severity. Thus, while the exclusion of alien shippers was
jealously secured by the most stringent measures, as, for instance, by
the law of 1727, Article 3, in which it was further ordained that no
foreigners should land with their ships or other vessels in the ports,
bays, or harbours, of the French colonies and islands, nor navigate
within one league round the said colonies and islands, under penalty of
confiscation of their vessels and cargoes, and a fine of 4000 livres,
jointly and severally, upon the master and his crew. These rigorous
prohibitions concerning sailing near the coast were, however, relaxed
in favour of England, after the cession to this country by France in
1763 under the Treaty of Paris of various islands on the American
coast, but with reference only to such as were in the vicinity of
British possessions.

But these stringent laws, ere long proved most disadvantageous to
France herself, and became a very great hardship to some of her
colonies; for, having lost Canada and Louisiana, which carried on a
flourishing trade with the Antilles, the inhabitants of these islands
were deprived of many essential commodities. Some of their ports were,
consequently, opened to foreign shipping for the importation of certain
enumerated articles, and the exportation of such of the goods produced
by them as could not find a sufficient market within the French
dominions.

Such, in a few words, were the ancient Navigation Laws of France; nor
did the Revolution, which cast aside so many of the most venerated
laws and customs of that country, discard the system of protection
which those ancient laws were assumed to afford to their shipping. This
system, on the contrary, seems to have suited the views of the chiefs
of the revolutionary period, and, being, also, in accordance with the
spirit of the stern legislators of that period, was rendered by them
still more stringent by the addition of special prohibitions, which
their predecessors had not considered expedient.

For instance, a decree of the 13th May, 1791, prohibited the
acquisition from that date of all vessels of foreign build; and
on the 21st September, 1793, another decree was issued, of a more
comprehensive character.

But it must be remembered that France was then at war with all the
Powers of Europe as well as with her own Rulers (the King having been
beheaded 21st January, 1793), and, consequently, her commercial and
naval laws were in accordance with the spirit of war, which has been
ever opposed to the progress and well-being of the people. The laws,
therefore, relating to trade and navigation, from 1792 to 1814 must
not be considered such as the nation would have approved of if at
peace, but rather as warlike measures, presumed to be necessary for the
welfare, and, indeed, for the very existence of the nation. England
being the nearest and most powerful enemy of France, as well as the
financial supporter of all the other nations then leagued against her,
it is not surprising that French statesmen should have passed such laws
as had special reference to the injury of her maritime commerce and her
power at sea; and that those laws should have been thought to display
a spirit of revenge and hatred, though in reality they were merely
counterparts of our own.

Consequently, Article 3 of the law of the 21st September, 1793, enacted
that “No foreign commodities, productions, or merchandise, shall be
imported into France, or into the possessions or colonies of France,
except directly in French vessels, or in vessels belonging to the
inhabitants of the countries in which the articles imported grew,
were produced or manufactured, or from the ordinary ports of sale or
exportation.” All officers and three-fourths of the crew were required
to be natives of the country of which the foreign vessel bore the
flag, under penalty of the confiscation of the ship and cargo, and a
fine of 300 livres, enforceable under pain of imprisonment, jointly
and severally, against owners, consignees, and agents of the vessel
and cargo, as well as against the captain and mate. Article 4, copied
from the most ancient laws of France, ordained that foreign vessels
should not carry from one French port to another any commodities,
productions, or merchandise, of the growth, production, or manufacture
of France, or of its colonies or possessions, under penalties similar
to those provided under Article 3. Another article stipulated that no
vessel should be allowed the privileges of the French flag, unless
built in that country, or in the colonies, or other possessions of
France, or condemned as a prize, or for any infringement of the laws of
the State, and, unless all the officers and three-fourths of the crew
were French.

[Sidenote: Amount of charges enforced.]

The provisions of this Act were made more complete by those of the
decree of the 18th of October of the same year (27 Vindémaire, year II.
of the Republic), establishing, among others, various rules concerning
the amount of repair to be done to a foreign vessel, sold after wreck
in the waters of France, to entitle her to carry the French flag; the
amount of repair which a French vessel might undergo in a foreign
country without forfeiting its national character; and the conditions
under which a French subject, resident abroad, might own a French
vessel; together with several enactments for securing the French
character of ships, and for the proper measurement of their tonnage.
At the same time, there was created by the Act a system of taxes, for
the purpose partly of revenue, and partly of protection, intended to
supersede the previous system of marine taxation, abolished expressly
by Article 29. Of these new taxes, some applied to the vessel and some
to the cargo; but the most important of them was a duty, assessed
according to tonnage, though in very different proportions, on all
vessels, whether French or foreign, entering French ports; excepting
French fishing vessels, or privateers, and French vessels returning
from foreign countries. It amounted to _three_ sous[219] per ton
on French vessels of above thirty tons engaged in the coasting trade
of the same French sea-board; to _four_ sous per ton, where the
trading was from the French ports of one sea to those of another;
and to _six_ sous, where the navigation was between France and
her colonies or possessions beyond the limits of Europe. On foreign
vessels, whencesoever they came, an uniform duty of fifty sous per ton
was levied when they discharged their cargoes in French ports.

[Sidenote: French and English Navigation Laws equally worthless.]

Such were the most important provisions of these two stringent laws;
they were, however, only similar, in nearly all respects, to those of
England, so much so that they have, frequently, been called in France
_Les Actes de Navigation_. Indeed, they were almost as famous, at
the time, in that country as the so-called celebrated Acts of Cromwell
were in Great Britain—notorious, rather than famous, not for any
benefits they conferred on the people of either country, but because
the object of each was to cripple the maritime and naval resources of
the rival power without enhancing its own; for, in those days, the
happiness and prosperity of one nation was supposed to be best promoted
by increasing its power of summarily inflicting punishment for any
wrongs attributed to its neighbour.

But the absolute rule introduced by the law of the 21st of September,
1793, against the importation into France of foreign produce by foreign
vessels except those of the country from which the produce originally
came, could, in the nature of things, be only partially enforced.
Supremacy cannot be obtained merely by the will of a legislator, nor
can a stroke of the pen conjure navies into existence.[220]

The mercantile marine of France, which had almost entirely disappeared
during the wars of the Republic and Empire, progressed so slowly
for some time after the Restoration, that the assistance of foreign
vessels became absolutely necessary for the supply of the French
market. Strange, however, to say, for the supposed encouragement of the
national shipping, and, as the next best protection that could be given
to it, the carrying marine of all other nations was heavily weighted,
by means of duties levied on almost all the commodities imported in
foreign bottoms. In the first tariff, published after the return
of the Bourbons, on the 17th of December, 1814, with the object of
providing for pressing requirements until a more matured system could
be established, differential duties were imposed on certain goods,
more or less heavy, according as they were imported under a foreign or
under the French flag. The system was developed and perfected by the
Finance Law of the 28th of April, 1816, which established a new order
of things, brought about by the heavy expenses of the _centjours_,
and of the fine imposed on the French nation by the treaties of
November, 1815. Consequently, most of such articles as were admitted
free under the French flag, were charged with duty under a foreign
one. For goods liable to duty, when imported in French bottoms, the
foreign carrying trade was generally mulcted with an additional
charge through the instrumentality of a series of differential duties
called, respectively, _surtaxes de pavillon_ and _surtaxes
d’entrepôt_.

[Sidenote: “_Surtaxes de Pavillon_,” and “_d’Entrepôt_.”]

The _surtaxe de pavillon_ was the additional duty levied on
such commodities when arriving under a foreign flag. The _surtaxe
d’entrepôt_ was an increase in the rate of duty on the same
merchandise, though imported under the French flag, coming from the
warehouses of intermediate countries. An example of both these taxes
with reference to coffee may be drawn from the tariff of the Finance
Law, Article 3, of the 28th of April, 1816;[221] and, by a further
decree of the 26th June, 1841, it was laid down, as a general rule,
that all goods under a foreign flag should pay the highest rate of
duties.

[Sidenote: “_Droits de Tonnage._”]

But, although this system of differential duties levied on goods
conveyed from their place of production in foreign vessels, was
somewhat modified by subsequent decrees and treaties of reciprocity,
it remained, practically, in force, or to a considerable extent, up
to a very recent period, while the _droits de tonnage_ levied
on foreign ships alone, were not abolished until 1867: these tonnage
duties were of the most objectionable and purely protective character,
all French vessels being exempted from this charge. Happily,
however, for France, there was one port where they were not exacted,
and hence this has ever been one of her most flourishing commercial
_entrepôts_.

[Sidenote: Special exemption of Marseilles.]

By a strange anomaly, Marseilles had been, by the law of the 16th
December, 1814, as well as by the ordinance of the 19th September,
1777, put out of the pale of the tonnage duty, and made substantially a
free port. This exception, the revival of a still older privilege, had
been conceded for the purpose of drawing again to Marseilles, as far as
possible, the trade of the Mediterranean, which, during the long period
of warfare through which France had passed, had been taken possession
of by her rivals in that sea, principally, by the Genoese. The
Marseillais considered it as a very great advantage; and Cette, besides
other ports of the Mediterranean, solicited a like exemption from a
duty they justly regarded much more as an evil than a protection;
but in vain, till the time when, as will be explained hereafter, the
whole of France was admitted to the freedom which had so long been the
exclusive privilege of a single port.

[Sidenote: French Colonial system preserved under all its Governments,]

The policy of France with regard to her colonies under the first
Republic was continued by subsequent Governments, subject, however,
to many qualifications and exceptions, by which the system lost much
of its uniformity and regularity. But with reference to the treatment
of the foreign mercantile marine, the rule excluding alien vessels
from the trade between France and the generality of her colonies and
possessions was for the most part maintained.

The term _Colonie_, or _Colonie à Culture_, is equivalent to
the English word Plantation. _Possession_ or _établissement_
applies to such settlements as were made more especially for the
purpose of trading, some of the other colonies and settlements being of
a mixed character. In the process of time the name of Colonies, in the
vocabulary of the Fiscal and Navigation Laws, came to be applied in a
stricter sense to the three coffee and sugar islands which had remained
to France, La Guadaloupe, la Martinique, and Bourbon (or la Réunion as
it is now styled). These three colonies had always been more jealously
guarded than the rest from foreign intrusion, and had remained very
much under the same system; a series of special regulations common to
each of them, placing them, as it were, apart from the rest. The rule
as to foreign vessels was still exclusion, and prohibition against
approaching the coast (with an exception in favour of the English flag
by the second Treaty of Paris in 1763 as already stated) was still,
in principle, maintained under the same penalty of confiscation, a
penalty, however, not unfrequently disregarded.

[Sidenote: but greatly to the injury of her people.]

These restrictive laws, as has been the case with all other countries,
while most injurious to the mass of the people of France, are really
of no benefit to the Shipowners of that country, in whose favour they
had been passed and so long adhered to. A few individuals may now
and again have been gainers, to the loss of the community at large,
but a reference to the customs returns of that country too clearly
demonstrates, that its shipping did not keep pace with the other
branches of its commerce, and that, ever since the time of Charles
IX., when the Navigation Laws were first imposed, France has had to
depend, frequently, to its serious loss, on the ships of foreign
nations for supplying its population with, not merely the luxuries,
but the actual necessaries of life: the restrictive system, therefore,
though remaining so long in force and apparent vigour, has ever
exhibited a gradual tendency to decline, and, by slow degrees, has been
worn away by the current of events flowing towards Free-trade.

[Sidenote: English Exhibition of 1851.]

It was not, however, until the year 1851 that the eyes of the people of
France really began to be opened to the advantages to be derived from a
policy of commercial freedom. In that year, the people of Great Britain
had reared in one of the beautiful parks, by which their capital is
adorned, an elegant structure. The idea, originating with the Society
of Arts, was readily adopted by the Prince Consort of our beloved
Queen.[222] Perhaps no grander and nobler idea ever emanated from the
mind of man. It had for its object peace and good will among nations,
and no structure, hitherto erected, ever conveyed a more striking
impression of “the abodes of Peace” than did the Crystal Palace of
1851. To it, all nations were invited to send specimens of the natural
and cultivated produce of their soil, and the manufactures and arts of
their people.

[Sidenote: Messrs. Cobden and Chevalier meet first there,]

[Sidenote: and, ultimately in 1860, carry the Commercial Treaty.]

In that marvellous structure, two great and good men for the first
time met—Richard Cobden of England and Michael Chevalier of France.
Men of such great intelligence could not fail to see how numerous
were the articles exhibited which were required by the people of both
countries where they could not be economically produced, but which were
heavily taxed, merely for the special benefit of the few who produced
them, to the great loss of whole communities; and that, consequently,
productions and manufactures were limited by a system of protection,
alike iniquitous and unnecessary for the purposes of revenue. They,
therefore, resolved to do what they could to modify the tariffs of
both countries, especially France, and thus to secure a more free
interchange of those articles each country produced more cheaply and
more abundantly than the other. The result of their labours was the
Commercial Treaty of 1860.

Although, by the great changes in the English tariff, carried into
effect by Sir Robert Peel (1842-46), the duty on French goods had been
much reduced in England, and on a great number of articles altogether
abolished, France still maintained high duties on most manufactured
articles, and, indeed, prohibited altogether the importation of
various descriptions of cotton and woollen cloths; the Treaty of 1860
had, therefore, not only the effect of abolishing or reducing duties
still levied on French goods or produce imported into England, but
of abolishing prohibitions and reducing duties on British goods and
manufactures imported into France; and, above all, it gave an impulse
to Free-trade ideas throughout Europe. In fact, immediately after
that Treaty was signed, other treaties were concluded, on liberal
terms, with most of the European States, and their direct or indirect
neighbours. Indeed there was then a general movement, to a greater or
less extent, in favour of increased freedom of commercial intercourse
between all nations.

Had it been possible, it would perhaps have been desirable that a
Treaty of Navigation should have accompanied or been embraced in the
Treaty of Commerce with France, but, as it was considered by Government
advisable to keep the one distinct from the other, a resolution I
submitted for the consideration of the House of Commons,[223] though
unanimously adopted, was held in abeyance until the Commercial Treaty
had been finally adjusted.

[Sidenote: The French, heavy losers by maintaining their Navigation
Laws.]

The discussion on that motion, however, paved the way for the changes
subsequently made in the ancient Navigation Laws of France. It was
shown, in the most incontrovertible manner, that the people of that
country were serious losers by the maintenance of these laws, and
that, by being unable to send their produce and manufactures, on as
favourable terms as other nations, to the markets of the world, they
were competing, at a disadvantage to themselves, while they were
likewise sufferers by not being able to import the raw materials
they required from abroad at the lowest current rates of freight.
Practically, thirty-five out of thirty-six millions of the nation (for
I presume that not more than one million of the inhabitants of France
depend for their living, directly or indirectly, upon its shipping)
were paying for the support of the remaining thirty-sixth million.

[Sidenote: Decline of French shipping.]

Nor does this payment, which their Navigation Laws so long enforced,
seem to have been of any advantage to the favoured class for whom it
was made. The shipping of France did not increase. On the contrary,
it actually decreased during the whole period when these laws were
enforced with the utmost rigour. While, in the year 1787, France
employed 164,000 tons of native shipping in her trade with foreign
countries, she had, forty-three years afterwards, only 156,000 tons.
In her colonial trade, which was confined entirely to her own ships,
she employed 114,000 tons of French shipping at the former period,
and only 102,000 tons in the year 1860. But the most complete answer
to those persons who desired still to retain the Navigation Laws was
the remarkable fact that, while the protected branches of her shipping
trade decreased, there was a steady and not inconsiderable increase in
those branches of it, where her ships had to enter into competition
with the vessels of other nations.

[Sidenote: Mr. Lindsay visits France, and has various interviews with
the Emperor, Messrs. Rouher and Chevalier, on this subject.]

Though the motion which the House of Commons had adopted was in favour
of a Treaty, that mode of negotiation presented so many objections
that, nine months after it had been passed, when Lord Russell furnished
me with an introduction to Lord Cowley, it was arranged that we should
endeavour to induce the French Government to consider this question as
one entirely relating to France, and to urge that she would inquire for
herself, and, having done so, to pass such measures as would be most
conducive to the interests of her own people, irrespectively of other
nations.[224] This was the course subsequently adopted.

There were many enlightened men in that country, as I shall hereafter
show, who entertained opinions favourable to the desired change, though
the prejudice in favour of the ancient laws and customs had become
so strong in the minds of the mass of the people, that it would have
been all but impossible to remove it, except through the powerful
influence of the enlightened monarch _then_ governing France, who
readily saw the advantage the nation would derive from Free navigation.
Consequently, he in due time appointed a council to inquire into the
whole subject.[225]

In the meantime an important step was taken in Colonial Legislation,
which paved the way for more important changes. La Martinique,
la Guadaloupe, and la Réunion (or Bourbon), the only three of
her old sugar plantations which France still possessed, had been
long complaining that the benefits they derived from the _Pacte
Colonial_ had entirely ceased, since the protection which their
sugar used to receive in the French market against foreign sugar,
and against that manufactured in France, had been withdrawn; and
that nothing remained of that system, except the hardships they had
to endure from the exclusion of the foreign trade and flag, and the
difficulty they had in getting rid of their produce, which the French
shipping was not sufficiently numerous to export.

In consequence of these and other[226] representations, a law, passed
on the 3rd July, 1861, enacted (Articles 1 and 2) that all the foreign
commodities allowed to be imported into France were to be admitted into
Guadaloupe, Martinique, and Bourbon, under the same conditions and
duties. Article 3 broke down the barrier which had hitherto shut out
foreign shipping from freedom of access to those islands. It allowed
the importation of foreign goods under every flag, without distinction,
subject, however, to the payment of special duties, which varied
according to the ports from which the goods were brought, and those to
which they were imported. Thus, goods carried under any foreign flag
from Europe or the Mediterranean to the Antilles, had to pay a duty,
per ton, of 20 francs; if to the Réunion, of 30 francs: and when from
the ports of the Atlantic coast (except the Cape and its territory),
to the Antilles, 10 francs; and to Réunion, 20 francs. The duties,
however, imposed by this Article, were only applicable to such foreign
commodities, admissible under the previous laws, as were not liable to
a higher duty. Otherwise, that duty was to continue in force. Article 6
went further, and allowed French goods to be carried to the colonies in
question, and their goods to France, in foreign bottoms, subject to a
duty of 20 francs per ton of cargo between France and the Antilles, and
of 30 francs per ton between France and La Réunion.

The seventh Article granted the like freedom for the exportation of
the goods of the colonies, either to foreign countries or to any other
colony, provided such colony were beyond the limits of the coasting
trade. But the law still excluded the foreign mercantile marine from
entering the Colonial coasting trade, and it was only applicable to
the three colonies mentioned in the Act. Nor were its provisions
applicable to the other French possessions, nor to its coasting trade;
nevertheless, it was an important step towards the freedom of maritime
commerce.

[Sidenote: Commission of Inquiry appointed, and law ultimately passed
May 1866.]

Many difficulties, however, had still to be overcome, and though the
_Conseil_, after a most minute inquiry, and the publication
of three large volumes of evidence, reported that great changes
were imperatively required in the laws, their recommendations did
not receive the sanction of the French legislative chambers until
1866,[227] and then only after many prolonged discussions.

Among these difficulties may be mentioned the removal of certain local
charges on shipping, which had long been maintained in our ports, and
against the payment of which the French Government had frequently
protested, though neither the vessels of France nor of other countries
were called upon to pay more than those of our own, except in some
special cases, such as the case of ships owned by freemen, and other
locally privileged persons, who were exempt. These charges differed in
every port, and sometimes within the limit of the same harbour. Some
of them were levied by virtue of Acts of Parliament, but others of a
vexatious character, though trifling in amount, were only claimed by
a prescriptive right, through long use. Those which were levied by
prescription were either in the nature of petty customs, or of duties
charged on vessels for anchorage, keelage, or with respect to ballast
or to fees levied on goods in the nature of cranage, metage, cartage,
wharfage; and, in too many instances, they were extorted for the use
of cranes which had no existence, or of wharves which for ages had
tumbled into decay. No doubt, in ancient times, it was an unquestioned
prerogative of the Crown to create petty customs for local purposes,
and, though that power has long since ceased to exist, when once
granted to corporations or individuals it became assignable, like other
property. It was, therefore, no easy task to abolish them without
conceding the exorbitant demands of their owners, as the Board of
Trade found out when the Vice-President, Mr. Lowe, brought the subject
before Parliament.[228] But France insisted on their abolition, and,
since then, the great bulk of them have been removed, by purchase or
otherwise.

By Article 1 of the law of the 19th May, 1866, all materials raw or
manufactured, including marine engines, intended to form parts of the
construction or equipment of iron or wooden vessels, were admitted into
France duty free. Article 2 abolished the premium granted by the law of
the 6th May, 1841, on all steam-engines manufactured in France intended
for international navigation. Article 3 permitted, after the expiration
of six months from the promulgation of the law, the admission of
foreign-built and fully equipped vessels to registration on payment of
two francs per ton admeasurement; while Article 4 abolished all tonnage
duties upon foreign ships, except such as had been or might be levied
for the improvement of certain commercial harbours.

[Sidenote: Its conditions.]

But other changes were more tardily made: Article 5 providing that,
only after “three years from the promulgation of the present law,
the surtaxes on the flag (_surtaxes de pavillon_), at present
applicable to productions imported from the countries where they are
produced, otherwise than under the French flag, shall be abolished;”
while Article 6 provided for the ulterior establishment, by imperial
decree, of such compensating duties as might be rendered desirable,
in consequence of any other nation imposing on the French flag higher
duties than were to be levied on its own vessels; thus copying the
retaliatory clause of the English Navigation Repeal Act of 1849. By
Clause 7 these various articles were made applicable to the islands of
Martinique, Guadaloupe, and Réunion (or Bourbon); and by Clause 8, the
conditions of Articles 1, 3, and 4 were extended to Algeria; while by
Article 9 the trade between France and that colony and its Coasting
trade (_cabotage_) was permitted to be carried on by foreign
vessels under the authorisation of its governor.

The 10th, or last Article, of the law of 1866, abolished the
differential duties (_surtaxes de navigation_) which had been
imposed on goods imported under a foreign flag, and the lower rate of
duty on certain commodities, imported from French warehouses, under the
flag of that country.[229]

[Sidenote: Repeal Act unsatisfactory to the French Shipowners.]

But the law of the 19th May, 1866, was very far from giving general
satisfaction in France. Many French Shipowners were as loud in their
complaints against it as the most noted Protectionist had been in
England against the repeal of her Navigation Laws, and with, perhaps,
more valid reasons. The new law did not give to them that freedom in
the purchase or construction of their ships they had a right to expect.
And though the duty of two francs per ton levied on every ship they
purchased from a foreign country was insignificant, the restrictions,
imposed on all materials necessary for the construction and equipment
of vessels in their own country, were of a harassing and vexatious
character. The measure in itself was good, but various classes of
Protectionists, fearing that numerous articles might be imported which
could be used for other than shipbuilding purposes, and thus interfere
with their own particular branches of trade, had influence enough with
the Legislature to obtain the issue of another decree[230] on the
8th June following, which nullified in some important respects the
operation of the law of May 1866, and rendered it less beneficial to
the people of France.

Under such vexatious restrictions it was impossible for the shipbuilder
of France to compete successfully with those of other countries, as
they were nearly as prejudicial to his interests as they would have
been by the maintenance of the duties on all the articles he required.
Competition in every branch of commerce throughout the world is so
close, that, wherever the Legislature imposes not merely taxes but
conditions, which, from their nature, must necessarily interfere with
the course of business, and occupy a considerable portion of the
shipbuilder’s _time_, which is a part of his capital, he cannot
successfully compete with those of other countries where no such
conditions are imposed.

[Sidenote: Another Commission of Inquiry appointed, 1870.]

Such restrictions, though in themselves comparatively unimportant,
afforded the Shipowners of France a lever which they worked
incessantly, hoping with the aid of the other Protectionists, to
overthrow in time, the wise and liberal Act of the 19th May, or at
least to abrogate its leading principles. At last the complaints from
the seaports, and some changes in the administration of affairs, led to
the appointment of a Commission or Parliamentary Committee, with powers
to inquire not merely into the effect of these restrictions, but into
the state generally, of the Commercial Marine of France, and on the
best means of affording it assistance, should any be deemed necessary
or desirable.

Although this Committee, which sat early in the year 1870, never
concluded its labours, its minutes are interesting and instructive,
from the depositions and discussions they embodied, and, more
especially, from the important fact, that not a few even of the
Shipowners themselves, who had previously doubted the policy of
Free-trade as applicable to their own interests, had, within the
previous five years, become converts to the advantages to be derived
from unfettered commerce. But the larger portion of them were, as, in
fact, Shipowners have long been in all countries, Protectionist. They
contended that the French commercial marine was both absolutely and
comparatively in a state of decline, caused, as they argued, mainly, by
the abolition of the protective duties, which they held were necessary
to prevent them from being ruined by foreign competition. Among the
various causes they alleged, as rendering them unable to compete
successfully with the vessels of other nations, was the want of “bulky
freights,” in consequence of which their ships had frequently to leave
France in ballast, or with incomplete cargoes; and, moreover, that
“France, being at the western border of Europe, English, German, and
other northern vessels, called at her ports, when not fully laden, to
complete their outward cargoes, and compete for French freight with
French shipping.”

[Sidenote: Views of rival parties.]

On the other hand, the partisans of Free-trade denied that French
shipping had declined either absolutely or in comparison with the
commercial marine of other countries. While conceding the point that
the rates of freight had diminished, they maintained that such was the
case in all other parts of the world; that this, therefore, was not in
any way peculiar to France, such diminution of freight being, in fact,
the natural consequence of a competition which, in the interests of the
community at large, it would be as impossible as it was undesirable to
prevent. Moreover, they showed that, where their Shipowners had kept
pace with the movements of the age, by substituting iron for wood, and
steamers for sailing vessels, whenever the requirements of the trade
necessitated a change, and in cases, where the masters of these vessels
themselves were enterprising and disposed to seek for freight, wherever
it could be most advantageously procured, they had increased. Thus
proving that the French commercial marine was fully able, if relieved
from needless restrictions, to hold its own against that of any other
nation. What they required was to have the “system of liberty more
completely and logically applied” by the alteration or abolition of
certain oppressive burdens; and by the removal of all troublesome,
onerous, and, frequently, frivolous duties imposed by the French laws,
besides a few other reforms which they specified.

But those Shipowners who favoured the Free-trade movement were, as
has been the case in other countries, assailed as traitors by the
adverse party, who taxed them with having selfish views, at variance
with the true interests of French shipping, owing to their position of
commission agents or shipbrokers, as well as of Shipowners; and, no
doubt, these two interests were conflicting, inasmuch as the profits
on the vessels might be made subservient to other and more lucrative
sources of gain. But this is an old story, which has been frequently
told, and those persons who, in this instance, used it as an argument,
did not perceive that it was double-edged. Nor was it, indeed,
conclusive, as, whatever the motives which prompted the arguments of
the partisans of Free-trade, these arguments were good and sound in
themselves. Besides, there were many shipowners in France in favour of
Free-trade who had no other interests to serve.

[Sidenote: M. de Coninck.]

For example, the late M. de Coninck,[231] who was a large shipowner,
in his evidence states that he had given up every other branch of
business except ship-owning—being at the time, as he remarked, “nothing
but a carrier” (_charretier_). In other respects his evidence was
equally frank and straightforward. The cause, he deliberately told the
Commissioners, the real cause of the complaints of the Protectionist
Shipowners was not loss, properly speaking, but a mere diminution in
their profits;[232] this loss, certainly, had, he as frankly admitted,
been reduced by competition to an average rate, inferior to that of
the palmy days of Protection, during which, he added, the Shipowners
obtained unreasonably large profits at the expense of the community. M.
de Coninck then gave happy illustrations of the _loss_ so called
of which they so loudly complained. “Formerly, and in my time,” he
said, “it was considered that a vessel should clear herself in three
voyages! That was the golden age of shipowners; but there is no such
thing now, and, when we can gain _ten_ per cent. per annum on the
cost of our vessel we should be well satisfied.”[233]

[Sidenote: M. Bergasse.]

In support of the opinions expressed by M. de Coninck we have the
indirect testimony of a well-known Protectionist who gave his evidence
before the Commission. M. Bergasse, himself a leading Shipowner of
Marseilles, was deputed by the Shipowners of that important seaport
to appear before the Commission and state the hardships of their
case. He was a gentleman of high position and considerable experience
and knowledge of the world. After attempting to show the advantages
which the Shipowners of other nations had over those of France, he
came to the old story which had been told a thousand times in England
about the Shipowners and seamen of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark,
“accustomed,” said he, “to live poorly, they equip their vessels in
an entirely economical manner, and _do not seek to make Shipowners
fortunes_,[234] but only to gain their livelihood.”

[Sidenote: M. Siegfried.]

M. Siegfried, a retired merchant, who followed, gave much valuable
evidence, showing the fallacy of the system of protection as insisted
on, in this instance, by its partizans. He contended that France, so
gifted by nature, only required outlets for her oversea commerce, a
better commercial training, and a more hardy and enterprising spirit
in trade. In the course of this portion of his evidence he stated, as
characteristic of the business deficiencies of French shipmasters,
that French export houses frequently chartered English vessels in
preference to those of their own country, because the English masters
were more easy to deal with, and more accommodating in their way of
doing business. Nor were they subject to the extreme anxieties about
their responsibility which distinguished the French shipmasters. For
instance, he said, the latter will constantly insist upon somebody
coming to take note “that bale number so and so had been wetted in
the corner,” and, by calling attention to reserves and protests on
the bills of lading were, constantly, wearying exporters by their
troublesome and minute precautions against responsibility.[235] With
regard to the demands of the Protectionists, he strongly adjured the
Commissioners on no account to be induced to advise the resumption
of the differential duties, as any such protection to the commercial
marine of France could have no other effect, in the end, but to
increase the prosperity of the railways and to give a fresh impetus
to the maritime prosperity of the Italian ports, on the one hand, and
of Antwerp and other ports in the northern vicinity of France, on the
other.

But this most excellent advice was given in vain; and, though the
Commissioners do not appear to have made any regular report on the
evidence, the evidence itself was so full of Protectionist views that
it taught abundant Protectionist lessons to the legislators who had to
draw conclusions from it. Many of these gentlemen are, indeed, imbued
with strong Conservative principles, and are, naturally, prone to
seize on any statement in favour of their own views without inquiring
very minutely into its soundness.

[Sidenote: M Thiers and Protection carry the day,]

Although an impression prevails that the spirit of Protection took
deeper root, than it had previously done in the French Legislative
Assembly, after the terrible disasters of the war with Germany, the
truth is that it only manifested itself owing to the pressure exerted
by M. Thiers when he came into power on that memorable occasion. The
spirit of the Assembly was still as much in favour of freedom of
commerce as it had been in 1860, when it passed its famous commercial
treaty with England. But the enormous drain on the resources of France,
together with other causes, and the then all-powerful influence of M.
Thiers, who, throughout his long life, has been an honest Protectionist
in its most original form, inspired the Assembly with a financial
policy intended to husband those resources and to make the most of
them, but, being timorous and narrow-minded in its conception, it
was by no means calculated to attain the object in view. That such
was the case we see most clearly in the system adopted by the New
Assembly with respect to foreign commerce, and even more especially,
in its relations with the mercantile marine of other countries. That
Assembly, in its wisdom, decided that the commercial treaties between
England, on the one hand, and Belgium, on the other, should be revised
from a Protectionist point of view, so as to return to the old system.
Happily, however, a proviso was introduced into the new law which was
only in conformity with the spirit of the Treaties of 1860, whereby
it was decreed that timely notice should be given to England and to
Belgium of any intention on the part of France to put an end to the
Treaties of 1860.

[Sidenote: and reversed, in 1872, much of the law of 1866.]

But the Assembly had its own way with regard to foreign shipping, and,
by the laws of the 30th January and 3rd February, 1872, it was enacted,
almost entirely through the overwhelming influence of M. Thiers:
That all goods imported in foreign ships, except from the French
colonies, were to be charged with a _surtaxe de pavillon_ per
100 kilogrammes, according to the following scale of rates: from the
countries of Europe and the basin of the Mediterranean, 75 centimes;
from countries out of Europe, on this side the Capes of Horn and Good
Hope, 1 franc 50 centimes; and, from all countries beyond these Capes,
2 francs. Guano was, however, excepted from these duties because a
French mercantile house had entered into a contract to purchase a large
quantity of it from the Peruvian Government.

This law further provided that all goods produced, originally, by
countries out of Europe were liable to a _surtaxe d’entrepôt_,
when imported from the warehouses of Europe, of 3 francs per 100
kilogrammes, unless they were, by the laws then in force, liable to a
higher duty, which, in such case, would be charged. But, perhaps, the
most suicidal portion of this law, as affecting the French Shipowners,
was the re-imposition of from 30 to 50 francs per ton measurement on
all foreign vessels, purchased for registration in France, together
with a duty on marine engines. Again, a tonnage duty was charged on
vessels of every flag coming from any foreign country or from the
French colonies, of from 50 centimes to 1 franc per ton measurement;
while Articles 1, 3, and 5, of the law of the 19th May, 1866, were
repealed.[236]

The object, however, of this new law seems to have been, more
especially, directed against the vessels of those countries which
were in some respect protected by commercial treaties, and would,
otherwise, have been free from it. It was introduced by a report of
M. Ancel, of a very discouraging character, who charged the law of
1866, which had abolished the _surtaxes de pavillon_, with the
sufferings and depression of the French maritime interests. Among the
injurious effects attributed to that law, M. Ancel’s report alleged
the diminution of the imports under the French flag from India and
the South Seas. Thus, he stated that, previously to 1860, the foreign
flag carried only a small portion of these goods (they never carried
any on account of the prohibitory differential duties then in force),
whereas, in 1869, three-fourths of them had been imported into France
in foreign vessels. Consequently, he demanded, forgetting altogether
the interests of the consumer and manufacturer, the re-establishment
of the _surtaxes de pavillon_ upon all importations, except those
under the flag of such producing countries as were protected against
_surtaxes_ by the treaties of navigation with France, at the same
time, expressing a hope that these changes would afford to the French
Mercantile marine “an encouragement and a strength that its situation
imperatively required.”[237]

But it is difficult—indeed it is impossible, to understand how the
abolition of the _surtaxes de pavillon_ by the law of 1866
could have caused so much mischief in 1869 and previously, as it was
only from the 11th of June of that year that the abolition came into
operation; and as to the _surtaxes d’entrepôt_ they had, in fact,
never been set aside! It was on such grounds as these, that the chief
provisions of the wise and liberal Merchant Shipping Act of Napoleon
III. were swept away!

[Sidenote: Just views of the Duke Decazes.]

Happily, however, there are still many able and shrewd men in the
Councils of France—men who were, from the first, well aware of the
pernicious effects which this law had produced upon the commerce of
their country. “It may be said,” remarks the Duke Decazes with great
truth and wisdom, “that it is that law which has jeopardised the great
trade in corn of the port of Marseilles, in the same way as it has
directed towards Genoa the exports of ore from the island of Elba, so
valuable for our foundries ... what has taken place in the south is
equally brought under our notice from the north, with respect to the
port of Antwerp, which has profited by the new law to the detriment
of Havre and Dunkirk. In those seas, it is the German flag which has
now obtained the advantage, and enjoys the freight which heretofore
pertained to the shipping of France.”

[Sidenote: Abolition, for the second time, of the _Surtaxes de
Pavillon_, July 1873.]

Unanswerable facts such as these, confirming as they did the lucid
and strong opinion expressed by M. Siegfried, showed what a nation
may suffer, if it disregard the clear teachings of political economy
applicable to all nations, and adopt such ancient and exploded dogmas
as those propounded by M. Thiers; hence the Assembly retraced its
steps, and by the first article of the law of the 28th and 31st July,
1873, which is still in force, the _surtaxes de pavillon_ were,
for the second time, abolished.[238]

It is to be hoped that this practical measure will have more effect
than the disregarded admonitions of experience and of knowledge, and
that the _surtaxes de pavillon_ will no more find a place in
the statute book of France. For the present, vessels of all foreign
countries are placed upon the same footing as those of France, except
with respect to the Coasting trade between its ports, from which
foreign vessels are, as a rule, excluded, except those of Spain.
Richer in agricultural products than most other countries, and, with
a population very largely engaged in the cultivation of the soil, the
French people will, no doubt in time, see the many advantages that
they themselves would derive, were this trade, also, thrown open to
the competition of the ships of all nations; not, that any nation
could manage it so well and profitably as themselves, resident as they
are on the spot, but, the fear of competition from others would have
a marvellous effect in rousing French Shipowners, as it did those of
England, to greater efforts on behalf of their own interests, apart
from the interests and well-being of their country.

It may thus be hoped that France will not again be found in the crooked
road of retrogression, but that, having under innumerable difficulties
and after long years of political discussion, often in the midst of
civil wars and great changes in her constitution, achieved victory over
the antiquated dogmas of a cumbrous and ruinous system of protection,
she will continue in the clear path of progress, which so well becomes
a nation endowed by nature with the richest soil and finest climate in
Europe. Possessing a population, whose industrious and frugal habits
will enable her to maintain for centuries yet to come the relatively
high position she has always held among nations, her legislators
would do well to teach the people that these great natural advantages,
and not her armies, are the true sources of the lasting greatness and
happiness of France.


FOOTNOTES:

[219] A sou is as nearly as possible one half-penny sterling.

[220] To the “celebrated decrees” which followed these laws, that
of Berlin of the 21st of November, 1806, and that of Milan 17th of
December, 1807, and to our “Orders in Council,” which were all mere
acts of war, I have already referred at considerable length (see
_ante_, vol. ii., Chaps. VIII., IX., and XI.). In regard to these
Acts, nations would do well to refer to the saying of Napoleon himself,
in 1816, at the commencement of his exile, “We must fall back for the
future on the open navigation of the seas, and on the entire liberty of
universal trade.”—_Memorial of St. Helena_, 12th June, 1816.

[221] Coffee in French ships paid 48 francs per 100 kilogrammes, and in
English and other foreign ships 84 francs.

[222] This Exhibition was followed by a similar one in Paris in 1855,
and, when the Emperor Napoleon came to visit the Queen just before it
was opened the merchants of London presented him with an address. The
late Mr. Samuel Gurney was one of the deputation. After shaking hands
with those of its members whom he knew, the Emperor remarked to Mr.
Gurney that it was a long time since they had met. “Yes, Sire,” said
the fine old Quaker with one of his blandest smiles, “it _is_
a long time, and there have been many changes since then;” having,
evidently, in his mind at the time, the means, whereby his Majesty had
risen to power, and the Crimean war. “I hope,” continued the Emperor,
“you will visit our Exhibition next year, and that you will allow me
the pleasure of seeing you there.” “It is my intention, Sire,” replied
Mr. Gurney, “to visit thy great PEACE DEMONSTRATION, and,
should I do so, I shall not fail as thou wishest to pay my respects
to thee.” The Emperor was, doubtless, pleased with the ready manner
in which his old Quaker friend had construed his Exhibition into a
demonstration of peace, and, especially, peace with England, which, at
that time, and, as I believe throughout the whole of his reign, he was
most anxious to maintain.

[223] The motion was as follows:—“That an humble address be presented
to her Majesty, praying that she will be graciously pleased to enter
into negotiations with the Emperor of the French with the view of
making a Treaty for the reciprocal abrogation of all discriminating
duties levied upon the vessels and their cargoes of either of the two
nations in the ports of the other; and for procuring such alterations
in the Navigation Laws of France as may tend to facilitate the
commercial intercourse, and strengthen the friendly relations between
England and France.”—See ‘Hansard’s Reports’ (March 29, 1860), vol.
clvii. pp. 1528 to 1553.

Having prepared and carried this resolution, I had frequently occasion
to correspond and converse with Mr. Cobden on the subject, who said
that the labour in connection with the Commercial Treaty was so
immense, that it would have been impossible to embrace the question of
navigation. Indeed, he observed that he, alone, never could have got
through with its numerous details, had it not been for the valuable
assistance rendered by Mr. (now Sir Lewis) Mallet, who, at that time
attached to the Board of Trade, accompanied him on his mission. I can
also state of my own knowledge that the services of Mr. Mallet during
the subsequent inquiry into the French Navigation Laws were of the
greatest importance. With regard to the Commercial Treaty itself, there
can be no doubt that, if the Legislatures of England and France, of
their own free will, had adopted measures to allow the people of the
respective countries to exchange their produce and manufactures free
from all duties, except such as were required for the revenue, it
would have been much preferable to the system of “bargaining” which
Treaties invariably entail; but, unfortunately, all nations do not yet
see that, if a principle is sound, it must be beneficial wherever it
is applied, and, as they are still prone to set up their own laws in
opposition to the laws of nature, no step in advance could have been
made at that time, so far as France was concerned, without a Treaty. On
the other hand, I have frequently heard objections raised to the Treaty
because France was the larger gainer; its opponents said, to use a
homely phrase, that the French people got 9_d._, while we got only
3_d._ out of the shilling. I offer no opinion on this point, but
even if such were the case, we are 3_d._ better off than we should
have been had no Treaty been made, and why therefore should we cavil
against it?

[224] I daresay many persons thought at the time that I was
interfering, where I had no business, with the affairs of Diplomacy;
but the truth was this, as I had taken upon myself the responsibility
of the motion which the House of Commons adopted, Lord Russell felt,
that I ought to go a step further, and do what I could to carry it
into effect, more especially, as the whole question was one full of
technical details. Indeed, Lord Cowley frankly stated that it was so
technical in its character, that he did not feel competent to bring
it under the notice of the French Government, and, in justice to his
Lordship, I must state that, so far from feeling that I was interfering
with his duties, he, not merely, rendered every assistance in his
power, but was most anxious that I should succeed in the object of
my self-imposed mission. The advantages I possessed were a practical
knowledge of the subject in all its bearings and details—a slight
personal knowledge of the Emperor which I had gained when I had an
interview with him about his transport service during the Crimean war,
and, more especially, the friendship of Michel Chevalier, through whom
I became acquainted with M. Rouher, the then Minister of Commerce.

[225] Having consulted with Messrs. Rouher and Chevalier as to
the most advisable course to pursue, and, seeing with them the
difficulties which had to be overcome, I had resolved with their
entire consent—indeed on their suggestion—to seek an audience with the
Emperor himself, a course which so thoroughly met the approval of Lord
Cowley, that he, at once, undertook to obtain it, and, himself, to
accompany me to the Tuileries. I had learned from the “tossing of the
horses’ heads” what an apt scholar I was about to meet, and that any
imperfect arguments or inconclusive facts would be at once detected.
Consequently, I had carefully rehearsed in my mind every point
necessary to bring under his notice, and had taken all my figures from
the _French Official Returns_. At first the subject, necessarily a
dry one, did not seem to interest the Emperor, but, when I called his
attention to the fact that, while the sailing-ships of Great Britain
had been increased during the previous twenty years by 2,800,000 tons,
and her steamers by 400,000 tons, those of France had only, in that
time, been increased by 370,000 tons, and 50,000 tons respectively,
though her general commerce, in every other branch, increased nearly as
rapidly as our own, he asked me to repeat the figures and explain, why
it was that there was such an enormous difference. The task was an easy
one; but, perhaps, the facts which struck him most were, that, though
the Shipowners of France were carefully protected at a loss to the
community, as more than one-half of the whole of her oversea carrying
trade was conducted by foreign vessels owing to the differential
duties, her people were really paying greatly enhanced prices for
everything they required from abroad, without adding one sixpence to
his revenue.

The interview, which, altogether, lasted for nearly two hours, must,
however, have made a considerable impression on the Emperor, for, on
parting, he requested me to put in writing, and in a letter addressed
to himself, the leading facts and figures I had brought under his
notice, and to let him have it that evening, if convenient. I made it
convenient, and by 6 P.M. of that day he received the letter,
a copy of which will be found in the Appendix, No. 4, p. 582.

On the following morning, I received a note from his private secretary,
M. Mocquard, saying that the Emperor wished to see me that forenoon
alone. After communicating with Lord Cowley, I waited upon his
Majesty, and his first expression was, “I have read your letter more
than once, and I wish you to explain more fully the effect of the
Navigation Laws.” That I might convey to his mind, effectually, the
operation of all such laws, I asked for the use of a Mercator chart
on a large scale, which was soon obtained, and, spreading it on the
floor, I drew upon it, with a pencil, lines to explain, for instance,
the usual course of commerce with India, by way of Egypt as well as
by the Cape of Good Hope. I then showed him that, though our steamers
and sailing-ships were constantly passing his chief ports of Havre and
Marseilles laden with produce, of which his people might be in the
greatest want, the differential duties imposed by his laws prevented
us from landing these goods; and then, turning to his own official
returns, I repeated the fact that not one franc of revenue was derived
from these dues; so that, while his people were heavy losers on one
hand, his exchequer was not benefited on the other. To obtain the
sugar, coffee, indigo, and other articles with which, for instance,
a Peninsular and Oriental steamer passing his port of Marseilles
was laden, it was necessary that they should be carried through the
Straits of Gibraltar (still tracing the lines on the chart), cross
the Bay of Biscay, pass his other great port of Havre, and be carried
on to Southampton, to be there landed, and, most likely, sent by
railway to London, where they were bonded, and thence shipped again
in either French or English vessels for Calais or Boulogne, and then
conveyed across France to wherever they might be required by his
people; possibly even to Marseilles or Havre. “Now, Sire,” I said,
still kneeling on the chart and looking earnestly at the Emperor, “if
your people prefer to have what Indian produce they need conveyed
to them, in that very roundabout and expensive manner, instead of
importing it direct in whatever vessels may be ready to carry the
produce to them on the most favourable terms, it is a process to which
I, as an Englishman, have no objections to offer, for we carry in our
ships not merely the great bulk of the Indian produce, but have also
much extra profit from it in the shape of landing, bonding, railway
carriage, transhipment, commissions, and so forth; I do not, however,
see how your manufacturers can compete successfully with those of other
countries, if they are compelled by your Navigation Laws to import the
raw material they require by such antiquated and expensive modes as
these.”

As the room, in which we were was small and the light not very good,
the Emperor had followed my example, and, that he might see the lines
and ports more distinctly, had himself, before I concluded, knelt down
also on the chart.

In the palaces of France are to be found many grand pictures
descriptive of the wars of the Empire, but its artists may now add
to the decoration of these walls a far grander and nobler scene, and
represent their last Emperor performing a duty to his people of much
greater importance as regards their future welfare and happiness, and
far more worthy of record than the blood-stained fields of Magenta and
Solferino. I had, subsequently, frequent occasion to see the Emperor on
the subject of these laws; and I gave evidence, for the same purposes,
before the _Conseil Supérieur_ he appointed to inquire into them:
in the report of these proceedings there will be found a copy of my
letter to his Majesty, and also a copy of one addressed to M. Fleury on
the same subject. (See Appendix to this volume, No. 5, p. 591.)

[226] The dates were:—Address of the House of Commons, and debate
upon it, 29th March, 1860; brought under the notice of the Emperor,
10th January, 1861; Report of the Minister of Commerce of France to
the Emperor relative to the state of the French Mercantile Marine,
published in the _Moniteur_ 2nd May, 1862; Conseil-Supérieur of
Commerce commenced its inquiry, 10th July, 1862.

[227] See correspondence respecting the operation of the French
Navigation Laws on British Shipping, Parl. Pap. 1867; also No. 11
Appendix, of this volume, pp. 620-3, where these dues, as they existed
in 1852, will be found.

[228] See _ante_, p. 411.

[229] A proposal was made to abolish the _Surtaxes d’Entrepôt_, or
taxes upon goods from the warehouses of Europe, but it was summarily
rejected.

[230] The Articles of this Decree were as follows:—

Article 1. From the date of the promulgation of the present Decree
shall be admitted, free of import duty, conformably to Article 1 of
the Law of May 19, 1866, with respect to the Mercantile Marine, all
raw or manufactured objects entering into the construction, rigging,
equipment, and maintenance of steam or sailing-vessels, of wood or
iron, destined for commerce.

Articles such as moveable furniture, bedding, linen, plates and dishes,
cutlery, table glass, and, in general, all objects intended for
personal use, shall not be considered as forming part of the equipment.

Art. 2. Shipbuilders, and manufacturers of articles destined for the
construction, equipment, rigging, or the maintenance of vessels, can
alone enjoy the benefit of the provisions of the present Decree as far
as raw materials are concerned.

To these articles they will have to prove their title at the
Custom-house.

Art. 3. Declarations made at the Custom-house for the admission of
articles duty free must bear, with respect to every kind of produce,
the particulars required by the Custom-house Regulations for the
payment of the dues.

Art. 4. Importers must engage, by an undertaking guaranteed in due
form, to prove, within a period not exceeding one year, that the
raw material admitted free, or the products manufactured with such
material, or, finally, the machines and machinery, detached portions
of machines, and other articles completely finished and temporarily
admitted free, have been applied to the use of vessels.

If, at the expiration of the term of one year, the before-mentioned
proofs have not been produced, the Custom-house will collect the
official fees, and take steps for their recovery, conformably to the
third paragraph of Article 1 of the Law of May 19, 1866.

Art. 5. All declarations relative to machines and machinery, to
detached parts of the same, and to other articles completely
manufactured, should contain the description of the said articles, in
order to ensure identification, and this, without prejudice to the
stamp which may be applied to steam or other machinery, to detached
portions of machines, to boilers, to sails, and to such other articles
as the Custom-house officers may think fit to apply it.

Art. 6. The incorporation into vessels of the raw material, or the
placing on board of manufactured articles destined for construction,
rigging, or equipment, shall be preceded by a declaration specifying—

1st. The nature and weight of the raw material, as well as of the
manufactured articles to be employed or put on board;

2nd. The date, number, and office of delivery of Custom-house
discharge; and,

3rd. The vessel to the construction, repair, or use of which the said
raw materials or the said manufactured articles shall have been applied.

When a manufactured article, which shall have required several metals
in its construction is in question, the declaration shall indicate the
weight of each kind of metal.

Art. 7. The Custom-house, in order to check the declarations set out of
the employment, whether as to raw material or manufactured articles,
shall make use of whatever mode of proceeding it may judge necessary.

Art. 8. There shall not be applied to vessels in substitution:—

1st. For iron in bars of irregular shape, any except articles
manufactured with iron of a like irregular shape.

2nd. For iron plates and rolled copper of a millimètre and less in
thickness, any objects unless manufactured with sheet iron or rolled
copper not exceeding that thickness.

In no case shall articles be admitted in the auditing of the
importation accounts, made up with materials of a degree of manufacture
less advanced than that of the articles tendered for entry.

Art. 9. Products manufactured with raw materials introduced duty free
must represent those same materials weight for weight, and without any
allowance for waste.

Art. 10. All infractions of the provisions of the present Decree will
be followed by the application of the penalties provided under the
third paragraph of Article 1 of the Law of the 19th May, 1866.

Art. 11. All articles placed on board vessels, and all material
incorporated into the construction of the said vessels under the
provisions of the present Decree, shall, in case of landing, or in case
of the dismantling, repairing, or breaking up of the ships, be subject
to the provisions of general legislation in matters of Customs’ dues.

[231] This gentleman was an eminent merchant and shipowner of Havre; he
was also one of the most able and consistent supporters of the freedom
of navigation.

[232] See _ante_, p. 363, in regard to how some persons calculated
their losses.

[233] See the Minutes and Evidence before the Commission, p. 877.

[234] “Ne cherchant pas à faire des fortunes d’armateur.”—See Minutes
of Evidence, p. 166.

[235] See Minutes of Evidence, p. 632, _note_. Matters have
materially changed in this respect during the last forty years. While
French shipmasters have deteriorated, the English have been greatly
improved by education and competition.

[236] It may be remembered that when the Assembly rejected certain
important clauses of this foolish Bill, M. Thiers resigned. He,
however, knew full well that at that moment the Assembly would submit
to his wishes sooner than let itself be deprived of his services. It
was only, therefore, in subserviency to him, that the retrogressive
law of 1872 passed the Assembly. It may have been the case that, at
this period of disorder and financial pressure, there was a rush of
Protectionists to propound their schemes for raising revenues—schemes
for making other people pay these debts—the cherished but delusive
theories of bygone ages; but the main spring of action was the
influence of M. Thiers. He was _the_ Government of the day. He
abhorred any opinions different from his own well-known principles in
favour of Protection, which he urged with all his might, and, being
then all-powerful, he carried the Assembly with him; and, that such
was the case, is clearly evident from the fact that, immediately after
his overthrow, the laws he had forced upon France were changed, and
the limited liberties of its people, which he had removed, were again
restored.

[237] The fact, as I learn from my friend M. Michel Chevalier,
connected with this Committee of Inquiry—the evidence before which was
made the basis of Thiers’ measure—was that Pouyer-quertier, though
not a member of it, exercised so much influence with its chairman, M.
Paulmier, a deputy of Calvados, that he, being constantly in attendance
with witnesses of strong Protectionist views, prevailed on him to
put such questions to them, as would make it appear that Free-trade
was ruining France. Witnesses of Liberal views, as I have shown,
could hardly be heard. Nevertheless, the Committee, as I have already
observed, came to no conclusion, and no report was made beyond the
informal one of M. Ancel.

[238] M. Thiers, it may be remembered, was thrown out of office May
24, 1873, and, as this Bill was passed on the 31st of July, or only
two months after his fall, his political opinions cannot have left
much impression on the Assembly which had so recently been under his
dictatorship.




CHAPTER XVI.

     Recent legislation relating to the loss of life and property at
     sea in British vessels—Committee on shipwrecks, 1836—Estimated
     loss of life at sea between 1818 and 1836—Recommendations of
     the Committee—Committee of 1843, loss of lives and ships at that
     period—First official return of wrecks, 1856—Loss of lives and
     ships, 1862 and 1873—Further recommendations—Various laws for the
     protection of seamen, 1846 to 1854—Agitation about “unseaworthy
     ships,” 1855—Further provisions for the benefit of seamen,
     1867-69-70—Mr. Samuel Plimsoll, M.P.—His first resolution,
     1870—Introduces a Bill, 1871—Government measure of that year—Mr.
     Plimsoll publishes a book, ‘Our Seamen,’ 1873—An extension of
     the principle applied to testing chain-cables strongly urged—Mr.
     Plimsoll moves an Address for a Commission of Inquiry, which
     was unanimously granted—Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships
     1873-74—Its members—Their order of reference—And mode of thorough
     investigation—Their reports—Load-line—Deck loads—Government
     survey—Its extension undesirable—Shipowners already harassed by
     over-legislation—Mode of inquiry into losses at sea, examined and
     condemned—Recommendations—Examination of masters and mates, and
     shipping officers approved—Power of masters—Scheme for training
     boys for sea—Marine Insurances—Report as a whole most valuable.


[Sidenote: Recent legislation relating to the loss of life and property
at sea in British vessels.]

[Sidenote: Committee on shipwrecks of 1836.]

Great Britain having by her example shown to other nations the
advantages to be derived from free navigation and unfettered commerce,
and having relieved her shipowners from nearly all the burdens of which
protection was the origin, directed her attention in a more special
manner than had hitherto been done to the safety of life and property
at sea. No doubt she had been ever mindful of her seamen and, from the
earliest records of her history, a just pride has been felt in those
who protect her sea-girt homes; but it is only in recent years that
any organised system has been adopted to reduce the disasters of a
naturally hazardous profession, or that the Legislature has seriously
devoted itself to the provision of measures whereby the proverbial
dangers of the sea may be lessened. Very little attention, indeed, had
been paid to this important subject until 1836, when a Committee of the
House of Commons was appointed to inquire into shipwrecks, the result
being that certain facts were, for the first time, brought prominently
under public notice in a practical manner. These facts are interesting
and instructive, especially when viewed by the light of subsequent
experience.

There being then, however, no reliable statistics of the extent of
the loss of life and property at sea, the Committee were obliged to
depend on information from other than official sources; hence, it was
only from the records of Lloyd’s, supplemented by estimates of their
own, that they were able to compare the casualties of 1816-18 with
those of 1833-35, the three years previous to their inquiry. Nor was
this comparison complete. To make it so, it would have been necessary
to compare, not merely the actual amounts of loss at the two periods,
but the proportion the amounts bore relatively to the amount of life
and property exposed to danger. There were, however, then no means
of obtaining these with accuracy, as the returns were imperfect as
regards the number of vessels, their sizes, and the number of persons
they carried, an imperfection arising, in a great measure, from the
fact that many vessels, which in 1816 had ceased to exist, were still
retained on the registry. Though the entries and clearances of British
ships engaged in trade between the United Kingdom and her colonies, and
foreign countries, could at both periods be obtained with accuracy,
there were no certain returns of the amount of tonnage and of the
number of men engaged in the Coasting trade, as the Customs did not
take any notice of vessels sailing in ballast or with cargoes of a
certain description. Nor do we even now know the actual amount of the
shipping and men engaged in this particular trade with anything like
perfect accuracy.

[Sidenote: Estimated loss of life at sea between 1818 and 1836.]

Thus it was impossible to arrive at a correct comparative estimate of
the increase, or otherwise, of the loss of life at sea at any given
periods previous to 1835. I may, however, state that the Committee,
with the best information they could obtain, arrived at the conclusion
that while the loss of life for the three years previous to 1818 had
averaged 763 persons per annum, it had increased to 894 per annum
for the three years previous to 1835, though the tonnage of vessels
belonging to the United Kingdom was actually less at the latter than it
had been at the former period.[239]

The amount of tonnage, however, in itself, even when correct, is
an imperfect criterion; indeed, to obtain anything like accuracy
we ought to have before us, not merely the number of entries and
clearances,[240] but the actual number of persons conveyed by sea; for,
without such data, we cannot hope to ascertain the comparative loss of
life.

[Sidenote: Recommendations of the Committee.]

The Committee of 1836 had, nevertheless, sufficient information before
them to arrive at certain sound conclusions; the more important
of these being that the increase of disasters at sea arose, in a
great measure, from the imperfect classification of ships which had
existed up to 1834 (when the improved Society of Lloyd’s Register was
instituted) depending, as it had, almost exclusively on the age of
the vessel; from the bad forms of vessels, arising from the defective
system of admeasurement for tonnage dues, and from the shallow harbours
where ships lay aground and were strained. The Committee likewise
attributed the losses to the incompetency of masters and officers,
and to their habits of intemperance, as well as to that of the crews;
to the system of marine insurance; to the want of harbours of refuge;
to the imperfection of charts;[241] and, strange to add, to the
“competition with foreign shipowners, who, from the many advantages
enjoyed by them in the superior cheapness of their materials for
building, equipping, and provisioning their vessels, and in the lower
rate of wages paid to their crews, were enabled to realise profits on
terms of freight which would not even cover the expenses of British
ships.”

[Sidenote: Committee of 1843—loss of lives and ships at that period.]

The next Committee appointed to inquire into shipwrecks commenced their
investigation in 1843, and the returns made up from the evidence before
them show that in the previous three years the annual average loss of
vessels was 611, of 128,678 tons, and 766 lives, out of 22,977 ships,
of 2,908,737 tons belonging to the United Kingdom, and of 37,380 of
such ships, of 6,730,242 tons entered and cleared in the foreign trade
of this country, so that, while the intercourse with other countries
had very materially increased, the loss of life had been only a
fraction more than it was in the three years previously to 1818.

[Sidenote: First official return of wrecks, 1856.]

But as we have no accurate and continuous official record, even of the
wrecks happening on our own coasts, till 1856, when the Board of Trade
for the first time published its return, and, as there is no official
record of the wrecks of British ships in other parts of the world until
1865, little reliance, beyond an approximate comparison, can be placed
on the full extent of the casualties at sea till that period. In some
measure they were guess work, and, as numerous vessels were no doubt
lost of which no record of any kind had been kept until about the year
1836, the probabilities are that the loss of life was greater than the
estimates of it made out by the Committees of 1836 or even of 1843.

[Sidenote: Loss of life and ships, 1862]

We have, however, a return[242] for the three years previously to
1863 much more complete and accurate than any earlier ones, on which
reliance may be placed, showing that, on an average in each of these
years, 1004 ships, of 251,000 tons, belonging to the _British
Empire_, and 1316 lives were lost. The average number of ships on
the register in these years belonging to the _whole Empire_ was
38,932, of 5,882,565 tons, and the British ships entered and cleared
in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom were 56,997, of 15,094,105
tons.

[Sidenote: and 1873.]

[Sidenote: Percentage of loss of life, 1833 to 1873.]

The last return,[243] made for 1871-3 inclusive shows that the average
number of ships lost in each of these three years was 1095, of 319,790
tons, and of lives was 1952; the number of ships belonging to the
British Empire being then 37,086, of 7,168,618 tons, and the entries
and clearances of vessels engaged in the foreign trade of the United
Kingdom being 73,783 vessels, of 27,275,339 tons. No doubt this return
shows a sacrifice of life which every humane or right-minded person
must wish to mitigate, as to desire to save life has now happily
become one of the highest objects of ambition among nations who are
truly civilised, but, considering the number of vessels afloat, and
the enormous increase in the entries and clearances, it, at the same
time, shows a very considerable comparative reduction on the losses of
previous years so far as they can be ascertained or estimated, more
especially when we consider that previous returns included only the
vessels belonging to the United Kingdom, whereas the later ones embrace
the tonnage of the whole of the British Empire then greatly increased,
and that, too, by steam vessels, increasing the risk of disaster to a
serious extent by the rapidity of their movements.

[Sidenote: Further recommendations.]

But to this important question I shall more fully refer hereafter. In
the meantime I may state that, among the various other recommendations
offered by the Committee of 1836, may be mentioned the formation of a
Mercantile Marine Board; the compilation and consolidation of a Code
of Mercantile Marine Laws; the improved classification of ships;
nautical schools; courts of inquiry into shipwrecks; tribunals for the
settlement of disputes; savings-banks for seamen, and asylums for them
in old age or when unfit for duty; and, above all, “discouragement of
drinking on board,” while attention was called “to the vast superiority
in officers, crews, and equipments, and to the consequent superior
success and growth of American shipping.”

To remedy many of these evils various Acts of Parliament were passed,
to most of which I have already referred, and, presently, I shall
refer at length to the great changes for the better made since then in
the classification of our ships by Lloyd’s Register and other private
associations; but some years elapsed before the more important of these
recommendations were carried into effect. In the meantime, the new
organisation in connection with the classification of ships, which had
been established in 1834, stirred up, no doubt, by the report of the
Committee, was laying the foundation for that career of success which
has since attended its efforts. Other similar associations followed;
one in Liverpool, which was afterwards amalgamated with Lloyd’s
Register, and the _Veritas_, a foreign association, still carrying
on its useful work in this country, though to a limited extent, but
largely in Canada, as well as on the Continent and in the United States
of America.

The Committee of 1843, confirming the recommendations of its
predecessor in 1836, added to them the survey of passenger ships;
amendments in the law of pilotage, the establishment of signals
by sound at the principal lighthouses, and of rocket and mortar
apparatuses for the saving of life on different parts of the coast;
the supply of life-buoys and belts in case of shipwreck; the carrying
of life-boats in all passenger vessels; a revision of the laws and
administration for the protection from plunder of wrecked property;
international regulations for vessels meeting at sea, and a code
of laws for the guidance and protection of seamen. All of these
recommendations, and many others for the protection of life and
property at sea, have since been carried into effect.

[Sidenote: Various laws for the protection of seamen, 1846 to 1854.]

In 1846, and again in 1848, further Acts were passed having the same
laudable object in view, and these, with all the other Acts, including
the important Act of 1850, to which I have already referred at
length,[244] were carefully revised and improved by the great Act of
1854, and by subsequent measures. Nor have the health and interests of
seamen, as well as the preservation of their lives from shipwreck, been
overlooked in this mass of legislation. In 1835, a register office for
seamen and apprentices was established, but the system, not answering
the objects in view, was abolished in 1853. By the Acts of 1844[245]
and 1845[246] seamen were enabled to recover their wages summarily, and
they were, for the first time, protected from imposition at the hands
of crimps. By these laws, all merchant ships were required to carry a
sufficient supply of medicine, as also of lime-juice for the use of the
crew; and, by the Act of 1854, the proceedings for the recovery of
wages were made still more summary, so that, under our present maritime
laws, seamen have special remedies for the recovery of their wages,
together with a lien on the ship not granted to any other class of
the community. Beyond the advantages of savings-banks and money-order
offices, specially for their use, a system has been established,
through the medium of the shipping offices and the consulates abroad,
under which, seamen, when paid off, can remit their wages without
expense to their relatives at any port in the United Kingdom.[247]

[Sidenote: Agitation about “unseaworthy ships,” 1855.]

[Sidenote: Further provisions for the benefit of seamen,]

In 1855, a question arose very similar to that which has recently
arisen regarding “unseaworthy ships,” as to whether seamen could be
compelled to go to sea in them. The opinion of the law-officers of the
Crown taken by the Board of Trade was given in favour of the seaman’s
right to refuse to sail in such vessels, and this opinion, having been
sent to the magistrates at the seaports, has ever since been acted
on, though it has been frequently abused by unprincipled seamen, who
have alleged unseaworthiness as an excuse for being relieved from
their engagements, more especially in cases where they have received
a payment of wages in advance, or where they have thought they could
improve their position. Nor did the efforts of the Board of Trade,
the permanent officers of which have been frequently charged with
neglecting the interests of seamen, here end. In 1864, that Board,
aware of the difficulty seamen accused of desertion might have in
proving unseaworthiness, recommended the Home Office to inform the
magistrates that, in all such cases, their surveyors would be at the
disposal of the magisterial bench for the purposes of survey, so that
seamen might have, _at the expense of the community_, what no
other class is allowed, easy and ready means of inquiring into their
complaints by officers remunerated by the Crown, and, consequently, an
economical and prompt dispensation of justice.

[Sidenote: 1867,]

In 1867, another Act was passed, specially for the benefit of seamen,
known as the Health Act,[248] which made further provision for the
inspection and safe custody of lime-juice or other anti-scorbutics,
and for serving these out in proper quantities and with regularity to
the crews of merchant ships. Provision was also made in this Bill,
compelling shipowners to bear all expenses connected with a seaman’s
illness, when not brought about by his own fault or misconduct, and for
securing him increased and improved accommodation on board ship.

[Sidenote: 1869, 1870.]

Nor did the good intention of the Government and its regard for the
interests of seamen end even here. In the Merchant Shipping Code
Consolidation Bill,[249] first introduced on the 9th August, 1869, by
Mr. Lefevre, on behalf of Government, there is a provision (Clause 278)
enabling seamen, charged with desertion or other crimes, to demand and
obtain an official survey of the ship from which they have thought
it expedient to quit without leave!—a provision so very liberal in
their favour as to resemble, on the part of the Government, almost
encouragement of the offence of desertion. In this Bill we have also
a clause (334) which, for the first time in our legislation, requires
every shipmaster to make an official record of the draught of water
of the vessel under his charge when leaving port. And the Bill, when
again introduced in 1870, repeated, with modifications still further
in favour of seamen charged with desertion, their power to demand
“impartial survey;” while it enables the officers of the Board of Trade
to take and record the draught of water of any sea-going ship, and
makes it a misdemeanour on the part of any shipowner who sends his ship
to sea in an unseaworthy state, for which he may be _criminally_
punished.

[Sidenote: Mr. Samuel Plimsoll, M.P.]

[Sidenote: His first resolution, 1870.]

It was in the Session of 1870 that Mr. Plimsoll[250] first submitted
his views to Parliament respecting the loss of life and property at
sea, by moving a resolution calling in general terms for legislation on
this subject, as if no legislation had, up to that period, been even
attempted, still more carried out. I cannot but commend the laudable
objects he evidently had in view, but, on that occasion, they were,
so far as I can judge from the Reports of ‘Hansard,’ somewhat vaguely
expressed. Nor did he even then mention (as if ignoring or unaware of
the fact) that, in that very Session, Government had introduced the
stringent Bill to which I have just referred respecting unseaworthy
ships. His resolution, requiring a _compulsory_ load-line and the
survey of all ships, was withdrawn.

The Government, however, spared no exertion to perfect the Shipping
Code, which had twice been submitted to the consideration of
Parliament; and having, during the recess, forwarded copies of it for
approval and amendment to various Shipping and Seamen’s Associations
throughout the kingdom, they again introduced it on the opening of
the Session of 1871,[251] accompanied by a memorandum,[252] calling
attention to the alterations which had been made in the existing laws.
The Bill, as re-introduced in 1871, besides providing for the transfer
of the supervision of emigrant ships to the Board of Trade, which was
carried out in the following year, contained clauses for the compulsory
marking the draught of water on the stem and stern of every ship,
for recording the draught, for making it a crime to send unseaworthy
vessels to sea, and for enabling seamen, charged with desertion, to
obtain, with even greater facility than they had hitherto done, a
survey of the ships in which they had engaged to serve. Indeed, it
went still further, and, for the first time, gave the Board of Trade
alone the power of preventing any ship from proceeding to sea if, in
the opinion of its officers, there were defects in her hull liable to
render her unseaworthy: a further provision was very properly added to
prevent an owner changing the name of his ship without the consent of
the Board of Trade.

[Sidenote: Introduces a Bill, 1871.]

[Sidenote: Government measure of that year.]

But in that year, 1871, Mr. Plimsoll, not satisfied with the course
of legislation, introduced a Bill having the same objects in view
as his resolution of the previous Session, which, however, was also
withdrawn, Government agreeing to introduce a separate Bill, as they
had been unable to pass their Merchant Shipping Code Bill, containing
the clauses of the larger measure relating to draught of water and
surveys. Accordingly, before the close of the Session a short Bill was
introduced and passed[253] with these provisions, but with very little
discussion, on account of the lateness of the Session. In this Bill the
clause giving seamen charged with desertion a right to a survey, was
justly modified by confining the right to cases where the complaint
of unseaworthiness is made by one-fourth of the crew; or if they
exceed twenty by not less than five, and to cases where a complaint of
unseaworthiness had been made by them before quitting the ship. The
power of ordering a survey was also given to naval courts abroad.

[Sidenote: Mr. Plimsoll publishes a book, ‘Our Seamen,’ 1873.]

Although these amendments had, as I have shown, been for some years
contemplated by Government, and had been, in fact, submitted for the
consideration of Parliament before Mr. Plimsoll expressed any opinion
on the subject, they did not satisfy his demands; and in order that his
views might become more extensively known, he published in January,
1873, a curious book.[254] It is of that sensational class which
at present, either in the shape of novels or other works of a more
pretentious character, evidently commands a large circulation among
the light-reading public. But, besides its sensational character,
it contains a great deal of information new to the ordinary reader,
who, if he does not understand its technicalities, which Mr. Plimsoll
himself does not seem to have very well understood, will be struck by
its illustrations of decayed timbers, worm-eaten planks, and corroded
bolts. It begins with a facsimile of a policy of insurance with the
names and amount of risk attached, and the underwriters’ “slip” on
which the policy was based, with the signatures crossed out as they
were subscribed to the policy. His object in giving the numerous
names in detail, and the amount of the liability of each, was, as he
states, “in order to show how the responsibility is so divided and
spread as to leave no one individual a risk large enough to be worth
fighting to escape, even if there were adequate grounds for disputing
the subsequent claim,” and, from these premises, he arrives at the
conclusion that the interest of each underwriter is so small, that
where a claim is made, it is not sufficient “to induce any one to fight
a lawsuit in order to escape it,” even when there is “more than a
suspicion of its injustice.”

Unfortunately his statement, on this point, is at variance with fact;
for, though the risk of each individual may be small, their interest,
as a body, in resisting unjust claims, and resisting them frequently
in the most strenuous manner, is too great to allow such claims to
be settled unquestioned. Mr. Plimsoll might not, however, have been
aware that the Underwriters of Lloyd’s are thoroughly organised for
the purpose of grappling with such matters, having their agents at all
the principal seaports of the world, with every facility for readily
obtaining information respecting the cause of losses, and the nature
and character of the claims made upon them; nor of the important fact
that they not merely resist claims, as may be frequently seen in
our courts of law, but are occasionally prosecutors in the case of
fraudulent losses. So that it is altogether a mistake to describe the
Underwriters of Lloyd’s, much less of the marine insurance companies,
as a weak body of men, whom a shipowner can “bully” into an unjust
settlement.[255] The photographs he supplied were, however, so curious
in themselves, and so novel to the public, generally, and especially
to many members of the House of Commons, and his statements, though
sometimes hap-hazard, were given with such evidently honest intentions,
that his book attracted unusual notice.

But, however well-disposed the House of Commons may have been to
listen to him, and to the recommendations in his book, the Bill he
introduced for its consideration could not possibly be entertained with
any regard to the great maritime interests of this country, nor could
they be adopted without full inquiry; indeed, they were little short
of a transfer of the construction and management of the whole of the
shipping of Great Britain from the owners to some department of the
Government, which was to survey every ship built, and every ship sent
to sea.

From his own showing, no such extraordinary and sweeping measure was
necessary, for he admits, in a curious and very incidental manner,
that only a very small proportion of the shipowners of this country
require to be thus controlled; indeed he states,[256] “I have heard one
shipowner say that, if a small number of well-known shipowners were put
aboard one of their own vessels when she was ready for sea, we should,
in the event of bad weather, see that with them had disappeared from
our annals nine-tenths of the losses we all deplore!”

[Sidenote: An extension of the principle applied to testing of chain
cables strongly urged.]

But Mr. Plimsoll, in his general statements, only repeated, though in
a more sensational and striking manner, arguments which have for years
been used in the House of Commons. There has long been a constant cry
from a certain portion of the public for Government interference and
control; and in Parliament there are always to be found well-meaning
representatives of the people, who think that every evil in this wicked
world can be remedied by legislative enactments, or Crown supervision.
I may mention one instance out of many, viz.: the Act for testing chain
cables and anchors, to which I have already referred,[257] which was
forced upon the Board of Trade by the House of Commons. Returns, I am
aware, can be produced to show that since this Testing Act came into
operation, nine or ten years ago, there have been fewer disasters than
before, as the result of inferior ground tackle. But figures can be
arranged to prove almost anything; and I shall not stop to examine
those which have been produced to prove that the chain and anchor
manufacturers of this country required to be placed under the immediate
control of the Board of Trade. It will be a dark day for the mechanics
of Great Britain when this system prevails, and we may then abandon all
hope of ever becoming, what we have long aimed to be, the workshop of
the world. But what I cannot too strongly condemn is, the principle of
appointing Government officials—too frequently underpaid—to superintend
or inspect the work of the manufacturer and to regulate the standard
of merit. If a manufacturer can produce an article which, by some
means or other, is able to pass inspection, it is a matter, now, of
far less consequence than formerly to make it of the best description,
as, in the case of accident, he screens himself behind the official
certificate of its merit. Besides, the test Government, originally,
adopted too often destroyed in a great measure the elasticity of chain
cables[258]—a quality of the utmost importance to a ship riding at
anchor in a heavy sea-way. I quite admit that many vessels and too
many lives have been lost through inferior anchors and cables; but
a still larger number of vessels have been sacrificed by defective
construction, decayed timbers, inferior spars, ropes, and sails, or
insufficient stores; and, if the principle of Government interference
is correct in the one case, it ought to be extended to the others.

But this system of Government supervision would not end here. An
inspection of every chain and anchor manufactory falls far short of
the demands of thousands of well-meaning people, who wish to see some
potent Board of Trade testing-machines permanently established in
every dockyard in the kingdom, as if our shipbuilders knew nothing
whatever about the business, or had all arrived at the conclusion that
honesty was no longer the best policy, and that the only sure road to
riches was to cheat their customers. Nor would even that extension
of Government control satisfy them. An estimable friend of mine, a
Vice-Admiral in H.M.’s service and a man of learning and of great
practical knowledge, asks me in a note I received from him not long
since—

     “Should there not be some more stringent provisions with respect
     to the inspection of sailing vessels? It is an old proverb, ‘Who
     ever saw a dead donkey?’ But who ever saw an old sailing-ship
     broken up? I am inclined to think that it is more to the interest
     of small owners to let an old tub go on shore than to bring her
     safe into port. This works two evils:—1, the danger to human life;
     2, the greater rate of insurance on honest owners to make up an
     average for the dishonest. Should there not be a Board of Trade
     inspection as to seaworthiness: 1, of every ship once a year; 2,
     of every ship absent from Great Britain or Ireland over a year
     continuously, on her return; 3, of every ship where it appears, on
     her arrival in port, that she had been on shore or had suffered
     from heavy weather?”

Now there is no doubt that the evils of which my friend complains do
exist, and the remedy he proposes has been advocated by many persons
besides himself. But would Government inspection, even if practicable,
remove or materially tend to mitigate the evil? A very large proportion
of the vessels owned in the United Kingdom are now classed either
at Lloyd’s or elsewhere, and are periodically inspected; and to the
possibility of extending this system, a much more feasible one than any
extension of the principle of Government supervision, I shall hereafter
refer. Unless a vessel is classed, an underwriter, as a rule, will
not take a risk on her, and, unless she is fully insured, it is not
the interest of the owner to lose her. In the case of clubs or mutual
associations, it would be impossible to have a better watch kept on the
vessels admitted, as each member and each person connected with these
associations adopts, for his own interest, if for no higher motive,
every possible precaution, as, in the event of loss, he becomes a
sufferer.

However great the evil, and however lamentable the losses annually
occurring on our shores, any very material extension of the legislation
now in force, can do little to remedy them. The remedy is in the
hands of those persons who are most deeply interested, in that they
are certain to become the heaviest sufferers from every loss. It is
true that no ship ought to be allowed to proceed to sea which is
unseaworthy, but it is the business of all insurance associations to
see that the vessels they insure are seaworthy; and no punishment
Government could inflict for neglect, would be heavier than that which
the owner of an uninsured ship sustains when she is lost, or than that
which falls on members of clubs, who admit worthless vessels to their
mutual-insurance associations. My experience (and it is not a short
one now) teaches me that nearly all legislation in this direction, is
unsound in principle; and, as a rule, pernicious in practice. I think,
for instance, that we have already erred in the attempt before noticed
to measure the standard of merit in the case of anchors and chains,
although we may have improved in the mode of testing them.

[Sidenote: Mr. Plimsoll moves an Address for a Commission of Inquiry,
which was unanimously granted.]

[Sidenote: Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships, 1873-4.]

However, the House of Commons, ever ready to listen to the appeals of
humanity, and with the most laudable desire to do what it could to save
life and to mitigate the disasters incidental to seafaring pursuits,
was fairly disposed to legislate even further in this direction, should
it really appear that fresh legislation was necessary; hence, accepting
in Mr. Plimsoll an earnest, if not a wise counsellor, of measures
for the grandest of all objects—the saving of human life—the House,
stimulated by his recent work, unanimously approved of his address
to Her Majesty, who was graciously pleased not merely to grant the
Commission he had prayed for, but to place upon it “her most dear son
and counsellor Alfred Ernest Albert, Duke of Edinburgh,” who, himself
a sailor, was fully competent to understand the nature of the inquiry,
and had a fellow-feeling for the sailors of all classes, on whose
behalf the appeal was made.

[Sidenote: Its members.]

No Commission in our time has consisted of more able and impartial
members. Besides His Royal Highness, it had as chairman the Duke of
Somerset, a nobleman of shrewd sense and of very sound judgment,
who had been First Lord of the Admiralty; Mr. Liddell (now Lord
Eslington), who represented a large maritime constituency, and had
for years directed his attention with unwearied zeal to all seafaring
questions; Mr. Milner Gibson, who had filled the office of President of
the Board of Trade; Sir James Hope, an Admiral of great experience; Mr.
Rothery, the Registrar of the Admiralty Court; Mr. Cohen, a well-known
barrister-at-law; Mr. Denny, an eminent shipbuilder; Mr. George Duncan,
an experienced Shipowner, and a member of the Committee of Lloyd’s
Register; Mr. Edgell, of the Trinity House; and Mr. C. W. Merrifield,
F.R.S. and late Principal of the Royal School of Naval Architecture.

[Sidenote: Their order of reference]

By such a Commission the most searching inquiry was to be instituted
“with regard to the alleged unseaworthiness of British registered
ships, whether arising form overloading, deck-loading, defective
construction, form equipment, machinery, age, or improper stowage.”
The Commission was also instructed “to inquire into the present system
of marine insurance; the state of the law as to the liability of
shipowners for injury to those whom they employ, and also the alleged
practice of under-manning ships; they were likewise to suggest any
amendments of the law which might remedy or lessen such evils as may be
found to have arisen from the matters aforesaid.”

A careful analysis of Mr. Plimsoll’s statements showed that he
attributed the causes of shipwreck to unseaworthiness, owing to want
of repair; overloading, which includes the carriage of cargo on deck;
under-manning; bad stowage; inadequate engine power; over-insurance;
defective construction, and undue length; and, that a full half of the
losses arose from two of these causes, first, that “a great number
of ships are regularly sent to sea in such a rotten and otherwise
ill-provided state that they can only reach their destination through
fine weather;” and, secondly, that “a large number are so overloaded
that it is nearly impossible for them also to reach their destination
if the voyage is at all rough.”

As I have already endeavoured to show, the “Merchant Shipping
Consolidated Act” of 1854, with its 548 clauses, was passed expressly
for the purpose of remedying by law, as far as practicable, existing
evils, and the amended Acts of 1855, 1862, 1871, and 1873 had the
same object in view; so that there was in force, at the time when the
Commission commenced its inquiry, a mass of legislation, which, in
itself, ought to have been amply sufficient to prevent and punish the
offences alleged to be committed. Indeed, conscientious Shipowners have
been heard to say that they were appalled at the numerous instances
in which they had found themselves law breakers, from the simple
impossibility of bearing in mind, owing to the number of Acts in force,
their legal duties. Yet, if Mr. Plimsoll’s recommendations had been
carried into effect, the manifold legislation, then in force, would
have been very much increased.

[Sidenote: and mode of thorough investigation.]

Happily, however, the Commission saw, after thoroughly examining the
whole subject, that it was not by increase of legislation, that such
evils could be remedied, but by a more effectual application of the
law as it then stood. In their reports[259] they express an opinion,
that much misapprehension appears to exist about what is meant by
unseaworthiness, so, before offering any recommendation with the view
of preserving human life at sea, they prefaced their observations
with a few practical and sensible remarks on what constitutes
unseaworthiness.

The safety of a ship at sea, they remark, with great force, cannot be
secured by any one precaution or set of precautions, but requires the
unceasing application of skill, care, and vigilance, from her first
design to her unloading at the port of destination. To be seaworthy,
she must be well designed, well constructed, well equipped, well
stowed, and, above all, well manned and well navigated; otherwise, “all
precautions as to her construction and her stowage will be unavailing.”
While public opinion had been abundantly directed to these precautions,
they considered that other sources of danger had been altogether
unnoticed, and they showed, from a summary of official inquiries, that
from the year 1856 to 1872, inclusive, while only 60 ships were known
to have been lost from defects in the vessels or their stowage, no less
than 711 were lost from neglect and bad navigation.

[Sidenote: Their reports.]

As these returns[260] too clearly showed, that by far the largest
proportion of losses and other casualties were due to preventible
causes, other than faulty construction, insufficient repair, or
overloading, the Commissioners directed their attention to a rigid
examination of these causes and to the most effectual means of finding
a remedy for the evil. With regard to the vexed question of a fixed
load-line, which Mr. Plimsoll had recommended as a means of lessening,
if not of removing altogether, the losses occasioned by overloading,
they were unable to recommend any enactment for establishing a fixed
line, founded on the proportion of freeboard to the depth of the hold
of the vessel, remarking that the information they had obtained led
“to the conclusion that the settlement of a load-line should be mainly
guided by the consideration of the reserved buoyancy, that is to say,
of the proportion which the capacity of the water-tight and solidly
constructed part of the ship which is above water bears to the capacity
of the part immersed.”

[Sidenote: Load-line.]

Analysing various schemes prepared for their consideration, they
remarked that the rough rule of three inches of freeboard to every
foot of hold, hitherto considered as the measure of safety, while
practically convenient, was not adapted for regulating the loading of
all vessels, and, consequently, could not be recommended as a law to be
enforced. The model of the ship, the character of her cargo, the method
in which it is stowed, the nature and length of the proposed voyage,
and the season of the year when engaged, were all matters requiring
consideration, and which it would be quite impossible to embrace by any
fixed rule applicable to every ship, whatever might be her form or the
nature of her employment. Indeed, they remark with great force, “These
circumstances must continually vary, and, under a charter, this mode of
marking would have the dangerous tendency of inducing the charterer to
insist on the vessels being laden up to the line of deepest immersion,
and thus imperilling the safety of the ship; while the suggestion, from
various instances, that there should be an elasticity in the law to be
left to the discretion of the surveyor only shows the inexpediency of
legislating either to secure freeboard in proportion to the depth of
hold, or to provide some fixed percentage of spare buoyancy in every
description of vessel.”

Under all these circumstances, the Commission considered it desirable
to leave the discretion as to the proper loading of his ship to the
Shipowner himself, holding him responsible, as the law has ever done,
for sending his ship to sea in an unseaworthy condition, instead of
lessening his responsibility by transferring a duty, which properly
rests on himself, to any official surveyor. But to render the
responsibility of the Shipowner more complete, they recommended that
a vertical scale of feet should be marked on each side of the vessel,
and that, immediately before the time of her leaving or starting on
her voyage, this measure should be entered in her log-book and should,
wherever practicable, be left with the officer of Customs or with the
British Consul, by whom the draught of water should also be recorded.

[Sidenote: Deck-loads.]

Having offered a few suggestions with regard to deck loads and other
matters of minor importance, the Commissioners next investigated with
great care the practicability of instituting a survey of all British
merchant ships. In their opinion, the policy of having a Government
survey for the purpose of securing the seaworthiness of ships was
more than questionable. Any such measure, while tending to remove
responsibility from those on whom it ought to rest, would render
Government nominally responsible for the form, the materials, and the
whole construction of our merchant ships, and, consequently, could not
be seriously entertained.

[Sidenote: Government survey.]

As there is now an official survey of emigrant and passenger ships, a
few witnesses proposed that a similar survey should be extended to all
merchant vessels. Others went so far as to recommend that the Board
of Trade, already overburdened with work, should also superintend the
construction, the periodical inspection, the repair, and the loading of
the vessels. But the Commissioners very properly repudiated all such
recommendations.

There are great complaints, the Commissioners remark, against the
interference of Government, whose surveyors are now not unfrequently
accused of forcing on Shipowners and marine engineers special views
of their own which are not always in accordance with the best
judgment of the two professions, and that to extend the power of such
men would produce “mischievous consequences to the future progress
of shipbuilding, and would be actually calamitous.” “Ships,” they
add, “would be built and repaired so as to pass the examination of
the official surveyor, and any additional outlay beyond what was
indispensable to secure a certificate would be rejected as useless.
Under the present enactments, Shipowners justly complain that their
business is seriously inconvenienced, and that foreign ships are
already gaining the trade which the British Shipowners are being
compelled to relinquish.”[261]

[Sidenote: Its extension undesirable.]

By the Merchant Shipping Act of 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. cap. 85), the Board
of Trade are empowered, at their discretion, to detain any British
vessel “which they have reason to believe is by the defective condition
of her hull, equipment, or machinery, or by reason of overloading or
improper loading, unfit to proceed to sea without serious danger to
human life.” By this Act, power is also given to the Board of Trade to
detain any ship for the purpose of survey, to impose conditions as to
her repair, and to enforce alterations in loading. The Commissioners
do not consider it necessary or desirable to extend these already
stringent and arbitrary powers, in order to prevent unseaworthy vessels
from leaving any port in the United Kingdom. On the contrary, they
suggest certain modifications of those powers, so as to make _their
action more prompt than it is at present_, in which all differences
must be referred to the Board of Trade in the case of detention, the
owner having power of appeal in England to any court having Admiralty
jurisdiction, and in Scotland to the Sheriffs’ Court; they further
recommend that the master or owner of the vessel thus detained may be
permitted to appeal to the shipping master or collector of customs,
who should be vested with authority, when necessary, to appoint two or
more competent shipmasters, to constitute a court whose decision should
be final.[262] They at the same time express the hope, that, when
these modifications are adopted, “the detention of vessels notoriously
overladen or otherwise unseaworthy will gradually compel negligent
Shipowners to be more attentive or to abandon the trade; worthless
ships will be broken up, and the eventual weeding out of such ships
will not only add to the safety of a seafaring life, but will be a
benefit to the careful Shipowner, who will find his business increase,
while the premium to be paid for insurance will be reduced.”

[Sidenote: Shipowners already harassed by over-legislation.]

Parliament having, for many years, been engaged in attempting to
regulate minute details about shipping, it is not surprising that
Shipowners should have complained of being harassed in their business
by well-intended but ill-contrived legislation, and that they should,
when further legislation of this sort was injudiciously proposed,
have resisted it to the utmost of their power. Indeed, the Board of
Trade itself had, for some time, seen the absurdity as well as the
danger of a public department, imperfectly acquainted with the science
of shipbuilding and with the interests of the commercial marine,
attempting to dictate to shipbuilders and owners of vast experience the
best mode of conducting their business; and, in the evidence before the
Commission, Mr. Gray, Assistant-Secretary Marine Department, admitted
that many enactments designed to secure safety of life at sea had been
mischievous, and ought to be modified or repealed.

For instance, the obligation by the Merchant Shipping Act of 1844 to
carry a certain number of boats in proportion to a ship’s tonnage,
was found to be impracticable, and, consequently, the Board of Trade,
by the amended Act of 1873, took upon itself a discretionary power in
this matter. But discretionary powers in this case, as in many other
instances, did not work well in practice; surveyors differed in their
views as to the number of boats necessary, and the number of boats
sanctioned at one port was frequently disallowed at another. Similar
objections arose in the case of lights, and, as no coloured lamps
could be found on trial until very recently, equal to the requirements
of the Statute, Shipowners were subjected to similar capricious
decisions of surveyors.

[Sidenote: Mode of inquiry into losses at sea]

It would weary my readers were I to enter into all these details, such
as bulkheads, sea-cocks, hatchways, stoke-holes, compasses, safety
valves, and innumerable other matters which Government has attempted
to regulate by Act of Parliament, as I have, already, in more than one
instance, alluded to these matters during the course of this work. But
I must not omit directing attention to the large amount of evidence
received regarding the system of inquiring into losses and casualties
at sea, and to the powers given to the Board of Trade, by the Act of
1854, to institute such inquiries. It would appear from this evidence
that the officers of the Board of Trade and the solicitors who act
for it, as well as the Shipowners, have all a serious objection to
the present mode of conducting such inquiries, and that the tribunal
constituted by the Act does not command general confidence, while the
mode of procedure is dilatory and expensive (perhaps, necessarily so,
where much evidence has to be collected), and the power of the court is
so ill-defined that, in too many cases, it cannot be enforced.

The inquiry frequently assumes the shape of a criminal proceeding
against the captain, rather than of a careful investigation into the
cause of disaster, the chief point at issue being whether the captain
is to be acquitted, or punished by having his certificate cancelled or
suspended; and, inasmuch as he is on his trial, he may if he pleases
volunteer a statement, but cannot be examined. Nor has the court any
power over the Shipowner, who, however culpable, is altogether beyond
its jurisdiction.

[Sidenote: examined and condemned.]

The Commissioners recommended that these inquiries, made purely in the
public interest with a view to the preservation of human life, should
be conducted in such a manner as would best disclose the nature and
cause of the disaster, whether, for instance, this was owing to the
faulty construction of the vessel, to bad stowage, to circumstances
connected with the navigation, to the incompetency of officers, or to
the neglect and misconduct of the master or crew.

[Sidenote: Recommendations.]

With this object in view, they recommended that the preliminary
inquiry now made by the receiver of wrecks should be limited in the
first place to such a narrative statement as would enable the Board of
Trade, with the aid of their legal advisers, to decide on the propriety
of an official inquiry, and that, if such were found necessary,
there should be a complete severance between that inquiry and any
proceedings of a penal character, power being reserved to the Board
of Trade to prosecute the Shipowner or to proceed criminally against
the master, mate, or any member of the crew whose neglect of duty
may have occasioned the disaster. They further suggest that the 11th
Section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1871, “should be amended and be
made expressly to extend to the master of the vessel; for it is very
important to avoid any doubt that the master who, without justifiable
excuse, leaves port with his vessel in an unseaworthy condition,
renders himself amenable to the criminal law.”[263]

The Commissioners very properly attached great importance to these
inquiries, as affording the best means of ascertaining on whom the
culpability rests; hence, they, incidentally, remark that, in comparing
the accidents occurring at sea with those taking place on land,
especially on railways, they were struck by the fact that, whereas,
in the latter case, it is usual to prosecute those servants whose
negligence has occasioned loss of life, there was scarcely a single
instance of the prosecution of a master or mate, or of a man on the
look-out or at the helm of a vessel, although cases have, undoubtedly,
been numerous in which vessels have been lost either by the negligence
of the master or of the crew.

They further recommend that the present system under which the
certificate of a master or other officer is suspended, very frequently
only for an error of judgment, should be entirely discontinued, and
that neither the Court of Inquiry nor the Board of Trade should have
the power of dealing with such certificates; but that, in cases to be
provided for by express enactment, the tribunal alone before which
the officer is tried should have the power of cancelling either all
his certificates, or, at its discretion, his higher certificates,
leaving him in these cases the chance of finding employment in a lower
grade.[264]

[Sidenote: Examination of masters and mates, shipping offices, &c.,
&c., approved.]

The examination of masters and mates, the regulation of space for
crews, the insertion of the scale of food in the articles, the
means of remitting wages, the allotment note, the establishment of
seamen’s savings-banks, and various other important measures, all
indicating as they do the earnest wish of the Legislature to secure
the welfare of the sailor, received the most careful consideration by
the Commissioners, with a view to their amendment where necessary.
But, though some Shipowners were of opinion that the system did not
work well, and that they should be allowed to engage seamen, as other
employers engage their workmen, without the presence of a shipping
master, the Commissioners were of opinion that the shipping offices
had been of great value and ought to be maintained, tersely remarking
that if the captain of a merchant ship would take trouble to seek out
eligible men he could arrange to meet them at the shipping offices,
indeed, could engage them on board or elsewhere under a special
application.

The anxiety of Parliament to protect the seaman and, more especially,
to treat him as incompetent to take care of himself, and as requiring
the special interference of the Legislature, had exercised a
prejudicial influence on his character, tending to destroy, as it
did, the confidence which should ever exist between the master and
his crew, and had frequently promoted insubordination at a time when
good discipline was most essential to the safety of the vessel and
all on board; moreover, the rule requiring misconduct on the part of a
seaman to be entered in the log and immediately read to the offender
was a contrivance so ill-calculated to promote good behaviour that
masters frequently left offences unnoticed rather than resort to such
a proceeding; the Commissioners recommended, therefore, that this plan
should be materially modified (they do not state how), and that, to
secure fair treatment for the seaman, without destroying discipline
or weakening the authority of the master, should be the object of the
Legislature.

Indeed, when it is considered that the safety of a merchant ship, as
well as of the lives of the passengers and crew, are entrusted to the
skill and judgment of the master, it is essential that his authority
should be upheld, as any interference tending to impair his authority
and to lower his position adds seriously to the dangers of navigation.

[Sidenote: Power of masters.]

As a ship at sea is in herself a little kingdom, the power of the
master should be paramount and all but unquestioned; hence, while held
strictly amenable to the law for any acts of tyranny and cruelty,
the Legislature was bound to take care not to deprive him of the
control necessary for the security of his vessel. Now, as the law
as it at present stands, gives him very little power of punishing
a sailor for anything but mutinous conduct, and as the sailor may
be guilty with virtual impunity of many gross derelictions of duty,
such as drunkenness, sleeping on the look-out, disobedience, and
insubordination, the Commissioners recommend that some remedies, less
cumbrous than those now existing, should be applied and more direct
penalties inflicted.

[Sidenote: Scheme for training boys for the sea.]

As most of my readers are aware, a system of compulsory apprenticeship
was established in the year 1844, but was abolished by the repeal of
the Navigation Laws in 1849, and, though some Shipowners, subsequently,
desired to restore this system, the Government could not, with any
regard to principle, meet their views. The object of training boys
for the sea service having been to secure a supply of seamen for the
Royal Navy as well as for the Merchant Service, it would have been
unjust to compel Shipowners to train boys for the public service
after they had been deprived of the special privileges, supposed
to be advantageous, conferred on them by the Navigation Laws. But,
as an impression prevailed that our seamen had deteriorated, both
in number and quality, since the Compulsory Apprenticeship Act was
abolished—though I think this is to be attributed to other and
different causes—the Commissioners suggested a scheme to meet the
existing evil. They proposed that every vessel above 100 tons register,
whether propelled by sail or steam, should be required to carry a
certain number of apprentices in proportion to her tonnage, or to pay a
small contribution annually (such as 6_d._ per ton), to be applied
towards the maintenance of training ships in all the principal ports in
the kingdom. They recommended that the apprentices should be indentured
at or about the age of fourteen to the master of the training ship for
five years; that, after serving in this ship for one or two years, the
indenture should be transferred to any Shipowner who would be willing
to take the apprentice, and with whom the apprentice might be willing
to serve, until the completion of his term, and that these school ships
should be inspected and receive grants from the State according to
their efficiency.

No doubt the system of apprenticeship affords the best means of
training boys for a service in which fitness can only be acquired
during early life. But the success of the system of training boys for
the Royal Navy, recommended by the Commission on Manning the Navy in
1859 (of which I had the honour to be a member) is so far questionable
that I think some other mode of obtaining the requisite supply of
seamen for the navy might have been adopted which would have been more
efficacious and much _less expensive_.

For instance, “a self-supporting pension fund for the benefit of
seamen, as suggested by the Manning Commission of 1859 might,” they
said, “prove of great value in creating a tie to bind the British
seaman to the Merchant Service of his own country,”[265] and would, I
venture to suggest, if properly organised have been a more effective
mode of training and maintaining the requisite number of seamen for
the Royal Navy as well as the Merchant Service. The Commissioners were
also of opinion that, though not strictly within the scope of their
inquiry, a self-supporting pension fund “well deserved the attention of
Government.”[266]

The desertion of seamen in foreign ports was a matter which, in the
opinion of the Commissioners, “deserved the serious attention of the
Government, inasmuch as British ships are now often obliged to sail
on their return voyage, when heavily laden, with insufficient or
incompetent crews,” and they recommended entering into arrangements
with foreign governments for some international conventions which
should have for their object the prevention of desertion and the
enforcement of better discipline in our ships when abroad.

[Sidenote: Marine Insurance.]

The question also of marine insurance was one which received most
careful consideration. The Commissioners felt that while the system
protects Shipowners against losses which would otherwise be ruinous, it
tends to render them less careful in the management of their ships, and
they were, evidently, alive to the fact that it relieved the Shipowner
from all loss, when his ship foundered at sea, and frequently enabled
him to derive a pecuniary profit from shipwreck. But to this difficult
and important question I shall fully refer hereafter, as also to the
system of advance notes inquired into by the Commission.

[Sidenote: Report, as a whole, most valuable.]

Considered as a whole the Report of the Commissioners is one of the
ablest documents I have ever examined, and, from the mass of valuable
evidence they have taken, and the care with which it has been analysed,
most of their recommendations are eminently qualified to effect the
great object in view—to reduce to the lowest possible extent the loss
of life and property at sea.


FOOTNOTES:

[239] In 1816, according to the official returns, the merchant navy of
the United Kingdom amounted to 2,783,933 tons; and in 1835 to 2,783,761
tons, or a fraction less; but we know that, at the former period, there
were a great many more vessels on the Register than there actually
existed, from the fact that no means were then taken to ascertain the
losses, or to erase from the records vessels which were lost.

[240] The entries and clearances of British vessels engaged in the
Foreign trade during the years 1816-18 averaged annually 21,735
vessels, of 3,180,472 tons; while for the three years previous to 1836
they averaged 27,390 vessels, of 4,628,450 tons, and, on the accuracy
of these returns at both periods, we can depend.

[241] “Imperfect charts” were often then made to cover, as I fear
may be the case to some extent now, incompetency, drunkenness, or
carelessness. Indeed, about that period, they frequently served as
excuses when other objects were in view. I remember a ludicrous
instance of this. When a boy at school in Ayr I used to accompany my
uncle to “the meeting of owners” of the brig _Eclipse_, in which
he held some eight or ten 64th-shares. Every spring, the owners met
on board to discuss matters relating to her affairs, and to dispose
of what I recollect best, a round of salt beef, sea-biscuits, and
rum-and-water. The _Eclipse_ had hitherto been invariably employed
during the summer season in the conveyance of timber from some one or
other of the ports of New Brunswick to Ayr. On one occasion, a tempting
freight had been offered for her to proceed to Quebec, and the owners,
in conclave assembled, had all but unanimously decided to send her to
that port. While, however, the discussion was going on, her skipper,
Garratt, or “old Garratty,” as he was called, seemed very uneasy, and
gulping down an extra tumbler of rum-and-water, he at last said,—“Weel,
gentlemen, should you send the _Eclipse_ to Quebec I’ll not be
answerable for her safety.” “How so?” asked one of the owners. “Ah,”
said Garratty, drawing his breath, “_the charts are a’ wrang in the
St. Lawrence_. Yee’l ne’er see the _Eclipse_ again gin ye send
her to Quebec.” The skipper carried the day.

It is much to be regretted that Shipowners, when they leave their
captains to provide their own charts (instead of supplying them), do
not stipulate that they are to be the best and the _latest_. I
remember a ship and cargo (numerous other instances could be produced),
valued at 70,000_l._, lost near Boulogne from the master mistaking
the two lights at Etaples for the South Foreland lights; and this,
as appeared by the Board of Trade inquiry, because his Channel
chart, which was thirty years old, had not the Etaples lights marked
on it. Indeed, it so far appears that the large passenger steamer
_Deutschland_, whose loss at the present moment (30th December,
1875) is now in course of investigation, was steered by an old chart.

[242] See Appendix to ‘Final Report of Unseaworthy Ships Commission,’
p. 600, and Summaries, p. 781, where this and other similar returns
will be found.

[243] See Appendix to ‘Final Report of Unseaworthy Ships Commission,’
p. 682, and Summary, p. 768.

[244] See _ante_, page 299.

[245] General Merchant Seaman’s Act, 7 & 8 Vict. cap. 112.

[246] 8 & 9 Vict. cap. 116.

[247] See _ante_, page 350, note.

[248] 30 & 31 Vict. cap. 124.

[249] This Bill consolidated all previous Acts; but from its
dimensions, or some other cause, it has not yet passed, though
frequently presented to the House of Commons for consideration.

[250] Mr. Samuel Plimsoll was first returned to Parliament in December,
1868, as one of the members for the town of Derby, which he had
unsuccessfully contested three years previously. In the ‘Parliamentary
Companion’ he is described as a “coal-merchant,” and author of various
pamphlets on the coal trade, and on the ‘Rights of Workmen,’ and of a
‘Plan to have Fatherless and Motherless Children cared for instead of
being consigned to the Workhouse.’

[251] This Bill contained 696 clauses, and replaced 90 Acts or parts of
Acts.

[252] See Parl. Paper, C. 287, 1871.

[253] Merchant Shipping Act, 34 & 35 Vict. cap. 110. “Unseaworthy
Ships.”

[254] It was entitled ‘Our Seamen: an Appeal by Samuel Plimsoll, M.P.,’
and was “dedicated to the Lady Gracious and Kind who seeing a labourer
working in the rain sent him her rug to wrap about his shoulders.”
Virtue and Co., Ivy Lane, London.

[255] See ‘Our Seamen,’ pp. 11, 12.

[256] ‘Our Seamen,’ p. 14.

[257] See _ante_, p. 318, _note_.

[258] It may not now be the case, but I have known a chain cable, made
of the best iron, and it would only be iron of the best description
which could stand such a strain, stretched from 150 fathoms, its length
when manufactured, to 155 fathoms after it had passed through the
testing-machine. Such an enormous strain must injure the fibre of the
iron, and, thereby, its elasticity, even though most of this stretch
would probably be due to the links fitting closer into each other,
and the actual stretch of the iron itself only a small portion of the
whole. But in either case the elasticity of the fibre would most likely
be injured, perhaps destroyed.

[259] There were two Reports: “Preliminary” and “Final.”

[260] See Parl. Paper, 349. Session 1873.

[261] I believe that there is much justice in these complaints. Indeed,
it cannot be otherwise if official surveyors are honest and vigilant.
For instance, some new danger or evil arises, and some new remedy is
invented. Consequently, the surveyor says:—“I must provide for this,”
and he makes the requirement; the trade call for uniformity, and the
specific thing required becomes a general _stereotyped_ Board of
Trade rule, checking further improvement, and making shipbuilders build
down to it.

On this point, my old friend, Mr. Alfred Holt, of Liverpool—and there
is no one more competent to offer an opinion on such a subject—in a
letter I had from him the other day, remarks with great force:—“The
real objection to Government survey is this: no Government can insist
on more than average standard of efficiency; but most of those ships of
which the nation is proud are built to _a much higher standard_.
Now, suppose two ships competing for freight, one of the high class
I describe, and one of low type just sufficient to pass survey.
Both have got certificates; these have blunted the discrimination
of underwriters, so that premiums are alike on both, and, naturally
enough, shippers send their goods by the one that asks least freight.
Is it in human nature that the conscience of the good Shipowner will
remain tender? He sees a vessel of much less strength, and not nigh so
efficiently manned, go to sea, perhaps a foot deeper than his, earning
the same rate of freight, and carrying a Government certificate of
competency. Is he likely to keep up to his old standard? and won’t he
be _compulsorily degraded_ to the other’s level? All these surveys
only help the bad, while they injure the good. I may say of ground
tackle that, although since the Act passed, it has become difficult to
get any very bad, it is equally difficult to get any really good. I
believe, in my own case, that the cables I have got since the Act came
into operation are worse than those I got before.”

[262] The recommendation might have been advantageously extended to any
other properly constituted tribunal, as it is most desirable that all
such disputes should be promptly settled, and especially in the port
where they arise, or its immediate locality. An appeal in all cases to
the central Board in London might inflict unnecessary hardship upon the
shipowner, and lead to other mischievous consequences.

[263] Although the present system, which originated with Lloyd’s,
stands much in need of reform, I think the recommendations of the
Commissioners on this subject require still further consideration
before they are adopted.

[264] The latter portion of this recommendation also requires further
consideration. While a second trial would be a double expense, it
would not facilitate getting evidence on the first inquest because the
captain would still be able to say,—“I shall not give evidence which
may be used against me.”

[265] There is no use hiding a fact which my experience on this
Commission and elsewhere has too clearly revealed. It is this, that the
officers of the Navy as a rule (there are exceptions) are much less
inclined to the amalgamation, under any circumstances, of the seamen
of the merchant service with those of the Royal Navy than the officers
of the Army are to coalesce with the Volunteers. They desire, and it
may be due to their patriotism, to have a large standing navy, as large
in peace as in war if they could get it; while they do not care to
be troubled with the drilling of relays of seamen from the merchant
service when they can obtain young men expressly trained, solely at the
expense of the State. They do not, or will not, understand the vast
natural resources this country has within itself—far greater than any
other countries,—or, indeed, than nearly all other countries combined,
available in the hour of need.

[266] See Report, ‘Manning the Navy.’




CHAPTER XVII.

     Loose statements with regard to the loss of life at sea, and
     other matters—“Coffin ships”—Great improvement of our ships
     and officers in recent years—Duties of the Board of Trade
     with regard to wrecks—Return of lives lost and saved between
     1855 and 1873, _note_—Wreck chart; but the extent of
     loss not sufficiently examined—Danger of too much Government
     interference—Loss of life in proportion to vessels afloat—Causes
     of loss—More details required—Improvement in lighthouses, buoys,
     and beacons—Harbours of Refuge—Extraordinary scene in the House
     of Commons on the withdrawal of the Merchant Shipping Bill,
     1875—Another Bill introduced by Government—Its conditions—Unusual
     _personal_ power granted to Surveyors—Propriety or not,
     of further legislation considered—Compulsory load-line—Mr. J.
     W. A. Harper’s evidence—Mr. W. J. Lamport and others—Opinion
     of the Commissioners—Voluntary load-line—Its value
     questionable—All ships should be certified as seaworthy—How
     can this be accomplished?—Opinion of Mr. Charles McIver,
     _note_—Registration Associations—Lloyd’s Register, its
     great importance—Improvement of seamen by better education—Evil
     effects of advance notes, confirmed by the opinion of the
     Commissioners—Over-insurance—Views of Mr. T. H. Farrer—Evidence of
     other witnesses—Opinion of the Commissioners—Too much legislation
     already—The necessity of a Mercantile Marine Code, and more
     prompt punishment in criminal cases—Concluding remarks on the
     extraordinary progress of British shipping, and the dangers of
     over-legislation.


[Sidenote: Loose statements with regard to the loss of life at sea, and
other matters.]

Although one or two of the more important questions with which the
Commissioners had to deal, cannot be materially advanced without an
arrangement with other nations, there are others entirely within our
own power. To retrace our steps, therefore, with regard to some of
these is as worthy of consideration as to devise any new enactments.
But these subjects can only be properly dealt with in a calm and
impartial spirit. So many exaggerated statements have been recently
made, in and out of Parliament, with reference to the extent of the
loss of life caused by men being sent to sea in “coffin ships,”[267] as
if such occurrences had no existence except in our own time, and were
the creation of a prevailing eagerness to be rich too soon, that it is,
above all things, necessary to adhere strictly to facts, in considering
further legislation, should such be necessary, and to regulate any
measures to be enforced on this subject by such facts alone. Nothing
can be more dangerous than legislation founded on sentimental or
sensational reports.

[Sidenote: “Coffin ships.”]

[Sidenote: Great improvement of our ships and officers in recent years.]

But if “coffin ships” still exist, and I fear they do, this cannot
arise from lack of legislative enactments. Indeed, the wisdom of
Parliament has, for the last quarter of a century, been seriously
directed every Session to the improvement of our ships and of their
crews.[268] Nor have individual efforts of the most effective and
laudable description been wanting to prevent the construction of
vessels of an unseaworthy character:[269] while it is _not_ the
case, as has been alleged, that, either our ships or the officers by
whom they are navigated have deteriorated. On the contrary, they
have, within the last quarter of a century, vastly improved in almost
every respect. If any of my readers have any doubts on this question,
let them refer to the answers to Mr. Murray’s circular of 1843,[270]
and to those sent by our consuls abroad to Mr. J. G. Shaw Lefevre’s
circular of 1872.[271] It may be that our seamen do not “hand, reef,
and steer,” with the same alacrity as they did in the days of our
forefathers, simply because such duties are less required now than they
were then; but our masters and mates are infinitely superior to what
they were a short time since, and in our regular lines of steamers and
packet-ships, there are to be found a class of seamen much more sober
and steady than could be found in any merchant service twenty-five
years ago. Men now exist, who are quite as competent for the duties
required of them, as any seamen of the days of Duncan or Nelson, and
far more to be depended on for the performance of their duties on board
of merchant ships than was the case in my own boyhood, although there
are, still, far too many who are inefficient, drunken, and worthless.
There are likewise still many ships lost which ought not to be lost,
but the assertions which have been made with regard to an increase in
the amount of loss during recent years have been greatly exaggerated,
as I shall now endeavour to show.

[Sidenote: Duties of the Board of Trade with regard to wrecks.]

Among the multifarious duties imposed on the Board of Trade, not
the least important is that connected with wrecks, casualties, and
collisions of ships at home and abroad. For many years, a sort of
record had been kept of those casualties, but it is not until 1855,
when the duty devolved on the Board of Trade, that we have any reliable
statistics.[272]

Of course the number of wrecks, casualties, and collisions reported for
any one year, increases or diminishes according to the prevalence or
absence of gales of remarkable violence and duration. These sometimes
tell in an appalling manner, in the greatly increased loss of life
which occurs in one year over another. A Table,[273] copied from the
wreck returns of the Board of Trade of 1874, classifies the reports so
far as regards the loss of life, showing how far one year has been more
disastrous than another; for instance, in 1859-60, the number of lives
lost was five times greater than in the previous year, and three times
more than in the year following, arising, in a great measure, from the
disastrous gale in October 1859 in which 343 lives were lost in the
_Royal Charter_, wrecked on the Anglesea Coast. Again, in 1867-68,
nearly double the number of lives were lost than during any year
either before or since: in fact, no less than 326 vessels were lost or
damaged, and 319 lives sacrificed by tempest, between the 1st and 3rd
December inclusive of the former year.

But, though between 1855 and 1873, 13,466 lives were lost on the coasts
of the United Kingdom, more than 71,000 lives were saved,[276] during
the same period, from the shipwrecked vessels; and, though the duty of
a seafaring man is proverbially a dangerous one, and the navigation
of our coasts is attended with greater perils than those in any other
parts of the world, it is astonishing how small is the percentage of
loss either of life or property, when compared with the amount of
shipping frequenting our shores.

[Sidenote: Wreck chart; but the extent of loss not sufficiently
examined.]

In the frontispiece to this volume will be found a wreck chart of the
British Islands, prepared from the last Board of Trade Returns for
the year 1873-4. A red dot signifies a case of total loss; a blue dot
signifies a case of partial damage. The first glance of this chart is
very appalling; but it becomes less so when we consider the enormous
number of vessels annually frequenting our coasts. Many hundreds of
vessels at times leave the northern coal ports, alone, in one day; and
I estimate that, in the year to which this chart refers, no less than
500,000 vessels of 90,000,000 tons! including their repeated voyages,
frequented the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.[277]

But, however startling these figures as a measure of the immense number
of vessels frequenting our coasts, they affect the mind much less than
a glance at the actual facts, the fleets themselves. Until I made
a course from the Thames to the Tyne, and saw the sea covered with
ships, steamers, and fishing boats, of all kinds and sizes, and saw
what an industry even the fishing alone employed, I never had clearly
in my own mind a notion of what our mercantile marine really was.
Let anyone survey from the fort of Tynemouth and ancient churchyard
adjoining—a favourite walk of mine when I represented that borough in
Parliament—and see from 200 to 300 ships going out at one tide, or
watch the passing ships from Flamborough Head or from the cliffs of
Dover, or let him steam through the endless crowd of herring boats
off the Scotch coast, and he will have a stronger impression of the
magnitude of the mercantile marine of Great Britain than can be derived
from the most careful study of all our Blue Books on the subject.

In dealing with this question, it becomes our duty to consider
carefully such realities as these. We should not be led astray by a
mere glance at the wrecks and casualties which appear on the face of
the chart—a chart which has too frequently been used as a picture to
alarm the public mind, and induce people, _who will not take the
trouble to inquire for themselves_, to believe that the question
of the loss of life and property at sea has not received that
consideration from Government or Parliament which its great importance
demands.

[Sidenote: Danger of too much Government interference.]

I have frequently remarked, in the course of this work, that, however
great our exertions have been to save human life, more might still be
done, but, without all the facts, further legislation, based on general
impressions, and still more so on popular clamour (valuable in itself,
though but too often deplorable in its results), will prove of the most
mischievous character. We must, also, remember that every act fettering
free navigation, renders our Shipowners less able to compete with
those of other countries, and, if it does not forward the main object
in view—the safety of life—must be a clear national loss, because it
renders us less able to make our ships a source of profit, a result
which, if not carefully watched, might easily be carried to such an
extent as to discourage investments in British shipping.[278]

Now if we take the total disasters on our coasts, including trivial
accidents, it does not amount to anything like one-half per cent.
per annum, and to not three out of every thousand of the vessels
frequenting these shores; indeed, when we consider the dangerous
character of these shores, the rocks and shoals with which they are
surrounded, the storms with which we are visited, the frequency and
uncertainty of these storms, and the dense fogs which often prevail,
we may, so far from being startled by the sight of the wreck chart, be
surprised that the casualties are not far greater. But, to arrive at
the true bearing of the case, it is desirable to analyse the disasters.
Besides the red and blue dots on the chart, indicative of total loss
or partial damage to vessels, I have indicated by similar dots, with a
cross above, the number of disasters in the course of the year, which
were attended with _loss of life_. When my readers examine these,
they will be still more agreeably surprised. From the Frith of Forth
to Spurnhead, a distance of somewhere about 150 miles of the most
rugged, unprotected, and dangerous coast in the world, where numerous
fleets of vessels are constantly wending their way, and in every
description of weather, there were only seven vessels wrecked with loss
of life during 1873-4, and two of these were partial losses. In calling
attention to this fact, I must remind my readers that, on the part of
our coast in question, the most inferior description of vessels, and
the most deeply laden, carry on their hazardous trade. If we next cast
our eye over the line of coast extending from London to the Lizard
Point, and embracing the whole coast of the English Channel, a distance
of somewhere about 400 miles, we will see that during the whole of the
same year there were only fifteen wrecks with loss of life, and seven
of these were partial. Nor is the proportion greater on any other
portion of the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.

[Sidenote: Loss of life in proportion to vessels afloat.]

[Sidenote: Causes of loss.]

But we should do well to inquire still further, and not merely compare
the present number of disasters with those of former years, but
likewise their extent and character; and, as far as is practicable,
the different causes of loss, so as to endeavour to apply, to the
best advantage, any further remedies that may be necessary. I have
shown[279] that the average loss of life during the three years ending
1835 was 894 per annum, when we owned 2,780,000 tons of shipping; but
the loss of life for the year 1873-4, when our Merchant Shipping had
increased to 7,294,230 tons, of which no less than 1,825,738 tons
consisted of steamers, in which the risk of navigating our coasts
is greatly increased, amounted only to 506, of whom 103 were lost in
foreign vessels. Many of the remaining 403 were lost on fishing boats,
and other vessels not registered under the Merchant Shipping Act.[280]
Very material progress towards the saving of life on our coasts has,
therefore, been made during the last forty years—a progress which will
appear the more striking when I direct attention to the fact, that,
while the entrances and clearances of British ships engaged in the
foreign trade were, in 1835, not much more than 4,000,000 tons, they
had increased to more than 26,000,000 tons in 1873-4.[281] Of the
506 lives lost, 61 were lost in vessels that foundered; 76 through
vessels in collision; 200 in vessels that stranded or were cast ashore
derelict; and 101 in missing vessels. The remaining 68 lives were lost
from various causes, such as by being washed overboard and by other
accidents on board. The whole of the above lives were lost in 130
vessels, 87 of which were laden, and 40 in ballast. It is not known
whether the remaining three were laden or light.

If we take the last five years from 1869 to 1873-4 inclusive, we
find the total number of wrecks and casualties of vessels of every
kind, arising from all causes and including collisions, amounted to
8952, giving an annual average of 1791; the average loss of life
in these vessels during the five and a half years, including the
disastrous half-year 1873, being 755 per annum. Although no return is
kept in minute detail of the approximate cause of these disasters,
we learn from the wreck register, that in the year 1873-4, 381 were
from collisions, and 1422 from wrecks and casualties other than
collisions; 346 were wrecks, &c., resulting in total loss; and 1076
partial damage more or less serious. Of the total losses, 128 happened
when the wind was at “force 9 or upwards” (a strong gale), and they
are classed as having been caused by stress of weather; 93 from
inattention, carelessness, or neglect; 30 from defects in the ship
or equipments (and of these thirty, 19 appear to have foundered from
unseaworthiness); the remainder seem to have arisen from various other
causes. Of the 1070 casualties, 525 arose from stress of weather; 180
from carelessness; and 91 from defects in equipments; and the remainder
from various other causes. In 1873-4, there were, on or near the coasts
of the United Kingdom, 165 wrecks and casualties to smacks and other
fishing vessels, which are included in the above returns, and in these,
76 lives were lost, while 195 lives were lost in vessels of the collier
class.

[Sidenote: More details required.]

These returns are, no doubt, very valuable as far as they go, and have
become more so since they were extended to the loss of _all_
British ships, and, where practicable, to the cause of the loss. But
the class of the vessel, whether built of wood or iron, and the draught
of water when she left her last port, might be added to advantage. Nor
should we omit the familiar S.S. to distinguish steam from sailing
ships. However, they amply show that no charge can be justly made
against either the Government or the Legislature of any dereliction of
duty in their endeavours to save the life of all persons who “go down
to the sea in ships.” Nor can we charge the people of this country with
any callousness or want of sympathy for the seafaring portion of the
population. The number of Acts of Parliament passed in recent years,
and the grants of public money voted for the purpose of saving life,
are an answer to all such charges; while noble private institutions,
like the Shipwrecked Mariners’ Society, the Lifeboat Establishments,
the Royal Alfred Asylum, besides various other charitable associations
for the benefit of seamen, testify in this respect to the liberality of
the public.[282]

[Sidenote: Improvement in lighthouses, buoys, and beacons.]

[Sidenote: Harbours of Refuge.]

Nor have the lights, beacons, and buoys on our coast, all tending
materially, as they do, to save life, been neglected. On the contrary,
while we have greatly reduced the charges, we have increased the number
and highly improved the quality of our lights. By the Act passed in
1836,[283] a number of lighthouses, which formed part of the hereditary
estate of the Crown and had been allowed to get into the hands of
private persons, were transferred to the Trinity House, provision being
made for reducing the exorbitant tolls previously levied. By an Act
of 1853,[284] the expenditure of the Trinity House on lighthouses,
and that of the Scotch and Irish lighthouse boards, was subjected to
the control of the Board of Trade, and, since then, the reduction on
the charges for lights, buoys, beacons, &c., has been fully 75 per
cent. Nor has the question of Harbours of Refuge been overlooked; for,
besides the construction of various national harbours, large sums of
public money have been advanced at a low rate of interest for the
improvement of local harbours, expressly for the benefit of merchant
ships and seamen, and these, while facilitating commerce, have, in no
small degree, tended to the safety of life and property.

Indeed, so anxious has Government been to rectify any shortcomings
in legislation, which might tend to the loss of life, or inflict
a hardship on seamen, that the Bill of Mr. Fortescue (now Lord
Carlingford), passed in 1873,[285] contained not merely clauses about
“load-lines” and “clear sides,” but a provision giving seamen a claim
for compensation when, having been detained on a charge of desertion,
the ship, upon survey, was shown to be unseaworthy. This Act further
contains a provision, strengthening the power of the Board of Trade
to detain unseaworthy ships, whereby that “Board are enabled to act
of their own accord, and without complaint from without,” the result
of which has been that, up to the last return,[286] out of the 474
vessels detained and surveyed by the Board of Trade under this Act,
435 have been on the report of their own officers, and 39 only on
complaints made _ab extra_.[287] To these facts I may add, as
having a very important bearing on the opinions I have hitherto
ventured to express, that only 24 out of the 474 vessels were detained
_because_ they were overladen; and that, out of these, not a
single vessel detained was alleged to be overladen on information given
by the crews, notwithstanding the encouragement they had to become
informers against their employers. This power to detain is extended to
cases of overloading and improper stowage or imperfect loading, and the
conditional orders of release are of a very elaborate character, while
the provisions concerning payment of expenses, and the mode of appeal,
are made far more full and explicit.

This Act further gives power to vary the requirements contained in the
Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 with regard to boats—requirements, I may
add, which it had been found practically impossible to comply with.
It likewise contains a clause, which ought to have been the law long
since, making it criminal (though the dictates of humanity, it had been
thought, were in themselves sufficient), in a master, after collision
with another vessel, not to stand by and render assistance. In the
same statute, a code of signals of distress has been adopted and very
properly enforced, as well as a general code of pilot signals.

Many losses having occurred from spontaneous combustion of coal on
board ship, Government, in 1874, appointed, on the recommendation of
Lloyd’s Committee, a Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr.
Childers, to inquire into this subject, but this Commission has not yet
concluded its labours.

[Sidenote: Extraordinary scene in the House of Commons on the
withdrawal of the Merchant Shipping Bill, 1875.]

Early in the Session of 1875, the Government introduced another
Merchant Shipping Bill, containing various amendments of the then
existing law, and among them a special clause which had for its
object the abolition of all advance notes. This Bill met with very
considerable opposition (partly of a frivolous character), rendering
its progress through the House so slow, that Government found it
desirable to withdraw it, more especially as the Bill had been
materially altered and curtailed in the course of various divisions,
especially in the clauses referring to the advance notes and other
matters of importance.

When Government intimated its intention of withdrawing the Bill of
which they could no longer approve, and which they had not time to
pass, a scene arose[289] happily of rare occurrence in the debates of
the British Parliament. It was closed, however, with great dignity by
the Prime Minister and leader of the Commons. He had introduced such
a measure as he no doubt, after grave consultation with his Cabinet,
considered necessary and sufficient. The House, and more especially
those members of it who were more immediately interested in maritime
affairs, and who either approved or opposed the views of Mr. Plimsoll
had so mutilated the Government measure, that Mr. Disraeli would no
longer be responsible for it. To use his own words, he “declined to
deal with the subject in that fragmentary manner,” and no man of
prudence or common sense can blame him for the course he adopted under
these circumstances.[290]

[Sidenote: Another Bill introduced by Government.]

Unfortunately, however, the popular outcry was so great against the
course he had adopted, aroused as this had been for the moment by the
well-meaning but rhapsodical protests of Mr. Plimsoll, backed, as they
no doubt were, by many really benevolent men, that Mr. Disraeli, in
the end, considered it expedient to introduce another Bill, embodying
a portion of his own views together with those of the philanthropists.
Although this Act contains some necessary and useful provisions, it
is not a wise measure, nor can the Government have considered it
perfect, as it was hurriedly passed so late in the Session as the 6th
of September, and is only to remain in force until the 1st of October
1876.[291]

[Sidenote: Its conditions.]

[Sidenote: Unusual personal power granted to Surveyors.]

This Act confirms the powers previously given to persons, specially
appointed by the Board of Trade, to detain what they consider
unseaworthy ships, _without previous orders from the Board_, an
addition which, however necessary, ought not to have been conceded to
any individuals without much further consideration and discussion than
it received. This addition opens the door to corruption in its most
pernicious and dangerous forms, by giving, as it does, to each one of
a great number of subordinate officers, _personal_ authority to
detain “unseaworthy vessels,” thus transferring to a single person
a power the Board of Trade alone possessed under the Act of 1873,
and laying down a principle contrary to all good government, while
relieving that Board of its administrative responsibility. Otherwise
the Bill contains some useful provisions, and none more so than where
it prohibits the carriage of a cargo of which more than one-third
consists of grain, &c., unless the grain is secured from shifting by
suitable boards or otherwise. But, while this clause may be necessary
or right in itself, its meaning may be misconstrued, and it may lead
to further and more detailed legislation, making its vague language
specific, and calling on Government officers in _Foreign_ ports to
enforce its provisions.[292]

The Act also amends the clause in the Act of 1871, which makes the
sending an unseaworthy ship to sea a misdemeanour, by providing—

(_a._) That criminal liability shall attach to any one who
attempts, or is party to an attempt, to send such a ship to sea, and to
a master who knowingly takes such a ship to sea.

(_b._) That every ship shall have a registered managing owner, and
that if she is sent to sea from any port in the United Kingdom in an
unseaworthy state he shall be liable, unless he proves that he has done
all he can to prevent it.

The Act further provides that every British ship shall be marked
permanently with lines on her sides showing the position of her decks.

It also provides that the owner of every foreign-going British ship
shall, before clearance outwards from any port in the United Kingdom,
mark upon her sides a maximum load-line, and shall insert the distance
between this and the deck marks in the entry outwards at the Custom
House and in the agreement with the crew.

The Act further stipulates that every contract with a seaman shall
imply an obligation on the part of the owner and his agents to use all
reasonable efforts to make and _keep_[293] the ship seaworthy.
The effect of this clause is to give the seaman or his family a remedy
against the owner. But it does not extend to damage or loss of life
caused by the act of a fellow seaman other than the master.

Happily it is not necessary, in reviewing the recent changes in our
Mercantile Marine Laws, to notice those personal matters which have
unfortunately been raised in the course of their discussion, except
to express regret that Mr. Plimsoll in dealing with a subject of such
great public importance should have made grave assertions and charges
alike against Government and private individuals, too many of which he
has not merely entirely failed to prove, but has neglected to withdraw.

Had Government been persistently neglectful of its duty in its
endeavours to mitigate the loss of life and property at sea, there
might have been an excuse for some of these charges, especially if
it had neglected necessary legislative enactments.[294] But such has
not been the case. On the contrary, Parliament of late years, while
producing some excellent measures, has interfered far too much with
the details of the affairs of individuals connected with Merchant
Shipping: and, though yielding for the moment to a popular cry,
Mr. Disraeli may well have had reasonable doubts whether further
legislation might not, so far from lessening, tend to increase those
dangers and disasters which must ever attend the navigation of the
ocean.

[Sidenote: Propriety or not, of further legislation considered.]

Having, however, officially announced his intention to review the whole
subject, and to consider it in all its bearings, I venture to invite
the attention of my readers to the more important points now pending.
They are: a compulsory load-line, and the production of an official
certificate of seaworthiness by all ships before they are cleared at
the Custom House.

[Sidenote: Compulsory load-line.]

[Sidenote: Mr. J. W. A. Harper’s evidence.]

So far as regards the proposed compulsory load-line, a very competent
and intelligent witness who gave his evidence before the Royal
Commission on unseaworthy ships, says,[296] “I think nothing could be
more serviceable and nothing more excellent than to obtain and, if it
were possible, enforce a load-line; but I also think there is nothing
more impossible. A load-line, do what you may, is the opinion of an
expert. How can you, by authority, enforce the opinion of an expert?
I have had before me,” he continues, “a great many proposals for
ascertaining load-lines for ships. Some of them are very ingenious. By
the best of them you may get, with considerable accuracy, the cubical
displacement of the empty ship, the displacement of the cargo, and so
you may arrive at the cubical space left in the ship available for
floating. And getting that you get a valuable and useful fact for some
objects. _But the supreme difficulty remains untouched, viz., What
ought the floating capacity to be?_ I cannot imagine it possible to
enforce by any Government intervention a rule _which must depend in
every individual case upon the opinion of an expert_.”

[Sidenote: Mr. W. J. Lamport and others.]

[Sidenote: Opinion of the Commissioners.]

Such, also, was the purport of the evidence of the great majority, if
not of all the witnesses examined before the Commission; but I quote
that of Mr. Harper, because he is not merely thoroughly competent to
offer an opinion on the subject, but is altogether disinterested.
Indeed, from the appointment he holds, it would be to his interest to
recommend a compulsory load-line, and he would no doubt have done so,
had he not thought that any such legislative measure would be likely
to aggravate the evils sought to be remedied. In fact, the whole tenor
of the evidence is that a fixed load-line would do more harm than
good.[297] And such was the opinion of the Commissioners, who state,
“that any rule of freeboard founded on surplus buoyancy gives to a
vessel of light scantling an advantage over a stronger vessel. Thus the
inferior ship would by law be allowed to carry the heavier cargo. Such
an enactment would not contribute to the safety of life at sea. From
all the evidence we have collected on this subject, we are of opinion
that an Act of Parliament enforcing any scale of freeboard would be
_mischievous_.”... “A law presenting such a rule would therefore
_enhance the perils of a seafaring life_.”

Nor can impartial persons who have studied this question arrive at
any other conclusion, for as the Commissioners justly add, “There is
no general agreement as to a rule by which the requisite amount of
_reserve_ buoyancy could be determined, and it appears that,
except under definite circumstances, it is not a determinable problem.
The proper load-line in each particular case depends not only upon the
principal dimensions of the ship, but also upon her form and structural
strength, the nature of her cargo, the voyage, and the season of the
year.”

[Sidenote: Voluntary load-line.]

The Commissioners, consequently, limited their recommendation so far
as regards freeboard to the extent that “every merchant ship should
have marked upon each of her sides amidships, a vertical scale of feet
downwards from the edge of her main-deck,” and that a note of her
draught of water “should be entered in the log after the vessel has
received her full load, immediately before the time of her starting
on her voyage, which should, wherever practicable, be left with the
officer of Customs or with the British Consul, by whom it should be
recorded.”

[Sidenote: Its value questionable.]

This recommendation was proposed to be carried out in the Government
Bill which was withdrawn, but, in the Act now temporarily in force, the
provisions are somewhat different. The advantages of either system are
problematical. Shipowners will continue, as they have hitherto done,
to load their vessels to such draught as they consider prudent, and if
one of their vessels is lost, and other persons remark that she was
too heavily laden, the answer will either be that the draught was as
usual, or that safety in proportion to depth is a matter of opinion
depending on many varying circumstances. The mere fact of publicly
recording the draught of water would, it is to be feared, have little
effect on unprincipled or avaricious Shipowners, against whom alone
the law is aimed. Practically, I think the system of marking now in
force will be of little or no avail, and that the result will not be
as the framers of the law intended. A Shipowner being now required by
law to mark upon the sides of the vessel amidships a circular disc 12
inches in diameter, to be so placed that “the centre of the disc shall
indicate the _maximum_ load-line in salt water to which the owner
intends to load the ship for that voyage,” will perceive that to place
the disc only slightly above the usual line of load draught would, on
the one hand, fetter him to some extent; while, on the other hand, he
would incur no disadvantage by placing it so much higher as to ensure
its being well clear of the water under any circumstances of loading.
A maximum load-line will, therefore, in practice mean the line down
to which the ship will certainly _not_ be loaded. Indeed, from
the information I have gained on the subject, the practice with some
Shipowners seems already to be that the discs are placed one, two,
and in some cases, three and even four feet above the water-line. The
mere marking it would, therefore, appear in a great measure worthless,
as surveyors will still require to wait until a ship has her cargo on
board and is ready for sea, before they can form any opinion as to
her safety. Whether it is wise, on the part of Shipowners, to place
the disc so far above the vessel’s ordinary water-line as to make it
meaningless has been doubted by many, but the fact remains that it is
so placed in very many instances. It would, certainly, have been better
to have omitted from the clause of the Act I have just quoted the word
“maximum,” as few Shipowners would have placed their discs too high
if, by doing so, this indicated an intention on their part to overload
their vessels.

However, if it can be shown that this new mode of marking the sides
of a ship tends in any degree towards the greater safety of life
and property at sea, the shipping community, generally, will not
complain of the expense and trouble. In all good governments there is
a pervading principle to which all classes submit, that the interests
of the few must be made subservient to the good of the many, and
that, especially where life is at stake, no reasonable trouble or
expense should be spared to preserve it. But if, on the other hand,
it is found that this system of marking or registering the draught of
water is useless, or even injurious, Shipowners will have great cause
of complaint against Government for an unnecessary interference with
their business, provided they can show that they have made an earnest
endeavour to apply the provisions of the Act fairly and in the spirit
in which they were framed.[298]

The other important point on which Mr. Plimsoll insisted is of a
different character. But to carry it out in the way suggested, or as
it was argued in the House of Commons and before the Royal Commission,
would be impracticable, and even if practicable, it would be most
mischievous: the Commissioners in their Report state the question as
follows:—“With the view of providing for the greater safety of life at
sea, it has been suggested that the Board of Trade shall superintend
the construction, the periodical inspection, the repair, and the
loading of all British Merchant Ships.” Considering the extent of our
mercantile marine and the mode in which business must, necessarily,
be conducted if we desire to maintain our present high position as a
maritime nation, any such suggestion is simply absurd and, if carried
into effect, would be most ruinous. That we have already too much
legislation in matters of detail the Commissioners themselves admit.
Referring to the pernicious effects of inquiry into such matters by
Government surveyors on Emigrant ships, they say, and from the evidence
before them they would have been justified in expressing their opinion
in still stronger terms, “We consider it to be a question worthy of
serious consideration, whether, in the case of passenger ships, the
certificate of the Board of Trade, so far as regards specific approval,
should not be expressly confined to the number of passengers to be
allowed, and to the accommodation for their health, comfort, and
general security; all questions of unseaworthiness of hull, machinery,
and equipment being left to the owners, subject only to a general power
of interference in case of danger, sufficiently apparent to justify
special intervention.”

[Sidenote: How this can be accomplished.]

I have been unable to ascertain who made the extraordinary proposal,
that every ship from the time her keel was laid until she was loaded
and ready for sea should be under the superintendence of officers
appointed by the Board of Trade. In justice to Mr. Plimsoll I must
state that, though I have read his book, and nearly all his speeches,
I cannot trace any recommendation that the merchant ships of this
country should be placed, either as regards construction, inspection,
or repair, altogether, under the control of the Board of Trade or of
any other Government department.[299] What Mr. Plimsoll mentions seems
to me, to be a matter to which I have often referred in the course of
this work, that we do not utilise to anything like the extent we might
the vast private resources within ourselves, and that we might do so to
advantage, so far as regards _the survey of our merchant ships_,
not one of which he suggests should be allowed to go to sea unless she
is _seaworthy_. Now this is a suggestion which few men would be
bold enough to decline to consider, and Mr. Plimsoll points out how
this may be secured by means already at our disposal. Perhaps in the
way he puts it, the difficulties with which it is surrounded could
not be overcome; but the maxim cannot be ignored, as it is sound in
principle.

To leave the survey of our ships to any one private institution,
not on a sufficiently broad basis, such as Lloyd’s Register, might
create as many evils as a general Government survey, and, besides
creating jealousy on the part of other somewhat similar institutions
or associations, might be considered contrary to the rules of sound
government. But these institutions could be enrolled and licensed, as
various other associations now are, and empowered to grant certificates
of seaworthiness, which every ship above a certain tonnage would
require to produce before she was cleared at the Custom House. Or they
might be welded into one great national institution directly controlled
by all the various branches of the shipping community in harmony with
their sentiments, and alive to the wants and necessities always arising
through the growth and development of trade and commerce.

Individuals may do wrong, and, though it may be for their interests
to have a good sound ship, there is no denying the fact that ships
are sent to sea which are not seaworthy; but corporations and
associations cannot do wrong with the same impunity. If they did, they
would be deprived of their licence, and there would be a check, one
against the other, which is not the case with individuals. Or, on the
other hand, a great representative institution would be efficiently
checked and influenced by public opinion, and the voice of those
immediately concerned. Were Government to require these associations to
_classify_ ships, then I agree with the Commissioners, that it is
not its province “to ascertain whether a ship is fit for the conveyance
of dry and perishable goods,” but, from the debates in Parliament, and
numerous articles in the public press, it is clear that many persons
are of opinion, that it is the duty of Government to be reasonably
satisfied that a ship is _seaworthy_ before she proceeds to sea.
We exercise this duty in the case of railways, mines, and manufactures
of various kinds, and events have shown, however much we may have
already done to save life and property at sea, that the exercise of a
similar duty, if practicable, is at least worthy of consideration in
the case of ships.

As the great bulk of the vessels belonging to the United Kingdom are
already classed, the certificate of classification they now hold would
suffice as a certificate of seaworthiness. Those which are not now
classed in Lloyd’s Register, or in any other association, but which
belong to the great steam companies, or to very large shipowners,
are so well known for their good qualities as not to require
classification, and for this reason classification, or, at least,
survey for seaworthiness, even if compulsory, could not be a serious
hardship to them.

Practically the number of vessels now unclassed is confined to the
very good or to the very bad ships. With the owners of the former
I should think there would be no difficulty in dealing; they do
not class their ships either because they do not care to incur the
expense (underwriters being ready to insure them at the lowest current
premiums), or because they think they can construct ships, in their own
way, superior to those which are built to rules for classification.
But such men, while they might protest, and justly so, against being
interfered with in a business they more thoroughly understand than any
government or private surveyor, and in which they take a laudable pride
(for such men are the pillars of our maritime greatness), would, I
doubt not, have no objection to an authorised surveyor inspecting their
ships, and would readily pay the moderate fee required to cover the
cost of a certificate of _seaworthiness_.[300]

For the information of the general public I may state that there is a
very great difference between the highest grades of vessels and those
which any surveyor who knew anything about his business would pronounce
to be _unseaworthy_. In the case of classed ships, the certificate
of classification would suffice; but, from the owners of ships who do
not class, many intelligent persons are of opinion that a certificate
of _seaworthiness_ should be required. They argue, and with great
force, that those persons who do not class their ships, because they
will not bear inspection, have no right to imperil the lives of others
for their own gain. Life is not a thing of price; if it were, the rich
would live, and the poor would die. And when a Shipowner declines to
bear the expense of making his vessel seaworthy, he places in jeopardy
the life of the sailor to benefit himself.

[Sidenote: Registration Associations.]

[Sidenote: Lloyd’s Register, its great importance.]

There are very easy means of ascertaining the seaworthiness of a ship,
_when first sent afloat_, already at our disposal, as those of
my readers, who are not conversant with this subject, will find by
referring to the Appendix,[301] where a history of Lloyd’s Register
of British and Foreign Shipping will be found. That association has
a well-organised and extensive staff of surveyors, through whom, at
a very small cost, this fact could be ascertained. My readers will
also there see the immense advantage that association has afforded in
the improvement of our ships and the power it possesses of rendering
still greater public service. But while rivalry amongst associations
for classification is unquestionably injurious,[302] it may not
be considered advisable that Lloyd’s Register alone should issue
certificates of seaworthiness. There are other similar associations
whose certificates would answer the object in view equally well, and it
is for Government to decide (should an attempt be made to carry this
principle into practice) what associations shall be empowered to issue
the requisite certificates.

But while I cannot ignore the principle that no unseaworthy vessel
should be allowed to leave our ports, I cannot hide from myself
the fact that there would be numerous difficulties (but far from
insurmountable) in the way of carrying it fully into practice. It
might be argued that if the Board of Trade enrolled the associations
named, and, more especially, if it took them under its _immediate_
control, they would in a few years, instead of being private
Institutions, be mere servants of the Board, and, through the Board,
of a sensational House of Commons. But that argument may be met by
the Shipowners saying to the Board of Trade, “We do not wish to be
under your immediate control at all. Why should we not be allowed to
manage our own affairs, as all other branches of the community now
do,—subject, in our case, as in that of all others, to such enactments
only as may be necessary for the public safety? We ought to know our
own business a great deal better than any of your surveyors can teach
us; and, if we think proper to form ourselves into an association,
or associations, to manage our own affairs, and if we do what the
country requires, why should we be interfered with by the Government
as to the manner in which we think proper to build, equip, and
navigate our ships, any more than other traders in the management of
their affairs? Enrol us, if we think proper to associate, as you do
joint-stock concerns or other associations; let us form a board with
members elected by the persons interested, such, for instance, as the
Metropolitan Board of Works, to manage our own concerns, with specific
rules for the protection of the public, which, if we violate, you will
punish us as you would do any other class of the community.”

Now, arguments such as these are really unanswerable. Statesmen and
others, who have to encounter the harassing difficulties of official
life, and who know that all executive power _must_ be exercised
by a minister, or by individuals responsible to him, and, through him,
to the public, might say, “How are we, unless all ships are under our
immediate control, to meet questions put to us in the House of Commons,
such as, ‘Whether such and such a society licensed by Government had
the folly and audacity to allow of spring safety-valves, or of boats
not fitted with Clifford’s Patent?’ or how could we justify a licence
granted to an association which showed such flagrant disregard of
modern inventions and of seamen’s lives?” But the reply to all this
is that it is _not the province of Government to legislate on such
details as these_, any more than it would be to dictate by Act of
Parliament, how the details of any other branch of trade or manufacture
are to be carried out. The duties of Government have long since been
defined, and it is because Government, of recent years, has gone far
beyond its duties in the case of Shipowners, that Shipowners complain,
and justly complain, against Government for a “meddling and muddling”
in matters alike beyond its province and its knowledge.

Reverting to the principle which so many persons now say should
be enforced by legislative enactment, the seaworthiness of every
ship, there would be great difficulty in carrying that out _by
Government_, as seaworthiness is not definable. That is to say,
though a vessel may be seaworthy, when launched, (even then it would
depend upon the trade in which she was to be employed), she might not
be so at the end of her first voyage, or she might be so for one trade
in summer, but not in winter, or with one description of cargo, but not
with another; or, in fact, with the same cargo if properly stowed,[303]
but not otherwise, and so forth. The details are so numerous that it
would be impossible to enter upon them within my limits, and for the
same reasons, if the principle is to be carried out, it can only be by
the association of competent individuals with the necessary staff under
their control, possessing that knowledge which long experience alone
can give. I mention these points in case the Legislature consider it
necessary to enforce this principle; for, if it is to be carried out,
it should be in such a manner as will satisfy the public with the least
possible interference with the duties of the Shipowner.[304]

[Sidenote: Improvement of seamen by better education.]

In the meantime I must direct the attention of my readers to the
unseaworthiness of too many of our seamen, which is of really greater
national importance than the unseaworthiness of our ships. However
desirable it may be to make certain, if we can, that no unseaworthy
ships shall leave our ports, the incompetency, carelessness, and
drunkenness of seamen demand much more seriously our attention; and, as
all legislative enactments have hitherto failed to raise them to the
requisite standard, we ought to direct our attention more earnestly
than we have yet done to their _education_. If education is
necessary on shore, it is still more so with seamen, and yet we have
done, practically, nothing, as a Nation, to assist them in gaining
knowledge, and, especially, that description of knowledge required
in their calling. Indeed, we have not seriously attempted any great
practical scheme for their education or for the amalgamation of the
services of the Royal Navy and those of the mercantile marine, which,
while invaluable to us as a nation, would tend so much to elevate the
social position of that neglected portion of their class, who, not
having the good fortune to be enrolled in the Navy or on the lists of
the large Shipowners, must seek their daily bread at sea in any ship
where employment can be found.

[Sidenote: Evil effects of advance notes]

On the contrary, we have, in some respects, pandered to their
pernicious habits. For instance, when a clause in the first Government
Bill of last Session (1875) was introduced to render advance notes
illegal, the House of Commons rejected it. From my own experience I
can have no hesitation in stating that the system of advance notes
(I do not include the _allotment notes_, which are most useful)
tends to lower the character of seamen, promotes intemperance and
insubordination, and has been the indirect means of far more disasters
at sea than either overladen or otherwise unseaworthy vessels.

Besides, any such system is unknown to any other class of the
community. What should we think of a mechanic or house servant who
could not enter our service unless we paid him a month’s wages in
advance? We should have nothing to say to him—1st, because we should
not care to trust our money to a person who, on some frivolous
excuse, might decline to repay us by his faithful service; and
(2ndly) because we should, naturally, consider anyone requiring such
an advance an improvident if not a worthless person. These advances
must, necessarily, discourage frugality and prudence; while, in the
case of seamen, they most assuredly lead, directly, to intemperance
and vice. Nor is there any real occasion for making advances in their
case. The mechanic or the house servant may have been for some time
out of employment, and, as his wages are paid weekly or monthly, he
may not have laid by anything; but, in the case of seamen, their
wages are paid at the end of the voyage, often in large sums, and by
means of savings-banks and money-order offices, specially established
for their use, they have every facility afforded them for retaining
their earnings. But they do not. Why? Because the Legislature has
encouraged their natural and _proverbially_ improvident habits,
by acknowledging a system of advance of wages unknown to any other
class of workmen, on which advance they depend for an outfit, after too
frequently squandering the wages they had earned on a previous voyage.

But I should prefer my readers considering carefully the Report of the
Commissioners on this subject instead of my own views, and therefore I
do not hesitate to give these conclusions at length,[305] as a large
mass of evidence was brought before them. They, as statesmen and
philanthropists, had no object in view beyond the national good, and,
more especially, the welfare of the seafaring population.

[Sidenote: confirmed by the opinion of the Commissioners.]

“The evidence before us leads to the conclusion that the system
of advance notes is one great obstacle to the amelioration of the
condition of merchant seamen. All the witnesses whom we have examined
admit that the system is most pernicious, but it is defended on the
ground that, without this advance, the sailor could not pay for his
lodging on shore, or procure the clothes requisite for him when he
joins a ship.

“In practice it seems that the advance note is handed over to the
lodging-house keeper, not usually in exchange for cash, but in
discharge of debts which the sailor has been induced to incur. The
lodging-house keeper charges a heavy discount, and the sailor is
frequently brought on board half-clad and intoxicated.

“Shipowners and captains of merchant ships concur in stating that a
large portion of the ship’s crew is very often brought or even lifted
on board in a condition of helpless drunkenness, that the vessel must
often be detained for twenty-four hours in order that the men may be so
far recovered as to be able to get her under weigh, and that there is
great risk of life and property at the commencement of the voyage from
the consequent inefficiency of the seamen.

“The advance note is not payable until some days after the sailing of
the ship; but if the ship then puts back or touches at another port,
the seaman often takes the opportunity of making some complaint, in
order to get free from his engagement, and will even incur a month’s
imprisonment with this object, whilst the Shipowner or the person who
has cashed the note loses the money which has been paid in advance.

“It is said that if there were no advance note, the crimp in a foreign
or colonial port would not have the same inducement to entice the
sailor to desert.

“After careful consideration of the numerous evils attending this mode
of prepayment, we recommend that advance notes should be declared
illegal, that no payment or order for payment made in advance for wages
shall be a discharge for the payment of any portion of a seaman’s
wages when due, and that no money paid by a Shipowner to or for a
seaman shall be debited to the seaman, except wages already earned,
the allotment notes, and the cost of such supplies as the seamen may
receive after joining the ship.

“There will be some inconvenience felt at first from the abolition
of the existing system of advance notes, and there will be perhaps
considerable opposition to the change in the ports, and amongst the
lodging-house keepers, who profit by these notes. We feel, however,
convinced that unless this mischievous mode of payment be discontinued,
the seamen will never be raised from their servile dependence on
crimps, and taught to rely on their own industry and intelligence.”[306]

[Sidenote: Over-insurance.]

But there is a question of quite as great importance to which I shall
again have occasion to refer when I review the history of our steam
companies, and show the remarkably small amount of loss that some of
them have sustained through the system and order prevailing on board
their vessels. _There we shall see how losses are prevented._ In
the meantime, we should do well to inquire how losses are encouraged by
allowing policies of insurance to be effected for a greater amount than
the value of the ship or the cargo she contains.

[Sidenote: Views of Mr. T. H. Farrer.]

A contract of marine insurance is in its essence a contract of
indemnity, and the spirit of the contract is violated if the assured
can make the occurrence of a loss the means of gain. But the law has
allowed a very considerable deviation from this fundamental principle.
Mr. T. H. Farrer, in his evidence, happily illustrates this in the case
of a ship with a chartered freight, bound from London to Calcutta and
back.[307] He supposes her to be lost on her outward passage in the
Bay of Biscay. Presuming that the owner only insured her prudently and
not exorbitantly, he would recover in this case not merely the value
of the ship at the commencement of the voyage, but also the freight
of the outward and homeward voyages, while he would be exempted from
paying the seamen’s wages from the date of the disaster, the expenses
necessary to carry his ship to Calcutta, to remain there, and to
return on her homeward passage, so that he would be, actually, a very
considerable gainer by the loss.[308] Nor is the matter less flagrant
in the case of valued policies, when the value of the property is fixed
by agreement beforehand between the assured and the underwriter. The
effect of this, as the Commissioners justly remark,[309] is, “that
unless the policy is altogether void, on account of fraud, or the
concealment of a material fact, the assured can, in the case of a total
loss, receive the value which has been stated in the policy, however
much it may exceed the actual worth of his property.” In confirmation
of their opinion, they add “that, in certain decided cases, the
Shipowner has been allowed to recover 50 and even 100 per cent. more
than the actual value of his vessel.”

[Sidenote: Evidence of other witnesses.]

Various witnesses recommended that, in case of a total loss, the
underwriter should be allowed to question a valued policy, when he
considered that the value had been overstated; but many Shipowners
and underwriters objected to this proposal, contending that, where
a value had been agreed on between the Shipowners and underwriter,
subsequent interference would be mischievous or futile, as it might
induce Shipowners to insure abroad. It was contended that the value
of a ship might depend on a variety of circumstances; for instance,
the loss of a steamer to a Shipowner, about to start a new line of
steam communication, would be inadequately replaced by the cost of the
vessel, though estimated values of this sort are very problematical.

As regards insurance of freight, it was further suggested that the
Shipowner should not, in case of total loss, be entitled to recover
his freight, without deducting the expense saved to him by reason
of the loss of the vessel. On the other hand, it was alleged that
the necessity of estimating these uninsured expenses would give rise
to doubt, difficulty, and litigation, and that, if the suggestion
were adopted, the Shipowner would be to a great extent deprived of
the legitimate advantage he now enjoys of being able to obtain with
facility an advance on his freight.

[Sidenote: Opinion of the Commissioners.]

After carefully considering all these matters, the Commissioners
arrived at the conclusion that they ought not to recommend any
alteration of the law with regard to valued policies in cases of total
loss, as there were weighty reasons against any interference on the
part of the Legislature with contracts made by persons capable of
taking care of their own interests, without carefully ascertaining the
effect this interference was likely to produce on the entire system
of law relating to such contracts. But they were of opinion that the
“whole system of insurance law requires complete revision, for not only
does it allow the assured, in some cases, to recover more than the
amount of the loss actually sustained by him, but it also, on the other
hand, deprives him of an indemnity in cases in which he ought to be
protected by his insurance.”

The Commissioners, however, with great force, remark, that “a complete
and thorough revision of our laws relating to marine insurance is a
task of equal importance, difficulty, and delicacy, requiring evidence
of an extensive character, and necessitating a very lengthy and careful
investigation, and it touches directly on so many subjects unconnected
with the security of life at sea, on which it has only an indirect
and somewhat remote bearing, that we do not think it properly falls
within the scope of our commission. We should also have been reluctant
to undertake the complete revision of our system of marine insurance
law, because, for many reasons, it appears to us to be important that,
before such a task is undertaken, an attempt should be made to induce
foreign nations to concur with us in framing and adopting a general
code of insurance law. To alter the English law of marine insurance
to any considerable extent, might have the effect of throwing the
business of insurance into the hands of foreigners, and there is so
much insurance of foreign property in England, as well as of English
property abroad, that it is most desirable that the law of insurance
should, as far as possible, be the same among all commercial nations.
An examination of the foreign codes leads us to hope that there would
be found no insuperable difficulty in the way of attaining this
important object.”

Although the Commissioners do not at present recommend any alteration
to be made in the law relating to valued policies, they think that the
Shipowner should not be able to recover his insurance, whether under
a time or voyage policy, in cases where it is shown that he or his
agent had not done everything reasonably within their power to make and
maintain the ship in a seaworthy condition, where that unseaworthiness
occasioned the loss. They further consider that the Shipowner’s
liability for damage to property or person should be unlimited in cases
involving the death of the seaman or the damage to person or property.
They are also of opinion that the present system by which insurance
cases are tried before a judge and jury is altogether unsatisfactory,
as a single judge and two assessors would constitute a far better
tribunal. In conclusion, they recommend that the Marine Department of
the Board should be revised and strengthened by having a legal adviser
exclusively attached to it (a recommendation which has been since
carried out). “It will,” they remark, “be the duty of the Board of
Trade to check the negligent and to punish the culpable shipowner,
but it is desirable that these functions should be performed without
harassing the great body of Shipowners, who, by their ability and
indefatigable energy, have contributed to the prosperity of the empire.”

I have now endeavoured to give as succinct an account of the whole
course of the maritime legislation of the British Empire and its
effects upon ships, seamen, and commerce as my space will permit, from
the earliest period up to the close of the year 1875. Although it is
not the province of an historian to enter upon controversial questions,
much less to dive into the future, yet history is of little value
unless we can gain knowledge from the past which can be made useful
hereafter. I may therefore be permitted to close this volume with a few
remarks on the subject of further maritime legislation, especially as
the subject is one to which an unusual amount of public attention has
been devoted during the last two or three years, and as it has been,
officially, announced that it will be again dealt with by Government in
the ensuing Session of Parliament.

[Sidenote: Too much legislation already.]

Shipowners say that there is far too much legislation already, and I
certainly agree with them; but when they charge the Government as they
do, and especially the Board of Trade, or rather Mr. T. H. Farrer,
as its permanent Secretary, with forcing all this over-legislation
upon them, I must remind them of the facts. What Government did, and
did wisely and well, as I have endeavoured to show, was to frame such
mercantile marine laws as had become essential after the repeal of the
Navigation Laws. The laws then passed have, unquestionably, been of
great service, not merely to the nation, but to Shipowners themselves.
Having completed all that was considered necessary, Government directed
its attention to the amendment, as cases for its necessity arose, and
to the consolidation of existing laws; and I can, of my own knowledge,
state that Mr. Farrer has, since then, opposed all further legislation
which had for its object the interference with the details of a
Shipowner’s duty. But the House of Commons would not allow Government
to rest with its good work. “Independent members” of that House,
actuated by various motives, some of them not very clearly defined,
commenced to “amend” (?) in their own way, these laws (see Hansard’s
‘Reports of Parliamentary Proceedings’), by proposing numerous fresh
clauses and fresh Bills which, if Government had not resisted, would
most likely have doubled the existing number of the mercantile marine
statutes. They next commenced to introduce Bills of their own, to teach
Shipowners how to construct and equip their vessels. Among the first
of these measures was the Act to test chains and anchors, introduced
by Sir J. D. H. Elphinstone and the late Mr. John Laird. So far from
that Bill receiving the approval of Government, when I moved its
rejection,[310] was strongly supported by Mr. Milner Gibson, the then
President of the Board of Trade. We were, however, defeated, and the
Bill passed and became law.

Encouraged by this success, other independent members followed,
and, since then, most of the measures connected with the mercantile
marine of this country have been forced upon Government either by
Bills introduced by individual members, or by questions asked, or by
deputations from interested constituencies, or “philanthropists,” who,
however good in their intentions, are, too frequently, mischievously
ignorant of the subjects they force upon the attention of Parliament.
No one of my readers conversant with these matters can say that the
Bills of the last three or four years, except so far as necessary
amendments, were Government measures. They were nearly all forced upon
the executive, while the only real and valuable measure of Government,
the consolidation and codification of existing laws, has been, Session
after Session, rejected, or, at least, “shunted” aside by the House of
Commons.

For more than two centuries we attempted to regulate our maritime
commerce by means of the Navigation Laws and their innumerable
additions and amendments, the fallacy of which I have endeavoured in
these volumes to expose; yet we are now following the same course our
forefathers adopted by attempting, by means of a library of Mercantile
Marine Laws, to regulate the details of the business of our Shipowners.
Commerce, in all its branches, flourishes most when left alone. Leave
our Shipowners alone, except when they do wrong. Leave them to manage
their own affairs in such a manner as they consider most conducive to
their own interests, and we may rest assured that, if they have a fair
and free field and no special favours, they will maintain, against all
nations, the maritime supremacy of England.

[Sidenote: Necessity of a Mercantile Marine Code,]

My advice, therefore, to the House of Commons, if an old member may
venture to give it, would be to do nothing next Session in the way
of fresh legislation, but to confine itself to necessary amendments,
and to the codification of existing laws, so that Shipowners may have
one law for their guidance; at present they are bewildered by the
numerous fragmentary laws now in force. But, in addition to whatever
reorganisation and changes may be found necessary, increased facilities
would still seem requisite for the immediate payment of seamen’s wages
on their discharge; and, though the mode of inquiry into the causes of
the loss of life and property at sea has already been altered, greater
rigour is still demanded for such inquiries, and more prompt means of
detecting and punishing persons who ignorantly or negligently lose the
vessels in which they serve. In cases of wilful loss, which I hope
and believe are of rare occurrence, the law cannot be too prompt, too
stringent, nor too severe. A man who _wilfully_ loses his ship, I
rank without hesitation with the “villain and the murderer.”

[Sidenote: and of more prompt punishment in criminal cases.]

Nor should I have much more mercy on the Shipowner who recklessly
loses his ship, or who is accessory to her loss; and I should subject
to punishment, though in a different and more modified form, any
Shipowner who, either ignorantly or negligently, sends his ship to sea
in an unseaworthy state. In these matters, the law is still open to
improvement, both as regards greater facilities for the discovery of
crime and its prompt punishment, arising, as this does, in no small
degree, from its too complex character.

Although the Shipowner is now made liable for criminal neglect, and
cannot, by contract, relieve himself from this liability, such neglect
is difficult of proof, and a jury deciding against a Shipowner on
a question of damages, may, often, hesitate to make him criminally
responsible. If it were possible to enforce this liability in all cases
where guilty; if every Shipowner were made to feel that the proper
construction, equipment, loading, manning, and navigation of his ship
were matters to which it was his duty to attend, and if these duties
were enforced, it would produce much more salutary effects in the way
of saving life and property at sea than any Government surveys with
a legion of inspectors at their back: each one of these relieves the
Shipowner from a duty which belongs to him alone, and relieves, or, at
the least, might relieve, him from a part of his responsibility; for
if, as in the case of compulsory pilotage, a Shipowner is relieved from
responsibility in case of accident, he cannot, in common justice, be
held criminally liable when he has acted in conformity with such laws
as have been passed for his guidance and control.

Whether it would be possible, as has been recommended, to establish
by positive enactment an absolute and indefeasible obligation on the
part of every Shipowner to his shippers, passengers, and underwriters,
that he and the agents to whom he trusts his ships, shall do all in
their power to make and _keep_ his ship seaworthy, is a problem
I am not, at present, prepared to solve; moreover, it raises numerous
questions of great difficulty and delicacy.

Some amendments may be, also, required in the tonnage and measurement
law, which, though, as I have already explained, now a vast
improvement on any previous law, still presents features of hardship
alike on Shipowners and seamen, as, in the case of the latter, frequent
instances occur where the law is evaded by the stowage of cargo or
stores in spaces appointed by the present Act for the accommodation of
the crew.

Such are the leading measures which may still require the attention of
the Legislature; but, before closing my remarks, I desire my readers to
recollect the existence of a Merchant Shipping Code, which has not yet
become law. It embraces all the laws relating to Merchant Shipping, and
if the First Minister would take up this Bill and amend it in detail,
he would not merely confer a boon on the largest shipping community the
world has ever seen, but one by which his name would be long remembered.

If the Legislature did nothing else during the ensuing Session, it
would be a Session well spent: ten clear sittings[311] would, however,
suffice, if there was a determination on both sides of the House to
allow no party spirit to interfere. Nor should any such feeling be
displayed, for the questions now to be considered are almost wholly of
an executive and not of a political character; while all the materials
are now ready, the lengthened inquiries and discussions to which almost
every point except insurance (and on this there must be further inquiry
before there is any legislation) has been already subjected, render
further discussion, in a great measure, unnecessary.

[Sidenote: Concluding remarks on the extraordinary progress of British
shipping.]

I have endeavoured to show how much progress has been made during the
last quarter of a century—a progress eminently due to the repeal of our
Navigation Laws and to many of the earlier measures of the Board of
Trade, in confirmation of which I may point to the magnificent ships
now produced, to the enormous extent of our mercantile fleets,[312] as
compared with those of all other nations, and to the superiority of our
officers to what they were before the repeal of the Navigation Laws.

There is, nevertheless, a wide and noble field in which the statesman
might employ his power and genius to great advantage, and earn for
himself an imperishable name. The means are now in a great measure
at his disposal. But he must decide between two principles. He must
not, on the one hand, give way to the question of sentiment or to
the popular cry that merchant ships and their cargoes shall be under
Government survey, and, at the same time, hold Shipowners responsible
for acts which legislation has placed beyond their control. If he
adopts the former course, he must double or treble the existing staff
of officials; but I venture to warn him that, in so doing, he will
place a canker-worm at the root of our maritime greatness, which
will as surely destroy the mighty fabric we have raised by individual
genius, energy, and skill, as ever did the “dry rot” in our wooden
ships of war and commerce.

Seeing what our Shipowners have already accomplished, he might to
advantage afford them facilities for _self-government_. The
means, as I have shown, are already at his disposal. We have Lloyd’s
Register, with its large staff of competent surveyors ready to aid,
at our disposal, as also a similar association in Liverpool. We have
mercantile marine boards, elected by popular constituencies, at all the
leading seaports in the kingdom, under whose supervision the shipping
officers are now placed, as well as the examination of all masters and
mates. Leave them as they are; but, as I understand that these boards
are not overburdened by the duties now devolving on them, could not
their duties in relation to the crews be extended and some arrangement
be made whereby these different institutions, formed into one, two, or
more central and district boards, might perform all the work of detail
now required by Parliament? By some such amalgamation everything the
country requires could be done more economically and efficiently than
at present.

Lloyd’s Registry now tests all anchors and chains as required by
Parliament, without any disturbance of their functions or the work for
which they were originally constituted, the voluntary classification
of ships. Why should we not place in their hands such duties connected
with the ship herself as the regulation of load-lines, certification of
seaworthiness, if found expedient, and the supervision of all matters
of detail which Parliament may consider necessary, in the construction,
equipment, loading, and navigation of our ships? All these matters
would be much better done by a popularly elected board chosen from
merchant Shipowners and underwriters than by any Department of the
Government. In their hands might be safely placed the appointment of
surveyors: one Department of this new Board attending to the hull of
the ship, the other to her navigation, as at present; all these matters
being subject, of course, to such regulations as Parliament might
consider it expedient to impose, and represented in Parliament by the
President of the Board of Trade, or, in lieu thereof, by a Secretary of
State for Commerce, should that be desirable.

I merely throw out these remarks for consideration, being aware that
many obstacles, though few real difficulties, would require to be
overcome in carrying out some such re-organisation as I venture to
suggest. But whatever changes Ministers may consider most expedient
to adopt, they must not lightly tamper with the merchant fleets which
the skill and genius of our people have created, or with the position
they have achieved since relieved from those legislative enactments,
by which they were bound for more than two centuries. These fleets
are now the largest, and unquestionably the finest, in the world, and
instead of foreigners overstocking our own ports as was prophesied, we
now conduct the greater portion of the maritime commerce of foreign
nations.[313] It is, therefore, no idle boast to say, that while the
sun never sets on the dominions of our Queen, there is no ocean, no
sea, and, I might add, were it not for the exclusive policy of the
United States and of France, with a few other insignificant exceptions,
no lake, no river, where the British flag is not unfurled, and where
it does not shed its civilising and beneficial influence, over many
peoples of varied tongues, who might otherwise still be living in
darkness, if not in barbarism.

It behoves, therefore, our Statesmen to take care how they deal with
this great interest—made great by the freedom of our laws and by
the energy of our people; and, whatever further legislation may be
necessary, it is seriously to be hoped that Government will confine
its measures to their legitimate object; viz. the clear definition of
the legal duties and responsibilities of Shipowners, the maintenance
of lighthouses, buoys and beacons on our coasts, the general
regulations necessary for the proper conduct of maritime commerce, the
investigation into the true cause of all accidents at sea, and the
prompt punishment of all persons who wrongfully and wilfully violate
the law.


FOOTNOTES:

[267] This term had its origin in the early part of the present
century, when so many of H.M.’s 10-gun brigs, employed in carrying
the mails, or on other short services, were lost, especially on their
Atlantic voyages, that they got the name of “_coffins_.”

[268] See Appendix, No. 13, p. 634, where a list will be found of
the different Acts of Parliament which have been passed relating to
merchant shipping since 1849.

[269] See ‘History of Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign
Shipping,’ Appendix, No. 12, p. 624.

[270] See _ante_, vol. iii. pp. 48 and 50.

[271] See Parl. Paper C. 630, 1872.

[272]

  +---------------------------------------------------+
  |       WRECKS, &C., OTHER THAN COLLISIONS IN THE   |
  |                   UNITED KINGDOM.                 |
  +-------------+-----------+----------------+--------+
  |    Year.    |Total Loss.| Partial Damage.|  Total |
  +-------------+-----------+----------------+--------+
  |    1856     |    368    |      469       |    837 |
  |    1857     |    384    |      482       |    866 |
  |    1858     |    354    |      515       |    869 |
  |    1859     |    527    |      540       |  1,067 |
  |    1860     |    476    |      605       |  1,081 |
  |    1861     |    513    |      658       |  1,171 |
  |    1862     |    455    |      695       |  1,150 |
  |    1863     |    503    |      830       |  1,333 |
  |    1864     |    386    |      653       |  1,039 |
  |    1865     |    470    |      832       |  1,302 |
  |    1866     |    562    |      876       |  1,438 |
  |    1867     |    656    |    1,020       |  1,676 |
  |    1868     |    527    |      841       |  1,368 |
  |    1869     |    606    |    1,047       |  1,653 |
  |    1870     |    411    |      730       |  1,141 |
  |    1871     |    398    |      826       |  1,224 |
  |    1872     |    439    |    1,110       |  1,549 |
  |    1873    }|           |                |        |
  |Jan. to June}|    212    |      522       |    734 |
  |             +-----------+----------------+--------+
  |    Total    |  8,247    |   13,251       | 21,498 |
  +-------------+-----------+----------------+--------+

Annual average of 17 years, 472-11/17 total wrecks, and 748-13/17
casualties resulting in partial damage.

_Note._—In the above statistical statement no earlier date than
1856 is taken, as the machinery had not in 1855 being sufficiently
organised to ensure that nearly all the wrecks, &c., in that year were
reported; and there is reason to believe that some may not have been
reported in the years 1856, 7, and 8.

[273]

[Sidenote: Return of lives lost and saved between 1855 and 1873.]

The following table shows the number of lives saved, and the number of
lives lost on and near the coasts of the United Kingdom, 1855-1873.

  -------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+--------
         |                     LIVES SAVED.                                                 |
         +------+----------+-----------+--------+------------+----------+----------+--------+
   Year. |  By  |By Rocket,|By Luggers,|By Ships|   By       |   By     |  By      | Total  |
         | Life |and Mortar|   and     |  and   |  Ships’    |Individual| other    | Lives  |
         |Boats.|Apparatus,|Coastguard | Steam  |   own      |Exertion. | means.   | Saved. | Lives
         |      |Lines, &c.| and other | Boats. |  Boats.    |          |          |        | Lost.[274]
         |      |          |   Boats.  |        |            |          |          |        |
  -------+------+----------+-----------+--------+------------+----------+----------+--------+--------
  1855-6 |  336 |    499   |    1351   |    489 |            |    22    |          |  2,697 |    485
  1856-7 |  634 |    383   |     606   |    587 |            |    21    |          |  2,231 |    521
  1857-8 |  120 |    149   |     683   |    244 |            |    17    |          |  1,213 |    539
  1858-9 |  220 |    154   |     878   |    622 |            |    16    |          |  1,890 |    353
  1859-60|  367 |    407   |     681   |    769 |    951[275]|     9    |          |  3,184 |  1,647
  1860-1 |  771 |    415   |     467   |    858 |  1,499     |    14    |  362[275]|  4,386 |    537
  1861-2 |  322 |    415   |     371   |    919 |  1,425     |    27    |  396     |  3,875 |    884
  1862-3 |  291 |    252   |     414   |  1,319 |  1,289     |     9    |  531     |  4,105 |    690
  1863-4 |  472 |    256   |     424   |  1,533 |  1,465     |    10    |  439     |  4,599 |    620
  1864-5 |  293 |    347   |     338   |  1,003 |  1,459     |    22    |  232     |  3,694 |    516
  1865-6 |  480 |    490   |     462   |  1,000 |  2,195     |     7    |  374     |  5,008 |    698
  1866-7 |  378 |    527   |     385   |    986 |  2,728     |    13    |  765     |  5,782 |    896
  1867-8 |  377 |    310   |     843   |  1,060 |  1,902     |     6    |  660     |  5,158 |  1,333
  1868-9 |  504 |    333   |     317   |    719 |  2,062     |          |  561     |  4,496 |    824
  1869-70|  532 |    354   |     383   |    714 |  2,067     |     8    |  443     |  4,501 |    933
  1870-1 |  473 |    203   |     500   |  1,062 |  2,795     |     2    |  459     |  5,495 |    774
  1871-2 |  403 |    293   |     265   |    990 |  1,737     |          |  245     |  3,933 |    626
  1872-3 |  548 |    715   |     582   |    647 |  1,888     |     6    |  388     |  4,774 |    590
  -------+------+----------+-----------+--------+------------+----------+----------+--------+--------
   Total | 7521 |   6502   |    9950   | 15,522 | 25,462     |   209    | 5855     | 71,021 | 13,466
  -------+------+----------+-----------+--------+------------+----------+----------+--------+--------

[274] The figures in this column show the number of lives lost between
the 1st January and 31st of December in each year. The number of lives
lost during the first six months of 1873 is 728.

[275] No record kept for former years.

[276] We expended between 1555 and 1873 143,660_l._ (see ‘Wreck
Returns, 1874,’ p. 11) in providing apparatus for saving life, and
in rewards to individuals as well as awards of the National Lifeboat
Institution (apart altogether from the efforts of that noble Society,
about which see _ante_, note, p. 315), and Her Majesty was
graciously pleased (12th April, 1867) to issue her warrant instituting
two decorations, the “Albert Medal of the first class,” and the
“Albert Medal of the second class,” to reward brave men, who have been
conspicuous for saving life at sea or on the coast.

[277] The total number of vessels and their tonnage, including their
repeated voyages, that entered and cleared at the ports in the United
Kingdom with cargoes and in ballast from and to foreign countries
and British possessions for the year 1873 was 130,075, of 44,439,986
tons; the entrances and clearance coastwise with cargoes only, 332,148
vessels, of 40,632,014 tons. If I add to these the coasters in ballast
and those with the description of cargo of which no note is taken at
the Customs, as also the vessels frequenting the Channel, and bound for
Hamburg, Bremen, and the Northern ports of Europe, which do not enter
any of the ports of the United Kingdom, of which no return is kept,
it will be found that I have not over-estimated the number which now
annually pass along or frequent our coasts.—‘Navigation and Shipping of
the United Kingdom for the Year 1873.’ Presented to Parliament, 1874.

[278] This point involves many grave questions. Happily, men do not
altogether live for the purpose of making money—they have other and
far nobler objects in view. Some, indeed, but they are rare and
grand characters, live altogether for the benefit of mankind and the
progress of the human race. There are others who follow a business or
profession, not altogether because it yields them profit, but because
it affords them pleasure. Such is the case to a large extent in this
country. We are a seafaring people, and we pursue occupations in
connexion with it frequently as much for pleasure as for profit. We
enjoy the business of Shipowners, because it is natural to us, and
we take a delight in improving the forms of our ships. I have seen a
captain whose heart was in his ship, caress her!—yes, caress her, by
clapping the taffrail where he stood when she was performing her work
to his satisfaction, as if she had been a living thing, and heard him
exclaiming, “Go a-head, my beauty!” just as many persons may have
been heard extolling the performance of a favourite horse. Care must,
therefore, be taken not to interfere by _unnecessary legislative
enactments_ with what is not merely our business but our pride and
pleasure, or we may be driven, to the serious loss of the nation,
to seek other investments for our capital. We have now arrived at
that point where competition has become so close that if we tax our
Shipowners to any greater extent than they are now taxed, directly or
indirectly (interference with their affairs is the heaviest as well as
the most obnoxious of all taxes), we shall most assuredly drive their
ships from the trades in which they are now engaged, or compel them to
submit to the humiliation of seeking a Foreign register, and hoisting a
Foreign flag.

[279] See _ante_, p. 465.

[280] The year previous to 1873-4 was a much more disastrous one than
the year before it, as there were 728 lives lost in the six months
ending 30th June, 1873, which is in some measure accounted for by the
wreck of the ship _Northfleet_, when 293 lives were lost.

[281] See Parl. Paper, 214, 1875, pp. 4 and 11.

[282] As it has often been broadly stated that employment in British
ships is much more dangerous now than it was in 1836, when the first
Committee sat to inquire into the cause of shipwrecks, I may reply
that the most careful analysis shows that, while the losses were then
on the average of the three previous years 3·72 percentage of the
number of vessels (or rather of their tonnage) employed, they were for
the three years previous to 1873 only 2·95 per cent., although these
years were exceptionally fatal to ships laden with timber, grain, and
coal (see Appendix to ‘Commission on Unseaworthy Ships,’ pp. 780 and
791), arising from the enormous increase in the oversea trade of these
articles. For instance, while in 1861, 57,745,993 cwts. of corn were
imported, the imports in 1872 amounted to 97,765,298 cwts. The imports
of timber rose between the same periods from 3,358,589 to 4,949,786
loads; and the oversea exports of coals from 7,934,832 in 1861 to
13,198,494 tons in 1872.

[283] Lighthouses, 6 & 7 Wm. IV. cap. 79.

[284] Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 16 & 17 Vict. cap. 131.

[285] Merchant Shipping Act, 36 & 37 Vict. cap. 85.

[286] Parl. Paper, C. 1152, 1875.

[287] However beneficial in its results, it may well be questioned
if any body of surveyors ought to be empowered at their pleasure,
without complaint, to thus retard trade and stop the ordinary course
of commerce; and I am disposed to question alike the policy and the
wisdom, as well as the necessity, of this regulation. There appear
to be now employed in these questionable operations, no less than
117 Government surveyors, “shipwrights,” and “engineers,” stationed
at different ports in the United Kingdom, twelve of whom are
retired officers of the Royal Navy, besides a good many so-called
“shipwrights,” who can have very little knowledge of the construction
of merchant ships or of their requirements.[288] In making these
appointments, the fact seems to have been overlooked that, at all
our ports, there are the surveyors of Lloyd’s Register, or of other
similar associations, whose services might have been utilised with
a great saving of public expenditure, and with, perhaps, greater
efficiency. Yet I read, to my astonishment, in the public journals not
long since a letter (6th August, 1875) from Mr. Plimsoll, addressed to
the President of the Board of Trade, in which, among much irrelevant
matter, he urgently recommends eighteen more surveyors to be appointed
by Government, at a salary of not less than 1000_l._ per annum. I
sincerely trust no such appointments will be made; but that Government
will direct its attention to other more economical and more efficient
modes of removing the evils of which Mr. Plimsoll complains, if indeed
they exist at all to the extent alleged. There is no use hiding the
fact that all such appointments must be filled, in a great measure,
through patronage, and that it would be impossible to find men, even
at the tempting salary named, competent for the numerous technical and
responsible duties that would be required of them. But if such men
could be found, are we to hand over the whole of the vast maritime
interests of this country, from the time the keel is laid to the
despatch of the ship to sea, to the supervision and control of a
certain number of Government officials, however competent? As it is,
the duties of the surveyors, already appointed, are too frequently as
ludicrous as they are questionable. I daresay Mr. Plimsoll must have
felt this when he recommended in his letter to Sir Charles Adderley,
that “we ought not to have less than four detaining officers in
Ireland, four in Scotland, and ten in England, and that the _minimum
average(?)_ salary should be 1000_l._ per annum.” Of course
he meant them to look after the officers already appointed as well as
after the ships; and that they should be “apart altogether from the
Permanent Secretary, and the Secretary of the Marine Department,” whom
he charges, in the same letter, without, by the way, one tittle or
shadow of evidence, with the grossest dereliction of duty.

[288] The staff of the Board of Trade, and its cost for salaries, in
1875 were as follows:—

  ---------------------------------------------------+-------+---------
                                                     |       |Aggregate
                   Employment.                       |Number.| Salary.
  ---------------------------------------------------+-------+---------
                                                     |       |    £
  In the Board of Trade and registry of seamen       |  237  |  48,760
  Examinations                                       |   13  |   3,355
  Mercantile marine offices                          |  237  |  24,416
  Surveyors, emigration officers, tonnage measurers,}|       |
    recorders of draught of water                   }|  154  |  30,078
  Nautical assessors                                 |       |   3,000
                                                     +-------+--------
                        Total                        |  641  |  109,609
  ---------------------------------------------------+-------+---------

[289] I feel no hesitation in giving, from the public journals, an
account of this most extraordinary and unusual scene, not merely as
an episode in the history of Merchant Shipping, but to explain the
circumstances under which the temporary Act now in force was passed at
the close of the Session of 1875:—

“Mr. CHARLEY asked the First Lord of the Treasury whether he could
hold out any hopes of being able to afford facilities for the third
reading of the Infanticide Bill in time to enable the House of Lords to
consider it this Session.

“Mr. DISRAELI said he thought he could hold out some hopes to the hon.
member. He felt some difficulty on Monday in stating the intentions of
the Government, but this arose from their desire to pass the Merchant
Shipping Bill this Session; but, finding it impossible to get through
the committee on the Agricultural Holdings Bill this week, they had
come to the conclusion to abandon the Merchant Shipping Bill. It had
been submitted to the Government that they might pass the Bill in
a modified form, but he declined to deal with the subject in that
fragmentary manner. All he could say was that they would take the
earliest opportunity of bringing forward the measure next Session.

“Mr. GOSCHEN, speaking on behalf of the shipping interest, expressed
his extreme regret that the Merchant Shipping Bill had been sacrificed
for the Agricultural Holdings Bill.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL earnestly entreated the Government not to consign
thousands of their fellow-creatures to an undeserved grave. There were,
he said, shipowners of murderous tendencies—(‘Order, order!’)—who had
frustrated the passing of the Bill by protracted debates. The secretary
of Lloyd’s had assured a friend of his that he did not know of a single
ship which had been broken up during the past thirty years because it
was worn out. The result was that hundreds of brave fellows were sent
to unhallowed graves by these speculative scoundrels—(cries of ‘Order!’
and uproar).

“The SPEAKER informed the hon. member that his remarks were out of
order. When the Merchant Shipping Bill, which was on the orders of
the day, came up for consideration he would have an opportunity of
addressing the House.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL said he would give notice that on Tuesday next he would
put a question to the President of the Board of Trade with reference
to certain vessels which had been lost, entailing a great sacrifice
of human life, and would ask whether those vessels were not owned by
Mr. Edward Bates, the member for Plymouth, or a person bearing the
same name. He should also have some questions to put, with respect to
members on the Liberal side of the House, for he was determined to
unmask the villains who sent these people to their death—(cries of
‘Order!’ and tremendous uproar).

“The SPEAKER said: The hon. member has used the term ‘villains.’ I
trust that he did not apply it to any members of this House.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL: I did, sir, and I shall not withdraw it.

“The SPEAKER: The conduct of the hon. member is altogether
unparliamentary, and I call on him to withdraw the language—(cheers).

“Mr. PLIMSOLL (excitedly): And I must again decline to withdraw it.

“In reply to a third interrogation by the Speaker, the hon. member
again declined to withdraw. The SPEAKER: The hon. member declines to
withdraw, and I must submit his conduct to the judgment of the House.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL, standing in the centre of the House, said he would
submit to the judgment of the House. Once more approaching the table,
holding a paper in his hand, said, ‘This, sir, is my protest,’ and was
proceeding to address the House, but in obedience to loud cries of
‘Order!’ he took his seat on the front bench below the gallery.

“Mr. DISRAELI rose and said that the conduct of the hon. member was
almost unparalleled.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL, jumping up and interrupting: ‘And so is that of the
Government’—(tremendous uproar).

“Mr. DISRAELI, continuing, said: I feel that it is my duty, as far as
I can, to uphold the dignity and honour of the House; for the conduct
of the hon. member has been not only violent, but so offensive, that
it is impossible for the House to pass it over. As the hon. member has
declined to withdraw the word used, it is my duty to move that he be
reprimanded by the Speaker for his disorderly and violent conduct—(loud
cheers).

“The SPEAKER said that according to the practice of the House the hon.
member for Derby would answer in his place, and then withdraw.

“Mr. PLIMSOLL retired to the bar, and as he reached it, turned round
apparently with the intention of saying something, but the members
there prevailed on him to pass out, and as he did so, he exclaimed:
‘You do not know the men as well as I do. This will cost the lives of
thousands.’ The hon. member then left the House.

“The Marquis of HARTINGTON rose and was about to address the House, but
was informed by the Speaker that the motion before the House was, that
the hon. member for Derby be reprimanded.

“The Marquis of HARTINGTON said he need hardly state that he should
support the motion—(cheers). It was evident that the hon. member was
labouring under great excitement, but he was not justified in using
the language he had employed. No doubt, when he had a little time for
reflection, he would see his conduct in a different light—(cheers).

“Mr. SULLIVAN said the scene they had witnessed was without precedent
in the House, but he appealed to the House to be indulgent to the
hon. member. He was aware that the hon. member was extremely ill, and
his state of mental excitement arose from his overstrained feelings.
Without seeking to justify the transgression of the hon. member, he
wished the House would allow him to have a week’s rest, by which
time he would be in a position to apologise for his misconduct. He
(Mr. Sullivan) held in his hands the documents which had wrought the
hon. member up to his present state of excitement, and for some time
past his friends had been caused the most serious uneasiness by the
deplorable state of his mind. If the House would afford him a few days’
rest, he would no doubt be able to set himself right—(cheers).

“Mr. DISRAELI then moved that the hon. member for Derby be requested to
attend in his place on this day week—(loud cheers).

“Mr. FAWCETT said that Mr. Plimsoll was at present in an extremely
painful state of excitement. He had gone out to him in the lobby, and
found him in the most lamentable condition. By great effort he had
persuaded him to take a walk in the open air—(great laughter). At the
end of a week there was little doubt that he would withdraw the violent
expressions he had used—(cheers).

“Mr. BASS, as the colleague of Mr. Plimsoll, offered his grateful
acknowledgments to the House for the course they had taken—(cheers).

“The matter then dropped.

“On the motion for discharging the Merchant Shipping Bill,

“Mr. BATES said that he wished, with the indulgence of the House,
to make a statement with respect to what had fallen from the hon.
member for Derby earlier in the sitting. All who had witnessed the
extraordinary exhibition would agree with him that the hon. member for
Derby was not responsible for his actions. With respect to himself
it was unfortunately true that he had lost during the last two years
five ships; but ships better found in every respect were never sent to
sea. They were all of them iron ships, and classed A 1. To himself,
personally, pecuniarily the loss was very severe, as he never insured
his ships for more than one-half or two-thirds of their market value.
That was not so much the matter; but he did deplore the loss of his
men, and his only consolation was that, as far as human foresight could
go, the ships were as good and as safe as man could make them. He felt
assured that the statement of the hon. member for Derby would be looked
upon by all, as he looked upon it, with pity—(cheers).

“The House shortly afterwards adjourned.”

Mr. Plimsoll subsequently apologised for his conduct to the House. But
it is much to be regretted, _on his own account_, that he neither
attempted to substantiate the charges he had brought against Mr. Bates,
nor asked leave to withdraw them.

[290] When the Bill was withdrawn there stood upon the orders of the
day of the House of Commons no less than 178 amendments to it, many
of them on subjects of great importance and difficulty, as well as of
great intricacy. See _Times’_ report of Mr. Disraeli’s speech at
the Mansion House, 4th August, 1875.

[291] ‘Unseaworthy Ships,’ 38 & 39 Vict. cap. 88.

[292] Already there seems to be a misapprehension. Mr. Plimsoll, as
would appear by the newspapers, has been spending his vacation on the
shores of the Black Sea and Danube, visiting the grain ports, and
instructing the masters of all vessels loading grain how to stow it in
accordance with the conditions of the new Act. That he is clearly of
opinion that inspectors should be appointed is evident from the fact
that he appointed forty of them! and that the Foreign Office approves
of what he has done! What next and next? But the Board of Trade, by the
correspondence which has been published, is of an entirely different
opinion, and maintains that the Act of Parliament gives no such power.
Nor does it! Nor should it! It is not the duty of Government to appoint
inspectors to see that its laws are carried into effect. I say nothing
as to the expense and impracticability of having surveyors at every
port in the world where a ship is to load grain; but, if such is the
meaning of the Act as applicable to grain ships, where is this sort
of legislation to end? Are we to have Government inspectors to see to
the loading of all our ships at home and abroad? And if so, why should
this new system not be applied to every branch of commerce? Nay, why
should it not extend into our houses? Surely heavy penalties would, in
the case of grain ships, be a much more effectual mode of enforcing
the conditions of the Act. Is there to be no end to the folly of
unauthorised individuals appointing surveyors to inspect the loading
of our ships abroad, or interfering with duties alone within the power
of the Executive Government? It is high time we put a stop to these
well-meaning, but Quixotic, proceedings.

[293] I cannot understand what is meant by the word “keep.” A ship
sails in a seaworthy condition, but an accident happens on the voyage
which _may_ render her “unseaworthy”: is the master, under such
circumstances, to put back to the nearest port for repairs? and if he
does not do so, and his ship is lost, it may be from causes wholly
different, is his policy of insurance to be invalid, and is he to be
responsible for any loss of life that may thus occur?

[294] In Mr. Plimsoll’s protest, which, as the rules of the House of
Commons would not allow him to present, he either threw upon the table,
or had dropped into the House from one of the galleries,[295] he says,
“I charge the Government that they are wittingly and unwittingly, for
they are both, playing into the hands of the maritime murderers inside
the House and outside the House to secure a further continuance of the
present murderous system.”... “I desire to unmask the villains who
sit in the House, fit representatives of the more numerous, but not
greater, villains who are outside the House.” I offer no comment on
this language. It tells its own tale of the state of mind of its author.

[295] The disgraceful scenes in the House of Commons could not have
arisen from Mr. Plimsoll’s momentary excitement, when the Government
announced the withdrawal of its Bill, but must have been premeditated,
as this carefully prepared protest too clearly shows.

[296] Mr. John W. A. Harper, Secretary to the Salvage Association. See
Question 8769, p. 311.

[297] See also evidence, W. J. Lamport, Question 5556, p. 192. With
regard to the question of overloading, Mr. Lamport made a remarkable
statement, which I do not hesitate to give at length, because it
differs entirely from an opinion prevailing at present in the public
mind.

The CHAIRMAN asked (Question 556): “From your knowledge of the
shipping in Liverpool during forty years, Do you think that there has
been a great deal of overloading?”—“Since it was intimated to me that
I was to be asked to give evidence in this room, I have been trying to
task my memory for cases in which when vessels had foundered or had
not been heard of, I myself had felt a reasonable suspicion that the
cause was overloading. I have not been able to bring to my recollection
a single instance of the kind. Now this result, I must confess, was a
little startling to myself, and in order to check it I spoke to the
overlooker of my firm, who is a man older than myself, who has had
longer experience than I have had, and who, from his outdoor business,
would probably hear of such things more frequently than I should. The
overlooker told me that he himself did not remember a single instance,
in which he had suspected that any vessel which had left the port of
Liverpool had been lost because of being overloaded.”

I may add, from my intimate knowledge of Mr. Lamport, which extended
over a period of thirty years up to his untimely death, that these
were no mere words of course. Indeed, the statement agrees with my
own experience; and, from the inquiries I have made elsewhere, there
are comparatively very few ships lost from overloading, except in the
coasting and short-voyage trades. In confirmation of this opinion, the
Commissioners, in their final report, state that “It is chiefly among
the small coasting vessels that any habitual overloading prevails,” and
“that there are a large number of ships in ballast annually lost, while
the losses from collisions show that the management and negligence of
sailors are not less disastrous than the carelessness of shipowners.”

[298] It appears to me to be a grave mistake to require the insertion
in the ship’s articles of the draught of water. These articles are an
agreement between owner, master, and crew, and are binding on all. How
can a drowned sailor’s family claim compensation for a vessel being
loaded to a draught the sailor himself agreed to?

[299] Mr. Gray, the Assistant-Secretary to the Board of Trade, stated
(Question 10,088) that the Board had received a letter from Mr.
Plimsoll, suggesting that the Department should employ the staff of
‘Lloyd’s Register’ to assist in the survey of certain merchant ships.

[300]

[Sidenote: Opinion of Mr. Charles McIver.]

In going carefully through the evidence taken before the Royal
Commission on Unseaworthy Ships, I cannot find that any witness
objects to the principle that no ship should be allowed to proceed
to sea that is unseaworthy, nor do I find that any Shipowner would
object to a survey of his ship for the purpose of ascertaining her
seaworthiness. Indeed, Mr. Charles McIver, of Liverpool, the senior
partner of the Cunard Company, and a gentleman of great experience,
though he does not class any of his ships for somewhat the same reason
as I have stated, considers it advisable that all ships should be
_classed_—not merely certified as seaworthy, but _classed_.
The Chairman (Question 9245, p. 331) remarked: “You said you would not
have any objection to have your vessels classed;” and then he asked,
“Do you think it advisable that all ships should be classed?—I think
so, from what I have seen in the last two or three years. If you will
allow me, I will give another reason. I once got nearly cast away in
an unclassed vessel about forty years ago. I was going to the States.
She was a wooden vessel. I had taken a passage in her along with my
sister, because I knew the captain of the ship. She was loaded with
steam-engines and coals. I shall not mention the ports or the owners,
because they are all dead and gone, the captain included. Off the
Azores we fell in with a gale of wind. It only lasted for twelve hours;
but, if it had lasted for twenty-four hours, she would have gone down.
The captain came to me, and said, ‘If I had known that she was as bad
as this, I would not have let you come.’ He said, ‘Her beams are away
from the sides.’ I said, ‘I know that she is making water very rapidly,
because it is coming out as clear as it went in,’ and they were pumping
every two hours, and so forth. Now, I do not mean to say that there
may not be culpability in the owner, but, sometimes, it is ignorance.
So it was in that case; they did not believe that the ship was as bad
as she was. My remark to the captain was, ‘When you go home you had
better throw up command of this vessel or you will lose your life.’ He
did so; but, in some way or other, he mixed up Mr. McIver’s name with
it. The owner said, ‘Mr. McIver is frightened.’ The captain said, ‘No,
he is not frightened, but he knows too much.’ He said, ‘I will give up
the ship.’ Now, to show you that I did not think that there was any
intentional culpability on the part of the owner, but simply ignorance,
or simply that they could do what I could not do, because I knew too
much, they gave that ship to the mate, and sent that vessel away in his
charge for a long voyage abroad, and she did it safely. The next voyage
she was never heard of. Now, any sort of classing, I think, would have
prevented that ship from going to sea.”

[301] Appendix No. 12, p. 624.

[302] The writer of a letter which appeared in the ‘Nautical Magazine,’
headed “‘Lloyd’s Register’ and the Great Steam Lines,” and which
was afterwards published separately (Pewtress & Co. London. 1872),
says, “It is very remarkable that the classing of large steamers with
Lloyd’s was nearly wholly omitted until 1870;” arising, I may add,
from the fact that the ‘Liverpool Register’ allowed, in such ships,
scantlings and arrangements of which Lloyd’s surveyors disapproved.
“But,” continues the same writer a little further on, “it is much more
remarkable that February 1870 is the date of Lloyd’s new rules, which
are, it is supposed, an abandonment of the principle and scantlings of
the old rules.” We have here exemplified in the most forcible manner
the evils of competing classification associations.

[303] Safety depends much more on the nature of the cargo, and
the manner in which it is stowed, than most people, or even some
shipowners, suppose. Dead weight, when stowed close and very low,
while it makes a vessel stiff—that is, “stand up” to a heavy pressure
of canvas, makes her roll in a calm when there is a heavy swell (like
the pendulum of a clock), to the injury of her spars and rigging, and,
not unfrequently, to roll her masts overboard. Railway and other bar
iron, which is now a very common description of cargo, should always be
stowed in a triangular form, and the heavier the bars the wider should
be the angles. Ores of every description, on an oversea voyage, should
be stowed in a boxed hold, or on platforms in the centre of the ship,
thoroughly blocked from the sides. In a word, the proper stowage of
a ship, whether as regards her form or the nature of her cargo, is a
science which has not been sufficiently studied.

[304] We must ever remember that although, since we relieved our
Shipowners of all the restrictions to which they were subjected by
the Navigation Laws, they have advanced above all other nations, the
shipping of many of those nations are now running them a very close
race. If we burden them with load-lines, which prevent them from
carrying as much cargo with safety as a foreign vessel would be allowed
to do—half a foot, or even three inches less depth may deprive them of
all their profit—or saddle them with charges for surveys and so forth,
already very heavy, and to which their competitors are not subjected,
we, in either case, drive them from the trade. We must further, if we
adopt the principle of a certificate of seaworthiness, recollect the
interests of a great number of small coasters, and carefully consider
if it would not _seriously_ affect them.

[305] See ‘Final Report of Royal Commissioners on Unseaworthy Ships,’
p. 15.

[306] The following graphic description of the state of too many of
our ordinary merchant vessels when they sail is so true that I do not
hesitate to transfer it to these pages. I do so with the hope that the
Legislature may direct its earliest attention to the improvement of
the lamentable state of things here described, and with the conviction
that the first step towards that improvement would be the abolition
of the system of advances to seamen: “The ship is about to leave the
dock, when the crew, generally of a very inferior description, are
brought on board, and, frequently, in such a state of intoxication that
they are worse than useless during that day, and the ship must anchor
for the night. Next day the motley crew commence work reluctantly, in
a thoroughly strange ship, under strange officers, and are strangers
to each other. The chief officer has the unenviable task of getting
them into order, not having a man that he can depend upon. Yet it is
from that strange crew he must select look-out men, helmsmen, and
leadsmen during the ten or twelve hours’ darkness of the following
night.”—Extract of letter from Captain H. A. Moriarty, R.N., to the
‘Nautical Magazine’ for November 1875.

[307] My readers should be informed that a premium of insurance on
chartered freight out and home is much higher in proportion, than if
insured out only, and then, after arrival at port of destination, home
only.

[308] Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships, Appendix to the Report No.
51, and Questions 11,516 and 13,072.

[309] See ‘Final Report,’ p. 16.

[310] See _ante_, p. 318, note, and p. 480.

[311] See _ante_, p. 321. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, which
is quite as large as the Merchant Shipping Code Bill, now ready, passed
through Committee in one forenoon sitting.

[312]

  ------+--------------------------------+------------------------------
  Years.| Ships belonging to the British | British Steam Vessels Entered
        | Empire at the end of each Year,| and Cleared in the Foreign
        |    1850 to 1874 inclusive.     | Trade in the United Kingdom,
        |                                |   1850 to 1874 inclusive.
  ------+--------------+-----------------+--------------+---------------
        |    Number.   |     Tons        |   Number.    |      Tons.
  1850  |    34,281    |    4,232,962    |     8,350    |     1,802,955
  1852  |    34,402    |    4,424,392    |     7,059    |     1,980,473
  1860  |    38,501    |    5,710,968    |    12,777    |     4,186,620
  1862  |    39,427    |    6,041,358    |    15,201    |     5,239,493
  1870  |    37,587    |    7,149,134    |    29,369    |    13,341,058
  1872  |    36,804    |    7,213,829    |    35,570    |    17,430,029
  1873  |    36,825    |    7,294,230    |    37,175    |    18,943,653
  1874  |    36,935    |    7,533,492    |    37,606    |    19,408,527
  ------+--------------+-----------------+--------------+---------------

[313] See Appendix No. 14, p. 637. Tonnage entered and cleared in the
United Kingdom, United States, France, Holland, Norway, Prussia, and
Sweden, distinguishing between national and foreign ships from 1850 to
1873.




APPENDICES.


  No.                                                              Page

  1. CONVENTION OF COMMERCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE,
  1826                                                              563

  2. LETTER FROM MR. W. S. LINDSAY TO LORD LYONS, BOSTON, U.S.,
  1860                                                              567

  3. CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE RESPECTING THE LIABILITY
  OF BRITISH SHIPOWNERS IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED
  STATES OF AMERICA                                                 571

  4. LETTER TO THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH ON THE SUBJECT OF THE
  NAVIGATION LAWS OF FRANCE, 10TH JANUARY, 1861                     582

  5. LETTER FROM M. FLEURY AND REPLY, 17TH AND 23RD JUNE, 1862      590

  6. LETTER TO THE COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATION, LISBON, 28TH JANUARY,
  1863                                                              596

  7. SUMMARY OF THE ACTS PASSED FOR THE REGULATION OF PASSENGER
  SHIPS                                                             600

  8. PASSAGES OF CLIPPER SHIPS ENGAGED IN THE TRADE WITH CHINA      611

  9. LOG OF THE SAILING SHIP ‘THERMOPYLÆ’                           613

  10. STATISTICS OF TONNAGE BELONGING TO GREAT BRITAIN, UNITED
  STATES, FRANCE AND HOLLAND, FROM 1821 TO 1874                     618

  11. EXEMPTION IN FAVOUR OF CERTAIN BRITISH SHIPS FROM LOCAL PORT
  CHARGES IN 1852                                                   620

  12. HISTORY OF LLOYD’S REGISTER OF BRITISH AND FOREIGN SHIPPING   624

  13. ACTS OF PARLIAMENT PASSED BETWEEN 1849 AND 1875, INCLUSIVE,
  RELATING TO BRITISH SHIPS AND SEAMEN, AND OTHER PARLIAMENTARY
  PAPERS REFERRING THERETO                                          634

  14. TONNAGE OF SHIPPING ENTERED AND CLEARED IN THE UNITED
  KINGDOM, UNITED STATES, FRANCE, HOLLAND, NORWAY, PRUSSIA,
  AND SWEDEN, DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NATIONAL AND FOREIGN
  SHIPS FROM 1850 TO 1873                                           637




APPENDICES.


APPENDIX No. 1.

     _Convention of Commerce between his Britannic Majesty and
     the most Christian King, together with two additional Articles
     annexed, signed at London, 26th January, 1826._

Article 1.—French vessels coming from or departing for the ports of
France, or if in ballast, coming from or departing from any place,
shall not be subject in the ports of the United Kingdom, either on
entering into or departing from the same, to any higher duties of
tonnage, harbour, lighthouse, pilotage, quarantine, or other similar
or corresponding duties, of whatever nature, or under whatever
denomination, than those to which British vessels, in respect of the
same voyages, are or may be subject, on entering into or departing from
such ports; and, reciprocally, from and after the same period, British
vessels coming from or departing for the ports of the United Kingdom,
or if in ballast, coming from or departing for any place, shall not be
subject, in the ports of France, either in entering into or departing
from the same, to any higher duties of tonnage, harbour, lighthouse,
pilotage, quarantine, or other similar or corresponding duties, of
whatever nature, or under whatever denomination, than those to which
French vessels, in respect of the same voyages, are or may be subject
on entering into or departing from such ports, whether such duties are
collected separately or are consolidated in one and the same duty, his
most Christian Majesty reserving to himself to regulate the amount of
such duty or duties in France, according to the rate at which they are
or may be established in the United Kingdom, at the same time, with a
view of diminishing the burdens imposed upon the navigation of the two
countries. His most Christian Majesty will always be disposed to reduce
the amount of the said burdens in France in proportion to any reduction
which may hereafter be made of those now levied in the ports of the
United Kingdom.

2. Goods which can or may be legally imported into the ports of the
United Kingdom from the ports of France, if so imported in French
vessels, shall be subject to no higher duties than if imported in
British vessels; and, reciprocally, which can or may be legally
imported into the ports of France from the ports of the United Kingdom,
if so imported in British vessels, shall be subject to no higher duties
than if imported in French vessels. The produce of Asia, Africa, and
America, not being allowed to be imported from the said countries, nor
from any other in French vessels, nor from France in French, British,
or any other vessels into the ports of the United Kingdom for home
consumption, but only for warehousing and re-exportation, his most
Christian Majesty reserves to himself to direct that in like manner the
produce of Asia, Africa, and America shall not be imported from the
said countries, nor from any other, in British vessels, nor from the
United Kingdom in British, French, or any other vessels into the ports
of France for the consumption of that kingdom, but only for warehousing
and re-exportation.

With regard to the productions of the countries of Europe, it is
understood between the high contracting parties that such productions
shall not be imported in British ships into France for the consumption
of that kingdom, unless such ships shall have been laden therewith in
some port of the United Kingdom; that his Britannic Majesty may adopt,
if he shall think fit, some corresponding restrictive measure with
regard to the productions of the countries of Europe imported into the
ports of the United Kingdom in French vessels, the high contracting
parties reserving to themselves the power of making by mutual consent
such relaxation in the strict execution of the present article as they
may think useful to the respective interests of the two countries
upon the principle of mutual concessions, affording each to the other
reciprocal or equivalent advantages.

3. All goods which can or may be legally exported from the ports
of either of the two countries shall on their export pay the same
duties of exportation, whether the exportation of such goods be made
in British or French vessels, provided the said vessels proceed,
respectively, direct from the ports of the one country to the other.
And all the said goods so exported in British or French vessels shall
be reciprocally entitled to the same bounties, drawbacks, and other
allowances of the same nature which are granted by the regulations of
each country respectively.

4. It is mutually agreed between the high contracting parties that in
the intercourse of navigation between the two countries the vessels of
any third power shall in no case obtain more favourable conditions than
those stipulated in the present convention in favour of British and
French vessels.

5. The fishing-boats of either of the two countries which may be forced
by stress of weather to seek shelter in the ports or on the coast of
the other country shall not be subject to any duties or port charges of
any description whatever; provided the said boats when so driven in by
stress of weather shall not discharge or receive on board any cargo, or
portion of cargo, in the ports or on the parts of the coast where they
shall have sought shelter.

6. It is agreed that the provisions of the present convention between
the high contracting parties shall be reciprocally extended and in
force in all the possessions subject to their respective dominions in
Europe.

7. The present convention shall be in force for a term of ten years
from the 5th April of the present year; and further, until the end of
twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall have
given notice to the other of its intention to terminate its operation;
each of the high contracting parties reserving to itself the right of
giving such notice to the other at the end of the said term of ten
years, and it is agreed between them that at the end of twelve months’
extension agreed on both sides this convention and all the stipulations
thereof shall cease and determine.

8. The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications
shall be exchanged in London within the space of one month, or sooner
if possible.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the
same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London on 26th day of January, 1826.

                                                        GEORGE CANNING.

                                                     WILLIAM HUSKISSON.

                                                 LE PRINCE DE POLIGNAC.

_Additional Articles._

Article 1.—French vessels shall be allowed to sail from any port
whatever of the countries under the dominion of his most Christian
Majesty, to all the colonies of the United Kingdom (except those
possessed by the East India Company) and to import into the said
colonies all kinds of merchandise (being productions the growth or
manufacture of France) with the exception of such as are prohibited to
be imported into the said colonies, or are permitted to be imported
only from countries under the British dominion; and the said French
vessels, as well as the merchandise imported in the same, shall not be
subject in the colonies of the United Kingdom to other or higher duties
than those to which British vessels may be subject, or importing the
same merchandise from any foreign country, or which are imposed on the
merchandise itself.

2. French vessels shall be allowed to export from all the colonies of
the United Kingdom (except those of East India Company) all kinds of
merchandise which are not prohibited to be exported from such colonies
in vessels other than those of Great Britain; and the said vessels,
as well as the merchandise exported in the same, shall not be subject
to other or higher duties than those to which British vessels may be
subject on exporting the said merchandise, or which are imposed on the
merchandise itself, and they shall be entitled, to the same bounties,
drawbacks, and other allowances of the same nature to which British
vessels would be entitled on such exportation. These two additional
articles shall have the same force and validity as if they were
inserted word for word in the convention signed this day. They shall be
ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at the same time.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the
same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, 26th January, 1826.
                                                                                                                           GEORGE CANNING.
                                                 LE PRINCE DE POLIGNAC.
                                                     WILLIAM HUSKISSON.

A Treasury letter, dated 28th March, 1826, directs that French vessels
and their cargoes legally imported or exported on board the same,
according to the terms of the convention in the preceding pages, are
from 5th April, 1826, to be charged with such and like duties only
of whatever kind they may be that are charged on British vessels and
similar cargoes laden on board thereof, and in like manner the same
bounties, drawbacks, and allowances are to be paid on articles exported
in French vessels that are paid, granted, or allowed on similar
articles exported in British vessels. And the necessary instructions
are to be transmitted to the officers in the colonies for carrying into
effect the stipulations contained in the two additional articles of the
said convention respecting French vessels and their cargoes from 1st
October, 1826.


APPENDIX No. 2.

                                                  Boston, United States,
                                                  21st September, 1860.

  MY LORD,

Mr. Hammond was good enough to read to me a letter which Lord John
Russell had addressed to your Lordship on the subject of my visit to
the United States. As reports have been current since then that my
visit to this country was one of a semi-official character, I may
remark that I am here merely in search of a little recreation after the
labours of the session. But as I am intimate with many of the leading
Shipowners and merchants of this country, Lord John Russell was pleased
to furnish me with copies of the correspondence which had passed
between our own Government and that of the United States with regard to
various maritime questions (to which, as your Lordship may be aware, my
attention has for some years been directed), in the hope that I might
be able to aid your Lordship in their settlement.

These papers I have studied on the passage to this place. I see they
deal with questions of very considerable importance to both countries;
but there are also others which equally impede our commercial
intercourse, and all these various questions are well worthy of
consideration, and should be adjusted as soon as possible. They are:—

1st. The rules of the road at sea and collisions.

2nd. Signal lights.

3rd. Limitation of Shipowners’ liability.

4th. The Foreign Deserter’s Act.

5th. The punishment of offences committed on the high seas.

6th. The settlement of disputes between the masters of ships and their
crews in foreign ports; and the extension of the use of our shipping
offices to the vessels of the United States.

There are, besides these questions, others of a much more difficult
and delicate character, such as belligerent rights of sea, the
coasting trade of the United States, and the registration in America
of British-built ships, all of great political as well as commercial
importance, and therefore I fear my services in their solution can
be of little value. It is, however, my intention to enter into
conversation bearing upon all these questions with the leading
merchants and Shipowners to whom I am known; and with the Presidents
of the Chambers of Commerce of this and other places, including New
York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Portland, and various seaports in the
New England States to whom I have letters of introduction. I shall at
least ascertain their views, and may thus be enabled to pave the way
to the settlement of some of those questions. And if I find that their
views can be brought into harmony with those entertained by our own
Government, I shall endeavour to prevail upon the different bodies to
memorialise their Government on the subject.

My first, and I fear imperfect, impressions in regard to the questions
I have named may be briefly stated as follows:—

1st. _The rules of the road at sea._—I think these rules should
be the same for the vessels of all nations. Different opinions prevail
in regard to our own rules; but, though they differ from the old
maritime law (acted upon by almost every other nation and at times
by ourselves), and are an improvement upon it, the decisions in our
Admiralty Courts are too often conflicting. Our rules, as a whole, are
perhaps, however, more satisfactory than those of any other. But be
that as it may, it would be most desirable if all nations would agree
to adopt one and the same rule of road at sea, and would tend greatly
to the safety of life and property.

2nd. _Signal lights._—Our recent regulations in regard to lights
have answered very well, and have been adopted by the owners of
steam-vessels belonging to the United States. The application of these
rules to sailing vessels is all that is now necessary, and is very
desirable.

3rd. _The limitation of shipowners’ liability._—This is a
question of great importance, and the laws in regard to it are in an
unsatisfactory state. May I refer your Lordship to the evidence taken
last session before the select committee on merchant shipping on this
subject, and to their report? From the correspondence I have read I
think the Government of the United States might be induced to adopt
the principles laid down in that report. If so, it might then (as the
laws of each country are similar) be mutually arranged by a convention,
or otherwise, to place our ships and those of the United States
respectively, on an equal footing with regard to claims raised in the
courts of either country in respect of any loss of life or personal
injury arising from collisions at sea, so as to limit such claims to
the same extent in each case, and also that the mode of procedure shall
be as provided by the laws of the country where the claim is made.

4th. _The application of our Foreign Deserter’s Act to the ships of
the United States._—As your Lordship is aware, the United States
Government has positively declined to become a party to this Act,
because it contains the words “not being slaves,” which were inserted,
I believe, after the Bill was introduced. Now it appears to me that
there is no necessity for these words. The Act is meant to deal solely
with voluntary agents, who, having of their own free will entered into
an agreement, break it at foreign ports. I think the case would be met
if instead of the words “not being slaves” there were substituted the
following words—“seamen who have voluntarily engaged themselves in, or
apprentices duly indentured to, the sea service.” I question if there
are any cases on record where slaves have been shipped as seamen to
English ports.

5th. _Offences committed on the high seas._—Your Lordship cannot
fail to be aware of the unsatisfactory state of the law in regard to
these offences. Why, _on the representation of the ministers or
consuls_, should the courts of England and of the United States not
have jurisdiction over offences committed on board of vessels of the
respective countries? I ask this question because I can at present see
no objection to the principle I have ventured to lay down, though the
mode of putting it into practice would require some consideration, and
could best be dealt with by the legal authorities of the two countries.
The same may be said with regard to the settlement of disputes between
masters and crews in the ports of either country.

6th. _The extension of our shipping offices to the vessels of the
United States._—If the Government of the United States would
not agree to establish similar offices and a machinery somewhat in
accordance with our own (I see no reason why such offices which have
answered so well in England should not be adopted), then we might
stipulate that all British seamen entering the service of American
Shipowners in the ports of Great Britain should be engaged before
our shipping masters, and we might grant to American shipowners the
privilege of engaging _all_ the seamen their vessels required
(when in any of the ports of Great Britain), through the medium of our
offices, on the same conditions as our own shipowners now engage their
seamen. This would pave the way to an international arrangement, and
tend to abolish the system of crimpage which still prevails to a great
extent in our ports, and is alike injurious to the interests of British
and American shipowners.

Though belligerent rights, the coasting trade, and the admission of
British-_built_ ships to American registration are difficult
questions for me to deal with, involving as they do the policy of the
respective nations bearing upon other interests than those of commerce,
I may remark that it is easy of proof in regard to the two latter that
the policy of the United States, while it is unjust towards England,
is injurious to the people of America, and contrary to the principles
laid down by their own most eminent statesmen in their intercourse with
other countries. Nevertheless, I fear the Government of the United
States will not be disposed to make concessions unless we are prepared
to make a _bargain_ with them. With that object in view, I think
if we agreed to relieve the shipowners of the United States from the
charge of light dues on our coast (which have been the source of great
complaint), and also from compulsory pilotage as recommended in the
merchant shipping report; provided they opened to us the trade between
their eastern and western ports, _viâ_ Panama and round Cape Horn,
if not prepared to throw open entirely their coasting trade, some
progress might be made. The Government of the United States might also
be induced to make some concession with regard to the registration of
British-built ships, for through the want of _iron screw_ vessels
(which cannot be produced at as moderate a price in the States) they
are fast losing the most valuable portion of the trade between England
and this country. And their coasting trade (especially that on the
inland lakes) is not developed to one-half the extent it would be
if the Shipowners of America were allowed to own the description of
vessels I have named. They are also losing the share they once had of
the Newfoundland fisheries from the fact that we can produce in the
colonies vessels adapted for that trade at 25 per cent. less cost than
they can build and equip similar vessels.

I daresay your Lordship can form little idea of the hindrance to
commerce and the constant irritation the questions I have named create
on both sides of the Atlantic; and I hope by holding intercourse
with the people of this country to pave the way, as I have said, for
the settlement of at least _some of them_. With that object I
shall take notes of the opinions entertained by the members of the
different Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade throughout this
country, and also the views of those members of the government whom
I may meet, and which I shall forward to your Lordship, and if you
think any satisfactory results are likely to follow, you may then deem
it desirable to communicate with Lord John Russell, with a view of
entering into formal negotiations with the Government of the United
States. I have for many years anxiously desired to see settled these
various questions, considering their settlement of great importance to
both countries; and if I can, in the way I propose, aid your Lordship
in this good work, my long promised visit to this country, though made
with no such object, will not be made in vain.

                                     I am, my Lord,
                                     Your faithful and obedient servant,

                                                 (Signed) W. S. LINDSAY.

  To His Excellency LORD LYONS,
    H. B. Majesty’s Minister,
      &c. &c. &c.,
        Washington.


APPENDIX No. 3.

                                   Foreign Office, 21st September, 1866.

  SIR,

I am directed by Lord Stanley to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 31st ultimo, in which you call his Lordship’s attention
to the state of relations existing between this country and the
United States with regard to the Navigation Laws; and in expressing
to you Lord Stanley’s thanks for this further communication, I am to
inform you that the same has been referred to the Board of Trade,
whose observations thereupon will be communicated to you as soon as
their answer shall have been received; and the delay in receiving
their report is the reason for your letter not having been sooner
acknowledged.

                           I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

                                                          E. C. EGERTON.

  To W. S. LINDSAY, Esq.,
    Manor House, Shepperton.

                                   Foreign Office, 26th September, 1866.

  SIR,

With reference to my letter of the 21st instant, I am directed by
Lord Stanley to state to you that his Lordship is fully alive to the
importance of the points on which you have urged that a satisfactory
understanding is desirable with the United States, but that since the
date of your letter to Lord Lyons of the 21st of September, 1860, the
first two of the seven questions enumerated in it have been settled by
the adoption of one uniform system of rules of the road, and of lights
to be carried at sea by maritime nations generally, including the
United States.

As regards the third question, viz., the limitation of shipowners’
liability, the Lords of Trade have pointed out to Lord Stanley that
the law of this country has undergone some modification since 1860.
By the Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment Act, 1862, the limit of such
liability was readjusted, and the limitation was extended to foreign
ships in cases arising in British courts concerning matters within
their jurisdiction.

Inasmuch, however, as this extension was not made specially for the
benefit of foreigners, but with the view of establishing a just
and uniform rule of law, no steps were taken to secure reciprocal
legislation in foreign countries.

If the law at present in force in the United States is liable to the
same objection as the law formerly in force in this country, and is
found to be attended with the inconveniences which were experienced
here, it may be presumed that the United States Government will
probably find it for their interest to amend it in a similar sense and
on similar grounds; but Lord Stanley sees no reason at present for
opening special communications with that Government on the subject.

With respect to the remaining four questions alluded to in your
letter, I am to state to you that the matters to which they relate are
under consideration.

                          I am, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

                                                          E. C. EGERTON.


  To W. S. LINDSAY, Esq.,
    Manor House, Shepperton.

                                     Manor House, Shepperton, Middlesex,
                                                   29th September, 1866.

  MY LORD,

I have to acknowledge receipt of your letters of 21st and 26th inst.,
and I am glad to learn that two of the questions to which I ventured to
direct your Lordship’s attention have, since 1860, been settled in a
satisfactory manner.

As regards the third, viz., the limitation of shipowners’ liability,
may I trouble you with an extract herewith[314] from the ‘New York
Herald’ of 10th October, 1860, as the question is therein, I think,
correctly stated. Since then I am aware that there has been an
amendment in our law relating to the liability of Shipowners; but it
would appear from the communication you have received from the Lords
of Trade that while we have extended the limitation to foreign ships
in cases arising in British courts, we have overlooked altogether the
still more important part of the question so far as this country is
concerned, and that is the unlimited liability of British shipowners in
cases arising in foreign courts. If such is the fact, then we, I fear,
have neglected a favourable opportunity of inviting foreign nations
to place our ships in their courts on the same terms as we had placed
their ships when thrown into our courts. Had we done so, I think the
Government of the United States would have readily met us in so just
and reasonable a request.

Considering, then, the position in which British shipowners would be
placed if an action was raised against them in foreign courts for the
recovery of claims arising through a collision at sea, your Lordship
will perceive that this is not a question in which foreigners alone are
interested, for we have given them all they asked in our courts, but
one which deeply affects the interests of British subjects, and which,
now more than ever, requires adjustment by special communication with
the United States and those other countries where the responsibility of
British shipowners is still unlimited. Since we have conceded all they
require, it may be found more difficult now to obtain the necessary
alterations in their law than it would have been at the time to which
my previous communications referred; but I daresay that when the
justice of our claim is represented, steps will still be taken to grant
in their courts the same limitation of responsibility to our Shipowners
as we have granted to their Shipowners in our courts.

I am gratified, to learn that the other questions are under
consideration, and

                                      I remain, my Lord,
                                      Your most obedient humble servant,

                                                          W. S. LINDSAY.

  To the Right Hon. Lord STANLEY, M.P.,
    Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
      &c. &c. &c.

                                      Foreign Office, 3rd October, 1866.

  SIR,

I am directed, by Lord Stanley, to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter and its inclosure of the 29th ultimo, respecting the liability
of British shipowners in suits arising in foreign courts out of
collisions at sea; and I am to acquaint you in reply, that Lord Stanley
will not fail to give this question due consideration, and will
communicate with you further on the subject after he has consulted the
Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade.

                           I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

                                                          E. C. EGERTON.

  To W. S. LINDSAY, Esq.

                                    Foreign Office, 14th November, 1866.

  SIR,

With reference to your letter of the 29th September last regarding
the laws of the United States and of other foreign countries, with
regard to the liability of British shipowners in cases of loss by
collisions at sea, I am directed by Lord Stanley to inform you that
his Lordship learns from the Lords of Trade that, by the common law of
this country, and by the maritime law, as administered in our Admiralty
Courts, the Shipowner was formerly personally liable to the whole
extent of his fortune for any damage done by his ships through default
of his servants. The legislature, however, long since passed statutes
limiting the liability, and the limitation, with some variations, still
continues.

It was, however, held that the statutes being municipal laws, did
not affect cases where foreign ships were concerned, and where the
collision or casualty happened on the high seas, but that such cases
must be governed by the general maritime law of the world, which was
assumed to be the same with our common law. This was, perhaps, too
hastily assumed, inasmuch as most maritime countries adopted the
principle of limiting the Shipowners’ liability much earlier, and to a
greater extent than Great Britain.

The consequence was, that if a collision happened between two British
ships, the British law of liability applied, and whichever might be in
fault, the liability was limited. On the other hand, if a collision
happened between a British and a foreign ship on the high seas, or
between two foreign ships on the high seas, and the case came into our
courts, then whichever was in fault, the liability was unlimited.

This law was unequal, but in no way specially injurious to the
foreigner. The British ship, if in fault, was equally liable with the
foreigner; and as the British ship is generally to be found at home,
and as the British shipowner resides here, the British shipowner being
thus more likely to be the defendant, was likely the more often to
suffer.

The law was consequently altered by making the limitation of liability
apply in all cases coming into our courts, whether the ships were both
British or both foreign, or one British and one foreign.

And as the change was simply an improvement of our own law, and
conferred no especial advantage upon foreigners, it was not thought
necessary or desirable to delay it for the purpose of obtaining similar
changes when desirable in the laws of foreign nations.

                           I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

                                                           JAMES MURRAY.

  To W. S. LINDSAY, Esq.

                                     Manor House, Shepperton, Middlesex,
                                     28th November, 1866.

  MY LORD,

I received in due course your Lordship’s letter of the 14th inst.,
which does not, however, appear to me to touch the main point of my
previous communication, viz., the unlimited liability to which our
Shipowners would still be subjected in cases of collision arising in
various foreign courts. For instance, if one of our Transatlantic steam
ships engaged in the conveyance of our mails came into collision—a very
possible event—with one of the numerous steam vessels owned in the
United States, freighted with passengers, cargo, and specie, of great
value, the consequences, under the existing law of that country, might
prove not only most disastrous to the owners of the British ship, but
also very detrimental to the public service.

As I understand the law of the United States, the owners of our mail
steamer, if at fault, would be responsible to the full extent of
their means for all the loss the owners of the American steamer had
sustained; if so, the result would be the seizure of the British
steamer whenever she reached an American port; and, possibly, if the
loss sustained was very great, the seizure of all the vessels in port
belonging to the same owner, and thus our mail service for the time
might be suspended.

It is to this grave contingency I am anxious to direct your Lordship’s
attention, in the hope that you may see the urgent necessity of taking
such steps as you may deem most expedient to induce the Government of
the United States to place our vessels in their courts on the same
footing in regard to the limitation of liability as we now place the
owners of their vessels in our courts.

                       I am, my Lord, your most obedient humble servant,

                                                          W. S. LINDSAY.

  To the Right Hon. the Lord STANLEY, M.P.,
    Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
      &c.     &c.     &c.

                                              Board of Trade, Whitehall,
                                              25th February, 1867.

  SIR,

With reference to your letter of the 29th September, 1866, addressed
to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to previous
correspondence upon the subject of the law of the United States as
affecting the liability of the Shipowner in cases of loss by collision
at sea, I am now directed by the Board of Trade to transmit to you the
accompanying copy of a despatch and inclosures received through the
Foreign Office from her Majesty’s Minister at Washington upon this
subject.

                                           I have the honour to be, Sir,
                                           Your obedient servant,

                                                            THOMAS GRAY.

  To W. S. LINDSAY, Esq.,
    Manor House, Shepperton.

                           (Copy.—M. 1268.)

                                         Washington, 23rd January, 1867.

  MY LORD,

In reply to your Lordship’s despatch, marked “Commercial No. 7,” of
the 14th November last, on the liability imposed by the laws of the
United States on Shipowners in cases of collision, I have the honour to
enclose copy of an opinion of Mr. Carlisle, the legal adviser of this
Legation.

Your Lordships will gather from it that the principle of limited
liability has been adopted by the laws of the United States, and is
applied in the Federal courts. But the injured party may apply to a
State court if the defendant is within its jurisdiction, and bring
an action on the case, and it is doubtful whether such a court would
limit the measure of damages by the principles contained in the Act of
Congress.

                                                           I have, &c.,

                                               (Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE.

  To Lord STANLEY,
    &c. &c.

                                (Copy.)

                                         Washington, 22nd January, 1867.

  SIR,

I have the honour to return herewith the papers in relation to the
question of the liability of Shipowners in cases of collision.

The only Act of Congress touching the subject is that of March 3rd,
1851, which in its third section limits the liability in such cases. A
copy of this section is enclosed herewith. This language is explicit
and comprehensive, making no distinction on account of the nationality
of the ship; nor have I been able to find that such a distinction has
been suggested in any adjudicated case under this statute.

For my own part I entertain no doubt that the limitation of liability
which it prescribes would be held in all _courts of the United
States_ as applying equally to foreign as to American ships.

The Courts of Admiralty are, by the constitution of the United States,
exclusively of the Federal Government. If therefore the remedy in cases
of collision were exclusively in Admiralty Courts, the Act of 1851
would completely cover the question.

But there is a remedy at common law, which is open to the injured party
at his election. He may maintain his action on the case, which is a
transitory action, wherever he can find the owner of the offending
vessel, in the same manner and to be determined by the same principles
as if the plaintiff’s coach or his person had been injured by a
collision occasioned by the unskilful driving of the defendant’s coach.

Such an action may be brought in any court of general jurisdiction in
any of the States of the Union; and it may be doubted whether this Act
of Congress would be available to limit the measure of damages in these
courts, though undoubtedly a convention between Great Britain and the
United States, with a proper Act of Congress to carry it into effect,
would accomplish the object.

                                                           I have, &c.,

                                               (Signed) J. M. CARLISLE.

  To Sir F. BRUCE, S.S.B.,
    &c. &c. &c.

                                (Copy.)

      _An Act to limit the Liability of Shipowners and for other
                              purposes._

                       (Approved March 3, 1851.)

SECTION 3.—_And be it further enacted_, That the liability of the
owner or owners of any ship or vessel for any embezzlement, loss, or
distinction by the master, officers, mariners, passengers, or any
other person or persons of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped
or put on board of such ship or vessel, or for any loss, damage, or
injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage,
or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred without the privity or
knowledge of such owner or owners, shall in no case exceed the amount
or value of the interest of such owner or owners respectively in such
ship or vessel, and her freight then pending.

IX. Statutes at Large, ch. xliii., page 635.

                              (M. 1266.)

                                     Manor House, Shepperton, Middlesex,
                                     26th February, 1867.

  SIR,

I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of yesterday’s date, with
copy of a despatch and inclosures, received through the Foreign Office
from her Majesty’s Minister at Washington. By these documents it would
appear that the laws of the United States of America, so far as regards
the responsibility of British Shipowners in their courts, are the same
as they were in 1860, and that, practically, our responsibility is
there still unlimited. This is a very unsatisfactory state of things,
and, as I have already explained to the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, might produce the most disastrous results to some of our
Shipowners in their intercourse with the United States. I, therefore,
trust that the Board of Trade may be induced to use its best efforts to
obtain as soon as possible a convention, whereby our ships frequenting
the ports of the United States may, so far as regards responsibility,
be placed upon the same footing as we have now placed in all our courts
the vessels belonging to that country.

                                       I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

                                                         W. S. LINDSAY.

  To the ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
    Marine Department, Board of Trade.

                              (M. 1766.)

                                              Board of Trade, Whitehall,
                                              6th March, 1867.


  SIR,

I am directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 26th ultimo, stating, with reference to the question of
the liability of British Shipowners in the United States, that that
liability appears to be practically unlimited, and trusting that this
Board may take steps to obtain complete reciprocity.

In reply, I am to point out to you that the principle of limited
liability has been adopted in the Federal Courts, and is applied in all
the Federal Courts of the United States—_i.e._ in all Admiralty
and Vice Admiralty Courts, to foreign as well as American ships.

It seems true, however, that an injured person may possibly maintain
an action against the owner of an offending vessel in a State Court,
and it must depend on the law of each State in that case, whether the
measure of damages would be limited. But not to mention the difficulty
of first ascertaining, and procuring the alteration of the law of each
State, it is to be observed that to maintain such action the owner of
the offending vessel must be found within the jurisdiction of the State
Court. This, in fact, amounts to a practical limitation, seeing that he
has all the advantages of limited liability so long as he keeps away
from the United States, or is not to be found within the jurisdiction
of the court in question.

                                       I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

                                                           THOMAS GRAY.

  To W. S. LINDSAY, Esq.,
    Manor House, Shepperton, Middlesex.

                              (M. 1766.)

                                Shepperton, Middlesex, 14th March, 1867.

  SIR,

I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 6th inst., but
it is very little satisfaction to know that the principle of limited
liability is applied in all the Federal Courts of the United States
to British Shipowners, whilst in all the State Courts of that country
their responsibility is altogether unlimited. To say that they have the
advantages of limited liability, so long as they keep away from the
ports of that country, is to suggest that if we wish to avoid unlimited
responsibility, we must renounce our carrying-trade with America.

The Board of Trade would also appear to be under the impression that
there is so little chance of any serious claim ever being made, that
the alteration of the law of the States is of little consequence to us,
and that it is not worthy of the trouble it would involve; but a case
in point has just come under my notice which signally illustrates the
force of the remonstrative observations I have ventured to make.

The screw steam-ship _Keder_, belonging to Messrs. G. and I.
Burns, of Glasgow, and their partners, sailed from New York 31st
August, 1864, and on the following day came into collision with the
_Czarina_, an American barque, of from 500 to 600 tons, which had
on board a cargo of sulphur, shumac, and fruit. The _Czarina_
was abandoned in a sinking state. As the evidence shows that the
_Keder_ was not to blame, the owners of that vessel hoped that
nothing more would be heard of the matter; but only a few days ago they
received a letter from Sir Edward Cunard, their correspondent at New
York, stating that he had just been called upon to give bond for one
hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars, on account of the cargo of
the _Czarina_, and adding that he had also been called upon to
give bond for the vessel, though the amount in the latter case is not
mentioned. It is estimated that the value put on the _Czarina_
and cargo will be something like 40,000_l._ Supposing the
_Keder_ to be in fault, her liability, according to British law,
would be restricted to 8_l._ per ton of her own gross tonnage,
viz. 14,264_l._, whereas, according to the law of the State of New
York, she may be held liable in this case for 40,000_l._, being
more than double her value; and if the _Czarina_ and cargo had
been more valuable than they are stated to be, the liability of the
owner of the _Keder_ would of course have been correspondingly
increased. In a word, _it would have been practically without
limit_.

I am aware that there may be some difficulty in obtaining an alteration
of the law, but this ought not to be any obstacle when the interests
at stake are so very large and of so grave a character. If the proper
representation is made, I think the Government of the United States
cannot now hesitate to place our vessels in _all_ their courts
on the same terms as we have recently placed their vessels in all our
courts, and if the executive is prepared to enter into a convention,
having that object in view, it will no doubt be confirmed by Congress.

                                       I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

                                                         W. S. LINDSAY.

  To the ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
    Marine Department, Board of Trade.

     _Note._—This correspondence was not at all satisfactory
     to me, but as I was then in a very precarious state of health,
     I sent copies of it to Mr. John Burns, whose firm (the Cunard
     Company) was more deeply interested in the matter to which it
     refers than any other. He followed it up with his usual energy and
     ability, and through his exertions the responsibility of British
     Shipowners has now been limited in the _States_, as well as
     in the Federal Courts of the United States of America, to the same
     extent as the Shipowners of that country would be held liable in
     an action, through loss at sea by collision or otherwise, brought
     against them in this country. See Parliamentary Papers, ‘British
     Ships in American Waters,’ No. 236, 17th May, 1871; and ‘United
     States Liability of Shipowners’ Collision,’ No. 173, 18th May,
     1874.

                                                                W. S. L.

APPENDIX No. 4.

                                (Copy.)

                        (Inclosure in No. 53.)

             MR. LINDSAY to HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF THE
                                FRENCH.

                                              Paris, 10th January, 1861.

  SIRE,

In accordance with your Majesty’s desire, expressed at the interview
with which you honoured me this morning, I may here recapitulate the
facts which I then brought under your notice.

In the early part of last session of Parliament I brought under the
consideration of the House of Commons the following resolution:—

“That an humble address be presented to her Majesty praying that she
may be graciously pleased to enter into negotiations with the Emperor
of the French with the view of making a treaty for the reciprocal
abrogation of all discriminating duties levied upon the vessels and
their cargoes of either of the two nations in the ports of the other,
and for procuring such alterations in the Navigation Laws of France as
may tend to facilitate the commercial intercourse and strengthen the
friendly relations between England and France.”

That resolution received the unanimous approval of both Houses of
Parliament, and was submitted for your Majesty’s consideration through
his Excellency Earl Cowley in the usual form. And, now I have to thank
your Majesty very cordially for granting me an audience together with
his Lordship, so that I might explain more fully the object of that
resolution in its relation to the maritime commerce of France. Sire,
the Navigation Laws of France may be divided into five distinct heads:—

1st. The coasting trade, which is confined entirely to French ships,
all other vessels entering it being, I believe, liable with their
cargoes to confiscation, with the exception of Spanish vessels employed
on a particular branch of that trade.

2ndly. The colonial trade, that is, the trade between the colonies and
possessions of France and the mother country, which is also confined
entirely to the ships of France.

3rdly. The foreign trade, as, for instance, the trade between France
and America, or between France and the Brazils, and other foreign
countries, which is confined to the ships of France and those of the
respective nations with which France has entered into treaties of
reciprocity.

4thly. The direct trade with England, which comprises commerce carried
on between the ports of Great Britain and the ports of France. This
trade is confined to the vessels of England, and France, and the ships
of the respective countries are, with some slight exception, placed on
the same footing in the ports of either country.

5thly. The direct trade between France and the colonies and possessions
of Great Britain, which, practically, is confined to the ships of
France, as the differential duties, to which I shall hereafter refer,
on nearly every article of produce are so high as against English ships
that they are prevented from entering the trade.

Now, it is a remarkable fact that in those branches of trade where
French shipping is placed in competition with the shipping of other
nations, it is making more progress than in those branches of trade
where it is protected, at an enormous cost to the people of France.
Indeed, the French shipping employed in those carefully protected
branches of commerce has, as appears by the returns, in some instances
actually declined. But this state of things is not confined merely to
the shipping of France. It has been so throughout all time and with
all nations. I shall endeavour to illustrate this to your Majesty by
reference to the official returns of the progress of shipping belonging
to my own country. Going as far back as 1720, I find that there cleared
outwards from the ports of Great Britain, 430,000 tons of British
shipping.

In 1810 the clearances amounted to 1,600,000 tons.

Ten years afterwards, in 1820, they had only increased to 1,670,000
tons, but in 1850 they had reached 4,700,000 tons.

That increase, however great, is nevertheless small when compared with
the increase which took place after Great Britain, in 1850, swept away
the last remnants of her Navigation Laws, and threw open her ports
unreservedly to the ships of the world. In 1858, the clearances of
British ships outwards employed in the over-sea trade, to which these
returns alone have reference, reached 6,400,000 tons.

Thus it appears that in ninety years of the closest protection, when
we guarded our ships with the most unusual care, and protected them
in every branch of our trade to the detriment of our revenue, and
by increased taxation upon the people, our shipping increased only
1,170,000 tons; whereas, in thirty years of partial free-trade,
during which we entered into treaties of reciprocity with almost
every nation, our shipping increased 3,000,000 tons, and in eight
years of perfect free trade, that is, from 1850, when our Navigation
Laws were entirely repealed, our shipping increased 1,740,000 tons,
or, in round numbers, 600,000 tons more than it increased in ninety
years of the closest protection. But it may be well to compare the
relative progress of French and British shipping. By comparing the
tonnage owned by the respective countries in 1838 and 1858, your
Majesty will find that in the last twenty years France has increased
her sailing vessels by 370,000 tons, and her steam ships by 50,000
tons. But England, during the same period, has increased her sailing
vessels by no less than 2,800,000 tons, and her steam ships by 400,000
tons. Thus the Shipowners of England, who are left to depend upon
their own energies and their own resources, are moving onwards at a
rate eight times greater than that of the Shipowners of France, who,
by means of protection, are taught to depend upon the State instead
of upon themselves and upon the vast natural resources which their
country affords. It is a mistake to suppose, as many persons do, that
France has not facilities for carrying on a great maritime commerce.
Her seaboard is almost as great as our own; she has no less than 150
leagues of coast in the Channel, 130 leagues on the Atlantic, and
90 leagues of coast on the Mediterranean. Along her seaboard there
are many fine harbours, some of them easy of access, and at points
convenient to the great markets of the world. I need hardly mention
the position of Havre as affording great facilities for carrying on a
large commerce with the United States and the continent of America,
generally, nor that of Marseilles, in its contiguity with India, and
the vast commerce of the East. But allow me to direct your Majesty’s
attention to a remarkable contrast which may be drawn between two great
branches of the trade of your own dominions. While your shipping is
comparatively at a standstill, your special commerce is increasing
with considerable rapidity, for I find that in ten years, from 1827 to
1836, the increase was 10,000,000 francs; from 1837 to 1846, 15,000,000
francs, but from 1847 to 1856 the increase was 22,000,000 francs in
that particular branch of commerce, which is confined entirely to
the produce and manufactures of France. To carry on this important
and steadily increasing trade your Majesty is obliged to depend very
materially upon the shipping of other countries, for I find that in
1858, while the total entries at French ports amounted to 4,162,000
tons, no less than 2,550,000 tons consisted of foreign shipping.

It is hardly possible to conceive the amount of money which the people
of France are annually paying in, as it appears, a vain attempt, to
encourage its shipping: I use the word “vain” because it is clear, if
the experience of other nations, or the experience of your own nation
is of any value, that all the money paid to “encourage shipping” is
actually lost, for French ships, with all this protection, do not
increase at the same rate as other nations, or at the same rates in the
branches of your own trade, where they are guarded with unusual care,
as they do in those branches where they are thrown into competition
with the shipping of other countries. It would be impossible to
ascertain the loss the people of France annually sustain, directly
and indirectly, through the operation of its Navigation Laws. I have,
however, analysed it in one small branch of trade. In 1858, there
cleared from the Island of Mauritius, 180,000 tons of shipping.
The trade which that island carries on with France is, through the
operation of the differential duties, confined to the vessels of
France. In a word, they have a monopoly of it. Analysing the commercial
circulars issued at that island, I find that the excess of freight paid
at the Mauritius to French ships for “a market,” or for the ports of
France, amounted in that year to 300,000_l._ more than the people
of England paid for a similar quantity of sugar imported from the
Mauritius.

I have mentioned to your Majesty the differential duties still
in force, but which in practice are unproductive to the revenue,
because, as you will see by the following scale, they are so great
that merchants are prohibited from shipping in any other than French
bottoms. For instance, sugar pays a duty of 68_s._ per 100
kilogrammes if imported in French vessels, but 84_s._ if in
English, from any of our colonies and possessions. Coffee in French
ships is charged 48_s._ per 100 kilogrammes, and 84_s._ if in
English vessels. Tobacco, if imported in French ships, pays 4_s._
per kilogramme, but double that duty if imported in English vessels.
Other articles, the produce of our Eastern possessions, are taxed in
somewhat similar proportions, so that your Majesty will see that your
merchants and manufacturers are thus practically prohibited from using
any other than French vessels to convey whatever produce they may
require from the colonies and possessions of Great Britain.

Your Majesty has just concluded a Treaty of Commerce with England,
which I feel certain will benefit alike the people of Great Britain and
of France, and no doubt develop the trade of the respective countries
to a far greater extent than many persons suppose; above all, it cannot
fail to strengthen the friendly relations now happily existing between
the Governments of the two countries, and which I most sincerely trust
may long continue. That treaty will, however, be seriously clogged in
its operations, unless there is a change in the Navigation Laws of
France. I shall endeavour to show how.

The produce and manufactures of France will not, in all cases, be paid
for either in coin or by the produce and manufactures of Great Britain,
but in many instances by the produce of India, Australia, and Canada.
Yet, by the French Navigation Laws, that produce which your own people
require, cannot be imported into France in the ships belonging to those
parties who buy the produce and the manufactures of France. No nation,
as your Majesty is well aware, can produce all that is necessary to
employ, to feed, and to clothe her own people. All nations must, to a
greater or less extent, depend upon other countries for those necessary
articles of existence. France, to keep her people employed, must have
the wools of Australia and the timber of Canada, as well as various
descriptions of raw materials which India alone affords, or produces
in greater abundance and at lower prices, than other countries.
Nevertheless, the Navigation Laws of France prevent those articles
which are required for the very existence of the people of France from
being imported in the ships of the country whose possessions produce
them. India, as your Majesty is aware, has, within the last two years,
become virtually, since the abolition of the charter of the East India
Company, an integral part of the British Empire: therefore I trust
your Majesty will see the justice as well as the policy of at least
placing the shipping of England and France engaged in that trade on
the same footing as they have been for many years in the trade between
those two countries. Such a change would entail no loss of revenue,
nor would it, I conceive, require more than your Majesty’s decree to
effect. This change, in my humble judgment, is indeed necessary on even
more urgent grounds than the development of the Commercial Treaty which
has recently been concluded. The shipping of the world has just passed
through an ordeal of great depression. The losses which Shipowners
of all countries have sustained during the last four years have been
so great, that capital has, to a considerable extent, ceased to flow
in that direction, so much so that, by returns now before me, I find
that the tonnage built during the year 1860 in the United States, in
Canada, in New Brunswick, in Norway, in England, and in other great
producing countries, falls far short of what it was either in 1859, or
in any one of the previous years of depression. But, on the other hand,
the general commerce of the world has, during that period, increased
enormously. For instance, by our Board of Trade returns, the imports of
cotton into Great Britain, which amounted to about 8,000,000 cwt. in
the eleven months ending November 30, 1859, exceeded 10,000,000 cwt. in
the eleven months ending November 30, 1860.

I need not call your Majesty’s attention to the vast increase in the
imports of grain, or to the remarkable increase in the exports of
manufactures, or to the greatly extended consumption of coal at remote
stations. In a word, while the bulky articles which require ships
for their conveyance to distant parts of the world have enormously
increased, the shipping of the world has been comparatively stationary
during the past year, and the many losses and disasters at sea during
1860 have tended materially to diminish the already scanty supply of
shipping necessary to conduct the oversea trade of the world. All this
will, without doubt, right itself in time, but it will take one year,
if not two years, to do so. In the mean time, it might so happen that
the artisans of France may be thrown out of employment for the want of
French ships to bring them those raw materials necessary to keep them
employed; or, what will amount to nearly the same, the increased cost
to the manufacturer of the raw material, through the laws of France
compelling him to bring it in her ships, might be so great that he
would be unable to compete in price with his rivals in other countries,
and, consequently, be obliged to close his mills or his workshops, as
the case might be, for want of remunerative employment.

Might I, therefore, venture to impress upon your Majesty the
desirability, I may even say the necessity, of at least placing the
carrying-trade between France and the possessions of Great Britain on
the same footing as it now exists between the mother countries. Your
people would be immense gainers by this change, and your Shipowners
would not suffer, for, independent altogether of the facts which I have
stated in regard to the advantages which they, as carriers, derive
above all others from the policy of Free-trade, there will be for the
next twelve months at least ample employment for the shipping of all
nations. I cannot close this, I fear too lengthy a letter, without
calling to your Majesty’s attention a remarkable instance of the injury
which even the Shipowners of that great maritime country, the United
States, sustain by protection. While in 1856, 1857, and 1858, the
tonnage owned in England increased 335,000 tons, the tonnage of America
in those same years actually decreased 67,000 tons.

In a recent visit which I made to that country, I did not fail, in
the many opportunities afforded me, to impress upon its Shipowners
that they were more interested in the removal of all barriers to free
intercourse than any other class of the community; for, as those
barriers which they still maintain along their coast retard their
commerce, and consequently limit the exchange of the different articles
produced in the various districts, the employment of their vessels must
necessarily be more curtailed than it would otherwise be if greater
facilities were afforded for the transmission of those articles which
one district produces in greater abundance than another.

To those maritime questions I have long devoted my attention, and I
have often been struck at the circuitous course which ships, by the
laws which nations adopted, have been obliged to follow. The ocean was
meant to be free to mankind, but one nation by its laws dictates the
course which the ships of other nations must follow; another nation,
by way of retaliation, lays down the only course which it will allow
its competitors to adopt. Thus we see ships, for instance, allowed to
follow one track with cargo, but compelled to return by the same track,
in ballast. We see the wool which your own people require, instead
of being imported, as it ought to be, direct from Australia to the
ports of France, sent, by the Navigation Laws of France, to the ports
of England, and from thence imported at greatly enhanced prices to
the consumers. It is the same with the produce of India. Those lines
of steamers belonging to England, which run weekly from Calcutta and
Bombay, and all the great ports of the East to Great Britain, passing
Marseilles and the other seaports of France, are not allowed to land,
for the use of its people, the very articles of which they may be in
urgent want. All experience has proved that while those restrictions do
great injury to the commerce of all nations, they inflict the largest
amount of injury upon the people of the nation that imposes them.

The feeble efforts of so humble an individual as myself, may be of
little avail in the removal of those pernicious restrictions, but I
will never cease those efforts till the ocean, which was meant for the
use of mankind in general, is as free as the waves which roll over
it, and the gale which hurries them along. And if your Majesty would
grant me your powerful aid by making one step in the direction I have
so imperfectly ventured to point out, I feel that other nations will
follow the example of a Sovereign so enlightened and so exalted, and
thus I may live to see the object I have so anxiously in view crowned
with success.

                                                            I have, &c.,

                                                (Signed) W. S. LINDSAY.


APPENDIX No. 5.

                            (Translation.)

                        Inclosure 1 in No. 73.

                    M. Fleury to Mr. Lindsay, M.P.

                                               Londres, 17th June, 1862.

  SIR,

The ‘Moniteur’ of the 2nd of May last published a report submitted to
the Emperor by the Minister of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works,
relative to the state of the French mercantile marine and the law by
which it is governed.

In conformity with the suggestion of this report, which has been
approved by his Majesty, the _Conseil Supérieur_ of Commerce is
instructed to prosecute an inquiry for the purpose of furnishing the
Imperial Government with the data which it needs in order to enable
it to judge between the diversity of opinion which has arisen on this
grave question.

In the inquiry, as in that which has been presented on the reform of
our Customs legislation, it will be advantageous that the principal
maritime places in Foreign States should be represented, and the
statements of their representatives heard side by side with those of
French merchants and Shipowners. This is why the Minister of Foreign
Affairs invites me to inform those principally interested here that
the _Conseil Supérieur_ will begin its sittings about the 10th of next
month.

M. Thouvenel adds that in case, as he hopes, the merchants of London,
appreciating the importance of the questions to be raised in this
inquiry, will express their intention to respond to the invitation
of the French Ministry, I should communicate their names to him,
so that he may invite them to present themselves at the Ministry
of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works, Department of Foreign
Commerce, Rue de Tarennes 78b. M. Rouher will take the necessary
measures that they may be summoned before the Upper Council with all
due promptitude.

I think, Sir, I cannot do better than communicate this invitation
to you, requesting you to inform me whether it will be agreeable to
you to accede to it yourself. I shall, moreover, be much obliged by
your communicating with the merchants or Shipowners in the City, and
forwarding to me the names of such as may wish to take advantage of
it. I shall take care to let you know later the precise date when the
sittings of the Council will open.

                                  Believe me and the _Conseil Général_,

                                                                FLEURY.

                                (Copy.)

                        Inclosure 2 in No. 73.

                   Mr. Lindsay, M.P., to M. Fleury.

                              8, Austin Friars, London, 23rd June, 1862.


  SIR,

     I have read with no ordinary interest the letter you did me the
     honour to address me on the 17th instant, and I shall be happy
     to forward the object your Government has in view by every means
     in my power. So far as I am concerned, you have merely to name
     the time when my presence is again required in Paris. In regard
     to other witnesses, the publication of your letter to me would
     enable you to obtain a greater amount and variety of evidence than
     could possibly be obtained through my own unaided exertions. I am
     glad your Government has decided upon an open inquiry, for thus
     all the important facts bearing upon the subject can be brought
     to light. The knowledge of these facts will greatly facilitate
     the inquiry about to be instituted. For instance, I dare say
     your Shipowners think (as our Shipowners thought in 1849) that
     any material relaxation of the Navigation Laws of France would
     ruin them. The arguments used against the repeal of our laws in
     1849 were very plausible, but not very profound; for what are the
     facts? The repeal of our Navigation Laws came into operation on
     the 1st January, 1850; the aggregate tonnage of the merchant navy
     of the British empire at that time was 4,232,962 tons. It had
     risen from 2,681,276 tons in 1815. So that the increase, under
     the guardian care of the State, had in the previous thirty-five
     years been 1,551,686 tons. That increase was then considered
     very great; and, as we could not look into futurity, much stress
     was laid upon the argument that if protection were removed from
     British shipping, any increase would in future be monopolised
     by the ships of foreign nations. But the Legislature had other
     interests to consider besides that to which I belong. Protection
     was, therefore, swept away, and Shipowners were left to depend
     upon their own exertions, instead of depending upon the State.
     Their desponding was great, but so far from being “ruined,” they
     are richer now than ever they were at any former period, if I
     may judge of their wealth by the extraordinary increase of our
     shipping. On the 1st January, 1860 (ten years after all protection
     had been removed), we owned 5,710,968 tons. Thus, in ten years
     of Free-trade our increase was about as great as it had been in
     thirty-five years of protection; but the increase in the amount of
     business carried on in British ships is even more remarkable. Here
     are the facts:

     In 1842, there were entered and cleared at our ports of British
     shipping 6,669,995 tons; 1850, 9,442,544 tons; 1861, 15,420,532
     tons; the increase being 2,772,549 tons during nine years of
     protection, and 5,977,988 tons during eleven years of Free-trade.

     In 1812 we built 129,929 tons of shipping; in 1849 only 117,953
     tons. In 1850, we built 133,695 tons, and in 1861, 310,900 tons;
     showing an annual decrease between the former periods of 11,976
     tons, but an annual increase between the latter of 177,205 tons.

     The reason of these extraordinary results is obvious. Shipping is
     not the parent, it is the child of commerce. If your Government
     apply to its merchant shipping the principles we have adopted,
     you will find that the results will be very much the same, for
     these principles are applicable to all countries. Shipping has no
     creative power in itself, like land, or manufactures, or minerals;
     it depends, entirely, upon other interests for its existence. If a
     country produced what was necessary for its own wants and no more,
     it would not require any ships. If France had no commerce with
     other countries, and no trade along its own shores, there would
     be no employment for its shipping in its own trade. Now, though
     France has, I daresay, within herself the means of producing what
     other nations require to nearly as great an extent as the United
     Kingdom, and, though she requires as much or even more from other
     countries than we do, yet her sea-borne commerce is very limited
     as compared with her resources and her powers of consumption.
     Turning to the ‘Tableau Général du Commerce de la France,’ I find
     that, in 1860, the entrances and clearances with cargoes only
     in your foreign and colonial trades, and the entrances in your
     coasting trade, including the ships of France and of every nation
     trading with her, amounted to 9,773,865 tons, whereas, in the same
     year, it required 37,841,329 tons of shipping to transport the
     cargoes which entered and cleared from the ports of the United
     Kingdom. But, curiously enough, though the ships of all nations
     are allowed to enter our ports (and our consumers invite them to
     do so), there was, in 1860, in our foreign trade, only 4,294,444
     tons of foreign shipping with cargoes as against 5,760,537 tons
     of British shipping; whereas, in your foreign trade, in the same
     year, there was 2,348,261 tons of foreign shipping with cargoes as
     against 1,663,615 tons of your own.

     It is, thus, evident that any restriction you impose on the
     freedom of intercourse with other countries, while it curtails the
     operations of your merchants, likewise enhances the price of the
     raw material to your manufacturers; and while it increases the
     cost of the commodity to your people, curtails the employment of
     your Shipowners. But, even if those restrictions and differential
     duties (which you still maintain without any advantage to the
     revenue) benefited your Shipowners, which they do not, why should
     your merchants and manufacturers, and landowners and farmers, and,
     above all, your hardworking people, be made to suffer, so that
     your Shipowners might be enriched? So long as all the producing
     classes were protected, the Shipowners might have had some right
     to say that, as they were obliged to pay, for the benefit, real
     or imaginary of others, enhanced prices for all articles of
     consumption, they were consequently entitled to some compensating
     protection; but, since the recent relaxations of the French
     tariff, and, now that the producing classes are exposed to the
     competition of other countries, these classes have unquestionably
     a right to insist on free navigation.

     No doubt your Shipowners will consider, as ours did, that their
     class was entitled to claim peculiar privileges, because the
     merchant service is the legitimate nursery of the seamen for the
     navy necessary for the protection of the State; but we have 20,000
     more seamen now in our merchant service than we had in 1849. Free
     intercourse with other countries gave increased employment to our
     shipping, and therefore we required more seamen. So it will be
     with your country when you adopt a similar policy.

     But, however fallacious the arguments have proved which were used
     against the repeal of our Navigation Laws, it is hardly possible
     to conceive anything so pernicious and absurd as the law itself
     which you still maintain. By way of illustration, may I direct
     your attention to the line of steamers trading between Southampton
     and the various ports in India, _viâ_ the Mediterranean?
     These vessels pass Marseilles every week laden with articles of
     which your people may be greatly in want, but the differential
     duties which the laws of France levy are so high on these articles
     (because they happen to be in English ships) that they cannot
     be landed, consequently they are carried through the Straits of
     Gibraltar, and across the Bay of Biscay to Southampton, and from
     thence by rail to London, and there shipped in either English
     or French bottoms to some port in France. Could anything be
     more absurd? The price your people pay for this folly is well
     illustrated by the startling fact that in 1860 France imported
     from the United Kingdom 8,000,000 lbs. of silk, 4,000,000 lbs. of
     coffee, 16,000,000 lbs. of wool, and 116,000 cwt. of cotton, not
     an ounce of any of these articles having been produced in this
     country.

     For the protection and “benefit” of your Shipowners, which is
     purely imaginary, as I will show, your people were compelled to
     pay greatly enhanced prices upon an enormous quantity of articles
     necessary for their existence.

     A few facts will now suffice to prove that your Shipowners have
     not profited by protection any more than our Shipowners when they
     were under the guardian care of the State.

     Your coasting trade is confined strictly to French vessels.
     The vessels of all other nations are actually prohibited from
     entering it. In that trade there were entered and cleared in 1850,
     2,447,556 tons of shipping. In 1860, 2,917,823 tons were entered
     and cleared. In your trade with the United Kingdom your Shipowners
     have had to contend on equal terms with the owners of British
     shipping, yet what are the results? In 1850 there were entered and
     cleared in that trade 594,640 tons of French shipping, cargoes,
     and ballast, but in 1860 the entrances and clearances of your own
     shipping in the same trade had increased to 1,017,617 tons. Thus,
     while the vessels in your closely protected trade increased 20 per
     cent., those engaged in the unprotected trade were nearly doubled!

     I fear I weary you with figures, but allow me to give one more
     instance of the pernicious effects of a protective policy on both
     English and French shipping, as shown by a return of the tonnage
     of ships built for or otherwise added to the merchant navies of
     the United Kingdom and France in the following years. (_See_
     Table, p. 595.)

     These figures speak for themselves. The comparative annual
     progress of the shipping of both countries was not worthy of
     notice during the first period, when both were protected by the
     laws of the respective countries. You made a start when between
     1849 and 1850 our Navigation Laws were repealed, but when the
     impetus which that repeal gave to our commerce came into play, and
     when our Shipowners felt that they had to depend upon themselves,
     and not upon the State, we shot ahead at an amazing rate during
     the second period, while the annual increase of your shipping
     remained stationary.

  +----------------------++---------------------+
  |To the United Kingdom.||     To France.      |
  +----------+-----------++----------+----------+
  |          |   Tons.   ||          |   Tons.  |
  | In 1842  |  129,929  || In 1842  |  30,923  |
  | ”  1849  |  117,953  || ”  1849  |  32,223  |
  | ”  1850  |  133,695  || ”  1850  |  43,474  |
  | ”  1860  |  211,968  || ”  1860  |  43,192  |
  +----------+-----------++----------+----------+

     When in Paris last month, I had occasion to converse with many of
     your merchants and others in regard to the effect produced by the
     recent commercial treaty. They were satisfied, but they felt that
     something more was wanted, though they could not exactly say what
     it was. Now, though both countries have every reason to be much
     satisfied with that treaty, the want is to me very apparent. Free
     navigation must accompany freedom of commerce. The ramifications
     of commerce are so numerous and the competition so close that
     the slightest hindrance to its natural flow, or the smallest
     increase of freight, either retards, paralyses, or destroys vast
     branches of it. The trade which your people are now carrying on
     with England and its colonies and possessions is greatly retarded
     by the restrictions of the Navigation Laws. The produce of France
     which we buy is not in all cases paid for by the produce or
     manufactures of this country. We wish you to take in exchange
     for your wines and for the other productions of France which we
     require, and you desire in many cases to receive in payment for
     those productions, the produce of our colonies and possessions;
     but your Navigation Laws raise, as I have shown, the price of
     all such importations, so as to affect, most unfavourably for
     your people, the conditions of exchange, and, consequently, our
     commercial intercourse with each other is much more limited than
     it would be under a system of free navigation. I most sincerely
     trust that these restrictions may soon be removed; I do so, not
     merely on account of my countrymen, but for the benefit of your
     people, who will be large gainers by the change.

     We were the first nation, I regret to say, to raise barriers to
     free intercourse with other nations. It was Great Britain which
     first set up laws to dictate the course which the ships of other
     nations should follow upon the ocean meant to be free for the use
     of mankind.

     We maintained that wretched policy for centuries to the injury of
     others, but not to our own gain.

     At last we discovered that the poverty of our neighbours did not
     enrich ourselves. Twelve years ago we changed our policy, and I
     have given you an outline of the happy results. Your country is
     still pursuing the same mistaken policy, but I think the day is
     not far distant when your enlightened Monarch will sweep away all
     the ancient barriers which hamper his commerce, and thus give to
     his people that freedom of intercourse which, while it tends to
     promote peace and goodwill, cannot fail to develop to an extent
     hitherto unknown the vast natural resources of your country.

                                                             I am, &c.,

                                                (Signed) W. S. LINDSAY.


APPENDIX No. 6.

             Letter to the Commercial Association, Lisbon.

                                                 Braganza Hotel, Lisbon,
                                                 28th January, 1863.

  SIR,

     My engagements have been such that it has not been in my power
     till now to answer your letter of the 20th instant. I have,
     however, in the interval been endeavouring to obtain statistical
     information in regard to the amount of tonnage belonging to this
     country, and the entrances and clearances of ships at its ports.
     I have obtained that information so far as regards the commerce
     of Lisbon and Oporto, but I cannot find that any returns are
     published of the general commerce of Portugal or of its shipping.
     I am therefore unable to offer an opinion to the members of your
     association respecting the effect produced upon your shipping, and
     on the sea-borne commerce, by your navigation and commercial laws.
     The trade of Lisbon, however, so far as the entries inwards and
     outwards are concerned, shows little or no increase these last six
     years.

     Considering the geographical position of Portugal and its natural
     resources, you seem to have more to gain by free intercourse with
     other nations than most other countries. The magnificent Tagus
     offers facilities which few harbours in Europe possess. Yet, with
     these great natural advantages, you do not appear to be doing
     one-half the amount of trade you might do, and I believe this
     arises in a great measure from the restrictive nature of your
     Navigation Laws, and the cumbrous, slow, and harassing character
     of your Customs’ regulations.

     England maintained somewhat similar Navigation Laws up to 1869.
     At that time the aggregate tonnage of the merchant navy of the
     British Empire was 4,232,962 tons. It had risen from 2,681,276
     tons in 1815, showing an increase of 1,551,686 tons in thirty-five
     years of Protection, and it was, therefore, argued by many
     persons that the repeal of those laws, while it would benefit the
     Shipowners of other nations, would be suicidal to our own. But
     our leading statesmen were of a very different opinion. They felt
     that it was for the interest of the people of Great Britain to
     have the freest possible intercourse with all nations; to import
     what they required, and export what they had to sell at the lowest
     cost; and, as shipping is not the parent but merely the child of
     commerce, they foresaw that it must increase with the increased
     intercourse with other nations. The result has proved the wisdom
     of their opinions. A reference to our Board of Trade returns (a
     copy of which I will send to you on my return to England) shows
     the enormous increase of our commerce, and the consequent increase
     of the wealth and prosperity of our people.

     Since the 1st of January, 1850, ships of all nations have been
     allowed to enter and leave our ports, and to trade to our colonies
     and possessions on the same terms in all respects as our own
     vessels. And while our people have been large gainers by the
     repeal of the Navigation Laws, an Act which that year came into
     operation, our Shipowners have been greatly benefited, for in
     1860 we owned 5,710,968 tons of shipping, showing an increase in
     ten years of Free-trade nearly as great as the increase during
     thirty-five years of Protection.

     But the increase in the amount of business carried on in British
     ships to and from the ports of Great Britain is even more
     remarkable.

     In 1842 there were entered and cleared at our ports of British
     shipping, 6,669,995 tons.

     In 1850 there were entered and cleared at our ports of British
     shipping, 9,442,544 tons.

     In 1861 there were entered and cleared at our ports of British
     shipping, 15,420,532 tons.

     The increase being 2,772,549 tons during nine years of Protection,
     while it was no less than 5,977,988 tons during eleven years of
     Free-trade.

     But experience has proved that restrictive laws are injurious to
     all countries which maintain them. It is verified in your our own
     case. See what the trade of the Tagus has become to that of the
     Thames or Mersey, though the former affords much greater natural
     facilities for shipping and commerce. It has long been apparent
     in Spain; and though the wealth and great natural resources of
     that country are now in course of development by means of railway
     communication, its intercourse with other countries is still
     very limited, and must remain so while they continue to maintain
     high differential duties, which yield little or no revenue, and
     seriously curtail their intercourse with the world.

     Even France is a striking example of the loss a nation sustains
     by endeavouring by means of Protection to shut herself up within
     herself.

     It is thus evident that every restriction a country imposes upon
     its freedom of intercourse with other countries—while it curtails
     the operations of its merchants, and enhances the price of the raw
     material to its manufacturers, increasing also the cost of the
     commodity to the people—must necessarily curtail the employment of
     its Shipowners.

     These restrictive laws often compel merchants to buy what they
     require, at greatly enhanced prices, articles not produced in the
     country from whence they are imported; as is the case in your
     importations from England of cotton, sugar, coffee, hemp, jute,
     silk, foreign wool, and numerous other articles, all arising in
     a great measure from the fact that the differential duties[315]
     imposed by your Navigation Laws oblige you to import foreign
     manufactures or produce, either in your own ships or in the ships
     of the country where the articles were produced. Consequently the
     people of Portugal pay much higher prices than we do for almost
     every article they require to import from other countries, for
     the exclusive benefit of your Shipowners, who do not increase
     the number of their vessels. But these restrictive laws retard
     the natural progress of commerce in ways too numerous to mention
     within the limits of a letter, and they are as absurd as they
     are pernicious. Their absurdity becomes apparent when you ask
     yourself the question, why should the merchants of either France
     or Portugal not be allowed, when it suits their purpose, to import
     direct, in any ships they please, the produce of Europe, Asia,
     Africa, or America, instead of importing it through England or
     through any other country where it is _not_ grown?

     France, as you are aware, has recently made great changes in her
     commercial tariff, and ere long she will, I daresay, make as great
     changes in her Navigation Laws. I can offer no opinion to your
     Chamber of Commerce beyond advising its members in the interests
     of their country to urge the Legislature by petitions and by
     every constitutional means within their power _to remove every
     restriction in your Customs’ regulations not absolutely necessary
     for the protection of the revenue, to reduce the duties upon all
     articles of large consumption, to abolish all differential duties
     which yield little or no revenue, and to repeal your Navigation
     Laws, which do the people great injury, and do not benefit your
     Shipowners except in rare instances_.

     I am thoroughly convinced that by some such changes as these much
     of your ancient greatness and grandeur would be restored. Unwise
     laws, combined with other matters too delicate for me to name,
     have done perhaps more to retard your progress than the loss of
     your possessions in the East, or your severance from the Brazils.
     Indeed, had Portugal adopted Free-trade measures at the time of
     that severance she would have retained the bulk of the Brazilian
     commerce; but your Protection laws set up barriers at all your
     ports, through which very few ships but your own could enter—they
     drove trade from your cities, and the very bread from the mouths
     of your children. No wonder that the glory of Portugal passed
     away; and that your merchants, who were, indeed, princes in the
     days of Vasco de Gama, are now almost unknown in the markets of
     Europe.

     Even, in spite of your restrictive laws, the natural facilities
     of the Tagus are still so great and so many that vessels from
     the Brazils are beginning to make it their port of call, and if
     the changes I have ventured to name are carried into effect, I
     am certain that Lisbon, from its position, is destined to carry
     on a very extensive traffic with the world. It may even become
     one of the great entrepôts for the supply of many of the European
     markets, as the railways now in course of construction will afford
     facilities for conveying its imports, not merely to the interior
     of Portugal and to Spain, but also to more distant parts of Europe.

     It is, indeed, sad to look, as I now do, from the window of my
     hotel upon the beautiful but lifeless Tagus—to think what it
     _is_ by nature, what it _was_ in commerce, and what it
     might be under wise and liberal laws. The future is in the hands
     of your own people, and the members of your chamber might become
     instruments of great good by the dissemination of statistical
     and other information bearing upon the questions on which you
     have invited my opinion. You have happily a free press, which
     will enable your chamber to do so to great advantage. I return to
     England to-morrow. When I reach home I shall forward to you copies
     of the works you desire to possess, as also other publications
     which may be of service to you. Much useful information might also
     be obtained from the various ministers and consuls resident in
     this city; and I am sure they will only be too happy to assist you
     in the laudable object you have in view, for the countries they
     represent, especially England and France, are deeply interested in
     every measure tending to create greater intercourse between your
     country and their own.

                                I am, Sir,
                                Your very obedient and faithful servant,

                                                          W. S. LINDSAY.

  To A. J. P. SERZEDELLO, junior, Esq.,
    &c.      &c.      &c.,
      Secretary to the Commercial Association, Lisbon.


APPENDIX No. 7.

_Summary of the Acts passed for the Regulation of Passenger Ships._

The first separate Act for regulating passenger ships was the 43 Geo.
3, cap. 56. By this Act the number of passengers to be carried in any
British vessel was limited to one person, including the crew, for every
two tons of the unladen part of the ship, and in foreign ships two
persons for every five tons. Vessels to North America were required to
be victualled for twelve weeks, so as to afford a daily allowance for
each person of ½ lb. of meat, 1½ lb. of biscuit or oatmeal, with ½ pint
of molasses, and 1 gallon of water. Regulations were prescribed for
mustering the passengers and for promoting cleanliness on the voyage,
and a surgeon was to be carried. The master and surgeon were obliged to
give bond in the sum of 100_l._ severally to keep a true journal,
which journal was, on the return of the vessel, to be delivered to
the officer of Customs and verified on oath. Bond was likewise to be
given by the owners or master for the seaworthiness of the ship and the
delivery of the passengers at their destined ports. An abstract of the
Act was to be hung up on board.

Some slight amendments of detail were made in this law in 1813 by the
53 Geo. 3, cap. 36; and in the year 1816 it was further amended by the
Act 56 Geo. 3, caps. 83, 114. By the first of these Acts, which is
confined in its operation to Newfoundland and the coast of Labrador,
the tonnage check was omitted, and the limitation was changed to the
check by space, viz. 6 feet in length by 2 feet in breadth for each
passenger, with the full perpendicular height between the two decks in
vessels having two decks, and 5 feet perpendicular between the cargo
and deck when there was no second deck.

The dietary scale was increased to

  1 lb. of bread or biscuit,        } per day,
  1 lb. of beef, or ¾ lb. of pork   } per passenger;
  2 lbs. of flour,   }
  3 lbs. of oatmeal, } weekly;
  ½ lb. of butter,   }

but the allowance of water was reduced from 8 to 5 pints.

[Sidenote: 57 Geo. 3. c. 10; 1817.]

In 1817 the original Act (43 Geo. 3, cap. 56), which had been
previously repealed in respect of Newfoundland and Labrador, was
repealed in respect of the rest of British North America by the 57
Geo. 3, cap. 10. By this Act the number of passengers was limited to
one passenger for every 2½ tons burthen—and in ships partly laden
with goods, in the same proportion for the unladen portion only. A
distinction in computation was, for the first time, made between
children and adults; three children under fourteen being reckoned,
for space purposes, as one adult. The dietary was the same as in the
repealed Act of 56 Geo. 3, cap. 83. The Shipowner was to give bond for
the number of passengers on board, and for their being landed at the
proper port. An abstract of the Act was to be hung up on board.

[Sidenote: 4 Geo. 4, c. 84; 1823.]

[Sidenote: 6 Geo. 4, c. 116; 1825.]

In 1823 the preceding Acts were repealed, and their principal
provisions embodied in the 4 Geo. 4, cap. 84, which enacted that
vessels should not carry to any place out of Europe more than one
person, including master and crew, for every 5 tons, without special
permission or licence from the Commissioners of Customs. The licence
would only be granted, in the case of British ships, to vessels having
two decks, with 5 feet 6 inches in height between them. Vessels
carrying goods were permitted to take passengers in the proportion
of one adult to every 2 tons of unladen space, provided that to each
passenger there should be allotted an “integral” space of 6 feet in
length by 2 feet 6 inches in breadth, and 5 feet 6 inches in height
between the decks, or from cargo to deck, when there was no second
deck. Two children under fourteen, or three under seven, were to be
computed as one adult. Bond was to be given in the sum of 20_l._
for each passenger, that the vessel was seaworthy and properly stored
with water and provisions, and provided with a surgeon, in case there
were fifty persons, including the crew, on board. Passengers could
only be embarked at a Custom-house port. A penalty of 50_l._ was
imposed for each passenger in excess of the licence. The allowance of
provisions, &c., was—

  Water                           5 pints  }
  Bread or biscuit                1 lb.    }
  Beef (or)                       1 lb.    } Daily.
  Pork                            ¾ lb.    }
  Flour                           2 lbs.   }
  Oatmeal, peas, or pearl barley  3 lbs.   } Weekly.
  Butter                          ½ lb.    }

And a penalty of 500_l._ was imposed for re-landing provisions,
&c. Rules for cleanliness and fumigation were established; ships carrying
passengers were to be marked with a “P.” if there were more
than one person, including the crew, to every 5 tons on board. The
Act did not apply to vessels engaged in the Newfoundland fishery.
The Commissioners of Customs at home, the local authorities in the
colonies, and the officers of the navy and consuls abroad were to
execute the Act. This law having been repealed in 1825 by an Act to
repeal the several laws relating to the customs, was re-enacted the
same year with some slight modifications by the 6 Geo. 4, cap. 116.

[Sidenote: 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 19; 28 May, 1827.]

By the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, cap. 12, this, and all other Acts affecting the
carriage of passengers, was repealed, and the trade left unrestricted
by law.

[Sidenote: 9 Geo. 4, c. 21; 23 May, 1828.]

The total absence of any legislative regulations having led to great
abuse, the 9 Geo. 4, cap. 21, was passed, to reimpose the necessary
limitations in the passenger trade. This Act was restricted in its
operation to the continent and islands of North America. The limit
upon the numbers to be carried was three persons for every 4 tons
burthen. Ships carrying passengers were to have a height of 5½ feet
between the decks or between the platform and the deck. Two children
under fourteen, or three between one and seven, were to be computed as
one adult. Fifty gallons of water and 50 lbs. of bread, biscuit, or
oatmeal, were to be put on board for each passenger. Provisions, water,
or stores were not to be carried on that part of the ’tween decks
appropriated to the emigrants. Passengers were not to be landed at the
places not contracted for, and the masters were to enter into bond for
the due performance of the regulations prescribed by the Act.

[Sidenote: 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 53; 31 Aug. 1835.]

By the 5 & 6 Will. 4, cap. 53, the Act of 1828 was repealed, and
further provisions made for the regulation of the carriage of
passengers. No ship was allowed to sail with more than three persons
for every 5 tons of burthen, and was required to have a height of
5½ feet between decks, and for every passenger carried 10 clear
superficial feet of space on the lower deck or platform. Ships having
two tiers of berths were to have 6 inches between the bottom of the
lower berths and the deck. The quantity of water and provisions to
be put on board was 5 gallons of water, 7 lbs. of bread, biscuit, or
oatmeal, or bread-stuffs, for each passenger per week, the length of
the voyage being computed as follows, viz.:—

                                                 Weeks.
  To North America                                  10
  To South America on the Atlantic, or to the West
    Coast of Africa                                 12
  To Cape of Good Hope                              15
  To Mauritius                                      18
  Any other voyage                                  24

The officers of Customs were to examine the provisions and water. A
table was to be made out and hung up of the prices at which provisions
were to be sold on board to the passengers. The seaworthiness of the
ship was to be ascertained by survey. Copies or abstracts of the Act
were to be kept on board. Ships carrying 100 passengers were to carry
a medical man, duly authorised by law to practise in this country as a
physician, surgeon, or apothecary, and a proper supply of instruments,
medicines, &c.; and ships carrying less than 100 passengers were to
have a proper supply of medicines and other things adequate to the
probable exigencies of the voyage. Passenger ships were prohibited
from carrying spirits as stores in larger quantities than 10 per cent.
more than the quantity allowed by the Customs for the use of the crew.
Lists of passengers, with their names, ages, and occupations, were to
be made out and delivered to the chief officer of Customs. Passengers
were not to be landed at ports not contracted for without their
consent. Two children under fourteen, or three between one and seven,
were to be reckoned as an adult. Infants under twelve months were not
to be counted. The passengers were to be victualled, or receive each
a shilling a day in lieu thereof, for every day they were detained
before the sailing of the ship, provided the detention did not arise
from stress of weather, or other unavoidable cause; they were also
entitled to remain on board forty-eight hours after the arrival of the
ship, except where the ship proceeded to another port, in prosecution
of her voyage. Masters were to give bond for the due performance of the
regulations prescribed by the Act.

[Sidenote: 3 & 4 Vict. c. 21; 4 July, 1840.]

By the 3 & 4 Vict. cap. 21, the provisions of the preceding Act were
made applicable to intercolonial voyage in the British colonies in the
West Indies, South America, the Bahamas, and Bermuda.

[Sidenote: 5 & 6 Vict. c. 107; Aug. 1842.]

The two preceding Acts were repealed by the 5 & 6 Vict. cap. 107, which
enacted that no vessel should carry more than three persons (master and
crew included) to every 5 tons burthen, nor, whatever be the tonnage,
more than one passenger to every 10 superficial feet of the space
appointed for the use of the passengers, under a penalty not exceeding
5_l._ for every passenger in excess. The lower deck was not to
be less than 1½ inch in thickness, and secured to the hold beams. The
height between decks was to be 6 feet at least; there were not to be
more than two tiers of berths; the bottom of the lower tier to be 6
inches above the deck; the berths were not to be less than 6 feet in
length and 18 inches in width, for each passenger, and to be securely
constructed. At least 3 quarts of water per diem was to be issued to
each passenger, and a supply of provisions, not less often than twice
a week, at the rate of 7 lbs. of bread-stuffs per week, half at least
to be bread or biscuit, the other half might be potatoes, of which 5
lbs. were to be reckoned equal to one pound of bread-stuffs. The length
of the voyage to be computed as follows:—

                                                       Weeks.
  For a voyage to North America, except the west coast
    thereof                                               10
  For a voyage to the West Indies, including under that
    term the Bahama Islands and British Guiana            10
  For a voyage to any part of the continent of Central or
    South America, except the west coast thereof, and
    except British Guiana                                 12
  For a voyage to the West Coast of Africa                12
  For a voyage to the Cape of Good Hope or the Falkland
    Islands                                               15
  For a voyage to the Mauritius                           18
  For a voyage to Western Australia                       20
  For a voyage to any other of the Australian colonies    22
  For a voyage to New Zealand                             24

Two children under 14 were to be computed as one passenger; children
under one year were not to count.

The provisions and water were to be inspected and surveyed by the
Government emigration agents, or in their absence by the officer of
Customs. Seaworthiness of vessels was to be ascertained by those
officers, who might order a survey if necessary. Boats were to be taken
in the following numbers, viz.:—

Ships between 150 and 250 tons, two boats.

Ships between 250 and 500 tons, three boats.

Ships of 500 tons and upwards, four boats; one of them to be a
long-boat, of the proper size.

Copies of the Act were to be kept on board, to be produced to the
passengers on demand. A proper supply of medicines, &c., with
directions for their use, was to be provided for the voyage to North
America; and on other voyages, ships carrying 100 passengers, or
fifty, if the voyage were longer than twelve weeks, were also required
to have on board a duly-qualified medical practitioner. The sale of
spirits to the passengers was prohibited. Parties contracting to find
passages to North America were to give written receipts for moneys
received in a prescribed form. No person, except owner or master of
the ship, was allowed to act as a passage-broker, unless licensed
by the magistrates at the petty or quarter sessions. In case the
contract for a passage were not performed, the aggrieved parties,
unless maintained at the contractor’s expense, and provided within a
reasonable time with a passage to the same place, might recover any
passage-money they had paid, with a sum not exceeding 10_l._ as
compensation. Passengers were to be victualled during detention of
ships; but if detention (except caused by wind or weather) exceeded two
clear working days, they were to receive instead 1_s._ per diem,
unless suitably lodged and maintained with their own consent by the
contractor. Passengers were not to be landed against their consent at
any place other than the one contracted for, and were to be maintained
on board for forty-eight hours after arrival, unless the ship, in the
prosecution of her voyage, quitted the port sooner. The Act extended to
foreign as well as to British ships, but not to vessels carrying fewer
than thirty passengers, nor to cabin passengers. The enforcement of
the law rested with the Government emigration agents and officers of
Customs.

[Sidenote: 10 & 11 Vict. c. 103, and 11 Vict. c. 6; July 1847 and 1848.]

[Sidenote: 28 March, 1848.]

The 5 & 6 Vict. cap. 107, was amended by the 10 & 11 Vict. cap. 103,
and 11 Vict. cap. 6. The first of these Acts brought within the full
operation of the law such ships as carried more than one passenger
for every twenty-five tons of registered burthen. It gave power to
the Commissioners to vary the diet. It prohibited the carriage of
gunpowder, vitriol, or green hides as cargo. It gave power to ensure
ventilation between decks, a survey of the ship, and a proper crew.
Ships putting back were to replenish their provisions. In case of
wreck, or other accident, the passengers were to be provided with
a passage in some other vessel. The second amending Act, which was
confined to North America, required that a ship carrying more than 100
passengers, should have a cook and proper cooking apparatus; and if
she did not carry a medical practitioner, that the superficial space
for each passenger should be 14 instead of 12 feet. Passengers were
to be examined by a medical practitioner, and persons affected with
contagious or other disease likely to affect the health of the other
passengers were not allowed to proceed. The passage-money of persons
re-landed was made recoverable from the ship. The Queen in Council was
empowered to issue rules and regulations for the preservation of order
on board. Ships carrying fewer passengers than one to twenty five tons
were exempted from the Act.

[Sidenote: 12 & 13 Vict. c. 33; 13 July, 1849.]

The three last-mentioned Acts were repealed, and their provisions
consolidated and amended by the 12 & 13 Vict. cap. 33. The principal
additions were—that an adequate ventilating apparatus should be put on
board all ships carrying 100 or more passengers; and that adult persons
of different sexes, unless husband or wife, should not be placed in the
same berth. A lifeboat and two properly fitted life-buoys were to be
provided; and the following increased dietary scale was prescribed:—

  3 quarts of water daily.
  2½ lbs. of bread or biscuit (not  }
    inferior to navy biscuit),      }
  1 lb. wheaten flour,              } per week. To be
  5 lbs. oatmeal,                   }   issued in advance,
  2 lbs. rice,                      }   and not
  2 oz. tea,                        }   less often than
  ½ lb. sugar,                      }   twice a week.
  ½ lb. molasses,                   }

[Sidenote: Passage broker’s bond, 200_l._]

5 lbs. of potatoes may be substituted for 1 lb. of oatmeal or rice; and
in ships sailing from Liverpool, or from Irish or Scotch ports, oatmeal
may be substituted in equal quantities for the whole or any part of
the issues of rice. The Emigration Commissioners, with the authority
of the Secretary of State, may substitute other articles of food. The
regulations for preserving order, cleanliness, and ventilation were
made applicable to all British ships proceeding to any of the British
possessions abroad, and not confined, as formerly, to those proceeding
to North America. Parties acting as passage-brokers in respect of
passages to North America were required, for the first time, to give
bond to the Crown in the sum of 200_l._, for the due observance
of such requirements of the Act as relate to their proceedings. And
the right of emigrant runners to recover from any emigrant, broker,
or other person, any reward for services in the way of information
or assistance, was taken away, unless such runner was acting under
the written authority, as the agent or servant of the licensed
passage-broker.

[Sidenote: 14 Vict. c. 1; 1851.]

[Sidenote: Bond from masters of foreign ships.]

By an Act, 14 Vict. cap. 1, the Consolidated Act of 1849 was amended,
so as to enable the Emigration Commissioners to fix a different length
of voyage for steam-and sailing-vessels, and to allow the use of an
alternative diet scale in all passenger ships. Vessels putting back
into any port in a damaged state were prohibited from putting to sea
again until effectually repaired. And bond is required to be given by
masters of foreign ships carrying passengers to the British possessions
abroad, that they will submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the
colonial courts in the same manner as if they were British subjects.

[Sidenote: 15 & 16 Vict. c. 44; 30 June, 1852.]

[Sidenote: Shipwrecked passengers may be forwarded by public officers
at the expense of the shipowner, &c.]

[Sidenote: Emigrant runners.]

By an Act passed in June, 1852, the two previous Acts of 1849 and 1851
were repealed, but their provisions were re-enacted in a consolidated
and amended form, with some alterations and additions. The following
are the main differences introduced by the Act of 1852: It empowered
the Emigration Commissioners to sue and be sued, by their secretary or
one of themselves, and exempted them from personal liability in respect
of all acts done in their official capacity. It forfeited “passenger
ships” putting to sea without obtaining a clearing certificate from an
emigration officer; it required ships taking additional passengers at
outports to obtain a fresh clearance from the emigration officer; it
punished, by fine or imprisonment, stowaways and their abettors; it
required the survey of ships to be undertaken by _two_ (instead
of one, as in the previous Act) or more surveyors, and provided for
an appeal against their decision; it required that single men should
be berthed in a separate compartment in the fore-part of the ship; it
provided for hospital accommodation and privies; it extended the boat
scale, and required night-signals and fire-engines to be carried; it
added to the articles expressly prohibited as cargo—horses, cattle,
and lucifer-matches—and prohibited the carriage of cargo on passenger
decks, unless stowed so as not to interfere with light and ventilation
or the comfort of the emigrants. It fixed different lengths of voyage
for steam- and sailing-vessels, and increased, from seventy to eighty
days, the length of voyage to North America for ships sailing between
the middle of October and the middle of January; in other respects, the
prescribed length of voyage remained substantially the same as in the
Act of 1852. It required that the provisions of the crew should not
be inferior to those of the passengers, and empowered the emigration
officers to reject bad provisions. The dietary scale (with the
exception of substituting a small allowance of salt for molasses) was
the same as in the Act of 1849, but a greater variety of articles was
allowed to be substituted for oatmeal, rice, and potatoes. It required
the provisions to be issued in a cooked state, and daily instead of
twice a-week, as in the Act of 1849. It provided for the appointment
of passengers’ stewards, and interpreters when required, and for
the medical inspection of the crew as well as of the passengers. It
extended, from forty-eight hours to ten days, the time within which a
Shipowner may forward passengers who had not obtained passages in the
ships for which they contracted. It required masters of ships putting
back for the purpose of repairing damages, to maintain the passengers,
or pay them subsistence money, until the ship is ready for sea or they
are provided with passages in some other eligible ship. It further
empowered the Secretary of State, Governor of a Colony, or British
Consul, to defray the expenses of rescuing, and—if the master fails to
do so—forwarding shipwrecked passengers, and constitutes such expenses
a debt to the Crown, to be recovered from the owner, charterer, or
master of the ship. The prohibition against acting as a passage-broker
without a licence, which was formerly restricted to passages to North
America, was now extended to passages to any place out of Europe, not
being in the Mediterranean; and the amount of the passage-broker’s
annual bond was increased from 200_l._ to 500_l._ It empowered trustees
of docks to pass bye-laws for regulating the landing and embarking of
emigrants, and for licensing emigrant runners—who were for the first
time brought under legal control by being compelled to take out an
annual licence, and to wear a badge.

[Sidenote: 18 & 19 Vict. c. 119; 14 Aug. 1855.]

The Act of 1852 was repealed and amended by the Act of 1855, which is
the chief Act now in force. It is in the main similar to the previous
Act, but contains several additions, which are fully shown in the
preceding memorandum. The principal of them relate—

     1. To the reduction of the number of passengers required to bring
     a ship within the operation of the Act.

     2. To the reduction of the age of a “statute adult” from 14 to 12
     years.

     3. To the distinction between the upper and lower passenger deck.

     4. To the increase of space allowed to passengers.

     5. To certificates of exemption for mail steamers.

     6. To appeals from the decision of an emigration officer who may
     decline to grant a clearing certificate.

     7. To the stowage of cargo.

     8. To the dietary scale for Australian voyages.

     9. To the increase in the amount of detention money.

     10. To the rights of passengers in case of the wreck or
     destruction of a passenger ship before the commencement of the
     voyage.

     11. To contract tickets for cabin passengers in “passenger ships,”
     and a summary remedy before magistrates for enforcing the contract.

     12. To emigrant runners.

     13. To agents of licensed passage brokers.

[Sidenote: 26 & 27 Vict. c. 51; 1863.]

The material alterations introduced into the Act of 1855 by the
amending Act of 1863 may be classed under the seven following heads:—

     1. The number of passengers necessary to bring a ship within the
     operation of the law is increased from two to three _statute
     adults_ for every 100 tons, and from 30 to 50 _passengers_
     in all.

     2. The exemption heretofore enjoyed by certain mail steamers is
     withdrawn.

     3. The tonnage check on the number of passengers to be carried is
     abolished, leaving the space check only to operate.

     4. Cabin passengers are to be included in the lists to be
     furnished to the officers of Customs, and such passengers are now
     entitled to a return of half their passage money in case they are
     prevented by an emigration officer from undertaking their voyage
     on account of the state of their health.

     5. Under certain restrictions the carriage of a limited number of
     horses, cattle, and dogs in passenger ships is allowed.

     6. In case of wreck or damage to the ship the same regulations are
     extended to passengers whose passages have been provided for them
     by others, as were applicable under the Act of 1855 to passengers
     who had contracted for their own passages.

     7. The bond to be given by the master and another surety to the
     Crown is increased from 200_l._ to 500_l._ in the case
     of ships of which neither the owner nor charterers reside in the
     United Kingdom, and the obligors are made liable for expenses
     incurred in rescuing and forwarding shipwrecked passengers.


APPENDIX No. 8.

_Passages of Clipper Ships engaged in the Trade with China._

The following Tables, showing the dates of starting and arrival of
ships from the China ports during the years 1868, 1869, 1870, 1871, and
1872, is abridged from ‘Naval Science’ for July, 1873.

  ---------+--------------+--------------+----------+---------
  Date of  |              |              | Date of  |
  Sailing. | Ship’s Name. |    Port.     | Arrival. | Passage.
  ---------+--------------+--------------+----------+---------
    1868.  |              |              |          |
  May   28 | Taeping      | Foo-chow-foo | Sept. 7. |  102
   ”    30 | Lahloo       | Foo-chow-foo |   ”    8 |  100
  June   7 | Yang-tsze    | Foo-chow-foo | Oct.   7 |  122
  May   28 | Sir Lancelot | Foo-chow-foo | Sept.  3 |   98
  June  11 | Forward Ho   | Shanghai     | Oct.  17 |  128
   ”    13 | Titania      | Shanghai     |   ”   17 |  126
  May   30 | Undine       | Whampoa      | Sept. 11 |  104
   ”    28 | Ariel        | Foo-chow-foo |  --      |   97
   ”    29 | Spindrift    | Foo-chow-foo |  --      |   97
  June   1 | Serica       | Foo-chow-foo |  --      |  113
   ”     2 | Fiery Cross  | Foo-chow-foo |  --      |  121
  July  10 | Challenge    | Shanghai     |  --      |  131
           |              |              |          |
    1869.  |              |              |          |
  July   9 | Taeping      | Foo-chow-foo |  --      |  107
   ”     2 | Lahloo       | Foo-chow-foo | Oct.  12 |  102
   ”    16 | Sir Lancelot | Foo-chow-foo |  ”    14 |   90
  June  10 | Forward Ho   | Shanghai     |  ”     2 |  114
   ”    16 | Titania      | Shanghai     | Sept. 22 |   98
  April  2 | Undine       | Shanghai     | Aug.   2 |  122
  June  30 | Ariel        | Foo-chow-foo | Oct.  12 |  104
  July   4 | Spindrift    | Foo-chow-foo |  --      |  106
   ”    27 | Serica       | Foo-chow-foo |  --      |  110
   ”     1 | Leander      | Foo-chow-foo | Oct.  12 |  103
  Aug.   6 | Challenge    | Shanghai     |  --      |  148
  July  28 | Falcon       | Foo-chow-foo |  --      |  110
   ”     3 | Thermopylæ   | Foo-chow-foo | Oct.   2 |   91
  June  21 | Taitsing     | Shanghai     |  --      |  115
           |              |              |          |
    1870.  |              |              |          |
  June   5 | Taeping      | Whampoa      | Sept. 29 |  116
  Oct.  13 | Lahloo       | Foo-chow-foo | Jan.  18 |   97
  Aug.   2 | Sir Lancelot | Foo-chow-foo | Nov.  12 |  102
  June  28 | Forward Ho   | Shanghai     | Oct.  25 |  119
   ”    14 | Titania      | Hankow       |  ”     8 |  116
  July  30 | Undine       | Shanghai     | Nov.  13 |  106
  June  28 | Serica       | Shanghai     | Oct.  14 |  112
  Sept. 15 | Fiery Cross  | Whampoa      | Jan.  10 |  117
  Oct.   6 | Leander      | Foo-chow-foo |  ”    17 |  103
  Aug.  30 | Windhover    | Foo-chow-foo |  --      |  100
  Sept.  2 | Falcon       | Foo-chow-foo | Dec.  20 |  109
  July  29 | Thermopylæ   | Foo-chow-foo | Nov.  12 |  106
  June  24 | Cutty Sark   | Shanghai     | Oct.  14 |  112
  Nov.   3 | Taitsing     | Foo-chow-foo | March  4 |  121
           |              |              |          |
    1871.  |              |              |          |
   --      | Taeping      |  --          |  --      |  --
  July  27 | Lahloo       | Foo-chow-foo | Nov. 15  |  111
  June  24 | Forward Ho   | Shanghai     | Oct. 20  |  118
  July   1 | Titania      | Foo-chow-foo |  ”    2  |   93
  June  27 | Undine       | Shanghai     |  ”   16  |  111
  Sept.  4 | Ariel        | Shanghai     | Dec. 26  |  113
  June  22 | Thermopylæ   | Shanghai     | Oct.  6  |  106
  Sept.  2 | Cutty Sark   | Shanghai     | Dec. 21  |  110
           |              |              |          |
    1872.  |              |              |          |
  July   7 | Sir Lancelot | Foo-chow-foo | Nov.  6  |  122
  May   25 | Titania      | Whampoa      | Sept. 19 |  116
  June  24 | Undine       | Shanghai     | Oct. 17  |  115
  Dec.   4 | Fiery Cross  | Shanghai     | April 2  |  119
  Aug.   3 | Falcon       | Whampoa      | May 22   |  111
  June  18 | Thermopylæ   | Shanghai     | Oct. 11  |  115
   ”    17 | Cutty Sark   | Shanghai     | Oct. 18  |  122
           |              |              |  Lost her Rudder.
  Aug.   8 | Taitsing     | Shanghai     | Nov. 30  |  114
  ---------+--------------+--------------+----------+---------


APPENDIX No. 9.

     _Log of the Passages of the Sailing Ship ‘Thermopylæ’ from
     London to Melbourne, thence to Newcastle (N.S.W.), thence to
     Foo-chow-foo, and thence to London, 1868-69._

                   LONDON TO MELBOURNE.
  ---------+--------+--------+---------+-------------------------------
    Date.  |  Lat.  |  Long. |Distance.|             REMARKS.
  ---------+--------+--------+---------+-------------------------------
           |   N.   |   W.   |         |
  Nov.   5 |   --   |    --  |    --   | 5.30 P.M. at Gravesend.
   ”     6 |   --   |    --  |    --   |
   ”     7 |   --   |    --  |    --   | 5 A.M. left Gravesend.
   ”     8 |   --   |    --  |    --   | 6 P.M. Lizard, N. 20 miles.
   ”     9 |  48·30 |   7·2  |   168   | Var., moderate.
   ”    10 |  45·38 |  13·16 |   274   | S.E., N.W., fresh.
   ”    11 |  43·13 |  15·38 |   213   | Var., moderate.
           |        |        |         |{ S.S.E. Lost Peter Johnson
   ”    12 |  41·11 |  19·24 |   194   |{   overboard, ship hove-to for
           |        |        |         |{   an hour, without success.
   ”    13 |  39·44 |  22·10 |   138   | S.S.E. strong gales.
   ”    14 |  38·40 |  22·58 |    69   | Var., moderate.
   ”    15 |  35·12 |  21·54 |   213   | North-westerly, strong.
   ”    16 |  30·39 |  22·55 |   279   | North-westerly, fresh.
   ”    17 |  29·9  |  23·43 |    99   | N., S.E., moderate.
   ”    18 |  27·38 |  26·5  |   200   | South-westerly, moderate.
   ”    19 |  26·45 |  24·12 |   112   | South-westerly, light.
   ”    20 |  26·32 |  24·39 |    --   | South-westerly, light.
   ”    21 |  25·14 |  24·32 |    68   | Easterly, light.
   ”    22 |  21·39 |  26·5  |   228   | E., fresh.
   ”    23 |  17·18 |  26·25 |   268   | North-easterly, fresh.
   ”    24 |  13·18 |  25·32 |   250   | E., fresh.
   ”    25 |  10·6  |  24·33 |   210   | Easterly, moderate.
   ”    26 |   6·53 |  23·32 |   202   | South-easterly, moderate.
   ”    27 |   4·27 |  24·3  |   140   | South-easterly, heavy squalls.
   ”    28 |   1·23 |  25·50 |   228   | South-easterly, moderate.
           |        |        |         |
           |   S.   |   E.   |         |
   ”    29 |   2·13 |  29·0  |   271   | South-easterly, fresh.
   ”    30 |   6·30 |  21·8  |   288   | South-easterly, strong.
  Dec.   1 |  11·22 |  31·28 |   293   | Easterly, variable.
   ”     2 |  16·14 |  31·25 |   294   | Easterly, strong.
   ”     3 |  20·24 |  30·26 |   256   | Easterly, moderate.
   ”     4 |  23·0  |  29·0  |   176   | Easterly, light.
   ”     5 |  24·32 |  27·39 |   118   | Easterly, light.
   ”     6 |  25·53 |  27·8  |    81   | Northerly, light.
   ”     7 |  27·22 |  26·28 |    96   | Northerly, light.
   ”     8 |  29·4  |  25·10 |   123   | Northerly, light.
   ”     9 |  32·24 |  22·35 |   240   | North-westerly, fresh gale.
   ”    10 |  26·26 |  18·51 |   224   | South-westerly, blowing a gale.
   ”    11 |  38·34 |  13·2  |   303   | South-westerly, strong.
   ”    12 |  39·38 |   6·34 |   314   | W.S.W., strong.
   ”    13 |  40·34 |   0·25 |   324   | S.W., strong.
   ”    14 |  40·51 |   6·33 |   280   | Var., moderate.
   ”    15 |  41·51 |  11·19 |   230   | Northerly, fresh.
   ”    16 |  42·29 |  17·30 |   282   | North-westerly, moderate.
   ”    17 |  43·6  |  23·41 |   278   | North-westerly, strong.
   ”    18 |  43·9  |  28·29 |   211   | North-easterly, fresh.
   ”    19 |  43·44 |  34·56 |   284   | North-easterly, strong.
   ”    20 |  43·57 |  40·30 |   240   | Northerly gale.
   ”    21 |  43·35 |  47·34 |   305   | Northerly gale.
   ”    22 |  43·45 |  54·18 |   290   | Northerly gale.
   ”    23 |  42·57 |  61·17 |   310   | Northerly gale.
   ”    24 |  43·6  |  67·21 |   266   | Northerly, strong.
   ”    25 |  42·57 |  74·26 |   312   | Northerly, strong.
   ”    26 |  43·22 |  80·28 |   265   | Northerly, fresh.
   ”    27 |  43·15 |  85·41 |   229   | Northerly, fresh.
   ”    28 |  43·22 |  90·40 |   222   | Easterly, fresh.
   ”    29 |  43·40 |  94·55 |   185   | N.E., light.
   ”    30 |  43·11 | 102·11 |   320   | S.W., gale.
   ”    31 |  43·4  | 106·43 |   200   | N.N.W., moderate.
           |        |        |         |
    1870   |        |        |         |
  Jan.   1 |  43·10 | 111·54 |   228   | N.N.W., moderate.
   ”     2 |  43·7  | 117·14 |   248   | N.N.W., fresh.
   ”     3 |  42·7  | 124·36 |   330   | Northerly, strong.
   ”     4 |  40·39 | 131·18 |   326   | Northerly, strong.
   ”     5 |  39·48 | 136·14 |   225   | South-westerly, moderate.
   ”     6 |  38·41 | 140·18 |   202   | S.E., Percy Island.
   ”     7 |   --   |   --   |   --    | Cape Otway, N. ½ W., 12 miles.
   ”     8 |   --   |   --   |   --    | Calm and light.
   ”     9 |   --   |   --   |   --    |{ 7 P.M., came to anchor in Port
           |        |        |         |{    Phillip Harbour.
  ---------+--------+--------+---------+-------------------------------
                 NEWCASTLE TO SHANGHAI.
  ---------+--------+--------+---------+-------------------------------
    Date.  |  Lat.  |  Long. |Distance.|           REMARKS.
  ---------+--------+--------+---------+-------------------------------
           |   S.   |   E.   |         |
  Feb.  10 |   7·30 |  A.M.  |    --   | Left the harbour.
   ”    11 |   --   |   --   |    60   | E.N.E. to S.E., calm.
   ”    12 |  32·46 | 156·3  |   152   | N.E. and E., very unsteady.
   ”    13 |  32·13 | 158·26 |   125   |{ N.E. and N., Passed Lord
           |        |        |         |{   Howe’s Island.
   ”    14 |  28·30 | 160·55 |   250   | N., strong, squally.
   ”    15 |  23·32 | 162·16 |   300   | N., clear.
   ”    16 |  19·47 | 161·58 |   230   | N.W., clear.
   ”    17 |  15·36 | 162·11 |   251   | N. ½ E., heavy, squally.
   ”    18 |  13·31 | 163·24 |   145   | N.N.E., thunder and lightning.
   ”    19 |  12·16 | 163·17 |    75   | N., heavy rain.
   ”    20 |   8·35 | 164·0  |   224   | N., heavy rain and thunder.
   ”    21 |   4·16 | 165·24 |   262   | N. and E., lightning.
   ”    22 |   1·35 | 166·48 |   180   | N.N.E., heavy squalls.
   ”    23 |   0·19 | 166·50 |    75   | { N.W. by W. Off Pleasant Head,
           |        |        |         | {    got quantity of jugs and
           |        |        |         | {    cocoa-nuts.
           |   N.   |        |         |
   ”    24 |   1·14 | 165·5  |   130   | N.W.
   ”    25 |   3·24 | 162·25 |   200   | N.W. ½ W., squally.
   ”    26 |   6·47 | 159·58 |   250   | N.W. by N., clear.
   ”    27 |  10·28 | 156·35 |   297   | N.W. by W., fresh.
   ”    28 |  13·28 | 152·4  |   298   | N.W. by W., fresh.
  Mar.   1 |  15·54 | 148·25 |   256   | N.W. by W., squally.
   ”     2 |  17·14 | 146·2  |   160   |{ N.W. by W., passed between
           |        |        |         |{   Faraltan and Guguants.
   ”     3 |  19·56 | 142·35 |   255   | N.W. by W. ½ W., squally.
   ”     4 |  21·46 | 139·48 |   200   | N.W. by W. ½ W., light.
   ”     5 |  22·23 | 138·19 |    82   | N.W. by W., light.
   ”     6 |  23·32 | 136·43 |   110   | N.W. by W., light and variable.
   ”     7 |  25·23 | 133·34 |   202   |{ N.N.W., passed _Golden_,
           |        |        |         |{   Sydney to Shanghai 59 days.
   ”     8 |  26·57 | 129·26 |   239   | W.N.W., passed Fok Island.
   ”     9 |  29·30 | 126·11 |   230   | { W. by N., heavy squalls,
           |        |        |         | {   thunder and lightning.
   ”    10 |  31·20 | 124·0  |   200   |{ W.N.W. Off Vido. Got pilot.
           |        |        |         |{   Passage pilot to pilot 28
           |        |        |         |{   days, quickest on record.
   ”    13 |   --   |   --   |    --   | Shanghai. Thick and calm.
  ---------+--------+--------+---------+-------------------------------
                   FOO-CHOW TO LONDON.
  ---------+--------+--------+---------+-------------------------------
    Date.  |  Lat.  |  Long. |Distance.|           REMARKS.
  ---------+--------+--------+---------+-------------------------------
           |   N.   |   E.   |         |
  July   3 |   --   |   --   |    --   | 5 A.M., proceeded down in tow.
   ”     4 |   --   |   --   |    --   | Pinnacle Island, W. by N.
   ”     5 |   --   |   --   |    --   | 3 P.M., passed Adams Point.
   ”     6 |  23·6  | 126·32 |   174   | South-westerly, fresh.
   ”     7 |  23·2  | 126·1  |    48   | Var., moderate.
   ”     8 |  21·13 | 123·59 |   157   | South-easterly, squally.
   ”     9 |  19·13 | 120·28 |   233   | South-easterly, fresh.
   ”    10 |  18·36 | 118·37 |   115   | South-westerly, light.
   ”    11 |  18·16 | 116·2  |   148   | South-easterly, fresh.
   ”    12 |  17·37 | 112·38 |   200   | Southerly, fresh.
   ”    13 |  16·43 | 109·49 |   176   | Southerly, fresh.
   ”    14 |  15·43 | 109·5  |    63   | South-easterly, light.
   ”    15 |  14·6  | 110·7  |   114   | South-westerly, light.
   ”    16 |  12·37 | 109·29 |    96   |{ South-westerly, light, Cape
           |        |        |         |{   Varella, 6 miles.
   ”    17 |  11·47 | 109·30 |    50   | South-westerly, light.
   ”    18 |   8·16 | 109·49 |   212   | Westerly, strong and squally.
   ”    19 |   5·9  | 109·21 |   191   | South-westerly, strong and squally.
   ”    20 |   4·16 | 109·17 |    53   | South-westerly, moderate.
   ”    21 |   3·28 | 109·22 |    48   | South-westerly, light.
   ”    22 |   2·40 | 109·54 |    58   | South-westerly, light.
   ”    23 |   2·6  |        |         | Var., light.
   ”    24 |   0·51 | 108·40 |         | Boorang Island, E. by S., 10 m.
           |        |        |         |
           |   S.   |   E.   |         |
   ”    25 |   0·45 | 108·34 |    96   | South-easterly, light.
   ”    26 |   1·28 | 107·48 |    63   | Var., light.
   ”    27 |   3·15 |        |         |{ Spoke _Achilles_, 10 days out
           |        |        |         |{ from Foo-chow.
   ”    28 |        |        |         | 6 A.M. Anger Light, S.S.W., 8 miles.
   ”    29 |   7·54 | 101·56 |   223   | South-easterly, fresh.
   ”    30 |   9·22 |  97·21 |   284   | South-easterly, squally.
   ”    31 |  10·59 |  93·10 |   267   | South-easterly, fresh.
  Aug.   1 |  12·42 |  88·43 |   290   | S.S.E., strong.
   ”     2 |  14·31 |  83·28 |   318   | E.S.E., strong.
   ”     3 |  16·5  |  79·44 |   236   |{ South-easterly, moderate.
           |        |        |         |{  Spoke _Leander_.
   ”     4 |  17·30 |  76·33 |   203   | S.E. moderate, _Leander_, 10 miles.
   ”     5 |  18·45 |  72·58 |   217   | S.E., fresh, _Leander_, 14 miles.
   ”     6 |  19·16 |  71·26 |    97   | S.E., light.
   ”     7 |  19·4  |  68·28 |   170   |{ S.W. to S.E., heavy gale, and sea
           |        |        |         |{   washed away head rail.
   ”     8 |  21·11 |  63·53 |   249   | S. by E., under topsails and courses.
   ”     9 |  23·4  |  59·0  |   295   | S. by E., strong.
   ”    10 |  24·30 |  54·55 |   246   | S. by E., all plain sail.
   ”    11 |  26·9  |  51·23 |   216   |{ S. by E., var., plain sail and port
           |        |        |         |{   studding-sails.
   ”    12 |  27·25 |  48·30 |   185   | E.N.E., moderate.
   ”    13 |  29·7  |  45·24 |   192   | E., light.
   ”    14 |        |        |   170   | W.S.W., var.
   ”    15 |  30·23 |  38·29 |   200   | S., strong gale with squalls.
   ”    16 |  31·20 |  35·0  |   198   | E., light.
   ”    17 |  34·20 |  33·35 |   110   |{ S.E., steamer astern like _Achilles_;
           |        |        |         |{   sunset, breeze increasing, leaving
           |        |        |         |{   her out of sight.
   ”    18 |  34·2  |  29·39 |   270   | N.N.E., fresh.
   ”    19 |  35·6  |  24·0  |   240   |{ S.W. by S., fresh, strong current to
           |        |        |         |{   S.W.
   ”    20 |  35·8  |  20·4  |   196   | N.E., fog and calm at noon.
   ”    21 |  34·45 |  18·10 |   100   |{ W.S.W. increasing, rounded Cape of
           |        |        |         |{   Good Hope, heavy sea.
   ”    22 |  31·53 |  13·26 |   302   | S., all plain sail set.
   ”    23 |  29·9  |   9·29 |   262   |{ S.S.E., all plain sail set and studding
           |        |        |         |{   sails.
   ”    24 |  26·14 |   5·19 |   284   | S.E., all possible sail.
   ”    25 |  23·13 |   1·50 |   264   | S.E. by S., all possible sail.
   ”    26 |  20·44 |   0·53 |   212   | N.E., and backing to S.E.
           |        |        |         |
           |   W.   |        |         |
   ”    27 |  19·9  |   2·49 |   146   | S.E., light.
   ”    28 |  17·29 |   4·58 |   158   | S.E., light.
   ”    29 |  15·36 |   7·33 |   187   | S.E., light.
   ”    30 |  13·19 |  10·5  |   201   | S.E., light.
   ”    31 |  11·16 |  12·16 |   190   | S.E., light.
  Sept.  1 |   9·6  |  14·8  |   164   | S.E. by S., light.
   ”     2 |   7·11 |  16·0  |   158   | S.E. by S., light.
   ”     3 |   5·9  |  18·2  |   172   | S.E. by S., light.
   ”     4 |   3·19 |  19·51 |   156   | S.E. by S., light.
   ”     5 |   1·10 |  21·46 |   172   | S.E. by S., light, strong current to W.
           |        |        |         |
           |   N.   |        |         |
   ”     6 |   0·55 |  23·4  |   146   | S.E., light.
   ”     7 |   2·57 |  25·4  |   174   | S.E. by S., light.
   ”     8 |   5·51 |  26·7  |   184   | S.S.W., fresh.
   ”     9 |  10·0  |  27·6  |   257   | S.W., very squally.
   ”    10 |  12·16 |  27·16 |   140   | S., light var.
   ”    11 |  13·10 |  27·0  |    60   | N.N.E., var., squally.
   ”    12 |  16·33 |  30·9  |   273   | N.E., trade winds.
   ”    13 |  20·5  |  32·58 |   270   | N.E., trade winds.
   ”    14 |  24·0  |  35·23 |   272   | N.E. by E., trade winds.
   ”    15 |  26·45 |  36·15 |   172   | E. by N., light.
   ”    16 |  27·39 |  36·18 |    54   | E. by N., light and calm.
   ”    17 |  28·0  |  36·23 |    21   | E. by N., light and airy.
   ”    18 |  28·56 |  36·5  |    58   | S., light.
   ”    19 |  30·18 |  35·45 |    52   | S., light.
   ”    20 |  32·37 |  35·5  |   144   | S., light.
   ”    21 |  33·45 |  34·18 |    85   | W., light rain.
   ”    22 |  36·4  |  34·4  |   140   | W., light breeze.
   ”    23 |  39·18 |  33·30 |   200   | S.W., squally, rain.
   ”    24 |  42·37 |  30·17 |   245   | W., squally, heavy sea.
   ”    25 |  44·10 |  26·16 |   200   | W., light and variable.
   ”    26 |  45·14 |  22·59 |   158   | S.W. to N.W.
   ”    27 |  46·8  |  18·34 |   200   | W., bar falling rapidly.
   ”    28 |  47·15 |  14·0  |   202   | S.W., bar falling rapidly, very low.
   ”    29 |  48·30 |   9·13 |   200   | S.W., bar falling rapidly, very low.
   ”    30 |   --   |   --   |   200   | S. by E., noon Lizard, N., 8 miles.
  Oct.   1 |        |        |         |{ Beechy Head, E., 20 miles at noon,
           |        |        |         |{   5 P.M., Dungeness, got pilot.
  ---------+--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------


APPENDIX No. 10.

_Statistics of Tonnage belonging to Great Britain, United States,
France, and Holland, from 1821 to 1874._

  -----+-----------------------+---------------------------------------------+----------------------+----------------------+-----
       |                       |                UNITED STATES.               |                      |                      |
       |                       +----------------------+----------------------+                      |                      |
  Year.|     BRITISH EMPIRE.   |  Registered Vessels- |  Enrolled Vessels-   |        FRANCE.       |         HOLLAND.     | Year.
       |                       |     Foreign Trade.   |   Coasting Trade.    |                      |                      |
       +-----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+
       |    Steam. |  Total.   |   Steam. |  Total.   |   Steam. |  Total.   |  Steam.  |  Total.   |  Steam.  |   Total.  |
  -----+-----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+-----
       |           | Steam and |          | Steam and |          | Steam and |          | Steam and |          | Steam and |
       |           |  Sailing. |          |  Sailing. |          |  Sailing. |          |  Sailing. |          |  Sailing. |
  1821 |        -- | 2,560,203 |      --  |   619,896 |      --  |   612,712 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1821
  1822 |        -- | 2,519,044 |      --  |   628,150 |      --  |   634,619 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1822
  1823 |        -- | 2,506,760 |      --  |   639,921 |      --  |   634,035 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1823
  1824 |        -- | 2,559,587 |      --  |   669,973 |      --  |   657,642 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1824
  1825 |        -- | 2,553,682 |      --  |   700,787 |      --  |   657,899 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1825
  1826 |        -- | 2,635,644 |      --  |   737,978 |      --  |   730,172 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1826
  1827 |        -- | 2,460,500 |      --  |   747,170 |      --  |   806,986 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1827
  1828 |        -- | 2,518,191 |      --  |   812,619 |      --  |   862,171 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1828
  1829 |        -- | 2,517,000 |      --  |   650,143 |      --  |   588,357 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1829
  1830 |        -- | 2,531,819 |      --  |   576,475 |      --  |   591,447 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1830
  1831 |        -- | 2,581,904 |      --  |   620,452 |      --  |   620,017 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1831
  1832 |        -- | 2,618,068 |      --  |   686,990 |      --  |   723,689 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1832
  1833 |        -- | 2,634,577 |      --  |   750,027 |      --  |   825,196 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1833
  1834 |        -- | 2,716,100 |      --  |   857,438 |      --  |   869,382 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1834
  1835 |        -- | 2,783,761 |      --  |   805,822 |      --  |   906,612 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1835
  1836 |        -- | 2,792,646 |      --  |   897,775 |      --  |   952,527 |      --  |       --  |      --  |     --    | 1836
  1837 |        -- | 2,791,018 |      --  |   810,447 |      --  | 1,051,011 |      --  |   696,978 |      --  |     --    | 1837
  1838 |    82,716 | 2,890,601 |    2,791 |   822,592 |  190,632 | 1,133,999 |    9,693 |   679,863 |      --  |     --    | 1838
  1839 |    86,731 | 3,068,433 |    5,149 |   834,245 |  199,789 | 1,221,902 |    9,810 |   673,308 |      --  |     --    | 1839
  1840 |    95,807 | 3,311,538 |    4,155 |   899,765 |  198,184 | 1,240,860 |    9,535 |   662,500 |      --  |     --    | 1840
  1841 |   104,845 | 3,512,480 |      746 |   945,803 |  174,342 | 1,147,913 |   10,183 |   590,262 |      --  |     --    | 1841
  1842 |   118,930 | 3,619,850 |    4,701 |   975,359 |  224,960 | 1,084,669 |    9,757 |   589,517 |      --  |     --    | 1842
  1843 |   121,455 | 3,588,387 |    5,373 | 1,009,305 |  231,494 | 1,115,028 |    9,536 |   599,707 |      --  |       --  | 1843
  1844 |   125,675 | 3,637,231 |    6,909 | 1,068,765 |  265,270 | 1,173,538 |    9,293 |   604,637 |      --  |       --  | 1844
  1845 |   131,202 | 3,714,061 |    6,492 | 1,095,172 |  319,527 | 1,282,344 |    9,390 |   611,492 |      --  |       --  | 1845
  1846 |   134,784 | 3,817,112 |    6,287 | 1,130,287 |  341,606 | 1,399,290 |   10,921 |   633,359 |      --  |       --  | 1846
  1847 |   156,557 | 3,952,524 |    5,631 | 1,241,313 |  399,210 | 1,554,252 |   12,567 |   670,260 |      --  |       --  | 1847
  1848 |   168,078 | 4,052,160 |   16,038 | 1,360,887 |  411,823 | 1,747,632 |   13,152 |   683,298 |      --  |       --  | 1848
  1849 |   177,310 | 4,144,115 |   20,870 | 1,438,942 |  441,525 | 1,848,235 |   13,391 |   680,565 |      --  |       --  | 1849
  1850 |   187,631 | 4,232,962 |   44,942 | 1,585,711 |  481,005 | 1,899,555 |   13,925 |   633,153 |    3,672 |   396,124 | 1850
  1851 |   204,654 | 4,332,085 |   62,390 | 1,726,307 |  521,217 | 1,992,333 |   19,460 |   704,036 |    3,692 |   421,506 | 1851
  1852 |   227,306 | 4,424,362 |   79,704 | 1,899,448 |  563,536 | 2,183,226 |   22,171 |   721,384 |    3,950 |   448,864 | 1852
  1853 |   264,336 | 4,764,422 |   90,520 | 2,103,674 |  574,098 | 2,242,622 |   26,399 |   762,415 |    4,452 |   479,202 | 1853
  1854 |   326,484 | 5,115,846 |   95,036 | 2,333,819 |  581,571 | 2,411,135 |   35,098 |   819,762 |    5,064 |   579,016 | 1854
  1855 |   408,290 | 5,250,553 |  115,045 | 2,535,136 |  655,240 | 2,615,731 |   45,093 |   872,156 |    5,868 |   551,854 | 1855
  1858 |   417,717 | 5,312,436 |   89,715 | 2,491,403 |  583,362 | 2,337,886 |   63,926 |   998,996 |   10,428 |   593,384 | 1856
  1857 |   453,966 | 5,531,887 |   86,873 | 2,463,968 |  618,911 | 2,438,370 |   71,979 | 1,052,535 |   13,302 |   621,102 | 1857
  1858 |   488,415 | 5,609,623 |   78,027 | 2,499,742 |  651,363 | 2,502,086 |   66,587 | 1,049,844 |   13,768 |   621,306 | 1858
  1859 |   472,764 | 5,660,402 |   92,747 | 2,507,402 |  676,004 | 2,586,967 |   65,006 | 1,025,942 |   14,340 |   611,350 | 1859
  1860 |   500,144 | 5,710,968 |   97,296 | 2,546,237 |  770,641 | 2,752,938 |   68,025 |   996,124 |   13,746 |   588,772 | 1860
  1861 |   561,023 | 5,895,369 |  102,608 | 2,642,628 |  774,596 | 2,839,399 |   73,267 |   983,996 |   13,012 |   572,434 | 1861
  1862 |   597,932 | 6,041,358 |  113,998 | 2,291,251 |  596,465 | 2,772,005 |   78,981 |   982,571 |   12,636 |   554,244 | 1862
  1863 |   657,026 | 6,624,403 |  133,215 | 2,026,114 |  439,755 | 3,076,193 |   84,918 |   985,235 |   13,994 |   539,844 | 1863
  1864 |   769,398 | 7,103,261 |  106,519 | 1,581,894 |  853,816 | 3,352,471 |   97,884 |   998,519 |   15,862 |   542,952 | 1864
  1865 |   902,052 | 7,322,604 |   98,008 | 1,602,583 |  969,131 | 3,454,093 |  108,328 | 1,008,084 |   15,068 |   538,676 | 1865
  1866 |   952,318 | 7,297,984 |  198,289 | 1,492,926 |  885,023 | 2,778,537 |  127,777 | 1,042,811 |   16,184 |   540,084 | 1866
  1867 |   973,415 | 7,232,671 |  198,115 | 1,568,032 |  993,765 | 2,695,368 |  133,158 | 1,048,679 |   20,694 |   540,164 | 1867
  1868 |   977,292 | 7,236,916 |  221,939 | 1,565,732 |  977,476 | 2,733,167 |  135,259 | 1,058,548 |   22,194 |   535,192 | 1868
  1869 | 1,033,247 | 7,185,430 |  213,252 | 1,566,422 |  890,316 | 2,526,093 |  142,942 | 1,074,656 |   22,568 |   528,196 | 1869
  1870 | 1,202,134 | 7,149,134 |  192,544 | 1,516,800 |  882,551 | 2,677,940 |  154,415 | 1,072,396 |   26,394 |   528,578 | 1870
  1871 | 1,411,803 | 7,142,891 |  180,914 | 1,425,142 |  906,723 | 2,805,274 |  160,478 | 1,077,611 |   36,644 |   521,098 | 1871
  1872 | 1,640,639 | 7,213,829 |  177,666 | 1,410,648 |  933,887 | 2,971,309 |  177,462 | 1,089,075 |   46,370 |   522,368 | 1872
  1873 | 1,825,738 | 7,294,230 |  173,423 | 1,423,288 |  963,020 | 3,215,915 |  185,165 | 1,068,031 |      --  |       --  | 1873
  1874 | 1,987,235 | 7,533,492 |      --  |       --  |      --  |       --  |  194,546 | 1,037,272 |      --  |       --  | 1874
  -----+-----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+-----------+-----


APPENDIX No. 11.

_Table showing at what Ports Exemptions existed, &c., in 1852, in
favour of certain British Ships, &c._

  -----------------+-----------------------------------------------+---------------------+-----------+--------------------
                   |                                               |                     | Amount of | When Exemption will
       Name.       |           Persons, &c., exempt.               |    How exempt.      |    Tax.   |      expire.
  -----------------+-----------------------------------------------+---------------------+-----------+--------------------
                   |                                               |                     |    £ _s._ |
  Faversham        | Vessels belonging to residents are exempt     | Favour of Lord of   |     19  0 | May cease at any time at
                   |  from anchorage duty levied by authority      |   the Manor.        |           |   will of lord.
                   |  of the Lord of the Manor.                    |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Chichester       | Freemen, from one-half quay dues, levied by   |        --           |    136  0 | Extinction of class of
                   |  prescriptive right of the Corporation.       |                     |           |   freemen.
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Southampton      | Vessels belonging to the port, from tonnage   |        --           |  4,350  0 |
                   |  and other dues.                              |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Cowes            | Vessels registered at Cowes, from harbour     |        --           |     58  0 |
                   |  dues.                                        |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Newport          | Freemen of Newport, from dues                 |        --           |    230  0 | Ditto.
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Exeter           | Freemen of Exeter, from town dues             | Under Charter       |    716  0 |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Teignmouth       | Vessel belonging to the port, from anchorage  |        --           |      2  9 |
                   |  dues.                                        |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Torquay          | Ditto, pay annually 8_d._ per ton, while      |        --           |  2,510  0 | Completion of new harbour.
                   |   others pay 4_d._ each time.                 |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Plymouth         | Cinque Ports vessels, from anchorage dues     | Charters            |    282  0 |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Brixham          | Resident owners, from harbour dues            |        --           |    648  0 |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Totness          | Freemen of Totness, from quay dues            |        --           |    346  0 | Extinction of class of
                   |                                               |                     |           |   freemen.
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Fowey            | Vessels belonging to Fowey and the Cinque     |        --           |     32  0 |
                   |   Ports, from anchorage dues.                 |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Falmouth         | Vessels belonging to Falmouth, Truro, and     |        --           |    313  0 |
                   |   Cinque Ports, from anchorage and flag       |                     |           |
                   |   money.                                      |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Penryn           | Local vessels, from mastage dues.             |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  St. Michael’s    | Fish belonging to inhabitants, from dues on   |        --           |    157  0 |
    Mount          |   goods.                                      |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Bideford         | Barnstaple Corporation, from imports and      |        --           |     97  0 |
                   |   tonnage duties.                             |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Bristol          | Freemen of Bristol, London, and Liverpool,    |        --           |  4,389  0 | Ditto.
                   |   from town dues on goods imported from       |                     |           |
                   |   foreign ports.                              |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Swansea          | Freemen of Swansea, from dues on certain      | Ancient customs     |  1,564  0 | Ditto.
                   |   goods.                                      |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Carmarthen       | Freemen of Carmarthen, from dues on           | Under the Municipal |     76  0 | Ditto.
                   |   certain goods.                              |   Acts.             |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Beaumaris        | Burgesses of the old Corporation, from town   |         --          |    350  0 | Extinction of old Corporation,
                   |   dues.                                       |                     |           |   when the
                   |                                               |                     |           |   town dues will expire.
  Liverpool        | Freemen of Liverpool, London, Waterford, and  | Ancient charters or |144,100  0 |
                   |   Wexford, being inhabitant householders,     |   customs.          |           |
                   |   from town and anchorage dues.               |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Lancaster        | Freemen of Lancaster, from anchorage dues     |        --           |      8  0 |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Newcastle        | Freemen of London, Dover, Rye, Faversham,     | By prescription     |13,456 0[316]| Extinction of class of
                   |   Folkestone, Sandwich, York, and Newcastle,  |                     |           |   freemen.
                   |   are exempt from export dues.                |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Scarborough      | Freemen of Scarborough, from water tolls      | By prescription     |    160  0 | Extinction of class of
                   |                                               |                     |           |   freemen.
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Kingston-on-Hull | Freemen of Hull, from anchorage               |        --           |  2,494  0 | Ditto.
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Bridlington      | Vessels belonging to persons resident in      |        --           |      2 12 |
                   |   Bridlington, from mastage dues.             |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  King’s Lynn      | Freemen of Lynn, from beacon                  | Charters and usage  |  1,961  0 | Ditto.
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Wells            | Vessels belonging to Wells, from ballast      |        --           |    814  0 |
                   |   dues.                                       |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Great Yarmouth   | Freemen’s vessels carrying coal               | By prescription,    |    400  0[317]
                   |                                               | confirmed by 5 Anne.|           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Colchester       | Vessels belonging to Colchester, from         |        --           |      8 11 |
                   |   anchorage and groundage dues.               |                     |           |

                                                              SCOTLAND.

  Leith            | Fish and oysters, from import dues            |        --           | 42,176  0 |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Fisherrow        | Ditto                                         |        --           |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  North Berwick    | Burgesses from one-half shore dues            | Act of Council.     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Leven            | Ships belonging to Leven, from one-half       | Authority of        |    112  0 |
                   |   tonnage dues.                               |   proprietor.       |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Burntisland      | Burgesses and freemen, from one-half shore    |        --           |  1,574  0 | Ditto.
                   |   dues.                                       |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Dundee           | Burgesses pay one-half shore placks           | Charter             |    278  0 |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  St. Andrew’s     | Ditto, tonnage dues                           |                     |    320  0 |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Newport          | Boats belonging to Newport, from shore dues   | Will of Lord of the |     10  0 |
                   |                                               |   Manor.            |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Aberdeen         | Vessels belonging to Aberdeen pay 9_d._ for   |                     |  1,427  0 |
                   |   ballast; other vessels 1_s._                |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Portsoy        } |                                               |                     |    315  0 |
  Cullen         } |                                               |                     |    226  0 |
  Whitehills     } | Vessels belonging to places in Earl Seafield’s|}                    |     56  0 |
  Blackpitts     } |   interest pay one-half harbour dues          |}                    |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Gardenstown      | Vessels belonging to Gardenstown and Troup    | Authority of Mr.    |     82  0 |
                   |   pay one-half shore dues.                    |   Campbell.         |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Inverness        | Local boats under five tons register          |                     |    105  0 |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Glasgow          | Vessels of burgesses of Dumbarton, from       | 21 and 22 Vict., c. |    585  0 | Extinction of class.
                   |   harbour dues.                               |   149, s. 108.      |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Port Glasgow     | Burgesses of Dumbarton, for dues and works    |                     |  2,951  0 |
                   |   existing prior to 1864.                     |                     |           |

                                                               IRELAND.

  Wicklow          | Vessels belonging to Wicklow pay annually     |                     |    130  0 |
                   |   4_d._ per ton; others pay 3_d._ per voyage. |                     |           |
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Cork             | Freemen of Cork, from Mayor’s fees            |                     |    317  0 | Ditto.
                   |                                               |                     |           |
  Kinsale        } |                                               | { Charter           |     40  0 |
  Carlingford    } | Local vessels                                 | { Custom            |    128  0 |
  -----------------+-----------------------------------------------+---------------------+-----------+-----------------------


APPENDIX No. 12.

_Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping._

Although no records have been preserved—what a mass of knowledge must
have been lost during the “dark ages”!—there can be no doubt that from
the earliest period, at least during the plenitude of the Maritime
Power of the Phœnicians, some means must have been adopted to show that
a ship was seaworthy, and, as little doubt, that the relative qualities
of ships, in this respect, were classified, and, if not recorded in any
public documents, were, at least, well known to all persons interested
in shipping. However much the world may have changed, human nature
remains the same; and the merchants and Shipowners of ancient times
must have desired, as they do now, to know if the vessel in which they
embarked, or in which they shipped their goods, was fit to carry them
safely: from this desire would, naturally, arise the competition of
one Shipowner to have a better vessel than his neighbour, so that he
might secure a preference. Nor can I suppose that this natural rivalry
was confined, any more then than it is now, to the superiority in
strength of hull, but was extended to equipment and speed. Indeed, that
such was the case is established by the unquestioned records handed
down to us of ancient vessels, including that in which St. Paul made
his celebrated voyage of which I have given an account in the early
portions of this work.

That the Italian Republics had some sort of classification for their
vessels we may feel even more certain, although, unfortunately,
throughout all time, no historians seem to have considered shipping
worthy of their pen—how strange, considering the part it has played
in the history of the world! for we find that they went so far as
to stipulate by law that no vessel should be laden beyond a certain
depth. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that they had means of
ascertaining the relative qualities of vessels, and that records of
these were kept and made public for the guidance of underwriters, whom
we know then existed, and of all persons who required to entrust their
lives or goods in them. It would, therefore, be absurd to deny the
existence of institutions, till a very recent period, of some sort or
another which had for their object the classification of ships, because
no account of them has been written or preserved.

I dare say the Ancient Britons knew, among themselves, perfectly well
which of their ships were built of seasoned oak, whether the planks
were well put together, or fastened with tree-nails or copper bolts,
and how they were caulked, fitted, and equipped. Nor is it at all
unreasonable to suppose that some sort of record of all these facts was
kept for their guidance. It would, indeed, be contrary to the instincts
of human nature, where self-interest has always prevailed, if no such
notes were taken and likewise recorded.

What particular form the earliest attempts at classification took must
be left entirely to conjecture, the first traces of the existence of
Register Books devoted specially to this purpose not appearing until
about the middle of the last century. The oldest Register Books of
which I have any knowledge are those preserved at Lloyd’s Register
of Shipping, White Lion Court, Cornhill, and although the series
is far from complete, and probably can never be made complete, an
examination of them is both interesting and instructive. The earliest
book preserved there is dated 1764-5. In it the classes assigned were
denoted by the letters A, E, I, O, and U, which seem as now to have
applied to the state of the ship’s hull, and the letters G, M, and B,
appended, which applied to the equipment. These latter denoted—G, good;
M, middling; and B, bad. Thus, A G denoted a first-class ship with a
good equipment; and U B denoted a ship of the lowest class with a bad
equipment.

The next book, in point of age, here, is dated 1768-9, and, instead
of the capital letters A, E, I, O, U, denoting the class of the ship,
as in the earlier book, the small letters a, b, c, appear, while the
figures 1, 2 denoted the state of the equipment. Thus, a 1 denoted
a first-class ship with a first-class equipment; b 2 denoted a
second-class ship with a second-class equipment, &c.

The next Register Book in point of age, preserved, is dated 1775, and,
in this book, the Roman capitals appear again for the hulls, while the
figures 1 and 2 remain for the equipment. This, as far as I can learn,
is the earliest book preserved containing the class A 1, which has
become so familiar now, just a century from what appears to have been
its first adoption.

On comparing the three books above mentioned, the curious fact is
disclosed that the 1764 book does not belong to the same series as the
1768 and the 1775 books. The front cover and first pages of all three
books are missing, but there is sufficient internal evidence to show
clearly that the two later books form part of the series known as the
‘Underwriters’ Register,’ which gradually developed into or rather
led up to the establishment of Lloyd’s Register. The earliest of them
is supposed to date from 1760; whether the 1764 book is a rival which
started immediately after it, or belonged to a Register Society which
existed previously to 1760, is not known, but the latter is perhaps
most probable. Its existence might, it is thought, have debarred the
new Register Book from using the Roman capitals, and it is no great
stretch to suppose that the old book had ceased before 1775, and left
its successor free to adopt the designation or class A 1.

The book dated 1764-5 furnished the following particulars: Ship’s name,
master and owner’s name, ports of trading, tonnage, when and where
built, number and kind of guns, and number of men and the class of the
ship. In the book dated 1775, the load-draught of water was given,
but not the number of men. The Register Book was at this latter date
published annually, and the corrections from time to time were posted
or stamped in the books by means of type as at present. In the earlier
books the revisions during the year, or rather two years—for the books
were then biennial—had to be inserted with pen and ink. The following
particulars have been for the most part obtained by an examination of
old Register Books, but they are necessarily incomplete, as many of the
early volumes were lost when the Royal Exchange was burnt down in 1838.

In the book for 1778 a list of ships of the Royal Navy is inserted,
also a list of the ships in the East India Company’s service. General
meetings used in those old days to be held by the subscribers (then
termed members), of whom there were, at the end of 1780, 164. The
subscription which at first was twelve guineas was eventually, about
1810, reduced to eight guineas, the funded property of the Register
Society having reached 12,000_l._ For twenty years, afterwards,
however, the expenses exceeded the income by 500_l._ per annum,
and the subscription was, in consequence, raised to ten guineas. The
particulars in the book for 1788, a copy of which is extant, were much
as formerly; but a few curious additions had come to be inserted, such
as whether the vessel had deep waists or low counters, and whether
American property: and a record was made of the description of timber
of which the ships were built, the number of decks, and if the beams
were kneed. In 1798, the number of subscribers amounted to 245, and
the number of members on the committee, who served gratuitously, was
eleven. In that year’s book the Government ships are not inserted. In
1799, a number of Shipowners started an opposition book, termed the
‘Red Book,’ which continued until 1833. In 1824, it would appear that
vessels supplied with iron cables did not receive the figure 1 or 2
unless they had hempen cables as well; and then, for the first time,
the letters PIC were inserted against them, denoting that the iron
cables had been proved. It does not appear by any of the early books
we have examined that the class was given for any specified number
of years, but it was omitted whenever the ship had not been surveyed
within three years. It seems, however, to be an established fact that
vessels were allowed to retain the A 1 character for a certain number
of years, the number being entirely dependent on the port at which she
was built, and varying from twelve years for a London built ship, to
five to six years for a north country built ship. After those years
had elapsed, the vessel became of the second class, and no amount of
repairs or strengthening would enable her to be replaced as an A 1
ship. Here were two principles involved in classification obviously
unsound. The first encouraged inferior building, and the second
discouraged ships being efficiently repaired.

These and other mischievous tendencies were entirely removed when,
in 1834, the two previously existing societies became united in the
present ‘Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping.’

The object sought in establishing the existing society was to class
vessels according to their intrinsic merits, so as to indicate by the
class, as nearly as might be, the efficiency and value of each vessel.
The subscription to the Register Book was fixed at three guineas.
Rules were published, and surveyors appointed to survey vessels while
building, as well as afterwards. The committee of the new register
was constituted, as it is at present, of merchants, Shipowners, and
underwriters, elected in equal proportions. Eight underwriters and four
merchants are elected by the Committee of Lloyd’s, and eight Shipowners
and four merchants are elected by the General Shipowners’ Society. In
addition to the foregoing, the chairman of Lloyd’s and the chairman of
the General Shipowners’ Society are ex-officio members of the Committee.

The Committee of Lloyd’s Register was, later on, still further
augmented by the admission of eight members elected to represent the
port of Liverpool, two to represent the Clyde, and three the north-east
coast of England, one to represent Hull, and one Bristol.

The Register Book for 1834 included both classed and unclassed ships,
but the latter were allowed to gradually drop out, until the ‘Register’
contained almost exclusively classed ships. Few particulars at that
time were given of the vessels beyond the tonnage (old), the date
and place of build, the captain’s and owner’s names, and the port of
registry.

The rules as first issued for the building of wood ships were brief and
general, but slight reference being made to wood steamers, which were
then few in number. The first iron vessels classed in the Register Book
were the _Sirius_, of 180 tons, built at London in 1837, and the
_Ironside_, built at Liverpool in 1838; they had the A 1 class
assigned without a term of years, and iron vessels were subsequently
classed in the same way until 1854, when rules for their construction
were framed, twelve A 1, nine A 1, and six A 1 classes, respectively,
being assigned under those rules. In 1863 the mode of classing iron
ships was altered to /A\ 1, /B\ 1, and /C\ 1. Rules for the
building of composite ships (iron frames planked with wood) were
devised in 1867, and the vessels were classed A 1 for a term of years.
In 1870 new rules for the construction of iron ships were framed, based
on the dimensions of vessels instead of on tonnage as formerly, and the
class of iron vessels was altered from the monogram system indicated
above to 100 A 1, 90 A 1, and 80 A 1;[318] and this is the mode of
classing now in force. But to go back a few years:—In 1841 another
register society was constituted at Liverpool, which existed for four
years, and was in 1845 amalgamated with ‘Lloyd’s Register.’ In 1863
Lloyd’s Register Book was enlarged, and the registered length, breadth,
and depth of the ships were given in addition to other particulars. In
1870, its size was still further increased. The book in 1874 received
great additions, and is about four times the size of that issued in
1834. It now contains all British ships classed and unclassed of 100
tons and above, in addition to many vessels of smaller size, and those
of other nations which have obtained classification therein, or others
of sufficient importance to be inserted. The rules for shipbuilding
were in 1874 also carefully revised, and issued with the enlarged book.

The information it contains may now be said to be very complete, for
few particulars are omitted which are likely to be required in the
ordinary course of business. Steps have been taken to publish the
rules in the principal European languages, and I learn that already
translations into the French, German, and Italian languages have been
completed, and are in the press.

From the current Register Book it will be seen that there are now
nearly 3000 subscribers, and there are about 8000 vessels classed, in
addition to those of which the class is temporarily suspended, pending
repairs or survey, or for some other cause. At the present time nearly
the whole of the shipbuilding in the United Kingdom is under the
survey of the Society’s surveyors for classification in the Register
Book. On the 31st of March, 1874, there were building, under special
survey in various parts of the world, 655 vessels of a total tonnage
of 543,918 tons to class at Lloyd’s. On the 30th of June, 1874, the
number of vessels building under special survey was 660, of a tonnage
of 516,109 tons.

The vast amount of shipping, now being built to class in Lloyd’s
Register, is doubtless due chiefly to the confidence which the British
shipping community repose in the Society’s present rules for the
building of vessels, and the manner in which they are administered.

In Italy, France, and the Netherlands there appears to be a manifest
tendency towards classification in Lloyd’s Register, and foreign
Shipowners, and even large companies—such as the General Transatlantic
Company—are submitting their vessels to this Society’s survey for
classification, thus placing them on an equality with ships belonging
to this country.

During the recent agitation with respect to shipping in Canada, the
Canadian Government communicated with the Committee of ‘Lloyd’s
Register’ on the project of instituting a Canadian registry, and the
following extract from the letter of the Canadian Ministry dated 11th
July, 1873, is of interest as showing the high repute in which the
Institution of which we are now writing is held in our North American
Colonies:—

“The Minister of Marine[319] is not unmindful of the great benefits
conferred on the shipping of this country by the establishment of
Lloyd’s surveyors at Quebec, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island
some years previous to the establishment of surveyors for ‘Bureau
Veritas’ in this country, and in making his arrangements for the
establishment of a Canadian registry, and the framing of rules and
regulations for inspection and classification under it, he feels
desirous to assimilate the system under which it will be worked to that
of your institution, which is controlled by British sentiment, and has
the confidence of such a large portion of the shipowners of the world,
and the officers of which possess such great experience in all these
matters.”

In judging of the value of ‘Lloyd’s Register of Shipping,’ it is
important to observe that it is, essentially, a public body, having
no pecuniary or commercial purposes to serve beyond those of the
public interest, because (with the exception of a moderate fee to the
Committee for their attendance) the whole of its receipts are devoted
to the interests of shipping, to the extension of the society’s staff
of surveyors, who are now stationed at all parts of the United Kingdom
and in many places abroad, the improvement of the Register Book and
other matters of public importance.[320]

It is impossible to speak too highly of the value of this great
institution. It had its failings, and I recollect that, a quarter of a
century ago, I made various attacks upon it through the public press;
and, on the ground of its maintaining certain rules for classification,
which I conceived were unsound in principle, I declined to classify any
of my ships with the society. But all these rules have been long since
altered; and when I look back to that time and compare the quality of
ships then launched to those of the present day, it is impossible to
question the great value of the services this institution has rendered
to the country. A ship that would have had an A 1 class assigned to her
forty years ago, would now be considered barely seaworthy.

Here we have another instance of the valuable work done in this country
without Government aid or interference in any shape or form. A few
individuals, for their own protection as well as for the protection of
the public, associate themselves together, and, by their organisation,
do perhaps more to save life and property at sea than all the laws
which have been passed having that object in view. For the success of
this valuable institution, its members, and I must add, the public,
are greatly indebted to Mr. Thomas Chapman, F.R.S., who has been its
chairman almost from its commencement in 1834, and who has devoted the
best years of his life, sparing neither time nor labour to raise it to
its present high position, while displaying a tact and sound judgment
throughout in the management of its affairs rarely to be met with,
combined with an honesty of purpose which must ever command respect
and admiration. Nor has he lacked able and indefatigable colleagues,
some of whom, as, for instance, the late Mr. William Tindall and Mr.
Duncan Dunbar, and now Mr. George Marshall, Mr. W. H. Tindall, and
others, have been active members of the Committee for a large portion
of their lives. But not the least important secret of its success
has been its complete system of organisation, and the competency of
all persons connected with it for their respective duties, while the
many checks upon its various branches tend to keep the working of
the business of the society free from those temptations to which men
holding responsible appointments are too frequently subjected. For
instance, there is a chief surveyor, who has two assistants acting
directly under him, and through whom all important reports from the
different surveyors must pass, before being laid before the Committee,
many of whom know quite as much about ship-building as the surveyors
themselves—then all these surveyors are under the secretary, Mr. B.
Waymouth, a gentleman of great practical knowledge and remarkable
ability. If there is anything wrong, he will be sure soon to detect
it; for, during the twenty-one years with which he has been connected
with the society, he has gone through the different grades, from
assistant-surveyor to chief-surveyor, acting as chief of the staff for
some time before receiving the appointment of secretary. There are also
annual visits of inspection made to all the principal building ports
by the chairman and members of the Committee, the secretary, and chief
surveyor. Moreover, the surveyors are not all located permanently, some
being from time to time changed, and a feeling pervades the whole staff
that if any one passes imperfect workmanship or materials, the fact
is likely to be brought to light by the surveyors who follow, who are
bound to report any apparent laxity, which is invariably inquired into
by the Committee, and dealt with as circumstances require.

That the survey and classification of ships has been of immense
advantage in saving life and property at sea may be seen by the
following table. Here we see, that the losses of vessels classed at
Lloyd’s have not, during the last three years, been one-half of the
unclassed, and that for the eighteen months ending 30th January, 1875,
while the percentage of loss of all vessels from all causes classed at
Lloyd’s has been only 5·25 per cent., the losses of vessels unclassed,
or not classed by that association, has been 12·32 per cent. These
figures speak volumes in favour of the society.

_Losses of British Ships of 100 tons and upwards during 1874-5._

LOSSES FROM ALL CAUSES, WRECKED, STRANDED, FOUNDERED, MISSING.

  -------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+--------------------
                     |      Number of Ships in       |       Number of Ships         |   Percentage of
                     |           Existence.          |             Lost.             |    Ships Lost.
                     +----------+---------+----------+----------+---------+----------+---------+----------
       YEAR.         | Classed  | Classed,|Unclassed,| Classed  | Classed,|Unclassed,| Classed,|Unclassed,
                     |   and    | Lloyd’s | Lloyd’s  |   and    | Lloyd’s |  Lloyd’s | Lloyd’s | Lloyd’s
                     |Unclassed.|Register.| Register.|Unclassed.|Register.| Register.|Register.| Register.
  -------------------+----------+---------+----------+----------+---------+----------+---------+----------
  1874               |  11,569  |   6115  |   5454   |    593   |   181   |    412   |   2·96  |   7·55
  First half, 1875   |  11,362  |   5893  |   5469   |    396   |   135   |    261   |   2·29  |   4·77
    Total for        +----------+---------+----------+----------+---------+----------+---------+----------
      last 18 months |          |         |          |          |         |          |   5·25  |  12·32
  -------------------+----------+---------+----------+----------+---------+----------+---------+----------

LOSSES FROM FOUNDERING, MISSING, &C., EXCLUDING STRANDING,
COLLISIONS, &C.

  -------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+--------------------
                     |      Number of Ships in       |       Number of Ships         |   Percentage of
                     |           Existence.          |             Lost.             |    Ships Lost.
                     +----------+---------+----------+----------+---------+----------+---------+----------
       YEAR.         | Classed  | Classed,|Unclassed,| Classed  | Classed,|Unclassed,| Classed,|Unclassed,
                     |   and    | Lloyd’s | Lloyd’s  |   and    | Lloyd’s |  Lloyd’s | Lloyd’s | Lloyd’s
                     |Unclassed.|Register.| Register.|Unclassed.|Register.| Register.|Register.| Register.
  -------------------+----------+---------+----------+----------+---------+----------+---------+----------
  1874               |  11,569  |   6115  |   5454   |    281   |   103   |    178   |   1·68  |   3·26
  First half, 1875   |  11,362  |   5893  |   5469   |    200   |    77   |    123   |   1·30  |   2·25
    Total for        +----------+---------+----------+----------+---------+----------+---------+----------
      last 18 months |          |         |          |          |         |          |   2·98  |   5·51
  -------------------+----------+---------+----------+----------+---------+----------+---------+----------

  -------------------+---------------------------------+---------------------------------
                     | All Losses, including Stranding,| Losses from Foundering, Missing,
                     |     Collisions, Foundered,      |     &c., but not Stranding,
                     |          Missing, &c.           |         Collisions, &c.
                     +-----------+----------+----------+-----------+----------+----------
       YEAR.         |  Classed  | Classed, |Unclassed,|  Classed  | Classed, |Unclassed,
                     |    and    | Lloyd’s  |  Lloyd’s |   and     |  Lloyd’s |  Lloyd’s
                     | Unclassed.| Register.| Register.| Unclassed.| Register.| Register.
  -------------------+-----------+----------+----------+-----------+----------+----------
  1872               |    863    |    262   |    601   |    198    |    70    |   128
  1873               |    938    |    301   |    637   |    316    |   108    |   208
  1874               |   1258    |    313   |    945   |    506    |   162    |   344
  First half, 1875   |   1013    |    273   |    680   |    389    |   118    |   271
  -------------------+-----------+----------+----------+-----------+----------+----------


APPENDIX No. 13.

     _Acts of Parliament passed between 1849 and 1875 inclusive,
     relating to Merchant Snips and Seamen, with a note of the more
     important Parliamentary Papers issued in regard to the Navigation
     Laws or Mercantile Marine of Great Britain._

  1849.     Emigrant Ships. Passenger Acts, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 33.
   ”        Repeal of Navigation Laws, Foreign Trade, 12 & 13 Vict.
              c. 29.
   ”        Pilotage, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 88.
   ”        Mercantile Marine Act, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 93.
  1851.     Mercantile Marine Act Amendment Act, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 96.
   ”        Steam Navigation Act, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 79.
   ”        Seamen’s Fund Winding-up, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 102.
   ”        Wages, &c., of Deceased Seamen. Parl. Paper, 143, 1875.
  1852.     Passenger Acts, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 1.
   ”        Foreign Deserters, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 26.
  1853.     (Emigrant Ships) Passengers Acts, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 44.
   ”        Pilotage Laws Amendment Act, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 129.
   ”        Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 131.
   ”        Colonial Lighthouses.
  1854.     Commission on Local Charges on Shipping. Parl. Paper, C.
              1836, 1854,  C. 1911, and C. 1967, 1855.
   ”        Repeal of Navigation Laws (Coasting Trade), 17 & 18 Vict.
              c. 5.
   ”        Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104.
   ”        Ship Registry.
   ”        Merchant Shipping Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104. Tonnage.
   ”        Wrecks. Wreck Register, Parl. Paper, C. 1260, 1875, p. 302.
              Liability. Legal Procedure. Seamen’s Money Orders. Parl.
              Paper, 161, 1875.
   ”        Meteorology.
  1855.     Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict.
              c. 91.
   ”        Emigrants, 18 & 19 Vict., Passenger Act, c. 119.
   ”        Seamen Deserting Unseaworthy Ships. Parl. Paper, C. 853,
              1875.
  1856.     Shipping Dues. Parl. Paper, 225, 1856.
   ”        Seamen’s Savings Banks, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 41. Parl. Paper,
              161,
              1875.
  1857-8.   Harbours of Refuge Committee. Parl. Paper, 344 and 344 i.
              1858.
  1859.     Harbours of Refuge Commission. Parl. Paper, C. 2474, and
              C. 2506,
              Sess. 1, 1859.
   ”        Commission on Manning the Navy. Naval Reserve; Training
              Ships. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 40.
  1860.     Anchors and Chain Cables. Parl. Paper, No. 182, 1860.
   ”        Committee on Merchant Shipping.
   ”        French Treaty. Parl. Paper, C. 2644, 1860.
  1861.     Harbours and Passing Tolls Act, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 47. Parl.
              Papers, 457, 1862, and 176, 1871.
   ”        Bristol Channel Pilotage Act, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 236.
   ”        Lighthouse Commission. Parl. Paper, C. 2793, I., II., 1861.
  1862.     Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict.
              c. 63. Examination of engineers. Inquiries. Rules as to
              lights, &c. Duty in case of collision. Steamboat
              passengers. Pilotage. Local lighthouses. Liability.
              Tonnage. International arrangements. Salvage jurisdiction.
              Delivery of goods. Repeal of law as to deck loading and
              for bulkheads.
   ”        Commercial Code of Signals.
   ”        Harbours transfer, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 69.
  1863.     Emigrant Ships. Passengers Act Amendment, 26 & 27 Vict.
              c. 51.
   ”        Naval Reserve (officers), 26 & 27 Vict. c. 69.
  1864.     Chain Cables and Anchors, 27 & 28 Vict. c. 27. Parl.
              Paper, 139,  1864.
   ”        Surveys in cases of Desertion. Questions 246 to 272, and
              App. No. 5 to Report of Unseaworthy Ships Commission.
  1866.     Timber Duties Repealed, 29 & 30 Vict. c. 36.
   ”        Crown Land Act, 1866, 29 & 30 Vict. c. 62. Parl. Paper,
              18, 1867.
   ”        Meteorology. Storm Warnings. Report of Committee, 14, 145,.
               1866 Parl. Paper, C. 1307, 1875.
  1867.     Merchant Shipping Act, Health of Seamen, 30 & 31 Vict.
              c. 124.
   ”        Local Dues Exemption, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 15; 33 & 31 Vict.
              c. 59.
  1868.     Colonial Shipping, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 129.
   ”        County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 71;
              32 & 33 Vict. c. 51.
   ”        Sea Fisheries, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 45.
   ”        Merchant Shipping Consolidation Bill.
   ”        Merchant Shipping (Colonial), 32 & 33 Vict. c. 11.
   ”        Coasting Trade of Colonies. Colonial Examinations.
   ”        Merchant Shipping Consolidation Bill, No. 267 of 1869.
  1869-70.  Opinions of Consuls on British Ships and Seamen. Parl.
              Paper, C. 630, 1872.
  1870.     Compulsory Pilotages, No. 343, 1870.
   ”        Consular connection with the United States.
   ”        Merchant Shipping Code, No. 24 of 1870. Parl. Paper,
              26-173, 1870. Scale showing draught of water. Survey in
              cases of Desertion. Record of draught of waters.
              Misdemeanour to send unseaworthy ships to sea.
  1871.     Merchant Shipping Code Bill, No. 15, C. 287, 1871.
   ”        Merchant Shipping Act, 34 & 35 Vict. C. 110. Unseaworthy
              ships.
   ”        Chain Cables Act, 34 & 35 Vict. c. 101.
  1872.     Merchant Shipping Act, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 73.
  1873.     Commission on Unseaworthy Ships.
   ”        Merchant Shipping Act, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 85. Parl. Paper,
              C. 1152, 1875.
  1874.     Chain Cables, 37 & 38 Vict. c. 5.
   ”        Tonnage Bill. Parl. Paper, C. 943, 1874.
  1875.     Combustion in Coal-laden Ships. Royal Commission.
   ”        Fog Signals at Lighthouses. Parl. Papers, 119, 1873; 188,
              1874, and 224, 1875.
   ”        Marine Insurance. Parl. Paper, No. 304, 1875.
   ”        Merchant Shipping Bill, No. 116, 1875.
   ”        Unseaworthy Ships, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 88.
   ”        Board of Trade and its Staff. Parl. Paper, 482, 1871.

It would thus appear that, since the Navigation Laws were repealed in
1849, Government has passed no less than forty-one Acts of Parliament,
and introduced seven Bills not yet passed, many of them great and
important measures, besides laying before Parliament numerous
instructive and interesting papers, all of them devoted expressly to
the purpose of improving our merchant ships and the condition of our
merchant seamen. It is idle, and worse than idle, after these facts, to
charge the respective Governments, since 1849, with having neglected
the interests of our mercantile marine, and the best answer to such
mischievous and unjust charges is the present very high position in all
respects of our merchant fleets as compared with those of all other
nations.


APPENDIX No. 14.

_Tonnage of Shipping Entered and Cleared in the United Kingdom,
United States, France, Holland, Norway, Prussia, and Sweden,
distinguishing between National and Foreign Ships from 1850 to 1873.
With Cargoes and in Ballast._

  ------+--------------------------------------
        |           UNITED KINGDOM.
        +------------+------------+------------
  Years.|  British   |  Foreign   |   Total
        |  Tonnage.  |  Tonnage.  |  Tonnage.
  ------+------------+------------+------------
  1850  |  9,442,544 |  5,062,520 | 14,505,064
        |   65·1 per |   34·9 per |
        |    cent.   |    cent.   |
        |            |            |
  1860  | 13,914,923 | 10,774,369 | 24,689,292
        |   56·3 per |   43·7 per |
        |    cent.   |    cent.   |
        |            |            |
  1870  | 25,072,180 | 11,568,002 | 36,640,182
        |   68·4 per |   31·6 per |
        |    cent.   |    cent.   |
  ------+------------+------------+------------

  ------+---------------------------------------
        |           UNITED STATES.
        +-------------+-------------+------------
  Years.|United States|  Foreign    |   Total
        |   Tonnage.  |  Tonnage.   |  Tonnage.
  ------+-------------+-------------+------------
  1850  |   5,205,804 |   3,503,837 |  8,709,641
        |    59·8 per |    40·2 per |
        |    cent.    |     cent.   |
        |             |             |
  1860  |  12,087,209 |   4,977,916 | 17,065,125
        |    70·8 per |    29·2 per |
        |     cent.   |     cent.   |
        |             |             |
  1870  |   6,992,967 |  11,332,095 | 18,325,062
        |    38·2 per |    61·8 per |
        |     cent.   |     cent.   |
  ------+-------------+-------------+------------

  ------+-----------------------------------
        |             FRANCE.
        +----------+-----------+------------
  Years.| French   |  Foreign  |    Total
        | Tonnage  |  Tonnage. |   Tonnage.
  ------+----------+-----------+------------
  1850  |1,891,512 | 2,719,207 |  4,610,719
        | 41 per   |  59 per   |
        |   cent.  |    cent.  |
        |          |           |
  1860  |3,502,912 | 4,953,824 |  8,456,736
        | 41·4 per |  58·6 per |
        |  cent.   |   cent.   |
        |          |           |
  1870  |4,289,206 | 9,317,531 | 13,606,737
        | 31·5 per |  68·5 per |
        |  cent.   |    cent.  |
  ------+----------+-----------+------------

  ------+-----------------------------------
        |             HOLLAND.
        +-----------+-----------+-----------
  Years.|   Dutch   |  Foreign  |   Total
        |  Tonnage. |  Tonnage. |  Tonnage.
  ------+-----------+-----------+-----------
  1850  |   935,283 | 1,301,152 | 2,236,435
        |  41·8 per |  58·2 per |
        |   cent.   |   cent.   |
        |           |           |
  1860  | 1,341,711 | 2,053,269 | 3,394,980
        |  39·5 per |  60·5 per |
        |   cent.   |   cent.   |
        |           |           |
  1870  | 1,323,475 | 3,341,448 | 4,664,923
        |  28·4 per |  71·6 per |
        |   cent.   |   cent.   |
  ------+-----------+-----------+-----------

  ------+----------------------------------
        |              NORWAY.
        +-----------+----------+-----------
  Years.| Norwegian | Foreign  |   Total
        |  Tonnage. | Tonnage. |  Tonnage.
  ------+-----------+----------+-----------
  1850  | 1,050,307 |  346,639 | 1,396,945
        |  75·2 per | 24·8 per |
        |   cent.   |  cent.   |
        |           |          |
  1860  | 1,513,369 |  516,667 | 2,030,036
        |  74·5 per | 25·5 per |
        |   cent.   |  cent.   |
        |           |          |
  1870  | 2,264,233 |  967,753 | 3,231,986
        |  70 per   | 30 per   |
        |   cent.   |  cent.   |
  ------+-----------+----------+-----------

  ------+-----------------------------------
        |              PRUSSIA.
        +-----------+-----------+-----------
  Years.|  Prussian | Foreign   |   Total
        |  Tonnage. | Tonnage.  |  Tonnage.
  ------+-----------+-----------+-----------
  1850  | 1,026,378 | 1,063,980 | 2,090,358
        |  49·1 per |  50·9 per |
        |   cent.   |   cent.   |
        |           |           |
  1860  | 1,711,442 | 1,588,382 | 3,299,824
        |  51·9 per |  48·1 per |
        |   cent.   |   cent.   |
        |           |           |
  1870  | 2,893,214 | 3,301,530 | 6,194,744
        |  46·7 per |  53·3 per |
        |   cent.   |   cent.   |
  ------+-----------+-----------+-----------

  ------+-----------------------------------
        |              SWEDEN.
        +-----------+-----------+-----------
  Years.|  Swedish  |  Foreign  |   Total
        |  Tonnage. |  Tonnage. |  Tonnage.
  ------+-----------+-----------+-----------
  1850  |   462,884 |   604,002 | 1,066,886
        |  43·4 per |  56·6 per |
        |   cent.   |   cent.   |
        |           |           |
  1860  |   560,066 |   828,386 | 1,388,452
        |  40·3 per |  59·7 per |
        |   cent.   |   cent.   |
        |           |           |
  1870  | 1,374,433 | 2,954,151 | 4,328,584
        |  31·8 per |  68·2 per |
        |   cent.   |   cent.   |
  ------+-----------+-----------+-----------


FOOTNOTES:

[314] Extract from the ‘New York Herald’ of 10th October, 1860:—

“MARITIME RELATIONS.”

“Remarks of Mr. W. S. Lindsay, M.P., at the Chamber of Commerce
meeting, Tuesday evening, 9th October.

“Mr. Lindsay said: ... With these preliminary remarks, allow me
to state to you the objects which I have in view in meeting you
this evening. I will speak first in reference to the liability of
Shipowners, because that, perhaps, is one of the most important
questions, and one which I think is not sufficiently understood. I
do not think that it is generally known how the Shipowners of both
countries stand with regard to each other on this question. As our
respective laws now stand, any Shipowner of this country or of England,
however wealthy, may rise any morning and find himself a ruined man.
That is a serious thing to consider. The law of England limits the
responsibility of our Shipowners to the value of the ship and freight.
In most other countries of Europe the responsibility of the Shipowners
is also limited to a similar extent. That is likewise the law in this
country, as far as I understand your law. That is to say, if one of
your ships runs down another at sea, and you pay into your courts the
value of the ship and freight, your responsibility cannot be carried
beyond that value. Now this is very good so far as the laws of the
respective countries stand. But if my ship runs down another ship in
which any American subject is interested, I am made responsible, in
your courts, not merely for the value of my ship and freight, but for
whatever amount of damage may have been sustained through the collision
brought about by my ship. Therefore if my ship runs down a vessel with
cargo and freight on board to the extent of 200,000_l._ sterling,
I would be responsible for the whole. If, on the other hand, your
ships at sea run down any other ship in which a British subject is
interested, and the action for loss is raised in our courts, you are
held responsible for the full amount of the damage which your ship
caused. This arises from the fact that our laws have jurisdiction only
over British ships, and your laws have jurisdiction over only American
ships. Now, considering the vast trade which is carried on between the
two countries, I hope you may agree with me in the opinion, that as the
laws of both countries are similar, the Shipowner’s liability in the
courts of either country should in all cases be limited to the value of
the ship and freight. I hope you will use your influence to extend that
limitation to the vessels of both countries, which might easily be done
by a convention between the two nations....”

[315] Goods imported in foreign vessels not being the produce or
manufacture of that country pay one-fifth more duty than if imported in
Portuguese vessels.

[316] 810_l._ allowed to persons exempt.

[317] Drawback allowed, 82_l._

[318] _Extracts from the Rules relating to the Classing and
Periodical Surveys of Ships_ (1875).

IRON STEAM AND SAILING SHIPS.

Iron Ships are classed A 1 with a numeral prefixed, and retain their
characters so long as, on careful annual and periodical Special
Surveys, they are to be found in a fit and efficient condition to carry
dry and perishable cargoes to and from all parts of the world.

100 A, 90 A, and 80 A, will denote vessels that have been built in
accordance with, or equal to, the Rules, and Tables G 1, G 2, G 3,
and G 4. Where deviations from the Rules are desired, a sketch of
the midship section, plans, &c., must be first submitted, through
the resident Surveyor, for the Committee’s approval, and the vessel
built in accordance with the approved plans, under the Survey of the
Surveyors to the Society.

Iron Ships built in accordance with previous Rules remain on the
characters assigned to them.

All vessels must be submitted to occasional or _Annual Surveys_
when practicable; and to entitle them to retain their characters in the
‘Register Book,’ Special Surveys must be held at intervals of three and
four years, according to the Class assigned.

WOOD SHIPS.

SHIPS CLASSED A 1 _for a term of Years_.—Section 34 requires that they
shall be occasionally surveyed; _Annually_ if practicable. If not
placed under _half-time or intermediate_ Surveys within periods not
exceeding four years—or, in the case of the higher classed vessels,
one-half of the terms of years originally assigned to them—their
Characters will be liable to be withdrawn from the ‘Register Book.’

Sections 54 to 58 provide for the Continuation or Restoration of the
Character A 1 for further periods.

SHIPS CLASSED A 1 _in Red_.—Section 60 provides for the Survey and
Classing of Ships A 1 in Red, which is also a Class of vessels fit for
the safe conveyance of dry and perishable goods _to and from all parts
of the world_. They are allowed to retain this Character upon _Special
Survey_, for terms in no case exceeding _two-thirds_ the periods
originally assigned to them.

They are also subject to Annual Survey, and to the half-time Survey
prescribed in Section 34.

SHIPS CLASSED Æ, for the conveyance of dry and perishable
goods on _shorter voyages_, and for the conveyance of cargoes
_not_ in their nature subject to sea damage _on any voyage_.

Section 61 requires that they should be submitted to _Annual_
Survey, and to Special Survey within periods not exceeding _four_
years.

SHIPS CLASSED E.—For the conveyance of cargoes not subject to
sea damage _on any voyage_.

Section 65 requires that they should be submitted to _Annual_
Survey, and to Special Survey within periods not exceeding _three_
years.

Provision is made in the Rules for the Classification of Composite
Ships; also of Foreign-built Ships constructed not in accordance with
the Rules.

As all vessels are required to be surveyed periodically, the _date
of Survey_ is the criterion of their state of efficiency _at that
time only_.

[319] See Evidence before Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships.
Question 11,135.

[320] _Statement of the Number of Exclusive and Non-Exclusive
Surveyors to ‘Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping.’_

  Exclusive Surveyors in the United Kingdom                       47
  Non-Exclusive Surveyors in the United Kingdom                   14
  Engineer Surveyors in the United Kingdom                         7
  Exclusive Surveyors in the Colonies and at Foreign Ports         6
  Non-Exclusive Surveyors in the Colonies and at Foreign Ports    36
  Engineer Surveyors stationed at Foreign Ports                    3
                                                                 ---
                     Total number of Surveyors                   113




INDEX.


    _Advance notes_ wholly wrong in principle. We do not pay our
        servants their wages in advance, p. 542

    ——, less pretence in giving them to the sailor, than to the
        mechanic or house servant, _ibid._

    ——, proposal to make illegal, rejected by the House of Commons,
        _ibid._

    ——, comprehensive view of, by the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy
        Ships, p. 543

    _America_, rapid progress of, in the first half of the present
        century, p. 1

    ——, reasons for this, pp. 2-3

    ——, eighty years after the Declaration of Independence, rivals all
        other nations, in the amount of shipping, p. 3

    ——, in 1860, owns more tonnage than the whole of the United
        Kingdom, p. 3, _note_

    ——, distinct contracts for the sailors of, in the bank and cod, and
        whale fisheries, p. 9

    —— adopts from other nations the laws best fitted for her
        condition, _ibid._

    ——, various regulations in, with reference to contracts between
        seamen and masters, pp. 9-10

    ——, duties of mates in, much like those of other countries, p. 10

    ——, in, masters of vessels are liable to actions of law if they
        enforce their authority too severely, _ibid._

    ——, regulations adopted in the courts of, for the duties of masters
        and mates, pp. 10-11

    —— caused the first infringement of the principle of the old
        Navigation Laws, p. 99

    ——, Protectionist farmers in, stop the importation of Canadian corn
        into, p. 126

    ——, the policy of, with reference to the English repeal of the
        Navigation Laws most important to ascertain, p. 212

    ——, general policy of, ever since her Independence, has been
        Protectionist, p. 213, _note_.

    ——, the dwellers in, on the sea-board of the States, very strongly
        Protectionist, p. 215

    —— builds, in 1848, a new and very superior class of vessels for
        trade from New York to California, and thence to China, p. 289

    —— declines the convention with reference to privateering, p. 407

    _American Captains_, memorial of, in 1820, to Congress complaining
        of the differential duties levied by France, p. 4, and _note_.

    _American Government_ had, for many years, to expend large sums for
        destitute seamen, p. 15

    —— at once accepts the conditions of the repeal of the Navigation
        Laws, but withholds their own coasting trade, p. 286

    _American Law_, careful provisions by, for all sailors employed in
        their ships, p. 11

    —— considers the masters and owners of ships common carriers, p. 20

    —— as applied to mercantile matters very nearly the same as the
        English, _ibid._

    —— expressly provides that merchant seamen shall have full
        opportunities of laying the complaints before their consuls
        abroad, p. 23

    _American merchant service_ offers more inducements than the
        English for young men to enter it, p. 17

    —— generally anxious that their captains should have a share in
        vessels, _ibid._

    ——, hence, secures for officers in its ships, men of superior
        position and attainments, _ibid._

    ——, nature of the contracts in, between owners and captains, p. 18

    ——, excellent schools provided by, for training boys, _ibid._

    ——, sailors employed in, can almost always read, write, and cypher,
        _ibid._

    ——, spirit and character of the “shipping articles” usual in, as
        affecting seamen, owners, masters, and consignees, pp. 19-20

    ——, conditions about wages, in, with securities for their due
        payment, pp. 21-2

    ——, power given to the sailors employed in, to appeal to the
        Admiralty courts, pp. 22-3

    _American Navigation Laws_, conditions and peculiarities of, pp.
        328-9

    _American Seamen_, Act of 1803 and 1840 with reference to the
        payment and discharge of, pp. 12-14

    ——, general character of, p. 25

    _American ships_ (under the Navigation Law) might carry British
        goods to British settlements in the East Indies, p. 95

    —— allowed to clear from English ports to China, while English
        merchants could not send a ship thither, p. 105

    _American Shipowners_ require the masters of their vessels to have
        knowledge of commercial pursuits as well as of navigation, p. 15

    _American tonnage and classification_ differ from that of England,
        p. 187

    _American Vessels_, Masters of, far superior to those of English
        ships during the first half of the present century, p. 15

    _American War of Independence_, at the commencement of, the
        Americans could neither import nor export, except in British
        ships, p. 100

    _Americans_ obtain, nearly, a monopoly of the trade between China
        and Great Britain in 1849, p. 290

    _Americans_ so outstripped by English sailing vessels, that English
        ships are often chartered to bring early teas from China to New
        York, pp. 418-20

    _Americans of the West_, naturally hope for a free exit of their
        goods to Europe, &c., from the mouth of the St. Lawrence, p. 125

    —— and the Canadians naturally desire Free-trade, p. 125

    _Ancel, M._, discouraging report of, pp. 458-9

    _Ancona, Consul of_, reply by, to the Foreign Office Circular, p. 45

    _Annatto_, case of ship laden with, pp. 119-20.

    _Anne, Queen, Act of_, for securing seafaring apprentices, p. 183

    _Anti-Corn-Law League_, object and action of, pp. 77-8

    _Austria_, regulations of, with reference to the commanders of
        their merchant vessels, p. 36

    ——, special Commercial Treaty made with, 1838-40, pp. 110-2

    ——, details of treaty with, in 1840, valuable as showing the
        influence of the new civilizing power, steam, p. 111

    _Austria, French War with_, caused a great demand for English
        shipping, p. 398


    _Bahia, the Consul at_, reply by, to the Foreign Office Circular,
        pp. 47-8

    _Baker, Mr._, Consul at Riga, reply by, to Foreign Office Circular,
        p. 43

    _Bancroft, Mr._, has interviews with Lord Palmerston in the autumn
        of 1847, p. 163

    ——, emphatic language of, at one of these, _ibid._

    ——, doubt if he meant all he said, pp. 163-4

    ——, letter from, to Lord Palmerston, Nov. 3, 1847, pp. 164-5

    ——, communications by, to the English Government, imply _complete
        reciprocity_, p. 169

    ——, certain, that up to March 5, 1849, he had succeeded in
        deceiving both Lord Palmerston and Mr. Labouchere, p. 223

    _Bank Charter Act of 1844_ suspended for a second time, 1858,
        causes the failure of many banks, p. 361

    _Baring, Mr. T._, thinks that we ought in all cases to adhere to
        the main principles of the Navigation Laws, p. 261

    —— thinks if the merchants have really suffered as much as stated
        from the laws, they would have complained, _ibid._

    _Belvidere, The, or Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution_, great
        value of, p. 37, _note_

    _Bentinck, Lord George_, resumes the debate on the Navigation Laws
        on June 9, 1848, the fourth night, p. 201

    ——, death of, Sept. 21, 1848, and universal respect to, shown on
        the day of his funeral, p. 219

    _Bergasse, M._, a Protectionist, gives evidence, practically,
        confirming the Free-trade assertions, p. 454

    _Berkeley, Captain_, evidence of, p. 186

    _Board of Trade, Commission by_, May 17, 1847, to examine into
        matters connected with the commercial marine, p. 50

    ——, _return of_, confirms the _general_ truth of the replies to Mr.
        Murray’s Circular to the Consuls, _ibid._

    _Booker, Mr., Vice-Consul of Cronstadt_, reply to the Foreign
        Office Circular, pp. 42-3

    _Boston_ sends ships to the East Indies and China as early as 1789,
        p. 7

    _Bouverie, Mr._, amendment proposed by, not accepted by even the
        Shipowners, p. 249

    —— urges that his amendment is strictly in accord with Free-trade
        principles, pp. 251-2

    ——, amendment of, ultimately supported by only 15 members, p. 254

    _Braysher, Mr._, evidence of (as Collector of Customs in London),
        on the practical working of the Navigation Laws, pp. 153-5

    ——, peculiar anomalies in the Navigation Laws shown by, p. 154

    _Bright, J., Mr._, energetically supports Mr. Cobden in his
        exertions against Protection, pp. 77-8

    —— urges in vain on Mr. Labouchere the importation of cotton, then
        abundant at Havre, p. 155, _note_

    _British Ships_, condition constituting previously to the repeal of
        the Navigation Laws, pp. 93-95

    ——, the owner of, under the Navigation Law, could not live in
        Paris, p. 117

    —— are excluded from the trade between the Atlantic and Pacific
        ports of the United States, p. 373

    _British Ships and Seamen_, Acts of Parliament passed between 1849
        and 1875 inclusive, relating to British ships and seamen, and
        other Parliamentary Papers respecting thereto, Append. p. 634

    _British Tonnage_, Returns of, if sufficiently extended, afford an
        adequate estimate of the actual state of British shipping, p.
        375

    _Brougham, Lord_, splendid oration of, against the repeal of the
        Navigation Laws, pp. 266-74

    —— condemns with great severity Mr. Porter’s statistics, pp. 267-9

    —— objects to sweep away all restriction without obtaining any
        equivalent, p. 269

    —— holds that the policy of the Navigation Laws rested on the
        partial monopoly they gave to British shipping, p. 271

    ——, and that the fleets, with which we destroyed the power of
        Bonaparte, were created by the Navigation Laws, p. 272

    —— believes the repeal of the Navigation Laws would encourage the
        infernal slave-trade, p. 273

    _Buchanan, Mr._, replies to Mr. Crampton, by sending him the Act of
        Congress of May 24, 1828, p. 212

    —— distinctly states that a letter had been written on Nov. 3,
        1846, urging a Free-trade treaty between America and England,
        but _reserving the coasting-trade of both countries_, p. 214

    _Bülow, Count_, replies on the part of Prussia that no pledge could
        be given for future legislation, p. 216

    _Buoyancy_, the reserve, no possible means of determining, p. 528


    _Cabotage_, technical name for the French coasting-trade, p. 447

    _Canada_, fleets from, respectively called, according to the time
        of year, the “Spring” or the “Fall” fleets, p. 123

    ——, by great exertions, secures more rapid communication between
        interior and the sea than America, _ibid._

    ——, _people of_, naturally hope that the German emigration to the
        United States would pass through it, pp. 124-5

    ——, _produce of_, so long as protected, had little ground for
        complaint, p. 130

    ——, could not be imported into England through New York, p. 131.

    ——, general results of the effect of the Navigation Laws as
        regarding, pp. 132-3

    _Canadians_, a large number of them, maintain that the effect on
        Canada of Protection was, practically, mischievous, p. 127

    —— assume that the opening of Canadian seaports to vessels of all
        nations would restore their trade, p. 128

    ——, though for a modified Free-trade, which might benefit
        themselves, were not prepared for it unconditionally, _ibid._

    —— naturally hope that they may be able to engross the trade of
        Western America, p. 130

    _Canton_, American vessels allowed to trade there, though British
        vessels were not, p. 106

    _Cardwell, Mr._ (_now Lord Cardwell_) thinks the effect of
        maintaining the “long-voyage” clause would defeat the policy of
        the warehousing system, p. 237

    —— asserts that the “warehousing system” was the result of a
        judicious relaxation of the Navigation Laws, p. 238

    ——, remarkable action of, in the preparation of the Merchant
        Shipping Act of 1854, p. 320, _note_

    ——, greatly increases the number of lighthouses, &c., p. 414

    _Castro, Viscount de_, replies sarcastically to Lord Palmerston’s
        letter of inquiry, pp. 216-17

    _Chain cables_, great mistake to test them by enormous strains, as
        these tend to destroy the fibre of the iron, p. 318, _note_,
        and p. 480

    —— and anchors, now tested through the agency of Lloyd’s Registry,
        p. 557

    _China, trade with_, passages of “Clipper Ships” engaged in,
        Append. p. 611

    _Clay, Mr._, though a Free-trader, declines to support Government
        till the restrictions on Shipowners were done away with, p. 200

    “_Clipper Ships_” first built at Aberdeen in 1846, to compete with
        the Americans on the Chinese coasts, p. 288

    _Coasting clauses_, in Mr. Labouchere’s Bill, withdrawn on the
        receipt of Mr. Buchanan’s letter, p. 223

    _Coasting Trade_ rigidly kept in the hands of England; indeed, made
        more strict by the Act of 1825, pp. 106-7

    —— thrown open, and manning clause repealed, in 1854, p. 353

    ——, we do not even now know the number of ships in our, p. 465

    _Coasting Trade of America_ liable to be diminished on the opening
        of the railway across Central America to Panama, p. 374

    ——, all parties agree that America has acted selfishly in
        withholding her, p. 384

    ——, error in supposing it only a trade to San Francisco, p. 385

    _Coasting Trade of North American Colonies_ still confined to
        British vessels, p. 400

    _Cobden, Richard_, letter from, to Mr. Lindsay, March, 1856, p. 75
        and _note_

    —— the chief of the new statesmen, who exploded the pernicious
        fallacies of Protection, pp. 74-77

    —— asserts that we can build better ships than the foreigners, and
        cheaper too, quality considered, p. 201

    —— that the sailor is as able to compete with foreigners as the
        artisan, _ibid._

    —— that the Shipowner pays none of the rates with which the
        landowner was charged, p. 202

    —— asserts that the constant assertion of maritime superiority
        tends only to provoke other nations, _ibid._

    —— first meets M. Chevalier at the Exhibition of 1851, p. 436

    —— determines with him to modify the tariffs of France, _ibid._

    _“Coffin” Ships_, if these still exist, this is not from any
        neglect on the part of Parliament, p. 503

    _Colbert_, in 1661, devotes much attention to French maritime
        affairs, p. 423

    _Collision, after_, masters of ships compelled, by Act of 1853, to
        stand by and help, p. 513

    _Colonie_, this name, in the strictest sense, confined to La
        Guadaloupe, Martinique, and Bourbon, p. 434

    _Colonie, or Colonie à Culture_, represents the English
        _Plantation_, _ibid._

    _Commercial Marine of France_, Commission to inquire into, 1870,
        pp. 450-1

    ——, rival views with reference to, of the French Protectionists and
        Free-traders, pp. 451-2

    _Commercial Maritime Law_, in inextricable confusion, owing to the
        multitude of Acts, p. 308

    _Commercial Treaties_, various, passed between England and America
        between 1794 and 1817, pp. 59-60

    _Commission, Royal, on Unseaworthy Ships_, appointed unanimously,
        in answer to Mr. Plimsoll’s appeals, p. 484

    ——, its members, their ability and impartiality, _ibid._

    —— see, clearly, that increasing legislation will not remedy the
        evils complained of, p. 486

    ——, opinion of, as to what “unseaworthiness” really means, _ibid._

    —— determine to leave to the Shipowner the proper loading of his
        ships, p. 488

    —— consider that a Government survey would only remove the
        responsibility from the Shipowners, p. 489

    ——, and, therefore, doubt its expediency, _ibid._

    —— point out that, already, there are great complaints of
        Government interference, _ibid._

    ——, decline to make the powers of the Board of Trade more
        stringent, p. 491

    —— are of opinion that the shipping offices have been of great
        value, p. 496

    —— propose a new scheme for training boys for sea, p. 498

    —— doubt the expediency of the present form of certificate of the
        Board of Trade as regards emigrant ships, p. 532

    —— suggest the appointment of a permanent legal adviser to the
        Board of Trade, p. 549

    ——, Report of, on the whole, most able, p. 501

    _Committee of 1836_, for inquiring into shipping, form many sound
        conclusions, p. 466

    _Committee of 1843_, estimate by, of the loss of ships and lives,
        pp. 467-8

    —— confirms the Act of that of 1846, and adds much new and useful
        matter, p. 471

    _Congress, in 1789_, retaliates on British Commerce and Navigation,
        pp. 57-8

    ——, conciliatory action of May, 1830, in reference to trade with
        England, p. 63

    _Coninck, M. de_, an ardent advocate of Free-trade, p. 453

    ——, evidence as to the real value of the complaints of the
        Protectionists, _ibid._

    _Conseil Supérieur_ publishes three large volumes of evidence, and
        announces that great changes in the French law are imperative,
        p. 445

    _Consuls_, alike in America and England, forbidden to trade on
        their own account, p. 13

    _Convention of Commerce_ between Great Britain and France, 1826,
        Append. p. 563

    _Cooper, Mr. T. C._, graphic account of a race up Channel with two
        American ships, p. 291, _note_

    _Corn, enormous price of, in 1847_, and consequent disastrous
        reaction, p. 159

    _Council, Order in, July, 1823_, issued in opposition to the Act of
        Congress of March, 1823, p. 62

    ——, further, July, 1826, directed against the action of Congress,
        p. 63

    —— can modify, in certain cases, the stringency of the Navigation
        Laws, p. 96

    ——, power, given to relax or restrict trade with different places,
        of the most capricious nature, p. 114

    _Crisis, Commercial, of 1857-8_, various causes of, pp. 361-2

    _Customs_ do not take notice of coasting vessels in ballast, or
        with certain cargoes, p. 465

    _Customs, Act of, 1825_, general effect, the throwing open English
        ports to the rest of world, under certain exceptions, p. 61


    _Dantzig, the Consul at_, reply by, to the Foreign Office Circular,
        pp. 45-6

    _Decazes, Duke_, sensible views of, p. 460

    _Denmark_, excellent system in, of education for the mates and for
        the higher grades of the merchant service, p. 28

    _Disraeli, Mr._, replies, sarcastically, to Mr. Cobden, pp. 202-3

    ——, on reporting progress, protests against the whole Bill as
        already seriously damaged, pp. 254-5

    —— thinks all that we had heard last year about the United States
        must be taken as a _tabula rasa_, p. 263

    _Draught of water_, very little advantage in publicly recording
        this, p. 529

    “_Droits de tonnage_” levied on all foreign vessels up to 1793, p.
        424

    —— on foreign ships, abolished, ultimately, in 1867, p. 432

    _Drouyn de Lhuys, M._, letter from, declining the overtures of Lord
        Palmerston for reciprocity, pp. 215-6

    _Drummond, H._, amusing but illogical speech of, pp. 244-6


    _East India, Trade with_, has been always exceptional, p. 103

    ——, conceded to ships not fulfilling the rules of the Navigation
        Laws, _ibid._

    ——, Lascars employed in, are not to count as British seamen, and
        a certain proportion of English sailors required according to
        ship’s tonnage, p. 105

    _East India Company (Dutch)_ practically prevents English vessels
        from trading with Dutch settlements in the East, p. 400

    _Education_ needed even more for sailors than for landsmen, but
        England has done little yet in this direction, p. 541

    _Ellenborough, Lord_, unwilling to diminish our navy, at the
        present period, by a single ship, p. 274

    ——, the more so, that by the new agency of railways, great forces
        can be suddenly concentrated on any one place, p. 275

    —— moves in Committee of May 24 that the operation of the Bill be
        deferred for one year, but is beaten by twelve, pp. 280-2

    —— urges that the effect of such undue haste will be to throw
        45,000 seamen out of employ, p. 281

    ——, on third reading, points out many things that ought at once to
        be done for the relief of the Shipowner, pp. 283-4

    _Emigrant ships_, the year 1854, the most fatal to them on record,
        no less than nine having been then lost, p. 324

    ——, no less than _sixty-one_ lost in _seven_ years ending Dec.
        1853, _ibid._

    ——, disgraceful state of the early, pp. 330-1

    ——, great mortality on board, noticed by Congress in Jan. 1854, p.
        331

    ——, order by United States Passenger Act, that every master shall
        pay a fine of ten dollars for each passenger who may die on the
        voyage, p. 334

    _Emigrants_, average annual number of, between 1815 and 1854,
        102,923 persons, p. 323

    ——, medical inspection of, unsatisfactory, p. 328

    ——, various rules drawn out to secure the safety and comfort of,
        pp. 331-3

    ——, caution to, not to purchase “through” tickets, p. 337

    ——, but “through” tickets by the Grand Trunk Railway of Canada
        perfectly reliable, _ibid._

    _Emigrants, dietary to_, amount and character of, required
        originally, with the changes therein, pp. 329-330

    _Emigration_, sums sent home for, amounted to from half a million
        to one million and a half annually, p. 323

    ——, resolutions, 1855, of the Senate of the United States in reply
        to questions on, pp. 333-4

    _Emigration Commissioners_, many and valuable improvements
        suggested and carried out by, p. 337

    _Emigration officers_ appointed at Liverpool in 1864, and their
        duties, pp. 327-8

    _Emigration system previously to 1855_, evil working of, and frauds
        practised on the emigrants, pp. 325-6

    _Engineers (marine)_ required, by the Act of 1862, to undergo the
        same examination in steam as Masters in sailing, p. 347

    ——, which, though at first doubted, has proved of great value, p.
        348

    _England_, alone of the nations, had no code for the regulation of
        her merchant sailors, p. 298

    _England, people of_, half inclined to join France against Austria,
        p. 397

    _‘Equador,’ The_, case of, as showing the fallacious and evil
        working of the Registry Law, pp. 115-16

    ——, importance of the decision of the Court of King’s Bench in this
        case, p. 116

    ——, showing, as it does, that a Corporation wholly consisting of
        foreigners may register a ship as British, p. 117

    _Europe, trade with_, continually modified, but finally settled by
        the Customs Act of 1825, pp. 101-2

    ——, character of it, under the Navigation Laws, pp. 101-3

    _Examination of Masters, Mates, &c._, has produced immense good
        since the passing of the Act of 1850, p. 302

    _Exhibition of 1851_, started by Society of Arts, and supported by
        the Prince Consort, p. 435


    _Farrer, Mr. T. H._ (now Chief Secretary to the Board of Trade),
        England greatly indebted to him for his exertions to ameliorate
        the state of the merchant seamen, pp. 298-9

    ——, evidence of, on the question of over-insurance, p. 546

    —— opposes all legislation interfering with the details of a
        Shipowner’s duty, p. 551

    _Favoured-Nation Clause_, sometimes, no doubt, beneficial, but
        often pernicious, p. 126

    _Fleury, M._, letter from, and reply, June 17 and 23, 1862, Append.
        p. 590

    _Foreign nations_ are suspicious of even a modified surrender of
        Protection on the part of England, p. 64

    —— do not understand the real position of free England, pp. 64-5

    _Foreign Office_, defects in, when dealing with commercial matters,
        p. 405

    —— apathetic, in not securing, by diplomacy, better terms of
        reciprocity from foreign Powers, p. 406

    ——, correspondence with, respecting the liability of British
        Shipowners in the courts of the United States of America, p. 571

    _Foreign Office Circular_, of _July 1, 1843_, requiring information
        from Consuls abroad with reference to the character of British
        shipmasters and seamen, pp. 42-3

    —— of great value, though unfair and invidious in form, p. 43

    _Foreign Shipmasters_ far more careful than the English in the
        stowage and transport of their cargoes, p. 52

    _Fortescue, Mr. (now Lord Carlingford)_, provisions in Bill
        introduced by, in 1873, strongly in favour of seamen, p. 515

    _France_, peculiar system adopted in, of combining the navy and
        commercial marine, p. 30

    ——, all seamen in, considered to be in Government employ, and,
        therefore, enrolled and pensioned, _ibid._

    —— provides for her seafaring classes a better education than that
        of any other country, p. 31

    ——, Reciprocity Treaty with, may be taken as a specimen of other
        such treaties, p. 67.

    —— in reply to Lord Palmerston, declines to have anything to do
        with Free-trade, p. 215

    ——, real object of war with Austria to advance her frontier to the
        Rhine, pp. 397-8

    ——, since Charles IX., has had to depend on other nations for many
        necessaries of life, p. 435

    ——, Commercial Treaty of 1860, the result of the labours of Messrs.
        Cobden and Chevalier, p. 436

    ——, its general conditions and effects, p. 437

    ——, the great natural advantages of, not her armies, the true
        sources of her lasting greatness and happiness, p. 462

    _France, people of_, probably not more than one million (out of
        thirty millions) depend for livelihood on French shipping, p.
        439

    _Free-trade_, Manchester and Liverpool at issue on this great
        question, pp. 134-5

    ——, chief advocates of, before Mr. Ricardo’s committee—Messrs.
        Lefevre, Macgregor, and Porter, pp. 136-40

    _Free-trade Party_ triumphant after dissolution of July, 1847, p.
        158

    _Free-traders, many_, lose their seats in Parliament owing to the
        vigorous action of the Shipowners’ Society, p. 389

    _Freight_, by the law of nations, considered to be the “Mother of
        Wages,” p. 21

    ——, enormous rise in, during 1853, and the causes thereof, pp. 296-7

    _French Assembly_, under the influence of M. Thiers, reverse in
        Jan. and Feb. 1872 much of the law of 1866, p. 457

    _French Colonial Trade (Pacte Colonial)_, special regulations for
        preserving and increasing, pp. 425-6

    ——, three special rules for, p. 426

    ——, regulations of, extremely disadvantageous to France herself,
        and hard on her colonies, pp. 426-7

    —— substantially maintained, and more vigorously enforced by the
        French revolutionary leaders, p. 427

    ——, measures adopted for, after the French Revolution, to be
        considered as _war measures_, p. 428

    ——, many of the regulations of, exact copies of the old English
        ones, _ibid._

    ——, preserved with some modifications by all its Governments, p. 433

    _French Colonies_, complaint of the chief, that they no longer
        derive any advantage from the _Pacte Colonial_, p. 443

    _French Differential Duties_ known by the names of the _surtaxes de
        pavillon_ and the _surtaxes d’entrepôt_, p. 432

    _French, Emperor of_, letter to, by Mr. Lindsay, on the subject of
        the Navigation Laws of France, Jan. 10, 1861, Append. p. 582

    _French Export Houses_ constantly employ English shipmasters as
        giving them less trouble, p. 455

    _French Markets_, after the peace, for some time supplied by the
        aid of foreign shipping, p. 431

    _French Mercantile Law_ of May 19, 1866, leading conditions of, pp.
        446-7

    _French Mercantile Marine_ did not keep pace with French commerce
        owing to the baneful influence of Protection, p. 435

    —— increased where in competition with that of other nations, p.
        439

    —— decreased under the operation of their Protective Laws, _ibid._

    —— so like the English as often to be called _Les Actes de
        Navigation_, p. 430

    _French Mercantile Marine Law_, as amended, did not finally pass
        the Chambers till 1866, p. 445

    _French Navigation Law_, the first, absurdly stringent under
        Charles IX., p. 422

    ——, impartial law of July 3, 1860, with reference to, p. 443

    _French Ship_, conditions entitling a vessel to this privilege, pp.
        423-4

    ——, no alien permitted to command, p. 424

    ——, various enactments for securing the true character of, p. 429


    _Genoa, Consul at_, reply by, to the Foreign Office Circular, p. 45

    _Gibson, Milner, Mr._, gives the sanction of Government to Mr.
        Ricardo’s motion, p. 88

    ——, the country greatly indebted to, as a practical sailor, for
        carrying out the “Rule of the road at sea,” pp. 345-6

    ——, value of the Bill introduced by, in 1861, p. 413

    _Gladstone, Mr._, objects to the discretionary power given to the
        Queen in Council, and to the reservation of the coasting trade,
        p. 198

    ——, relying chiefly on the sincerity of Mr. Bancroft, cautiously
        supports the repeal of the Navigation Laws, pp. 198-9

    —— thinks it best to stick to the path of experience, and to carry
        out principles analogous with those of Mr. Huskisson, p. 239

    —— strongly urges the removal of every burden with which the
        Shipowner is now oppressed, _ibid._

    —— urges that experience only points to _conditional_ relaxation,
        p. 240

    —— again strongly opposes the idea of retaliation, _ibid._

    ——, in fine, thinks that substantial justice can only be rendered
        by conditional legislation, p. 242

    —— again urges conditional legislation, but not in the form
        proposed by Mr. Bouverie, p. 250

    —— would, at once, remove all taxes affecting the British
        Shipowners, p. 251

    _Government_ cannot legislate or dictate how a particular trade is
        to be carried on, p. 539

    —— very properly concludes that it cannot leave the lives of many
        persons in the hands of incompetent officers and men, p. 52

    _Government, English_, informs the American Government of its
        intentions with regard to the Navigation Laws, one day before
        the Queen’s speech, 1847, p. 166

    _Graham, Sir James_, very able speech of, on third reading, pp.
        258-260

    —— objects to both reciprocity and retaliation, p. 259

    —— considers the whole question involved to be Protection or no
        Protection, p. 260

    _Gray, Mr. T._, rhymes made by, to facilitate recollection of the
        “Rule of the road at sea,” p. 345, _note_

    ——, thinks several of the Acts for saving life do more harm than
        good, p. 492

    _Great Britain_ has only quite recently instituted a system of
        examinations for her mercantile marine, p. 36

    —— possesses no State institution for the benefit of her merchant
        seamen, p. 37

    _‘Great Republic,’ The_, the finest and largest of the American
        clippers, pp. 359-360

    _Grey, Earl_, replies to the strictures of the Earl of Hardwicke,
        p. 172

    —— clearly shows that the Navigation Laws were of no advantage to
        the shipowner, p. 275

    ——, and proves that the Navigation Laws were a proximate cause of
        the independence of America, p. 276

    _Guano-trade with Africa_ asserted by General Shipowners’ Society
        to be the cause of the return of prosperity to the shipping
        interest, p. 70


    _Harbours of Refuge_, large sums of money advanced for the
        construction or improvement of, p. 515

    _Hardwicke, Earl of_, selected as the mouth-piece of the
        Protectionists in the Upper House, p. 171

    ——, speech of, Feb. 25, 1848, on moving a Select Committee of the
        House of Lords, pp. 171-2

    _Harper, J. W. A._, evidence of, as to the impossibility of
        enforcing a load-line, p. 526

    _Harris, Capt._, tries to enforce the apprenticing system, but
        fails, p. 256

    _Harrowby, Earl of_, holds that where the interests of commerce and
        navigation conflict, those of navigation ought to predominate,
        p. 275

    _Henley, Mr._, thinks that the principle of Free-trade has not been
        sufficiently tested as yet for it to be applied to another
        great interest, p. 238

    _Herries, Mr._ (Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1828), takes up the
        cause of the Shipowners in 1848, by a counter resolution, p.
        192

    ——, speech of, pp. 193-7

    —— states that interests to the extent of 60 millions are affected
        by any change in the Navigation Laws, p. 195

    —— professes, generally, to follow the Protective policy
        inaugurated by Mr. Huskisson, _ibid._

    —— hopes that no merely experimental changes will be countenanced
        or adopted, p. 196.

    ——, amendment of, finally rejected by a majority of 117, p. 206

    ——, March, 1849, moves that Mr. Labouchere’s Bill be read again
        “this day six months,” p. 231

    —— considers all the details of the Bill with great minuteness,
        pp. 231-2

    —— makes a final speech against the Bill on the third reading,
        April 23, 1849, pp. 256-7

    —— urges the great importance of the petitions against the Bill,
        and that the Navigation Laws have nothing strictly to do with
        Free-trade, p. 257

    _Hesketh, Mr._, Consul at Rio di Janeiro, reply of, to the Foreign
        Office Circular, p. 47

    _Hildyard, Mr._, points out the great value of the coasting trade
        of America, p. 243

    _Holt, Mr. A._, sensible note by, on the effect of Government
        surveys, p. 490, _note_

    _Hudson, Mr._ (as member for Sunderland), supports the
        Protectionist side of the question, p. 199


    _Impressment_, indefensible, and not to be resorted to, except when
        the country is actually in peril, p. 184, _note_

    _Improvement of condition of Masters, Mates, &c._, Act passed in
        1850 with this object, p. 298

    —— receives Royal assent August 14, and details, pp. 299-306.

    _India_, the Governor-General of, empowered to grant special
        privileges to States in alliance with the East India Company,
        p. 104

    _Inspection by Government_ of manufacturers’ work, wholly wrong in
        principle, p. 480

    _Inspection by Government_, much doubt whether it would do the good
        expected, p. 482

    _Insurance of Ships_, difficulties surrounding this subject,
        especially in the case of valued policies, p. 547

    ——, the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships, urge the necessity
        of a complete revision of the laws on, p. 548

    _Interference of Government_ may be carried so far as to be very
        injurious, p. 509, and _note_


    _Jardine, Matheson and Co._ commission Hall and Co., of Aberdeen,
        to build a ship of as fine lines and greater strength than any
        of the Americans, pp. 293-4

    _Java_, case of ship from, laden with coffee, pp. 120-1


    _Labouchere, Mr._, replies to the arguments of Mr. Herries, p. 197

    —— formally lays the Government resolution for repeal of the
        Navigation Laws on the table, Aug. 10, 1848, p. 207

    —— brings in the Bill for the repeal of the Navigation Laws, Aug.
        16, 1848, but defers discussion on it till next session, _ibid._

    —— (as President of the Board of Trade) moves, Feb. 14, 1849,
        nearly the same resolutions as in preceding year, p. 220

    —— affects to believe that the Americans will not persevere in
        calling a voyage from New York to California a “Coasting” one,
        yet they do still, _ibid._

    ——, his scheme for the Coasting trade, after all, a bungling one,
        p. 222

    ——, after the receipt in England of Mr. Buchanan’s letter, still
        maintains that Mr. Bancroft “was a most honourable and
        straightforward man,” p. 223

    ——, motion of, for second reading of the Bill carried by fifty-six,
        p. 246

    ——, on motion for going into Committee, March 23, withdraws the
        Coasting clauses, p. 247

    —— tries to excuse himself by showing that Sir T. Fremantle had
        changed his mind, p. 248

    ‘_Lancelot, Sir_,’ The, extraordinary speed of, in sailing from
        China to London, p. 418, and _note_

    _Lansdowne, Marquess of_, introduces Bill for repeal of Navigation
        Laws into the Lords, May 7, 1849, p. 265.

    —— thinks that the Navigation Law might have been a suit of
        impenetrable armour, but is now only an imperfect garment of
        shreds and patches, _ibid._

    —— urges that Bonaparte at the height of his power longed for
        three things he could not obtain—ships, colonies, and commerce,
        p. 266

    _Lefevre, Mr. (now Sir J. S.)_, well fitted by his mathematical
        training to study complicated questions of law or trade, p. 137

    _Legislation, most recent_, not unlike the old Navigation Laws as
        attempting to regulate the business of Shipowners, p. 552

    _Letters of Marque_, Government decline issuing, at the
        commencement of the Crimean War, p. 353

    _Liability, Limited_, principle of, as shown in the powers given to
        the Board of Trade, p. 340

    _Liberal policy of England_, no doubt the cause of the great
        increase of imports and exports in 1853, p. 296

    ——, the nations who have adopted it have far outstripped all
        others, p. 421

    _Liddell, Mr. (Earl Ravensworth)_, replies, on the Protectionist
        side, to Mr. Ricardo, pp. 88-90

    _Life, loss of, at sea_ between 1818 and 1836, p. 465

    ——, greatly increased by old imperfect classification of ships, p.
        466

    ——, returns of, three years previous to 1863 and 1874, show great
        accuracy, and may be relied on, pp. 468-9

    _Life, saving of_, none of H. M.’s ships can make any claim for, p.
        218

    ——, no charge against Government that they have not done their
        utmost in, p. 513

    _Lighthouses, buoys, and beacons_, dealt with under the 6th Section
        of Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, pp. 313-4

    _Lighthouses, Colonial_, Act of 1855 passed as part of the great
        Act of 1854, p. 321

    _Lighting of the British coasts_ greatly improved of recent years,
        p. 514

    _Lindsay, Mr._, his letters to the ‘_Morning Herald_’ in opposition
        to the Government scheme of repealing Navigation Laws without
        reciprocity from other nations, p. 208, _note_.

    —— contracts for six vessels in one week (1849) on an improved
        form, to compete with those of other nations, p. 221, _note_

    ——, interview with Napoleon III., and remarkable evidence of his
        knowledge in all matters of transport, p. 355, _note_

    —— moves and carries in the House of Commons the appointment of a
        Committee to consider all questions relative to the Transport
        Service, p. 358, _note_

    —— moves for a Committee to inquire into the operation of certain
        burdens specially affecting merchant shipping, p. 366

    —— moves an Address to the Queen for inquiry into the burdens on
        the shipping interest, Jan. 31, 1860, p. 398

    —— draws up the final report of the Committee on the shipping
        interest, p. 399

    —— moves, March 29, 1860, an address to Her Majesty, with a view
        to negotiations with the Emperor of the French, and the
        modification of the French Navigation Laws, p. 438, and _note_

    ——, audiences with Napoleon III. to urge the value to France of
        free navigation, p. 440, _note_

    _Lisbon_, commercial association at, letter to, by Mr. Lindsay,
        Jan. 28, 1863, Append. p. 596

    _Liverpool, Petition from_, principal terms urged in, pp. 228-9

    _Load-line_, the marking of, enforced compulsorily by the Act of
        1871, p. 475

    ——, the, Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships declines to endorse
        with their approbation Mr. Plimsoll’s fancies about, p. 487

    ——, details of the views about, of the Royal Commission on
        Unseaworthy Ships, p. 488

    ——, a fixed, would do more harm than good, p. 527

    —— must, ultimately, depend on the opinion of an expert, _ibid._

    _Local charges at ports_, French Government protest against, p. 445

    ——, exemption in favour of certain British ships, in 1852, Append.
        p. 620

    _Log-book, official_, masters of all ships required by the Act of
        1850 to keep, and under heavy penalties, also, if badly kept,
        p. 304

    _Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping_, history of,
        Append. p. 624

    _Lloyd’s Registry_ and other private associations do much towards
        the improvement of shipping, p. 471

    _London Merchants, Petition of, in 1820_, the real commencement of
        Free-trade, does not allude to the Navigation Laws, p. 217

    _‘Lord of the Isles,’ The_, beats two American clippers from
        Foo-chow-foo to London, p. 294

    _Loss of Life_ must be considered in proportion to the number of
        vessels actually afloat, p. 511

    _Loss of Life on British Coasts_, analysis of, and of the causes
        leading to, pp. 511-13

    _Losses by Railway Accidents_, character of the inquiry into, as
        contrasted with that in lost ships, p. 495

    _Losses of Ships_, present mode of inquiry into, not satisfactory
        to any one, p. 493

    ——, the essential point to ascertain how the accident arose,
        whether from badness of ship, or the incapacity of those
        commanding her, p. 495

    ——, the amount, during recent years, greatly exaggerated, p. 504

    ——, no reliable statistics about, till 1855, when the Board of
        Trade undertook to prepare these, p. 505

    ——, _and of lives_, often, much greater in one year than in those
        preceding or following it, p. 506

    _Louisiana_, sold by France to America in 1803, for 15 million of
        dollars, p. 3

    _Lyell, Mr., M.P._, proposes Committee of 1844 to inquire into the
        condition of the English commercial marine, pp. 69-70

    _Lyons, Lord_ (Boston, U.S.), letter to, from Mr. Lindsay, 1860,
        Append. p. 567


    _Macgregor, Mr._, offers statements full of inaccuracies to Mr.
        Ricardo’s Committee, p. 137

    _Marine boards, Local_, established at the principal seaports, p.
        299

    —— empowered to establish shipping offices, where all sailors are
        to be engaged, p. 300

    _Marine Insurance_, the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships
        disapproves the present form of, p. 501

    _Marseilles_ always a comparatively free port, p. 433

    ——, object of the privilege to, to draw to France the commerce of
        the Mediterranean, _ibid._

    _Martin, Adm. Sir G. Byam_, evidence of, pp. 178-186

    —— asserts that the repeal of Navigation Laws will certainly
        diminish the number of shipwrights, p. 179

    —— will concede nothing of the Navigation Laws, _ibid._

    —— thinks that Shipowners will go to foreigners for cheap ships if
        Navigation Laws are abolished, p. 180

    ——, and that the merchant service is valuable to the navy as
        supplying their men, p. 181

    —— states that Lord Howe’s victory of June 1, 1794, was gained
        mainly by merchant seamen, _ibid._

    ——, and that Admiral Gardner collected 35,000 to 40,000 merchant
        seamen, p. _ibid._

    ——, estimate by, of English mercantile tonnage now more than
        trebled, p. 182, _note_

    —— thinks supply of seamen could not have been kept up in long war
        but by compulsory apprenticing, p. 182

    ——, and that impressment cannot be wholly given up, p. 184

    —— holds that the law compelling so many apprentices to be taken
        with each ship is a most wise one, p. 185

    _Massachusetts_, the merchants of, supply their own people and the
        north of Europe with the produce of India and China, p. 7

    _Master_, powers of, to be always fully upheld, pp. 497-8

    _Masters and Mates_ of foreign-going ships compelled to give
        testimonies of character for sobriety, &c., and to pass an
        examination, p. 300

    _McIver, Mr. C._, evidence of, about the “classing” of ships, p.
        535, _note_

    _MacTavish, Mr._, Consul at Baltimore, reply by, to the Foreign
        Office Circular, pp. 46-7

    _Measurement of Ships, the new_, worked out by Mr. Moorson, and
        embodied in Act of 1854 by Mr. T. H. Farrer, p. 309, _note_

    —— takes capacity as the basis of the calculations, p. 309

    —— adopted at the recent Congress for the tonnage of all nations
        passing through Suez Canal, p. 310

    _Mercantile Marine Fund_ dealt with in 7th Section of Merchant
        Shipping Act, 1854, p. 314

    _Mercantile Marine Board_, and Code of Mercantile Maritime Laws,
        recommended by Committee of 1836, p. 470

    _Merchant Seaman’s Fund, in England_, intended for the sole benefit
        of that class, p. 31

    —— abolished in 1851, after long and gross mismanagement, p. 37,
        and _note_

    ——, the winding-up of it placed under the Board of Trade, p. 306

    ——, Act passed August 8, 1851, for winding it up, and for its
        better management in future, _ibid._

    _Merchant Seamen_, necessity of good education for, recognised by
        all other nations before England, p. 27

    _Merchant Shipping_, short Act passed by Government, Sept. 6, 1875,
        p. 522

    ——, extraordinary and dangerous power granted to the officers of
        the Board of Trade by the Act of Sept. 6, 1875, pp. 522-3

    _Merchant Shipping Act of 1854_, its vast size, comprehensive
        details, &c., pp. 308-321

    _Merchant Shipping Act of 1875_ withdrawn, as so altered that Mr.
        Disraeli declined to go on with it, p. 578

    _Merchant Shipping Code_ ought to be amended, and then effectually
        carried out, p. 555

    _Merit, the Official Certificate of_, tends to screen the
        manufacturer, and to secure articles only so good as to pass
        inspection, p. 481

    _Minturn, Mr._ (an eminent New York merchant), evidence of, pp.
        186-90

    ——, as to materials used in American ships, wages, number of hands
        required, &c., p. 188

    ——, and as to the cost of the New York Packets, p. 187

    —— thinks that the commerce of America has not really gained by
        Reciprocity treaties, p. 190

    —— asserts that the Temperance system has been of the greatest
        value in American ships, _ibid._

    _Misconduct endangering life_, or breach of duty by drunkenness,
        &c., &c., considered a misdemeanour by Act of 1850, p. 303

    _Money-Order Office, a special_, opened for the benefit of sailors,
        p. 350

    _Montreal_ gradually became deserted by the Western merchants of
        America, p. 131

    _Murray, Mr._, general conclusions of (Nov. 1847), drawn from the
        replies to the Foreign Office Circular, and suggestions for
        remedies, pp. 48-50

    —— proposes “_A Board or Department of Commercial Marine_,” p. 49


    _Naples, Consul at_, reply by, to the Foreign Office Circular, pp.
        45-6

    _Napoleon III._ announces, Jan. 1, 1860, his intended rupture with
        Austria, p. 397

    —— at once sees how much the French would gain from free
        navigation, pp. 440-1

    _Naturalisation of goods_, special evil in the case of those
        brought to Europe, p. 118

    _Naval Courts_ instituted abroad by Act of 1850, p. 304

    _Navigation, a Treaty of_, ought to have accompanied the French
        Treaty of 1860, p. 437

    _Navigation Bill_, third reading of it carried by a majority of 61
        in the House of Commons, p. 263

    ——, second reading of, carried by a majority of 10 in the Lords, p.
        278

    _Navigation Laws_, for two centuries considered universally the
        cause of England’s superiority on the ocean, p. 54

    ——, views of foreign nations on the character and value of them to
        England, pp. 54-5

    ——, study of them leads to but one conclusion—how much trouble our
        ancestors took to “beggar their neighbours,” p. 107

    ——, condensed summary of, as in force in 1847, pp. 107-8

    —— so far relaxed, as to call places, not geographically belonging
        to Austria, &c., ports, p. 113

    —— full, in 1847, of anomalies which could neither be explained
        nor defended, pp. 113-15

    ——, great difficulty in executing them, as they were in 1847, owing
        to the Registry Law, p. 114

    ——, anecdote of the vessel chartered with cochineal for the Canary
        Islands, p. 121

    ——, their ultimate working of no value to any one but the
        Shipowner, and, economically, a total waste of capital, p. 121

    —— in many instances direct obstructions to ordinary trade, caused
        by, pp. 121-2

    —— studied as much to see how they could be evaded as acted on in
        good faith, p. 122

    ——, special difficulty of carrying out their principles in the case
        of Canada, p. 123

    ——, advocates of their repeal, in 1847, not altogether successful,
        p. 140.

    ——, chief advocates of them as they were, Mr. G. F. Young, Mr.
        Richmond, Mr. Philippe, Mr. Imrie, Mr. Duncan Dunbar, and Mr.
        Macqueen, p. 141, _note_

    ——, arguments of the Shipowners in favour of the, pp. 141-3

    ——, under, there was in 1847, coincidentally, a protected and an
        unprotected trade, p. 154, _note_

    ——, difficulty under, as to what was or was not a manufactured
        article, pp. 155-6

    ——, under, foreign ships, up to 1845, could carry passengers but
        not goods, _coastwise_, pp. 156-7

    ——, the Queen, in Speech from Throne, Nov. 18, 1847, recommends
        their consideration, p. 162

    ——, twenty-five witnesses called by the Committee for the repeal
        of, and nine against, p. 157

    ——, many questions on, to be dealt with by Government, unsupported,
        at the time, by any facts, pp. 177-8

    ——, debate on-first division—June 2, 1848, for adjournment carried
        by 236 to 73, p. 200

    ——, inquiry into restrictions imposed by, recommended in Speech
        from the Throne, pp. 218-9

    ——, the Royal Assent given to the Bill for their repeal, June 26,
        1849, p. 285

    _Neutrals_, Government resumes the right of allowing effective
        blockades by, p. 354

    _Neutrals, rights of_, respected in the war with Russia, and
        privateering abolished, p. 406

    _New England_ produces the almost entire supply of native-born
        American seamen, pp. 25-6

    _New Orleans_, extraordinary growth of the trade of, since 1820, p.
        5, note

    _New York_ profited greatly during the earlier part of the
        revolutionary war in Europe, p. 5

    —— greatly advantaged by the commencement of the Erie Canal in
        1825, pp. 5-6.

    ——, details of the amount of tonnage entering it, between 1822 and
        1871, p. 6, _note_

    —— suffered severely between 1806 and 1815 from captures,
        condemnations, and embargoes, _ibid._

    _Norway_, character of the Seaman’s Institution in, founded Dec.
        1834, pp. 39-40

    _Norway and Sweden_ require for the officers of their ships an even
        more rigid examination than that of Denmark, p. 29


    _Ocean race_, the celebrated, from China to England in 1866, p.
        417, _note_

    _Overloading_, evidence of Mr. W. J. Lamport on, p. 527, _note_

    _Owner’s liability_ in the case of passenger ships, real facts
        about, pp. 338-9

    _Oxford, Bishop of_, tries to get a clause inserted that privileges
        should not be given to countries who had not adhered to the
        treaties for the suppression of the slave-trade, p. 285


    “_Pacte de Famille_,” allowing the Bourbon-ruled kingdoms to trade
        freely with France, Jan. 2, 1768, p. 425

    _Panic, Commercial, of 1847_, shipping interest alone flourished
        during, owing to the great demand for corn in Ireland, pp. 158-9

    _Palmerston, Lord_, reply of, to Mr. Bancroft, Nov. 17, 1847, pp.
        165-6

    ——, all parties disapprove his communications with the American
        Government, p. 169

    —— admits, in the House of Commons, on Feb. 3, 1848, his
        correspondence with the American Government, p. 170

    —— issues from the Foreign Office a circular (Dec. 22, 1848)
        to the foreign nations, seeking their views with regard to
        reciprocity, should the proposed repeal of the Navigation Laws
        be carried, pp. 209-17

    ——, Circular of, general statement in, of what was likely to be
        done if the repeal of the Navigation Laws was carried, pp.
        210-12

    —— orders his agents to find out whether other countries will
        accept the advances of England, p. 211

    —— requires information as to restrictions in force against
        British ships in different countries, differential duties, &c.,
        _ibid._

    _Parliament_ has interfered too much with Shipowners, p. 525

    ——, “_Independent Members_” of, introduce all sorts of measures to
        amend the Mercantile Laws, p. 551

    _Passenger Ships_ to be surveyed by Act of 1854, but further
        inquiry about, 1855, p. 322

    —— surveyed, agreeably with the orders of the Committee of 1843,
        p. 471

    ——, regulation of, summary of the Acts passed for, Append. p. 600

    _Passengers’ Act_, impossible to obtain an uniform one, owing to
        the different laws of the States sending emigrants to America,
        pp. 334-5

    _Passengers’ Act of 1855_ consolidates all that was good in the
        previous Acts, p. 331

    ——, chief matters of, as its general management has been
        transferred to the Board of Trade, p. 343

    _Passengers’ Amendment Act_, abstract of, and all Orders in Council
        relating to, to be posted up in the ship, p. 336

    _Passing Tolls_ all abolished, since 1860, but with far too high
        compensations, p. 411, _note_

    _Peel, Sir Robert_, makes great alterations in the tariff, p. 71

    —— resigns office on the question of opening the ports owing to
        Irish famine, but resumes it on Lord John Russell’s failure to
        form a ministry, pp. 78-9

    —— proposes, in 1846, a sliding scale of duties on corn, to last
        till February, 1849, p. 79

    —— carries the repeal of the Corn Laws, but is, on same night,
        beaten on the Irish Arms Bill, p. 80

    —— supports the Government measure, but in a hesitating manner,
        pp. 203-5

    —— reserves his opinion for the present as to the throwing open
        the coasting trade, p. 204

    —— suggests that the measure for the repeal of the Navigation Laws
        should only endure for five years, p. 205

    _Peel, Mr. F._, brings in, in 1852, a Bill for the improvement of
        the Emigration system, p. 331

    _Peter, Mr., Consul_, letters of, to English Foreign Office on the
        education of boys for the Philadelphian merchant service, p. 16
        and _note_

    _Pilots, the Licensing of_, generally left in America to the laws
        of the separate States, p. 24

    _Pilots and Pilotage_ dealt with very fully by the fifth section of
        the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, p. 312

    _Pitt, Mr._, general principles of the Bill introduced by him to
        regulate the commerce between America and England, p. 56

    —— resigns on the rejection of his Bill, by a combination of
        English Shipowners and the Loyalists of the American colonies,
        pp. 56-7

    _Plantation Trade_, rules of, under the Navigation Acts, pp. 95-9

    ——, rules with reference to, considerably modified by the Customs
        Act of 1825, p. 98

    _Plimsoll, Mr._, carries his first Resolution in 1870, p. 474

    —— publishes, January, 1873, a sensational book, entitled ‘Our
        Seamen,’ p. 476

    ——, inaccurate in his statements, or ignorant of the power really
        possessed by the Underwriters at Lloyd’s, p. 477

    ——, the Bill proposed by, could not possibly be entertained with
        any regard to the great maritime interests of this country, p.
        478

    ——, Bill by, practically, proposed that some officer of Government
        should survey every ship built and sent to sea, p. _ibid._

    ——, most of the grievances urged by him have been met, so far
        as they could be, by legislation, by the “Merchant Shipping
        Consolidated Act” of 1854, and subsequent Acts, p. 485

    ——, statements by, carefully analysed by the Royal Commission on
        Unseaworthy Ships, _ibid._

    ——, violent conduct of, in the House of Commons, on withdrawal of
        Government Shipping Bill, 1875, p. 518, and _notes_

    ——makes grave assertions and charges, alike, against Government and
        private individuals, p. 525

    _Porter, Mr. G. R._, in his evidence before Mr. Ricardo’s
        Committee, shows that England has been in nowise benefited by
        the Navigation Laws, pp. 138-9

    ——, a hard-working honest man, of little or no knowledge in
        commercial matters, 137

    —— shows the enormous increase of shipping between 1833 and 1846,
        p. 139

    —— suggests that Prussia at the head of the Zollverein States,
        would impose differential duties on foreign states, p. 140

    _Possession_ or _établissement_, settlements specially created for
        the purposes of trade, p. 434

    _Portugal_, trade with, not worth considering in any alteration of
        English law, p. 370

    _Portugal, King of_, special trading allowances made to, on his
        emigration to the Brazils in 1808, p. 99

    _Potato Disease and Irish Famine_, 1845-6, cause the repeal of the
        Corn Laws and the suspension of the Navigation Acts, pp. 78-9

    _‘Powhattan’ The_, dreadful loss of, April 16, 1854, pp. 324-5

    _Protection, the system of_, renders English Shipowners less
        inclined to compete with foreigners, p. 28

    _Protection_, under the form of the Navigation Laws, renders
        foreign ships and sailors superior to those of England, p. 41

    —— generally prevalent abroad as well as in England, pp. 55-6

    ——, there was an actual decrease of tonnage under, p. 378

    _Protectionists_ assert that foreign vessels would practically
        obtain all the long oversea carrying trade, if British ships
        could import non-prohibited articles, p. 69

    _Protectionists, French_, succeed in nullifying, by the decree of
        June 8, 1866, many Free-trade provisions of the Act, May 19,
        1866, pp. 448-9

    _Punishments inflicted by Government_, cannot he heavier than the
        loss of his vessel to the owner who does not insure, p. 483


    _Receiver of Wrecks_, great power given to, under Merchant Shipping
        Act of 1854, p. 317

    _Reciprocity Treaties_, under, the trade to her colonial ports was
        jealously reserved by England, p. 65

    —— of Mr. Canning and Mr. Huskisson, pp. 182-6;

    ——, their general character, p. 65

    —— of little or no use in checking the anomalies of Protection, p.
        68

    —— serve as a wedge to break down the “great tree of Protection,”
        p. 71

    _Registration, the question of_, fully dealt with in Merchant
        Shipping Act of 1854, under 91 clauses, p. 310

    _Registry Laws_ compelled British Shipowners in 1847 to use the
        dearest ships in the world, p. 92

    _Retaliation, Principle of_, proposed by foreign nations and
        adopted (as against England) by America in 1817, p. 55

    ——, naturally to be expected when one nation excludes the vessels
        of another from its trade, p. 58

    _Returns, Statistical_, of the highest value to Merchant Shipping,
        pp. 376-9

    _Ricardo, Mr._, proposes a Select Committee to inquire into the
        Navigation Laws, Feb. 1847, p. 83

    ——, details of his speech on motion to inquire into the Navigation
        Laws, pp. 84-88

    ——, motion for committee carried by 155 to 61, p. 90

    ——, list of members who served on his Committee, p. 92, _note_

    ——, Committee of, make five reports, but limit themselves to the
        evidence they had taken, p. 92

    ——, vigorous speech of, pp. 223-4

    _Richmond, Mr._, sent by the Shipowners of Tynemouth to advocate
        the cause of the Navigation Laws before Committee of Mr.
        Ricardo, p. 147

    —— urges that shipowning in the Baltic trade had been for
        twenty-five years a losing matter, _ibid._

    ——, views of, as enounced before Mr. Ricardo’s Committee, pp.
        147-152

    —— urges that (in the north), Shipowners and merchants were
        distinct, the former having been so for generations, p. 148

    —— holds that the captain of the present day is fully equal to the
        captain of former days, p. 149

    —— considers English sailors less given to spirit-drinking than
        the Germans, p. 149.

    —— accuses, with some reason, Mr. Porter of unfairness in his
        statements, p. 152

    —— urges the abolition of all Reciprocity Treaties as injurious to
        England, p. 151

    _Robinson, Mr._, and Protectionists deceived by the mild wording of
        the Queen’s Speech, p. 162

    —— claims indemnity for the Shipowner, in case the Bill should
        pass, p. 242

    “_Rule of the Sea_,” together with the number of boats to be
        carried by ships, clearly laid down in 4th Section of the
        Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, pp. 311-12

    _Russell, Mr._, a leading merchant of Boston from 1786 to 1798, p.
        7, _note_

    _Russell, Lord John_, action of, as leader of the revolt against
        Protection, pp. 72-4

    —— carries the measure for equalising the sugar duties, p. 81

    ——, letter from, to Mr. Lindsay (1875), p. 82, _note_

    —— compelled by the Irish famine to suspend the Navigation Laws
        (Jan. 1847), _ibid._

    —— suspends the Bank Charter Act, Oct. 25, 1847, p. 160

    —— asserts, in his final speech on the third reading, that the
        fullest reciprocity would be conceded by America, p. 262

    _Russia_, system in, for encouraging seamen, called the
        “Corporations of Free Mariners,” p. 30

    ——, treaty made with, on the same principle as those with Austria
        and the Zollverein, p. 113

    ——, exports from, generally, in British ships as there was not a
        sufficient Russian marine, p. 155

    _Russia and Prussia_ require the officers of their ships to have
        some knowledge of English and French, pp. 29-30


    _Sailors_, as distinguished from mechanics or servants, have every
        facility in retaining their earnings, p. 543

    _Salvage_, conditions under which it is granted under Merchant
        Shipping Act of 1854, p. 318

    _Sardinia_ accepts the proposals of Lord Palmerston,
        unconditionally, p. 216

    _Savings-Banks_ established, 1856, for the benefit of seamen, to
        save them from the baneful influence of “crimps,” p. 35

    ——, large sums passed through, up to November 1874, p. 357, _note_

    _Sea, Rule of the road at_, special notices of, p. 344, _note_

    _Seamen_, all agreements with, to be in writing, and to specify, in
        detail, what is expected of them, p. 301

    ——, laws, various, for their protection, passed from 1846 to 1854,
        p. 472

    ——, peculiar favour shown to, in Merchant Shipping Code
        Consolidation Bill of August 1869, p. 474

    _Seamen, English_, have now many privileges not granted to any
        other class of the community, p. 472

    —— have not deteriorated, but have much improved in the last
        quarter of a century, p. 504

    _Seaworthiness_, the proposed plan for certifying absurd, and, if
        carried out, ruinous, p. 531

    ——, practically, cannot be defined, p. 539

    _Sherrard, Mr._, Consul at Portland, U.S., reply by, to the Foreign
        Office Circular, p. 46

    _Sherwood, Mr., Consul_, letter to English Foreign Office on the
        education of youths destined to the sea service, p. 16, and
        _note_

    _Ships_ properly to be considered merely as the adjuncts to
        commerce, p. 65

    ——, cost of building, at Dantzig, in the United States, &c., p.
        141, _note_

    ——, nearly all, are now classed at Lloyd’s or elsewhere, p. 482

    ——, loss of, from 1856 to 1872; sixty lost, from defects, &c.,
        while 711 were lost from neglect or bad navigation, p. 487

    _Shipbuilders, French_, much hampered by the absurd Protectionist
        Decree of June 8, 1866, p. 450

    _Shipowners_ object strongly to Government interference, p. 51

    —— who joined the Anti-Corn-Law League did not perceive that the
        sweeping away of the Protective Navigation Laws _must_ follow,
        p. 78

    —— still suffering, in 1849, a periodical depression after two or
        three very prosperous years, p. 218

    —— hold meetings in all the principal towns, especially seaports
        of England, p. 228

    —— resolve to try another division in Committee of the House of
        Lords when there would be no proxies, p. 278

    ——, great despondency of, on the repeal of the Navigation Laws, p.
        287

    ——, prosperity returns to, in 1852 and 1853, as confirmed by Mr.
        Tooke’s ‘History of Prices,’ p. 296

    ——, the liability of, under certain circumstances defined by 9th
        Section of Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, and still further in
        1862, pp. 318-9

    —— able to appeal to the Court of Chancery to determine the amount
        of their liability, p. 341

    —— complain of the discretionary power given to Emigration
        officers, p. 342

    —— propose a petition to the Crown, requesting retaliation on such
        Foreign Powers as should decline reciprocity, p. 364

    ——, public meeting of, Dec. 15, 1858, Mr. Dunbar in the chair, pp.
        364-5

    —— naturally feel that they have been treated very illiberally by
        the nations who will not reciprocate, p. 404

    —— now only wish to be let alone, and allowed to manage their own
        business their own way, p. 414

    —— liable, by the Act of 1870, to be punished _criminally_ if they
        send an unseaworthy ship to sea, p. 475

    _Shipowners’ General Society_, meeting of, Aug. 12, 1847, to
        consider the result of Mr. Ricardo’s motion, p. 90

    ——, arguments urged by, pp. 91-2

    —— told on two occasions, by Lord Clarendon, that the principle of
        the Navigation Law would not be altered, p. 166

    —— issue many pamphlets, &c., showing the evil of the Government
        scheme for the repeal of the Navigation Laws, p. 208

    —— still, in 1858, attribute their losses to the repeal of the
        Navigation Laws and the absence of reciprocity, p. 362

    ——, meeting of, at London Tavern, R. W. Crawford, Esq., in the
        Chair, pp. 390-6

    —— petition the Queen, praying her to exercise the powers vested
        in her, and to put in force the Retaliatory Clause of 1849, p.
        366

    ——, meeting of, Mr. Lindsay proposes an amendment at, which is ill
        received, p. 393 and _notes_

    _Shipping_, any decline of, in 1858, fully accounted for by the
        commercial distresses of the previous autumn, p. 380

    _Shipping Interest_, Government at length determines that unequal
        burdens on, should be removed, p. 383

    ——, inquiry into burdens in Committee for, appointed Feb. 16, 1860,
        p. 398, and _note_

    _Shipping Interest, Committee on_, decidedly object to the
        enforcement of reciprocity, p. 401

    —— refuse the reimposition and restrictions on our colonial trade,
        p. 403

    —— strongly affirm their judgment that all private property (not
        contraband of war) should be exempt from capture at sea, p. 408

    ——, and opinion that the liability of owners of ships should not be
        much less than the value of the ship and its freight, pp. 408-9

    —— decide that all light dues ought to be paid by the country at
        large, p. 410

    —— give no decided opinion on the question of compulsory pilotage,
        pp. 410-11

    —— are of opinion that most of the legislation since 1835 has been
        useful, though in some cases carried too far, p. 412

    ——, report of, so generally accepted that there has been no further
        inquiry since, p. 412

    _Shipping Masters_, important duties of, as appointed by the local
        Marine Boards under the Board of Trade, p. 300

    _Siegfried, M._, in his evidence, shows the utter fallacy of
        Protection, pp. 454-5

    _Smith, Adam_, quotation from, in Mr. Ricardo’s speech, showing his
        views of the Navigation Act, p. 87 and _note_

    _Stanley, Lord_ (Derby), says that Canada demands repeal of the
        Navigation Laws as a compensation for the loss of Protection,
        p. 277

    —— urges, in his final speech against the Bill, that, not the
        merchants had found out the Navigation Laws disadvantageous,
        but Ministers for them, _ibid._

    —— moves, May 13, the rejection of the repealing clauses, so as to
        make the Bill one of conditional legislation, p. 279

    ——, his amendment finally rejected by a majority of thirteen, p. 280

    —— finally enters a protest in the Journals of the House, p. 285

    _Statesmen_, the arising of a new class prepared to carry through
        the important principle of a free and unfettered commerce, p. 72

    ——, ample field for, in fully working-out the mercantile questions
        now before them, p. 556

    _Steamer, one_, can do the work of five sailing-vessels, p. 402

    _Steamers_, rapid increase of, compared with sailing-vessels,
        between 1852 and 1860, _ibid._

    _Surtaxes de Pavillon_ again abolished, July 28 and 31, 1873, p. 460

    _Survey of ships_, perhaps it might be possible to enrol several
        great associations for this purpose, p. 533

    —— even by Lloyd’s Registry would, perhaps, prove scarcely better
        than one by Government, _ibid._

    ——, great difficulties in really carrying it out, p. 538

    _Surveys of Board of Trade_, number of persons now employed by the
        Board of Trade, p. 315, _note_

    _Surveyors of the Board of Trade_ ordered, in 1864, to survey
        gratuitously such ships as seamen complained were unseaworthy,
        p. 473

    _Swedes and Norwegians_ already, in 1859, large buyers of
        English-built vessels, p. 403


    _‘Thermopylæ,’ The,_ sails from London to Melbourne in _sixty_
        days—the fastest passage on record—doing 380 miles in one day!,
        p. 415

    ——, extraordinary speed of this sailing-ship, _ibid._, and _note_

    ——, log of, Append. p. 613

    _Thiers, M._, influence of, in favour of Protection after the
        German war, p. 456

    _Thompson, Alderman_, thinks Sir Jas. Stirling’s plan for manning
        the navy Utopian, p. 197

    _Tonnage, Statistics of_, belonging to Great Britain, United
        States, France, and Holland, from 1821 to 1874, Append. p. 618

    _Tonnage of Shipping entered and cleared in the United Kingdom_,
        United States, France, Holland, Norway, Prussia, and Sweden,
        distinguishing between national and foreign ships, from 1850 to
        1873, Append. p. 637

    _‘Torrington,’ The_, a successful “clipper” built by Hall and Co.
        at Aberdeen, in 1846, to compete with Americans in China, p. 288

    _Trade, Board of_, power given to, to appoint special
        investigations where serious accident, p. 305

    ——, power to summon a jury to ascertain the number, &c., of persons
        injured, p. 340

    ——, inconclusive arguments as to any reaction for the employment of
        more ships than was required, p. 382

    ——, returns by, of trade between 1834 and 1858, vigorously attacked
        by the Shipowners’ Association, pp. 386-7

    —— empowered, by the Act of 1871, to stop the proceeding to sea of
        any ship reported as unseaworthy, p. 476

    _Transport Service_ during the Crimean war greatly increased for
        want of a well-organised Board, p. 357

    _Treaties_ of some value in rude times, but wholly inadequate to
        the regulation of commerce between great nations, pp. 65-7


    _Unclassed vessels_ now are, practically, either the very best or
        the very worst, p. 535

    _Underwriters_, as a rule, will not take a risk on unclassed ships,
        p. 482

    _United States, trade between, and British North American
        Colonies_, thrown open in 1807, p. 60

    _Unseaworthiness of seamen_ of greater national importance than
        that of the ships, p. 541

    _Unseaworthy ships_, the law punishing those who send such to sea,
        can be made more prompt and effective, p. 553


    _Venetian Republic_, law made by, in 1786, for the securing
        efficient and well-educated men for their marine service, p. 35

    —— _Scuola di San Nicolo_, origin and progressive history from
        1476 till modified in 1814, pp. 32-4

    —— _shipmasters_, qualifications required from all, p. 35

    _Venice_, Charitable Institution for Invalids in, the successor of
        the Scuola di San Nicolo, p. 34

    _Veritas, The_, the name of a foreign system of registration much
        used in Canada, p. 471

    _Vessels_ built of iron compelled by the Act of 1854 to be
        separated into water-tight compartments, p. 312


    _Walker, Mr. J._, Secretary to the Treasury in America, a zealous
        supporter of complete reciprocity, p. 214

    _Walpole, Mr._, in debate on the third reading, asserts that the
        Navigation Laws are the wisest of our regulations, p. 258

    ‘_Washington Union_,’ the article in, detailing Lord Palmerston’s
        intentions as to the Navigation Laws produces intense
        astonishment, pp. 167-8

    _Wetland Canal_, value of, to Canada, as most of the expenses
        connected with it are paid by the Americans, p. 129

    _Wellington, Duke of_, votes with the Government on the Navigation
        Bill, greatly to the annoyance of the Shipowners, p. 278

    _Wharfinger_, the, responsible for the safe delivery of all goods
        on board vessels, p. 11

    _Williams, Mr._, observations by, on the advantages of a general
        seaman’s fund, p. 38, and _notes_

    _Wilson, Mr. J._ (editor of the ‘Economist’), shows that,
        practically, the Navigation Laws were of little value to
        British shipowners, p. 233

    —— urges that reciprocity must rest on equivalents which were, in
        this case, impossible, p. 234

    —— resists Mr. Gladstone’s notion of reciprocity in some cases by
        special treaties, as sure to be misunderstood by foreigners, p.
        234

    —— opposes reciprocity even in shipping, p. 235

    —— maintained that real reciprocity meant perfect freedom of trade
        to those who gave perfect freedom to us, _ibid._

    ——, his supposition that America would act on the principle of her
        law of 1828, altogether fallacious, p. 253

    _Wrecks_, accurate return of, first provided by Board of Trade in
        1856, p. 468

    _Wrecks, inquiry into_, one of the most valuable parts of the
        Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, p. 316

    _Wrecks cast on shore_, general superintendence of, and appointment
        of receivers, placed under the Board of Trade by Merchant
        Shipping Act of 1854, p. 317

    _West Indies_, 15,000 slaves perish from starvation between 1780
        and 1787, p. 58

    —— demand Free-trade on nearly the same principles as Canada, pp.
        133-4


    _Yeames, Mr._, Consul-General at Odessa, reply by, to Foreign
        Office Circular, p. 44

    _Young, Mr. G. F._, strenuous advocate of the Navigation Laws, &c.,
        as they were, pp. 143-6

    ——, arguments in favour of Protection adduced by him before the
        Committee of the House of Lords, pp. 172-175

    —— considers the “Long-voyage” Clause the most important in the
        Navigation Laws, p. 174

    —— proposes some minor modifications of the Navigation Laws, pp.
        174-5

    ——, which are not, however, accepted by Government, p. 177

    —— moves a strenuous resolution at the meeting of Shipowners, Dec.
        15, 1858, p. 365


    _Zollverein, The_, list of the States united under this commercial
        bond, p. 112

    _Zollverein States_, treaties made with—after the fashion of that
        with Austria—1841, pp. 112-3


                           END OF VOL. III.


                                LONDON:
                  PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,
                  STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.




Transcriber’s Note:

     Inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the original document have
     been preserved. Obvious typographical errors have been corrected.

     Accents and other diacritics are inconsistently used.

     Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

     This volume contains references to the previous two volumes
     of this work.

     They can be found at:

     Volume 1: https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/73757
     Volume 2: https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/73949



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