*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75081 ***





                              BELGIAN ARMY
                                NOTICES
                                   ON
                        THE OUTLASTING WAR SITES

[Illustration: [Logo]]

    Illustrated by a map scale 1/100.000, four sketches and thirteen
           photographs made by the Army Photographic Service.

[Illustration: [Logo]]

                                  1923

       Imprimerie du Ministère de la Défense Nationale Bruxelles.

[Illustration:

  H. M. THE KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM.
]




                             OFFICIAL LIST
                      OF THE OUTLASTING WAR SITES.


The figures of the list are connected with those printed on the
1/100.000 map included with this booklet, as well as with those of the
following notices.

                                                                  Pages.

  1. German battery “Wilhelm II” at Knocke on sea                      7

  2. German guns on the pier of Zeebrugge                             10

  3. German battery “Deutschland” at Breedene                         14

  4. German battery “Tirpitz” at Ostend                               15

  5. German admiralty Headquarters at Middelkerke                     19

  6. The Great Redan at Nieuport                                      19

  7. “Karnak” battery at Oost-dunkerke                                23

  8. Levelcrossing guard shelter at Ramscappelle with machine-gun
       pit                                                            24

  9. Machine-gun pit in front of the Pervyse railway station          26

 10. Observation-post of the Pervyse railway station                  26

 11. Battalion commander’s Headquarters at Km. 4.400 of the
       Dixmude-Nieuport railway                                       30

 12. Foot of the Oud-Stuyvekenskerke tower with neighbouring
       shelter                                                        30

 13. The trench called “Boyau de la mort” (Death Trench) and the
       breastwork called “Ouvrage du cavalier”. German saphead on
       the left bank of the Yser river and concrete dug-out on
       the righthand river bank (km. 16)                              34

 14. Company commander’s post near the Yserdam, at Dixmude in
       front of the canal of Handzaeme (lefthand bank)                42

 15. Mill of Dixmude and series of German pillboxes on the
       righthand Yser-bank, up to the railway line                    44

 16. Concrete dug-out south of the railway bridge at Dixmude
       (lefthand bank)                                                42

 17. Albert and Elisabeth redoubts between kilom. 19 and 20 of
       the Yser river (lefthand bank)                                 53

 18. The “Joconde’s” dwelling, kilom. 19.500 of the Yser river
       (left bank)                                                    53

 19. Battalion commander’s Headquarters at kilom. 19.500 of Yser
       river (lefthand bank)                                          53

 20. Bridge-head at kilom. 19.500 and “Presqu´île” wood
       (righthand bank)                                               54

 21. Observation-post near the church of Clercken                     58

 22. “Grand-Père” concrete dug-out north of Kippe, kilom. 12.500
       of the Dixmude-Yper road                                       60

 23. “Castel Britannia” south of Kippe, kilom. 12.500 of the
       Dixmude-Ypres road                                             60

 24. Hoekske (spot where three german guns stuck in the mud)          60

 25. German gun of Leugenboom, at Couckelaere                         65




                                NOTICES

                                   ON

                        THE OUTLASTING WAR SITES




        1.—German battery “Kaiser Wilhelm II” at Knocke on Sea.


Before going into the description of the war sites along the Belgian
sea-coast, it is important to cast a general glance on the defences
established there by the Germans.

Admiral Schröder was given the task of the organization of the
sea-front. To do so he had at his disposal: the German Marine Army
Corps, a coast artillery altogether powerful in number as well as in the
caliber of the guns, a flotilla of patrolers, torpedo-boats, destroyers,
submarines and a few squadrons of aeroplanes and seaplanes.

In a few months time Belgian coast, thus strongly and thoroughly
organized was to be looked upon as a real up to date fortress. The power
of the defences was mainly concentrated round Zeebrugge and Ostend,—the
two german war outlets of the naval basis Bruges,—also between
Lombartzijde and Middelkerke,—where both territorial and seafronts were
hinged,—and finally at Knocke and East of that locality, for the
protection of the river Schelde’s estuary.

The pivot of the coast defences was to be incumbent on the artillery
acting in close cooperation with the land and sea-forces. The artillery
was to engage at long range all the allied boats and to keep them under
a constant crossfire, while they were endeavouring to proceed towards
the coast. For that purpose, about sixty batteries, thirty five of which
of the heaviest type were placed either along or at the rear of the
sandhills.

In fact, the guns of very high caliber were distributed behind the belt
of dunes; their tactical duty was to keep off the coast all boats which
would try to carry out long range bombardments. As those batteries could
not from their emplacements use direct fire, being unable to see the
targets, observation-posts with good field of view on the sea—for fire
registering—were found necessary. Herein lies the reason of the
construction of the numerous concrete ones, some of them still remaining
hidden along the downs.

As far as the smaller guns are concerned, these were dug in along the
dunes and were performing direct fire to prevent against raids, attempts
of landing or bottling the harbours.

Against eventual landings, the defences also comprised a series of mine
barrages, screens of nettings for submarines, hindering the access of
the shore. Redoubts manned by infantry troops were staking out an almost
uninterrupted line of trenches which were running along the beach, right
up to the Dutch frontiers.

Machine-guns and field guns were utilized for flanking the strand and
for anti-aircraft action.

The German defence of the Belgian coast was completed by high sea
forces.

The organization of the maritime defences was only seriously taken in
hand in 1915. The “Boat-detachement” composed of trawlers, mine
sweepers, tow boats and barges, was formed up in February that year.
Small types of torpedo-boats and submarines were sent dismounted, and
conveyed by railway up to the dock-yards created at Bruges, Ostend, and
later on at Hoboken, where those units were mounted. They formed with a
certain number of other units which came directly by sea, a flotilla of
submarines and one of torpedo-boats. Motor trawlers were on the watch
far out in the sea.

In 1916, the naval forces anchored in the Flanders base were
considerably increased in number, but it was particularly in the year
1917 that the Germans multiplied their submarines, thus turning the
harbours of Ostend and Zeebrugge into real haunts. Shelters were built
to protect them against air raids and the numerous bombardments carried
out by the British Fleet.

At Zeebrugge, the shelters were established along the mole and in the
tidal basins south of the locks and in the Bruges canal.

At Ostend, the flotillas were berthed in the wharfs and the darses. The
submarines were sheltered alongside the marine docks.

The year 1917 saw the submarine warfare ruthlessly carried out and the
enemy’s torpedo-boats raided the British and French coast.

In the early 1918, during the dismal winter nights, the foe undertook
several offensive reconnoitrings up to the British Channel. These were
to be their last deeds.

Doggedly determined to bring an end to the U boats’ boundless crimes,
the British Admiralty tackled the plan for the bottling up of the two
Belgian harbours. It was thus that were performed the most astounding
operations, which took the enemy unaware, pinning him down in Zeebrugge
and almost paralysing him in Ostend.

                                   ⁂

“=Kaiser Wilhelm II battery=” constitutes one of the typical kind of
heavy battery erected by the Germans along the North-Sea.

_Armement_: Four 12 inch marine guns, firing at 38 kilomètres (23½
miles) a shell weighing more than 400 kilos, needing a charge of 103
kilos.

The tube was 17 meters 25 cm^s long.

_Gun crew_: 5 officers and 360 other ranks.

_Observation-posts_: especially in Knocke’s Kursaal and on the down 23
near Duinbergen.

_Ammunition supply_: was done by railway.

_Historical account_: the battery was armed in July 1916 but did only
fire during our Flanders offensive in 1918.

It fired the last time on the 18^{th} October at about 3 p. m. and the
next day the battery was taken by our troops.




              2.—Germans Guns upon the jetty of Zeebrugge.


We will not study the guns, but we feel compelled to bring back to
memory, one of the most striking naval operations of the Great War.


                    British Raid against Zeebrugge.

Loathing the countless crimes of the foe’s submarine warfare, Admiral
Sir Jellicoe, the newly promoted First Sea Lord, brought forward a
scheme for the bottling up of Zeebrugge and Ostend, the two outlets of
the German Naval basis Bruges.

The operations, though of the boldest character, was agreed upon and
attempted on April 22^d 1918, eve of S^t Georges’ day, patron of
England. Admiral Sir Roger Keyes was entrusted with the glorious
mission.

Five old Cruisers loaded with ferro-concrete, with on board a crew
mainly composed of volunteers were to carry that mission through. Three
of these cruisers, namely: H. M. S. _Thetis_, _Intrepid_, and
_Iphigenia_ were bound for Zeebrugge; H. M. S. _Brilliant_ and _Sirius_
for Ostend. A flotilla composed of destroyers, submarines, several steam
barges and motor trawlers had to cooperate in the action.

The attack against Zeebrugge seeming the more difficult of the two had
to be shouldered by the old cruiser H. M. S. _Vindictive_ and the two
Liverpool carriers _Iris_ and _Daffodil_. These units were to undertake
a daring diversion in dashing for the pier.

It was 5 o’clock p. m. when the fleet was concentrated at about 63 miles
off the coast and from thither directed towards the two goals. While a
wind due North East was carrying forward a thick smoke screen produced
by fume boats, the fleet sailed forth without raising the enemy’s
attention.

Unfortunately, at a few cable’s lengths from the ports the wind suddenly
swerved due South-West, cleaning away the smoke cloud, disclosing at
once the “Gallant British Fleet”. It was then 11.56 p. m. Like
lightenings, all the guns and machine-guns, raised as though by magic
power, roared their rapid rounds.

In front of Ostend, the lights guiding the boats towards the coast were
hit by shellfire and put out of action. Unable to be driven, the attack
failed. H. M. S. _Sirius_ and H. M. S. _Brilliant_ were sunk at 3
kilomètres East of the harbour’s entrance[1].

Footnote 1:

  The operation against Ostend was successfully carried out during the
  night of the 9^{th} to 10^{th} May. H. M. S. _Vindictive_ managed to
  place herself athwart in the entrance of the harbour and there was
  blown up.

In front of Zeebrugge, in spite of the infernal artillery and
machine-gun fire, sweeping the mole, H. M. S. _Vindictive_, under
captain A. F. B. Carpenter, helped by the _Daffodil_ and _Iris_ managed
to land his men. That diversion brought the whole fire and the enemy’s
attention up to the mole, thus clearing the way to the blockships.
Machine-gun nests and a part of the enemy’s organizations were destroyed
or set on fire. Little damage was done, which after all was merely
accessory.

During that time, H. M. S. _Thetis_ was nearing the channel. She
succeeded to cross the mine-barrage but unluckily her propeller got
entangled in the nets of the defences, rendering all manœuvres
impossible whatever. The commander was then forced to blow her up after
that the crew had been taken on board of the trawlers. Her position
after all greatly helped the rapid sanding up of the harbour.

H. M. S. _Intrepid_ and _Iphigenia_ which followed H. M. S. _Thetis_ up,
overran all the obstacles and managed to enter the canal. They placed
themselves athwart in order to block entirely the entrance up. It is
then, when freed from their crews that were embarked on board of the
trawlers, that their captains exploded charges.

It was while these manœuvres were on, that Lieutenant Richard D.
Sandford drove his submarine,—the C_{3}—, below the bays of the pier and
there blew her up, making a breach thirty meters long, thus isolating
the jetty from the coast. This last deed was to be the master piece of
the gallant expedition. The explosion had been tremendous.

As soon as the three cruisers loaded with concrete had been sunk, H. M.
S. _Vindictive_ re-embarked her crew and the whole little “British Main”
turned back “Homeward-Bound”. The men of the _Vindictive_ were then
taken on board of the admiral’s boat, the _Warwick_.

There is one point which must be kept in mind, that is that during the
whole of these operations, the powerful defences, switched on Zeebrugge,
were thundering death from every gun, from every rifle and machine-gun,
and, under that tornado of fire the battle area was no else but real
hell!

The next day, the aerial photographs proved the wonderful results
attained by the expedition, results which were far beyond the most
optimistical previsions. In regard to this wonderful achievement and the
temerity needed to carry it through, the casualties have shown
relatively light. From out of the 1780 officers and other ranks who took
part in the raid, 176 were killed, 412 wounded and 49 missing.

[Illustration:

  The Blocking of Zeebrugge by the British Navy during the night of
    April 22^d to 23^d 1918.
]

         1. Rhine barges anchored in line (forming boom).
         2. One pounder quick firing gun (pom-pom).
         3. Nettings of the defence.
         4. Lighthouse.
        ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
         5. Mole batteries.
         6.                          „
         7.                          „
        ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
         8. Shelter for submarines.
         9. Aeroplanes sheds.
        10. S. S. Brussels.
        11. Breach caused by the explosion of the submarine C3.
        12. Extreme line of the flood.
        13. Groden battery.
        14. Wurtemberg battery.
        15. Zeppelin battery.
        16. Lübeck battery.
        17. Pier.
        18. Channel-entrance.
        19. Friedrichsort battery.
        20. Kanal battery.

As far as the boats losses are concerned, only the destroyer _North
Star_ and two motor boats went down.

This raid is the most striking instance of military valour and devotion
to duty. We feel as though we must emphasize the glorious conduct of the
British sailors and the best way is for us to oppose the straight
forwardness of the British sailormen to the sly and underhanded methods
of the Germans, who only feel apt to sink, without being seen,
defenceless boats, thus bringing death on to harmless people.




              3.—German battery “Deutschland” at Breedene.


The battery “Deutschland” is situated near the Jacobinessen farm.

_Armement_: Four 15 inch guns firing at 55 kilometers a shell 2 meters
long.

The charge was contained in a brass shell case.

The tube was 17 meters 10 cm. long.

_Gun crew_: Each gun was attended by 150 men, in other words the whole
battery was 8 officers and 600 all ranks strong.

_Observation-posts_: The main observation-post (concrete) was built in
Albert’s Parc; auxiliary posts were connected to it by phones, such was
the case for the one of the hotel Belle-Vue at Wenduyne, and the other
called “Fulda” at Mariakerke.

_Ammunition supply_: was done by railway.

_Historical account_: The construction of the Deutschland battery was
done piece by piece and began in the early part of September 1915.

Belgian labour was requisitioned for that work, with Russian prisoners
of war, the hands employed for that battery amounted to seven hundred
that toiled months on end for it.

The battery’s activity culminated in 1918, specially in May, going
increasingly from the 1^{st} of June up to the 15^{th}, 16^{th}, 17^{th}
of October 1918. After the last fire which occurred on the morning of
the 17^{th} of October the German disabled the guns and left them few
hours later, the battery was then captured by our boys, on their way for
victory.




                 4.—German Battery “Tirpitz” at Ostend.


_Armement_: Four 12 inch guns, firing at a range of 35 kilometers a
shell weighing 375 kilos needing a charge of 103 kilos.

The tube was 12 meters 90 cms long.

_Gun crew_: 5 officers and 400 other ranks.

_Observation-posts_: One at Mariakerke on the roof of the asylum, the
other in the dunes.

_Ammunition supply_ was also done by railway.

_Historical account_: The guns of this battery had been ordered to
Krupp, by the Belgian Army, in view to complete the armement of
fortified position of Antwerp. At the outbreak of the war the German
Government kept hold of them and used them for their coast defences in
Belgium.

The battery was in position West of Ostend close by Hamilton Farm. The
first rounds date from September the 7^{th} 1915. Only two guns opened
fire at that time and during one of the firing a barrel of one of them
burst causing the death of twelve gunners; that tube was afterwards
replaced by another.

On January the 24^{th} 1916, the “Tirpitz” battery fired a hundred
shells on the Church of Nieuport and on the old Templers’s Tower, last
vestige of the first convent of that order, which dated from the
XII^{th} century. That destruction must have proved very satisfactory to
the German commanders, for, in recognition of that gallant deed, iron
crosses were awarded to 10 gunners of the battery.

The four guns fired for the first time in battery fire in July the
16^{th} 1916. The allied counter-battery work was fairly active, mainly
in 1917 and 1918. The pivot of that counter-battery fire was formed of
French 12 inch guns, mounted on railway; these were firing from round
Coxyde.

On July 16^{th} 1917 the French gunners were rather successful, several
of the guns servants were killed, shelters were destroyed, and the men
were scattered. The guns themselves were hit by shell splinters. The top
of the gun pits were then strengthened with a bursting layer thick of
one meter of concrete, and the battery resumed its action on the 22^d of
the same month.

In order to deceive our observers, a dummy battery was erected by the
German at about 2 kilometers away from the real emplacement, in the
direction of Wilskerke. Two old Belgian mortars of the 1862 type,
brought from Liége, and, four dummy guns made of wood were forming the
battery. Each time Tirpitz was firing a shot, the dummy was exploding
three successive charges, thus giving the impression of four rounds.

Another trick used by the enemy was, that whenever the counter-battery
was on, the crew was blowing up huge fougases thus preventing the
registering of the fire.

The last fire occured on the 15^{th} of October 1918, and the battery
was then destroyed.

[Illustration:

  KNOCKE ON SEA.—German Battery Wilhelm II.
]

[Illustration:

  NIEUPORT.—Aerial photo of the Main Redan (August 10^{th} 1918).
]




            5.—German Admiralty Headquarters at Middelkerke.


If the material employed for the coast defences was of the first
quality, the German took the same care for the fitting up of the
position held by the naval infantry, which disposed of strong and
numerous dug-outs, skilfully camouflaged, in other word they formed
magnificent battle posts.

The Admiralty Headquarters at Middelkerke is a wonderful display of
luxury and it emphasises their taste for comfort.

Nothing was left uncared for; in case of alarm the admiral could easily
act in complete quiétude. He had his staff well at hand, his liaisons
thoroughly assured and could deliver his orders and instruction with the
maximum efficiency.




                   6.—The “Great Redan” at Nieuport.


From the old fortified position of Nieuport, the part situated North of
the harbour solely remained after the dismantling had been decided by
the Belgian State, in 1859.

Unproperly called during the war “Great Redan” that work—if one wants to
be accurate—is formed of a non reveted horne work which must have
belonged to the old fortification of Nieuport rebuilt in 1793, and
preceded with a half moon work constructed after 1815.

The whole place, in fact, had to be reconstructed following the Vauban
system, with the funds accordingly allotted by the Paris treaty of 1815.

The abandonment of those remains of fortifications since 1859 had
evidently reduced them to mere ruins, when the battle of the Yser was
fought in 1914. If the “Great Redan” was not utilized during the battle
as firing line, at least it afforded a magnificent place of arms, to
shelter the reserve troops for the defence of the “Little Bridge-head of
Nieuport”.

The latter place also known as the “Bridge-head of Palingbrug” extended
itself from the right bank of the channel, at the hight of the old
lighthouse to the brickwork (Plasschendaele canal) passing by the
kilometer 14.500 of the Nieuport Westende road.

It is from the evening of the 20^{th} of October 1914 onward that the
defence clung to that position.

To spare his men, Lieutenant General Dossin was contrived to flood the
“Groot Noord Nieuwland Polder” up, by letting in the seawater in to the
creek of Nieuwendamme, the dikes of which had been previously pierced.
This inundation was stretched in the evening of the 21^{st} of October.

After the epic fights at Lombarzyde and Groot Bamburg-Farm, in which
heroism was lavishly displayed by our men, during the day and night of
the 22^{nd}, the French troops under General Grossetti came at dawn on
the 23^{rd} to relieve the Belgian troops in Nieuport.

They were to resume the offensive movement the Belgian troops had
started, but the foe having pierced the line at Saint-Georges and
Tervaete, compelled the staff to withdraw the troops from Nieuport to
take position on the bridge-head of Palingbrug, in order to dispose of a
maximum of reserve to be arrayed on the threatened front and also to
draft the counter-attacks which were more and more urging.

On the evening of the 26^{th}, Colonel Claudon, commanding the French
troops at Palingbrug, judging his contingent too weak to hold on that
position, retired on the left bank of the Channel, in doing so he gave
up the bridge-head, the Great Redan, the five bridges and the locks, in
one word that retreat meant the abandonment of the key of the whole
hydrographic system of the region.

Fortunately, the enemy not only worn out but much more concerned with
the center of his front of attack, did not venture to keep in touch with
the troops at Nieuport and failed to notice the leaving of the right
bank of the river Yser, of which he might have so easely drawn
advantage. The German, perhaps still believing in the existence of the
fortress of Nieuport, did not attack.

Up to the 3^d of November 1914 the Palingbrug was left abandoned.
Though, it is during that period of time that the inundation was
stretched. A first attempt took place on the morning of the 27^{th} of
October, but was a failure, it is only at 5 a. m. on the 28^{th} that we
managed to open and keep it so during the incoming tide, the old lock of
Furnes.

The inroad of water through that lock having been reckoned unsufficient,
the Belgian G.H.Q. decided to make use of the Noordvaart lock, but the
latter was since the evening of the 26^{th} right in “No man’s land”,
position which rendered the operation most dangerous.

Under the protection of 40 cyclists carabiniers who had to cross over in
walking on the Furnes lock gates (the bridge having been blown up, by
order of Colonel Claudon after the retreat of the 26^{th}), Captain Umé,
of the Royal Engineers successfully managed to open the locks of
Noordvaart. The following nights the operations were renewed and
gradually the sheet of water rose and rose. Awestruck by that mystery,
the enemy, fortunately realised it but too late.


At last, on the 3^d of November, while the Yser battle had proved a
victory, all along the Belgian line, reconnaissances were carried out in
front of the advanced posts.


On November the 4^{th}, detachment of the 2^d Army Division occupied
again the bridge-head of Palingbrug and the Redan, which we pledge our
word was never tred on by German heels.


A few time afterwards an offensive movement took place and was
undertaken by the Franco-Belgian troops, that operation forced the enemy
to give up the channel North of the “Geleïde”. The front was then fixed
on a position baptized “The Main bridge-head of Nieuport” on a line
parallel to the channel and at about 600 meters East of the latter,
running round the Western side of Lombartzyde and prolonging itself
almost parallel to Plasschendaele canal up to the Boterdijk.

That front never knew any alterations till July 1917.


The 10th of July 1917, at about 8 o’clock p. m., after a regular
bombardment of more than 10 hours duration, all along the Nieuport
sector, the enemy rushed the positions held, only since a few days, by
the British Infantry. The fight lasted the whole night long and after
the most bloody hand to hand fights, the attackers succeeded to enter
the British trenches between the beach and the Geleïde and throwing the
occupants in the channel, those who swam across escaped from death or
capture.

From up the 11 July onward the Nieuport front was running along the
channel right up to Geleïde river, where it was hinged to the primitive
front, which determined attacks had successfully brought to its original
point.

Later the “Redan” and its surrounding area were subjected to almost
daily bombardments, which soon gave them a bloody fame.

The powder-mill of the old work, thanks to the superimposed vaults,
which were forming its ceiling, managed to resist to all kind of German
shells, which made it deserve the nickname of _Rubber house_. It was
occupied during the operations both as battle headquarters and as
advanced dressing station.

In March 1918, the Belgian front had to be stretched out, in order to
relieve allied divisions. To avoid the weakening of our resistance, our
front having been thus considerably lengthened and the occupation having
become very thin, the G. H. Q. decided to stretch a further inundation
which allowed to gain up several outposts.

At Nieuport, the Redan became the front line. It was hooked North by the
“huitrière” (oyster-pond), fronting the West bank of the channel, and
South at “Dupuis and de Luc” trench.

Those three points d’appui formed an important point of resistance: they
were covering the locks. They were garrisoned by a battalion; its duty
was to hold at all costs and it did it.


At last, the Belgian offensive was launched from up the southern part of
our front on the 28^{th} of September 1918. North of Dixmude our troops
remained momentarily waiting and the position of Nieuport had still to
suffer severe bombardments. But the last occupants of the Redan stood
them up lightly, only anxiously waiting their turn to rush victoriously
over the parapet. The kick off was given on the 17^{th} of October and
the very same day they were able to admire with a legitimate pride the
magnificent enemy artillery, which had made them suffer so much and that
the Germans had left them, the guns still loaded.




                  7.—Karnak battery at Oost-Dunkerke.


English battery composed of two 9.2 inches, guns. That battery was
situated at about 1 kilometer East of Oost-Dunkerke and at 200 meters
South of Oost-Dunkerke bath and Nieuport bath road.

Its interest lies in the reason of its having been constructed
underneath the great dunes, from that emplacement the battery drew the
three fold advantages in regard to camouflage, protection and mainly in
creating great difficulties to the German counter-battery; indeed the
latter was deprived of any aiming point whatever, and the shell craters
were rapidly leveled up by the sand.

Karnak battery, which was manned by British gunners had been placed
under the Orders of the O. C. of the Nieuport sector, who utilized it
for momentous counter-battery and destruction fires.




  8.—Levelcrossing guard shelter at Ramscappelle with machine-gun-pit.


Ramscappelle was the only point West of the Nieuport-Dixmude railway
line that ever was trod on by the invader. After the taking of
St-Georges on October 24^{th} 1914, the foe in order to widen his
success rushed on the 26^{th} for the Noordvaart and compelled our
troops after a night of fierce struggle to withdraw on the railway
track, on which they clung without much difficulty up to the 29^{th} of
October.

During the evening of the 29^{th}, two attempts of the enemy against the
railway line facing Ramscappelle failed. The 30^{th}, at 4.45 a. m. a
new trial was again pinned down. And finally round 5.30 a. m. after a
terrific artillery preparation, a last and more powerful attack than the
previous ones, forced the resistance at a point South of the halt of
Ramscappelle, the enemy linked himself on the railway line which he now
enfilades and thus proceeding northward, reached the village.

The 5^{th} and 6^{th} line Regiments, which had battled with the finest
determination, withdrew and took a strong position at the Koolhofbrug
and Jockveld farm from whither they managed to prevent the enemy to
emerge from out the village, thus stemming the rush for good and all.

Lieutenant General Dossin, in command of the 2^d Army Division, ordered
the counter-strike to be organized at once. Accordingly at the beginning
of the afternoon a force composed of four French Battalions and five
Belgian ones plus a machine-gun company, and, with in support two
Belgian and two French battalions, went slowly forward, encircled the
village altogether northward, westward and southward. When that move had
been completed, the assault was launched; it was then 7 o’clock p. m.

The group of houses on the southern side of the wind mill and the wind
mill itself were carried out at the first jump, thanks to the fighting
spirit of the men and also to the efficient artillery fire of N^o
26^{th} Belgian Field Battery, which, in spite of a hurricane of
machine-gun bullets had been brought as far forward as the Pelican
bridge.

The fighting ground being of a very close nature permitted but a very
slow progression of the wings. But nothing daunted, the attack however
reached the nearer outskirts of the village, bar the eastern side of the
brook, called Ramscapelleleed excepted.

The night was spent in carrying out violent musketry fire, and to goad
the enemy several reconnaissances were pushed in the village while a
section of a French and Belgian bridging company was erecting a foot
bridge on the Ramscappelleleed. The artillery kept hammering the enemy’s
defences into ruins.

At dawn of the 31^{th} of October, the german resistance weakened and a
general attack carries the village up bringing in one jump the
assaulting troops right up the railway line, scattering the remaining
defenders and pushing them back toward the river Yser.

The german fled, leaving their dead and wounded behind them, they also
abandoned in the inundation the two famous “Minenwerfer”, which only
seven days ago had annihilated a whole Belgian battalion, which was
defending the Yser crossing at the Union Bridge.

During the whole war, the Nieuport-Dixmude railway line formed in the
“Ramscappelle sector”, the main line of resistance. When the water had
retired a little, the sector was guarded by two main-guards i. e.
Rijkenhoek and Beverdijk, particularly famous as kick off points for the
numerous attacks and raids of our troops against the Violette and
Terstille farms.

That line offered numerous and well constructed shelters affording to
our men relatively comfortable dwellings. Here and there, at places
offering good field of fire or permitting to sweep main-traffic passages
concrete machine pits (such as the one at the station) were built. In
the hut of the railway guard an artillery observation-post was also
constructed.




       9.—Machine-gun shelter facing the Pervyse railway station.




          10.—Observation-post at the Pervyse railway station.


From up the 26^{th} of October 1914, date at which our troops were
compelled to leave the Beverdijk, the Dixmude railway track outlined in
front of Pervyse our first front line.

On the 30^{th} of October meanwhile the foe was rushing for Ramscappelle
he hurled detachments against the Pervyse station. That attack miserably
failed under the violent rifle firing of the 1^{st} Battalion of the
12^{th} line Regiment which had been swiftly reinforced by few sections
of the 2^d Bat.

The assailants fled seeking refuge in the houses bordering the Schoore
road opposite the railway station, where they were made prisoner in the
course of the day. The rest managed to retire back to their former
position but had to fight their way through the inundation in order to
rally their line.

[Illustration:

  PERVYSE.—The inundation facing the railway station (September 1916).
]

[Illustration:

  OUD-STUYVEKENSKERKE.—The Tower (November 1914).
]

[Illustration:

  OUD-STUYVEKENSKERKE.—The Tower (February 1917).
]

The above assault was to be the only one the first line of Pervyse ever
had to grapple with.

The main-guard of Schilderbrug with its advanced posts, (one outlook
post on the road and two sentry posts on the water with the intermediate
ones) gave the troops a sufficient security to allow the men, in spite
of the rafale fires which from time to time poured upon the line, to
say: “It is fine in Pervyse”.

The line was organized since the early days of its occupation, then was
gradually improved to become during the last years of war a model of
stabilized trench warfare area.

Even the station itself, where an artillery observation-post had been
constructed, was wedged in a powerful stronghold whose solid concrete
shelters for machine-guns were forming the bastions.

One of the above mentioned machine-gun pits, that of the south eastern
angle may still be seen and will give a thorough idea of the
organization.

The observation-post of the railway station, one of the main O. P. s. of
the Belgian front, had a vast field of view and was provided with visual
apparatus of the highest precision.

It was connected in 1917, by means of two telephone wires with
alternative courses, to Dunkirk signalling post and that, in order to
warn the city of the firing intended for her by the Leugenboom gun.

The report of the monster, perceived at Pervyse was at once communicated
to Dunkirk where the receiving station was to alert the town by means of
the powerful steam-whistles or other such alarm signals.




       11.—Battalion commander’s Headquarters at Km. 4.400 of the
                     Nieuport-Dixmude railway line.


That concrete dug-out served as battle Headquarters to the major
commanding the Oud-Stuyvekenskerke subsector. It was of that type
adopted for such shelters prompted along the railway line.

These emplacements were generally constructed in the years 1916 and 1917
to take the place of the far less resisting ones whose walls as well as
roofings were formed by beams and logs in juxtaposition. The roof had
been rendered waterproof by means of tarred board, while a more or less
thick layer of bags filled with concrete rendered them safe against
small shells.

These which replaced them, some of which are still remaining such that
of kilom. 4.400, were very well conceived. They often contained several
different rooms, the number of which were varying according the need of
the sector: major’s orderly room, major’s and adjutant’s lodging, visual
signalling and very-light posts, telephone central, etc....




           12.—The base of the tower of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke.


The old tower of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke has not been able to resist to the
amount of projectiles poured upon it by the Germans, throughout the
whole campaign. Its emplacement however, and the concrete bloc which has
taken its place are interesting as marking the extreme advance of the
enemy in the region, it also brings back to memory the terrific
bombardments and fights which that corner of Flanders witnessed.

[Illustration:

  DIXMUDE.—Aerial photo (Mai 26^{th} 1917).
]

[Illustration:

  DIXMUDE.—Their Majesties King and Queen at the “Death trench”. (June
    1^{st} 1917).
]

[Illustration:

  DIXMUDE.—Their Majesties King and Queen at the Riderswork. (June
    1^{st} 1917).

  The Queen examining private J. Vermeire’s helmet, which had just been
    pierced by a German bullet.
]

At the end of the Yser battle, after the 29^{th} of October 1914,
Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was only occupied for a few days by weak German
detachements, whilst our line of defence had been brought back upon the
Nieuport-Dixmude railway line and rejoining the Yser at the kilometer 16
by a line running through Roode-Poort farm and the houses of the Burg.

Then the flood forced the foe to withdraw up to the bank of the river.

On the 3^{rd} of November 1914, the Belgian G. H. Q. ordered to push
forward reconnaitring parties all along our army front; advanced posts
were then placed which, little by little were multiplied untill they
formed a complete defence line of advanced guards, acting as outposts
screen to the whole defence scheme. The main-guards were all on duty
beyond the inundations, the mean of access to the main-guards being long
duck boards placed on threstle stuck in the soil. The one leading to
Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was particularly dangerous because the Germans had
aimed a fixed rifle on it, which was sweeping its whole length. The
losses there sustained have been very heavy, mainly when relieves were
on. To cut the casualties down the 4^{th} line Regiment erected concrete
shields against bullets and shell splinters.

The main-guard of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was protecting the left flanc of
the organization of the Dixmude sector and that by keeping under its
fire the whole of the ground stretching itself in front of their
advanced posts. Besides, the hamlet which was situated on a little
knoll, was thus affording great advantages for the creation of
observation-posts.

In connection with this “War-Site” there is a name which is closely
associated with every details of its life. Known as the “Burgomaster of
Oud-Stuyvekenskerke”, R. Father Martial Lekeux, Artillery Commander,
spent the first years of the war in the tower, then when latter tumbled
down, he moved in the gable front of a farm where he organized a
remarkable observation-post. The name of Martial Lekeux deserves to be
mentioned here, because his dogged determination and pluck, unidentified
themselves with that main-guard of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke.

Three momentous German posts, were facing it, i. e. the farms n^o 1,
“den Toren and Van de Woude”, which owed many a tragic days to the keen
eyes of the Belgian observer.

For four years on end of trench warfare the main-guard of
Oud-Stuyvekenskerke held fast. It held under storms of iron, it held
against assailants who, at renewed attempts endeavoured to overrun it.
These different rushes, the one of March 1918 against our cyclist
carabiniers and the 1^{st} foot jagers as well as that of June of the
same year against the 22^{nd} line regiment have disclosed the stubborn
energy and enthusiastic courage which moved our men of 1918, classing
them amongst the best fighting elements of the great allied armies.




            13.—Death Trench and the “Cavalier” field work.


When the battle of the Yser was over, our first front line was running
along the river in front of Dixmude in a direction due North-West up to
the kilometer 16. There the river Yser, makes a sudden bend and our
front was leaving the river side to prolonge itself westward, leaning on
the Roode-Poort farm thus joining the Nieuport-Dixmude railway line.

That particular point of kilometer n^o 16, which ought to have been on
the early days of stabilized warfare, a stronghold of our defensive
scheme, struck our high command, as being rather weak. The decision was
then taken to strengthen it.

A line of main-guards already covered the Belgian positions from
Nieuport up to Oud-Stuyvekenskerke, when General Jacquet decided, in
order to cover himself at the kilometer n^o 16, to prolonge that line by
adding to it an element, the advanced posts of which would be placed
along the river Reigersvliet and that right up to its mouth.

To carry that mission through it was thought necessary to rush the
petrol tanks, the mystery of which, more than their power had already
given to the sector a fair renown.

[Illustration:

  Death trench and Riders’work-Operations which took place from up May
    to October 1915 North and East of kilometer 16 of the river Yser.
]

The 1^{st} foot jagers, shouldered by the 3^{rd} divisional artillery
and accompanied by detachements of pioneers, tried the operations.

A keen fight developed for three long days, from up the 9^{th} to the
12^{th} May 1915[2], in a horrible ground, the main part being under
water, and cut up by deep and broad ditches and shell holes full of
water, offering no shelter whatever to the rafales of machine-guns and
the harassing fires of the artillery which were hacking our gallant boys
down. The attack failed in spite of their courage, and the losses
endured.

Footnote 2:

  At the same time, the 3^d foot jagers began the fight on the right
  bank, succeeding to establish a bridge-head South-East of kilometer
  16. The enemy clung against it and the daily casualties were such that
  it was decided to reduce its development and manning. In 1917 few
  portions of trenches running along the right bank remained solely held
  and were the starting point of the raids carried on against the
  enemy’s organizations, right up to the end of the war. A few shelters,
  last witnesses of our occupation, are still standing and will be kept
  up for the future.

The 1^{st} foot jagers alone had lost in that action 10 officers and
five hundred and fifty men, killed or wounded. The plan was not given
up, but tactics was changed. The ground which had been captured was
hurriedly fitted up, while a platoon of a tunneling company was set at
task on the bank of the Yser to resume the advance by sap-work. The
mining was progressing satisfactorily when it was realized that on the
German side a similar work was on, which, in less than a fortnights time
reduced to few yards the distance separating the Belgian saphead from
the enemy’s.

On the 27^{th} of May 1915, during the relieve, and taking the advantage
of a pitch dark night and protected by a violent bombardment, a group of
Germans jumped in our trench placing a machine-gun section in it. The
enfilading fire of those guns caused heavy casualties to the 9^{th} line
regiment which delivered a counter-attack.

After useless efforts, the only alternative left was to push actively
forward the organization of the remaining portion of the trench so as to
render it able to resist, notwithstanding the achievement of the
previous object, it is to say the strengthening of the Yser salient at
kilometer 16.

From time to time, the enemy tried to attack the trench but each time
was repulsed by spontaneous counter-strokes. The enormous casualties
suffered, either by the bombardments or by the numerous raids, carried
out by the enemy, against the trench, made it deserve the name of:
“Death Trench”. (Boyau de la Mort.)

In September 1915, the more urgent works of the Death Trench were nearly
finished and could easely suffice to the defence of the left bank of the
river at kilometer n^o 16. The attention of the engineers was then
driven on to the construction of the “Cavalier”, work which was to
complete the above mentioned defence, by securing it against all
attempts of the enemy to cross the river.

The characteristic features of the “Cavalier” comes from the working
condition it had to be submitted to, it is to say, to combine the
defence as to fit or better to match in the most perfect way to the one
of the “Death trench” thus forming a center of the highest possible
resistance.

The “Cavalier” in itself presents two different and parallel lines, the
first one on the level with the ground, to serve the purpose of round
way and communication line, the second, above level thus dominating the
whole region. The latter trench is the firing one, the overlooking
position of which permitting to carry out enfilading and plunging fires
upon the two banks of the river Yser as well as in the Death Trench
itself, and on the enemy’s organization round kilometer n^o 16.

The dead angles of that position were under machine-gun fire and later,
automatic rifles were placed at the entrance of the Death Trench, and
also in the one connecting it with the “Cavalier”.

The building up of the “Cavalier” was long and cost to our sappers and
infantrymen many a toilsome days and many a casualties. Seeing those
provoking works, the German indeed did not remain inactive, they
frequently ruined our works with their artillery and minenwerfers,
inflicting to our troops awful losses.

The close of 1915 marked the end of the grounding of the accessory
defences. The emplacements for trench mortars, machine-guns pits were
rising little by little, the dug-out for the officer in Command of the
“Cavalier” sector, was gradually coming to shape, and the shelters were
rising from out the soil.

It was then decided to reduce the occupation of the “Death Trench”.

On October 11^{th} 1915, the bank of the Yser was blown up by a mine at
about 275 meters in front of kilometer 16, thus opening a gap 6 or 8
meters in length, which connected the Yser to the flooded area. The
Northern portion of the trench was filled up and then abandoned.

Three bombing teams, garrisoned by day time the thus shortened line.

Our men had become first class bomb throwers and feeling themselves well
shouldered by the Van Deuren mortars (Belgian Stokes Guns) were full of
confidence and never feared their opponents.

In 1916 the organization of the “Cavalier” completes itself and becomes
a real redoubt. The two flights of the work is provided with offensive
and defensive weapons, as well as with liaison material of the most
diverse nature. Concrete shelters for the men have taken the place of
those built with logs, which so often were bombed to ruins by the enemy.
A post of visual signalling was placed so as to maintain a constant
contact with the commander of the sector.

May 1916 was to be a tragic month for the kilometer 16 sector.

From up the 2^{nd} on to the 22^{nd}, the German switched on the “Death
Trench” a fire of the most terrific power, and hurling troops forward
they managed to get a foot-hold in our position, but nothing daunted, a
counter-attack winged them at once back, by dint of grenades fights and
sharp hand to hand struggles.... The enemy fled, he had not even had
time to take his dead and wounded back with him.

In July 1916, an artillery observation-post was established at the
“Cavalier”. The camouflage section came and erected there a strong steel
cabin, loopholed towards the enemy side, and also provided with a
periscope. A telephone wire was connecting that post to the Divisional
Artillery Commander.

But the month of may with its hard and bloody days the men had to
contend with, were not to be forgotten, and a keen wish for vengeance
was nursed by every one.

Was the No “One” enemy trench not presenting itself to us in a similar
way as our “Death Trench” to him? In fact, we were on the bridge-head on
the right bank. The attack and destruction of that line was decided.

On July 18^{th} 1916, after that several reconnaissances had made during
the preceding nights, and thorough destruction fire switched on to the
trench, a detachment of n^o 4 company of the IV^{th} Bat. of the 2^{nd}
line Regiment, under the command of Lieutenants Loyse and Desenfans
stormed it. The object of the raid was not to remain there, but the duty
of the raiding-party was to “clean the place up” and keep it free of
Germans a sufficient length of time to blow all the concrete shelters
up, to render them unhabitable. The “cleaning up” was thoroughly done,
but unfortunately Lieutenant Loyse having been dangerously wounded,
could not give the signal which was to start the blowing of the charges,
that sapper sergeant Billiet had placed, after having himself taken an
ample share in the first part of the show.

This raid is recorded as an example of the kind. All the dead and
wounded of the party were brought back to our lines.

The enthusiasm was at its highest, the confidence kindled, the regiment
avenged.

The sector was calm for a good while.

The 17^{th} of October 1916, the German, roused once again, opened on
our line, at kilometer 16, the most powerful bombardment, foreboding a
new attack. But our gunners were on the watch, they directed at once a
counter-bombardment so violently efficient that it must have taken out
from the enemy’s mind the slightest wish to jump out of his haunts.

Ten days later, the 2^d line regiment decided to do away with the “One”
enemy trench, for good and all. From up the 27^{th} on to the 31^{st} of
October detachment raided by night the accursed trench, they undertook
the destruction of the shelters, turning the whole of No “One” line into
real havoc.

In the course of the years 1917 and 1918, the life at the kilometer 16
quietened down, the intervals between the bombardments and mortar duals
lengthened, and were replaced by intermittant artillery and hand
grenades fights.

The “Cavalier and Death Trench” received then their final improvements.
The first observation cabin having been demolished by gun fire, on April
the 4^{th} 1917, a new one in concrete took its place, the upper trench
became a platform, the liaison and signal post provided with ground
telegraphy. The automatic rifles and bomb throwers multiplied.

The Death Trench was provided with an alternative straight communication
line. A light wooden railway track was layed, to enable transport and
evacuation by means of the small trucks. Numerous “concrete-brick”
shelters were created.

Finally the head of the trench was turned into a deathtrap, surrounded
by wolf’s holes and barbed wires, that point was only manned by day time
by snipers sheltered in a small concrete sentry box.

The trap was separated from the death trench by a monolithe concrete
dug-out of a rather peculiar shape. That shelter was fitted with a heavy
steel door, and loopholed to enable hand grenade throwing and automatic
rifle’s firing. A vibrating connected the little redoubt with the
Commander of the “Cavalier”.

In case that the enemy managed to enter the trap or to reach our trench,
the garrison of the fortlet was to shut itself up in it and resist from
within during a length of time sufficient to be relieved by a
counter-attack delivered by the “Cavalier” which had been alerted by the
buzzer.

During the Franco-British offensive of October 1917 numerous fires were
carried out by our artillery to prepare the eventual cooperation of the
Belgian forces. That artillery action brought on to us energetic
retaliations which did a lot of damages to the line at Roode-Poort.

The numerous raids of our troops in the German lines proved the
efficiency of our fire, which had reduced the enemy’s trenches to mere
ruins.

When the 1917 offensive was stopped the life resumed its normal and dull
course; the 5^{th} infantry division was set at work to repair the
damages and restore to our positions their former power.

Our attack of September 1918 had a repercussion upon the whole sector
overlooked by the Cavalier.

The first battle had brought the Belgian Army on the Clercken ridge. The
intention to hinge the new front to the old one including the Dixmude
town, induced the 5^{th} line Regiment to get hold of Trench “One”,
“111”, as well as of the first work North of Dixmude. And this was to be
the only alteration brought on the front round kilometer 16.

From the 15^{th} to the 17^{th} of October, under the victorious onrush
of the second battle, the front was split up from Nieuport to Dixmude
and the Germans were compelled to a hurried retreat.

The front of the Yser was definitively cleared, the Rider and the Death
Trench had ended their glorious mission.

It is important to note the powerful organizations of the enemy, facing
the “Death Trench”, notably the enormous concrete of German sap-heads on
the leftbank of the Yser, with their iron-plated loopholes and firing
ranges, overlooking all the surrounding districts.

The Rider is a work of the greatest interest. It may be considered as a
small museum concerning the trench warfare. In the minimum space it
utilized in a most judicious way all defensive and offensive implement
such as accessory defences and all kinds of liaison systems, which were
coordinated to bring the highest efficiency.

It was also the witness of the magnificent and sustained stoïcism on the
part numerous Belgian soldiers who succeeded each other to defend it.

The Death Trench is a sacred spot, sacred by the acts of courage and
heroism that were accomplished there, and sacred by the blood that was
shed here, it is the tomb of hundreds of brave heroes.




 14.—Company commander’s post near the Yserdam, at Dixmude, in front of
                   the canal of Handzaeme (leftbank).




16.—Concrete dug-out south of the railway bridge at Dixmude (left bank).


These two shelters mark out the portion of the Belgian front which
suffered the most by German bombardment with trench-mortars shells and
bombs.

During the dreadful days of May 1916, our first line, facing Dixmude was
subjected to awful firing; the embankment of the Yser, behind which our
men were sheltered, was overthrown, the shelters broken down, the relief
posts destroyed. All the work of the trenches which had taken eighteen
months of patient toil to erect was annihilated in a few days and
transformed into a horrible chaos. Hundreds of brave soldiers were torn
to pieces by the bursting of German trench mortar shells, the effects of
which were so terrible that in falling they dug craters of 10 meters
diameter, thus smashing up the strongest shelters, and crushing and
burying under the ruins all those who had taken refuge there. After the
storm calmed down (and it was only calmed when our mortars arrived,
affording us then the opportunity to juggle with those of the
adversary), the Belgian soldiers with their habitual tenacity, undertook
to rebuild their defensive works. Night and day, they worked patiently
and obstinately on, and in the face of the enemy which was watching them
from the opposite side of the bank, managed ruins out of the ruins that
were accumulated there, to erect new lines of defence, stronger and
better established than the first. They were composed, besides firing
parapets for infantrymen, of numerous shelters for snipers and
machine-gunners, rest and waiting shelters, relief posts, fighting
battle posts for unit commanders, etc.... Earth, wood, iron, concrete,
all were put together and used to constitute a formidable entrenched
line, which was held till the end of the war.

From amongst these numerous shelters, two have been preserved: the first
at the South of the Bridge-rail of Dixmude, is situated in the centre of
the bend formed by the Yser in front of the town. The second was used as
a fighting post for the commander of the company entrusted to defend the
portion of the embankment, situated in front of the Handzaeme Canal.
That particular point was specially momentous and to be watched, because
it meant there to forbid the inroad in our lines of the Germans troops,
which, under the cover of the Handzaeme canal banks, could, mounted on
little boats berthed at Dixmude, try a landing on the West bank of the
river Yser.




                     15.—The Flour-Mill of Dixmude.


How can one recall the battle of Dixmude without having before one’s
eyes the vision of the flour-mill rising far above the ruins of the
little Flemish town? One saw it in spite of oneself; in fact nearly
always one felt its presence. During the four years of trench warfare it
was the vigilant eye watch of the enemy. An eye with a look of fire and
iron. An eye which had the command over powerful artillery, over
numerous minenwerfers, and even over simple snipers who coldly struck
down the imprudent and foolhardy ones who ventured to brave it, very
often without being aware of it.

At the beginning of the war, a legend ran that the massif construction
of the corn-mill was built by the Germans. The authorised opinion of E.
Hosten in his book entitled _the Agony of Dixmude_ gives the lie to this
assertion in the following terms: “It is quite evident at the present
day that the platform of the huge cube of cement which formed the
corn-mill of Dixmude was not erected on the shore of the Yser, solely to
receive heavy German artillery which from that matchless observatory
could have overlooked and swept-away all the surroundings”.

During the tragic days of the battle of the Yser (from the 17^{th} to
the 31^{st} of October 1914) the bridge-head, created round Dixmude was
preserved in spite of the many furious assaults of the enemy. It was the
witness each day, each hour even, of incredible and superhuman tenacity
and endurance on the part of the Belgian and French troops. Those brave
soldiers were commanded by energetic, resolute and iron willed chiefs,
whose fame has long classed them among the most accomplished men of the
war. Let us suffice to mention the celebrated and famous names of
Ronarch, Meiser and Jacques.

[Illustration:

  DIXMUDE.—The flour-mill (La minoterie) in 1916.
]

[Illustration:

  DIXMUDE. The flour-mill (La minoterie) in 1917.
]

The corn-mill, in this position acted the double part of observatory and
shelter for the defensive reserves. An observer connected with Colonel
De Vleeschouwer, who was in command of the Belgian artillery in front of
Dixmude, could, while placed on the platform of the building, direct the
firing on all telling points, such as batteries of the enemy in action,
troops on the march, preparations for attacks, etc....

The enemy did not allow our artillery such an advantage for long; the
corn-mill was partly taken by the German batteries, which took great
pleasure in directing blazing fires on that colossal building. The
observer was forced to abandon his post, but nevertheless not without
the satisfaction of having registered to the best advantage and
conditions the first fires of our artillery.

The corn-mill, from that time, was simply utilized as the nest for the
reserves of the bridge-head. A company, to which a platoon was sometimes
added, composed its garrison.

                                   ⁂

The night of the 25^{th} to the 26^{th} of October 1914 was marked, in
the resistance of Dixmude, by a unique and singular incident.

In the evening of the 25^{th}, groups of Germans had managed to creep
into the intervening spaces of the trenches, situated between the
railway line of Zarren and the road leading to Eessen, trenches which
were guarded by troops physically exhausted, whose lines were
considerably weakened by ten days of cruel and outrageous fighting.
These groups of enemies formed themselves up again inside our lines. The
night was as black as ink, and unfortunately the guns on the road of
Eessen were jammed.

As soon as Lieutenant Simon of the 12^{th} line was informed of the
incident by one of his men, he immediately directed an intensive fire on
the Germans, putting a great number out of the field. The others
reformed on the road. They were about three hundred. Headed by the Major
and accompanied by an enervating music of fifes, they penetrated in the
town, firing on all lited points, such as fighting posts, shelters for
troops, relief posts, killing and capturing on their passage all small
and isolated groups of French and Belgian soldiers who were taken
prisoners and forced to march in front to serve as shields.

Thanks to this infamous trick the German column arrived without incident
as far as the bridge road. The latter was crossed by the allied soldiers
followed up by the Germans, the Major included. The machine-gunners of
the bridge only perceived their mistake when a hundred pick helmets had
already passed over. They then opened a muzzle to muzzle fire on the
rest of the column which went whirling over and was scattered in the
town, leaving numerous dead and wounded on the pavement.

In the meanwhile the troops of the bridge-head were living the most
thrilling moments of the battle. Nevertheless though much unnerved, they
were maintained at their post, thanks to the marvelous calm and heroical
energy of the officers who examined and rectified the occupation of the
trenches.

And then, what an unutterable relief to the troops and their chiefs when
they heard the guns firing on the bridge road proclaiming loudly that
the line of the Yser still held good and that it had not been taken
unawares!

Till dawn, the front of the bridge-head had to face at the same time,
the positions of the enemy, and the town. It was not necessary. The
Germans who had crossed the bridge, marched on at random. At a little
distance at the East of the halt at Caeskerke, they soon ran up against
a company of the 12^{th} of the line in reserve. (The C. P. of the
admiral was composed of a group of cyclist carabiniers re-enforced by
their runners). Without fighting the enemy detachment turned South
across the fields, and fell, without knowing, on our batteries and would
have surprised them without help when fortunately the detachment was
taken between the fires of several groups of French and Belgian soldiers
and was encircled without difficulty. Not quick enough though, to
prevent the said detachment of committing the most abominable crime: the
massacre without mercy and without distinction of their prisoners.

Taken prisoners in their turn, the Germans could have been judged
according to the regulations and an avalanche of shot would have
sufficed to have stretched them out. But we were struggling for the
Right; brought before Admiral Ronarch, he decided to have executed
militarily the Germans who had shown themselves the most cruel in the
massacre; three amongst these, recognized by the Belgian doctor Van der
Ghinst, who had been taken prisoner during the night, and had escaped by
miracle, were shot on the spot, the others were sent to the back.

As for the part of the German column which had not been able to cross
the bridge, this was taken under the fires of the guns, and was, as we
have already said, dispersed in all directions, endeavouring to seek
refuge in the houses at Dixmude. The reserve garrisoned in the flour
mill, awaken by the noise of the fighting and being at once acquainted
with the situation, remained in place, ready to intervene.

The Germans, who tempted to take refuge in the corn-mill were shot down
without ceremony, and at daylight patrols were sent in the town to
search the houses, and arrest all those who were hidden there. The
nightmare was ended, and confidence revived more than ever.

This trick of the Germans, which might have figured in their war annals,
as a glorious page, simply lengthened the list of their crimes. On the
other hand, it set of more than ever the admirable qualities of the
French and Belgian armies: the confidence of the troops in their chiefs,
their character and above all their generosity perhaps somewhat
exaggerated when addressed to individuals deformed by a barbarous
“Kultur”.

The action of the bridge-head ended with the battle of the Yser, the
1^{st} of November 1914; anyhow for reasons purely moral, it was still
kept there. The occupying troops were reduced.

The defensive artillery was also reduced in too large proportions owing
to the reason that a great quantity of pieces had been disabled,
moreover the munitions were deficient. Many empty ammunition limbers
could not be replenished, already for several days the wants surpassed
the means of supply.

The days of the 9^{th} and 10^{th} of November 1914 marked out the agony
of Dixmude which began by a general bombardment of great violence, to
which our twenty guns of 7c5, with only the aid of a few heavy french
guns, could but attempt a retaliation.

The 3^d battalion of the 1^{st} line regiment and two battalions of
Singalese kept the bridge-head.

The 10^{th}, about 7 o’clock, a first German assault failed before our
lines, to the great astonishment of the enemy who was convinced that he
had annihilated all our defences.

His plan of attack had to be completely altered. The XXII^{th} army
corps of reserve was charged with this mission. Three convergent columns
took the South and East sectors as though in pincers. The artillery
carried on an infernal fire, casting and sowing death in the trenches,
in the town and on all accessible roads to our reserves.

The South sector resisted, the East one also, but unfortunately a
portion of the trench, situated between the railway line and the road,
and only guarded by the dead and wounded could no longer keep back the
enemy who rushed the position and took it back handed. Then began a most
terrific fight, the memory of which makes the ancients shudder. It was a
serie of hand to hand fights, individual fights with the bayonet in the
streets, in the houses, in the trenches, leaving on the ground at every
step, the blood of the vanquisher as well as the vanquished.

Unfortunately the admiral disposes of no reserves at hand. He cannot
untrim the bank of the Yser which will have to face the attack if
continued, and endeavour to bar the crossing of the river.

And that is why under the pressure of numbers and after several hours of
bloody struggle, the defenders of the bridge-head were forced to
concentrate themselves in the corn-mill and in the trench preceding it.
During several hours it is a resistance, where the resolute and
determined courage of a few men, held the head to a numerous enemy which
was struck down in heaps.

In the meantime, the bridging company had placed a foot bridge across
the Yser at the western side of the corn-mill thus permitting the last
defenders of Dixmude to cross the river, sheltered from the front fires
of the infantry.

All our men re-entered the corn-mill. The order for the general retreat
arrived. It was four o’clock p. m.

With heavy hearts, those brave troops who had fought like lions and who
were determined to the last sacrifice leave their fortress of one day
cast a last look on the smoking ruins of the town, on the corn-mill,
which in its turn begins to burn (the fire was set during the defence by
a french soldier), send a last and pious thought to all the gallant
heroes who have just bravely fallen for their country, and the river is
crossed.

Twenty-two officers and a large number of soldiers were missing at the
roll call on the left bank.

The German attack attempts again the passage of the Yser, but it is
annihilated. The artillery thunders, all the time, but the infantry
holds, and will hold till the end.

Thus were the last spasms of the battle of the Yser, and the trench
warfare begins.

                                   ⁂

The Germans occupied Dixmude and the corn-mill. Our first line was
staked out on the West of the Yser. From one end to the other, positions
were organized, fortified and armed according to the constant progress
of the science of the new war, which transformed the sectors into real
fortresses, whose smallest corners hid instruments of death.

The corn-mill did not escape German organization. Strong, it was
already, but it was rendered undestroyable. The walls were used as lock
ups for tons of concrete in the midst of which were disposed a series of
shelters and posts of observation, which had nothing to fear even from
the most enormous projectiles.

The corn-mill was a source of great suffering to our troops, not only by
the watchmen, but by the minenwerfers that it sheltered. Our artillery
made many desperate attempts to attack it. It only managed to round its
cubic forms and to pulverize certain points of its bulk, but that was
all.

                                   ⁂

During the Franco-British offensive from August to October 1917, our
staff thought, at a certain moment to be able to extend on our front the
progression of the Allies. It was at the time of the long artillery
preparations. Our batteries, re-enforced by numerous guns of heavy
calibre of the allied armies, executed a systematic hammering on the
enemy’s front, which after a few days enabled us to believe that the
works of the enemy had been absolutely and thoroughly annihilated.

It was decided to ascertain and see the state of the upheaval.
Consequently raids were undertaken on all the beaten front. They were a
great success, except at the flour-mill.

On the nights of the 28^{th} to 29^{th} of October, on the 3^d and
4^{th} of November 1917, detachments of the 5^{th} and 6^{th} of the
line regiment crossed the Yser with magnificent spirit. The South and
North trenches of the flour-mill were cleaned out without great
difficulty, but when the detailed group attacked the flour-mill, there
was a reaction, and a painful one which cost the life to many a brave
man, a reaction which proved once more, the power of inactive and inert
substance against which courage is nothing. Through their invisible loop
holes and under the thick armour of their shelters immersed in concrete,
the few occupants of the flour-mill soon overpowered the will and
determination of our troops, who were forced to retreat taking away with
them their dead and wounded.

The Franco-British offensive could not be continued for several reasons,
and our army resumed the life of the trenches which still lasted another
year.

At last there was the liberating offensive.

The rapid progress of our troops forced the enemy to abandon Dixmude.
Our soldiers entered there the 29^{th} of September 1918 and settled
there till the 15^{th} of October, date of the second rush forward.

The town was nothing but a heap of ruins and the flour-mill a grey
shapeless mass, which will perpetuate the remembrance of this long war
and the numerous heroes fallen there under its blows.




                   17.—Albert and Elisabeth Redoubts.




                      18.—The Joconde’s dwelling.




19.—Battalion commander’s Headquarters (all between kilom. 19 and 20 of
                        Yser river, left bank).


The fighting posts and shelters established after the battle of the
Yser, in the ruins of the small buildings along the embankment, saw
little by little their walls relined with a strong interior casing of
concrete, and their lost roofs, replaced by thick concrete layers also.
The house of the Joconde (so called, because of the good old
proprietress, Mieke Bœuf, who during long weeks of trench warfare still
occupied it and who became quite legendary with our soldiers), served as
a lodging to the Commander of the company at the bridge-head, till a
better appropriated shelter was built. It was occupied after, by the men
of the Royal engineers, who were charged to keep in good order, the foot
bridges giving access to the bridge-head.

The next house to the one of the Joconde’s served as C. P. to the major
on guard.

After the organization of the bridge-head (see notice n^o 20), an
allround plan fortifying the sector was elaborated. They foresaw the
construction of little forts or redoubts with a distance of 600 meters
between each and utilizing the embankment as a parapet and the Yser as
obstacle.

It was with the redoubts Albert and Elisabeth that they began. They were
finished in December 1915. The reason of their existence, was to protect
the bridge-head against enfilading fire; but that was not the only part
they played. These two redoubts completed and formed with the part of
the embankment which bound them together a kind of curtain which had to
hold good, whatever happened.

The system and assemblage of fires which shot out from the numerous loop
holes and “embrasures” of their shelters for machine-guns and rifles
gave them an enormous capacity of resistance.

The redoubts Albert and Elisabeth were the work of the engineers of 2^d
army division.




         20.—The Bridge-Head at kilometer 19.500 (Right Bank).


When the Belgian front was stabilized (November 1914), it was in part
covered by floods, before which our posts soon became powerful
main-guards.

Two well distinctive floods had been spread; the first during the battle
of the Yser, was extended between the river and the railway line
Nieuport-Dixmude having the paved road Oostkerke kilometer 16 of the
Yser as Southern limit; the second, subsequent to the fall of Dixmude
was created at the request of the French troops from the 14^{th} of
November 1914. All the land situated at the East of the Yser, between
the Houtensluisvaart and the road embankment of Knocke to Drie Grachten
was flooded (this was realised, thanks to the great difference of water
level of the two river-banks. The one on the right bank being inferior
to the one on the left).

Between the kilometer 16 of the Yser and Houtensluisvaart the obstacle
of water did not exist. The enemy, at Dixmude occupied the right bank of
the Yser, which alone separated the adversary lines. At the South of the
railway line of Dixmude to Zarren, the German positions followed a
course almost parallel to the road of Woumen, comprising the strongly
organized points such as the cemetery of Dixmude, the Castle of
kilometer 19 and several farms. Our troops continued to follow the left
bank of the river.

After the victory of the Yser, the constant idea of our staff was to
reconquer the most ground possible. The Belgian army built on all
practicable spots; posts of various degrees of importance, and this
principle was applied to the sector of Nieucappelle on a very large
scale.

It was decided to establish on the right bank of the Yser, at the South
of Dixmude, towards kilometer 19, to the close contact of the enemy a
bridge-head which would be afterwards widened, in order to create a
starting position to permit our army to take and offensive. It was Major
Panhuys who was charged with this perilous operation, with a group
composed of his own battalion (the 1^{st} battalion of the 2^d foot
jagers), re-enforced with a company of machine-gunners and a company of
cyclists. It was important to take the enemy unawares. All was put in
action to that end, each one having his definite mission to accomplish.
During the night of the 21^{st} to the 22^d of December 1914, a night
cold and dark, the group crossed the river in two places and managed to
instal itself on a position uniting the little wood of the peninsula of
kilometer 19.500 with a bend to the North, facing the cemetery of
Dixmude. The enemy being taken by surprise, could not till dawn offer an
efficient resistance: but already our troops had organized the ground
and maintained their positions in spite of firing, counter-attacks and
severe bombardments.

[Illustration:

  Bridge-head of kilometer 19.500 of the river Yser in June 1915.
]

The heroïc group, who had performed the operation with such valour and
spirit, was mentioned in despatches by decision of the H. M. the King.

It was of the utmost importance to strengthen the occupation, but there
could be no question of working by day, the enemy holding the watch and
sway over the land, and especially over the knoll of Woumen (castle of
kilometer 19). So our troops were kept to the task without respite.

Afterwards the extension of the bridge-head to the South, for months saw
added to the companies on guard, picket companies and detachments of
pioneers, nightly erecting parapets and communication trenches, building
shelters, casting footbridges over muddy ground, covering the positions
with wire netting work, regulating the current of the waters at Sparken
and Waalevaardeken by locks and dams, multiplying and rebuilding the
footbridges on the river etc., in a word executing the thousand and one
labours required by an advanced position to render it strong and
powerful, durable if not comfortable and give to the troops of the
principal resisting position real and positive security.

Then, arose the question of progressing towards the East and towards the
North. The works of extension were commenced, but it was soon realised
what a great effort and incessant sacrifice such an enterprise would
demand, that about Mai 1915 the bridge-head was brought back to its
former line. During the course of the war, the evolution of fighting
methods altered and likewise the mission of the advanced positions and
the effective forces of the garrisons which held them. For this reason,
when the bridge-head of kilometer 19.500 was created, and which had to
resist to the utmost, it required more than one battalion to guard it;
and in 1918, a few posts of section or squad sufficed, the mission of
the advanced ones having simply become at this place, for watching
purposes in case of a defensive, or kick off in the case of an
offensive.

To give one an exact idea of the enormous effort that the bridge-head of
the kilometer 19 cost, one needed to see the development and extension
it had taken in May 1915 and be equally penetrated with the idea, that
all the work had been done at the price of heavy losses, although it had
been done by night, under the bullets and shrapnells, in bad weather and
often with reduced means. This bridge-head contributed greatly to
maintain an offensive spirit in the minds of the infantrymen, it served
also as a base to many patrols towards the enemy’s organizations and
notably to a famous raid on the castle of kilometer 19 on the night of
the 28^{th} to the 29^{th} of October 1917, which was a brilliant
success, led by Captain Dendal, who brought back materials and
prisoners.

Several times the Germans tried to rush the bridge-head of kilometer 19,
but without any result whatever.

And then during the offensive of September 1918, it served as a starting
trench to the troops of the Belgian 4^{th} division, for the victorious
assault which ended by the liberation of Dixmude.




           21.—Observation-post near the Church of Clercken.


Clercken Ridge was very precious to the enemy to whom it gave the
opportunity to establish a lot of natural observation-posts which had
not the vulnerability of the confined kite balloons and which assured
more stability to the observation. Many of these posts were destroyed
during the war, especially by the destructive fires which preceded the
great offensive in Flanders on the 28^{th} of September 1918. Others,
such as the mill of Clercken, are already rebuilt, so offer no longer
any historical interest.

[Illustration:

  German observation-post near the church of Clercken.

  Sketch showing the directions of the villages seen from this
    observation-post.
]

However the one which is situated near the church of Clercken, and still
exists in the same state as when abandoned by the Germans (see sketch),
shows how easily the enemy could see into our lines, in spite of all the
efforts made by the Belgian Army to counteract their observations, such
as: diverse dissimulations, plantations of all kinds, artificial masks
in linen, sandbags, reeds and straw, etc....




                   22.—“Grand-Père” concrete dug-out.




                        23.—“Castel Britannia”.




                              24.—Hoekske.


The southern part of the Belgian front may be classed as one of the most
agitated sectors of the Western front. The short communications of the
press which announced in their brief laconic style: “Bombing actions at
het Sas and at Steenstraat; duel of artillery in the region of
Noordschote”, said nothing of the horror of certain days of guard where
the blood marked the ground of trenches, a hundred times turned over and
as many times reestablished and always defended by our heroical troops.
Drie Grachten, le Passeur, Steenstraat, Merckem, all these names
resound, like as many bugle calls proclaiming the heroism of our
soldiers and the glory of our arms.

It was in July-October 1917 that the Franco-British offensive gave us
back, in that region, a corner of Belgian land. A few Belgian units
participated on the 27^{th} of October to the last assault which drove
the enemy back beyond Luyghem, Kippe, Aschoop and reached, on the right,
the outskirts of Houthulst forest. The effort had to be followed up, our
troops had to extend to the North of Dixmude, the progression of the
Allies; our artillery preparation was ended, the Belgian army only
waited for the signal!

But a run of unfavourable circumstances: the russian defection, the
Caporetto incidents and the continual rain obliged the allies’ chief
staff to suspend the offensive. One had to be resigned and wait, but it
was a great deception to the Belgian soldier.

The 11^{th} of November 1917, the 4^{th} army division relieved a French
division at Merckem. The state of the field after the battle, is
depicted in the following extract from the order of the division
commander dated the 14^{th} of November. “In order to avoid, during the
relieves, the sinking of the men in the excavations which are hollowed
out all over the track, it is advised to gather the men in groups of
five, holding one to one another with a rope and thus lending each other
mutual help.”

Nineteen hundred and seventeen was, in fact, the year of offensives with
long artillery preparations, which transformed the battle fields into
masterpieces of devastation. The soil ploughed up by thousands of
projectiles formed a vast field of hollows, filled with water by the
autumn rains. Nothing else was seen in this desolate landscape but a few
cut down trunks of trees and the monstrous concretes of the Germans,
which were sometimes demolished and overturned.

However, it was absolutely necessary to remain on the chaotic ground.
The positions had to be established strong enough to repulse the
counter-attacks. At first it was only a system of shell holes surrounded
by blocks of concrete which had been deserted by the enemy. It was a
dreadful hard winter for the 4^{th} army division. When the engineers
and infantrymen at the price of terrible labour, had repaired and
rebuilt the roads and tracks which facilitated and rendered possible the
relieves, the rational and defensive organization of the sector was
undertaken. Successive lines showed themselves, and were bound between
by intermediate lines and a well organized plan of defence was able to
be applied.

The “Grand-Père” (Grand-father) concrete dug-out, the remains of which
have been preserved, was one of the posts best known among of the
advanced positions of Merckem. It formed a rather prominent salient
which was always a temptation to the enemy and provoked him to many
sudden attacks, generally preceded by violent artillery fires
demolishing all the surroundings.

The 4^{th} army division managed to repulse two attempts and that at two
days’ interval: one on the night 26–27 and the other 28–29 of November
1917. They were more like trials on the part of the enemy to stake out
our advanced positions.

During the occupation of the sector by the 3^d army division, the raids
became real attacks to reconquer the “Grand-father”. The 15^{th} of
February 1918, the enemy was thrown back in his own lines; but on the
7^{th} of March, he managed to take a footing and bring machine-guns in
the concrete shelter, from where our counter-attacks drove him out on
the evening of the 8^{th}.

It was decided then, to rectify the advanced line by suppressing the
salient of the grand-father, and also the one, constituted by three
little posts of Aschoop, which also was subjected to the enemy’s fires.

The last german raid on the “Grand-father” was on the 27^{th} of March
1918, which hastened the decision, taken on the 29^{th} of the same
month, to abandon after destruction the salients of the Grand-father and
Aschoop.

The “Grand-father” was again occupied by our troops the 9^{th} of
September 1918 after the taking of the german position of Kwaebeek
brook. A centre of resistance was established there and was occupied
till the offensive of the 28^{th} of September 1918.

The name of _Castel Britannia_ was given to the place occupied by the
enemy’s batteries which oppressed up till 1917 our positions of the
sector of Steenstraat. Thick concrete masses protected them. They served
under the Belgian occupation as observation-posts and battle posts.

The cross road of _Hoekske_ is situated at the crossing of Steenstraat
to Dixmude road with the road of Merckem. It marks nearly the centre of
the subsector which bears its name, and is celebrated by the numerous
bombardments it has been subjected to. Heavy pieces of german artillery
have been sunk in its vicinity.


These three sites are destined to perpetuate the remembrance of the
defence of Merckem sector, organized by the 4^{th} army division at the
price of the greatest difficulties during the winter of 1917, and
brilliantly defended by the 3^d army division in April 1918, and the
gallant fields of action of the 1^{st} army division at the time
preceding the offensive of the 28^{th} of September. These sites will
remain it that region, the witnesses of the _battle of Merckem_, which
was fought the 17^{th} of April 1918 in the neighbourhood of Kippe near
Langemark, and where the 3^d army division, under general Jacques, and
the 4^{th} army division, under general Michel, were covered with glory.

The Germans, who were in immediate contact with the 3^d army division at
Kippe, made a sudden and abrupt irruption in the lines of this division
and advanced up to the front of the Merckem and Hoekske trenches, where
they were stopped.

Brilliant and heroical counter-attacks cleverly upheld by the artillery,
drove them back disabled in their positions.

On the side of the 4^{th} army division, the enemy, who, before
approaching the front had to descend the slope at the North-East-bank of
the Broenbeek and although vigorously welcomed by infantry and artillery
fires, managed to push through a corner between the main-guards of
Champaubert and Montmirail, whose wings were turned over to form a hook.
Held in that way, the efforts of the Germans to open the breach further
were vain. Crushed by violent musketry fires and the precise firing of
the artillery, the enemy could not hold the positions reached and had to
retire.

The battle of Merckem which had not procured to the Germans one atom of
land, nor advantage, cost them many dead and wounded, eight hundred
prisoners and the loss of numerous material, which was left in the hands
of the 3^d army division. The order of Leopold was granted to the 9^{th}
regiment of the line and to the 1^{st} jagers.

The inscription of “Merckem” on the regimental Colours of the 3^d army
division, and on those of the 13^{th} and 19^{th} of the line (4^{th}
army division) and also on the shields of the guns, rewarded the bravery
of the troops who won the battle.

As regards the moral point of view, the victory of the 17^{th} of April
in which our regiments had overthrown whole divisions of enemies,
revealed to the General Staff, the offensive worth and power of our army
and gave to it the full due, of its conscientiousness and strength and
the ardent desire to go forward.

From the 17^{th} of April, our soldiers at Merckem felt themselves
masters of the sector. Patrols and audacious raids were undertaken,
sometimes on Kloostermolen, sometimes on the trenches of the Kwaebeek
position or on the Little-son and on Italy, Portugal and Epernon farms.

The numerous prisoners brought back from these expeditions supplied our
Staff with informations, which were the more interesting because, at
that time, the allied armies had begun to drive back the enemy from the
French front.

At last, on the 9^{th} of September, at dawn, a brilliant attack was
executed without great loss by the 3^d line regiment. The position of
Kwaebeek, entirely taken, was organized, and, when a few days later, the
enemy who had recovered, attempted with the aid of great reinforcement
to drive back our troops in their former lines, the success was of short
duration, for the enemy had to let go.

It was from the position of Kwaebeek, that the 1st Infantry division,
started the 28^{th} of September 1918 to the signal for the great
liberating offensive.




    25.—The big german gun of Leugenboom at Couckelaere near Moere.


Not having succeeded, in spite of their brutal effort and the use of
asphyxiating gas, which till then had never been made use of, to pierce
the front at Steenstraat, in April 1915, the Germans who had foreseen
every thing, began to bombard Dunkirk, this permitted to their press to
hide the check, to cry out loudly “Victory, our artillery is bombarding
Dunkirk”.

A marine gun of 380 mm. installed in a public house called “In het
Predikboom” (kilometer 12^{th}, road Dixmude-Poelcappelle) had just
started, to execute its first shot. That was on the 26^{th} of April
1915.

A powerful counter-battery action was soon organized and proved a
success. Twice the gun was disabled, the first time for a period of
forty two days and the second time for forty eight. The 9^{th} of August
1915 registered its last shot.

Nevertheless the counter-battery maintained its firing in order to
prevent the Germans rebuilding the place and arming it.

In October 1916, an extraordinary activity was shown at the former
emplacement of Predikboom. Numerous and deliberate firings were executed
by the counter-batteries; and one might well ask if this German activity
was not a new dodge. Another place, in fact was being built at
Leugenboom (3200 meters to the North of Couckelaere).

The emplacement of Leugenboom was noted for the first time the 7^{th} of
May 1917 by Captain Jaumotte while making one of his aerial
reconnoitrings. He took a photograph of it, which clearly showed the
advanced state of the works, the switch line, grafted on a point to a
normal gauge, thus forming the junction at Eerneghem, to the state
railway line Ostend-Thourout.

Without a doubt the firing on Dunkirk was going to begin again.

The Belgian artillery staff, started at once a plan of action against
that urgent threat. The said staff obtained of the 36^{th} French army
corps, which was operating on the Belgian front the aid of two guns of
A. L. V. F. (artillerie lourde sur voie ferrée, i. e. Heavy railway
battery) two magnificent naval guns of 305 (12 inch.).

These two pieces will be the soul of the counter-battery, they will be
upheld in their action by a special group of numerous heavy batteries
which will make opposition on all german batteries opening fire on the
two heavy guns.

The plan was prepared, but to realise it, important and preliminary
works had to be executed, which took five days after Captain Jaumotte’s
reconnoitring.

These works consisted thus: first of all, the building of firing
emplacements for the heavy artillery; establishing many telephone
connections, needed since the creation of the special group, connections
which had to perform not only the centralisation of the command, but
also a perfect understanding between the director of the firing, the
batteries and the observation-posts and the cross registering section,
as well as the creation of antennas to receive the messages of aerial
observations.

The railway battalion, pushed on after three days of splendid and
extraordinary efforts, the works sufficiently far to render the point of
Eggewaertscappelle capable of bearing the firing of the heavy guns. The
group of telegraphists and telephonists accomplished at the same time,
grand and important works of liaison, which altogether constituted the
tool of the firing director.

A firing program was elaborated, a program which led the action on
Leugenboom and on the Tirpitz battery (see site n^o 4) at the same time.
The firing on the Tirpitz was assured by two heavy guns of 305 in
position on the point of Coxyde-Bains.

The 13^{th} of May, the two heavy guns of 305 were brought to the
place of firing which had been chosen—the switch-point of
Eggewaertscappelle—and a nice clear day was waited to open action.
That beautiful day was longed for right up to the 20^{th} of May 1917.

The execution of the genuine program was preceded by an independant
firing directed on the German observation-post installed in the belfry
of Eessen, with a 240 (10 inch.) gun in position at the East of Burg
Molen, upheld by the special group. The tower was partially demolished.

About 11 o’clock, the heavy guns of 305 of Eggewaertscappelle fired
their first shot on Leugenboom, while the gun of Burg Molen continued
its demolishing and blinding work on the enemy’s observation-post. A
little while after the guns of Coxyde-Bains entered in action in their
turn against Tirpitz battery. The observation of these firings were both
terrestrial and aerial.

The firing program was continued the following days when the weather was
favourable for observation.

On the 25^{th} of May, an aerial photograph of Leugenboom position was
taken. It did not disclose the least damage to the concrete block, but
its clearness sufficiently noted the gun carriage not yet armed, in the
centre of the honeycomb which formed the platform.

In order to parry, as might be the case, to a more accurate enemy
counter-battery, the railway battalion built or layed out sucessively
several sites for heavy artillery firing. It is so, that two sites on
the switch point of Eggewaertscappelle, a third at the station of
Moerhoek and a fourth on the point of Isenberghe, served as reserve, and
were occupied in turns.

The Leugenboom heavy gun entered in action the 27^{th} of June 1917.
Between 5 and 10 o’clock, it bombarded Malo-on-sea and Dunkirk. This
first action made numerous victims. The shells were of 380 mm.

One shell, amongst others, the first, it is thought, fell on the Casino
of Malo, where the general staff of the XV^{th} British army corps was
established: it made twenty four victims, eleven dead and thirteen
wounded.

In July 1917, there were several bombardments to be noted on different
objectives: Furnes, Dunkirk, Coxyde, Forthem and Alveringhem.

The bombardments of Dunkirk, threatening to become very frequent,
alarmed the authorities, and it was decided from the 19^{th} of July
1917 to create two direct telephone lines at different courses which
would join Dunkirk to the Pervyse railway station observation-post,
which was particularly well situated.

The starting shots of Leugenboom, heard at the railway station at
Pervyse, were in that way instantly communicated to Dunkirk, where the
reception posts gave the alert to the town by powerful horns and other
alarm engines, thus permitting the population to take refuge in the
concrete shelters specially built for that purpose.

In spite of the well studied counter-battery, the Leugenboom gun still
continued firing. The lulls, which lasted often long time, gave the hope
that a positive result had been obtained. Then after a lapse of one and
sometimes two months, the rage of the Germans revived and Dunkirk was
again subjected to further attacks.

In 1918, bombardments were very frequent. At certain times, they became
even daily, but Dunkirk was not always the objective. In May and notably
in June, the firing of Leugenboom was directed on Klein-Leysele and the
27^{th} of September 1918 on Bergues.

The offensive of Flanders, at last lights up. But the enraged Germans
will hold on till the last minute.

It is only on the 16^{th} of October at 20 minutes to three that the
heavy cannon of Leugenboom is for ever silenced. In its last spasms of
agony it dealt terrible blows to the localities situated behind the
front of attack.

At last on the 17^{th} of October the monster of Leugenboom belongs to
us. Our troops neared it, and, passing by it, threw a slightly haughtly
look, but certainly encouraged by their grand trophy. Pressed by our
soldiers, the Germans had hastily attempted to put their cannon out of
action. It was loaded and levelled horizontally, and so it remains to
the present day. In that position they hoped that the projectile would
touch the concrete mass before being entirely shot out of the tube, and
that its bursting would blow up the flight. But their anticipations were
not realised; the projectile, instead of being stopped by the mass of
concrete, passed through it, making a breach and burst about 800 meters
further.

It was a Krupp marine gun of 380 mm. (15 inch), type 1914, n^o 154, of a
total length of 17 m. 13 placed on a gun carriage, formed by two
formidable tanks, tap rooted in the centre of a concrete pit. This pit
has a special shape because, of the conditions the constructors imposed
themselves to give it a field of fire of 157°, the axis of which passes
by Dunkirk.

The total weight of the piece is 77630 kilos.

The breech has an outer diameter of one meter, the manœuvre is
electrical but there exists handles for hand manœuvring. The artillery
men were entirely protected by a cabin joined to the gun carriage, built
in strong sheet of iron of a thickness of about 50 mm.

The cannon fired a projectile of 750 kilogrammes.

The two heavy guns of Predikboom and Leugenboom subjected Dunkirk to
thirty two bombardments, the four hundred and eleven 15 inches shells of
which killed one hundred and fourteen persons and wounded one hundred
and eighty five.

[Illustration:

  COUCKELAERE.—Heavy 15 inch gun at Leugenboom.
]

[Illustration:

  CAESKERKE.—Arched communication trench and light railway line (1916).
]




                  LIST OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SKETCHES


                                                                  Pages.

 H. M. THE KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM                                      3

 CAESKERKE: Arched communication Trench and light railway line
   (1916)                                                             71

 CLERCKEN: Sketch of the German Observation-post                      59

 COUCKELAERE: Heavy 15 inch German gun at Leugenboom                  70

 DIXMUDE: Their Majesties the King and Queen in the “Death
   Trench” (June 1^{st} 1917)                                         32

 DIXMUDE: Their Majesties the King and Queen at the “Rider’s
   work” (June 1^{st} 1917)                                           32

 DIXMUDE:  The flour-mill. La minoterie (1916)                        45

 „ The flour-mill. La minoterie (1917)                                46

 „ Aerial photo (May 26^{th} 1917)                                    31

 „ Sketch of the “Death Trench” and of the “Rider’s work”             35

 DIXMUDE: Sketch of the Bridge-head at kil. 19.500 of Yser river      56

 KNOCKE ON SEA: German battery Wilhelm II                             17

 NIEUPORT: Aerial photo of the Main Redan (August 10^{th} 1918)       18

 OUD-STUYVEKENSKERKE: The Tower (November 1914)                       28

 „ The Tower (February 1917)                                          28

 PERVYSE: The inundation facing the railway station (September
   1916)                                                              27

 ZEEBRUGGE: Sketch showing the blocking of the harbour                13




                                                 IMPRIMERIE DU MINISTÈRE
                                                 DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE
                                                         BRUXELLES
                                                   B 10,002.—3000 ex.

[Illustration:

  CHAMP DE BATAILLE DE L’YSER—SLAGVELD AAN DEN IJZER—BATTLEFIELD OF THE
    YSER.
]

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                              PUBLICATIONS

                            =issued by the=

                      BELGIAN WAR SITES DEPARTMENT

  (English translation of the French text, written by the Army General
                                Staff).

   Booklet N^r 1: General View on the operations of the Belgian Army,
           1914–1918, including one map and 14 illustrations.

                                                =PRICE: 1 fr. 75 (net).=

 Booklet N^r 2: Notices on the outlasting war sites, including one map,
                  four sketches and 13 illustrations.

                                                =PRICE: 1 fr. 75 (net).=

    These publications have appeared in French, Flemish and English.


     N^r 3: Ordnance Survey map of the Yser sector scale 1/200.000.

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For orders, application to be made to the

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                            Hôtel de Ville_

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 These publications are also sold at the _Touring Club de Belgique_, 44,
                         rue de la Loi, Brussels.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                          TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES


 Page           Changed from                      Changed to

   12 propeller got entangled in the   propeller got entangled in the
      nests of the defences, rendering nets of the defences, rendering

  12a It was while these manœuvres     It was while these manœuvres
      were one, that Lieutenant        were on, that Lieutenant

   22 fight last the whole night long  fight lasted the whole night
      and after the most bloody        long and after the most bloody

   23 English battery composed of two  English battery composed of two
      9 inches 2, guns. That           9.2 inches, guns. That

   26 war guarded by two main guards   was guarded by two main guards
      i. e. Rijkenhoek and             i. e. Rijkenhoek and

   30 rendered waterproof by means of  rendered waterproof by means of
      tared board, while a             tarred board, while a

   39 But the month of may with its    But the month of may with its
      had and bloody days the men had  hard and bloody days the men had
      to content                       to contend

   43 banks, could, mounted on little  banks, could, mounted on little
      boats birthed at Dixmude         boats berthed at Dixmude

   60 at Steenstraat; duel of          at Steenstraat; duel of
      artillery in the region of       artillery in the region of
      Noordschote                      Noordschote

   69 to give it a field of tire of    to give it a field of fire of
      157°, the axis of which          157°, the axis of which

 ● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained.
 ● Used numbers for footnotes.
 ● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.
 ● Enclosed bold font in =equals=.
 ● The caret (^) serves as a superscript indicator, applicable to
     individual characters (like 2^d) and even entire phrases (like
     1^{st}).



*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75081 ***